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gao_GAO-04-854 | gao_GAO-04-854_0 | Background
The U.S. military has relied on contractors to provide supplies and services in support of contingency operations since the Revolutionary War. This same emphasis on planning and the early identification of requirements is also discussed in Army Regulation 700-137—”Logistics Civil Augmentation Program”—which establishes the policies, responsibilities, and procedures for implementing LOGCAP. Specifics follow: The Army developed a plan to support the troops in Iraq (task order 59 of the LOGCAP contract) in May 2003, but the plan was not comprehensive because it did not include all of the dining facilities, troop housing, and other services that the Army has since added to the task order. We believe it will be difficult to comprehensively assess the contractor’s performance in an award fee board because customer evaluations of the contractor’s performance have not been uniformly documented. Efforts to control costs vary widely both across and within logistics support contracts. We have noted that when the customer reviews the contractor’s work for economy and efficiency, savings are realized. Steps to Ensure That the Contractors Provide Service in an Economical and Efficient Manner Have Not Been Taken at All Task Order Locations
Customers who use the logistics support contracts have a role in ensuring that the contracts are used in an economical and efficient manner, and our previous work has shown that when government officials (including customers) review the contractor’s work for economy and efficiency, savings are generated. Obtain the housing under the LOGCAP contract. DOD Did Not Always Have Enough Personnel to Manage Its Logistics Support Contracts, and Available Personnel Often Lack the Training to Effectively Use and Monitor the Contract
Given the scope and complexity of logistics support contracts, there were not always enough personnel responsible for contract oversight and monitoring the performance of the contractor, and oversight personnel have not always been adequately trained. DOD deploys civilian and military personnel to provide contract administration and oversight of its logistics support contractors. In addition, military units receiving services from the contracts generally lacked a comprehensive understanding of their roles and responsibilities. The Air Force has not consistently provided training for its personnel overseeing the performance of the AFCAP contractor. We selected these contracts (1) on the basis of their size and scope and (2) to include more than one of the military services. We reviewed the guidance prepared by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Army’s regulations and guidance related to planning for contractor support to deployed forces; and an array of additional guidance specific to each of the logistics support contracts as follows: the Army Materiel Command’s LOGCAP battle book, U.S. Army, Europe, Users’ Guide to the Balkans Support Contract and operating procedures written by the Balkans Support Contract procurement contracting office on task order development, the Air Force’s guide for using the Air Force’s AFCAP contract—the AFCAP Concept of Operations, and the Navy’s CONCAP Users’ Guide. To assess the extent to which DOD had a sufficient number of qualified personnel with the training and skills necessary to provide effective contract oversight and management in place, we determined the numbers of DCMA, Defense Contract Audit Agency, and Army Materiel Command personnel that were deployed in support of AFCAP, LOGCAP, and BSC. Other LOGCAP sites in Kuwait. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its contingency operations since the early 1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied extensively on logistics support contractors to provide many of the supplies and services needed by deployed U.S. forces. As requested, GAO assessed DOD's planning in its use of logistics support contracts in contingency operations; determined whether DOD has had contract oversight processes that are adequate to ensure that quality services were provided in an economical and efficient manner; and assessed the extent to which DOD provided trained personnel qualified to oversee its contractors. GAO focused its efforts on four logistics support contracts chosen because of their size and chosen to represent more than one military service--the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and Balkans Support Contract, the Navy's Construction Capabilities Augmentation Program, and the Air Force's Contract Augmentation Program.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of DOD's planning to use the logistics support contracts during contingency operations varies widely between the commands that use them and the contracts themselves. In many cases, planning was done effectively, in close coordination with the respective contractors. For LOGCAP, however, the Army Central Command did not develop plans to use the contract to support its military forces in Iraq until May 2003, even though Army's LOGCAP guidance calls for early planning and early involvement of the contractor. Those plans, moreover, have undergone numerous changes since that initial planning. In Kuwait, as well, the Army has made frequent changes in its use of LOGCAP. DOD's contract oversight processes were generally good, although there is room for improvement. DOD customers have not always ensured that contractors provide services in an economic and efficient manner, although they have a responsibility to do so. We have found that when the customer reviews the contractor's work for economy and efficiency, savings are realized. Under the LOGCAP contract, months-long delays in definitizing contract task orders have frequently undermined the contractor's cost-control incentives, and the absence of an Army award fee board to comprehensively evaluate the contractor's performance has further limited DOD's oversight. DOD did not have sufficient numbers of trained personnel in place to provide effective oversight of its logistics support contractors. The Army has deployed units responsible for supporting the LOGCAP contract, but some of the personnel have little knowledge of the contract. The Air Force did not consistently train evaluators to monitor its logistics support contractor's performance. Military units across the services receiving contractor support have lacked a comprehensive understanding of their roles and responsibilities, which include establishing the work to be done by contractors and monitoring contractors' performance. |
gao_GAO-04-238 | gao_GAO-04-238_0 | Background
In April 2003, Congress enacted P.L. In fiscal year 2006, the Service is required to begin making payments into an escrow account that it cannot use until otherwise provided for by law. The Service proposes that the $10 billion in overfunding would remain in the pension fund, in a separate account designated as the “Postal Service Retiree Health Benefit Fund (Retiree Health Fund).” The Service made a payment of about $1.3 billion for its pension obligation into the CSRS pension fund in fiscal year 2003. This proposal assumes that the escrow requirement would be eliminated. 108-18. Both Proposals Are Generally Consistent with P.L. Several options include (1) tying the repeal of the escrow requirement to congressional review of the Service’s progress on transformation, which could include the Service providing Congress with an acceptable plan for realigning its infrastructure and workforce; (2) repealing the escrow requirement but specifying the use of funds; or (3) repealing the escrow requirement and allowing the Service to fund activities as specified in its proposals. Proposal I strikes a better balance between current and future ratepayers by prefunding the retiree health benefits obligation for both retirees and current employees and providing a mechanism for better aligning current expenses with current revenues. Therefore, benefits being earned by today’s employees would be built into the current rate base. Under Proposal II, which assumes that the Service would retain responsibility for the military service costs, the Service said it would fund its retiree health benefits obligation only for its employees hired after fiscal year 2002 and then fund, in priority sequence, debt repayment and capital investments to improve productivity and cost-savings. The Service’s proposals attempt to balance both short-term rate mitigation and some level of prefunding of retiree health obligations to address its long-term obligations, while also providing for debt repayment and capital investment. However, it is not clear based upon available information from the Postal Service whether it can accomplish these goals. It is against this backdrop of fairness to current and future ratepayers and taxpayers, affordability, and the ability of the Service to achieve its transformation goals that the Service’s proposal to eliminate the escrow requirement and its two funding proposals must be weighed. Proposal II, on the other hand, would require less of a postal rate increase, focus more on rate mitigation, and shift less of the responsibility for the retiree health benefits obligation to current ratepayers than Proposal I. Finally, the Service anticipates that it will be able to pay down debt and fund capital investments through inflation-based rate increases under both proposals. Although the Service believes it would be able to generate enough funds, this is not clear because the Service has not yet presented a comprehensive integrated infrastructure and workforce rationalization plan. 108-18, and that its preferred proposal presented a more equitable balance of costs between current and future ratepayers. On the other hand, contrary to the Service’s view, we believe the escrow requirement is an opportunity for Congress to review how the Service plans to address a number of long-term challenges, including debt repayment, capital projects, an unfunded retiree health benefits obligation, and its progress toward transformation. If the Service provides Congress with an acceptable plan in the next several months and Congress finds the plan and the Service’s transformation progress satisfactory, we believe Congress should have sufficient time to repeal the escrow requirement so that an escrow account would not be needed. We evaluated the report based on its consistency with P.L. 108-18. We also addressed the escrow requirement that the Service identified as an issue in its report, and identified issues based upon our previous work that Congress may want to consider in assessing the Service’s proposals, including the fairness and affordability of the proposals, and the ability of the proposals to help the Service achieve its transformation goals. To assess whether the proposals were consistent with the provisions of P.L. 108-18. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2003, Congress enacted the Postal Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) Funding Reform Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-18), which\ lowered the Postal Service's (Service) annual payment for its CSRS obligation by over $2.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2003. P.L. 108-18 includes requiring (1) the Service to begin making payments into an escrow account in fiscal year 2006, (2) the Service to issue a report on its proposed use of "savings" resulting from the lower CSRS payments, and (3) GAO to evaluate the Service's report and present its findings to Congress. GAO evaluated whether the Service's proposals were consistent with P.L. 108-18; the impact of the escrow account; and whether the proposals were fair to current and future ratepayers, affordable, and helped achieve transformation goals.
What GAO Found
The Service's report presented two proposals for how it would use the "savings," and GAO found both to be generally consistent with P.L. 108-18. The first proposal assumes that responsibility for military service pension costs shifts to the Treasury Department and proposes prefunding retiree health benefits for retirees and current employees. The second proposal assumes that the Service retains responsibility for military service pension costs and proposes prefunding retiree health benefits only for new employees. Both proposals assume that the Service would pay down debt and fund capital investment through inflation-based rate increases. Under both proposals, the Service proposes that the escrow requirement be eliminated, so that the Service would not have to include $3 billion as a mandated incremental operating expense beginning in fiscal year 2006. The Service cannot use the escrow funds unless Congress eliminates the escrow requirement or specifies by law how these funds may be used. If no action is taken, the Service believes that it would have to raise rates higher than would otherwise be necessary. The escrow requirement provides Congress an opportunity to review how the Postal Service will address a number of long-term challenges, such as progress toward transformation and funding its retiree health benefits obligation. Once Congress is satisfied, it could repeal the escrow requirement so that an escrow account is not needed. GAO assessed the Service's two proposals according to their fairness, affordability, and the ability to achieve transformation goals. Fairness: Proposal I strikes a more equitable balance of allocating costs between current and future ratepayers, because benefits earned by today's employees will be built into the current rate base. Under Proposal II, much of the retiree health benefits obligation would remain unfunded, thereby placing the burden of the benefits being earned today on future ratepayers. Affordability: The Service's proposals attempt to balance short-term rate mitigation with some level of prefunding to address its long-term obligations. The first proposal would require a larger postal rate increase than the second proposal and would prefund more of the retiree health benefits. The second proposal focuses more on rate mitigation. Given the Service's uncertain financial future, its ability to raise revenues, reduce costs, and improve productivity and efficiency is critical to affordability. Transformation goals: Although the Service believes it can pay down debt and fund the capital investments associated with its transformation initiatives, this is not clear because the Service has not yet presented a comprehensive, integrated infrastructure and workforce rationalization plan. GAO has previously recommended that the Service provide Congress with such a plan and periodic reports on its transformation progress. The Service disagrees with GAO that the escrow repeal should be tied to a plan. |
gao_GAO-03-443 | gao_GAO-03-443_0 | This is an 11 percent increase over the amount spent in 1997. Overall, contracting for goods and services accounted for about 24 percent of the government’s discretionary resources in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2001, DOD contracted for more than $152.6 billion of goods and services, or more than twice the amount spent by the next nine largest federal agencies combined. Further Growth in Contract Spending Is Likely
Further growth in contract spending, at least in the short term, is likely given the President’s request for additional funds for defense and homeland security, agencies’ plans to update their information technology systems, and other factors. In particular, federal agencies are increasingly relying on contracts awarded by other federal agencies to obtain goods and services and have turned to using government purchase cards for many of their low dollar value procurements. Agency officials at each of the agencies we reviewed reported increases in their use of the schedules program over the past 5 years, driven largely by increased purchases of information technology and professional, administrative, and management support services. Acquisition Workforce and Workload Trends
Over the last decade, the federal acquisition workforce has had to adapt to changes in staffing levels, workloads, and the need for new skill sets. For example, contracting specialists are required to have a greater knowledge of market conditions, industry trends, and the technical details of the commodities and services they procure. Ensuring that agencies will have the right people with the right skills to successfully meet the increasingly complex demands expected in the future has become a priority at most of the agencies we reviewed. While agencies still face many hurdles, our recent work has found that most agencies have taken steps to address their strategic human capital planning challenges. Changes in the acquisition workforce have been accompanied by changes in the types of actions being managed. While managing spending effectively is always a key management responsibility, the need for effective management is more acute in agencies that rely heavily on acquiring goods and services to carry out their missions or support their operations. Changes in what the government buys, its contracting approaches and methods, and its acquisition workforce combine to create a dynamic acquisition environment. However, our work has found that the lack of proper training, guidance, and internal controls can increase an agency’s procurement risk and lead to reduced public confidence. Agency officials concurred with our analyses and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Treasury’s acquisition workforce represents about 1.5 percent of its total workforce. Other key organizations: Federal Transit Administration and Federal Highway Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government, comprised of more than 60 agencies and nearly 1.7 million civilian workers, acquires most of its goods and services through contracts. Recent changes in what the government buys, its contracting approaches and methods, and its acquisition workforce have combined to create a dynamic acquisition environment. Many of these recent changes enhance contracting efficiency and offer a number of benefits, such as reduced administrative burdens. However, GAO's past work has found that if these changes are not accompanied by proper training, guidance, and internal controls, agency procurements may be at greater risk. While effectively managing contracts is always a key management responsibility, this responsibility is more acute in those agencies that rely heavily on acquisitions to accomplish their missions. The goal of this report is to identify for Congress, the administration, and accountability organizations those procurement-related trends and challenges that may affect federal agencies. Specifically, GAO analyzed recent federal procurement patterns, the use of various procurement methods, and changes in the acquisition workforce.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies procured more than $235 billion in goods and services during fiscal year 2001, reflecting an 11 percent increase over the amount spent 5 years earlier. Further growth in contract spending, at least in the short term, is likely to increase given the President's request for additional funds for defense and homeland security, agencies' plans to update their information technology systems, and other factors. Overall, contracting for goods and services accounted for about 24 percent of the government's discretionary resources in fiscal year 2001. Federal agencies are taking advantage of the streamlined acquisition processes that were developed in the 1990s, including relying on contracts awarded by other federal agencies to obtain goods and services. The increase in the use of this acquisition method is driven largely by purchases of information technology and by professional, administrative, and management support services. Similarly, agencies are increasingly using purchase cards for many of their low dollar value procurements. Over the last decade, the federal acquisition workforce has had to adapt to changes in staffing levels, workloads, and the need for new skill sets. Procurement reforms have required contracting specialists to have a greater knowledge of market conditions, industry trends, and the technical details of the commodities and services they procure. A priority at most agencies we reviewed was attracting and retaining the right people with the right skills to successfully address the increasingly complex actions expected in the future. Many agencies have made progress with strategic human capital planning efforts. We reviewed 10 agencies that represent over 90 percent of the federal government's acquisition spending. All agencies provided comments on our report and concurred with our analyses. |
gao_GAO-03-647 | gao_GAO-03-647_0 | Background
Foreign schools can offer unique educational opportunities for U.S. residents, such as improved language proficiency and knowledge of other cultures, and help ensure that U.S. residents have a wide range of options in pursuing postsecondary education. About 9,000 of these students attend foreign medical schools and account for about three-quarters of the total loan volume. While a few foreign schools enroll large numbers of U.S. residents who receive FFELP funds, the majority of foreign schools enroll only a small number. Education evaluates the application and accompanying documentation to determine whether a school is eligible to participate. FFELP is Vulnerable to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Several Ways with Respect to U.S. Also, an investigation by our Office of Special Investigations revealed vulnerability in Education’s process for determining the eligibility of foreign schools to participate in FFELP. As a result, FFELP funds may be provided to students who should not be receiving them. For example, the reviews revealed that some foreign school administrators had certified FFELP loans for students in excess of allowable loan limits and certified loans without verifying students’ eligibility for FFELP loans. Many Foreign Schools Fail to Submit Required Annual Audit Reports That Could Help Education Monitor for and Detect Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Many foreign schools have not submitted required annual audited financial statement and program compliance audit reports, which enable Education to monitor whether schools are using correct procedures to award, disburse, and account for the use of federal funds as well as help Education monitor for and detect significant fraud or other illegal acts. For fiscal year 2001, about 57 percent of foreign schools failed to submit audited financial statements. As we reported in November 2002, due in part to this weakness, Education granted approval to a fictitious foreign school that our undercover investigators created and which enabled our investigators to obtain approval for FFELP loans for fictitious students. Education Has Taken Limited Steps to Reduce the Vulnerability of FFELP to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse but FFELP Remains Vulnerable
Education has taken limited steps—since the beginning of 2002 and throughout the course of our audit work—to reduce the vulnerability of FFELP to fraud, waste, and abuse; however, its actions in some cases have been limited or have achieved limited results. Our review also found that the on-line training tutorial made available to foreign school officials on Education’s Web site does not contain information specific to foreign schools and even has information contrary to how foreign schools are to administer FFELP. Reference Handbook and Training Provided to Foreign School Officials, Yet Some Officials Remain Unaware of How to Properly Administer FFELP
Education has provided a reference handbook and training to foreign school officials; however, our interviews with several school officials and our review of schools’ files revealed that they remain unaware of how to properly administer FFELP, which may increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse occurring. For instance, two foreign school administrators indicated that they had not received the Handbook from Education. However, any steps that Education takes will likely involve trade-offs that may affect access, accountability, and burden for various participants in FFELP. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent events have increased concerns about the potential for fraud in Education's student loan programs related to loans for U.S. residents attending foreign schools. In 2002, GAO's Office of Special Investigations created a fictitious foreign school that Education subsequently certified as eligible to participate in the student loan program. GAO investigators subsequently successfully obtained approval for student loans totaling $55,000 on behalf of three fictitious students. Over the past decade, Education's Inspector General has investigated many instances of suspected student loan fraud involving individuals applying for loans for purported attendance at foreign schools. The conference report accompanying the 2001 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act mandated that GAO examine and report on fraud, waste, and abuse with respect to student loans for Americans attending foreign schools.
What GAO Found
Foreign schools offer unique educational opportunities for Americans and help ensure that U.S. students have a wide range of options in pursuing postsecondary education. Almost 70 percent of all U.S. residents receiving Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) funds to attend foreign schools are in medical school and they account for three-quarters of the total loan volume. While some foreign schools participating in the FFELP enroll large numbers of U.S. residents, others enroll only a few, as seen in the table below, which also indicates the countries wherein FFELP loan volume is highest. We found that FFELP is vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse in several ways. For instance, many foreign schools do not submit required audited financial statements and program compliance audit reports, which would allow Education to monitor for and detect significant fraud or other illegal acts. For fiscal year 2001, about 57 percent of foreign schools failed to submit audited financial statements, while the vast majority of foreign schools failed to submit program compliance audit reports. Education has taken limited steps to address instances of vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. For example, Education has issued a reference guide and conducted training for foreign school officials. However, a number of foreign school officials reported that they had not received training prior to administering FFELP funds. In addition, we found that some foreign school officials are not properly determining and documenting student eligibility for loans; as a result FFELP funds may be provided to students who should not be receiving them. We also found that the on-line training to which Education refers foreign school officials presents information in some cases that is contrary to how foreign schools are to administer FFELP. Education could take additional action to reduce the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse, but will have to address the trade-offs that arise from its actions that may affect student access and burden for various program participants. A comprehensive risk assessment is one method that Education could employ to determine how to balance an appropriate level of oversight with the desire to provide American students access to foreign educational opportunities. |
gao_PEMD-95-20 | gao_PEMD-95-20_0 | Technical Appendix
This appendix presents detailed information on the following technical topics: (1) the estimation of “system error” (percentage of uncounted departures) and INS’ “global” assumption that the level of system error is the same worldwide (across all airlines and all countries of citizenship); (2) the formula we developed for estimating overstays (given an estimate of system error) and an explanation of the error we identified in INS’ computation formula; and (3) a new set of procedures for estimating overstays that, by incorporating data on specific airlines, avoids the need for INS’ global assumption and, at the same time, uses the correct computation formula and appropriately weighted data. Use English. It is clear, however, that being able to estimate the number of uncounted departures (system error) would allow the number of overstays to be estimated. INS Devised a Strategy to Estimate System Error
INS devised a creative strategy to estimate system error. The key is to examine the rates of unrecorded departure forms in “index” countries—such as Australia, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland—for which INS believes it is safe to assume that there are only negligible numbers of overstays. Notably, Mexicans and Canadians who arrive by air may be more likely to depart by land than visitors from countries that do not border the United States. Such a variable could form the basis of a new index. XXV, No. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1990. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the basis for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates of persons who entered the United States legally as visitors but did not leave under the terms of their admission.
What GAO Found
GAO found that INS: (1) devised a creative approach for estimating overstays by estimating the number of uncounted departures; (2) determined that the number of uncounted departures could be estimated by using system data from countries for which it seems safe to assume there are few or no overstays; (3) applied its strategy using a global approach that requires the assumption that a single rate of system error applies to all countries worldwide; and (4) global approach provided a good starting point for estimating overstays, but INS should develop improved procedures for estimating overstays among foreign visitors arriving by air. |
gao_PEMD-96-1 | gao_PEMD-96-1_0 | At your request, we have assembled data on all new drug applications submitted to FDA in 1987-94 to answer three questions:
Has the timeliness of the review and approval process for new drugs changed in recent years? What factors distinguish NDAs that are approved relatively quickly from those that take longer to be approved? What distinguishes NDAs that are approved from those that are not? Additionally, as you asked, we obtained the most recently available data on how long it takes for drugs to be approved in the United Kingdom and compared them with approval times in the United States. Once FDA has accepted an NDA, it decides whether to approve the drug on the basis of the information in the application and any supplemental information FDA has requested. For example, table 4 shows that the number of months that passed before half of all submissions were approved declined from 58 months for NDAs submitted in 1987 to 33 months for 1992 submissions. The average time was 24 months. Approval. In FDA’s statistical reports, it starts the clock with the submission of an “accepted” NDA. Neither therapeutic priority nor the experience of the sponsor affected review time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided data on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) new drug application (NDA) process, focusing on: (1) whether the timeliness of the review and approval process for new drugs changed in recent years; (2) the factors that distinguish NDA that are approved quickly from those that take longer to approve; (3) what distinguishes NDA that are approved from those that are not; and (4) how FDA drug approval process compares with the approval process in the United Kingdom.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the average number of months for NDA to be approved by FDA decreased from 33 months in 1987 to 19 months in 1992; (2) the overall decrease in approval times was achieved through gradual reductions in the submission of all NDA from 1987 to 1992; (3) the priority FDA assigns to an NDA and the experience of its sponsor determine the timeliness and likelihood of the approval process; and (4) although comparable data is limited, the review times for FDA and its counterpart agency in the United Kingdom are similar. |
gao_GAO-09-814 | gao_GAO-09-814_0 | 1.) APEC estimated th approximately $860 million in improper payments occurred in the school lunch and breakfast programs due to meal counting and claiming errors during school year 2005-2006. States and SFAs Conduct Reviews, but Meal Counting and Claiming Errors Persist
Gaps in State and SFA Review Requirements Limit Their Effectiveness
Although states conduct program integrity reviews of the meal programs, oversight of the breakfast program is limited. While all states reported through our survey that they conduct these reviews, 21 states reported that they do not include the breakfast program in reviews. However, like state reviews, SFAs are not required to review the breakfast program (see fig. Several of the SFAs we visited had the same errors identified during consecutive state and SFA reviews. States and SFAs identified several factors that hinder efforts to address meal counting and claiming errors. USDA Has Taken Some Actions to Improve State Monitoring, but Has Not Focused on Oversight of Meal Counting and Claiming
USDA Recently Took Some Steps to Update, Strengthen, and Increase the Number of State Reviews
In 2008, USDA released an updated form for states to use when conducting state administrative reviews through the coordinated review effort. Since fiscal year 2005, USDA has also provided annual grants to, in part, support state efforts to conduct additional reviews of meal counting and claiming and certification procedures in SFAs that have a high level of, or high risk for, administrative error in the school meal programs. Other recent USDA efforts may also help identify and address meal counting and claiming errors in the school meal programs. USDA Has Not Focused Its Own Oversight Efforts on Identifying or Addressing Meal Counting and Claiming Errors
USDA’s oversight efforts have not directly focused on identifying or addressing meal counting and claiming errors. Officials in some of the regional offices could not provide us with information on the extent of meal counting and claiming errors in the states they oversee. USDA also collects annual data on findings from state administrative reviews of SFAs, but it does not use these data to assess meal counting and claiming errors. These data include several pieces of information about meal counting and claiming errors in SFAs reviewed by states, such as the number of lunches observed that were erroneously counted as reimbursable because they did not meet federal menu planning and nutrition requirements and the value of over-claims resulting from meal counting and claiming errors. In addition, to assist federal efforts to target resources to states and SFAs at the greatest risk for these errors, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture: Develop procedures for using state administrative review data reported to FNS to assess risks and target oversight efforts associated with meal counting and claiming errors, and modify the FNS form on which states report the data so that it includes identification of which SFAs were reviewed each year and information from School Breakfast Program reviews. This study provided the first national picture of improper payments in the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program related to cashier/meal counting errors and aggregation/meal claiming errors. The survey included questions about the extent to which states have identified meal counting and claiming errors within their SFAs, state and SFA processes to identify and reduce errors, related state assistance provided to SFAs, challenges states and SFAs have experienced in identifying and reducing errors, and support provided by FNS to help states and SFAs address errors. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program provided meals to 30.9 million and 10.5 million children, respectively. Recently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued the first estimate of improper payments due to meal counting and claiming errors in these programs, which was approximately $860 million (8.6 percent of federal program reimbursements) in school year 2005-2006. These errors include: (1) cashier errors, such as those made in determining if a meal meets the federal menu planning and nutrition requirements (meal counting), and (2) aggregation errors made when officials count and total meals for federal reimbursement (meal claiming). GAO was asked to review (1) actions taken by states and school food authorities (SFA) to identify and address meal counting and claiming errors; and (2) actions taken by USDA to help states and SFAs identify and address meal counting and claiming errors. GAO's steps included analyzing data on state administrative reviews of SFAs; surveying all states; conducting site visits; and interviewing federal, state, and SFA officials.
What GAO Found
Although states and SFAs conduct program integrity reviews of the school meal programs, gaps in federal requirements for these reviews limit their effectiveness at identifying meal counting and claiming errors. States and SFAs are generally not required to review the School Breakfast Program, and 21 states reported through GAO's survey that they do not review the breakfast program. However, USDA estimates that the percentage of meal counting and claiming errors is higher in the breakfast program than the lunch program. Further, some states reported that SFA reviews of the meal programs are ineffective at identifying and reducing errors, which may be due, in part, to the self-assessment design of these reviews. When state and SFA reviews identify errors, meal counting and claiming errors persist. For example, in several SFAs that GAO visited, the same errors were identified during consecutive reviews. States and SFAs identified multiple factors that hinder efforts to address these errors, such as staff turnover, inadequate training, and school policies that complicate meal service. USDA has taken some actions to improve state reviews of SFAs, but it has not directly focused on oversight of meal counting and claiming. USDA recently provided new review forms and nationwide training to strengthen state reviews and also simplified the application process for state grants to conduct additional reviews of SFAs. However, USDA has not targeted its oversight efforts to identify or address meal counting and claiming errors. For example, USDA regional offices' reviews of state administration of the school meal programs do not focus on these errors, and some regional officials could not provide information on the extent of these errors in the states they oversee. USDA also has not updated its meal counting and claiming manual since it was first issued in 1991. Further, while USDA collects annual data on findings from state reviews of SFAs, the agency has not used these data for oversight purposes or to assess risks associated with meal counting and claiming errors. |
gao_GAO-03-231 | gao_GAO-03-231_0 | AOC is also responsible for making all necessary capital improvements within the complex, including major renovations and new construction. Given the important role AOC plays in supporting the effective functioning of the Congress and neighboring institutions, the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2002, mandated this review, and Senate and House Appropriations Committee reports directed our review on certain management shortcomings at AOC that needed attention, with a focus on recommending solutions—strategic planning, organizational alignment, strategic human capital management, and financial management. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2002, directed us to conduct a comprehensive management study of AOC’s operations. Therefore, as a first priority, AOC needs to establish a management and accountability framework by, among other things, demonstrating top leadership commitment to organizational involving key congressional and other stakeholders in developing its using its strategic plan as the foundation for aligning its activities, core processes, and resources to support mission-related outcomes; establishing a communications strategy to foster change and create shared expectations and build involvement; developing annual goals and a system for measuring performance; and strategically managing its human capital to drive transformation and to support the accomplishment of agency goals. As AOC continues to develop its strategic plan, it should consider how it can build such a communications strategy to help to achieve the organization’s mission. AOC’s needs to improve its executive decision-making capacity and accountability in order to help (1) elevate attention on management issues and transformation, (2) integrate various key management and transformation efforts, and (3) institutionalize accountability for addressing management issues and leading transformation. Effective internal control also helps in managing change to cope with shifting environments and evolving demands and priorities. Strategic Management Framework Important for Addressing Long-standing Worker Safety, Project Management, and Recycling Issues
In the preceding chapters, we discussed the need for the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) to put in place the management and accountability framework needed for organizational transformation— leadership, strategic planning, organizational alignment, communications, and performance measurement—and the management infrastructure of financial, information technology, and other controls that support the transformation. Improvements in these areas can also ameliorate the performance of program areas of long-standing concern to AOC’s employees and congressional stakeholders—worker safety, project management, and recycling. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) plays an important role in supporting the effective functioning of the Congress and its neighboring institutions. With a budget of $426 million, AOC is responsible for the maintenance, renovation, and new construction of all buildings and grounds within the Capitol Hill complex. GAO was mandated by the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2002, to conduct a comprehensive management review of AOC's operations to help identify improvements in strategic planning, organizational alignment, and strategic human capital management to help AOC better achieve its mission and to address long-standing program issues. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed AOC's legislative authority and internal documents, interviewed key AOC officials and senior managers, and conducted employee focus groups.
What GAO Found
AOC is an agency working to transform itself and has planned management improvement efforts, such as a new strategic planning process, to help it make this transition. GAO found that without AOC establishing a management and accountability framework, it might have difficulty leading and executing its organizational transformation. Leading organizations undergoing transformation efforts draw from the following management and accountability components: (1) demonstrating top leadership commitment to organizational transformation; (2) involving key stakeholders in developing an organizationwide strategic plan; (3) using the strategic plan as the foundation for aligning activities, core processes, and resources to support mission-related outcomes; (4) establishing a communications strategy to foster transformation and create shared expectations and build ; (5) developing annual goals and a system for measuring performance; and (6) managing human capital and information technology strategically to drive transformation and to support the accomplishment of agency goals. To support its transformation initiatives and to cope with shifting environments and evolving demands and priorities, AOC also should continue to develop its management infrastructure and controls. Establishing this management and accountability framework and further developing its management infrastructure and controls can also help AOC improve performance in program areas of long-standing concern to AOC's employees and congressional stakeholders--worker safety, project management, and recycling. |
gao_GAO-07-424 | gao_GAO-07-424_0 | IT Is Critical to DHS’s Mission Performance
To accomplish its mission, DHS relies extensively on IT. As mentioned earlier, DHS requested about $4 billion for fiscal year 2008, which is the third largest planned IT expenditure among federal departments. DHS has established the management structure to effectively manage its investments. However, the department has yet to fully define 8 of the 11 related policies and procedures defined by our ITIM framework. Specifically, while DHS has documented the policies and related procedures for project-level management, some of these procedures do not include key elements. In addition, the department has yet to define most of the policies associated with managing its IT projects as investment portfolios. Officials attributed the absence of policies and procedures at the portfolio level to other investment management priorities. Until DHS fully defines and documents its policies and procedures for investment management, it risks selecting investments that will not meet mission needs in the most cost-effective manner. DHS Has Not Fully Executed Key Practices Associated with Effectively Controlling Investments
DHS has not fully implemented any of the key practices needed to control investments—either at the project level or at the portfolio level. For example, according to DHS officials and our review of the department’s control review schedule, the investment boards have not conducted regular reviews of investments. Further, while control activities are sometimes performed, they are not performed consistently across projects. In addition, because the policies and procedures for portfolio management have yet to be defined, control of the department’s investment portfolios is ad hoc, according to DHS officials. Officials told us that to strengthen IT investment management, they have recently hired a portfolio manager and are recruiting another one. Until DHS fully implements processes to control its investments, both at the project and portfolio levels, it increases the risk of not meeting cost, schedule, benefit, and risk expectations. At a minimum, this should include fully defining and documenting project-and portfolio-level policies and procedures that address the following eight areas: selecting new investments, including specifying the criteria and steps for prioritizing and selecting these proposals; reselecting ongoing IT investments, including specifying the criteria and steps for prioritizing and reselecting these investments; overseeing (i.e., controlling) IT projects and systems, including specifying the procedural rules for the investment boards’ operations and decision making during project oversight; identifying and collecting information about investments, including assigning responsibility for the process and ownership of the information and defining the locations for information storage; creating and modifying IT portfolio selection criteria; analyzing, selecting, and maintaining the investment portfolios; assessing portfolio performance at regular intervals to reflect current conducting postimplementation reviews of IT investments, including defining roles and responsibilities for doing so, and specifying how conclusions, lesson learned, and recommended management actions are to be shared with executives and others. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established the management structure and policies and procedures needed to effectively manage its information technology (IT) investments and (2) determine whether the department is implementing key practices needed to effectively control these investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) relies extensively on information technology (IT) to carry out its mission. For fiscal year 2008, DHS requested about $4 billion--the third largest planned IT expenditure among federal departments. Given the size and significance of DHS's IT investments, GAO's objectives were to determine whether DHS (1) has established the management structure and associated policies and procedures needed to effectively manage these investments and (2) is implementing key practices needed to effectively control them. GAO used its IT Investment Management (ITIM) framework and associated methodology to address these objectives, focusing on the framework's stages related to the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act.
What GAO Found
DHS has established the management structure to effectively manage its investments. However, the department has yet to fully define 8 of the 11 related policies and procedures that GAO's ITIM framework defines. Specifically, while DHS has documented the policies and related procedures for project-level management, some of these procedures do not include key elements. For example, procedures for selecting investments do not cite either the specific criteria or steps for prioritizing and selecting new IT proposals. In addition, the department has yet to define most of the policies associated with managing its IT projects as investment portfolios. Officials attributed the absence of policies and procedures at the portfolio level to other investment management priorities. Until DHS fully defines and documents policies and procedures for investment management, it risks selecting investments that will not meet mission needs in the most cost-effective manner. DHS has also not fully implemented the key practices needed to actually control investments--either at the project level or at the portfolio level. For example, according to DHS officials and the department's control review schedule, DHS investment boards have not conducted regular investment reviews. Further, while GAO found that control activities are sometimes performed, they are not performed consistently across projects. In addition, because the policies and procedures for portfolio management have yet to be defined, control of the department's investment portfolios is ad hoc, according to DHS officials. Officials told GAO that they have recently hired a portfolio manager and are recruiting another one to strengthen IT investment management. Until DHS fully implements processes to control its investments, both at the project and portfolio levels, it increases the risk of not meeting cost, schedule, benefit, and risk expectations. |
gao_HEHS-96-52 | gao_HEHS-96-52_0 | Profile of VA Facility Users
While many veterans received medical care during the early 1990s, relatively few obtained their care from VA facilities. Veterans who used VA facilities generally had lower incomes and were less likely to have private insurance than veterans who used non-VA facilities. VA Facility Users Generally Had Lower Incomes Than Users of Non-VA Facilities
Using VA patient treatment records and Internal Revenue Service information, we examined the incomes of the 2.2 million veterans who used VA medical facilities in 1991 and found that two-thirds had incomes under $20,000, and about one-third of these had incomes under $5,000.However, VA’s survey of veterans in 1992 showed that only about 32 percent of all veterans had gross family incomes below $20,000. Our analysis of 1990 census data showed that about 50 percent of all veterans lived over 25 miles from a VA hospital, including 6 percent who lived over 100 miles away, and 34 percent lived over 25 miles from a VA clinic. For example, about 11 percent of all veterans lived within 5 miles of a VA hospital, and they accounted for 22 percent of the facility users. Comparison of Veterans’ Access to VA and Private Facilities in Selected Markets
Veterans generally have less access to VA medical facilities than to private facilities, as the following market examples show. Private facilities are often more convenient. 3.) 4.) Options VA Might Explore for Improving Accessibility of VA Health Care
In February 1995, VA issued an interim policy that encouraged its field offices to employ all means at their disposal, consistent with funding availability and federal law, to improve veterans’ access to VA health care. VA could improve access for one or more of the high-priority groups. For example, a medical center could target veterans with service-connected disabilities. On the positive side, VA-operated facilities could give VA more control over resources, potentially lessening the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. We revised the report to show that we focused on veterans’ access to standard health care benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on veterans' use of Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) medical facilities, focusing on: (1) users' characteristics; (2) the geographic accessibility of VA and private medical facilities that provide standard benefits; and (3) options to improve accessibility of VA health care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in the early 1990s, over 80 percent of veterans who received health care services obtained them from non-VA sources; (2) veterans who used VA medical facilities generally had lower incomes and were less likely to have private health insurance than veterans who obtained health care from non-VA facilities: (3) veterans with service-connected disabilities utilized VA facilities more often than other veterans; (4) about 50 percent of all veterans lived over 25 miles from a VA facility and 11 percent of veterans lived within 5 miles of a VA hospital; (5) although VA hospitals and outpatient clinics were geographically less accessible to veterans than private medical facilities, veterans had better access to certain specialty services through VA facilities; (6) options to improve veterans' access to VA health care include determining whether to improve access for current users, all veterans, or selected veterans groups, and comparing the costs of VA-provided services and contractor-provided services; and (7) although VA facilities are more costly to operate, they lessen the chances of program abuse by giving VA more control over resources. |
gao_GAO-11-747T | gao_GAO-11-747T_0 | We have made many recommendations over time that could address the tax gap. Some analysts believe the 2001 estimate likely underestimated the tax gap and that in absolute dollars it is likely larger now than in 2001. Complexity Can Have Value, but Adds to Compliance and Efficiency Costs
The federal tax system contains complex rules. These rules may be necessary, for example, to ensure proper measurement of income, target benefits to specific taxpayers, and address areas of noncompliance. However, these complex rules also impose a wide range of record keeping, planning, computational, and filing requirements upon businesses and individuals. Complying with these requirements costs taxpayers time and money. For example, in 2005 we reviewed existing studies and reported that even using the lowest available compliance cost estimates for the personal and corporate income tax, combined compliance costs would total $107 billion (roughly 1 percent of gross domestic product ) per year; other studies estimate costs 1.5 times as large. The tax system also results in economic efficiency costs, which are reductions in economic well-being caused by changes in behavior due to taxes, government benefits, monopolies, and other forces that interfere in the market. Complexities in Reporting Income Contribute to the Tax Gap by Providing Opportunities for Taxpayers to Misreport
Income measurement is straightforward for a large proportion of the individual taxpayer population: those who earn only labor and interest income and capital income within a retirement account generally have their income reported to them (and to the IRS) by the source of the income. However, substantial numbers of taxpayers who receive income from capital gains, rents, self-employment, and other sources often deal with complex tax laws, complicated calculations, and detailed record keeping. Tax Expenditures Add Complexity and Contribute to the Tax Gap by Providing Opportunities for Taxpayers to Make Mistakes or Evade Taxes
The growing number of tax expenditures is among the causes of tax code complexity. However, tax expenditures add to tax code complexity in part because they require taxpayers to learn about, determine their eligibility for, and choose between tax expenditures that have similar purposes. Tax expenditures also complicate tax planning, as taxpayers must predict their own future circumstances as well as future tax rules to make the best choice among provisions. Savings incentives within the tax code illustrate how tax expenditures add to complexity. The underreported net income due to misreported IRA distributions was $6.3 billion, including taxpayers who failed to report early distributions and the associated tax. In a 2008 testimony, we reported that among tax filers who appeared to be eligible for a tax credit or tuition deduction in tax year 2005, about 19 percent, representing about 412,000 returns, failed to claim any of them. No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance since the noncompliance has multiple causes and spans different types of taxes and taxpayers. These strategies could require actions by Congress or IRS. For example, if tax forms and instructions are unclear, taxpayers may be confused and make unintentional errors. Expanding Compliance Checks Before IRS Issues Refunds
IRS could reduce the tax gap by expanding compliance checks before issuing refunds to taxpayers. There are no easy solutions to the tax gap, but addressing the tax gap is as important as ever before in the face of the nation’s fiscal challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Taxes are necessary because they fund the services provided by government. Several years ago, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated that the gross tax gap--the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on time--was $345 billion for 2001. In the face of large and growing deficits, it is important to seek out potential causes and solutions to the tax gap. Achieving high levels of voluntary compliance is made more challenging as the tax code expands. Tax expenditures--preferential provisions in the code such as exemptions, exclusions, deductions, credits, and deferral of tax liability--have expanded the tax code, more than doubling in number since 1974. GAO's statement focuses on four key areas: (1) how complexity adds to taxpayer burden and economic efficiency costs; (2) how complexities in reporting income contribute to the tax gap; (3) how tax expenditures add complexity and contribute to the tax gap; and (4) possible strategies for addressing the tax gap. The statement is based largely on GAO's previous work conducted on tax compliance issues affecting individual taxpayers from 2005 through 2011.
What GAO Found
The federal tax system contains complex rules. These rules may be necessary, for example, to ensure proper measurement of income, target benefits to specific taxpayers, and address areas of noncompliance. However, these complex rules also impose a wide range of recordkeeping, planning, computational, and filing requirements upon businesses and individuals. Complying with these requirements costs taxpayers time and money. In 2005 GAO reviewed existing studies and reported that even using the lowest available compliance cost estimates for the personal and corporate income tax, combined compliance costs would total $107 billion (roughly 1 percent of gross domestic product) per year; other studies estimate costs 1.5 times as large. Economic efficiency costs, which are reductions in economic well-being caused by changes in behavior due to taxes, are estimated to be even larger. Although many taxpayers have simple forms of income, others do not--especially those who receive income from capital gains, rents, self-employment, and other sources--and they may be required to do complicated calculations and keep detailed records. This complexity can engender errors and underpaid taxes. For example, GAO has documented millions of taxpayer errors in following complex rules for determining taxpayers' "basis"--generally the taxpayer's investment in a property--in securities they sold or corporations they own. Tax expenditures add to tax code complexity in part because they require taxpayers to learn about, determine their eligibility for, and choose between tax expenditures that have similar purposes. Tax expenditures also complicate tax planning, as taxpayers must predict their own future circumstances as well as future tax rules to make the best choice among provisions. Taxpayer errors contribute to the tax gap. For example, in 2001 taxpayers underreported $6.3 billion in net income due to misreported Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA) distributions. But taxpayers also may underclaim benefits to which they are entitled. According to GAO's past analysis, of tax filers who appeared to be eligible for a higher-education tax credit or tuition deduction in tax year 2005, about 19 percent, representing about 412,000 returns, failed to claim any of them. No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address the tax gap, but several strategies could improve taxpayer compliance. These strategies could require actions by Congress or IRS. For example, Congress can simplify the tax code by eliminating some tax expenditures and by making definitions more consistent across the tax code. IRS and Congress could take steps to enhance information reporting by third parties or expand compliance checking before refunds are issued. GAO does not make any new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-03-437 | gao_GAO-03-437_0 | Periodic Physical and Dental Examinations Are Valuable for Assessing Health Status and Provide Beneficial Information to the Army
Medical experts recommend physical and dental examinations as an effective means of assessing health. Because Army early-deploying reservists need to be healthy to fulfill their professional responsibilities, periodic examinations are useful for assessing whether they can perform their assigned duties. For instance, according to a 1998 U.S. Army Medical Command study, a “significant number” of Army reservists could not be deployed for medical reasons during mobilization for the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991). The Army Has Not Collected and Maintained All Required Medical and Dental Information on Early-Deploying Reservists
The Army has not consistently carried out the requirements that early- deploying reservists undergo 5- or 2-year physical examinations, and the required dental examination. At the seven Army early-deploying reserve units we visited, about 66 percent of the medical records were available for our review. However, our review of the available records found that approximately 68 percent of early- deploying reservists over age 40 did not have a record of a current biennial examination. Army’s Automated Systems Do Not Contain Comprehensive Health Information on Early- Deploying Reservists
The Army’s two automated information systems for monitoring reservists’ health do not maintain important medical and dental information for early- deploying reservists—including information on the early-deploying reservists’ overall health status, information from the annual medical certificate form, dental classifications, and the date of dental examinations. According to Army officials, in 2003 the Army plans to expand the Medical Occupational Database System to provide the Army with access to current, accurate, and relevant medical and dental information at the aggregate and individual levels for all of its reservists—including early-deploying reservists. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that early-deploying reservists are healthy to carry out their duties, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to comply with existing statutory requirements to ensure that the 5-year physical examinations for early-deploying reservists under 40 and the biennial physical examinations for early-deploying reservists over 40 are current and complete, all early-deploying reservists complete their annual medical certificate of health status and that the appropriate Army personnel review the certificate, and the required dental examinations and treatments for all early-deploying reservists are complete. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, health problems prevented the deployment of a significant number of Army reservists. To help correct this problem the Congress passed legislation that required reservists to undergo periodic physical and dental examinations. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2002 directed GAO to review the value and advisability of providing examinations. GAO also examined whether the Army is collecting and maintaining information on reservist health. GAO obtained expert opinion on the value of periodic examinations and visited seven Army reserve units to obtain information on the number of examinations that have been conducted.
What GAO Found
Medical experts recommend periodic physical and dental examinations as an effective means of assessing health. Periodic physical and dental examinations for early-deploying reservists provide a means for the Army to determine their health status. Army early-deploying reservists need to be healthy to meet the specific demands of their occupations; examinations and other health screenings can be used to identify those who cannot perform their assigned duties. Without adequate examinations, the Army may train, support, and mobilize reservists who are unfit for duty. The Army has not consistently carried out the statutory requirements for monitoring the health and dental status of Army early-deploying reservists. At the early-deploying units GAO visited, approximately 66 percent of the medical records were available for review. For example, we found that about 68 percent of the required 2-year physical examinations for those over age 40 had not been performed and that none of the annual medical certificates required of reservists were completed by reservists and reviewed by the units. The Army's automated health care information system does not contain comprehensive physical and dental information on early-deploying reservists. According to Army officials, in 2003 the Army plans to expand its system to maintain accurate and complete medical and dental information to monitor the health status of early-deploying reservists. |
gao_GAO-03-241 | gao_GAO-03-241_0 | During the past three decades, the Department of Education has created many disparate information systems to support these various student financial aid programs. As part of the COD process, XML is being used to consolidate multiple legacy record formats previously used by schools to submit data on the Pell Grant and Direct Loan programs. Progress in Implementing the COD Process, but Critical Work Remains, and Benefits and Lessons Learned Are Not Being Tracked
FSA has made progress in implementing the new COD process. As a prerequisite to implementing COD, in late October 2001, FSA deployed its middleware solution in an EAI “bus”—an IT infrastructure that uses middleware to access data from disparate systems, transform the data formats as necessary, and route the data to the appropriate requesting systems, thus enabling data exchange among disparate systems. The COD system replaces the Direct Loan Origination System and the Recipient Financial Management System, and it currently processes files for all schools participating in the Pell Grant and Direct Loan programs. Development and implementation of the common record. Using XML, FSA developed and began implementing a common record that schools can use to submit student financial aid data to the COD system. First, FSA is behind schedule in implementing the basic COD system. However, as illustrated in table 1, at this time FSA has only some of the data necessary to determine whether it is achieving all expected benefits. FSA has recognized the importance of generating lessons learned in certain areas. However, by relying on such an ad hoc process, FSA lacks assurance that it has captured and disseminated all key lessons learned related to schools’ implementation of the common record and could overlook important improvements that could be made. As a result, schools may encounter problems that could have been avoided or mitigated had they known of other schools’ experiences. Recommendations
To determine the extent to which the new COD process is achieving expected results related to customer satisfaction and financial integrity, we recommend that you direct FSA’s Chief Operating Officer to expeditiously develop metrics and baseline data to measure these benefits and develop a tracking process to assess the extent to which the expected results are being achieved. 2. 3. 4. Instead, this report notes that the implementation is not yet complete. We modified this report to reflect that FSA plans to include lessons learned in a planned update to its school testing guide. While this is a positive step, it does not replace the need for mechanisms to continuously capture and disseminate acquired knowledge as schools implement the common record. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address system problems and other long-standing management weaknesses, in 1998, the Congress created a discrete unit within the Department of Education, the Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA). This office subsequently adopted a new approach to systems integration using middleware (a type of software that can allow an application to access data residing in different databases) and Extensible Markup Language (XML)--a flexible, nonproprietary set of standards that is intended to make it easier to identify, integrate, and process information widely dispersed among systems and organizations. FSA's first use of this approach is the Common Origination and Disbursement (COD) process for the Direct Loan, Pell Grant, and campus-based programs. GAO initiated a follow-up review to assess FSA's progress in implementing this process.
What GAO Found
FSA has made progress in implementing the COD process. Specifically, it has implemented (1) a new information technology infrastructure that uses middleware to enable data exchange among disparate systems; (2) the initial version of the basic COD system, which replaces two existing systems and is being used by schools participating in the Pell Grant and Direct Loan programs; (3) middleware into existing systems to support the COD process; and (4) a common record based on XML that schools can use to submit student financial data for the Pell Grant and Direct Loan programs. However, the implementation of the COD process is behind schedule, and its ultimate success hinges on FSA's completing critical work, including addressing serious postimplementation operational problems, and having thousands of postsecondary schools implement the common record. Further, there are important elements to managing any information technology investment that FSA has not yet completed: Determining whether expected benefits are being achieved. FSA has only some of the metrics, baseline data, and tracking processes necessary to determine whether it is achieving all expected benefits. Tracking lessons learned. FSA has relied on an ad hoc approach for gathering and disseminating lessons learned related to schools' implementation of the common record. To address this issue, FSA plans to include lessons learned as part of an update to its school testing guide. However, this does not replace the need for an ongoing mechanism to capture and disseminate lessons learned, without which schools may encounter problems that could have been avoided or mitigated. |
gao_GAO-10-377 | gao_GAO-10-377_0 | The Method of Selling Allowances in a Cap- and-Trade Program Can Influence Program Outcomes
The literature and programs that we reviewed present many options for the design of a mechanism to sell allowances under a cap-and-trade program. First, because elements of the mechanism’s design may affect outcomes—such as the price of allowances obtained at auctions and the cost of the program—it is important that design choices align with an emissions trading program’s goals. Second, once a goal is chosen, policymakers have numerous choices regarding the sale of allowances, including whether to sell them on an exchange or use auctions. Goals commonly cited by researchers and program officials include: Simplicity and transparency. Maximizing participation. Economic efficiency. That is, the price would reflect decisions by covered entities either to reduce their emissions or to purchase allowances to cover them, whichever is more cost-effective. Avoiding market manipulation. Revenue generation. For example, policymakers could design a sale so that it is more likely to achieve high allowance prices. Some goals may also be interrelated—for example, a simple and transparent design may boost participation and reduce the risk of market manipulation. German and Danish officials we interviewed expressed general satisfaction with sales on exchanges and cited their potential strengths in meeting certain goals. Program officials reported that auctions, the more commonly used sales mechanism in the EU and RGGI, effectively distributed allowances to program participants, although several noted that allowance auctions have not yet been implemented on a large scale. Program officials noted that auctions can also be administered through exchanges. According to a program official, this approach allows them to draw on preexisting auction infrastructure and administrative processes, as allowance bids are subject to the same rules as other exchange transactions. Even though they made different bids, each company that bids above a certain price receives allowances at the same price. In some discriminatory-price auctions, winning bidders pay the amount of their bid. Previous U.S. federal government experience with auctions has involved different formats in different markets. Existing cap-and-trade programs for carbon dioxide allowances—the EU ETS and RGGI—have employed the uniform-price, single-round format, in which winning bidders submit secret bids and pay the same price for allowances. According to literature and economists we interviewed, advantages of this format include: Simplicity. Some economists said that other auction formats, such as clock auctions, may be more conducive to collusion than single-round auctions, because multiple bidding rounds give other bidders information and create opportunities for collusion. The clock auction format may also present some disadvantages. Other Auction Design Elements
Apart from format, policymakers would face a number of choices related to auction design, each of which has implications for program outcomes. Among other things, choices must be made regarding participation rules, the frequency and timing of auctions, the use of reserve prices or other price controls, and the monitoring and reporting of auction activities. Participation. Programs that met these criteria were the European Union’s (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Participation limits. Given these concerns, many economists and program officials favored maximizing the number of potential auction participants. Bid limits. For example, a CBO report said that a reserve price could create a price floor if the government chose to sell a significant fraction of emission allowances, as opposed to distributing them for free. In determining which data to report, program officials recommended that the government disclose aggregated data such as the quantity of allowances sold, the number of participants (and the fraction that won allowances), and the clearing price. Appendix III: Allowance Sales Conducted in the EU ETS and RGGI
Appendix III: Allowance Sales Conducted in the EU ETS and RGGI Percentage of each member state’s cap sold (or expected to be sold)
2006 and 2008 (auctions)
2.3 (Phase I)
Auction 1: $33.12 Auction 2: 8.65 Auction 3: 0.01 0.5 (Phase II)
2009 (sale)
2.5 (Phase I)
Auction 1: 9.34 Auction 2: 1.09 5.0 (Phase I)
5.1 Weighted average price: 1.5 (Phase I)
Auction 1: $.07 7.0 (Phase II)
Auctions 1 to 7: 1.3 (Phase II)
Auction 1: $13.66 Auction 2: $16.68 8.8 (Phase II)
80.0 Weighted average price: 2008 sales: $27.97 2009 sales: $15.49 raised (rounded)
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Michael Hix (Assistant Director), Cindy Gilbert, Robert Grace, Richard Johnson, Jessica Lemke, Micah McMillan, Benjamin Shouse, Jeanette Soares, Ardith A. Spence, and Kiki Theodoropolous made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress is considering proposals for market-based programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Many proposals involve creating a cap-and-trade program, in which an overall emissions cap is set and entities covered by the program must hold tradable permits--or "allowances"-- to cover their emissions. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the value of these allowances could total $300 billion annually by 2020. The government could either sell the allowances, give them away for free, or some combination of the two. Some existing cap-and-trade programs have experience selling allowances. For example, member states participating in the European Union's (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) have sold up to about 9 percent of their allowances, and the amount of auctioning is expected to increase significantly starting in 2013. In the United States, the 10 northeastern states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) have auctioned about 87 percent of their allowances. This report is part of GAO's response to a request to review climate change policy options. This report describes the implications of different methods for selling allowances, given available information and the experiences of selected programs. GAO reviewed relevant literature and interviewed program officials from the EU and RGGI, economists, and other researchers. This report contains no recommendations.
What GAO Found
The method of selling emissions allowances can have significant implications for a cap-and-trade program's outcomes, and therefore, it is important that the method be chosen based on well-defined goals. Goals often cited by program officials and economists include: maintaining simplicity and transparency, maximizing participation, promoting economic efficiency, generating a price that reflects the marginal cost of reducing emissions, avoiding market manipulation, raising revenues, and minimizing administrative costs. According to program officials, it is important to identify goals prior to choosing a sales method, as tradeoffs may exist. Some goals may also be interrelated--for example, a simple and transparent design may boost participation and reduce the risk of market manipulation. Once goals are identified, policymakers face a number of choices regarding the design of a sales mechanism. Existing programs have used different mechanisms to sell allowances, including direct sales through exchanges and auctions. EU officials described exchange-based sales as effective and easy to implement, although they and other economists questioned whether this approach would be suitable for selling a high volume of allowances. Program officials also reported that auctions, the more commonly used sales mechanism in the EU and RGGI, effectively distributed allowances to program participants. However, some economists noted that auctions are not "one size fits all," and should be designed to take into account market characteristics, such as the number of potential buyers. Using auctions to sell allowances would entail a number of other design choices. For example, policymakers could decide to utilize existing auction infrastructure, such as that used in exchanges or government auctions, or develop a new platform. Choices must also be made regarding the auction format and other design elements. (1) Auction format: The auction format determines, among other things, the price that winning bidders pay for allowances and the number of bidding rounds. To date, ETS and RGGI auctions have used a single round format in which each participant that bids above a certain price receives allowances at that price. Program officials expressed general satisfaction with this format, and economists noted that its relative simplicity may encourage participation. However, some economists also recommended that policymakers consider other formats as well, such as multiple-round auctions, given that experience with large-scale allowance auctions has been limited to date. (2) Other auction design elements: Apart from the auction format, other elements may affect outcomes, including: participation requirements, the frequency and timing of auctions, measures that establish lower or upper limits on allowance prices, and rules governing auction monitoring and the reporting of results. |
gao_AIMD-99-137 | gao_AIMD-99-137_0 | FAA Has Historically Not Followed a Disciplined Acquisition Management Approach
FAA has encountered difficulty in acquiring new systems to help achieve its goals of replacing the air traffic control system’s aging infrastructure and of meeting the projected increase in air traffic. During the First Decade of Modernization, FAA Did Not Follow a Disciplined Approach
In the 1980s and early 1990s, we reported that problems with modernization projects occurred largely because FAA did not follow the guidance outlined in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109, which is the principal guidance for acquiring major systems in the federal government. Circular A-109 calls for following a disciplined, five-phased approach to acquisition in order to minimize problems, such as cost increases and schedule delays. The agency believed that it could deliver and install new systems more quickly by combining Circular A-109 phases. Concerned about the continuing slow pace of the air traffic control modernization program—which led at times to FAA’s having to implement costly interim projects to sustain the ATC system—FAA sought from the Congress exemptions from many federal procurement rules. Specifically, our preliminary findings on FAA’s present approach indicate that the agency has not fully implemented an effective process for monitoring the cost, schedule, benefits, performance, and risk of its key projects throughout their life-cycle. We have reported on several root causes of FAA’s past modernization problems. FAA Has Taken Steps to Overcome Modernization Problems and Has Delivered Some Systems
FAA has taken a number of steps, in addition to implementing its Acquisition Management System, to overcome past problems with modernization efforts. As a result of this outreach effort, FAA and the aviation community agreed to (1) use an incremental approach to modernizing the National Airspace System, referred to as the “build a little, test a little” approach; (2) revise its blueprint for modernizing this system; and (3) deploy certain technologies earlier than FAA had planned because the aviation industry believed that these technologies could provide immediate benefits. These practices differ from those of the past in which FAA made unilateral decisions about air traffic control modernization and tried to deploy large, complex projects all at once, known as the “big bang” approach. Second, FAA has begun to develop a complete systems architecture for its modernization program and estimated in May 1998 that it would take 18 to 24 months to complete the development. We note that although FAA completed several of its major projects, they generally cost more than anticipated and were delivered behind schedule. Progress Made on Addressing Year 2000 Problems
On a related issue, our work on the Year 2000 problem has shown that FAA has made tremendous progress over the past year, but much remains to be done to complete the validation and implementation of FAA’s mission-critical systems. While the agency has many of the elements in place to improve its management of the modernization program, implementation is key to the agency’s future success in this area. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Control Modernization Program, focusing on: (1) the causes of the problems that have plagued FAA's modernization program for nearly two decades; (2) recent agency efforts to overcome these problems; and (3) the readiness of FAA and others to meet year 2000 requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from the inception of the air traffic control modernization program to today, FAA has not consistently followed a disciplined management approach for acquiring new systems; (2) in the 1980s and early 1990s, FAA did not follow the phased approach of federal acquisition guidance designed to help mitigate the cost, schedule, and performance risk associated with the development of major systems; (3) FAA believed it could develop and install new systems more quickly by combining several of the five phases outlined in this guidance; (4) however, as a result of not following this disciplined, phased approach, FAA often encountered major difficulties such as those associated with developing the Advanced Automation System; (5) in 1995, Congress exempted FAA from many federal procurement rules and regulations; (6) in April 1996, FAA implemented an acquisition management system, which emphasized the need for a disciplined approach to acquisition management; (7) however, GAO found continuing weaknesses in key areas such as how FAA monitors the status of projects throughout their life cycles; (8) FAA has taken a number of steps to overcome problems with past modernization efforts; (9) FAA has moved away from its practice of taking on large, complex projects all at once and is now acquiring new systems by using a more incremental approach; (10) in addition, FAA is no longer making unilateral decisions about air traffic control modernization; (11) instead, it has been working actively with the aviation community to make decisions more collaboratively; (12) furthermore, FAA has begun to address some of the root causes of its modernization problems by implementing processes to help: (a) improve its ability to estimate and account for project costs; (b) develop a complete architecture for modernizing the National Airspace System; (c) reduce the risks associated with software development; and (d) reform the organization's culture, including providing incentives to make managers more accountable; (13) while FAA has delivered some of its major systems, it must be recognized that many of these projects encountered difficulties in meeting their original cost and schedule goals, and the baselines were subsequently revised; and (14) FAA has taken critical steps over the past year to address problems associated with the date change to the year 2000, but much work remains to be done to help ensure that FAA and other key players such as airports have made needed fixes and have contingency plans in place so that operations can continue should problems arise. |
gao_HEHS-98-141 | gao_HEHS-98-141_0 | Teen Birth Rates Have Declined, but Proportion of Unmarried Mothers Has Increased
Since the late 1950s, the birth rate of women aged 15 to 19 has decreased by about 41 percent overall. 1.) Decline in Teen Birth Rate Parallels Decline in Birth Rate for All Women
In 1995, the most recent year for which final data are available, the annual birth rate for women aged 15 through 19 was approximately 57 per thousand, compared with 96 per thousand in 1957 when the rate was at its peak. 1.) Rates for black and Hispanic teens were more than double those of white teens, and older teens constituted nearly two-thirds of teens who gave birth in 1995. 2.) About two-thirds of teen mothers graduated from high school; however, teen mothers graduated at substantially lower rates than teen women without children. Nearly Half of Teen Mothers Are White, and Most Are Age 18 or Older and Unmarried
Almost half of the 512,000 births in 1995 (233,000) were to white teen mothers. 3.) 4.) Many Teens Who Gave Birth in 1995 Already Had at Least One Child
In 1995, more than one-fifth of all teen births in the United States were to teenage women who had already given birth to at least one child. 5.) A recent education study shows that about 64 percent of teen mothers graduated from high school or earned a general equivalency diploma within 2 years after the time they would have graduated, compared with about 94 percent of teenage women who did not give birth. Also, high school completion rates among teen mothers vary considerably by race. School Involvement and Family Background Influence the Likelihood of Teenage Motherhood
Certain social factors, such as the teen’s level of school involvement or family background and income, appear to influence the likelihood that a woman will give birth in her teenage years. Generally, lower school involvement, unstable family structure, and declining family income are associated with an increased likelihood of teen births. 6.) However, recent multivariate analysis shows that the effect of SES on teen births varies by race and ethnicity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided social and demographic information about teen mothers, focusing on: (1) trends in birth rates for teens; (2) a profile of teen mothers; and (3) factors, such as education or family background, that may influence the likelihood of teen motherhood.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although the birth rate for teenage women decreased 41 percent from the late 1950s to 1995--paralleling the decline in the U.S. birth rate--the number of babies born to teenagers is still high; (2) births to unmarried teenage mothers, however, more than quintupled as a proportion of total teen births over the same period; (3) as of 1995, the teen birth rate was about 57 per thousand; however, rates varied considerably by subgroup; (4) the birth rates for black and Hispanic teenage women are more than twice those for white teens; (5) in 1995, nearly half of teen mothers were white and most were aged 18 to 19 and unmarried; (6) about two-thirds of recent teen mothers did not intend to get pregnant or have a child; however, about one-fifth of women who gave birth already had one child; (7) teenage mothers also graduate from high school at lower rates than all teen women; (8) 64 percent of teen mothers complete high school, compared with about 90 percent of all teen women; (9) research studies that have examined the antecedents of teen motherhood have shown that limited involvement in school and some family background characteristics--such as family instability and declines in family income--are associated with increased likelihood of teen motherhood; and (10) the effect of most factors varies among racial and ethnic groups. |
gao_GAO-02-1013T | gao_GAO-02-1013T_0 | Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs are in line with previous recommendations and show promise towards reducing fragmentation and improving coordination. However, as the Comptroller General has recently testified,implementation of the new department will be an extremely complex task, and in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to make it effective. In areas ranging from fire protection to drinking water to port security, the new threats are prompting a reassessment and shift of longstanding roles and responsibilities. However, until this time, proposed shifts in roles and responsibilities have been considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide this process. Current homeland security proposals recognize that the unique scale and complexity of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and capacities of all levels of government as well as the private sector. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the homeland security challenge, national performance goals and measures may best be developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and the private sector. Appropriate Tools Need to Be Selected for Providing Assistance
The choice and design of the policy tools the federal government uses to engage and involve other levels of government and the private sector in enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for performance and accountability. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of resources. The national strategy acknowledges the shared responsibility of providing homeland security between federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector and recognizes the importance of using tools of government such as grants, regulations, and information sharing to improve national preparedness. The proposed department will clearly have a central role in the success of efforts to strengthen homeland security, and has primary responsibility for many of the initiatives in the national homeland security strategy. Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory Management Are Needed. | What GAO Found
The challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation against these threats calls for a truly integrated approach, bringing together the resources of all levels of government. The proposed Department of Homeland Security will clearly have a central role in efforts to enhance homeland security. The proposed consolidation of homeland security programs has the potential to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, and clarify roles and responsibilities. Realistically, the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and it will take additional resources to make it effective. Moreover, formation of a department should not be considered a replacement for the timely issuance of a national homeland security strategy to guide implementation of the complex mission of the department. Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of long-standing roles and responsibilities, but these shifts are being considered on a piecemeal basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process. A national strategy could provide such guidance by more systematically identifying the unique capacities and resources of each level of government to enhance homeland security and by providing increased accountability within the intergovernmental system. The nation does not yet have performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness and develop common criteria that can demonstrate success, promote accountability, and determine areas where additional resources are needed, such as improving communications and equipment interoperability. A careful choice of the most appropriate tools is critical to achieve and sustain national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and tax incentives, can enhance the capacity of all levels of government to target areas of highest risk and greatest need, promote shared responsibilities, and track progress toward achieving preparedness goals. |
gao_GAO-02-695T | gao_GAO-02-695T_0 | The Congress recognized the unique economic hardship facing the 40 percent of American Indians living on reservations by exempting anyone living on reservations with high unemployment from the law’s 60-month time limit on receipt of TANF cash assistance.Furthermore, the act gave federally recognized American Indian tribes the option to administer their own TANF programs either individually or as part of a consortium, an option they did not have in the past. Under PRWORA, tribes implementing their own TANF programs have greater flexibility than states in some areas. Tribes and states also have the same flexibility to determine what types of work supports, such as childcare, transportation, and job training, they will provide to recipients. Despite Tribes’ Economic Development Efforts, Economic Conditions On Reservations Remain Poor, And Tribes Lack Some Key Factors For Economic Growth
Tribes have used various strategies to stimulate economic development; however, unemployment and poverty rates remain high on reservations. 1). Even if those participating in tribal TANF programs were taken into account, the decline in American Indian families receiving TANF is significant. Tribes Face Challenges Implementing Their Programs
Tribes have faced a number of challenges in implementing tribal TANF programs. Many tribes have found that data on the number of American Indians are inaccurate, complicating the determination of tribal TANF grant amounts and making it difficult to design and plan programs. Others believe that eligible families are more likely to seek benefits from a tribal program, in part because of increased outreach. These start-up costs include those for basic infrastructure such as information technology systems. | What GAO Found
Under welfare reform, American Indian tribes have the option to run Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs either alone or as part of a consortium of other tribes rather than receiving benefits and services from state TANF programs. Because of the difficult economic circumstances on many reservations, the law also gives tribal TANF programs more flexibility to design their programs than it gives to states. Tribes have used various strategies to stimulate economic development; however, unemployment and poverty rates remain high on reservations, and prospects for economic growth are limited. Nationally, the number of American Indian families receiving TANF assistance has declined significantly in recent years. On some reservations, however, caseloads have remained the same or increased. American Indians represent an increasing proportion of the total TANF caseload in some states. To date, 172 tribes, either alone or as part of a consortium, have used the act's flexibility to design and administer their own TANF programs. Tribes face challenges in implementing tribal TANF programs, including a lack of (1) reliable data on the number of American Indian TANF recipients; (2) infrastructure support, such as information systems; and (3) experience and expertise in administering welfare programs. |
gao_GAO-10-649T | gao_GAO-10-649T_0 | FAA Has Established Several Mechanisms to Facilitate Coordination on NextGen Activities among Partner Agencies, but Several Challenges Exist
Several Mechanisms Are in Place to Facilitate Coordination
Several mechanisms to facilitate coordination among FAA and partner agencies – including interagency committees, advisory boards, and working groups – are in place. In addition to the Senior Policy Committee, several other interagency coordination mechanisms are in place to facilitate coordination among FAA and partner agencies, many of which are within JPDO. Several Challenges Impede Cross-Agency Coordination
Our past work identified several leadership and organizational challenges in ensuring coordination across partner agencies. Third, with the ATO focused on implementing capabilities through the midterm, JPDO’s role was shifted to a focus on the long term beyond 2018. Recent changes in the leadership and organizational position of JPDO are likely to change the nature of the relationship among JPDO, FAA, and its partner agencies and hold promise for increased coordination. In addition to these leadership and structural issues, stakeholders and representatives of the partner agencies identified other broad challenges that affect the extent to which some partner agencies have coordinated with others. These challenges include (1) limited funding and staffing to dedicate to NextGen activities, (2) competing mission priorities, and (3) undefined near-term roles and responsibilities of some partner agencies. It Is Too Early to Determine Whether FAA Steps to Improve Coordination for NextGen among FAA Offices Will Be Effective
Stakeholders we spoke to cited challenges with coordinating the implementation of NextGen capabilities across FAA lines of business. Shifting from an organization and culture focused on system acquisition to one focused on integration and coordination will be an ongoing challenge for FAA. Recent organizational changes may help address these issues, but it is too early to measure the success of these efforts. As previously discussed and as shown in figure 1, changes that move JPDO out of the ATO and create a direct reporting relationship to the FAA Deputy Administrator solidify the FAA Deputy Administrator as the key executive in charge of NextGen. Integration of Near- and Midterm Implementation Plans with Long-term Plans Is Ongoing
FAA officials and several stakeholders we interviewed described FAA’s near- and midterm efforts as necessary stepping-stones to the long-term plans and vision for NextGen. Early success in implementing key NextGen capabilities desired by aircraft operators will help build confidence among operators that FAA can and will provide the operational improvements necessary for operators to realize benefits from their equipment investments. From a planning perspective, integration of near- and midterm implementation plans with the long-term plans and vision for NextGen is currently an ongoing effort within the FAA. Some stakeholders expressed concern that near- and midterm programs and capabilities are not connected well enough to the long-term vision and identified several key policy decisions that will affect the vision of the NextGen system and thus will determine whether programs, technologies, and capabilities implemented today will be the stepping-stones to future, more advanced capabilities. Three of these decisions that will have a major impact on the direction of near- and midterm implementation efforts as well as the long-term vision involve issues such as the scope and timing of installing necessary equipment on aircraft, expediting environmental reviews, and the extent to which additional airport capacity will be needed. Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prepare for future air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including its Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and Air Traffic Organization, is planning and implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in partnership with other federal agencies, such as the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security, and the aviation industry. NextGen will transform the current radar-based air traffic control system into a satellite-based system. As FAA begins implementing near-and midterm NextGen capabilities, a key challenge will be the extent to which FAA is able to integrate near and midterm improvements (those between 2012 and 2018) with long-term plans (beyond 2018). Furthermore, coordination among federal partner agencies and among various lines of business within FAA is important to ensure that NextGen implementation efforts are aligned. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) current mechanisms for and challenges to coordination among FAA and its partner agencies in implementing NextGen, (2) challenges and ongoing efforts to improve coordination across offices within FAA, and (3) issues related to integrating near- and midterm implementation plans with long-term NextGen plans. This statement is based on past and ongoing GAO work, and interviews GAO conducted with senior agency officials at FAA, JPDO and its partner agencies, and selected industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Several mechanisms to facilitate coordination on NextGen activities among partner agencies and across FAA exist, but challenges to this coordination remain. One interagency coordination mechanism is the Senior Policy Committee, which is the high-level coordinating body across all of the partner agencies. In addition, JPDO is tasked with facilitating day-to-day interagency coordination, and has several mechanisms, including working groups and research transition teams, to accomplish this. GAO has previously reported that a lack of stable leadership and ambiguity surrounding JPDO's organizational position and ongoing role have contributed to the uneven performance of its coordination mechanisms. Recent changes in both the leadership and organizational position of JPDO could improve coordination across partner agencies. Stakeholders and partner agencies identified several other challenges to improving interagency coordination and collaboration, including (1) limited funding and staffing to dedicate to NextGen activities, (2) competing mission priorities, and (3) undefined near-term roles and responsibilities of some partner agencies. FAA also faces challenges coordinating the implementation of NextGen across multiple FAA offices. GAO has previously reported that shifting from an organization focused on system acquisition to one focused on integration and coordination will be an ongoing challenge for FAA. Recent organizational changes that solidify the FAA Deputy Administrator as the key executive in charge of NextGen may help address these challenges. Moreover, FAA has made progress in improving coordination of efforts within FAA, by coordinating some office functions and moving toward a portfolio approach for implementation. However, as all these changes have recently occurred, it is too early to measure their success. Integration of midterm implementation plans with the long-term plans and vision for NextGen is currently an ongoing effort within FAA. FAA officials and several stakeholders described FAA's near- and midterm efforts--such as implementing satellite-based surveillance of aircraft--as necessary stepping-stones to the long-term plans and vision of NextGen--such as aircraft operators receiving satellite surveillance information in the cockpit and using it to self-separate from surrounding aircraft. Early success in implementing NextGen capabilities will help build confidence among aircraft operators that FAA can and will provide the operational improvements necessary for operators to realize benefits from their equipment investments. However, some stakeholders expressed concern that near- and midterm implementation efforts are not integrated well enough with the long-term vision. Stakeholders identified key policy decisions that will affect the vision of the NextGen system over the long term and in turn determine whether programs, technologies, and capabilities implemented today will be the stepping-stones to future, more advanced capabilities. Key decisions include such issues as the installation of aircraft equipment, expediting environmental reviews, and the extent to which additional airport capacity will be needed. |
gao_GAO-03-1040T | gao_GAO-03-1040T_0 | Options Exist to Address the Federal- Aid Highway Program’s Oversight Challenges
The federal-aid highway program provides nearly $30 billion annually to the states, most of which are formula grant funds that FHWA distributes through annual apportionments according to statutory formulas; once apportioned, these funds are generally available to each state for eligible projects. Many elements of the administration’s proposal are responsive to problems and options we have described in past reports and testimony. Should the Congress determine that enhancing federal oversight of major highway and bridge projects is needed and appropriate, options we have identified in prior work remain available to build on the administration’s proposal during the reauthorization process. Clarify uncertainties concerning FHWA’s role and authority. These requirements apply to programs managed by and acquisitions made by federal agencies, but they do not apply to the federal- aid highway program, a federally assisted state program. NHTSA Makes Inconsistent and Limited Use of Oversight Tools
Over the last 25 years, more than 1.2 million people have died as a result of traffic crashes in the United States—more than 42,000 in 2002. To improve safety on the nation’s highways, NHTSA administers a number of programs, including the core federally funded highway safety program, Section 402 State and Community Grants, and several other highway safety programs that were authorized in 1998 by TEA-21. NHTSA has two tools available to strengthen its monitoring and oversight of the state programs—improvement plans that states not making progress towards their highway safety goals are to develop, which identify programs and activities that a state and NHTSA regional office will undertake to help the state meet its goals; and management reviews, which generally involve sending a team to a state to review its highway safety operations, examine its projects, and determine that it is using funds in accordance with requirements. Challenges
Among the key challenges in this area are (1) evaluating how well the federally funded state highway safety programs are meeting their goals and (2) determining how well the states are spending and controlling their federal highway safety funds. For example, the proposal would somewhat simplify the current grant structure for NHTSA’s highway safety programs. Unlike the federal highway program and certain transit programs, under which funds are automatically distributed to states on the basis of formulas, the New Starts program requires local transit agencies to compete for New Starts project funds on the basis of specific financial and project justification criteria. Strategies
FTA has developed strategies to address the twin challenges of selecting the right projects and monitoring their implementation costs, schedule, and performance. Figure 3 illustrates the New Starts evaluation and ratings process. While FTA has made substantial progress in establishing a systematic process for evaluating and rating potential projects, our work has raised some concerns about the process. FTA has not implemented this recommendation. However, this initiative might reduce the number of smaller communities that would participate in the New Starts program. DOT’s Essential Air Service Program Faces Possible Program Modifications Due to Changing Conditions
The Congress established the Essential Air Service (EAS) program as part of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Under the Airline Deregulation Act, the EAS program was intended to sunset, or end, after 10 years. Challenges
As the airline industry has evolved since the industry was deregulated in 1978, the EAS program has faced increasing challenges to remain viable. Strategies
Over the past year, the Congress, the administration, and we have each identified a number of potential strategies generally aimed at enhancing the EAS program’s long-term sustainability. Mass Transit: Implementation of FTA’s New Starts Evaluation Process and FY 2001 Funding Proposals. Essential Air Service: Changes in Subsidy Levels, Air Carrier Costs, and Passenger Traffic. | Why GAO Did This Study
It is important to ensure that longterm spending on transportation programs meets the goals of increasing mobility and improving transportation safety. In this testimony, GAO discusses what recently completed work on four transportation programs suggests about challenges and strategies for improving the oversight and use of taxpayer funds. These four programs are (1) the federal-aid highway program, administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA); (2) highway safety programs, administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA); (3) the New Starts program, administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA); and (4) the Essential Air Service (EAS) program, administered out of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. Differences in the structure of these programs have contributed to the challenges they illustrate. The federal-aid highway program uses formulas to apportion funds to the states, the highway safety programs use formulas and grants, the New Starts program uses competitive grants, and the EAS program provides subsidies. For each program, GAO describes in general how the program illustrates a particular challenge in managing or overseeing long-term spending and in particular what challenges and strategies for addressing the challenges GAO and others have identified.
What GAO Found
The federal-aid highway program illustrates the challenge of ensuring that federal funds (nearly $30 billion annually) are spent efficiently when projects are managed by the states. GAO has raised concerns about cost growth on and FHWA's oversight of major highway and bridge projects. Recent proposals to strengthen FHWA's oversight are responsive to issues and options GAO has raised. Options identified in previous GAO work provide the Congress with opportunities to build on recent proposals by, among other things, clarifying uncertainties about FHWA's role and authority. NHTSA's highway safety programs illustrate the challenge of evaluating how well federally funded state programs are meeting their goals. Over 5 years, the Congress provided about $2 billion to the states for programs to reduce traffic fatalities, which numbered over 42,000 in 2002. GAO found that NHTSA was making limited use of oversight tools that could help states better implement their programs and recommended strategies for improving the tools' use that NHTSA has begun to implement. The administration recently proposed performance-based grants in this area. FTA's New Starts program illustrates the challenge of developing effective processes for evaluating grant proposals. Under the New Starts program, which provided about $10 billion in mass transit funding in the past 6 years, local transit agencies compete for project funds through grant proposals. FTA has developed a systematic process for evaluating these proposals. GAO believes that FTA has made substantial progress by implementing this process, but our work has raised some concerns, including the extent to which the process is able to adequately prioritize the projects. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program illustrates the challenge of considering modifications to statutorily defined programs in response to changing conditions. Under the EAS program, many small communities are guaranteed to continue receiving air service through subsidies to carriers. However, the program has faced increasing costs and decreasing average passenger levels. The Congress, the administration, and GAO have all proposed strategies to improve the program's efficiency by better targeting available resources and offering alternatives for sustainable services. |
gao_GAO-05-848T | gao_GAO-05-848T_0 | The Federal Real Property Environment
The federal real property environment has many stakeholders and involves a vast and diverse portfolio of assets that are used for a wide variety of missions. The Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. The state of deterioration is alarming because of the magnitude of the repair backlog— current estimates show that tens of billions of dollars will be needed to restore these assets and make them fully functional. For example, there is a lack of reliable and useful real property data that are needed for strategic decision-making. Federal agencies also face challenges in protecting their facilities due to the threat of terrorism. Various Efforts Initiated, but Real Property Problems Persist Due to Factors that Require Attention
In February 2004, the President added the Federal Asset Management Initiative to the President’s Management Agenda and signed Executive Order 13327 to address challenges in this area. The order requires senior real property officers at specified executive branch departments and agencies to, among other things, develop and implement an agency asset management plan; identify and categorize all real property owned, leased, or otherwise managed by the agency; prioritize actions needed to improve the operational and financial management of the agency’s real property inventory; and make life-cycle cost estimations associated with the prioritized actions. The order also established a new Federal Real Property Council (the Council) at OMB. The Council has also developed guiding principles for real property asset management. And, agencies such as DOD and VA have made progress in addressing long-standing federal real property problems and governmentwide efforts in the facility protection area are progressing. However, despite the increased focus on real property issues in recent years, the underlying conditions—such as excess and deteriorating properties and costly leasing—continue to exist and more needs to be done to address various obstacles that led to our high risk designation. For example, the problems have been exacerbated by competing stakeholder interests in real property decisions, various legal and budget related disincentives to businesslike outcomes, and the need for better capital planning among real property-holding agencies. To be effective in addressing these problems, it would be important for the strategy to focus on minimizing the negative effects associated with competing stakeholder interests in real property decisionmaking; providing agencies with appropriate tools and incentives that will facilitate businesslike decisions—for example, consideration should be given to what financing options should be available; whether agencies should keep some of the disposal proceeds to recoup the costs of preparing properties for disposal; what process would permit comparisons between rehabilitation/renovation and replacement and among construction, purchase, lease-purchase, and operating lease; and how public-private partnerships should be evaluated; addressing federal human capital issues related to real property by recognizing that real property conditions affect the federal government’s ability to attract and retain high-performing individuals and the productivity and morale of employees; improving real property capital planning in the federal government by helping agencies to better integrate agency mission considerations into the capital decision-making process, make businesslike decisions when evaluating and selecting capital assets, evaluate and select capital assets by using an investment approach, evaluate results on an ongoing basis, and develop long-term capital plans; and ensuring credible, rational, long-term budget planning for facility sustainment, modernization, or recapitalization. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area due to long-standing problems with excess and underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, and costly space challenges. Federal agencies were also facing many challenges protecting their facilities due to the threat of terrorism. This testimony discusses the problems with federal real property, particularly those relating to excess and deteriorating property, and what needs to be done to address them.
What GAO Found
The federal real property portfolio is vast and diverse--over 30 agencies control hundreds of thousands of real property assets worldwide, including facilities and land worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Unfortunately, many of these assets are no longer effectively aligned with, or responsive to, agencies' changing missions. Further, many assets are in an alarming state of deterioration; agencies have estimated restoration and repair needs to be in the tens of billions of dollars. Compounding these problems are the lack of reliable governmentwide data for strategic asset management, a heavy reliance on costly leasing, instead of ownership, to meet new needs, and the cost and challenge of protecting these assets against terrorism. In February 2004, the President added the Federal Asset Management Initiative to the President's Management Agenda and signed Executive Order 13327. The order requires senior real property officers at specified executive branch departments and agencies to, among other things, prioritize actions needed to improve the operational and financial management of the agency's real property inventory. A new Federal Real Property Council at OMB has developed guiding principles for real property asset management and is also developing performance measures, a real property inventory database, and an agency asset management planning process. In addition to these reform efforts, some agencies such as the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) have made progress in addressing long-standing federal real property problems. For example, DOD is preparing for a round of base realignment and closures in 2005. Also, in May 2004, VA announced a wide range of asset realignment decisions. These and other efforts are positive steps, but it is too early to judge whether the administration's focus on this area will have a lasting impact. The underlying conditions and related obstacles that led to GAO's high-risk designation continue to exist. Remaining obstacles include competing stakeholder interests in real property decisions, various legal and budget-related disincentives to optimal, businesslike, real property decisions, and the need for better capital planning among agencies. |
gao_GAO-04-488 | gao_GAO-04-488_0 | Congressional Mandates in 1997 and 2003 to Review Authorizations
The Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to review existing statutory general and flag officer authorizations and submit a report to Congress. Results of General and Flag Officer Study Were Not Fully Disclosed in DOD’s March 2003 Report to Congress
The general and flag officer study validated total requirements for 1,630 general and flag officer positions. DOD, in the March 2003 report to Congress, recommended no additional authorizations to meet validated requirements. However, the March 2003 report did not disclose this data or address the magnitude of the gap between validated requirements and authorizations. DOD Used an Established Methodology, but Precision and Usefulness of Results Could Be Enhanced
DOD used an established methodology known as job evaluation to assess general and flag officer requirements. One limitation of job evaluation is that it has numerous subjective features, including the selection of job factors to be assessed. The methodology is not designed to capture new or emerging needs, such as those resulting from DOD transformation efforts or other changes in the department. Periodic updates could capture changes in requirements. Such limitations do not invalidate DOD’s methodology; however, an explicit acknowledgment and assessment of these limitations would have provided more context for the study results. In addition, the study did not clearly account for dual-hatted positions or assess how each service’s authorizations were affected by the need to contribute general and flag officers to fill external (joint) positions. Addressing these issues could have enhanced the precision and usefulness of DOD’s study. In addition, we noted that while Congress directed DOD to ensure the Reserve Forces Policy Board participated in development of the report’s recommendations, the Board played a minimal role in producing the DOD 2003 report. External (Joint) Requirements Were Not Tracked Back to Each Service’s Authorizations
DOD’s general and flag officer study did not assess how each service’s authorizations were affected by the need to contribute general and flag officers to fill external (joint) positions. The Board provided written comments on the report in April 2003 concurring with DOD’s conclusion that all current congressional authorizations for general and flag officers were needed, but registering strong objections to DOD’s recommendation not to seek additional authorizations now to meet validated requirements and to the limited role it played in the overall process. In our view, this report was truly a Total Force effort.”
DOD Incorporated Lessons Learned From GAO’s Review of DOD’s 1997 General and Flag Officer Study
DOD, in conducting its 2003 general and flag officer requirements study, incorporated some of the lessons learned from a GAO review of DOD’s 1997 study. As part of its 2003 study, DOD did not consider which positions could conceivably be converted from the military ranks to the civilian workforce. Specifically, DOD’s 2003 report to Congress did not fully disclose the results from its general and flag officer study or address the magnitude or the impact of the gap between requirements and authorizations. Fully disclosing the study results and discussing the implications of its findings would help to explain DOD’s recommendation not to seek additional authorizations. In its comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it will (1) address the impact of the gap in requirements and the use of workarounds in a separate study on alternative methods for dealing with the gap in requirements, (2) review all dual-hatted positions and add the additional information to the established requirements database, and (3) incorporate the results of the ongoing civilian conversion study in a future update of general and flag officer requirements. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether DOD fully disclosed the results of its general and flag officer study in its March 2003 report to Congress and explained the rationale for any recommendations, we obtained and analyzed the results of the general and flag officer study, the database of validated requirements, supporting documentation, and the March 2003 report. We plan to conduct a separate review of these management issues and recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to assess whether general and flag officer authorizations were sufficient to meet all requirements. GAO's objectives were to determine whether DOD (1) fully disclosed the results of its study in its March 2003 report to Congress and explained the rationale for any recommendations, (2) used an established methodology to meet the objectives of its study, and (3) incorporated lessons learned from a GAO review of DOD's 1997 general and flag officer study. The 2003 act also directed DOD to review legislation affecting general and flag officer management. DOD included the results of its review in the March 2003 report, making several recommendations. GAO plans a separate review of these issues and recommendations.
What GAO Found
DOD's March 2003 report to Congress did not fully disclose the results of the general and flag officer study or explain its recommendation not to seek additional authorizations (people) to meet validated requirements (positions). The general and flag officer study validated requirements for general and flag officer positions that exceeded congressional authorizations for both the active and reserve components. However, the validated requirements data generated by the study were not disclosed in the March 2003 report to Congress. In its report, DOD did not address the magnitude of the gap between validated requirements of 1,630 positions and congressional authorizations of 1,311--a difference of 319. DOD's report also did not address the impact of "workarounds" used to fill the gap between requirements and authorizations, such as the practice of assigning colonels and Navy captains to general and flag officer positions. Fully disclosing the study results and discussing the implications of these findings in the March 2003 report to Congress would have provided a more complete picture of DOD's general and flag officer requirements and may have helped to explain its recommendation not to seek additional authorizations. DOD used an established methodology to conduct a position-by-position validation of general and flag officer requirements. This methodology, known as job evaluation, has been widely used in the United States. Job evaluation, however, has numerous subjective features, including the selection of factors used for measurement. In addition, it is not designed to project emerging needs, such as those that could result from transformation efforts. Periodic updates could capture changes in requirements. Such limitations do not invalidate DOD's methodology; however, an explicit acknowledgment and assessment of these limitations would have provided more context for the study results. In addition, the study did not clearly account for dual-hatted positions (where one individual holds more than one position simultaneously) or assess how each service's authorizations were affected by the need to contribute general and flag officers to fill external (joint) positions. Addressing these issues could have enhanced the precision and usefulness of DOD's study. In addition, we noted that while Congress directed DOD to ensure the Reserve Forces Policy Board participated in development of the report's recommendations, the Board played a minimal role in producing DOD's 2003 report. The Board registered strong objections to DOD's recommendation not to seek additional authorizations now to meet validated requirements and to the limited role it played in the process. DOD, in conducting its 2003 general and flag officer study, incorporated some of the lessons learned from a GAO review of DOD's 1997 general and flag officer study. DOD recognized the need to identify general and flag officer positions that could conceivably be converted from the military ranks to the civilian workforce, although it deferred this assessment until after the general and flag officer study was complete. DOD is currently assessing civilian conversion of general and flag officer positions. |
gao_GAO-17-266 | gao_GAO-17-266_0 | These principal offices generally focus on specific areas of education, such as career, technical, and adult education; elementary and secondary education; or postsecondary education. In fiscal year 2015, Education awarded about $4.3 billion in discretionary grants across its seven principal offices (see table 1). For example, all grant files should include the following three key documents: grant award notifications, post-award conference records, and grantee performance reports. Official Grant Files for About $21 Million in Selected Discretionary Grants Lacked Complete Documentation of Grantee Performance, and Education Has No Written Grant File Supervisory Review Procedures
Official Grant Files We Reviewed Did Not Consistently Contain Key Monitoring Documenation
The sample of official grant files we reviewed did not consistently contain documentation of certain key required monitoring activities outlined in Education’s Handbook. Federal internal control standards state that entities should provide continuous supervision to provide reasonable assurance that internal control objectives are achieved, and that internal control activities and transactions be clearly documented. Written procedures that detail requirements for the supervisory review of official grant files could enhance Education’s ability to hold grant staff supervisors accountable for ensuring their grant staff adhere to the monitoring and documentation requirements and help the department be better positioned to ensure proper stewardship of its federal discretionary grants. Education Created a Way to Identify and Share Grantee Performance Information Internally, but Has Not Developed Guidance to Help Ensure Its Effective Use by Grant Staff
Education developed features within G5 that allow grant staff to systematically maintain, organize, identify, and share information about grants and grantees in a central location. In 2013, Education spent about $700,000 to develop the G5 Post-Award Monitoring (PAM) Module, according to officials with whom we spoke. Specifically, since the PAM Module was implemented in 2013, RMS officials said grant staff have been inconsistently interpreting key terminology like “issues” and “notable results.” While RMS officials said they offer grant staff training on the PAM Module, due to competing priorities, they have not developed guidance to clarify what information grant staff should enter into the PAM Module related to the “Issues” and “Notable Results” tabs, specifically, nor circumstances under which using the PAM Module might be an effective means to share information. Federal internal control standards state that pertinent information should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently. Without guidance to help grant staff enter consistent information about grantee performance across Education’s principal and program offices, RMS may not be able to realize the full potential of its grants management system. Conclusions
The Department of Education’s more than 80 discretionary grant programs are one of the foundational tools for achieving its mission of increasing student achievement. Absent detailed written procedures for the supervisory review of official grant files, these issues may persist. As Education continues to move toward agency-wide adoption of its electronic G5 grants administration system, using a centralized approach, such as G5’s PAM Module, to gather this information could provide Education opportunities to share information about grantee performance across programs and offices. Such guidance may better position Education to achieve the full potential benefits of its grants management system. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance its oversight of discretionary grantee performance, the Secretary of Education should direct RMS to work with principal offices, as appropriate, to:
Establish and implement detailed written supervisory review procedures for official grant files to provide reasonable assurance that grant staff perform and document key monitoring activities. Develop guidance for grant staff on using the PAM Module to share information on grantee performance. In its comments, Education substantially agreed with both of our recommendations and provided additional technical comments and clarifications, which we have incorporated, as appropriate. Among other things, Education reported that it will (1) establish a standard operating procedure for grant file reviews, including a protocol for the review of these files to ensure that monitoring efforts are documented appropriately; and (2) reinforce through grant administration trainings the importance of sharing grantee performance information agency-wide, including in the PAM Module. In commenting on our finding about the extent to which grant staff consistently applied discretionary grant monitoring policies, Education focused much of its attention on the 58 performance reports we determined were missing from the official grant files we reviewed, and which were associated with about $21 million in discretionary grant awards. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2015, Education awarded more than $4 billion to over 7,000 grantees through some 80 discretionary grant programs. Over the past decade, GAO and Education's Inspector General identified various grants management and oversight challenges, including effectively monitoring grantee performance. GAO was asked to examine Education's oversight of its discretionary grants.
This report examines the extent to which Education: (1) consistently applied its discretionary grant monitoring policies, and (2) identified and shared across the department information about the performance of discretionary grantees. GAO reviewed the grant monitoring practices of three of Education's seven principal offices, which together awarded more than 80 percent of discretionary grant funds in fiscal year 2015, according to GAO's review of Education data, the most recent data available. Additionally, GAO reviewed a randomly selected, nongeneralizable sample of 75 official grant files; analyzed federal and Education grants policies and procedures; and interviewed Education grant officials and nine randomly selected grantees.
What GAO Found
U.S. Department of Education (Education) grant staff did not consistently document in the official grant files key required monitoring activities, according to GAO's review of a nongeneralizable sample of 75 discretionary grants. As a result, about $21 million in discretionary grant funds lacked correct documentation of grantee performance in the official grant files GAO reviewed. Specifically, compared to Education's requirements for these files, almost all—69 of 75—were incomplete in terms of certain key documents (i.e., grant award notifications, post-award conference records, and annual performance reports) that should have been contained in them (see figure). Further, the three principal offices GAO reviewed—the Offices of Postsecondary Education, Elementary and Secondary Education, and Innovation and Improvement—have not established detailed written procedures for the supervisory review of official grant files, contrary to federal internal control standards, which call for entities to provide reasonable assurance that internal control objectives, such as grant monitoring, are achieved and clearly documented. By developing and implementing detailed supervisory review procedures for official grant files, Education would be better positioned to ensure the proper stewardship of its discretionary grants.
Education spent about $700,000 to develop features within the Post-Award Monitoring (PAM) Module of its grants management system that allow staff to, for example, identify and share performance information to a central location, but it has not developed guidance on its effective use by grant staff working across programs and offices. Education described several ways staff share performance information, but according to a review of official grant files and interviews with Education officials, GAO found that staff rarely used PAM to disseminate information about grantee performance, such as notable results achieved in specific grant projects. Additionally, while Education officials said they offer staff training on PAM, they have not developed guidance to clarify use of features related to grantee performance. Federal internal control standards call for pertinent information, such as grantee performance information, to be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently. Absent guidance on how to effectively use PAM Module features to share information about grantee performance, Education will likely not be able to achieve the full potential benefits of its grants management system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends Education establish and implement detailed written supervisory review procedures for official grant files and develop guidance for grant staff on using the PAM Module to share information. Education substantially agreed with both recommendations and described the procedures and training it will provide to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-758 | gao_GAO-06-758_0 | Students are eligible for SES if they attend Title I schools that have missed AYP for 3 consecutive years and are from low-income families. 1). Although nationally SES participation is increasing, some districts required to offer SES have no students receiving services. 2). Districts Used Several Methods to Contact Parents and Offered Services on School Campuses and at Various Times to Increase Participation
Districts have taken multiple actions to encourage participation, as shown in table 3. Providers Have Taken Steps to Deliver Quality Services, but Contracting and Coordination Remain Challenges to Working with Districts and Schools
To promote improved student academic achievement, providers aligned their curriculum with district instruction primarily by hiring district teachers and communicating with the teachers of participating students. Providers Worked to Align Curriculum and Communicate with Parents, though the Extent of Their Efforts Varied
In order to increase student academic achievement, providers took steps to align their curriculum with school instruction by hiring and communicating with teachers, though the extent of their efforts varied. A majority of the 22 providers we interviewed hired certified teachers in the district as tutors. Providers, District and School Officials Reported That a Greater Role for Schools Would Improve Local SES Implementation
In part because SES can be delivered in school facilities, providers and officials in the districts and schools we visited reported that involvement of school administrators and other staff improves SES implementation. In addition, districts have taken a direct role in monitoring providers, and their monitoring activities similarly increased during this time. Though States and Districts Are Challenged to Monitor Providers, They Are Moving from Limited Monitoring of Providers to a More Active Approach
Although states and districts reported increasing their efforts to monitor SES providers between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, over two-thirds of states reported that on-site monitoring of providers has been a challenge. Many States Struggle to Develop Meaningful Evaluations, and the Few State Evaluations Completed to Date Were Inconclusive
Many states struggle to develop evaluations to determine whether SES providers are improving student achievement, though states are required to evaluate and withdraw approval from providers that fail to do so after 2 years. Due to their limitations, neither evaluation provided a conclusive assessment of SES providers’ effect on student academic achievement. Several Education Offices Monitor and Support SES Implementation, but States and Districts Cite the Need for Additional Assistance and Flexibility
Several offices within Education monitor various aspects of SES activity across the country and provide support, but states and districts reported needing additional assistance and flexibility with program implementation. Other Education offices also provide SES support through various means. Specifically, 85 percent of states and an estimated 70 percent of districts needed additional assistance with methods for evaluating SES, and over 60 percent also needed assistance with developing data systems. For example, several state and district SES coordinators expressed interest in Education’s pilot program that allowed two districts in needs improvement status to act as SES providers in exchange for their expansion of student access to SES providers and collection of achievement data to determine SES program effectiveness. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To obtain nationally representative information on supplemental educational services (SES) participation, state and local implementation, and federal oversight, we conducted a Web-based survey of state SES coordinators and a mail survey of district SES coordinators from a nationally representative sample of districts with schools required to offer SES. State reports from all 3 years included the number of students receiving SES and the number of schools those students attended, and state reports from 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 also included the number of students eligible for SES. No Child Left Behind Act: Additional Assistance and Research on Effective Strategies Would Help Small Rural Districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) requires districts with schools that have not met state performance goals for 3 consecutive years to offer their low-income students supplemental educational services (SES), such as tutoring, if these schools receive Title I funds. SES are provided outside of the regular school day by a state-approved provider, with responsibility for implementation shared by states and districts. GAO examined (1) how SES participation changed between school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005; (2) how SES providers are working with districts to deliver SES; (3) how states are monitoring and evaluating SES; and (4) how the Department of Education (Education) monitors and supports state implementation of SES. To collect data on SES, GAO surveyed all states and a nationally representative sample of districts with schools required to offer SES. We also visited 4 school districts, interviewed 22 SES providers, reviewed SES-related research, and interviewed Education staff.
What GAO Found
SES participation among eligible students increased from 12 to 19 percent between school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, and the number of recipients also increased, due in part to a rise in the number of schools required to offer services. Districts have used some promising practices to inform parents and encourage participation, such as offering services on school campuses and at various times. However, challenges remain, including timely and effective notification of parents and attracting providers to serve certain areas and students, such as rural districts or students with disabilities. To promote improved student academic achievement, SES providers took steps to align their curriculum with district instruction and communicate with teachers and parents, though the extent of their efforts varied. A majority of the 22 providers we interviewed worked to align SES and district curriculum by hiring teachers familiar with the district curriculum as tutors. However, at least some providers did not have any contact with teachers in about 40 percent of districts. Both providers and district officials experienced challenges related to contracting and coordination of service delivery. Providers, districts, and schools reported that greater involvement of schools would improve SES delivery and coordination, as it has in some places where this is occurring. While state monitoring of district and provider efforts to implement SES has been limited in past years, more states reported conducting on-site reviews and other monitoring activities during 2005-2006. In addition, districts have taken a direct role in monitoring providers, and their monitoring efforts have similarly increased. Although states are required to withdraw approval from providers that fail to increase student academic achievement for 2 years, many states struggle to develop meaningful SES evaluations. While a few states have completed evaluations, none provides a conclusive assessment of SES providers' effect on student academic achievement. Several Education offices monitor SES activity across the country and provide SES support to states and districts through written guidance, grants, and technical assistance. However, states and districts reported needing additional SES evaluation support and technical assistance. For example, 85 percent of states reported needing assistance with methods for evaluating SES. Many also voiced interest in Education's pilot programs that increase SES flexibility, including the one that allowed certain districts identified as in need of improvement to act as providers. |
gao_NSIAD-97-32 | gao_NSIAD-97-32_0 | DOD had inconsistent policies and practices for recovering costs from other responsible parties. Army Policies and Practices
The Army has no servicewide policy regarding cleanup cost sharing. However, the Navy has not initiated timely requests for cost sharing or followed up. For example, although Navy’s 1989 policy required officials to begin negotiation on cost-sharing arrangements at the two facilities we visited, the Navy has not initiated timely requests for contractor participation in the cleanup. DOD-Wide Policy Issues
Even though we recommended in 1992 and again in 1994 that DOD issue guidance to resolve disparities between DLA’s and the military services’ cleanup policies and procedures, DOD has not done so. However, the regulation only applies to costs incurred by contractors. Cleanup Estimates Improving, but Problems Remain
Following our July 1994 report that cleanup at GOCO plants would take longer and cost far more than DOD’s estimate, DOD increased its fiscal year 1993 estimate of $1.4 billion to $3.6 billion in fiscal year 1994. In addition, cleanup expenses not identified in either DOD or service component estimates included: $120 million to decontaminate and dispose of the chemical plant at the Newport Army Ammunition Plant; $6 million in cleanup costs for uranium-tipped bullets at the Lake City $4 million in 1983 and 1984, which was paid for cleanup costs at Air Force Plant 4 before DERA funds were available; $836,000 already spent on a cleanup study at the Navy’s Allegany Ballistics money paid to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state regulatory agencies for overseeing the cleanup at several sites (as an example, at the Fridley Naval Industrial Reserve Ordanance Plant, $481,000 was paid to EPA and $106,000 was paid to the state of Minnesota). DOD’s report for fiscal year 1995, dated May 15, 1996, showed that total cleanup cost estimates for GOCO facilities decreased from $3.6 billion to $3.3 billion, but it did not include cleanup costs for our 2 DLA case studies, or with 1 exception, any of the 21 DLA facilities reflected in prior DOD reports. DLA cleanup costs totaled $101 million in DOD’s fiscal year 1994 report. Recommendations
To address the inconsistencies in cost-sharing approaches and the potential for disparate treatment of other responsible parties described in this and past reports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance to DOD components to resolve current disparities and to promote future consistent treatment of all parties in cost recovery decisions. So that sufficient data will be available for cost-sharing negotiations and program oversight, we also recommend that the Secretary direct the military services and DLA to: Identify, to the extent it has not already been done, whether parties other than the government were involved with any contamination, as part of environmental cleanup preliminary assessments at GOCO facilities. Provide consistent estimates, including all cleanup costs for DOD’s environmental reports to Congress, regardless of the source of funds. In the absence of guidance that explicitly addresses the sharing of DOD cleanup costs, the services and DLA have taken different approaches to deciding whether and when to seek contributions from contractors and other responsible parties. Agency Cost-Sharing Policy
The Defense Fuel Supply Center policy and practice have been to recover most cleanup costs for past contamination through a fuel surcharge assessed to its customers, rather than with DERA funds. Current operators are to be held responsible for a fuel spill if they are negligent in attending to a leak on the facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Department of Defense's (DOD) policies and practices regarding cleanup of environmental contamination at government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) plants, as a followup to its previous reports that showed inconsistent policies and practices on cost sharing. GAO reviewed nine higher-cost case studies at the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the military services to: (1) assess the consistency of cost-sharing practices across DOD; and (2) compare the service cleanup estimates against DOD's.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the services' policies and practices for having contractors share cleanup costs still vary widely; (2) notwithstanding GAO's recommendations to do so, DOD has not given the services adequate guidance for making decisions on whether and when to seek recovery of environmental cleanup costs incurred by DOD from contractors and other parties at GOCO facilities; (3) the Army authorized indemnifying its operating contractors from cleanup costs at ammunition plants; (4) the Navy policy requires cost-recovery efforts, but has not initiated timely requests for cost sharing or followed up; (5) the Air Force is beginning to seek participation in cleanup costs from its operating contractors; (6) regarding cleanup at GOCO facilities GAO visited, DOD's fiscal year (FY) 1994 report to Congress included cleanup costs that were closer to the military services' supporting data than DOD's reported FY 1993 estimates; (7) DOD's estimates for cleaning up the 78 GOCO facilities increased from $1.4 billion in FY 1993 to $3.6 billion in 1994, but decreased somewhat to $3.3 billion in 1995; (8) although DOD and the services have addressed GAO's recommendations to improve cost information, their estimates of past and projected costs still differ, and not all costs were included; (9) for example, the 1995 estimate decreased in part because DOD excluded $19.1 million in unfunded Navy cleanup requirements that should have been reported, and DLA cleanup costs totalling $101 million in FY 1994 that would be funded by customer surcharges; (10) GAO also found many additional expenses that were not included in either DOD or service cost estimates; (11) because Superfund holds parties liable for the billions of dollars needed to remediate past contamination regardless of wrongdoing, it is important that DLA and the services deal with potentially responsible parties on the basis of consistent policy and accurate data; (12) however, the lack of DOD guidance on cost sharing has permitted inconsistencies in approaches to cost-sharing, and the potential for some parties to be held responsible for cleanup costs, while others in similar situations are not; and (13) if cost-sharing agreements are reached, omissions in historical information and cost data may inhibit the recovery of all appropriate costs. |
gao_GGD-99-125 | gao_GGD-99-125_0 | Background
OPM is the central management agency of the federal government charged with administering and enforcing federal civil service laws, regulations, and rules and aiding the President in carrying out his responsibilities for managing the federal workforce. OPM’s Performance Plan Provides a General Picture of Intended Performance Across the Agency
The plan includes performance goals and measures that address major programs and priorities and provides a general picture of intended performance across the agency. However, the plan only partially discusses its coordination with other agencies on crosscutting activities and could have been more useful if it had contained cost-based performance goals and measures. OPM’s fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan also does not contain cost-based performance goals and measures, where it appears appropriate to do so, to show how efficiently OPM performs certain operations and activities. The fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan indicates moderate progress in addressing the weaknesses that we identified in our assessment of the fiscal year 1999 annual performance plan. OPM’s Performance Plan Provides a General Discussion of the Strategies and Resources the Agency Will Use to Achieve Its Goals
OPM’s plan provides a general discussion of the resources the agency will use to achieve performance goals and identifies strategies for achieving each of its performance goals. OPM’s strategies for achieving this goal include conducting internal and external evaluations of its systems, such as engaging the assistance of the National Security Agency to review its security capabilities, and implementing appropriate recommendations to improve its security. OPM’S Performance Plan Provides Limited Confidence That Agency Performance Information Will Be Credible
OPM’s fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan provides limited confidence that its performance information will be credible. For example, in its overall section on verification and validation, OPM discusses several customer satisfaction surveys that are key elements in OPM’s measurement program, with varied response rates of up to 57 percent. One of these surveys, a nationwide survey of a sample of human resources specialists at all grade levels and geographic locations, received only a 29 percent response rate. Lower response rates generally increase the uncertainty about the reliability and validity of the survey results. OPM’s Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan Presents a Moderate Improvement Over the 1999 Plan
In reviewing the fiscal year 1999 annual performance plan, we observed that the plan’s goals typically were activity or output oriented rather than results oriented, and that the plan could also be improved by including more information on how resources would be used to achieve goals. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as the federal government’s central personnel agency, has a leading role in many of these areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) fiscal year (FY) 2000 annual performance plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) past work done by others and GAO has documented poor workforce planning in federal agencies that can hinder their movement toward performance-based management; (2) major human capital challenges are also emerging, such as the aging of the federal workforce, skills imbalances that arose during downsizing, and a highly competitive market for the kinds of talented employees federal agencies need to meet modern demands for efficient and effective services; (3) because OPM is the central management agency responsible for assisting the President and agencies in managing the workforce, OPM's leadership will be critical to addressing the government's human capital challenges; (4) OPM's FY 2000 annual performance plan provides a general picture of intended performance across the agency; (5) GAO found that the plan's performance goals address OPM's major programs and priorities; (6) however, OPM's plan could have been more useful to decisionmakers in some areas, if it contained cost-based performance measures to show how efficiently OPM performs certain operations and activities, such as processing civil service retirement payments; (7) OPM's annual performance plan includes a general discussion of strategies and resources the agency will use to achieve its goals; (8) for each of its goals, the plan discusses a strategy for achieving that goal; (9) for example, the plan discusses OPM's strategy to enhance its information security program by conducting internal and external evaluations of its systems; (10) OPM's FY 2000 annual performance plan provides a fuller discussion of its performance information than its FY 1999 annual performance plan but overall provides limited confidence that agency performance information will be credible; (11) although the plan discusses OPM's verification and validation of its performance measures, the discussion does not always provide assurance that the methods used will be reliable; (12) the plan proposes using survey results of a sample of human resources specialists as a key element in its measurement program, but the survey received only a 29 percent response rate; (13) in general, the lower the response rates the larger the uncertainty about the reliability and validity of the survey results; and (14) overall, OPM's FY 2000 annual performance plan represents a moderate improvement over the FY 1999 plan in that it addresses a number of weaknesses that GAO identified in its assessment of the FY 1999 plan. |
gao_GAO-14-496 | gao_GAO-14-496_0 | Background
Virtual currencies are financial innovations that have grown in number and popularity in recent years. Other virtual currencies may be used to purchase goods and services in the real economy and can be converted into government-issued currencies through virtual currency exchanges. A prominent example of a decentralized virtual currency system is bitcoin. The bitcoin computer protocol permits the storage of unique digital representations of value (bitcoins) and facilitates the assignment of bitcoins from one user to another through a peer-to-peer, Internet-based network. Federal Agencies Face Emerging Challenges in Carrying Out Responsibilities Related to the Use of Virtual Currencies
While federal agencies’ responsibilities with respect to virtual currency are still being clarified, some virtual currency activities and products have implications for the responsibilities of federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agencies. These challenges stem partly from certain characteristics of virtual currency systems, such as the higher degree of anonymity they provide compared with traditional payment systems and the ease with which they can be accessed globally to make payments and transfer funds across borders. Some Virtual Currency Activities and Products May Have Implications for Federal Agencies’ Responsibilities
Although virtual currencies are not government-issued and do not currently pass through U.S. banks, some activities and products that involve virtual currencies have implications for the responsibilities of federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Examples of illegitimate uses include money laundering and purchasing illegal goods and services using virtual currencies. SEC also regulates and has examination authority over investment advisers subject to its jurisdiction. Virtual Currencies Present Regulatory, Law Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Challenges
The emergence of virtual currencies presents challenges to federal agencies responsible for financial regulation, law enforcement, and consumer and investor protection. If these exchangers have customers located in the United States, they must comply with BSA and anti-money- laundering requirements. For example, law enforcement may have to rely upon cooperation from international partners to conduct investigations, make arrests, and seize criminal assets. Volatile prices. Agencies Have Taken Some Actions on Virtual Currencies, but Interagency Working Groups Have Not Focused on Consumer Risks
Federal financial regulators and law enforcement agencies have taken a number of actions related to the emergence of virtual currencies, including providing regulatory guidance, assessing anti-money-laundering compliance, and investigating crimes and violations that have been facilitated by the use of virtual currencies. Additionally, in March 2013, FinCEN issued guidance that clarified the applicability of BSA regulations to participants in certain virtual currency systems. Law Enforcement Agencies Have Taken Actions against Parties Alleged to Have Used Virtual Currencies to Facilitate Crimes
Law enforcement agencies have taken actions against parties involved in the illicit use of virtual currencies to facilitate crimes. Also in May 2013, law enforcement agencies shut down Liberty Reserve, a centralized virtual currency system that was allegedly designed and frequently used to facilitate money laundering and had its own virtual currency. Federal agencies have also begun to discuss virtual currency issues in existing interagency working groups that address broader topics such as money laundering, electronic crimes, and the digital economy, as follows:
The BSA Advisory Group—which is chaired by FinCEN and includes the prudential banking regulators, Treasury, federal and state law enforcement and regulatory agencies, and industry representatives— has addressed virtual currency issues in a number of ways. More recently, in February 2014, Mt. These bitcoins were worth more than $460 million when Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, these efforts may not be consistent with key practices that can benefit interagency collaboration, such as including all relevant participants to ensure that their knowledge, skills, and abilities contribute to the outcomes of the effort. As a result, future interagency efforts may not be in a position to address consumer risks associated with virtual currencies in the most timely and effective manner. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that federal interagency collaboration on virtual currencies addresses emerging consumer protection issues, we recommend that the Director of CFPB (1) identify which interagency working groups could help CFPB maintain awareness of these issues or would benefit from CFPB’s participation; and (2) decide, in coordination with the agencies already participating in these efforts, which ones CFPB should participate in. In its letter, CFPB concurred with our recommendation to identify and participate in pertinent interagency working groups addressing virtual currencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Virtual currencies—digital representations of value that are not government-issued—have grown in popularity in recent years. Some virtual currencies can be used to buy real goods and services and exchanged for dollars or other currencies. One example of these is bitcoin, which was developed in 2009. Bitcoin and similar virtual currency systems operate over the Internet and use computer protocols and encryption to conduct and verify transactions. While these virtual currency systems offer some benefits, they also pose risks. For example, they have been associated with illicit activity and security breaches, raising possible regulatory, law enforcement, and consumer protection issues. GAO was asked to examine federal policy and interagency collaboration issues concerning virtual currencies.
This report discusses (1) federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agency responsibilities related to the use of virtual currencies and associated challenges and (2) actions and collaborative efforts the agencies have undertaken regarding virtual currencies. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations, academic and industry research, and agency documents; and interviewed federal agency officials, researchers, and industry groups.
What GAO Found
Virtual currencies are financial innovations that pose emerging challenges to federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agencies in carrying out their responsibilities, as the following examples illustrate:
Virtual currency systems may provide greater anonymity than traditional payment systems and sometimes lack a central intermediary to maintain transaction information. As a result, financial regulators and law enforcement agencies may find it difficult to detect money laundering and other crimes involving virtual currencies.
Many virtual currency systems can be accessed globally to make payments and transfer funds across borders. Consequently, law enforcement agencies investigating and prosecuting crimes that involve virtual currencies may have to rely upon cooperation from international partners who may operate under different regulatory and legal regimes.
The emergence of virtual currencies has raised a number of consumer and investor protection issues. These include the reported loss of consumer funds maintained by bitcoin exchanges, volatility in bitcoin prices, and the development of virtual-currency-based investment products. For example, in February 2014, a Tokyo-based bitcoin exchange called Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy after reporting that it had lost more than $460 million.
Federal financial regulatory and law enforcement agencies have taken a number of actions regarding virtual currencies. In March 2013, the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance that clarified which participants in virtual currency systems are subject to anti-money-laundering requirements and required virtual currency exchanges to register with FinCEN. Additionally, financial regulators have taken some actions regarding anti-money-laundering compliance and investor protection. For example, in July 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged an individual and his company with defrauding investors through a bitcoin-based investment scheme. Further, law enforcement agencies have taken actions against parties alleged to have used virtual currencies to facilitate money laundering or other crimes. For example, in October 2013, multiple agencies worked together to shut down Silk Road, an online marketplace where users paid for illegal goods and services with bitcoins.
Federal agencies also have begun to collaborate on virtual currency issues through informal discussions and interagency working groups primarily concerned with money laundering and other law enforcement matters. However, these working groups have not focused on emerging consumer protection issues, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—whose responsibilities include providing consumers with information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions—has generally not participated in these groups. Therefore, interagency efforts related to virtual currencies may not be consistent with key practices that can benefit interagency collaboration, such as including all relevant participants to ensure they contribute to the outcomes of the effort. As a result, future interagency efforts may not be in a position to address consumer risks associated with virtual currencies in the most timely and effective manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CFPB take steps to identify and participate in pertinent interagency working groups addressing virtual currencies, in coordination with other participating agencies. CFPB concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-856 | gao_GAO-09-856_0 | Among other matters, the congressionally mandated review is to address the full range of ballistic missile threats to the United States, deployed forces, friends, and allies; the organization, discharge, and oversight of acquisition for ballistic missile defense programs; roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military departments in such programs; DOD’s process for determining the force structure and inventory objectives for ballistic missile defense programs; the near-term and long-term affordability and cost-effectiveness of such programs; and the role of international cooperation on missile defense in the ballistic missile defense policy and strategy of the United States. DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has Not Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements
DOD has identified its needs for establishing an initial and evolving ballistic missile defense capability, but lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the overall mix of elements and interceptors that it requires. However, DOD’s assessments of missile defense requirements prepared to date were limited in scope primarily because they were prepared for specific purposes. The Joint Staff, for example, conducted studies to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to- intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and the services have studied requirements for specific elements. Assessments of the threat and other risk assessments are also factors affecting overall requirements for the types and quantities of missile defense elements and interceptors. Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating Ballistic Missile Defense Elements
DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of the eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To defend against potentially catastrophic threats posed by rogue states armed with ballistic missiles, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military services had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them. However, the five remaining elements that have been put into operational use represent new capabilities designed expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes and for which new operational units had to be created. For example, the Army has faced personnel shortfalls to operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, which necessitated augmentation with personnel from the Army National Guard to overcome operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military services are taking steps to establish the forces needed for operations, but this may take years for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that operational units be in place before new elements are made available for use. In the future, emerging threats or crises could again require DOD to press developmental capabilities into use. However, without fully established organizations, personnel, and training, these units faced challenges in dealing with the rapid fielding of elements, the ongoing research and development activities involving fielded elements, and the lack of an established force structure for operating the BMDS command and control system. Lacking the solid foundation of a knowledge-based, comprehensive analytic basis for making decisions, which includes careful assessments of DOD’s overall ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, DOD will continue to lack crucial data it needs to make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic missile defense. Looking forward, reassessing this approach is important because DOD has several elements in development that may be fielded in coming years, including additional forward-based radars, the interceptors and radars that are planned for fielding in Europe, and new elements associated with ascent phase intercept. To determine the extent to which DOD has identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense elements that it requires, we identified, obtained, and reviewed key guidance, studies, and analyses from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, other combatant commands, and the military services. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing and rapidly fielding a global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of elements that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems. These elements are envisioned to be linked together to defend against a broad range of ballistic missile threats. In 2009, DOD began a broadly scoped review of missile defense policy and strategy intended to reassess the BMDS and set direction for the future. In response to congressional interest in missile defense requirements and operations, GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs and (2) established the units to operate elements that have been put into use. GAO reviewed key analyses, studies, plans, and other documents from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff; and interviewed officials from across DOD.
What GAO Found
DOD lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs. Such an analytic basis would include a comprehensive examination of the optimal mix of elements and interceptors needed to meet all of DOD's ballistic missile defense requirements. DOD studies prepared to date were completed for specific purposes, such as addressing regional threats. However, none of the studies have taken a comprehensive approach that addressed the full range of requirements. The Joint Staff conducted studies, for example, to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to-intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and the services have studied requirements for specific elements. Without a full assessment of its overall requirements, DOD lacks the information it needs to make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic missile defense. DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To rapidly field missile defenses, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military services had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them. Three of the eight elements were modifications to existing systems, like the Navy's Aegis ships, so units already existed to operate these modified elements. The five remaining elements--the midcourse defense system designed to defend the United States from long-range threats; the high-altitude, theater missile defense system; a powerful radar placed on a sea-based, movable platform; ground-based radars currently fielded in Japan and Israel; and the command and control system designed to link the BMDS together--were put into use before operational units were fully established. As a result, DOD has faced a number of challenges. For example, the Army faced personnel shortfalls to operate the midcourse defense system. These shortages affected the Army units' ability to support ongoing research and development activities and ultimately resulted in operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military services are taking steps to establish the needed forces, but this may take years for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that operational units be in place before new elements are made available for use. Looking ahead, several new elements are in development, like the radars and interceptors currently being considered for deployment in Europe, and emerging threats could again cause DOD to press those capabilities into use. Unless fully trained units are in place to support missile defense elements when they are made operational, DOD will continue to face uncertainties and operational risks associated with the elements. |
gao_GAO-17-637 | gao_GAO-17-637_0 | 1). Providers then receive payments from a mix of sources, depending on the transported patient’s insurance coverage. Specifically, according to Medicare data we analyzed, the median price providers charged for helicopter air ambulance transports increased 113 percent between 2010 and 2014. Due to a lack of such information, it is unclear to what extent patients with private health insurance are billed by providers for the difference between the air ambulance price charged and the insurer’s payment (balance billing). Various Factors May Play a Role in Air Ambulance Prices, but Data Are Limited
According to Selected Providers, Transport Costs and Volume, Payer Mix, and Competition May Play a Role in Increased Prices Charged
Selected providers reported that factors such as transport costs and volume, payer mix, and competition play a role in prices charged. Representatives from six of the eight providers we spoke to said that they adjust prices charged to receive sufficient revenue from private health insurance to account for lower-reimbursed transports. Providers have limited ability to control the payer mix—the proportion of transports reimbursed by, for example, Medicare or private health insurance—as they do not turn away patients based on insurance coverage. Lack of Data Limits Assessment of Factors Affecting Prices
Despite the above indications of factors that affect prices, an in-depth analysis of these factors is not possible due to lack of the following types of data. Stakeholders expressed mixed views on two of these actions—modifying the ADA and raising Medicare rates. None disagreed with the third action of increased data collection for the purposes of investigations—such as unfair or deceptive practices—or increased transparency regarding prices. In particular, DOT officials questioned the value of consumer disclosure requirements for the air ambulance industry given that patients have little to no choice or ability to “shop.” However, a representative from a group involved with consumer policy or research noted that it is important that the public understands the price variation that exists among air ambulance providers, along with any potential limits of their insurance coverage. Without such information, stakeholders may not be able to make decisions that serve the patients’ best interest. In fact, air ambulance prices have increased— approximately doubling between 2010 and 2014—and large providers report average prices charged of over $40,000 per transport in 2016. Despite media reports of balance billing, DOT officials note they have received very few air ambulance complaints since 2006, possibly because consumers do not think of DOT as a place to file such complaints. DOT recently modified its online form to include air ambulance complaints, but the website does not have instructions on how to file such a complaint. Furthermore, DOT lacks data needed to assess several key aspects of the industry, ranging from basic aspects—such as the composition of the industry by provider type, prices charged by provider, or number of overall air ambulance transports—to the more complex, such as the extent of contracting between providers and insurers or extent of balance billing to patients. Likewise, without information on the industry and pricing, stakeholders such as hospital staff have limited ability to make air ambulance decisions, such as selecting a provider that best serves the patient’s financial interests without compromising the medical benefits air ambulance transports provide. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase transparency and obtain information to better inform decisions on whether to investigate potentially unfair or deceptive practices in the air ambulance industry, we recommend the Secretary of Transportation take the following four actions:
Communicate a method to receive air ambulance-related complaints, including those regarding balance billing, such as through a dedicated web page that contains instructions on how to submit air ambulance complaints and includes information on how DOT uses the complaints. CMS and DOT provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. II), DOT agreed with three of our recommendations but did not concur with our recommendation that DOT assess available federal and industry data and determine what information could assist in the evaluation of future complaints or concerns regarding unfair or deceptive practices. As we note in the report, the federal standards for internal control state that management should identify information needed to achieve objectives and address risks. DOT has discretionary authority to investigate air ambulance providers but to date has not done so. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this work we examined: (1) what is known about the prices charged for air ambulance service, (2) what is known about the factors that affect the prices charged for air ambulance service, and (3) what actions, if any, selected stakeholders believe the federal government should take regarding air ambulance pricing. To describe what is known about air ambulance prices charged, we analyzed and assessed the reliability of information on prices charged and amount paid for 2010 and 2014 from Medicare claims data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and private health insurance data published by the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI). To describe stakeholder views on potential federal actions, we selected and interviewed 26 stakeholders, including representatives from: 8 air ambulance providers (3 large independent providers and 5 hospital- affiliated providers); 2 associations representing air ambulance providers; 6 groups familiar with air ambulance business and billing such as analysts and consultants; 4 states active in assessing air ambulance costs and prices charged; 2 associations of state officials; 2 associations representing health insurers; and 2 groups involved with consumer policy or research. | Why GAO Did This Study
Helicopter air ambulances reduce transport times for critically ill patients during life-threatening emergencies. Although patients typically have little to no choice over the service or provider given the often emergency nature of the transports, they might be billed for charges that have potentially devastating financial impacts. GAO was asked to review air ambulance pricing. This report examines: (1) the prices charged for air ambulance service, (2) the factors that affect prices, and (3) stakeholders' views on any actions the federal government could take to address air ambulance pricing. To answer these questions GAO analyzed 2 years of data (2010 and 2014—the latest available) on prices from CMS and a private health insurance database; interviewed 26 stakeholders, such as 8 air ambulance providers chosen to represent a range of types (hospital-affiliated and independent) and sizes; and interviewed DOT and CMS officials.
What GAO Found
Between 2010 and 2014, the median prices providers charged for helicopter air ambulance service approximately doubled, from around $15,000 to about $30,000 per transport, according to Medicare data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and private health insurance data. Air ambulance providers do not turn away patients based on their ability to pay and receive payments from many sources depending on the patient's coverage, often at rates lower than the price charged. For example, the Medicare median payment was $6,502 per transport in 2014. Air ambulance providers might bill a privately-insured patient for the difference between the price charged and the insurance payment—a practice called balance billing—when the provider lacks an in-network contract with the insurer. However, due to a lack of information it is unclear to what extent patients are balance billed.
Factors such as a provider's proportion of transports provided by payer and competition may play a role in air ambulance prices charged, but data to assess these factors are not available. For example, selected providers reported that they adjust prices to receive sufficient revenue from private health insurance to account for certain lower-paid transports, such as those covered by Medicare. Price increases may also be tied to the industry's characteristics such as apparent market concentration—the three large independent providers reported operating 73 percent of the industry's total helicopters in 2016. An analysis of these factors is not possible due to a lack of currently available data such as the number of transports or the industry's composition by provider.
Selected stakeholders we spoke to proposed actions to address air ambulance pricing issues, including (1) raising Medicare rates, (2) allowing state-level regulation of air ambulance prices, and (3) improving data collection for the purposes of investigations and transparency regarding prices. Stakeholders expressed mixed views on the first two proposals but none disagreed with the third. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify and communicate information needed to achieve objectives and address risks. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has discretionary authority to investigate potentially unfair practices in air transportation or the sale of air transportation, but has not exercised this authority in regards to helicopter air ambulances. DOT officials said they need additional information about the air ambulance industry. For example, DOT officials note that they have received few air ambulance complaints since 2006 and report that consumers may not think of DOT as the place to complain. Although DOT recently modified its online form to include air ambulance complaints, it has not communicated how to file complaints. Without doing so and obtaining more industry data, DOT is missing important information needed to put complaints into the context of the overall industry that could affect its assessment on whether to pursue investigations. Further, stakeholders such as hospital staff could benefit from greater transparency as they currently have limited ability to make air ambulance decisions that serve both the financial interests and medical needs of the patient.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of Transportation should: (1) communicate a method to receive air ambulance, including balance billing, complaints; (2) take steps to make complaint information publicly available; (3) assess available data and determine what information could assist in the evaluation of future complaints; and (4) consider air ambulance consumer disclosure requirements. DOT concurred with all but the third recommendation, stating additional information is not needed for such purposes. GAO stands by the recommendation, as discussed in this report. DOT and CMS also provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_RCED-98-249 | gao_RCED-98-249_0 | It supports the development of these technologies through its Office of Science and Technology (OST), within the Office of Environmental Management (EM). Specifically, we were asked to determine (1) to what extent innovative technologies developed by OST have been deployed (used) at DOE sites and how this rate of deployment compares with the rates of other government organizations that develop environmental technologies; (2) what obstacles exist to deploying innovative technologies at DOE sites; and (3) what EM is doing to overcome obstacles to deploying innovative technologies. We contacted the eight government programs whose research and development work was most comparable to OST’s in mission and scope, and two of these programs—EPA’s Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation Program and the Department of Defense’s Environmental Security Technology Certification Program—were able to provide deployment data for comparison with OST’s data. EM Has Deployed Less Than 20 Percent of OST’s Projects
While OST has initiated 713 technology development projects, we estimate that EM has deployed between 88 and 130 of these projects, for an overall deployment rate of 12 to 18 percent. In contrast, OST has reported that 152 projects have been deployed one or more times, for an overall deployment rate of 21 percent. Specifically, OST compiled deployment data quickly, in response to a congressional request that came 7 years after the program’s inception, because it had not previously maintained comprehensive data. Deployment Rate for OST Technologies Falls Between the Rates of Two Other Environmental Technology Programs
We compared the deployment rate for OST’s technologies with the deployment rates for technologies sponsored by EPA’s SITE program and the Department of Defense’s ESTCP. Deployment Rate Comparisons Between OST and Other Environmental Technology Developers May Have Limited Usefulness
Comparisons of OST’s deployment rate with the rates of other organizations must be viewed with caution when assessing how well EM is doing in deploying OST-developed technologies. OST Has Developed Innovative Technologies Without Sufficient User Involvement
Despite the progress that has been made, some obstacles internal to EM and OST operations continue to slow the deployment of innovative technologies. However, EM’s efforts only partially address the internal obstacles limiting deployment. In addition, EM has not yet improved developer-user cooperation for individual projects. Furthermore, EM has yet to determine how it will provide deployment assistance to cleanup sites to (1) more routinely provide technical assistance in selecting and implementing innovative technologies and (2) make modifications to completed technologies to better meet sites’ needs when it is cost-effective to do so. Recommendations
To increase the deployment of existing technologies and ensure that technologies developed in the future are used, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management to direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Science and Technology to establish centers of expertise for innovative technologies by using existing focus areas or another approach if needed and require that a representative from one of these centers participate in the technology selection process on each cleanup project; direct the cleanup programs and OST to (1) use existing data to identify OST-developed technologies that can be cost-effectively modified to meet sites’ needs and (2) identify funds to modify these technologies if needed; direct that the gates system be used rigorously and consistently as a decision-making tool for managing technology development projects and as a vehicle for increasing developer-user cooperation; use their annual performance expectations to hold EM headquarters managers responsible for increasing the deployment of innovative technology; and implement a system to verify the accuracy of future deployment data and label any existing data that have not been verified as an estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management's (EM) efforts to deploy innovative cleanup technologies, focusing on: (1) the extent to which innovative technologies developed by the Office of Science and Technology (OST) have been deployed at DOE sites and how this rate of deployment compares with the rates of other government organizations that develop environmental technologies; (2) what progress EM has made in overcoming obstacles to deploying innovative technologies at DOE cleanup sites; and (3) what EM is doing to increase the deployment of innovative technologies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OST has initiated 713 technology development projects and has reported that 152 projects have been deployed one or more times, for an overall deployment rate of 21 percent; (2) GAO found many errors in the office's deployment data and estimates that EM has deployed between 88 and 130 of these projects, for an overall deployment rate of 12 to 18 percent; (3) OST overstated its deployment information because it had not previously maintained comprehensive deployment data; compiled the data rapidly in response to congressional requests; and lacked procedures for compiling the data; (4) in comparison with the deployment rates of other programs that demonstrate environmental technologies--the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation Program and the Department of Defense's Environmental Security Technology Certification Program--OST's deployment rate for projects at comparable stages of development falls between the rates of these two programs; (5) however, comparisons of OST's deployment rate with the rates of other organizations' programs must be viewed with caution because no organization is fully comparable with OST, and the deployment rate is not the only possible measure of success for research and development programs; (6) as DOE's Environmental Management program has matured, its waste cleanup sites have made progress in overcoming some obstacles to implementing innovative technologies; (7) other obstacles that are internal to the operations of EM and its OST continue to slow the use of innovative technologies, including the lack of: (a) involvement by technology users in the development of cleanup technologies by OST; and (b) technical assistance by OST to help sites select and implement technologies; (8) after congressional hearings in May 1997, EM initiated changes in its organization and processes to increase the deployment of innovative technologies; (9) some of these initiatives address the internal obstacles limiting deployment; (10) however, the office has not yet improved developer-user cooperation in individual technology development projects; (11) OST does not consistently and rigorously use its existing decisionmaking process for managing the development of innovative technologies; and (12) EM has yet to determine how it will: (a) provide technical assistance to sites in selecting and implementing innovative technologies; and (b) make modifications to completed technologies to meet sites' specific needs and conditions. |
gao_GAO-02-786 | gao_GAO-02-786_0 | In general, we observed that the Army’s, Navy’s, and Marine Corps’ Parris Island barracks were in the worst physical condition. Our visits to the basic training locations confirmed that most of the barracks had significant or major deficiencies, but we found some apparent inconsistencies in the application of C-ratings to describe the condition of the barracks. Without adequate maintenance, facilities tend to deteriorate more rapidly. Some Improvements Have Been Made
While most barracks across the services had significant deficiencies, others were in better condition, primarily because they had recently been constructed or renovated. Military Services Have Different Approaches for Barracks’ Recapitalization
The services’ approaches to recapitalize their recruit barracks vary and are influenced by their overall priorities to improve all facilities. The Air Force has placed a high priority on renovating, rather than replacing its recruit barracks in the near-term. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense reports that is has been faced with difficulties adequately maintaining its facilities to meet mission requirements. Facilities have been aging and deteriorating as funds needed to sustain and recapitalize the facilities have fallen short of requirements. GAO's review of the services' condition assessments in conjunction with visits to the basic training locations showed that most barracks were in need of significant repair, although some barracks were in better condition than others.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the exteriors of each service's barracks were generally in good condition and presented an acceptable appearance, but the barracks' infrastructure often had persistent repair problems because of inadequate maintenance. The services' approaches to recapitalize their recruit barracks vary and are influenced by their overall priorities to improve all facilities. Although the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are addressing many of their recapitalization needs in the near-term, most of the Army's plans are longer term. |
gao_NSIAD-96-73 | gao_NSIAD-96-73_0 | NASA’s safety organization provides an independent channel for assessing shuttle flight safety. Interviews with key shuttle program officials, survey data, and our observations indicate that NASA has been successful in creating communication channels and an organizational culture that encourages people to discuss safety concerns and to bring those concerns to higher management if necessary. Not Complete Agreement on Type and Amount of Information Needed
While there was a high level of agreement that the current culture encourages and enables contractors and employees to discuss safety issues and concerns, there was not universal agreement about the kinds of risk information needed for final launch decisions. Some participants in our discussion groups expressed concern about the effect of continued cost reductions and the transition to contractor management of the program. However, NASA still relies primarily on qualitative methods to assess and prioritize significant shuttle risk. NASA uses a variety of methods to assess shuttle risk issues, and efforts are underway to increase the use of quantitative methods. Cost, lack of specific expertise, and lack of data are the reasons cited for limited use. NASA’s Databases Do Not Provide Sufficient Information for Quantitative Analysis
Another factor that has hindered development of quantitative methods of risk assessment is that NASA’s databases do not always provide timely, accessible, accurate, and complete information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) management of risk associated with space shuttle flights, focusing on NASA attempts to: (1) increase the flow and communication of risk information; and (2) use quantitative methods for assessing risk.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA has successfully created numerous formal and informal communication channels and an open organizational culture that encourages people to discuss safety concerns and to elevate unaddressed concerns to higher management levels; (2) while most personnel agreed that the current culture encourages discussions of safety concerns, there was not universal agreement about the kinds of risk information needed for final launch decisions; (3) some personnel expressed concerns about the effects of pending cost reductions and program changes on shuttle safety; (4) NASA primarily relies on qualitative methods to assess and prioritize significant shuttle risk; (5) costs, lack of expertise, and lack of data have hindered NASA progress in increasing its use of quantitative methods to assess shuttle safety risks; and (6) NASA databases do not always provide timely, accessible, accurate, and complete information to facilitate quantitative assessment or decisionmaking. |
gao_GAO-14-97 | gao_GAO-14-97_0 | Background
SSBCI provides direct support to participants for use in programs designed to increase access to credit for small businesses. Treasury has procedures for participants to apply for modifications and for its processing of modification approval requests. SSBCI Participants Have Used Funds at Varying Rates and a Number of Challenges Have Been Addressed
Between June 30, 2012, and June 30, 2013, SSBCI participants nearly quadrupled their overall use of SSBCI funds, but individual participants continue to use their funds at varying rates and for different types of programs. While initial challenges have mostly been addressed, participants continue to face ongoing challenges with using SSBCI funds, including reluctance from large banks to participate in the program. Variation among SSBCI participants’ programs. Treasury Uses Performance Measures to Manage SSBCI but Has Not Set Targets for All Measures
In 2012 we reported that Treasury had established performance measures for both the timeliness of program administration and the monitoring of program performance, which are listed in table 1. First, Treasury officials stated that they use the measure on the amount of SSBCI funds participants have used to adjust staff allocations, which has helped them to improve efficiency in program operations. To address these issues, Treasury has started to determine how it will evaluate the performance of SSBCI at the end of the program in 2017. In addition, because the SSBCI program is included as one of the programs that will help to meet a Cross-Agency Priority goal, obtaining input from the agencies involved in the working group on increasing access to capital for entrepreneurs and small businesses (Ex- Im, SBA, and USDA) could help to ensure that the evaluation is useful in measuring progress toward that goal. Further, our guidance on designing program evaluations encourages agencies to obtain input from external stakeholders, such as Congress, that are expected to be interested in the evaluation results. By seeking input from Congress on the types of information in which it is interested, Treasury can help ensure that it designs an evaluation that is useful for decision makers. Treasury officials stated that it did not develop these targets because, among other things, factors outside of the program’s control can have a significant impact on SSBCI’s outcomes. Targets for selected performance measures could help Treasury better manage SSBCI by identifying performance gaps and highlighting program areas that may need additional attention. In its written comments, Treasury agreed with our recommendations and stated that it has begun to take steps to implement both of them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) participants have used their SSBCI allocations and faced challenges in using the funds, (2) the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and program stakeholders have used outreach activities to promote use of the program and assessed the success of these efforts, and (3) Treasury has used performance measures and program evaluation to manage SSBCI. To examine the extent to which SSBCI participants faced challenges in using SSBCI funds, we reviewed reports from Treasury’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on participants’ usage of SSBCI funds; our 2011 and 2012 reports on SSBCI; and Treasury’s policies and procedures, including its policies on disbursing subsequent tranches of SSBCI funds and terminating the availability of participants’ SSBCI allocations.addition, we interviewed officials from Treasury and nine SSBCI In participants: Arizona; Iowa; Maryland; Missouri; Montana; New York; City of Carrington, North Dakota; Vermont; and Virginia. We identified relevant criteria on setting targets for performance measures in the federal internal control standards and leading practices for federal agencies’ performance management. Finally, we reviewed the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 to identify requirements for Treasury to evaluate SSBCI. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 created SSBCI within Treasury. The program provides direct funding to participants for programs that expand access to capital for small businesses. The act mandates that GAO conduct an annual audit of the program. GAO's first two reports examined Treasury's implementation of SSBCI and its processes for monitoring compliance and procedures for evaluating and communicating program outcomes. This third report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) participants have used their SSBCI allocations and faced challenges in using the funds, and (2) Treasury has used performance measures and program evaluation to manage SSBCI. GAO reviewed Treasury's SSBCI policies and procedures and participants' data on fund usage and interviewed officials from Treasury, eight states, and one municipality. GAO selected the states and municipality based on usage of SSBCI funds, the number of programs they implemented, and geographic dispersion, among other things.
What GAO Found
As of June 30, 2013, State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) participants--states, territories, and municipalities--had used $549 million of the $1.5 billion the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) allocated to them, nearly four times the amount used as of June 30, 2012. However, the rates at which participants have used funds continue to vary, as shown below. While initial challenges generally have been addressed, others remain. Participants' challenges with using funds at the start of the program resulted from some program policies not being finalized and low demand for some program types, among other things. Treasury and participants have since addressed many of these issues, but according to agency officials and others, participants will likely continue to face some challenges in using SSBCI funds. For example, some large lenders have been reluctant to partner with SSBCI participants because the variation in participants' programs makes it difficult for lenders to implement the program on a national basis, which has limited the program's reach into the small business lending market.
Treasury uses performance measures to manage SSBCI. For example, Treasury uses performance measures to adjust staff allocations and to identify participants that may need additional assistance. Although Treasury has set targets for program administration measures (for example, how long it takes the agency to approve participants' requests to modify their programs), it has not set targets for performance (for example, the amount of funds used over time). Federal internal control standards and performance management leading practices encourage agencies to set targets, where appropriate. Targets could help Treasury identify program areas needing improvement. Treasury has also recently started to determine how it will evaluate SSBCI's effectiveness and plans to form a working group of participants to help design the format of the evaluation. GAO guidance on designing evaluations encourages agencies to obtain input from external stakeholders, including Congress, that are expected to be interested in the results. By seeking input from external stakeholders early in the design phase, Treasury can help ensure that it designs an evaluation that is useful for decision makers and other agencies working to promote small business credit access.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Treasury set targets for selected measures to track SSBCI's performance and seek input from Congress and other federal agencies on what information will be useful in assessing SSBCI's effectiveness as Treasury designs its program evaluation. Treasury agreed with both of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1095T | gao_GAO-07-1095T_0 | The value of the derivative contract depends on the performance of the underlying asset—for example, crude oil or natural gas. Market participants monitor and analyze a myriad of information on the factors that currently affect and that they expect to affect the supply of and demand for energy commodities. Multiple Factors in the Derivatives and Physical Markets Have Impacted Energy Prices
Both derivatives and physical markets experienced a substantial amount of change from 2002 through 2006. These changes have been occurring simultaneously, and the specific effect of any one of these changes on energy prices is unclear. The Energy Futures Markets Experienced Rising Prices, High Volatility, Increased Trading Volume, and Growth in Some Types of Traders
Several recent trends in the futures markets have raised concerns among some market observers that these conditions may have contributed to higher physical energy prices. During this period, monthly average spot prices for crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil increased by over 200 percent, and natural gas spot prices increased by over 140 percent. At the same time, the annual historical volatilities—measured using the relative change in daily prices of energy futures—between 2000 and 2006 generally were above or near their long-term averages, although crude oil and heating oil declined below the average and gasoline declined slightly at the end of that period. Despite the lack of comprehensive energy-specific data on OTC derivatives, the recent experience of individual trading facilities further reveals the growth of energy derivatives trading outside of futures exchanges. Still others told us that while speculative trading in the futures market could contribute to short-term price movements in the physical markets, they did not believe it was possible to sustain a speculative “bubble” over time, because the two markets were linked and both responded to information about changes in supply and demand caused by such factors as the weather or geographical events. 2). As we have reported, refining capacity in the United States has not expanded at the same pace as the demand for gasoline. Some observers believe that higher energy prices were solely the result of supply and demand fundamentals, while others believe that increased futures trading activity contributed to higher prices. The relative effect of each of these changes remains unclear, however, because all of the changes were occurring simultaneously. Monitoring these trends and patterns in the future will be important in order to better understand their effects, protect the public, and ensure market integrity. CFTC Oversees Exchanges and Has Some Authority over Other Derivatives Markets
Energy products are traded on multiple markets, some of which are subject to varying levels of CFTC oversight and some of which are not. This difference in oversight has caused some market observers to question whether CFTC needs broader oversight authority. But in recent years two additional venues for trading energy futures contracts that are not subject to direct CFTC oversight have grown and become increasingly important—exempt commercial markets and OTC markets. However, traders in these markets are subject to the CEA’s antimanipulation and antifraud provisions, which CFTC has the authority to enforce. Also, exempt commercial markets must provide CFTC with data for certain contracts. CFTC conducts regular market surveillance and oversight of energy trading on NYMEX and other futures exchanges. CFTC officials have said that while they have reason to believe these off-exchange activities can affect prices determined on a regulated exchange, they also generally believe that the commission has sufficient authority over OTC derivatives and exempt energy markets. However, CFTC has recently begun to take steps to clarify its authority to obtain information about pertinent off-exchange transactions. CFTC generally believes that the commission has sufficient authority over OTC derivatives and exempt energy markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Energy prices for crude oil, heating oil, unleaded gasoline, and natural gas have risen substantially since 2002, generating questions about the reasons for the increase. Some observers believe that the higher energy prices were solely due to supply and demand fundamentals while others believe that increased futures trading activity may also have contributed to higher prices. This testimony highlights GAO's preliminary findings related to (1) trends and patterns in the futures and physical energy markets and the effect of these trends on energy prices and (2) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) regulatory and enforcement authority over derivatives markets. GAO analyzed futures and large trader reporting data; trading data obtained from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) for crude oil, heating oil, unleaded gasoline, and natural gas; and various other sources of energy-related data. GAO also analyzed relevant academic and other studies on the subject and interviewed market participants, experts, and officials at relevant federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Rising energy prices have been attributed to a variety of factors, and recent trends in the futures and physical markets highlight the changes that have occurred in both markets from 2002 through 2006. Specifically: (1) inflation-adjusted energy prices in both the futures and physical markets increased by over 200 percent during this period for three of the four commodities we reviewed; (2) volatility (a measurement of the degree to which prices fluctuate over time) in energy futures prices generally remained above historic averages during the beginning of the time period but declined through 2006 for three of the four commodities we reviewed; and (3) the number of noncommercial participants in the futures markets including hedge funds, has grown; along with the volume of energy futures contracts traded; and the volume of energy derivatives traded outside traditional futures exchanges. At the same time these changes were occurring in the futures markets for energy commodities, tight supply and rising demand in the physical markets pushed prices higher. For example, while global demand for oil has risen at high rates, spare oil production capacity has fallen since 2002, and increased political instability in some of the major oil-producing countries has threatened the supply of oil. Refining capacity also has not expanded at the same pace as the demand for gasoline. The individual effect of these collective changes on energy prices is unclear, as many factors have combined to affect energy prices. Monitoring these changes will be important to protect the public and ensure market integrity. Based on its authority under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), CFTC primarily focuses its oversight on the operations of traditional futures exchanges, such as NYMEX, where energy futures are traded. However, energy derivatives are also traded on other markets, namely exempt commercial markets and over-the-counter (OTC) markets--both of which have experienced increased volumes in recent years. Exempt commercial markets are electronic trading facilities that trade exempt commodities between eligible participants, and OTC markets involve eligible parties that can enter into contracts directly off-exchange. Both of these markets are exempt from general CFTC oversight, but they are subject to the CEA's antimanipulation and antifraud provisions and CFTC enforcement of those provisions. Because of these varying levels of CFTC oversight, some market observers question whether CFTC needs broader authority over all derivative markets. CFTC generally believes that the commission has sufficient authority over OTC derivatives and exempt energy markets. However, CFTC has recently taken additional actions to clarify its authority to obtain information about pertinent off-exchange transactions. |
gao_GAO-11-642T | gao_GAO-11-642T_0 | Third, states had to use at least 50 percent of Recovery Act funds to provide “additional subsidies” for projects in the form of principal forgiveness, grants, or negative interest loans (loans for which the rate of interest is such that the total payments over the life of the loans are less than the principal of the loans). All Recovery Act SRF Program Funds Have Been Awarded and Obligated, and With Some Exceptions, States Reported Supporting Major Infrastructure Projects and Helping Economically Disadvantaged Communities
Nationwide, the 50 states have awarded and obligated the almost $6 billion in Clean Water and Drinking Water SRF program funds provided under the Recovery Act and reported using the majority of these funds for sewage treatment infrastructure and drinking water treatment and distribution systems, according to EPA data. In the nine states we reviewed, states used these funds to pay for infrastructure projects that help to address major water quality problems, although state officials said that in some cases, Recovery Act requirements changed their priorities or the projects selected for funding. Nationwide, EPA Data Indicate States Used the Majority of Recovery Act Water Funds for Sewage Treatment Infrastructure and Drinking Water Treatment and Distribution Systems
As of March 30, 2011, states had awarded funds for contracts and obligated the $4 billion in Clean Water SRF program funds and $2 billion in Drinking Water SRF program funds provided under the Recovery Act. In the 2 years since the Recovery Act was passed, approximately 79 percent, or $3.1 billion, of the Clean Water SRF program funds and approximately 83 percent, or $1.7 billion, of the Drinking Water SRF program funds have been drawn down from the Treasury by states. Across the nation, the states have used the $6 billion in Recovery Act Clean and Drinking Water SRF program funds to support more than 3,000 water quality infrastructure projects. In addition to requiring that projects awarded funds be under contract within 1 year of the act’s passage, the Recovery Act required that states use at least 20 percent of their funds for “green” projects. Recovery Act Water Funds Generally Addressed Major Water Quality Problems in Nine States, Although Recovery Act Requirements Changed State Priorities or Projects
In the nine states we reviewed, Recovery Act Clean and Drinking Water SRF funding has been used to address the major clean and drinking water problems in the state. Although these higher-ranked projects did not receive Recovery Act funds, at least two states were able to fund these projects in other ways, such as through state grants or non-Recovery Act SRF program funds. The Recovery Act Funded Jobs, and Federal and State Efforts to Oversee the Recovery Act SRF Programs Continue
For the quarter ending December 2009 through the quarter ending in June 2010, the number of full-time equivalent jobs (FTE) paid for with Recovery Act SRF program funds increased each reporting quarter from about 6,000 to 15,000 quarterly FTEs for planning, designing, and building water projects, as shown in figure 5. To oversee Recovery Act projects and funds, EPA developed an oversight plan, as required by OMB. Officials in two of the nine states we reviewed noted that the goal of supporting green projects was not difficult to achieve because they had already identified green projects, but officials in four other states said that achieving the 20-percent green project goal was difficult to achieve, leading one official to suggest that green projects be encouraged without setting a fixed percentage of program funds. The fiscal years 2010 and 2011 appropriations for the Clean and Drinking Water SRF programs also continued the requirement to provide additional subsidies in the form of principal forgiveness, negative interest loans, or grants. State officials pointed out that when monies are not repaid into the revolving fund, the reuse of funds is reduced and the purpose of the revolving SRF program changes from primarily providing loans for investments in water infrastructure to providing grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) included $4 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Water State Revolving Fund (SRF) and $2 billion for the agency's Drinking Water SRF. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing review of clean and drinking water projects. It provides preliminary observations on (1) the status and use of Recovery Act SRF program funds nationwide and in nine selected states, (2) jobs funded by the Recovery Act SRF programs and federal and state efforts to oversee the programs, and (3) challenges, if any, that states have faced in implementing Recovery Act requirements. For this ongoing work, GAO is, among other things, obtaining and analyzing EPA nationwide data on the status of Recovery Act clean and drinking water funds and projects, as well as information from a nonprobability sample of nine states that it had not reviewed in previous bimonthly reports. These states represent all but one of EPA's 10 regions. GAO is also interviewing EPA and state officials about their experiences with the Recovery Act clean and drinking water funds
What GAO Found
Nationwide, the 50 states have awarded and obligated the almost $6 billion in Clean Water and Drinking Water SRF program funds provided under the Recovery Act and reported using the majority of these funds for sewage treatment infrastructure and drinking water treatment and distribution systems, according to EPA data. These funds supported more than 3,000 water quality infrastructure projects nationwide. Since the Recovery Act was passed, states have drawn down $3.1 billion (79 percent) of the Clean Water SRF program funds and $1.7 billion (83 percent) of the Drinking Water SRF program funds provided under the Recovery Act. States also met the act's requirements that at least (1) 20 percent of the funds provided be used to support "green" projects, such as those that promote energy or water efficiency, and (2) 50 percent of the funds provide additional subsidies in the form of loans for which the principal is forgiven, loans for which the repayment is less than the principal (negative interest loans), or grants. In the nine states GAO reviewed, Recovery Act funds have paid for 419 infrastructure projects that help to address major water quality problems, although state officials said that in some cases, Recovery Act requirements changed their priorities for ranking projects or the projects selected. For example, because some projects could not meet the act's requirement to have funds under contract by February 17, 2010, some states provided Recovery Act funds to lower-ranked projects. Some states provided funding to these priority projects in other ways, such as through state grants or non-Recovery Act SRF funds. In addition, although not required by the Recovery Act, the nine states used 24 percent of the funds they received to pay for projects in economically disadvantaged communities, the majority of which was provided as additional subsidies. States reported that the Recovery Act SRF programs funded an increasing amount of full-time equivalent (FTE) positions from the quarter ending December 2009 through the quarter ending June 2010, from 6,000 FTEs to 15,000 FTEs, declining to 6,000 FTEs for the quarter ending in March 2011 as projects were completed. EPA and the states are overseeing Recovery Act projects and funds using EPA's oversight plan, updated in June 2010 in response to recommendations GAO made to specify procedures for oversight. The fiscal year 2010 and 2011 appropriations for the SRF programs continue the green project and additional subsidy requirements. State officials GAO interviewed identified challenges in implementing these requirements for the Clean and Drinking Water SRF programs, including: (1) Encouraging green projects. Officials in some states said that the goal of supporting green projects is important but that the percent of funds specifically dedicated to green funds (20 percent) was difficult to achieve. (2) Providing subsidies. Officials in several of the nine states noted that when monies are not repaid into revolving funds to generate future revenue for these funds, the SRF program purpose changes from primarily providing loans for investments in water infrastructure to providing grants. |
gao_GAO-16-791T | gao_GAO-16-791T_0 | Progress Made Addressing Barriers to Conducting Voluntary Assessments and Sharing Information
DHS’s took steps to address barriers to conducting critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments and sharing information, in response to findings from our previous work. Specifically, DHS has made progress in the following areas: Determining why some industry partners do not participate in voluntary assessments. We found that various factors influence whether industry owners and operators of assets participate in these voluntary programs, but that DHS did not systematically collect data on reasons why some owners and operators of high-priority assets declined to participate in security surveys or vulnerability assessments. We concluded that collecting data on the reason for declinations could help DHS take steps to enhance the overall protection and resilience of those high-priority critical infrastructure assets crucial to national security, public health and safety, and the economy. In response to our recommendations, in October 2013 DHS developed and implemented a tracking system to capture and account for declinations. Guidance and Coordination to Address Potential Duplication and Gaps Needed for CI Vulnerability Assessment Activities
Our previous work identified a need for DHS vulnerability assessment guidance and coordination. Specifically, we found: Establishing guidance for areas of vulnerability covered by assessments. In a September 2014 report examining, among other things, the extent to which DHS is positioned to integrate vulnerability assessments to identify priorities, we found that the vulnerability assessment tools and methods DHS offices and components use vary with respect to the areas assessed depending on which DHS office or component conducts or requires the assessment. As a result, it was not clear what areas DHS believes should be included in a comprehensive vulnerability assessment. We recommended that DHS review its vulnerability assessments to identify the most important areas to be assessed, and determine the areas and level of detail that are necessary to integrate assessments and enable comparisons, and establish guidance, among other things. DHS agreed with our recommendation, and established a working group in August 2015 to address this recommendation and others we made. As we reported in September 2014, federal assessment fatigue could impede DHS’s ability to garner the participation of CI owners and operators in its voluntary assessment activities. DHS agreed with our recommendation, and as of March 2016 DHS had established a working group to address the recommendations from our report and planned to provide us with a status update in the summer of 2016. Addressing the potential for duplication, overlap, or gaps between and among the various efforts. As with the sharing of common assessment data, we found in our 2014 review of vulnerability assessments that DHS also lacks a department-wide process to facilitate coordination among the various offices and components that conduct vulnerability assessments or require assessments on the part of owners and operators. This could hinder the ability to identify gaps or potential duplication in DHS assessments. For example, PSAs may inform and invite CI partners to participate in these assessments, if the owner and operator of the asset agrees. As of March 2016, DHS has begun a process of identifying the appropriate level of guidance to eliminate gaps or duplication in methods and to coordinate vulnerability assessments throughout the department. We also recommended that DHS identify key CI security-related assessment tools and methods used or offered by SSAs and other federal agencies, analyze them to determine the areas of vulnerability they capture, and develop and provide guidance for what areas should be included in vulnerability assessments of CI that can be used by DHS and other CI partners in an integrated and coordinated manner. These efforts are ongoing and we will continue to monitor DHS’s progress in implementing these recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Protecting the security of CI is a top priority for the nation. CI includes assets and systems, whether physical or cyber, that are so vital to the United States that their destruction would have a debilitating impact on, among other things, national security or the economy. Multiple federal entities, including DHS, are involved in assessing CI vulnerabilities, and assessment fatigue could impede DHS's ability to garner the participation of CI owners and operators in its voluntary assessment activities.
This testimony summarizes past GAO findings on progress made and improvements needed in DHS's vulnerability assessments, such as addressing potential duplication and gaps in these efforts.
This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 2012 through October 2015 and recommendation follow-up conducted through March 2016. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, directives, and policies from selected programs. GAO interviewed officials responsible for administering these programs and assessed related data. GAO interviewed and surveyed a range of stakeholders, including federal officials, and CI owners and operators.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has shown the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing barriers to conducting voluntary assessments but guidance is needed for DHS's critical infrastructure (CI) vulnerability assessments activities and to address potential duplication and gaps. For example:
Determining why some industry partners do not participate in voluntary assessments . In May 2012, GAO reported that various factors influence whether CI owners and operators participate in voluntary assessments that DHS uses to identify security gaps and potential vulnerabilities, but that DHS did not systematically collect data on reasons why some owners and operators of high-priority CI declined to participate. GAO concluded that collecting data on the reason for declinations could help DHS take steps to enhance the overall security and resilience of high-priority CI crucial to national security, public health and safety, and the economy, and made a recommendation to that effect. DHS concurred and has taken steps to address the recommendation, including developing a tracking system in October 2013 to capture declinations.
Establishing guidance for areas of vulnerability covered by assessments. In September 2014, GAO reported that the vulnerability assessment tools and methods DHS offices and components use vary with respect to the areas of vulnerability—such as perimeter security—assessed depending on which DHS office or component conducts or requires the assessment. As a result it was not clear what areas DHS believes should be included in its assessments. GAO recommended that DHS review its vulnerability assessments to identify the most important areas of vulnerability to be assessed, and establish guidance, among other things. DHS agreed and established a working group in August 2015 to address this recommendation. As of March 2016 these efforts were ongoing with a status update expected in the summer of 2016.
Addressing the potential for duplication, overlap, or gaps between and among the various efforts . In September 2014, GAO found overlapping assessment activities and reported that DHS lacks a department-wide process to facilitate coordination among the various offices and components that conduct vulnerability assessments or require assessments on the part of owners and operators. This could hinder the ability to identify gaps or potential duplication in DHS assessments. GAO identified opportunities for DHS to coordinate with other federal partners to share information regarding assessments. In response to GAO recommendations, DHS began a process of identifying the appropriate level of guidance to eliminate gaps or duplication in methods and to coordinate vulnerability assessments throughout the department. GAO also recommended that DHS identify key CI security-related assessment tools and methods used or offered by other federal agencies, analyze them to determine the areas they capture, and develop and provide guidance for what areas should be included in vulnerability assessments of CI that can be used by DHS and other CI partners in an integrated and coordinated manner. DHS agreed, and as of March 2016, established a working group to address GAO recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen its assessment efforts. DHS agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them. GAO will continue to monitor DHS efforts to address these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-213 | gao_GAO-05-213_0 | As a result, federal agencies spend resources on similar food safety activities. Agencies Maintain Similar Inspection Training Programs
USDA and FDA provide similar training to their inspectors. The agencies’ ability to take full advantage of these agreements is hampered by the absence of adequate mechanisms for tracking them and, in some cases, by ineffective implementation of the provisions of these agreements. The other agencies did not have such databases. USDA and FDA Agreement to Exchange Information About Establishments That Are Subject to the Jurisdiction of Both Agencies and to Permit More Efficient Use of Resources
In 1999, USDA and FDA signed an interagency agreement to facilitate the exchange of information between the agencies about food-processing facilities that they both inspect. Industry and Other Stakeholders Disagree on the Significance of Overlap in the Federal Food Safety System and on How to Improve It
Industry associations, food-processing companies, consumer groups, and academic experts we contacted disagree on the significance of overlapping activities in the federal food safety system. However, most of these stakeholders agree that the laws and regulations governing the system should be modernized so that science and technological advancements can be used to more effectively and efficiently control current and emerging food safety hazards. These overlaps, they noted, occur primarily in dual jurisdiction establishments—those regulated by both USDA and FDA—or facilities inspected by both FDA and NMFS. Other interagency agreements designed to reduce overlap might also prove fruitful. To better use FDA’s limited inspection resources and leverage USDA’s resources, we recommend that, if appropriate and cost effective, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, as authorized under the Pubic Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, enter into an agreement to commission USDA inspectors to carry out FDA’s inspection responsibilities for food establishments that are under the jurisdiction of both agencies. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Scope and Methodology
To identify overlaps that may exist in the federal food safety system, we collected fiscal year 2003 budget data for food safety-related activities from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). We defined the categories of food safety activities into the following program functions: Monitoring/Surveillance: activities related to the monitoring of foodborne illness or disease, as well as monitoring the agents of illness in the food supply, including the collection of baseline data for contaminants; Inspection/Enforcement: activities related to ensuring compliance with agency food safety regulations, including premarket application or petition approval; Education/Outreach: activities related to communicating food safety- related information or guidance to the public, industry, or agencies’ other clients; Research: activities related to the study of food safety-related topics, which support agency policy decisions; Risk assessment: activities related to evaluation of the likelihood and severity of an adverse event (e.g., illness or death) on the public health as a result of the likelihood of exposure to a particular hazard; Food security: activities related to preparing for and responding to deliberate attacks on the food supply; Administration: supporting activities that enable the agencies to perform their food safety responsibilities. GAO Comments
1. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has documented many problems resulting from the fragmented nature of the federal food safety system and recommended fundamental restructuring to ensure the effective use of scarce government resources. In this report, GAO (1) identified overlaps in food safety activities at USDA, FDA, EPA, and NMFS; (2) analyzed the extent to which the agencies use interagency agreements to leverage resources; and (3) obtained the views of stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Several statutes give responsibility for different segments of the food supply to different agencies to ensure that the food supply is safe. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have the primary responsibility for regulating food safety, with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) also involved. In carrying out their responsibilities, with respect to both domestic and imported food, these agencies spend resources on a number of overlapping activities, such as inspection/enforcement, training, research, or rulemaking. For example, both USDA and FDA conduct similar inspections at 1,451 dual jurisdiction establishments--facilities that produce foods regulated by both agencies. Under authority granted by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, FDA could authorize USDA inspectors to inspect these facilities, but it has not done so. Furthermore, USDA and FDA maintain separate training programs on similar topics for their inspectors that could be shared. Ultimately, inspection and training resources could be used more efficiently. GAO identified 71 interagency agreements that the agencies entered into to better protect public health and to coordinate their food safety activities. However, the agencies have weak mechanisms for tracking these agreements that, in some cases, lead to ineffective implementation. Specifically, USDA and FDA are not fully implementing an agreement to facilitate the exchange of information about dual jurisdiction establishments, which both agencies inspect. In addition, FDA and NMFS are not implementing an agreement designed to enable each agency to discharge its seafood responsibilities effectively. GAO spoke with selected industry associations, food companies, consumer groups, and academic experts, and they disagree on the extent of overlap and on how best to improve the food safety system. Most of these stakeholders agreed that laws and regulations should be modernized to more effectively and efficiently control food safety hazards, but they differed about whether to consolidate food safety functions into a single agency. |
gao_GAO-06-910T | gao_GAO-06-910T_0 | Background
SAFETEA-LU authorized over $52 billion for federal transit programs, including the New Starts and JARC programs, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009. SAFETEA-LU authorized $7.9 billion for the New Starts program and $727 million for the JARC program. Both of these programs are managed by FTA. The New Starts program is a discretionary grant program for investments in new fixed-guideway projects. 1). JARC is intended to increase collaboration among transit agencies, local human service agencies, nonprofit organizations, and others and to improve the mobility of low-income individuals seeking work. SAFETEA-LU’s Changes to the New Starts Program Range from Identifying New Evaluation Criteria to Establishing the Small Starts Program
SAFETEA-LU made changes to the New Starts program that range from identifying new evaluation criteria to establishing the Small Starts program. FTA has taken some initial steps in implementing these changes, including issuing an ANPRM for the Small Starts program and guidance for the New Starts program, both in January 2006. The Small Starts program is a new component of the New Starts program and is intended to expedite and streamline the application and review process for small projects. The transit community, however, questioned whether the program, as outlined in the ANPRM, would streamline the process. In its January 2006 guidance, FTA also identified and sought public input on possible changes to the New Starts program that would affect traditional New Starts projects, or large starts, such as revising the evaluation process to incorporate the new evaluation criteria identified by SAFETEA-LU. FTA has taken some initial steps in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes. SAFETEA-LU Transformed the JARC Program from a Discretionary to a Formula-based Program
SAFETEA-LU made a number of changes to the JARC program, the most notable of which was the creation of a formula to distribute JARC funds. Other JARC changes resulting from SAFETEA-LU include the ability to use a portion of JARC funds for planning activities and the removal of a restriction on the JARC funding available for reverse commute projects, which are designed to help individuals in urban areas access suburban employment opportunities. FTA has worked to develop guidance to help JARC recipients implement these changes by soliciting comments and input through program notices and listening sessions beginning in November 2005. FTA plans to solicit comments on the draft final guidance and issue final guidance for JARC later this year. Transparency, Communication, and Accountability Issues Will Continue to Be Important
Our past work suggests that transparency, communication, and accountability issues will be important as FTA moves forward in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes to the New Starts and JARC programs. Since 1998, we have issued numerous reports on these programs, and many of the reports contained recommendations to FTA on ways to improve the implementation of these programs. SAFETEA-LU addressed some of these issues, and FTA has also taken steps to resolve some of them. Nevertheless, given the number of changes that are being made to both programs, continued focus on improving transparency, communication, and accountability will be important. Typically, these cases dealt with FTA’s decisions not to seek public input on proposed policy changes before they were implemented. SAFETEA-LU addressed our past concerns about the transparency of the New Starts program by requiring FTA to publish for notice and comment any proposals that make significant changes to the New Starts program. Appendix I: FTA’s Proposed Changes to the New Starts Program
In its January 2006 guidance, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) identified possible changes to the New Starts program in response to the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Job Access and Reverse Commute: Program Status and Potential Effects of Proposed Legislative Changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorized a significant level of investment--over $52 billion--for federal transit programs. SAFETEA-LU also added new transit programs and made changes to existing programs, including the New Starts and Job Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) programs. The New Starts program is a discretionary grant program for public transportation capital projects. The JARC program is intended to improve the mobility of low-income individuals seeking work. SAFETEA-LU authorized $8.6 billion for these two programs. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) manages both of these programs. This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary findings on the (1) changes SAFETEA-LU made to the New Starts program, (2) changes SAFETEA-LU made to the JARC program, and (3) issues that may be important as FTA moves forward with implementing the act. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed FTA officials, sponsors of New Starts projects, and representatives from industry associations and reviewed FTA's guidance on the New Starts and JARC programs and federal statutes, among other things.
What GAO Found
The changes SAFETEA-LU made to the New Starts program range from establishing the Small Starts program to introducing new evaluation criteria. FTA has taken some initial steps in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes, including issuing an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) for the Small Starts program and guidance for the New Starts program in January 2006. The Small Starts program is intended to offer small projects an expedited and streamlined application and review process; however, the transit community has questioned whether the Small Starts program, as outlined in the ANPRM, would provide such a process. FTA's guidance for the New Starts program identified and sought public input on possible changes to the program that would affect traditional New Starts projects, or large starts, such as revising the evaluation process to incorporate the new criteria identified by SAFETEA-LU. SAFETEA-LU also made a number of changes to the JARC program. One key change was to change JARC from a discretionary to a formula-based program, which provides funds to states and large urbanized areas for JARC projects. Other SAFETEA-LU changes include allowing JARC recipients to use a portion of funds for planning activities and removing a limit on the amount of funds available for reverse commute projects. To implement these changes, FTA solicited comments and input through public listening sessions and program notices. FTA has released interim guidance for fiscal year 2006, is currently developing draft final guidance for the JARC program, and plans to issue final guidance later this year. GAO's past work suggests that transparency, communication, and accountability issues will be important as FTA moves forward in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes to the New Starts and JARC programs. Since 1998, GAO has issued numerous reports on these programs, and many of the reports contained recommendations to FTA on ways to improve the implementation of these programs. For example, GAO has reported that FTA could increase the transparency of the New Starts program by obtaining public input on proposed policy changes before they are implemented. SAFETEA-LU addressed some of these issues, and FTA has also taken steps to resolve some of them. For example, SAFETEA-LU requires FTA to publish for notice and comment any proposals that make significant changes to the New Starts program. Nevertheless, given the number of changes that are being made to both programs, continued focus on efforts to improve transparency, communication, and accountability will be important. FTA officials provided technical comments on a draft of this testimony, which were incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-548 | gao_GAO-17-548_0 | Shipyard Facilities and Equipment Are in Poor Condition
Although the Navy has committed to increasing shipyard capital investment and implementing improvement plans, the physical condition of the shipyards’ facilities remains poor according to Navy data, and the cost to address restoration and modernization backlogs is increasing. For example, we estimate that it will take at least 19 years to clear the backlog (through fiscal year 2036), 6 years longer than the Navy estimated in 2013. The average age of capital equipment at the shipyards exceeds its expected useful life, and the overall condition of this equipment may be deteriorating. Shipyard Facilities Are in Poor Condition
GAO’s analysis of data on Navy facilities found that the average rating for the overall condition of facilities at the Navy’s four shipyards remains poor. Given the current average funding levels for capital facilities that the shipyards have received from the Navy of approximately $260 million per year, we calculated that it would take the Navy at least 19 years (through fiscal year 2036) to eliminate the $4.86 billion backlog of facilities restoration and modernization that the shipyards faced at the end of fiscal year 2016. Shipyard Capital Facilities and Equipment Are Not Fully Meeting the Navy’s Operational Needs and Will Likely Not Support Projected Operational Needs
The shipyards’ capital facilities and equipment are not fully meeting the Navy’s operational needs, in part due to their condition. Maintenance delays partially attributable to inadequate facilities and equipment at the shipyards have led to thousands of lost operational days for submarines and aircraft carriers over the last 16 fiscal years. Our analysis shows that facilities and equipment in poor condition can contribute to maintenance delays. These overruns in maintenance periods resulted in at least 1,300 lost operational days—days that a ship is not available for operations—for aircraft carriers and about 12,500 days for submarines during fiscal years 2000 through 2016 (see figure 7). The Navy projects that the shipyards will be unable to support 73—or about one-third—of 218 maintenance periods planned for the shipyards over the next 23 years, including 5 aircraft carrier and 50 submarine maintenance periods. The Navy’s Capital Investment Approach Is Not Fully Addressing the Shipyards’ Challenges
Though the Navy has developed detailed plans for capital investment in facilities and equipment at the shipyards that attempt to prioritize their investment strategies, this approach does not fully address the shipyards’ challenges, in part because the plans are missing key elements. However, without adopting a management approach for its capital investment needs that includes key results-oriented elements, the Navy risks continued deterioration at its shipyards, hindering its ability to efficiently and effectively support Navy readiness over the long term. The Navy’s Capital Investment Plans Lack Key Elements of a Results-Oriented Approach
Though the Navy’s capital investment approach has resulted in the development of three capital investment plans, those plans are missing key elements, including the development of analytically-based goals that would help guide long-term planning, a full identification of the shipyards’ resource needs, metrics that would allow the Navy to assess the effectiveness of its capital investment spending in supporting the ability of the shipyards to meet operational needs, regular management reviews of progress, and reporting on progress to key Navy decision makers and Congress. On July 6, 2017, the House Armed Services Committee released report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. (Recommendation 3)
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. Appendix II: Condition and Performance of the Individual Naval Shipyards
There are four Navy-operated shipyards: Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy's four public shipyards—Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility—are critical to maintaining fleet readiness and supporting ongoing operations involving the Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. The condition of these facilities affects the readiness of the aircraft carrier and submarine fleets. Senate Report 114-255, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to examine the capital investment in and performance of the Navy's shipyards. GAO evaluated (1) the state of the naval shipyards' capital facilities and equipment, (2) the extent to which shipyard capital facilities and equipment support the Navy's operational needs, and (3) the extent to which the Navy's capital investment plans for facilities and equipment are addressing shipyard challenges. GAO reviewed data from fiscal years 2000 through 2016 on shipyard capital investment and performance and the age and condition of facilities and equipment; reviewed Navy guidance; visited the shipyards; and interviewed Navy and shipyard officials.
What GAO Found
Although the Navy committed to increased capital investment and developed an improvement plan in 2013, the shipyards' facilities and equipment remain in poor condition. GAO's analysis of Navy shipyard facilities data found that their overall physical condition remains poor. Navy data show that the cost of backlogged restoration and maintenance projects at the shipyards has grown by 41 percent over five years, to a Navy-estimated $4.86 billion, and will take at least 19 years (through fiscal year 2036) to clear. Similarly, a Navy analysis shows that the average age of shipyard capital equipment now exceeds its expected useful life.
Partly as a result of their poor condition, the shipyards have not been fully meeting the Navy's operational needs. In fiscal years 2000 through 2016, inadequate facilities and equipment led to maintenance delays that contributed in part to more than 1,300 lost operational days—days when ships were unavailable for operations—for aircraft carriers and 12,500 lost operational days for submarines (see figure). The Navy estimates that it will be unable to conduct 73 of 218 maintenance periods over the next 23 fiscal years due to insufficient capacity and other deficiencies.
Though the Navy has developed detailed plans for capital investment in facilities and equipment at the shipyards that attempt to prioritize their investment strategies, this approach does not fully address the shipyards' challenges, in part because the plans are missing key elements. Missing elements include analytically-based goals and metrics, a full identification of the shipyards' resource needs, regular management reviews of progress, and reporting on progress to key decision makers and Congress. For example, the Navy estimates that it will need at least $9.0 billion in capital investment over the next 12 fiscal years, but this estimate does not account for all expected costs, such as those for planning and modernizing the shipyards' utility infrastructure. Unless it adopts a comprehensive, results-oriented approach to addressing its capital investment needs, the Navy risks continued deterioration of its shipyards, hindering its ability to efficiently and effectively support Navy readiness over the long term.T
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Navy develop a comprehensive plan to guide shipyard capital investment, conduct regular management reviews, and report to Congress on progress in addressing the shipyards' needs. DOD concurred with all 3 recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-170 | gao_GAO-11-170_0 | DOD classified the separation of 2 servicemembers (less than 1 percent) as “bad conduct,” which is a type of punitive separation applicable to enlisted personnel only. Differences between the Current and Previous GAO Report
In 2005, we reported on the number of servicemembers separated under the policy who held skills in critical occupations and important foreign languages and the costs of recruiting and training replacements for servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy for the period covering fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2003. Some Servicemembers Separated under the Homosexual Conduct Policy Held Skills in Critical Occupations or Important Foreign Languages
Based on our analysis of DMDC data, 3,664 servicemembers were separated under the homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004 through 2009, and based on our analysis of information provided by the services, 1,458 (40 percent) of these servicemembers held skills in a critical occupation, an important foreign language, or both, as determined by us and the services. According to our analysis, 7 servicemembers held a critical occupation and also held an important foreign language skill. The reported number of separated Navy and Air Force servicemembers who held skills in critical occupations could be an underestimation. Certain Costs Associated with Administering DOD’s Homosexual Conduct Policy Can Be Calculated
Using available DOD cost data, we calculated that it cost DOD approximately $193.3 million ($52,800 per separation) in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars to separate and replace the 3,664 servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. This figure represents about $185.6 million in recruiting and training costs for replacing servicemembers separated under the policy and about $7.7 million in certain administrative costs for which we were able to obtain data. In calculating the services’ costs to recruit and train replacements, we used variable costs and excluded fixed costs to the extent possible because, according to service officials, there would likely be no significant increase in fixed costs when recruiting and training a relatively small number of replacement personnel. However, each of the services tracks and maintains data in different ways, which in some cases affected their ability to provide us with only variable costs. For example, while the Army and Air Force were able to provide us with variable recruiting and training costs, the Navy was not able to provide variable recruiting and training costs, and the Marine Corps was not able to provide variable training costs. The Navy explained that it was not able to provide this information because changes in separation processes from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 prevented Navy officials from providing an accurate administrative cost estimate in time for the data to be included in our analyses. This calculation represents about 76 percent of the total calculated replacement cost associated with separating servicemembers under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy. To the extent that recruiting and training cost data provided by the services contain fixed costs, this would result in an overestimation of replacement costs. Administrative Costs Could Be Estimated from Data Provided by Three of the Services
The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps were able to provide estimates on the administrative costs associated with separating servicemembers under DOD’s homosexual conduct policy. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD did not have any comments on the report. While the Air Force was able to provide the occupational specialties eligible for enlistment bonuses from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, the Air Force was unable to provide the occupational specialties eligible for enlistment bonuses in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 because the Air Force’s data were incomplete. We interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the offices within the services that are responsible for determining foreign language requirements and administering bonus programs. Because the Navy did not provide data on administrative costs, our calculation of these costs is an underestimation of DOD’s likely total administrative costs. We were unable to determine the extent of the overestimation of replacement costs, the underestimation of the administrative costs, or the resulting net impact on our calculation of the overall total cost. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 1994 through 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) separated over 13,000 active military servicemembers under its homosexual conduct policy. These separations represent about 0.37 percent of the 3.6 million members separated for all reasons, including expiration of terms of service and retirement. In 2005, GAO reported on the number of separated servicemembers under DOD's homosexual conduct policy who held critical skills and the costs associated with administering the policy from fiscal years 1994 through 2003. GAO was asked to examine data from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 to determine (1) the extent to which the policy has resulted in the separation of servicemembers with skills in critical occupations and important foreign languages and (2) the services' costs for certain activities associated with administering the policy. GAO obtained and analyzed DOD personnel and cost data; examined DOD regulations and policy documents; and conducted interviews with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and each of the military services. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD did not have any comments on the report.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's analysis of Defense Manpower Data Center data, 3,664 servicemembers were separated under DOD's homosexual conduct policy from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Of the 3,664 separations, 1,458 of these separated servicemembers held a critical occupation or an important foreign language skill as determined by GAO and the services. More specifically, 1,442 (39 percent) of the servicemembers separated under the policy held critical occupations, such as infantryman and security forces, while 23 (less than 1 percent) of the servicemembers held skills in an important foreign language, such as Arabic or Spanish. Seven separated servicemembers held both a critical occupation and an important foreign language skill. However, the number of separated servicemembers with critical occupations could be an underestimation because of a number of factors. For example, the Air Force provided the occupations eligible for enlistment bonuses from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, but could not provide this information for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 because the Air Force's data were incomplete. Using available DOD cost data, GAO calculated that it cost DOD about $193.3 million ($52,800 per separation) in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars to separate and replace the 3,664 servicemembers separated under the homosexual conduct policy. This $193.3 million comprises $185.6 million in replacement costs and $7.7 million in administrative costs. The cost to recruit and train replacements amounted to about $185.6 million. In calculating these costs, GAO included variable costs, such as recruiting bonuses, and excluded fixed costs, such as salaries and buildings, to the extent possible because according to service officials there would likely be no significant increase in fixed costs when recruiting and training a relatively small number of replacement personnel. Each of the services tracks and maintains data in different ways, which in some cases affected their ability to provide GAO with only variable costs. For example, while the Army and Air Force could disaggregate variable and fixed recruiting and training costs, the Navy could not disaggregate variable and fixed recruiting and training costs, and the Marine Corps could not disaggregate variable and fixed training costs. To the extent that recruiting and training cost data provided by the services contain fixed costs, this is an overestimation of replacement costs. Administrative costs amounted to about $7.7 million and include costs associated with certain legal activities, such as board hearings, and nonlegal activities, such as processing separation paperwork. The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps provided GAO with administrative cost estimates; however, Navy officials explained that changes in separation processes from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 prevented them from providing an accurate administrative cost estimate in time for the data to be included in GAO's analyses. Because the Navy did not provide these data, GAO's calculation is an underestimation of DOD's likely total administrative costs. Because of data limitations, GAO was unable to determine the extent of the overestimation of the replacement costs, the underestimation of the administrative costs, or the resulting net impact on GAO's total calculations. |
gao_GAO-06-702T | gao_GAO-06-702T_0 | Students and employees from foreign countries have pursued STEM degrees and worked in STEM occupations in the United States as well. The Proportion of Students Obtaining Degrees in STEM Fields Has Fallen, and Teacher Quality and High School Preparation Were Cited as Influential Factors
From the 1994–1995 academic year to the 2003–2004 academic year, the number of graduates with STEM degrees increased, but the proportion of students obtaining degrees in STEM fields fell. Teacher quality, academic preparation, collegiate degree requirements, and the pay for employment in STEM fields were cited by university officials and Education as factors affecting the pursuit of degrees in these fields. Total Number of Graduates with STEM Degrees Increased, but Numbers Decreased in Some Fields, and Proportions of Minority Graduates at the Master’s and Doctoral Levels Did Not Change
The number of graduates with degrees in STEM fields increased from approximately 519,000 to approximately 578,000 from the 1994–1995 academic year to the 2003–2004 academic year. STEM Employment Rose in Math and Science, but There Is No Evidence of an Increase in Engineering or Technology
Although the total number of STEM employees increased from 1994 to 2003, particularly in mathematics and computer science, there was no evidence that the number of employees in engineering and technology- related fields did. STEM Employment Rose Relative to Non-STEM Employment, but in STEM Fields the Proportion of Women Remained about the Same, Minorities Continued to be Underrepresented, and the Number of Foreign Workers Declined
From 1994 to 2003, employment in STEM fields increased from an estimated 7.2 million to an estimated 8.9 million—representing a 23 percent increase, as compared to a 17 percent increase in non-STEM fields. The estimated number of minorities employed in the STEM fields as well as the proportion of total STEM employees they constituted increased, but African-American and Hispanic employees remained underrepresented relative to their percentages in the civilian labor force. In recent years, these numbers have declined in certain fields. Key Factors Affecting STEM Employment Decisions Include Mentoring for Women and Minorities and Opportunities Abroad for Foreign Employees
University officials and congressional commissions noted the important role that mentors play in encouraging employment in STEM fields and that this was particularly important for women and minorities. Furthermore, coordination among the federal STEM education programs has been limited. Federal Civilian Agencies Reported Spending Billions for Over 200 STEM Education Programs in Fiscal Year 2004 and that Evaluations Were Completed or Under Way for About Half
Officials from 13 federal civilian agencies reported that approximately $2.8 billion was spent in fiscal year 2004 on 207 STEM education programs. For example, it had surveyed federal agency education programs designed to increase the participation of women and underrepresented minorities in STEM studies, and it had coordinated the Excellence in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education Week activities, which provide an opportunity for the nation’s schools to focus on improving mathematics and science education. Congress also established an Academic Competitiveness Council in passing the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. To help improve the trends in the numbers of graduates and employees in STEM fields, university officials and others made several suggestions, such as increasing the federal commitment to STEM education programs. However, before expanding the number of federal programs, it is important to know the extent to which existing STEM education programs are appropriately targeted and making the best use of available federal resources—in other words, these programs must be evaluated—and a comprehensive evaluation of federal programs is currently nonexistent. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is a world leader in scientific and technological innovation. To help maintain this advantage, the federal government has spent billions of dollars on education programs in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields for many years. However, concerns have been raised about the nation's ability to maintain its global technological competitive advantage in the future. This testimony is based on our October 2005 report and presents information on (1) trends in degree attainment in STEM- and non-STEM-related fields and factors that may influence these trends, (2) trends in the levels of employment in STEM- and non-STEM- related fields and factors that may influence these trends, and (3) federal education programs intended to support the study of and employment in STEM-related fields. For this report, we analyzed survey responses from 13 civilian federal departments and agencies; analyzed data from the Departments of Education and Labor; interviewed educators, federal agency officials, and representatives from education associations and organizations; and interviewed students.
What GAO Found
While postsecondary enrollment has increased over the past decade, the proportion of students obtaining degrees in STEM fields has fallen. In academic year 1994-1995, about 519,000 students (32 percent) obtained STEM degrees. About 578,000 students obtained STEM degrees in academic year 2003-2004, accounting for 27 percent of degrees awarded. Despite increases in enrollment and degree attainment by women and minorities at the graduate level, the number of graduate degrees conferred fell in several STEM-related fields from academic year 1994-1995 to academic year 2003-2004. College and university officials and students most often cited subpar teacher quality and poor high school preparation as factors that discouraged the pursuit of STEM degrees. Suggestions to encourage more enrollment in STEM fields include increased outreach and mentoring. The past decade has seen an increase in STEM employees, particularly in mathematics and computer science. From 1994 to 2003, employment in STEM fields increased by an estimated 23 percent, compared to 17 percent in non-STEM fields. Mathematics and computer science showed the highest increase in STEM-related employment, and employment in science-related fields increased as well. However, in certain STEM fields, including engineering, the number of employees did not increase significantly. Further, while the estimated number of women, African-Americans, and Hispanic-Americans employed in STEM fields increased, women and minorities remained underrepresented relative to their numbers in the civilian labor force. The number of foreign workers employed in the United States has fluctuated, experiencing declines in 2002 and 2003. Key factors affecting STEM employment decisions include mentoring for women and minorities and opportunities abroad for foreign employees. Thirteen federal civilian agencies spent approximately $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2004 to fund over 200 programs designed to increase the numbers of students in STEM fields and employees in STEM occupations and to improve related educational programs. The funding reported for individual STEM education programs varied significantly, and programs most commonly provided financial support to students or infrastructure support to institutions. However, only half of these programs had been evaluated or had evaluations underway, and coordination among STEM education programs was limited. It is important to know the extent to which existing STEM education programs target the right people and the right areas and make the best use of available resources. Since our report was issued in October 2005, Congress, in addition to establishing new grants to encourage students from low-income families to enroll in STEM fields, established an Academic Competitiveness Council to identify, evaluate, coordinate, and improve federal STEM programs. |
gao_GAO-17-318 | gao_GAO-17-318_0 | Additionally, according to FSOs we interviewed, both language proficiency and gaps in proficiency have, in some cases, affected State’s ability to, for example, properly adjudicate visa applications, effectively communicate with foreign audiences, and perform other critical diplomatic duties. State Has Made Some Progress in Improving Foreign Language Proficiency since 2008
The percentage of overseas LDPs staffed by FSOs who did not meet the positions’ language proficiency requirements has decreased since October 2008 (see table 2). State Reviews Language Proficiency Requirements Every 3 Years, but Extent to Which This Process Addresses Posts’ Reported Needs Is Unclear
State Determines Language Proficiency Requirements Primarily through Triennial Review of Existing LDPs
According to State officials, State conducts a review of all LDPs every 3 years to reevaluate posts’ language needs. State’s policies indicate that operational need should determine designation of positions as LDPs and required proficiency levels. However, views expressed by geographic bureau officials and FSOs we met with at overseas posts suggest that State officials also consider other factors, such as staffing concerns, when making LDP decisions. Cost concerns. State Is Implementing Efforts Outlined in Foreign Language Strategic Plan but Has Not Evaluated Their Effectiveness
State’s Foreign Language Strategic Plan Outlines Efforts to Address Language Proficiency Requirements
State’s 2011 “Strategic Plan for Foreign Language Capabilities” (foreign language strategic plan), which it issued partly in response to a recommendation in our 2009 report, outlines a number of efforts intended to meet its current and projected needs for foreign language proficiency. As a result of the review, State reduced the number of incentive languages from 52 to 34 to reflect the department’s highest strategic priorities. In addition, State officials told us that they are using technology to complement language skills at the operational level. State Has Not Evaluated Effects of Efforts Implemented under the Foreign Language Strategic Plan
More than 5 years after State developed and began implementing its foreign language strategic plan, we found no evidence that State had conducted a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of all the actions identified in the plan to determine their effects on language proficiency gaps. According to State’s evaluation policy, the department is committed to using performance management best practices, including evaluation, to achieve the most effective U.S. foreign policy outcomes and greater accountability. As a result, State cannot determine the extent to which these efforts have contributed to progress in increasing language proficiency worldwide and has limited information on which to base future investments of its resources. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen State’s ability to address persistent gaps in foreign language proficiency at overseas posts and make informed future resource investments, we recommend that the Secretary of State evaluate the effectiveness of efforts implemented under the “Strategic Plan for Foreign-Language Capabilities.”
Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examine (1) the extent to which the Department of State (State) is meeting its foreign language proficiency requirements for overseas posts as well as the effects of language proficiency and any gaps in State’s ability to perform diplomatic duties, (2) State’s process for identifying overseas posts’ language proficiency needs and the extent to which the process addresses these reported needs, and (3) efforts State has taken to enhance foreign language proficiency and any effects of those efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Proficiency in foreign languages is a key skill for U.S. diplomats to advance U.S. interests overseas. GAO has issued several reports highlighting State's persistent foreign language shortfalls. In 2009, GAO recommended that State, to address these shortfalls, develop a strategic plan linking all of its efforts to meet its foreign language requirements. In response, in 2011 State issued its “Strategic Plan for Foreign Language Capabilities.”
GAO was asked to build on its previous reviews of State's foreign language capabilities. In this report, GAO examines (1) the extent to which State is meeting its foreign language proficiency requirements for overseas posts as well as the effects of language proficiency and any gaps in State's ability to perform diplomatic duties, (2) State's process for identifying overseas posts' language proficiency needs and the extent to which the process addresses these reported needs, and (3) efforts State has taken to enhance foreign language proficiency and any effects of those efforts. GAO analyzed data on State's overseas language-designated positions; reviewed State strategic planning and policy documents; interviewed State officials; and visited overseas posts in China, Egypt, Korea, Mexico, and Russia.
What GAO Found
As of September 2016, 23 percent of overseas language-designated positions (LDP) were filled by Foreign Service officers (FSO) who did not meet the positions' language proficiency requirements. While this represents an 8-percentage-point improvement from 2008, the Department of State (State) still faces significant language proficiency gaps (see fig.). Regionally, the greatest gaps were in the Near East (37 percent), Africa (34 percent), and South and Central Asia (31 percent). According to FSOs we interviewed, language proficiency gaps have, in some cases, affected State's ability to properly adjudicate visa applications; effectively communicate with foreign audiences, address security concerns, and perform other critical diplomatic duties.
State reviews overseas posts' language needs every 3 years, but the extent to which the reviews' outcomes address these needs is unclear. State's policies indicate that operational need should determine the designation of positions as LDPs and required proficiency levels. However, views expressed by geographic bureau officials and FSOs whom GAO met at overseas posts suggest that other factors, such as staffing and cost concerns, influence State's decisions about LDP designations and proficiency requirements. State Human Resources officials noted that State is taking steps to better align its LDP policies with its operational needs.
State has implemented most actions described in its 2011 “Strategic Plan for Foreign Language Capabilities” but has not evaluated the effects of these actions on language proficiency at overseas posts. According to State’s evaluation policy, the department is committed to using performance management, including evaluation, to achieve the most effective foreign policy outcomes and greater accountability. Actions State has implemented under the plan include reviewing the language requirements of overseas posts every 3 years; offering recruitment incentives for personnel with proficiency in critically important languages; providing language incentive pay only for languages that reflect the department’s highest strategic priorities; and using technology to strengthen and develop new approaches for language training and to complement FSOs’ language skills. However, more than 5 years after it began implementing its strategic plan, State has not systematically evaluated the results of these efforts. As a result, State cannot determine the extent to which these efforts contribute to progress in increasing language proficiency worldwide and reducing proficiency gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State evaluate the effectiveness of efforts implemented under the “Strategic Plan for Foreign Language Capabilities.” State agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-633 | gao_GAO-14-633_0 | IDT refund fraud occurs when a refund-seeking identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using the legitimate taxpayer’s identifying information. However, IRS only begins matching W-2 information from employers to tax returns in July. Issuing refunds before fully verifying the information on tax returns is an example of what IRS officials refer to as a “look-back” compliance model: rather than holding refunds until all compliance checks can be completed, IRS issues refunds after doing some selected, automated reviews of the information the taxpayer submits to verify identity (e.g., name and SSN matching); filtering out returns with indicators of fraud such as a mismatched name and SSN; and correcting obvious errors, such as calculation mistakes and claims for credits and deductions exceeding statutory limits. Matching tax returns to W-2s is an example of these checks. In Filing Season 2013, IRS Estimates Paying $5.2 Billion in Fraudulent IDT Refunds While Preventing $24.2 Billion; However, the Full Extent of IDT Refund Fraud Is Unknown
Based on IRS’s preliminary Identity Theft Taxonomy (Taxonomy), the agency estimated that $29.4 billion in IDT refund fraud was attempted in filing season 2013. IRS has also requested funding to support timelier processing of W-2s. IRS issues most refunds before it has access to employers’ W-2 data. Treasury’s Proposal for Accelerated W-2 Deadlines is Intended to Benefit IRS and Taxpayers
To facilitate the use of W-2 information in detection of noncompliance (which includes IDT refund fraud) earlier in the filing season, Treasury recently proposed to Congress that the W-2 deadlines be moved to January 31 (for both paper and e-filing). 2014). SSA. Estimating the costs and benefits of options to accelerate W-2 deadlines and to conduct earlier W-2 matching is consistent with IRS’s strategic plan, which includes objectives to strengthen refund fraud prevention through the use of third-party data and to use analytics for timely, informed decision making. However, without better analysis of the costs and benefits of options for implementing accelerated W-2 deadlines and pre-refund matching, Congress does not have the information needed to consider Treasury’s proposal and deliberate the merits of making such a significant change. Lowering the E-File Threshold for Employers Because of the additional time and resources associated with processing paper W-2s submitted by employers, SSA officials told us that a change in the e-file threshold would be needed to sufficiently increase the number of e-filed W-2s. Implementing a lower e-filing threshold would have the ancillary benefit (described above) of supporting pre-refund matching. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider providing the Secretary of the Treasury with the regulatory authority to lower the threshold for electronic filing of W-2s from 250 returns annually to between 5 to 10 returns, as appropriate. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend the Commissioner of Internal Revenue fully assess the costs and benefits of accelerating W-2 deadlines and provide information to Congress on the IRS systems and work processes that will need to be adjusted to accommodate earlier, pre-refund matching of W-2s and then identify timeframes for when these changes could be made; potential impacts on taxpayers, IRS, SSA, and third parties; and what other changes will be needed (such as delaying the start of the filing season or delaying refunds) to ensure IRS can match tax returns to W-2 data before issuing refunds. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix III, IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. IRS stated that it is determining how potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities before deciding whether to implement the recommendations. SSA also said that it transmits wage data to IRS immediately upon receiving electronic W-2s. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) what the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) knows about the extent of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud and (2) what additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information (for example, from employers and financial institutions). To understand what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud, we reviewed IRS’s Identity Theft Taxonomy (Taxonomy), which estimates the amount of IDT refund fraud that IRS is, and is not, preventing. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Identity theft tax refund fraud is a persistent, evolving threat to honest taxpayers and tax administration. It occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund.
GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the first of a series, examines (1) what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud and (2) additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information from, for example, employers and financial institutions.
To understand what is known about the extent of IDT refund fraud, GAO reviewed IRS documentation, including the Identity Theft Taxonomy . To identify additional actions IRS can take, GAO assessed IRS and SSA data on the timing of W-2s; and interviewed SSA officials and selected associations representing software companies, return preparers, payroll companies, and others.
What GAO Found
Based on preliminary analysis, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates it paid $5.2 billion in fraudulent identity theft (IDT) refunds in filing season 2013, while preventing $24.2 billion (based on what it could detect). The full extent is unknown because of the challenges inherent in detecting IDT refund fraud.
IDT refund fraud takes advantage of IRS's “look-back” compliance model. Under this model, rather than holding refunds until completing all compliance checks, IRS issues refunds after conducting selected reviews. While there are no simple solutions, one option is earlier matching of employer-reported wage information to taxpayers' returns before issuing refunds. IRS currently cannot do such matching because employers' wage data (from Form W-2s) are not available until months after IRS issues most refunds. Consequently, IRS begins matching employer-reported W-2 data to tax returns in July, following the tax season. If IRS had access to W-2 data earlier—through accelerated W-2 deadlines and increased electronic filing of W-2s—it could conduct pre-refund matching and identify discrepancies to prevent the issuance of billions in fraudulent refunds.
Accelerated W-2 deadlines. In 2014, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) proposed that Congress accelerate W-2 deadlines to January 31. However, IRS has not fully assessed the impacts of this proposal. Without this assessment, Congress does not have the information needed to deliberate the merits of such a significant change to W-2 deadlines or the use of pre-refund W-2 matching. Such an assessment is consistent with IRS's strategic plan that calls for analytics-based decisions, and would help IRS ensure effective use of resources.
Increased e-filing of W-2s. Treasury has requested authority to reduce the 250-return threshold for electronically filing (e-filing) information returns. The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimated that to meaningfully increase W-2 e-filing, the threshold would have to be lowered to include those filing 5 to 10 W-2s. In addition, SSA estimated an administrative cost savings of about $0.50 per e-filed W-2. Based on these cost savings and the ancillary benefits they provide in supporting IRS's efforts to conduct more pre-refund matching, a change in the e-filing threshold is warranted. Without this change, some employers' paper W-2s could not be available for IRS matching until much later in the year, due to the additional time needed to process paper forms.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Congress should consider providing Treasury with authority to lower the annual threshold for e-filing W-2s. In addition, IRS should fully assess the costs and benefits of shifting W-2 deadlines, and provide this information to Congress. IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, and it stated it is determining how these potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities. |
gao_GAO-02-28 | gao_GAO-02-28_0 | Emergency medical transport or transfer. Equipment. Federal officials said progress in implementing the Agenda has been affected by the lack of consistent information about EMS systems, and as part of their attempts to act as facilitators, they have all attempted to collect EMS data or promote consistency in the data. Federal EMS Activity Centers on Four Agencies
Four different federal agencies are involved in supporting and promoting EMS improvements. Instead, the agencies undertake activities such as providing technical support and guidance, providing funding for EMS initiatives through various grant programs to states, and exploring avenues for developing a consensus among EMS providers on policy needs and changes. Progress in this area, however, is likely to remain slow because EMS systems and providers have many competing demands and few incentives to devote limited resources to data collection efforts. | What GAO Found
Local emergency medical systems (EMS) have reported substantial needs in such areas as personnel, training, equipment, and the availability of doctors to advise emergency personnel in the field. Federal agencies have supported EMS improvements by acting as facilitators rather then by establishing requirements or providing significant funding. The agencies provide technical assistance, set voluntary standards for licensing EMS providers, and administer limited grant funding. The four federal agencies GAO studied have separately begun to collect EMS data or promote data consistency. However, progress in developing this information has been slow. State and local EMS officials attributed the lack of progress to the many competing demands on their time and said that EMS providers and local systems have few incentives to collect and report EMS information. |
gao_GAO-17-765T | gao_GAO-17-765T_0 | CBP Has Made Progress Deploying Surveillance Technology along the Southwest Border, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of Its Programs
CBP Has Made Progress toward Completing Milestones for Technology Deployment
Since 2014, we have reported multiple times on the progress CBP has made deploying technologies under the ATP. In addition to deploying technologies under the ATP, CBP’s 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan extended technology deployments to the remainder of the southwest border, beginning with selected areas in Texas and California. As of July 2017, CBP completed deployment of select technologies to sectors in Arizona, Texas, and California. For example, in our April 2017 assessment of DHS’s major acquisitions programs, we reported that CBP completed deployments of 7 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems to the Nogales Border Patrol station within the Tucson sector in Arizona, and was working to deploy the remaining 46 towers to other sectors in Arizona. CBP has also made changes to the IFT program. CBP also reported that it had completed Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) deployments to Arizona as planned under the ATP, and deployed 32 MSC systems to Texas and California. We will plan to report on the deployment status of southwest border surveillance technology, among other topics, in a forthcoming report. CBP Has Made Progress in Implementing GAO’s Prior Recommendations, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of Its Programs
In March 2014, we assessed CBP’s efforts to develop and implement the ATP. Specifically, we recommended that CBP, among other things, (1) apply scheduling best practices; (2) develop an integrated schedule; and (3) verify life-cycle cost estimates. DHS concurred with some of our recommendations and has taken actions to address some of them, which we discuss below. CBP did not concur with this recommendation and maintained that an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP in one file undermines the DHS- approved implementation strategy for the individual programs making up the ATP, and that the implementation of this recommendation would essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively create an aggregated “system of systems.” DHS further stated at the time that a key element of its plan has been the disaggregation of technology procurements. In March 2014, we also reported that the life- cycle cost estimates for the technology programs under the ATP reflected some, but not all, best practices. We continue to believe that independently verifying the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates. CBP Has Made Progress Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies
We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed along the southwest border, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. However, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed, as we recommended in November 2011. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. | Why GAO Did This Study
CBP deploys land-based surveillance technologies to help monitor and secure the border and apprehend individuals who attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO has reported on the progress and challenges DHS and its components have faced implementing its border security efforts.
This statement addresses (1) the status of CBP efforts to deploy land-based surveillance technologies along the southwest border and (2) CBP's efforts to measure the effectiveness of these technologies.
This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies from 2011 through 2016, selected updates conducted in 2017, and ongoing work for this subcommittee related to border surveillance technology. For ongoing work and updates, GAO analyzed technology program documents; interviewed DHS, CBP, and U.S. Border Patrol officials; and conducted site visits to Arizona and Texas to observe technologies.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made progress deploying surveillance technology along the southwest U.S. border under its 2011 Arizona Technology Plan (ATP) and 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan. The ATP called for deployment of a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras in Arizona, and the 2014 Plan incorporates the ATP and includes deployments to the rest of the southwest border, beginning with areas in Texas and California. As of July 2017, CBP completed deployment of select technologies to areas in Arizona, Texas, and California. For example, CBP deployed all planned Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) systems, and 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems to Arizona. CBP also deployed all planned MSC systems to Texas and California and completed contract negotiations to deploy RVSS to Texas.
CBP has made progress implementing some, but not all of GAO's recommendations related to managing deployments of its technology programs. In 2014, GAO assessed CBP's implementation of the ATP and recommended that CBP: (1) apply scheduling best practices; (2) develop an integrated schedule; and (3) verify cost estimates for the technology programs. DHS concurred with some, but not all of the recommendations and has taken actions to address some of them, such as applying best practices when updating schedules, but has not taken action to address others, such as developing an integrated master schedule and verifying cost estimates with independent estimates for the IFT program. GAO continues to believe that applying schedule and cost estimating best practices could better position CBP to strengthen its management efforts of these programs.
CBP has also made progress toward assessing performance of surveillance technologies. GAO reported in 2014 that CBP identified some mission benefits, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety, but had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended (and CBP concurred) in 2011. GAO has ongoing work examining DHS's technology deployments and efforts to assess technology performance, which GAO plans to report on later this year.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS to improve its management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies. DHS has generally agreed. DHS has taken actions or described planned actions to address some of these recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations could strengthen CBP's management efforts and will continue to monitor CBP's efforts. |
gao_GAO-17-334 | gao_GAO-17-334_0 | Background
Children who have suffered a severe and potentially life threatening physical injury as a result of an event such as a motor vehicle crash or a fall need specialized care because of their unique anatomical, physiological, and psychological characteristics. 1). Trauma care is an essential component of emergency care, which encompasses all services involved in emergency medical care—both injury and illness. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary can make grants and enter into cooperative agreements and contracts to conduct and support research, training, evaluations, and demonstration projects related to trauma care and to foster the development of trauma care systems. Additionally, in 2006, HHS’ Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) released the Model Trauma System Planning and Evaluation document, a guide for trauma system development across the United States. An Estimated 57 Percent of Children Lived within 30 Miles of a High-Level Pediatric Trauma Center during the Period 2011- 2015, Although the Percentage Varied by State
Our analysis of data from the American Trauma Society and the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey shows that 57 percent, or 41.9 million, of the estimated 73.7 million children in the United States lived within 30 miles of a high-level pediatric trauma center during the period 2011-2015. These centers have the dedicated resources necessary to treat all injuries, regardless of severity. In areas without high-level pediatric trauma centers, children may have to rely on adult trauma centers with the resources to treat injured patients, even though these facilities are not specialized to treat children. Some Studies Suggest that Children Treated at Pediatric Trauma Centers Have a Lower Risk of Mortality, While Information on Other Outcomes Is Limited
Five of the studies we reviewed, including studies based on national data, suggest that children treated at pediatric trauma centers have a lower risk of mortality compared to children treated at other types of facilities. However, some of the studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed suggested that data on pediatric outcomes is limited and that more information is needed on outcomes other than mortality for children treated at pediatric trauma centers. For example, two studies, which each examined data for adolescents from a single state, did not identify significant differences in mortality among adolescents treated at pediatric and adult trauma centers. Data on other outcomes. Further, as some studies note, mortality can be a limited measure for determining quality of care or a trauma center’s contribution to survival, because overall mortality is low among severely injured children. One 2015 study found that adding a pediatric trauma center in Delaware decreased the frequency of pediatric splenectomies—a procedure that removes a child’s spleen. Two Federal Agencies Support Hospital-Based Pediatric Trauma Activities Primarily through Grants, While Other Efforts Broadly Address Emergency Care
Two agencies within HHS—HRSA and NIH—have grant programs and other activities that support hospital-based pediatric trauma care (see table 2). Within HRSA, the Emergency Medical Services for Children (EMSC) program, established in 1984, provides funding to states and academic medical institutions. Federal Activities Related to Hospital-Based Pediatric Trauma Care and Other Emergency Care Are Coordinated through an Interagency Group and Arrangements between Agencies
HRSA and NIH officials reported that activities related to hospital-based trauma care and other emergency care, including pediatrics, are coordinated through an interagency group and through arrangements between individual agencies (see table 3). Both HRSA and NIH representatives are executive committee members of the Council on Emergency Medical Care, a federal interagency group led by ASPR’s Emergency Care Coordination Center, a center specially created as the policy lead for emergency care activities across the federal government. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pediatric trauma—a severe and potentially disabling or life threatening injury to a child resulting from an event such as a motor vehicle crash or a fall—is the leading cause of disability for children in the United States. More children die of injury each year than from all other causes combined. GAO was asked to examine issues related to pediatric trauma care.
This report examines (1) what is known about the availability of trauma centers for children and the outcomes for children treated at different types of facilities, and (2) how, if at all, federal agencies are involved in supporting pediatric trauma care and how these activities are coordinated. GAO analyzed data on the number of pediatric and adult trauma centers in the United States relative to the pediatric population under 18 years of age. GAO used 2015 data on trauma centers from the American Trauma Society's Trauma Information Exchange Program and 5-year population estimates for 2011-2015 from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey, which were the latest available data at the time of GAO's analysis. GAO also reviewed the existing peer-reviewed, academic literature on outcomes for pediatric trauma patients, interviewed stakeholder group representatives and federal agency officials involved in activities related to hospital-based pediatric trauma care, and reviewed available agency documentation.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that 57 percent of the 73.7 million children in the United States during the period 2011-2015 lived within 30 miles of a pediatric trauma center that can treat all injuries regardless of severity. Among states, the proportion of children who lived within 30 miles of these pediatric trauma centers varied widely. In areas without pediatric trauma centers, injured children may have to rely on adult trauma centers or less specialized hospital emergency departments for initial trauma care. Some studies GAO reviewed, including nationwide studies, found that children treated at pediatric trauma centers have a lower mortality risk compared to children treated at adult trauma centers and other facilities, while other state-level studies GAO reviewed found no difference in mortality. Further, some studies GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed suggest that more information is needed on outcomes other than mortality for children treated at pediatric trauma centers because mortality can be a limited outcome measure, as overall mortality is low among severely injured children.
Two agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)—have grant programs and other activities that support hospital-based pediatric trauma care. For example, HRSA's Emergency Medical Services for Children Program provides grants to integrate pediatric emergency care—which encompasses care for both traumatic injury and illness—into states' larger emergency medical services systems. GAO also found that federal activities related to hospital-based pediatric trauma care and other emergency care are coordinated through an interagency group and arrangements among agencies. For example, HRSA and NIH staff participate in the Council on Emergency Medical Care, an interagency group established to coordinate emergency care activities across the federal government by promoting information sharing and policy development. |
gao_GAO-08-252 | gao_GAO-08-252_0 | 1). NORTHCOM’s mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil support. 2). 3). NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States and NGB in Planning for Its Missions
In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. The command conducts two large-scale exercises—Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield—and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM’s Coordination with the States and NGB
We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with the states and NGB. Third, a 2005 memorandum of agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency’s roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to states to obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future revisions of NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities plan. In either homeland defense or civil support, increasing the current level of state involvement in the development of NORTHCOM’s plans could help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible. According to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM is not at all or only slightly familiar with their states’ plan (see table 4). In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with these plans because it has no established and thorough process regarding coordination with the states or for gaining access to emergency response plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to obtain information on state emergency response plans or determine state and local capabilities and potential resource gaps. By minimally involving the states in its homeland defense and civil support plans and not becoming familiar with information on states’ emergency response plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may not be prepared with the needed resources to respond to an incident. These gaps may be attributable in part to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has experience working with state and local authorities during incidents and it functions as NORTHCOM’s formal link to the states. As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities between NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances in which there was confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted efforts. In addition, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland defense plans and make them available to NORTHCOM. However, NORTHCOM officials told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB staff to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data. Without effective interagency coordination and planning and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s, NGB’s, and other nationwide efforts to respond to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. We achieved a 100 percent response rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions on U.S. soil. It is particularly important that NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency coordination plans and guidance.
What GAO Found
NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM facilitates weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and federal emergency management officials, through which it has begun to build more productive relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-scale exercises and participated in over 25 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans. We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and NGB in three areas: (1) NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development of its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent of the state adjutants general reported that they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM officials told us that they are reaching out directly to states to better understand states' plans and capabilities, but for homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide states perspectives. (2) NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was not at all or only slightly familiar with their states' emergency response plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on states' plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be prepared to respond to an incident with the needed resources to support civil authorities. (3) A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not fully or clearly define each agency's roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has resulted in confusion and duplicative or wasted efforts. For example, as required in NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states' homeland defense plans and made them available to NORTHCOM; however, NORTHCOM planners told us that they neither requested nor needed access to this information. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM's and NGB's responses to an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated. Addressing these gaps could help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible. |
gao_GAO-02-106 | gao_GAO-02-106_0 | The Components’ Plans Lack Necessary Elements for Improving Logistics Management
While each of the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command prepared implementation plans in the form of transformation plans and other documents to support the Logistics Strategic Plan, these plans will not likely result in overall improvements to the economy and efficiency of logistics activities. The Department agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should revise the Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan to provide for an overarching logistics strategy that will guide the components’ logistics planning efforts. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Logistics Strategic Plan is not comprehensive enough and does not provide an adequate overall logistics strategy to effectively guide the defense components' logistics plans. The military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command each developed separate logistics transformation and other implementation plans to support the Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan. However, these plans also have weaknesses and are not likely to improve the overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of logistics activities. |
gao_RCED-97-113 | gao_RCED-97-113_0 | The differences in the complexities of the procedures followed by the agencies are mirrored by differences in the fees and related expenses. The patent process is totally funded through user fees. The trademark process can also be lengthy. He asked that we address fees as they relate specifically to patents, trademarks, and copyrights and, where applicable, determine (1) how fees are set for the services provided by PTO and the Copyright Office, (2) the extent to which intellectual property fees are recovering the costs of the services provided, (3) whether different users of the same services pay different fees, (4) whether patent fees encourage or discourage the completeness and accuracy of applications, and (5) the potential effects of increasing copyright fees. Despite the self-sufficiency of the patent process overall, however, individual fees are not necessarily commensurate with the costs of the services for which they are assessed. Again, this is by design because (1) the largest fees are paid at the back end of the process, while most costs occur at the front end of the process; (2) large and small entities generally are charged different fees for the same service; (3) costs vary by invention type, while fees do not; and (4) delays caused by the applicants generate more costs than fees. Actually, patent fees are structured so that in effect (1) successful applicants pay more than unsuccessful applicants, (2) large entities pay more than small entities, (3) applicants with less complicated applications pay the same as those with more complicated applications, and (4) applicants who create delays in the examination process do not pay fees commensurate with the additional pendency caused by those delays. There are no differences in filing fees, however, for different types of inventions within the utility patent category, which accounts for over 90 percent of all patent applications. However, unlike patents, trademark fees do not vary on the basis of the size of the entity applying, and most fees are paid at the beginning of the process before PTO begins to incur costs. Consequently, while PTO believes some adjustments may be needed, fees in the trademark process appear to be more closely aligned with the costs of services. Unlike patent regulations, trademark regulations do not require acceptance of incomplete applications and, as a result, PTO does not accept and process incomplete trademark applications. Conclusions
Trademark fees are more streamlined than patent fees. Copyright Fees Do Not Recover the Costs of Copyright Services
Unlike the patent and trademark process, the copyright process is not self-sustaining, and copyright fees have been adjusted infrequently since the 1950s. Most applicants pay a one-time fee of $20, or about half the cost the Copyright Office incurs to register a copyright. Our disagreement is based on the Copyright Office’s own study. While the law permits the Copyright Office to raise fees periodically to account for the effects of inflation, it chose not to do so in fiscal year 1995, the last year it had the authority to do so. Concerning the Library’s comments regarding the Copyright Office’s position on fee increases, we added information to the report showing that the Copyright Office has supported the need for fee increases in the past, believes a fee increase is needed currently, and supports proposed legislation that would allow the Register to raise fees to cover the costs of copyright registration and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues related to intellectual property fees charged by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the Copyright Office, focusing on: (1) how fees are set for the services provided by the federal agencies; (2) the extent to which intellectual property fees are recovering the costs of the services provided; (3) whether different users of the same services pay different fees; (4) whether patent fees encourage or discourage the completeness and accuracy of applications; and (5) the potential effects of increasing copyright fees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) patent fees, like trademark and copyright fees, are set primarily by statute; (2) overall, patent fees recover the costs of the patent process within PTO and, by law, can be adjusted annually for inflation; (3) despite this self-sufficiency overall, fees for individual services are not necessarily commensurate with the costs of those services because the largest fees are paid at the back end of the patent process, while PTO incurs most of its costs at the front end, and different categories of applicants pay different fees for the same service; (4) generally, successful applicants and large entities tend to pay more than unsuccessful applicants and small entities for the same services; (5) because fees do not differ on the basis of the complexity of the invention and because fees do little to discourage the submission of inaccurate and incomplete applications, applicants with complicated inventions and applicants who create delays in the process may not pay fees sufficient to recover the additional costs they create; (6) trademark fees also recover the overall costs of the trademark process and can be adjusted annually for inflation; (7) trademark fees are smaller and fewer in number than patent fees; (8) fees and costs tend to be more closely aligned in the trademark process because most income is received prior to the examination of the application; (9) there are no differences in trademark fees based on the size of the entity applying, no significant differences in the costs for different types of trademark applications, and fewer costs and delays caused by inaccurate and incomplete applications; (10) copyright fees are the smallest and simplest of all the federal intellectual property fees; (11) most applicants pay only an up-front, one-time registration fee, with no differences based on entity size, the accuracy or completeness of the application, or the type of copyright being registered; (12) copyright fees do not recover costs and, as a result, the Copyright Office receives about $10 million a year in appropriations; (13) copyright fees have not been increased since fiscal year (FY) 1991 because the Copyright Office chose not to raise fees to adjust for inflation in FY 1995; (14) the Copyright Office has supported fee increases in the past and supports legislative proposals that would give the Register of Copyrights the authority to raise fees to recover costs; and (15) Copyright Office officials do not believe that the Copyright Office should be fully self-sustaining through fees because it performs other functions that the officials believe are more appropriately funded through appropriations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-45 | gao_NSIAD-96-45_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) discusses the aggregate capabilities of the military services to provide close support and the extent to which those capabilities continue to be modernized and enhanced and (2) evaluates the processes the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission needs, capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support mission. The Marine Corps also upgraded its AV-8B Harrier aircraft used primarily for CAS. The Army plans to field Crusader in fiscal year 2005. A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close Support Mission Needs and Existing Capabilities Is Needed
DOD’s current assessment processes do not yield the information that the Secretary of Defense needs to weigh the merits of service-generated weapons acquisition and modernization proposals for the close support mission. Based on this perspective, the services have focused on unique mission needs or unique weapons system capabilities. Moreover, although a new process for assessing joint warfighting capabilities was introduced in 1994, a separate assessment of joint close support needs and capabilities has not yet been made. This is important because the Air Force plans to spend about $547 million to upgrade 623 fixed wing aircraft specifically for CAS. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the military services' plans to upgrade their close support weapons capabilities, focusing on the processes the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission needs, capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support mission.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over the next 6 years, the Army plans to spend nearly $5.5 billion to develop and field more modern target acquisition systems, the Marine Corps plans to spend $3.2 billion to remanufacture AV-8B aircraft, and the Air Force plans to spend over $547 million to upgrade its target acquisition and night operations capabilities; (2) DOD has not determined the appropriate number and type of weapons needed for the joint close support mission; (3) the services have taken actions to enhance their close support capabilities without adequately considering the capabilities of other weapons systems; (4) although DOD instituted a joint warfighting capabilities assessment process in 1994, a separate assessment of the close support mission has not yet been made; and (5) without a comprehensive assessment of joint mission needs, DOD cannot decide which modernization proposals should be funded. |
gao_GAO-06-1013 | gao_GAO-06-1013_0 | IHP Assistance to Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Far Surpassed Assistance to Victims of 2003 and 2004 Hurricane Seasons
Because of the magnitude of the hurricanes and the extent of the resulting damage, the total number of applications for, and benefits provided through IHP in 2005 for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita far exceeded the combined total of the 2 years since the program was established in 2003. Two categories of assistance—temporary housing assistance and expedited assistance---- accounted for much of the significant increase in IHP expenditures for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as compared to prior years. By comparison, about $59 million was approved for hurricanes in 2004, while no expedited assistance was approved for hurricanes in 2003. However, it is too early to assess the success of these initiatives. To provide benefits quickly to eligible victims, communicate with about 2 million applicants scattered across the country and conduct inspections, FEMA developed a number of new approaches, as summarized in table 4. In terms of trained staff, FEMA lacked the surge capacity to effectively manage the disaster assistance process. As we testified in June 2006, an estimated 16 percent, or approximately $1 billion, in FEMA IHP payments were improper and potentially fraudulent due to invalid application data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) disaster assistance provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), we assessed (1) how the types and amounts of assistance provided to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita compare to other recent hurricanes, (2) the challenges posed by the magnitude of the requests for assistance following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and FEMA’s response to these challenges, and (3) the vulnerability of the IHP to fraud and abuse and management issues in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and FEMA’s reported actions to address any identified problems. FEMA provides direct (temporary housing units) and financial assistance (grant funding for temporary housing and other disaster-related needs) to individuals and households through the IHP to meet necessary expenses and serious needs of eligible disaster victims who, as a direct result of a major disaster, have uninsured or under insured necessary expenses and serious needs and are unable to meet such needs through other means. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be Between $600 Million and $1.4 Billion. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused unprecedented damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Individuals and Households Program (IHP), provides direct assistance (temporary housing units) and financial assistance (grant funding for temporary housing and other disaster-related needs) to eligible individuals affected by disasters. Our objectives were to (1) compare the types and amounts of IHP assistance provided to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita victims to other recent hurricanes, (2) describe the challenges FEMA faced by the magnitude of the requests for assistance following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and (3) determine the vulnerability of the IHP program to fraud and abuse. GAO determined the extent to which the program was vulnerability to fraud and abuse, by conducting statistical sampling, data mining and undercover operations.
What GAO Found
For Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA received more than 2.4 million applications for IHP assistance and distributed $7.0 billion as compared to the six hurricanes that hit the United States in the prior two years and totaled about 1.5 million applications and about $1.5 billion in assistance, respectively. Temporary housing assistance and expedited assistance accounted for much of the increase in IHP expenditures as compared to prior years. Overall, however, although the number of applications was much higher, the percentage approved for non-housing assistance was notably lower for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita than in 2003 and 2004. The magnitude of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita posed challenges in providing assistance to an unprecedented number of victims many of whom were widely dispersed across the country. To address these challenges, FEMA developed new approaches and adapted existing approaches to quickly provide assistance and improve communication with victims. Despite these efforts, management challenges in staffing and training and program restrictions limited the effectiveness and efficiency of the disaster assistance process. FEMA has proposed a number of initiatives to address these problems, but it is too early to determine whether these efforts will effectively address the problems identified. GAO identified the potential for significant fraud and abuse as a result of FEMA's management of the IHP in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Flaws in the registration process resulted in what GAO estimated to be between $600 million and $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments due to invalid registration data. In addition, duplicate payments were made and FEMA lacked accountability over $2,000 debit cards that were given to disaster victims. |
gao_GAO-17-150 | gao_GAO-17-150_0 | According to the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authorities, DOD often is expected to play a prominent supporting role to primary federal agencies in their response efforts. HHS and DHS Have Plans to Respond to a Pandemic, but Their Plans Do Not Explain How They Would Respond If DOD’s Capabilities Are Limited, and Coordination Mechanisms Among the Three Agencies Exist That Could Enhance Their Preparedness
HHS and DHS have plans to guide their responses to a pandemic, but their plans do not explain how they would respond in a resource- constrained environment where state and local capabilities are overwhelmed or unavailable, and other federal capabilities, like DOD’s, are limited. HHS and DHS plans also do not specifically address what resources would be needed to support a response to a pandemic in an environment where federal resources, including DOD, are exceeded by demands. HHS officials stated that there would be no way of knowing in advance what unique facts, circumstances, or conditions might occur to determine what resources would be needed. Exercises play an instrumental role in preparing these agencies to respond to an incident by providing opportunities to test plans, improve proficiency, and assess capabilities and readiness. Unless DOD, HHS, and DHS explore opportunities to enhance their existing coordination mechanisms—such as working groups, Defense Coordinating Officers, and training exercises—to identify approaches for responding to a pandemic in the event that DOD’s capabilities are limited, HHS and FEMA risk being unprepared to respond. HHS and DHS are in the process of updating their plans, which presents an opportunity for them to coordinate with each other and with DOD to determine the appropriate actions to take should DOD’s support be limited during a pandemic. As HHS plans to respond to a pandemic, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response to use HHS’s existing coordination mechanisms with DOD and FEMA to explore opportunities to improve their preparedness and response to a pandemic if DOD’s capabilities are limited. Appendix I: DOD’s Preparedness, Detection of, and Response to Zika Virus
The Department of Defense (DOD) also assists federal agencies in combating other non-pandemic viruses that have occurred, such as the recent Zika virus. This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD has guidance and plans for supporting civil authorities in the event of a domestic outbreak of a pandemic disease, and (2) HHS and DHS have plans to respond to a pandemic if DOD’s support capabilities are limited, and they have mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic preparedness and response with DOD. To determine the extent to which HHS and DHS have plans to respond to a pandemic if DOD’s support capabilities are limited, and they have mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic preparedness and response with DOD, we obtained and analyzed pandemic planning guidance, such as HHS’s Pandemic Influenza Plan, DHS’s National Response Framework, and Federal Interagency Operational Plans to identify these primary agencies’ roles and responsibilities in support of civil authorities and in the event of a severe disease pandemic. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army estimates that if a severe infectious disease pandemic were to occur today, the number of U.S. fatalities could be almost twice the total number of battlefield fatalities in all of America's wars since the American Revolution in 1776. A pandemic occurs when an infectious agent emerges that can be efficiently transmitted between humans and has crossed international borders. DOD's day-to-day functioning and the military's readiness and operations abroad could be impaired if a large percentage of its personnel are sick or absent, and DOD's assistance to civil authorities might be limited.
House Report 114-102 included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's planning and coordination to support civil authorities during a pandemic. This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD has guidance and plans for supporting civil authorities in the event of a domestic outbreak of a pandemic disease and (2) HHS and DHS have plans to respond to a pandemic if DOD support capabilities are limited, and they have mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic preparedness and response. GAO reviewed agency pandemic guidance and plans, interagency coordination mechanisms, and pandemic-related exercises and after-action reports.
What GAO Found
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authorities states that DOD often is expected to play a prominent supporting role to primary federal agencies. DOD also assists those agencies in the preparedness, detection, and response to other non-pandemic viruses, such as the recent outbreak of the Zika virus.
HHS and DHS have plans to guide their response to a pandemic, but their plans do not explain how they would respond in a resource-constrained environment in which capabilities like those provided by DOD are limited. DOD coordinates with the agencies, but existing coordination mechanisms among HHS, DHS, and DOD could be used to improve preparedness. HHS's Pandemic Influenza Plan is the departmental blueprint for its preparedness and response to an influenza pandemic. DHS's National Response Framework is a national guide on how federal, state, and local governments are to respond to such incidents. DOD, HHS, and DHS have mechanisms—such as interagency working groups, liaison officers, and training exercises—to coordinate their response to a pandemic. For example, training exercises are critical in preparing these agencies to respond to an incident by providing opportunities to test plans, improve proficiency, and assess capabilities and readiness. These existing mechanisms provide the agencies opportunities to improve their preparedness and response to a pandemic. HHS and DHS plans do not specifically identify what resources would be needed to support a response to a pandemic in which demands exceeded federal resources. These officials stated that there would be no way of knowing in advance what resources would be required. HHS and DHS are in the process of updating their plans and thus have an opportunity to coordinate with each other and with DOD to determine the appropriate actions to take should DOD's support be limited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD, HHS, and DHS use existing coordination mechanisms to explore opportunities to improve preparedness and response to a pandemic if DOD's capabilities are limited. DOD, HHS, and DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-99-72 | gao_RCED-99-72_0 | On-site assessments of completed appraisals, known as field reviews, are HUD’s principal tool for monitoring the performance of the appraisers on FHA’s roster. In fiscal year 1998, HUD performed about 81,000 field reviews of appraisals nationwide. However, three of the four HOCs did not meet HUD’s policy requirement to field review at least 10 percent of the FHA appraisals performed within their jurisdictions. For example, the HOCs’ records for 126 field reviews conducted during the period from October 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998, that rated the appraisals as poor, showed that HUD approved mortgage insurance for 96 of the homes that were the subjects of these reviews. HOCs Did Not Fully Implement Guidance on Consumer Complaint Procedures
Consumers’ complaints are another means by which HUD obtains information about the quality of the appraisals used to support FHA-insured mortgages. HUD prohibited only 11 of these appraisers from conducting further FHA appraisals. HUD Has Not Aggressively Enforced Its Policy on Lenders’ Accountability for Appraisals
HUD’s policy is that lenders are responsible, equally with the appraisers they select, for the accuracy and thoroughness of appraisals. HUD has not aggressively enforced this policy because of disagreement within HUD over its authority to do so. Among other things, the letter stated that (1) the lender did not know the appraiser had performed the appraisal in an unsatisfactory manner; (2) there was no basis to believe that the lender should have known about the unsatisfactory nature of the appraisal; (3) there was no financial tie, business affiliation, or conflict of interest between the lender and the appraiser; and (4) HUD did not have the authority to hold lenders responsible for the acts, errors, or omissions of independent appraisers. Appraisers must be state-licensed or -certified to qualify for FHA’s appraiser roster, but the states’ minimum licensing standards do not require expertise in conducting FHA appraisals. HUD is revising its appraisal guidance and forms and is adopting a testing requirement for appraisers. In addition, a procedural change by HUD has made field reviews less timely, with the result that HUD did not learn of problems with certain appraisals until after HUD had already approved mortgage insurance on the properties. Recommendations
To reduce the financial risks assumed by FHA and to improve HUD’s oversight of appraisers on FHA’s roster, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the Assistant Secretary for Housing-Federal Housing Commissioner to achieve better field review coverage of FHA’s appraiser roster by (1) ensuring that each HOC field reviews the required percentage (currently 10 percent) of the FHA appraisals conducted annually within its geographic jurisdiction and (2) requiring that when selecting appraisals for field review, HUD staff give higher priority to the work of appraisers who have done a substantial number of FHA appraisals but have not been field reviewed within the past year; make field reviews of appraisals more timely by establishing a process to ensure that HUD staff obtain copies of appraisal reports and perform field reviews prior to FHA’s approval of mortgage insurance; and better assess the quality of appraisal field reviews by insuring that a portion of each field review contractor’s work is verified through on-site evaluation of properties field reviewed by the contractor. Comments From the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) How well is the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) monitoring the performance of the appraisers on its roster and implementing procedures for addressing consumers’ complaints about Federal Housing Administration (FHA) appraisals? (2) To what extent is HUD holding appraisers accountable for poor-quality FHA appraisals? (3) To what extent is HUD holding lenders responsible for the quality of the FHA appraisals they use? (4) How does HUD ensure that the appraisers on its roster are qualified to perform FHA appraisals? To determine the extent to which HUD was holding appraisers accountable for poor-quality appraisals, we reviewed HUD’s guidance regarding enforcement actions against poorly performing appraisers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) appraisal process, focusing on: (1) how well the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is monitoring the performance of the appraisers on its roster and implementing procedures for addressing consumers' complaints about FHA appraisals; (2) the extent to which HUD is holding appraisers accountable for poor-quality FHA appraisals; (3) the extent to which HUD is holding lenders responsible for the quality of the FHA appraisals they use; and (4) how HUD ensures that appraisers on its roster are qualified to perform FHA appraisals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD is not doing a good job of monitoring the performance of appraisers; (2) on-site evaluations of completed appraisals, known as field reviews, are HUD's principal tool for assessing the quality of appraisers' work; (3) in fiscal year (FY) 1998, HUD performed about 81,000 of these reviews, but three of the four HUD homeownership centers (HOC) did not meet HUD's requirement to field review no less than 10 percent of the FHA appraisals performed within their jurisdictions; (4) although HUD's guidance states that timeliness is essential to ensure quality field reviews, half of the field reviews conducted in FY 1998 did not occur until more than 2 months after the appraisals had been performed; (5) moreover, HUD did not learn about problems with some appraisals until after it had already approved mortgage insurance for the properties; (6) the Philadelphia and Denver HOCs' records for 126 field reviews that rated the appraisals as poor showed that HUD approved mortgage insurance for 96 of the homes covered by these reviews; (7) HUD staff did not routinely visit appraised properties to determine the accuracy of the field review contractors' observations; (8) the Philadelphia and Denver HOCs did not fully implement guidance on the handling and tracking of consumers' complaints, including those relating to appraisals; (9) HUD is not holding appraisers accountable for the quality of their appraisals; (10) contrary to HUD's policy, appraisers who received two or more poor ratings in field reviews were frequently not prohibited from conducting further FHA appraisals; (11) a poor field review score indicates that the appraiser made errors and omissions that could result in an unacceptable insurance risk to FHA; (12) HUD has not aggressively enforced its policy to hold lenders equally accountable with the appraisers they select for the accuracy and thoroughness of appraisals because of a disagreement within HUD over its authority to do so; (13) HUD has limited assurance that the appraisers on its roster are knowledgeable about FHA's appraisal requirements; (14) HUD relies largely on the states' licensing process to ensure that appraisers are qualified, but the states' minimum licensing standards do not include proficiency in FHA's appraisal requirements; and (15) HUD is revising its appraisal guidance and forms to better clarify the roles and responsibilities of appraisers and is adopting a testing requirement for appraisers to ensure their competency in FHA's appraisal standards. |
gao_GAO-14-57 | gao_GAO-14-57_0 | CHS Program Funding and Service Eligibility Requirements
The CHS program is funded through annual appropriations and must Based on the operate within the limits of available appropriated funds.regulations that IHS has established for the CHS program, a number of requirements must be met in order for a service to be eligible for CHS payment.payment, local CHS programs must consider the following: Based on the requirements, before approving a service for Is the patient a member or descendent of a federally recognized tribe or someone with close ties to the tribe? CHS Payment Process
In general, three entities are involved in the CHS payment process: (1) the local CHS program, (2) the provider, and (3) IHS’s fiscal intermediary (FI). 2. External provider submits a claim to IHS’s FI. Health Care Coverage Options in PPACA Affecting American Indians and Alaska Natives
PPACA made significant changes to the Medicaid program and included new health care coverage options that may benefit American Indians and Alaska Natives. More than Two-Thirds of CHS Claims Were Paid within 6 Months but Some Took Much Longer to Pay
For CHS services delivered in fiscal year 2011, a majority of providers’ claims were paid within 6 months of the service delivery date, but some took much longer. The percentage of claims paid more than 6 months after service delivery was much smaller, with 19 percent of claims being paid between 6 months and 1 year after services were delivered, and about 8 percent paid more than 1 year after services were delivered. 2.) 3.) Among the three main steps in the payment process, the step that most often took the longest in the payment process was the first step—the time from date of service to the issuance of the purchase order. 4.) The first of two measures that IHS uses to assess the timeliness of the first step in the provider payment process is the average time it takes for IHS to issue a purchase order after a service has been provided. However, the GPRA measure does not provide a clear picture of the timeliness of purchase order issuance because it combines self-referrals with some IHS referrals when calculating the average time it takes for IHS to issue a purchase order, even though the timing of when purchase orders are issued relative to service delivery can be very different for the two referral types. Officials from one local CHS program told us that for these referrals, it may take only one day from the date of service to issue the purchase order. The other measure that IHS uses to assess the timeliness of the first step in the provider payment process is how long it takes from the time IHS is notified of a claim to when the agency makes a decision about it. In addition, CHS officials reported that staffing shortages and limited funding contribute to delays in processing payments to providers. Evaluating a service against each of the service eligibility requirements involves multiple steps, some of which depend on the CHS program receiving information from providers, patients, and others, and delays can occur during the evaluation of some of these eligibility requirements, according to CHS officials. Some CHS program officials noted that their number of staff was below these standards. New Coverage Options in PPACA May Provide IHS an Opportunity to Simplify CHS Eligibility Rules
New health care coverage options available to many IHS beneficiaries as a result of provisions in PPACA could provide IHS with an opportunity to simplify the complex eligibility rules of the CHS program. As we previously reported, however, many American Indians and Alaska Natives may gain new health care coverage beginning in 2014 as a result of PPACA, which could alleviate some constraints on CHS program funds. Recommendations for Executive Action
In an effort to ensure that IHS has meaningful information on the timeliness with which it issues purchase orders authorizing payment under the CHS program and to improve the timeliness of payments to providers, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the Director of IHS to: modify IHS’s claims data system to separately track IHS referrals and self-referrals, revise the GPRA measure for the CHS program so that it distinguishes between these two types of referrals, and establish separate timeframe targets for these referral types; and improve the alignment between CHS staffing levels and workloads by revising its current practices, where appropriate, to allow available funds to be used to pay for CHS program staff. HHS also concurred with our recommendation that as HHS and IHS monitor the effect that new coverage options available to IHS beneficiaries through PPACA have on CHS program funds, IHS proactively develop potential options to streamline program eligibility requirements. Medicaid Expansion: States’ Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Indian Health Service: Health Care Services Are Not Always Available to Native Americans. | Why GAO Did This Study
IHS provides health care to American Indians and Alaska Natives. When services are unavailable from IHS, IHS's CHS program may pay for care from external providers. GAO previously reported on challenges regarding the timeliness of CHS payments and the number of American Indians and Alaska Natives who may gain new health care coverage as a result of PPACA. PPACA mandated GAO to review the CHS program. This report examines (1) the length of time it takes external providers to receive payment from IHS after delivering CHS services; (2) the performance measures IHS has established for processing CHS provider payments; (3) the factors that affect the length of time it takes IHS to pay CHS providers; and (4) how new PPACA health care coverage options could affect the program. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 CHS claims data, interviewed IHS officials, including officials in four IHS areas, and reviewed agency documents and statutes.
What GAO Found
For Indian Health Service (IHS) contract health services (CHS) delivered in fiscal year 2011, a majority of claims were paid within 6 months of the service delivery date, but some took much longer. Specifically, about 73 percent of claims were paid within 6 months of service delivery, while about 8 percent took more than 1 year. The CHS payment process consists of three main steps: (1) the local CHS program issues a purchase order to the provider authorizing payment (either before service delivery, or after, such as in emergency situations), (2) the provider submits a claim for payment, and (3) IHS pays the provider. GAO found that the first step took the longest--often taking more than 2 months.
IHS uses three measures to assess the time it takes to approve and then process payments to CHS providers. Two of the measures concern the first step in the payment process (purchase order issuance) and the third concerns the final step (making the payment). One of the measures IHS uses to assess the timeliness of the first step is the average time it takes to issue a purchase order after a service has been delivered; IHS's current target for this measure is 74 days. However, the measure does not provide a clear picture of timeliness for this activity as it combines data for two different types of CHS services--those for which payment eligibility was determined prior to service delivery and those for which eligibility was determined after service delivery. IHS officials told GAO that when eligibility is determined prior to service delivery, it may take only one day from the date of service to issue the purchase order. Including this type of service in the calculation, therefore, lowers the overall average.
The complexity of the CHS program affects the timeliness of provider payments. IHS program officials make decisions on what care will be funded on a case-by-case basis, evaluating each case against a number of eligibility requirements involving multiple steps. This process can lead to payment delays. Officials noted that delays also can occur when processing payments and that staffing shortages can affect the timeliness of payments. Some program officials noted that their staffing levels were below standards established by IHS.
New coverage options in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) may provide an opportunity to simplify CHS eligibility requirements. PPACA made significant changes to the Medicaid program and included new health care coverage options that may benefit many American Indians and Alaska Natives beginning in 2014. IHS officials reported the agency developed the current CHS program eligibility requirements to manage CHS program funding constraints. In particular, some of the complexities of the program were designed to allow the program to operate within the constrained levels of program funding. With the availability of new coverage options under PPACA, some constraints on CHS program funds could be alleviated, providing IHS an opportunity to streamline service eligibility requirements and expand the range of services it pays for with CHS funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IHS revise an agency measure of the timeliness with which purchase orders are issued, use available funds as appropriate to improve the alignment between CHS staffing levels and workloads, and proactively develop potential options to streamline CHS eligibility requirements. The agency concurred with two recommendations, but did not concur with the recommendation to use available funds to improve CHS staffing levels. GAO believes the recommendation is valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-597T | gao_GAO-04-597T_0 | Background
The Air Force began the F/A-22 development program in 1986 and expected to complete development in 9 years for an estimated cost of $12.6 billion. We have reported in the past that the F/A-22 acquisition approach was a major contributor to the cost increases and delays in schedule that led to reduced buying power. Integrated avionics has been a source of major schedule delays and cost increases in the F/A-22 program. To accomplish this expanded mission, the Air Force will need additional investments to develop and expand air-to-ground attack capabilities for the F/A-22. In March 2003, the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the Air Force would need $11.7 billion for the planned modernization program. Additional risks are likely because the new processor and architecture are being developed by other major aircraft programs and will require extensive integration and operational testing to ensure that the F/A-22 program does not encounter similar problems that have delayed integration and testing of the F/A-22’s current avionics suite. However, the Air Force redesigned the tail to reduce producibility costs. Last year, in light of the changes in the program and investments that remained, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform asked DOD to provide a new business case justifying the Air Force’s planned number of F/A-22s (276 at that time) as well as how many F/A-22s are affordable. JSF Joint Strike Fighter Program Is Approaching a Decision Point
The JSF acquisition program is approaching a key investment decision point in its development as it prepares to stabilize the design for its critical design reviews. It is the most expensive acquisition program in DOD’s history with plans to buy almost 2,500 aircraft for an estimated acquisition cost of about $200 billion. We have also seen the reverse, where programs have gathered appropriate knowledge before their critical design review. These programs had much more predictable cost and schedule outcomes. Conclusions
DOD is not immune to efforts to address the fiscal imbalance confronting the nation and will continue to face challenges based on competing priorities, both within and external to its budget. In light of this substantial investment and the many changes that have occurred in the F/A-22 program, we believe decision makers would benefit from a new business case that justifies the need for the full air-to- air and air-to-ground capabilities and the quantities needed and affordable. The JSF program has a greater opportunity to make critical investment decisions using a knowledge-based approach. While the program started off with a high-risk approach by not maturing technologies before starting system development, it has the opportunity to manage the system development phase and stabilize the design before committing to large investments in manufacturing capability—tooling, labor, and facilities—to build test aircraft. The JSF program is considering a delay in its critical design review to attain greater design stability in its airframe. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) two major tactical aircraft fighter programs, the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, represent an investment of about $280 billion. Problems in the F/A-22 development program have led to a 10-year delay in delivering the initial capability and development cost increases of $16 billion. The Joint Strike Fighter, which experienced problems early in the program, is now at a critical crossroad in development. Any discussion of DOD's sizeable investment that remains in these programs must also be viewed within the context of the fiscal imbalance facing the nation within the next 10 years. GAO was asked to testify on the status of the F/A-22 and draw comparisons between both F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter programs' acquisition approaches.
What GAO Found
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant challenges since it began development in 1986. First, the Air Force had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can only afford about 218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop an expanded air-to-ground attack capability, DOD estimates that the Air Force will need $11.7 billion in modernization funding. Third, the Air Force has determined that new avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support most planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk. Lastly, the development test program continues to experience problems and risks further delays primarily due to avionics failures and problems meeting reliability requirements. Because of the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did not address how many aircraft the Air Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford considering the full life-cycle costs, whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities are needed, and what are the opportunity costs associated with purchasing any proposed quantities of this aircraft. The Joint Strike Fighter program started system development and demonstration in 2001 and has already encountered some cost and schedule problems. It is now working toward maturing the aircraft design and is considering delays in its critical design reviews to attain greater knowledge before making a decision to increase its investment significantly. In contrast, the F/A-22 program encountered poor cost and schedule outcomes because it had not gathered the appropriate knowledge at critical junctures in the program. The Joint Strike Fighter program is still early in its development program, with a greater opportunity to efficiently apply knowledge to its critical investment decisions. |
gao_GAO-13-369 | gao_GAO-13-369_0 | EPA assesses the human health risks of chemicals using a model from the National Academies. Taken together, these two steps are commonly referred to as IRIS toxicity assessments. California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) Toxicity Assessments. Without a clear understanding of current demand for IRIS toxicity assessments, EPA cannot adequately measure the program’s performance; effectively determine the number of IRIS assessments required to meet the statutory, regulatory, and programmatic needs of IRIS users; or know the extent to which unmet demand exists. According to the report, EPA estimated that 50 new or updated IRIS toxicity assessments a year were needed to meet user needs. However, based on our review of the report, we did not find sufficient support for the estimate. EPA’s Chemical Nomination and Selection Process May Not Accurately Reflect Current Demand for IRIS Toxicity Assessments
The IRIS Program’s chemical nomination and selection process, which the agency uses to gauge interest in the IRIS Program from users inside and outside of EPA, may not accurately reflect current demand for IRIS toxicity assessments. Also, given the long-standing challenges the IRIS Program has had in routinely starting new assessments, according to some EPA IRIS users, they chose not to nominate new chemicals for assessment and instead nominated chemicals that were already listed on the IRIS agenda as under way. Consequently, for the chemicals that were nominated during the most recent 2011 nomination period, but not selected, it is not clear how many, if any, were excluded from consideration because they did not meet the IRIS Program’s selection criteria, because the IRIS Program determined that an IRIS toxicity assessment was not needed— or, alternatively, if they were not selected because of resource constraints or other reasons. EPA Has Not Implemented an Agencywide Strategy for Addressing Unmet Needs for IRIS Toxicity Assessments
EPA has not implemented an agencywide strategy for addressing the unmet needs of EPA program offices and regions when IRIS toxicity assessments are not available, applicable, or current. Specifically, EPA does not have (1) a strategy for identifying and filling data gaps that would enable it to conduct IRIS toxicity assessments for nominated chemicals that were not selected for IRIS toxicity assessment due to insufficient data and (2) agencywide guidance for addressing unmet needs when IRIS toxicity assessments are not available, applicable, or current—which is consistent with findings reported recently by EPA’s Inspector General and Science Advisory Board. EPA has not evaluated demand for IRIS toxicity assessments with input from users inside and outside the agency since 2003, and although IRIS Program officials recognize that the 2003 estimate does not reflect current conditions, the agency does not plan to perform another evaluation of demand. Furthermore, EPA has not clearly articulated how the IRIS Program applies the criteria it uses to prioritize the selection of chemicals for IRIS toxicity assessment—including how it determines the circumstances under which program offices and regions may or may not need an IRIS toxicity assessment. To ensure that EPA maximizes its limited resources and addresses the statutory, regulatory, and programmatic needs of EPA program offices and regions when IRIS toxicity assessments are not available, we recommend that the EPA Administrator direct the Deputy Administrator, in coordination with EPA’s Science Advisor, to implement the following action:
Once demand for the IRIS Program is determined, develop an agencywide strategy to address the unmet needs of EPA program offices and regions that includes, at a minimum: coordination across EPA offices and with other federal research agencies to help identify and fill data gaps that preclude the agency from conducting IRIS toxicity assessments, and guidance that describes alternative sources of toxicity information and when it would be appropriate to use them when IRIS values are not available, applicable, or current. Specifically, EPA agreed with our recommendations that the Office of Research and Development (1) identify and evaluate demand for the IRIS Program to determine the number of IRIS toxicity assessments and resources required to meet users’ needs and (2) document how EPA applies its IRIS toxicity assessment selection criteria, including the circumstances under which program offices and regions may or may not need an IRIS toxicity assessment. In the absence of agencywide guidance that addresses unmet demand for IRIS assessments, EPA offices operate in much the same way they operated before the IRIS Program was formed to develop consensus opinions within the agency about the health effects from chronic exposure to chemicals. We did not evaluate the scientific content or quality of IRIS toxicity assessments. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA created the IRIS database in 1985 to help develop consensus opinions within the agency about the health effects from chronic exposure to chemicals. The health effects information in IRIS--referred to as IRIS toxicity assessments--provides fundamental scientific information EPA needs to develop human health risk assessments. GAO was asked to review the effectiveness of EPA's implementation of its IRIS toxicity assessment process. This report determines the extent to which (1) EPA has evaluated demand for IRIS toxicity assessments from users inside and outside EPA; (2) EPA's process for nominating and selecting chemicals for IRIS toxicity assessment accurately reflects demand; and (3) EPA has implemented a strategy for addressing any unmet agency needs when IRIS toxicity assessments are not available, applicable, or current. To do this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed IRIS nomination data, among other things, and interviewed EPA officials. GAO did not evaluate the scientific content or quality of IRIS toxicity assessments.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not conducted a recent evaluation of demand for Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) toxicity assessments with input from users inside and outside EPA. Specifically, EPA issued a needs assessment report in 2003, which estimated that 50 new or updated IRIS toxicity assessments were needed each year to meet users' needs. However, GAO did not find sufficient support for the estimate. In addition, IRIS Program officials recognize that the 2003 estimate does not reflect current conditions, but the agency does not plan to perform another evaluation of demand. Without a clear understanding of current demand for IRIS toxicity assessments, EPA cannot adequately measure the program's performance; effectively determine the number of IRIS toxicity assessments required to meet the needs of IRIS users; or know the extent of unmet demand.
The IRIS Program's chemical nomination and selection process, which the agency uses to gauge interest in the IRIS Program from users inside and outside of EPA, may not accurately reflect current demand for IRIS toxicity assessments. The 75 chemicals that were nominated in response to EPA's most recent 2011 nomination period may not reflect demand for a number of reasons. For example, given the long-standing challenges the IRIS Program has had in routinely starting new assessments, according to some EPA IRIS users, they chose not to nominate new chemicals for assessment. Also, EPA has not clearly articulated how the IRIS Program applies the criteria it uses to prioritize the selection of chemicals for IRIS toxicity assessment--including how it determines the circumstances under which an IRIS toxicity assessment is or is not needed. Consequently, for chemicals that were nominated but not selected for assessment, it is not clear how many, if any, were excluded from consideration because they did not meet the IRIS Program's selection criteria because the IRIS Program determined that an IRIS toxicity assessment was not needed--or, alternatively, if they were not selected due to resource constraints or other reasons.
EPA has not implemented an agencywide strategy for addressing the unmet needs of EPA program offices and regions when IRIS toxicity assessments are not available, applicable, or current. Specifically, EPA does not have a strategy for identifying and filling data gaps that would enable it to conduct IRIS toxicity assessments for nominated chemicals that are not selected for assessment because sufficient data from health studies are not available. IRIS Program officials stated that no agencywide mechanism exists for EPA to ensure that chemicals without sufficient scientific data during one nomination period will have such information by the next nomination period or even the one after that. These officials acknowledged that better coordination across EPA and with other federal agencies could help address the issue. EPA also does not have agencywide guidance for addressing unmet needs when IRIS toxicity assessments are not available, applicable, or current. In the absence of agencywide guidance, officials from select EPA offices stated that they used a variety of alternatives to IRIS toxicity assessments to meet their needs, including using toxicity information from other EPA offices or other federal agencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA evaluate demand for IRIS assessments; document how the agency applies its selection criteria, including the circumstances under which an IRIS toxicity assessment is or is not needed and; develop an agencywide strategy including, at a minimum, coordination across EPA offices, as well as with other federal agencies, to identify and fill data gaps, and providing guidance that describes alternative sources of toxicity information. EPA agreed with the first two recommendations and partially agreed with the third. |
gao_GAO-10-336 | gao_GAO-10-336_0 | However, from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, NHTSA was barred from using appropriated funds made available in DOT’s appropriation to raise CAFE standards. Although NHTSA and EPA Worked to Propose CAFE and GHG Emissions Standards That Are Aligned, the Programs Have Several Key Differences
Although the Proposed Standards Based on Vehicle Footprint Should Result in Benefits, Actual Vehicle Sales May Affect the Level of Benefits Realized
Although the proposed CAFE and GHG emissions standards are distinct and automobile manufacturers will be subject to both sets, EPA and NHTSA have worked to develop standards that are aligned (what the agencies refer to as “harmonized”) with the intention that manufacturers can build one fleet of vehicles to comply with both sets of standards. 3). Under a single standard, manufacturers could reduce vehicle size as one approach for CAFE compliance. While NHTSA and EPA expect benefits from adopting a standard based on vehicle footprint and predict that the administration’s goal of a fleetwide average 34.1 mpg and 250 grams per mile carbon dioxide in 2016 will be met, there is no guarantee that a specific national target will be achieved. 4). Similar scenarios could occur with respect to EPA’s GHG standards. For example, EPA’s proposed GHG standards offer a “temporary lead time” mechanism for manufacturers that sell a limited number of vehicles in the U.S. NHTSA officials said that this work helped improve its analysis. NHTSA also contributed safety research. By comparison, EPA has been able to develop and maintain automotive engineering expertise. However, the two agencies have not documented the processes for use during future rulemakings, and officials at both agencies report they currently have no plans to do so. NHTSA Improved the Analysis It Uses to Help Set CAFE Standards, and although Experts Still Expressed Some Concerns, They Lacked Consensus on Additional Improvements
NHTSA Evaluates Potential CAFE Standards Using the Volpe Model, Which Attempts to Simulate How Manufacturers Will Meet the Standards and Then Measures the Effects of the Standards
In part because NHTSA has previous experience in setting CAFE standards, we were asked to review any improvements NHTSA made to its process for setting CAFE standards. NHTSA Made Several Improvements to Its Analysis That Could Help NHTSA Better Estimate the Costs and Benefits of Increasing CAFE Standards
Transparency
To increase the transparency of inputs to the Volpe model for the 2012 through 2016 rulemaking, NHTSA used publicly available data to develop the model’s baseline vehicle fleet. Largely Due to Resource Constraints, NHTSA Has Limited Plans to Assess the Model Year 2008 through 2011 Light Truck CAFE Standards or Key Data Used to Develop the Standards
Federal agencies can use retrospective analyses of rulemakings to help determine the extent to which the expected costs, benefits, and goals of a regulation are being realized. An analysis of the accuracy of key data inputs, including the baseline fleet and technology cost estimates. Although NHTSA officials we spoke with recognize the value of these analyses and hope to conduct them, they report that resource limitations have prevented them from doing so in the past and will prevent them from doing so in the near future. If NHTSA and EPA do not collaborate closely on future standards, there is a risk that the standards may not be harmonized, which would lead to increased compliance costs for manufacturers; the standards may not reflect the expertise of both agencies, such as the vehicle power train technology and environmental expertise of EPA and vehicle safety expertise of NHTSA; and the goals that the standards are attempting to accomplish may not be met. However, we were not able to confirm the extent to which NHTSA leveraged DOT’s expertise because NHTSA did not provide this information. We analyzed these documents to summarize the structure of each set of standards, describing how the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) harmonized the standards and areas in which there are differences between the standards, such as certain types of flexibilities like temporary lead-time mechanisms. We conducted internet searches to identify experts publishing recent research on fuel economy, GHG emissions, economic modeling, and other issues. To determine the steps NHTSA has taken to analyze the effects of the model year 2008 through 2011 light truck standards, we reviewed and analyzed the Energy Independence and Security Act, NHTSA’s final rulemaking on the model year 2008 through 2011 CAFE standards for light trucks, and the data used to set these standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2009, the U.S. administration announced plans to increase the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards and establish the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for vehicles. NHTSA redesigned CAFE standards for light trucks for model years 2008 through 2011, and some experts raised questions about the rigor of the computer modeling NHTSA used to develop these standards. GAO was asked to review (1) the design of NHTSA and EPA's proposed standards; (2) how they are collaborating to set these standards; (3) improvements compared to a previous rulemaking, if any, NHTSA made to the modeling; and (4) the extent to which NHTSA analyzed the effects of past light truck standards and the accuracy of data used to set them. GAO reviewed relevant rulemaking and modeling documents, and interviewed agency officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
NHTSA and EPA have worked to propose CAFE and GHG standards that are generally aligned so manufacturers can build a single fleet of vehicles to comply with both. The standards are based on vehicle size and will cover model years 2012 to 2016. However, differences between the standards still exist because of variation in the legal authorities of each agency. For example, certain flexibility mechanisms designed to reduce compliance costs for manufacturers apply only to GHG standards, which could make aligning them with CAFE standards more difficult. However, potentially stricter penalties for GHG standard noncompliance could improve compliance with CAFE standards. Also, while NHTSA and EPA expect benefits from adopting a standard based on vehicle size, neither standard has a mechanism to ensure that a specific national target will be met. NHTSA and EPA are collaborating by sharing resources and expertise to jointly set CAFE and GHG standards. From fiscal years 1996 through 2001, NHTSA was barred from using appropriated funds to raise CAFE standards. In contrast, EPA has continually expanded its automotive engineering expertise, including at its vehicle testing lab. As a result, EPA was able to contribute several original research studies to the proposed joint standards. Because this collaboration is not formally required and the agencies are not documenting the processes used--a recognized best practice--they may not be able to replicate them in the future. To set the proposed standards, NHTSA improved upon the computer model compared to the version used that had been used to set the CAFE standards for 2008 through 2011 light trucks. One improvement was that NHTSA increased the model's transparency by using publicly available, rather than confidential, data to develop a baseline fleet of vehicles. With EPA's input, NHTSA updated several data inputs such as technology costs and the cost of emissions. While experts GAO interviewed had varying critiques of NHTSA's model, there was no consensus on how NHTSA could further improve it. In particular, experts' opinions differed sharply on two studies, which reported opposing findings concerning the relationship between vehicle weight (a key factor in determining fuel consumption) and safety--suggesting that additional research may be warranted. In part due to resource and data constraints, NHTSA has not yet evaluated its 2008 through 2011 light truck CAFE standards, which have a similar design to the new standards. Retrospective analyses of efforts and data inputs could inform NHTSA on the extent to which the standards met goals and provide means to improve the process of setting standards. Lacking such analysis, NHTSA does not know whether goals of the standards have been met or if changes are needed to the program. NHTSA officials said that while they would like to conduct such analyses, limited resources and time have prevented them from doing so, and they have no definitive plans to conduct them in the future. |
gao_NSIAD-97-63 | gao_NSIAD-97-63_0 | Although using LOGCAP is the choice of last resort, Army officials stated it is often necessary to use LOGCAP in these missions because of planning considerations such as the ability to respond to a major regional conflict, the political sensitivity of activating guard and reserve forces, the lack of host nation support agreements in undeveloped countries, and the desire to maintain a relatively low U.S. presence. The Army’s latest revised estimate of $461.5 million exceeds its initial estimate of $350.2 million by $111.3 million, or 32 percent. Our review shows that the difference in the Army’s estimates was largely driven by changes in operational requirements once the forces arrived in Bosnia. Estimated costs for troop housing and facilities rose from an original estimate of $56.5 million to $150.4 million. 1 for U.S. base camps in the Balkan peninsula.) 2.) 3.) This cost function increases as estimated contract costs increase. According to a U.S. Army, Europe official, the increase in the amount of services required and greater involvement by the contractor’s home office in procuring and shipping material and equipment, also contributed to the increase. Opportunities to Improve the Program’s Effectiveness
Our review of the Bosnian operation shows that there are opportunities to improve the program’s effectiveness. Areas that need improvement include doctrine and guidance, cost reporting, and contract monitoring. LOGCAP Cost Reporting
The LOGCAP financial reporting systems were not sufficient to provide U.S. Army, Europe commanders with adequate information on how much money had been spent for LOGCAP and for what purpose. The Army Contracting Support Agency similarly concluded that not enough people were deployed in the early stages of the operation to monitor contractor performance for the same reasons. AMC officials have worked with U.S. Army, Europe to identify problems experienced in Bosnia and they intend to make several program changes to improve planning and management and reduce costs. AMC awarded a new LOGCAP contract on January 30, 1997. The contract is for 1 year with the option of extending it for 4 more years, making the program available until 2002. Multiple Support Programs May Be Inefficient
The Navy and the Air Force recently created programs to preplan for contractor support, similar in many respects to the Army’s program. However, the programs may result in unnecessary duplication and costs. Before creating these programs, the Navy and the Air Force relied on LOGCAP for support during operations other than war such as in Somalia and Aviano, Italy. As part of this effort to improve LOGCAP, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to include specific changes to LOGCAP that incorporate lessons learned from the Bosnian operation and other missions, including developing doctrine and guidance for implementing LOGCAP that identify the way to use the contractor effectively, the type of management structure to establish, financial control and oversight requirements, and mission planning considerations; providing training to commanders on using LOGCAP, including information on contractor capabilities and roles and responsibilities in planning and execution; providing assistance to commands when LOGCAP is implemented to include deployable management teams; and developing improved financial reporting and internal controls mechanisms that provide commanders with the assurance that LOGCAP services are necessary and reasonably priced. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), focusing on: (1) the extent to which the Army is using the program; (2) reasons for increases in the program's cost for the Bosnia peacekeeping mission; (3) opportunities to improve program implementation from a doctrine, cost control, and contract oversight standpoint; (4) the use of LOGCAP in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti; and (5) the potential for inefficiency by having similar support contract programs in the Navy and the Air Force.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over the last 4 years, the Army has relied on LOGCAP to help support various contingency operations and plans to maintain the capability as an option for providing support in the future; (2) since 1992, the Army has used LOGCAP to provide logistics and engineering support services to U.S. forces in six operations and, on January 30, 1997, awarded a new contract that will keep the program available until 2002; (3) as of December 7, 1996, estimated program costs were about $674.2 million, with the vast majority, about $461.5 million, going to the Bosnian mission; (4) according to the Army, use of the contractor is the choice of last resort but necessary in these missions because of troop ceilings, unavailability of host nation support, and the need to keep military units available to respond to a major regional conflict; (5) LOGCAP cost estimates for the Bosnian mission have increased substantially; (6) the Army's latest revised estimate of $461.5 million exceeds its original estimate of $350.2 million by $111.3 million or 32 percent; (7) GAO's review shows that the difference in the estimates was largely driven by changes in operational requirements once the forces arrived in the Balkan peninsula; (8) weaknesses in financial reporting and contract monitoring systems also contributed to cost increases; (9) GAO's analysis of LOGCAP implementation during the Bosnian peacekeeping mission shows that there are opportunities to make the program more efficient and effective; (10) little doctrine on how to manage contractor resources and effectively integrate them with force structure units exists; (11) the financial reporting and contract monitoring systems during the early phases of the Bosnian mission were not sufficient to provide U.S. Army, Europe officials with information they needed to track the cost of the operation, report on how LOGCAP funds were spent, or monitor contractor performance; (12) Army Materiel Command officials have worked with U.S. Army, Europe to identify problems experienced in Bosnia, and they are taking actions intended to improve program planning and management and reduce costs for future operations; and (13) the Air Force and the Navy recently initiated programs similar to LOGCAP, which may result in unnecessary overhead costs and duplication. |
gao_RCED-99-56 | gao_RCED-99-56_0 | Specifically, this report (1) discusses DOE’s current process for setting its training budget, (2) identifies opportunities to reduce the costs associated with DOE’s training program, and (3) evaluates DOE’s draft plan for training the Department’s employees in the future. Those factors are that DOE offices and contractors offer a high percentage of training that is not mandated by laws and/or regulations and that DOE’s offices and contractors independently develop and deliver training. DOE’s Budget Process for Training Could Be Improved
According to the Office of Personnel Management and DOE guidance, certain steps are critical in developing a training budget. For example, one location offered a course to employees facing mid-life questions, another offered a course on determining social styles in the workplace, and a third offered a course on defensive driving. In the budgetary area, DOE has not successfully completed any of the critical steps needed to develop sound and defensible training budgets. It has not developed criteria on what type of nonmandatory training is appropriate within the Department, which has led to a wide range of nonmandatory training courses being offered. Finally, DOE offices have either not completed annual training plans or not completed them properly. Opportunities also exist for DOE to reduce its training costs. In addition, DOE has not standardized the development and delivery of training courses that have general application across the Department. However, it has several shortcomings. DOE training officials told us they were aware of these shortcomings and intend to address each of them before a final training plan is issued. For instance, DOE had intended to reduce by 50 percent the number of duplicate training courses offered by it and its contractors. In the draft plan, DOE estimates that about $2 million will be needed over fiscal years 1999 through 2001 to implement the performance actions contained in the plan. Furthermore, DOE’s draft training plan provides little information on the centers-of-excellence concept. Finally, even though DOE spent about 85 percent of its training budget for fiscal year 1997 on training contractor employees, DOE’s training plan does not address what steps should be taken to improve contractor employee training. Recommendations
To improve DOE’s new training plan, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy require that the plan include a realistic estimate of the overall costs to implement the plan and the overall savings to be achieved; an explanation of how DOE’s decentralized training resources will be committed to finance the plan; a policy regarding the use of the Department’s centers of excellence; and an identification of the steps necessary to improve contractor training performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) training program and the changes that are needed to address those problems, focusing on: (1) DOE's current process for setting its training budget; (2) opportunities to reduce the costs associated with DOE's training program; and (3) DOE's draft plan for training its employees in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE has not completed any of the critical steps identified in the Office of Personnel Management's and its own guidance that lead to the development of a sound and defensible training budget; (2) for instance, DOE has not defined the training needs for various occupations, including program managers and contractor oversight specialists; (3) in addition, DOE employees have generally not completed individual development plans, and DOE offices have generally not prepared annual training plans; (4) DOE could reduce its training costs by eliminating certain nonmandatory training and reducing duplicative and nonstandardized training across the Department; (5) about 90 percent of DOE's training, according to a departmental estimate, is not mandated by laws or regulations, but DOE has not developed criteria on the type of nonmandatory training that is appropriate; (6) as a result, DOE offers a wide range of nonmandatory training courses, such as a course on determining social styles in the workplace and one on employees facing mid-life questions; (7) furthermore, because DOE and its contractors independently develop and deliver training, duplicate courses exist and nonstandardized training occurs across the department; (8) DOE's draft training plan has several shortcomings that may preclude it from improving departmental training over fiscal years 1999 through 2001, as intended; (9) for example, the draft plan does not realistically estimate what overall costs and overall savings will result from the plan, how the plan will be financed, given DOE's decentralized training resources, and how DOE's training centers of excellence will eliminate duplicative training, as intended; (10) moreover, even though DOE spent about 85 percent of its fiscal year 1997 training expenditures on contractor employees, the draft training plan does not address the steps necessary to improve contractor training; and (11) DOE officials stated that they are aware of these shortcomings and intend to address them in the final plan. |
gao_GAO-05-375 | gao_GAO-05-375_0 | DOE’s Megaports Initiative Has Had Limited Success Initiating Work at High Priority Foreign Seaports and Lacks a Comprehensive Long- Term Plan to Guide Its Efforts
DOE’s Megaports Initiative has made limited progress in beginning to install radiation detection equipment at seaports identified as high priority by its Maritime Prioritization Model. DOE has completed work at two ports and signed agreements to initiate work at five others, two of which were ranked in the 20 highest priority ports by DOE’s model. First, some foreign governments have concerns that the flow of commerce at their ports could be disrupted by participating in the Initiative in both the short- and long-term. DOE officials also told us that they are close to signing agreements to initiate work in five additional countries. Through the End of Fiscal Year 2004, DOE Had Spent About $43 Million on Megaports Initiative Activities, but Total Program Costs Are Uncertain
Since the inception of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003 through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on Megaports Initiative activities. DOE’s current plan is to install radiation detection equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010 at an estimated cost of $337 million, but several uncertainties may affect the Initiative’s scope, cost, and time frames for completion. Second, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative’s scope should increase beyond 20 ports. DOE Faces Several Operational and Technical Challenges in Preventing Nuclear Smuggling at Foreign Seaports
In its effort to install radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports, DOE faces several operational and technical challenges. Additionally, some nuclear materials can be shielded with lead or other materials to prevent radiation from being detected. Further, environmental conditions specific to ports, such the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect the radiation detection equipment’s performance and long-term sustainability. DOE Is Developing Methods to Overcome Technical Challenges Posed by Ports’ Physical Layouts and Cargo Stacking Configurations
When implementing its Megaports Initiative at foreign ports, DOE has the specific challenge of trying to screen all cargo passing through a port. However, to date, DOE has not developed such a plan for the Initiative. DOE’s $15 million estimate for the average cost of installing equipment at a port was based on the department’s prior experience installing radiation detection equipment at Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take the following two actions: Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures that are consistent with DOE’s desire to install radiation detection equipment at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE will employ to determine how many and which lower priority ports it will include in the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty installing equipment at the highest priority ports as identified by its model, (3) projections of the anticipated funds required to meet the Initiative’s objectives, and (4) specific time frames for effectively spending program funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in implementing the Initiative, (2) current and expected costs of the Initiative, and (3) challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports.
What GAO Found
DOE's Megaports Initiative has had limited success in initiating work at seaports identified as high priority by DOE's Maritime Prioritization Model, which ranks ports in terms of their relative attractiveness to potential nuclear smugglers. Gaining the cooperation of foreign governments has been difficult in part because some countries have concerns that screening large volumes of containers will create delays that could inhibit the flow of commerce at their ports. DOE has completed work at 2 ports and signed agreements to initiate work at 5 other ports. Additionally, DOE is negotiating agreements with the governments of 18 additional countries and DOE officials told us they are close to signing agreements with 5 of these countries. However, DOE does not have a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the Initiative's efforts. Developing such a plan would lead DOE to, among other things, determine criteria for deciding how many and which lower priority ports to complete if it continues to have difficulties working at higher volume and higher threat ports of interest. Through the end of fiscal year 2004, DOE had spent about $43 million on Megaports Initiative activities. Of this amount, about $14 million was spent on completing installations at 2 ports. Although DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of 20 ports by 2010, at an estimated cost of $337 million, this cost projection is uncertain for several reasons. For example, the projection is based in part on DOE's $15 million estimate for the average cost per port, which may not be accurate because it was based primarily on DOE's work at Russian land borders, airports, and seaports. Additionally, DOE is currently assessing whether the Initiative's scope should increase beyond 20 ports; if this occurs, total costs and time frames will also increase. DOE faces several operational and technical challenges in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. For example, DOE is currently devising ways to overcome technical challenges posed by the physical layouts and cargo stacking configurations at some ports. Additionally, environmental conditions, such high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection equipment's performance and sustainability. |
gao_GAO-04-798T | gao_GAO-04-798T_0 | In the early 1990s, we identified an architecture as a critical success factor in allowing organizations to effectively apply IT to meet mission goals. To help oversee and budget for federal IT investments, OMB began developing the FEA in 2002, and has since issued versions of four of its five major parts. What Is an Enterprise Architecture? Importance of Enterprise Architectures
The importance of enterprise architectures is a basic tenet of IT management, and their effective use is a recognized hallmark of successful public and private organizations. In February 2002, OMB established the Federal Enterprise Architecture Program Management Office to develop the FEA, which, according to OMB, is intended to facilitate governmentwide improvement through cross-agency analysis and identification of duplicative investments, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration, interoperability, and integration within and across agency programs. Several laws and regulations have established requirements and guidance for agencies’ management of architectures, beginning with the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1996, which directs the CIOs of major departments and agencies to develop, maintain, and facilitate the implementation of IT architectures as a means of integrating agency goals and business processes with IT. OMB Has Made Progress on FEA, but Questions Remain
In 2001, the lack of a federal enterprise architecture was cited by OMB’s E-Government Task Force as a barrier to the success of the administration’s e-government initiatives. OMB Has Cited a Number of Broad Purposes for the FEA
OMB has identified multiple purposes for the FEA. It also describes a process for agencies to use to identify and define these measurement indicators. Since then, OMB initiated a governmentwide analysis of these five lines of business to examine business and IT data and best practices for each. Should the FEA be described as an enterprise architecture? Our reading of the four available reference models does not demonstrate to us that this kind of content exists in the FEA, and thus we believe that the FEA is more akin to a point-in-time framework or classification scheme for federal government operations. Is the expected relationship between agencies’ enterprise architectures and the FEA clearly articulated? In particular, the percentage of agencies that had established at least the foundation for effective enterprise architecture management was virtually unchanged from where it was in 2001 (about 50 percent). Recently, OMB and the federal CIO Council began to take steps that are consistent with many of our recommendations. Of the 93 agencies that we reported on in 2001 and 2003, ● 22 agencies (24 percent) increased their maturity, ● 24 agencies (26 percent) decreased their maturity, and ● 47 agencies (51 percent) remained the same. The most often satisfied elements included the following stage 2 elements: ● “Enterprise architecture plans call for describing both the ‘as-is’ and the ‘to-be’ environments of the enterprise, as well as a sequencing plan for transitioning from the ‘as-is’ to the ‘to-be’”(about 94 percent); ● “Enterprise architecture plans call for describing both the ‘as-is’ and the ‘to-be’ environments in terms of business, performance, information/data, application/service, and technology” (about 90 percent); and ● “Enterprise architecture plans call for business, performance, information/data, application/service, and technology descriptions to address security” (about 86 percent). Subsequently, it incorporated enterprise architecture considerations into its oversight processes and issued guidance directing that agency IT investments be based on agency enterprise architectures. Accordingly, we recommended that the OMB Director, in collaboration with the federal CIO Council, use our maturity framework and the agency baseline information provided in our February 2002 report as the basis for helping agencies to advance the state of their respective enterprise architecture development, implementation, and maintenance efforts, and for measuring agency progress. In summary, enterprise architecture development and use in the federal government are maturing, but they are not mature. | Why GAO Did This Study
The concept of enterprise architecture emerged in the mid- 1980s as a means for optimizing integration and interoperability across organizations. In the early 1990s, GAO research of successful public and private sector organizations led it to identify enterprise architecture as a critical success factor for agencies that are attempting to modernize their information technology (IT) environments. Since then, GAO has repeatedly identified the lack of an enterprise architecture as a key management weakness in major modernization programs at a number of federal agencies. It has also collaborated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council to develop architecture guidance. In 2002, OMB began developing the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA), an initiative intended to guide and constrain federal agencies' enterprise architectures and IT investments. GAO was asked to testify on the status of the FEA and on the state of federal agencies' development and use of enterprise architectures.
What GAO Found
OMB has made progress on the FEA, but it remains very much a work in process and is still maturing. Its stated purposes include facilitating (1) the development of agencies' enterprise architectures, (2) the reuse of common IT components across agencies, and (3) the identification of opportunities for interagency collaboration in developing common IT solutions. Currently, the FEA is made up of five parts known as reference models, four of which have been issued in at least initial form. OMB reports that the FEA has been used to help identify potentially redundant agency IT investments, choose five lines of business (e.g., grants management) in which to pursue opportunities for agency collaboration, and begin to develop the architectural foundation for some of these business lines. GAO supports the FEA as a framework for achieving these ends, but raises questions whose answers are important to the its future. For example: Should the FEA be described as an enterprise architecture? GAO's reading of its content suggests that it is more akin to a classification scheme for government operations than a true enterprise architecture. Further, OMB requires agencies to "map" and "align" their architectures with the FEA. However, since these terms are not well-defined, GAO asks if the expected relationship between the FEA and agencies' architectures is clear enough. Like the FEA, agencies' enterprise architectures are still maturing. GAO recently reported (GAO-04-40) that agencies' management of architecture programs was generally not mature. Using its Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework as a benchmark, GAO found little change in overall maturity between 2001 and 2003. Only 20 of 96 agencies examined had established at least the foundation for effective architecture management. Further, while 22 agencies increased in maturity since 2001, 24 agencies decreased and 47 agencies remained the same. Recently, OMB and the federal CIO Council initiated actions to advance agency architecture programs that are consistent with many of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-463 | gao_GAO-17-463_0 | Federal Investment in Early Learning and Child Care Includes Multiple Programs that Either Require or Permit Use of Funds for Such Services
Multiple Programs May Provide or Support Early Learning or Child Care
Multiple federal programs may provide or support early learning or child care for children age 5 and under. In addition to these federally funded programs, we identified three federal tax expenditures that forgo tax revenue to subsidize the private purchase of child care and adult dependent care services. The Federal Government Obligated $15 Billion in Fiscal Year 2015 for Programs with an Explicit Early Learning or Child Care Purpose, and Other Programs Also Permit Using Funds for These Purposes
Agencies obligated approximately $15 billion in fiscal year 2015, the most recent obligations data available at the time we conducted our review, across the nine programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose. The vast majority of this funding is concentrated in two programs administered by HHS: Head Start and CCDF. Improved Agency Coordination has Helped Address Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication
Some Early Learning and Child Care Programs are Still Fragmented, Overlap, or Have Potential for Duplication
As we found in 2012, some fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication exist among early learning and child care programs. Fragmentation
The federal investment in early learning and child care is fragmented in that it is administered through multiple agencies. Despite some similarities in target populations and activities, programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose often have different goals and administrative structures. Duplication
There may be potential for duplication among early learning and child care programs insofar as some programs may fund similar types of services for similar populations. However, as we noted in our 2012 review, the extent to which actual duplication exists is difficult to assess at the federal level due to differing program eligibility requirements and data limitations. As we previously reported, effective coordination can help mitigate the effects of program fragmentation and overlap and potentially help bridge service gaps. Based upon our analysis, the Early Learning Interagency Policy Board— HHS and Education’s inter-departmental workgroup that focuses on children from birth through age 8—has followed leading practices for interagency collaboration that we have identified, such as defining outcomes, tracking progress toward goals, and including relevant participants across agencies, among others (see table 4). For example, in response to needed actions we identified in 2012, HHS and Education expanded membership of this group to include other agencies with early learning and child care programs. The agencies use various combinations of three approaches: performance monitoring, conducting program evaluations or studies, and reviewing other performance information (see fig. For example:
Children age 5 and under: Eight of the nine programs assess results regarding this age group. Although many of the programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose assess common aspects of performance, the specific results agencies examine differ for a number of reasons. Interior did not have comments on our report. In its written comments, HHS agreed with our findings and noted that children and families benefit most from investments in federal early learning and child care programs when they are coordinated with similar programs and activities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine: (1) what is known about the federal investment in early learning and child care programs; (2) the extent to which early learning and child care programs are fragmented, overlap, or are duplicative, and the efforts agencies have made to manage these conditions; and (3) the extent to which agencies assess performance for programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose. In addition to agency responses to our questionnaires, we obtained supplementary information from the Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), the Interior (Interior), and other agencies. Appendix II: Update of Programs and Tax Expenditures that May Provide or Support Early Learning or Child Care
Appendix IV: Performance Information for Programs with an Explicit Early Learning or Child Care Purpose
Department of Education: Performance Assessment of Programs with an Explicit Early Learning or Child Care Purpose
Child Care Access Means Parents in School (CCAMPIS)
The Department of Education (Education) has two performance measures for Child Care Access Means Parents in School program (CCAMPIS), but has not set program-wide targets (see table 7). | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of children age 5 and under participate each year in federally funded preschool and other early learning programs, or receive federally supported child care. Federal support for early learning and child care has evolved over time to meet emerging needs. In 2012, GAO reported that multiple federal agencies administer numerous early learning and child care programs. GAO was asked to re-examine federal programs that provide or support early learning and child care.
This report examines 1) the federal investment in early learning and child care programs; 2) fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among early learning and child care programs and agencies' efforts to address these conditions; and 3) the extent to which agencies assess performance for programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose. GAO analyzed responses to questionnaires from nine agencies and one regional commission; reviewed budget and tax expenditure documentation, evaluations, annual program performance results, and other agency documentation; and interviewed officials from HHS, Education, and Interior.
What GAO Found
Multiple federal programs may provide or support early learning or child care for children age 5 and under. Of these programs, nine describe early learning or child care as an explicit purpose and are administered by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Education (Education), and the Interior (Interior). Fiscal year 2015 obligations for these nine programs totaled approximately $15 billion, with the vast majority of these funds concentrated in Head Start and the Child Care and Development Fund. An additional 35 programs did not have an explicit early learning or child care purpose, but permitted funds to be used for these services. Additionally, three tax expenditures subsidized individuals' private purchase of child or dependent care.
As GAO found in 2012, some early learning and child care programs are fragmented, overlap, or have potential for duplication. Specifically:
Fragmentation. The federal investment in early learning and child care is fragmented in that it is administered through multiple agencies.
Overlap. Some programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose overlap, given that they target similar beneficiaries, such as low-income children, or engage in similar activities. However, these programs often have different goals and administrative structures.
Duplication. Some programs are potentially duplicative because they may fund similar types of services for similar populations. However, the extent to which actual duplication exists is difficult to assess due to differing program eligibility requirements and data limitations.
HHS and Education have helped address these conditions through improved agency coordination, particularly by following leading practices for interagency collaboration. For example, in response to needed actions GAO identified in 2012, HHS and Education expanded membership of their inter-departmental workgroup on young children to include other agencies with early learning and child care programs. The agencies have also documented their agreements, dedicated staff time to promote the goals and activities of this inter-departmental workgroup, and issued joint policy statements. The resulting improvement in coordination has helped mitigate the effects of fragmentation and overlap.
HHS, Education, and Interior use different methods to assess performance for the nine programs with an explicit early learning or child care purpose. These agencies collect performance information through various combinations of performance monitoring, program evaluations or studies, and other information, such as grantee-submitted reports. In addition, they collect performance information that aligns with program objectives, and many programs examine common aspects of performance. However, the specific results agencies assess differ for a number of reasons. For example, some programs assess children only while they receive services, while others assess later impacts on children.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. In its comments, HHS agreed with GAO's findings and noted that children benefit most from investments in federal early learning and child care programs when they are coordinated with similar programs. Education and HHS also provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-09-493 | gao_GAO-09-493_0 | As a result, many manufacturers are developing lithium-ion batteries because they have the potential to store more energy and are typically smaller and lighter than batteries currently in use. The federal government is also trying to reduce petroleum consumption in federal fleet vehicles by requiring agencies to take several actions and by setting a number of goals and requirements for federal agencies, as follows: Begin acquiring plug-in hybrid electric vehicles: Executive Order 13423 sets a goal for federal agencies operating fleets of 20 or more vehicles to begin using plug-in hybrids when these vehicles become commercially available and can be purchased at a cost reasonably comparable to conventional vehicles based on life-cycle costs. The cost-effectiveness of plug-ins will be determined by the cost of batteries and trends in the price of gasoline relative to the price of electricity to charge the vehicles. Plug-ins Offer Environmental Benefits, but These Benefits Depend on Shifting to Lower- Emission Fuel Sources to Generate Electricity
Through their potential to make substantial reductions in oil consumption, plug-ins could produce environmental benefits such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the construction of new nuclear plants can be controversial because of public concern about safety. Several Factors Could Delay the Widespread Availability of Plug-in Vehicles, and the Federal Government Has Options to Provide Support
Manufacturers plan to introduce several types of plug-in vehicles over the next 6 years. However, certain factors, such as the limitations of current battery technology, could delay availability of plug-ins, and the current financial situation could prevent consumers from purchasing plug-ins. Such technology, or “smart charging infrastructure,” would likely need to include features that allow consumers to indicate by what time the car needs to be charged and a way to meter and bill consumers different prices for on- and off-peak consumption. In addition to these issues, the recent spike and decline in gasoline prices may make it more difficult to market plug-ins in that consumers may be doubtful that they will recoup the high upfront costs of plug-ins through fuel savings over the life of the vehicle. The Federal Government Has Encouraged the Development and Manufacture of Plug-in Vehicles, and Experts Identified Several Additional Options
The federal government has historically played a role in the research and development of plug-in vehicle technology and has recently provided grant funding for plug-in hybrid test fleets: Funding for basic research to develop technology: DOE funds basic research to develop battery technology for vehicles as well as other components necessary for electric-powered vehicles. Cost and Other Factors, Including Federal Requirements, Could Hinder the Integration of Plug-in Vehicles into the Federal Fleet
Once plug-ins become commercially available, agencies will face challenges related to cost, availability, planning, and federal requirements. Among the agencies we reviewed, the use of life-cycle cost analysis varied, and according to FEDFLEET, an organization representing federal fleet managers, most agencies do not use life-cycle costing when evaluating which vehicles to purchase. Agencies Have Not Developed Plans to Incorporate Plug-ins Due to Uncertainties Surrounding Vehicle Performance and Infrastructure Needs
Almost all of the agency officials we interviewed stated they have not developed plans for incorporating plug-ins into their fleets, in some cases because of the uncertainties surrounding plug-ins. Incorporating Plug-ins into the Federal Fleet May Be at Odds with Other Federal Requirements
Agencies also face a challenge posed by the patchwork of existing federal requirements that covers energy use and vehicle acquisitions. Because plug-ins are expected to rely on electricity from federal facilities while charging, they could increase energy consumption, particularly if plug-ins are used in large numbers. DOE has not provided guidance to agencies on this subject. Although, by making statutory requirements, Congress signified the importance of acquiring alternative fuel vehicles, using alternative fuel, decreasing petroleum use, decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, and improving energy efficiency in facilities, the requirements can be costly and are sometimes in conflict. As a result, agencies are uncertain about setting priorities and struggle to meet the overall intent of these requirements and goals. We also recommend that, once plug-in hybrids and all-electrics become available to the federal government but are still in the early phases of commercialization, the Administrator of GSA explore the possibility of arranging pass-through leases of plug-in vehicles directly from vehicle manufacturers or dealers—as is being done with DOD’s acquisition of neighborhood electric vehicles—if doing so proves to be a cost-effective means of reducing some of the risk agencies face associated with acquiring new technology. We defined this set of vehicles as “plug-ins” since they derive part or all of their energy from plugging into an electricity source. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. transportation sector relies almost exclusively on oil; as a result, it causes about a third of the nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Advanced technology vehicles powered by alternative fuels, such as electricity and ethanol, are one way to reduce oil consumption. The federal government set a goal for federal agencies to use plug-in hybrid electric vehicles--vehicles that run on both gasoline and batteries charged by connecting a plug into an electric power source--as they become available at a reasonable cost. This goal is on top of other requirements agencies must meet for conserving energy. In response to a request, GAO examined the (1) potential benefits of plug-ins, (2) factors affecting the availability of plug-ins, and (3) challenges to incorporating plug-ins into the federal fleet. GAO reviewed literature on plug-ins, federal legislation, and agency policies and interviewed federal officials, experts, and industry stakeholders, including auto and battery manufacturers.
What GAO Found
Increasing the use of plug-ins could result in environmental and other benefits, but realizing these benefits depends on several factors. Because plug-ins are powered at least in part by electricity, they could significantly reduce oil consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions. For plug-ins to realize their full potential, electricity would need to be generated from lower-emission fuels such as nuclear and renewable energy rather than the fossil fuels--coal and natural gas--used most often to generate electricity today. However, new nuclear plants and renewable energy sources can be controversial and expensive. In addition, research suggests that for plug-ins to be cost-effective relative to gasoline vehicles the price of batteries must come down significantly and gasoline prices must be high relative to electricity. Auto manufacturers plan to introduce a range of plug-in models over the next 6 years, but several factors could delay widespread availability and affect the extent to which consumers are willing to purchase plug-ins. For example, limited battery manufacturing, relatively low gasoline prices, and declining vehicle sales could delay availability and discourage consumers. Other factors may emerge over the longer term if the use of plug-ins increases, including managing the impact on the electrical grid (the network linking the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity) and increasing consumer access to public charging infrastructure needed to charge the vehicles. The federal government has supported plug-in-related research and initiated new programs to encourage manufacturing. Experts also identified options for providing additional federal support. To incorporate plug-ins into the federal fleet, agencies will face challenges related to cost, availability, planning, and federal requirements. Plug-ins are expected to have high upfront costs when they are first introduced. However, they could become comparable to gasoline vehicles over the life of ownership if certain factors change, such as a decrease in the cost of batteries and an increase in gasoline prices. Agencies vary in the extent to which they use life-cycle costing when evaluating which vehicle to purchase. Agencies also may find that plug-ins are not available to them, especially when the vehicles are initially introduced because the number available to the government may be limited. In addition, agencies have not made plans to incorporate plug-ins due to uncertainties about vehicle cost, performance, and infrastructure needs. Finally, agencies must meet a number of requirements covering energy use and vehicle acquisition--such as acquiring alternative fuel vehicles and reducing facility energy and petroleum consumption--but these sometimes conflict with one another. For example, plugging vehicles into federal facilities could reduce petroleum consumption but increase facility energy use. The federal government has not yet provided information to agencies on how to set priorities for these requirements or leverage different types of vehicles to do so. Without such information, agencies face challenges in making decisions about acquiring plug-ins that will meet the requirements, as well as maximize plug-ins' potential benefits and minimize costs. |
gao_GAO-07-203 | gao_GAO-07-203_0 | The Trustee Program’s Process for Screening Providers Is Designed to Help Ensure Statutory and Program Requirements Are Met
The Bankruptcy Act requires prefiling credit counseling and debtor education providers to meet certain requirements designed to ensure the quality of their services and prevent abusive practices. Few complaints have been raised about providers’ competence or integrity, although IRS is in the process of examining the tax-exempt status of four providers. No credit counseling provider approved by the Trustee Program had had its federal 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status revoked as of March 2007, according to publicly available documents we reviewed. The great majority of counseling is conducted by telephone or via the Internet rather than in person. It was intended to help consumers make informed choices about their options, but anecdotal evidence suggests that by the time most consumers receive the counseling, their financial problems are dire and they have few viable alternatives to bankruptcy. Finally, the predischarge debtor education requirement—a general financial literacy course covering budgeting, money management, credit, and consumer protection—is believed by most observers we spoke with to be beneficial. Many Question the Value of the Credit Counseling Requirement, but Data on Outcomes Are Limited
The Conference Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Act indicated that the purpose of the credit counseling provisions was to ensure that consumers could “make an informed choice about bankruptcy, its alternatives, and consequences.” The report further noted that the counseling was intended to give consumers in financial distress “an opportunity to learn about the consequences of bankruptcy—such as the potentially devastating effect it can have on their credit rating” before they decided to file for bankruptcy relief. However, formalized guidance could be beneficial because it could, among other things, set a minimum benchmark for reducing or waiving fees. Trustee Program Has Not Issued Formal Guidance on Determining a Client’s Ability to Pay
As noted earlier, neither the statute nor the Trustee Program’s rulemaking provide criteria for what constitutes a client’s ability to pay the fee for a counseling or education session. Supply of Providers Appears Sufficient and Actions Under Way Address Challenges Some Consumers May Face Fulfilling the Requirements
Evidence showed that as of October 2006, enough prefiling credit counseling and predischarge debtor education providers—153 and 268, respectively—had been approved to allow consumers to receive these services on a timely basis. A wide range of participants in the bankruptcy process—including bankruptcy attorneys, panel trustees, a bankruptcy court representative, and service providers—told us that getting access to these services in a timely manner had generally not been a barrier to filing or receiving discharge of debts. Further, the courts’ recent steps to better ensure that filers are aware of the prefiling counseling requirement are beneficial given the potential consequences of filing for bankruptcy without the required counseling certificate. Recommendations
We recommend that the Attorney General direct the Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees to do the following: To help assess the merit of the Bankruptcy Act’s prefiling counseling requirement, the Trustee Program should develop a mechanism that would allow the program or other parties to track the outcomes of prefiling credit counseling, including the number of individuals issued counseling certificates who then file for bankruptcy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our report objectives were to examine (1) the actions taken by the Trustee Program to approve credit counseling and debtor education providers; (2) the content and results of the counseling and education sessions; (3) the fees providers charge for counseling and education services, and the extent to which these services are provided regardless of debtors’ ability to pay; and (4) the availability of approved counseling and education services, and the challenges debtors may face in receiving these services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 requires individuals to receive credit counseling before filing for bankruptcy and to take a debtor education course before having debts discharged. Concerns were raised that the new requirements could expose consumers to abusive practices by credit counseling agencies or become barriers to filing for bankruptcy. GAO was asked to examine (1) the process of approving counseling and education providers, (2) the content and results of the counseling and education sessions, (3) the fees charged, and (4) the availability of and challenges to accessing services. To address these issues, GAO reviewed Trustee Program data and application case files, and interviewed a wide range of individuals and groups involved in the bankruptcy process.
What GAO Found
The Trustee Program's process for approving credit counseling and debtor education providers was designed to help ensure that providers met statutory and program requirements and demonstrated evidence of proficiency, experience, and reputability. The Bankruptcy Act set certain standards for providers, and the program's July 2006 rule clarified these standards and formalized the application review process. As of October 2006, the Trustee Program had approved 153 credit counseling and 268 debtor education providers. These providers have had few formal complaints lodged against them, and federal and state law enforcement authorities with whom we spoke did not identify any recent enforcement actions against them under consumer protection laws. No provider approved by the Trustee Program had had its federal tax-exempt status revoked, although four providers' tax-exempt status was being examined by the Internal Revenue Service. The content of the required credit counseling and debtor education sessions generally complied with statutory and program requirements. Participants in the bankruptcy process largely believed the education requirement--a general financial literacy course--to be beneficial. However, the value of the counseling requirement is not clear. The counseling was intended to help consumers make informed choices about bankruptcy and its alternatives. Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that by the time most clients receive the counseling, their financial situations are dire, leaving them with no viable alternative to bankruptcy. As a result, the requirement may often serve more as an administrative obstacle than as a timely presentation of meaningful options. Because no mechanism currently exists to track the outcomes of the counseling, policymakers and program managers are unable to fully assess how well the requirement is serving its intended purpose. Providers typically charge about $50 per session and evidence suggests fees are being waived as appropriate for clients unable to pay, as the Bankruptcy Act requires. Neither the statute nor Trustee Program guidance defines what constitutes "ability to pay," and policies vary among providers. Formal guidance on this issue would have several benefits, including ensuring compliance with a minimum benchmark for waiving fees. The number of counseling and education providers that have been approved appears sufficient to allow consumers to access these services in a timely manner. In-person sessions are available in most parts of the country, although the great majority of clients fulfill the requirements via telephone or Internet. The Trustee Program has efforts under way to help mitigate the challenges speakers of foreign languages can face in accessing services. Further, the bankruptcy courts have taken steps recently to help better ensure that filers are aware of the potential consequences of filing for bankruptcy without the required counseling certificate. |
gao_GAO-17-504T | gao_GAO-17-504T_0 | 1). The federal government provides grants to help fund airport capital development through its Airport Improvement Program (AIP). Congress appropriates funds for AIP and other FAA programs from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), which is itself funded by a variety of aviation- related taxes, such as taxes on tickets, cargo, general aviation gasoline, and jet fuel. Because of the size and duration of airport development—for example, planning, funding and building a new runway can take more than a decade and several hundred-million dollars to complete—long-term debt is used to help finance these types of projects. Airport Planned Development Cost Estimates Differ due to Multiple Factors
The FAA’s estimate of the costs for infrastructure development at airports over the next 5 years is about $32.5 billion compared to the airport industry’s estimate of almost $100 billion for the same period. FAA reported a decrease in estimated costs for planned projects at most large and medium hubs, with increases at other hub types. The airport industry’s estimate of 5-year planned development cost, as developed by Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), is three times FAA’s. The principal reason why FAA’s and ACI-NA’s planned development costs differ so significantly is that the ACI-NA cost estimate encompasses substantially more projects than does FAA’s, according to ACI-NA. The 5-year FAA estimate for 2017 through 2021 fell from the prior estimate to $32.5 billion, whereas ACI-NA’s estimate increased by $24.4 billion to $99.9 billion, or three times FAA’s estimate. Airports Rely on Federal and Locally Generated Revenues to Fund Development
In 2015, we estimated that in recent years national system airports had generated an average of $10 billion annually for capital development. AIP grants must be used for eligible and justified projects, which are planned and prioritized by airports, included in their capital improvement plans, and reviewed and approved by FAA staff and the Secretary of Transportation. PFC collections: Congress last raised the PFC cap in 2000 to $4.50 per flight segment, with a limit on the total PFCs that a passenger can be charged per round trip of $18 total. As we reported in 2015, airports have a number of options for addressing any shortfall in funding their capital development, including prioritizing capital development projects, financing projects, attempting to increase airport revenues, or entering into public-private partnerships. Increasing Passenger Facility Charges Would Increase Airport Funding, but Other Effects Are Less Certain
One approach to increasing funding for airports that has been advanced by airports and others is to increase or eliminate the current $4.50 cap on PFCs. However, any increase in PFCs is controversial and strongly opposed by airlines, which contend that airports currently have adequate access to funding for their development. We have previously found that increasing the PFC cap would significantly increase PFC collections available to airports. While an increase in PFCs would mainly flow to the larger airports, smaller airports could also benefit from increased PFC collections. Such a decrease would also result in marginally slowing growth in revenues to the AATF. Under all three scenarios, AATF revenues, which totaled $14.3 billion in 2016 and are used to fund FAA activities, would likely continue to grow overall based on current projections of passenger growth; however, the modeled cap increases could reduce total AATF’s revenues by roughly 1 percent because of reduced passenger demand. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Roughly 3,300 airports in the United States are eligible for federal AIP grants from the FAA that can be used for certain types of projects, such as building runways and noise mitigation. To fund development, in addition to AIP grants, airports rely on locally generated revenues and federally authorized PFCs, which are added to the price of an airline ticket and have been capped at $4.50 per flight segment.
The administration's call to boost spending on public infrastructure has renewed attention on the importance of maintaining and improving airport infrastructure.
This testimony discusses: (1) the differences between estimates of airports' planned development costs, (2) the federal funding and other airport funding and revenues that may be available to defray development costs, and (3) the implications of increasing the cap on PFCs, among other objectives.
This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from March 1998 through April 2015, with selected updates conducted through March 2017. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed recent information on FAA's program activities and analyses outlined in FAA reports, and related airport industry estimates of infrastructure development costs. GAO also interviewed officials from FAA, and airport and airline trade associations.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) estimate of the costs for planned capital development at airports over the next five years is about $32.5 billion, compared to the Airports Council International-North America's (ACI-NA) estimate of almost $100 billion, both for the period 2017-2021. The difference between these two estimates can be attributed to a number of factors, but most significantly to the types of projects included in the estimates. FAA's estimate is limited to projects that are eligible for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants that do not already have funding arranged, whereas ACI-NA's estimates include all projects regardless of AIP eligibility or whether funding is arranged. The figure below illustrates the disparity between the two estimates since 2005. Note that since 2015, FAA's estimate has decreased by $1 billion whereas ACI-NA's has increased by $24.4 billion.
In addition to the AIP and state grants they receive, airports generate funds through airport-generated income and Passenger Facility Charges (PFC), among other sources. In 2015, GAO estimated that funding from these sources totaled an average of $10.3 billion annually (2013 dollars), $2.7 billion less than airports' planned development costs. Airports have a number of options for addressing any shortfall in funding their planned development costs, including prioritizing development projects, financing projects with long term debt, attempting to increase airport revenues, or entering into public-private partnerships.
Increasing or eliminating the PFC cap would significantly increase PFC collections available to airports under three scenarios GAO modeled in prior work. However, according to GAO's model, an increase in the PFC could also marginally slow passenger growth and therefore the growth in tax revenues to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), which is used to fund FAA programs. Such projected effects depend on key assumptions regarding the consumers' sensitivity to a PFC cap increase, whether the airlines decide to pass on the full increase to consumers, and the rate at which airports would adopt the increased PFC cap. Any increase in PFCs is strongly opposed by airlines which contend that an increase could reduce passenger demand. |
gao_GAO-15-549 | gao_GAO-15-549_0 | Background
Leading Commercial Strategic Sourcing Practices
Strategic sourcing is a process that moves an organization away from numerous individual procurements to a broader aggregate approach. While strategic sourcing may not be suitable for all procurements, we found that leading companies generally strategically manage about 90 percent of their procurement spending, including the full range of services they buy. This allows companies to more aggressively leverage their buying power for all types of services. At the enterprise level, each agency has designated officials responsible for strategic sourcing and have offices dedicated to identifying and implementing strategic sourcing opportunities, including those specific to IT. Some agency efforts to strategically source IT services have been executed in a decentralized manner and without clearly identifying the roles and resources needed to carry out leading practices such as enterprise-wide spend analysis or measuring progress in implementing strategic sourcing approaches based on goals and metrics. Specifically, the Army, Navy, Air Force, DHS, and NASA collectively obligated more than $11 billion for IT services in fiscal year 2013, but managed only between 10 to 44 percent of their respective IT services spending through strategically sourced vehicles. A senior DHS official responsible for strategic sourcing noted that fiscal year 2013 was a transition year between EAGLE I and EAGLE II and not fully representative of the agency’s spending through the contract vehicles. Agencies Lacked Insight into Labor Rates Paid for Similar IT Services and Paid Widely Varying Rates
Contracting officials from the agencies we reviewed generally had limited insights into the labor rates paid for similar IT services. Our analysis of 30 IT services contract actions for similar IT services found that the agencies we reviewed paid widely varying rates for 12 similar labor categories with the same contractors, with the average difference between the lowest and highest labor rate being 62 percent. Agency contracting and contractor officials identified a number of factors that could contribute to such differences, including geographic or work location, unique security, education or skill requirements, and the contractor unit performing the work. Further, we found that the 30 contract actions for IT services that were awarded to two contractors contained more than 117 discrete labor categories, many with multiple variations to account for experience levels. Several government-wide and agency- specific efforts are under way to address certain aspects of these challenges, but none are currently addressing the range of challenges our work identified, which may limit their utility in providing contracting officers with readily available information that would facilitate labor rate comparisons. Specifically, we analyzed rates paid for IT strategy and architecture services in fiscal year 2013 from a sample of 30 contract actions with the same two contractors, and identified 12 labor categories and levels that were common to at least two contract actions. At the enterprise level, most agencies have opportunities to better adopt leading commercial practices by conducting spend analysis for IT services, monitoring the use of their strategic sourcing vehicle in comparison to their total spending on IT services, establishing utilization goals and metrics; establishing policies requiring the mandatory use or consideration of their preferred strategic sourcing contract vehicle and taking steps to monitor compliance with such policies, and identifying methods for calculating savings and setting savings goals. Following these leading practices enabled commercial companies to achieve annual savings of 4 to 15 percent. To improve efforts to strategically source IT services within the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy should direct its strategic sourcing accountable official to take the following two actions:
Conduct a comprehensive analysis of IT services spending to determine the extent to which requirements can be addressed by the existing contracts or other strategic sourcing approaches and based on this analysis, reduce duplicative contracts. DOD, DHS, and NASA concurred with our recommendations to improve efforts to strategically source IT services within their agencies. To evaluate agency strategic sourcing efforts, we selected three agencies—Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—which accounted for 53 percent of total fiscal year 2013 federal IT services procurement spending, based on data reported in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). To assess the extent to which agency acquisition personnel have insights into labor rates for similar IT services, we used FPDS-NG to identify one high-spend IT service category—IT strategy and architecture services— that was among the top five IT service spend categories at each of the agencies we selected and among the top two government-wide. Test Engineer - Senior We compared labor rates for each of these 12 categories. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reported in 2012 that the government is not fully leveraging its buying power for high-spending areas such as IT services, which accounted for more than $30 billion in fiscal year 2013. Leading commercial companies use strategic sourcing—a process that moves them away from numerous individual purchases to an aggregate approach—to better manage the services they acquire and achieve savings of 4 to 15 percent annually.
GAO was asked to review strategic sourcing of IT services. This report addresses the extent to which selected agencies (1) manage IT services through strategic sourcing approaches, and (2) have insight into labor rates for similar IT services.
GAO reviewed DOD (including the three military departments), DHS, and NASA, which collectively accounted for 53 percent of reported federal fiscal year 2013 IT services obligations. GAO analyzed agency policies, procurement and contracting data, and interviewed agency and contractor officials. GAO identified a high-spend IT service category and obtained labor rate information from a nongeneralizable sample of 30 contract actions awarded to two of the largest contractors common to these agencies.
What GAO Found
Efforts by the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to strategically manage spending for information technology (IT) services, such as software design and development, have improved in recent years. Each of the agencies GAO reviewed has designated officials responsible for strategic sourcing and created offices to identify and implement strategic sourcing opportunities, including those specific to IT services. Most of these agencies' IT services spending, however, continues to be obligated through hundreds of potentially duplicative contracts that diminish the government's buying power. These agencies managed between 10 and 44 percent of their IT services spending through preferred strategic sourcing contracts in fiscal year 2013. In contrast, GAO previously reported that leading companies generally strategically managed about 90 percent of their procurement spending, including services.
Further, most of these agencies' efforts to strategically source IT services have not followed leading commercial practices, such as clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the offices responsible for strategic sourcing; conducting an enterprise-wide spend analysis; monitoring the spending going through the agencies' strategic sourcing contract vehicles; or establishing savings goals and metrics. As a result, the agencies are missing opportunities to leverage their buying power and more effectively acquire IT services.
Contracting officials from the agencies GAO reviewed generally had limited insights into the labor rates paid for similar IT services. GAO's analysis of 30 contract actions for similar IT services in fiscal year 2013 found that the agencies paid widely varying labor rates for similar services with the same contractors. The average difference between the lowest and highest labor rate for the categories GAO reviewed was 62 percent, in part due to geographic or work location, unique security, education or skill requirements, and the contractor unit performing the work. Further, for the 30 contract actions for IT services that GAO reviewed, the two contractors proposed more than 117 discrete labor categories—some with multiple variations—which complicated efforts to compare labor rates. Prior GAO reports on leading commercial practices have noted that companies use standardized labor categories for IT services to enable comparison of labor rates and ultimately realize cost savings. Several government-wide and agency-specific efforts to address aspects of these challenges, including providing tools to assess labor rate variations or streamlining labor categories, are under development or in their early implementation stages.
What GAO Recommends
To improve efforts to strategically source IT services, GAO recommends that each agency conduct spend analysis, monitor spending, develop savings goals and metrics, and consider the use of standardized labor categories, as appropriate for their agency. The agencies concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-443T | gao_GAO-05-443T_0 | Army Modularity Is a Significant Undertaking
The Army’s modular force initiative, which has been referred to as the largest Army reorganization in 50 years, encompasses the Army’s total force--active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve—and directly affects not only the Army’s combat units, but related support and command and control. Therefore, successful implementation of this initiative will require many changes such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix of skills and occupational specialties among Army personnel, and significant changes to training and doctrine. The foundation of Army modularity is the creation of brigade combat teams—brigade-sized units that will have a common organizational design and will increase the pool of available units for deployment. By the end of fiscal year 2006, the Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular, standardized brigade combat teams and creating new types of command headquarters to replace the current division headquarters structure. Although our work has focused on the active component, restructuring of the reserve component into modular units will also be a major undertaking. Because of the high degree of complexity associated with establishing a modular force while managing deployments to ongoing operations, the Army has developed a number of plans and processes, such as the Army Campaign Plan and has held periodic meetings within the Army headquarters and its components and major commands, to manage these changes. Army May Face Challenges in Staffing and Equipping Modular Brigade Combat Teams
The Army is likely to face a number of challenges in fully staffing and equipping modular combat brigades as designed. Moreover, the Army needs an additional 6200 military intelligence specialists through fiscal year 2010 to meet modular force requirements. For example, the design requires a division with four modular brigade combat teams to have approximately 28 tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems. Army Faces a Number of Key Decisions That Could Affect Modular Force Requirements
According to Army modularity plans, the Army is continuing to assess its requirements and may make some key decisions in the future that will affect the size and composition of the modular force as well as its cost. First, the Army’s Campaign Plan calls for a potential decision by fiscal year 2006 on whether to create 5 additional modular brigade combat teams. Also, as with the decision to add additional battalions, until the Army completes all of its force structure designs for support brigades, it will not have a total picture of its personnel and equipment requirements. Cost Estimates for Fully Implementing Modularity Have Increased Significantly and Are Still Evolving
The costs of modularity are substantial and are likely to grow. In January 2004, the Army estimated that increasing the number of active modular brigade combat teams from 33 to 48 would cost $20 billion from fiscal years 2004 through 2011 based on a “rough order of magnitude estimate.” As of July 2004, the Army added $8 billion to address costs for reorganizing the reserve component, bringing the total estimated cost for reorganizing the entire force to $28 billion. For example, the July 2004 estimate: included costs of adding 15 light infantry brigades for the active component to bring the total number of active brigades to 48, but these costs were based on the current brigade structure, not the tested modular design; did not take into account the costs for upgrading existing active brigades, or other support and command elements; and accounted for construction of temporary, relocatable facilities, but did not allow for permanent upgrades to facilities or increases to other services provided at Army installations to accommodate the increase in modular units. As of March 2005, the Army has revised its earlier estimate, now estimating that modularity will cost a total of $48 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2011—an increase of 71 percent over its earlier $28 billion estimate. According to Army officials, they estimated equipment costs in this manner because some equipment is not currently available or in production in sufficient quantities to meet modularity requirements. Until the Army more fully defines the requirements and potential costs associated with modularity, DOD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities and make informed decisions, and the Congress will not have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests for modularity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Modularity is a major restructuring of the entire Army, involving the creation of brigade combat teams that will have a common design and will increase the pool of available units for deployment. The Army is undertaking this initiative at the same time it is supporting the Global War on Terrorism, and developing transformational capabilities such as the Army Future Combat Systems. To achieve modularity, the Army currently estimates it will need $48 billion. The Department of Defense's (DOD) request for fiscal year 2005 supplemental funds includes $5 billion for modularity. The Army plans for another $5 billion to be funded from fiscal year 2006 supplemental funds and the remaining $38 billion from DOD's annual appropriation from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Our testimony addresses: (1) the Army's goals and plans for modularity, (2) challenges the Army faces in staffing and equipping its modular combat brigades, (3) key decisions that could affect requirements, and (4) the Army's cost estimates and funding plans. This testimony is based on ongoing GAO work examining Army modularity plans and costs. Our work has been primarily focused on the Army's active forces.
What GAO Found
The Army has embarked on a major initiative to create modular units to better meet the near-term demand for forces and improve its capabilities to conduct full-spectrum operations. Modularity is a major undertaking because it affects both the active and reserve components as well as combat and support forces. Successfully implementing this initiative will require many changes such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix of skills among Army personnel, and significant changes to training and doctrine. By the end of fiscal year 2006, the Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions, expanding from 33 brigades to 43 modular brigade combat teams, and by fiscal year 2010, create new types of command headquarters. The Army has completed or is in the process of establishing modular brigades in four of its active divisions. While the Army has made progress in establishing modular brigades, it is likely to face several challenges in providing its new modular units with some required skilled personnel and equipment that are needed to achieve planned capabilities. For example, the Army has not provided its new modular brigades with required quantities of critical equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles, communications equipment, and trucks because they are not currently available in sufficient quantities. Moreover, it may take years to meet increased requirements for critical skills such as military intelligence analysts because they are in high demand and take years to train. In addition, the Army has not yet made a number of key decisions that could further increase requirements for equipment and personnel. First, the Army has not yet decided whether to recommend an increase in the number of active brigade combat teams from 43 to 48. Also, it is assessing the costs and benefits of adding one more combat maneuver battalion to its new modular brigades. Finally, the Army has not yet finalized the design of higher echelon and support units. Until designs are finalized and key decisions are reached, the Army will not have a complete understanding of the equipment and personnel that are needed to fully achieve its goals. The costs associated with modularizing the entire Army are substantial, continuing to evolve, and likely to grow beyond current estimates. As of March 2005, the Army estimated it will need about $48 billion to fund modularity--representing an increase of 71 percent from its earlier estimate of $28 billion in 2004. However, this estimate may not reflect all potential costs, such as for fully equipping the modular force as designed. Also, if the Army decides to add additional brigades or make other design changes, additional costs may be incurred. Furthermore, some costs are uncertain. For example, it will be difficult for the Army to determine facility requirements and related costs until DOD finalizes plans for restationing forces from overseas. Until the Army provides a better understanding of the requirements and costs associated with modularity, DOD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities and make informed decisions nor will the Congress have the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. |
gao_GAO-09-1019T | gao_GAO-09-1019T_0 | While Policies on Compensation Are Generally Comparable, Some Policy and Implementation Issues Affect the Amount, Accuracy, and Completeness of Compensation
Although policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable across agencies, we found some issues that affect the amount of compensation they receive—depending on such things as the agency’s pay system or the civilian’s grade/band level—and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. However, some variations in compensation available to deployed civilians result directly from the employing agency’s pay system and the employee’s pay grade/band level. But, at the time of our review, OPM had not developed such a package or provided legislative recommendations. For example, we project that approximately 40 percent of the estimated 2,100 civilians deployed from January 1, 2006, to April 30, 2008, experienced problems with compensation—including not receiving danger pay or receiving it late, for instance—in part because they were unaware of their eligibility or did not know where to go for assistance to start and stop these deployment- related pays. We therefore recommended that (1) OPM oversee an executive agency working group on compensation for deployed civilians to address any differences and if necessary make legislative recommendations; (2) the agencies included in our review establish ombudsman programs or, for agencies deploying small numbers of civilians, focal points to help ensure that deployed civilians receive the compensation to which they are entitled; and (3) Labor set a time frame for issuing implementing guidance for the death gratuity. While Policies on Medical Benefits Are Generally Comparable, Some Issues Exist in Both Policies and Implementation
Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, we found some issues with policies related to medical treatment following deployment and with the implementation of workers’ compensation and post- deployment medical screening that affect the medical benefits of these civilians. DOD and State guidance provides for medical care of all civilians during their deployments—regardless of the employing agency. Without clear information on what documentation to submit in support of their claims, applicants may continue to experience delays in the process. Additionally, DOD requires deploying civilians to be medically screened both before and following their deployments. Our prior work has found that documenting the medical condition of deployed civilians both before and following deployment is critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment, such as traumatic brain injury. To address these matters, we recommended that (1) DOD clarify its guidance concerning the circumstances under which civilians are entitled to treatment at military treatment facilities following deployment and formally advise other agencies that deploy civilians of its policy governing treatment at these facilities; (2) Labor revise the application materials for workers’ compensation claims to make clear what documentation applicants must submit with their claims; (3) the agencies included in our review establish ombudsman programs or, for agencies deploying small numbers of civilians, focal points to help ensure that deployed civilians get timely responses to their applications and receive the medical benefits to which they are entitled; (4) DOD establish standard procedures to ensure that returning civilians complete required post-deployment medical screenings; and (5) State develop post-deployment medical screening requirements for civilians deployed under its purview. Executive Agencies’ Ability to Track Deployed Civilians Is Limited
While each of the agencies we reviewed was able to provide a list of deployed civilians, none of these agencies has fully implemented policies and procedures to identify and track its civilians who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD, for example, issued guidance and established procedures for identifying and tracking deployed civilians in 2006 but concluded in 2008 that its guidance and associated procedures were not being consistently implemented across the agency. Lack of such information may hamper these agencies’ ability to intervene quickly to address any future health issues that may result from deployments in support of contingency operations. We therefore recommended that (1) DOD establish mechanisms to ensure that its policies to identify and track deployed civilians are implemented and (2) the five other executive agencies included in our review develop policies and procedures to accurately identify and track standardized information on deployed civilians. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) and other executive agencies increasingly deploy civilians in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior GAO reports show that the use of deployed civilians has raised questions about the potential for differences in policies on compensation and medical benefits. When these civilians are deployed and serve side by side, differences in compensation or medical benefits may become more apparent and could adversely impact morale. This statement is based on GAO's June 2009 congressionally requested report, which compared agency policies and identified any issues in policy or implementation regarding (1) compensation, (2) medical benefits, and (3) identification and tracking of deployed civilians. GAO reviewed laws, agency policies and guidance; interviewed responsible officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the six selected agencies, including DOD and State; reviewed workers' compensation claims filed by deployed civilians with the Department of Labor from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008; and conducted a survey of deployed civilians. GAO made ten recommendations for agencies to take actions such as reviewing compensation laws and policies, establishing medical screening requirements, and creating mechanisms to assist and track deployed civilians. At the time of this testimony, the agencies were in various stages of taking action.
What GAO Found
While policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable, GAO found some issues that affect the amount of compensation--depending on such things as the pay system--and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. For example, two comparable civilian supervisors who deploy under different pay systems may receive different rates of overtime pay because this rate is set by the employee's pay system and grade/band. While a congressional subcommittee asked OPM to develop a benefits package for all civilians deployed to war zones and recommend enabling legislation, at the time of GAO's review, OPM had not yet done so. Also, implementation of some policies may not always be accurate or timely. For example, GAO estimates that about 40 percent of the deployed civilians in its survey reported experiencing problems with compensation, including danger pay. GAO recommended, among other things, that OPM oversee an agency working group on compensation to address differences and, if necessary, make legislative recommendations. OPM generally concurred with this recommendation. Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, GAO found some issues with medical care following deployment, workers' compensation, and post deployment medical screenings that affect the benefits of deployed civilians. Specifically, while DOD allows its treatment facilities to care for non-DOD civilians following deployment in some cases, the circumstances are not clearly defined and some agencies were unaware of DOD's policy. Civilians who deploy also may be eligible for benefits through workers' compensation. GAO's analysis of 188 such claims revealed some significant delays resulting in part from a lack of clarity about the documentation required. Without clear information on what documents to submit, applicants may continue to experience delays. Further, while DOD requires medical screening of civilians before and following deployment, State requires screenings only before deployment. Prior GAO work found that documenting the medical condition of deployed personnel before and following deployment was critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment. In June 2009, GAO recommended, among other things, that State establish post-deployment screening requirements and that DOD establish procedures to ensure its post-deployment screenings requirements are completed. Each agency provided GAO with a list of deployed civilians, but none had fully implemented policies to identify and track these civilians. DOD, for example, had procedures to identify and track civilians but concluded that its guidance was not consistently implemented. While the other agencies had some ability to identify and track civilians, some had to manually search their systems. Thus, agencies may lack critical information on the location and movement of personnel, which may hamper their ability to intervene promptly to address emerging health issues. GAO recommended that DOD enforce its tracking requirements and the other five agencies establish tracking procedures. DOD and four agencies concurred with the recommendations; one agency did not. |
gao_GAO-02-552T | gao_GAO-02-552T_0 | Conferring Cabinet status on EPA would not in itself change the federal environmental role or policies, but it would clearly have an important symbolic effect. The United States is the only major industrial power without a Cabinet-level environmental organization. Such factors are clearly applicable to EPA’s role and responsibilities in managing the nation’s response to domestic and foreign environmental problems. Such conflicts could be addressed more effectively in the future by placing the head of the federal environmental organization on an equal footing with the heads of other federal departments. This would enable environmental issues to better compete with other national issues in policy, budgetary, and programmatic decisions as they are being made. EPA Faces Major Management Challenges That Hinder Its Efforts to Meet Its Mission
Whether or not EPA becomes a Cabinet-level department, the challenges that await it are formidable. More Complete and Accurate Data Are Needed to Characterize Risk
Establishing risk-based priorities for EPA’s programs requires high-quality data on the use and disposal of chemicals. We recently initiated a comprehensive management review of EPA that will include many of the areas being considered by the Subcommittee as it deliberates the legislation before it to elevate EPA to Cabinet status. | What GAO Found
This testimony comments on legislation that would elevate the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to Cabinet status. Today, EPA's mission, size, and scope of responsibilities place it on a par with many Cabinet departments. The United States is the only major industrial power without a Cabinet-level environmental organization. It is important to consider that (1) environmental policy be given appropriate weight as it cuts across the domestic and foreign policies that other Cabinet departments implement and enforce and (2) the head of the agency is able to deal as an equal with his or her counterparts within the federal government as well as the international community. Conferring Cabinet status on EPA would not in itself change the federal environmental role or policies, but it would clearly have an important symbolic effect. Regardless of its status, however, EPA must respond more effectively to its fundamental management challenges. These challenges include (1) placing the right people with the appropriate skills where they are needed and (2) gaining access to high-quality environmental, natural, and social data on which to base environmental decisions. EPA must have the flexibility to use innovative approaches to address complex and intractable environmental problems. Meetings these challenges will require the sustained attention of top EPA management. |
gao_HEHS-96-131 | gao_HEHS-96-131_0 | HCFA and State Agency Oversight
HCFA published final regulations for quality of care in ICFs/MR in 1974 and revised them in 1988. A few of these practices have resulted in serious harm to residents, including injury, illness, physical degeneration, and death. Although state survey agencies have the primary responsibility for monitoring the care in ICFs/MR on an ongoing basis, HCFA surveyors and Justice Department investigators have identified more deficiencies—and more serious deficiencies—than have state survey agencies. Second, enforcement efforts have not been sufficient to ensure that deficient care practices do not recur. They generally focus on deficient care practices about which Justice has received specific allegations, often related to medical and psychiatric care. Medicaid Enforcement Efforts Are Insufficient
Even when state survey agencies identify deficiencies in large public ICFs/MR, state enforcement efforts do not always ensure that facilities’ corrections are sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the same serious deficiencies. Federal Oversight Has Declined Dramatically
Direct federal oversight has declined dramatically in recent years despite its importance for independent monitoring of the care provided in large public institutions and the performance of state survey agencies. Most of these institutions comply with Medicaid quality-of-care standards. Serious deficiencies continue to occur, however, in some institutions despite federal standards, oversight by HCFA and state agencies, and continuing investigations by the Department of Justice. States are the key players in ensuring that ICFs/MR meet federal standards. Furthermore, serious deficiencies continue to recur in some of these institutions. This change, and others that HCFA is implementing to more efficiently use limited federal and state resources, may also reduce the impact of some of the other weaknesses we have identified. Recommendations
To improve HCFA’s oversight of large public ICFs/MR, we recommend that the Administrator of HCFA assess the effectiveness of its new survey approach in ensuring that serious deficiencies at large public ICFs/MR are identified and corrected; take steps, such as enhanced monitoring of state survey agencies or direct inspection of institutions, to address the potential conflict of interest that occurs when states are both the operators and inspectors of ICFs/MR; and determine whether the application of a wider range of enforcement mechanisms would more effectively correct serious deficiencies and prevent their recurrence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the role of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), state agencies, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in overseeing quality of care in intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR), focusing on: (1) deficient care practices occurring in large ICF/MR; (2) whether state agencies identify all serious deficiencies in these institutions; and (3) weaknesses in HCFA and state oversight of ICF/MR care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite federal standards, HCFA and state agency oversight, and continuing Justice Department investigations, serious quality-of-care deficiencies continue to occur in some large public ICFs/MR; (2) insufficient staffing, lack of active treatment needed to enhance independence and prevent loss of functional ability, and deficient medical and psychiatric care are among those deficiencies that have been frequently cited; (3) in a few instances, these practices have led to serious harm to residents, including injury, illness, physical degeneration, and death; (4) states, which are the key players in ensuring that these institutions meet federal standards, do not always identify all serious deficiencies nor use sufficient enforcement actions to prevent the recurrence of deficient care; (5) direct federal surveys conducted by HCFA and Justice Department investigations have identified more numerous and more serious deficiencies in public institutions than have state surveys; (6) furthermore, even when serious deficiencies have been identified, state agencies' enforcement actions have not always been sufficient to ensure that these problems did not recur; (7) some institutions have been cited repeatedly for the same serious violations; (8) although HCFA has recently taken steps to improve the process for identifying serious deficiencies in these institutions and to more efficiently use limited federal and state resources, several oversight weaknesses remain; (9) moreover, state surveys may lack independence because states are responsible for surveying their own institutions; and (10) the effects of this potential conflict of interest raise concern given the decline in direct federal oversight of both the care in these facilities and the performance of state survey agencies. |
gao_GAO-04-48 | gao_GAO-04-48_0 | Based on the information submitted to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), the SBIRS High program was officially certified on May 2, 2002, with the contingencies that the Air Force fully fund the program to the cost estimate developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to reestablish a baseline to OSD’s schedule for the GEO satellites. The value of the restructured development contract increased by $2 billion to $4.4 billion. At the time of the restructuring, the Air Force believed the modified contract established an executable schedule, a realistic set of requirements, and adequate funding, and addressed the underlying factors that led to the Nunn- McCurdy breach. Delivery of these effectivities is tied to the contractor’s award and incentive fees. The restructured contract also prescribed tighter management controls, improved reporting of contractor information, and added formal review processes. The restructuring also modified the program’s use of DOD’s Earned Value Management System (EVMS). In particular, design problems have delayed the delivery of the first HEO sensor (HEO 1). As a result, the committee directed the Air Force to develop a plan to reduce the production gap in the SBIRS High program from 2 years to 1. However, at the SBIRS High critical design review—1 year before the restructuring—only 50 percent of design drawings were complete, compared to 90 percent as recommended by best practices. As a part of the restructuring, the delivery of this sensor to the host satellite was delayed from its original date in February 2002 to February 2003. For example, the design to control the sensor’s electromagnetic interference (EMI) was inadequate. Since the critical design review in August 2001, the Air Force also determined that two late design changes to the GEO satellites were necessary to improve the program’s chances of success. Despite the restructuring, the contractor and Program Office continue to report that software development underlies most of the top 10 program risks. One deficiency involved the HEO sensor’s ability to maintain earth coverage and track missiles while orbiting the earth. Program officials stated that they are coordinating the delivery of HEO 1 and the host satellite to mitigate any schedule impacts, but they agreed that these delays put the remaining SBIRS High schedule at risk. Conclusions
DOD has invested billions of dollars in an effort to develop a system that will provide greater long-range detection capabilities than DSP, its current missile tracking system. Such a review should include determining whether the
SBIRS High development schedule is executable within current cost and schedule estimates in light of the recent HEO 1 delays and other risks (such as software development), program design is stable and sufficient to meet performance requirements, contractor’s software development procedures and practices have reached at least a CMMI level 3 in relation to the Software Engineering Institute’s standards, appropriate management mechanisms are in place to achieve intended pending requirements changes should be funded. To determine the problems and potential risks relating to cost, schedule, and performance that are still facing the SBIRS High program, we reviewed technical reports and program briefings and held discussions with program and contractor officials regarding ongoing challenges. SBIRS Low is transferred to Missile Defense Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to provide greater long-range ballistic missile detection capabilities than its current system. The initial SBIRS architecture included "High" and "Low" orbiting space-based components and ground processing segments. SBIRS has been technically challenging, and in October 2001, SBIRS Low was transferred from the Air Force to the Missile Defense Agency. The Air Force expected to field SBIRS High by 2004, but numerous problems have led to schedule overruns. In the fall of 2001, DOD identified potential cost growth of $2 billion. To determine the causes of the significant cost growth, DOD convened an Independent Review Team. In August 2002, the Air Force restructured the program to address the findings of the team's assessment. Our report (1) describes the key elements of the restructured program and (2) identifies problems and potential risks still facing the program.
What GAO Found
In an effort to get the SBIRS High program on track, the most recent program restructuring provided contractor incentives and oversight measures, as recommended by the Independent Review Team. Under the current contract, the prime contractor's award fees are now tied to the incremental delivery of specific system capabilities. DOD also modified the contract to prescribe tighter management controls, improve reporting of contractor information, and add formal review processes by DOD management. This increased oversight is intended, in part, to minimize further changes in requirements and improve management of software development, both of which have been particularly problematic. The restructuring also added funding and other resources to the program and extended the scheduled delivery of certain components. At the time of the restructuring, the Air Force believed the modified contract established an executable schedule, a realistic set of requirements, and adequate funding. However, the restructuring did not fully address some long-standing problems identified by the Independent Review Team. As a result, the program continues to be at substantial risk of cost and schedule increases. Key among the problems is the program's history of moving forward without sufficient knowledge to ensure that the product design is stable and meets performance requirements and that adequate resources are available. For example, a year before the restructuring, the program passed its critical design review with only 50 percent of its design drawings completed, compared to 90 percent as recommended by best practices. Consequently, several design modifications were necessary, including 39 to the first of two infrared sensors to reduce excessive noise created by electromagnetic interference--a threat to the host satellite's functionality--delaying delivery of the sensor by 10 months or more. Software development underlies most of the top 10 program risks, according to the contractor and the SBIRS High Program Office. For example, testing of the first infrared sensor revealed several deficiencies in the flight software involving the sensor's ability to maintain earth coverage and track missiles while orbiting the earth. Program officials stated that they are coordinating the delivery of the first sensor with the delivery of the host satellite to mitigate any schedule impacts, but they agreed that these delays put the remaining SBIRS High schedule at risk. |
gao_GAO-07-1010 | gao_GAO-07-1010_0 | Since the early 1980s, DOE has studied the Yucca Mountain site to determine whether it is suitable for a high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel repository. DOE’s Schedule to Submit a License Application to NRC by June 30, 2008, Was Developed in Consultation with Yucca Mountain Project Managers
In July 2006, DOE announced its intent to file a license application to NRC no later than June 30, 2008. OCRWM’s director told us that he consulted with DOE and contractor project managers to get a reasonable estimate of an achievable date for submitting the license application and asked OCRWM managers to develop a plan and schedule for meeting the June 30, 2008, goal. DOE did not consult with external stakeholders in developing this schedule because there was no legal or regulatory requirement or compelling management reason to do so, according to senior OCRWM officials. NRC Officials Are Uncertain Whether DOE Will File a High- Quality License Application That Will Facilitate Completion of a Timely Review
NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license application by June 30, 2008, but will not speculate about its quality due to a long- standing practice to maintain an objective and neutral position toward proposed license applications until they are filed with NRC. Although NRC has no formal oversight role in the Yucca Mountain project until DOE files a license application, NRC staff observe DOE audits of its quality assurance activities to identify potential issues and problems that may affect licensing. DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Our Quality Assurance Recommendations and Resolving Challenges We Identified
DOE is implementing the recommendations and addressing the challenges identified in our March 2006 report, but it is unclear whether the department’s actions will prevent similar problems from recurring. In response, DOE has stopped using its panel of performance indicators and replaced them with monthly program review meetings—chaired by OCRWM’s director and attended by top-level OCRWM, BSC, Sandia, and USGS managers—that review the progress of four main OCRWM projects: (1) the drafting of the license application; (2) the effort to select and load documents and records into NRC’s Licensing Support Network; (3) work supplementing DOE’s environmental impact statement to reflect the October 2005 changes in repository design, which shift from direct handling of waste to the use of canisters; and (4) the development of a system to transport waste from where it is generated, mainly nuclear power plants, to the repository. DOE has revised its design control and requirements management processes to address the problems that our March 2006 report identified. DOE has worked to fill and retain personnel in key management positions that had been vacant for extended periods of time, most notably the director of quality assurance and the OCRWM project director. Finally, as we have previously reported, DOE has a long history of quality assurance problems and has experienced repeated difficulties in resolving these problems. Agency Comments
We provided DOE and NRC with a draft of this report for their review and comment. In their written responses, both DOE and NRC agreed with our report. We also reviewed the DOE management plan for creating the license application and other internal reports on the progress in drafting the application. These meetings were held in Rockville, Maryland; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Arlington, Virginia. To obtain NRC’s assessment of DOE’s readiness to file a high-quality license application, we obtained NRC documents—such as the status of key technical issues and briefing slides on NRC’s technical exchanges with DOE. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nuclear power reactors generate highly radioactive waste. To permanently store this waste, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been working to submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain about 100 miles from Las Vegas, Nevada. Although the project has been beset with delays, in part because of persistent problems with its quality assurance program, DOE stated in July 2006 that it will submit a license application with NRC by June 30, 2008. NRC states that a high-quality application needs to be complete, technically adequate, transparent by clearly justifying underlying assumptions, and traceable back to original source materials. GAO examined (1) DOE's development of its schedule for submitting a license application and the stakeholders with whom it consulted, (2) NRC's assessment of DOE's readiness to submit a high-quality application, and (3) DOE's progress in addressing quality assurance recommendations and challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. GAO reviewed DOE's management plan for creating the license application, reviewed correspondence and attended prelicensing meetings between DOE and NRC, and interviewed DOE managers and NRC on-site representatives for the Yucca Mountain project. In commenting on a draft of the report, both DOE and NRC agreed with the report.
What GAO Found
The director of DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management set the June 30, 2008, date for filing the license application with NRC in consultation with the DOE and contractor managers for the Yucca Mountain project. DOE officials told us that external stakeholders were not consulted because there was neither a legal requirement nor a compelling management reason to do so. According to the director, the June 2008 schedule is achievable because DOE has already completed a large amount of work, including the completion of a draft license application in 2005 that DOE decided not to submit to NRC. NRC officials believe it is likely that DOE will submit a license application by June 30, 2008, but until NRC receives the application, officials will not speculate about whether it will be high quality. NRC has not seen a draft of the license application, and NRC's long-standing practice is to maintain an objective and neutral position toward a future application until it is filed. To help ensure that DOE understands its expectations, NRC has, among other things, held periodic prelicensing management and technical meetings with DOE. DOE has made progress in resolving the quality assurance recommendations and challenges identified in GAO's March 2006 report. For example, DOE has replaced the one-page summary of performance indicators that GAO had determined was ineffective with more frequent and rigorous project management meetings. DOE has addressed the management challenges GAO identified to varying degrees. For example, regarding management continuity, DOE has worked to fill and retain personnel in key management positions, such as the director of quality assurance. However, for various reasons--including the long history of recurring problems and likely project leadership changes in January 2009 when the current administration leaves office--it is unclear whether DOE's actions will prevent these problems from recurring. |
gao_GAO-06-42 | gao_GAO-06-42_0 | Workers in an ongoing DB plan only receive benefits if they are vested. We note further that some sponsors of CB plans have already exited the DB system, a system that has been declining in sponsorship and participation for several decades now. Analysis of lifetime benefits under a conversion to an equal cost CB plan does not change basic findings. Research Provides Limited Evidence to
Data and other methodological issues
Data and other methodological issues (e.g., sampling methods) limit generalization of results. Conversion impact depends on a variety of factors including plan generosity, transition provisions, and firm specific employee demographics. Also, because of the different accrual patterns in a CB plan compared to a FAP plan, for a variety of workers, the impact of a conversion varies. Research Provides Limited Evidence to Generalize About CB Conversions, cont. Why sponsors convert to CB plans. CB plan conversions have distributional effects on pension Younger, more mobile workers who vest usually benefit. Older workers with long job tenure likely to experience a loss, particularly if they are near age and service requirements for early retirement. About Half of Plans Offered Some Form
Grandfathering was offered in 47% of all conversions
and in 55% of the largest converted plans, although most of these provisions had some form of age or service restrictions. Plan Characteristics: Cash-Balance Plan
Typical CB Plan Conversion vs. Terminated Typical
Regardless of age, all vested workers who converted to a typical CB plan experienced monthly benefit increases compared to a terminated FAP plan. Grandfathered benefits for those eligible under the CB plan greatly impact results shown for older workers. More workers converted to an equal cost CB plan from a typical FAP at age 30 receive greater present value of lifetime benefits through conversion than would at later conversion ages. Outside of grandfather protections, results show a redistribution of benefits from older workers to younger workers. Because a range of factors that are unique to each conversion influence the final impact on workers—including demographic characteristics, the transition benefits offered during the conversion and the generosity of the new CB plan relative to the old plan it is replacing—it is difficult to extend the results of the literature to the actual experience of workers. However, some research suggests that the retirement benefit implications due to a shift to a less generous CB plan differ materially from the effects of a cost-neutral conversion. Mellon Financial Corporation. Survey of Conversions from Traditional Pension Plans to Cash Balance Plans. 2002. Description of the Review
After obtaining Form 5500s, attachments, and summary plan descriptions where available for sampled plans, we recorded plan features on a standardized instrument containing 51 questions designed to capture information about characteristics of the traditional DB plan, such as the conversion date and the type of DB plan in place before the conversion; the conversion such as when it took place, which employees were affected, and the type of transition provisions used; and the ongoing features of the CB plan, such as pay credits and interest credits provided at the time of conversion. Appendix IV: Analysis of Simulated Cash Balance Plans and Traditional Final Average Pay Plans
To analyze the effects of a CB plan conversion on individual workers, we used a pension policy simulation model PENSIM. An annuity loading fee was used such that it ensures the provider is solvent (i.e., 1.5 percent for women and 3.0 percent for men); at conversion, opening account balance is equal to the statutory present value of accrued benefit under old plan; at conversion, employee with age plus service greater than or equal to 60 is grandfathered in old plan so that benefit at job end can never be lower than it would have been if the old plan had continued operating The equal-cost CB plan has the following characteristics same characteristics as the typical CB plan except the base pay credit is 7.35 percent of salary for employee with age-plus-service (APS) ≤ 35, rather than the 3.0 percent of salary in the typical CB plan, and pay credit rises gradually until it reaches a maximum of 6 percentage points above the base pay credit for employee with age plus service greater than or equal to 70. Most of the study analysis focuses on those who have vested in at least one private-sector FAP or CB plan. Employer Cost Estimates
The employer cost of sponsoring a pension plan is defined as the percentage ratio of the present value of benefits paid to all individuals who worked on a job where that pension plan was sponsored and the present value of earnings paid to all individuals who worked on a job where that pension plan was sponsored. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's private defined benefit (DB) pension system, a key contributor to the financial security of millions of Americans, is in long-term decline. Since 1980, the number of active participants in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insured single employer DB plans has dropped from 27.3 percent of all national private wage and salary workers in 1980, to about 15 percent in 2002, and more recently the PBGC has assumed billions of dollars in unfunded benefit obligations from bankrupt plan sponsors. Some analysts have identified hybrid DB plans like cash balance (CB) plans as a possible means to revitalize this declining system. However, conversions from traditional DB plans to CB plans have sometimes been controversial because of the effect conversions may have on the benefits of workers of different ages. As House and Senate committees consider comprehensive pension reform legislation that includes efforts to resolve uncertainties about CB plans, GAO was asked to (1) review current research about the implications of CB conversions for employee benefits, (2) describe the prevalence and type of transition provisions used to protect workers' benefits in past CB conversions, and (3) estimate the effects of CB conversions on the benefits of individual participants under a hypothetical conversion to a typical CB plan from a typical traditional DB plan.
What GAO Found
Current pension and economic literature provides little conclusive evidence about the effects of CB plan conversions on benefits. In many cases, data and other methodological issues (e.g., sampling methods) limit the generalization of results. Nonetheless, cash balance research indicates that the effects of a conversion depend on many factors, including the generosity of the CB plan, transition provisions that might limit any adverse effects on current employees, and firm-specific employee demographics. CB plan conversions are posited to have distributional effects on expected pension wealth: younger, more mobile workers usually benefit while older workers with long job tenure are likelier to experience a loss, particularly if they are nearly eligible for early retirement. GAO's analysis of a representative sample of plan conversions determined that most conversions occurred between 1990 and 1999 and primarily in the manufacturing, health care, finance and insurance industries. Most conversions set participants' opening account balances equal to the present value of benefits accrued under the previous plan, although the interest rate used to calculate the balance varied around the 30-year Treasury bond rate. Most plans provided some form of transition provisions to mitigate the potential adverse effects of a conversion on workers' expected benefits for at least some employees. About 47 percent of all conversions grandfathered at least some of the employees into the former traditional DB plan. In most cases, grandfathering eligibility was limited to employees meeting a specified minimum age and/or years of service. GAO's simulations of the effects of conversions on pension benefits show that in conversions from a traditional DB plan to a typical CB plan, most workers, regardless of age, would have received greater benefits under the DB plan. Unless grandfathered into the former plan, older workers experience a greater loss of expected benefits than younger workers. Further, in comparing a typical CB plan to a terminated FAP plan, all vested workers would do better under the CB plan. Also, in conversions from a traditional DB plan to a CB plan of equal cost to the sponsor and more generous than the typical CB plan, while more workers at age 30 have benefit increases under the CB plan, this was not true for those at age 40 and 50. Moreover, in comparing a equal cost CB plan to a terminated FAP plan, again all vested workers would do better under the CB plan. Finally, GAO's comparisons focusing on the lifetime present value of benefits did not change the basic findings of GAO's analysis of monthly benefits. |
gao_GAO-12-35 | gao_GAO-12-35_0 | It states in its entirety that “none of the funds made available under this Act may be used to lobby for or against abortion.”
U.S. Officials Publicly Supported the Constitutional Reform Process, but Did Not Take a Position on the Issue of Abortion
Between 2008 and 2010, U.S. officials publicly expressed support for Kenya’s comprehensive reform agenda, including constitutional reform, as an essential tool for maintaining peace and stability. Our media search did not reveal any instances of U.S. officials publicly discussing the abortion-related provisions of the constitution, and the officials we interviewed stated that they never discussed abortion in public or sought to influence the text of the abortion-related provisions in the constitution. Some U.S.-Funded Award Recipients and Subrecipients Addressed Abortion through Civic Education and Technical Assistance
Two elements of U.S.-funded support for the constitutional reform process—civic education and technical assistance—addressed the issue of abortion to some extent. Some subrecipients explained to civic education participants that, in their opinion, future legislation and judicial decisions would be required in order to fully interpret and implement the abortion-related provisions of the proposed constitution. No Indication That U.S.- Funded Civic Education Cited Abortion as a Rationale to Vote for or against the Constitution
While some U.S.-funded civic education subrecipients addressed the abortion-related provisions of the constitution, we did not find any indication that U.S.-funded award recipients or subrecipients cited the provisions as a rationale to vote for or against the constitution. U.S.-Funded Technical Assistance Included Advice on the Draft Constitution’s Abortion- Related Provisions
U.S.-funded award recipients provided technical assistance to Kenyan organizations involved in the constitutional reform process, which included providing advice on the abortion-related provisions of the draft constitution to the COE, the nongovernmental entity charged with drafting the constitution. The International Development Law Organization (IDLO), the award recipient that provided technical assistance to the COE, did so at the request of the COE. While the COE indicated to IDLO that it generally considered IDLO’s advice when revising the draft constitution, we were unable to confirm whether the COE changed the Right to Life article based on IDLO advice. During this comment period, IDLO provided the COE analysis on the entire draft constitution, including advice on the issues of fetal rights and abortion, though the draft had not mentioned either issue at this point. Furthermore, the officials emphasized that State and USAID have no plans to provide such assistance. Neither State nor USAID Has Clear Guidance on the Types of Activities Prohibited under the Siljander Amendment
Neither State nor USAID has guidance on complying with the Siljander Amendment that includes a formal definition of lobbying, which some agency officials and award recipients indicated makes it difficult for them to determine what types of activities are prohibited. Without clear guidance on the Siljander Amendment, some of the State and USAID officials and award recipients we interviewed said that they were unclear as to what specific activities were prohibited. Family planning compliance training. USAID has offered compliance training for its health and legal officers on family planning-related legislation for years, according to USAID officials. USAID began disseminating these compliance resources beyond health and legal officials in mid-2010, when it offered some training and general written guidance to other agency officials. Conclusions
The United States has long determined that it is vitally important to support nations in undertaking democratic reforms, such as Kenya’s constitutional reform. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure the actions of U.S. officials and implementing partners comply with the legislative prohibition against using certain U.S. assistance funds to lobby for or against abortion, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator develop specific guidance on compliance with the Siljander Amendment, indicating what kinds of activities may be prohibited, disseminate this guidance throughout their agencies, and make it available to award recipients and subrecipients. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to State and USAID. USAID agreed with our recommendation and indicated that it would develop additional guidance for USAID and award recipient and subrecipient staff on the Siljander Amendment. Following the August 2010 referendum, USAID has continued to work with the Kenyan government and people to support the constitutional reform process in the country. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following a 2007 disputed election and widespread violence, Kenya reformed its constitution, which its voters approved in August 2010. The United States has provided over $18 million to support this process to date. GAO was asked to (1) describe any involvement that U.S. officials have had in Kenya's constitutional reform process relating to abortion; (2) describe any support that U.S.-funded award recipients and subrecipients have provided in Kenya's constitutional reform process relating to abortion; and (3) assess the extent to which agencies have developed and implemented guidance on compliance with the Siljander Amendment, which prohibits using certain assistance funds to lobby either for or against abortion. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (State), award recipients and subrecipients, and the Kenyan government, and conducted an extensive media search.
What GAO Found
Between 2008 and 2010, U.S. officials, including the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, publicly expressed support for Kenya's constitutional reform process. GAO found no indication that U.S. officials opined on the issue of abortion publicly or attempted to influence the abortion-related provisions of the draft constitution--a finding corroborated by a key Kenyan parliamentarian who served on the committee assisting in the constitutional reform process. U.S.-funded award recipients and their subrecipients supported the constitutional reform process through activities that included civic education and technical assistance, both of which addressed the issue of abortion to some extent. USAID-funded civic education sought to inform Kenyans on the text of the draft constitution, and GAO found that some forums included discussion of abortion- related provisions. Some subrecipients undertook interpretation of the provisions at their forums, including describing scenarios in which abortion might be allowed. Several subrecipients explained to the public that, in their view, future legislation might be required to implement and further articulate the abortion- related provisions. While some subrecipients addressed the abortion-related provisions of the constitution, GAO found no indication that they cited the abortion provisions as a rationale to vote for or against the constitution. USAID also funded a technical assistance award to the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) to support the Committee of Experts (COE), the nongovernmental entity charged with drafting the constitution. In the course of providing comments and advice regarding the entire draft constitution, IDLO made suggestions relating to the issues of fetal rights and abortion during the early stages of drafting. IDLO later commented on broadening the exceptions when abortion would be legal. The COE has indicated that it generally considered IDLO's advice when revising the draft constitution. The final draft of the constitution is consistent with some of IDLO's advice relating to abortion, though GAO could not determine whether the COE made these changes in direct response to IDLO's advice. Neither State nor USAID has clear guidance for compliance with the Siljander Amendment, which makes it difficult for some agency officials and award recipients to determine what types of activities are prohibited. State has not developed any guidance at all on the prohibition. USAID has offered training for its health and legal officers on compliance with family planning-related legislation, including the Siljander Amendment, for years and began offering some training to other officials in 2010. However, USAID's training and other family planning resources do not identify specific types of activities that are prohibited under the amendment. State and USAID attorneys indicated that they are available to provide advice to staff on a case-by-case basis, upon request. However, some State and USAID officials and award recipients GAO spoke to said that they were unclear as to what specific activities were prohibited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State and USAID develop specific guidance on compliance with the Siljander Amendment, indicating what kinds of activities may be prohibited, disseminate this guidance throughout their agencies, and make it available to award recipients and subrecipients. USAID concurred. State concurred that it should inform staff of the amendment but not that it should provide examples of potentially prohibited activities. GAO continues to believe that providing such examples would enable officials to better understand the amendment and when to seek additional guidance. |
gao_GAO-14-256 | gao_GAO-14-256_0 | Borrowers who make nine on-time monthly payments within 10 months may be eligible for loan rehabilitation, which entitles them to have the default removed from their credit report. Education Relies on Collection Agencies to Assist Borrowers in Rehabilitating Defaulted Student Loans
Education provides information about loan rehabilitation and relies on collection agencies to assist borrowers in rehabilitating defaulted student loans. Education contracts with 22 collection agencies to locate and explain repayment options to borrowers who do not make such repayment arrangements. With regard to loan rehabilitation collections, collection agencies recovered 97 percent of $9 billion collected on over 1.5 million defaulted loans, and collections in fiscal year 2013 represented more than half of all rehabilitation collections during the 3-year period (see figure 3). Limited Planning and Oversight of Education’s Defaulted Loan Information System Upgrade Adversely Affected Loan Rehabilitation
Education’s Limited Planning and Oversight Did Not Address Risks of System Upgrade
As a result of limited planning and oversight, Education was unable to provide most borrowers who completed loan rehabilitation with timely benefits, such as removing defaults from their credit reports, for more than a year following the October 2011 upgrade of its defaulted loan information system. Despite previous concerns about the contractor’s performance related to systems development work, Education accepted the offer. Education updated its contract monitoring plan in 2011, about a year after the upgrade work began and performance problems, such as missed deadlines, had occurred. As a result of the system challenges, no loan rehabilitations were processed from September 2011 through March 2012, and Education officials said they needed until January 2013 to clear the resulting backlog. Education officials reported that they used manual processing until the workaround was automated in September 2013. They acknowledged that a substantial amount of development work needs to be completed to address the remaining issues; work they expect to be completed under the new contract. For instance, while Education reported rehabilitating about 600,000 loans for 200,000 borrowers from April 2012 to January 2013, it does not have other data to track its loan rehabilitation performance, such as the number of borrowers that experience delays in having their loans rehabilitated or the length of delays. Oversight Weaknesses Reduce Education’s Ability to Effectively Monitor Collection Agency Performance
Education has developed several mechanisms for overseeing collection agencies, but key weaknesses reduce its ability to effectively monitor their performance related to loan rehabilitation and other collection activities. For example, Education has not conducted quarterly reviews of each collection agency as stated in its guidance and procedures since it began reviewing loan rehabilitation calls in 2011. While Education provides feedback on the results of its call reviews to each collection agency, it does not ensure that collection agencies take corrective actions or use the information to assess collection agencies’ performance. Education officials reported that the department monitors collection agencies to ensure corrective actions are taken. This approach could include options for developing data and related performance measures for tracking timely rehabilitation of loans; 2. take steps to ensure that the final monitoring plan for the new defaulted loan information system contract identifies risks presented by the contractor or contract work and the oversight activities planned to address those risks; and 3. take steps to improve its collection agency call review process. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of fiscal year 2013 about $94 billion—over 11 percent of federal student loan volume in repayment—was in default, which generally occurs when a borrower fails to make a payment for more than 270 days. Loan rehabilitation was established as an option to help Education collect defaulted student loans, and borrowers address the adverse consequences of default, such as repairing damaged credit. GAO was asked to review Education's loan rehabilitation process. This report examines how: (1) Education assists borrowers in rehabilitating defaulted student loans; (2) the upgrade of its defaulted loan information system affected loan rehabilitation; and (3) Education oversees private collection agencies in implementing loan rehabilitation.
GAO reviewed Education's policies, procedures and guidance; contracts and monitoring records for the defaulted loan information system contractor and 22 collection agencies; collections and rehabilitation data; and relevant federal laws and regulations. GAO interviewed Education officials, representatives of borrower advocacy groups, and visited 6 selected collection agencies, based on their loan volume and geographic location.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education (Education) relies on collection agencies to assist borrowers in rehabilitating defaulted student loans, which allows borrowers who make nine on-time monthly payments within 10 months to have the default removed from their credit reports. Education works with 22 collection agencies to locate borrowers and explain repayment options, including rehabilitation. From fiscal years 2011 to 2013, Education collected about $9 billion on over 1.5 million loans through rehabilitation, most of which was recovered by collection agencies.
For more than a year after the October 2011 upgrade of its defaulted loan information system, Education was unable to provide most borrowers who completed rehabilitation with timely benefits, such as removing defaults from their credit reports. GAO found the delays largely attributable to gaps in Education's oversight of its system contractor. For example, despite concerns about the contractor's unreliable performance on previous system development efforts, Education conducted limited oversight until the contractor began missing deadlines. In addition, system testing was not sufficient for Education to detect key problems prior to the upgrade. As a result, no rehabilitations were processed until April 2012, and officials said they needed until January 2013 to clear the resulting backlog. During this time period, Education reported rehabilitating loans for about 200,000 borrowers, but it has not developed performance data to assess the number or extent of individual borrower delays. Further, Education has acknowledged that the system still requires workarounds and a substantial amount of development work will need to be completed under a new contract, which was awarded in September 2013, to address remaining system issues.
Education has developed tools for overseeing collection agencies, but key weaknesses reduce its ability to effectively monitor their performance. Specifically, to ensure collection agencies provide borrowers with accurate information, Education monitors their interactions with borrowers through quarterly reviews of loan rehabilitation phone calls. However, GAO found that Education has not consistently completed such call reviews. While Education provides the results of its reviews to each collection agency, it does not ensure corrective actions are taken and does not systematically analyze results over time or across collection agencies to inform its oversight activities. As a result, it may be difficult for Education to ensure that borrowers receive accurate information regarding loan rehabilitation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education take steps to track loan rehabilitation performance data and improve oversight of its system contractor and collection agencies. Education agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-112 | gao_T-HEHS-97-112_0 | Some of this difference is due to differences in the number of hours worked, since women are more likely to work part-time and part-time workers earn lower wages. Individual annuities, however, tend to be costly. Although women’s labor force participation is increasing, the Social Security Administration forecasts that fewer than 30 percent of the women retiring in 2020 will have 38 years of covered earnings, compared with almost 60 percent of men. Effects on Women’s Benefits of Changing Basic Social Security Law
Many of the proposed changes to Social Security would affect the benefits received by men and by women differently. Women who do receive retired worker benefits typically receive lower benefits than men. Public and private pension plans do not offer the social insurance protections that Social Security does. Each of the proposals has the potential to exacerbate the current differences in benefits between men and women. Narrowing the gap in labor force attachment, earnings, and investment behavior may reduce the differences in benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the impacts of proposals to finance and restructure the Social Security system, specifically the impacts on the financial well-being of women.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its work shows that, despite the provisions of the Social Security Act that do not differentiate between men and women, women tend to receive lower benefits than men; (2) this is due primarily to differences in lifetime earnings because women tend to have lower wages and fewer years in the workforce; (3) women's experience under pension plans also differs from men's not only because of earnings differences but also because of differences in investment behavior and longevity; (4) moreover, public and private pension plans do not offer the same social insurance protections that Social Security does; (5) furthermore, some of the provisions of the Social Security Advisory Council's three proposals may exacerbate the differences in men and women's benefits; (6) for example, proposals that call for individual retirement accounts will pay benefits that are affected by investment behavior and longevity; and (7) expected changes in women's labor force participation rates and increasing earnings will reduce but probably not eliminate these differences. |
gao_GAO-15-813 | gao_GAO-15-813_0 | The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) provided capital to Community Development Financial Institutions by purchasing preferred stock. Treasury Has Implemented Most of Our Performance Audit Recommendations, but a Few Related to CPP and MHA Have Not Been Fully Addressed
As of August 2015, our performance audits of the TARP programs have resulted in 72 recommendations to Treasury. Of the 72 performance audit recommendations, Treasury has implemented 59, or approximately 82 percent; partially implemented 4—that is, taken some steps toward implementation but needs to take more actions; and not implemented 3— that is, Treasury has not taken steps to implement them (see fig.1). Among the 7 recommendations that Treasury has taken some or no steps to implement, 1 was directed at CPP and 6 directed at the MHA housing programs. Due to Treasury’s inaction and the evolving nature of the programs, we considered 3 of them to be outdated and no longer applicable. Two of these 6 recommendations were related to CPP and 2 were related to the MHA programs. While Treasury reported generally on the results of its CPP auctions and the status of institutions remaining in the program, as of August 2015, it had not yet considered analyzing and reporting on remaining and former CPP participants separately and it is not likely to do so, according to Treasury. Treasury Has Implemented the Majority of Recommendations for MHA
Since 2009, we have made 27 recommendations aimed at improving MHA’s TARP-funded housing programs. Treasury established quantitative and qualitative benchmarks for each of the three performance categories for HAMP first-lien modifications and other TARP-funded MHA programs. In February 2014, we recommended that Treasury issue clarifying guidance to servicers on providing effective relationship management to borrowers with limited English proficiency (LEP). Six of these recommendations remain open, including 4 of which Treasury has taken some action. The four recommendations that Treasury has taken some action to address are as follows: In June 2010, we recommended that Treasury expeditiously report activity under PRA, including the extent to which servicers determined that principal reduction was beneficial to investors but did not offer it, to ensure transparency in the implementation of this program feature across servicers. Thus, we continue to maintain that Treasury should take action to fully implement this recommendation. In July 2015, we recommended that Treasury develop and implement policies and procedures that established a standard process to better ensure that changes to TARP-funded housing programs were based on evaluations that comprehensively and consistently met the key elements of benefit-cost analysis. Appendix I: Status of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Performance Audit Recommendations, as of August 2015
The following table summarizes the status of our TARP performance audit recommendations as of August 28, 2015. We classify each recommendation as implemented, partially implemented (the agency took steps to implement the recommendation but more work remains), open (the agency has not taken steps to implement the recommendation), and closed, not implemented (the agency decided not to take action to implement the recommendation). The recommendations are listed by report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) authorized the creation of TARP to address the most severe crisis that the financial system had faced in decades. Treasury has been the primary agency responsible for TARP programs. EESA provided GAO with broad oversight authorities for actions taken under TARP and included a provision that GAO report at least every 60 days on TARP activities and performance.
This 60-day report describes the status of GAO's TARP performance audit recommendations to Treasury as of August 2015. In particular, this report discusses Treasury's implementation of GAO's recommendations, focusing on two programs: CPP and MHA. GAO's methodologies included assessing relevant documentation from Treasury, interviewing Treasury officials, and reviewing prior TARP reports issued by GAO.
What GAO Found
As of August 2015, GAO's performance audits of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) activities have resulted in 72 recommendations to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Treasury has implemented 59 of the 72 recommendations (about 82 percent), some of which were aimed at improving transparency and internal controls of TARP. The status of the remaining recommendations is as follows:
Treasury has partially implemented four of the recommendations—that is, it has taken some steps toward implementation but needs to take more actions. All four recommendations are directed at the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, a collection of housing programs designed to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. The recommendations call for Treasury to, for example, issue guidance and monitor servicer compliance on working with borrowers with limited English proficiency. Treasury issued applicable guidance and obtained the policies of the larger MHA servicers, but has not assessed the implementation of those policies at the servicers.
Three recommendations remain open—that is, Treasury has not taken steps to implement them. Among these open recommendations are one directed at the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which provided capital to certain U.S. financial institutions, and two recommendations directed at the MHA housing programs. For example, in July 2015, GAO recommended that Treasury establish a standard process to better ensure that changes to TARP-funded MHA programs are based on comprehensive benefit-cost analyses. Treasury told GAO they would consider these recommendations at the time the recommendations were made.
Six recommendations have been closed but were not implemented. Four are related to CPP and MHA and two to other TARP activities. Generally, Treasury did not take action before the programs evolved or began to wind down, and therefore GAO determined that the recommendations were outdated and no longer applicable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to maintain that Treasury should take action to fully implement the four partially implemented recommendations and three open recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-1049 | gao_GAO-10-1049_0 | If the Head Start program has implemented policies and procedures that ensure that the program is meeting the needs of children eligible under the primary criteria and prioritizes their enrollment in the program, then the program may also fill up to 35 percent of its slots with children from families with income below 130 percent of the poverty line. Children from families with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty line, and children who qualify under one of the primary eligibility criteria, are referred to as “under-income” for the purposes of this report. Allegations of Fraud and Abuse Involving Two Head Start Grantees
We investigated the allegations of fraud and abuse that we received involving Head Start nonprofit grantees in the Midwest and Texas. Based on our investigation, two of the allegations were substantiated. Texas Grantee Allegations
Over-Income Enrollments
In Texas, individuals we spoke with alleged that the grantee enrolled more than 10 percent of over-income families in order to meet enrollment requirements. GAO found that over-income families at this center reported incomes ranging from a low of $27,000 to a high of $120,000. Employees at seven centers knowingly disregarded part of our families’ income to help make over-income families and their children appear to actually be under- income. At no point during our registrations was any of the information contained in fictitious documentation submitted by our parents verified, which indicates that the program is vulnerable to beneficiary fraud in addition to grantee fraud. To view selected video clips of these undercover enrollments, go to http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-10-1049/. We found that only 44 centers stated that they had any openings. We interviewed 21 families on wait lists and found that the majority stated that their income was at or below the federal poverty level. In some cases, families had experienced some type of domestic violence or were receiving some other type of public assistance, a group targeted specifically for assistance by Head Start program guidelines. We did not attempt to verify this information. While several grantees reported that they had lengthy wait lists, other grantees were eager to accept our fictitious, over-income children to fill their rolls. We did not validate the actual number of students on waitlists in these centers. We did not attempt to verify the applicants’ statements. Review and analysis of the existing Head Start monitoring system to ensure that (1) the verification of income eligibility is clearly understood and fully implemented; (2) Head Start grantees are providing regular training to employees who verify income; (3) Head Start grantees have active waiting lists that, based on the Head Start grantees’ selection criteria as mandated in the 2007 Head Start Act, include income-eligible children as well as categorically eligible children, such as families receiving public assistance and homeless children and families; and (4) Head Start grantees are taking a closer look at their recruitment efforts and the need for the reallocation of slots. HHS officials also indicated that the agency has moved expeditiously to begin a rule making process to strengthen the regulations on the eligibility verification process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) investigate the allegations of fraud and abuse at these two Head Start grantees, (2) conduct undercover tests to determine if other grantees were committing similar abuses, and (3) document instances in which potentially eligible children were put on wait lists for Head Start services at other centers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Head Start program provides child development services primarily to low-income families and their children. Federal law allows up to 10 percent of families to have incomes above 130 percent of the poverty line--GAO refers to them as over-income families. Families with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty line, or that meet certain other criteria, are referred to as under-income families. Nearly 1 million children a year participate in Head Start, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided an additional $2.1 billion. GAO received hotline tips alleging fraud by grantees. In response, GAO investigated the allegations, conducted undercover tests to determine if other centers were committing fraud, and documented instances where potentially eligible children were put on Head Start wait lists. On May 18, 2010 GAO testified on the preliminary results of the ongoing investigation. This report reiterates the findings disclosed in GAO's May testimony, and discusses new findings related to specific fraud allegations at two Head Start grantees. Since GAO's May testimony, HHS has taken a number of actions to address identified weaknesses, such as implementing a fraud hotline. HHS also indicated that it has moved expeditiously to begin a rule making process to strengthen the regulations on the eligibility verification process.
What GAO Found
GAO received allegations of fraud and abuse involving two Head Start nonprofit grantees in the Midwest and Texas. Two of the many allegations were substantiated. For example, one grantee inappropriately counted time parents spent helping children with homework as contributions to meet program funding requirements. While not fraudulent, we found that at both grantees, the average number of students who attended class was significantly lower than the number of students the grantees reported as enrolled in class. Realizing that the alleged fraud schemes could be perpetrated at other Head Start programs, GAO attempted to register fictitious children as part of 15 undercover test scenarios at centers in six states and the District of Columbia. In 8 instances staff at these centers fraudulently misrepresented information, including disregarding part of a family's income to register over-income children into under-income slots. The undercover tests revealed that seven Head Start employees lied about applicants' employment status or misrepresented their earnings. This leaves Head Start at risk that over-income children may be enrolled while legitimate under-income children are put on wait lists. At no point during our registrations was information submitted by GAO's fictitious parents verified, leaving the program at risk that dishonest persons could falsify earnings statements and other documents in order to qualify. In seven instances centers did not manipulate information. To hear selected video clips of GAO enrollments, see http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-10-1049/ . In addition, GAO found that most of the 550 Head Start centers contacted had wait lists. GAO also found that two centers where GAO enrolled fictitious children later became full and developed wait lists after the fictitious children had been withdrawn. Only 44 centers reported that they had openings. GAO interviewed families on wait lists from other centers and found that many stated that their incomes were at or below the federal poverty level. In some cases, families stated they had experienced some type of domestic violence, or were receiving some type of public assistance, which made them automatically eligible for Head Start. GAO did not attempt to verify family statements. |
gao_GAO-16-623 | gao_GAO-16-623_0 | IT Systems Supporting the 2020 Census
The Bureau’s redesign of the census relies on the acquisition and development of many new and modified systems. Several of the key systems are expected to be provided as CEDCAP enterprise systems under the purview of the IT Directorate. Eleven of these projects are intended to deliver one or more IT solutions. The Bureau has taken steps to implement these recommendations, but has not fully implemented them. Key activities in project monitoring and control include determining progress against the plan by comparing actual cost and schedule against the documented plan for the full scope of the project and communicating the results; identifying and documenting when significant deviations in cost and schedule performance (i.e., deviations from planned cost and schedule that, when left unresolved, preclude the project from meeting its objectives) have occurred; taking timely corrective actions, such as revising the original plan, establishing new agreements, or including additional mitigation activities in the current plan, to address issues when performance deviates significantly from the plan; monitoring the status of risks periodically, which can result in the discovery of new risks, revisions to existing risks, or the need to implement a risk mitigation plan; and implementing risk mitigation plans that include sufficient detail such as start and completion dates and trigger events and dates, which provide early warning that a risk is about to occur or has just occurred and are valuable in assessing risk urgency. The Internet and Mobile Data Collection project and Survey (and Listing) Interview Operational Control project fully met one of the best practices in monitoring and controlling, but partially met the other four best practices. Specifically, the CEDCAP program has established a process for taking corrective actions to address issues when needed and, as of April 2016, Bureau officials stated they have not needed to take any corrective actions to address CEDCAP program issues. Without effective processes for managing these interdependencies, the Bureau is limited in its ability to understand the work needed by both programs to meet agreed upon milestones, mitigate major risks, and ensure that requirements are appropriately identified. Consequently, the two programs have been manually identifying activities within their master schedules that are dependent on each other, and rather than establishing one dependency schedule, as best practices dictate, the programs have each developed their own dependency schedule and meet weekly with the intent of coordinating these two schedules. Nonetheless, this process has proven to be ineffective, as it has contributed to the misalignment between the programs’ schedules. These tests were intended to, among other things, help define requirements around critical functions. Adequately protecting mobile devices—The 2020 Census will be the first one in which the Census Bureau will provide mobile devices to enumerators to collect PII from households who did not self- respond to the survey. Continued focus on these considerable challenges will be important as the Bureau begins to develop and/or acquire systems and implement the 2020 design. However, this has not always been the case. Specifically, until the two programs establish schedules that are completely aligned, develop an integrated list of all interdependent risks, and finalize processes for managing requirements, both programs are at risk of not delivering their programs as expected. Finally, while the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, it also introduces many information security challenges, including educating the public to offset inevitable phishing scams. In its comments, the department agreed with all eight of our recommendations and indicated that it will be taking actions in response to our recommendations. Given that the Bureau is in the early stages of conducting research and developing requirements in this area and there is only a year remaining before the 2018 Census end-to-end test begins, we maintain that the lack of experience and specific requirements related to non-ID response validation is highly concerning, and our recommendation to make this a high and immediate priority or consider alternative approaches needs to be implemented. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the status of the 12 Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP) projects, (2) evaluate the extent to which the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is implementing best practices in monitoring and controlling selected CEDCAP projects, (3) determine the extent to which the Bureau is adequately managing the interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs, and (4) describe the key information security challenges the Bureau faces in implementing the 2020 Census design. To describe the key information security challenges the Bureau faces in implementing the 2020 Census design, we reviewed documentation on the 2020 Census design—including the 2020 Census Operational Plan, CEDCAP and 2020 Census program risk registers, and a report developed by a contractor for the 2020 Census—and interviewed staff within the Bureau’s Office of the Chief Information Security Officer. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Commerce's U.S. Census Bureau plans to significantly change the methods and technology it uses to count the population with the 2020 Decennial Census. The Bureau's redesign of the census relies on the acquisition and development of many new and modified systems. Several of the key systems are to be provided by an enterprise-wide initiative called CEDCAP, which is a large and complex modernization program intended to deliver a system-of-systems for all survey data collection and processing functions.
GAO's objectives for this review included (1) evaluating the extent to which the Bureau is implementing best practices in monitoring and controlling three selected CEDCAP projects, (2) determining the extent to which the Bureau is adequately managing the interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs, and (3) describing key information security challenges the Bureau faces in implementing the 2020 Census design. GAO selected the three high-priority projects planned for the 2020 design; reviewed Bureau documentation such as project plans and schedules and compared them against relevant guidance; and analyzed information security reports and documents.
What GAO Found
The three selected Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP) projects (of 12 total) in GAO's review partially met best practices for monitoring and controlling. For example, the projects fully met the best practice of establishing a process for taking corrective actions if issues are identified, but they did not fully meet the practice of identifying significant performance deviations. Until project officials implement missing practices, they will be limited in their abilities to monitor and control costs, schedules, and performance.
The 2020 Census program is heavily dependent upon CEDCAP to deliver the key systems needed to support the 2020 Census redesign. However, while the two programs have taken steps to coordinate their schedules, risks, and requirements, they lacked effective processes for managing their interdependencies. Specifically:
Among tens of thousands of schedule activities, the two programs are expected to manually identify activities that are dependent on each other, and rather than establishing one integrated dependency schedule, the programs maintain two separate dependency schedules. This has contributed to misalignment in milestones between the programs.
The programs do not have an integrated list of interdependent program risks, and thus they do not always recognize the same risks that impact both programs.
Among other things, key requirements have not been defined for validating responses from individuals who respond to the census using an address instead of a Bureau-assigned identification number, because of the Bureau's limited knowledge and experience in this area. The lack of knowledge and specific requirements related to this critical function is concerning, given that there is about a year remaining before the Census end-to-end test begins in August 2017 (which is intended to test all key systems and operations to ensure readiness for the 2020 Census).
Officials have acknowledged these weaknesses and reported that they are taking, or plan to take, steps to address the issues. However, until these interdependencies are managed more effectively, the Bureau will be limited in understanding the work needed by both programs to meet milestones, mitigate major risks, and ensure that requirements are appropriately identified.
While the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. For example, the introduction of an option for households to respond using the Internet puts respondents at greater risk for phishing attacks (requests for information from authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails and websites). In addition, because the Bureau plans to allow its enumerators to use mobile devices to collect information from households that did not self-respond to the survey, it is important that the Bureau ensures that these devices are adequately protected. The Bureau has begun efforts to address many of these challenges; as it begins implementing the 2020 Census design, continued focus on these considerable security challenges will be critical.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations to the Department of Commerce in the areas of project monitoring and control and in managing interdependencies related to schedule, risk, and requirements. The department agreed with all eight recommendations and indicated that it will be taking actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-527T | gao_GAO-06-527T_0 | FISMA Authorized and Streng
Enacted into law on December 17, 2002, as title III of the E- Government Act of 2002, FISMA authorized and strengthened information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements. Specifically, this program is to include ● periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm tha se, disclosure, could result from the unauthorized access, u disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively red information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system, including minimally acceptable system configuration requirements; uce subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action information security policies, procedures, and practice agency; to address any deficiencies in the procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; and ● plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of th agency. OMB’s Report to Congress Noted Improvements and Weaknesses
In its March 2006 report to Congress on fiscal year 2005 FISMA implementation, OMB emphasized that the federal government has made progress in meeting key performance measures for IT security; however, uneven implementation of security efforts leaves weaknesses in several areas. ● Assessed quality of the certification and accreditation process. Figure 1 illustrates that the major agencies have made steady progress in fiscal year 2005 certifying and accrediting their systems, although they have made mixed progress in meeting other key performance measures compared with the previous two fiscal years. Overall, agencies continued to report that they have not tested a significant number of their contingency plans with only 61 percent of systems with tested plans. Without testing, agencies can have limited assurance that they will be able to recover mission critical applications, business processes, and information in the event of an unexpected interruption. Actions are Needed to Improve FISMA Reporting and Underlying Information Security Weaknesses
There are actions that OMB and the agencies can take to improve FISMA reporting and compliance and to address underlying weaknesses in information security controls. We recommended that the Director of OMB take actions in revising future FISMA reporting instructions to increase the usefulness of the agencies’ annual reports to oversight bodies by: ● requiring agencies to report FISMA data by risk category; ● reviewing guidance to ensure the clarity of instructions; ● requesting the IGs report on the quality of additional agency processes, such as the annual system reviews. Such actions should include completing and maintaining an accurate, complete inventory of major systems, and prioritizing information security efforts based on system risk levels. In the 24 major agencies’ fiscal year 2005 reporting regarding their financial systems, 6 reported information security as a material weakness and 14 reported it as a reportable condition. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, GAO has reported that ineffective information security is a widespread problem that has potentially devastating consequences. In its reports to Congress since 1997, GAO has identified information security as a governmentwide high-risk issue--most recently in January 2005. Concerned with accounts of attacks on commercial systems via the Internet and reports of significant weaknesses in federal computer systems that make them vulnerable to attack, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which permanently authorized and strengthened the federal information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements established for federal agencies. This testimony discusses the federal government's progress and challenges in implementing FISMA, as reported by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the agencies, and the Inspectors General (IGs), and actions needed to improve FISMA reporting and address underlying information security weaknesses.
What GAO Found
In its fiscal year 2005 report to Congress, OMB discusses progress in implementing key information security requirements, but at the same time cites challenging weaknesses that remain. The report notes several governmentwide findings, such as the varying effectiveness of agencies' security remediation processes and the inconsistent quality of agencies' certification and accreditation (the process of authorizing operation of a system, including the development and implementation of risk assessments and security controls). Nevertheless, fiscal year 2005 data reported by 24 major agencies, compared with data reported for the previous 2 fiscal years, show that these agencies have made steady progress in certifying and accrediting systems, although they reported mixed progress in meeting other key statutory information security requirements. For example, agencies reported that only 61 percent of their systems had tested contingency plans, thereby reducing assurance that agencies will be able to recover from the disruption of those systems with untested plans. Federal entities can act to improve the usefulness of the annual FISMA reporting process and to mitigate underlying information security weaknesses. OMB has taken several actions to improve FISMA reporting--such as requiring agencies to provide performance information based on the relative importance or risk of the systems--and can further enhance the reliability and quality of reported information. Agencies also can take actions to fully implement their FISMA-mandated programs and address the weaknesses in their information security controls. Such actions include completing and maintaining accurate inventories of major systems, prioritizing information security efforts based on system risk levels, and strengthening controls that are to prevent, limit, and detect access to the agencies' information and information systems. |
gao_GAO-11-493 | gao_GAO-11-493_0 | Background
If ATATs are highly technical and organized or marketed, they are often referred to as abusive tax shelters. Tax shelters can be legitimate to the extent that they take advantage of various provisions in the tax code to lawfully avoid tax. IRS Has Limited Trend Data on the Extent of Abusive Transactions, but Many Tax Experts Said That the Ever- Changing Nature of ATATs Requires Constant Vigilance
IRS has limited trend data on the size of the ATAT problem in terms of the number of abusive promoters and taxpayers investing in the promotions. Estimating the extent of ATATs is at best an inexact process because ATATs are often hidden. A theme we heard from the experts is that the mass marketing of ATATs has declined in recent years, although the experts had different views on the extent of the decline. This advice was sold to clients such as wealthy individuals and corporations. IRS officials also said that ATATs seemed more international than before, with promoters changing the countries and mechanics of their promotions. Investigations of Promoters Stopped Some Abuse, but IRS Has Incomplete Information on Why Many Investigations Were Closed without Penalties or Injunctions
For fiscal years 2006 through 2010, about 100 SB/SE promoter investigations annually resulted in injunctions for promoters to stop what they were doing and/or penalties for what they did, as table 1 shows. IRS Examined Thousands of Tax Returns Involving Suspected ATATs and Recommended Billions of Dollars in Additional Taxes, but the Impact Is Unclear
The impact of examinations on the ATAT problem is uncertain. Further, isolating the impact on ATATs of settlement initiatives from the impacts of examinations and promoter investigations is difficult to do, especially when IRS does not have an IRS- wide system for tracking and comparing the results from its enforcement efforts. OTSA Did Not Verify That It Received All Required Disclosures or That They Were Complete
OTSA Did Not Verify That It Received All Disclosures from Taxpayers
According to OTSA officials, OTSA did not confirm that it always received its copy of the required Form 8886 from taxpayers disclosing a reportable transaction. However, IRS knows that a problem exists because, according to IRS officials, IRS examiners of tax returns have identified some taxpayers who filed their Form 8886 with their tax return but failed to send it to OTSA. If OTSA does not receive disclosures, it cannot identify transactions that merit examination for appropriateness as well as possible penalties. Taxpayers could be burdened by having to keep records longer. In addition, IRS has generally been successful in obtaining required disclosures and investor lists from material advisors. Promoters who do not meet the statutory definition to be a material advisor face no requirements to provide IRS with their list of investors within 20 business days after IRS requested a list or no penalties for failing to do so. 2. 3. 5. In describing actions on the recommendations with which IRS had agreements, the Deputy Commissioner stated that IRS would do the following: update the Internal Revenue Manual’s handling of reason codes for surveying or discontinuing investigations and evaluate whether any of the reason data collected warrant changing how investigations are selected; ensure that IRS uses the same databases and methodologies (such as across IRS divisions) for public reporting on the examination results of ATAT issues; develop criteria for consistently using IRS examination result data and a consistent methodology for validating the data before they are released (such as to the Joint Committee on Taxation); establish a new indicator and a process to regularly review whether filers met their disclosure obligations with OTSA; improve its next study of whether Form 8886 should be filed electronically by identifying how many Form 8886 filers use computers to prepare the form; test mismatches of partnership and S corporation information with OTSA information to identify potentially unfiled forms; and formalize procedures to identify, evaluate, and follow up on incomplete disclosures. IRS partially agreed with our recommendation on two options for inducing non-material advisors to provide investor lists within a specified time. Although IRS agreed that tracking these amounts by issue (rather than by case as is currently done) might provide valuable information for management, it cited resource and capability constraints in doing the tracking. Results of IRS’s Implementation of the Abusive Tax Avoidance Transaction (ATAT) Disclosure and Sanction Provisions Enacted in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA)
To evaluate the results of IRS’s implementation of the AJCA, we selected those sections of the act for which IRS had data on the disclosures and penalties. Criteria we used to evaluate the AJCA’s results included whether (1) OTSA received all the reportable transaction and material advisor forms it should have, (2) submitted reportable transaction disclosure forms met OTSA’s standard for completeness, (3) IRS received investor lists from material advisors within 20 business days of the time requested, and (4) the AJCA’s introduction of new penalties and penalty amounts increased the annual number and aggregate dollar amount of ATAT penalties assessed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Abusive tax avoidance transactions (ATAT) range from frivolous tax schemes to highly technical and abusive tax shelters marketed to taxpayers by promoters selling tax advice. ATATs threaten the U.S. tax system's integrity if honest taxpayers believe that others do not pay their fair share of taxes. GAO was asked to (1) describe what is known about trends in ATAT usage; (2) describe results of IRS's ATAT enforcement efforts; and (3) evaluate IRS's implementation of the ATAT provisions in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Using criteria from the act, GAO analyzed statistics and other documents on trends and results and interviewed IRS and other tax experts.
What GAO Found
While trend data on taxpayers' use of ATATs are limited, IRS and other experts GAO contacted agreed that a problem exists and is continually changing. One theme that emerged from GAO's discussions with these experts is that ATATs marketed by promoters to corporations and wealthy individuals have declined in recent years, although the experts had different views on the extent of the decline. They also said that ATATs have become more international in nature. Even though estimating the extent of the ATAT problem is inexact because ATATs are often hidden, the experts believed that the changing nature of ATATs warrants continuous IRS vigilance. IRS has many ATAT-related enforcement efforts--investigations, examinations, and settlement initiatives--across different divisions but has incomplete data on the results on those efforts. For example, IRS's small business division's promoter investigations help stop promotions, but IRS had incomplete information on why investigations often closed without penalties or injunctions, information that could be used to help decide the types of investigations to start. In addition, IRS recommended billions of dollars in additional taxes from examining tax returns with suspected ATATs, but IRS did not identify the part of the additional amount that was collected or that related to the ATAT issue as opposed to other issues. In addition, some ATAT results were reported inconsistently across IRS divisions. Without comprehensive or consistent information, IRS does not have the best information to decide which promoters to investigate and the number of examinations that should be done as well as to evaluate their impacts. Even though the 2004 act increased the requirements for taxpayers and promoters to disclose their use of transactions and enhanced the penalties for improper disclosure, problems existed. IRS received many disclosures of transaction use from taxpayers, but it had no assurance that its Office of Tax Shelter Analysis received all the disclosures it should have. In addition, IRS did not verify that all the disclosures it received were complete, and a new process for reviewing the completeness of disclosures and following up with taxpayers was not yet finalized. Not receiving disclosures or receiving incomplete disclosures of transactions would keep IRS from having information needed to identify the transactions that merit an examination of their appropriateness and to assess related penalties as needed. Finally, certain promoters who are required by law under threat of penalty to give their list of investors within 20 business days after IRS requested it did so. However, other promoters who are not covered by this requirement often took longer than 20 days to provide the lists without the threat of a similar penalty. IRS did not comprehensively track how quickly the lists were received. Not receiving lists on a timely basis prevents IRS from quickly working to stop promoter activity. GAO suggests that Congress consider instituting a penalty aimed at certain promoters not giving investor lists to IRS within a specified time. GAO also recommends IRS act or establish processes to (1) improve data on the results of ATAT-related investigations and examinations, (2) ensure that required disclosures are filed by taxpayers, (3) review disclosures for completeness; (4) track the time for IRS to receive investor lists; and (5) induce more promoters to provide investor lists by a specified time. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with most recommendations but cited resource and capability constraints in tracking ATAT data and investor lists, which GAO believes can be addressed. |
gao_GAO-07-479 | gao_GAO-07-479_0 | Storm Water Permit Issuance Has Been Slow and Many Communities Have Not Fully Implemented Activities
Storm water program implementation has been slow for both Phase I and II MS4s. Although the Phase I and II federal application deadlines for storm water permits passed years ago—around 14 years ago for Phase I and 4 years ago for Phase II—nearly 11 percent of MS4s have not yet received permits, and thus are not required to implement storm water management activities. Moreover, for many MS4s, litigation over the process of issuing storm water permits or their conditions, among other reasons, delayed program implementation for years after the initial permit application deadlines. As a result, almost all Phase II and some Phase I MS4s are still in the early stages of implementing their first 5-year permits. Several Factors Influence the Extent to Which Storm Water Program Implementation Is or Could Be a Burden
Because many MS4s are still in their first permit cycle, it is too early to determine the overall program burden. First, some states may require that MS4s implement more stringent or specific storm water permit requirements than envisioned by federal regulations to address local water quality concerns. First, burdens could increase as EPA and state permitting authorities reissue permits with more stringent or specific requirements than they have done to date. Methodological Concerns Raise Questions about the Usefulness of EPA’s Cost Estimates
Because we could not identify the overall burden MS4s face from the storm water program, in part due to its early implementation, we could not determine whether EPA’s Phase I and II analyses over- or underestimated actual costs for implementing the storm water program. Specifically, (1) the methodology used for the Phase I analysis was not designed to estimate national program costs or present ranges that reflect actual program costs, (2) concerns about the validity and reliability of Phase II data call into question the usefulness of the Phase II cost estimates, and (3) EPA’s Phase I and II analyses did not exclude the costs of storm water activities that MS4s may have been conducting prior to the program. Assessment of Program Burden Is Hampered by Limited and Inconsistent Data
Any assessment of program burden will be hampered by limited and inconsistent data on MS4s’ storm water activities and their costs. Furthermore, the number of factors that can influence a community’s storm water management activities—such as whether it can take advantage of the flexibility provided by EPA’s storm water regulations to implement the program in a less expensive manner, its current level of water pollution, or whether it shares program responsibility with other entities—make it difficult to develop a uniform assessment of the burden the storm water program may impose nationwide. For some communities, challenges to establishing reliable sources of local funding for their efforts can also influence the extent to which the program is a burden. Furthermore, it will be difficult to assess the burden of implementing the storm water program, and for EPA to meet its goal of evaluating Phase II starting in 2012, without more complete and consistent reporting on the scope, costs, and results of communities’ storm water best management practices. However, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) estimates of the costs of implementing these regulations did not consider the burdens communities faced from regulations already in place. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) identify the progress made in implementing the storm water program, (2) determine the extent to which the storm water program burdens communities, (3) evaluate the accuracy of EPA’s cost estimates, and (4) examine the data available for future assessment of program burdens. uired to obtain. uired to obtain permit coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Urban storm water runoff is a major contributor to the nation's degraded waters. Under the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established a program requiring communities to obtain permits and implement activities to control storm water pollution. EPA's Phase I regulations (1990) applied to communities with populations of 100,000 or more, and its Phase II regulations (1999) covered smaller urban communities. Communities must report progress in meeting permit requirements. Some have raised concerns that storm water requirements impose an undue burden. To evaluate storm water program costs, EPA developed estimates for both phases. GAO was asked to (1) determine the progress in implementing the storm water program, (2) evaluate the extent to which the program burdens communities, (3) examine the accuracy of EPA's cost estimates, and (4) examine the data available for assessing program burden. GAO collected data for all states and a sample of 130 communities, among other steps.
What GAO Found
Storm water program implementation has been slow for both Phase I and II communities. The federal deadlines for permit applications were years ago--14 years for Phase I and 4 years for Phase II--but almost 11 percent of all communities were not yet permitted as of fall 2006. In addition, litigation, among other reasons, delayed the issuance of some permits for years after the application deadlines. As a result, almost all Phase II and some Phase I communities are still in the early stages of program implementation. It is too early to determine the storm water program's overall burden, but several factors influence the extent to which the program burdens a community. In particular, burden varies depending on whether communities (1) can use the flexibility built into EPA's regulations to implement less expensive measures, or (2) are able to benefit from prior storm water management experience. Some communities may face a greater burden because of more stringent requirements set by EPA or the states, additional efforts required to address litigation over water quality, or because of barriers to obtaining funding for storm water activities. Storm water program burdens could increase in the future because, among other reasons, EPA or the states may reissue permits with more stringent requirements. Without an estimate of actual storm water program costs--or burden--GAO could not determine the accuracy of EPA's cost estimates. However, GAO did identify methodological concerns that raise questions about the usefulness of these estimates for measuring the burden communities face. That is, the Phase I analysis was not designed to estimate national program costs, the Phase II analysis was based on survey data of questionable validity and reliability, and neither analysis excluded costs for activities that communities were implementing before the program. Any assessment of program burden will be hampered because EPA is not collecting complete and consistent data on communities' activities and their costs. For example, only Phase I communities are required to include data on program costs and these data are often limited. Also, communities' inconsistent reporting of activities makes it difficult to evaluate program implementation nationwide. Consequently, EPA will find it challenging to meet its goal to examine Phase II implementation starting in 2012. |
gao_GAO-16-734 | gao_GAO-16-734_0 | Program funds can be used for housing, economic development, neighborhood revitalization, and other community development activities. States distribute their allocated CDBG funds to nonentitlement communities. After the set-asides, 70 percent of CDBG funds are allocated to entitlement communities, and the remaining 30 percent are allocated to states to distribute to nonentitlement communities. In fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated about $3.1 billion for the Community Development Fund, $66 million of which was set aside for Native American tribes. HUD’s Low- and Moderate-Income Summary Data
For projects designed to serve either the entire community or a smaller area within a community, HUD produces the LMI summary data to help states and communities determine whether at least 51 percent of a proposed project’s service area is comprised of LMI persons. Communities Have the Option to Conduct a Local Income Survey When They Disagree with Census Data
For nonentitlement communities that disagree with their CDBG eligibility determination based on HUD’s use of ACS data, HUD’s and states’ primary policy is to allow these communities to conduct local income surveys. HUD and States Allow Local Income Surveys When Service Areas Do Not Align with Census Geographic Boundaries
HUD’s CDBG regulations and local income survey guidance also discuss the use of local income surveys in place of the LMI summary data when the service area benefitting from an activity is larger or smaller than the census boundaries. Based on our review of CDBG guidance from 49 states and Puerto Rico, 1 state does not allow nonentitlement communities to use the LMI summary data to show they meet the LMI threshold; instead, this state requires all communities applying for funding using the area-benefit criteria to conduct local income surveys. For example, officials from four states said it is challenging for communities to obtain a sufficient number of survey responses to be considered representative of the nonentitlement community’s income. State and local stakeholders cited cost as a challenge associated with conducting a local income survey. HUD and most states provide guidance that nonentitlement communities can use to develop and conduct their local income surveys. Stakeholders Noted That Potential Alternative Data Sources Have Limitations and That Collecting Accurate Income Information Is Generally Challenging
Stakeholders we interviewed noted that alternative data sources that might be used to demonstrate that communities meet the LMI requirements of the CDBG program have limitations, and they cited challenges associated with measuring income generally. Stakeholders we interviewed cited several types of alternative sources of income information that have not been used by communities that disagree with census data to determine CDBG eligibility:
Other large-scale Census Bureau surveys that include information on income. These could include federal and state tax data or data on enrollment in income-based programs, such as the National School Lunch Program for free and reduced-price meals, Medicaid, or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). For example, the Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) supplements ACS income data with administrative data such as federal income tax return data. However, while these potential sources could provide information on income at the individual or community level, stakeholders also noted that they would likely have one or more of the following limitations:
Does not fully allow communities to determine if they are LMI. Is not easily accessible by communities. Is not available at small geographic levels. Because nonentitlement communities are small communities, an alternative data source would need to be available at a sufficiently small geographic level. Is not more precise than ACS. In addition, in July 2015, the Census Bureau announced a plan to evaluate the availability and sustainability of using external data sources, such as Social Security Administration and Internal Revenue Service data, to supplement income information collected by ACS, which they said could improve the data. According to the research plan, the Census Bureau expects to make specific recommendations before March 2017. They provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
You asked us to review options for nonentitlement communities that disagree with their Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) eligibility determination based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) use of American Community Survey (ACS) data. This report examines (1) HUD’s and states’ policies for communities that disagree with their eligibility determination based on HUD’s use of ACS data or are not able to use HUD’s Low- and Moderate-Income (LMI) summary data and the challenges, if any, communities face in using available options, and (2) stakeholders’ views on whether there are possible alternative data sources for determining eligibility under CDBG’s LMI objective. Appendix III: Changes in the LMI Status of Nonentitlement Communities between 2000 and 2006–2010 Low- and Moderate-Income Summary Data
Officials from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and some states we interviewed noted that each time HUD updates its Low- and Moderate-Income (LMI) summary data, whether from one decennial census to another as in the past, or the more recent 2014 transition from the 2000 decennial census to the 2006–2010 American Community Survey (ACS) data, some nonentitlement communities see changes in their LMI status. | Why GAO Did This Study
Administered by HUD, the CDBG program provides funding for housing, community, and economic development programs. After set asides, HUD must allocate 70 percent of funds to cities and urban counties, known as entitlement communities, and 30 percent to states for distribution to eligible nonentitlement communities. In fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated $3 billion for the CDBG program, of which HUD allocated $900 million to states. Seventy percent of CDBG funds must principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons, and Census Bureau data are used for this determination. In 2014, HUD transitioned from using decennial census long form income data (which are no longer collected) to ACS income data, which HUD uses to update its income data every 5 years.
GAO was asked to review HUD's policies related to communities that disagree with their CDBG eligibility determination based on HUD's use of ACS data. This report examines (1) HUD's and states' eligibility policies and (2) potential alternative data sources. GAO interviewed CDBG administrators from 8 states and from nonentitlement communities in each of these states, all of which were selected based on available data and CDBG stakeholders' recommendations; spoke with other CDBG stakeholders; and reviewed CDBG guidance from 49 states and Puerto Rico. GAO also analyzed how use of ACS data can affect community eligibility.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. HUD and the Department of Commerce provided technical comments.
What GAO Found
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) and states' primary method for communities to demonstrate eligibility when they disagree with HUD's eligibility determination is to allow communities to conduct their own local income surveys to show that they meet the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) income threshold. HUD instructs small communities, known as nonentitlement communities, to use data based on the Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) to determine whether at least 51 percent of residents in their proposed project service areas are low- and moderate-income persons and are therefore eligible for CDBG funds. However, communities may disagree with their eligibility determination based on ACS data, or they may be unable to use this method because the project's service area is larger or smaller than the census boundaries. In these cases, HUD and states allow communities to conduct their own local income surveys to demonstrate eligibility. State officials GAO interviewed said it is common for nonentitlement communities to use local income surveys as an alternative to HUD's ACS-based data, and HUD and states provide guidance on conducting these surveys. However, stakeholders cited costs and other challenges nonentitlement communities face in conducting local income surveys, including resource constraints, administrative burdens, and difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of survey responses. Other than local income surveys, alternative methods for showing eligibility for CDBG funds are limited. For example, communities may qualify by funding activities that serve populations HUD presumes to be low- and-moderate income, such as the elderly or homeless.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed cited challenges associated with measuring income and limitations associated with alternative data sources that might be used to demonstrate that communities meet the low- and moderate-income requirements. For example, stakeholders cited general challenges associated with measuring income and poverty, such as fluctuations in an individual's or community's income over a year. Some stakeholders cited alternative sources of income information that have not been used by communities that disagree with census data to determine CDBG eligibility. However, they noted that these sources would likely have one or more of the following limitations:
does not fully measure a community's income;
is not easily accessible by communities;
is not available at small geographic levels; or
is not more precise than ACS.
For example, some sources of income data, such as income tax data, may have limited public availability—limiting their accessibility by communities—and income tax data would not include low-income earners who are not required to file tax returns. Other sources, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and other income-based programs, would not provide data at a small enough geographic level to be useful for this purpose. The Census Bureau is in the process of exploring ways to use external data sources, such as Social Security Administration and Internal Revenue Service data, to supplement ACS to improve the data and expects to make recommendations by March 2017. |
gao_GAO-13-322 | gao_GAO-13-322_0 | Within these medical commands, the Army and Navy have separate but similarly centralized approaches to contracting for medical services, including health care professionals. JTF CapMed relies on the Army to award contracts for health care professionals because it does not have its own contracting authority. A variety of contracting arrangements are available to DOD to contract for health care professionals. We also found that fixed-price contracts were used for more than 90 percent of direct health care medical service obligations in fiscal year 2011, as shown in table 3. We found that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and JTF CapMed together used multiple-award contracts for 64 percent of the $1.14 billion in obligations for contracts for health care professionals in fiscal year 2011. During our review, Navy and Air Force officials completed analyses of their contracting arrangements which indicated that multiple-award contracts may result in lower costs when contracting for health care professionals compared to CSAs. Consolidation of Staffing Requirements Is Limited in the Absence of a DOD- wide Acquisition Strategy
Contracting for health care staffing requirements across the military departments remains largely fragmented. In 2007, DOD drafted a charter for a Defense Medical Strategic Sourcing Council. For example, the departments have made efforts to use multiple-award contracts to consolidate intraservice staffing requirements, but we identified several instances where multiple task orders were placed for the same type of provider in the same area or facility. Almost All Contract Health Care Professionals Work in On-Base Military Treatment Facilities
Nearly all of the military departments’ contract health care professionals— 96 percent—worked in facilities located on military installations in fiscal year 2011. Further, based on available data and interviews with DOD officials, we determined that labor categories, labor costs, and full-time equivalent calculations all vary by military department, and in some cases by facility or contract. Costs Associated with Contract Health Care Professionals at On-Base Facilities Are Not Comparable to Those at Off-Base Facilities
Based on available data and interviews with DOD officials, we determined that the costs associated with the provision of care by contract health care professionals at on-base facilities and off-base facilities were not directly comparable for a variety of reasons. For example, reported workload data have been characterized as unreliable. DOD Has Agency- wide Training Requirements for Contracting Personnel, and Health Care Experience Varies
DOD medical services contracting personnel are subject to DOD-wide training requirements, and health care experience varies for these personnel. The military departments provide CORs, but usually not contracting officers, with specialized training in contracting for health care professionals in addition to DOD’s requirements. The training offered by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) provides a foundation for acquisition and career field knowledge, and is not targeted to specific jobs, including the award and administration of contracts for health care professionals. The Military Departments’ Existing Policies and Procedures Generally Address Legislated Quality Standards, but DOD Did Not Require Consistency
Section 732 of the NDAA for FY 2007 directed the Secretary of Defense to require consistent quality standards for contract health care professionals and the staffing companies that provide them across all of the military departments’ MTFs. According to DOD officials, DOD did not require consistent quality standards or take any additional actions in response to this legislation—such as by establishing a specific policy or guidance—because officials believed the military departments were already applying these standards as part of their contracting processes. Without such a strategy, the Military Health System may be missing opportunities for acquiring professional medical services in the most cost effective manner. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what contracting practices are used by the military departments to contract for medical services as well as what is known about the cost effectiveness of these practices, we analyzed fiscal year 2011 data obtained from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation on medical service contracts to determine the extent to which the military departments used particular contracting practices as well as the types and amount of medical services that were purchased. To determine the extent to which the military departments have policies or procedures that generally address legislated quality standards for contract health care professionals and the staffing companies that provide these professionals, we obtained documentation such as federal regulations, DOD and military department-level policies and procedures, and military department-wide standardized contracting language, as provided to us by each of the military departments and JTF CapMed. Appendix II: Interactive Graphic Information for the Location of On-Base MTFs and the Number of FTEs at Each Location
Appendix III: Military Treatment Facilities and Total Contracted Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) by Military Department
Military department Army
Military department
Military department
Military department
Facility name Grand Forks Air Force Base Buckley Air Force Base (off-base primary military treatment facility) Columbus Air Force Base Brandon Clinic (off-base facility associated with MacDill Air Force Base) Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (Previously the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center)
Dumfries TRICARE clinic (off-base clinic associated with Fort Belvoir Community Hospital, previously Woodbridge Family Health Center) Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (Previously Dewitt Army Community Hospital)
Fairfax TRICARE clinic (off-base clinic associated with Fort Belvoir Community Hospital)
Appendix IV: The Joint Commission’s Health Care Staffing Services Standards, 2011
Appendix IV: The Joint Commission’s Health Care Staffing Services Standards, 2011 1. 4. 8. 5. 2. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD operates a large and complex health care system that employs more than 150,000 military, civilian, and contract personnel working in military treatment facilities. Each military department operates its own facilities, and contracts separately for health care professionals to supplement care provided within these facilities. In fiscal year 2011, these contracts totaled $1.14 billion.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress mandated that GAO review the military departments' acquisition of health care professional services. This report examines (1) the contracting practices used by the departments and their cost effectiveness; (2) the extent to which the departments consolidate health care staffing requirements; (3) the percentage and associated costs of contract health care professionals working at on-base facilities versus offbase; (4) the training requirements for and experience of medical services contracting personnel; and (5) the extent to which the departments' policies address legislated quality standards for contract civilian health care professionals and for staffing companies that provide these professionals. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed military health care policies, analyzed DOD's fiscal year 2011 procurement and staffing data, and interviewed DOD military health system officials.
What GAO Found
The military departments--the Army, Navy, and Air Force--generally use competition and fixed-price contracts when contracting for medical professionals. These practices can provide lower prices or reduced risk for the government. The military departments use a number of contract arrangements, including contracts awarded to multiple health care staffing companies, for health care professionals. Military department analyses indicate that multiple-award contracts result in lower prices compared to other contract arrangements.
The Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a consolidated agency-wide acquisition strategy for medical services. In the absence of such a strategy, contracting for health care professionals is largely fragmented. For example, the military departments had not consolidated their staffing requirements by developing joint contracts beyond a limited number of instances amounting to about 8 percent of the fiscal year 2011 spending on health care professionals. The departments have made efforts to use multiple-award contracts to consolidate intraservice staffing requirements, but GAO identified several instances where multiple task orders were placed for the same type of provider in the same area or facility. A more consolidated strategic sourcing strategy could allow DOD to acquire medical services in a more cost-effective way.
Nearly all of the military departments' 11,253 contract health care professionals--96 percent--worked in 114 on-base military treatment facilities in fiscal year 2011, while the remaining 4 percent worked in 8 off-base clinics. The costs associated with the contracted health care services provided at on-base facilities are not comparable to such costs at off-base facilities for a variety of reasons. For example, some Military Health System cost accounting data have been characterized as unreliable. In addition, according to DOD officials, labor categories, labor costs, and full time equivalent calculations all vary by military department and in some cases by facility, contract, or geographic location, making a cost comparison problematic.
DOD medical services contracting personnel are subject to DOD-wide training requirements. Consistent with DOD-wide training for all its contracting officers, DOD does not require health care contracting officers to have specialized training or experience. The required training provides a foundation for career field knowledge and is not targeted to specific types of acquisitions, including contracts for health care professionals. Health care experience among contracting personnel varied by location. Air Force contracting officers are not typically dedicated to medical services contracting, unlike their counterparts in the Army and Navy. The military departments provide contracting officers' representatives, who provide contract oversight, with specialized training in contracting for health care.
GAO found that each of the departments has policies or procedures in place that generally address most of the legislated quality standards enacted in 2007 for contract health care professionals and the staffing companies that provide them. However, DOD did not require the military departments to use consistent quality standards in response to this legislation because DOD officials believed that the departments were already applying these standards as part of their contracting processes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense develop a DOD-wide strategic approach to contracting for health care professionals. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-929T | gao_GAO-10-929T_0 | One such area is inventory management. We have reported that in order to successfully resolve supply chain management problems, DOD needs to sustain top leadership commitment and long-term institutional support for its strategic planning efforts for supply chain management, obtain necessary commitments for its initiatives from the military services and other DOD components, make substantial progress in implementing improvement initiatives and programs across the department, and demonstrate progress in achieving the objectives identified in supply chain management-related strategic planning documents. In addition, successful resolution of weaknesses in supply chain management depends on improvements in some of DOD’s other high-risk areas. DOD’s new Logistics Strategic Plan is intended to support other recent strategic planning efforts in the department, including the completion of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the publication of the 2009 Strategic Management Plan. Our prior work has shown that strategic planning is the foundation for defining what the agency seeks to accomplish, identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and then determining how well it succeeds in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving objectives. DOD Has Issued Prior Strategic Plans on Logistics and Supply Chain Management
Over a number of years prior to the publication of its Logistics Strategic Plan, DOD issued a series of strategic planning documents for logistics and the management of its supply chain. For example, for a period of several years beginning in the mid-1990s, DOD issued a series of strategic plans for logistics. Building on the “as is” Focused Logistics Roadmap, DOD recognized the need for a comprehensive, integrated strategy for transforming logistics and released its Logistics Roadmap in July 2008 to provide a more coherent and authoritative framework for logistics improvement efforts, including supply chain management. The roadmap documented numerous initiatives and programs that were then under way and organized these around goals, joint capabilities, and objectives. First, it did not identify the scope of DOD’s logistics problems or gaps in logistics capabilities. Third, DOD had not clearly stated how it intended to integrate the roadmap into DOD’s logistics decision-making processes or who within the department was responsible for this integration. DOD’s 2010 Logistics Strategic Plan Provides High-Level Strategic Direction
The 2010 Logistics Strategic Plan is DOD’s most recent effort to provide high-level strategic direction for future logistics improvement efforts, including those in the area of supply chain management. The Logistics Strategic Plan reiterates high-level department goals drawn from both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Strategic Management Plan. In our review of the plan, we noted that key initiatives appear to focus on issues that we have identified as needing management attention. DOD identifies four success indicators and three performance measures for this goal. Logistics Strategic Plan Lacks Specificity Regarding Strategies and Time Frames
Plan Lacks Detailed Information in Several Areas
Although the Logistics Strategic Plan contains some key elements of an effective strategic plan and provides unifying themes for improvement efforts, it lacks detailed information regarding strategies and time frames that would help to specify how and when goals will be achieved. While the plan presents three performance measures associated with Goal 4, it lacks baseline or trend data for past performance, measurable target-level information, or time frames for the achievement of goals or completion of initiatives. Key concepts. Problems and capability gaps. Resource needs. It is not clear how the Logistics Strategic Plan will be used within the existing logistics governance framework to assist decision makers and influence resource decisions and priorities. In conclusion, strategic plans need to remain at a high enough level to provide a clear vision and direction for improvement, but without more specific information in the Logistics Strategic Plan, it will be difficult for DOD to demonstrate progress in addressing supply chain management problems and provide Congress with assurance that the DOD supply chain is fulfilling the department’s goal of providing cost-effective joint logistics support for the warfighter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its supply chain network is critical to supporting military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and also represents a substantial investment of resources. As a result of weaknesses in DOD's management of supply inventories and responsiveness to warfighter requirements, supply chain management is on GAO's list of high-risk federal government programs and operations. In July 2010, DOD issued a new Logistics Strategic Plan that represents the department's current vision and direction for supply chain management and other logistics areas. Today's testimony draws from GAO's prior related work and observations from an ongoing review of DOD supply chain management, and, as requested, will (1) describe DOD's prior strategic planning efforts in the area of logistics, (2) highlight key elements in the new Logistics Strategic Plan, and (3) discuss opportunities for improvement in future iterations of this plan. In conducting its ongoing audit work, GAO reviewed the Logistics Strategic Plan, compared elements in the plan with effective strategic planning practices, and met with cognizant officials from DOD, the military services, and other DOD components as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Prior to the publication of its new Logistics Strategic Plan, DOD issued a series of strategic planning documents for logistics over a period of several years. In 2008, DOD released its Logistics Roadmap to provide a more coherent and authoritative framework for logistics improvement efforts, including supply chain management. While the roadmap discussed numerous ongoing initiatives and programs that were organized around goals and joint capabilities, it fell short of providing a comprehensive, integrated strategy for logistics. GAO found, for example, that the roadmap did not identify gaps in logistics capabilities and that DOD had not clearly stated how the roadmap was integrated into DOD's logistics decision-making processes. GAO's prior work has shown that strategic planning is the foundation for defining what an agency seeks to accomplish, identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and then determining how well it succeeds in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving objectives. DOD said that it would remedy some of the weaknesses GAO identified in the roadmap. The July 2010 Logistics Strategic Plan, which updates the roadmap, is DOD's most recent effort to provide high-level strategic direction for future logistics improvement efforts, including those in the area of supply chain management. The plan provides unifying themes for improvement efforts, for example, by including a logistics mission statement and vision for the department, and it presents four goals for improvement efforts with supporting success indicators, key initiatives, and general performance measures. One goal focuses specifically on supply chain processes. The plan is aligned to and reiterates high-level departmentwide goals drawn from both the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2009 Strategic Management Plan for business operations. Key initiatives in the plan appear to focus on issues that GAO has identified as needing management attention. While the Logistics Strategic Plan contains some of the elements necessary for strategic planning, it lacks some detailed information that would benefit decision makers and guide DOD's logistics and supply chain improvement efforts. The plan lacks specific and clear performance measurement information (such as baseline or trend data for past performance, measurable target-level information, or time frames for the achievement of goals or completion of initiatives), definition of key concepts, identification of problems and capability gaps, and discussion of resources needed to achieve goals. Further, linkages to other plans and some key related activities under way within logistics are unclear, and it is similarly unclear how the plan will be used within the existing governance framework for logistics. Without more specific information in the Logistics Strategic Plan, it will be difficult for DOD to demonstrate progress in addressing supply chain management problems and provide Congress with assurance that the DOD supply chain is fulfilling the department's goal of providing cost-effective joint logistics support for the warfighter. |
gao_GGD-97-167 | gao_GGD-97-167_0 | Rather, agencies are required to demonstrate a public safety need and an inability to address this need without a grant. We noted that federal grants have been established to achieve a variety of goals. The Community Policing Act also requires that grants be used to supplement, not supplant, state and local funds. In January 1997, the COPS Office began taking steps to increase the level of its monitoring. Eighty-three percent—11,173 grants—of the total grants awarded went to agencies serving populations of fewer than 50,000. About 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations of 150,000 or less, and about 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations exceeding 150,000, as the Community Policing Act required. Table 2 shows the number and amount of the COPS grants (awarded in fiscal years 1995 and 1996) by the type of grant. Figure 3 shows the distribution of community policing grant dollars awarded by each state and Washington, D.C.
We Estimated That 61 Percent of MORE Program Grant Funds Were Spent to Hire Civilian Personnel
Our survey results showed that in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, grantees were awarded an estimated $286 million (plus or minus 3 percent) in MORE program funds to use for purchases of technology and equipment, hiring of support personnel, and/or payment of law enforcement officers’ overtime. According to our survey, MORE grantees had spent an estimated $90.1 million in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, a little less than one-third of the $286 million in MORE funds they were awarded. About 31 percent of the funds went for the purchase of technology and/or equipment, primarily computers, and about 8 percent was spent on overtime for law enforcement officers. Distributions of MORE program grant expenditures were heavily influenced by the expenditures of one large jurisdiction, the New York City Police Department. This police department was awarded about one-third of the total amount of MORE grant funds awarded and had spent about one-half of all MORE grant funds expended nationwide. New Officers and Redeployments to Community Policing Count Toward the Goal of 100,000 New Officers on the Street
As of June 1997, a total of 30,155 law enforcement officer positions funded by COPS grants were estimated by the COPS Office to be on the street. COPS Office estimates of the numbers of new community policing officers on the street were based on three funding sources: (1) officers on board as a result of COPS hiring grants; (2) officers redeployed to community policing as a result of time savings achieved through technology and equipment purchases, hiring of civilian personnel, and/or law enforcement officers’ overtime funded by the MORE grant program; and (3) officers funded under the Police Hiring Supplement Program, which was in place before the COPS grant program. This number was less than 3 percent of the 11,434 hiring grants awarded during the 2-year period. The 293 special agency grantees applied most frequently to use officers hired with the COPS funds to (1) write strategic plans for community policing, (2) provide community policing training for citizens and/or law enforcement officers, (3) meet regularly with community groups, and (4) develop neighborhood watch programs and antiviolence programs. To determine how the COPS Office monitored the use of grants it awarded, we reviewed documentation on monitoring procedures and interviewed officials about actions taken and planned. To determine the process the COPS Office used to calculate the number of officers on the street, we interviewed officials and reviewed documentation on how calculations were made. To describe funding distributions and uses of COPS hiring grants in special law enforcement agencies, we used a data collection instrument to review the COPS Office’s grant application files of hiring grants accepted by special law enforcement agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Justice Office of Community Policing Services (COPS) grant program, focusing on: (1) Justice's implementation of the Community Policing Act with special attention to statutory requirements for implementing the COPS grants; (2) how COPS monitored the use of grants it awarded; (3) the distribution of COPS grants nationwide by population size of jurisdiction served, by type of grant, and by state; (4) how law enforcement agencies used grants under the COPS Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) grant program; (5) the process the COPS office used to calculate the number of officers on the street; and (6) the funding distributions and uses of COPS hiring grants by special law enforcement agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under the Community Policing Act, grants are generally available to any law enforcement agency that can demonstrate a public safety need; demonstrate an inability to address the need without a grant; and, in most instances, contribute a 25-percent match of the federal share of the grant; (2) to achieve the goal of increasing the number of community policing officers, the law required that grants be used to supplement, not supplant, state and local funds; (3) the COPS Office provided limited monitoring of the grants during the period GAO reviewed; however, the office was taking steps to increase its level of monitoring; (4) about 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations of 150,000 or less, and about 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations exceeding 150,000, as the Community Policing Act required; (5) about $286 million, or 11 percent of the total grant dollars awarded in fiscal years (FY) 1995 and 1996, were awarded under the MORE grant program; (6) according to the results of a survey GAO did of a representative national sample of those receiving grants under the COPS MORE grant program in FY 1995 and 1996, grantees had spent an estimated $90.1 million, or a little less than one-third of the funds they were awarded; (7) they spent about 61 percent of these funds to hire civilian personnel, about 31 percent to purchase technology or equipment, and about 8 percent on overtime payments for law enforcement officers; (8) the distributions of MORE program grant expenditures were heavily influenced by the expenditures of the New York City Police Department, which spent about one-half of all the MORE program grant funds expended nationwide; (9) to calculate its progress toward achieving the goal of 100,000 new community policing officers on the street as a result of its grants, the COPS Office did telephone surveys of grantees; (10) as of June 1997, the COPS Office estimated that a total of 30,155 law enforcement officer positions funded by COPS grants were on the street; (11) according to the results of GAO's review of COPS Office files, special law enforcement agencies were awarded 329 community policing hiring grants in FY 1995 and 1996--less than 3 percent of the total hiring grants awarded; and (12) special agency grantees applied most frequently to use officers hired with the COPS funds to write strategic plans, work with community groups, and provide community policing training to officers and citizens. |
gao_AIMD-97-7 | gao_AIMD-97-7_0 | To illustrate how substitution works, if states use federal funds to replace state spending on a dollar-for-dollar basis, then federally aided state services would remain at pre-grant levels—in which case the fiscal impact of the additional federal dollar on the intended program is zero. In practice, substitution effects are not this extreme; total state spending rises upon receiving federal grant funds—but by less than the full amount of the grant because states reduce their own spending for the area. In addition to this statistical analysis, our examination of substitution and targeting included (1) a comprehensive review of over 120 journal articles, reports, and econometric studies on substitution, targeting, and grant design factors related to both, (2) a synthesis of 50 econometric studies of federal grants, culminating in the development of point and range estimates of fiscal impact overall as well as for different time periods and grant designs, (3) a review of 23 GAO reports on options to achieve greater targeting in specific formula grant programs, and (4) an analysis of grants for design features associated with substitution and targeting. Grant Design Influences Fiscal Substitution
The economic literature we reviewed suggested that three types of grant design features affect the likelihood that states will use federal funds to supplement, rather than replace, their own spending. The first type of feature concerns the extent to which grant purposes are restricted. Therefore, the federal grants simply displaced, rather than supplemented, local spending. About half the 87 largest grants, representing 30 percent of the funds for those programs, did not require state matching. We examined whether existing federal grant allocations can be justified on the grounds that they provide budgetary relief to fiscally stressed states.We found that, controlling for differences in programmatic needs, grant allocations to states were not significantly higher for states with relatively fewer fiscal resources. Observations
Our analysis suggests that most grants are designed neither to reduce substitution nor to target funding to states with relatively greater programmatic needs and fewer fiscal resources. Others might argue that if the provision of fiscal relief is to be the primary goal of the federal grant system, then this relief should be allocated in a manner that allows for adequate oversight and control by the Congress. Notwithstanding the importance policymakers may place on providing states with fiscal relief, the question remains as to whether the federal government can afford this approach and still accomplish objectives of national importance in an era of increasingly scarce federal resources. Taking one path, the Congress could consider redesigning grants to reduce substitution and increase targeting. Also, if formula grants were redesigned to include a combination of targeting factors, a larger share of federal aid could be allocated to those states and communities with relatively greater programmatic needs and fewer fiscal resources. Accordingly, the Congress may decide that such programs no longer represent the best use of scarce federal resources. Such reductions could be used either to cut the deficit or invest in other federal programs that the Congress judges to be more cost-effective. However, because the evidence on whether states would replace reductions in federal grant funds is inconclusive, and because replacing federal funds would mean reductions to other state programs or increases in state taxes, the Congress would need to consider the costs and benefits of individual programs carefully in selecting which programs to reduce or eliminate. Scope and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which the federal grant system succeeds in two fiscal objectives often cited by public finance experts. First, do grants succeed in encouraging states to use federal dollars to supplement rather than replace their own spending on nationally important activities? 7-16. 3-6. 15-29. Chapter 13, “Grants-in-Aid System,” Economics of State and Local Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the federal grant-in-aid system from the perspective of fiscal impact, focusing on the extent to which the federal grant system succeeds in: (1) encouraging states to use federal dollars to supplement rather than replace their own spending on nationally important activities; and (2) targeting grant funding to states with relatively greater programmatic needs and fewer fiscal resources.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) for the most part, the federal grant system does not encourage states to use federal dollars to supplement rather than replace their own spending on nationally important activities; (2) grants are unlikely to supplement completely a state's own spending; (3) GAO's review and analysis of economists' most recent estimates of substitution suggests that every additional federal grant dollar results in less than a dollar of total additional spending on the aided activity; (4) with the responsibilities of states increasing in the federal system, some observers may view this substitution as a legitimate means of providing states fiscal relief and budgetary flexibility; (5) the Congress has various criteria available to address how such relief should be allocated among the states; (6) GAO's analysis of the extent to which the fiscal relief provided by grants is allocated to states with relatively greater programmatic needs and fewer fiscal resources indicated that federal aid is not targeted to offset these fiscal imbalances; (7) GAO's analysis also suggested that the practice of placing constraints in grant formulas to assure all states a minimum amount of funding has contributed to this lack of targeting; (8) these fiscal substitution and targeting results reflect the way in which most of the 633 federal grants GAO examined are designed; (9) a majority of the 87 largest grant programs did not include features to encourage states to use federal funds to supplement rather than replace their own spending; (10) a number of strategies for increasing the fiscal impact of grants are available to the Congress, depending on the value the Congress places on this goal relative to other grant goals and objectives; (11) grant redesign is one strategy for reducing substitution or targeting fiscal relief to states with greater fiscal stress; (12) in redesigning grants, the Congress would need to consider how best to balance grant restrictions needed to reduce substitution against possible decreases in state budgetary flexibility and discretion; (13) if states do not share the federal government's programmatic objectives, high levels of substitution may occur even after design changes; (14) alternatively, the Congress could decide that particular programs no longer represent the best use of scarce federal resources, which would free up budgetary resources that could be used to reduce the deficit or invest in more promising programs; (15) like the first strategy, grant spending cuts also involve tradeoffs; and (16) depending on the size and area of the reductions, states would incur varying degrees of budgetary stress and might face the prospect of increased state taxes, cuts in state programs, or some combination of both. |
gao_T-RCED-96-137 | gao_T-RCED-96-137_0 | EPA’s removal cleanups include (1) emergency removals for threats requiring immediate action, (2) time-critical removals for threats requiring action within 6 months, and (3) NTC removals for threats where action can be delayed for at least 6 months in order to adequately plan for cleanups. Also, using these removals could shift a portion of the cleanup costs from the states to EPA. NTC Removals Save Time and Money and Improve Environmental Protection
According to the site managers EPA surveyed, using the NTC program instead of the remedial program reduced the overall time spent on cleaning up portions of sites from about 4 years to 2 years, on average. In many cases, larger savings have been reported. NTC Removals Have Potential Disadvantages
While NTC removals demonstrate valuable benefits, they may also present some disadvantages, including the need for more staff time to monitor NTC cleanups, less ability for EPA to enforce cleanup agreements with private parties, and a potential for states to decrease their funding of a portion of the cleanup costs. Several Factors Constrain the Use of NTC Removals
Several factors have constrained the use of NTC removals, including the difficulty regions encounter in funding these actions and the current statutory limits on the time and costs that can be spent on NTC removals. Of this percentage, most must go to fund the hundreds of emergency and time-critical removals that regions conduct, leaving little for NTC removals. Proposed legislation to reauthorize Superfund, H.R. 2500 and S. 1285, would raise the limits on removals and relax the consistency requirements. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) use of non-time-critical removals for hazardous waste cleanups, focusing on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of non-time-critical removals; (2) the potential use of non-time-critical removals in Superfund cleanups; and (3) factors that inhibit the use of non-time-critical removals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on average the use of non-time-critical removals could expedite environmental cleanups by 2 years and reduce costs by about $500,000 over similar cleanup actions using the remedial removal process; (2) non-time-critical removals are successful because they have a streamlined planning process; (3) non-time-critical removals would require EPA to spend more time overseeing cleanup contracts and shift costs from states to EPA; (4) non-time-critical removals are a potentially useful tool in cleaning up portions of most of the 3,000 sites in the EPA Superfund inventory; (5) non-time-critical removals have not been used for a wide variety of cleanups because most Superfund funding has been spent on emergency removals; (6) additional factors that have limited non-time-critical removal use include EPA inability to shift funds between accounts and regions, and statutory limits on the duration and cost of non-time-critical removals; and (7) the proposed Superfund reauthorization legislation would ease the statutory limitations on non-time-critical removals. |
gao_GAO-16-765T | gao_GAO-16-765T_0 | See figure 3. FAA’s primary means of authorizing space launch activities is through its licensing process which includes: licensing launch and reentry vehicle operations, reviewing applications for experimental permits, reviewing safety approvals, and conducting safety inspections and oversight of licensed and permitted activities, among other activities. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry Has Expanded in Recent Years
As we reported in our 2015 report, during the last decade, U.S. companies conducted fewer orbital commercial launches in total than companies in Russia or Europe, which are among the main foreign competitors. In 2015, U.S. companies conducted more orbital launches than companies in Russia, which conducted five, or Europe, which conducted six. In 2015 we found that a number of factors are responsible for the recent expansion of the U.S. commercial space launch industry. Third, the emerging space tourism industry and small satellite industry in the United States also may help the U.S. commercial space launch industry expand. FAA Faces Multiple Challenges Regarding Developments in the Commercial Space Launch Industry and Requested Additional Resources to Address Some Challenges
Challenges
In our 2015 report, we asked FAA officials, representatives from nine commercial space launch companies, and three experts to identify the challenges that FAA faces—and is likely to face in the near future—to address significant developments in the commercial space launch industry over the last decade. The challenges for FAA that they identified included: (1) determining whether and when to regulate the safety of crew and spaceflight participants and (2) handling an increased workload relating to licensing and permitting launches and launch sites. In addition, in our 2015 report, we noted that changes in the number and types of commercial space launches could affect the government’s overall exposure and indemnification for launches. As part of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Congress required FAA in consultation with an industry advisory group—the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee—to submit two reports to Congress on this topic. In the future, FAA also will need to license launches for NASA’s commercial crew program and potentially launches of companies placing small satellites in orbit. For example, Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo, XCOR’s Aerospace’s Lynx, and Blue Origin’s New Shepard are new vehicles. We recommended that FAA review its maximum probable loss methodology. FAA Request for Resources
In 2015 we found that FAA’s budget requests for its commercial space launch activities generally were based on the number of projected launches, but that in recent years the actual number of launches was much lower than FAA’s projections. According to FAA officials, more detailed information was not provided in their budget submissions because the agency lacked certain workload metrics regarding its commercial space launch oversight activities. We also found that the Office of Commercial Space Transportation did not track the amount of time spent on the office’s various activities. To provide Congress with more information about the resources requested to address developments in the commercial space launch industry, we recommended that FAA provide more detailed information in its budget submissions about its workload. FAA has taken steps to implement our recommendation. In the 2017 budget submission, FAA provided workload indices based on the number of authorizations which the agency uses to authorize companies to conduct one or more launches, the number of licenses and permits, the number of on-site inspections as part of licensing launch sites, and staffing levels since fiscal year 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. commercial space launch industry has changed considerably since the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. FAA is required to license or permit commercial space launches; however, to allow space tourism to develop, the act prohibited FAA from regulating crew and spaceflight participant safety before 2012—a moratorium that was extended to 2023. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, enacted in November 2015, addressed other aspects of the commercial space launch industry.
This testimony summarizes and updates findings from GAO's 2015 report, specifically industry developments and FAA challenges, including FAA's launch licensing workload and budget. For its 2015 report, GAO reviewed FAA's guidance on its launch permit, licensing, and safety oversight activities; interviewed FAA officials, industry stakeholders, and experts who were selected on the basis of their knowledge of FAA's oversight of the commercial space launch industry; and visited spaceports where two 2014 launch mishaps occurred. To update this information GAO reviewed FAA information on the industry and FAA's budget request.
What GAO Found
In 2015, GAO reported that during the last decade, U.S. commercial space launch companies conducted fewer orbital launches in total than companies in Russia or Europe, which are among their main foreign competitors. However, the U.S. commercial space launch industry has expanded recently. In 2015, U.S. companies conducted eight orbital launches, compared with none in 2011. In addition, in 2015, U.S. companies conducted more orbital launches than companies in Russia, which conducted five, or Europe, which conducted six.
In 2015, GAO reported that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—which is responsible for protecting the public with respect to commercial space launches, including licensing and permitting launches—faces challenges. According to FAA officials and industry stakeholders, FAA faces an increasing workload licensing and permitting launches for transporting cargo, and in the future, crew for NASA's commercial space programs, space tourism, and potentially launching small satellites. FAA also faces the challenges of whether and when to regulate the safety of crew and spaceflight participants—in 2015 Congress extended the moratorium to 2023—and overseeing new types of vehicles and technologies. (See figure for commercial space launch vehicles.) Challenges also include updating FAA's method to calculate maximum probable loss—the amount above which the federal government indemnifies the industry for catastrophic loss.
Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo and SpaceX's Falcon 9
GAO reported in 2015 that FAA's budget requests for its commercial space launch activities generally were based on the number of projected launches, but that in recent years the actual number of launches was much lower than FAA's projections. GAO also reported that, according to FAA officials, more detailed information was not provided in FAA's budget submissions because the agency lacked information on its workload overseeing commercial space launch activities. In addition, GAO reported that the Office of Commercial Space Transportation did not track the amount of time spent on various activities. FAA has taken steps to implement GAO's recommendation that it provide more detailed information in its budget submissions regarding commercial space transportation activities. In its 2017 budget submission, FAA provided workload indices regarding authorizations under which companies conduct one or more launches; on-site inspections; licensing of spaceports; and staffing levels since 2006.Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Recommends
In 2015, GAO recommended that FAA, in its budget submissions, provide more detailed information about the Office of Commercial Space Transportation's workload. FAA agreed with the recommendation. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-07-1152T | gao_GAO-07-1152T_0 | The Department of State is the U.S. agency primarily responsible for leading U.S. efforts toward achieving equitable U.S. employment representation in UN organizations. U.S. Citizens Were Underrepresented Relative to Targets at Three UN Agencies
Relative to UN agencies’ formal or informal targets for equitable geographic representation, U.S. citizens were underrepresented at three of the five agencies we reviewed–IAEA, UNESCO, and UNHCR. U.S. citizens were equitably represented at the UN Secretariat, though at the lower end of its target range, while the fifth agency–UNDP–had not established a target for U.S. representation. U.S. citizens filled about 11 percent of UNDP’s professional positions. Increased Hiring of Americans Needed to Meet Several UN Agencies’ Minimum Targets
We estimated that each of the four agencies with geographic targets–the Secretariat, IAEA, UNESCO, and UNHCR–would need to hire U.S. citizens in greater numbers than they had in recent years to achieve their minimum targets by 2010, given projected staff levels, retirements, and separations; otherwise, with the exception of UNESCO, U.S. geographic representation will decline further. These barriers combined with distinct agency-specific factors to impede recruitment and retention. Representation at Several UN Agencies
We identified the following six barriers that affected U.S. representation in the UN agencies we reviewed, though often to differing degrees: Nontransparent human resource practices. Recruiting U.S. candidates was difficult because agencies offered a limited number of posts to external candidates. Lengthy hiring process. Low or unclear compensation. Required mobility or rotation. Limited U.S. government support. For example, Candidates serving in professional positions funded by their member governments were more likely to be hired by the Secretariat than those who took the Secretariat’s entry-level exam; however, the United States had not funded such positions at the Secretariat. Representation, but Additional Options Exist to Target Professional Positions
State targeted its recruitment efforts for senior and policy-making UN positions, and, although it was difficult to directly link State’s efforts to UN hiring decisions, U.S. representation in these positions either improved or displayed no trend in the five UN agencies we reviewed. State also increased its efforts to improve overall U.S. representation; however, despite these efforts, U.S. representation in entry-level positions declined or did not reflect a trend in four of the five UN agencies. Additional options exist to target potential pools of candidates for these positions. Although it is difficult to directly link State’s efforts to UN hiring decisions, the percentage of U.S. representation in senior and policymaking positions either increased or did not display a trend at each of the five UN agencies we reviewed between 2001 and 2005. According to State, the other staff have been recruiting candidates for professional positions at career fairs and other venues; however, a large portion of their work has been focused on providing information to potential applicants and disseminating information on UN vacancies and opportunities. State prepares annual reports to Congress that provide data on U.S. employment at UN agencies as well as State’s assessment of U.S. representation at selected UN organizations and these organizations’ efforts to hire more Americans. Finally, State has increased coordination with U.S. agencies. Expanding marketing and outreach activities. Analyzing the costs and benefits of sponsoring JPOs. As the lead department in charge of U.S. government efforts to promote equitable American representation at the UN, State will continue to face a number of barriers to increasing the employment of Americans at these organizations, most of which are outside the U.S. government’s control. Because equitable representation of Americans employed at UN organizations has been a high priority for U.S. interests, we recommended that the Secretary of State take the following actions: provide more consistent and comprehensive information about UN employment on the State and U.S. mission Web sites and work with U.S. agencies to expand the UN employment information on their Web sites. This could include identifying options for developing a benefits calculator that would enable applicants to better estimate their potential total compensation based on their individual circumstances; expand targeted recruiting and outreach to more strategically reach populations of Americans that may be qualified for and interested in entry- and mid-level UN positions; and conduct an evaluation of the costs, benefits, and trade-offs of: maintaining a roster of qualified candidates for professional and senior positions determined to be a high priority for U.S. interests; funding Junior Professional Officers, or other gratis personnel, where Americans are underrepresented or in danger of becoming underrepresented. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses ways to improve the representation of American professionals at United Nations (UN) organizations. The U.S. Congress continues to be concerned about the underrepresentation of American professionals employed by some UN organizations and that insufficient progress has been made to improve U.S. representation. The equitable representation of Americans at UN organizations is a priority to Congress in part because the United States is the largest financial contributor to most of these organizations. Moreover, according to the U.S. Department of State (State), Americans bring desirable skills, values, and experience that can have a significant impact on UN organizations' operational effectiveness. This testimony is based on a report that we issued on September 6, 2006. This testimoney will discuss (1) U.S. representation status and employment trends at five UN organizations, (2) factors affecting these organizations' ability to meet U.S. representation targets, and (3) State's efforts to improve U.S. representation and additional efforts that can be taken.
What GAO Found
The United States was underrepresented in three of the five UN agencies we reviewed, and increased hiring of U.S. citizens is needed to meet agreed-upon employment targets. Based on UN agencies' formal or informal targets for equitable geographic representation, U.S. citizens were underrepresented at IAEA, UNESCO, and UNHCR, and equitably represented at the UN Secretariat, though close to the lower end of its target range. UNDP had not established a target for U.S. representation, although U.S. citizens filled about 11 percent of the agency's professional positions. Given projected staff levels, retirements, and separations for 2006 to 2010, the Secretariat, IAEA, UNESCO, and UNHCR would need to hire more Americans than they have hired in recent years to meet their minimum targets for equitable U.S. representation in 2010. Summary While the UN agencies we reviewed faced some common barriers to recruiting and retaining professional staff, including Americans, they also faced distinct challenges. Most of these barriers and challenges were outside of the U.S. government's control. Six barriers common to UN agencies we reviewed included nontransparent human resource practices; a limited number of positions open to external candidates; lengthy hiring processes; comparatively low or unclear compensation; required staff mobility and rotation policies; and limited U.S. government support during Americans' efforts to obtain, or be promoted at, a UN job. These barriers combined with distinct agency-specific factors to impede recruitment and retention. For example, candidates serving in professional positions funded by their member governments were more likely to be hired by the Secretariat than those who took the Secretariat's entry-level exam; however, the United States had not funded such positions at the Secretariat. In addition, IAEA had difficulty attracting U.S. employees because the number of U.S. nuclear specialists was decreasing. State has increased its efforts to support the goal of achieving equitable U.S. representation at UN organizations, and additional options exist to target professional positions. State has targeted efforts to recruit U.S. candidates for senior and policymaking UN positions, and, although it was difficult to directly link State's efforts to UN hiring decisions, U.S. representation in senior and policymaking positions either improved or did not reflect a trend in each of the five UN agencies we reviewed. State also has undertaken several efforts to improve overall U.S. representation, including adding staff to its UN employment office and increasing coordination with other U.S. agencies that work with UN organizations. For positions below the senior level, State focused on "getting the word out" by, for example, disseminating information on UN vacancies through its Web site, attending career fairs and conferences, and other means. Despite these efforts, U.S. representation in entry-level positions declined or did not display a trend in four of the five UN agencies we reviewed. Additional options to target potential pools of candidates for professional positions include: maintaining a roster of qualified American candidates; expanding marketing and outreach activities; increasing UN employment information on U.S. agency Web sites; and conducting an assessment of the costs and benefits of sponsoring Junior Professional Officers (JPO), who are entry-level employees that are financially supported by their home government. |
gao_PEMD-96-16 | gao_PEMD-96-16_0 | Insofar as a number of extraordinary expenses were incurred in fiscal 1995, CDC officials anticipate that final survey costs will decrease in fiscal 1996 and future years. For the calendar year 1994 survey, contractors estimated that the overall response rate was 69.5 percent. Identification of Pockets of Need
CDC officials have indicated that they view identification of pockets of children in need of more timely immunization as a state responsibility rather than a federal one. Instead, the primary objectives CDC has for the NIS have been monitoring state progress in achieving childhood immunization objectives, permitting comparison of current coverage rates across states, and awarding incentive funds available to CDC grantees based on their immunization of certain percentages of preschool children. First, of the appropriation that it has requested for fiscal 1997, CDC has requested $16 million for the survey and its administration. Second, the NIS does not provide useful quarterly measurements of statewide immunization levels, and even annual estimates may not be suitable for monitoring the level of annual change that is likely to occur in immunization coverage. Insofar as this indicator is not linked to any specific component of the unique set of immunization initiatives pursued by a particular CDC grantee, it is not surprising that it is not useful in helping states to diagnose problems in their ongoing activities, target their efforts, or design interventions. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. CDC has acknowledged that the NIS does not identify pockets of children in need of more timely immunization, and most state immunization program managers have told us that the NIS does not help them in targeting their efforts or designing interventions, although it does relieve them of CDC’s previous requirement that they collect statewide coverage data on their own. 6. 7. 13. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Immunization Survey (NIS), focusing on: (1) survey costs; (2) survey methods; and (3) use in identifying groups of children in need of more timely immunization.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) CDC designed NIS for monitoring state progress in achieving child immunization objectives, comparing coverage rates across states, and awarding incentive funds; (2) CDC estimates and contractor invoices indicate that NIS costs for fiscal year (FY) 1995, including extraordinary expenses incurred when 1994 survey participants were reinterviewed, were about $13 million; (3) although CDC anticipates that survey costs will decrease in the future, it has requested $16 million for NIS administration for FY 1997; (4) the two-phase survey methodology, which gathers information by telephone from households and immunization providers, excludes households that lack a telephone, may not accurately represent the overall population, and is limited by response accuracy; (5) NIS has not achieved sufficient precision in its survey estimates to detect modest changes that occur in most coverage levels; (6) CDC considers the identification of groups of children in need of more timely immunization as a state rather than a federal responsibility and has not designed and does not use NIS to make such identifications; and (7) interviews with state officials indicate that NIS is not useful in helping states to diagnose problems in immunization activities, target efforts, or design interventions. |
gao_NSIAD-99-52 | gao_NSIAD-99-52_0 | Over the years, barracks construction standards have changed to provide for increased space and privacy. Status of the 1+1 Barracks Program
With the exception of the Marine Corps, the services have embraced the 1+1 design standard and began building new and renovating older barracks in accordance with the standard in fiscal year 1996. As shown in table 1, through fiscal year 1999, about $1.5 billion in funding was approved for 124 barracks projects designed to provide over 29,000 barracks spaces meeting the 1+1 design standard. According to service officials, the plans generally call for (1) eliminating barracks with central latrines primarily through construction of new 1+1 barracks, (2) providing members with increased privacy and approximating the 1+1 standard in existing barracks by assigning one member to rooms originally designed for two members or two persons to rooms originally designed for three persons, (3) constructing new 1+1 barracks to meet existing barracks shortages and to regain capacity lost when fewer members are assigned to existing rooms, and (4) replacing existing barracks at the end of their economic life with new 1+1 barracks. DOD’s Justification for Adopting the 1+1 Standard
DOD primarily justified the adoption of the 1+1 barracks design standard in 1995 as an investment in quality of life aimed at improving readiness, retention, and motivation of a professional, all-volunteer armed force. We also agree that improved barracks enhance individual quality of life. However, to what extent is unknown because quality of life is inherently difficult to quantify. Even with existing barracks conditions, the services have met most retention goals over the past 3 fiscal years. In the one instance, the Air Force missed its first-term retention goal by 1 percentage point in fiscal year 1998. Further, information collected from members that do not reenlist has shown that factors other than housing, such as pay and promotion opportunities, are usually cited as the reasons members leave the military. The comparison showed significant cost differences among the designs. Specifically, because of the increased isolation provided in private sleeping rooms, the Marine Corps believes that the 1+1 standard does not allow for the unit cohesion and team building needed to reinforce Corps values and develop a stronger bond among junior Marines. These officials also noted that the Marine Corps’ first-term retention goals are significantly lower than the goals of the other services. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested, we reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) barracks program in the United States to (1) determine the status of the services’ implementation of the 1+1 barracks design standard; (2) document DOD’s rationale for adopting the standard; (3) determine the costs of alternatives to the 1+1 standard; and (4) obtain service views of the impact of the standard from a team-building, individual isolation, or similar perspective. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) barracks program in the United States, focusing on: (1) the status of the services' implementation of the 1 plus 1 barracks design standard, which calls for more space and increased privacy in new barracks; (2) DOD's rationale for adopting the standard; (3) the costs of alternatives for the 1 plus 1 standard; and (4) service views of the impact of the standard from a team-building, individual isolation, or similar perspective.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) except for the Marine Corps, the services embraced the 1 plus 1 barracks design standard and in fiscal year (FY) 1996 began building new and renovating older barracks to conform to the new standard; (2) in fiscal years 1996-99, about $1.5 billion in funding was approved for 124 military construction projects designed to provide over 29,000 barracks spaces meeting the 1 plus 1 design standard; (3) also, to provide increased privacy in existing barracks over a phased time period, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force plan to assign one member to existing rooms designed for two members and two members to existing rooms designed for three members; (4) when required, the barracks capacity lost through this practice will be regained through construction of new 1 plus 1 barracks; (5) in lieu of the 1 plus 1 design, the Marine Corps is building new barracks with two-person sleeping rooms for junior Marines; (6) DOD justified the adoption of the 1 plus 1 standard primarily as an investment in quality of life aimed at improving military readiness and retention; (7) although barracks improvements do enhance individuals' quality of life, to what degree is unknown because quality of life is inherently difficult to quantify; (8) DOD has not developed any direct, quantitative evidence showing that barracks improvements, as distinct from other factors, result in improved readiness and retention; (9) even with existing barracks conditions, the services have achieved their first-term retention goals for the past 3 fiscal years with only one exception; (10) in FY 1998, the Air Force missed its first-term retention goal by one percentage point; (11) information collected from members that do not reenlist has shown that many factors other than housing, such as pay and promotion opportunities, are usually cited as the reasons for leaving the military; (12) GAO's comparison of barracks construction costs associated with alternative design standards showed significant differences in the amount of funds that would be required over and above what has already been funded; (13) because of the isolation provided in private rooms, the Marine Corps believes the 1 plus 1 standard does not allow for the unit cohesion and team building needed to reinforce Marine Corps values and develop a stronger bond among Junior Marines; and (14) the other services believe that the 1 plus 1 standard does not include these negative aspects because the standard applies only to permanent party personnel, not to recruits or initial trainees. |
gao_GAO-11-292 | gao_GAO-11-292_0 | Therefore, these officials told us that it is important to manage idle wells so that they do not become orphan wells. First, the bond adequacy policy directs BLM offices to review bonds and increase amounts as necessary to ensure, among other things, that the bond amount reflects the risk posed by the operator. BLM’s Idle and Orphan Well Policy Directs Field Offices to Review These Wells and Ensure They Are Either Plugged or Returned to Production
By issuing IM 2007-192 in September 2007, BLM established a program to rank all idle and orphan oil and gas wells on federal land, as required by EPAct 2005. Sensitive environmental resources and other land use priorities. BLM Has Not Consistently or Completely Implemented Its Policies for Managing Potential Liability
BLM field and state offices have not consistently or completely implemented BLM’s policies for managing the oil and gas wells on federal land to reduce the likelihood that BLM will need to pay for or perform reclamation. BLM Field Offices Have Not Always Conducted Bond Adequacy Reviews and Have Not Consistently Interpreted Criteria for Increasing Bonds
According to our analysis of the number of bond reviews reported by 33 survey respondents, the field offices do not always regularly review bonds and increase bond amounts as necessary. BLM policy calls for field offices to conduct a bond adequacy review when certain events occur. For example, 13 of the 33 survey respondents reported that they either did not conduct any reviews or did not know the number of reviews they conducted for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. For example, the Vernal Field Office did not conduct any bond adequacy reviews during this period. The criteria for increases outlined in IM 2008-122 are vague, creating ambiguity about whether a request for an increase should be submitted and whether it will be approved. BLM Data Limitations Restrict the Agency’s Ability to Evaluate Potential Liability and Measure Performance
We identified three limitations in BLM’s data systems that restrict the ability of BLM field and state offices to evaluate potential liability and measure performance of BLM field offices’ implementation of the agency’s policies: (1) incomplete bond information in AFMSS, (2) unreliable field office counts of the number of idle wells, and (3) incomplete AFMSS data on the number of reviews for bond adequacy and idle wells. Unreliable Counts of the Number of Idle Wells
The 33 BLM field offices that responded to our survey reported a total of about 2,300 idle wells that had been inactive for 7 years or more as of fiscal year 2009. Because minimum bond amounts have not been updated or adjusted for inflation in more than 50 years, they may not be sufficient to serve as an incentive to encourage operators to comply with plugging and reclamation requirements and the cost to plug and reclaim a well site may far outweigh the value of the bond. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better manage potential liability on federal land, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to develop a comprehensive strategy to include four actions: increasing regulatory minimum bonding amounts over time to strengthen bonding as a tool for ensuring operators’ compliance, revising the bond adequacy review policy to more clearly define terms and the conditions that warrant a bond increase, implementing an approach for ensuring complete and consistent well records in AFMSS so that BLM field and state offices can better evaluate potential liability and improve decisionmaking, and implementing an approach for better monitoring agency performance in conducting reviews for bond adequacy and idle wells. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
GAO provided Interior with a draft of this report for its review and comment. Interior concurred with all four of our recommendations and noted that, among other things, it has already started to take steps to improve the data in AFMSS to ensure the completeness and accuracy of these data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to examine the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) policies and efforts to ensure that the bonds for oil and gas wells are adequate to cover the cost of reclaiming land disturbed by oil and gas operations. Specifically, we were asked to (1) identify BLM’s policies for managing potential federal oil and gas liabilities, (2) determine the extent to which BLM has implemented these policies, and (3) describe the challenges, if any, BLM faces in managing potential oil and gas well liability. We developed a Web-based survey, which we sent to all 48 BLM field offices with an oil and gas program and received responses from all these offices. To identify the challenges BLM faces in managing potential liabilities, we analyzed the information officials in the 16 BLM field offices and the corresponding six state offices provided during our interviews on what challenges they face, if any, in implementing BLM policies for managing the potential liability on federal land; whether they had sufficient tools and resources to implement the policies; and what their views were on BLM’s bonding system and minimum bonding amounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of oil and gas wells on leased federal land has increased dramatically. To help manage the environmental impacts of these wells, the Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Land Management (BLM) requires oil and gas operators to reclaim disturbed land in a manner it prescribes. To help ensure operators reclaim leased land, BLM requires them to provide a bond before beginning drilling operations. BLM refers to oil and gas wells and leased land that will require reclamation as potential liabilities because BLM may have to pay for reclamation if the operators fail to do so. GAO was asked to determine (1) BLM's policies for managing potential federal oil and gas well liability, (2) the extent to which BLM has implemented these policies, and (3) the challenges, if any, BLM faces in managing potential oil and gas well liability. GAO analyzed agency data on bonding and wells and interviewed BLM officials. We surveyed all 48 BLM field offices with an oil and gas program, and received 33 responses covering these offices.
What GAO Found
To manage potential liability on federal land, BLM has developed policies for reviewing bond adequacy and for managing idle wells (wells that have not produced for at least 7 years) and orphan wells (wells that generally have no responsible or liable parties). The bond adequacy policy is intended to ensure that bonds are regularly reviewed by BLM field offices when certain events occur, or periodically, and increased as necessary to ensure that they reflect the level of risk posed by the operator. BLM's idle and orphan well policy is intended to ensure that nonproducing wells are either plugged or returned to production; this policy directs BLM field offices to develop an inventory of such wells and rank and prioritize them for reclamation based on potential environmental harm, among other things. BLM has not consistently implemented its policies for managing potential liabilities. Specifically, for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, GAO found that 13 of the 33 field office survey respondents reported that they either did not conduct any reviews or did not know the number of reviews conducted. Most field office officials told GAO that a lack of resources and higher priorities were the primary reasons for not conducting these reviews. In addition, BLM state offices also did not consistently interpret BLM policy on when to increase bond amounts. For example, officials in three state offices told GAO that they generally require evidence of operator noncompliance before raising a bond amount, while another state office increased bond amounts for most operators because it viewed them as a potential risk to the government. With regard to reviews of idle or orphan wells, 11 of the 33 field office survey respondents reported that they had not conducted any reviews in one or more fiscal years during the 5-year period GAO examined. The shortage of resources was identified by officials as the primary reason that these reviews were not conducted. In addition, 2 BLM state offices and 22 field offices have not created action plans for reviewing bond adequacy and idle and orphan wells, as BLM policies call for. BLM faces two challenges in managing potential liability, according to field office officials. First, its bonding system impairs BLM's ability to manage potential liability. Specifically, the minimum bond amounts--not updated in more than 50 years--may not be sufficient to encourage all operators to comply with reclamation requirements. These officials also stated that criteria in the policy for deciding when to increase a bond is vague, creating ambiguity about whether a request for an increase should be submitted and whether it will be approved. Second, limitations with the data system BLM uses to track oil and gas information on public land restrict the agency's ability to evaluate potential liability and monitor agency performance. For example, the BLM field offices GAO surveyed reported a total of about 2,300 idle wells that had been inactive for 7 years or more as of fiscal year 2009. However, other Interior data indicate that the number of idle wells on federal land is nearly double the amount reported by the BLM field offices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BLM develop a comprehensive strategy to, among other things, increase minimum bond amounts over time and improve its data system to better evaluate potential liability and agency performance. In commenting on a draft of this report BLM agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted that it has already taken steps to improve the completeness and accuracy of its oil and gas data. |
gao_GAO-08-543T | gao_GAO-08-543T_0 | The Fair Information Practices Are Widely Agreed to Be Key Principles for Privacy Protection
The Privacy Act of 1974 is largely based on a set of internationally recognized principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information known as the Fair Information Practices. Agencies Used Governmentwide Contracts to Obtain Personal Information from Information Resellers for a Variety of Purposes
DOJ, DHS, State, and SSA reported approximately $30 million through contracts with information resellers in fiscal year 2005. In all, approximately 91 percent of agency uses of reseller data were in the categories of law enforcement (69 percent) or counterterrorism (22 percent). DHS and its components reported that they used information reseller data in fiscal year 2005 primarily for law enforcement purposes, such as developing leads on subjects in criminal investigations and detecting fraud in immigration benefit applications (part of enforcing immigration laws). Agencies Lacked Policies on Use of Reseller Data, and Practices Do Not Consistently Reflect the Fair Information Practices
Agencies generally lacked policies that specifically addressed their use of personal information from commercial sources (although DHS Privacy Office officials reported in 2006 that they were drafting such a policy), and agency practices for handling personal information acquired from information resellers did not always fully reflect the Fair Information Practices. This practice is consistent with the principle of data quality. Agency policies and practices with regard to the other four principles were uneven. The inconsistency with which agencies specify resellers as a source of information in system-of-records notices is due in part to ambiguity in OMB guidance, which states that “for systems of records which contain information obtained from sources other than the individual to whom the records pertain, the notice should list the types of sources used.” Although the guidance is unclear as to what would constitute adequate disclosure of “types of sources,” OMB and DHS Privacy Office officials agreed that to the extent that reseller data is subject to the Privacy Act, agencies should specifically identify information resellers as a source and that merely citing public records information does not sufficiently describe the source. Current OMB guidance on conducting PIAs is not always clear about when they should be conducted. This means that agencies should take steps to ensure that they use personal information from information resellers appropriately. Not All Agencies Have Taken Steps to Address our Recommendations
In our report, we recommended that the agencies develop specific policies for the collection, maintenance, and use of personal information obtained from resellers. We also recommended that OMB revise its privacy guidance to clarify the applicability of requirements for public notices and privacy impact assessments to agency use of personal information from resellers and direct agencies to review their uses of such information to ensure it is explicitly referenced in privacy notices and assessments. The agencies generally agreed with our findings and described actions initiated to address our recommendations. For example, the DHS Privacy Office incorporated specific questions in its May 2007 PIA guidance concerning use of commercial data. Further, the guidance for systems that use or rely on commercial data requires an explanation of how data accuracy and integrity are preserved and the reliability of the data assessed with regard to its value to the purpose of the system. Privacy Provisions of the Proposed Federal Agency Data Protection Act are Consistent with Our Recommendations
The Federal Agency Data Protection Act was introduced on December 18, 2007. We believe these provisions are consistent with the results and recommendations contained in our 2006 report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies collect and use personal information for various purposes from information resellers--companies that amass and sell data from many sources. GAO was asked to testify on its April 2006 report on agency use of reseller data. For that report, GAO was asked to determine how the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration used personal data from resellers and to review the extent to which agencies' policies and practices for handling this information reflected the Fair Information Practices, a set of widely accepted principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal data. GAO was also asked to provide an update on the implementation status of its recommendations and to comment on provisions of the proposed Federal Agency Data Protection Act. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied primarily on its April 2006 report.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2005, the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration reported that they used personal information obtained from resellers for a variety of purposes, including performing criminal investigations, locating witnesses and fugitives, researching assets held by individuals of interest, and detecting prescription drug fraud. The agencies planned spending approximately $30 million on contractual arrangements with resellers that enabled the acquisition and use of such information. About 91 percent of the planned fiscal year 2005 spending was for law enforcement (69 percent) or counterterrorism (22 percent). Agency practices for handling personal information acquired from information resellers did not always fully reflect the Fair Information Practices. That is, for some of these principles, agency practices were uneven. For example, although agencies issued public notices when they systematically collected personal information, these notices did not always notify the public that information resellers were among the sources to be used. This practice is not consistent with the principle that individuals should be informed about privacy policies and the collection of information. Contributing to the uneven application of the Fair Information Practices are ambiguities in guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding the applicability of privacy requirements to federal agency uses of reseller information. In addition, agencies generally lacked policies that specifically address these uses. GAO made recommendations to OMB to revise privacy guidance and to the four agencies to develop specific policies for the use of personal information from resellers. The five agencies generally agreed with the report and described actions initiated to address the recommendations. Since GAO issued its report, agencies have taken steps to address the recommendations. For example, the Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office incorporated specific questions in its May 2007 Privacy Impact Assessment guidance concerning use of commercial data. In addition, the Department of Justice took steps to update its public notices to specify their use of data from information resellers. OMB, however, has not implemented GAO's recommendation to clarify guidance on use of commercial data. The Federal Agency Data Protection Act was introduced on December 18, 2007. The legislation, among other things would require that agencies (1) conduct privacy impact assessments for their uses of commercial data, and (2) promulgate regulations concerning the use of commercial data brokers. GAO considers these requirements to be consistent with the results and the recommendations made to the agencies in its 2006 report |
gao_GAO-07-391T | gao_GAO-07-391T_0 | IRS has concerns with the certainty of the tax gap estimate for tax year 2001 in part because some areas of the estimate rely on old data, IRS has no estimates for other areas of the tax gap, and it is inherently difficult to measure some types of noncompliance. IRS’s overall approach to reducing the tax gap consists of improving service to taxpayers and enhancing enforcement of the tax laws. Multiple Approaches Are Needed to Reduce the Tax Gap
No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance and therefore multiple approaches are likely to be needed. Simplifying or reforming the tax code, providing IRS more enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement are three major tax gap reduction approaches discussed in more detail below, but providing quality services to taxpayers plays an important role in improving compliance and reducing the tax gap. Evaluating the results. Optimizing resource allocation. Leveraging technology. Reducing the Tax Gap through Tax Simplification or Tax System Reform Depends on Their Design and May Have Effects Beyond Tax Compliance
Tax law simplification and reform both have the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. For example, IRS’s recent tax gap estimate includes a $32 billion loss in individual income taxes for tax year 2001 because of noncompliance with these provisions. Despite the potential benefits that simplification may yield, these credits and deductions serve purposes that Congress has judged to be important to advance federal goals. Fundamental tax reform would most likely result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few tax preferences or complex tax code provisions and if taxable transactions are transparent. However, these characteristics are difficult to achieve in any system and experience suggests that simply adopting a fundamentally different tax system may not by itself eliminate any tax gap. Providing IRS with Additional Enforcement Tools Potentially Could Improve Compliance Significantly, but Identifying and Designing Such Tools Can Be Challenging
Changing the tax laws to provide IRS with additional enforcement tools, such as expanded tax withholding and information reporting, could also reduce the tax gap by many billions of dollars, particularly with regard to underreporting—the largest segment of the tax gap. Also, withholding and information reporting help IRS to better identify noncompliant taxpayers and prioritize contacting them, which enables IRS to better allocate its resources. However, designing new withholding or information reporting requirements to address underreporting can be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to at least some form of withholding or information reporting, underreporting exists in varied forms, and the requirements could impose costs and burdens on third parties. Devoting Additional Resources to Enforcement Likely Could Reduce the Tax Gap, but to What Extent Is Difficult to Predict
Devoting more resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars, as IRS would be able to expand its enforcement efforts to reach a greater number of potentially noncompliant taxpayers. However, determining the appropriate level of enforcement resources to provide IRS requires taking into account many factors, such as how effectively and efficiently IRS is currently using its resources, how to strike the proper balance between IRS’s taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. If Congress were to provide IRS more enforcement resources, the amount of the tax gap that could be reduced depends in part on the size of any increase in IRS’s budget, how IRS would manage any additional resources, and the indirect increase in taxpayers’ voluntary compliance that would likely result from expanded IRS enforcement. For example, IRS estimated that it contacted about 3 million of the over 13 million taxpayers it identified as potentially noncompliant through its matching of tax returns to information returns. Although additional enforcement funding has the potential to reduce the tax gap, the extent to which it would help depends on several factors. Generally, larger budget increases should result in larger reductions in the tax gap. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax gap--the difference between the tax amounts taxpayers pay voluntarily and on time and what they should pay under the law--has been a long-standing problem in spite of many efforts to reduce it. Most recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated a gross tax gap for tax year 2001 of $345 billion and estimated it would recover $55 billion of this gap, resulting in a net tax gap of $290 billion. When some taxpayers fail to comply, the burden of funding the nation's commitments falls more heavily on compliant taxpayers. Reducing the tax gap would help improve the nation's fiscal stability. For example, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield $3 billion annually. GAO was asked to discuss the tax gap and various approaches to reduce it. This testimony discusses the need for taking multiple approaches and to what extent the tax gap could be reduced through three overall approaches--simplifying or reforming the tax system, providing IRS with additional enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement. This statement is based on prior GAO work.
What GAO Found
Multiple approaches are needed to reduce the tax gap. No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance since, for example, it has multiple causes and spans different types of taxes and taxpayers. Simplifying or reforming the tax code, providing IRS more enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement are three major approaches, but providing quality services to taxpayers also is a necessary foundation for voluntary compliance. Such steps as periodically measuring noncompliance and its causes, setting tax gap reduction goals, evaluating the results of any initiatives to reduce the tax gap, optimizing the allocation of IRS's resources, and leveraging technology to enhance IRS's efficiency would also contribute to tax gap reduction. Simplifying the tax code or fundamental tax reform has the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. IRS has estimated that errors in claiming tax credits and deductions for tax year 2001 contributed $32 billion to the tax gap. Thus, considerable potential exists. However, these provisions serve purposes Congress has judged to be important and eliminating or consolidating them could be complicated. Fundamental tax reform would most likely result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few, if any, exceptions (e.g., few tax preferences) and taxable transactions are transparent to tax administrators. These characteristics are difficult to achieve, and any tax system could be subject to noncompliance. Withholding and information reporting are particularly powerful tools to reduce the tax gap. They could help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars, especially if they make underreported income transparent to IRS. These tools have led to high, sustained levels of taxpayer compliance and improved IRS resource allocation by helping IRS identify and prioritize its contacts with noncompliant taxpayers. As GAO previously suggested, reporting the cost, or basis, of securities sales is one option to improve taxpayers' compliance. However, designing additional withholding and information reporting requirements may be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to reporting, underreporting exists in many forms, and withholding and reporting requirements impose costs on third parties. Devoting additional resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. However, determining the appropriate level of IRS enforcement resources requires taking into account such factors as how well IRS uses its resources, the proper balance between taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. If Congress provides IRS more enforcement resources, the amount of tax gap reduction would depend on factors such as the size of budget increases, how IRS manages any additional resources, and the indirect increase in taxpayers' voluntary compliance resulting from expanded enforcement. Increasing IRS's funding would enable it to contact millions of potentially noncompliant taxpayers it identifies but does not contact. |
gao_GAO-12-898 | gao_GAO-12-898_0 | a requirement to implement SMS in three of FAA’s business lines—the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), the Aviation Safety Organization (AVS), and the Office of Airports (ARP)—and a goal to implement SMS policy in all appropriate FAA organizations, which include the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) and the Office of NextGen (ANG). FAA and Its Business Lines Are at Different Stages of SMS Implementation
ATO completed its implementation of SMS, but FAA and several of its other business lines and offices are in the early stages of implementation. Most FAA business lines and offices have guidance and plans for SMS implementation in place and have begun to integrate SMS-related practices into their operations, but many tasks remain and aviation officials and experts with whom we spoke project that full SMS implementation will take many years. FAA Recently Finalized Its Agency-Wide Implementation Plan, but Full SMS Implementation Is Likely to Take Many Years
FAA finalized its agency-wide plan for SMS implementation in April 2012. FAA’s SMS Approach Is Consistent with Many but Not All Key Practices for Successful Project Implementation
There are a number of key practices and implementation steps that can help agencies successfully plan for and implement new projects, including large scale transformative ones, such as FAA’s implementation of SMS. FAA currently has many of these key factors in place, such as established support from top leadership and a clear project mission; however, it has only partially addressed other key practices, such as providing needed expertise and technology, and has yet to establish SMS performance measures (see fig. However, we identified six challenges that could negatively affect FAA’s efforts to implement SMS in a timely and efficient manner: 1) the large scope and complexity of SMS implementation, 2) resource and capacity constraints, 3) standardization of policies and processes, 4) data sharing and protection, 5) data quality and usefulness, and 6) development of performance measures to evaluate SMS effectiveness. Resources and Capacity
SMS implementation across FAA will require some skills that agency employees currently do not have, yet FAA has not formally assessed the skills of its workforce to identify any gaps in the expertise required to implement SMS or determined how to fill those gaps. FAA officials acknowledged that this is a challenge for the agency and noted that the agency plans to provide additional training to inspectors related to oversight of SMS. Although FAA has some data protections in place, such as those established by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which protects data that airports and air carriers submit to FAA for SMS from federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, any data airports collect and any data air carriers share with airports could be subject to state-specific FOIA laws. The magnitude of SMS’s potential impact on aviation oversight and the complexity of implementation are both a benefit and a drawback for FAA, as SMS implementation could help ensure the continued safety of the U.S. aviation system, but could also affect implementation time frames for other large initiatives as the agency works in a resource-limited environment. To align strategic goals with employee efforts, develop a system to evaluate employees’ performance as it relates to SMS. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS) and provide information on potential implementation challenges. (2) To what extent have FAA’s SMS efforts been consistent with key practices for successful planning and implementation of a new program? (3) What challenges does FAA face in implementing SMS? We reviewed prior GAO work on performance measurement and workforce analysis, Department of Transportation Inspector General reports and NTSB recommendations related to SMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's aviation system is one of the safest in the world, but with air travel projected to increase over the next 20 years, efforts to ensure the continued safety of aviation are increasingly important. The FAA is seeking to further enhance safety by shifting to a data-driven, risk-based safety oversight approach--referred to as SMS. SMS implementation is required for FAA and several of its business lines and the agency is taking steps to require industry implementation.
As requested, this report addresses (1) the status of FAA's implementation of SMS, (2) the extent to which FAA's SMS efforts have been consistent with key practices for successful planning and implementation of a new program, and (3) challenges FAA faces in implementing SMS. To address these issues, GAO reviewed FAA SMS documents, compared FAA efforts to key practices, and interviewed agency and industry officials.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its business lines and offices are in different stages of their implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS). FAA finalized its agency-wide implementation plan in April 2012, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) has completed its SMS implementation, but other FAA SMS efforts are in the early stages. FAA business lines, such as the Aviation Safety Organization (AVS) and the Office of Airports (ARP), have SMS guidance and plans largely in place and have begun to integrate related practices into their operations, but many implementation tasks remain incomplete, and officials and experts project that full SMS implementation could take many years.
There are a number of key practices that can help agencies plan for and efficiently implement new projects, including large scale transformations such as FAA's SMS implementation, and FAA has many in place. For example, FAA has support from top leadership and a clear project mission. However, FAA has only partially addressed other key practices such as developing a project plan to track SMS implementation, and FAA has not addressed performance-related practices such as establishing SMS performance measures or links between employees' performance standards and SMS.
Several challenges remain that may affect FAA's ability to effectively implement SMS. FAA is taking steps to address some challenges and stakeholder concerns, but challenges related to data sharing and data quality; capacity to conduct SMS-based analyses and oversight; and standardization of policies and procedures could negatively affect FAA's efforts to implement SMS in a timely and efficient manner. Further, FAA officials stated that SMS implementation will require some skills that agency employees do not have, but FAA has not yet assessed the skills of its workforce to identify specific gaps in employee expertise. In addition, while existing federal law protects any data collected for SMS, any data airports collect could be subject to state-specific Freedom of Information Act laws, a gap that could create a disincentive for airports to fully participate in SMS implementation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA develop systems to: track SMS implementation, evaluate employee performance as it relates to SMS, and assess whether SMS meets its goals and objectives; conduct a workforce analysis for SMS; and consider strategies to address airports' data concerns. The Department of Transportation agreed to consider the recommendations and provided clarifying information about SMS, which GAO incorporated. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-113 | gao_T-HEHS-97-113_0 | Medicare Beneficiaries With Diabetes Are Not Receiving Recommended Levels of Monitoring Services
The American Diabetes Association’s (ADA) clinical care recommendations, which reflect the published research evidence and expert opinion, are widely accepted as guidance on what constitutes quality diabetes care. 2.) About 11 percent showed Medicare claims for all four of these services. We also found that white beneficiaries with diabetes received the six monitoring services at consistently higher rates than beneficiaries who were black or of another racial group, but the differences were not great. The substantial out-of-pocket costs of active self-management also may discourage Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes. Finally, managed care plans and physician practices alike tend to lack service-tracking systems capable of reminding physicians and patients when routine preventive and monitoring services are needed. Most efforts were initiated recently, and little is known yet about their effectiveness. In our follow-up interviews with 12 HMOs that reported using a variety of diabetes services, 5 told us they have committed substantial resources to develop systemwide, comprehensive diabetes management programs. Little Evidence Available on Effectiveness of Diabetes Management Efforts
Even the HMOs reporting the most comprehensive programs, however, generally had little information about the extent to which their diabetes management approaches had affected the use of recommended preventive and monitoring services. HCFA Has Targeted Diabetes for Special Initiatives, but Effectiveness Is Still Largely Unknown
diabetes as well as patient and provider education about diabetes and practice guidelines. Like the diabetes management approaches we learned about in our survey of Medicare HMOs, HCFA’s initiatives either have been undertaken recently or are still in the planning stages, and it is too soon to tell which of these projects will prove most effective. When beneficiaries receive less than the recommended levels of preventive and monitoring services, the result may be increased medical complications and Medicare costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its recent report on preventive and monitoring services provided to Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes, focusing on: (1) the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes receive recommended levels of preventive and monitoring services; (2) what Medicare health maintenance organizations (HMO) are doing to improve delivery of recommended diabetes services; and (3) the activities that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) supports to address these service needs for Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while experts agree that regular use of preventive and monitoring services can help minimize the complications of diabetes, most Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes do not receive these services at recommended intervals; (2) this is true both in traditional fee-for-service Medicare, which serves about 90 percent of all beneficiaries, and in managed care delivery; (3) the efforts of Medicare HMOs to improve diabetes care have been varied but generally limited, with most plans reporting that they have focused on educating their enrollees with diabetes about self-management and their physicians about the need for preventive and monitoring services; (4) very few plans have developed comprehensive diabetes management programs; and (5) at the federal level, HCFA has targeted diabetes for special emphasis and has begun to test preventive care initiatives, but like the HMOs, HCFA's efforts are quite recent and the agency does not yet have results that would allow it to evaluate effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-12-895T | gao_GAO-12-895T_0 | ICE Does Not Have a Process to Identify and Assess Risks Posed by Schools in SEVP
ICE has not developed and implemented a process to identify and analyze program risks since assuming responsibility for SEVP in 2003, making it difficult for ICE to determine the potential security and fraud risks across the more than 10,000 SEVP-certified schools and to identify actions that could help mitigate these risks. Furthermore, various cases of school fraud have demonstrated vulnerabilities in the management and oversight of SEVP-certified schools. We reported that SEVP faces two primary challenges to identifying and assessing risks posed by schools: (1) it does not evaluate program data on prior and suspected instances of school fraud and noncompliance, and (2) it does not obtain and assess information from CTCEU and ICE field office school investigations and outreach events. For example, according to investigators in one ICE field office, CTCEU was hampered in pursuing a criminal investigation because SEVP officials did not obtain a signed attestation statement within the I-17 application from a school official stating that the official agreed to comply with rules and regulations. To address these issues, we recommended that ICE develop and implement a process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, including evaluating prior and suspected cases of school noncompliance and fraud to identify potential trends, and obtaining and assessing information from CTCEU and ICE field office investigative and outreach efforts. Weaknesses in ICE’s Monitoring and Oversight of SEVP- Certified Schools Contribute to Security and Fraud Vulnerabilities
ICE has not consistently implemented existing internal control procedures for SEVP in four areas: (1) initial verification of evidence submitted in lieu of accreditation, (2) recordkeeping to ensure schools’ continued eligibility, (3) ongoing compliance monitoring of school licensing and accreditation status, and (4) certification of schools offering flight training. In addition, weaknesses in managing and sharing key information with CTCEU impede SEVP’s prevention and detection of school fraud. The following summarizes these key findings and recommendations we made to address these issues. We recommended that ICE consistently implement procedures for ensuring schools’ eligibility, including consistently verifying “in lieu of” letters. We reported that ICE had not consistently maintained certain evidence of selected schools’ eligibility for the program. The Border Security Act required recertification for all SEVP-certified schools by May 2004 and every 2 years thereafter. ICE has not consistently followed the standard operating procedures that govern the communication and coordination process among SEVP, CTCEU, and ICE field offices. Thus, we recommended that ICE revise its standard operating procedure to specify which information to share among stakeholders during criminal investigations. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the findings from our June 2012 report assessing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) oversight of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). ICE, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for managing SEVP, including ensuring that foreign students studying in the United States comply with the terms of their admission into the country. ICE also certifies schools as authorized to accept foreign students in academic and vocational programs. As of January 2012, more than 850,000 active foreign students were enrolled at over 10,000 certified schools in the United States. In addition, ICE manages the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which assists the agency in tracking and monitoring certified schools, as well as approved students. We reported in April 2011 on the need for close monitoring and oversight of foreign students, and that some schools have attempted to exploit the immigration system by knowingly reporting that foreign students were fulfilling their visa requirements when they were not attending school or attending intermittently.
Schools interested in accepting foreign students on F and M visas must petition for SEVP certification by submitting a Form I-17 to ICE. Once this certification is achieved, schools issue Forms I-20 for students, which enable them to apply for nonimmigrant student status. The Border Security Act requires DHS to confirm, every 2 years, SEVP-certified schools’ continued eligibility and compliance with the program’s requirements. During the initial petition and recertification processes, a school must provide ICE with evidence of its legitimacy and its eligibility, such as designated school officials’ attestation statements that both the school and officials intend to comply with program rules and regulations.
This testimony summarizes the key findings of our report on ICE’s management of SEVP, which was publicly released last week. Like that report, this statement will address ICE’s efforts to (1) identify and assess risks in SEVP, and (2) develop and implement procedures to prevent and detect fraud during the initial certification process and once schools begin accepting foreign students.
What GAO Found
In summary, we reported that ICE does not have a process to identify and assess risks posed by schools in SEVP. Specifically, SEVP (1) does not evaluate program data on prior and suspected instances of school fraud and noncompliance, and (2) does not obtain and assess information from CTCEU and ICE field office school investigations and outreach events. Moreover, weaknesses in ICE’s monitoring and oversight of SEVP-certified schools contribute to security and fraud vulnerabilities. For example, ICE has not consistently implemented internal control procedures for SEVP in the initial verification of evidence submitted in lieu of accreditation. In addition, ICE has not consistently followed the standard operating procedures that govern the communication and coordination process among SEVP, CTCEU, and ICE field offices.
We recommended that ICE, among other things, identify and assess program risks; consistently implement procedures for ensuring schools’ eligibility; and, revise its standard operating procedure to specify which information to share among stakeholders during criminal investigations. ICE concurred with all the recommendations we made to address these challenges and has actions planned or under way to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-581T | gao_GAO-08-581T_0 | Most segments of ISS cannot be delivered by any other vehicle. The Retirement of the Shuttle Poses Challenges to NASA’s Ability to Complete the International Space Station
It will be a challenge for NASA to complete the space station by 2010 given the compressed nature of the schedule, maintenance and safety concerns, as well as events beyond its control such as weather. Shuttle Flight Schedule Is Aggressive
In our July 2007 testimony, we reported that NASA planned to launch a shuttle once every 2.7 months. NASA has launched shuttles at this rate in the past. The two contingency flights of the shuttle have been designated to deliver these key replacement units, which only the shuttle is capable of carrying. This includes elements needed for the planned configuration to complete the station and delivery of critical spares. Alternative Vehicle Options to Service the International Space Station Pose Challenges
In the event that NASA completes assembly of the ISS on schedule and prepositions an adequate number of critical spares, the agency still faces a myriad of challenges in sustaining the research facility until its retirement, currently planned for fiscal year 2016. NASA will rely on an assortment of vehicles in order to provide the necessary logistical support and crew rotation capabilities required by the station. From the Columbia disaster in 2003 until return to flight in 2005, the Russian vehicles were the sole source of logistical support and crew rotation capability for the station. The new vehicles being developed by the European and Japanese space agencies are very complex. The Japanese vehicle is still under development and has faced some setbacks. NASA officials told us that the HTV’s first test launch is planned for July 2009.
International Partner Vehicles Have Constraints in Ability to Ferry Crew and Cargo to and from the ISS in Comparison to the Shuttle
In addition to potential development challenges, the international partner vehicles have constraints in terms of what they can take to and from the ISS in comparison to the shuttle. NASA’s current plans to manage the gap after the shuttle retirement do not take into account the possibility of delays in the development of these vehicles, and even if they do come on line on time, NASA officials estimate that there will be a significant shortfall to the ISS of at least 114,199 pounds (or 51.8 metric tons) in cargo re-supply capability. These vehicles were designed to augment the capabilities of the shuttle and have significantly less capability to deliver cargo to the ISS. Commercial Vehicles
NASA is working with the commercial space sector through its Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to develop and produce vehicles that can take equipment and crew to and from the space station. NASA expects that these vehicles will be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012. However, these vehicles have yet to be successfully launched into orbit, and some NASA officials have acknowledged that their development schedules leave little room for the unexpected. Ultimately, NASA’s aggressive schedule leaves little room for the unexpected. The shortfall may well impact support for a six person crew and the quality of research that can be conducted on the ISS. To determine the risks and challenges NASA faces in providing logistics and maintenance support to the International Space Station after 2010, we analyzed documents related to the up-mass and down-mass capabilities of the International Partners and SpaceX vehicles, the shortfall in ISS up- mass for re-supply and sustainment, the new vehicles that will support ISS NASA’s plans for using Russian vehicles to support ISS through what NASA refers to as its “exemption,” and the impacts to the utilization of the ISS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The International Space Station (ISS), the most complex scientific space project ever attempted, remains incomplete. NASA expects the station's final construction cost will be $31 billion and expects sustainment costs through the station's planned retirement in fiscal year 2016 to total $11 billion. The space shuttle, the only vehicle capable of transporting large segments of the station into orbit, is critical to its completion. NASA plans to complete ISS assembly and retire the shuttle in 2010 in order to pursue a new generation of space flight vehicles, which will not begin to be available until 2015. To provide crew rotation and logistical support during this 5-year gap, NASA plans to rely on spacecraft developed by the commercial sector and other countries. In light of these circumstances, GAO examined the risks and challenges NASA faces in (1) completing assembly of the ISS by 2010 and (2) providing logistics and maintenance to the ISS after 2010. GAO's work to accomplish this included reviewing budget, planning, and other documents from NASA; reviewing NASA officials' testimonies; and interviewing NASA and foreign space program officials.
What GAO Found
NASA faces significant challenges in its plans to complete assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) prior to the scheduled retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. Since GAO testified on this issue in July 2007, the shuttle flight schedule has remained aggressive--slating the same number of launches in a shorter period. While NASA thinks the proposed schedule is still achievable, the schedule (1) is only slightly less demanding than it was prior to the Columbia disaster when the agency launched a shuttle every other month with a larger shuttle fleet and (2) leaves little room for the kinds of weather-related, technical, and logistical problems that have delayed flights in the past. Unanticipated delays could result in changes to the station's configuration, that is, some components may not be delivered. We have previously testified that such changes could limit the extent of scientific research that can be conducted on board the ISS. After assembly is completed and the shuttle retires, NASA's ability to rotate crew and supply the ISS will be impaired because of the absence of a vehicle capable of carrying the 114,199 pounds of additional supplies and spares needed to sustain the station until its planned retirement in 2016. For crew rotation and logistics, NASA plans to rely on Russian, European and Japanese vehicles--these vehicles were designed to augment the capabilities of the shuttle, not replace them, and have far less capacity to haul cargo. Furthermore, aside from a single Russian vehicle that can bring back 132 pounds of cargo, no vehicle can return cargo from the ISS after the shuttle is retired; and Commercially developed vehicles--NASA has pledged approximately $500 million for the development of commercial vehicles. NASA expects these vehicles will be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012, even though none of the vehicles currently under development has been launched into orbit yet and their aggressive development schedule leaves little room for the unexpected. If one of these vehicles cannot be delivered according to NASA's current expectations, NASA will have to rely on Russian vehicles to maintain U.S. crew presence on the ISS until the new generation of U.S. spacecraft becomes available. |
gao_GAO-08-425T | gao_GAO-08-425T_0 | As seen in table 1, about 18,000 undervotes were reported in Sarasota County in the race for Florida’s 13th Congressional District. After the election results were contested in the House of Representatives, the task force met and unanimously voted to seek GAO’s assistance in determining whether the voting systems contributed to the large undervote in Sarasota County. We found that some of the prior tests and reviews conducted by the State of Florida and Sarasota County provided assurance that certain components of the voting system in Sarasota County functioned correctly, but they were not enough to provide reasonable assurance that the iVotronic DREs did not contribute to the undervote. Overview of the Voting Systems Used in Sarasota County in the 2006 General Elections
In the 2006 general election, Sarasota County used voting systems manufactured by ES&S. Consequently, if we are reasonably confident that the same firmware was running in all 1,499 machines, then we are more confident that the results of other tests, conducted both by GAO and by others, on a small number of machines can be used to obtain increased assurance that the iVotronic DREs did not cause the undervote. Methodology for Firmware Verification Testing
Our methodology to obtain reasonable assurance that the firmware used on Sarasota County’s iVotronic DREs during the 2006 general election was the same as that certified by the State of Florida was broken down into two basic steps: (1) selecting a representative sample of machines, and (2) verifying that the firmware extracted from the voting machines was the same as the escrowed firmware that had been certified by the Florida Division of Elections. We witnessed the rebuild of the iVotronic DRE’s firmware from the source code that was held in escrow by the Florida Division of Elections and that was previously reviewed by Florida State University and by us. Casting a ballot from the review screen selection. Process Used in Executing the Ballot Test
A two-person test team conducted the ballot testing. We conducted calibration testing on two different machines that were used for ballot testing. Conclusions
Our tests showed that (1) the firmware installed in a statistically selected sample of machines used by Sarasota County during the 2006 general election matched the firmware certified by the Florida Division of Elections, and we confirmed that when the manufacturer rebuilt the iVotronic 8.0.1.2 firmware from the escrowed source code, the resulting firmware matched the certified version of firmware held in escrow, (2) the machines properly displayed, recorded, and counted the selections for all test ballots cast during the ballot testing involving the 112 common ways a voter may interact with the system to cast a ballot for the Florida-13 race, and (3) the machines accurately recorded the test ballots displayed on deliberately miscalibrated machines. The results of these tests did not identify any problems that would indicate that the iVotronic DREs were responsible for the undervote in the Florida-13 race in the 2006 general election. Although the test results cannot be used to provide absolute assurance, we believe that these test results, combined with the other reviews that have been conducted by Florida, GAO, and others, have significantly reduced the possibility that the iVotronic DREs were the cause of the undervote. At this point, we believe that adequate testing has been performed on the voting machine software to reach this conclusion and do not recommend further testing in this area. Given the complex interaction of people, processes, and technology that must work effectively together to achieve a successful election, we acknowledge the possibility that the large undervote in Florida’s 13th Congressional District race could have been caused by factors such as voters who intentionally undervoted, or voters who did not properly cast their ballots on the iVotronic DRE, potentially because of issues relating to interaction between voters and the ballot. Appendix I: Methodology for Selecting IVotronic DREs for GAO Testing
Each of the three tests—firmware verification, ballot, and calibration— was conducted on a sample of the 1,499 iVotronic DREs that recorded votes during the 2006 general election in Sarasota County, Florida. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2006, about 18,000 undervotes were reported in Sarasota County in the race for Florida's 13th Congressional District (Florida-13). After the election results were contested in the House of Representatives, the task force unanimously voted to seek GAO's assistance in determining whether the voting systems contributed to the large undervote in Sarasota County. In October 2007, GAO presented its findings on the review of the voting systems and concluded that while prior tests and reviews provided some assurance that the voting systems performed correctly, they were not enough to provide reasonable assurance that the voting systems in Sarasota County did not contribute to the undervote. GAO proposed that a firmware verification test, a ballot test, and a calibration test be conducted. The task force requested that GAO proceed with the proposed additional tests. GAO also verified whether source code escrowed by Florida could be rebuilt into the firmware used in Sarasota County. To conduct its work, GAO conducted tests on a sample of voting systems used in Sarasota County during the 2006 general election. GAO witnessed the rebuild of the firmware from the escrowed source code at the manufacturer's development facility. GAO reviewed test documentation from Florida, Sarasota County, and the voting system manufacturer and met with election officials to prepare the test protocols and detailed test procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO conducted three tests on the iVotronic Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems in Sarasota County and these tests did not identify any problems. Based on its testing, GAO obtained increased assurance that the iVotronic DREs used in Sarasota County during the 2006 general election did not contribute to the large undervote in the Florida-13 contest. Although the test results cannot be used to provide absolute assurance, GAO believes that these test results, combined with the other reviews that have been conducted by the State of Florida, GAO, and others, have significantly reduced the possibility that the iVotronic DREs were the cause of the undervote. GAO's firmware verification test showed that the firmware installed in a statistically selected sample of 115 machines used by Sarasota County during the 2006 general election matched the firmware certified by the Florida Division of Elections. The statistical approach used in selecting these machines lets GAO estimate with a 99 percent confidence level that no more than 60 of the 1,499 iVotronic DREs that recorded votes in the 2006 general election were using different firmware. Consequently, GAO is able to place more confidence in the results of other tests conducted on a small number of machines by GAO and by others, which indicated that the iVotronic DREs did not cause the undervote. GAO also confirmed that when the manufacturer rebuilt the iVotronic DRE firmware from the source code that was held in escrow by the Florida Division of Elections and previously reviewed by GAO and others, the resulting firmware matched the version certified by the Florida Division of Elections. For the ballot test, GAO cast predefined test ballots on 10 iVotronic DREs and confirmed that each ballot was displayed and recorded accurately. GAO conducted the calibration test by miscalibrating two iVotronic DREs and casting ballots on them to validate that the machines recorded the information that was displayed on the touch screen. Based on the results of the ballot and calibration tests, GAO found that (1) the machines properly displayed, recorded, and counted the selections for all test ballots cast during ballot testing involving 112 common ways a voter may have interacted with the system, and (2) the deliberately miscalibrated machines, though difficult to use, accurately recorded the ballot selections as displayed on screen. At this point, GAO believes that adequate testing has been performed on the voting machine software and does not recommend further testing in this area. Given the complex interaction of people, processes, and technology that must work effectively together to achieve a successful election, GAO acknowledges the possibility that the large undervote in Florida's 13th Congressional District race could have been caused by factors such as voters who intentionally undervoted, or voters who did not properly cast their ballots on the iVotronic DRE, potentially because of issues relating to interaction between voters and the ballot. |
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