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gao_GAO-12-69 | gao_GAO-12-69_0 | Absentee and early voting. In addition, some states also allow in-person early voting, as discussed later in the report. Most States Provided Early or No-Excuse Absentee Voting as Alternatives to Voting on Tuesday in the 2010 General Election
For the November 2010 general election, 35 states and the District provided voters at least one alternative to casting their ballot on Election Day through in-person early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, or voting by mail. As shown in figure 2, 33 states and the District provided in- person early voting, 29 states and the District provided no-excuse absentee voting, and 2 states provided voting by mail to all or most voters. Of the nine states and the District where we conducted interviews, all but two states provided voters the option of in-person early voting in the November 2010 general election. Five of the seven states and the District offered both early voting and no-excuse absentee voting. Although the length of the early voting periods ranged from 7 to 30 days in the states we contacted, five of the seven states and the District required local jurisdictions to include at least one Saturday in their early voting period, and two states allowed for some jurisdiction discretion to include weekend days. Most Election Officials We Interviewed Expect Greater Difficulty and Costs Associated with a Weekend Election
State and local election officials we interviewed about implementing a weekend election most often identified challenges they would anticipate facing in planning and conducting Election Day activities—specifically, finding poll workers and polling places and securing ballots and voting equipment. Further, officials from 12 jurisdictions and the District said they would expect poll workers to be less willing or able to work 2 consecutive days of a weekend election due to fatigue, noting that many poll workers are elderly. Most Election Officials Expect Difficulty and Some Increased Costs Finding Polling Places for a Weekend Election
Election officials we interviewed in 14 of the 17 local jurisdictions— including 5 jurisdictions with experience conducting elections on a Saturday—and the District expected that at least some of the polling places they used in past elections would not be available for a weekend election, and officials in all of those jurisdictions and the District anticipated difficulty finding replacements. Most Election Officials Said Ensuring Overnight Security of Ballots and Equipment Would Also Be Challenging and Costly
According to election officials we interviewed in all nine states, the District, and 15 of the 17 local jurisdictions, ensuring the security of ballots and voting equipment over the Saturday night of a weekend election would be both challenging and expensive. Officials we interviewed in 5 of the 7 states and the District that conducted early voting and provided security over multiple days explained that the level of planning and challenges needed for overnight security for a weekend election would be on a scale that would far surpass that of early voting due to the greater number and variety of polling places used on Election Day. For example, election officials in one state observed that for the 2010 general election, the entire state had fewer than 300 early voting sites compared to more than 2,750 polling places on Election Day, and the early voting sites were selected with the need for overnight security in mind. In contrast, Election Day polling places are precinct-based and generally selected based on factors that include availability and proximity to voters rather than overnight security. Weekend Elections Have Not Been Studied, but Studies of Other Voting Alternatives Suggest That Voter Turnout May Not Be Strongly Affected
Limited U.S. Experience with Weekend Elections Makes Evaluating Effect on Voter Turnout Challenging
Because nationwide federal elections have never been held on a weekend and we could identify few U.S. jurisdictions that have held weekend elections for state or local offices, it is difficult to draw valid conclusions about how moving federal elections to a weekend would affect voter turnout. With the exception of vote by mail, each of the alternative voting methods we reviewed was estimated to increase or decrease turnout by no more than 4 percentage points. Turnout Did Not Increase during the Weekend Early Voting Period in Maryland’s 2010 General Election
Our analysis of voter turnout data from the early voting period during the 2010 general election in Maryland showed that voters were not very likely to vote on the weekend days provided. Of the voters we analyzed, 1.1 percent cast ballots on the weekend during the early voting period when they had this option during the primary election, and 1.5 percent of voters did so during the general election. We conducted interviews with election officials in a nonprobability sample of nine states and the District of Columbia (District), and a nonprobability sample of 17 local jurisdictions within those states, about if and how they implemented alternative voting methods and their views on how election administration and voter turnout would likely be affected in their state or jurisdiction if the day for regularly scheduled federal elections were moved to a weekend. “Who Votes By Mail? | Why GAO Did This Study
Many U.S. citizens who are eligible to vote in federal elections do not do so. For instance, in the 2008 general election, about 62 percent of eligible citizens voted. To increase voter turnout by enhancing convenience, some states have implemented alternative voting methods, such as in-person early votingcasting a ballot in person prior to Election Day without providing a reasonand no-excuse absentee votingcasting an absentee ballot, usually by mail, without providing a reason. In general, since 1845, federal law has required that federal elections be held on Tuesday.
The committees on appropriations directed GAO to study and report on costs and benefits of implementing H.R. 254the Weekend Voting Actincluding issues associated with conducting a weekend election. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) alternatives to voting on Tuesday that states provided for the November 2010 general election, (2) how election officials anticipate election administration and costs would be affected if the day for federal elections were moved to a weekend, and (3) what research and available data suggest about the potential effect of a weekend election on voter turnout. GAO reviewed H.R. 254 and analyzed state statutes and early voting turnout in the 2010 Maryland elections, which had early voting over weekdays and weekends. GAO interviewed election officials in nine states, the District of Columbia (District), and 17 local jurisdictions that were selected on the basis of geographic dispersion and experience with weekend voting, among other things. Though not generalizable, the interviews provide insights.
What GAO Found
For the 2010 general election, 35 states and the District provided voters at least one alternative to casting their ballot on Election Day through in-person early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, or voting by mail. Specifically, 33 states and the District provided in-person early voting, 29 states and the District provided no-excuse absentee voting, and 2 states provided voting by mail to all or most voters. Of the 9 states and the District where GAO conducted interviews, all but 2 states provided voters the option of in-person early voting in the 2010 general election, and 5 states and the District offered both early voting and no-excuse absentee voting. Implementation and characteristics of in-person early voting varied among the 7 states and, in some cases, among the jurisdictions within a state. For example, 5 states and the District required local jurisdictions to include at least one Saturday, and 2 states allowed for some jurisdiction discretion to include weekend days.
State and local election officials GAO interviewed identified challenges they would anticipate facing in planning and conducting Election Day activities on weekendsspecifically, finding poll workers and polling places, and securing ballots and voting equipmentand expected cost increases. Officials in all 17 jurisdictions and the District we contacted said they expected the number of poll workers needed for a 2-day weekend election would increase. Further, officials in 13 jurisdictions said that some poll workers would be less willing to work on the weekend because of other priorities, such as family obligations or attending religious services. Officials in 14 of the 17 jurisdictions and the District expected that at least some of the polling places they used in past electionssuch as churcheswould not be available for a weekend election, and anticipated difficulty finding replacements. Officials in all 9 states, the District, and 15 of the 17 local jurisdictions said ensuring the security of ballots and voting equipment over the Saturday night of a weekend election would be both challenging and expensive. Officials in 5 of the 7 states and the District that conducted early voting and provided security over multiple days explained that the level of planning needed for overnight security for a weekend election would far surpass that of early voting due to the greater number and variety of Election Day polling places. For example, officials in one state said that for the 2010 general election, the state had fewer than 300 early voting siteswhich were selected to ensure securitycompared to more than 2,750 polling places on Election Day, which are generally selected based on availability and proximity to voters. In addition, officials in all 9 states, the District, and 15 of the 17 local jurisdictions said they expected overnight security costs to increase.
Weekend elections have not been studied, but studies of other voting alternatives determined that voter turnout is not strongly affected by them. Since nationwide federal elections have never been held on a weekend, it is difficult to draw valid conclusions about how moving federal elections to a weekend would affect voter turnout. GAOs review of 24 studies found that, with the exception of vote by mail, each of the alternative voting methods was estimated to change turnout by no more than 4 percentage points. GAOs analysis of early voter turnout data in Maryland found that 1.5 percent of voters we analyzed cast ballots on the weekend during the 2010 general election. |
gao_HEHS-98-55 | gao_HEHS-98-55_0 | Background
TBI is the injury most likely to result in death or permanent disability. Medicaid, Vocational Rehabilitation, and ILS Programs Provide Services to Adults With TBI
Federal funding is available for medical and social support services under Medicaid, vocational rehabilitation services provided through state VR agencies, and for independent living services. With the exception of nursing facility care, most services provided under the standard Medicaid program are medically oriented. To provide long-term home and community-based services for broad groups of Medicaid beneficiaries—such as the elderly disabled or physically disabled, including adults with TBI—states generally have used 1915(c) waivers. States Target Medicaid Services to Small Groups of Adults With TBI
States generally use Medicaid home and community-based waivers to target Medicaid services to small groups of adults with TBI. VR and ILS Provide Services to Reintegrate Adults With TBI Into the Community
VR and ILS—Department of Education programs administered by the states—provide services to disabled adults, including adults with TBI, to support their reentry into the community. Both programs are financed by a combination of federal and state funds—totaling roughly $2.5 billion in 1996—and receive referrals from a variety of sources. VR provides vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with disabilities, including adults with TBI, to prepare them for and support them during their transition to employment. State-Financed Programs Provide Services to Adults With TBI
Five states that we contacted—Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Pennsylvania—have developed programs funded exclusively by the state to provide services to a generally small number of adults with TBI.These programs—which obtain services from other programs and pay only for services that cannot be financed otherwise—are more flexible than Medicaid waiver programs. Despite State Efforts to Provide Services, Certain Individuals Are Likely to Confront Substantial Barriers
Some adults with TBI encounter substantial barriers in accessing services that will support their reintegration into the community. Although the states we contacted have developed strategies to expand such services, a small number of individuals relative to the number of adults with TBI are generally served by these programs. These experts most frequently identified three groups: individuals who are cognitively impaired but lack physical impairments, individuals without personal advocates, and individuals with problematic behaviors. People without social support systems or whose social support systems fail also fall into this category. Individuals With Problematic Behaviors
People with problematic behaviors—such as aggression, destructiveness, or participation in illegal activities—generally do not have the skills required to return to the community and usually require expensive treatment in residential environments with a great deal of structure. Without treatment, these individuals are the most likely to become homeless, be committed to a mental institution, or be sentenced to prison. Based on state reports of the number of individuals who sustain a TBI in a year, the gap between the number receiving long-term services and the estimated number of disabled adults with TBI remains wide. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal and state efforts to provide services the individuals with traumatic brain injury (TBI), focusing on the: (1) primary federal and state programs that provide adults with TBI services to help them function more independently; (2) strategies that states have developed to enhance access to TBI-related services; and (3) circumstances believed to be most frequently associated with difficulty in obtaining services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) adults with TBI receive services to facilitate their reintegration into the community primarily from three federal-state programs: Medicaid, vocational rehabilitation (VR), and Independent Living Services (ILS); (2) Medicaid provides medical, rehabilitation, and social support services to poor individuals with disabilities; (3) VR agencies provide services to individuals with disabilities to prepare them for and support them during the transition to employment; (4) ILS programs provide skills training to individuals with disabilities to facilitate their independence in the community; (5) all three programs are financed by a combination of federal and state funds and serve a range of individuals with disabilities, only a small number of whom have a TBI; (6) because most of the services covered by standard Medicaid programs are medical, all states have expanded Medicaid services through home and community-based waivers, which permit them to offer additional services--such as homemaker services, adult day care, and nonmedical transportation--to persons at risk of institutionalization; (7) these Medicaid waivers generally target long-term community-based services to a broad population, such as the physically disabled or disabled elderly; (8) recognizing the difficulties adults with TBI experience in accessing services, each of the states GAO contacted have developed various strategies to target services to adults with TBI; (9) five target Medicaid services specifically to limited numbers of adults with TBI; (10) despite these strategies, service gaps are likely--the number of adults with TBI who are provided services remains small relative to estimates of the total number; (11) according to program representatives and experts, those most likely to have difficulty accessing services are: (a) individuals with cognitive impairment but who lack physical disabilities; (b) individuals without an effective advocate to negotiate the social service system or without a social support system; and (c) individuals with problematic or unmanageable behaviors, such as aggression, destructiveness, or participation in illegal behaviors; and (12) without treatment, individuals with problematic or unmanageable behaviors are the most likely to become homeless, institutionalized in a mental facility, or imprisoned. |
gao_HEHS-98-103 | gao_HEHS-98-103_0 | Faulty EDS Processes Contributed to Loan Verification Problems and Inaccurate Payments; Direct Loan Servicing Information Also Flawed
Lenders’ representatives said that the primary problems they had with FDLP consolidations were (1) loan verification certificates EDS them sent that contained errors and (2) inaccurate payments EDS sent to pay off loans. EDS Errors Caused Lenders Problems in Verifying Loan Data
The process EDS used to verify the loan amounts that borrowers wanted to consolidate was prone to error. The third problem lenders mentioned was that they sometimes received more than one certificate for a particular borrower. Most of the underpayments that we analyzed resulted from data that lenders provided to EDS not being entered into EDS’ data system, while others resulted from a control EDS put in place to try to reduce duplicate payments or other system problems: In several examples, EDS did not enter data into its system for one of a borrower’s loans when a lender certified a number of loans. All four lenders we talked with agreed that their problems with the FDLP loan consolidation process had affected their operations. Education and EDS Are Making Changes to Improve the Consolidation Process
Since the shutdown of the FDLP loan consolidation program between August 27 and December 1, 1997, both Education and EDS have taken steps to improve the process and reduce the problems that contributed to the buildup of the backlog. Among other tasks, the consolidation team is working directly with lenders to try to resolve consolidation problems. Education officials also said that changes are under way that are intended to improve the transfer of such transactions in the future. Since the reopening of the consolidation process in December 1997, EDS has been tracking the first 1,000 consolidation applications, and it hopes its evaluation of these applications will provide information on how well the new changes to the process are working. Conclusions
EDS’ errors in processing FDLP consolidation applications led to a number of problems; lenders had to spend additional time resolving the problems, and borrowers’ applications were not always processed correctly. Scope and Methodology
We interviewed officials from four judgmentally selected Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) lenders. We selected the lenders to obtain variety in size, as measured by FFELP loan volume, and different perspectives on lenders’ experiences with William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) consolidations. We discussed with Electronic Data Systems (EDS) and the Department of Education the problems the lenders raised. For this reason, we cannot make judgments regarding the overall frequency or extent of these problems in the program as a whole. So at times, if EDS received a certificate, paid off a borrower’s loan account, and subsequently discovered that it had received another completed certificate it had sent to a lender, it would make a second payment to the lender. In some of these cases, a borrower signed two very similar promissory notes, sometimes within several weeks of each other, and EDS paid lenders for the same loan twice. In most examples we analyzed in which borrowers had not been credited for refunds made on their behalf, we verified that EDS received a refund, but we could not determine whether the refund transaction had been forwarded to the direct loan servicer, CDSI/AFSA, for posting in the FDLP servicing system. Lenders also said that EDS’ customer service to lenders had been uneven. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed problems lenders had with William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) consolidation loans, focusing on: (1) the nature and source of problems Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) lenders have encountered in the direct loan consolidation program; (2) whether these problems affected lenders; and (3) steps the Department of Education and its contractor, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) are taking to correct these problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) lenders said their problems came primarily at two stages in the consolidation process--verifying loan data EDS provided and receiving payments for the loans being consolidated; (2) these problems occurred, in part, because borrowers provided poor information or EDS used inaccurate Education-provided data to identify lenders' addresses for loan verification requests; (3) regarding the payments lenders received, in some examples EDS sent inaccurate payments to lenders for loans being consolidated; (4) some lenders received overpayments because EDS paid for the same loan more than once; (5) other examples GAO analyzed had more serious problems, such as several instances in which EDS charged one borrower for a second borrower's loans; (6) however, lenders also received underpayments on occasion, which occurred because not all loans a borrower owed and wanted to consolidate were paid off; (7) in addition to the two problems lenders raised about the process, GAO found a flaw in the transfer of data from EDS to the FDLP servicing system; (8) GAO found that refunds that lenders made for overpayments were not always credited to a borrower's new consolidation loan account; (9) lenders' representatives said that problems associated with FDLP consolidations adversely affected their operations; (10) lenders said that their staffs had to repeatedly complete verification requests or call EDS to explain that a completed certificate had previously been returned; (11) lenders' officials also said that it took time for their staffs to resolve inaccurate payments; (12) in general, however, lenders could not quantify their costs of resolving FDLP consolidation problems; (13) both Education and EDS recognized that the consolidation process had problems prior to a 3-month shutdown during which new applications were not accepted; (14) officials from both Education and EDS said that they have taken new steps to improve FDLP consolidation processing; (15) some of the changes were made during the shutdown, others went into effect as GAO was conducting its study, when EDS again began accepting new applications, and others are still being implemented; (16) EDS has devoted more resources and made system changes to improve data quality throughout the process, it has started a pilot program for electronic loan data exchange with lenders, and it has begun a review of the first 1,000 post startup applications with the goal of detecting remaining problems; and (17) lenders' representatives GAO talked with had mixed opinions about the effectiveness of these changes and said it was too early to evaluate them. |
gao_GAO-16-348 | gao_GAO-16-348_0 | While AMMD has the primary responsibility of awarding and administering contracts, AMMD often works with the AOC’s jurisdictions and offices to assist in monitoring the progress of contracts awarded to support AOC’s various projects, such as the restoration of the Capitol Dome. From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, AOC obligated, on average, $326 million annually to procure goods and services. In general, for the 21 contracts and orders we reviewed, AOC officials implemented procedures related to these critical functions, such as documenting justifications for the use of noncompetitive procedures, in a manner consistent with the manual. However, the agency conducts limited analysis of the factors driving the number of sole-source awards or the level of competition achieved across different product types. Such analysis could help identify where additional management attention may be needed to maximize competition to the fullest extent. AOC Has Developed Contracting Practices
In 2014, AOC issued a contracting manual that incorporates statutes and federal regulations applicable to the AOC, as well as internal policies in order to provide uniform policies across the agency and guidance to personnel. The manual covers topics central to AOC day-to-day contracting functions, such as acquisition planning, market research, and competition, all of which we have previously found to be key aspects of a sound acquisition process. We found that AOC employs a number of different ways of conducting market research that reflect what is in the contracting manual. Our analysis of AOC procurement data showed that the agency competed approximately 50 percent of its contract obligations for the past 3 fiscal years—compared to 65 percent for the federal government overall. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to establish mechanisms to track and assess performance against their objectives. The AOC began to collect competition data in fiscal year 2012. AOC Uses a Variety of Approaches to Monitor Contractor Performance, but Does Not Have Suspension and Debarment Procedures
AOC uses various approaches to monitor contractors’ progress and work quality and address contractor performance, but does not have suspension and debarment procedures. AOC may issue multiple notices on the same matter before it is fully addressed. Consistent with the findings from our prior work, in a September 2012 management letter, the AOC Inspector General proposed that AOC develop a suspension and debarment process as a means to deal with “unscrupulous or ineffective contractors.” According to AOC officials, the agency declined to implement that recommendation, largely because without being subject to the FAR, AOC believed it could only debar contractors from doing business with AOC, and it was thought that the small number of actions anticipated would likely not justify the cost of developing a new process. GAO, which is also a legislative branch agency, established a suspension and debarment process in 2012. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance the acquisition function, we recommend that the Architect of the Capitol take the following two actions:
Explore options for developing a more robust analysis of AOC’s competition levels, including areas such as the trends in competition over time, the use of market research to enhance competition, and the types of goods and services for which competition could be increased;
Establish a process for suspensions and debarments that is suitable for the AOC’s mission and organizational structure, focusing on policies, staff responsibilities, and a referral process. AOC agreed with our findings, concurred with our recommendations and noted it is taking steps to implement them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which AOC has developed and implemented acquisition policies and processes to guide its contracting function, and (2) the tools used by AOC to monitor and address contractor performance. We selected a non-generalizable sample of 21 contracts and orders, during this timeframe to obtain insights into AOC’s recent contracting practices. We also interviewed AOC contracting officials and contracting officer’s technical representative about their experiences in monitoring contractor performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The AOC is responsible for the maintenance, operation, and preservation of the buildings and grounds of the U.S. Capitol complex, which covers more than 17.4 million square feet in buildings and 587 acres of grounds. In fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated $600.3 million to fund AOC's operations, over half of which was used to procure various goods and services ranging from large projects like the restoration of the Capitol Dome, to routine custodial services.
GAO was asked to review the AOC's contracting practices. This report examines (1) the extent to which the AOC has developed and implemented acquisition policies and processes to guide its contracting function, and (2) the tools used by the AOC to monitor and address contractor performance. GAO reviewed the AOC's acquisition policies, interviewed contracting officials, and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 21 contracts and task or delivery orders with dollars obligated in fiscal years 2013 through 2015. The sample consists of a mix of high-value contracts for goods and services.
What GAO Found
The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) recently implemented a contracting manual that centralizes current law and regulations applicable to the AOC, as well as policies, orders and procedures. As a legislative branch agency, the AOC is not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which governs executive branch agencies; however, its manual draws on the FAR and covers topics central to the AOC's day-to-day contracting functions, such as acquisition planning, market research, and competition, all of which are key aspects of a sound acquisition process. In the 21 contracts and task orders GAO reviewed, AOC officials generally followed the policies in the contracting manual related to these critical functions—such as documenting justifications for the use of noncompetitive procedures.
The AOC began to collect competition data in fiscal year 2012, but the agency only conducts a limited assessment of its efforts to achieve competition. The AOC manual states it is agency policy to promote competition, and federal internal control standards state that agencies should establish mechanisms to track and assess performance against their objectives. While the AOC monitors data to track the number of sole-source contracts awarded, other analyses are limited. GAO's analysis of the AOC's data found that the agency competed approximately 50 percent of its contract obligations for the past 3 fiscal years—compared to 65 percent for the overall federal government. By examining the factors driving the number of sole-source awards or level of competition across different product types, AOC may be better positioned to identify where additional management attention may be needed to maximize competition.
The AOC uses a variety of approaches to monitor contractor performance on its projects, with contracting officers and their technical representatives being the primary officials responsible for providing oversight. The AOC uses a number of methods to address contractor performance problems, as shown in the figure below.
While the AOC has tools for addressing poor performance on specific contracts, it does not have a suspension and debarment process in place that could bar irresponsible contractors from working for the AOC or provide notice to other government agencies. Past GAO work has shown that having suspension and debarment procedures is critical to ensuring that the government only does business with responsible contractors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that AOC explore options for developing a more robust analysis of its competition levels and establish a suspension and debarment process suitable to its mission and structure. AOC agreed with GAO's findings and concurred with the two recommendations and noted it is taking steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-774T | gao_GAO-06-774T_0 | In fiscal year 2005, EPA awarded about $2.4 billion in nondiscretionary grants. EPA Has Strengthened the Award Process, but Lack of Key Documentation Raises Accountability Concerns
EPA has strengthened its award process by, among other things, expanding competition to select the most qualified applicants. EPA also issued a policy to require certain nonprofit organizations to document that they have administrative and financial systems to manage grants. While EPA has improved its award process, its internal reviews in program and regional offices have found that staff do not always fully document their reviews of grantees’ cost proposals. This documentation problem may hinder EPA’s ability to ensure the reasonableness of its grantees’ estimated costs for performing the proposed work. Because of the continuing problems with documenting cost reviews, EPA is reexamining its cost review policy for grants. In-depth Monitoring Results Can Be Analyzed Nationwide to Identify Problems, but Staff Do Not Always Document Whether Corrective Actions Have Been Taken
EPA has begun to review the results of its in-depth monitoring to identify systemic grantee problems, but staff do not always document whether grantees have taken corrective actions. A lack of documentation raises questions about the adequacy of the project officers’ and grant specialists’ ongoing monitoring of grantee performance. During closeout, EPA ensures that the grant recipient has met all financial requirements and provided final technical reports, and ensures that any unexpended balances are “deobligated” and returned to the agency. EPA’s current performance measure for closing out grants is a valuable tool for determining if grants were ultimately closed out. In fact, for fiscal year 2005, EPA closed out only 37 percent of the grants within the 180 days. However, it took the region an additional 591 days after the grantee provided the final reports to close out the grant. EPA Has Initiated Actions to Obtain Results from Grants, but Its Efforts Are Not Complete
EPA has taken steps to obtain environmental results from its grants, but its efforts are not complete. EPA included a performance measure in its Grants Management Plan for identifying expected environmental results from grants and issued an environmental results policy, effective in January 2005. To assess the agency’s effectiveness in implementing its environmental results policy, EPA identified seven criteria that grant agreements should meet. Furthermore, EPA acknowledges that it has not identified better ways to integrate its systems for reporting on the results of grants. While EPA has taken positive steps by issuing a results policy, OMB’s evaluation of EPA grant programs in 2006 indicate that EPA must continue its concerted efforts to achieve results from its grants. EPA Has Taken Steps to Manage Grants Staff and Resources More Effectively but Still Faces Major Management Problems
EPA has taken steps to manage grants staff and resources more effectively in four key areas: (1) analyzing workload; (2) providing training on grant policies; (3) assessing the reliability of the agency’s grants management computer database; and (4) holding managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their grant responsibilities. Nevertheless, management attention to these four issues is still needed. Holding managers and staff accountable. In response, EPA issued a plan in January 2006 to ensure that the agency’s new performance appraisal system addresses grants management responsibilities. Mr. Chairman, about 3 years into its Grants Management Plan, 2003- 2008, EPA has made important strides in achieving its grant reforms, but it has not resolved its long-standing problems in documenting ongoing monitoring and closing out grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has faced challenges for many years in managing its grants, which constitute over one-half of the agency's budget, or about $4 billion annually. EPA awards grants through 93 programs to such recipients as state and local governments, tribes, universities, and nonprofit organizations. In response to concerns about its ability to manage grants effectively, EPA issued its 5-year Grants Management Plan in 2003, with performance measures and targets. This testimony is based on GAO's May 2006 report, Grants Management: EPA Has Made Progress in Grant Reforms but Needs to Address Weaknesses in Implementation and Accountability (GAO-06-625). GAO examined EPA's progress in implementing its grant reforms in four key areas: (1) awarding grants, (2) monitoring grantees, (3) obtaining results from grants, and (4) managing grant staff and resources.
What GAO Found
EPA has made important strides in achieving the grant reforms laid out in its 2003 Grants Management Plan, but weaknesses in implementation and accountability continue to hamper effective grants management in four areas. First, EPA has strengthened its award process by, among other things, (1) expanding the use of competition to select the most qualified applicants and (2) issuing new policies and guidance to improve the awarding of grants. However, EPA's reviews found that staff do not always fully document their assessments of grantees' cost proposals; GAO also identified this problem in one region. Lack of documentation may hinder EPA's ability to be accountable for the reasonableness of a grantee's proposed costs. EPA is reexamining its cost review policy to address this problem. Second, EPA has made progress in reviewing its in-depth monitoring results to identify systemic problems, but long-standing issues remain in documenting ongoing monitoring and closing out grants. EPA and GAO found that staff do not always document ongoing monitoring, which is critical for determining if a grantee is on track in meeting its agreement. Without documentation, questions arise about the adequacy of EPA's monitoring of grantee performance. In addition, grant closeouts are needed to ensure that grantees have met all financial requirements, provided their final reports, and returned any unexpended balances. For fiscal year 2005, EPA closed out only 37 percent of its grants within 180 days after the grant project ended, as required by its policy. EPA also did not always close out grants properly in the regional files GAO reviewed. Third, EPA has initiated actions to obtain environmental results from its grants, but these efforts are not complete. For example, EPA's 2005 environmental results policy establishes criteria that grants should meet to obtain results. However, EPA has not established a performance measure that addresses these criteria. Furthermore, EPA has not yet identified better ways to integrate its grant reporting systems. The Office of Management and Budget's 2006 assessment also indicates that EPA needs to continue its concerted efforts to achieve results from grants. Finally, EPA has taken steps to manage grant staff and resources more effectively by analyzing workload, providing training, assessing the reliability of its grants management computer database, and holding managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their grant responsibilities. Management attention is still needed because, among other things, EPA has just begun to implement its performance appraisal system for holding managers and staff accountable for grants management. |
gao_GAO-13-176 | gao_GAO-13-176_0 | These entities include drug wholesalers, independent pharmacies, PSAOs, and third-party payers and their PBMs. These sales accounted for almost 17 percent of the $266 billion in prescription drug sales in the United States in 2010. Third-party payers include private and public health plans such as those offered by large corporations and the federal government through Medicare and the FEHBP, many of which use PBMs to help them manage their prescription drug benefits. 1 for a diagram of the network of entities in the distribution of and payment for pharmaceuticals.) At Least 22 PSAOs Contracted with over 20,000 Pharmacies in 2011 or 2012, the Majority of Which Were Independent Pharmacies
At least 22 PSAOs, which varied in the number and location of pharmacies to which they provided services, were in operation in 2011 or 2012. In total, depending on different data sources, these 22 PSAOs represented or provided other services to between 20,275 and 28,343 pharmacies in 2011 or 2012. The number of pharmacies contracted with each PSAO across these sources ranged from 24 to 5,000 pharmacies; however, according to NCPDP data most contracted with fewer than 1,000 pharmacies. Some PSAOs contracted primarily with pharmacies located in a particular region. These PSAOs generally represented fewer pharmacies than PSAOs representing pharmacies across the United States. PSAOs Provide Independent Pharmacies with a Range of Services Intended to Achieve Administrative Efficiencies, and Most PSAOs Are Paid a Monthly Fee for These Services
PSAOs provide a broad range of services to independent pharmacies including negotiating contractual agreements and providing communication and help-desk services. Both the HHS OIG and an industry study reported that small businesses such as independent pharmacies generally lack the legal expertise and time to adequately review and negotiate third-party payer or PBM contracts, which can be lengthy and complex.independent pharmacies that we reviewed indicated, and all of the PSAOs we spoke with stated, that the PSAO was explicitly authorized to negotiate and enter into contracts with third-party payers on behalf of member pharmacies. All of the model agreements between PSAOs and PSAOs we spoke with had different processes for negotiating and entering into contracts with third-party payers or their PBMs. In addition to communicating contractual requirements, PSAOs may also communicate applicable federal and state regulatory updates. PSAOs may provide such assistance by means of a help-desk (or customer service department) or a dedicated staff person. For example, PSAOs may provide services that help the pharmacy with payment from a third- party payer or its PBM, comply with third-party payer requirements, or develop services that make the pharmacy more appealing to third-party payers or their PBMs. PSAOs Provide Services Intended to Achieve Administrative Efficiencies for Independent Pharmacies and Third- Party Payers or Their PBMs
PSAOs provide services intended to achieve administrative efficiencies for both independent pharmacies and third-party payers or their PBMs. Most PSAOs Charge a Monthly Fee for Bundled Services and Additional Fees for Other Services
Although PSAOs’ charges to member pharmacies for their services may vary depending on how the services are provided, 8 of the 10 PSAOs we spoke with charged a monthly fee for a bundled set of services. Virtually all of the fees for PSAO services are paid for by member pharmacies. Wholesalers and Independent Pharmacy Cooperatives Owned the Majority of PSAOs; Requirements to Use Non-PSAO Services Varied by Owner
The majority of PSAOs in operation in 2011 or 2012 were owned by wholesalers and independent pharmacy cooperatives.PSAO owners varied as to whether they require member pharmacies to also use the non-PSAO services they offer. Specifically, of the 22 PSAOs we identified, 9 PSAOs were owned by wholesalers, 6 were owned by independent pharmacy cooperatives (“member-owned”), 4 were owned by group purchasing organizations, and 3 were stand- alone PSAOs owned by other private entities. PSAO owners may operate PSAOs for a number of reasons, including to benefit another, non-PSAO line of their business. Other types of PSAO owners also provided a number of reasons for providing PSAO services, for instance, a number of these owners stated that they began offering PSAO services as a market-driven response to the growth of third-party payers and PBMs. PSAO Owners Vary As to Whether They Require Member Pharmacies to Use Their Non-PSAO Services
The owners of PSAOs we spoke with varied as to whether they require PSAO member pharmacies to also use services from a separate non- PSAO line of their business. Of the remaining three, one wholesaler-owned PSAO limited its offer of services to pharmacies that were existing customers of its drug distribution line of business, while two member-owned PSAOs reported requiring their PSAO member pharmacies to join their group purchasing organizations. In this case, a pharmacy must contract and pay for PSAO and other services separately. | Why GAO Did This Study
Independent pharmacies dispensed about 17 percent of all prescription drugs in the United States in 2010. To obtain, distribute, and collect payment for drugs dispensed, pharmacies interact with a network of entities, including drug wholesalers and third-party payers. With limited time and resources, independent pharmacies may need assistance in interacting with these entities, particularly with third-party payers that include large private and public health plans. Most use a PSAO to interact on their behalf. PSAOs develop networks of pharmacies by signing contractual agreements with each pharmacy that authorizes them to interact with third-party payers on the pharmacy's behalf by, for example, negotiating contracts. While specific services provided by PSAOs may vary, PSAOs can be identified and distinguished from other entities in the pharmaceutical distribution and payment system by their provision of intermediary or other services to assist pharmacies with third-party payers.
GAO was asked to review the role of PSAOs. In this report, GAO describes: (1) how many PSAOs are in operation and how many pharmacies contract with PSAOs for services; (2) the services PSAOs offer and how they are paid for these services; and (3) entities that own PSAOs and the types of relationships that exists between owners and the pharmacies they represent. GAO analyzed data on PSAOs in operation in 2011 and 2012, reviewed literature on PSAOs and model agreements from 8 PSAOs, and interviewed federal agencies and entities in the pharmaceutical industry.
What GAO Found
At least 22 pharmacy services administrative organizations (PSAO), which varied in the number and location of the pharmacies to which they provided services, were in operation in 2011 or 2012. In total, depending on different data sources, these PSAOs represented or provided other services to between 20,275 and 28,343 pharmacies in 2011 or 2012, most of which were independent pharmacies. While the number of pharmacies with which each PSAO contracted ranged from 24 to 5,000 pharmacies, most PSAOs represented or provided other services to fewer than 1,000 pharmacies. Additionally, some PSAOs contracted with pharmacies primarily located in a particular region rather than contracting with pharmacies located across the United States.
While PSAOs provide a broad range of services to independent pharmacies, and vary in how they offer these services, PSAOs consistently provide contract negotiation, communication, and help-desk services. All of the model agreements between PSAOs and independent pharmacies that GAO reviewed stated that the PSAO will negotiate and enter into contracts with third-party payers on behalf of member pharmacies. PSAOs may also contract with pharmacy benefit managers (PBM), which many third-party payers use to manage their prescription drug benefit. In addition to contracting, PSAOs also communicate information to members regarding contractual and regulatory requirements, and provide general and claims-specific assistance to members by means of a help-desk or a dedicated staff person. They may also provide other services to help member pharmacies interact with third-party payers or their PBMs, such as managing and analyzing payment and drug-dispensing data to identify claims unpaid or incorrectly paid by a third-party payer. PSAO services are intended to achieve administrative efficiencies, including contract and payment efficiencies for both independent pharmacies and third-party payers or their PBMs. Most PSAOs charge a monthly fee for a bundle of services and may charge additional fees for other services provided to its member pharmacies. Virtually all of the fees paid for PSAO services are paid by member pharmacies, with PSAOs receiving no administrative fees from other entities such as third-party payers or their PBMs.
The majority of PSAOs in operation in 2011 or 2012 were owned by drug wholesalers and independent pharmacy cooperatives. Of the 22 PSAOs we identified, 9 PSAOs were owned by wholesalers, 6 were owned by independent pharmacy cooperatives, 4 were owned by group purchasing organizations, and 3 were stand-alone PSAOs owned by other private entities. These owners varied in their requirements for PSAO member pharmacies to also use services from their separate, non-PSAO line of business. Three PSAO owners GAO spoke with required PSAO members to also use their non-PSAO services. For example, one wholesaler-owned PSAO limited its offer of PSAO services to existing customers of its drug distribution line of business. All but one PSAO owner GAO spoke with reported that their PSAO line of business earned little to no profit. However, PSAO owners may operate PSAOs for a number of reasons, including helping pharmacies gain access to third-party payer contracts and to provide benefits to the owner's non-PSAO line of business. |
gao_GGD-97-157 | gao_GGD-97-157_0 | Scope and Methodology
To provide information on private sector companies’ and federal agencies’ reasons for using ADR, the types of ADR these organizations have made available through procedures other than those under collective bargaining agreements, the extent to which they have put these processes in place, and the results they may have achieved, we spoke with experts and practitioners knowledgeable about the use of ADR in the private and federal sectors, and reviewed the literature about ADR and information available from past reports and surveys. To illustrate private and federal sector organizations’ experiences in planning and implementing ADR processes, the extent to which they evaluated their ADR processes and the extent to which they reported that these processes have been successful in resolving workplace disputes and lessening costs, and the lessons they reported having learned, we judgmentally selected for study five private sector companies and five federal agencies that had some experience with ADR. Interest in ADR Grew With the Rising Tide of Discrimination Complaints
In both the private and federal sectors, the time and cost pressures that helped spur the use of ADR increased when the number of discrimination complaints rose sharply in the early 1990s. We identified five main ADR methods available to many private sector employees and, in some instances, to federal employees: ombudsmen, mediation, peer panels, management review and dispute resolution boards, and arbitration. In 1994, according to a survey we did, about 52 percent of private firms had some type of ADR process in place for discrimination complaints. While most of the organizations we studied gave only limited attention to formally evaluating their ADR programs, the common thread among our case illustrations was a continuing use of ADR and a perception that ADR was worthwhile. These lessons were varied, but many of them centered on ensuring that the appropriate ADR methods were used and that they fulfilled their potential. Four of the organizations said they had learned the importance of involving employees in the development of their ADR programs. Two federal agencies—Walter Reed and Agriculture—said they learned that special care must be given to balancing the desire to settle and close cases against the need for fairness to employees and managers alike. Specifically, he asked us to provide information on (1) private sector companies’ and federal agencies’ reasons for using ADR, (2) the types of ADR these organizations have made available to their employees through procedures other than those under collective bargaining agreements and the extent to which they have put ADR processes in place, and (3) the results, if any, they have achieved by using ADR. 1. 2. 3. Polaroid has long offered alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques as part of its traditional dispute resolution process. With one exception, TRW pays all dispute resolution costs. Another important lesson is that the support of top management is essential to a program’s success. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on alternative dispute resolution (ADR), focusing on: (1) private sector companies' and federal agencies' reasons for using ADR; (2) the types of ADR these organizations have made available to their employees through procedures other than those under collective bargaining agreements and the extent to which they have put these ADR processes in place; and (3) the results, if any, they have achieved by using ADR.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) many private companies and federal agencies have used ADR to avoid more formal dispute resolution processes; (2) one reason for the use of ADR was that traditional dispute resolution processes have been costly, both in time and money, and became especially so as the number of discrimination complaints rose sharply in the early 1990s; (3) through a broad examination of ADR use involving interview with experts and practitioners, a review of the literature, and GAO's earlier survey of the private sector, GAO identified five main ADR methods available to private sector employees and, in some instances, to federal employees: ombudsmen, mediation, peer panels, management review and dispute resolution boards, and arbitration; (4) according to GAO's survey, in 1994, about 52 percent of private companies reported having some type of ADR process in place of discrimination complaints; these companies reported that they generally instituted ADR organizationwide; (5) private companies responding to GAO's survey generally reported employing a wider variety of ADR methods than did federal agencies; (6) experts and officials at organizations using ADR generally considered it to be successful in resolving workplace disputes; (7) the five companies and five federal agencies that GAO studied as case illustrations reported having varied but generally positive experiences with ADR; (8) most of the organizations GAO studied gave only limited attention to evaluating the results of their ADR programs and the time or cost savings these programs may have generated; (9) data were limited regarding time and cost savings; (10) the lessons that the organizations reported learning in planning, implementing, and evaluating their ADR programs varied, but many of them centered on ensuring that the appropriate ADR methods were adopted and that they fulfilled their potential; and (11) some of the lessons organizations reported learning were: (a) the importance of top management commitment in establishing and maintaining a program; (b) the importance of involving employees in the development of their ADR programs; (c) the advantage of intervening in the early stages of disputes so as to focus more on underlying interests than on hardened positions; (d) the necessity to balance the desire to settle and close cases against the need for fairness to all concerned; and (e) that ADR programs could help improve managers' understanding of the roots of conflict in their organizations. |
gao_GAO-05-787 | gao_GAO-05-787_0 | In February 2004, the District and COG submitted their respective plans to the Congress, outlining how they intended to use the foster care improvement funds. CFSA, DMH, and COG Obligated and Spent Funds for Purposes Consistent with the Appropriations Act and Spending Plans, but Some Funds Were Not Used
We found that CFSA, DMH, and COG obligated and expended the federal funds provided for foster care improvement for purposes consistent with the appropriations act and organizations’ spending plans. At that time, over $12.4 million of the $13.9 million provided remained unobligated. As of March 31, 2005, about $6.2 million of the total obligated funds had been expended and about $722,524 remained unobligated. The unobligated funds for CFSA and DMH, in the amounts of $588,859 and $30,545 respectively, ceased to be available for new obligations after September 30, 2004, and should revert to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. However, in conducting our tests, we found three instances worth discussion. These involved the need for sufficient documentation, better adherence to operating procedures, and greater control over physical assets. New Programs Have Been Implemented to Improve Foster Care, but Challenges Remain
CFSA, DMH, and COG have implemented the programs and initiatives specified in the appropriations act and spending plans, and some foster families have received needed services. CFSA also established a student loan repayment program, developed an information technology plan, and provided laptops to some caseworkers. However, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of some programs, and challenges remain for others. Emergency Support Fund Provided Critical Services, but the Number of Unlicensed Homes Remained the Same
One goal of the emergency support fund is to help facilitate the licensing of family members who are willing to provide kinship homes to care for children who would otherwise go into traditional foster homes or congregate care. Most Eligible Caseworkers Participated in the Student Loan Repayment Program, but More Could Have Been Supported
About 70 percent of CFSA’s eligible caseworkers participated in the student loan repayment program and most were approved for payments of more than $10,000. In fiscal year 2003, CFSA’s attrition rate for caseworkers was about 15 percent. In fiscal year 2004, the rate had increased to about 18 percent. DMH faces ongoing challenges in building the mental health system’s capacity to provide timely assessments and in securing long-term funding for treatment services for foster care children. COG’s Respite Program Was More Challenging to Implement Than Expected
COG, in conjunction with CFSA and FAPAC, developed a respite program for foster parents of the District’s children. As of June 2005, 62 respite foster parents had been trained, and 7 had completed the licensing process. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To assess whether the federal funds were being obligated and expended by the Child and Family Service Agency (CFSA), Department of Mental Health (DMH) and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) consistent with the provisions in the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2004, and the spending plans that were submitted to the Congress, we interviewed District and COG officials responsible for overseeing, monitoring, and tracking the federal funds received for foster care improvements. To determine whether internal controls are operating effectively, we interviewed financial and program personnel from CFSA, DMH, COG, and from the District government’s central Office of the Chief Financial Officer. To assess the extent to which CFSA, DMH, and COG have implemented the foster care improvement programs and initiatives specified in the appropriations act and spending plans, we gathered and analyzed data from various sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help improve foster care in the District of Columbia, the Congress provided $14 million for fiscal year 2004 to the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), the Department of Mental Health (DMH), and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG). These funds were for programs for early intervention, emergency support, and student loan repayments; computer technology upgrades, mental health services, and respite care (short-term care to provide relief for foster parents). GAO was asked to (1) assess whether the federal funds were being obligated and expended by the District government and COG consistent with provisions in the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2004, and the spending plans that were submitted to the Congress; (2) determine whether internal controls were operating effectively over the obligations and disbursements; and (3) assess the extent to which the District government and COG have implemented the foster care improvement programs and initiatives specified in the act and spending plans. GAO received written comments from CFSA, DMH, and COG. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and conclusions.
What GAO Found
The District and COG have used the federal funds for foster care improvements as intended by the Congress and as described in their respective spending plans. As of March 31, 2005, about $13.2 million of the funds provided had been obligated, about $6.2 million of the obligated funds had been expended, and about $722,524 remained unobligated. The unobligated funds for CFSA and DMH, in the amounts of $588,859 and $30,545 respectively, ceased to be available for new obligations after September 30, 2004, and should revert to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. However, there is no such fiscal limitation on COG's use of the funds it received; thus, its unobligated $103,120 remains available for its foster care improvement program. Internal controls were generally operating effectively over obligations related to the federal funds at CFSA and DMH. Overall, we found that authorized personnel were processing and approving transactions and transactions were adequately supported. However, we found three instances worth discussion. These involved the need for sufficient documentation, better adherence to operating procedures and greater control over physical assets. CFSA, DMH, and COG have implemented the programs and initiatives specified in the appropriations act and spending plans; however, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of some and challenges remain for others. Although implementation of the early intervention program was delayed, this program helped about 150 families. Also, the emergency support fund helped about 100 kinship families--relatives who provide foster care. However, it will be a challenge for CFSA to reduce the number of unlicensed kinship homes--one program goal. Although most of CFSA's unlicensed homes are not kinship homes, 265 of the 300 unlicensed homes are not in the District and officials from other jurisdictions will play a role in the licensing process. About 70 percent of CFSA's eligible caseworkers participated in the agency's student loan repayment program. This program was intended to help recruit and retain caseworkers, but CFSA's attrition rate increased from about 15 percent in 2003 to about 18 percent in 2004. CFSA developed an information technology plan that indicates the system upgrades will be completed by the end of 2005, and provided laptops to some caseworkers. DMH increased mental health services available to foster care children; however, it faces ongoing challenges in building its capacity to provide assessments and in securing long-term funding for treatment services. COG established a respite program for foster parents, but few families completed the required licensing process, and fewer placements were made than anticipated. It may be a challenge for COG to recruit, train, and license enough respite providers and convince foster parents to participate. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-216 | gao_T-HEHS-96-216_0 | The extent to which negotiated rebates and discounts with drug manufacturers and pharmacies have controlled costs can be substantial. The success of insurers and other institutional buyers in using their consolidated buying power to reduce the price they pay for drugs has not been shared by retail pharmacists. As health insurers and the PBMs that represent them cover more people, they use the size of their member populations as leverage to help reduce the amounts that they reimburse pharmacies for prescriptions dispensed to those populations. All these pressures on retail pharmacies have had a considerable effect. Responses of Retail Pharmacists
Retail pharmacists have resorted to three different types of action in response to the changes in pharmaceutical pricing: litigation, adoption of competitive strategies, and calls for legislation. Prescription Drugs: Changes in Prices for Selected Drugs (GAO/HRD-92-128, Aug. 24, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implications of prescription drug pricing for retail pharmacies, focusing on the: (1) changes in the process of getting prescription drugs from manufacturers to patients; and (2) consequences for and response of retail pharmacies to these changes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) health insurers have used their consolidated buying power to obtain drug discounts not available to retail pharmacies; (2) health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) use the size of their member populations as leverage to help reduce the amounts that they reimburse pharmacies for prescriptions dispensed to those populations; (3) retail pharmacies have been facing increased competition from mail order pharmacies; and (4) retail pharmacies have responded to the changes in pharmaceutical pricing by waging lawsuits against leading drug manufacturers and wholesalers, developing more competitive strategies for gaining business, and campaigning for legislative action. |
gao_HEHS-99-68 | gao_HEHS-99-68_0 | Specifically, the order required, among other things, that Medicare HMOs (1) issue denial notices within no more than 5 working days of the request for service or payment and at least 1 working day before the reduction or termination of treatment, (2) clearly state the reason for the denial in the notice, (3) expedite appeals when services are urgently needed (within 3 working days of the request), and (4) continue acute care services until a final appeal decision is issued when the beneficiary requests an expedited appeal. Medicare Beneficiaries Can Appeal Plan Decisions
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans have a multilevel appeals process available if plans refuse to pay for requested services, refuse to provide requested services, or discontinue or reduce services.Beneficiaries generally appeal to their plan first. Appeals Process Starts at Managed Care Plan but Is Subject to External Review
The appeals process may begin when a Medicare member asks his or her plan to provide a service, such as skilled nursing care or a referral to a specialist, or pay for a service already obtained and is turned down. To make a reconsidered decision, the plan representative reviews the initial decision and all other evidence submitted by the beneficiary, beneficiary representative, provider, and health plan. HCFA has modified its contract with CHDR requiring CHDR to be held to the same time standards as the plans for processing appeals. Medicare beneficiaries can request expedited decisions when they believe that waiting the standard time for an initial decision or an appeal of the initial decision could seriously jeopardize their health or life. First, dissatisfied beneficiaries may disenroll and switch to another plan or fee-for-service instead of appealing. Second, beneficiaries may be unfamiliar with their appeal rights or the appeals process. The 242 Medicare HMOs that responded to our recent survey reported an average of about 9 appeals annually per 1,000 beneficiaries between January 1996 and May 1998 (see table 1). Some Beneficiaries May Disenroll Instead of Filing Appeals
The number of appeals may understate beneficiaries’ dissatisfaction with their HMO’s initial decision if some disenroll instead of appealing. Denial Notices Are Sometimes Incomplete or Never Issued
Beneficiaries are supposed to be informed of their appeal rights when they receive a written notice from their plan denying a service or payment.These notices are required to state that the beneficiary has the right to appeal if he or she believes the plan’s initial determination is incorrect. Also, vague notices may hinder beneficiaries from appealing because they may be uncertain as to whether they are entitled to the requested services. If the beneficiary appeals and loses, he or she is responsible for the cost associated with services received after the date specified in the denial notice. HCFA’s Monitoring Protocol Systematically Misses Beneficiaries Who May Not Have Been Informed of Their Appeal Rights
To determine whether plans informed beneficiaries of their appeal rights, HCFA’s monitoring protocol requires agency staff to review a sample of appeal cases. Yet HCFA does not check cases where services or payment for services were denied and not appealed. Comments From the Health Care Financing Administration
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicare's managed care beneficiary appeals process, focusing on: (1) the appeals process available to beneficiaries when managed care plans deny care or payment for services; (2) beneficiaries' use of the appeals process and the extent to which they are informed of their appeal rights; and (3) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) oversight of this process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans have the right to appeal if their plans refuse to provide health services or pay for services already obtained; (2) upon receipt of the written denial notice, the beneficiary may appeal and the health plan must reconsider its initial decision; (3) if the plan's reconsidered decision is not fully favorable to the beneficiary, the case is automatically sent to the Center for Health Dispute Resolution (CHDR) to review the decision; (4) CHDR may overturn or uphold the plan's decision; (5) a beneficiary is entitled to an expedited decision from the plan, both on the initial request and on appeal, if the standard time for making the decision could endanger his or her health or life; (6) a beneficiary who is dissatisfied with CHDR's decision may appeal further to an administrative law judge and then to a U.S. District Court provided certain requirements are met; (7) health maintenance organizations (HMO) reported an average of approximately 9 appeals per 1,000 Medicare members annually between January 1996 and May 1998; (8) HMOs reversed their original denial in about 75 percent of appeal cases; (9) the number of appeals may understate beneficiaries' dissatisfaction with the initial decisions by HMOs for two reasons: (a) some beneficiaries may disenroll and switch to another plan or fee-for-service Medicare instead of appealing; and (b) some beneficiaries may not appeal because they are unfamiliar with their appeal rights or the appeals process; (10) GAO found that beneficiaries frequently received incomplete notices that failed to explain their appeal rights, and some beneficiaries did not receive any notices; (11) notices often do not state a specific reason for the denial; as a result, beneficiaries may be uncertain as to whether they are entitled to the requested services and thus discouraged from appealing; (12) GAO also found that beneficiaries may receive little advance notice when plans decide to discontinue paying for services, which places these beneficiaries at financial risk should they decide to continue treatment during their appeal; (13) beneficiaries who lose their appeals are responsible for the treatment costs incurred after the date specified in the denial notice; (14) the agency does not determine whether beneficiaries who were denied services but did not appeal were informed of their appeal rights, nor does it monitor provider groups that contract with health plans; and (15) HCFA has not used available information to develop more effective plan oversight strategies. |
gao_GAO-02-168T | gao_GAO-02-168T_0 | Balancing Competing Priorities
As previously mentioned, INS’ mission involves carrying out two primary functions—enforcing immigration laws and providing services or benefits to eligible legal immigrants. These functions often translate into competing priorities at the program level that need to be balanced for effective program implementation. Our recent work shows that coordination and communication is still a problem. Our work and the work of an INS contractor both found that INS did not have a structure in place to manage the information that adjudicators needed to make correct decisions. In one case, the lack of communication and unclear policies and procedures had tragic consequences. Information Technology
INS has had long-standing difficulty developing and fielding information systems to support its program operations. Both are in the early planning stages. | What GAO Found
The Immigration and Naturalization's (INS) organizational structure has led to recurring management problems, including an inability to balance competing priorities, poor communications, and weaknesses in the development and fielding of critical information technology. Although restructuring may help, INS will still need to assemble the basic building blocks essential to any organization. These building blocks include clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures that effectively balance competing priorities, effective internal and external communication and coordination, and computer systems that provide accurate and timely information. Until these element are in place, it will be difficult to enforce the nation's immigration laws effectively. |
gao_GAO-01-931 | gao_GAO-01-931_0 | In the fiscal year 2002 plan, GSA described its overall strategy for achieving this new goal. In contrast with its fiscal year 1999 performance report, GSA’s fiscal year 2000 report either discussed for all unmet goals the reasons why the goals were not achieved or explained that GSA was studying these matters. Conclusions
Our analysis indicates that both the fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan were more informative and useful documents than GSA’s prior year report and plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the General Services Administration's (GSA) performance report for fiscal year 2000 and its performance plan for fiscal year 2002 to assess GSA's progress in achieving key outcomes important to its mission.
What GAO Found
GAO found that some goals were met or exceeded and others were not met. For fiscal year 2002, GSA set up a strategy to better meet these goals. Overall, GSA's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 plan were more informative and useful than its report and plan from last year. |
gao_GAO-09-748 | gao_GAO-09-748_0 | FDCPA Is the Primary Federal Law Governing Third-party Debt Collection Practices
Congress has passed several laws that govern the practices of creditors or third parties in the collection of debt, including FDCPA, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). While FDCPA does not apply directly to credit card issuers collecting on their own debts, some of the practices prohibited by the statute, if engaged in by financial institutions, may support a claim of unfair or deceptive practices in violation of the FTC Act, which is the statute on which the federal depository regulators rely in overseeing collection activities. As with FTC, a number of state regulators make efforts to educate consumers about their rights under federal and state fair debt collection laws. Delinquent Credit Card Debt May Be Collected Internally, Outsourced, or Sold
Large credit card issuers first seek to recover delinquent debt using internal collection departments or first-party collection agencies that collect debt using the issuer’s name. When large issuers are unable to collect these accounts, they typically send them to third- party collection agencies or collection law firms. Contracts between issuers and collection agencies often specify the policies and procedures to be used during the collection process. Credit Card Debt Often Is Sold and Resold
Issuers often sell portfolios of delinquent credit card debt to debt-buying companies. Credit card accounts can be resold multiple times. For example, accounts that are 91 days to 6 months past due and never previously placed for collection generally receive the highest prices, while older accounts and those previously placed for collection typically receive far lower prices. Certain Issues Exist about Some Debt Collection Practices and FDCPA Does Not Address Some Changes That Have Occurred in Technology and the Marketplace
State and federal enforcement actions, anecdotal evidence, and the volume of consumer complaints to federal agencies—about such things as excessive telephone calls or the addition of unauthorized fees—suggest that problems exist with some processes and practices involved in the collection of credit card debt, although the prevalence of such problems is not known. Some state agencies also collect consumer complaints about debt collection practices. Collection of time-barred debt. According to FTC and other stakeholders, collection agencies and debt buyers sometimes may not have adequate information about their accounts and may not always have access to documentation needed to verify the debt. Collection companies sometimes have faced difficulties in trying to use these technologies while remaining in compliance with the act: Answering machines and voice mail. However, the debt collector may also violate FDCPA if someone other than the debtor overhears a telephone recording revealing the debt collection effort. FDCPA restricts the hours in which debt collectors can call consumers and prohibits collectors from imposing additional telephone charges on consumers. Second, because FDCPA was enacted prior to the advent of technologies such as mobile telephones, e-mail, and voice mail, its provisions on communicating with consumers are outdated. Among such modifications, Congress should consider, in particular, options for modifying FDCPA to help ensure that debt collectors and debt buyers have adequate information about the debts transferred and adequate documentation to verify the debts they seek to collect from consumers, reflect technologies that were not prevalent when the act was originally enacted, and provide FTC with the authority to issue rules to implement the act. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to examine (1) the protections provided consumers under federal and state laws related to credit card debt collection, and the roles and responsibilities of federal and state agencies in enforcing these laws; (2) the processes and practices involved in collecting and selling delinquent credit card debt; and (3) any issues that may exist related to some of these processes and practices. In addition, we met with six third-party debt collection agencies, six companies that purchase credit card debt, one law firm that specializes in debt collection, and one collection attorney. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 6.6 percent of credit cards were 30 or more days past due in the first quarter of 2009--the highest rate in 18 years. To recover delinquent debt, credit card issuers may use their own collection departments, outside collection agencies, collection law firms, or sell the debt. GAO was asked to examine (1) the federal and state consumer protections and enforcement responsibilities related to credit card debt collection, (2) the processes and practices involved in collecting and selling delinquent credit card debt, and (3) any issues that may exist related to some of these processes and practices. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed representatives from six large credit card issuers, six third-party debt collection agencies, six debt buyers, two law firms, federal and state agencies, and attorneys and organizations representing consumers and collectors.
What GAO Found
The primary federal law governing third-party debt collection is the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which contains provisions on how collectors can communicate with consumers and prohibits collectors from using abusive, deceptive, and unfair collection practices. Some states have fair debt collection laws that provide protections additional to those of FDCPA. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the primary enforcement agency for the debt collection industry; it collects consumer complaints, enforces violations of relevant laws, and undertakes consumer education efforts. Federal depository regulators oversee credit card issuers' collection practices, and various state agencies enforce state fair debt collection laws. Collecting and selling delinquent debt involves multiple parties. Credit card issuers typically collect on accounts less than 6 months delinquent using internal collection departments or "first-party" agencies that collect under the issuer's name, and often hire third-party collection agencies or law firms to collect on older accounts. Contracts between issuers and collectors often specify the collection policies and practices used. Third-party collection agencies rely primarily on telephone calls and postal mail in their operations, but often use automated mail systems and other technologies to do so efficiently in large volume. Credit card accounts often are sold--and may be resold multiple times. Several factors influence the price of these accounts, including their age, location, and number of times previously placed for collection. State and federal enforcement actions, anecdotal evidence, and the volume of consumer complaints to federal agencies--about such things as excessive telephone calls or the addition of unauthorized fees--suggest that problems exist with some processes and practices involved in the collection of credit card debt, although the prevalence of such problems is not known. One issue is that collection agencies and debt buyers often may not have adequate information about their accounts--sometimes leading the collector to try to collect from the wrong consumer or for the wrong amount--or may not have access to billing statements or other documentation needed to verify the debt. Further, with the advent of the debt-buying industry, accounts are frequently sold and resold, which can make verification more difficult as the owner of the debt becomes farther removed from the original creditor. Communications technologies that are ubiquitous today, such as mobile telephones, e-mail, and voice mail, were not prevalent when FDCPA was enacted in 1977. Significant uncertainty exists about how to use these technologies in compliance with the statute--for example, a debt collector may violate FDCPA if someone other than the debtor overhears a voice mail message revealing the debt collection effort. Additionally, FDCPA does not provide FTC with rulemaking authority, which has limited the agency's ability to address concerns related to the adequacy of account information, collectors' use of modern technologies, and other issues that arise in an evolving marketplace. |
gao_GAO-05-67 | gao_GAO-05-67_0 | reviewed and analyzed IRS reports, testimonies, budget submissions, other documents and data, including workload data and data from IRS’s current suite of balanced performance measures, which we used to assess performance this year; interviewed IRS officials about current operations, performance relative to 2004 goals and prior filing seasons, and significant factors and initiatives that affected performance; interviewed representatives of large private and non-profit organizations that prepare tax returns and trade organizations that represent both individual practitioners and tax preparation companies; reviewed related TIGTA reports and interviewed TIGTA officials; followed up on GAO recommendations made in prior filing season and tested for statistical differences between yearly changes for various IRS analyzed information posted to IRS’s Internet Web site based on GAO’s knowledge of the type of information taxpayers look for, and assessed the ease of finding information, as well as the accuracy and currency of data on the site; reviewed information from companies that evaluated Internet performance and assessed various aspects of IRS's Web site; and reviewed staffing data for paper and electronic processing, telephone assistance, and walk-in assistance. IRS Has Generally Improved Its Performance Processing Tax Returns but Does Not Expect to Meet Its Long-Term Electronic Filing Goal
IRS processed individual income tax returns and issued refunds smoothly in 2004. IRS nearly met or exceeded many of its 2004 performance goals, with performance generally improving since 2001. However, despite continued growth this year and despite various initiatives to encourage electronic filing, IRS is not on track to achieve its long-term goal of having 80 percent of all individual tax returns filed electronically by 2007. Appendix 1 provides details. However, the accuracy of CSR answers to tax law questions declined. Taxpayer Use of IRS Walk-in Sites Continued to Decrease While Use of Volunteer Sites Increased; Quality Data Are Limited
The total number of taxpayers visiting IRS walk-in sites continued to decrease while those having their returns prepared at volunteer sites increased. 2). Account Assistance: During the 2004 filing season, IRS did not measure account assistance accuracy at its walk-in sites. IRS Has Initiatives Under Way Intended to Better Measure Quality at Walk-in and Volunteer Sites Though Implementation May Not be Timely
IRS has initiatives under way intended to better measure the quality of key services at walk-in and volunteer sites. Use of IRS’s Web Site Increased, But Concerns Exist About a Feature for Answering Tax Law Questions
IRS’s Web site is important because it provides taxpayers and tax practitioners with customer service without having to directly contact IRS employees. It also reported that, during the filing season, IRS’s response time was consistent with other organizations being measured. IRS should be commended for its efforts to improve service. At the same time, however, we have identified several areas that present opportunities for further improvement. Until IRS fully implements these initiatives and gathers data on quality, it may not be able to effectively monitor and improve performance at its walk-in sites or volunteer sites and, as a consequence, could be risking its credibility among taxpayers who use the sites and the community-based coalitions that prepare returns at volunteer sites. Therefore, the data is likely to be reliable to show trends over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Most taxpayers have their only contact with IRS during the filing season, with tens of millions filing their returns, getting refunds, and seeking assistance by calling or visiting IRS's offices or Web site. GAO was asked to assess IRS's performance in 2004 relative to goals and prior years' performance as well as initiatives or other factors that significantly affected performance for the following areas: (1) the processing of paper and electronic returns, (2) telephone service, (3) walk-in service, and (4) Web site service.
What GAO Found
During the 2004 filing season, IRS met many of its performance goals and continued a trend of improvement in recent years. However, IRS did not improve in all dimensions of its filing season services and lacks sufficient data to evaluate quality in others. IRS processed returns and issued refunds smoothly. The proportion of returns filed electronically is up to 47 percent. Despite this achievement and numerous initiatives to increase electronic filing, IRS does not expect to reach its long-term goal of having 80 percent of all individual tax returns filed electronically by 2007. A higher percentage of taxpayers was able to reach IRS assistors by telephone than last year and the accuracy rate for providing taxpayers with information about their accounts remained stable. However, the accuracy rate for answering tax law questions declined to 2001 levels. Consistent with IRS's strategy, the number of taxpayers visiting IRS walk-in sites declined, while the number having tax returns prepared at volunteer sites increased. Finally, although IRS continued to expand its Web site services, the site's feature for answering tax law questions raises some concerns. Despite the 2004 improvements, IRS has opportunities for further service improvements. For example, IRS has limited data with which to assess the quality of key services at its walk-in sites and sites staffed by volunteers. Although IRS has initiatives under way to measure quality at both types of sites, the initiatives have been delayed and important details have not yet been determined, which may undermine IRS's efforts to improve services in this area. In the meantime, some of IRS's quality data is likely to be biased. Until IRS fully implements its initiatives and gathers data on quality, it will have difficulty monitoring and improving performance at its walk-in sites and volunteer sites. |
gao_T-RCED-96-126 | gao_T-RCED-96-126_0 | Deregulation was expected to result in (1) lower fares at large-community airports, from which many trips are long-distance, and somewhat higher fares at small- and medium-sized-community airports; (2) increased competition from new airlines entering the market; and (3) greater use of turboprop (propeller) aircraft by airlines in place of jets in smaller markets that could not economically support jet service. Our current report on changes in airfares, service, and safety since airline deregulation updated this analysis for the same 112 airports. In contrast to those airports in the West and Southwest that have experienced substantial declines in fares, these airports tend to be dominated by one or two higher-cost airlines. Large Communities Have More and Better Air Service, but the Trends for Small and Medium-Sized Communities Are Mixed
Most communities served by the airports in our sample have more air service today than they did under regulation. Because of the greater use of turboprops, some airports serving small and medium-sized communities have actually had a decrease in the number of available seats even though the number of departures has increased. Measuring the overall changes in air service quality since deregulation is more difficult than measuring the changes in quantity. 4, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed changes that have occurred in domestic aviation since the deregulation of the airline industry, focusing on changes in airline fares, service quantity and quality, and safety.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) increased competition and especially the entry of new airlines has resulted in lower air fares than before deregulation at most airports; (2) fares have risen at some airports, many of which are dominated by one or two airlines; (3) most airports have more and better quality air service, in terms of number of departures and available seats, available now than they did before deregulation, although some airports serving small- and medium-sized communities have experienced decreases in service; and (4) air travel safety has improved since deregulation, and there were no statistically significant differences in air safety rates among airports serving small, medium, or large communities. |
gao_GAO-11-38 | gao_GAO-11-38_0 | 5). Border Patrol Operates under Several Land Management Laws and Coordinates Its Responsibilities under These Laws with Land Management Agencies through National and Local Agreements
When operating on federal lands, Border Patrol has responsibilities under several federal land management laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Wilderness Act of 1964, and Endangered Species Act of 1973, and it generally coordinates its responsibilities under these laws with land management agencies through national and local interagency agreements. Border Patrol must obtain permission or a permit from federal land management agencies before its agents can undertake certain activities on federal lands, such as maintaining roads and installing surveillance equipment. Because the land management agencies are responsible for ensuring compliance with land management laws, Border Patrol and the land management agencies have developed several mechanisms to coordinate their responsibilities. The most comprehensive of these is a national-level agreement—a memorandum of understanding signed in 2006 by the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture—intended to provide consistent principles to guide their agencies’ activities on federal lands. Land Management Laws Have Limited Border Patrol’s Access to Federal Lands in Some Areas, but Most Agents-in-Charge Reported No Effect on Their Stations’ Border Security Status
Border Patrol stations’ access has been limited on some federal lands along the southwestern border because of certain land management laws, according to some patrol agents-in-charge in the borderlands region. Despite these delays and restrictions, 22 of the 26 Border Patrol stations reported that the border security status of their area of operation has not been affected by land management laws. Specifically, patrol agents-in-charge of 14 of the 17 stations reported that they have been unable to obtain a permit or permission to access certain areas in a timely manner because of how long it takes for land managers to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act. The 2006 memorandum of understanding directs the agencies to cooperate with each other to complete, in an expedited manner, all compliance required by applicable federal laws, but such cooperation has not always occurred, as shown in the following examples: Federal lands in Arizona. For example, Border Patrol requested permission to move a mobile surveillance system to a certain area, but by the time permission was granted—more than 4 months after the initial request—illegal traffic had shifted to other areas. Instead, factors other than access delays or restrictions, such as the remoteness and ruggedness of the terrain or dense vegetation, have had the greatest effect on their abilities to achieve or maintain operational control. For Four Stations Reporting That Their Security Status Has Been Affected by Land Management Laws, Agents Have Either Not Requested Additional Access or Have Had Such Requests Denied by Senior Border Patrol Officials
Of the 26 patrol agents-in-charge we interviewed, 4 reported that delays and restrictions in gaining access to federal lands have negatively affected their ability to achieve or maintain operational control: 2 of these 4 agents reported not having used Border Patrol’s operational assessments to request resources to facilitate increased or timelier access, and the other 2 reported having had such requests denied by either Border Patrol sector or headquarters officials. Some Federal Land Managers Have Collected and Used Selected Data on the Environmental Effects of Cross-Border Illegal Activity to Manage Federal Borderlands
While federal land managers along the southwestern border receive data collected by Border Patrol on the extent of cross-border illegal activities on their lands, the extent of land managers’ data collection efforts on the effects of these illegal activities has varied among land units, with some land managers regularly monitoring areas to determine resource impacts, others documenting environmental damage on an ad hoc basis, and still others collecting no such data. Nevertheless, many patrol agents-in-charge reported wanting more frequent, land unit-specific, in-person training for their agents. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the key land management laws Border Patrol operates under and how Border Patrol and land management agencies coordinate their responsibilities under these laws, (2) examine how Border Patrol operations are affected by these laws, and (3) identify the extent to which land management agencies collect data related to cross-border illegal activities and associated environmental impacts and how these data are used. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last 5 years, Border Patrol has nearly doubled the number of its agents on patrol, constructed hundreds of miles of border fence, and installed surveillance equipment on and near lands managed by the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture along the southwestern border. In so doing, the agency has had to comply with federal land management laws, and some have expressed concern that these laws may limit agents' abilities to detect and apprehend undocumented aliens. GAO was asked to examine (1) key land management laws Border Patrol operates under and how it and land management agencies coordinate their responsibilities under these laws; (2) how Border Patrol operations are affected by these laws; and (3) the extent to which land management agencies collect and use data related to the environmental effects of illegal activities, such as human trafficking and drug smuggling. GAO reviewed key land management laws, interviewed agents-in-charge at 26 Border Patrol stations responsible for patrolling federal southwest borderlands, and interviewed managers of these lands.
What GAO Found
When operating on federal lands, Border Patrol has responsibilities under several federal land management laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Wilderness Act, and Endangered Species Act. Border Patrol must obtain permission or a permit from federal land management agencies before its agents can maintain roads and install surveillance equipment on these lands. Because land management agencies are also responsible for ensuring compliance with land management laws, Border Patrol generally coordinates its responsibilities under these laws with land management agencies through national and local interagency agreements. The most comprehensive agreement is a 2006 memorandum of understanding intended to guide Border Patrol activities on federal lands. Border Patrol's access to portions of some federal lands along the southwestern border has been limited because of certain land management laws, according to patrol agents-in-charge for 17 of the 26 stations, resulting in delays and restrictions in agents' patrolling and monitoring these lands. Specifically, patrol agents-in-charge for 14 of the 17 stations reported that they have been unable to obtain a permit or permission to access certain areas in a timely manner because of how long it takes for land managers to conduct required environmental and historic property assessments. The 2006 memorandum of understanding directs the agencies to cooperate with one another to complete, in an expedited manner, all compliance required by applicable federal laws, but such cooperation has not always occurred. For example, Border Patrol requested permission to move surveillance equipment to an area, but by the time the land manager conducted a historic property assessment and granted permission--more than 4 months after the initial request--illegal traffic had shifted to other areas. Despite the access delays and restrictions, 22 of the 26 agents-in-charge reported that the overall security status of their jurisdiction is not affected by land management laws. Instead, factors such as the remoteness and ruggedness of the terrain have the greatest effect on their ability to achieve operational control. Although 4 agents-in-charge reported that delays and restrictions have affected their ability to achieve or maintain operational control, they either have not requested resources for increased or timelier access or have had their requests denied by senior Border Patrol officials, who said that other needs were more important. While federal land managers in the borderlands region rely on Border Patrol to collect data on the extent of cross-border illegal activities on their lands, the extent of the land managers' data collection efforts on the effects of these illegal activities has varied. Some land managers monitor areas on a routine basis, some document environmental damage on an ad hoc basis, and still others collect no such data. Where collected, land managers have used these data for several purposes, including restoring lands and providing Border Patrol agents with environmental awareness training. With regard to training, most agents-in-charge wanted more-frequent, area-specific training to be provided by land managers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture take steps to help Border Patrol expedite access to portions of federal lands by more quickly initiating required assessments. In commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-826T | gao_GAO-02-826T_0 | Background
DI and SSI provide cash benefits to people with long-term disabilities. This completes the initial claims process. Many individuals who appeal SSA’s initial decision will wait a year or longer for a final decision on their benefit claims. Among other things, SSA planned to develop a streamlined decision-making and appeals process, more consistent guidance and training for decision makers at all levels of the process, and an improved process for reviewing the quality of eligibility decisions. This initiative makes substantial changes to the way the DDS processes initial claims. However, interim results also indicate that more denied claimants would appeal to administrative law judges (ALJ) at hearings offices, which would increase both administrative and program costs (benefit payments) and lengthen the wait for final agency decisions for many claimants. They also include decisions to enhance the use of technology in the hearings process, as well as other refinements. The initiative has slightly reduced both case processing time and the backlog of pending cases, but the results fall significantly short of the initiative’s goals. Problems Implementing Technological Improvements Have Long Undermined SSA’s Redesign Efforts
SSA’s slow progress in achieving technological improvements has contributed, at least in part, to SSA’s lack of progress in achieving results from its redesign initiatives. As originally envisioned, SSA’s plan to redesign its disability determination process was heavily dependent upon these improvements. The agency spent a number of years designing and developing a new computer software application to automate the disability claims process. SSA expects this effort to move the agency toward a totally paperless disability claims process. SSA is optimistic that it will achieve a paperless disability claims process. Implications for Future Progress
In spite of the significant resources SSA has dedicated to improving the disability claims process since 1994, the overall results have been disappointing. SSA has focused significant energy and resources over the past 7 years on changing the steps and procedures of the process and adjusting the duties of its decision makers, yet this approach has not been effective to date. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses Social Security Administration (SSA) improvements in the claims process for its two disability programs, Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
What GAO Found
Managing its disability caseloads with fair, consistent, and timely eligibility decisions in the face of resource constraints has become one of SSA's most pressing management challenges. SSA has spent more than $39 million over the past 7 years to test and implement initiatives designed to improve the timeliness, accuracy, and consistency of its disability decisions and to make the process more efficient and understandable for claimants. These have included efforts to improve the initial claims process as well as handling appeals of denied claims. The results to date have been disappointing. SSA's two tests to improve the initial claims process produced some benefits; however, both initiatives as tested would have significantly raised costs, and one would have lengthened the wait for final decisions for many claimants. As a result, SSA is considering additional changes to one of these initiatives and has shelved the other. One initiative to change the process for handling appealed claims in SSA's hearing offices has resulted in even slower case processing and larger backlogs of pending claims. A second initiative has reduced the processing times for a separate group of appealed claims, though far less than expected. Moreover, a cross-cutting initiative to update the SSA's quality assurance program--a goal the SSA has held since 1994--is still in the planning stage. Finally, SSA's plans to improve its disability claims process relied upon hoped for technological improvements. However, SSA failed to design and develop a software application to automate the disability claims process after a 7-year effort. |
gao_GAO-17-498 | gao_GAO-17-498_0 | DOD Has Addressed the Direction to Identify Root Causes and Corrective Actions, but It Is Too Soon to Evaluate the Effectiveness of These Efforts
In its September 2015 report, DOD addressed the committee direction to identify root causes regarding the improper documentation and packaging of HAZMAT shipments and any needed corrective actions, but it is too soon to determine the effectiveness of the department’s efforts. DOD identified the root causes of the improper documentation and packaging of HAZMAT shipments and developed a plan of action with milestones to address them. As a result of this approach, DOD identified in its report contract- and documentation-related issues and human error as root causes of improper documentation and packaging of HAZMAT. Further addressing the committee direction, DOD in its September 2015 report included a plan of action and milestones to address the root causes identified and specified over 40 corrective actions. Our analysis found that these corrective actions generally align with the root causes that DOD identified. As DOD implements its corrective actions, it continues to face issues with improper documentation and packaging causing delayed cargo, according to DOD officials. According to DOD officials, most of the corrective actions were to begin in late fiscal year 2016 and the key performance measures for assessing those and the remaining actions will not be completed until late fiscal year 2017.The officials added that it will take time to accumulate data and conduct subsequent analyses to determine the efficacy of actions that have already been taken or are currently in progress. DOD Has Addressed the Direction to Report on the Unnecessary Use of Transportation Protective Services, but Lacked Detail on the Assumptions or the Limitations Underpinning Its Analysis
In its September 2015 report, DOD addressed the committee direction to report on the extent to which it used TPS for HAZMAT shipments that could have been safely and securely transported using less costly alternatives, and identified two corrective actions. However, the report did not fully disclose the assumptions and limitations associated with its analysis. In its report, DOD concluded that between June 1, 2013, and July 31, 2014, it had used TPS motor carriers to transport 518 of 31,373 HAZMAT shipments that could have been transported using less costly alternatives and that doing so had resulted in a total unnecessary cost of approximately $126,000. DOD did not disclose the use of average cost estimates: According to DOD, on 10 of the 518 invoices for TPS motor carrier shipments, DOD found the TPS charges exceeded the total amount paid to the carrier. However, the officials noted that, because the number of improper TPS shipments is relatively low and the range of the potential cost of these shipments is also relatively low, these assumptions and limitations did not affect the department’s general conclusion that DOD had infrequently used TPS unnecessarily to transport HAZMAT and that the additional cost incurred was relativity small. Reviewing the data DOD provided in support of its analysis, we have reasonable assurance that DOD was correct in its general conclusion that DOD had infrequently used TPS during the period studied and that the additional cost associated with these shipments was relatively small. In addition, DOD identified corrective actions to preclude the future unnecessary use of TPS. We anticipate that these actions, if properly implemented, will help ensure that TPS is only used when necessary. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, and DOD responded that it would not be providing comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Commercial carriers transport over 3 billion tons of HAZMAT in commerce in the United States each year, transporting an estimated 1 million HAZMAT shipments per day. DOD relies heavily on commercial carriers to transport HAZMAT, using them to transport about 90 percent of the department's HAZMAT shipments. DOD uses the TPS program to transport certain sensitive materials including ammunition and classified materials that follow more stringent safety and security standards.
House Report 113-446 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 directed DOD to report on the root causes of improper documentation and packaging of HAZMAT; the extent to which TPS is used for materials that could be transported using less costly means; and any needed corrective actions and a plan, with milestones, to address them. The House report also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's report. DOD issued its report in September 2015.
This report examines the extent to which DOD (1) identified the root causes of improper documentation and packaging of HAZMAT shipments and any corrective actions taken since the report's issuance and (2) reported on the department's use of TPS carriers to transport shipments that could have been safely and securely transported using less costly alternatives.
GAO examined DOD's HAZMAT data and found the data it examined sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the review.
DOD reviewed a draft of this report and did not have any comments.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has addressed the committee direction to identify the root causes regarding the improper documentation and packaging of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) shipments and any needed corrective actions, but it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts. In its September 2015 report, DOD identified:
contract- and documentation-related issues and human error as the root causes,
several corrective actions—such as improved reporting—that aligned with these root causes, and
milestones and DOD stakeholders to implement the corrective actions.
In addition to aligning with the DOD-identified root causes, the corrective actions also align with the root causes of improper documentation and packaging that GAO identified in its May 2014 report. However, it is too early to determine the efficacy of these corrective actions. According to DOD officials, most of the corrective actions were to begin in late fiscal year 2016, and the key performance measures for assessing those and the remaining actions will not be fully completed until late fiscal year 2017.
DOD has addressed the committee direction to report on the extent to which the department had used Transportation Protective Services (TPS) for HAZMAT shipments that could have been safely and securely transported using less costly alternatives, but did not include in its September 2015 report detail on the assumptions or limitations made underpinning its analysis. In its analysis, conducted specifically to address the committee direction, DOD concluded that it had used TPS infrequently when not required between June 1, 2013, and July 31, 2014. Specifically, DOD reported it used TPS to transport 518 of 31,373 HAZMAT shipments that it could have transported using less costly alternatives. This resulted in a total unnecessary cost of approximately $126,000, according to DOD. While GAO found DOD did not include detail on the assumptions or limitations underpinning its analysis, GAO concurs with the report's general conclusion that DOD had infrequently used TPS unnecessarily to transport HAZMAT during the period studied and that the additional cost associated with these shipments was relatively small. Further, as part of its plan of action, DOD has identified corrective actions to preclude future unnecessary use of TPS, which, if properly implemented, should help ensure that in the future DOD uses TPS only when necessary. |
gao_GAO-15-540 | gao_GAO-15-540_0 | Background
Beginning with tax year 2014, individuals are to report on their health care coverage, report exemptions to the coverage requirement, pay the shared responsibility tax penalty when they file their tax returns, or do some combination of the above.reporting process. IRS also started verifying taxpayers’ PTC claims using data from the marketplaces. However, IRS had limited information with which to verify the information taxpayers reported because complete marketplace data for most states were not submitted by the due date and the requirement for health issuers and applicable large employers to submit information returns was delayed until tax year 2015. Therefore, according to IRS officials, IRS is using its standard examination processes to check the information taxpayers report. Incomplete and Delayed Marketplace Data Limited IRS’s Ability to Implement Planned Pre-refund Premium Tax Credit Compliance Checks during the 2015 Filing Season
Although IRS created a new system to verify PTC claims, incomplete and delayed marketplace data limited IRS’s ability to use the system to verify claims at the time of return filing. Accuracy of marketplace data. Specifically, as of March 21, 2015, according to IRS documentation, IRS had processed and made available for verification of taxpayer PTC claims complete coverage data for the entire January 2014 to December 2014 tax year for 4 of the 51 marketplace states. IRS implemented contingency plans—such as using other available data and corresponding with taxpayers—to compensate for missing marketplace data. IRS’s goals include effectively enforcing compliance with tax laws, reducing taxpayer burden, and encouraging voluntary compliance. Because marketplace data are incomplete, CMS has not provided IRS the total amount of advance PTC payments made for 2014 marketplace policies. Without knowing the size of this gap, IRS does not know the extent of noncompliance with the requirement for recipients of advance PTC payments to accurately report those payments on their tax return, a measure that could help IRS assess the effectiveness of its education, outreach, and compliance efforts. Until it receives complete and accurate marketplace data, IRS does not know the baseline for the total amount of advance PTC that taxpayers should have reported on 2014 tax returns. IRS Is Not Evaluating Its Efforts to Coordinate and Communicate with Key Stakeholders, Which May Pose Challenges for Implementing New Requirements for Tax Year 2015
Successful implementation of the PTC and individual shared responsibility tax provisions requires IRS collaboration with CMS and the marketplaces. It also requires communication with other stakeholders, such as tax software companies, employers, and health insurers. IRS worked to collaborate and communicate with external stakeholders to implement PPACA requirements for tax year 2014. Without an assessment of its efforts to collaborate and communicate with key external stakeholders, challenges in implementing the 2014 PPACA requirements that relied on these groups could also affect new requirements taking effect in 2015.opportunities for improving return processing and taxpayer experience related to the shared responsibility and PTC provisions, it is not evaluating its collaboration efforts. But at the time we spoke with the officials in January 2015, CMS had not provided this guidance. If the problems are expected to be an ongoing challenge, assessing their effects and correction options would help IRS better target contingency plans and assess the trade-offs among any correction options. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen oversight of the individual shared responsibility and premium tax credit provisions, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following five actions:
Assess the costs and benefits of compliance options, such as soft notices, that could be used beginning in the 2016 filing season to address the problem of tax returns that do not include at least one of the following: indication of full-year health care coverage, claim of an exemption from the requirement to have coverage, or report of a shared responsibility payment, as required. Assess whether the challenges in getting complete and accurate marketplace data in time to conduct pre-refund verification of taxpayer PTC claims are a single year or an ongoing problem and, if they are an ongoing problem, assess the effects of the problem and options for correcting it. Work with CMS to get the total amount of advance PTC paid for the 2014 tax year and establish, as a baseline, the aggregate amount of the gap between advance PTC paid and advance PTC reported for the 2014 tax year, and track this aggregate gap for future tax years to help in evaluating the effectiveness of IRS’s PTC education and compliance efforts. Evaluate IRS efforts to collaborate and communicate with key external stakeholders to inform efforts related to implementation of the new 2015 PPACA requirements. IRS generally agreed with our recommendations. IRS agreed to analyze reporting of advance payments of the PTC by the marketplaces. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) assess what the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has done and plans to do to implement the premium tax credit (PTC) and individual shared responsibility tax provisions; (2) determine the extent to which IRS goals for these tax provisions are linked to performance measures to evaluate program success; (3) assess IRS collaboration with government and private sector entities to implement and enforce these tax provisions; and (4) describe IRS’s progress in implementing our past recommendations on Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) implementation. We assessed the reliability of the data by reviewing related documentation, testing the data for errors, and interviewing IRS officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax year 2014 marked the first time individual taxpayers were required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to report health care coverage information on their tax returns. Taxpayers reported on whether they had health care coverage, had an exemption from the coverage requirement, or owed a tax penalty (the SRP). Most taxpayers who received coverage through a health insurance marketplace were also eligible for an advance PTC to make their coverage more affordable. Marketplace customers can choose to have the PTC paid in advance to their insurance company or may claim all of the credit when they file their tax returns. GAO was asked to review IRS implementation of the individual shared responsibility and PTC tax provisions.
Among other objectives, this report examines (1) IRS's implementation of these PPACA requirements; and (2) IRS efforts to collaborate with key external stakeholders. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents from IRS and CMS; analyzed preliminary 2014 tax year data; and interviewed officials from IRS, CMS, marketplaces and other key external stakeholders, such as tax preparers and tax software companies.
What GAO Found
In January 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began verifying taxpayers' premium tax credit (PTC) claims using marketplace data on enrollments and advance payments of the PTC. IRS is using its standard examination processes to check the coverage, exemption, or shared responsibility payment (SRP) information taxpayers report. IRS's overall goals are to efficiently and effectively enforce compliance with tax laws, reduce taxpayer burden, and encourage voluntary compliance.
Incomplete and delayed marketplace data limited IRS's ability to match taxpayer PTC claims to marketplace data at the time of return filing. Complete marketplace data for the 2014 coverage year were due to IRS in January, but due to marketplace delays in transmitting the data and IRS technical difficulties with processing the data for matching, as of March 21, 2015, IRS had complete data available for verification of taxpayer PTC claims for 4 of the 51 marketplace states (i.e., the 50 states and the District of Columbia). IRS does not know whether these challenges are a single year or an ongoing problem. According to IRS officials, IRS checks the formatting, but not the accuracy of the data. Although IRS implemented contingency plans to compensate for missing and inaccurate data, those processes were more burdensome for taxpayers. Assessing whether the problems with the timeliness and reliability of the marketplace data are expected to be an ongoing challenge, rather than just a first-year problem, would help IRS understand how it can use the data effectively and better target contingency plans.
IRS does not know the total amount of advance PTC payments made to insurers for 2014 marketplace policies because marketplace data are incomplete. Without this information, IRS does not know the aggregate amount of advance PTC that taxpayers should have reported on 2014 tax returns. Thus, IRS does not know the size of the gap between advance PTC paid and reported or the extent of noncompliance with the requirement for recipients of advance PTC payments to accurately report those payments on their tax return, a measure that could help IRS assess the effectiveness of its education, outreach, and compliance efforts.
Successful implementation of the PTC and individual shared responsibility tax provisions requires IRS collaboration with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—which is responsible for overseeing the marketplaces—and the marketplaces, and communication with other stakeholders, such as tax software companies, employers, and health insurers. IRS worked to collaborate and communicate with external stakeholders to implement PPACA requirements for tax year 2014. However, several external stakeholders GAO spoke with reported challenges with IRS collaboration efforts, such as not receiving certain IRS guidance in time for stakeholders to have complete information at the beginning of the filing season. IRS is evaluating opportunities for improving return processing and the taxpayer experience, but is not evaluating its collaboration efforts. Without an assessment of its efforts to collaborate and communicate with key external stakeholders, challenges in implementing the 2014 PPACA requirements that relied on these groups could also affect new requirements taking effect in 2015, including new information reporting requirements for the State-based Marketplaces, issuers of coverage, and applicable large employers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommendations include that IRS (1) assess whether marketplace data delays are an ongoing problem, (2) assess the reliability of the data for IRS matching, (3) work with CMS to get complete data and track the aggregate gap between advance PTC paid and reported, and (4) evaluate its collaboration efforts. IRS generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-586 | gao_GAO-11-586_0 | are not interoperable. The department generally agreed with our recommendations. MIDAS Is Currently Being Defined; Cost and Schedule Estimates Are Uncertain
FSA plans to modernize all the systems that support its 37 farm programs (listed in app. The implementation cost estimate is approximately $305 million, with a life cycle cost of approximately $473 million. However, the implementation cost is uncertain because it has not been updated since 2007 and does not include key cost elements. MIDAS is in its second of four phases—proof of concept and system design. However, the schedule for the current program phase, which was to be completed in October 2011, is uncertain, and a key milestone, requirements review, is delayed. As a result, the completion date for the second phase, and its impact on subsequent phases, is unknown. FSA officials plan to revisit the cost and schedule estimates after completing requirements definition. FSA completed the program planning phase in October 2010. Proof of concept and system design. However, FSA officials do not plan to conduct the system requirements review until December 2011, and a new date for the high-level design review has not yet been set because additional information and analysis are needed to plan this milestone. MIDAS Plans Reflect Many Leading Management Practices, but Could Be Strengthened
Delivering large IT modernization programs such as MIDAS on time and within budget presents challenges and risks. Prior to the proof of concept and system design phase, MIDAS plans were in place and managers were assigned for these practices. Specifically, FSA has assigned a program manager and a business sponsor, has planned and initiated organizational change and communications management, and planned for earned value management. This board should review investments against criteria at key decision points, such as investment selection. Oversight and governance of MIDAS is the responsibility of several department and agency bodies. A key role has not been assigned. On the other hand, department officials reported that MIDAS has complied with department requirements for business case and monthly status reviews. The lack of clarity and definition for the roles of MIDAS oversight and governance bodies may result in duplication or voids in program oversight and wasted resources. Moreover, because MIDAS is not being fully governed according to department investment guidance, the department may not be rigorously monitoring and managing the program and its risks, and may not have the information it needs to make timely and appropriate decisions to ensure the success of MIDAS. However, the roles and coordination among oversight bodies are not clearly defined and USDA’s well-defined investment oversight guidance is not being fully executed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the likelihood that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) will be able to successfully define, develop, and deploy the Modernize and Innovate the Delivery of Agricultural Systems (MIDAS) program, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the chief information officers of USDA and the Farm Service Agency (FSA) to take the following three actions: To ensure that the department can effectively oversee MIDAS cost, schedule, and performance commitments, FSA should develop timely cost estimates for MIDAS’s remaining phases, its overall development and deployment, and its life cycle, to incorporate the program changes previously omitted and any others recently identified and develop complete and detailed schedules for the program’s current and remaining phases that take into account the milestone delays from the program’s second phase and a requirements baseline. To ensure that FSA is employing leading practices for program planning and monitoring, requirements management, contract management, and risk management for MIDAS, the agency should charter and operate an integrated project team that commits stakeholders to the program from other USDA information technology (IT) initiatives; establish an integrated project schedule that identifies tasks, dependencies, and resource commitments and contention between MIDAS and other department IT initiatives; clearly track key milestones, and report their status in the program’s business case and on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard; validate all of the 591 user pain points against the requirements and document the results of this validation, including points that will not be addressed by MIDAS; update the program’s management plans to clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of contractors assigned to the same tasks; and document the status of resolved and unresolved risks initially identified in November 2010, identify and maintain any unresolved risks from that period in the current risk register, and regularly track risks and update the risk register according to the program’s risk management plan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the scope and status of the Modernize and Innovate the Delivery of Agricultural Systems (MIDAS) program; (2) whether MIDAS has appropriate program management; and (3) whether MIDAS has appropriate executive oversight and governance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) is responsible for administering billions of dollars annually in program benefits to farmers and ranchers. Since 2004, FSA has been planning to modernize its information technology (IT) systems that process these benefits with the Modernize and Innovate the Delivery of Agricultural Systems (MIDAS) program. GAO was asked to determine (1) the scope and status of MIDAS, (2) whether MIDAS has appropriate program management, and (3) whether MIDAS has appropriate executive oversight and governance. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant department guidance and program documents and interviewed USDA officials.
What GAO Found
FSA plans to modernize the systems supporting its 37 farm programs with MIDAS. The implementation cost estimate is approximately $305 million, with a life cycle cost of approximately $473 million. However, the implementation cost estimate is uncertain because it has not been updated since 2007 and does not include cost elements that have since been identified, such as the selection of a commercial enterprise resource planning product. Following completion of its initial phase of program planning in October 2010, MIDAS entered its second of four phases--proof of concept and system design. However, the schedule for this phase, which was to be completed in October 2011, is now uncertain. While FSA officials report that the proof of concept activities are proceeding as scheduled, they have delayed a requirements review milestone until December 2011 and have not yet set a new date for the design review. As a result, the completion date for the second phase and its impact on subsequent phases is uncertain. FSA officials plan to revisit the cost and schedule estimates after completing requirements definition. FSA's program management approach includes many leading practices, but could be strengthened. For example, prior to the proof of concept and system design phase, plans were in place for organizational change and communication, requirements management, and risk. However, a few practices were either partially addressed or not addressed at all in program plans or in the implementation of those plans. For example, an integrated team has not yet been formed with representatives from IT programs that MIDAS depends on for its success. Moreover, the plans do not explicitly call for, and FSA has not produced, a schedule that reflects dependencies with those programs, and risks are not being regularly tracked as planned. FSA's uneven adoption of leading practices is likely to limit the agency's effectiveness in managing system development, and thus its ability to deliver system capabilities on time and within budget. Executive-level governance for MIDAS has not been clearly defined and does not fully follow department IT investment management guidance. Specifically, oversight and governance has been assigned to several department and agency bodies, but roles and escalation criteria are not clearly defined among them. Department officials reported that department guidance is being followed for monthly status reviews, but not for department-level reviews at key decision points. The lack of clarity and definition for the roles of the governance bodies could result in duplication or voids in program oversight, as well as wasted resources. Moreover, because MIDAS is not being governed according to the department's investment guidance, the department may not be rigorously monitoring and managing the program and its risks, and may not have the information it needs to make timely and appropriate decisions to ensure the success of MIDAS.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that USDA update cost and schedule estimates, address management weaknesses in plans and program execution, and clarify the roles and coordination among governance bodies. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations and described plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-812 | gao_GAO-06-812_0 | Increased Funding for Expanded Responsibilities
The Special Operations Command has received considerable increases in funding to meet its expanded responsibilities in the Global War on Terrorism. While the Command has determined the number of special operations forces personnel who are needed to increase the number of its warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to determine (a) the number of headquarters staff needed to train and equip these additional warfighters or (b) the number of headquarters staff needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks—a new mission for the Command. Although these studies were in progress at the time of our review, DOD has already made the decision to increase the number of military and civilian positions for the Command’s headquarters, beginning with its fiscal year 2007 budget request. However, until the Special Operations Command fully completes its analyses of the personnel requirements needed to carry out its Title 10 responsibilities and its expanded mission, it cannot provide assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command’s headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to address the Command’s expanded mission. Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations Command Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals
The military services and the Special Operations Command have made progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining special operations forces personnel; however, the military services and the Special Operations Command must overcome persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained special operations forces personnel in some cases to meet DOD’s plan to increase the number of special operations forces personnel through fiscal year 2011. Without complete information on human capital challenges, the Special Operations Command will be unable to determine whether the service components’ human capital management approaches, including their recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be effective in meeting the planned growth targets. Special Operations Command Has Established a Policy to Manage Increased Deployments, but the Policy Has Not Been Consistently or Fully Implemented
The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the challenge of increased personnel deployments. The policy requires the Command’s active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at their home station as they do deployed for operations and training. For example, the policy does not identify the length of time for which the components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment guidelines. However, officials with the Command’s Army and Navy components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the information they use to track the individual deployments of their personnel. Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of special operations forces, which affects the Command’s ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces personnel. Given the Command’s expanded mission, however, it is critical that the Command complete its analyses of personnel requirements and fully determine the number of personnel, who possess the right knowledge and skill sets, for the Command to meet its new role. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to 1. establish specific milestones for completing the Command’s ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for the Command’s headquarters and related future funding requests; 2. revise the Command’s directive for its program to monitor the status of special operations forces to include performance objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned growth; and enforce all of the directive’s reporting requirements; and 3. clarify the methodology that the Command’s service components should use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to expand the role of the United States Special Operations Command (Command) and its forces. In response, the Command has transformed its headquarters to coordinate counterterrorism activities, and DOD has increased funding and the number of special operations forces positions. Given the expanded mission, it is critical that the Command has personnel with the right knowledge and skill sets. GAO was asked to assess: (1) whether the Command has determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded role; (2) the progress and challenges in meeting growth goals; and (3) any effect of deployments on the Command's ability to provide trained forces, and the progress made in managing deployments. GAO performed its work at the Special Operations Command and its service components, analyzed personnel data against requirements, and examined policies and directives.
What GAO Found
Although DOD plans to significantly increase the number of special operations forces personnel, the Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While it has determined the number of personnel needed to increase its number of warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to determine (a) how many headquarters staff are needed to train and equip these additional warfighters or (b) how many headquarters staff are needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks--a new mission for the Command. DOD plans to begin increasing the number of headquarters positions and has requested funds for these positions in its fiscal year 2007 budget request. Until these analyses are completed, the Special Operations Command cannot provide assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command's headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to address the Command's expanded mission. The military services and the Special Operations Command have made progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining special operations forces personnel, but they must overcome persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained personnel, in certain specialties, to meet DOD's plan to increase the number of special operations forces. In addition, GAO's review of the service components' annual reports required by the Special Operations Command shows that the reports have not provided the information needed to determine whether they have enough personnel to meet current and future requirements. Without such information, the Command will be unable to determine whether the service components' human capital management approaches, including recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be effective in meeting the planned growth targets. Since fiscal year 2000, the number of special operations forces personnel deployed for operations has greatly increased, and the number deployed for training has simultaneously decreased. The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the challenge of increased deployments; in August 2005, it began requiring active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at home as deployed. But the Command's service components have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is because the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment policy guidelines. In addition, officials with the Command's Army and Navy service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of their information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of special operations forces, which affects its ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of these personnel. |
gao_GAO-07-902T | gao_GAO-07-902T_0 | Crude Oil Prices and Other Factors Affect Gasoline Prices
Crude oil prices are a major determinant of gasoline prices. In other words, if the demand for gasoline increases faster than the ability to supply it, the price of gasoline will most likely increase. Refining capacity and utilization rates also play a role in determining gasoline prices. Refinery capacity in the United States has not expanded at the same pace as demand for gasoline and other petroleum products in recent years. This could mean that gasoline prices remain high until the imported supplies can reach the market. As have a number of other industries, the petroleum industry has adopted so-called “just-in-time” delivery processes to reduce costs leading to a downward trend in the level of gasoline inventories in the United States. Regulatory factors play a role as well. Finally, market consolidation in the U.S. petroleum industry through mergers can influence the prices of gasoline. Mergers raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects because mergers could result in greater market power for the merged companies, either through unilateral actions of the merged companies or coordinated interaction with other companies, potentially allowing them to increase and maintain prices above competitive levels. On the other hand, mergers could also yield cost savings and efficiency gains, which could be passed on to consumers through lower prices. Mergers in the 1990s Increased Market Concentration and Led to Small But Significant Increases in Wholesale Gasoline Prices; However the Impact of More Recent Mergers is Unknown
During the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum industry experienced a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, several of them between large oil companies that had previously competed with each other for the sale of petroleum products. These mergers contributed to increases in market concentration in the refining and marketing segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. Econometric modeling we performed of eight mergers involving major integrated oil companies that occurred in the 1990s showed that the majority resulted in small but significant increases in wholesale gasoline prices. Proposed mergers in all industries are generally reviewed by federal antitrust authorities—including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—to assess the potential impact on market competition and consumer prices. For the four mergers that we modeled for reformulated gasoline, two— Exxon-Mobil and Marathon-Ashland—led to increased prices of about 1 cent per gallon, on average. The increases were for branded gasoline only and were about 7 cents per gallon, on average. In addition, merger activity can influence gasoline prices. While we have not performed modeling on mergers that occurred since 2000, and thus cannot comment on any potential effect on wholesale gasoline prices at this time, these mergers would further increase market concentration nationwide since there are now fewer oil companies. We are currently in the process of studying the effects of the mergers that have occurred since 2000 on gasoline prices as a follow up to our previous report on mergers in the 1990s. Also, we are working on a separate study on issues related to petroleum inventories, refining, and fuel prices. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Few issues generate more attention and anxiety among American consumers than the price of gasoline. The most current upsurge in prices is no exception. According to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the average retail price of regular unleaded gasoline in the United States has increased almost every week this year since January 29th and reached an all-time high of $3.10 the week of May 14th. Over this time period, the price has increase 94 cents per gallon and added about $20 billion to consumers' total gasoline bill, or about $146 for each passenger car in the United States. Given the importance of gasoline for the nation's economy, it is essential to understand the market for gasoline and the factors that influence gasoline prices. In this context, this testimony addresses the following questions: (1) what key factors affect the prices of gasoline and (2) what effects have mergers had on market concentration and wholesale gasoline prices? To address these questions, GAO relied on previous reports, including a 2004 GAO report on mergers in the U.S. petroleum industry, a 2005 GAO primer on gasoline prices and a 2006 testimony. GAO also collected updated data from EIA. This work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
The price of crude oil is a major determinant of gasoline prices. However, a number of other factors also affect gasoline prices including (1) increasing demand for gasoline; (2) refinery capacity in the United States that has not expanded at the same pace as the demand for gasoline; (3) a declining trend in gasoline inventories and (4) regulatory factors, such as national air quality standards, that have induced some states to switch to special gasoline blends. Consolidation in the petroleum industry plays a role in determining gasoline prices as well. For example, mergers raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects because mergers could result in greater market power for the merged companies, potentially allowing them to increase and sustain prices above competitive levels; on the other hand, these mergers could lead to efficiency effects enabling the merged companies to lower prices. The 1990s saw a wave of merger activity in which over 2600 mergers occurred in all segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. This wave of mergers contributed to increases in market concentration in the refining and marketing segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. Econometric modeling that GAO performed on eight of these mergers showed that, after controlling for other factors including crude oil prices, the majority resulted in wholesale gasoline price increases--generally between about 1 and 7 cents per gallon. While these price increases seem small, they are not trivial because according to the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) standards for merger review in the petroleum industry, a 1-cent increase is considered to be significant. Additional mergers occurring since 2000 are expected to increase the level of industry concentration further, and because GAO has not yet performed modeling on these mergers, we cannot comment on any potential effect on gasoline prices at this time. However, we are currently in the process of studying the effects of the mergers that have occurred since 2000 on gasoline prices as a follow up to our previous work on mergers in the 1990s. Also, we are working on a separate study on issues related to petroleum inventories, refining, and fuel prices. |
gao_GAO-17-290 | gao_GAO-17-290_0 | This department frequently works with the provider education department to conduct educational efforts focusing on correcting provider billing (see fig. 1). The objective of the CERT program is to estimate the payment accuracy of the Medicare fee-for-service program, which results in a Medicare fee-for-service improper payment rate. Probe and Educate Reviews
The probe and educate reviews are a CMS strategy to determine the extent to which providers understand recent policy changes for certain areas vulnerable to improper billing and help providers improve billing in these areas through a review of a sample of claims from every provider. 2.) MAC Officials State Their Provider Education Efforts Focus on Areas Vulnerable to Improper Billing; CMS Oversight and Requirements for These Efforts Are Limited
MAC officials state that their provider education department efforts focus on areas vulnerable to improper billing. 3). According to CMS officials, they do not require IPRS reports to have a certain level of specificity regarding how provider education department efforts focus on areas vulnerable to improper billing because they do not want to be overly prescriptive regarding MACs’ provider education department efforts. CMS’s collection of limited information is inconsistent with federal internal control standards related to information and communications, which state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives—CMS’s objective in this instance being the education of providers about proper billing. Unless CMS requires sufficient MAC provider education department reporting, it cannot ensure that MACs’ provider education department efforts are focused on areas vulnerable to improper billing. CMS Does Not Require MACs to Educate Referring Providers for Durable Medical Equipment and Home Health Services
CMS does not require A/B MACs to educate referring providers on documentation requirements for ordering DME and home health services because referring providers do not bill for any DME or home health services on these orders. The absence of a requirement for MACs to educate referring providers about proper documentation for DME and home health claims is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which state that in order to achieve an entity’s objectives, management should assign responsibility, and delegate authority. Without explicitly requiring that MACs educate referring providers, the billing errors that result from referring providers’ insufficient documentation may persist. CMS Officials Consider Hospital Probe and Educate Reviews a Success, but Did Not Measure Effectiveness
Although CMS officials consider the MACs’ short-stay hospital probe and educate reviews to be a success, they did not measure the effectiveness of this new strategy in reducing improper billing. We found that the effectiveness of the MACs’ short-stay hospital probe and educate reviews cannot be confirmed because CMS did not establish performance metrics to determine whether the probe and educate reviews were effective in reducing improper billing. Additionally, the percentage of claims denied in each round also remained high throughout the three rounds (see table 1). Therefore, without performance metrics, CMS cannot determine whether future probe and educate reviews would be effective in reducing improper billing. In order to reduce the high improper payment rates for home health and DME, education on proper documentation for providers who refer their patients for DME and home health services is necessary; however, MACs are not required to provide this education to the referring providers. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure MACs’ provider education efforts are focused on areas vulnerable to improper billing and to strengthen CMS’s oversight of those efforts, we recommend that CMS take the following three actions: 1. CMS should require sufficient detail in MAC reporting to allow CMS to determine the extent to which MACs’ provider education department efforts focus on areas identified as vulnerable to improper billing. 2. For any future probe and educate reviews, CMS should establish performance metrics that will help the agency determine the reviews’ effectiveness in reducing improper billing. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
For fiscal year 2016, HHS reported an estimated 11 percent improper payment rate and $41.1 billion in improper payments in the Medicare fee-for-service program. To help ensure payments are made properly, CMS contracts with MACs to conduct provider education efforts. CMS cites the MACs’ provider education department efforts as an important way to reduce improper payments.
GAO was asked to examine MACs’ provider education department efforts and the results of MACs’ probe and educate reviews. This report examines (1) the focus of MACs’ provider education department efforts to help reduce improper billing and CMS oversight of these efforts and (2) the extent to which CMS measured the effectiveness of the MAC probe and educate reviews. GAO reviewed and analyzed CMS and MAC documents and MAC probe and educate review data for 2013-2016; interviewed CMS and MAC officials; and assessed CMS’s oversight activities against federal internal control standards
What GAO Found
Medicare administrative contractors (MAC) process Medicare claims, identify areas vulnerable to improper billing, and develop general education efforts focused on these areas. MAC officials state that their provider education departments focus their educational efforts on areas vulnerable to improper billing; however, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS)--the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicare--oversight and requirements for these efforts are limited.
CMS collects limited information about how these efforts focus on the areas MACs identify as vulnerable to improper billing. According to CMS officials, the agency has not required the MACs to provide specifics on their provider education department efforts in these reports because it does not want to be overly prescriptive regarding MAC provider education department efforts. Federal internal control standards state that management should use quality reporting information to achieve the entity's objectives. Unless CMS requires sufficient MAC provider education department reporting, it cannot ensure that the departments' efforts are focused on areas vulnerable to improper billing.
CMS does not require MACs to educate providers who refer patients for durable medical equipment (DME), including prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies, and home health services on proper billing documentation, nor does it explicitly require MACs to work together to provide this education. HHS has reported that a large portion of the high improper payment rates in these services is related to insufficient documentation. The absence of a requirement for MACs to educate referring providers about proper documentation for DME and home health claims is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which state that in order to achieve an entity's objectives, management should assign responsibility and delegate authority. Without an explicit requirement from CMS to educate these referring providers, billing errors due to insufficient documentation may persist.
Short-stay hospital and home health claims have been the focus of the MACs' probe and educate reviews--a CMS strategy to help providers improve billing in certain areas vulnerable to improper billing. Under the probe and educate reviews, MACs review a sample of claims from every provider and then offer individualized education to reduce billing errors. CMS officials consider the completed short-stay hospital reviews to be a success based on anecdotal feedback from providers. However, the effectiveness of these reviews cannot be confirmed because CMS did not establish performance metrics to determine whether the reviews were effective in reducing improper billing. Furthermore, GAO found the percentage of claims remained high throughout the three rounds of the review process, despite the offer of education after each round. Federal internal control standards state that management should define objectives in specific and measurable terms and evaluate results against those objectives. Without performance metrics, CMS cannot determine whether future probe and educate reviews would be effective in reducing improper billing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS should (1) require sufficient detail in MAC reporting to determine the extent to which MACs' provider education department efforts focus on vulnerable areas, (2) explicitly require MACs to work together to educate referring providers on proper documentation for DME and home health services, and (3) establish performance metrics for future probe and educate reviews. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-619 | gao_GAO-09-619_0 | The Reform Act
In response to the problems facing the District’s public school system, the D.C. Council (the legislative branch of the D.C. government) approved the 2007 Reform Act, which significantly altered the governance of the D.C. public schools. Early Initiatives Are Focused on Improving Student Achievement and DCPS Is Modifying Its Approach as It Moves Forward
During the first 2 years of its reform efforts, DCPS implemented several classroom-based initiatives to improve students’ basic skills in core subjects and implemented a new staffing model designed to give all students access to art, music, and physical education classes. In addition, as required by NCLBA, DCPS restructured 22 schools before the fall of 2008, after the schools failed to meet academic targets for 6 consecutive years. In addition, DCPS and the state superintendent’s office are planning and developing new ways to use data to monitor student achievement and school performance. Table 1 provides a list of DCPS’s major initiatives to improve student outcomes, as well as descriptions and the status of these initiatives. The state superintendent’s office also is developing a longitudinal database, called the Statewide Longitudinal Education Data Warehouse (SLED) that is intended to allow DCPS and other stakeholders to access a broad array of information, including standardized test scores of students and information on teachers. DCPS Replaced Teachers and Principals and Introduced Professional Development Initiatives, but Encountered Challenges in Implementation
DCPS is attempting to improve the quality of its teacher and principal workforce by hiring new teachers and principals and by providing professional development. In addition, DCPS introduced professional development initiatives for teachers and principals, but late decisions about the program for teachers led to inconsistent implementation. Specifically, about one-fifth of the teachers and one-third of the principals resigned, retired, or were terminated from the school system at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. DCPS began placing teacher coaches in schools to help teachers increase student achievement at their workplaces. Late hiring of teacher coaches, however, affected the implementation of the professional development plan for the 2008-2009 school year. The State Superintendent’s Office and DCPS Have Developed and Begun Implementing Strategic Plans; However, DCPS Has Not Always Involved Relevant Stakeholders in Planning and Implementing Key Initiatives
The state superintendent plan is a “state-level” strategic plan that covers the District’s public schools (and public charter schools). This plan and DCPS’s strategic plan each contain elements GAO has identified as key to an effective plan, such as aligning short-term objectives to long-term goals in order to delineate how to attain those goals. DCPS Has Recently Increased Its Efforts to Involve Stakeholders in Various Initiatives, However It Has Not Systematically Included Stakeholders
DCPS officials have several planned and ongoing efforts to involve stakeholders in planning, implementing, and evaluating various initiatives. DCPS and the State Superintendent’s Office Have Taken Steps to Improve Accountability and Performance, and DCPS Has Yet to Align Key Aspects of Its Performance Management System to Organizational Goals
DCPS and the state superintendent’s office have taken steps to improve accountability and performance of their offices. For example, both offices have started implementation of new individual employee performance management systems. While DCPS has taken steps to improve accountability and link its individual performance management system to organizational goals, it has not completed this process or used the results of surveys to improve central office operations. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to long-standing problems with student achievement and the management of the District of Columbia (D.C. or the District) public school system, the D.C. Council approved the Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007. This act made major changes to the governance of the D.C. public school system, giving the Mayor authority over public schools. This report follows a GAO testimony in March 2008 and focuses on the primary reform approaches the District has taken. This report examines the steps the District took to: (1) address student academic achievement; (2) strengthen the quality of teachers and principals; (3) develop long-term plans and involve stakeholders; and (4) improve accountability and performance of the D.C. public schools (DCPS) and the state superintendent's central offices. GAO reviewed documentation on District initiatives, and interviewed District education officials as well as representatives from the teachers' union, community organizations, and research institutions. GAO also conducted visits to four urban school districts with mayoral governance.
What GAO Found
Early efforts to improve student achievement at DCPS have focused on improving student performance, closing underutilized and reorganizing underperforming schools, and creating and enhancing data systems. During the first 2 years of its reform efforts, DCPS implemented many initiatives to improve overall student performance, such as classroom-based initiatives to improve basic skills of students. In addition, under the No Child Left Behind Act, DCPS restructured 22 schools before the fall of 2008, after the schools failed to meet academic targets for 6 consecutive years. Finally, DCPS and the state superintendent's office are developing new ways to monitor student achievement and school performance. Specifically, a longitudinal database is being developed that is intended to allow DCPS and other key users to access a broad array of data, including student test scores. DCPS is modifying its approach to many of these initiatives such as focusing on effective teaching as opposed to implementing disparate programs. DCPS has focused on improving the quality of its workforce by replacing teachers and principals and by providing professional development, but it has encountered challenges in effectively implementing these changes. After the 2007-2008 school year, about one-fifth of the teachers and one-third of the principals resigned, retired, or were terminated from DCPS. However, because DCPS did not have an effective way to evaluate teacher performance, officials are uncertain if the new staff improved the quality of its workforce. DCPS is currently working on a new teacher evaluation system. In addition, DCPS introduced professional development initiatives for teachers and principals. For example, it began placing teacher coaches at schools to support teachers at their work sites. However, late decisions to hire these teacher coaches led to inconsistent implementation of this initiative during the 2008-2009 school year. The state superintendent's office and DCPS each developed their 5-year strategic plans and involved stakeholders in developing these plans. The state superintendent plan and the DCPS draft strategic plan each contain many elements of effective plans, such as aligning short-term objectives to long-term goals. DCPS has recently increased its efforts to involve stakeholders in various initiatives; however, it has not always involved stakeholders in key decisions and initiatives. DCPS and the state superintendent's office have taken steps to improve accountability and performance. For example, both offices have started implementation of new individual employee performance management systems. However, while DCPS has taken some additional steps to improve accountability, it has not yet linked its employee expectations and performance evaluations to organizational goals to improve central office operations. |
gao_GAO-04-274 | gao_GAO-04-274_0 | However, a majority of the officials also expect that the rule will lead to an overall increase in emissions of harmful air pollutants and hinder efforts to meet air quality standards, potentially creating or exacerbating risk to public health. A Majority of the State Officials Expect the Rule to Increase Emissions and Hinder Efforts to Meet Health-based Air Quality Standards
A majority of the state officials expect emissions to increase as a result of the final rule—in contrast to EPA’s conclusion, in the agency’s analysis of the rule’s environmental effects, that it will reduce emissions from industrial facilities. EPA program managers maintain that this provision will decrease emissions. At Least Half of the State Officials Expected the Proposed Revisions Defining NSR Exclusions to Provide Industry Greater Flexibility but Also Increase Emissions and the Administrative Workload for State Agencies
Similar to their opinions on the final rule, a majority (28 of 42) of the state officials expected EPA’s two NSR revisions—as proposed in December 2002—to provide companies the flexibility to perform maintenance and replacement activities without obtaining permits and installing pollution controls. Only 2 officials thought that this exclusion would decrease emissions, while the others expected no change (7) or could not judge (12). Overall, 21 of the 44 state officials believed the two exclusions would enable older facilities, built prior to 1977, to increase emissions. A Majority of the State Officials Expected the Exclusions Would Create a Greater Administrative Workload
A majority of the officials said that implementing the exclusions would increase their administrative burden (27 of 44) and create uncertainty for agencies in determining when a facility’s activities can be excluded (28 of 44). In contrast, stakeholders representing the industry groups asserted that the proposed and final changes clarified the NSR program, thereby making permitting easier, and encouraging investment in energy efficient projects that lower fuel consumption and emissions. Environmental and Public Health Group Stakeholders Expected the Proposed and Final Revisions to Decrease Industry’s Regulatory Burden but Increase Emissions and Air Quality Agencies’ Workload
According to the opinions of the six environmental and public health group stakeholders we contacted, as well as an association representing all of the state and local air quality agencies, the proposed and final revisions would lessen the regulatory burden on companies because, as discussed earlier, fewer modifications would trigger NSR. The company would also have to periodically report on their compliance with the permit. Under the air toxics program, some companies have had to install controls to reduce facility emissions of hazardous air pollutants. However, the DOE analysis is not useful as a benchmark for assessing the effects of EPA’s revisions because, under the NSR program, facilities only have to install the best available controls when making major modifications. Conclusions
EPA’s assessments of the December 2002 and October 2003 NSR revisions concluded that the rules would provide industry with greater flexibility to modify their facilities without having to obtain NSR permits or, in some cases, install pollution controls, while enhancing the program’s environmental benefits. Little data currently exist to resolve these competing viewpoints. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that state and local air quality agencies are adequately equipped to implement the new NSR rules, as required by EPA, and that the rules do not have unintended effects on emissions and public health, we recommend that the EPA Administrator (1) provide state and local air quality agencies with assistance in implementing the December 2002 rule, (2) pending the court’s decision on the equipment replacement rule, work with state and local air quality agencies to identify the data that the agency would need to monitor the effects of this rule and use the monitoring results to identify necessary changes, and (3) consider the state and stakeholder concerns about emissions and workload impacts that we identified before deciding whether to issue a final rule on the second proposed exclusion, the annual maintenance allowance exclusion. These figures are similar to the state responses, however, compared with state officials, fewer local officials expected the exclusions to result in significant enough emissions changes to exacerbate air quality problems in areas that do not meet standards or cause new problems in areas that currently meet the standards. Detailed survey results are available at: http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-04-337sp. | Why GAO Did This Study
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revisions to the New Source Review (NSR) program to control industrial emissions have drawn attention from state and local agencies that implement the program, as well as industry and environmental and health groups. Under the revisions, companies may not have to install pollution controls when making some facility changes. GAO was asked to obtain the opinions of state air quality officials and other stakeholders on the impact of both the final and proposed revisions EPA issued in December 2002. GAO obtained survey responses from NSR program managers in 44 states and certain localities and contacted six environmental and health groups, and eight industry groups active in the NSR debate. Survey details are available in GAO-04-337SP .
What GAO Found
A majority (29 of 44) of the state officials responding to GAO's survey expected the rule EPA finalized in December 2002 to provide industry with greater flexibility to make some facility changes without having to obtain NSR permits or, in some cases, install pollution controls. However, in their opinion, 27 officials expected the rule to increase emissions of harmful air pollutants, thereby hindering areas' efforts to meet air quality standards and potentially creating or exacerbating public health risks. This concern\ contrasts with EPA's assessment that the rule will decrease emissions and maintain the current level of environmental protection. Furthermore, 30 of the officials expected their agency's workload would increase as they adopt and implement the rule into their own programs. Almost all of the 44 officials would like EPA assistance with implementation. Similarly, 28 of the 42 officials responding expected the two NSR revisions as proposed in December 2002--intended to provide more certainty about when facility changes are considered routine maintenance, repair, and replacement activities and can be excluded from NSR requirements--to decrease the number of permits companies would have to obtain, thereby giving them the flexibility to make some changes without installing controls. However, 21 and 26 officials, respectively, thought that the two exclusions would increase emissions; only relatively few thought the exclusions would decrease emissions as EPA's analysis had predicted. About a third of the officials thought the exclusions would exacerbate air quality problems in areas that do not meet standards, but fewer officials thought the exclusions would cause problems in areas that currently meet standards. Finally, 27 thought that implementing the two exclusions would increase states' administrative burden. The other stakeholder groups GAO contacted agreed that the final rule and two exclusions would decrease the regulatory burden on companies that modify their facilities, but disagreed about the impact on emissions and air quality agencies' workload. The six environmental and public health officials expected that because companies would not have to obtain as many NSR permits or install as many controls when modifying facilities, emissions would rise and state and local agencies' workloads increase as agencies sought alternative ways to meet standards. In contrast, the eight industry officials expected the revisions to encourage companies to invest in energy-efficient projects they had avoided under the prior program, which the officials believed would lower fuel use and emissions. The officials also expected that fewer permits would lead to decreases in agencies' workloads. Determining the revisions' likely impacts is difficult because, as discussed in GAO's August 2003 report on EPA's analytical basis for the final rule (GAO-03-947), little data exist to confirm stakeholders' opinions. In that report, GAO recommended that EPA work with state and local agencies to obtain data to assess the rule's emissions impact and correct any adverse effects. |
gao_NSIAD-98-134 | gao_NSIAD-98-134_0 | Tribunal’s Current and Future Workloads Exceed Capacity
Our analysis of the Tribunal’s plans and available resources indicates that it does not have the capacity to handle its current workload, and the problem is likely to get worse. The Tribunal will be unable to conduct the number of investigations it planned for 1998, may be unable to begin trials without undue delay, and will continue to have a growing backlog of unread documentary evidence. According to the Tribunal President and State Department officials, pretrial detention longer than 2 years could be considered undue delay, although this may vary depending on the circumstances of each case. Current Workload Exceeds Capacity
Our analysis shows that, based on its current workload and capacity, the Tribunal will be unable to undertake the number of investigations it planned for 1998 and will take at least 3 years to complete the trials and appeals of the accused currently in custody. As a result, the Tribunal currently does not have sufficient capacity in a number of key areas to handle its present workload. Information Backlog
The Tribunal has collected an immense amount of evidence and information on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Challenges to Increasing Capacity
We noted that there are several administrative barriers that could inhibit efforts to quickly increase the Tribunal’s capacity. Surcharge
Another barrier is the United Nations’ surcharge on voluntary contributions. However, the Tribunal has insufficient investigators, judges, courtrooms, and information processors to carry out its existing workload because the recent increase in the number of detainees exceeds what the Tribunal planned for in its 1998 budget request. The Tribunal’s capacity to carry out its primary functions will become more strained as more indicted are brought into custody. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) reviews the startup challenges the Tribunal faced and (2) assesses the Tribunal’s capacity to carry out its mandate; that is, whether the Tribunal has sufficient staff, facilities, and equipment needed to investigate and prosecute individuals indicted in accordance with its statute and rules of procedure. However, the Security Council resolutions that established the Tribunal, its statute, and its rules of procedure and evidence provide a series of requirements for the Tribunal and its judicial process. The international community, and not the Tribunal, is responsible for the arrest or surrender of indictees. Currently in custody and on trial at the Tribunal. 9. 6. 7. 8. Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia (GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the startup challenges the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia faced and the Tribunal's capacity to carry out its mandate.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Tribunal met its early organizational challenges and has established the organizational structure and legal processes and procedures to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia; (2) there are no precise measurement standards on the personnel levels or the amount of equipment and facilities the Tribunal needs to meet its workload, and the rate of surrender or apprehension is uncertain; (3) nonetheless, based on GAO's analysis of the Tribunal's primary functions, the Tribunal has insufficient investigators, judges, courtrooms, and information processors to carry out its existing workload while ensuring that it complies with its mandate, statute, and rules of procedure and evidence; (4) as a result, the Tribunal has suspended six investigations it planned for 1998, has a growing backlog of unread documentary evidence, and may be unable to try some accused in custody without undue delay; (5) in addition, on May 8, 1998, the Office of the Prosecuter announced the withdrawal of charges against 14 indicted individuals because, facing a much larger than anticipated workload, the Tribunal wanted to focus its available resources on persons holding higher levels of responsibility; (6) according to the President of the Tribunal and other experts, what constitutes undue delay is not specifically defined, but they believe the Tribunal's credibility and legitimacy may be jeopardized if it cannot bring accused in custody to trial within at least 2 years, although this time period may vary depending on the circumstances of each case; (7) the existing caseload exceeds the 18 persons in custody and 5 trials the Tribunal originally projected in its 1998 budget request, and GAO's analysis shows the Tribunal will need 3 years or more to try all accused currently in custody; (8) if more indictees are arrested or additional requirements arise, such as investigating recent incidents in Kosovo, the Tribunal's already overburdened capacity in key areas will be further strained; (9) GAO's analysis of the Tribunal's plans and available resources indicates that it does not have the capacity to handle its current workload, and the problem is likely to get worse; and (10) moreover, there are significant barriers that could inhibit efforts to quickly increase the Tribunal's capacity, such as the United Nations' lengthy recruitment process and its practice of assessing a surcharge for voluntary contributions. |
gao_GAO-16-417 | gao_GAO-16-417_0 | Undeclared nuclear material and activities are those a state has not declared and placed under safeguards but is required to do so pursuant to its CSA. The U.S. Department of State coordinates the United States’ financial and policy relationship with IAEA. IAEA Uses Its Authorities to Carry out Its Verification Activities under the JCPOA
manufacturing; and (3) conditions on uranium ore concentrate. Under the JCPOA, IAEA also conducts certain activities agreed to by Iran, such as monitoring of Iran’s uranium mines and mills, according to IAEA officials. Further, under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply, and seek ratification of the Additional Protocol, which gives the agency’s inspectors access to an expanded range of declared activities and locations, including buildings at nuclear sites, and locations where undeclared activities may be suspected. The JCPOA includes a mechanism in which its participants commit to resolve an access request from the agency within 24 days after the request is made. IAEA Has Identified the Financial, Human, and Technical Resources Necessary to Verify the Nuclear- Related Commitments in the JCPOA
Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA has estimated the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to verify Iran’s implementation of nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. IAEA has estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in additional funding above its current safeguards budget to fund additional inspections, among other things. IAEA officials said that, pursuant to the Statute, the agency intends to propose to the Board of Governors that the approximately $5.7 million for all Additional Protocol activities and inspector costs attributable to the JCPOA be funded through IAEA’s regular budget after 2016. Consequently, according to a 2015 IAEA report, all of IAEA’s JCPOA work through 2016 will be funded through extra-budgetary contributions. IAEA officials told us that the agency plans to transfer 18 experienced inspectors and nearly twice that number of other staff to its Iran Task Force from other divisions within its Safeguards Department that cover countries and regions beyond Iran. In addition, according to IAEA officials, existing safeguards technical resources are sufficient to implement IAEA’s activities under the JCPOA. Verifying the JCPOA’s Nuclear-Related Commitments May Present Potential Challenges to IAEA’s Safeguards Efforts
Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA may face some potential challenges in monitoring and verifying Iran’s implementation of certain nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA, according to current U.S. and IAEA officials as well as some former U.S. officials, several former IAEA officials, and many expert organizations we interviewed. IAEA Faces an Inherent Challenge in Detecting Undeclared Nuclear Materials and Activities
Our preliminary observations indicate that detection of undeclared nuclear materials and activities is an inherent challenge for IAEA particularly with regard to activities that do not involve nuclear material, such as some weapons development activities and centrifuge manufacturing, according to current U.S. officials, a former U.S. official, several former IAEA officials, and several expert organizations we interviewed. According to U.S. government officials, as well as a former U.S. official, detection of undeclared material and activities in Iran and worldwide is IAEA’s greatest challenge. Iran has previously failed to declare activity to IAEA. According to a former IAEA official as well as current IAEA and U.S. government officials we interviewed, IAEA has improved its capabilities in detecting undeclared activity. IAEA Access Depends on Iran’s Cooperation and the JCPOA Mechanism to Resolve Access Requests Is Untested
Our preliminary observations indicate that IAEA could face potential challenges in gaining access to Iranian sites, according to two former U.S. government officials, a former IAEA official, and one expert organization. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report provides our preliminary observations on (1) the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been asked to verify and its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify the JCPOA, and (3) potential challenges and mitigating actions, if any, IAEA and others have identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA. We will issue a separate report with the final results of our work later this year. We also analyzed IAEA documentation concerning the safeguards legal framework, including the Statute of the IAEA, which authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement; “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (information circular (INFCIRC)/153), which provides the basis for the comprehensive safeguards agreement that most countries have concluded with IAEA and that covers all of the countries’ civilian nuclear activities; Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214); the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which provides the basis for an Additional Protocol that most countries with a CSA have concluded with IAEA to provide additional information about countries’ nuclear and nuclear-related activities; and the November 2011 IAEA Safeguards Report, which details items concerning “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program; IAEA’s report on its investigation of the possible military dimensions; and the related Board of Governor’s resolution. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2015, multilateral talks with Iran culminated in an agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), through which Iran committed to limits on its nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions put in place by the United States and other nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent international organization that administers safeguards designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, was requested to monitor and verify Iran's adherence to these limits. The U.S. Department of State coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA.
GAO was asked to review the authorities and resources IAEA has to carry out its activities regarding the JCPOA. On the basis of preliminary results of ongoing work that GAO is conducting, this report provides observations on (1) the JCPOA commitments that IAEA has been asked to verify and its authorities to do so, (2) the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify the JCPOA, and (3) potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and others have identified with regard to verifying the JCPOA. GAO analyzed the JCPOA and key IAEA documents and interviewed current and former IAEA officials, U.S. government officials, national laboratory representatives, and experts from research institutions.
GAO is not making recommendations at this time and expects to issue a final report on this work later this year.
What GAO Found
As outlined in the JCPOA, IAEA was asked to verify Iran's implementation of a range of nuclear-related commitments, and IAEA uses its authorities and conducts additional verification activities to do so, according to IAEA. Iran's commitments include limits on uranium enrichment levels and enriched uranium inventories. GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA plans to verify Iran's implementation of these commitments through a range of activities conducted by its Safeguards Department, such as inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities and analyzing environmental samples. To verify Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA, IAEA officials told GAO that the agency uses its authorities and conducts additional verification activities agreed to by Iran under the JCPOA, such as monitoring Iran's uranium mines and mills. In addition, under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, an agreement that will expand IAEA's access, including to locations where undeclared materials and activities—those that an IAEA member state is required to, but has not declared under its agreements with IAEA—may be suspected. The JCPOA also includes a mechanism in which participants to the agreement commit to resolve an access request from the agency within 24 days after the request is made.
GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA has identified the resources necessary to verify the nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. IAEA has estimated that it needs approximately $10 million per year for 15 years in additional funding above its current safeguards budget for JCPOA verification. In addition, IAEA plans to transfer 18 experienced inspectors to its Iran Task Force from other safeguards divisions and to hire and train additional inspectors. According to IAEA officials, existing safeguards technical resources are sufficient to implement the JCPOA. According to IAEA documents, all of IAEA's JCPOA work through 2016 will be funded through extra-budgetary contributions. IAEA officials said that the agency intends to propose that of the $10 million, approximately $5.7 million for all Additional Protocol activities and inspector costs attributable to the JCPOA be funded through IAEA's regular budget after 2016.
GAO's preliminary observations indicate that IAEA may face potential challenges in monitoring and verifying Iran's implementation of certain nuclear-related commitments in the JCPOA. According to current and former IAEA and U.S. officials and experts, these potential challenges include (1) integrating JCPOA-related funding into its regular budget and managing human resources in the safeguards program, (2) access challenges depending on Iran's cooperation and the untested JCPOA mechanism to resolve access requests, and (3) the inherent challenge of detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities—such as potential weapons development activities that may not involve nuclear material. According to knowledgeable current and former U.S. government officials, detection of undeclared material and activities in Iran and worldwide is IAEA's greatest challenge. According to IAEA documents, Iran has previously failed to declare activity to IAEA. However, according to a former IAEA official as well as current IAEA and U.S. government officials GAO interviewed, IAEA has improved its capabilities in detecting undeclared activity, such as by adapting its inspector training program. |
gao_RCED-96-67 | gao_RCED-96-67_0 | HANO currently has nearly $200 million in unexpended funds. In addition, even as the OIG’s 1994 report called for specific corrective actions by HANO and close monitoring of HANO by HUD, the OIG concluded that this “course of action had failed in the past.” This judgment suggests to us that HUD’s field office in New Orleans has not provided for the necessary and effective oversight of HANO. Actions to Improve Operations at HANO Have Not Been Effective
To deal with the problems identified by the numerous audit reports and the poor performance results as measured by HUD’s Public Housing Management Assessment Program, HUD has unsuccessfully attempted on several occasions to improve HANO’s management, including a September 1994 partnership between the Secretary of HUD and the then-Mayor of New Orleans. The partnership’s purposes were to avoid a federal takeover of HANO, hold the Mayor and the New Orleans City Council accountable for progress, and ultimately solve New Orleans’ public housing crisis and improve the residents’ housing conditions. In 1991, HUD attempted to prevent HANO’s board of commissioners from interfering with the private manager’s activities by issuing a “limited denial of participation” against HANO’s board of commissioners. On February 8, 1996, the Secretary of HUD declared HANO to be in breach of its contract and entered into a cooperative endeavor agreement with the Mayor of New Orleans for improving HANO’s performance. HUD and HANO enter into a memorandum of understanding requiring HANO to contract with a private firm to manage the housing authority’s day-to-day operations. HUD’s Secretary agrees to declare HANO in breach of its contract and take control of the housing authority and its properties. Comments From the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Major Contributors to This Report
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
Eric A. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), focusing on: (1) its major operational difficulties; (2) the causes of those problems; and (3) the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) corrective actions and the effects of those actions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) HANO has been unable to implement and maintain effective maintenance, modernization, and rehabilitation programs; (2) in 1994, none of the 150 HANO housing units that HUD sampled met HUD housing quality standards; (3) although HANO has over $200 million in unspent modernization grants that have accumulated over the past decade, its housing units continue to deteriorate and unit vacancies remain at over 25 percent; (4) the HANO board of commissioners has not effectively governed HANO and has interfered with its day-to-day operations, hiring, and contracting; (5) this interference has slowed HANO management improvements, prevented its staff from performing effectively, and resulted in the cancellation of modernization contracts; (6) HUD and its New Orleans Field Office have not helped to improve HANO operations; (7) unsuccessful HUD attempts to correct HANO mismanagement have included punitive actions, imposing private management, and limiting the board of commissioners' authority; (8) in 1994, HUD entered into a partnership with New Orleans to avoid a federal takeover of HANO, hold local officials responsible for HANO performance, and improve management and housing conditions; and (9) in February 1996, HUD declared HANO in breach of its contract and entered into a new partnership with New Orleans. |
gao_GAO-06-749T | gao_GAO-06-749T_0 | To minimize financial burdens on servicemembers, DOD has requested and Congress has increased cash compensation for active duty military personnel. Additionally, some financial products marketed to servicemembers may negatively affect their financial condition. Data Suggest Financial Conditions of Deployed Servicemembers and Their Families Similar to Nondeployed Servicemembers and Their Families
In a 2003 DOD-wide survey, servicemembers who were deployed for at least 30 days reported similar levels of financial health or problems as those who had not deployed. For example, an analysis of the responses for only junior enlisted personnel showed that 3 percent of the deployed group and 2 percent of the nondeployed group indicated that they were in “over their heads” financially; and 13 percent of the deployed group and 15 percent of the nondeployed group responded that they found it “tough to make ends meet but keeping your head above water” financially. Figure 1 shows estimates of financial conditions for all servicemembers based on their responses to this survey. Deployed Servicemembers Faced Problems Receiving Family Separation Allowance and Communicating with Creditors
Deployed servicemembers experienced problems receiving their family’s separation allowance promptly and communicating with creditors and families. Regarding family separation allowance, DOD pay data for January 2005 showed that almost 6,000 of 71,000 deployed servicemembers who have dependents did not receive their family separation allowance in a timely manner. Servicemembers may also experience financial difficulties as a result of communication constraints while deployed. DOD Has Taken Steps to Assist Servicemembers with Financial Concerns, but Some Assistance Is Underutilized
DOD has taken a number of steps to assist servicemembers with their financial concerns, including providing military-sponsored PFM training, establishing a Financial Readiness Campaign, providing command financial specialists, and using Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards. 2). Services Require Financial Management Training
All four military services require PFM training for servicemembers, and the timing and location of the training varies by service. Free Legal Assistance Offered, but Servicemembers Do Not Make Full Use of This Assistance
DOD provides free legal assistance on contracts and other financial documents at installations, but servicemembers do not make full use this assistance. They stated that junior enlisted servicemembers who want their purchases or loans immediately may not take the time to visit the attorney’s office for such a review. Additionally, the legal assistance attorneys noted that some servicemembers feared information about their financial problems would get back to the command and limit their career progression. Service Relief/Aid Societies Provide Financial Assistance
Each service has a relief or aid society designed to provide financial assistance to servicemembers. These societies provide counseling and education as well as financial relief through grants or no-interest loans to eligible servicemembers experiencing emergencies. Some servicemembers in our focus groups stated that they would not use grants or no-interest loans from a service society because they take too long, are intrusive because the financial institution or relief/aid society requires in-depth financial information in the loan or grant application, or could be career limiting if the command found out the servicemembers were having financial problems. Non-DOD Resources May Be Used When Sevicemembers Need Additional Financial Support or Confidentiality
Servicemembers may choose to use non-DOD resources if they do not want the command to be aware of their financial conditions or they need financial products or support not offered through DOD, the services, or the installation. DOD Lacks Oversight Framework for Assessing and Monitoring PFM Program Effectiveness
Although DOD has made resources available to assist servicemembers, it lacks the results-oriented, departmentwide data needed to assess the effectiveness of its PFM programs and provide necessary oversight. Without an oversight framework requiring common evaluation DOD-wide and reporting relationships among DOD and the services, DOD and Congress do not have the visibility or oversight they need to assess the effectiveness of DOD’s financial management training and assistance to servicemembers. Concluding Observations
In summary, as mentioned earlier in my testimony, Congress and DOD have taken steps to decrease the likelihood that deployed and nondeployed servicemembers will experience financial problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The finances of servicemembers and their families have been an ongoing concern of Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD), especially in light of more frequent deployments to support conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adverse effects that may result when servicemembers experience financial problems include loss of security clearances, criminal or nonjudicial sanctions, adverse personnel actions, or adverse impacts on unit readiness. To decrease the likelihood that servicemembers will experience financial problems, DOD has requested and Congress has granted annual increases in military basic pay for all active duty servicemembers and increases in special pays and allowances for deployed servicemembers. The military has also developed personal financial management (PFM) programs to help avoid or mitigate adverse effects associated with personal financial problems. However, studies published in 2002 showed that servicemembers continue to report financial problems. This testimony provides a summary of GAO's prior work examining (1) the extent to which deployments have affected the financial conditions of active duty servicemembers and their families, and (2) steps that DOD has taken to assist servicemembers with their financial needs.
What GAO Found
DOD data suggests that deployment status does not affect the financial condition of active duty servicemembers, although some deployed servicemembers faced certain problems. Data from a 2003 DOD-wide survey suggests that servicemembers who were deployed for at least 30 days reported similar levels of financial health or problems as those who had not deployed. For example, of junior enlisted personnel, 3 percent of the deployed group and 2 percent of the nondeployed group indicated that they were in "over their heads" financially; and 13 percent of the deployed group and 15 percent of the nondeployed group responded that they found it "tough to make ends meet but keeping your head above water" financially. However, problems receiving family separation allowance and communicating with creditors may result in financial difficulties for some deployed servicemembers. Based on DOD pay data for January 2005, almost 6,000 of 71,000 deployed servicemembers who had dependents did not obtain their family separation allowance in a timely manner. Furthermore, problems communicating with creditors--caused by limited Internet access, few telephones and high fees, and delays in receiving ground mail--can affect deployed servicemembers' abilities to resolve financial issues. Additionally, some financial products marketed to servicemembers may negatively affect their financial condition. DOD has taken a number of steps to assist servicemembers with their financial needs, although some of this assistance has been underutilized. These steps include PFM training for servicemembers, which is required by all four military services. DOD also provides free legal assistance on purchase contracts for large items and other financial documents. However, according to the attorneys and other personnel, servicemembers do not make full use of available legal services because they may not take the time to visit the attorney's office or they fear information about a financial problem would get back to the command and limit their career progression. In addition, each service has a relief or aid society designed to provide financial assistance through counseling and education as well as financial relief through grants or no-interest loans. Some servicemembers in our focus groups stated that they would not use relief from a service society because they take too long, are intrusive, require too much in-depth financial information, or may be career limiting if the command found out. Servicemembers may use non-DOD resources if they do not want the command to be aware of their financial conditions or they need products or support not offered through DOD, the services, or the installation. Although DOD has taken these steps to assist servicemembers with their financial needs, it does not have the results-oriented departmentwide data needed to assess the effectiveness of its PFM programs and provide necessary oversight. Without an oversight framework requiring evaluation and a reporting relationship between DOD and the services, DOD and Congress do not have the visibility or oversight needed to assess the effectiveness of DOD's financial management training and assistance to servicemembers. |
gao_GAO-10-171 | gao_GAO-10-171_0 | This community of federal stakeholders is known as the NBIS. Generally, there are four elements that are critical for NBIC to achieve its early detection and situational awareness missions established in the 9/11 Commission Act: (1) acquire data from NBIS partners that can be analyzed for indications of new or ongoing biological events, (2) leverage scientific and event-specific expertise from across the NBIS, (3) obtain strategic and operational guidance from NBIS partners, and (4) develop and maintain information technologies to support data collection, analysis, and communication. Much of the information gathered for these biosurveillance purposes is generated at the state government level. We have previously reported that for collaborating agencies to enhance and sustain collaboration, they need to, among other things, (1) have a clear and compelling rationale for working together; (2) establish joint strategies, policies, and procedures for aligning core processes and resources; (3) identify resources needed to initiate or sustain their collaborative effort; (4) work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities; and (5) develop accountability mechanisms to help implement and monitor their efforts to achieve collaborative results. NBIC Generally Has Not Acquired Data from Other Agencies to Support the Early Detection Mission and Instead Relies on Nonfederal, Open-Source Data
NBIC’s ability to acquire and consolidate data from NBIS partners as well as from nonfederal sources is central to achieving its mission. However, NBIC officials noted that there are limitations on the value of final reports for supporting early detection. However, for the most part, NBIC has not consistently received this kind of support from NBIS partners. NBIC Uses an IT System to Manage Publicly Available Data and to Communicate Alerts, but Generally Lacks the Ability to Apply Analytical Tools to Data
One of the elements that is critical for NBIC to carry out its mission is development and maintenance of information technologies to support data collection, analysis, and communication of alerts. NBIC has taken steps to develop an IT system that can manage data from NBIS partners and can help identify open source reports of potential biological events, but NBIC largely lacks data from federal agencies. However, we found (1) widespread uncertainty and skepticism around the value of participating in the NBIS and the purpose of NBIC; (2) incomplete joint strategies, policies, and procedures for operating across agency boundaries; (3) an inability or unwillingness of NBIS members to respond to plans for leveraging resources; (4) confusion and dissatisfaction around the definitions of mission, roles, and responsibilities of NBIC and its NBIS partners; and (5) a lack of mechanisms to monitor and account for collaborative results. Because there is no legal requirement for agencies to participate in NBIS, agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale to work together as a community of federal partners by joining the NBIS and providing data and personnel to the integration center. The officials also provided several examples of outreach to NBIS officials at all 11 agencies, such as through discussions with NBIS partner agency representatives at NIWG meetings. Information on the status of NBIC’s efforts to achieve its mission has been provided to the NIOC, an oversight council serving the NBIS community, but substantive discussion of strategies for overcoming barriers to collaboration that impact NBIC’s execution of its mission did not occur during meetings with the NIOC. The 9/11 Commission Act charged NBIC with early detection and situational awareness, but both the act and the operational guidance NBIC has developed acknowledges that this is to be done, in large part, through the NBIS—a multi-agency collaborative community. A strategy for helping ensure that NBIC applies key collaborative practices effectively and consistently, that draws on the existing intellectual resources of its strategic partners in the NIOC, and that includes mechanisms to monitor performance and accountability for collaborative results, may help NBIC and NBIS partners to identify and overcome challenges to sharing data and personnel for the purposes of earlier detection and enhanced situational awareness of potentially catastrophic biological events. In addition, monitoring the effectiveness of collaboration through the use of performance metrics could help NBIC ensure they are progressing towards their goal of obtaining the resources necessary to accomplish its mission of early detection and situational awareness of biological events of national concern. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recently, there has been an increased focus on developing the ability to provide early detection of and situational awareness during a disease outbreak. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act sought to enhance this capability, in part, by creating the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) within the Department of Homeland Security. NBIC is to help provide early detection and situational awareness by integrating information and supporting an interagency biosurveillance community. The act directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report on the state of biosurveillance and resource use in federal, state, local, and tribal governments. This report is one in a series responding to that mandate. This report focuses on the actions taken by NBIC to (1) acquire resources to accomplish its mission and (2) effectively collaborate with its federal partners. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents, such as NBIC's Concept of Operations, and interviewed officials at NBIC and 11 federal partners.
What GAO Found
To carry out its early detection and situational awareness mission, NBIC has made efforts to acquire data from the integration center's community of federal partners, obtain analytical expertise from other agencies, establish governance bodies to develop and oversee the community of federal partners, and provide information technologies to support data collection, analysis, and communication. However, NBIC does not receive the kind of data it has identified as most critical for supporting its early detection mission--particularly, data generated at the earliest stages of an event. In addition, NBIC has faced challenges leveraging the expertise of its federal partners. For example, NBIC officials have emphasized the importance of agencies temporarily assigning personnel to supplement the expertise at NBIC. However, only 2 of 11 partner agencies have assigned personnel to support the integration center. NBIC has developed governance bodies that provide oversight for the integration center and the interagency community. Although the integration center has also developed an information technology system, it is primarily used to help identify and collect publicly available Internet data because NBIC lacks data from federal partners that best support the early detection goal of biosurveillance. NBIC is not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacks key resources--data and personnel--from its partner agencies, which may be at least partially attributed to collaboration challenges it has faced. Integrating biosurveillance data is an inherently interagency enterprise, as reflected by both law and NBIC's strategy for meeting its mission. NBIC is to help coordinate and support a community of federal partners for early detection and enhanced situational awareness. Consequently, for NBIC to obtain the resources it needs to meet its mission, it must effectively employ collaborative practices. However, in interviews with partner agencies, GAO encountered widespread confusion, uncertainty, and skepticism around the value of participation in the interagency community, as well as the mission and purpose of NBIC within that community. Further, interviews with agency officials demonstrated a lack of clarity about roles, responsibilities, joint strategies, policies, and procedures for operating across agency boundaries. We have previously reported on key practices that can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. For collaborating agencies to overcome barriers to working together, they need to, among other things, (1) develop a clear and compelling rationale for working together by articulating a common federal outcome or purpose; (2) establish joint strategies, policies, and procedures to help align activities, core processes, and resources; (3) identify resources needed to initiate or sustain their collaborative effort; (4) work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities; and (5) develop accountability mechanisms to guide implementation and monitoring of their efforts to collaborate. Development of a strategy for collaboration and the use of these key collaboration practices could enhance NBIC's ability to foster interagency data and resource sharing. |
gao_GAO-10-110 | gao_GAO-10-110_0 | The Number of DPAs and NPAs Has Generally Been Less Than the Number of Corporate Prosecutions, and DOJ Recently Began Tracking Its Use of These Agreements
DOJ’s Use of DPAs and NPAs Peaked in Fiscal Year 2007, Then Declined, and USAOs Have Used Fewer DPAs and NPAs Than Corporate Prosecutions While the Criminal Division Has Used about the Same Number of Each
DOJ has made more frequent use of DPAs and NPAs in recent years, entering into four agreements in fiscal year 2003 compared to a high of 38 agreements in fiscal year 2007, although use declined in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 when DOJ entered into 24 and 23 agreements, respectively. As shown in table 1, the number of DPAs and NPAs entered into by the USAOs is small compared to the number of corporate prosecutions they pursued, but the number of DPAs and NPAs entered into by the Criminal Division is similar to—and in some fiscal years, more than—the number of corporate prosecutions it pursued. For example, USAOs pursued almost 18 times more corporate prosecutions than DPAs and NPAs from fiscal years 2004 to 2009. DOJ Has Improved Its Ability to Centrally Track Its Use of DPAs and NPAs
Prior to 2009, DOJ did not have a mechanism to centrally track its use of DPAs and NPAs, which inhibited its ability to accurately report the number and terms of the agreements to the Congress and the public. However, in response to our requests for information, DOJ has recently taken steps to better track its use of DPAs and NPAs, steps that will allow it to more accurately report on the number and terms of DPAs and NPAs to Congress and the public, and identify best practices and ensure consistency across agreements. However, DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs and NPAs—in addition to other tools, such as prosecution—contribute to the department’s efforts to combat corporate crime because it has no measures to assess their effectiveness. DOJ officials acknowledged that one of DOJ’s goals in using DPAs and NPAs is to help reform the company. In our discussions with the Senior Counsel to the ODAG as well as the five monitors and seven companies that provided opinions on how DOJ could measure the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs, these officials suggested two possible models for measuring effectiveness by considering (1) a company’s recidivist behavior—or the extent to which the company re-engages in criminal misconduct—after the agreement is complete or during the term of the DPA or NPA, or (2) whether the company successfully met the terms of the agreement, which often include requirements to establish or enhance compliance programs as a means to reform the company. Courts Generally Had Limited Involvement in the DPA Process, and Prosecutors, Company Officials, Monitors, and Judges More Frequently Cited Disadvantages Than Advantages to Greater Court Involvement
Judges Reported Limited Involvement in the DPA Process
The Speedy Trial Act allows judges to approve the deferral of prosecution pursuant to a written agreement between the government and the defendant, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct; however, the law does not otherwise specify judicial involvement in the DPA process. We obtained responses from 12 U.S. district and magistrate judges who handled cases involving a DPA, and these judges reported they were generally not involved in the DPA process. By developing performance measures to evaluate DPAs and NPAs, DOJ will be better positioned to gauge whether they are effective tools in deterring and combating corporate crime. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent cases of corporate fraud and mismanagement heighten the Department of Justice's (DOJ) need to appropriately punish and deter corporate crime. Recently, DOJ has made more use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prosecutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring prosecution. In June and November 2009, GAO testified on DOJ's use and oversight of DPAs and NPAs, and this report discusses additional findings, including (1) the extent to which DOJ has used DPAs and NPAs to address corporate misconduct and tracks use of these agreements, (2) the extent to which DOJ measures the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs, and (3) the role of the court in the DPA and NPA process. GAO examined 152 DPAs and NPAs negotiated from 1993 through September 2009 and analyzed DOJ data on corporate prosecutions in fiscal years 2004 through 2009. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials, prosecutors from 13 DOJ offices, 20 company representatives, 11 monitors who oversee company compliance, and 12 federal judges. While not generalizable, these results provide insight into decisions about DPAs and NPAs.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2004, the number of DPAs and NPAs has generally been less than the number of corporate prosecutions, and in 2009, DOJ began tracking its use of these agreements. DOJ has made more frequent use of DPAs and NPAs in recent years, entering into four agreements in fiscal year 2003 compared to a high of 38 agreements in fiscal year 2007, although use declined in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 when DOJ entered into 24 and 23 agreements, respectively. The U.S. Attorneys Offices (USAO) and DOJ's Criminal Division entered into the vast majority of agreements. From fiscal years 2004 to 2009, for USAOs, the number of DPAs and NPAs was less than the number of corporate prosecutions, whereas for the Criminal Division, the number of DPAs and NPAs was comparable to the number of corporate prosecutions. Prior to 2009, DOJ did not have a mechanism to centrally track its use of DPAs and NPAs, which inhibited its ability to accurately report the number and terms of the agreements to the Congress and the public. However, in response to GAO's requests for information, DOJ has recently taken steps to better track its use of DPAs and NPAs, steps that will allow it to more accurately report on the number and terms of DPAs and NPAs to Congress and the public and identify best practices and ensure consistency across agreements. DOJ lacks performance measures to assess how DPAs and NPAs contribute to its efforts to combat corporate crime. Two possible measures of DPA and NPA effectiveness could be (1) whether the company repeats the criminal behavior either during or after its agreement; or (2) whether the company successfully implements the terms of the agreement; implementation could be a proxy measure for whether the company reformed because DPAs and NPAs often require companies to make improvements in internal controls, compliance programs, or training to detect and prevent future wrongdoing. By developing performance measures to evaluate DPAs and NPAs, DOJ will be better positioned to gauge whether they are effective tools in deterring and combating corporate crime. The Speedy Trial Act allows judges to approve the deferral of prosecution pursuant to a written agreement between the government and the defendant, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate its good conduct; however, the law does not otherwise specify judicial involvement in the DPA process. GAO obtained responses from 12 U.S. district and magistrate judges who handled cases involving a DPA, and these judges reported they were generally not involved in the DPA process. Prosecutors, company representatives, monitors, and judges with whom GAO spoke more frequently cited disadvantages to greater judicial involvement--such as the lack of time and resources available to judges and concerns about the separation of powers and constitutionality of increased judicial involvement--than advantages to such involvement--such as the court's ability to act as an independent arbiter of disputes, increased transparency in the DPA process, and decreased perceptions of favoritism in selecting the monitor. |
gao_GAO-03-580T | gao_GAO-03-580T_0 | Fiscal Year 2002 Performance and Results
Fiscal year 2002 was a year of challenges, not just for GAO but also for the Congress and the nation. In fiscal year 2002, GAO also served the Congress and the American people by helping to: Contribute to a national preparedness strategy at the federal, state, and local levels that will make Americans safer from terrorism Protect investors through better oversight of the securities industry and Ensure a safer national food supply Expose the inadequacy of nursing home care Make income tax collection fair, effective, and less painful to taxpayers Strengthen public schools’ accountability for educating children Keep sensitive American technologies out of the wrong hands Protect American armed forces confronting chemical or biological weapons Identify the risks to employees in private pension programs Identify factors causing the shortage of children’s vaccines Assist the postal system in addressing anthrax and various management challenges Identify security risks at ports, airports, and transit systems Save billions by bringing sound business practices to the Department of Foster human capital strategic management to create a capable, effective, Ensure that the armed forces are trained and equipped to meet the nation’s defense commitments Enhance the safety of Americans and foreign nationals at U.S.
Assess ways of improving border security through biometric technologies Reduce the international debt problems faced by poor countries Reform the way federal agencies manage their finances Protect government computer systems from security threats Enhance the transition of e-government—the new “electronic connection” between government and the public During fiscal year 2002, GAO’s analyses and recommendations contributed to a wide range of legislation considered by the Congress, as shown in the following table. 1). 2). Maximizing GAO’s Effectiveness, Responsiveness and Value
The results of our work were possible, in part, because of changes we have made to maximize the value of GAO. We had already realigned GAO’s structure and resources to better serve the Congress in its legislative, oversight, appropriations, and investigative roles. Over the past year, we cultivated and fostered congressional and agency relations, better refined our strategic and annual planning and reporting processes, and enhanced our information technology infrastructure. We also continued to provide priority attention to our management challenges of human capital, information security, and physical security. Changes we made in each of these areas helped enable us to operate in a constantly changing environment. GAO’s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request
GAO is requesting budget authority of $473 million for fiscal year 2004 to maintain current operations for serving the Congress as outlined in our strategic plan and to continue initiatives to enhance our human capital, support business processes, and ensure the safety and security of GAO staff, facilities, and information systems. Our requested increase of $18.4 million in direct appropriations represents a modest 4.1 percent increase, primarily for mandatory pay and uncontrollable costs. Our fiscal year 2004 budget includes $4.8 million for safety and security needs that are also included in the supplemental. If the requested fiscal year 2003 supplemental funds are provided, our fiscal year 2004 budget could be reduced by $4.8 million. The performance goals lay out the work we plan to do in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to help achieve our strategic goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is a key source of objective information and analyses and, as such, plays a crucial role in supporting congressional decision-making and helping improve government for the benefit of the American people. This testimony focuses on GAO's (1) fiscal year 2002 performance and results, (2) efforts to maximize our effectiveness, responsiveness and value, and (3) our budget request for fiscal year 2004 to support the Congress and serve the American public.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2002, GAO's work informed the national debate on a broad spectrum of issues including helping the Congress answer questions about the associated costs and program tradeoffs of the national preparedness strategy, including providing perspectives on how best to organize and manage the new Transportation Security Administration and Department of Homeland Security. GAO's efforts helped the Congress and government leaders achieve $37.7 billion in financial benefits--an $88 return on every dollar invested in GAO. The return on the public's investment in GAO extends beyond dollar savings to improvements in how the government serves its citizens. This includes a range of accomplishments that serve to improve safety, enhance security, protect privacy, and increase the effectiveness of a range of federal programs and activities. The results of our work in fiscal year 2002 were possible, in part, because of changes we have made to transform GAO in order to meet our goal of being a model federal agency and a world-class professional services organization. We had already realigned GAO's structure and resources to better serve the Congress in its legislative, oversight, appropriations, and investigative roles. Over the past year, we cultivated and fostered congressional and agency relations, better refined our strategic and annual planning and reporting processes, and enhanced our information technology infrastructure. We also continued to provide priority attention to our management challenges of human capital, information security, and physical security. We have made progress in addressing each of these challenges, but we still have work to do and plan to ask for legislation to help address some of these issues. GAO is requesting budget authority of $473 million for fiscal year 2004. Our request represents a modest 4.1 percent increase in direct appropriations, primarily for mandatory pay and uncontrollable costs. This budget will allow us to maintain current operations for serving the Congress as outlined in our strategic plan and continue initiatives to enhance our human capital, support business processes, and ensure the safety and security of GAO staff, facilities, and information systems. Approximately $4.8 million, or about 1 percent, of our request relates to several safety and security items that are included in our fiscal year 2003 supplemental request. If this supplemental request is granted, our fiscal year 2004 request could be reduced accordingly. |
gao_OSI-95-15 | gao_OSI-95-15_0 | According to SBA, the total dollar value of contracts awarded to the firms initially not recommended for participation in the program is at least $2.9 billion. In its report, it cited findings wherein individuals in the program had overcome their economic disadvantage but remained in the program by understating their net worth;
SBA officials had miscalculated the net worth; high personal income was also not considered in the evaluation of net worth; and individuals remained in the program because either the firm’s equity, the owner’s personal residence, and/or the spouse’s net worth were not considered factors in determining the owners’ net worth. (U.S. citizenship is a requirement for acceptance into the 8(a) program.) I-NET submitted financial statements to SBA that misrepresented its size by excluding certain revenues from the total sales, which allowed it to meet size standards for contracts in 1991 and 1992. During this same time period, however, I-NET did not portray itself as a company at risk when it sought outside investors. SBA Allowed I-NET to Remain in the 8(a) Program After It Exceeded Size Limits
Although SBA officials responsible for monitoring I-NET’s progress had become aware that I-NET had grown too large for continued program participation, SBA allowed the company to remain enrolled for almost 2 additional years. Both the court and the Comptroller General determined that an 8(a) firm that has exceeded size limitations must have its 8(a) contracts suspended. The Coast Guard changed the original SIC code so that TAMSCO would be eligible for the award; used the IDIQ contracting option; and lowered the labor hours to avoid competition. Thus, the minimum contract value dropped below the $3-million competition threshold, from $4.6 million to $2.1 million. A draft of an internal Coast Guard memorandum, written to justify the contract award to TAMSCO, sheds light on Coast Guard attitudes about the use of competition and 8(a) sole source contracts. 1.) IDIQ Contract to TAMSCO Was Referred to as a “Graduation Present”
Notes that the COTR took during Coast Guard/TAMSCO discussions also referred to suggestions that the contract be awarded to TAMSCO as a “graduation present” before the end of TAMSCO’s 8(a) program participation. The files for two firms were unavailable for review. To date, according to SBA, no 8(a) firm has graduated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) program, focusing on whether: (1) ineligible 8(a) firms have received contracts through their improper participation in the program; (2) 8(a) firms have misrepresented themselves to enter and stay in the program; (3) firms exceeding the size standard have inappropriately received 8(a) awards; (4) SBA has allowed ineligible firms to remain in the program after they exceeded the size limitations; and (5) federal contracting authorities have improperly used indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts to avoid competition.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the two firms studied were initially recommended for nonacceptance into the 8(a) program because of eligibility questions about who actually controlled the firms; (2) SBA justification for accepting the firms was questionable, since the questions about the firms' ownership were never fully answered; (3) one firm's owner misrepresented her personal qualifications, her equity in the firm, and ownership changes, but SBA took no action when it found out about the misrepresentations; (4) the firm received millions of dollars worth of 8(a) contracts after it had grown too large to participate in the program; (5) although the firm hid its size by excluding items from its financial statements, understating its total revenue, and representing itself as a company at financial risk, it had considerable access to credit; (6) SBA allowed the firm to remain in the program and receive new 8(a) contracts even after it had determined that the firm had grown too large for continued program participation; (7) the Coast Guard awarded a sole-source IDIQ contract to the second firm by changing the contract's classification code to one for which the firm was eligible and altering the contract's original minimum value below the minimum threshold for mandatory 8(a) competitive procurements; and (8) the Coast Guard believed that competitive 8(a) procurements hindered its mission and viewed the contract as a graduation present to the firm. |
gao_NSIAD-95-11 | gao_NSIAD-95-11_0 | Rationale for Building the Santa Lucia Base
According to U.S. officials, the rationale for building the Santa Lucia base was to place U.S. personnel in the safest possible environment from which to conduct antidrug activities. Costs of the Santa Lucia Base
According to INM and U.S. embassy records, about $49.2 million was provided to construct, maintain, and operate the Santa Lucia base during fiscal years 1988-93. After coordinating with various U.S. agencies involved in antidrug activities regarding program options, the State Department decided that it could not adequately support maintenance and operations at the Santa Lucia base while supporting its antidrug programs in Peru and other countries. Thus, in December 1993, the United States stopped supporting the base and the Peruvian government assumed responsibility for the base’s administrative and operational control. However, the U.S. embassy has faced a number of obstacles to fully implementing a mobile basing concept for conducting antidrug missions, including problems with helicopter maintenance, internal conflicts over the responsibility for planning and coordinating antidrug operations, and a U.S. decision not to share with Peru real-time information and assistance that could lead to the shoot down of civilian aircraft suspected of drug trafficking. The delay was caused by internal differences within the U.S. embassy about the structure and staffing of the group. The executive branch is discussing this issue with the Peruvian government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on U.S. antidrug efforts in Peru, focusing on the: (1) rationale for, and costs associated with, the construction, maintenance, and operations of the Santa Lucia antidrug base; (2) rationale for discontinuing support of the Santa Lucia base; and (3) current status of U.S. efforts to restructure antidrug programs in Peru.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Santa Lucia base was constructed to place U.S. personnel in the safest possible environment from which to conduct antidrug activities; (2) between fiscal years 1988 and 1993, the State Department spent about $49.2 million to construct, maintain, and operate the Santa Lucia base; (3) in December 1993, the U.S embassy restructured its antidrug programs in Peru because it could not continue to support the base while also supporting other U.S. antidrug efforts; (4) although the executive branch has approved a formal mobile basing concept to implement antidrug efforts, the U.S. embassy has been slow in implementing the concept because of maintenance problems with helicopters, internal differences within the U.S. embassy over how the operational planning group would function to coordinate law enforcement operations, and the decision to stop sharing information with the government of Peru that could be used to shoot down civilian aircraft suspected of drug trafficking; and (5) although legislation has been passed to allow information sharing on drug activities, the Administration has not reached agreement with Peru on certain required preconditions. |
gao_GAO-07-35 | gao_GAO-07-35_0 | Financial issues were also identified as a disincentive to participating in these programs, with limited funding available to the programs overall and for individuals specifically, most frequently identified by survey respondents. Incentives for Participating in USDA Conservation Programs to Benefit Threatened and Endangered Species
As might be expected, respondents most frequently identified financial benefits as the primary incentive to participating in the six USDA conservation programs we reviewed for the benefit of threatened and endangered species or their habitat. Cost-share payments. Program Criteria That Give Greater Consideration to Projects that Directly Address Threatened and Endangered Species
Another most frequently identified incentive for landowner participation for the benefit of threatened and endangered species or their habitat—in all but one of the six USDA conservation programs we reviewed, CSP— was program evaluation criteria that give projects directly addressing threatened, endangered, or other at-risk species greater chances of being approved. Fears about federal government regulations, administrative and paperwork requirements, participation and eligibility requirements, and the potential for current or future agricultural uses to be harmed or restricted were the other most frequently identified factors limiting participation. Suggestions for Addressing Disincentives to Participating in Programs to Benefit Threatened and Endangered Species
Survey respondents most frequently suggested increasing funding, improving education and outreach to landowners, streamlining paperwork requirements, and allowing greater flexibility in program participation and eligibility requirements to address disincentives and encourage greater participation in the six USDA conservation programs we reviewed for the benefit of threatened and endangered species and their habitats. Respondents indicated that improving education and conducting more outreach to landowners could address a number of different disincentives. Implementing Suggestions Has Potential Limitations for Threatened and Endangered Species
Some respondents noted that while implementing the suggestions might entice more people to participate in the programs and address disincentives that were identified, doing so would not necessarily benefit threatened and endangered species in all cases. However, agency officials acknowledged that the quality of working relationships and the frequency of coordination between USDA and FWS staff varies by location. Although the draft memorandum is a positive step in improving coordination, it currently lacks mechanisms to monitor and report on implementation efforts to help ensure that coordination occurs and is sustained. Still, some agency officials we interviewed noted that despite past problems between USDA and FWS, coordination is improving. Specifically, officials noted that individuals who possessed a strong commitment to coordinate, had good interpersonal skills, and demonstrated a willingness to work with others were often the driving force behind successful collaborative efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance and sustain coordination at USDA’s and FWS’s field offices at the state and local level for the benefit of threatened, endangered, and other at-risk species, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior: direct the Chief of NRCS and the Director of FWS to work with AFWA to incorporate monitoring and reporting mechanisms in their memorandum of understanding prior to finalizing it for implementation; and direct the Chief of NRCS, the Administrator of FSA, and the Director of FWS, in cooperation with AFWA, to include FSA as an additional partner to the memorandum or develop a separate memorandum of understanding to address coordination. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our study were to identify (1) stakeholder views on the incentives and disincentives for landowners to benefit threatened and endangered species and their habitats through participation in U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conservation programs as well as suggestions for addressing disincentives to program participation, and (2) how USDA and the U.S. We also conducted telephone surveys with USDA and soil and water conservation district officials, and private landowners. NRCS also emphasizes projects that include practices that are beneficial to fish and wildlife, but may not otherwise be funded. | Why GAO Did This Study
Authorization for several conservation programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) expires in 2007, raising questions about how these programs may be modified, including how they can better support conservation of threatened and endangered species. Private landowners receive funding under these programs to implement conservation projects directed at several resource concerns, including threatened and endangered species. In this report, GAO discusses (1) stakeholder views on the incentives and disincentives to participating in USDA programs for the benefit of threatened and endangered species and their suggestions for addressing identified disincentives and (2) coordination efforts by USDA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to benefit threatened and endangered species. In performing this work, GAO conducted telephone surveys with a nonprobability sample of over 150 federal and nonfederal officials and landowners.
What GAO Found
As might be expected, survey respondents most frequently identified receiving payments as the primary incentive for landowners to participate in USDA conservation programs for the benefit of threatened and endangered species or their habitats. The other most frequently identified incentives were program evaluation criteria that give projects directly addressing threatened or endangered species greater chances of being funded by USDA and landowners' personal interest in conservation. Relatedly, limited funding for programs overall and for the amount available to individual landowners was the most frequently identified disincentive to participation in USDA's programs. Fears about federal government regulations, paperwork requirements, participation and eligibility requirements, and the potential for participation to hinder current or future agricultural production were the next most frequently identified factors limiting participation. Survey respondents most frequently suggested increasing funding, improving education and outreach, streamlining paperwork requirements, and allowing more flexibility in program participation and eligibility requirements as ways to address program disincentives to participating in USDA's programs for the benefit of threatened and endangered species. Respondents indicated that educating and reaching out to more landowners may address a number of identified disincentives, including the fear of government regulations. For some disincentives, however, respondents noted that, while addressing them might entice more people to participate in the programs, it would not necessarily benefit threatened and endangered species. For example, some respondents suggested loosening requirements on the size of buffer strips in riparian areas, but others noted that doing so might harm certain species that are dependent on riparian areas for habitat. Much of the coordination between USDA and FWS for the benefit of threatened and endangered species occurs at their state and local offices, and is largely driven by the personal motivation of the staff involved. The types of coordination efforts that occur include sharing technical and financial assistance for implementing conservation projects, simplifying regulatory compliance procedures, assisting with special conservation projects, and participating on agency advisory groups. Agency officials noted that successful coordination is largely driven by individuals who have a strong commitment to coordinate, good interpersonal skills, and a willingness to work with others. Officials also recognized, however, that the quality of working relationships and the frequency of coordination between USDA and FWS staff varies considerably by location. To help improve working relationships and coordination, USDA and FWS have developed a draft memorandum of understanding that includes actions such as sharing information on imperiled species and streamlining regulatory processes. While the draft memorandum is a positive step toward strengthening coordination, it does not clearly articulate how these efforts are to be monitored and reported on to ensure that the intended goals are achieved and that coordination is sustained. |
gao_GAO-07-730T | gao_GAO-07-730T_0 | Space Acquisitions Continue to Face Cost and Schedule Increases
The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return on investment. Along with the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as 6 years—postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. Some programs have been able to work through the bulk of technical problems they were facing and are on track to meet revised targets, albeit at higher costs and with delayed deliveries. Others, however, continue to face setbacks. For example, two satellites and four instruments were deleted from National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer capabilities. In addition to SBIRS High and NPOESS, the programs featured in the figures include the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), which are all communications satellites, and the Global Positioning System (GPS) II. DOD Is Implementing Best Practices on Two New Efforts
Over the past decade, GAO has examined successful organizations in the commercial sector to identify best practices that can be applied to space and weapon system acquisitions. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. DOD is making efforts to instill these practices on two programs reviewed this year: the Transformational Satellite Communications System and the Space Radar program. If these programs adhere to the TRL 6 criteria, they will greatly reduce the risk of encountering costly technical delays, though not completely. There are still significant inherent risks associated with integrating critical technologies and with developing the software needed to realize the benefits of the technologies. Actions Needed to Sustain Commitment to Improvements
The Air Force’s continued efforts to instill best practices on Space Radar and TSAT are good first steps toward addressing acquisition problems in the space portfolio. But sustaining these reforms will not be easy. The programs are not immune to funding pressures that have encouraged too much optimism. They are also being undertaken as DOD is addressing shortfalls in critical technical, business, and program management skills. In total, these efforts will increase DOD’s investment for all major space acquisitions from $6.31 billion to $9.22 billion, or about 46 percent over the next 3 years. In addition to technical and cost estimating skills, DOD and GAO studies have also pointed to capacity shortfalls in program management. Last, policies that surround space acquisition need to be further revised to ensure best practices are instilled and sustained. In closing, we support efforts to instill best practices on programs like Space Radar and TSAT. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In preparing for this testimony, we relied on previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and DOD’s space acquisition policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years, and increased performance risks. DOD has recognized the need to change its approach to developing space systems and is attempting to instill best practices in new efforts. GAO was asked to testify on its findings on space acquisitions problems and steps needed to sustain and expand the use of best practices. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied on its detailed reviews of space programs as well as cross-cutting work on cost estimating and best practices. GAO does not make recommendations in this testimony. However, GAO has made recommendations on steps DOD can take to ensure better outcomes for its space acquisitions programs. These include developing an overall investment strategy for acquisition programs, addressing human capital and other shortfalls in capacity, and revising policies supporting space to incorporate best practices.
What GAO Found
The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100-percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return on investment. Along with the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 6 years--postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. GAO's reviews of space acquisitions this year found that some ongoing programs--for example, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program and the Wideband Global SATCOM program--have been able to work through the bulk of technical problems they were facing and are on track to meet revised targets, albeit at higher costs and with delayed capability. Others, however, including the Space-Based Infrared System High program, the Global Positioning System IIF, and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, continue to face setbacks and further risks. In recognizing the need to reform space acquisitions, DOD has taken steps to instill best practices in two new major space efforts--the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and the Space Radar program--which are expected to be among the most complex and costly space programs ever. For these programs, DOD has taken steps to separate technology discovery from acquisition, establish an incremental path toward meeting user needs, obtain agreements on requirements before program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. If these actions can be sustained, DOD will greatly reduce technical risks, although not completely. There is still significant inherent risk associated with integrating critical technologies on board the satellites and with developing the software needed to achieve the capabilities of the satellites. Moreover, sustaining these reforms on these two programs and expanding them to others will not be easy. Like all weapons programs, space programs continue to face funding pressures that have encouraged too much optimism. DOD has not prioritized its programs for funding even though its investment for all major space acquisitions is expected to increase about 46 percent in the next 3 years. It is likely to continue to face cost overruns on problematic programs, and it wants to undertake other major new efforts in addition to Space Radar and TSAT. In addition, new programs are being undertaken as DOD is addressing shortfalls in critical technical, business, and program management skills. In other words, DOD may not be able to obtain the right skills and experience to manage all of the new efforts. |
gao_GAO-02-645T | gao_GAO-02-645T_0 | As acknowledged by VBA, excessive claims inventories have resulted in long waits for veterans to receive decisions on their claims and appeals. Although this may have reduced short-term production, it should enable VBA to increase production in the long term by enhancing the proficiency of new staff. Some Progress Made, but Meeting Production and Inventory Goals Will be Challenging
VBA has made some progress in improving its production and reducing its inventory but will be challenged to meet the production and inventory goals it has set for fiscal year 2002. Specifically, the Secretary’s end of fiscal year 2003 goals are to complete accurate decisions on rating-related compensation and pension claims in an average of 100 days and reduce VBA’s inventory of such claims to about 250,000. To achieve these goals, VBA is focusing on increasing the number of claims decisions its regional offices can complete. VBA expects to increase production in the second half of the fiscal year. VBA will have to cut its average claims processing time by more than half – from an average of 224 days in the first half of fiscal year 2002 — to meet the 100 day goal. Veterans Benefits Administration: Problems and Challenges Facing Disability Claims Processing. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) will provide $25 billion in compensation and pension benefits in fiscal year 2002 to more than three million veterans, dependents and survivors. For years, the compensation and pension claims process has been subject to long long waits for decision and large claims backlogs. VA's goal for fiscal year 2003 is to complete accurate decisions on rating-related claims in an average of 100 days. To achieve this, the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) is focusing on increasing production of rating decisions and reducing the inventory of claims to about 250,000. As of the end of March 2002, VBA was completing claims in an average of 224 days and had an inventory of about 412,000 claims. VBA is trying to significantly increase regional offices' rating decision production to reduce the inventory, and, in turn, reduce the time required to complete decisions. VBA expects to increase production by hiring more staff and increasing the proficiency of new staff. Although VBA has recently increased its production and reduced its inventory, meeting its production and inventory reduction and its timeliness goals will be challenging. |
gao_GAO-16-218 | gao_GAO-16-218_0 | As of September 2015, NNSA’s expected costs for its share of the LEP work were approximately $7.3 billion. Earned value management systems measure the value of work accomplished in a given period and compare the measured value with the planned value of work scheduled for that period and the actual cost of work accomplished. The Management Approach for the B61- 12 LEP Informed a New NNSA Program Management Policy for Defense Programs, but Potential Challenges Remain
The B61-12 LEP’s program managers have developed a management approach that was then used to inform a new NNSA policy that applies to NNSA defense program management. Several officials from both NNSA and DOD characterized the B61-12 LEP’s overall program management approach as improved over the approaches used in previous LEPs. According to NNSA and DOD officials we interviewed, the B61-12 LEP is the first LEP to use earned value management, a tool that may help NNSA ensure that its work progresses on budget and on schedule. Integrated cost estimates. DOE generally agreed with our recommendation. The new management approach that the B61-12 LEP’s program managers have implemented, along with the new Program Execution Guide, may help NNSA address the potential management challenges that NNSA officials and others have identified with previous LEPs, but it is too soon to determine whether this will be the case. NNSA and the Air Force Have Instituted a Process to Identify and Manage Risks
According to NNSA and Air Force officials, the B61-12 LEP risk analysis and management approach uses the program’s integrated master schedules in conjunction with a risk register, the Active Risk Manager database. According to NNSA and Air Force officials, some of the joint risks identified through this process have already been successfully managed. NNSA estimates that avoiding this risk prevented a program delay that could have lasted for more than a year and increased program costs by more than $2 million. Joint risks in the “red” category (i.e., high risk) include risks related to the compatibility of the B61-12 with the still-developing F-35 aircraft, the risk of temperature- related component failures in certain flight environments, and schedule risks related to the hydrodynamic testing of certain changed nonnuclear components. NNSA and DOD officials acknowledged the schedule’s constraints, which they say are driven by factors including delays in starting the B61-12 LEP because of a lengthy design study, the effects of sequestration, and the need to complete work on the B61-12 LEP to enable NNSA to start work on planned future LEPs. In testimony given to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2015, the Nuclear Weapons Council characterized the B61-12 LEP’s schedule as having “little, if any, margin left.” DOD officials have testified before Congress that the B61-12 LEP must be completed on the current schedule to ensure that the aging of B61 legacy bombs does not affect the United States’ ability to maintain its commitments to NATO, and DOE officials have testified that the LEP must be completed to ensure that DOE can effectively manage other ongoing and planned LEPs and stockpile stewardship activities. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We are not making new recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DOD for review and comment. Both agencies provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management approach for the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) and (2) the extent to which NNSA and the Air Force are managing risks in the LEP. In addition, we visited NNSA’s Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory to view systems that track project activities, cost and schedule information, and the execution of risk management steps, as well as to meet program officials responsible for the design and production of the B61-12 and see some of the components under development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile are aging. NNSA and DOD undertake LEPs to refurbish or replace nuclear weapons' aging components. In 2010, they began an LEP to consolidate four versions of a legacy nuclear weapon, the B61 bomb, into a bomb called the B61-12 (see fig.). NNSA and DOD have stated they must complete this LEP by 2024 to uphold U.S. commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As of September 2015, NNSA and DOD estimated that the B61-12 LEP would cost about $8.9 billion.
Senate Report 113-44 included a provision for GAO to periodically assess the status of the B61-12 LEP. This report assesses (1) NNSA's management approach for the B61-12 LEP and (2) the extent to which NNSA and the Air Force are managing risks in the LEP. GAO reviewed project plans, schedules, management plans, and other documents and program data, and visited the two NNSA national laboratories—Sandia and Los Alamos—that serve as the design agencies for the LEP.
What GAO Found
The B61-12 life extension program's (LEP) managers have developed a management approach that officials from the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) regard as improved over the management approach used for past LEPs, which experienced schedule delays and cost overruns. Among other things, the B61-12 LEP is the first LEP to use earned value management, a tool that measures the planned versus actual value of work accomplished in a given period, which may help NNSA ensure that work progresses on budget and on schedule. It is also the first LEP to integrate the schedules and cost estimates for activities at all participating NNSA sites. NNSA used this new approach to inform its first Program Execution Guide for defense programs, issued in August 2014, which applies to all NNSA defense programs. NNSA's new management approach notwithstanding, the B61-12 LEP faces ongoing management challenges in some areas, including staff shortfalls and an earned value management system that has yet to be tested. The new management approach may help the LEP address these potential challenges, but it is too soon to determine whether this will be the case.
To manage risks in the B61-12 LEP, NNSA and the Air Force use a risk management database and integrated schedules to categorize risks and incorporate risk management steps in the schedules. According to NNSA and Air Force officials, some risks have already been managed in this manner. For example, NNSA estimates that making a needed material procurement in advance prevented a potential delay of more than a year and a potential cost increase of more than $2 million. Remaining risks include the risk that components may fail in certain flight environments and risks related to testing of certain nonnuclear components. NNSA is also working to ensure future compatibility with the F-35 aircraft. NNSA and Air Force officials said they will not know for several years whether steps planned to manage these risks are adequate. A constrained development and production schedule—which DOE's and DOD's Nuclear Weapons Council characterized as having “little, if any, margin left”—complicates efforts to manage risks. Factors constraining the schedule include the aging of components in current versions of the B61, delays in starting the B61-12 LEP because of a lengthy design study, the effects of sequestration, and the need to complete the B61-12 LEP so that NNSA can begin other planned LEPs. GAO will continue to monitor these issues as it assesses the LEP in later stages.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations but discusses the status of prior GAO recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE generally agreed with GAO's findings and provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. DOD provided technical comments that were also incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-165 | gao_GAO-05-165_0 | Introduction
Wastewater systems in the United States provide essential services to residential, commercial, and industrial users by collecting and treating wastewater and discharging it into receiving waters. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, Congress and the executive branch have placed increased attention on improving the security of the nation’s water infrastructure—including wastewater systems—to protect against future terrorist threats. A terrorist could seek to impair a wastewater system’s treatment process, to use a wastewater system to carry out an attack elsewhere, or some combination of both. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, this report identifies experts’ views on the following questions: What are the key security-related vulnerabilities affecting the nation’s wastewater systems? What are the criteria that should be used to determine how federal funds are allocated among recipients to improve wastewater security, and how should the funds be distributed? To obtain information on these three questions, we conducted a three- phase Web-based survey of 50 experts on wastewater security. Experts Identified Key Vulnerabilities That Could Compromise Wastewater Security
Experts responding to our survey identified five key physical assets of wastewater systems as among the most vulnerable to terrorist-related attacks: (1) the collection systems’ network of sewers, which includes underground sanitary, stormwater and combined sewer lines; (2) treatment chemicals, primarily chlorine, which are used to disinfect wastewater; (3) key components of the wastewater treatment plant, such as its headworks, where the raw sewage first enters the treatment plant; (4) control systems, used to control plant operations; and (5) pumping stations along the collection system, which lift or pump wastewater to allow gravity flow to help move sewage to the treatment plant (see fig. These vulnerabilities include (1) a general lack of security awareness within the wastewater sector; (2) interdependencies among components of the wastewater system, opening the possibility that a failure of any individual component could bring down the entire system; and (3) interdependencies between the wastewater system and other critical infrastructure that could fail, such as electric power supplies. Experts Identified Wastewater Security- Enhancing Activities That Warrant Federal Support
Experts most frequently identified 11 specific activities to improve wastewater security as deserving high priority for federal support (see fig. Replace Gaseous Chemicals with Less Hazardous Alternatives
Over half of the experts surveyed (29 of 50) rated the replacement of gaseous chemicals at wastewater treatment facilities with less hazardous alternatives as warranting highest priority for federal funding. Improve Local, State, and Regional Collaboration Efforts
Twenty-three of 50 experts rated efforts to improve local, state, and regional collaboration as warranting highest priority for federal funding. The most frequently identified were utilities: (1) serving critical infrastructure including government, commercial, industrial, and public health centers; (2) using large quantities of gaseous chemicals; (3) serving areas with large populations; (4) where a security breach would adversely impact environmental resources (e.g., receiving waters); (5) having completed vulnerability assessments; (6) serving areas with medium or small populations; and (7) serving buildings, monuments, parks, tourist attractions or other entities that have symbolic value (see fig. Utilities Serving Critical Infrastructure
More than three quarters of the experts (39 of 50) gave utilities serving critical infrastructure a highest priority rating. Funding Mechanisms Recommended for Distributing Federal Funds
When we asked the experts to identify how best to distribute federal funds that may be made available to utilities to address wastewater security, they overwhelmingly indicated that direct federal grants to utilities would be the most effective mechanism. Other mechanisms that were rated as less effective included loans, or loan guarantees, and tax incentives for private utilities. Many, for example, favored direct grants with no match for activities that benefit multiple utilities, or which should be addressed in the near term. A number of experts, however, expressed reservations. Another expert suggested that a trust fund should be supported annually by the federal government and local wastewater utilities, and administered in a manner similar to the former Wastewater Construction Grants program that funded wastewater construction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the security of the nation's drinking water and wastewater infrastructure has received increased attention from Congress and the executive branch. Wastewater facilities in the United States provide essential services to residential, commercial, and industrial users by collecting and treating wastewater and discharging it into receiving waters. These facilities, however, may possess certain characteristics that terrorists could exploit either to impair the wastewater treatment process or to damage surrounding communities and infrastructure. GAO was asked to obtain experts' views on (1) the key security-related vulnerabilities affecting the nation's wastewater systems, (2) the activities the federal government should support to improve wastewater security, and (3) the criteria that should be used to determine how any federal funds are allocated to improve security, and the best methods to distribute these funds. GAO conducted a systematic, Web-based survey of 50 nationally recognized experts to seek consensus on these key wastewater security issues. EPA expressed general agreement with the report, citing its value as the agency works with its partners to better secure the nation's critical wastewater infrastructure.
What GAO Found
Experts identified the collection system's network of sewer lines as the most vulnerable asset of a wastewater utility. Experts stated that the sewers could be used either as a means to covertly gain access to surrounding buildings or as a conduit to inject hazardous substances that could impair a wastewater treatment plant's capabilities. Among the other vulnerabilities most frequently cited were the storage and transportation of chemicals used in the wastewater treatment process and the automated systems that control many vital operations. In addition, experts described a number of vulnerabilities not specific to particular assets but which may also affect the security of wastewater facilities. These vulnerabilities include a general lack of security awareness among wastewater facility staff and administrators, interdependencies among various wastewater facility components leading to the possibility that the disruption of a single component could take down the entire system, and interdependencies between wastewater facilities and other critical infrastructures. Experts identified several key activities as most deserving of federal funds to improve wastewater facilities' security. Among those most frequently cited was the replacement of gaseous chemicals used in the disinfection process with less hazardous alternatives. This activity was rated as warranting highest priority for federal funding by 29 of 50 experts. Other security-enhancing activities most often rated as warranting highest priority included improving local, state, and regional collaboration (23 of 50 experts) and supporting facilities' efforts to comprehensively assess their vulnerabilities (20 of 50 experts). When asked how federal wastewater security funds should be allocated among potential recipients, the vast majority of experts suggested that wastewater utilities serving critical infrastructure (e.g., public health institutions, government, commercial and industrial centers) should be given highest priority (39 of 50). Other recipients warranting highest priority included utilities using large quantities of gaseous chemicals (26 of 50) and utilities serving areas with large populations (24 of 50). Experts identified direct federal grants as the most effective method to distribute the funds, noting particular circumstances in which a matching contribution should be sought from recipients. Specifically, a matching requirement was often recommended to fund activities that benefit individual utilities. Grants with no matching requirements were often recommended for activities that should be implemented more quickly and would benefit multiple utilities. The other funding mechanisms experts mentioned most frequently included the federal Clean Water State Revolving Fund, loans or loan guarantees, trust funds, and tax incentives. |
gao_GAO-11-807T | gao_GAO-11-807T_0 | Figure 1 shows TSA’s layers of aviation security. We reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT nationwide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate completed a validation study in April 2011 to determine the extent to which SPOT was more effective than random screening at identifying security threats and how the program’s behaviors correlate to identifying high-risk travelers. However, as noted in the study, the assessment was an initial validation step, but was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation of the program was completed to help address potential threats to the aviation system, such as those posed by suicide bombers. TSA also stated that the program was based upon scientific research available at the time regarding human behaviors. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT program. DHS’s validation study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. For example, the study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening at identifying individuals who possessed fraudulent documents and identifying individuals who law enforcement officers ultimately arrested. In our May 2010 report, we recommended that TSA establish controls for this SPOT data. DHS agreed and TSA has established additional data controls as part of its database upgrade. TSA is currently reviewing the study’s findings and assessing the steps needed to address DHS’s recommendations. Airport Perimeter and Access Controls
TSA has taken actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security, but has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment or developed a national strategy for airport security. We reported in September 2009 that TSA has implemented a variety of programs and actions since 2004 to improve and strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security, including strengthening worker screening and improving access control technology. However, we reported in September 2009 that while TSA has taken actions to assess risk with respect to airport perimeter and access controls security, it had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment based on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, as required by DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). DHS concurred with our recommendation to assess the need for a vulnerability assessment of airports nationwide. Checked Baggage Screening Systems
TSA has revised explosives detection requirements for checked baggage screening systems but faces challenges in deploying equipment that meet the requirements. TSA seeks to ensure that checked baggage screening technology is capable of detecting explosives through its Electronic Baggage Screening Program, one of the largest acquisition programs within DHS. Under the program, TSA certifies and acquires systems used to screen checked baggage at 463 TSA-regulated airports throughout the United States. As of January 2011, some of the EDS in TSA’s fleet are detecting explosives at the level established by the 2005 requirements. The first phase, which includes implementation of the 2005 requirements, is scheduled to take years to fully implement and deploying EDS that meet 2010 requirements could prove difficult given that TSA did not begin deployment of EDS meeting 2005 requirements until 2009—4 years later. We found that TSA did not have a plan to deploy and operate EDS to meet the most recent requirements and recommended, among other things, that TSA develop a plan to deploy EDS that meet the current EDS explosives detection requirements and ensure that new EDS, as well as those already deployed in airports, be operated at the levels established in those requirements. In addition, TSA has faced challenges in procuring the first 260 EDS to meet 2010 requirements. DHS concurred with all of the recommendations and has subsequently outlined actions to implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 in December 2009 underscores the need for effective aviation security programs. Aviation security remains a daunting challenge with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of aviation security initiatives. Three key layers of aviation security are (1) TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program designed to identify persons who may pose a security risk; (2) airport perimeter and access controls security; and (3) checked baggage screening systems. This testimony provides information on the extent to which TSA has taken actions to validate the scientific basis of SPOT, strengthen airport perimeter security and access controls, and deploy more effective checked baggage screening systems. This statement is based on prior reports GAO issued from September 2009 through July 2011 and selected updates in June and July 2011. GAO analyzed documents on TSA's progress in strengthening aviation security, among other things.
What GAO Found
DHS has completed an initial study to validate the scientific basis of the SPOT program; however, additional work remains to fully validate the program. GAO reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed this program, which uses behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers, before determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. TSA officials said that SPOT was deployed in response to potential threats, such as suicide bombers, and was based on scientific research available at the time. GAO recommended in May 2010 that DHS, as part of its study, assess the methodology to help ensure the validity of the SPOT program. DHS concurred and its April 2011 validation study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. For example, the study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening at identifying individuals who possessed fraudulent documents and individuals who were subsequently arrested. However, DHS's study was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. The study noted that additional work is needed to comprehensively validate the program. TSA officials are assessing the actions needed to address the study's recommendations. In September 2009, GAO reported that since 2004 TSA has taken actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security by, among other things, deploying a random worker screening program; however, TSA has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment or developed a national strategy. Specifically, TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the approximately 450 U.S. airports regulated by TSA at that time. GAO recommended that TSA develop (1) a comprehensive risk assessment and evaluate the need to assess airport vulnerabilities nationwide and (2) a national strategy to guide efforts to strengthen airport security. DHS concurred and said TSA is developing the assessment and strategy, but has not yet evaluated the need to assess airport vulnerabilities nationwide. GAO reported in July 2011 that TSA revised explosives detection requirements for its explosives detection systems (EDS) used to screen checked baggage in January 2010, but faces challenges in deploying EDS that meet these requirements. Deploying systems that meet the 2010 EDS requirements could be difficult given that TSA did not begin deployment of systems meeting the previous 2005 requirements until 2009. As of January 2011 some of the EDS in TSA's fleet detect explosives at the level established in 2005 while the remaining EDS detect explosives at levels established in 1998. Further, TSA does not have a plan to deploy and operate systems to meet the current requirements and has faced challenges in procuring the first 260 systems to meet these requirements. GAO recommended that TSA, among other things, develop a plan to ensure that EDS are operated at the levels in established requirements. DHS agreed and has outlined actions to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT program, airport security efforts, checked baggage screening efforts. DHS and TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and have actions under way to address them. |
gao_GAO-07-636T | gao_GAO-07-636T_0 | FAA Has Improved Its Financial Management, although the Soundness of Its Cost Allocation Methodology is Uncertain
Sound financial management, including sound cost accounting and cost allocation systems, is important for the current operation of FAA and lays the foundation for the transformation to NextGen and proposed changes to the agency’s funding system laid out in the administration’s reauthorization proposal. FAA is working to address the problem. While the reauthorization proposal may address some of the equity and efficiency concerns that FAA has raised with the current funding structure, we have reported that it is not yet clear if FAA has developed a sound cost allocation methodology from which to derive the new cost-based funding. However, in recent years, FAA has made significant progress toward improving its acquisition management. To its credit, FAA has taken a number of actions to improve its acquisition management. Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to Manage and Sustain the Current System
While the acquisition and deployment of NextGen technology are key issues facing the agency, it will be critical for FAA to continue to maintain existing systems and phase out existing systems using a risk-based approach. Key Issues Remain in the Transition From Planning to Implementing NextGen
Several key issues will need to be addressed to help ensure a successful transition to NextGen as FAA moves from the conceptualization and planning of NextGen, handled largely through the interagency collaborative efforts of FAA’s JPDO, to the implementation of NextGen technologies and systems. Those issues include (1) continuing to focus on the coordination between ATO and JPDO and stakeholder involvement; (2) determining which entities will fund the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects for NextGen; and (3) determining whether FAA has the technical and contract management expertise necessary to oversee the complex implementation of NextGen. This is a step in the right direction. The OEP is being expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen, including the required technologies, procedures, and resources. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion. Aviation Safety Record Remains High, but Some Areas Need to be Addressed for Current and Future Safety as FAA Transitions to NextGen
As FAA works to develop the policies and systems to transition to NextGen, it will be important for the agency to also ensure that its safety programs are aligned with these changes. FAA’s ability to deal with current safety issues and the transition to NextGen would be enhanced by (1) acquiring and deploying new safety enhancing technologies; (2) establishing appropriate regulatory approaches for current airspace users and emerging sectors; (3) improving the accuracy and completeness of its safety data; and (4) addressing human capital issues associated with hiring, training, and deploying its skilled workforce of air traffic controllers, safety inspectors, engineers, and technicians. It will be important for FAA to establish the appropriate regulatory approach for current users and new users such as the emerging space tourism industry and unmanned aircraft systems. FAA Needs Improved Data and Analysis for Current Safety Oversight and for the Transition to NextGen
FAA cannot rely on its current oversight approach, which focuses on labor-intensive inspections to maintain and expand the margin of safety, especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes. FAA Faces Human Capital Challenges
FAA’s ability to ensure safety in NextGen will also be affected by its ability to manage its human capital, including air traffic controllers, safety inspectors, engineers, and technicians. Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System. FAA’s Proposed Plan for Implementing a Reliability Centered Maintenance Process for Air Traffic Control Equipment. Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts. Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but More can be Done to Institutionalize Improvements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world. It is, however, a system under strain. The skies are becoming more crowded every day, with an estimated 1 billion passengers per year expected by 2015. The current aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this growth. The reauthorization of FAA is an opportunity to examine how the agency is managing the operation and safety of the air transportation system as it leads the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a major redesign of the current system. GAO's testimony focuses on key issues related to FAA's reauthorization, including (1) FAA's progress in implementing initiatives that could provide a solid foundation for NextGen, (2) issues that need to be addressed to help ensure a successful transition to NextGen, and (3) safety areas that are important for the continued safe operation of the current and future system. This statement is based on recent GAO reports and ongoing work on some management and safety initiatives.
What GAO Found
FAA has made significant progress in moving to more businesslike and cost-effective operations and modernizing the air traffic control system. This progress should better position the agency for the complex implementation of NextGen. However, further work remains to fully address past problems in the modernization effort while at the same time finding new leadership--due to losses of key leaders at FAA and its Air Traffic Organization--that can continue an agencywide commitment to transformation. While FAA has improved its financial management capability, including implementing a new cost accounting system and developing a cost allocation methodology, it is not yet clear if that methodology provides a sound basis from which to derive the administration's proposed new cost-based funding structure for FAA. In addition, improved acquisition processes, such as establishing guidance on using Earned Value Management, are positive steps, but they need to be fully implemented across all critical acquisitions. As FAA works toward acquiring and deploying NextGen technology, it will also be important to phase out existing air traffic control equipment using a risk-based approach and continue to maintain existing systems. Key issues that FAA needs to address as it begins implementing NextGen include continued focus on coordination with the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO). FAA, in coordination with JPDO, is developing an implementation plan for NextGen that is expected to include details of the required technologies, procedures, and resources. This is a step in the right direction. While FAA estimates that its cost for NextGen programs may range between $15 billion and $22 billion, it will be important to determine which entities will fund and conduct the necessary developmental research. Also, GAO has recommended that FAA assess its capacity to handle the technical and contract management expertise to determine if it has the capabilities required to oversee the implementation of NextGen. FAA is considering action that would respond to this recommendation. To deal with current safety issues and the transition to NextGen, it will be important for FAA to address safety in the airport environment, where forecasted traffic growth could lead to increased ground congestion and safety hazards. FAA also needs to establish the appropriate regulatory approach for certain current airspace users, such as air ambulances, and new users, such as the emerging space tourism industry. In addition, to maintain and expand the margin of safety, especially if substantial growth in air traffic materializes, FAA will need to rely more on data than on labor-intensive inspections. GAO has recommended that FAA improve its safety data. FAA has taken some action to improve its data, but more work remains. FAA's ability to ensure a safe system will also be affected by its ability to hire, train, and deploy its workforce of air traffic controllers, inspectors, and technicians. |
gao_GAO-12-263 | gao_GAO-12-263_0 | DOD’s Use of the National Security Exception Covers a Range of Goods and Services, but Gaps in Data Limit Ability to Determine Full Extent of Use
DOD Military Departments’ Use of the National Security Exception Is Small Relative to Other Competition Exceptions and Covers a Range of Goods and Services
Based on data from FPDS-NG, DOD dollar obligations under the national security exception during fiscal years 2007 through 2010 were small relative to other exceptions to full and open competition. By contrast, non-military-department components accounted for about 4 percent of DOD’s use under the exception. While the memorandum from OSD exempts three of DOD’s intelligence agencies (NGA, DIA, and NSA) from reporting procurement data to FPDS-NG because of the sensitive nature of their procurement data, OSD and military department officials were not aware of a specific policy basis for excluding sensitive programs outside of the intelligence agencies. DOD Often Uses a Single Document to Justify Multiple Actions under the National Security Exception, and All Justifications Met Requirements
DOD Makes Extensive Use of Class Justifications for the National Security Exception
For most contracts we reviewed, DOD entities used a single justification and approval document that applies to multiple contracts—referred to in the FAR as a class justification—for national security exception contract actions. Class justifications reduce the steps required to proceed with individual contract actions that are not fully competitive. According to contracting officials at an Air Force program office that has a class justification in place under the national security exception, the increased flexibility of their national security exception class justification helps them meet mission needs. Some Air Force officials also noted that concerns about the level of review of individual contracts that are awarded without full and open competition under class justifications have led to efforts to revise the review process for activity under class justifications. Of the more than 11,300 DOD military department contract actions citing the national security exception from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, DOD received only one proposal for $10.6 billion of its obligations—about 84 percent of the total $12.7 billion in obligations under this exception. The military departments generally continue to use the same exception for follow-on contract actions to national security exception contracts, as well as the same vendor, based on our analysis of the contracts in our sample. Contracting officials told us that the tools that are used to solicit competition generally cannot be used in a security sensitive contracting environment. An NSA Inspector General report found that this system improved the agency’s ability to conduct market research and solicit competition. Conclusions
DOD’s use of the national security exception is necessary in certain situations when disclosing the government’s needs in a full and open competition would reveal information that would harm national security. However, more competition is possible. In written comments, DOD concurred with the report’s last two recommendations and partially concurred with the first recommendation. However, we found that DOD policy was not clear on if and when sensitive, but unclassified, contract data should be excluded from FPDS-NG. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our mandate required us to review (1) the pattern of usage of the national security exception by acquisition organizations within the Department of Defense to determine which organizations are commonly using the exception and the frequency of such usage; (2) the range of items or services being acquired through the use of such exception; (3) the process for reviewing and approving justifications involving such exception; 4) whether the justifications for use of such exception typically meet the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation applicable to the use of such exception; (5) issues associated with follow-on procurements for items or services acquired using such exception; and (6) potential additional instances where such exception could be applied and any authorities available to DOD other than such exception that could be applied in such instances. Because the Air Force makes up 73.5 percent of all obligations under the national security exception, we selected 18 contracts from the Air Force, 6 from the Army, and 3 from the Navy. DOD Intelligence Agencies and Special Access Programs
To assess the extent of DOD intelligence agencies’ use of the national security exception, we obtained data from the four agencies, as these agencies do not report data to FPDS-NG. We reviewed five contract files at four DOD intelligence agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition is a critical tool for achieving the best return on the governments investment. Federal agencies are generally required to award contracts competitively, but they are permitted to use other than full and open competition in certain situations, such as when open competition would reveal information that would harm national security. GAO examined DODs use of this provision, known as the national security exception. It requires the use of competition to the greatest extent practicable. GAO assessed (1) the pattern of DODs use of the national security exception;
(2) DODs processes for using the exception; and (3) the extent to which DOD achieved competition under the exception. GAO analyzed federal procurement data; reviewed a selection of 27 contract files and justifications citing the exception from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, based on largest obligations, frequent users, and a range of procurement types, as well as five contracts from DOD intelligence agencies; and interviewed DOD contracting and program officials.
What GAO Found
DODs use of the national security exception is smallabout 2 percent of the dollar value of its total use of exceptions to full and open competition, but gaps in federal procurement data limit GAOs ability to determine the full extent of DODs use. DOD procures a range of goods and services under this exception, and according to federal procurement data, the Air Force accounted for about 74 percent of DODs use during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. However, DOD intelligence agencies and special access programs frequently use the exception, but are generally excluded from reporting procurement data. While an Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandum exempts three of the intelligence agencies from reporting such data, DOD policy on reporting sensitive procurements for other military department programs is not clear.
For most national security exception contract actions GAO reviewed, DOD used a single justification and approval document that applies to multiple contractsknown as a class justification. Among those reviewed, $3.3 billion of $3.4 billion was obligated under contracts that used class justifications, which reduce the steps required to proceed with individual contract actions that do not use full and open competition. According to contracting officials, the increased flexibility of national security exception class justifications helps meet mission needs. However, in the Air Force, concerns about the reduced management review of these contracts have led to changes in the process for approving individual contract actions using class justifications. Nevertheless, all of the justifications GAO reviewed met Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements.
GAOs analysis of federal procurement data on about 11,300 contract actions found that, from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, only 16 percent of all obligations under those actions by the military departments under the national security exception received more than one proposal. Contract files and contracting officials cited a limited pool of companies with the right capabilities, the difficulty of changing from an established vendor, and limited tools for soliciting competitive bids as reasons for their inability to obtain more competition. Twelve of the 27 military department contract files GAO reviewed did not include a record of market research, and others included few details on the results. Two intelligence agencies that reported using the national security exception for all contracting reported achieving comparatively high levels of competition. Both have systems that catalogue firms, capabilities, and solicitations that are used to facilitate security sensitive market research.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD issue guidance clarifying when security sensitive contracting data must be reported, monitor the impact of new Air Force class justification processes, and consider using tools that facilitate market research in a secure environment. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with the recommendation on clarifying guidance, citing pending revisions to regulations. GAO continues to believe that clarifying guidance is needed. |
gao_GAO-04-247 | gao_GAO-04-247_0 | Inspection Records Were Incomplete and Inconsistent, Making It Difficult to Determine the Frequency and Scope of Noncompliance
The universe of inspection records that FSIS provided to us was incomplete, making it difficult to assess the frequency of noncompliance with the HMSA. At least 7 of the 16 DVMSs we spoke with believe that inspectors have not always documented violations in noncompliance records when they should. As a result, it is difficult for FSIS to quantify, interpret, and report the data related to the scope and severity of documented instances of noncompliance. FSIS also released a new directive, “Humane Handling and Slaughter of Livestock,” in November 2003. FSIS Took Inconsistent Enforcement Actions to Address Noncompliance
Our review of noncompliance records indicates that FSIS has taken inconsistent enforcement actions in response to violations of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act and applicable regulations. Also, district managers were not using consistent criteria to suspend plant operations when more serious violations occurred. FSIS officials and guidance indicate that it is not appropriate to take an enforcement action for all violations. For example, our analysis of enforcement actions taken in the 167 instances of ineffective stunning shows that inspectors used reject tags to temporarily suspend stunning operations in more than half of the 86 cases involving ineffective stunning of a single animal but in less than half of the 79 cases that involved multiple animals. FSIS Data on Inspection Resources Devoted to Overseeing Humane Handling and Slaughter Requirements Are Inadequate
Because FSIS does not have adequate data on the number of inspectors responsible for enforcing the HMSA or the actual time they spend on humane handling and slaughter requirements—nor other information, such as criteria to determine the appropriate number of inspectors for different sized plants—it is difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate to effectively enforce the HMSA. Recently, the Congress also provided USDA with additional resources and directed the Secretary of Agriculture to fully enforce the HMSA and implementing regulations. First, we obtained the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s March 2003 Report to Congress on Humane Handling and Slaughter Enforcement Activities, in which USDA presents their findings on noncompliance with the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) during fiscal year 2002. To determine FSIS actions to enforce compliance with the humane handling and slaughter requirements, we obtained information on enforcement actions taken at the plant and FSIS district level. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1978, the Congress passed the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act to ensure that cattle, sheep, hogs, and other animals destined for human consumption are handled and slaughtered humanely. Within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for enforcing the act. Recently, the Congress took additional actions to improve FSIS enforcement. GAO reviewed (1) the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations, (2) actions to enforce compliance, and (3) the adequacy of existing resources to enforce the act.
What GAO Found
Incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter violations. FSIS was unable to produce at least 44 of its inspection records that document violations of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and implementing regulations. Also, inspectors did not always document violations of the HMSA because they may not have been aware of regulatory requirements. Further, the records that FSIS provided did not consistently document the scope and severity of each incident. USDA is taking steps to address these issues. Enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act and regulations were also inconsistent. For example, we found that FSIS inspectors temporarily halted stunning operations in more than half of the cases involving ineffective stunning of a single animal, but in less than half of similar cases involving multiple animals. We also found that FSIS officials may not be using consistent criteria to suspend plant operations--the enforcement action used when serious or repeated violations of the HMSA occur. As a result, plants in different FSIS districts may not be subject to comparable enforcement actions. In November 2003, FSIS issued clearer guidance to its inspectors and field personnel that should help resolve some of these problems. FSIS lacks detailed information on how much time its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter activities making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. In general, FSIS officials believe that, with the introduction of a District Veterinary Medical Specialist at each of the agency's field offices, the current number of personnel devoted to humane handling and slaughter compliance is adequate. |
gao_GAO-06-1130T | gao_GAO-06-1130T_0 | The Department of State is now responsible for overseeing U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq. U.S. Efforts Have Produced Mixed Results in Restoring Iraq’s Essential Services
The United States has made some progress in restoring Iraq’s essential services, but as of August 2006, such efforts generally have not met prewar production levels or U.S. goals. The continuing violence may make it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals. Iraq Contracting Challenges Reflect Systemic Issues Faced by DOD
The contracting challenges encountered in Iraq are emblematic of systemic issues faced by DOD. At the sector, program, and project levels, the failure to define realistic requirements has had a cascading effect on contracts and made it difficult to take subsequent steps necessary to get to successful outcomes. For example, in the absence of settled requirements, DOD has sometimes relied on what are known as undefinitized contractual actions, which were used extensively in Iraq and can leave the government exposed to increased costs. Managing risks when requirements are in flux requires effective oversight, but DOD lacked the capacity to provide a sufficient acquisition workforce, thereby hindering oversight efforts. In September 2005, we reported that difficulties in defining the cost, schedule, and work to be performed associated with projects in the water sector contributed to project delays and reduced scopes of work. 1). During the initial stages of reconstruction, we and the DOD Inspector General found instances in which DOD improperly used interagency contracts for many of the same reasons. Overall, the Special Inspector General has reported that competition has improved for Iraq reconstruction projects since the early reconstruction efforts. Just as multiple factors contribute to success or failure, multiple actors play a role in achieving successful acquisition outcomes, including policy makers, program managers, contracting officers, and the contractors themselves. Looking to the future, about one-third of DOD’s planned construction work remains to be completed, including some work that is not planned for completion until the end of 2008. Scope and Methodology
In preparing this testimony, we relied primarily on our completed and ongoing reviews of efforts to rebuild Iraq that we have undertaken since 2003, as well as our work related to selected DOD contract management issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States, along with its coalition partners and various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging, complex, and costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) has responsibility for a significant portion of the reconstruction effort. Amid signs of progress, the coalition faces numerous political, security, and economic challenges in rebuilding Iraq. Within this environment, many reconstruction projects have fallen short of expectations, resulting in increased costs, schedule delays, reduced scopes of work, and in some cases project cancellations. This testimony (1) discusses the overall progress that has been made in rebuilding Iraq and (2) describes challenges faced by DOD in achieving successful outcomes on individual projects. This testimony reflects our reviews of reconstruction and DOD contract management issues, as well as work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. In our previous reports, we have made several recommendations to improve outcomes in Iraq. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.
What GAO Found
Overall, the United States generally has not met its goals for reconstruction activities in Iraq with respect to the oil, electricity, and water sectors. As of August 2006, oil production is below the prewar level, and the restoration of electricity and new or restored water treatment capacity remain below stated goals. One-third of DOD's planned construction work still needs to be completed and some work is not planned for completion until late 2008. Continuing violence in the region is one of the reasons that DOD is having difficulty achieving its goals. The contracting challenges encountered in Iraq are emblematic of systemic issues faced by DOD. When setting requirements for work to be done, DOD made assumptions about funding and time frames that later proved to be unfounded. The failure to define realistic requirements has had a cascading effect on contracts and has made it difficult to take subsequent steps to get successful outcomes. For example, in the absence of settled requirements, agencies sometimes rely on what are known as undefinitized contract actions, which can leave the government exposed to increased costs. Further, DOD lacked the capacity to provide effective oversight and manage risks. We also found that DOD, at times, improperly used interagency contracts and was not able to take advantage of full and open competition during the initial stages of reconstruction. Just as multiple factors contribute to success or failure, multiple actors play a role in achieving successful acquisition outcomes, including policy makers, program managers, contracting officers, and the contractors themselves. |
gao_GAO-17-691 | gao_GAO-17-691_0 | For example, definitions may include the penalties and disadvantages contained in laws and regulations of the federal and state governments; ordinances established by local governments; and policies maintained by non- government organizations, such as private employers, schools, and churches. Federal collateral consequences can serve various functions, such as enhancing public safety or protecting government interests. The NICCC also identified which types of criminal offense(s) can trigger these 1,171 collateral consequences, and based on our review of these data, 641 (55 percent) may be imposed on individuals with NVDC. In addition, the NICCC data that we reviewed identified that these 641 collateral consequences can limit numerous aspects of an individual’s life. Some Mechanisms Exist to Relieve or Mitigate Federal Collateral Consequences for Nonviolent Drug Convictions
One in Five Federal Collateral Consequences for Nonviolent Drug Convictions Have Relief Specified in Laws or Regulations
Of the 641 federal collateral consequences for NVDC, we found that the NICCC identified 131 (20 percent) as having a relief mechanism, as of December 31, 2016. However, the law also includes a relief mechanism for this collateral consequence, stating that individuals may resume eligibility for federal education loans if they successfully complete a drug rehabilitation program. Of the 641 federal collateral consequences for NVDC, we found that the NICCC identified 510 (80 percent) that did not have a related law or regulation that prescribed how a person could potentially obtain relief from the collateral consequence, as of December 31, 2016. Thirteen stakeholders said that mitigating federal collateral consequences could potentially reduce the likelihood that individuals with NVDC reoffend. Some stakeholders cautioned that federal action should strike the appropriate balance between preserving collateral consequences that provide a public safety benefit, and addressing consequences that can cause unnecessary burdens and potentially increase the likelihood that individuals with NVDC reoffend. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) What federal collateral consequences can be imposed upon individuals with nonviolent drug convictions (NVDC), (2) What mechanisms exist to relieve individuals from federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions, and (3) According to selected stakeholders, what actions, if any, could the federal government consider to mitigate federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions. To address our first objective, we obtained data on state and federal collateral consequences from the American Bar Association’s (ABA) National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC). According to the act: “The term ‘collateral consequence’ means a collateral sanction or a disqualification….The term ‘collateral sanction’ means a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, that is imposed by law as a result of an individual’s conviction for a felony, misdemeanor, or other offense, but not as part of the judgment of the court; and does not include a term of imprisonment, probation, parole, supervised release, fine, assessment, forfeiture, restitution, or the costs of prosecution….The term ‘disqualification’ means a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, that an administrative agency, official, or a court in a civil proceeding is authorized, but not required, to impose on an individual convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or other offense on grounds relating to the conviction.” Although some differences exist between the definition of collateral consequences in the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 and the definition used by the NICCC, we determined that the definition used by the ABA’s NICCC was appropriate for the purposes of describing federal collateral consequences for NVDC and their characteristics. To address our second objective, we analyzed NICCC data; reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and federal agency directives and guidance; and interviewed selected federal officials and ABA staff. In addition, we asked about potential benefits and risks of taking actions to mitigate these collateral consequences. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2015, certain federal, state, and other law enforcement agencies made about 11 million arrests, according to the Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation. Individuals ultimately convicted of a crime may face federal or state collateral consequences. According to the ABA's NICCC, roughly 46,000 collateral consequences existed in federal and state laws and regulations, as of December 31, 2016. According to the ABA, collateral consequences have been a feature of the justice system since colonial times, but have become more pervasive in the past 20 years.
The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 included a provision for GAO to review collateral consequences for individuals with NVDC. This report identifies (1) collateral consequences in federal laws and regulations that can be imposed upon individuals with NVDC, (2) mechanisms that exist to relieve individuals from these collateral consequences, and (3) selected stakeholders' views on actions the federal government could consider to mitigate these collateral consequences.
GAO analyzed NICCC data as of December 31, 2016; reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and federal agency documents; and conducted interviews with ABA staff, selected federal officials, and 14 stakeholders. GAO selected stakeholders with relevant experience, among other factors. Selected stakeholders included leaders of organizations representing judges, victims of crime, and states, among others.
What GAO Found
Collateral consequences are the penalties and disadvantages that can be imposed upon an individual with a criminal conviction, in addition to those directly associated with a sentence (such as a fine, prison, or community service). GAO's review of the American Bar Association's (ABA) National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC) found that, in federal laws and regulations, there are 641 collateral consequences that can be triggered by nonviolent drug convictions (NVDC). For example, individuals with NVDC may be ineligible for certain professional licenses and federal housing assistance. The NICCC data that GAO reviewed indicate that these 641 collateral consequences can limit many aspects of an individual's life, such as employment, business licenses, education, and government benefits. In addition, GAO also found that the NICCC identified that 497 (78 percent) of the 641 collateral consequences can potentially last a lifetime.
Of the 641 federal collateral consequences for NVDC, GAO found that the NICCC identified 131 (20 percent) as having a relief mechanism in a related law or regulation that prescribed how an individual could potentially obtain relief from the consequence. For example, individuals may be relieved if they successfully complete a drug rehabilitation program or receive a pardon.
Thirteen of the 14 stakeholders GAO interviewed said the federal government should consider taking action to reduce the severity of (i.e., mitigate) federal collateral consequences for NVDC, such as conducting a comprehensive review of these collateral consequences and implementing a new relief mechanism. Additional mitigation could, according to some stakeholders, help individuals with NVDC obtain employment, housing, or education; and almost all the stakeholders said mitigation could potentially reduce the likelihood of reoffending. At the same time, federal collateral consequences can serve public safety functions and protect government interests. Some stakeholders cautioned that federal action should strike the appropriate balance between preserving collateral consequences that provide a public safety benefit, and addressing consequences that can cause unnecessary burdens and potentially increase the likelihood that individuals with NVDC reoffend. |
gao_GAO-02-502 | gao_GAO-02-502_0 | The act requires contractors and subcontractors to provide the government with cost or pricing data supporting their proposed prices and to certify that the data are accurate, complete, and current. These provisions are designed to give the government the information it needs to ensure fair and reasonable contract prices. . . may, without power of delegation, waive the requirement for submission of cost or pricing data in exceptional cases.”The waiver provision also states that the head of the contracting activity “may consider waiving the requirement if the price can be determined to be fair and reasonable without submission of cost or pricing data.” Aside from stating that a waiver may be considered in this situation, the regulation provides no further guidance on the circumstances that would warrant a waiver. DOD’s Use of Waivers for Certified Data
Using DOD’s contract database, we identified 20 waivers valued at more than $5 million each in fiscal year 2000. The total value of these waivers was about $4.4 billion. Reasons Why Waivers Were Used
Contract pricing or waiver documents for all of the cases we reviewed stated that sufficient information was available to determine the price to be fair and reasonable without the submission of cost or pricing data and did not cite other circumstances to justify the waivers. The Truth in Negotiations Act does not define exceptional cases and the regulatory guidance is limited. Second, DOD does not have guidance that would help buying organizations draw the line between what type of data and analyses would be acceptable or not and what kinds of outside assistance, such as DOD contracting and pricing experts, should be obtained. Our analysis showed that there was a wide spectrum in the quality of the data and analyses being used. | What GAO Found
Although most federal contracts are awarded through competition, the government also buys unique products and services, including sophisticated weapons systems, for which it cannot always rely on competition to get the best prices and values. Instead, it uses a single source for its procurements. In these cases, contractors and subcontractors provide the government with cost or pricing data supporting their proposed prices and certify that the data submitted are accurate, complete, and current, as required by the Truth in Negotiations Act. This ensures that the government has the data it needs to effectively negotiate with the contractor and avoid paying inflated prices. The government can waive the requirement for certified data in exceptional cases. In these instances, contracting officers use other techniques to arrive at fair and reasonable prices. Using the Department of Defense's (DOD) contract database, GAO found 20 waivers, each valued at more than $5 million, in fiscal year 2000. The total value of these waivers was $4.4 billion. In each case, the contract pricing or waiver documents stated that sufficient information was available to determine the price to be fair and reasonable without the submission of cost or pricing data. There was a wide variety in the quality of the data and analyses being used, from very old to very recent data. Despite the range of techniques employed to arrive at a price, DOD does not have guidance that would help buying organizations determine acceptable data and analyses and what kinds of outside assistance, such as contracting and pricing experts, should be obtained. |
gao_HEHS-98-122 | gao_HEHS-98-122_0 | Under the proposed data collection system, OSHA would (1) identify industries among the most hazardous based on their injury and illness rates as reported by the BLS annual survey of occupational injuries and illnesses and (2) survey establishments in these industries to collect establishment-specific injury and illness data. OSHA Considered Industrywide Injury and Illness Data and Establishment Size in Designing Its Data Collection Surveys
OSHA used a two-stage process for selecting industries and establishments to include in its data collection surveys. First, OSHA selected the industries for its surveys using mainly industrywide data on injuries and illnesses. With about $2.6 million available annually to fund the surveys in 1996, 1997, and 1998, OSHA determined it could survey up to 80,000 establishments each year. OSHA also considered work-related fatalities when selecting industries to survey. Because OSHA already requires the establishments to compile this information, employers are not required to develop new data sets. The first part of the summary section requests the average annual number of employees and the total number of hours that employees worked during the previous calendar year. The second part of the form requests the following information from the total line of the log and summary of occupational injuries and illnesses maintained by each establishment: total injuries, including the number of deaths as a result of injury, injuries with days away from work or restricted workdays or both, total days away from work, total days of restricted work activity, and injuries without lost workdays; total illnesses, including deaths as a result of illness, illnesses with days away from work or restricted workdays or both, total days away from work, total days of restricted work activity, and illnesses without lost workdays; and types of illnesses experienced by the workers, including skin diseases or disorders, diseases of the lungs due to dust, respiratory conditions due to toxic agents, poisonings, disorders due to physical agents, disorders associated with repeated trauma, and other occupational illnesses. The intended uses were (1) directing OSHA’s program activities, including the scheduling of establishment inspections under its enforcement program and the targeting of mailings of safety and health information to employers under its nonenforcement programs; (2) monitoring and tracking injury and illness incidents; (3) developing information for promulgating, revising, and evaluating OSHA’s safety and health standards; (4) evaluating the effectiveness of OSHA’s enforcement, training, and voluntary programs; and (5) providing pertinent information to the public. Although OSHA collected establishment-specific injury and illness data during 1996 and 1997, as of April 1998, it had made only limited use of the data. OSHA will use the data to identify the 500 establishments with the highest rates and schedule them for on-site inspections. In addition, OSHA wants to use the establishment-specific injury and illness data to identify employers for participation in its new Cooperative Compliance Program (CCP). OSHA used the information it collected in 1997 to develop a list of about 12,500 establishments with the highest LWDII rates—that is, LWDII rates of 7.0 or higher. OSHA Gave Employers No Assurance of Confidentiality as Part of the Data Collection Initiative
OSHA gave no assurances about privacy rights or confidentiality associated with the data collected from employers selected to participate in the data collection survey. Most of the requests OSHA has received and responded to about the data initiative asked for the names and addresses of establishments identified as having LWDII rates high enough to be invited to participate in the CCP. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) efforts to collect establishment-specific data on injuries and illnesses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) with about $2.6 million available annually in 1996, 1997, and 1998 for its data collection surveys, OSHA determined it could survey about 80,000 establishments each year; (2) within that constraint, OSHA used mainly Bureau of Labor Statistics data to select industries with high rates of injuries and illnesses; (3) OSHA used size of establishment as a determining factor for the number of establishments to survey; (4) in addition, OSHA knew some of the industries had high numbers of work-related fatalities; (5) OSHA surveyed establishments in these industries with 60 or more employees in both years; (6) employers surveyed were not required to develop new sets of injury and illness data to respond to OSHA surveys; (7) instead, these employers were already required by OSHA to keep at their establishments records of specific information on work-related injuries and illnesses; (8) OSHA also required surveyed establishments to provide information on employees' total hours worked and on the average number of employees who worked during the year; (9) OSHA planned to use the data collected to better identify establishments with the highest injury and illness rates so that it could more accurately target on-site compliance inspections to establishments with safety and health problems; (10) in addition, OSHA planned to use the data to better target its technical assistance and consultation efforts and to measure its performance under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 in meeting its goals of reducing establishment injuries and illnesses; (11) as of April 1998, however, OSHA had made only limited use of the data collected in its 1996 and 1997 surveys mainly because of two lawsuits; (12) a federal court ordered OSHA to halt implementation of a new program that, using the 1997 survey data, identified specific establishments with the highest lost workday injury and illness rates; (13) employers who declined to participate in this new program would remain on OSHA's list of employers most likely to be inspected; (14) the program has been suspended until the court issues a decision; (15) as a part of its data collection effort, OSHA gave no assurances about privacy or confidentiality when it requested establishment information from employers; and (16) OSHA has received many Freedom of Information Act requests for the names and addresses of the 12,000 establishments with high injury and illness rates that it invited to participate in the new program. |
gao_GAO-13-436 | gao_GAO-13-436_0 | Communities Have Used a Variety of Strategies to Deal with BRAC 2005 Closures and Select Local Economic Data Are Comparable to National Averages
Communities surrounding the 23 major DOD installations closed in BRAC 2005 have used a variety of strategies to deal with the closures, and economic data on unemployment and real per capita income growth show the rates for these communities are comparable to national averages. Our analyses of BLS annual unemployment data for 2011, the most recent data available, showed that 11 (52 percent) of the 21 closure communities had unemployment rates at or below the national average of 8.9 percent for the period from January through December 2011. The other 10 communities had unemployment rates that were higher than the national average (see figure 5). Growth Has Occurred at 23 Major Installations and Communities Have Used a Variety of Strategies to Accommodate this Growth
Since 2005, DOD has implemented several major initiatives, including BRAC realignment actions and Army Modularity, that have resulted in growth in military and civilian personnel at 23 installations, and the communities surrounding these installations, which also experienced growth, have used a variety of practices and strategies to accommodate this growth. As shown in table 2, these 23 installations had a combined net growth of about 191,000 military and civilian personnel from fiscal years 2006 through 2012, with their total population growing from about 526,000 to over 717,000, a 36.3 percent increase. The most common successful strategy, cited by DOD officials, community representatives we interviewed, survey respondents, and discussion group participants, was to form a regional working group composed of representatives from all of the jurisdictions affected by the growth at the installation. DOD Provides Assistance to Communities Surrounding Closure Installations, but Additional Army Guidance Is Needed to Improve Maintenance of Facilities
Community representatives we surveyed and spoke with indicated that DOD provides good support to communities facing base closure through its OEA, but representatives from communities surrounding closed Army installations that took ownership of the facilities stated that in many instances the Army facilities were not maintained at a sufficient level to retain their value or facilitate reuse. If Army officials and community representatives do not have a clear understanding as to the level of maintenance that should be carried out, local redevelopment authorities and the Army will continue to have differing expectations of the maintenance that should be provided to closed facilities, hindering the transfer and reuse process. Finally, while the DOD guidance states that the services have developed specific maintenance levels, only the Navy and the Air Force have published service-specific guidance to clearly describe their maintenance levels consistent with factors outlined in DOD’s guidance. The Army has not issued any guidance in this area. However, the DOD guidance does not describe specific levels of maintenance. An official with the Army BRAC office told us that the Army makes an effort to maintain closed facilities in accordance with their planned usage. Without clear guidance on the expected levels of maintenance for closed facilities, the communities will not have a clear understanding of what maintenance the Army will provide, hindering the transfer and reuse process. DOD Provides Support to Communities Facing Installation Growth, but More Data and Long-Term Coordination Is Needed
Community representatives we surveyed or spoke with indicated that DOD provides good support to communities facing base growth through its OEA, but more data and long-term coordination could improve the communities’ and DOD’s ability to respond to future force structure changes. DOD guidance states that maximum advance information and support should be provided to state and local governments to plan for military growth actions. However, some community representatives noted that they would like more specific information. For example, they told us that installations are unable to provide communities with aggregate data on where servicemembers and their families live while stationed at the local installation, because they do not have a system that tracks this type of information. Installation and service officials did note, however, that existing data systems could potentially be modified to provide this information. In addition to the need for more data on where personnel live, community representatives and installation officials we interviewed stated that establishing a long-term civilian point of contact at the base installation level is necessary to effectively plan for the long-term effects of growth on the base and local community. Accurate and timely information on such things as personnel residence areas and expected changes in demand for public services could better facilitate communities’ efforts to accommodate installation growth. To improve the ability of DOD and the local communities to respond to future growth actions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to consider developing a procedure for collecting service members’ physical addresses while stationed at an installation, annually updating this information, and sharing aggregate information with community representatives relevant for local planning decisions, such as additional population per zip code, consistent with privacy and force protection concerns. GAO-13-337. Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through BRAC and other growth initiatives, DOD has made significant changes to its force structure, affecting communities around DOD installations. To help transition toward a smaller, more agile force, DOD has requested new BRAC authority. House Report 112-479, accompanying the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to study the practices and strategies that communities have used to cope with installation closure or growth. This report (1) describes the practices and strategies communities have used in dealing with base closures and growth since 2005 and economic and population data in those communities and (2) presents information on communities' needs in adjusting to installation closure and growth. GAO interviewed DOD, service, and installation officials; interviewed and surveyed community representatives; reviewed relevant guidance; and visited select installations.
What GAO Found
The 21 communities surrounding the 23 Department of Defense (DOD) installations closed in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round have used strategies such as forming a local redevelopment authority and seeking federal grants to deal with the closures. Some economic data for these communities are comparable to national averages, with some variation. For instance, GAO found that 52 percent (11 of 21) of communities had unemployment rates lower than the national average of 8.9 percent, although the rates ranged from a low of 6.1 percent to a high of 16.8 percent. Sixty-two percent (13 of 21) of the closure communities had real per capita income growth rates higher than the national average of 0.14 percent for the period from 2006 through 2011. Since 2005, 23 other installations have experienced population increases that have resulted in net growth of about 191,000 military and civilian personnel (a 36 percent increase), and their corresponding communities have used several strategies to accommodate this growth, including forming a regional working group composed of representatives from affected jurisdictions.
Community representatives stated that DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides good support to communities facing base closure, but some representatives from communities surrounding closed Army installations stated that facilities were not maintained at a high enough level for reuse. An Army official told GAO that the Army makes an effort to maintain closed facilities in accordance with their planned usage and that local redevelopment authorities have unrealistic expectations of maintenance levels. DOD guidance states that the services have developed specific maintenance levels for facilities during the transition process. The Air Force and the Navy have published this specific guidance, but the Army has not and instead relies upon DOD's guidance, which does not describe specific levels of maintenance. Without clear guidance on the expected levels of maintenance for closed facilities, the communities may not have a clear understanding of what maintenance the Army will provide.
Community representatives indicated that OEA provides good support to communities facing base growth, but that additional data and a civilian point of contact at the installation could improve their ability to respond to future growth. DOD has issued guidance that states communities should be provided maximum advance information to plan, and service guidance states that services will give communities information including military and personnel changes. However, community representatives told GAO that they would like additional aggregate information on where servicemembers live while stationed at the installation to facilitate planning for the impact of installation growth. Installations currently do not provide communities with this information because they do not have a system to track it, but officials noted that existing systems could potentially be modified to provide it. Installation officials and community representatives also stated that establishing a long-term civilian point of contact at the installation would help the community effectively plan for growth. Accurate and timely information on personnel residence areas and a civilian point of contact at the installation could better facilitate communities' efforts to accommodate installation growth.
What GAO Recommends
DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation that the Army issue guidance on maintenance levels to be provided during the base closure process. DOD partially concurred that it should establish procedures for sharing additional information with growth communities and designate a civilian point of contact at growth installations. GAO believes action by DOD prior to future installation growth will help forestall future challenges. |
gao_GAO-04-108T | gao_GAO-04-108T_0 | These changes appear to have placed First-Class Mail volume in the early stages of what may be a long-term decline. All options for statutory and discretionary change need to be on the table for discussion. The Commission’s findings are generally consistent with our past work, and its recommendations address postal reform issues in a comprehensive manner. We agree with the Commission that the Service has significant opportunities to improve its efficiency through best execution strategies in which those who can do it best and at the best price would perform postal activities while the Service rightsizes its infrastructure and workforce. The starting point is to consider the Commission’s recommendation that Congress amend the nation’s postal laws “to clarify that the mission of the Postal Service is to provide high-quality, essential postal services to all persons and communities by the most cost-effective and efficient means possible at affordable, and where appropriate, uniform rates.” This recommendation is coupled with proposals to create a mechanism for change by giving broad authority to a newly created Postal Regulatory Board, including authority to review and issue binding decisions on certain Postal Service proposals to redefine delivery frequency requirements; uniform postal rates; and the Postal Service’s monopoly to deliver mail and place items in mailboxes. However, we agree with the Commission’s conclusion that the legacy governance structure of the Service is increasingly at odds with its mission in the modern environment and that the Service’s governing structure needs to consist of members with the requisite knowledge and experience. Since then, the Service has improved its quarterly financial reports. On the Service’s overall financial situation and transformation efforts? 3). The P-NOC would be charged with making recommendations to Congress and the President relating to the consolidation and rationalization of the Service’s mail processing and distribution infrastructure. Taking advantage of this opportunity could better position the Service for the future. Thus, we believe that now is the time to “get it right” and modernize the statutory framework that governs the Service. The Commission’s vision of rightsizing the Service’s infrastructure and workforce is achievable if approached in a comprehensive, integrated fashion, and supported by postal stakeholders. However, since the Service issued its Transformation Plan in April 2002, it has not provided adequate transparency on its plans to rationalize its infrastructure and workforce; the status of initiatives included in its Transformation Plan; and how it plans to integrate the strategies, timing, and funding necessary to implement its plans. Some of the key areas that need to be addressed as part of comprehensive reform legislation include clarifying the Service’s mission and role; enhancing governance, accountability, oversight, and transparency; improving regulation of postal rates; and making human capital reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Last year the President established a commission to examine the future of the U.S. Postal Service (the Service). Its report, issued in July 2003, contained a proposed vision for the Service and recommendations to ensure the viability of postal services. GAO was asked to discuss (1) its perspective on the commission's report and (2) suggestions for next steps. This testimony is based on GAO's analysis of the Commission's report and prior GAO reports and testimonies.
What GAO Found
The Commission found that the Service faces a bleak fiscal outlook. The Service has an outdated and inflexible business model amid a rapidly changing postal landscape. First-Class Mail appears to be on the brink of long-term decline as Americans take advantage of cheaper electronic alternatives. Thus, universal postal service is at risk. These findings are similar to our past work and point to the need for fundamental reforms to minimize the risk of a significant taxpayer bailout or dramatic postal rate increases. The Commission made recommendations to Congress and the Service aimed at achieving such reforms, which GAO believes merit consideration. GAO agrees with the Commission that now is the time to modernize the nation's postal laws rather than waiting until a financial crisis occurs that limits congressional options. Key aspects of the Service's existing legislative framework that need to be addressed are 1) a broadly defined mission that enables the Service to engage in unprofitable and controversial endeavors, 2) a governance structure that does not ensure governing board members who have the requisite knowledge and skills, 3) the need for additional accountability, oversight, and transparency provisions; 4) a lengthy, burdensome rate-setting process, and 5) provisions that hinder the Service in rationalizing its infrastructure and workforce. GAO also agrees with the Commission that the Service can take steps now to modernize and increase efficiency and effectiveness, improve its financial position, and rationalize its infrastructure and workforce. The Service has begun to implement its Transformation Plan initiatives, cut its costs and the size of its workforce, and improve its efficiency. However, since the Service issued its Transformation Plan in April 2002, it has not provided adequate transparency on its overall plans to rationalize its infrastructure and workforce; the status of initiatives included in its Transformation Plan; and how it plans to integrate the strategies, timing, and funding necessary to move toward becoming a high-performing organization. The Service's vision of rightsizing its infrastructure and workforce is achievable if approached in a comprehensive, integrated fashion, with appropriate communication and coordination with postal stakeholders. |
gao_NSIAD-99-4 | gao_NSIAD-99-4_0 | Under the current ACTD program, DOD builds prototypes to assess the military utility of mature technologies, which are used to reduce or avoid the time and effort usually devoted to technology development. ACTD projects are not acquisition programs. Not all projects will be selected for transition into the normal acquisition process. However, the project selection process does not ensure that only mature technologies enter the ACTD program. If the demonstrated technology is deemed to have sufficient military utility, many ACTD projects will still need to enter the normal acquisition process to complete product and concept development and testing to determine, for example, whether the system is producible and can meet the user’s suitability needs. Commercial items that do not require any further development could proceed directly to production. However, other non-software related ACTDs should enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase to proceed with product and concept development and testing. In the case of the Predator ACTD, the one ACTD that has proceeded into production, DOD decided to enter the technology into production before proceeding with product and concept development and testing, thereby accepting programmatic risks that could offset the schedule and other benefits gained through the ACTD process. Procuring ACTD Prototypes Beyond Those Needed for Basic Demonstration Is Unnecessarily Risky
DOD’s practice is to procure sufficient ACTD prototypes to provide a 2-year residual capability. Procuring additional ACTD prototypes before product and concept development and testing is completed risks wasting resources on the procurement of items that may not work as expected or may not have sufficient military utility. DOD’s criteria for selecting technologies for ACTD candidates should be clarified to ensure the selection of mature technology with few, if any, exceptions. Lastly, emphasizing the need to complete concept and product development and testing before procuring more items than needed for the basic demonstration would reduce the risk of prematurely starting production. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify the ACTD program guidance to (1) ensure the use of mature technology with few, if any, exceptions and (2) describe when transition to the development phase of the acquisition cycle is necessary and the types of development activity that may be appropriate. Moreover, the new guidance goes on to describe several types of exceptions under which immature technologies may be permitted to be used in an ACTD. As stated in our recommendation, the guidance should specify when a transition to development may be appropriate and the kinds of developmental activities that may be appropriate. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. As DOD stated in its intent to establish the ACTD program, we believe the benefit of the ACTD process is in eliminating or reducing technology development, not in making early commitments to production or in postponing product and concept development and testing activities until after production starts. 10. 11. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the current Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program, focusing on: (1) whether the selection process includes criteria that are adequate to ensure that only mature technologies are selected for ACTD prototypes; (2) whether guidance on transitioning to the normal acquisition process ensures that a prototype appropriately completes product and concept development and testing before entering production; and (3) the Department of Defense's (DOD) current practice of procuring more ACTD prototypes than needed to assess the military utility of a mature technology.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) through the determination of military value of mature technologies and their use in the acquisition process, ACTDs have the potential to reduce the time to develop and acquire weapon systems; (2) however, several aspects of the ACTD program can be improved; (3) DOD's process for selecting ACTD candidates does not include adequate criteria for assessing the maturity of the proposed technology and has resulted in the approval of ACTD projects that included immature technology; (4) DOD has improved its guidance on the maturity of the technologies to be used in ACTD projects but the revised guidance describes several types of exceptions under which immature technologies may be used; (5) where DOD approves immature technologies as ACTD program candidates and time is spent conducting developmental activities, the goal of reduced acquisition cycle time will not be realized; (6) further, guidance on entering technologies into the normal acquisition process is not sufficient to ensure that a prototype completes product and concept development and testing before entering production; (7) the guidance does not mention the circumstances when transition to development may be appropriate or the kinds of developmental activities that may be appropriate; (8) while commercial items that do not require any further development could proceed directly to production, many ACTDs may still need to enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase to proceed with product and concept development and testing before production begins; (9) through the ACTD early user demonstration, DOD is expected to obtain more detailed knowledge about its technologies before entering into the acquisition process; (10) however, in the one case in which an ACTD has proceeded into production, DOD made that decision before completing product and concept development and testing, thereby accepting programmatic risks that could offset the schedule and other benefits gained through the ACTD process; (11) DOD's current practice of procuring prototypes beyond those needed for the basic ACTD demonstration and before completing product and concept development and testing is unnecessarily risky; and (12) this practice risks wasting resources on the procurement of items that may not work as expected or may not have sufficient military utility and risks a premature and excessive commitment to production. |
gao_GAO-03-551T | gao_GAO-03-551T_0 | Mutual Fund Fees Appear to Have Risen Recently
Data from others and our own analysis indicates that mutual fund fees may have increased recently. Studies by SEC and ICI found that expense ratios for mutual funds overall have increased since 1980. Recent Studies Indicate that Mutual Fund Expense Ratios Have Increased
Since we issued our report in 2000, the staff at SEC have published a study of mutual fund fees that showed that fund expense ratios have increased. Some industry participants have criticized the ICI’s methodology. Our Analysis Shows that Average Fees for Large Stock Funds Have Increased Recently, but Fees for Large Bond Funds Have Declined
Although our June 2000 report found that fees for large stock and bond funds had generally declined between 1990 and 1998, analysis of recent years shows that the average expense ratios for large stock funds have risen since 1998 while fees for bond funds have continued to decline. The average expense ratios for the large bond funds also generally declined between 1990 and 2001, from 0.62 percent to 0.54 percent. Of the remaining 18 funds we analyzed, most of whose assets increased, their expense ratios either did not change or decreased between 1998 and 2001. SEC Is Proposing Additional Fee Disclosures, but Other Alternatives Could Provide More Specific Information
SEC is proposing that investors receive additional information about mutual fund fees, but other alternatives for disclosing fees exist that could better inform investors of the actual fees they are charged. The SEC proposal would allow fees to be compared across funds, but would present information to investors in dollar amounts using only illustrative investment amounts. If adopted, we agree that the proposed disclosures would provide investors with additional useful information. In addition, SEC’s proposed placement of these new disclosures in the semiannual shareholder reports, instead of in quarterly statements, may be less likely to increase investor awareness and improve price competition among mutual funds. One former fund adviser suggested that mutual funds could provide investors with fairly precise estimates of what they are paying in fees in their quarterly account statement by multiplying the funds’ expense ratio for the prior year by the assets that the shareholder held as of the last day of the year or period. As a result, although additional disclosures could provide investor-specific information and in documents that investors receive more frequently, fund companies and other financial institutions would incur costs to produce such additions to the existing reporting made to fund shareholders. The benefit to investors from receiving this additional information has not been quantified. Currently brokerage commissions are not routinely or explicitly disclosed to investors and there have been increasing calls for disclosure as well as debate on the benefits and costs of added transparency. Data from mutual funds indicates that brokerage commissions and other trading costs can be significant. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of U.S. households have invested in mutual funds whose value exceeds $6 trillion. The fees and other costs that these investors pay as part of owning mutual funds can significantly affect their investment returns. Recent press reports suggest that mutual fund fees have increased during the market downturn in the last few years. In addition, questions have been raised as to whether the disclosures of these fees and other costs, such as brokerage commissions, are sufficiently transparent. GAO updated its analysis from its June 2000 report, which showed the trends in mutual fund fees from 1990 and 1998 for large funds by collecting data on how these 76 funds' fees changed between 1998 to 2001. GAO also reviewed the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule proposal on fee disclosure as well as studies by industry.
What GAO Found
Recent data indicate that mutual fund fees may have increased. Studies by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Investment Company Institute found that expense ratios for mutual funds overall have increased since 1980. GAO's prior analysis of large mutual funds showed that these funds' average expense ratios generally decreased between 1990 and 1998, but between 1999 and 2001, the average ratio for the large stock funds analyzed has increased somewhat while the average ratio for the large bond funds has continued to decline. The average expense ratio for these large funds overall remains lower than their average in 1990. SEC is proposing that investors receive additional information about mutual fund fees in the semiannual reports sent to fund shareholders. If adopted, these new disclosures would appear to provide additional useful information to investors and would allow for fees to be compared across funds. However, various alternatives to the disclosures that SEC is proposing could provide information specific to each investor and in a more frequently distributed and relevant document to mutual fund shareholders--the quarterly account statement, which presents information on the actual number and value of each investor's shareholdings. Industry participants have raised concerns that requiring additional disclosures in quarterly statements would be costly and that the additional benefits to investors have not been quantified. |
gao_GAO-04-37 | gao_GAO-04-37_0 | Scope and Methodology
As agreed with your offices, our objectives for this report were to review the Bureau’s current plans for the 2010 Census and the extent to which they might address shortcomings with the 2000 Census, analyze the Bureau’s cost estimates, and assess the rigor of the Bureau’s 2010 planning process. 2010 Design Has Potential, but Introduces New Risks
In designing the 2010 Census, Bureau officials had four principal goals in mind: (1) increase the relevance and timeliness of census long-form data, (2) reduce operational risk, (3) increase the coverage and accuracy of the census, and (4) contain costs. The Bureau’s experience in conducting the 2000 Census highlighted the need to update and modernize MAF/TIGER prior to 2010. Challenge #2: Resolving Uncertainties That Surround ACS
Most of the reforms, savings, and improvements in accuracy the Bureau anticipates will not be possible unless it conducts a short-form-only census. While certain aspects of the Bureau’s coverage measurement plans are still being developed, the Bureau is not currently planning to develop a procedure that would allow it to adjust census numbers for purposes of redistricting. This makes it difficult to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative designs, determine the level of resources needed to achieve this goal, measure the Bureau’s progress, or hold managers accountable for results. The Bureau appears to be further along in planning the 2010 Census compared to a similar point during the 2000 Census cycle, and its efforts to enhance past planning practices are commendable. However, the Bureau’s plans for 2010, while not unreasonable on the surface, lack a substantial amount of supporting analysis, budgetary transparency, and other information, making it difficult for us, Congress, and other stakeholders to properly assess the feasibility of the Bureau’s design and the extent to which it could lead to greater cost-effectiveness compared to alternative approaches. Our draft report emphasized this exact point noting that “The growing cost of the head count, at a time when the nation is facing historic budget deficits, highlights the importance of congressional deliberations on the extent to which each additional dollar spent on the census results in better data, as well as how best to balance the need for a complete count, with the need to ensure the cost of a complete count does not become unreasonable.” Similarly, we concluded that “it will also be important for policymakers to consider, early in the decade, the long-term costs associated with the census and finding the right balance between controlling mushrooming costs and improving accuracy.”
The Bureau also believes the report implies that the cost increases are caused by the reengineering effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
The key to a successful census is meticulous planning as it helps ensure greater cost-effectiveness. However, the 2000 and previous censuses have been marked by poor planning, which unnecessarily raised the costs and risks of those efforts. GAO was asked to (1) review the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) current plans for 2010 and whether they might address shortcomings of the 2000 Census, (2) analyze the Bureau's cost estimates, and (3) review the rigor of the Bureau's 2010 planning process.
What GAO Found
While preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along compared to a similar point prior to the 2000 Census, cost and design information had to be pieced together from various documents. The Bureau's plans also lack a substantial amount of supporting analysis, budgetary transparency, and other information that made it difficult to verify the Bureau's assertions concerning the costs and benefits of its proposed approach. Further, unlike in previous censuses, the Bureau does not intend to develop coverage measurement procedures that would allow it to adjust census data for certain purposes. Although its experience in 2000 shows that its coverage measurement methodology needs improvement, GAO believes the Bureau should have researched alternative approaches more thoroughly and disclosed the results of its research before making a decision. In designing the 2010 Census, the Bureau hoped to address several shortcomings of the 2000 enumeration, namely to (1) increase the relevance and timeliness of data, (2) reduce operational risk, (3) increase coverage and accuracy, and (4) contain costs. To achieve these goals, three components--all new operations--are key to the Bureau's plans for 2010. They include enhancing procedures for building the census address list and associated maps, replacing the census long-form questionnaire with a more frequent sample survey, and conducting a short-form-only census. The Bureau's approach has the potential to achieve the first three goals, but reducing operational risk could prove to be more difficult as each of the three components actually introduces new risks. The Bureau will also be challenged to control the cost of the 2010 Census, now estimated at over $11 billion. The current budget reporting process masks the long-term costs of the census, most of which will be incurred in 2010; making it difficult for Congress to monitor the Bureau's planned expenditures. Certain actions by the Office of Management and Budget could produce greater fiscal transparency, and thus help inform congressional deliberations on how to best balance the need for an accurate census, with the need to ensure a reasonable cost for this endeavor. |
gao_GGD-96-77 | gao_GGD-96-77_0 | Major component parts of designated passenger motor vehicles are to be marked with identification numbers so that stolen parts can be identified. National Motor Vehicle Title Information System
The 1992 Act required Transportation to, among other things establish a task force by April 25, 1993, to study problems related to motor vehicle titling, registration, and salvage, which may affect motor vehicle theft, and to recommend (1) ways to solve these problems, including obtaining any national uniformity that it determines is necessary in these areas and related resources and (2) other needed legislative or administrative actions; review by January 1, 1994, state systems for motor vehicle titling and determine each state’s costs for providing a titling information system; and establish the title information system by January 31, 1996, unless Transportation determines that an existing system meets the statute’s requirement, and by January 1, 1997, report to Congress on those states that elected to participate in the information system and on those states not participating, including the reasons for nonparticipation. Implementation Status of the 1992 Act’s Requirements
The task force, established in April 1993, reported in February 1994 its recommendations on the legislative and administrative actions needed to address problems in the areas of titling, registration, and controls over salvage to deter motor vehicle theft. In March 1996, AAMVA officials estimated that about $19 million in federal grants would be needed to fund states’ implementation costs. Potential Issues Affecting the 1992 Act’s Implementation or Effectiveness
On the basis of discussions with NHTSA and AAMVA officials, issues that may affect the 1992 Act’s implementation or effectiveness are concerns about the size and scope of the pilot study, uniformity, funding for the states, responsibility for the titling system, and other factors, including states’ willingness to participate and the complexity of the titling system. According to an NHTSA official, local law enforcement officials look for markings when investigating stolen vehicles and parts. The Institute expects work to begin on this study in May 1996. Potential Issues Affecting the 1992 Act’s Effectiveness
A determination of the effectiveness of the marking of major components of passenger motor vehicles is not expected to be made until the Justice and Transportation reports are completed. Also, according to FBI officials, the implementation of NSPMVIS might have an adverse economic impact on insurance companies and smaller businesses involved in vehicle parts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the implementation of the Anti-Car Theft Act, focusing on the: (1) status of national information systems on motor vehicle titles and stolen passenger cars and parts; (2) marking of major component parts of passenger cars with identification numbers; and (3) issues that may impede the act's implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) have begun developing information systems and DOT has issued initial parts-marking regulations; (2) a DOT task force has made recommendations on the legislative and administrative actions needed to address problems in titling, registration, and controls over salvage to deter motor vehicle theft; (3) states need about $19 million in federal grants to implement their part of the titling system; (4) the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has proposed legislation to implement the task force's recommendations; (5) issues affecting the implementation or effectiveness of the proposed titling information system include prosecution immunity, major vehicle damage disclosure, the system's complexity, and state participation, funding, and responsibility; (6) the association that DOJ authorized to set up the stolen vehicle and parts database and complete a pilot study on the database's concept and maintenance feasibility expects to begin studying parts-marking effectiveness in May 1996; and (7) potential barriers to the implementation or effectiveness of the act's parts marking provisions include state funding for the database, confusion over what vehicles and parts are to be marked, whether local law enforcement agencies have the resources necessary to follow up on identified stolen vehicles and parts, and the potential adverse economic impact on insurance companies and small businesses. |
gao_NSIAD-98-64 | gao_NSIAD-98-64_0 | Operational Factors Do Not Preclude Assigning More B-1s to the Reserves
In general, reserve component B-1 units are considered just as capable of carrying out operational missions as their active duty counterparts. Our analysis of five operational factors the Air Force considers in assessing whether a mission is suitable for reserve component participation indicates that assigning more B-1s to the reserve component than the Air Force has announced would not adversely affect peacetime and wartime missions. According to Air National Guard B-1 unit officials, aircrews must fly about four times per month, which can easily be scheduled around part-time reservists’ civilian employment. Personnel Tempo
B-1 personnel have not experienced excessive peacetime personnel tempo rates—frequent and lengthy temporary duty assignments away from their home operating locations. Table 2 describes six options for assigning more B-1s to the reserves and shows the estimated savings the Air Force could achieve by implementing these options. Savings range from $87.1 million to $235.3 million during fiscal years 1999-2003. We used these factors to develop criteria to assess the feasibility of increasing the reserve component’s participation in the B-1 mission. We analyzed the recruiting, response times, and cost implications for each option. To assess the potential savings from placing more B-1s in the reserve component, we used operational cost estimates developed by the Congressional Budget Office and other costs Air Force officials provided such as for the military construction and movement of an operational unit that would be required to implement some of our options. Option 4: Consolidate B-1s at Two Bases, One Active and One Reserve
Establish a reserve component unit of 54 B-1s at Dyess Air Force Base by reducing to zero both the active duty unit of 36 B-1s at Dyess and the reserve component units of 10 and 8 B-1s at McConnell and Robins Air Force bases, respectively. Other Impacts
This option could produce savings that are not shown in table I.5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the cost and operational implications of assigning more B-1 bombers to the reserve component, focusing on: (1) whether operational factors preclude greater reserve component participation in the B-1 mission; and (2) options for increasing the number of B-1s assigned to reserve component units and their effect on operations and costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Air Force active and reserve components consider essentially the same operational factors in determining whether a mission is suitable for the reserve component; (2) factors Air Force officials consider include: (a) overseas presence; (b) peacetime training; (c) mission response times; (d) personnel tempo; and (e) personnel recruiting; (3) GAO's assessment of these factors showed that they do not preclude assigning more B-1s to the reserve component; (4) B-1s are not based overseas, peacetime training can be scheduled around part-time reservists' civilian employment, reserve units could mobilize to meet mission response times, and personnel tempo rates for B-1 unit personnel do not exceed the Air Force's maximum desired standard; (5) however, the lack of availability of recruitable personnel in some locations limits where reserve units can operate; (6) if the Air Force were to assign more B-1s to the reserve component than are currently planned, the cost to operate the B-1 fleet could be reduced--without adversely affecting day-to-day peacetime training or critical wartime missions or closing any bases; (7) GAO developed six options for assigning more B-1s to the reserves; and (8) based on Congressional Budget Office cost savings projections and GAO's analysis of other one-time costs, GAO estimates that implementing these options could produce savings ranging from $87.1 million to $235.3 million during the last 5 years (1999-2003) of the current Future Years Defense Program. |
gao_GAO-02-780 | gao_GAO-02-780_0 | The panel recommended creating a permanent interagency committee to develop a methodology to determine the appropriate size and locations of the U.S. overseas presence. We identified three critical elements that should be systematically evaluated as part of this framework: (1) physical/technical security of facilities and employees, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3) cost of operations. What Are an Embassy’s Operating Costs? Our framework encourages consideration of a full range of options along with the security, mission, and cost trade-offs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To facilitate the use of a common set of criteria for making staff assessments and adjustments at overseas posts and encourage decision makers to consider security, mission priorities and requirements, and costs, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget ensure that our framework is used as a basis for assessing staffing levels in the administration’s rightsizing initiative, starting with its assessments of staffing levels and rightsizing options at U.S. embassies in Europe and Eurasia. Do security vulnerabilities suggest the need to reduce or relocate staff? | What GAO Found
There have been recurring calls to evaluate and realign, or "rightsize," the number and location of staff at U.S. embassies and consulates and to consider staff reductions to reduce security vulnerabilities. The Office of Management and Budget is implementing this rightsizing initiative by analyzing the U.S. overseas presence and reviewing the staffing allocation process. This report uses a systematic approach to assess overseas workforce size and identifying options for rightsizing, both at the embassy level and for making related decisions worldwide. GAO's framework links staffing levels to the following three critical elements of overseas diplomatic operations: (1) physical/technical security of facilities and employees, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3) cost of operations. Unlike an analysis that considers the elements in isolation, GAO's rightsizing framework encourages consideration of a full range of options, along with the security, mission, and cost trade-offs. Policy makers could use this information to decide whether to add, reduce, or change the staff mix at an embassy. |
gao_AIMD-96-5 | gao_AIMD-96-5_0 | The majority of the assets pledged as collateral are each FRB’s Treasury securities. Scope and Methodology
To conduct our work, we (1) gained an understanding of relevant accounting and reporting policies and procedures by reviewing and analyzing documentation and interviewing key FRB and Board personnel, (2) reviewed documentation supporting selected significant balance sheet amounts originating at the Dallas FRB, and (3) tested the effectiveness of certain internal controls in place at the Dallas FRB and the Federal Reserve Automation Services (FRAS) in Richmond, Virginia, and Dallas, Texas. For example, (1) reconciliations of general ledger accounts and activity were not always based on independent records, (2) the automated systems did not prohibit access by all terminated employees, (3) accounting adjustments related to check processing activity were not appropriately reviewed, and (4) inventory counts of Federal Reserve notes at some branches were not always properly conducted and documented. These weaknesses involved controls over access to sensitive information and the computer center, changes to system software, testing the disaster recovery plan, and the use of special privileges on automated tasks. These annual audits enhance the credibility of reported information and conforms to the practices of the central banks of many other major industrialized nations. Conclusions
We commend the Board for taking the step to contract for external, independent financial statement audits over the next 5 years. Recommendations
To bring about consistency and improve the efficiency of Federal Reserve note accounting and reporting procedures, we recommend that in conjunction with planning and implementing future changes to the automated systems used to account for and report notes, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System consider incorporating changes in the function of these systems to allow FRBs to account for and report notes without regard to the identifiers printed on the notes; directing the FRBs to discontinue using specific FRB identifiers printed on notes as the basis for recording each FRB’s liability for Federal Reserve notes; stopping the tracking of shipments by FRB identifiers; directing each FRB to record its note liability based on the Federal Reserve notes it actually receives and holds without regard to FRB identifiers; and apportioning note destructions among FRBs on an appropriate basis without regard to FRB identifiers. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed several internal control issues at the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) of Dallas and the Federal Reserve Automation Services' (FRAS) accounting procedures, focusing on: (1) Dallas FRB financial accounting and reporting and electronic data processing (EDP) control weaknesses; (2) the efficiency and consistency of Federal Reserve note accounting; and (3) auditing issues that need the attention of the Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors and its auditor.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) at the Dallas FRB, its 3 branches, and FRAS, weaknesses exist in accounting records, asset accountability, and the use of automated systems; (2) Dallas FRB control weaknesses include failure to use independent records to verify and reconcile general ledger accounts and activity, limit access to FRB automated systems, review accounting adjustments related to check processing activity, and properly conduct and document Federal Reserve note inventories; (3) FRAS and Dallas FRB general EDP weaknesses include inadequate control over access to sensitive information, system software changes, disaster recovery plan testing, and the use of special privileges on automated tasks; (4) the Federal Reserve could improve the consistency and efficiency of its note accounting procedures by eliminating the use of the FRB identifier on each note for recording liabilities for notes in circulation; (5) the Board of Governors has contracted for annual independent external audits of the combined FRB asset accounts and financial statements over the next 5 years and one audit of each FRB during the same period to enhance the credibility of reported information; and (6) the auditor will face challenges identifying the ownership and original cost of U.S. Treasury securities, confirming amounts held by note holders, and the notes' unique characteristics of nonmaturity and destructibility. |
gao_GAO-07-562T | gao_GAO-07-562T_0 | VA Continues to Face Challenges in Improving Its Claims Processing
Several factors are continuing to create challenges for VA’s claims processing, despite its steps to improve performance. VA’s steps to improve performance include requesting funding for additional staff and undertaking initiatives to reduce appeal remands. VA’s inventory of pending claims and their average time pending has increased significantly in the last 3 years, in part because of an increase in the number of claims. The number of pending claims increased by almost one-half from the end of fiscal year 2003 to the end of fiscal year 2006, from about 254,000 to about 378,000. Rating-related claims, including those filed by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, increased steadily from about 579,000 in fiscal year 2000 to about 806,000 in fiscal year 2006, an increase of about 39 percent. Moreover, according to VA, the complexity of claims is also increasing. Since 1999, several court decisions and laws related to VA’s responsibilities to assist veterans in developing their benefit claims have significantly affected VA’s ability to process claims in a timely manner. VA’s budget justification provides information on actual and planned productivity, in terms of claims decided per full-time equivalent employee. To resolve appeals faster, VA has been working to reduce the number of appeals sent back by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals for further work such as obtaining additional evidence and correcting procedural errors. Opportunities for Improvement May Lie in More Fundamental Reform
While VA is taking actions to address its claims-processing challenges, there are opportunities for more fundamental reform that could dramatically improve decision making and processing. These include reexamining program design, as well as the structure and division of labor among field offices. This study would include estimates of the effects on the size, cost, and management of VA’s disability programs and other relevant VA programs and would identify any legislative actions needed to initiate and fund such changes. Veterans’ Disability Benefits: VA Can Improve Its Procedures for Obtaining Military Service Records. Department of Veterans Affairs: Key Management Challenges in Health and Disability Programs. Veterans’ Benefits: Quality Assurance for Disability Claims and Appeals Processing Can Be Further Improved. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, House Veterans' Affairs Committee, asked GAO to discuss its recent work related to the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability claims and appeals processing. GAO has reported and testified on this subject on numerous occasions. GAO's work has addressed VA's efforts to improve the timeliness of decisions on claims and appeals and VA's efforts to reduce backlogs.
What GAO Found
VA continues to face challenges in improving service delivery to veterans, specifically speeding up the process of adjudication and appeal, and reducing the existing backlog of claims. For example, as of the end of fiscal year 2006, rating-related compensation claims were pending an average of 127 days, 16 days more than at the end of fiscal year 2003. During the same period, the inventory of rating-related claims grew by almost half, in part because of increased filing of claims, including those filed by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Meanwhile, appeals resolution remains a lengthy process, taking an average of 657 days in fiscal year 2006. However, several factors may limit VA's ability to make and sustain significant improvements in its claims-processing performance, including the potential impacts of laws and court decisions, continued increases in the number and complexity of claims being filed, and difficulties in obtaining the evidence needed to decide claims in a timely manner, such as military service records. VA is taking steps to address these problems. For example, the President's fiscal year 2008 budget requests an increase of over 450 full-time equivalent employees to process compensation claims. VA is also working to improve appeals timeliness by reducing appeals remanded for further work. While VA is taking actions to address its claims-processing challenges, opportunities for significant performance improvement may lie in more fundamental reform of VA's disability compensation program. This could include reexamining program design such as updating the disability criteria to reflect the current state of science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions. It could also include examining the structure and division of labor among field offices. |
gao_GAO-14-568T | gao_GAO-14-568T_0 | However, as we have described in numerous reports, although a variety of best practices exist to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Given the importance of transparency, oversight, and management of the government’s IT investments, in June 2009, OMB established a public website, referred to as the IT Dashboard, that provides detailed information on 760 major IT investments at 27 federal agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. Among other things, agencies are to submit Chief Information Officer (CIO) ratings, which, according to OMB’s instructions, should reflect the level of risk facing an investment on a scale from 1 (high risk) to 5 (low risk) relative to that investment’s ability to accomplish its goals. OMB believes that this initiative has the potential to provide about $3 billion in savings by the end of 2015. PortfolioStat. Opportunities Exist to Improve Acquisition and Management of IT Investments
Given the magnitude of the federal government’s annual IT budget, which is expected to be more than $82 billion in fiscal year 2014, it is important that agencies leverage all available opportunities to ensure that their IT investments are acquired in the most effective manner possible. To do so, agencies can rely on IT acquisition best practices and initiatives such as OMB’s IT Dashboard, and OMB-mandated TechStat sessions. Best Practices Are Intended to Help Ensure Successful Major Acquisitions
In 2011, we identified seven successful acquisitions and nine common factors critical to their success, and noted that (1) the factors support OMB’s objective of improving the management of large-scale IT acquisitions across the federal government, and (2) wide dissemination of these factors could complement OMB’s efforts. IT Dashboard Can Improve the Transparency into and Oversight of Major IT Investments
The IT Dashboard serves an important role in allowing OMB and other oversight bodies to hold agencies accountable for results and performance. However, we have issued a series of reports highlighting deficiencies with the accuracy and reliability of the data reported on the Dashboard. Further, while we reported in 2011 that the accuracy of Dashboard cost and schedule data had improved over time, more recently, in December 2013 we found that agencies had removed investments from the Dashboard by reclassifying their investments—representing a troubling trend toward decreased transparency and accountability. Additionally, as of December 2013, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the previous 24 months because OMB does not revise it as the President’s budget request is being created. We also found that, while agencies experienced several issues with reporting the risk of their investments, such as technical problems and delayed updates to the Dashboard, the CIO ratings were mostly or completely consistent with investment risk at seven of the eight selected agencies. Six agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments and two others did not agree, believing their categorizations were appropriate. Continued Oversight Needed to Consolidate Federal Data Centers and Achieve Cost Savings
In an effort to consolidate the growing number of federal data centers, in 2010, OMB launched a consolidation initiative intended to close 40 percent of government data centers by 2015, and, in doing so, save $3 billion. Among other things, we recommended that OMB track and report on key performance measures, such as cost savings to date, and improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities, and that agencies complete inventories and plans. OMB agreed with these two recommendations, and most agencies agreed with our recommendations to them. Specifically, as of May 2013, agencies had reported closing 484 data centers by the end of April 2013, and were planning to close an additional 571 data centers—for a total of 1,055—by September 2014. Agencies’ PortfolioStat Efforts Have the Potential to Save Billions of Dollars
OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative in March 2012, which required 26 executive agencies to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending and demonstrate how their IT investments align with the agency’s mission and business functions. In addition, we made several recommendations to improve agencies’ implementation of PortfolioStat requirements. OMB partially agreed with these recommendations, and responses from 20 of the agencies commenting on the report varied. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government reportedly plans to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014. Given the scale of such planned outlays and the criticality of many of these systems to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that OMB and federal agencies provide appropriate oversight and transparency into these programs and avoid duplicative investments, whenever possible, to ensure the most efficient use of resources.
GAO has previously reported and testified that federal IT projects too frequently fail and incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Numerous best practices and administration initiatives are available for agencies that can help them improve the oversight and management of IT acquisitions.
GAO is testifying today on the results and recommendations from selected reports that focused on how best practices and IT reform initiatives can help federal agencies better manage major acquisitions and legacy investments.
What GAO Found
Information technology (IT) acquisition best practices have been developed by both industry and the federal government to help guide the successful acquisition of investments. For example, GAO recently reported on nine critical factors underlying successful major IT acquisitions. Factors cited included (1) program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders and (2) prioritized requirements.
One key IT reform initiative undertaken by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to improve transparency is a public website, referred to as the IT Dashboard, which provides information on 760 major investments at 27 federal agencies, totaling almost $41 billion. The Dashboard also includes ratings of investments' risk on a scale from 1 (high risk) to 5 (low risk). As of April 2014, according to the Dashboard, 559 investments were low or moderately low risk (green), 159 were medium risk (yellow), and 42 were moderately high or high risk (red).
GAO has issued a series of reports on Dashboard accuracy and, in 2011, found that while there were continued issues with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data, the accuracy of these data had improved over time. Further, a recent GAO report found that selected agencies' ratings were mostly or completely consistent with investment risk. However, this report also noted that agencies had removed major investments from the IT Dashboard, representing a troubling trend toward decreased transparency and accountability. Additionally, GAO reported that as of December 2013, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the previous 24 months because OMB did not revise it as the President's budget request was being created. Consequently, GAO made recommendations to improve the Dashboard's accuracy, ensure that it includes all major IT investments, and increase its availability. Agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments.
In an effort to consolidate the growing number of federal data centers, OMB launched a consolidation initiative intended to close 40 percent of government data centers by 2015, and in doing so, save $3 billion. GAO reported that agencies planned to close 1,055 data centers by the end of fiscal year 2014, but also highlighted the need for continued oversight of these efforts. Among other things, GAO recommended that OMB improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities, with which OMB agreed.
To better manage the government's existing IT systems, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative, which, among other things, requires agencies to conduct annual reviews of their IT investments and make decisions on eliminating duplication. GAO reported that agencies continued to identify duplicative spending as part of PortfolioStat and that this initiative has the potential to save at least $5.8 billion by fiscal year 2015, but that weaknesses existed in agencies' implementation of the initiative's requirements. Among other things, GAO made several recommendations to improve agencies' implementation of PortfolioStat requirements. OMB partially agreed with these recommendations, and most of the other 20 agencies commenting on the report also agreed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to OMB and federal agencies on key aspects of IT acquisition management, as well as the oversight and management of these investments. In particular, GAO has made recommendations regarding the IT Dashboard, efforts to consolidate federal data centers, and PortfolioStat. |
gao_GAO-03-846 | gao_GAO-03-846_0 | Four Key Grants Management Challenges Persist despite EPA’s Past Efforts to Address Them
We identified four key challenges that EPA continues to face in managing its grants despite efforts to address them. These challenges are (1) selecting the most qualified grant applicants, (2) effectively overseeing grantees, (3) measuring the results of grants, and (4) effectively managing grant staff and resources. In recent years, EPA took a series of actions to address these challenges by, among other things, issuing policies on competition and oversight, conducting training for project officers and nonprofit organizations, and developing a new data system for grants management. However, these actions had mixed results because of the complexity of the problems, weaknesses in design and implementation, and insufficient management attention. Similarly, EPA’s new oversight policy should increase the agency’s monitoring of individual grantees, but it does not enable the agency to identify and address systemic problems. New Plan Focuses on the Four Major Management Challenges but Will Require Strengthening, Sustained Commitment, and Enhanced Accountability
According to EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Administration and Resources Management, the agency’s April 2003 5-year grants management plan is the most critical component of EPA’s efforts to improve its grants management. For example, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation conducts preaward desk reviews of some applicants to learn about the organization and assess its fiscal health. Conclusions
If EPA is to better achieve its environmental mission, it must more effectively manage its grants programs—which account for more than half of its annual budget. Furthermore, to strengthen EPA’s efforts we recommend incorporating appropriate statistical techniques in selecting grantees for requiring EPA staff to use a standard reporting format for in-depth reviews so that the results can be entered into the grant databases and analyzed agencywide; developing a plan, including modifications to the grantee compliance database, to use data from its various oversight efforts—in-depth reviews, significant actions, corrective actions taken, and other compliance information—to fully identify systemic problems, inform grants management officials of areas that need to be addressed, and take corrective action as needed; modifying its in-depth review protocols to include questions on the status of grantees’ progress in measuring and achieving environmental outcomes; incorporating accountability for grants management responsibilities through performance standards that address grants management for all managers and staff in headquarters and the regions responsible for grants management and holding managers and staff accountable for meeting these standards; and evaluating the promising practices identified in this report and implementing those that could potentially improve EPA grants management. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to determine the (1) major challenges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces in managing its grants and how it has addressed these challenges in the past, (2) extent to which EPA’s recently issued policies and grants management plan address these challenges, and (3) promising practices, if any, that could assist EPA in addressing these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has long faced problems managing its grants, which constitute over one-half of the agency's annual budget, or about $4 billion. EPA uses grants to implement its programs to protect human health and the environment and awards grants to thousands of recipients, including state and local governments, tribes, universities, and nonprofit organizations. EPA's ability to efficiently and effectively accomplish its mission largely depends on how well it manages its grant resources. As requested, GAO determined (1) major challenges EPA faces in managing its grants and how it has addressed these challenges in the past, (2) extent to which EPA's recently issued policies and grants management plan address these challenges, and (3) promising practices, if any, that could assist EPA in addressing these challenges.
What GAO Found
EPA continues to face four key management challenges, despite past efforts to address them. These challenges are (1) selecting the most qualified applicants, (2) effectively overseeing grantees, (3) measuring the results of grants, and (4) effectively managing grants staff and resources. In recent years, EPA has taken a series of actions to address these challenges by, among other things, issuing policies, conducting training, and developing a new data system for grants management. However, these past actions had mixed results because of the complexity of the problems, weaknesses in design and implementation, and insufficient management emphasis. EPA's 2002 competition and oversight policies and 2003 grants management plan focus on the major challenges GAO identified, but will require strengthening, enhanced accountability, and a sustained commitment to succeed. For example, EPA's new oversight policy mandates more in-depth monitoring of grantees but it does not build in a process for analyzing the results of the in-depth monitoring to address systemic grantee problems. Such analysis could better target EPA's oversight efforts. In addition, its 5-year grants management plan does offer, for the first time, a comprehensive road map with objectives, goals, and milestones for addressing grants management challenges. However, the plan does not completely address how EPA will hold all managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their management responsibilities. Therefore, EPA cannot ensure the sustained commitment required for the plan's success. Although information on promising grants management practices is limited, the federal agencies and other organizations GAO contacted identified some practices for each of EPA's four major challenges that may further assist EPA in improving its grants management. For example, one federal agency takes into account applicants' potential to achieve results when selecting grantees. A private foundation conducts preaward reviews of some applicants to learn about the organization and assess its fiscal health. In addition, GAO has developed a guide for federal agencies to use to hold managers and staff accountable for achieving desired agency results. This guide could be useful in helping EPA ensure accountability for grants management performance. |
gao_GAO-01-583T | gao_GAO-01-583T_0 | In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while information technology can help the government provide services more efficiently and at lower costs, many challenges must be overcome to increase the government’s ability to use the information resources at its disposal effectively, securely, and with the best service to the American people. A central focal point such as a federal CIO can serve in the essential role of ensuring that attention to information technology issues is sustained and improves the likelihood that progress is charted and achieved. Although our research has found that there is no one right way to establish a CIO position, critical success factors we found in leading organizations, such as aligning the position for value creation, are extremely important considerations. Finally, the experiences of statewide CIOs offer a rich set of experiences to draw on for ideas and innovation. As a result, it is critical that a federal CIO, as well as agency-level CIOs, develop effective working relationships with state CIOs to discuss and resolve policy, funding, and common systems and technical infrastructure issues. | What GAO Found
The rapid pace of technological change and innovation has offered unprecedented opportunities for both the government and commercial sectors to use information technology (IT) to improve performance, reduce costs, and enhance service. A range of issues have emerged about how to best manage and integrate complex information technologies and management processes so that they are aligned with mission goals, strategies, and objectives. Although IT can help the government provide services more efficiently and at lower costs, many challenges must be overcome to increase the government's ability to use the information resources at its disposal effectively, securely, and with the best service to the American people. A central focal point such as a federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) can help ensure that attention to IT issues is sustained and increase the likelihood that progress is charted and achieved. Although GAO's research has found that there is no one right way to establish a CIO position, critical success factors GAO found in leading organizations, such as aligning the position for value creation, are extremely important considerations. Finally, the experiences of statewide CIOs offer a rich set of experiences to draw on for ideas and innovation. A federal CIO, as well as agency-level CIOs, must develop effective working relationships with state CIOs to discuss and resolve policy, funding, and common systems and technical infrastructure issues. |
gao_GAO-05-623T | gao_GAO-05-623T_0 | A primary goal of the DTV transition is for the federal government to reclaim spectrum that broadcasters currently use to provide analog television signals. Most television stations throughout the country are now providing a digital broadcast signal in addition to their analog signal. For example, prior to implementing a subsidy program, various determinations need to be made, including (1) which federal entity will administer a subsidy program, (2) whether a rulemaking process is necessary to fully determine and stipulate how the subsidy program will be structured, (3) who will be eligible to receive a subsidy, (4) what equipment will be covered, (5) how information about the subsidy will be communicated to consumers and industry, and (6) what measures, if any, will be taken to limit fraud. Several stakeholders noted that any product that enables consumers to receive digital broadcast signals does the job of ensuring that there is no loss in television service when the transition occurs. A Successful Subsidy Program Will Require an Effective Information Campaign about the DTV Transition and Subsidy
To successfully implement a DTV subsidy program, eligible recipients will need to understand that a subsidy is available, how to obtain it, which equipment the subsidy can be used for, and where they can obtain the equipment. Following is a description of and stakeholders’ views on four DTV subsidy options: a refundable tax credit, government distribution of equipment, a voucher program, and a rebate program. As we noted above, we take no position on whether a subsidy should be implemented, or whether, if a subsidy program is established, it should be implemented in any particular way. Refundable Tax Credit Program: One method that could be used to administer a subsidy program for DTV equipment would be a refundable tax credit, administered as part of the federal individual income tax. For the DTV transition, the government could directly provide the necessary equipment to individuals, but we found there would be a number of challenges to implementing and administering such a program, and, based on discussions with state social service agencies, it appears that this would be an unwieldy way to administer a DTV subsidy. While a government distribution program would not require households to pay for equipment in advance of receiving the subsidy, which would be beneficial to low-income households, the program could present other challenges to those eligible to participate. Several Government Programs Have Employed Rebates or Vouchers to Provide Subsidies
We identified several government programs that have used or are using rebates or vouchers to subsidize consumers’ purchase of products. While aspects of these programs might provide insight into the establishment of a DTV subsidy, we found, overall, that the programs we reviewed differed in many respects from what might be undertaken for a DTV subsidy. In reviewing various other aspects of the programs, such as eligibility determinations and what products were subsidized, we found that differences existed between the voucher and rebate programs that might also provide some insight for a DTV subsidy. For example, for all of the voucher programs we reviewed, benefits were targeted to low-income individuals, and eligibility was specifically defined. We also found differences in the types of products subsidized for the rebate and voucher programs that we reviewed. Other Efforts Necessary for the Completion of the DTV Transition Are Ongoing
If a subsidy program is implemented, it will pose many challenges for the implementing agency and industry. However, there are other aspects of the DTV transition not related to the implementation of possible subsidy program that are ongoing and will take time to complete or may pose their own challenges. Another challenge that may be posed by the DTV transition relates to antenna reception of digital over-the-air broadcast signals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The digital television (DTV) transition offers the promise of enhanced television. At the end of the transition, radiofrequency spectrum currently used for analog broadcast television will be used for other wireless services and for critical public safety services. To spur the digital transition while preventing any loss of television service to households, some industry participants and experts have suggested that the government subsidize DTV equipment to enable households to view digital broadcast signals. This testimony provides information on (1) some challenges to administering a subsidy program for DTV equipment, (2) some administrative options for implementing a DTV subsidy, (3) examples of government programs that make use of rebates or vouchers to provide subsidies, and (4) other efforts necessary for the completion of the DTV transition. We discussed administrative challenges to and options for a DTV subsidy with federal and state government officials, electronics manufacturers and retailers, and experts in product promotion. As in our previous work, we take no position on whether a subsidy should be implemented or not, or whether, if a subsidy program is established, it should be implemented in any particular way. While policies other than a subsidy might help promote the DTV transition, any other such approaches were not part of this investigation.
What GAO Found
We found that several administrative challenges might arise in implementing a subsidy for DTV equipment. One of several key challenges we identified would be determining those eligible to receive a subsidy. If the subsidy were restricted to low-income households or to households that rely exclusively on over-the-air television, methods to identify these households would need to be developed and may prove to be challenging. Another key challenge would be ensuring that eligible recipients understand the availability of a subsidy, how they could obtain it, and what equipment would be subsidized. Effectively communicating this information will likely first require that information about the DTV transition itself is successfully communicated to the public. Several administrative options could be used to provide a government subsidy to help households obtain DTV equipment, including a refundable tax credit, government distribution of equipment, a voucher program, and a rebate program. The suitability of any of these methods depends on aspects of the subsidy's design, such as which entity is most appropriate to administer the subsidy and who would be eligible to receive the benefit. Various government programs make use of rebates or vouchers to subsidize consumers' purchase of products. We reviewed three rebate and three voucher programs that might provide insight for the development of a DTV subsidy and found that differences existed between these types of programs. We observed that eligibility for the voucher programs was specifically defined and the benefits were targeted to low-income individuals, whereas eligibility for the rebate programs was not based on income. Overall, however, we found these programs differed with respect to what might be undertaken for a DTV subsidy. In addition to the administrative challenges of a subsidy program, there are other aspects of the DTV transition that are ongoing and will take time to complete or may pose their own challenges. For example, the channel election process, which will determine each television station's channel placement for its digital signal, will not be final until sometime in 2007, according to the Federal Communications Commission. Another issue that might arise relates to antennas used to receive digital broadcast signals. Although many stakeholders believe that antennas used for analog reception will work well for digital signals, we were also told that reception of digital signals may vary on the basis of a household's geography and other factors. |
gao_GAO-08-707T | gao_GAO-08-707T_0 | In fiscal year 2007, GAO received over 1,200 requests for studies. GAO is requesting budget authority of $545.5 million to support a staff level of 3,251 FTEs needed to serve the Congress. This is a fiscally prudent request of 7.5 percent over our fiscal year 2008 funding level, as illustrated in table 2. Financial Benefits
GAO’s work in fiscal year 2007 generated $45.9 billion in financial benefits. These financial benefits, which resulted primarily from actions agencies and the Congress took in response to our recommendations, included about $21.1 billion resulting from changes to laws or regulations, $16.3 billion resulting from improvements to core business processes, and $8.5 billion resulting from agency actions based on our recommendations to improve public services. Other Improvements in Government
Many of the benefits that result from our work cannot be measured in dollar terms. During fiscal year 2007, we recorded a total of 1,354 other improvements in government resulting from GAO work. For example, in 646 instances federal agencies improved services to the public, in 634 other cases agencies improved core business processes or governmentwide reforms were advanced, and in 74 instances information we provided to the Congress resulted in statutory or regulatory changes. These actions spanned the full spectrum of national issues, from strengthened screening procedures for all VA health care practitioners to improved information security at the Securities and Exchange Commission. High Risk Series
In January 2007, we also issued our High-Risk Series: An Update, which identifies federal areas and programs at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and those in need of broad-based transformations. Issued to coincide with the start of each new Congress, our high-risk list focuses on major government programs and operations that need urgent attention. Overall, this program has served to help resolve a range of serious weaknesses that involve substantial resources and provide critical services to the public. GAO added the 2010 Census as a high-risk area in March 2008. Concluding Remarks
GAO’s achievements are of great service to the Congress and American taxpayers. With your support, we will be able to continue to provide the high level of performance that has come to be expected of GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
The budget authority GAO is requesting for fiscal year 2009--$545.5 million--represents a prudent request of 7.5 percent to support the Congress as it confronts a growing array of difficult challenges. GAO will continue to reward the confidence Congress places in us by providing a strong return on this investment. In fiscal year 2007 for example, in addition to delivering hundreds of reports and briefings to aid congressional oversight and decisionmaking, our work yielded: financial benefits, such as increased collection of delinquent taxes and civil fines, totaling $45.9 billion--a return of $94 for every dollar invested in GAO; over 1,300 other improvements in government operations spanning the full spectrum of national issues, ranging from helping Congress create a center to better locate children after disasters to strengthening computer security over sensitive government records and assets to encouraging more transparency over nursing home fire safety to strengthening screening procedures for VA health care practitioners; and expert testimony at 276 congressional hearings to help Congress address a variety of issues of broad national concern, such as the conflict in Iraq and efforts to ensure drug and food safety.
What GAO Found
GAO's work in fiscal year 2007 generated $45.9 billion in financial benefits. These financial benefits, which resulted primarily from actions agencies and the Congress took in response to our recommendations, included about $21.1 billion resulting from changes to laws or regulations, $16.3 billion resulting from improvements to core business processes, and $8.5 billion resulting from agency actions based on our recommendations to improve public services. Many of the benefits that result from our work cannot be measured in dollar terms. During fiscal year 2007, we recorded a total of 1,354 other improvements in government resulting from GAO work. For example, in 646 instances federal agencies improved services to the public, in 634 other cases agencies improved core business processes or governmentwide reforms were advanced, and in 74 instances information we provided to the Congress resulted in statutory or regulatory changes. These actions spanned the full spectrum of national issues, from strengthened screening procedures for all VA health care practitioners to improved information security at the Securities and Exchange Commission. In January 2007, we also issued our High-Risk Series: An Update, which identifies federal areas and programs at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and those in need of broad-based transformations. Issued to coincide with the start of each new Congress, our high-risk list focuses on major government programs and operations that need urgent attention. Overall, this program has served to help resolve a range of serious weaknesses that involve substantial resources and provide critical services to the public. GAO added the 2010 Census as a high-risk area in March 2008. GAO's achievements are of great service to the Congress and American taxpayers. With Congressional support, we will be able to continue to provide the high level of performance that has come to be expected of GAO. |
gao_GAO-07-567T | gao_GAO-07-567T_0 | Some Health Care Purchasers Use Physician Profiling Results to Encourage Efficient Medical Practice
Consistent with the premise that physicians play a central role in the generation of most health care expenditures, some health care purchasers employ physician profiling to promote efficiency. We selected 10 health care purchasers that profiled physicians in their networks—that is, compared physicians’ performance to an efficiency standard to identify those who practiced inefficiently. To measure efficiency, the purchasers we spoke with generally compared actual spending for physicians’ patients to the expected spending for those same patients, given their clinical and demographic characteristics. Most purchasers said they also evaluated physicians on quality. The purchasers linked their efficiency profiling results and other measures to a range of physician-focused strategies to encourage the efficient provision of care. Some of the purchasers said their profiling efforts produced savings. The methods they used generally computed efficiency measures as the ratio of actual to expected spending for patients of similar health status. Through Profiling, We Found That Physicians Likely to Practice Inefficiently in Medicare Were Present in All Selected Areas
Having considered the efforts of other health care purchasers in profiling physicians for efficiency, we conducted our own profiling analysis of physician practices in Medicare and found individual physicians who were likely to practice medicine inefficiently in each of 12 metropolitan areas studied. We focused our analysis on generalists—physicians who described their specialty as general practice, internal medicine, or family practice. We selected areas that were diverse geographically and in terms of Medicare spending per beneficiary. Based on 2003 Medicare claims data, our analysis found outlier generalist physicians in all 12 metropolitan areas we studied. CMS Has Tools Available to Profile Physicians for Efficiency
Medicare’s data-rich environment is conducive to identifying physicians who are likely to practice medicine inefficiently. CMS has the tools to make statistically valid comparisons, including comprehensive medical claims information, sufficient numbers of physicians in most areas to construct adequate sample sizes, and methods to adjust for differences in patient health status. For example, the health care purchasers we spoke with made choices about whether to profile individual physicians or group practices; which risk adjustment tool was best suited for a purchaser’s physician and enrollee population; whether to measure costs associated with episodes of care or the costs, within a specific time period, associated with the patients in a physician’s practice; and what criteria to use to identify inefficient practice patterns. A primary virtue of profiling is that, coupled with incentives to encourage efficiency, it can create a system that operates at the individual physician level. In this way, profiling can address a principal criticism of the SGR system, which only operates at the aggregate physician level. Although savings from physician profiling alone would clearly not be sufficient to correct Medicare’s long-term fiscal imbalance, it could be an important part of a package of reforms aimed at future program sustainability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare's current system of spending targets used to moderate spending growth for physician services and annually update physician fees is problematic. This spending target system--called the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system--adjusts physician fees based on the extent to which actual spending aligns with specified targets. In recent years, because spending has exceeded the targets, the system has called for fee cuts. Since 2003, the cuts have been averted through administrative or legislative action, thus postponing the budgetary consequences of excess spending. Under these circumstances, policymakers are seeking reforms that can help moderate spending growth while ensuring that beneficiaries have appropriate access to care. For today's hearing, the Subcommittee on Health, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which is exploring options for improving how Medicare pays physicians, asked GAO to share the preliminary results of its ongoing study related to this topic. GAO's statement addresses (1) approaches taken by other health care purchasers to address physicians' inefficient practice patterns, (2) GAO's efforts to estimate the prevalence of inefficient physicians in Medicare, and (3) the methodological tools available to identify inefficient practice patterns programwide. GAO ensured the reliability of the claims data used in this report by performing appropriate electronic data checks and by interviewing agency officials who were knowledgeable about the data.
What GAO Found
Consistent with the premise that physicians play a central role in the generation of health care expenditures, some health care purchasers examine the practice patterns of physicians in their network to promote efficiency. GAO selected 10 health care purchasers for review because they assess physicians' performance against an efficiency standard. To measure efficiency, the purchasers we spoke with generally compared actual spending for physicians' patients to the expected spending for those same patients, given their clinical and demographic characteristics. Most purchasers said they also evaluated physicians on quality. The purchasers linked their efficiency analysis results and other measures to a range of strategies--from steering patients toward the most efficient providers to excluding a physician from the purchaser's provider network because of poor performance. Some of the purchasers said these efforts produced savings. Having considered the efforts of other health care purchasers in evaluating physicians for efficiency, GAO conducted its own analysis of physician practices in Medicare. GAO used the term efficiency to mean providing and ordering a level of services that is sufficient to meet patients' health care needs but not excessive, given a patient's health status. GAO focused the analysis on generalists--physicians who described their specialty as general practice, internal medicine, or family practice--and selected metropolitan areas that were diverse geographically and in terms of Medicare spending per beneficiary. GAO found that individual physicians who were likely to practice medicine inefficiently were present in each of 12 metropolitan areas studied. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare, also has the tools to identify physicians who are likely to practice medicine inefficiently. Specifically, CMS has at its disposal comprehensive medical claims information, sufficient numbers of physicians in most areas to construct adequate sample sizes, and methods to adjust for differences in beneficiary health status. A primary virtue of examining physician practices for efficiency is that the information can be coupled with incentives that operate at the individual physician level, in contrast with the SGR system, which operates at the aggregate physician level. Efforts to improve physician efficiency would not, by themselves, be sufficient to correct Medicare's long-term fiscal imbalance, but such efforts could be an important part of a package of reforms aimed at future program sustainability. |
gao_GGD-95-18 | gao_GGD-95-18_0 | To identify the management practices that managers of public and private fleets considered essential to cost-efficient fleet management, we conducted interviews at two levels. However, the PCMI’s Task Force on Federal Motor Vehicle Fleet Management found that federal agencies faced obstacles to managing a cost-efficient fleet and complying with COBRA requirements. Unpredictable funding and restrictive agency solicitations limited agencies’ ability to select a more cost-efficient alternative for managing and replacing their fleets. As recommended by the task force, in 1993 OMB issued uniform guidance—(1) minimum quality standards, (2) a cost-comparison handbook, and (3) a cost accounting guide—for conducting cost-comparison studies. These practices were conducting utilization assessments to determine the right size of the fleet and to establish a baseline for fleet operations; having information and supporting management information systems to enable managers to make sound decisions and assess performance; comparing, or benchmarking, the cost and performance of a fleet with those of the best fleets; funding the fleet through a revolving fund; and centralizing fleet management responsibilities to (1) establish written policies, procedures, and other guidance; and (2) identify opportunities for improving fleet cost-efficiency. Since COBRA was enacted, most federal agencies have continued to operate their fleets without considering other alternatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the federal government's management of its motor vehicle fleet, focusing on: (1) obstacles to achieving cost-efficient fleet management; and (2) public and private fleet management practices that might be applicable to the federal fleet.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) obstacles to cost-efficient federal fleet management include the lack of uniform guidance for conducting valid cost-comparison studies, insufficient vehicle information, unpredictable funding, and restrictive agency solicitations that limit private-sector competition; (2) in 1993, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued uniform guidance for conducting valid cost-comparison studies in response to a task force recommendation; (3) most federal agencies continue to operate their fleets without complying with statutory requirements for cost-efficiency; (4) improving fleet management requires a cost-conscious culture; and (5) essential management practices for cost-effective fleet operation include assessing vehicle utilization to determine the appropriate size of the fleet, establishing a fleet operation baseline, having needed information and supporting management information systems to assess performance, comparing costs and performance with the best fleets, funding the fleet through a revolving fund, and centralizing fleet management responsibilities. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-266 | gao_T-AIMD-98-266_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to the Public Is High
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Nevertheless, overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant. Unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time. In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress. Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains. First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established. These governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences. Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. Third, OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified. In fact, we have found cases in which agencies’ systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined. State and Local Governments Face Significant Year 2000 Risks
State and local governments also face a major risk of Year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services—such as benefits payments, transportation, and public safety—that they provide. Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed. In May 1998, the Texas project office stated that it was “cautiously optimistic that most Mission Critical functions will not be disrupted by the Year 2000 problem.” However, the project office added that “this does not mean that agencies and universities will complete their projects on time and on budget.” The project office reported that 3 priority agencies were “on target,” 12 priority agencies were in the “watch” category, and 4 priority agencies “at risk.”
The Texas Year 2000 Project Office has also issued a business contingency planning guide to its agencies and universities, and directed that agencies and universities meet certain milestones related to business contingency planning. At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1) GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues; and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40 percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6) unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10) governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's assessment of the status of federal year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16) end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined; (17) state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant. |
gao_GAO-07-910T | gao_GAO-07-910T_0 | This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to 5 years. NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain to Be Completed
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks remain to be done. Specifically, the program office has established interim program plans guiding the contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 2007 and has made progress in implementing these plans. As of June 2007, these approvals are over 9 months past due. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure—including establishing a new organizational framework with increased oversight by program executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. In March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer 2007 as part of this executive’s natural career progression. Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks Remain
Major segments of the NPOESS program—the space segment and ground systems segment—are under development; however, significant problems have occurred and risks remain. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to higher final program costs. We also made two additional recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining how the program handles the three different agencies’ administrative procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately filling needed positions. In summary, NPOESS restructuring is well under way, and the program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure. Additionally, the program office continues to have difficulty filling key positions and lacks a programwide staffing process. In addition, the likelihood exists that there will be further cost increases and schedule delays because of technical problems on key sensors and pending contract negotiations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--which experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing its complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to summarize a report being released today that (1) assesses progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluates progress in establishing an effective management structure, and (3) identifies the status and key risks on the program's major segments.
What GAO Found
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans guiding contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however, important tasks remain to be done. Executive approvals of key acquisition documents are about 9 months late--due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies' approval processes. Delays in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline. The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the program's risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. As of June 2007, key positions remain to be filled. Development and testing of major NPOESS segments--including key sensors and ground systems--are under way, but significant risks remain. For example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them--the visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the cross-track infrared sounder--experienced significant problems and are considered high risk. Continued sensor problems could cause further cost increases and schedule delays. Additionally, while progress has been made in reducing delays in the data processing system, work remains in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into usable weather products. Given the tight time frames for completing this work, it will be important for program officials and executives to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks. |
gao_GAO-03-717T | gao_GAO-03-717T_0 | NSPS is intended to be a major component of DOD’s efforts to more strategically manage its workforce and respond to current and emerging challenges. As a result, from a conceptual standpoint, we strongly support the need to expand broad banding approaches and pay for performance-based systems in the federal government. However, moving too quickly or prematurely at DOD or elsewhere can significantly raise the risk of doing it wrong. This could also serve to severely set back the legitimate need to move to a more performance and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. Thus, while it is imperative that we take steps to better link employee pay to performance across the federal government, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the difference in whether or not such efforts are successful. In our view, one key need is to modernize performance management systems in executive agencies so that they are capable of adequately supporting more performance-based pay and other personnel decisions. Unfortunately, based on GAO’s past work, most existing federal performance appraisal systems, including a vast majority of DOD’s systems, are not designed to support a meaningful performance-based pay system. This approach would serve as a positive step to promote high-performing organizations throughout the federal government while avoiding fragmentation within the executive branch in the critical human capital area. To underscore the importance that Congress places on employee involvement in the development and implementation of NSPS, Congress should consider including similar language as that found in the Homeland Security Act. Concluding Observations
In summary, DOD’s civilian human capital proposals raise several critical questions. Does DOD have the institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of the new authorities? This institutional infrastructure includes, at a minimum, a human capital planning process that integrates the agency’s human capital policies, strategies, and programs with its program goals and mission, and desired outcomes; the capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital system; and a set of adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair, effective, and credible implementation and application of a new system. Many of the basic principles underlying DOD’s civilian human capital proposals have merit and deserve the serious consideration they are receiving here today and will no doubt be received by others in the coming weeks and months. However, the same critical questions should be posed to the DOD proposal. Should DOD and/or other federal agencies be granted broad-based exemptions from existing law, and if so, on what basis? In our view, Congress should consider providing governmentwide broad banding and pay for performance authorities that DOD and other federal agencies can use provided they can demonstrate that they have a performance management system in place that meets certain statutory standards, which can be certified to by a qualified and independent party, such as OPM. Congress should also consider establishing a governmentwide fund whereby agencies, based on a sound business case, could apply for funds to modernize their performance management systems and ensure that those systems have adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is in the midst of a major transformation effort including a number of initiatives to transform its forces and improve its business operations. DOD's legislative initiative would provide for major changes in the civiliean and military human capital management, make major adjustments in the DOD acquisition process, affect DOD's organization structure, and change DOD's reporting requirements to Congress, among other things. DOD's proposed National Security Personnel System (NSPS) would provide for wide-ranging changes in DOD's civilian personnel pay and performance management, collective bargaining, rightsizing, and a variety of other human capital areas. The NSPS would enable DOD to develop and implement a consistent DOD-wide civilian personnel system. This testimony provides GAO's preliminary observations on aspects of DOD's legislative proposal to make changes to its civilian personnel system and poses critical questions that need to be considered.
What GAO Found
Many of the basic principles underlying DOD's civilian human capital proposals have merit and deserve serious consideration. The federal personnel system is clearly broken in critical respects--designed for a time and workforce of an earlier era and not able to meet the needs and challenges of our current rapidly changing and knowledge-based environment. DOD's proposal recognizes that as GAO has stated and the experiences of leading public sector organizations here and abroad have found strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious government transformation effort. More generally, from a conceptual standpoint, GAO strongly supports the need to expand broad banding and pay for performance-based systems in the federal government. However, moving to quickly or prematurely at DOD or elsewhere, can significantly raise the risk of doing it wrong. This could also serve to severely set back the legitimate need to move to a more performance and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. Thus, while it is imperative that we take steps to better link employee pay and other personnel decisions to performance across the the federal government, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done, can make all the difference in whether or not we are successful. In our view, one key need is to modernize performance management systems in executive agencies so that they are capable of supporting more performance-based pay and other personnel decisions. Unfortunately, based on GAO's past work, most existing federal performance appraisal systems, including a vast majority of DOD's systems, are not currently designed to support a meaningful performance-based pay system. The critical questions to consider are: should DOD and/or other agencies be granted broad-based exemptions from existing law, and if so, on what bas; and whether they have the institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of the new authorities. This institutional infrastructure includes, at a minimum, a human capital planning process that integrates the agency's human capital policies, strategies, and programs with its program goals and mission, and desired outcomes; the capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital system; and, importantly, a set of adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair, effective, and credible implementation of a new system. In our view, Congress should consider providing governmentwide broad banding and pay for performance authorities that DOD and other federal agencies can use provided they can demonstrate that they have a performance management system in place that meets certain statutory standards, which can be certified to by a qualified and independent party, such as OPM, within prescribed timeframes. Congress should also consider establishing a governmentwide fund whereby agencies, based on a sound business case, could apply for funding to modernize their performance management systems and ensure that those systems have adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. This approach would serve as a positive step to promote high-performing organizations throughout the federal government while avoiding fragmentation within the executive branch in the critical human capital area. |
gao_GAO-08-558 | gao_GAO-08-558_0 | Because issuing banks incur costs to issue cards to consumers, the interchange fee helps to allocate these costs among the parties involved in card transactions. The merchant discount fees charged on American Express and Discover transactions are, however, set to cover some of the same types of costs that merchant discount fees (which include interchange fees) cover for Visa and MasterCard transactions. Federal Entities Are Taking Steps to Control Costs while Realizing the Benefits Associated with Accepting Credit and Debit Cards
Federal entities realize benefits from accepting credit and debit cards, including increased customer satisfaction, fewer bad checks and cash thefts, and improved operational efficiency. Some entities also stated that the ability to accept cards has increased their sales volume. Data on revenues collected by FMS, which processes the card transactions for a large number of federal executive, legislative, and judicial branch agencies and other federal entities, show that while credit and debit card transactions accounted for only 0.23 percent of the total federal government revenues FMS collected in fiscal year 2007, its card collections have grown by almost 28 percent in just 2 years—from approximately $5.5 billion in fiscal year 2005 to almost $7.1 billion in fiscal year 2007 (in current dollars). As card revenues and merchant discount fees increased for these three entities, so did the interchange fees they paid. Both Visa and MasterCard have a merchant category for federal entities, and the interchange rates for the transactions of merchants in these categories are lower than those for many other merchant categories. Federal Entities Have Attempted to Negotiate Lower Fees
Another way in which federal entities have acted to reduce card acceptance costs is by negotiating with their acquiring banks for lower merchant discount rates or with card networks for lower interchange rates. FMS Has Begun a Program to Identify Cost Savings Opportunities, but Has Yet to Develop a Full Implementation Strategy
In addition to looking for opportunities to reduce card acceptance costs, FMS has initiated a program to review the overall cash management practices of federal entities. Since that time rates have declined. Limited Information on the Effects of Interchange Rate Intervention Suggests Some Benefit to Merchants and a Mixed Picture for Consumers
In the three countries we examined, incomplete information is available on the impact of actions to reduce interchange rates, but available data indicate that merchants appear to have benefited, while the impact on consumers has been mixed. Federal entities pay no direct costs for the general use of cards. In fiscal year 2007, federal entities used cards to purchase more than $27 billion of goods and services. Officials from several entities also told us that cards allow them to make purchases more quickly and/or more conveniently than previously used methods of purchasing. In collecting over $27 billion in revenue via cards in 2007, the transactions of federal entities included within the scope of this report resulted in more than $430 million in merchant discount fees, including at least $205 million in interchange fees (paid by entities that provided us with data specifically on interchange fees). Further adding to the difficulty of estimating the potential effects of such actions in the United States, are differences in the structure and regulation of the U.S. card payment market from those of the other countries we examined. In addition to increased efficiency in administrative processes and cost savings, in fiscal year 2007 card use also produced about $175 million in additional operating funds through the rebates provided by the banks that issue government cards. Such a strategy should include a timeline for completing the reviews, cost savings estimates associated with individual reviews, and an assessment of the adequacy of the resources committed to the program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the benefits and costs, including interchange fees, associated with federal entities’ acceptance of cards as payment for the sale of goods, services, and revenue collection; (2) actions taken in countries that have regulated or otherwise limited interchange fees and their impact; and (3) the impact on federal entities of using cards to make purchases. We reviewed data for these entities as well. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal entities--agencies, corporations, and others--are growing users of credit and debit cards, as both "merchants" (receiving payments) and purchasers. Merchants accepting cards incur fees--called merchant discount fees--paid to banks to process the transactions. For Visa and MasterCard transactions, a large portion of these fees-- referred to as interchange--goes to the card-issuing banks. Some countries have acted to limit these fees. GAO was asked to examine (1) the benefits and costs associated with federal entities' acceptance of cards, (2) the effects of other countries' actions to limit interchange fees, and (3) the impact on federal entities of using cards to make purchases. Among other things, GAO analyzed fee data and information on the impact of accepting and using cards from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the General Services Administration, reviewed literature, and interviewed officials of major card companies and three foreign governments.
What GAO Found
By accepting cards, federal entities realize benefits, including more satisfied customers, fewer bad checks and cash thefts, and improved operational efficiency. In fiscal year 2007, federal entities accepted cards for over $27 billion in revenues and paid at least $433 million in associated merchant discount fees. For those able to separately identify interchange costs, these entities collected $18.6 billion in card revenues and paid $205 million in interchange fees. Federal entities are taking steps to control card acceptance costs, including reviewing transactions to ensure that the lowest interchange rates--which can vary by merchant category, type of card used, and other factors--are assessed. While the Visa and MasterCard card networks have established lower interchange rates for many government transactions, some federal entities have attempted to negotiate lower ones, with mixed success. To identify savings from cards and other collection mechanisms, Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS)--which handles revenues and pays merchant discount fees for many federal entities--initiated a program in 2007 to review each entity's overall revenue collections. FMS has identified potential efficiency and cost saving improvements at the eight entities it has reviewed thus far, but has yet to develop a full implementation strategy-- including a timeline for completing all reviews, cost savings estimates, and resource assessment--that could help expeditiously achieve program goals. Several countries have taken steps to lower interchange rates, but information on their effects is limited. Among the three countries GAO examined, regulators in Australia and Israel intervened directly to establish limits on interchange rates, while Mexico's banking association voluntarily lowered some rates. Since Australia's regulators acted in 2003, total merchant discount fees paid by merchants have declined, but no conclusive evidence exists that lower interchange fees led merchants to reduce retail prices for goods; further, some costs for card users, such as annual and other fees, have increased. Few data exist on the impact of the actions taken in Mexico (beginning in 2004) and Israel (beginning in the late 1990s). Because of the limited data on effects, and because the structure and regulation of credit and debit card markets in these countries differ from those in the United States, estimating the impact of taking similar actions in the United States is difficult. Federal officials cited various benefits from card use--which totaled more than $27 billion in fiscal year 2007, a 51 percent increase since fiscal year 1999 after adjusting for inflation--including the ability to make purchases more quickly and with lower administrative costs than with previously used purchasing methods. The banks that issue cards to federal entities also rebate a small percentage of their card purchase amounts; these rebates totaled $175 million in fiscal year 2007. Preventing inappropriate card use poses challenges, and GAO and others have identified inadequate controls over various agencies' card programs. However, tools and data provided by the issuing banks now allow entities to review transactions more quickly, increasing their ability to detect suspicious transactions. |
gao_GAO-03-976 | gao_GAO-03-976_0 | Species that are federally listed are entitled to certain protections under the Endangered Species Act. Fish and Wildlife Service has been using these management plans in lieu of designating critical habitat on military lands. Despite Some Positive Examples, Cooperative Management for Endangered Species Affecting Military Training Ranges Is Limited
Notwithstanding some positive efforts to implement regional interagency cooperative efforts, the extent to which DOD and other federal land managers are managing cooperatively for endangered species affecting military training ranges is limited. Recognizing the benefits of cooperatively managing natural resources, the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture have issued policies, and DOD has issued directives, instructions, and an action plan to promote such efforts. In addition, these departments have entered into memorandums of understanding that contain specific actions to be taken to implement cooperative management—such as forming interagency working groups, identifying geographic regions for species management, and identifying reporting requirements—but many of these actions were never fully implemented. According to a DOD official, this was in response to two legislative proposals that could have reduced the scope and authority of the act. Such crises can include a marked decline of a species’ population or land-use restrictions that may impact the federal land managers’ ability to carry out their missions. Factors Limiting Cooperative Management for Endangered Species
The Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture have identified a number of factors that can limit interagency cooperative management for endangered species affecting military training ranges. Lack of a Shared Crisis among Federal Land Managers Hinders Cooperative Management
When there is not a shared crisis among federal land managers, such as when a species does not exist on each other’s land or is not federally listed, federal land managers do not always consider management of the species a high priority. However, Congress currently has no such mechanism available to monitor interagency efforts to cooperatively manage endangered species on a regional basis. Given that federal agencies have made little progress in implementing the various agreements for cooperative management, an interagency reporting requirement to Congress would provide the basis to hold the agencies accountable for making progress on sharing the management for endangered species affecting military training ranges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To encourage cooperative management for endangered species affecting military training ranges, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture jointly (1) develop and implement an interagency strategy that includes a systematic methodology to identify opportunities for cooperative management efforts, funding sources, science and technology sources, and goals and criteria to measure success; (2) develop a comprehensive training program for federal land managers, to include senior executives, regional, and on-site staff to identify and implement opportunities for interagency cooperation; and (3) create a centralized or easily accessible source of information on cooperative management efforts that includes elements such as lessons learned, best practices, and agency contacts for federal land managers. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To hold DOD and other federal land managers accountable for implementing regional interagency cooperative efforts for managing endangered species affecting military training ranges, Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretaries of Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture to jointly report each year on their efforts to manage cooperatively for endangered species affecting military training ranges and share the burden of land use restrictions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Military lands provide habitat for more than 300 species that must be protected under the Endangered Species Act and many other species that may become endangered. In some cases, military installations provide some of the finest remaining habitat for these species. However, Department of Defense (DOD) officials stated that protection of endangered species may result in land-use restrictions that reduce the military's flexibility to use land for training. GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent to which DOD and other nearby federal land managers in the region are managing cooperatively for endangered species affecting military training ranges and (2) factors that can limit cooperative management for endangered species on military training ranges.
What GAO Found
DOD and other federal land managers have taken some steps to implement interagency cooperative efforts to manage endangered species on a regional basis, but the extent to which they are using this approach for military training ranges is limited. Federal land managers recognize that cooperative management of endangered species has several benefits, such as sharing land-use restrictions and resources and providing better protection for species in some cases. The Departments of the Interior and Agriculture have issued policies, and DOD has issued directives to promote cooperative management of natural resources. They have also outlined specific actions to be taken--such as identifying geographic regions for species management and forming working groups. However, follow-through on these actions has been limited, without many of the prescribed actions being implemented. A few cooperative management efforts have been taken but were generally in response to a crisis--such as a species' population declining. The Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture have identified a number of factors that can limit cooperative management for endangered species on military training ranges. When a species is found on training ranges but is not found on other federal land or is not protected under the Endangered Species Act, neighboring land managers do not always consider management of the species a high priority. Limited interaction among agencies and limited resources to employ cooperative programs also inhibit cooperative management. Lack of training and expertise has limited federal land managers' ability to identify such opportunities. Moreover, federal agencies cannot easily share information--such as best practices and land management plans--because there is no centralized source of such information. Given that federal agencies have made little progress in implementing the various agreements for cooperative management, an interagency reporting requirement would provide a basis to hold agencies accountable for sharing endangered species management on training ranges. |
gao_GAO-15-260 | gao_GAO-15-260_0 | Commerce OIG’s Budget and Staff Resources and Reported Monetary Accomplishments for Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013
Commerce OIG’s Budget and Staff Resources
The Commerce OIG had total budgetary resources of approximately $41 million in fiscal year 2013. Also, while five of these other OIGs had a decline in total budgetary resources equal to or greater than that of the Commerce OIG, the Commerce OIG’s decline was greater than the 6 percent average decline for all other cabinet-level OIGs during the 3-year period. Commerce OIG’s Reported Monetary Accomplishments
The Commerce OIG reported approximately $543 million in monetary accomplishments from audits, evaluations, and investigations during fiscal years 2011 through 2013. While the Commerce OIG’s return was within the range of the lowest and highest returns for all other OIGs for each fiscal year, its average return on each budget dollar of $4.18 over the 3-year period was less than the average of $22.64 for the other OIGs. Commerce OIG Focused on Large Programs but Lacked Audit Coverage of Important Smaller Programs
During the 3-year period we reviewed, OAE issued 90 reports including mandatory audits, performance audits, evaluations, and memorandums, intended to provide oversight of Commerce’s 13 major bureaus and offices identified in the OIG’s semiannual reports.reports issued, or 93 percent, were directed to four bureaus and offices, and to department-wide issues managed by the Office of the Secretary. However, the OIG did not conduct audits in the high-risk areas of managing federal real property and ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security interests during the 3-year period. The Commerce OIG did not provide audit coverage of this high-risk area during the 3-year period we reviewed, but as a result of a congressional request, the OIG completed an audit of the Bureau of Industry and Security’s licensing of exports related to these programs in September 2014. The Commerce OIG’s Hotline Policies and Procedures Were Generally Consistent with Recommended Practices but Were Not Always Followed
The Commerce OIG’s hotline policies and procedures were generally consistent with recommended hotline practices provided through CIGIE. However, our testing of a random sample of OIG hotline cases from fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013 identified numerous instances in which OIG staff did not follow the OIG’s formal hotline policies and procedures that we selected for review. The Commerce OIG followed much of the OPM guidance to address the 2012 FEVS results but lacked an action plan with measures of success. In addition, the OIG’s audit plans did not fully consider all GAO high-risk areas applicable to Commerce, which resulted in areas that were not subject to audit. However, the OIG did not develop an action plan with measures of success to reasonably assure that employee concerns are effectively addressed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide increased performance audit coverage of Commerce’s bureaus and offices, the Commerce IG should augment the OIG’s risk- based audit planning process to consider (1) a rotation of performance audit coverage among the smaller bureaus and offices to help ensure that the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their programs are periodically reviewed and (2) all applicable high-risk areas identified by GAO. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Commerce IG for comment. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To provide information on the budget, staff resources, and accomplishments of the Department of Commerce (Commerce) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the other cabinet-level OIGs, we obtained access to the Office of Management and Budget database of budget information for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 for comparison among these OIGs. To review the effectiveness of the Commerce OIG in addressing complaints and allegations of wrongdoing received by its hotline during fiscal years 2011 through 2013, we compared the OIG’s policies and procedures with recommended hotline practices provided through the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. To review the Commerce OIG’s effectiveness in addressing issues identified by the OIG and based on its employees’ responses to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), we obtained the Commerce OIG survey responses to the 71 questions from OPM for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 that addressed the employees’ work experience, work unit, agency, supervisors, leadership, and satisfaction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congressional committees and Commerce leaders rely on the OIG to provide oversight of the agency's wide range of responsibilities. GAO was asked to review the effectiveness of the Commerce OIG's oversight. GAO's objectives were to provide information on the Commerce OIG's budgets, staffing, and accomplishments, and to review the OIG's effectiveness in providing audit coverage, addressing hotline complaints, and addressing employee concerns identified in OPM's annual FEVS.
For fiscal years 2011 through 2013, GAO identified the budget and staff resources of the Commerce OIG and other cabinet-level OIGs and their reported accomplishments for comparison; reviewed the Commerce OIG's audit coverage of bureaus and offices, management challenges, and high-risk areas; compared the OIG's hotline policies with hotline guidance provided through CIGIE; and tested a random sample of hotline complaints. GAO also reviewed the OIG's efforts to address employee concerns from the 2012 FEVS results.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) Office of Inspector General (OIG) experienced reductions in total budgetary resources from about $47 million to about $41 million, or almost 13 percent, compared to the average reduction of about 6 percent for all other cabinet-level OIGs. The Commerce OIG had a decline of full-time equivalent staff from 171 to 137, or about 20 percent, which was a greater decline than the average decline of about 5 percent for the other OIGs. The Commerce OIG reported approximately $543 million in monetary accomplishments from audits, evaluations, and investigations for the period. Differences in missions and programs of the cabinet-level departments and agencies result in varied opportunities for OIGs to provide monetary accomplishments. While the Commerce OIG's return on each budget dollar was within the range of the lowest and highest returns for all other OIGs for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, its average return of $4.18 over the 3-year period was less than the average return of about $22.64 for the other cabinet-level OIGs.
During this period of constrained resources, the Commerce OIG conducted mandatory audits that covered all bureaus and offices and provided performance audit coverage of Commerce's largest bureaus and offices. It also audited areas identified by the OIG as management challenges. However, the OIG did not conduct performance audits of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs specific to Commerce's smaller bureaus and offices, which had combined fiscal year 2013 total budgetary resources of approximately $2.4 billion, during the 3-year period. In addition, the OIG did not conduct audits over the 3-year period of two areas on GAO's high-risk list relevant to Commerce: (1) managing federal real property and (2) ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security interests. The OIG's risk-based audit planning contributed to gaps in audit coverage as the office did not provide periodic performance audit coverage of Commerce's smaller programs on a rotational basis and did not fully consider all GAO high-risk areas.
The Commerce OIG's hotline policies and procedures were generally consistent with recommended hotline practices of other OIGs provided through the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). However, through a review of a random sample of OIG hotline cases from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, GAO identified numerous instances where the OIG did not follow one or more of its own hotline policies and procedures regarding the processing, disposition, and timeliness of hotline cases. The OIG could not reasonably ensure that its hotline policies and procedures were consistently followed because of a lack of ongoing monitoring of its internal control activities.
The Commerce OIG's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) results for 2013 and 2014 improved after OIG efforts to address the poor 2012 FEVS results, but responses to specific survey questions remain lower than the government-wide average. The OIG's efforts followed much of the guidance issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to address FEVS results, but they did not include an action plan with measures of success.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the IG (1) augment the OIG's audit planning to consider a rotation of performance audit coverage among smaller Commerce programs, and applicable GAO high-risk areas; (2) include monitoring of internal controls for the OIG's hotline operations; and (3) develop an action plan with measures of success to address FEVS results.
In commenting on a draft of the report, the Commerce IG concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-736 | gao_GAO-05-736_0 | Background
Share-in-savings contracts fall under the umbrella of performance-based contracting, in which a federal agency specifies the outcome or result it desires and lets the contractor decide how best to achieve the desired outcome. Because of the increased financial risk a contractor assumes, a contractor can earn a greater return with a share-in- savings contract compared to the return on a traditional contract. In December 2004, the OMB reported that no contracts for information technology projects had been awarded. OMB officials indicated, however, that implementing regulations and share-in-savings guidance would be completed in the near future. GSA established a share-in-savings program office in February 2003, and in July of that year launched two Web-based tools to help agencies identify and evaluate share-in-savings opportunities. The Business Case Decision Tool is designed to assist agencies in developing business cases on the basis of realistic baseline costs to ensure that use of share-in-savings contracts would be cost- effective. As of March 2005, various agencies have used the tool to conduct 219 analyses, resulting in the identification of 15 information technology projects as potential share-in-savings candidates. Finally, in July 2004, GSA established blanket purchase agreements with six contractors; each of which is a major information technology solution provider with commercial share-in-savings contracting experience. Use of Share-in- Savings Authority Hindered by Issues Related to Regulations, Baseline Costs, Up-front Funding, and Training
Officials from 11 agencies cited several reasons the share-in-savings contracting authority for information technology has not led to the award of share-in-savings contracts. Reasons include a lack of final implementing regulations and OMB guidance on how to budget and account for retained savings and the difficulty of determining baseline costs. Officials also said that too few acquisition personnel have been trained to use this innovative contracting technique. Appropriations Still Necessary
Another reason, according to officials, agencies may not have used share- in-savings contracting to acquire information technology solutions is that the E-Government Act requires funds to be available for the first year of the contract. However, few acquisition personnel have been trained on when and how to use share-in-savings contracting. As of March 21, 2005, only 21 federal acquisition employees had received share-in-savings training from GSA’s share-in-savings training contractor. Conclusions
With only a few months remaining before authority for the initiative is due to expire, no federal agencies have used the share-in-savings authority provided by the E-Government Act to award contracts. As a result, the act’s authority has not actually been tested. Since OMB expects the implementing regulations and share-in-savings guidance to be issued soon, at least some of the reasons agencies cited for not using the share-in-savings contracting authority for information technology soon could be addressed. Although it is too early to know whether or not other reasons can be overcome, the issuance of implementing regulations and OMB guidance may soon create better conditions under which to test the share-in-savings initiative. The agencies we obtained information from as to why they opted not to use the E-Government Act’s share-in-savings contracting authority are the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Defense Commissary Agency in the Department of Defense; the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Interior, and Justice; GSA; the Internal Revenue Service; and the Office of Personnel Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies spend billions of dollars every year on information technology and are increasingly using performance-based contracting methods where agencies specify desired outcomes and allow contractors to design the best solutions to achieve those outcomes. Share-in-savings contracting is one such method under which a contractor provides funding for a project, and the agency compensates the contractor from any savings derived as a result of contract performance. The E-Government Act of 2002 authorized the use of share-in-savings contracting for information technology and required implementing regulations by mid-September 2003. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported in December 2004 that no share-in-savings contracts had been awarded. The act's authority expires in September 2005. The act required GAO to assess the effectiveness of share-in-savings contracts. Because no such contracts have been awarded, GAO cannot provide an assessment. Instead, GAO reviewed the status of regulations and tools available to agencies in developing these contracts and identified the reasons agencies have not used the authority provided by the act. OMB and the General Services Administration (GSA) generally agreed with GAO's report.
What GAO Found
More than 2 years after enactment of the E-Government Act of 2002, implementing regulations and OMB guidance for using share-in-savings contracts for information technology have yet to be issued. OMB officials indicate, however, that implementing regulations and share-in-savings guidance will be issued in the near future. GSA--which the act holds responsible for helping agencies identify share-in-savings opportunities, among other requirements--established a share-in-savings program office in February 2003. A few months later, GSA launched two Web-based tools, one of which is designed to assist agencies in identifying cost-effective uses for the share-in-savings approach and producing business cases for using share-in-savings for information technology projects. As of March 2005, this tool had been used more than 200 times. A total of 15 business cases were deemed potential share-in-savings candidates, however, none of these resulted in a contract award. GSA hired a contractor that developed a 2-day training course for share-in-savings contracting, but only 21 federal acquisition employees have taken the course. And even though GSA prequalified six contractors as viable information technology system solution providers with commercial share-in-savings experience, no agencies have taken advantage of these opportunities to award a share-in-savings contract. Officials from 11 agencies cited a number of reasons that the share-in-savings initiative has not resulted in the award of contracts for information technology projects. Reasons include lack of implementing regulations; difficulty determining baseline costs; a belief that the return on investment using share-in-savings contracts is insufficient; concerns among agency officials that they still would have to obtain funding for cancellation and termination liability, which can be a significant sum; and too few acquisition employees have been trained to use the share-in-savings contracting technique. Since OMB expects the implementing regulations and share-in-savings guidance to be issued soon, at least some of the reasons agencies cited for not using the share-in-savings contracting authority for information technology soon could be addressed. Whether or not other reasons can be overcome may not be known until the authority is tested. |
gao_GAO-12-347 | gao_GAO-12-347_0 | DOE’s Reform Effort Streamlined Directives, but Views on the Revisions Were Not Sought from the Public or Federal Agencies Other than the Safety Board
Under its reform effort, DOE reduced the number of safety directives by eliminating or combining, among other things, requirements it determined were unclear, duplicative, or too prescriptive; allowing contractors additional flexibility; and encouraging the use of industry standards. DOE Revised Its Safety Directives to Reduce Duplication, Allow Contractors Additional Flexibility, and Encourage the Use of Industry Standards
In total, under its reform effort, DOE reduced the number of its safety directives from 80 to 42. In its quality assurance directive, for example, DOE deleted 61 of 245 requirements for a corrective action program because it determined that the requirements were adequately addressed in revisions to other directives on oversight practices. DOE Obtained Views on Proposed Changes from DOE and Contractor Staff and from the Safety Board, but Did Not Seek the Views of the Public or Other Federal Agencies
As part of its process to revise its directives, DOE obtained comments from federal and contractor officials on proposed revisions. Benefits of DOE’s Reform Effort Are Unclear
Under its reform effort, DOE intended to enhance productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety, but it is unclear whether its effort will achieve these benefits, or whether the benefits will outweigh the costs to implement the reform. For example, DOE did not determine how the original requirements contained in safety directives impaired productivity or added costs before undertaking the reform effort. As a result, DOE is not well positioned to know that its reform effort will achieve its intended benefits. DOE Sought to Enhance Productivity and Reduce Costs but Did Not First Analyze Burden or Costs of the Original Requirements
According to the Deputy Secretary’s March 2010 memorandum announcing the reform effort and discussions with DOE officials, DOE undertook the reform effort to realize productivity and cost benefits while maintaining safety. Instead, DOE’s reform effort has focused on output-oriented measures, such as the number of directives cancelled or revised, and not on outcome measures, such as specific improvements in productivity or cost savings. DOE’s Reform Effort Did Not Fully Address Safety Concerns We and Others Have Identified
DOE’s reform effort did not fully address safety concerns that we, DOE’s Office of Inspector General, and the Safety Board have repeatedly identified in three key areas—(1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture, and (3) federal oversight. For example, DOE’s Office of Enforcement identified quality assurance problems following a June 2010 incident during which a worker was exposed to radiation after puncturing his hand with a sharp object contaminated with plutonium at DOE’s Savannah River Site. According to Safety Board officials, because the acquisition regulation does not contain the specificity of the Integrated Safety Management directives, contractors may not implement the requirements as vigorously as they would if they had to follow the more specific practices in the original directives. For example:
DOE has placed greater emphasis on having its Office of Independent Oversight staff review safety design documents, which lay out the safety systems for facilities at DOE’s sites, before their construction. In addition, changes to DOE’s oversight directives raise concerns about the ability of DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight staff to provide a critical review of safety at DOE’s sites that is independent from DOE site office and contractor staff, a concern we have raised in the past. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOE’s reform of its safety directives results in improved productivity and safety at its sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following four actions prior to fully implementing revisions to its directives across all of the department’s sites: systematically analyze the costs and benefits associated with implementing the revised safety directives to ensure that the costs do not exceed the benefits that the department expects to achieve; provide DOE’s sites and contractors with a plan that details (1) the reform effort’s goals, (2) the effort’s long-term implementation strategy, (3) results-oriented outcome measures, and (4) how DOE will use results-oriented data to evaluate the reform’s effectiveness and to determine whether additional changes are needed; ensure that the plan developed for DOE’s sites and contractors identifies how the reform effort will help address past and recurring safety concerns with quality assurance, safety culture, and federal oversight of contractor activities; and clearly define the oversight roles and responsibilities of DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight staff to ensure that their work is sufficiently independent from the activities of DOE site office and contractor staff. However, DOE commented that it had significant concerns with the accuracy of the report’s findings and the validity of its conclusions. DOE is correct that safety management and safety culture are different, but related, concepts. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE carries out many of the nations most critical missions, including stewardship of the nations nuclear weapons stockpile and the environmental remediation of radioactive and hazardous legacy waste left over from the Cold War. DOE uses a system of regulations and internal directives that lay out requirements and guidance for ensuring the safety of staff and contractors, the public, and the environment. Over the past 10 years, GAO and others have repeatedly made recommendations for DOE to improve safety performance. In March 2010, DOE announced a reform effort to revise safety-related directives to increase productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety.
This report examines (1) how DOE revised safety directives under its reform effort, (2) the costs of the reform effort and the benefits DOE hoped to achieve, and (3) the extent to which its reform effort addresses safety concerns GAO and others have identified. GAO reviewed relevant DOE reform effort documents, visited selected DOE sites to interview site office and contractor officials, and analyzed past GAO and other reports on DOEs safety problems.
What GAO Found
Under its safety reform effort, the Department of Energy (DOE) reduced the number of safety directives by eliminating or combining requirements it determined were unclear, duplicative, or too prescriptive and by encouraging the use of industry standards. DOE reduced the number of its safety directives from 80 to 42, and for some of the directives DOE retained, it made extensive revisions. For example, DOE deleted requirements from its quality assurance directive addressing a corrective action program because another safety directive adequately covered these requirements. DOE obtained comments on its proposed revisions from DOE and contractor staff and from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board).
The benefits of DOEs reform effort are not clear. DOE intended to enhance productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety, but DOE did not determine how the original requirements contained in safety directives impaired productivity or added costs before undertaking the reform effort. Moreover, DOE did not assess whether the cost to implement the revised directives would exceed the benefits, but officials said they had launched an initial study to determine, among other things, the costs associated with implementing selected safety requirements. DOE also did not develop performance measures in order to assess how the reform effort will lead to improved productivity or lower costs while maintaining safety. Instead, DOE is measuring success by using output-oriented measures, such as the number of directives eliminated, and not outcome measures, such as specific productivity improvements or cost savings. In the absence of clear measures linking the reform effort to productivity and safety improvements, DOE is not well positioned to know that its reform effort will achieve the intended benefits.
DOEs reform effort did not fully address safety concerns GAO and others have identified in three key areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture, and (3) federal oversight. Regarding quality assurance, DOE strengthened its quality assurance directive by clarifying that contractors must follow specific industry quality assurance standards, but quality assurance problems persist. For example, DOE proposed a nearly $250,000 fine against a contractor in July 2011 after identifying quality assurance problems in an incident where a worker punctured his hand with a sharp object contaminated with plutonium. With regard to safety culture, DOE revised its Integrated Safety Management directives to attempt to strengthen the safety culture at its sites, but DOE removed requirements for contractors to follow the directives because contractors already had to comply with safety management requirements in federal regulation. Safety Board officials raised concerns that the requirements in federal regulation are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not implement safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the more specific requirements in DOEs directives. Finally, regarding federal oversight, DOE revised its approach to place greater emphasis on having its independent oversight staff review safety design documents before facilities are constructed, rather than after they are built. Other changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to coordinate their assessment activities with DOE site office and contractor staff, raise concerns about the oversight staffs ability to provide a critical review of safety at DOEs sites that is independent from DOE site office and contractor staff.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE analyze the costs and benefits of its safety reform effort and identify how the effort will help address safety concerns. DOE agreed with the recommendations but commented that it had significant concerns about the accuracy of the reports findings and conclusions. GAO stands by its findings and conclusions for the reasons discussed in the report. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-132 | gao_T-AIMD-96-132_0 | Moreover, agencies have failed to take full advantage of IT by failing to first critically examine and then reengineer existing business and program delivery processes. ITMRA builds in essential investment and performance ingredients that empower agencies to make wiser, not just faster, acquisitions of IT products and services. During this period, consistent oversight leadership, coordination, and clear guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is essential to getting agency implementation off to a constructive start. For ITMRA to be successful, improved management processes and practices that focus on capital investment and planning, reengineering, and performance measurement are essential. This order will officially create a governmentwide Chief Information Officers Council, composed of agency CIOs and Deputy CIOs and chaired by OMB’s Deputy Director for Management, to provide recommendations to OMB on governmentwide IT policies, procedures, and standards; the Government Information Technology Services Board, staffed by agency personnel, to oversee the continued implementation of the NPR IT recommendations and to identify and promote the development of innovative technologies, standards, and practices; and the Information Technology Resources Board, staffed by agency personnel and used to review, at OMB’s or an agency’s request, an information systems development or acquisition project and provide recommendations as appropriate. Interagency Outreach and Coordination
OMB has also organized an interagency CIO Working Group—comprised of the existing senior IRM officials from the major agencies and departments—to assist in developing the policies, guidance, and information needed to effectively implement ITMRA. Continue to Emphasize an Integrated, Not Selective Management Approach
ITMRA embraces an entire set of comprehensive management reforms to IT decision-making. Focus on the evaluation of results. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implementation of the Information Technology (IT) Management Reform Act (ITMRA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal agencies have failed to reengineer their business and program delivery processes before acquiring new information systems, which results in costly IT resources; (2) ITMRA should empower federal agencies to make wise acquisitions of IT products and services; (3) lessons learned from other governmentwide management reforms indicate the need for senior management involvement, consistent oversight and leadership from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and a focus on capital investment and planning, reengineering, and performance measurement; (4) OMB has organized interagency discussions on needed policy and guidance changes and issued guidance on selecting, controlling, and evaluating agencies' IT investments; (5) OMB has established an interagency Chief Information Officers (CIO) working group to assist in developing policies, guidance, and information needed for effective ITMRA implementation; (6) the Administration is ensuring that CIO candidates are qualified and given sufficient authority and responsibility and that core legislative requirements are met; (7) challenges to ITMRA implementation include involving top agency management, consistently directing CIO appointments and organizational placement, building new IT skills, focusing on internal implementation at the department-level, and continually emphasizing an integrated management approach; and (8) congressional support and oversight is essential to ensuring successful implementation of ITMRA. |
gao_GAO-14-571 | gao_GAO-14-571_0 | In January 2012, CMS began phasing-in MA encounter data collection by type of provider. Risk Adjustment
To risk adjust payments to MAOs, CMS calculates a risk score—the expected health care expenditures for an enrollee compared with the average health care expenditures of all beneficiaries—for each MA enrollee and Medicare FFS beneficiary. MA Encounter Data Are More Comprehensive and Are Reported More Frequently than Current Risk Adjustment Data
Compared with information available in RAPS data, MA encounter data, with more elements reported, provide CMS with more comprehensive information on all enrollee diagnoses as well as the cost and types of services and items provided to enrollees. In contrast, more provider types report encounter data, significantly expanding the scope of sources for diagnosis and other information. With MA Encounter Data at Expected Volume, CMS Will Begin Using Some Data for Risk Adjustment in 2015, but Its Plans for Other Uses Remain Undeveloped
CMS is receiving MA encounter data from nearly all MAOs on all types of services at the monthly volume that CMS officials told us they expected. 1.) Accordingly, CMS’s plans remain undeveloped and it has not established specific time frames for any of the following potential uses outlined in 2008: the agency has yet to determine
Revise CMS’s risk adjustment model for MA payments. CMS Has Performed Some Steps to Ensure That MA Encounter Data Are Complete and Accurate but Has Not Yet Fully Validated the Data
As of May 2014, CMS had taken some, but not yet all, appropriate actions—as outlined in its Medicaid encounter data validation protocol— to ensure that MA encounter data are complete and accurate before they are used. 2.) Although CMS intends to perform these additional quality assurance activities, CMS officials have not specified a time frame for doing so. CMS Has Established and Publicized MA Encounter Data Submission Requirements but Has Not Developed Benchmarks for Completeness and Accuracy
CMS has established certain requirements for the MAOs’ collection and submission of encounter data. While it has focused its efforts on educating plans about reporting requirements, CMS has not yet established benchmarks for encounter data completeness and accuracy and does not have a timeline for developing such benchmarks. CMS Performs Automated Checks for Completeness and Accuracy of MA Encounter Data
CMS performs automated checks to determine encounter data quality and identify submission issues, such as whether certain data elements are missing, and sends automated notifications to MAOs. Generating basic statistics from the encounter data. Analyzing encounter data elements by demographic group, provider type, and service type. However, CMS has yet to develop specifics on how or when it will use encounter data for a variety of program management purposes. Furthermore, CMS’s decision to use MA encounter data in 2015 may be premature because the agency has not yet fully validated the data. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that MA encounter data are of sufficient quality for their intended purposes, the Administrator of CMS should establish specific plans and time frames for using the data for all intended purposes in addition to risk adjusting payments to MAOs and complete all the steps necessary to validate the data, including performing statistical analyses, reviewing medical records, and providing MAOs with summary reports on CMS’s findings, before using the data to risk adjust payments or for other intended purposes. HHS noted that it has developed lists of the purposes for which it intends to use the data. Appendix I: Select Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Outreach Efforts on Medicare Advantage (MA) Encounter Data
Description CMS organized this meeting with Medicare Advantage organizations (MAO) to disseminate information on the requirements for encounter data submission, the transition to submitting encounter data, and the schedule for encounter data implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare Advantage—the private plan alternative to the traditional Medicare program—provides health care for nearly 15.5 million enrollees, about 30 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries. After a multiyear rollout, CMS began collecting encounter data in January 2012. GAO was asked to review CMS's plans for using MA encounter data and its efforts to validate the data's quality.
This report examines (1) how the scope of MA encounter data compare with CMS's current risk adjustment data, (2) the extent to which CMS has specified plans and time frames to use encounter data for risk adjustment and other purposes, and (3) the extent to which CMS has taken appropriate steps to ensure MA encounter data's completeness and accuracy. In addition to reviewing laws, regulations, and guidance on MA encounter data collection and reporting, GAO interviewed CMS officials and representatives of MAOs. GAO also compared CMS's activities to the protocol CMS developed to validate Medicaid encounter data—comparable data collected and submitted by entities similar to MAOs.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is collecting Medicare Advantage (MA) encounter data—information on the services and items furnished to enrollees—that are more comprehensive than the beneficiary diagnosis data the agency currently uses to risk adjust capitated payments to MA organizations (MAO). CMS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), makes these adjustments to reflect the expected health care costs of MA enrollees. Encounter data have many more elements—including procedure codes and provider payments—from a wider range of provider types—such as home health agencies and skilled nursing facilities—thus expanding the scope of sources for diagnosis and other information.
CMS has not fully developed plans for using MA encounter data. The agency announced that it will begin using diagnoses from both encounter data and the data it currently collects for risk adjustment to determine payments to MAOs in 2015. However, CMS has not established time frames or specific plans to use encounter data for other potential purposes.
CMS has taken some, but not yet all, appropriate actions to ensure that MA encounter data are complete and accurate. (See figure.) The agency has established timeliness and frequency requirements for data submission, but has not yet developed requirements for completeness and accuracy. Also, the agency has certified nearly all MAOs to transmit encounter data. Although CMS performs automated checks to determine whether key data elements are completed and values are reasonable, it has not yet performed statistical analyses that could detect more complex data validity issues. For example, CMS has not yet generated basic statistics from the data by demographic group or provider type to identify inconsistencies or gaps in the data. Also, it has not yet reviewed medical records to verify diagnoses and services listed in encounter data or reported what it has learned about data quality to MAOs. Agency officials told GAO they intend to perform these additional quality assurance activities but have not established time frames to do so.
What GAO Recommends
CMS should establish specific plans for using MA encounter data and thoroughly assess data completeness and accuracy before using the data to risk adjust payments or for other purposes. While in general agreement, HHS did not specify a date by which CMS will develop plans for all authorized uses of encounter data and did not commit to completing data validation before using the data for risk adjustment in 2015. |
gao_GAO-10-494T | gao_GAO-10-494T_0 | The U.S. Government Supports a Broad Array of Programs and Activities for Global Food Security, but Lacks Comprehensive Funding Data
While the U.S. government supports a wide variety of programs and activities for global food security, it lacks comprehensive data on funding. In response to our data collection instrument to the 10 agencies, 7 agencies reported providing monetary assistance for global food security programs and activities in fiscal year 2008, based on the working definition we developed for this purpose with agency input. USAID and USDA reported providing the broadest array of global food security programs and activities. USAID, MCC, Treasury (through its participation in multilateral development institutions), USDA, and State provide the highest levels of funding to address food insecurity in developing countries. These 7 agencies reported directing at least $5 billion in fiscal year 2008 to global food security, with food aid accounting for about half of this funding. However, the actual total level of funding is likely greater. The agencies also lack reporting requirements to routinely capture data on all relevant funds. Second, some agencies’ management systems are inadequate for tracking and reporting food security funding data comprehensively and consistently. The Administration Is Developing a Governmentwide Global Food Security Strategy, but Efforts Are Vulnerable to Data Weaknesses and Risks Associated with the Host Country-Led Approach
While the administration is making progress toward finalizing a governmentwide global food security strategy through improved interagency coordination at the headquarters level, its efforts are vulnerable to weaknesses in data and risks associated with the host country-led approach called for in the strategy under development. The lack of comprehensive data on current programs and funding levels may impair the success of the new strategy because it deprives decision makers of information on all available resources, actual costs, and a firm baseline against which to plan. Second, the shortage of expertise in agriculture and food security at relevant U.S. agencies can constrain efforts to help strengthen host government capacity, as well as review host government efforts and guide in-country activities. Third, policy differences between the United States and host governments with regard to agricultural development and food security may complicate efforts to align U.S. assistance with host government strategies. GAO Recommends That Agencies Address Data Weaknesses and Mitigate Risks Associated with Host Country-Led Approach
In the report issued today, we recommended that the Secretary of State (1) work with the existing NSC Interagency Policy Committee to develop an operational definition of food security that is accepted by all U.S. agencies; establish a methodology for consistently reporting comprehensive data across agencies; and periodically inventory the food security-related programs and associated funding for each of these agencies; and (2) work in collaboration with relevant agency heads to delineate measures to mitigate the risks associated with the host country- led approach on the successful implementation of the forthcoming governmentwide global food security strategy. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Global hunger continues to worsen despite world leaders' 1996 pledge--reaffirmed in 2000 and 2009--to halve hunger by 2015. To reverse this trend, in 2009 major donor countries pledged about $22.7 billion in a 3-year commitment to agriculture and food security in developing countries, of which $3.5 billion is the U.S. share. This testimony addresses (1) the types and funding of food security programs and activities of relevant U.S. government agencies and (2) progress in developing an integrated U.S. governmentwide strategy to address global food insecurity and the strategy's potential vulnerabilities. This is based on a new GAO report being released at today's hearing (GAO-10-352).
What GAO Found
The U.S. government supports a wide variety of programs and activities for global food security, but lacks readily available comprehensive data on funding. In response to GAO's data collection instrument to 10 agencies, 7 agencies reported such funding for global food security in fiscal year 2008 based on the working definition GAO developed for this exercise with agency input. USAID and USDA reported the broadest array of programs and activities, while USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Treasury, USDA, and State reported providing the highest levels of funding for global food security. The 7 agencies together directed at least $5 billion in fiscal year 2008 to global food security, with food aid accounting for about half of that funding. However, the actual total is likely greater. GAO's estimate does not account for all U.S. government funds targeting global food insecurity because the agencies lack (1) a commonly accepted governmentwide operational definition of global food security programs and activities as well as reporting requirements to routinely capture data on all relevant funds, and (2) data management systems to track and report food security funding comprehensively and consistently. The administration is making progress toward finalizing a governmentwide global food security strategy--expected to be released shortly--but its efforts are vulnerable to data weaknesses and risks associated with the strategy's host country-led approach. The administration has established interagency coordination mechanisms at headquarters and is finalizing an implementation document and a results framework. However, the lack of comprehensive data on programs and funding levels may deprive decision makers of information on available resources and a firm baseline against which to plan. Furthermore, the host country-led approach, although promising, is vulnerable to (1) the weak capacity of host governments, which can limit their ability to sustain donor-funded efforts; (2) a shortage of expertise in agriculture and food security at U.S. agencies that could constrain efforts to help strengthen host government capacity; and (3) policy differences between host governments and donors, including the United States, may complicate efforts to align donor interventions with host government strategies. |
gao_HEHS-98-189 | gao_HEHS-98-189_0 | Complaint and appeal procedures are regulated by a patchwork of federal and state laws. No federal standards, however, prescribe how complaint and appeal systems are to be structured and administered. Nine Elements Were Considered Important for Indemnity Plans
The groups we contacted identified 9 of the 11 elements recommended for HMO complaint and appeal systems as applicable to indemnity plans. The elements considered important to a sound complaint and appeal process for indemnity plans fell into three general categories—timeliness, integrity of the decision-making process, and effective communication—and included the following: explicit time periods, set out in plan policies, within which plans resolve complaints or appeals. Key Elements Were Present in at Least Half the Plans
Nearly all the recommended elements were present in the policies of at least half the plans in our study. As shown in table 1, five elements—explicit time periods for resolving member appeals, appeal decisions made by medical professionals with appropriate expertise, provision of information on how to register a complaint or appeal, plan acceptance of oral complaints, and inclusion of appeal rights in notice of denial of coverage or payment—were included in the policies of a large majority of the indemnity plans in our study. However, the remaining four elements—expedited review of appeals in urgent situations, appeal decisions made by individuals not involved in the initial decision, plan acceptance of oral appeals, and written notice of appeal denials including further appeal rights—were present in the policies of only two-thirds or fewer of the plans reporting. Indemnity Plans Were Less Closely Aligned With Certain Key Elements Than Were HMOs
Compared with the 38 HMOs in our previous report, a smaller proportion of the 10 indemnity plans’ policies and procedures included the recommended elements. Figure 1 compares the prevalence of recommended elements in indemnity plans with those in place in the HMO offered by the same carrier. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the key features that are important to indemnity plans' complaint and appeal systems, focusing on: (1) the elements that are considered important to a system for processing indemnity plan member complaints and appeals; (2) the extent to which indemnity plan complaint and appeal systems contain these elements; and (3) how indemnity plans compare with health maintenance organizations (HMO) in the extent to which their complaint and appeal systems incorporate recommended elements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) guidelines issued by the regulatory and consumer advocacy groups in GAO's study identified nine elements as important to indemnity plan complaint and appeal systems, falling into three general categories: (a) timeliness; (b) integrity of the decisionmaking process; and (c) communication with members; (2) nearly all the recommended elements were present in the policies of at least half of the plans in GAO's study; (3) five elements--explicit time periods for resolving member appeals, appeal decisions made by medical professionals with appropriate expertise, provision of information on how to register a complaint or appeal, plan acceptance of oral complaints, and inclusion of appeal rights in notice of denial of coverage or payment--were included in the policies of a large majority of indemnity plans in GAO's study; (4) however, the remaining four elements--expedited review of appeals in urgent situations, appeal decisions made by individuals not involved in the initial decision, plan acceptance of oral appeals, and written notice of appeal denials including further appeal rights, were present in the policies of only two-thirds or fewer of the plans reporting; (5) taken together, a smaller proportion of indemnity plans in GAO's study incorporated recommended elements in their complaint and appeal systems than did HMOs in GAO's previous study; and (6) when compared with HMOs operated by the same carrier, indemnity plans generally incorporated about the same proportion of recommended elements as did HMOs. |
gao_GAO-10-9 | gao_GAO-10-9_0 | Though the Vision changed and reduced the scope of NASA’s goals for its own research on board the ISS, Congress designated the ISS as a national laboratory in 2005 in an effort to increase utilization of the ISS for research. According to NASA officials, this designation does not guarantee an appropriation specifically for ISS National Laboratory research. The ISS Will Have Excess Research Facilities Available for Other Users by Construction Completion
The ISS has been continuously manned since 2000, and in March 2009 the crew expanded from three to six. NASA’s primary objective for the ISS through 2010 is construction, so research has not been the main priority. As such, research is being conducted at the margins of assembly and operations activities as time permits, while the crew on board performs assembly and operations tasks. Several Significant Challenges May Impede Full Use of ISS Research Facilities
NASA faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to maximize research utilization of the ISS, including (1) the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010, reduced launch capabilities once the shuttle retires, and the potential for a gap between retirement and follow-on U.S. vehicles; (2) high costs for launches and developing research hardware and a lack of dedicated funding streams for ISS research; (3) limited crew time available for research due to a fixed crew size and other requirements for crew time; and (4) an uncertain future for the ISS beyond 2015. There is currently no direct analogue to the ISS National Laboratory, and though NASA currently manages research programs at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and its other centers that it believes possess similar characteristics to other national laboratories, NASA has limited experience managing the type of diverse scientific research and technology demonstration portfolio that the ISS could eventually represent. We identified three common practices that may be applicable to whatever management structure NASA decides on for managing all U.S.-sponsored ISS research: central management of research, robust in-house technical expertise, and significant user outreach. Congress has also directed NASA to develop plans involving an external management body: in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2000, Congress instructed the agency to submit an implementation plan to incorporate the use of an NGO to conduct research utilization and commercialization management activities of the ISS, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 required NASA to develop a plan to support operations and utilization of the ISS beyond 2015, including a research management plan that identified who would manage United States research. In-house Expertise
The national laboratories and science programs we studied have capable in-house scientific and technical experts (generally provided by the management body) who can consult with and provide guidance to users. Significant User Outreach
The national laboratories and other large, user-based science institutes we studied place a high priority on conducting outreach to current and potential users and hold conferences and workshops on a regular basis for this purpose. Though it may not be possible to establish a management structure similar to those found at other national laboratories that have been in existence for much longer than the ISS in the limited time remaining, NASA may be able to leverage existing agreements with management bodies to provide for a faster solution, or leverage the scientific and technical expertise of other sponsoring federal agencies (such as NIH) that have experience in conducting peer-reviewed research in areas pertinent to their missions. To determine how NASA is managing the ISS, we interviewed NASA officials and reviewed NASA plans and documentation, including its Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan 2008; ISS Utilization Management Concept Development Study; Research and Utilization Plan for the International Space Station; Commercial Development Plan for the International Space Station; Reference Guide to the International Space Station; NASA ISS Prioritization Desk Instruction; Human Research Program: Integrated Research Plan; Advanced Capabilities Division: International Space Station (ISS) Science Portfolio, Determination and Management; NASA Report to Congress: Regarding a Plan for the International Space Station’s National Laboratory; Plan to Support Operations and Utilization of the International Space Station Beyond FY 2015; and NASA’s Organizational Model Evaluation Team Process, Analysis, and Recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, after about 25 years of work and the expenditure of billions of dollars, the International Space Station (ISS) will be completed. According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the ISS crew will then be able to redirect its efforts from assembling the station to conducting research. In 2005, Congress designated the ISS as a national laboratory; in addition, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 required NASA to provide a research management plan for the ISS National Laboratory. In light of these developments, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review the research use of the ISS. Specifically, GAO (1) identified how the ISS is being used for research and how it is expected to be used once completed, (2) identified challenges to maximizing ISS research; and (3) identified common management practices at other national laboratories and large science programs that could be applicable to the management of the ISS. To accomplish this, GAO interviewed NASA officials and reviewed key documents related to the ISS. GAO also studied two ground-based national laboratories and several large science institutions.
What GAO Found
The ISS has been continuously staffed since 2000 and now has a six-member crew. The primary objective for the ISS through 2010 is construction, so research utilization has not been the priority. Some research has been and is being conducted as time and resources permit while the crew on board performs assembly tasks, but research will is expected to begin in earnest in 2010. NASA projects that it will utilize approximately 50 percent of the U.S. ISS research facilities for its own research, including the Human Research Program, opening the remaining facilities to U.S. ISS National Laboratory researchers. NASA faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to maximize utilization of all ISS research facilities, including: (1) the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 and reduced launch capabilities for transporting ISS research cargo once the shuttle retires; (2) high costs for launches and no dedicated funding to support research; (3) limited time available for research due to the fixed size of crew and competing demands for the crew's time; and (4) an uncertain future for the ISS beyond 2015. NASA is researching the possibility of developing a management body--including internal and external elements--to manage ISS research, which would make the ISS National Laboratory similar to other national laboratories. Though there is no existing direct analogue to the ISS, GAO studied two national laboratories and several other large science institutions and identified three common practices that these institutions employ that could benefit the management of ISS research. (1) Centralized management body: At each of the institutions GAO studied, there is a central body responsible for prioritizing and selecting research, even if there are different funding agencies. NASA's ISS managers are currently not responsible for evaluating and selecting all research that will be conducted on the ISS, leaving this to the research sponsor. (2) In-house scientific and technical expertise: The institutions GAO studied have large staffs of in-house experts that can provide technical and engineering support to users. NASA's staff members in ISS fundamental science research areas have been decentralized or reassigned, limiting its capability to provide user support. (3) Robust user outreach: The laboratories and institutes GAO studied place a high priority on user outreach and are actively involved in educating and recruiting users. NASA has conducted outreach to potential users in the public and private sectors, but its outreach is limited in comparison. |
gao_GAO-07-763 | gao_GAO-07-763_0 | EPA estimated that about 571,000 facilities were regulated under the SPCC rule as of 2005. Specifically, EPA’s 2002 analysis was limited because it did not (1) assess the uncertainty associated with key data and assumptions, such as the degree to which facilities were already in compliance with the amendments, (2) analyze the effect of regulatory alternatives to the amendments, (3) provide the compliance costs that EPA expected facilities to incur or save as a result of the amendments in comparable present value terms, and (4) estimate the effect of the amendments on the risk of an oil spill and on public health and welfare and the environment. Therefore, in its analysis, EPA assumed that all regulated facilities were in full compliance with these existing provisions and would not incur any additional compliance costs as a result of the amendments. However, EPA’s 2002 analysis did not assess alternatives to the amendments, such as alternative levels of stringency or alternative lead times to comply. As depicted in table 1, EPA did not present the total cost estimate (costs incurred minus cost savings) of the amendments in comparable, net present value terms. EPA’s Economic Analysis of the 2006 SPCC Amendments Improved on the Earlier Study but Also Had Limitations
EPA’s economic analysis of the 2006 amendments to the SPCC rule addressed several of the limitations in the agency’s 2002 analysis. EPA’s 2006 Analysis Included Elements Absent from Its Earlier Study
As shown in table 2, EPA estimated the compliance cost savings that would be generated by the 2006 amendments under (1) a baseline assuming full compliance with the existing SPCC rule including the 2002 amendments, (2) an alternative baseline assuming only 50 percent compliance with the existing SPCC rule including the 2002 amendments, and (3) different assumptions about the number of facilities that would be affected by the 2006 amendments. EPA’s 2006 Analysis Also Had Limitations
Despite the improvements over its 2002 analysis, EPA’s analysis of the 2006 amendments also had some limitations that made it less useful than it could have been for assessing the economic trade-offs associated with the amendments. For example, EPA did not quantify or monetize the potential impacts of the 2006 amendments on the risk of an oil spill and on public health and welfare and the environment. In addition, because EPA’s estimates of the number of facilities that would be affected by the 2006 amendments were not based on nationally representative samples, the results may not be accurate. In particular, for the one amendment that would reduce the burden for certain SPCC- regulated facilities, EPA based its estimates of the number of facilities that would be affected by this amendment on data drawn from eight states: Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Because facilities in these states may not have been representative of facilities nationwide, EPA’s use of these data in its analysis could have introduced bias into its estimates of the number of facilities and costs for this amendment. EPA acknowledged these limitations in its analysis and stated that the analysis provided the best possible results given time and resource constraints. Overall, EPA reported that its analysis did not fully comply with OMB guidelines for conducting economic analyses of significant regulatory actions. Moreover, because EPA did not estimate the impact of the amendments on the potential risk of an oil spill and on public health and welfare and the environment for either the 2002 or the 2006 amendments, EPA’s economic analyses may not provide decision makers, stakeholders, and the public with a sufficient basis for concluding that the benefits of the amendments outweigh their costs, as EPA did. As criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of the economic analyses, we used guidelines for federal agencies in assessing regulatory impacts that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) developed under Executive Order 12866, including its Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12966; Guidelines to Standardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements; and Circular A-4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil in aboveground tanks can leak into soil and nearby water, threatening human health and wildlife. To prevent certain oil spills, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) rule in 1973. EPA estimated that, in 2005, about 571,000 facilities were regulated under this rule. When finalizing amendments to the rule in 2002 and 2006 to both strengthen the rule and reduce industry burden, EPA analyzed the amendments' potential impacts and concluded that the amendments were economically justified. As requested, GAO assessed the reasonableness of EPA's economic analyses of the 2002 and 2006 SPCC amendments, using Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines for federal agencies in determining regulatory impacts, among other criteria, and discussed EPA's analyses with EPA officials.
What GAO Found
EPA's economic analysis of the 2002 SPCC amendments had several limitations that reduced its usefulness for assessing the amendments' benefits and costs. In particular, EPA did not include in its analysis a number of the elements recommended by OMB guidelines for assessing regulatory impacts. For example, EPA did not assess the uncertainty of key assumptions and data. In the analysis, EPA assumed that certain facilities were already complying with at least some of the rule's provisions and, as a result, they would not incur any additional compliance costs because of the amendments. However, the extent of facility compliance with the rule was highly uncertain. EPA did not analyze the effects of alternative rates of industry compliance on the estimated costs and benefits of the revised rule and, therefore, potentially misstated these amounts. Furthermore, EPA's 2002 analysis was limited in that it (1) did not analyze alternatives to the amendments, such as alternative lead times for industry to comply or alternative levels of stringency; (2) did not present the compliance costs that EPA expects facilities to incur or save in the second and subsequent years under the amendments in comparable present value terms (through discounting); and (3) provided only limited general information on the amendments' potential benefits in reducing the risk of an oil spill and its potential effects on human health and the environment. EPA's economic analysis of the 2006 amendments addressed several of the limitations of its 2002 analysis, but it also had some limitations that made it less useful than it could have been for assessing the amendments' costs and benefits. For example, EPA's 2006 analysis assessed the potential effect of industry noncompliance on the estimated costs (or cost savings) and estimated the present value of costs (or cost savings) associated with different alternatives for burden reduction. Nevertheless, as with the 2002 analysis, EPA did not estimate the potential benefits of the 2006 amendments, such as the extent to which they would affect the risk of an oil spill and public health and welfare and the environment. In addition, EPA did not have available nationally representative samples for its analysis; therefore, its estimates of the number of facilities that would be affected by the 2006 amendments may not be accurate. In particular, for one category of facilities, EPA based its estimates of the number of facilities on data available from eight states. Because facilities in these states may not have been representative of facilities nationwide, EPA's use of these data in its analysis could have introduced bias into its estimates of the number of facilities and costs for this amendment. EPA acknowledged that its analysis of the 2006 amendments was not a full accounting of all social benefits and costs but stated that the results were based on the best available information given time and resource constraints. |
gao_GAO-06-918 | gao_GAO-06-918_0 | The process was updated in 2005, and if implemented effectively, it should ensure that NIH leasing complies with OMB’s scorekeeping guidelines for classifying leases. This new process should also ensure that no violations of the Antideficiency Act occur due to improper scorekeeping. More specifically, this review identified eight leases that had been improperly classified as operating leases instead of capital leases and potential unrecorded obligations from 50 active multiyear operating leases that totaled $565 million, as of September 30, 2005. HHS stated that it did not believe the potential $565 million in unrecorded obligations from scoring operating leases to be Antideficiency Act violations. We concluded that no Antideficiency Act violation exists. This authority provides that, when entering into multiyear leases, “the obligation of the amount for a lease is limited to the current fiscal year for which payments are due without regard to the Antideficiency Act.” Accordingly, GSA is directed by law to obligate funds for multiyear leases one year at a time, and it is exempt from the general prohibition in the Antideficiency Act against obligating the government in advance of appropriations for GSA leases. GSA is drafting a modification to its guidance for delegated leasing authority which, according to a GSA official, will clarify that agencies with delegated leasing authority can score operating leases in the same manner as GSA does. GSA and agencies with delegated leasing authority are expected to continue to score capital leases according to OMB’s requirements. NIH Corrected Weaknesses in Implementation of Prospectus Guidance, but Some Past Prospectus-level Leases Remain Unreported
As part of its leasing process, NIH has established decision points for identifying leases whose costs exceed a legislatively established threshold and for which a prospectus should be submitted for congressional review and approval prior to finalizing contracts. In addition, all alterations to leased buildings are reviewed by an NIH leasing official. To address previous problems with inconsistent and informal implementation of prospectus guidance, NIH has incorporated into its leasing process several decision points for identifying any leases for which a congressionally approved prospectus should be submitted. Furthermore, according to NIH’s Office of Acquisitions, ORF, it is now responsible for ensuring that the contracting for alterations to leased buildings does not exceed that prospectus threshold. This process involves agencies with delegated leasing authority, which must identify prospectus level leases to GSA for submission. While there is no legal penalty for not following the congressional prospectus process, failure to do so hinders the ability of the appropriate congressional committees to fulfill their oversight responsibilities for all prospectus-level leases. Conclusions
NIH has taken actions to formalize its processes of lease scoring and prospectus analysis by developing and implementing LeMOP, its new leasing process. An issue remains with five prior leases that were not submitted to the appropriate congressional committees for review under the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the General Services Administration and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the nation's primary medical and behavioral research agency. NIH's need for leased space has more than doubled since 1996 to about 3.9 million square feet in 2005. In 1996, General Services Administration (GSA) delegated leasing authority to NIH that includes performing budget scoring and prospectus analysis. In light of NIH's increased use of leased space, GAO was asked to address two issues: (1) Is NIH complying with budget scorekeeping guidelines and Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) requirements for implementing the guidelines to determine if a lease should be classified as operating or capital and ensure that no violations of the Antideficiency Act occur because of improper budget scorekeeping? and (2) Is NIH complying with the congressional prospectus process for both leases and alterations to leased buildings? To address these issues we interviewed leasing and financial officials, reviewed laws and reviewed budget scoring and prospectus analysis of 59 leases.
What GAO Found
NIH has implemented a formal leasing process that, if carried out effectively, should comply with budget scorekeeping guidelines and OMB's requirements for classifying operating and capital leases. This process should ensure that no Antideficiency Act violations occur due to leasing. The agency's new leasing process addresses previous problems with inconsistent and informal implementation of the guidelines and requirements by properly identifying operating and capital leases and properly recording lease obligations for budget scoring purposes. In October 2005, the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services expressed the belief that the potential $565 million in unrecorded obligations from 50 active multiyear NIH leases were not Antideficiency Act violations. We agree that no Antideficiency Act violations exist because the GSA delegation of leasing authority included specific authority that directed NIH to obligate funds for multiyear leases, one year at a time, and that such actions were exempt from the Antideficiency Act. GSA is also modifying its guidance for delegated leasing authority, which would make it clear that agencies with delegated leasing authority can score operating leases in the same manner as GSA. The scoring process for capital leases would remain unchanged. As part of its leasing process, NIH has also established decision points for identifying any leases for which a prospectus should be submitted through GSA for congressional approval, under the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended. This process involves submitting leases and alterations to leased buildings for approval whose costs exceed a legislatively established threshold. In addition, NIH has designated the Office of Acquisitions, Office of Resource Facilities to review prospectus-level alterations to leased buildings to ensure that the contracting for alterations to leased buildings does not exceed the prospectus threshold for alterations to leased buildings. However, NIH has taken no action to address five prospectus-level leases that were not submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in past years. While there is no penalty provided in law for not submitting a prospectus, failure to do so hinders the ability of the appropriate congressional committees to fulfill their oversight responsibilities for all prospectus-level leases. |
gao_GAO-16-685 | gao_GAO-16-685_0 | 1). The Extent to Which the Corps Has Reviewed or Revised Water Control Manuals Is Unclear Because It Did Not Document Reviews or Track Revisions
According to agency officials, the Corps conducts ongoing, informal reviews of selected water control manuals and has revised some of them, but the extent of the reviews and revisions is unclear because they were not documented or tracked. A 2014 Corps engineer regulation states that water control manuals should be reviewed no less than every 10 years, so that they can be revised as necessary. However, officials we interviewed from all 15 districts said they do not document these informal reviews because they consider such reviews to be part of the daily routine of operating projects. However, the Corps does not have guidance on what activities constitute a review or how officials should document the results of their reviews. Without developing guidance on what activities constitute a review of a water control manual and how to document that review, the Corps does not have reasonable assurance that its districts will consistently conduct reviews and document them to provide a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to personnel directly involved with these reviews. The Corps Has Revised Some Water Control Manuals but Does Not Track Consistent Information on Which Have Been Revised or Need Revision
The Corps has revised some water control manuals; however, divisions and districts do not track consistent information about revisions to manuals, and the extent to which they have been revised—or need revision—is unclear. Corps engineer regulations state that manuals are to be revised as needed, in accordance with the regulations. For example, based on our review of Corps documents, one of eight divisions tracked whether the water control plans in its water control manuals reflected actual operations of the project, but the remaining seven divisions did not. The Corps Has Efforts Under Way to Improve Its Ability to Respond to Extreme Weather
The Corps has efforts under way to improve its ability to help respond to extreme weather events. The Corps is also conducting research on how to better prepare operations for extreme weather. The Corps Is Developing a Strategy to Revise Drought Contingency Plans and Is Studying the Use of Forecasts to Make Operations Decisions at Two Projects
To better respond to drought, the Corps is developing a strategy to analyze drought contingency plans in its manuals and devise methods for those plans to account for a changing climate. As of May 2016, the Corps was conducting pilot updates of drought contingency plans at five high-priority projects to help test methods and tools for those plans to account for a changing climate. In addition to its efforts related to drought contingency plans, the Corps is studying the use of forecasting tools to determine whether water control manuals can be adjusted to improve water-supply and flood-control operations at two projects in California—Folsom Dam and Lake Mendocino. Corps officials told us that the forecasts must be accurate in terms of space and time to allow the reservoirs to retain some water for future supply as long as the retained water can be safely released, if necessary, prior to the next storm. Corps headquarters officials said that once they determine how forecasting can be incorporated into these projects, the agency may consider using forecast-based operations at other projects. Four of the five knowledgeable stakeholders we interviewed said that it would be important for the Corps to consider using such operations to help ensure efficiency and to be able to respond to changing patterns of precipitation. Conclusions
The Corps has revised some of the water control manuals used to operate its water resources projects, which serve important public purposes such as flood control, irrigation, and water supply. Without tracking which manuals need revision, it is difficult for the Corps to know the universe of projects that may not be operating in a way that reflects current conditions as called for in the Corps’ engineer manual and to prioritize revisions as needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the efficiency of Corps operations at reservoir projects and to assist the Corps in meeting the requirement of the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 to update the Corps’ 1992 reservoir report, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following two actions: develop guidance on what activities constitute a review of a water control manual and how to document that review; and track consistent information on the status of water control manuals, including whether they need revisions, and prioritize revisions as needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps owns and operates water resource projects, including more than 700 dams and their associated reservoirs across the country, for such purposes as flood control, hydropower, and water supply. To manage and operate each project, the Corps' districts use water control manuals to guide project operations. These manuals include water control plans that describe the policies and procedures for deciding how much water to release from reservoirs. However, many of the Corps' projects were built more than 50 years ago, and stakeholders have raised concerns that these manuals have not been revised to account for changing conditions.
The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 included a provision for GAO to study the Corps' reviews of project operations, including whether practices could better prepare the agency for extreme weather. This report (1) examines the extent to which the Corps has reviewed or revised selected water control manuals and (2) describes the Corps' efforts to improve its ability to respond to extreme weather. GAO reviewed the Corps' guidance on project operations; examined agency practices; and interviewed Corps officials from headquarters, all 8 divisions, and 15 districts—selected, in part, on regional differences in weather conditions.
What GAO Found
According to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) officials, the agency conducts ongoing, informal reviews of selected water control manuals and has revised some of them, but the extent of the reviews and revisions is unclear because they are not documented or tracked, respectively. The Corps' engineer regulations state that water control manuals should be reviewed no less than every 10 years so that they can be revised as necessary. However, officials from all 15 districts GAO interviewed said they do not document informal reviews of water control manuals because they consider such reviews part of the daily routine of operating projects. The Corps does not have guidance, consistent with federal standards for internal control, on what activities constitute a review or how to document the results of reviews. Without such guidance, the Corps does not have reasonable assurance that it will consistently conduct reviews and document them to provide a means to retain organizational knowledge. The Corps' engineer regulations also state that water control manuals shall be revised as needed, but the extent to which manuals have been revised or need revision remains unknown because the Corps' divisions do not track consistent information about manuals. For example, based on GAO's review of the Corps' documents, one of the eight divisions tracked whether the water control plans in its water control manuals reflected actual operations of a project, but the remaining seven did not. While the Corps has revised certain water control manuals as called for by its regulations, district officials GAO interviewed said additional manuals need revision. However, the Corps does not track consistent information on manuals needing revision, in accordance with federal internal control standards. Without tracking which manuals need revision, it is difficult for the Corps to know the universe of projects that may not be operating in a way that reflects current conditions as called for in the Corps' engineer regulations.
The Corps has efforts under way to improve its ability to respond to extreme weather, including developing a strategy to revise drought contingency plans and studying the use of forecasting to make decisions on project operations. To better respond to drought, the Corps is developing a strategy to analyze drought contingency plans in its water control manuals to account for a changing climate. As of May 2016, the Corps was conducting, as a pilot, updates of five projects' drought contingency plans to help test methods and tools for future use in other plans. The Corps is also studying the use of forecasting tools to improve water supply and flood control operations at two projects in California by evaluating if they can retain storm water for future supply as long as the retained water can safely be released, if necessary, prior to the next storm. Knowledgeable stakeholders GAO interviewed said it is important for the Corps to consider forecast-based operations at its projects to help ensure efficient operations and to be able to respond to changing patterns of precipitation. Corps officials said the agency may consider doing so once the two California projects are completed in 2017.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps develop guidance on what constitutes a water control manual's review and how to document it and track which manuals need revision. The agency concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-750 | gao_GAO-06-750_0 | CMS Oversees the Medicare & Medicaid Programs
CMS, a component of HHS, is responsible for overseeing two major health programs. It administers the Medicare program—the nation’s largest health insurance program—which covers more than 42 million Americans. In particular, CMS relies on a contractor-owned and operated network from which it purchases networking services to provide connectivity to its business partners. Significant Network Weaknesses Place Medical Data at Risk
Although CMS has many information security controls in place that are designed to safeguard the communication network, there were significant weaknesses in electronic access controls and other controls designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the sensitive, personally identifiable medical information it transmits. A key reason for these weaknesses was that CMS did not always ensure the effective implementation of its security policies and standards. As a result, sensitive, personally identifiable, medical data traversing this network are vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure, and these weaknesses could lead to disruptions in CMS operations. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing electronic controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, and information. Electronic access controls include those related to user identification and authentication, authorization, boundary protection, cryptography, and auditing and monitoring of security-related events. In addition, certain network devices used vulnerable operating system software. CMS did not always ensure that its contractor sufficiently segregate incompatible responsibilities and duties. Security Policies Were Not Always Fully Implemented
Although CMS has developed and documented information security policies, a key reason for the communication network weaknesses was that CMS did not always ensure the effective implementation of its security policies and standards. Conclusions
Although CMS had many information security controls designed to safeguard the communication network, missing controls and ineffective implementation of certain controls, when considered collectively, threaten the confidentiality and availability of the sensitive, personally identifiable medical information it transmits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), a component within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for overseeing the Medicare and Medicaid programs--the nation's largest health insurance programs--which benefit about one in every four Americans. CMS relies on a contractor-owned and operated network to facilitate communication and data transmission among CMS business related entities. Effective information security controls are essential to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of this sensitive information. At Congress's request, GAO assessed the effectiveness of information security controls over the communication network used by CMS by conducting a technical assessment of the information security controls that are currently in place.
What GAO Found
Although CMS had many key information security controls in place--which had been designed to safeguard the communication network--some were missing, and existing ones had not always been effectively implemented. Significant weaknesses in electronic access and other system controls threatened the confidentiality and availability of sensitive CMS financial and medical information when it was transmitted across the network. CMS did not always ensure that its contractor effectively implemented electronic access controls designed to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to sensitive computing resources and devices used to support the communication network. GAO discovered numerous vulnerabilities in several areas: user identification and authentication, user authorization, system boundary protection, cryptography, and auditing and monitoring of security-related events. There were also weaknesses in controls that had been designed to ensure that secure configurations would be implemented on network devices and that incompatible duties would be sufficiently segregated. A key reason for these weaknesses is that CMS did not always ensure that its security policies and standards were implemented effectively. As a result, sensitive, personally identifiable medical data traversing the network is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure and these weaknesses could lead to disruptions in CMS services. |
gao_GAO-15-580T | gao_GAO-15-580T_0 | High Risk List Designation Status Depends on Program Significance, Effects, and Status of Corrective Measures
Criteria for Addition to the High Risk List
To determine which federal government programs and functions should be designated high risk, we use our guidance document, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.consider qualitative factors, such as whether the risk involves public health or safety, service delivery, national security, national defense, economic growth, or privacy or citizens’ rights; or could result in significantly impaired service, program failure, injury or loss of life, or significantly reduced economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. Criteria for Removal of High-Risk Designation
Since 1990, more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have been removed from the High Risk List because sufficient progress was made in addressing the problems identified. The five criteria for removal are
Leadership Commitment. Agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to resolve the risk(s). Action Plan. Monitoring. Demonstrated Progress. Five Broad Areas of Concern Contributed to Designation of VA Health Care as High Risk
In designating VA as a high-risk area, we categorized our concerns about VA’s ability to ensure the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of veterans’ health care, into five broad areas: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3) information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff, and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. We have made numerous recommendations that aim to address weaknesses in VA’s management and oversight of its health care system. Ambiguous VA policies lead to inconsistency in the way VA facilities carry out processes at the local level. In numerous reports, we have found that this ambiguity and inconsistency may pose risks for veterans’ access to VA health care, or for the quality and safety of VA health care they receive. We also have found weaknesses in VA’s ability to hold its health care facilities accountable and ensure that identified problems are resolved in a timely and appropriate manner. Of particular concern is the outdated, inefficient nature of certain systems, along with a lack of system interoperability—the ability to exchange information—which presents risks to the timeliness, quality, and safety of VA health care. In a number of reports, we have identified gaps in VA training that could put the quality and safety of veterans’ health at risk. In many of our reports, we have found gaps in the availability of data required by VA to efficiently identify resource needs and to ensure that resources are effectively allocated across the VA health care system. Sustained Attention and Focus Needed to Resolve More than 100 Recommendations for Improvement in VA Health Care
VA has taken actions to address some of the recommendations we have made related to VA health care; however, there are currently more than 100 that have yet to be fully resolved, including recommendations related to the five broad areas of concern highlighted above. For example, to ensure that its facilities are carrying out processes at the local level more consistently—such as scheduling veterans’ medical appointments—VA needs to clarify its existing policies. The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act included a number of provisions intended to help VA address systemic weaknesses. In the spring and summer of 2014, congressional committees held more than 20 hearings to address identified weaknesses in the VA health care system. Sustained congressional attention to these issues will help ensure that VA continues to make progress in improving the delivery of health care services to veterans. We plan to continue monitoring VA’s efforts to improve the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of veterans’ health care. An assessment of the status of VA health care’s high-risk designation will be done during our next update in 2017. Veterans’ Health Care: Oversight of Tissue Product Safety. VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Improve Administration of the Provider Performance Pay and Award Systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in the nation, including 150 medical centers and more than 800 community-based outpatient clinics. Enrollment in the VA health care system has grown significantly, increasing from 6.8 to 8.9 million veterans between fiscal years 2002 and 2013. Over this same period, Congress has provided steady increases in VA's health care budget, increasing from $23.0 billion to $55.5 billion.
Risks to the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of veterans' health care, along with other persistent weaknesses GAO and others have identified in recent years, raised serious concerns about VA's management and oversight of its health care system. Based on these concerns, GAO designated VA health care a high-risk area and added it to GAO's High Risk List in 2015.
Since 1990, GAO has regularly updated the list of government operations that it has identified as high risk due to their vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
This statement addresses (1) the criteria for the addition to and removal from the High Risk List, (2) specific areas of concern identified in VA health care that led to its high-risk designation; and (3) actions needed to address the VA health care high-risk area.
What GAO Found
To determine which federal government programs and functions should be designated high risk, GAO considers a number of factors. For example, it assesses whether the risk involves public health or safety, service delivery, national security, national defense, economic growth, or privacy or citizens' rights, or whether the risk could result in significantly impaired service, program failure, injury or loss of life, or significantly reduced economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. There are five criteria for removal from the High Risk List: leadership commitment, capacity (people and resources needed to resolve the risk), development of an action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress in resolving the risk.
In designating the health care system of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a high-risk area, GAO categorized its concerns about VA's ability to ensure the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of veterans' health care, into five broad areas:
1. Ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes. GAO found ambiguous VA policies lead to inconsistency in the way its facilities carry out processes at the local level, which may pose risks for veterans' access to VA health care, or for the quality and safety of VA health care.
2. Inadequate oversight and accountability. GAO found weaknesses in VA's ability to hold its health care facilities accountable and ensure that identified problems are resolved in a timely and appropriate manner.
3. Information technology challenges. Of particular concern is the outdated, inefficient nature of certain systems, along with a lack of system interoperability.
4. Inadequate training for VA staff. GAO has identified gaps in VA training that could put the quality and safety of veterans' health at risk or training requirements that were particularly burdensome to complete.
5. Unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. GAO has found gaps in the availability of data required by VA to efficiently identify resource needs and to ensure that resources are effectively allocated across the VA health care system.
VA has taken actions to address some of the recommendations GAO has made related to VA health care, including those related to the five broad areas of concern highlighted above; however, there are currently more than 100 that have yet to be fully resolved. For example, to ensure that processes are being carried out more consistently at the local level--such as scheduling veterans' medical appointments--VA needs to clarify its existing policies, as well as strengthen its oversight and accountability across its facilities. The Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 included a number of provisions intended to help VA address systemic weaknesses in its health care system. Effective implementation, coupled with sustained congressional attention to these issues, will help ensure that VA continues to make progress in improving the delivery of health care services to veterans. GAO plans to continue monitoring VA's efforts to improve veterans' health care. An assessment of the status of VA health care's high-risk designation will be done during GAO's next update in 2017. |
gao_GAO-05-370 | gao_GAO-05-370_0 | NCAP Crash Tests Vehicles, Rates Their Safety, and Reports the Results to the Public
NHTSA conducts three types of tests in NCAP: a full frontal crash test, an angled side crash test, and a rollover test. NCAP Conducts Three Tests—Full Frontal, Side, and Rollover
Every year NHTSA tests new vehicles that are predicted to have high sales volume, have been redesigned with structural changes, or have improved safety equipment. U.S. NCAP Differs from Other Crash Programs in Testing, Rating, Reporting, and Government Involvement
We identified four other programs that crash test vehicles and report the results to the public—the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (Insurance Institute) program in the United States and NCAP programs in Australia, Europe, and Japan. All of the programs shared the U.S. NCAP goals of providing manufacturers with an incentive to produce safer vehicles and providing consumers with comparative safety information on the vehicles they plan to purchase. The U.S. NCAP is the only program to conduct a vehicle rollover test. Further, each program except the Insurance Institute uses stars to convey the test results, and some programs combine individual ratings into summary ratings in an effort to make it easier for the public to understand crash test results. However, the program is at a crossroads where it will need to change to maintain its relevance. The usefulness of the current tests has been eroded by changes in the vehicle fleet that have occurred since the program began. NHTSA also has opportunities to enhance the presentation and timeliness of information provided to consumers. NCAP Has Encouraged Improvement in Vehicle Safety and Provided the Public with Vehicle Safety Information
NCAP testing has contributed to more crashworthy passenger vehicles and NHTSA has informed the public of test results. NCAP frontal and side crash test results have improved to a point where there is little difference among most vehicles’ ratings. Using this higher barrier has resulted in different scores than NHTSA’s NCAP. All types of vehicles can roll over. Conclusions
While NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program has contributed to making safer vehicles, it is at a crossroads where it will need to change to remain relevant. While we believe there are opportunities to enhance NCAP by developing approaches to better measure the interaction of large and small vehicles and occupant protection in rollovers, rating technologies that help prevent crashes from occurring, and using different injury measures to rate the crash results, there are challenges that must be considered and addressed before changes can be implemented. In addition, NHTSA will need to enhance the timeliness of testing and presentation of the New Car Assessment Program information. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to examine the future direction of the New Car Assessment Program to maximize its value in providing an incentive for manufacturers to improve vehicle safety and informing the public about the relative safety of vehicles. To compare NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program with other programs that test vehicles and report vehicle safety results to the public, we researched literature and interviewed NHTSA officials to identify three foreign New Car Assessment Programs (in Australia, Europe, and Japan) and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety as a domestic program. Figure 45 shows how the program communicates its overall and pedestrian ratings to consumers on the Internet. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, 42,643 people were killed and more than 2.8 million people were injured in motor vehicle crashes. Efforts to reduce fatalities on the nation's roadways include the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's (NHTSA) New Car Assessment Program. Under this program, NHTSA conducts vehicle crash and rollover tests to encourage manufacturers to make safety improvements to new vehicles and provide the public with information on the relative safety of vehicles. GAO examined (1) how NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program crash tests vehicles, rates their safety, and reports the results to the public; (2) how NHTSA's program compares to other programs that crash test vehicles and report results to the public; and (3) the impact of the program and opportunities to enhance its effectiveness.
What GAO Found
NHTSA conducts three types of tests in the New Car Assessment Program--full frontal and angled side crash tests and a rollover test. Each year, NHTSA tests new vehicles that are expected to have high sales volume, have been redesigned with structural changes, or have improved safety equipment. Based on test results, vehicles receive ratings from one to five stars, with five stars being the best, to indicate the vehicles' relative crashworthiness and which are less likely to roll over. NHTSA makes ratings available to the public on the Internet and through a brochure. Other publications, such as Consumer Reports, use NHTSA's test results in their safety assessments. GAO identified four other programs--the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety's program and the New Car Assessment Programs in Australia, Europe, and Japan--that crash test vehicles and report the results to the public. They share the goals of encouraging manufacturers to improve vehicle safety and providing safety information to consumers. These programs conduct different types of frontal and side crash tests, and some perform other tests, such as pedestrian tests, that are not conducted under the U.S. program. Only the U.S. program conducts a rollover test. The other programs measure test results differently and include more potential injuries to occupants in ratings. They also reported their test results differently, with all summarizing at least some of the scores or combining them into an overall crashworthiness rating to make comparisons easier. NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program has been successful in encouraging manufacturers to make safer vehicles and providing information to consumers. However, the program is at a crossroads where it will need to change to maintain its relevance. The usefulness of the current tests has been eroded by the growing number of larger pickups, minivans, and sport utility vehicles in the vehicle fleet since the program began. In addition, NCAP scores have increased to the point where there is little difference in vehicle ratings. As a result, the program provides little incentive for manufacturers to further improve safety, and consumers can see few differences among new vehicles. Opportunities to enhance the program include developing approaches to better measure the interaction of large and small vehicles and occupant protection in rollovers, rating technologies that help prevent crashes, and using different injury measures to rate the crash results. NHTSA also has opportunities to enhance the presentation and timeliness of the information provided to consumers. |
gao_GAO-15-161 | gao_GAO-15-161_0 | The two CAFTA-DR countries (El Salvador and Guatemala) and the two countries with bilateral FTAs (Peru and Chile) that we visited reflect a range of national per capita incomes. Partners Have Taken Steps to Improve Enviromental Protection, with U.S. Assistance, but Continue to Face Challenges
According to officials in Chile, Peru, El Salvador, and Guatemala, their countries passed or made changes to their environmental laws and established or strengthened environmental institutions since signing their respective FTAs. U.S. agencies worked with these partners under environmental cooperation agreements to help them build capacity to meet FTA environmental commitments. Peru
U.S., Peruvian, and NGO officials credit the FTA with helping the country take steps to improve environmental protection. 2.) 3.) 5.) U.S. Resources for Cooperation Activities Have Declined Since Fiscal Year 2009
U.S. funding resources for FTA-related cooperation activities have declined since fiscal year 2009, because of a decline in CAFTA-DR funding and shifting budget priorities. In fiscal year 2013, funding for cooperation activities to countries under CAFTA-DR was 18 percent of its fiscal year 2009 level, while funding under the Peru FTA was 41 percent of its fiscal year 2009 level. For example, cooperation activities in Peru and CAFTA-DR partner countries received over 90 percent of the almost $151 million of funding for cooperation activities from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. More specifically, countries under CAFTA-DR received over $87 million in funding for cooperation activities from fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and Peru received nearly $49 million from fiscal years 2009 through Cooperation activities in Chile received over $4 million in funding 2013.since fiscal year 2009, as well. State and USTR Improved Monitoring, but USTR’s Process Lacks Key Elements
Since 2009, State has improved its management and monitoring of U.S.- funded FTA cooperation activities, by working with the Organization of American States and a private firm that specializes in monitoring and evaluation. In terms of the remaining 19 FTA partners, USTR has taken initial steps to improve monitoring FTA partner country compliance with environmental commitments—such as developing a monitoring plan. Although the bilateral plan identifies a targeted set of actions for Peru to undertake to address challenges in its forestry sector, the lack of performance indicators and time frames for completing action precludes USTR from having a clear understanding of the extent to which Peru is meeting its commitments in the bilateral plan. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance its ability to monitor partner compliance with FTA environmental commitments and provide timely and useful information to help target assistance where it is most needed, USTR should: establish time frames and develop performance indicators to assess the extent to which Peru’s actions are meeting the commitments of the U.S.–Peru bilateral action plan to address specific challenges in Peru’s forestry sector, and work with its interagency monitoring subcommittee to establish time frames and performance indicators to implement its plan for enhanced monitoring of implementation of FTA environmental commitments across all FTA partner countries. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine steps selected partner countries have taken with U.S. assistance to implement free trade agreement (FTA) environmental commitments, we analyzed the structure and provisions of the environmental chapters of the 11 FTAs that entered into force from 2003 through 2013 to identify the range of their provisions and the procedures, if any, for the receipt and consideration of public environmental submissions under those FTAs. We also examined in detail the environmental chapters in the Chile FTA, Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and Peru Trade Promotion Agreement to identify similarities and differences among their key environmental provisions. We interviewed officials from the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Department of State (State), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., and State, USAID, and host government and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials in two CAFTA-DR countries, El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as in Chile and Peru. To examine U.S. resources to assist partners in implementing environmental commitments, we collected budget data on funding of FTA environmental activities from State and USAID. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has signed free trade agreements that lower barriers to trade with 20 countries, including 5 Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. Reflecting Congress's interest in balancing commercial interests with environmental protection, the United States and FTA partners have agreed to strengthen environmental protection. In 2009, GAO recommended improved FTA monitoring. GAO was asked for an update.
This report examines, among other things: (1) steps selected partners have taken, with U.S. assistance, to implement FTA environmental commitments; (2) resources to assist partners in implementing environmental commitments; and (3) U.S. agency monitoring of cooperation activities and partner compliance with their FTA environmental commitments.
GAO reviewed FTA environmental provisions and cooperation agreements; analyzed U.S. funding data for cooperation activities from fiscal years 2003 through 2013; and evaluated documentary and testimonial evidence. GAO visited Guatemala and El Salvador, two of six CAFTA-DR countries, and Peru and Chile, and met with U.S., host government, private sector, and NGO officials. GAO selected these countries because they reflect a range of per capita income, U.S. assistance, environmental progress, and challenges.
What GAO Found
The four free trade agreement (FTA) partners that GAO selected for this review all passed environmental laws and established institutions to improve environmental protection, in line with their FTA commitments to strive to improve their laws on and levels of environmental protection. For example, Chile created enforcement agencies and modernized its system for evaluating the environmental impact of projects; El Salvador launched a National Environmental Strategy; and Guatemala created a unit to verify compliance with natural resource protections. According to U.S., Peruvian, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials, U.S. assistance has helped Peru improve management and monitoring of its forest resources. However, each FTA partner continues to face challenges in capacity and enforcement of environmental protection.
Peruvian Officials Conduct Timber Inspection
U.S. resources for cooperation activities have declined since 2009 because of shifting priorities. Peru and countries in the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) received 90 percent of the roughly $151 million of total funding for FTA cooperation activities from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. CAFTA-DR countries received over $87 million from fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and Peru received nearly $49 million from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. However, in fiscal year 2013, U.S. funding for environmental cooperation activities to CAFTA-DR countries was 18 percent of its 2009 level, and funding for Peru FTA activities was 41 percent of its 2009 level.
The Department of State has improved monitoring of environmental cooperation activities since 2009, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) developed a plan for monitoring partner compliance with FTA environmental commitments. However, USTR's monitoring lacks timeframes and performance indicators to measure partner progress in meeting FTA environmental commitments. In addition, the U.S.-Peru bilateral action plan addresses specific challenges in Peru's forestry sector and identifies actions for Peru to take, but does not include timeframes and indicators. Lack of timeframes and performance indicators precludes stakeholders and the public from having a clear understanding of the extent to which Peru is meeting its commitments since agreeing to the terms of the bilateral action plan.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USTR establish timeframes and indicators to assess the extent to which Peru is meeting commitments in the bilateral action plan and establish timeframes and indicators to implement its plan for enhanced monitoring across all FTA partner countries. |
gao_GAO-04-32 | gao_GAO-04-32_0 | Despite Industry-wide Improvement, Some Owners of Nuclear Power Plants Are Not Accumulating Sufficient Decommissioning Funds
Using our most likely economic assumptions, the combined value of the nuclear power plant owners’ decommissioning trust funds was about 47 percent higher at the end of 2000 than necessary to ensure accumulation of sufficient funds by the time the plants’ licenses expire. This situation contrasts favorably with the findings in our 1999 report, which indicated that the industry was about 3 percent below where it needed to be at the end of 1997 to ensure that enough funds would be available. When we individually analyzed the owners’ trust funds, we found that 33 owners for several different plants had not accumulated funds at a rate that would be sufficient for eventual decommissioning. Specifically, the owners had accumulated about $26.9 billion—about $8.6 billion more than we estimate they needed at that point to ensure sufficient funds. By contrast, 20 owners with ownership interests in 31 plants recently contributed less to their trust funds than we estimate they needed to put them on track to meet their decommissioning obligations. NRC’s Analysis Did Not Effectively Determine Whether Each Owner Was Accumulating Sufficient Decommissioning Funds
NRC’s analysis of the 2001 biennial decommissioning status reports was not effective in identifying owners that might not be accumulating funds at sufficient rates to pay for decommissioning costs when their plants are permanently shut down. Although the NRC reported in 2001 that all owners appeared to be on track to have sufficient funds for decommissioning, our analysis indicated that several owners might not be able to meet financial obligations for decommissioning. Second, for the plants with more than one owner, NRC did not separately assess the status of each co-owner’s trust funds relative to the co-owner’s contractual obligation to fund a certain portion of decommissioning. However, as we demonstrated with our industry-wide analysis, such an assessment for determining whether owners are accumulating sufficient funds can produce misleading results because owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out owners with less than sufficient funds, even though funds are generally not transferable among owners. Moreover, it aggregated the owners’ trust funds plant- wide instead of assessing whether each individual owner was on track to accumulate sufficient funds to pay for its share of decommissioning costs. Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The following are GAO’s comments on NRC’s letter dated October 3, 2003. However, we believe that NRC should take a more proactive approach in developing an effective method for ensuring that sufficient funds will be available for decommissioning. For example, NRC relied on the owners’ future funding plans, or on rate-setting authority decisions, in concluding that the owners were on track to fully fund decommissioning. In addition, as a practical matter, owners have contractual agreements to pay for their share of decommissioning, and the trust funds are generally not transferable among owners. In addition, based on our analysis using the actual contributions the owners recently made to their trust funds, we found that 28 owners with ownership shares in 44 plants contributed less than the amounts we estimate they will need to contribute over the remaining life of their plants to meet their decommissioning obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the shutdown of a nuclear power plant a significant radioactive waste hazard remains until the waste is removed and the plant site decommissioned. In 1999, GAO reported that the combined value of the owners' decommissioning funds was insufficient to ensure enough funds would be available for decommissioning. GAO was asked to update its 1999 report and to evaluate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) analysis of the owners' funds and its process for acting on reports that show insufficient funds.
What GAO Found
Although the collective status of the owners' decommissioning fund accounts has improved considerably since GAO's last report, some individual owners are not on track to accumulate sufficient funds for decommissioning. Based on our analysis and most likely economic assumptions, the combined value of the nuclear power plant owners' decommissioning fund accounts in 2000--about $26.9 billion--was about 47 percent greater than needed at that point to ensure that sufficient funds will be available to cover the approximately $33 billion in estimated decommissioning costs when the plants are permanently shutdown. This value contrasts with GAO's prior finding that 1997 account balances were collectively 3 percent below what was needed. However, overall industry results can be misleading. Because funds are generally not transferable from funds that have more than sufficient reserves to those with insufficient reserves, each individual owner must ensure that enough funds are available for decommissioning its particular plants. We found that 33 owners with ownership interests in a total of 42 plants had accumulated fewer funds than needed through 2000 to be on track to pay for eventual decommissioning. In addition, 20 owners with ownership interests in a total of 31 plants recently contributed less to their trust funds than we estimate they needed to put them on track to meet their decommissioning obligations. NRC's analysis of the owners' 2001 biennial reports was not effective in identifying owners that might not be accumulating sufficient funds to cover their eventual decommissioning costs. In reviewing the 2001 reports, NRC reported that all owners appeared to be on track to have sufficient funds for decommissioning. In reaching this conclusion, NRC relied on the owners' future plans for fully funding their decommissioning obligations. However, based on the owners' recent actual contributions, and using a different method, GAO found that several owners could be at risk of not meeting their financial obligations for decommissioning when these plants stop operating. In addition, for plants with more than one owner, NRC did not separately assess the status of each co-owner's trust funds against each co-owner's contractual obligation to fund decommissioning. Instead, NRC assessed whether the combined value of the trust funds for the plant as a whole was reasonable. Such an assessment for determining whether owners are accumulating sufficient funds can produce misleading results because owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out owners with less than sufficient funds even, though funds are generally not transferable among owners. Moreover, NRC has not established criteria for taking action if it determines that an owner is not accumulating sufficient funds. |
gao_GAO-04-559 | gao_GAO-04-559_0 | In 1999, INCSF was established as a foundation to provide support to INC and to provide an organizational structure for State’s funding of INC. A seven-member board of directors (the INC Leadership Council) governed INCSF. In April and May 2003, INCSF began the process of relocating its offices to Baghdad. Planned programming included news, current affairs, and programs censored by the regime in Baghdad. State’s Funding Was Generally Provided on a Short-term Basis
Beginning in March 2000, State entered into a series of cooperative agreements with INCSF that included funding totaling nearly $33 million as of September 2003, but most of this funding came under agreements and amendments provided at irregular intervals, involved some retroactive funding, and were short-term and thus affected INCSF’s ability to broadcast. About $5 million was earmarked for Liberty TV broadcasting activities, which included hiring staff and establishing studio operations. Liberty TV broadcasting actually began in August 2001. While emphasizing that it was not prepared to fund INCSF activities inside Iraq, State did offer to fund a series of activities, including publication of the newspaper, satellite TV broadcasting, information collection analysis, and startup of radio broadcasting using a transmitter based in Iran. Inability to Reach Long-term Agreements Centered on Concerns over Financial Management, Operations in Iraq, and Information Collection
Three main concerns affected State’s funding decisions for INCSF and thwarted the parties’ ability to negotiate and conclude long-term funding agreements: concerns over INCSF’s financial management and accountability based largely on the results of audits of INCSF; the desire of INCSF to operate inside Iraq, which was inconsistent with U.S. policy; and State’s increasing concerns about the appropriateness and merits of funding INCSF’s information collection program. INCSF resisted this policy. State’s initial proposal for the bridge grant caused great concern in INCSF for several reasons. On May 1, 2002, Liberty TV stopped its broadcasting operations. At a meeting of top INCSF and State officials in late May 2002, State officials said that the department would no longer fund the information collection program. Third, and most important, INCSF was not willing to accept an agreement without funding for the information collection program. However, Liberty TV did not become operational, primarily due to disagreements between State and INCSF over the amount of the funding provided and the time period of State’s commitment. State funding of INCSF continued through September 2003 and funds were available for television operations. According to an INCSF representative, INCSF decided in May 2003 that it did not have a dependable offer from the Department of State to resume Liberty TV broadcasts. State also said it believed our observation that State and INCSF, through their inability to work together to restart Liberty TV, missed a chance to reach the Iraqi people at critical times prior to and during the war in Iraq lay outside the scope of our review. INCSF agreed that due to the inability of State and INCSF to work together to restart Liberty TV, important opportunities to broadcast to the Iraqi people were lost. Scope and Methodology
To document the history of State’s funding for INCSF programs and the issues affecting its funding decisions, we reviewed State’s cooperative agreement files. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the efforts by the United States to oust Saddam Hussein, a critical element of U.S. policy included funding the Iraqi National Congress as the lead Iraqi opposition coalition. In 1999, the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) was established to provide an organizational structure for Department of State funding. From March 2000 until September 2003, the Department of State funded several INCSF programs, including television broadcasting. INCSF's broadcasting goals included broadcasts into Iraq focusing on providing the Iraqi people unbiased news and information and updating them on efforts to bring democracy to Iraq. GAO was asked to review (1) the history of the Department of State's funding of INCSF broadcasting activities and (2) the key issues affecting State's funding decisions.
What GAO Found
State's funding of INCSF programs totaled nearly $33 million for the period March 2000 through September 2003. This money was made available through 23 cooperative agreements and amendments that provided shortterm funding at irregular intervals. The funds were provided for several purposes, including establishing new satellite television capability (Liberty TV), newspaper publication, and information collection programs. About $10 million was earmarked for Liberty TV broadcasting activities, which included hiring staff, establishing studio operations, and actual broadcasting. There were several periods during which State did not have an agreement to fund INCSF's program, causing State to later fund INCSF activities retroactively. State's funding approach affected INCSF's ability to conduct television broadcast operations. Liberty TV broadcasted from August 2001 to May 2002, when funding shortages caused by funding and policy disputes between State and INCSF resulted in termination of broadcasting. Attempts to restart Liberty TV failed due to a combination of factors, including continued disagreements between INCSF and State over funding requirements for the broadcasts, the rapidly changing conditions associated with the war in Iraq, and INCSF's relocation of operations to Iraq in May 2003. INCSF repeatedly complained to State that the short-term nature of the funding agreements made it difficult to run an effective television broadcasting operation. State cited three reasons why it was unable to reach long-term funding agreements with INCSF: (1) State was concerned about INCSF's accountability for funds and operational costs, based largely on results of audits of INCSF, and remained concerned even after INCSF took steps to improve its accountability during late 2001 and 2002; (2) INCSF resisted U.S. government policy prohibiting INCSF operations inside Iraq; and (3) State questioned both the usefulness of INCSF's information collection program and whether it was appropriate for State to fund it. (In May 2002 State decided to drop its funding for the information collection program, effective August 2002.) Against this background and the sporadic funding arrangements that characterized the program, the process of proposal and counterproposal continued without producing agreements that could lead to restarting Liberty TV. Through their inability to work together to restart Liberty TV, State and INCSF missed a chance to reach the Iraqi people at critical times prior to and during the March 2003 war in Iraq. |
gao_GAO-04-100 | gao_GAO-04-100_0 | Through State’s security upgrade program, the department has done much since the 1998 bombings to upgrade physical security at existing overseas posts without building new embassy or consulate compounds. However, even with these improvements, most office facilities do not meet security standards that State developed to protect overseas diplomatic office facilities from terrorist attacks and other dangers. OBO Mechanisms to More Effectively Manage the Embassy Construction Program
Recognizing past problems managing State’s overseas construction program, OBO in 2001 began to institute organizational and management reforms in its structure and operations. OBO has instituted the following seven key mechanisms over the past 3 years to better manage its expanded embassy construction program: the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan, which prioritizes and summarizes capital projects over 6 years; monthly project reviews at headquarters, where senior management officials review ongoing projects to identify and resolve current or potential issues at all stages of the project; an Industry Advisory Panel, which advises OBO on industry best practices in the construction sector; efforts to broaden the contractor pool through events such as Industry Day, where interested contractors are invited to learn about OBO’s construction program; ongoing work to standardize and streamline the planning, design, and construction processes, including the initiation of design-build contract delivery and a standard embassy design for most projects; additional training for OBO headquarters and field staff; and advance identification and acquisition of sites. According to the latest version of the plan, State plans to start replacing facilities at 75 vulnerable posts from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2008 at an estimated cost of $7.4 billion. However, as discussed in the following section, it is still too early in the new program’s implementation to assess their effectiveness in achieving these goals. Status of and Challenges Facing the Construction Program
As of September 30, 2003, State had started construction of 22 projects to replace embassies and consulates at risk of terrorist or other attacks. Over half of the 22 projects have faced challenges that have led or, if not overcome, could lead to extensions to or cost increases in the construction contract. OBO reports attribute project delays to such factors as changes in project design and security requirements, difficulties hiring appropriate labor, differing site conditions, and civil unrest. The U.S. government has had mixed success in dealing with this problem of coordinating funding. In the comments, State said that the report is a fair and accurate representation overall of the department’s overseas construction process and provided additional information on (1) how State prioritizes and plans for its construction projects, (2) the problems in funding USAID building projects, and (3) other capital construction projects being implemented by OBO. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has mechanisms in place to more effectively manage State’s construction program to replace vulnerable embassies and consulates, we (1) reviewed the report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel and earlier GAO reports that outlined problems in embassy security and State’s embassy construction program and (2) interviewed OBO and contractor officials about specific steps OBO has taken to improve program management, including the usefulness of and rationale behind both the standard embassy design for new embassy and consulate compounds and the design-build contract delivery method. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa, the State Department has done much to improve physical security at overseas posts. However, most overseas diplomatic office facilities still do not meet the security standards State developed to protect these sites from terrorist attacks and other dangers. To correct this problem, State in 1999 embarked on an estimated $21 billion embassy construction program. The program's key objective is to provide secure, safe, and functional compounds for employees overseas--in most cases by building replacement facilities. In 2001, State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)--which manages the program--began instituting reforms in its structure and operations to meet the challenges of the embassy construction program. This report discusses (1) OBO's mechanisms for more effectively managing the embassy construction program and (2) the status of and challenges facing the program. We received comments from State, which said that the report is a fair and accurate representation overall of the Department's overseas construction process.
What GAO Found
OBO in 2001 began instituting organizational and management reforms designed to cut costs, put in place standard designs and review processes, and reduce the construction period for new embassies and consulates. OBO now has mechanisms to more effectively manage the embassy construction program, including (1) an annual Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan to guide the planning and execution of the program over a 6-year period; (2) monthly project reviews at headquarters; (3) an Industry Advisory Panel for input on current best practices in the construction industry; (4) expanded outreach to contractors in an effort to increase the number of bidders; (5) ongoing work to standardize and streamline the planning, design, and construction processes, including initiation of design-build contract delivery and a standard embassy design for most projects; (6) additional training for OBO headquarters and field staff; and (7) advance identification and acquisition of sites. State's program to replace about 185 vulnerable embassies and consulates is in its early stages, but the pace of initiating and completing new construction projects has increased significantly over the past two fiscal years. As of September 30, 2003, State had started construction of 22 projects to replace facilities at risk of terrorist or other attacks. Overall, 16 projects have encountered challenges that have led or, if not overcome, could ultimately lead to extensions in the completion date or cost increases in the construction contract. According to OBO, project delays have occurred because of such factors as changes in project design and security requirements; difficulties hiring appropriate American and local labor with the necessary clearances and skills; differing site conditions; and unforeseen events such as civil unrest. In addition, the U.S. government has had problems coordinating funding for projects that include buildings for the U.S. Agency for International Development. None of the projects started since OBO instituted its reforms has been completed; thus GAO believes it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the reforms in ensuring that new embassy and consulate compounds are built within the approved project budget and on time. |
gao_GAO-07-913 | gao_GAO-07-913_0 | As the steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal government is accountable for how its agencies and grantees spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars and is responsible for safeguarding those funds against improper payments as well as having mechanisms in place to recoup those funds when improper payments occur. DHS Has Made Some Progress in Implementing the Requirements of IPIA, but Remains Noncompliant
While DHS has taken actions over the last 3 fiscal years to implement IPIA requirements, much more work needs to be done. Until DHS is able to fully assess its programs, the potential magnitude of improper payments cannot be estimated. Over $6 billion of this amount related to payments for grant programs. Required Risk Assessments Not Completed for All Programs for Fiscal Year 2006
Although DHS made progress in identifying its programs in fiscal year 2006, the agency did not perform a risk assessment for all programs and activities—covering approximately $13 billion of its more than $29 billion in disbursements subject to IPIA. Since DHS did not perform the required first step—a risk assessment—on programs with approximately $13 billion of its more than $29 billion in disbursements subject to IPIA, it is unknown whether these programs are at high risk for issuing improper payments. Developing a plan to assess risk and potentially test grant payments is important because of noted financial management weaknesses of DHS grantees. Assessing and, if necessary, testing these grant programs will allow DHS to gain an understanding of its risk in this area related to improper payments and potentially reduce future improper payments. DHS’s planning and assessment process to develop its IPIA corrective action plan enabled the agency to update its guidance for its components and, according to DHS, the agency plans to focus on program identification and risk assessments during fiscal year 2007. DHS Has Developed Plans to Reduce Improper Payments for FEMA’s Two Disaster-Related Programs, but Effects Remain Unknown
In addition to its overall corrective action plan to comply with IPIA, DHS, as required by IPIA and related OMB implementing guidance, has developed plans to reduce improper payments related to the two high-risk programs it identified in its fiscal year 2006 testing—FEMA’s IHP assistance payments and disaster-related vendor payment programs. DHS’s Efforts to Comply with the Recovery Auditing Act and to Recover Improper Payments Need to Be Enhanced
For the last 3 years, DHS has contracted with a recovery auditing firm to perform recovery audit work to comply with the Recovery Auditing Act; however, activities in this area could be improved. Specifically, DHS encountered problems that kept it from reporting on recovery audit efforts during fiscal year 2006. In addition, DHS did not perform recovery auditing efforts at the fourth component identified as meeting the criteria. However, DHS’s internal guidance does not require components to include information in its annual PAR related to its efforts to recover improper payments identified during IPIA testing and, as a result, DHS has not yet reported on its efforts to recover improper disaster-related vendor payments identified and has reported limited information on its efforts to recover identified improper IHP assistance payments. Having components report this information in the annual PAR would provide a more complete picture of the agency’s actions to recover payments that it has identified as being improper. DHS noted that significant actions under way include strengthening the department’s financial management and oversight functions to improve the DHS control environment and implementing risk assessments to build a foundation for a sustainable IPIA program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine to what extent the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented the requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), we compared the IPIA legislation, and the related Office of Management and Budget (OMB) implementing guidance, with DHS improper payment risk assessment methodologies, and IPIA Performance and Accountability Report (PAR) information for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is accountable for how its agencies and grantees spend more than $2 trillion of taxpayer dollars and is responsible for safeguarding those funds against improper payments as well as for recouping those funds when improper payments occur. The Congress enacted the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) and the Recovery Auditing Act to address these issues. Fiscal year 2006 marked the third year that agencies were required to report improper payment and recovery audit information in their Performance and Accountability Reports. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported limited information during these 3 years. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which DHS has implemented the requirements of IPIA, (2) identify actions DHS has under way to improve IPIA compliance and reporting, and (3) determine what efforts DHS has in place to recover improper payments. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed DHS's internal guidance and action plans, and reviewed information reported in its Performance and Accountability Reports.
What GAO Found
DHS has made some progress in implementing IPIA requirements, but much more work remains for the agency to become compliant with IPIA. For example, while DHS has made progress in identifying its programs, for fiscal year 2006, the agency did not perform the required first step--a risk assessment--on approximately $13 billion of its more than $29 billion in disbursements subject to IPIA. Until DHS fully assesses its programs, the potential magnitude of improper payments is unknown. For the remaining $16 billion, DHS determined that two programs-- Individuals and Households Program (IHP) assistance payments and disaster-related vendor payments--were at high risk for issuing improper payments and reported related estimates. For the $13 billion for which no risk assessment was performed, DHS has encountered challenges with IPIA implementation. Of this amount, over $6 billion relates to payments for grant programs. Developing a plan to assess risk and potentially test grant payments is important given that the DHS Office of Inspector General, GAO, and other auditors have identified weaknesses in grant programs. This will allow DHS to gain a better understanding of its risk for improper payments and potentially reduce future improper payments. DHS has actions under way to improve IPIA reporting and compliance, but does not plan to be fully compliant in fiscal year 2007. DHS has prepared a plan to address its noncompliance with IPIA, which included updating its guidance to focus on program identification and risk assessments to build a foundation for a sustainable IPIA program. In addition, DHS has developed plans to reduce improper payments related to its two identified high-risk programs. However, until DHS fully completes the required risk assessments for all of its programs and then estimates for risk-susceptible programs, it is not known whether other programs have significant improper payments that also need to be addressed. In addition, DHS's efforts to recover improper payments could be improved. According to DHS, four of its components meet the criteria for recovery auditing as specified in the Recovery Auditing Act. These four components make at least $4 billion of contractor payments each fiscal year. DHS encountered problems that kept it from reporting on recovery audit efforts during fiscal year 2006 for three of the four components, and did not perform recovery auditing at the fourth component. In March 2007, DHS revised its guidance to clarify what is expected; however, ongoing oversight will be necessary to monitor the components' progress. In addition, DHS has reported limited information on its efforts to recover specific improper payments identified during its testing of high-risk programs. Although DHS is not currently required to do so, reporting this information would provide a more complete picture of the agency's actions to recover payments that it has identified as being improper. |
gao_GAO-17-325 | gao_GAO-17-325_0 | Several components within DOJ, including the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) and the Office of Justice Programs, which includes the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), provide grants to help state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies combat human trafficking and to support nongovernmental organizations and others in assisting trafficking victims or conducting research on human trafficking in the United States. While Federal Agencies Generally Maintain Data on Human Trafficking Cases in Indian Country, They Do Not Maintain Data on Native American Status of Victims
Three of the Four Investigative and Prosecutorial Agencies Maintain Data on Human Trafficking Cases in Indian Country
All four agencies that have the authority to investigate or prosecute human trafficking in Indian country—FBI, BIA, ICE HSI, and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO)—are required to record in their case management systems if a human trafficking offense was involved in the case. Three of these agencies—FBI, BIA, and the USAOs—also record in their case management systems whether the crime took place in Indian country. ICE HSI officials explained that they do not have a field for Indian country in their case management system because, unlike BIA and the FBI, ICE HSI is not generally involved in criminal investigations in Indian country; rather, ICE HSI would only conduct an investigation in Indian country if specifically invited by a tribe to do so. Table 1 provides the number of federal human trafficking investigations and prosecutions in Indian country, by agency, from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Most of the Federal Investigative and Prosecutorial Agencies that Address Human Trafficking Do Not Consistently Collect Native American Status of Victims in Their Cases
Three of the four federal agencies that investigate or prosecute human trafficking-related crimes do not require their agents or attorneys to consistently collect or record the race or ethnicity, including Native American status, of victims in their cases. At Least 50 Federal Grant Programs Can Be Used to Address Human Trafficking in Indian Country or of Native Americans, but Number of Native American Victims Served Is Unknown
DOJ, HHS, and DHS Grant Programs that Address Human Trafficking in Indian Country or of Native Americans Can Be Used to Foster Collaboration and Provide Training and Victim Assistance, among Other Things
DOJ, HHS, and DHS administered at least 50 grant programs from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 that could help address human trafficking in Indian country or of Native Americans. However, the total number of Native American human trafficking victims who received services under these grant programs is unknown. DOJ and HHS Do Not Require Grantees to Report Data on the Number of Native American Victims Served
Among the 21 grant programs administered by DOJ and HHS that allowed for the provision of victim services, the number of Native American human trafficking victims who received services is unknown because agencies generally did not require grantees to report the Native American status of victims served. Also, while Native American status is generally not a factor for determining whether a victim can receive services or relevant for current performance measures, it may be a factor for determining how best to assist this particular demographic. According to the 2013-2017 Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States, expanding human trafficking data collection and research efforts for vulnerable populations, which include Native Americans, is an area for improvement for the federal government. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that quality information should be used to achieve objectives based on relevant data from reliable sources. Without collecting data on the Native American status of victims served, federal agencies will not know the extent to which they are achieving government-wide strategic goals to provide and improve services to vulnerable populations, including Native American crime victims. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOJ is contributing to efforts to improve data collection and service provision to Native Americans, we recommend that: the Director of OVW require grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served using grant funding, and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims; and the Assistant Attorney General for OJP direct OVC and OJJDP to require their grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served using grant funding, and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims. DOJ partially agreed with our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human trafficking—the exploitation of a person typically through force, fraud, or coercion for such purposes as forced labor, involuntary servitude or commercial sex—is occurring in the United States. Traffickers seek out persons perceived to be vulnerable. Native Americans (i.e., American Indians or Alaska Natives) are considered to be a vulnerable population. DOJ, DHS, and the Department of the Interior investigate human trafficking crimes. Primarily, DOJ and HHS provide grants to fund victim services.
GAO was asked to examine Native American human trafficking. This report focuses on federal efforts to address human trafficking, including the extent to which (1) agencies collect and maintain data on investigations and prosecutions of human trafficking in Indian country or of Native Americans regardless of location and (2) federal grant programs are available to help address such trafficking, and how many Native American trafficking victims have received assistance through these programs. GAO reviewed human trafficking investigation and prosecution data from fiscal years 2013 to 2016; reviewed solicitations for human trafficking-related grant programs; and interviewed grant program officials.
What GAO Found
All four federal agencies that investigate or prosecute human trafficking in Indian country—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO)—are required to record in their case management systems whether a human trafficking offense was involved in the case. With the exception of ICE, these agencies are also required to record in their case management systems whether the crime took place in Indian country. ICE officials explained that the agency does not record this information because, unlike BIA and the FBI, ICE is not generally involved in criminal investigations in Indian country. Typically, ICE would only conduct an investigation in Indian country if specifically invited by a tribe to do so. Further, with the exception of BIA, these agencies do not require their agents or attorneys to collect or record Native American status of victims in their cases due to concerns about victim privacy and lack of relevance of the victim's race to the substance of the investigation or prosecution.
The Departments of Justice (DOJ), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security (DHS) administered at least 50 grant programs from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 that could help address Native American human trafficking. For example, 21 of these grant programs, which were administered by DOJ and HHS, could be used to provide services to Native American human trafficking victims. However, the total number of Native American victims who received services under these grant programs is unknown. HHS is developing a data collection tool that grantees can use to report information on human trafficking victims served, including Native American status of victims. DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) requires grantees to report Native American status of victims served, but not by type of crime. DOJ's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) do not require grantees to collect and report Native American status of victims served. However, in fiscal year 2017, OVC began providing recipients of human trafficking-specific grant programs the option to report the race or Native American status of victims served. While Native American status may not generally be a factor for determining whether a victim can receive services, it may be a factor for determining how best to assist this particular demographic. According to the 2013-2017 Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States, expanding human trafficking data collection and research efforts for Native Americans and other vulnerable populations is an area for improvement for the federal government. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that quality information should be used to achieve objectives based on relevant data from reliable sources. Without collecting data on the Native American status of victims served, federal agencies will not know the extent to which they are achieving government-wide strategic goals to provide and improve services to vulnerable populations, including Native American human trafficking victims.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ require its grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims. DOJ partially concurred with the recommendation. GAO clarified the recommendation and maintains action is needed. |
gao_GAO-17-40 | gao_GAO-17-40_0 | Background
Coast Guard is the federal agency responsible for oversight of U.S. merchant marine credentialing and licensing. The STCW certification process is intended to ensure that the training a mariner receives, and the assessment of a mariner’s skills after the training is completed, supports the goal of placing qualified mariners on- board merchant vessels. STCW Training Providers We Surveyed Reported Satisfaction with Coast Guard Guidance, but Reported Delay in Quality Assurance Guidance May Affect STCW Implementation
Coast Guard Has Provided Guidance to Training Providers Through Outreach Activities and Guidance Documents
Coast Guard has provided guidance to training providers to implement the revised STCW requirements generally in two ways. In addition, Coast Guard officials said they met with the training institutions, including the maritime academies, to help implement the revised requirements and that they continue to provide assistance to all training institutions. Although most survey respondents reported that they were satisfied with Coast Guard’s coordination efforts overall, most training providers also reported that they would have benefited from a more timely update of guidance on developing the required Quality Standards System (QSS). For example, most of the training providers who responded to our survey (58 percent) reported that their ability to implement the revised STCW requirements was affected by a lack of timely guidance from Coast Guard on developing the QSS. As a result, the Coast Guard plans to meet with MERPAC representatives in March 2017 to discuss whether guidance on developing the required QSS is necessary. Training Providers We Surveyed Generally Reported They Will Meet the STCW Implementation Deadline Despite Implementation Challenges Most Survey Respondents Reported They Will Meet the STCW Implementation Deadline
Most of the training providers who responded to our survey reported that as of June 2016, they expect to meet the overall January 1, 2017, deadline for implementing the revised STCW requirements (81 percent). With regard to developing a QSS, Coast Guard officials noted that since we concluded our survey in June 2016, when some training providers reported developing a QSS as a challenge, many of the training providers have succeeded in implementing QSS or expect to do so by the January 1, 2017, deadline. For additional details regarding the extent to which the respondents reported experiencing challenges in implementing the revised STCW requirements, see appendix IV. Interpreting the revised STCW requirements: The most frequently reported challenge by survey respondents was interpreting Coast Guard’s revision of the STCW requirements with 54 percent of survey respondents reporting this as a challenge. State maritime academies also reported challenges interpreting the revised STCW requirements. In addition, the Coast Guard officials stated that they are unable to speak to the challenge of recruiting qualified instructors for any specific training providers. Developing QSS: Almost half of the training providers–46 percent– reported that developing the organizations’ QSS was a challenge to meeting the deadline. Coast Guard Assessed Costs and Benefits of STCW Implementation, and Training Providers We Surveyed Reported Varying Perspectives on STCW Costs and Benefits
Coast Guard Assessed Costs and Benefits in Accordance with Key Practices for Federal Rulemaking
Coast Guard estimated the costs and benefits of implementing the revised STCW requirements in its regulatory analysis of the STCW final rule. About a third of respondents (28 to 39 percent) expect costs to be higher than Coast Guard estimated and 2 to 14 percent anticipated costs lower than Coast Guard’s estimates. For example, the U.S. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report focuses on the maritime training providers’ perspectives on the U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) guidance available to implement the revised Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requirements, their progress implementing the revised requirements, and any costs and benefits associated with implementing the new requirements. 1. 3. To what extent has Coast Guard evaluated the costs and benefits of the revised STCW requirements, and what impact, if any, do training providers report regarding the costs and benefits of implementing the requirements? To determine the extent to which Coast Guard provided sufficient guidance to training providers to implement the revised STCW requirements, we analyzed data from our survey and included relevant questions in our interviews with Coast Guard, stakeholders, and selected training providers. We reviewed Coast Guard’s updated Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVIC), which Coast Guard provided to training providers as guidance to assist with implementing the revised STCW requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Merchant mariners operate U.S. commercial ships and support national defense in emergency and war. Coast Guard issues regulations and policies to ensure merchant mariners are credentialed and meet minimum international standards. To incorporate changes made to the international STCW Convention in 2010, Coast Guard issued regulations in December 2013 that training providers must implement by January 1, 2017, to ensure mariners meet the revised requirements. These changes are intended to help reduce the risk of accidents in U.S. and international waters.
GAO was asked to review Coast Guard and training providers' implementation of the revised STCW requirements. This report addresses (1) the extent to which Coast Guard provided sufficient guidance to training providers about the revised STCW requirements; (2) the progress training providers report in implementing the revised STCW requirements; and challenges reported in doing so; and, (3) the extent to which Coast Guard evaluated costs and benefits of the revised STCW requirements, and impacts training providers report about the costs and benefits of implementing the revised requirements. GAO conducted a web-based survey from March 2016 to June 2016 of all 167 Coast Guard-approved STCW training providers. Eighty-one percent responded, although response rates varied for individual questions. GAO also reviewed Coast Guard's guidance and reports and interviewed officials.
GAO is not making recommendations.
What GAO Found
Most training providers (80 percent) who responded to GAO's survey reported that they were satisfied with guidance the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) provided to assist them in implementing the revised International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requirements. However, 58 percent of respondents, including state maritime academies, private for-profit colleges, and others, reported that the lack of timely Coast Guard guidance for developing a quality assurance process—Quality Standards System (QSS)—affected their ability to implement the revised STCW requirements. A QSS is intended to ensure that training providers have a documented quality system in place to monitor training activities. Coast Guard officials said the agency plans to meet with industry stakeholders in March 2017 to discuss whether additional QSS guidance is necessary.
Most of the training providers (81 percent) who responded to GAO's survey reported that they plan to meet the January 1, 2017, deadline to implement the revised STCW requirements, but also reported some challenges in doing so. For example, over half of the respondents (54 percent) reported that interpreting the revised STCW requirements was a challenge. To address this issue, Coast Guard has ongoing outreach efforts to obtain feedback from training providers, help them interpret Coast Guard's regulations, and determine what additional guidance is needed. Almost half of the respondents (46 percent) reported that recruiting qualified course instructors was a challenge. However, Coast Guard stated that the revised requirements related to instructor's qualifications have not changed substantially; therefore, the challenge experienced with recruiting instructors may be related to specific training providers, rather than to the revised STCW requirements. Training providers not expecting to meet the deadline for implementing the revised STCW requirements (19 percent) provided various reasons, such as a lack of funding to address the requirements, needing additional Coast Guard guidance, or lacking the time to complete the required documentation.
Coast Guard evaluated the costs and benefits of the revised STCW requirements, and training providers who responded to GAO's survey reported related impacts of implementing the revised requirements. For example, Coast Guard evaluated the average costs to training providers for developing a QSS and the costs for conducting STCW audits. About half of the surveyed training providers expected their costs would be similar to Coast Guard's estimates. About one third anticipated incurring costs higher than the Coast Guard's average estimate due to needing more time for administrative tasks than Coast Guard allowed or purchasing additional training equipment. Coast Guard officials said they estimated average costs, and therefore did not consider specific items that particular training providers may need. Over half of training providers agreed with Coast Guard's assessment of potential benefits from the revised STCW requirements, such as increased vessel safety, with most of the remaining providers expecting no effect from the STCW changes. |
gao_GAO-16-680 | gao_GAO-16-680_0 | 1). Federal Buildings Are Located in Areas of Varying Seismic Hazard, and DOD and GSA Could Do More to Identify and Mitigate Seismic Risk
Almost 40 Percent of Federally Owned and Leased Buildings Are Located in Very Strong to Extreme Earthquake Hazard Areas
As of September 2014, the federal government owned and leased almost 100,000 buildings (about 40 percent of the total approximate 252,000 federal buildings) within the United States that were located in earthquake hazard areas which could experience very strong (MMI VII) to extreme (MMI X) shaking (see table 2). DOD and GSA Have Not Fully Identified Their Exceptionally High Risk Buildings or Developed Comprehensive Seismic Safety Measures
Defining and Identifying Exceptionally High Risk Buildings
DOD components and GSA have made varied efforts to define what constitutes an “exceptionally high risk” building—those that are most susceptible to earthquake damage—and identify these buildings within their portfolios. However, DOD and GSA have not developed and implemented comprehensive seismic safety measures to mitigate the impacts of earthquakes across their building portfolios. However, based on our interviews with DOD and GSA officials and observations during site visits, we identified gaps in the extent to which agencies have implemented earthquake drills and seismic safety inspections as part of a comprehensive approach to seismic safety. ShakeAlert Is Capable of Delivering Earthquake Early Warnings, but Cannot Be Fully Implemented until Challenges are Addressed
ShakeAlert System Is Capable of Issuing Early Earthquake Warnings to Enhance Public Safety and Benefit Private Users
Public Safety
According to Shake Alert stakeholders we spoke with, the implementation of an Earthquake Early Warning (EEW) system could have numerous benefits, including providing warnings to the general public prior to shaking and giving more time for individuals to take protective measures such as to “drop, cover, and hold on.” For example, in the western United States where the system is initially being implemented, EEW is capable of providing up to a 90 second warning in California and up to a 5 minute warning in the Pacific Northwest. Conclusions
Nearly half of all Americans are exposed to potentially damaging ground shaking from earthquakes, according to USGS, with communities such as Los Angeles, Memphis, San Francisco, and Seattle being particularly vulnerable because of their locations in areas where extreme shaking could occur. These cities have taken actions to assess and mitigate earthquake risks, including mandating structural retrofits of buildings to enable them to better withstand shaking and requiring that building furnishings, equipment, and other nonstructural components be secured to prevent their displacement and causing damage when shaking occurs. Until they fully identify their exceptionally high risk buildings, DOD and GSA will be unable to fully understand the most significant earthquake risks affecting buildings for which they are responsible and develop a plan to reduce those risks—in accordance with RP 8—which could inform prioritizing funding requests for mitigations such as retrofits. Developing a program management plan that establishes management controls for integrating and managing the program’s individual components could help address these challenges. 2. Establish a program management plan that addresses, among other things, the known implementation challenges. DOD, GSA, and USGS agreed with our recommendations, as applicable to each agency. If implemented effectively, this action should begin to address the recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) What actions have select city governments taken to assess and mitigate seismic risks that could affect buildings in their jurisdictions? (2) What is the distribution of federal buildings with regard to seismic hazard areas, and to what extent have select federal agencies identified and mitigated seismic risks to their buildings? (3) What are the potential benefits of ShakeAlert and to what extent are United States Geological Survey (USGS) and stakeholders addressing technical and implementation challenges, if any, to implementing the system? A 10 percent in 50 years probability equates to an earthquake recurring and exceeding a given MMI level about every 475 years. Downtown Seattle has a 5 percent chance of experiencing violent shaking within the next 50 years, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Recent studies have identified various vulnerabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Earthquakes pose a significant threat to people and infrastructure because of their capacity to cause catastrophic casualties, property damage, and economic disruption. According to the USGS, 16 states have a relatively high likelihood of experiencing damaging ground shaking in the next 50 years, and nearly half of all Americans are exposed to potentially damaging earthquakes.
GAO was asked to review efforts to mitigate against earthquakes impacts in the United States. Specifically, this report address (1) actions select cities have taken to mitigate seismic risks, (2) the distribution of federal buildings relative to earthquake prone areas and actions to identify and mitigate seismic risks to these buildings, and (3) what is known about the benefits of USGS's earthquake early warning system, ShakeAlert, and the extent to which implementation challenges are being addressed. GAO reviewed key documents and federal authorities; collected federal building inventory information; conducted site visits to selected cities—Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Memphis; and interviewed, among others, federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
The four cities GAO visited (see figure) have taken various actions to assess and mitigate seismic risks, including identifying and assessing their high risk buildings, structurally retrofitting buildings, and requiring that furnishings and nonstructural components be secured, among other things.
Note: A 2 percent in 50 years probability equates to an earthquake recurring and exceeding a given MMI level about every 2,475 years.
About 40 percent of federally-owned and -leased buildings in the United States are located in areas where very strong to extreme shaking from earthquakes could occur. The Department of Defense (DOD) and General Services Administration (GSA), which are responsible for the majority of these buildings, have not fully identified their exceptionally high risk (EHR) buildings or prioritized and implemented comprehensive seismic safety measures. Federal agencies identified their EHR buildings as part of a government-wide effort in the 1990's, and GSA has begun taking initial steps to identify its current EHR buildings. In addition, while DOD and GSA have taken some steps to reduce the seismic risk of their buildings through seismic retrofits, disposals, and low-cost mitigation alternatives, GAO observed gaps in the extent to which these agencies have comprehensively implemented these mitigation measures, such as securing furniture. Until they fully identify their EHR buildings and prioritize and implement comprehensive safety measures, DOD and GSA will be unable to fully understand and address the vulnerabilities of their buildings.
U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) early warning system—ShakeAlert—is capable of broadcasting early warnings, and stakeholders, including state agencies and universities, have identified multiple benefits, such as enhanced public safety. However, implementation challenges exist that could inhibit efforts to expand the system throughout the western United States. For example, decisions on funding, public education, and user certification are needed to enable implementation of an integrated system across jurisdictions. Developing a program management plan, which helps establish management controls, could help address ShakeAlert implementation challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and GSA (1) fully identify their exceptionally high risk buildings; (2) prioritize and implement comprehensive seismic safety measures to mitigate earthquake risks; and (3) that USGS develop a program management plan to address, among other things, ShakeAlert implementation challenges. DOD, GSA, and USGS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-209 | gao_GAO-16-209_0 | These include contracts, financial assistance mechanisms such as grants and cooperative agreements, and cooperative research and development agreements. The traditional mechanisms include the following:
Contracts. Under these authorities, agencies may develop agreements that are not required to follow a standard format or include terms and conditions that are typically required when using traditional mechanisms. Agencies may use other transaction agreements for a variety of projects and activities. This report includes information on all agencies with other transaction authority. Eleven Federal Agencies Are Authorized to Use Other Transaction Agreements and Generally Have Guidance for Use
Congress has granted statutory authority to use other transaction agreements to 11 federal agencies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was granted the authority in 1958, was the first agency to receive it (see fig. Over the next several decades, the authority to use other transaction agreements was granted to five federal departments—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Transportation (DOT). Congress also granted specific authority to use other transaction agreements to several agencies within these departments, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) within DOT and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within DHS. Most agencies have limitations on their other transaction authorities, although the extent and type of limitations or requirements laid out in the agencies’ statutory authorities vary. For example, DOT’s statutory authority limits the agency’s use of other transaction agreements to three types of RD&D projects that focus on public transportation. To implement their authority, 10 of the 11 agencies have issued guidance to govern their use of other transaction agreements. Other Transaction Agreements Offered Agencies Flexibility and Were Used by Most Agencies for RD&D Activities
Most agencies cited flexibility as a primary reason for their use of other transaction agreements, specifically to meet the needs of the agency, or the entities entering into these agreements with the agency. Officials from most agencies told us the authority allowed them to develop customized agreements that addressed concerns over requirements in traditional mechanisms that entities viewed as potential obstacles to doing business with a federal agency. Officials cited two areas of concern for entities—protection of intellectual property rights and compliance with government cost accounting standards—that other transaction agreements allowed agencies to address. Most Agencies Used Other Transaction Agreements for RD&D Activities
Nine of the 11 agencies used other transaction agreements for RD&D activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 (see table 1). Officials from two agencies—TSA and NASA—told us the agencies used other transaction agreements for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for an array of activities that were not related to RD&D or prototype activities. Other Transaction Agreements Were a Small Proportion of Most Agencies’ Contracting and Financial Assistance Activities, and the Number of Agreements Was Generally Low
Most agencies used other transaction agreements sparingly compared to traditional contracting and other financial assistance mechanisms, generally because they identified few situations that justified or necessitated the use of other transaction agreements, according to officials. As a result, each of the component’s agreements took a long time to develop. Specifically, 9 out of 11 agencies managed 75 or fewer other transaction agreements in fiscal year 2010, and the number of agreements used remained low by the end of fiscal year 2014 (see table 2). In contrast, TSA and NASA—two agencies that used other transaction agreements for projects and activities other than RD&D and prototypes— had the largest number of other transaction agreements in fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year 2010, TSA and NASA had about 400 and 2,220 agreements, respectively. By the end of fiscal year 2014, these agencies had increased their use to about 640 and 3,220 agreements, respectively. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The report describes (1) which federal agencies are authorized to use other transaction agreements and the extent to which agencies have guidance to implement the authority, (2) why agencies used other transaction agreements and for what types of activities, and (3) the extent to which federal agencies used other transaction agreements for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies use a variety of acquisition and financial assistance mechanisms, such as contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, to help meet their missions. Some federal agencies have received authorization to use other transaction agreements, which allow an agency to enter into agreements other than traditional mechanisms, such as contracts. As a result, agencies can customize their other transaction agreements to help meet project requirements and mission needs. As GAO reported in May 2002, this authority carries risks, however, because such agreements may be exempt from the Federal Acquisition Regulation and other requirements that are intended to protect taxpayers' interests.
GAO was asked to review federal agencies' use of other transaction authority. This report describes (1) which agencies are authorized to use other transaction agreements and the extent to which agencies have guidance to implement the authority, (2) why agencies used other transaction agreements and for what types of activities, and (3) the extent to which agencies used other transaction agreements for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. GAO reviewed statutory authorizations, agencies' guidance, and information on agencies' other transaction agreements and use for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, and interviewed officials from each of the agencies authorized to use other transaction agreements.
What GAO Found
Congress has authorized 11 federal agencies to use other transaction agreements—which generally do not follow a standard format or include terms and conditions required in traditional mechanisms, such as contracts or grants—to help meet project requirements and mission needs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) first received this authority in 1958. Over the next several decades, five additional federal departments were given this authority—Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Transportation (DOT). Congress also granted authority to five agencies within these departments, including DOT's Federal Aviation Administration and DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The statutory authorities for most agencies include some limitations on the use of their agreements, although the extent and type of limitations vary. For example, DOT's authority limits use of other transaction agreements to research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects that focus on public transportation. Ten of the 11 agencies have issued guidance to implement their authority. The last agency—the National Institutes of Health (NIH)—is in the process of developing guidance.
Most agencies cited flexibility as a primary reason for their use of other transaction agreements, and used agreements mostly for RD&D activities. Officials from 7 agencies told GAO the authority allowed them to develop customized agreements that addressed concerns over requirements in traditional mechanisms that some companies viewed as potential obstacles to doing business with a federal agency. This flexibility allowed agencies to address concerns regarding intellectual property and cost accounting provisions that would otherwise need to be included when using traditional mechanisms, such as contracts. In addition, other transaction agreements allowed some agencies to tailor other terms and conditions of agreements as needed when working with other entities. Most agencies—9 of the 11—used other transaction agreements for RD&D activities for a range of projects from medical research to energy development research. Two of the 9 agencies—DOD and DHS—also used other transaction agreements for prototype activities. Three agencies, including TSA and NASA, used other transaction agreements for activities not related to RD&D or prototype development, including airport security and education and outreach.
Other transaction agreements were a small proportion of most agencies' contracting and financial assistance activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Compared to traditional mechanisms, most agencies used other transaction agreements sparingly, according to officials. Most agencies had a small number of other transaction agreements—75 or fewer—in fiscal year 2010, and the number of agreements generally remained low by the end of fiscal year 2014. Officials cited budgetary and other reasons for this trend. In contrast, two agencies that used other transaction agreements for activities other than RD&D and prototypes—TSA and NASA—had larger numbers of agreements. In fiscal year 2010, TSA and NASA had about 400 and 2,220 agreements, respectively. By the end of fiscal year 2014, these agencies had increased their use to about 640 and 3,220 agreements, respectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-611 | gao_GAO-09-611_0 | Completion times for land exchanges within this period varied widely, from about 2 months to more than 12 years. Agency officials surveyed said the number of exchanges processed since 2000 has generally declined because of the availability of qualified staff, changing priorities, and the availability of funding. Some of the exchanges had unique characteristics because they were facilitated by third parties, conducted in multiple phases, or were specifically legislated by Congress. The agencies have taken actions to address most of these problems. However, we found that the effectiveness of these actions has been mixed. According to BLM officials, the agency discontinued its use of escrow accounts and issued new guidance on how to use land exchange ledgers to track land value imbalances in multiphase exchanges. As a result, BLM cannot be assured that its total balance of about $2.6 million due to the United States, as of June 30, 2008, is accurate. Both BLM and the Forest Service have issued new guidance that requires full disclosure of the relationship between the facilitator and other parties to an exchange. However, we found that the agencies do not clearly define third-party facilitators in their guidance and are not consistently applying disclosure policy to them. While the agencies’ revisions to the guidance provided clearer direction, staff are generally not required to participate in training, and the agencies do not systematically track staff participation. The agencies restructured their appraisal functions to assure the independence of appraisers and BLM took steps to improve appraisal timeliness, but the appraisal process, particularly for BLM, continues to delay the completion of some land exchanges. Conclusions
The federal land management agencies hold a public trust: to manage and preserve millions of acres of land in pursuit of multiple national goals. However, these actions have not always been fully implemented or are not fully adequate to ensure the agencies are adhering to their requirements and policies and effectively using their resources to serve the public interest. Finally, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture direct the heads of BLM and the Forest Service to clarify the definition of a third-party facilitator, ensure that disclosure guidelines are consistently applied to all third-party facilitators, and include disclosure documentation in the review process; develop and issue national land tenure strategies for each agency and encourage the BLM state and Forest Service regional offices to develop their own plans to help guide land exchange decisions; track the agencies’ costs of processing individual land exchanges; determine the elements of current training that should be mandatory to ensure that staff are able to process exchanges in conformance to agency guidance, create a formal system to track attendance at training, and determine how often training should be retaken; and ensure that staff have completed this mandatory training before working on land exchanges. We were asked to (1) analyze the number, trends, and characteristics of BLM and Forest Service land exchanges, and (2) determine the actions BLM and the Forest Service have taken to address previously identified key problems and the effectiveness of these actions. In this survey, we asked program managers about trends and reasons for overall exchange activity, legislated land exchanges, third-party facilitators, BLM and Forest Service land exchange proposal reviews, the land exchange ledgers and financial assurances BLM uses to account for land value imbalances, BLM’s land tenure strategy plans, the timeliness of land exchanges, the valuation process, land exchange training and guidance, and the cost of exchanges. Third, to determine the effectiveness of the agencies’ actions to address the key problems earlier reports had identified, we analyzed the available key documents for a sample of land exchanges processed from October 2004 through June 2008 to determine (1) whether the previously identified problems were addressed, (2) whether internal BLM and Forest Service reviews documented these problems, and (3) the resolution of the documented problems. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of 31 land exchanges out of the 250 exchanges processed from October 2004 through June 2008, comprised of 27 exchanges that accounted for 85 percent of acres that the agencies have or plan to acquire, and 4 others that we reviewed during the course of our site visits. 20.) 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture (USDA) manage millions of acres of public land. To enhance land management and fulfill other public objectives, they acquire and dispose of land using exchanges--trading federal lands for lands owned by willing private entities, individuals, or state or local governments. GAO and others have raised concerns about whether the public interest has always been served in these land exchanges. GAO was asked to (1) analyze the number, trends, and characteristics of BLM and Forest Service land exchanges and (2) determine the effectiveness of agency actions to address previously identified key problems. GAO interviewed and surveyed agency officials, analyzed agency data on recent exchanges, and reviewed documents on a nongeneralizable sample of 31 land exchanges representing at least 85 percent of the acres that agencies acquired, or plan to acquire, during the time of GAO's review.
What GAO Found
From October 2004 through June 2008, BLM and the Forest Service processed 250 completed, pending, or terminated land exchanges. Completion times for exchanges within this period varied widely, from 2 months to more than 12 years. These exchanges involved 628,429 federal acres and 621,588 nonfederal acres. According to agency officials, the number of exchanges since 2000 has generally declined because of the availability of qualified staff and funding and the lower priority given to land exchanges compared with other activities. Of the 250 land exchanges, 47 were facilitated by third parties, 9 were conducted in multiple phases, and 20 were specifically legislated by Congress. GAO, the agencies' inspectors general, and others identified problems in the agencies' land exchange programs and have made recommendations to correct them. The agencies have taken actions to address most of these problems, but the effectiveness of the actions has been mixed. Specifically: (1) According to most agency officials surveyed, headquarters reviews at least somewhat improved exchange quality; often ensured that exchanges complied with laws, regulations, and policies; and were processed properly. However, the reviews did not always document problems or indicate their resolution, making the process less transparent. (2) BLM stopped using interest-bearing accounts outside of the U.S. Treasury, according to agency officials, and issued new guidance on managing ledgers, which are used to track land value imbalances over time in multiphase exchanges. However, the agency is not always adhering to this guidance and, therefore, cannot fully know how much is owed. Specifically, BLM cannot be assured that the $2.6 million land value imbalance due to the United States, recorded in its ledgers as of June 30, 2008, is accurate. (3) Both agencies issued new guidance to require full disclosure of the relationship between a third-party facilitator and other parties to an exchange. But the guidance does not clearly define third-party facilitators and officials do not consistently apply the disclosure policy. Without consistent application, the agencies fail to obtain critical information and potentially risk losing the ability to control the exchange process. (4) The agencies updated their exchange guidance to provide clearer direction on exchanges and incorporated it into their training. However, staff generally are not required to attend this training, and the agencies do not systematically track staff participation. Therefore, the agencies cannot ensure that realty staff develop and maintain necessary skills. The agencies took steps to improve appraisal timeliness, but the process, particularly for BLM, continues to delay some exchanges, officials said. Neither agency has a national strategy to guide land transactions, nor does either track all costs of individual exchanges. Developing national strategies and tracking the costs of individual exchanges will enhance the agencies' ability to make informed decisions in pursuit of shared goals. |
gao_GAO-01-815 | gao_GAO-01-815_0 | Conclusions
Chemical pesticides play an important role in allowing Americans to enjoy an abundant and inexpensive food supply. However, these chemicals can have adverse effects on human health and the environment, and their long- term effectiveness will be increasingly limited as pests continue developing resistance to them. Consequently, it has become clear that sustainable and effective agricultural pest management will require continued development and increased use of alternative pest management strategies such as IPM. Some IPM practices yield significant environmental and economic benefits in certain crops, and IPM can lead to better long- term pest management than chemical control alone. However, the federal commitment to IPM has waned over the years. The IPM initiative is missing several management elements identified in the Government Performance and Results Act that are essential for successful implementation of any federal effort. Specifically, no one is effectively in charge of federal IPM efforts; coordination of IPM efforts is lacking among federal agencies and with the private sector; the intended results of these efforts have not been clearly articulated or prioritized; and methods for measuring IPM’s environmental and economic results have not been developed. Until these shortcomings are effectively addressed, the full range of potential benefits that IPM can yield for producers, the public, and the environment is unlikely to be realized. | What GAO Found
Chemical pesticides play an important role in providing Americans with an abundant and inexpensive food supply. However, these chemicals can have adverse effects on human health and the environment, and pests continue to develop resistance to them. Sustainable and effective agricultural pest management will require continued development and increased use of alternative pest management strategies, such as integrated pest management (IPM). Some IPM practices yield significant environmental and economic benefits in certain crops, and IPM can lead to better long-term pest management than chemical control alone. However, the federal commitment to IPM has waned over the years. The IPM initiative is missing several key management elements identified in the Government Performance and Results Act. Specifically, no one is effectively in charge of federal IPM efforts; coordination of IPM efforts is lacking among federal agencies and with the private sector; the intended results of these efforts have not been clearly articulated or prioritized; and methods for measuring IPM's environmental and economic results have not been developed. Until these shortcomings are addressed, the full range of potential benefits that IPM can yield for producers, the public, and the environment is unlikely to be realized. |
gao_GAO-06-548T | gao_GAO-06-548T_0 | The foundation of the modular force is the creation of modular brigade combat teams—combat maneuver brigades that will have a common organizational design and will increase the rotational pool of ready units. Lack of Clarity in Army’s Cost Estimate for Modularity Limits Decision Makers’ Ability to Weigh Funding Priorities
The Army’s cost estimate for modularity has continued to evolve since our September 2005 report. The latter estimate addressed some of the shortcomings of the initial rough order of magnitude estimate and included lessons learned from operations in Iraq. As a result, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not be in a sound position to weigh competing demands for funding and assess whether the Army will be able to fully achieve planned capabilities for the modular force by 2011 within the planned funding level. Although the Army Is Well Under Way in Its Active Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, Its Ability to Meet Its Equipping Goals by 2011 Is Unclear
The Army has made progress in creating active component modular combat brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these brigades and is still developing its overall equipping strategy, which raises concerns about the extent to which brigades will be equipped in the near and longer term. However, the Army has not yet determined the levels of equipment it needs to support this strategy, assessed the operational risk of not fully equipping all units, or provided to Congress detailed information about these plans so it can assess the Army’s current and long-term equipment requirements and funding plans. The Army says it will manage these shortfalls; however, according to Army officials, the Army may continue to seek modular force equipment funding beyond 2011 and may exceed its $52.5 billion modularity cost estimate. The Army’s modular force concept is intended to transform the National Guard from a strategic standby force to a force that is to be organized, staffed, and equipped comparable to active units for involvement in the full range of overseas operations. To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipment among Units Based on Their Movement through Training, Readiness, and Deployment Cycles
Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment in the near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades at 100 percent of their requirements, the Army is developing a new equipping strategy as part of its force rotation model; however, it has not yet determined equipping requirements for this new strategy. However, as of March 2006 the Army had not decided on specific equipping plans for units in the various phases of its force rotation model. The Army Faces Challenges in Managing Personnel Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure
The Army has made some progress meeting modular personnel requirements in the active component by shifting positions from its noncombat force to its operational combat force but faces significant challenges reducing its overall end strength while increasing the size of its modular combat force. The Army plans to reduce its current end strength of 512,400, based upon a temporary authorized increase, to 482,400 soldiers by 2011 in order to help fund the Army’s priority acquisition programs. The Army Has Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity but Lacks Performance Metrics to Measure Progress
The Army lacks a comprehensive and transparent approach to effectively measure its progress against stated modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and monitor implementation plans. However, these goals have not translated into outcome-related metrics that are reported to provide decision makers a clear status of the modular restructuring as a whole. Since these initial design assessments, the Army has been assessing implementation and making further adjustments in designs and implementation plans through a number of venues, to include unit readiness reporting on personnel, equipment, and training; modular force coordination cells to assist units in the conversion process; modular force observation teams to collect lessons during training; and collection and analysis teams to assess units’ effectiveness during deployment. In addition, the Army has recently completed designs for support units and headquarters units. Without another broad-based evaluation, the Secretary of Defense and congressional leadership will lack visibility into the capabilities of the brigade combat teams as they are being organized, staffed, and equipped. In this challenging environment, it is important for the Army to clearly establish and communicate its funding priorities and equipment and personnel requirements and assess the risks associated with its plans. Moreover, it is important for the Army to clearly establish a comprehensive long-term approach for its modular restructuring that reports not only a schedule of creating modular units, but measures of its progress toward meeting its goal of creating a more rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army considers its modular force transformation the most extensive restructuring it has undertaken since World War II. Restructuring the Army from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require extensive investments in equipment and retraining of personnel. The foundation of the modular force is the creation of standardized modular combat brigades designed to be stand-alone, self-sufficient units that are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint operations than their larger division-based predecessors. GAO was asked to testify on the status of the Army's modularity effort. This testimony addresses (1) the Army's cost estimate for restructuring to a modular force, (2) progress and plans for equipping modular brigade combat teams, (3) progress made and challenges to meeting personnel requirements, and (4) the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing modularity results and the need for further adjusting designs or implementation plans. This testimony is based on previous and ongoing GAO work examining Army modularity plans and cost. GAO's work has been primarily focused on the Army's active forces. GAO has suggested that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide a plan for overseeing spending of funds for modularity.
What GAO Found
Although the Army is making progress creating modular units, it faces significant challenges in managing costs and meeting equipment and personnel requirements associated with modular restructuring in the active component and National Guard. Moreover, the Army has not provided sufficient information for the Department of Defense and congressional decision makers to assess the capabilities, costs, affordability, and risks of the Army's modular force implementation plans. The Army's cost estimate for completing modular force restructuring by 2011 has grown from an initial rough order of magnitude of $28 billion in 2004 to $52.5 billion currently. Although the Army's most recent estimate addresses some shortcomings of its earlier estimate, it is not clear to what extent the Army can achieve expected capabilities within its cost estimate and planned time frames for completing unit conversions. Moreover, according to senior Army officials, the Army may request additional funds for modularity beyond 2011. Although modular conversions are under way, the Army is not meeting its near-term equipping goals for its active modular combat brigades, and units are likely to have shortfalls of some key equipment until at least 2012. The Army plans to mitigate risk in the near term by providing priority for equipping deployed units and maintaining other units at lower readiness levels. However, it has not yet defined specific equipping plans for units in various phases of its force rotation model. As a result, it is unclear what level of equipment units will have and how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises. In addition, the Army faces significant challenges in implementing its plan to reduce overall active component end strength from 512,400 to 482,400 soldiers by fiscal year 2011 while increasing the size of its modular combat force from 315,000 to 355,000. This will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat positions through military civilian conversions and other initiatives, but some of its goals for these initiatives may be difficult to meet and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Already the Army does not fully plan to fill some key intelligence positions required by its new modular force structure. Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach to measure progress against stated modularity objectives and assess the need for further changes to modular designs. The Army has not established outcome-related metrics linked to many of its modularity objectives. Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and training events, the Army does not have a long-term, comprehensive plan for further analysis and testing of the designs and fielded capabilities. Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Secretary of Defense nor congressional leaders will have full visibility into the capabilities of the modular force as it is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. |
gao_GAO-08-661 | gao_GAO-08-661_0 | The Departments of Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF
Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, despite our recommendation in 2005 and a mandate from Congress in 2008 that such a plan be developed. For example, although the document provides some broad objectives and performance measures for training and equipping the ANSF, it identifies few milestones. However, while this military plan provides needed field guidance, it is not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. Few Afghan Army Units Are Capable of Leading Operations and Efforts to Develop Their Capability Face Several Challenges
The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002, but less than 2 percent (2 of 105 ANA units rated) are assessed at CM1—full operational capability. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in approximately 40 percent of items defined as critical by Defense, including machine guns and vehicles. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of mentors and equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to senior Defense officials. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in Manning, Training, and Equipping the Force
U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in manning the army, such as recruiting for leadership positions and retaining personnel; shortfalls in the number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors deployed with ANA units in the field to assist in developing capable ANA forces; and shortages of critical equipment items. Second, although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist positions. Several Challenges Impede Efforts to Improve Capability of Afghan National Police Forces
Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of nearly $6 billion, no police unit is assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. First, less than one- quarter of the ANP has police mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, the Afghan police have not received about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers critical, and continue to face shortages in several categories of equipment, including trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective policing, and our analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks, including by insurgents. Defense, State, and DynCorp officials all identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors as a challenge to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police. In 2007, Defense provided a 5-page document in response to our recommendation. However, this document included few long-term milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no sustainability strategy. In 2008, Congress mandated that Defense, in coordination with State, submit reports on a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze U.S. plans for developing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and identify the extent to which these plans contain detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, and sustainability strategies, we reviewed planning documents from Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including draft and CSTC-A-approved versions of the Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan); a planning document provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a Defense briefing on ANSF sustainment. However, although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the fact remains State did not participate in the development of the 5-page document Defense provided to GAO, nor has State developed a plan of its own. We maintain that, without a detailed plan, assessing progress in developing the ANSF is difficult. Goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Department of State (State), the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from GAO's 2005 report on the ANSF, GAO analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Defense, State, and contractor documents and met with cognizant officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
What GAO Found
In 2005, GAO recommended that Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided a document in response to this recommendation. This 5-page document lacks sufficient detail for effective interagency planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some broad objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones and no intermediate milestones for assessing progress, and it lacks a sustainability strategy. Although Defense and State are partners in police training, the document does not include State's input or describe State's role. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan to develop the ANSF that includes force goals, objectives, and performance measures. While this is an improvement over prior field-level planning, it is not a substitute for a coordinated, detailed Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. In 2008, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. These have not been provided. Without a detailed plan, it is difficult to assess progress and conduct oversight of the cost of developing the ANSF. This is particularly important given the limited capacity of the Afghan government to fund the estimated $2 billion per year ANSF sustainment costs for years into the future. The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of over $6 billion, no police unit is fully capable and several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop the police. First, less than one-quarter of the police have mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, police units continue to face shortages in equipment items that Defense considers critical, such as vehicles, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan's weak judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and the ANP consistently experiences problems with pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Defense began a new effort in November 2007 to address these challenges, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk. |
gao_GAO-08-405 | gao_GAO-08-405_0 | USTR’s Annual Reports to Congress Do Not Systematically Analyze China’s Progress in Resolving Compliance Issues
USTR’s annual reports to Congress do not have the systematic analysis needed to clearly provide an understanding of China’s compliance situation. While the reports describe many issues with China’s compliance and progress on resolving such issues, they lack summary analysis about the number, scope, and disposition of reported problems that would facilitate understanding of key China trade issues and developments and allow the agency to track its effectiveness in monitoring and enforcing China’s trade compliance. Therefore, we conducted a systematic content analysis of USTR’s reports in order to quantify the number, type, and disposition of trade issues. We identified 180 compliance issues from 2002 to 2007, spanning nine trade areas ranging from very specific issues to broader, more complex concerns. In addition, our analysis showed that China’s progress in resolving issues varies by trade area. See table 4 for examples of issues that made no progress over the period 2003 to 2007. On one hand, we found that USTR and the other agencies have made considerable progress implementing planned action items listed in the report. While this report lays out USTR’s plans for U.S.-China trade relations, USTR does not formally assess its progress or measure its results as we have recommended in our past reviews of USTR plans. The lack of clear linkages between U.S. objectives and planned action items and vague language make it difficult to determine whether the steps agencies reported taking were effective. Furthermore, the report has not been updated to reflect subsequent developments. We found that some previously identified challenges—staffing gaps and limited Chinese language capacity—remained at some agencies. They also increased staff training opportunities. Lack of Linkages and Specificity Make It Difficult to Assess Progress
Assessing USTR’s progress toward achieving its objectives for U.S.-China trade is difficult since the broad objectives and the more specific action items are not clearly linked in the top-to-bottom report. The top-to-bottom report sets forth the following six U.S.-China trade objectives: Participation—integrate China more fully as a responsible stakeholder into the global rules-based system of international trade and secure its support for efforts to further open world markets; Implementation and compliance—monitor China’s adherence to international and bilateral trade obligations and secure full implementation and compliance; Enforcement of U.S. trade laws—ensure that U.S. trade remedies and other import laws are enforced fully and transparently, so that Chinese imports are fairly traded, and U.S. and Chinese products are able to compete in the U.S. market on a level playing field; Further market access and reform—secure further access to the Chinese market and greater economic reforms in China to ensure that U.S. companies and workers can compete on a level playing field; Export promotion—pursue effective U.S. export promotion efforts with special attention to areas of particular U.S. export growth potential in China; and Proactive identification and resolution of trade problems—identify mid- and long-term challenges that the trade relationship may encounter, and seek proactively to address those challenges. Conclusions
Clearer information on the number and disposition of trade issues with China and the trends over time helps Congress and the public understand the results of U.S. government monitoring and enforcement activities. We were asked to (1) evaluate the degree to which USTR’s annual reports to Congress on China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance present information necessary to clearly understand China’s compliance situation and (2) examine the status of USTR efforts to implement the action items and achieve the objectives presented in its February 2006 top-to-bottom report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress mandated that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) annually assess China's trade compliance and report its findings to Congress. In addition, USTR conducted an interagency "top-to-bottom review" of U.S. trade policies toward China. USTR's resulting February 2006 report outlined U.S objectives and action items. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate USTR's annual China trade compliance reports to Congress and the degree to which they present information necessary to fully understand China's compliance situation and (2) examine the status of the plans presented in USTR's February 2006 top-to-bottom report. GAO systematically analyzed the contents of USTR's compliance reports from 2002 to 2007 and reviewed information on the status of agencies' monitoring and enforcement activities.
What GAO Found
USTR's annual reports to Congress, which detail U.S. industry concerns with China's compliance and progress on resolving such concerns, are very consistent in format and language. However, they lack any summary analysis about the number, scope, and disposition of reported issues that would facilitate understanding of developments in China's trade compliance and better tracking of the effectiveness of U.S. monitoring and enforcement efforts with China. For example, USTR's narrative reports make it difficult to understand the relative level of progress China made in each trade area in a given year. USTR reported issues that spanned nine trade areas and ranged from very specific issues to broader concerns; however, USTR's narrative reports make it difficult to ascertain specific changes or trends. GAO's systematic content analysis quantified the number, type, and disposition of trade issues and identified 180 individual compliance issues from 2002 to 2007. GAO analysis showed that China resolved a quarter of these issues, but made no progress on one-third of them. Also, GAO's analysis revealed that China's progress in resolving compliance issues varied by trade area and has been slowing over time, especially since 2004, when most progress was made. GAO could only partially determine the status of U.S. agencies' implementation of USTR's 2006 top-to-bottom report, which outlines broad objectives and priority goals for U.S.-China trade relations as well as specific action items. GAO found that key trade agencies made considerable progress implementing planned action items. They increased bilateral engagement with the Chinese and monitoring and enforcement capacity by increasing staffing levels and training opportunities, but staffing gaps and limited Chinese language capacity are challenges at some agencies. However, GAO could not determine agencies' progress toward achieving some U.S. objectives and goals identified in the report. USTR does not formally assess its progress or measure program results. The lack of linkages between U.S. objectives and planned action items and undefined terms make it difficult to assess whether the steps agencies described taking were effective. Furthermore, the report has not been updated to reflect recent developments. |
gao_GAO-04-706 | gao_GAO-04-706_0 | As vulnerabilities are discovered, attackers may attempt to exploit them and can cause significant damage. Specifically, all report that they have some level of senior executive involvement in the patch management process, perform a systems inventory, and provide information security training. Agencies’ centralization of common practices for effective patch management varies. Typical policies include elements such as assigning roles and responsibilities, performing risk assessments, and testing patches. More refined information on key aspects of agencies’ patch management practices—such as their documentation of patch management policies and procedures, their testing of new patches in their specific computing environments prior to installation, and the frequency with which systems are monitored to ensure that patches are installed— could provide OMB, Congress, and agencies themselves with data that could better enable an assessment of the effectiveness of an agency’s patch management processes. Automated Tools and Services Can Assist Agencies in Performing Patch Management Activities
Several automated tools and services are available to assist agencies with patch management. A centralized resource that incorporates lessons learned from PADC’s limitations could provide standardized services, such as the testing of patches, a patch management training curriculum, and development of criteria for patch management tools and services. A governmentwide service could lower costs to—and resource requirements of—individual agencies, while facilitating their implementation of selected patch management practices. Agencies face a number of common patch management obstacles, including (1) quickly installing patches while implementing effective patch management practices, (2) patching heterogeneous systems, (3) ensuring that mobile systems receive the latest patches, (4) avoiding unacceptable downtime when patching high-availability systems, and (5) dedicating sufficient resources toward patch management. Vendors that are proactive and adopt known effective software engineering practices can drastically reduce the number of flaws in their software products. Research and development in a wide range of other areas could also lead to more effective technologies to prevent, detect, and recover from attacks, as well as identify their perpetrators. The federal government has already started to use its purchasing power to influence software vendors to deliver more secure systems. Additional steps can be taken by vendors, the security community, and the federal government to address the risk associated with software vulnerabilities and patch management challenges. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Members of the Committee on Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census and other interested parties. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the (1) reported status of 23 of the agencies under the CFO Act and DHS in performing effective patch management practices, (2) tools and services available to federal agencies to perform patch management, (3) challenges to performing patch management, and (4) additional steps that can be taken to mitigate the risks created by software vulnerabilities. Finally, to determine the challenges to performing patch management and the additional steps that can be taken to mitigate the risks created by software vulnerabilities, we reviewed professional information technology security literature, examined available commercial software patch management tools and services, and solicited agencies’ input on patch management challenges in our survey. We also interviewed relevant federal and private-sector officials and computer security experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Flaws in software code can introduce vulnerabilities that may be exploited to cause significant damage to federal information systems. Such risks continue to grow with the increasing speed, sophistication, and volume of reported attacks, as well as the decreasing period of the time from vulnerability announcement to attempted exploits. The process of applying software patches to fix flaws, referred to as patch management, is a critical process to help secure systems from attacks. The Chairmen of the House Committee on Government Reform and its Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census requested that GAO assess the (1) reported status of 24 selected agencies in performing effective patch management practices, (2) patch management tools and services available to federal agencies, (3) challenges to performing patch management, and (4) additional steps that can be taken to mitigate the risks created by software vulnerabilities.
What GAO Found
Based on agency-reported data, agencies generally are implementing important common practices for effective patch management, such as performing systems inventories and providing information security training. However, they are not consistently performing others, such as risk assessments and testing all patches before deployment. Additional information on key aspects of agencies' patch management practices--such as their documentation of patch management policies and procedures and the frequency with which systems are monitored to ensure that patches are installed--could provide OMB, Congress, and agencies themselves with consistent data that could better enable an assessment of the effectiveness of an agency's patch management processes. Several automated tools and services are available to assist agencies in performing patch management. These tools and services typically include a wide range of functionality, including methods to inventory computers, identify relevant patches and workarounds, test patches, and report network status information to various levels of management. A centralized resource could provide agencies with selected services such as the testing of patches, a patch management training curriculum, and development of criteria for patch management tools and services. A governmentwide service could lower costs to--and resource requirements of--individual agencies, while facilitating their implementation of selected patch management practices. Agencies face several challenges to implement effective patch management practices, including (1) quickly installing patches while implementing effective patch management practices, (2) patching heterogeneous systems, (3) ensuring that mobile systems receive the latest patches, (4) avoiding unacceptable downtime when patching high-availability systems, and (5) dedicating sufficient resources toward patch management. Agency officials and computer security experts identified a number of additional steps that can be taken by vendors, the security community, and the federal government to assist agencies in mitigating the risks created by software vulnerabilities. For example, more rigorous software engineering practices by software vendors could reduce the number of software vulnerabilities and the need for patches. In addition, the research and development of more capable technologies could help secure information systems against cyber attacks. Also, the federal government could use its substantial purchasing power to influence software vendors to deliver more secure systems. |
gao_GAO-11-621 | gao_GAO-11-621_0 | DOD Leverages Numerous Capabilities to Collect, Fuse, and Share Maritime Information to Respond to Global Maritime Challenges
DOD, combatant commands, and joint task forces leverage numerous capabilities to enhance maritime domain awareness, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection platforms; intelligence fusion and analysis; and information sharing and dissemination. DOD Identified Numerous Maritime Capability Gaps, but Does Not Have a Comprehensive, Departmentwide Strategy to Manage Risk Associated with These Capability Gaps and Guide Future Investments
DOD has articulated a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness and identified numerous maritime capability gaps through various documents. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, measure progress, and assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. DOD Strategy Documents Does Not Have Departmentwide Objectives, Identify Roles and Responsibilities, and Align with National Strategies
We previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy that lays out goals and objectives, identifies actions for addressing those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. The federal government, DOD, and its components have developed a number of documents that incorporate some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain awareness. Department of Defense Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept. Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009. Even though DOD, its interagency partners, and its components have made efforts to identify and start prioritizing capability gaps, DOD does not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high priority capability gaps. For example, DOD’s combatant commands and components prioritize maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective missions. The various interagency and DOD views on capability gaps and priorities may not provide a full assessment of the risks associated with these gaps at a departmentwide level. A strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to managing maritime domain awareness, including a departmentwide assessment of the critical capabilities, may also provide better information to decision makers about the potential implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within DOD and across the interagency. In the absence of a departmentwide strategy for maritime domain awareness, including the prioritized allocation of resources to maritime domain awareness, measures of performance in meeting the goals and objectives, monitoring of progress in addressing capability gaps, and assessing risk, DOD may not be effectively managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to manage the implementation of maritime domain awareness across DOD we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD’s Executive Agent, to take the following two actions: Develop and implement a departmentwide strategy for maritime domain awareness that, at a minimum Identifies DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD for achieving maritime domain awareness, and aligns efforts and objectives with DOD’s corporate process for determining requirements and allocating resources; and Identifies responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and includes performance measures for assessing progress of the overall strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. | Why GAO Did This Study
Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness--that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions--a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report..
What GAO Found
DOD has identified numerous maritime capability gaps and developed documents that articulate a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, and to assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. GAO has previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. DOD and its components have developed a number of documents that incorporate some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain awareness such as a definition of the problem. However, collectively they do not have several key elements a strategy should contain. For example, neither DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept nor the DOD's Executive Agent Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans fully address organizational roles and responsibilities and resources, investments, performance measures, and risk management. Additionally, DOD leverages numerous capabilities to collect, fuse, and share maritime information to respond to global maritime challenges. DOD components have identified and started prioritizing capability gaps; however, DOD does not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high priority capability gaps. DOD combatant commands and components prioritize maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective missions and these component-level views may not provide a full view of the risks associated with these gaps at a departmentwide level. Prior GAO work has emphasized the importance of using a comprehensive risk assessment process. A strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to managing maritime domain awareness may provide better information to decision makers about the potential implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within DOD and across the interagency. In the absence of a departmentwide strategy, DOD may not be effectively managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. This report is a publicly releasable version of a previously issued, sensitive report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD's corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-851 | gao_GAO-11-851_0 | As noted above, DOD has been required since 1997 to prepare and issue annual departmentwide audited financial statements and, pursuant to various statutes, certain DOD components, including the military departments, are required to prepare and issue annual audited financial statements. Consistent with prior GAO recommendations and the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, the DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance in May 2010 to provide standardized guidance for DOD components to follow in developing their FIPs. It details the roles and responsibilities of the DOD components, and prescribes a standard, systematic process components should follow to assess processes, controls, and systems, and identify and correct weaknesses in order to achieve auditability. Overall, the procedures required by the FIAR Guidance are consistent with selected procedures for conducting financial statement audits, such as reconciling the population of transactions to be tested, conducting tests of information systems controls, and conducting internal control and substantive testing. The FIAR Guidance also requires the components to correct the deficiencies identified during testing and document the results, which is consistent with federal internal control standards and OMB guidance. DOD’s ability to achieve audit readiness is highly dependent on the components’ ability to effectively develop and implement FIPs in compliance with the FIAR Guidance. Navy Civilian Pay and Air Force Military Equipment FIPs Were Not Adequately Developed and Implemented
The Navy and Air Force did not adequately develop and implement their respective FIPs for Civilian Pay and Military Equipment in accordance with the FIAR Guidance. Our review of these FIPs found similar deficiencies in both of them. Also, neither component had fully developed and implemented corrective action plans to address deficiencies identified during implementation of the FIPs. As a result of these deficiencies, neither FIP provided sufficient support for the components’ conclusions that the assessable units were ready to be audited. Specifically, our review of this FIP found that the Navy did not (1) conduct sufficient control and substantive testing, and reached conclusions that were not supported by the testing results; (2) reconcile the population of transactions recorded in the payroll system to those in the general ledger prior to testing; (3) fully test information systems controls; (4) adequately develop and implement corrective action plans; and (5) accurately assess and report the status of its FIP work in terms of specific FIAR Plan metrics. Testing Was Insufficient and Did Not Support Conclusions. FIP Monitoring and Oversight Needs Improvement
DOD and its military components have established senior executive committees as well as designated officials at the appropriate levels to monitor and oversee their financial improvement efforts. Thus, the lack of adequate oversight results in an inefficient FIP process and can impact the ability of components to meet established milestones. As a result, both the Navy’s and Air Force’s conclusions of audit readiness for civilian pay and military equipment, respectively, were unsupported. If the DOD components are unable to achieve interim FIAR milestones, DOD will need to consider the effect on its ability to achieve departmentwide audit readiness by September 30, 2017. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making 13 recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve the development, implementation, documentation, and oversight of the department’s financial management improvement efforts. The Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that all responsible parties within the Air Force, including the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) carry out their responsibilities for ensuring that FIP development and implementation complies with the FIAR Guidance and that the FIP contains sufficient information to indicate audit readiness before it is signed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance provided a reasonable methodology for the Department of Defense (DOD) components to develop Financial Improvement Plans (FIP), (2) the DOD components had adequately developed and implemented selected FIPs in accordance with the FIAR Guidance, and (3) DOD is adequately monitoring and overseeing the FIP process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been required to prepare audited annual financial statements since 1997 but to date, has not been able to meet this requirement. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 mandated that DOD be prepared to validate [certify] that its consolidated financial statements are audit-ready by September 30, 2017. In May 2010, DOD issued its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance to provide a methodology for DOD components to follow to develop and implement their Financial Improvement Plans (FIPs) for achieving audit readiness. The DOD FIP is a framework for planning and tracking the steps and supporting documentation. GAO was asked to assess the FIP methodology provided in the FIAR Guidance, the development and implementation of selected components' FIPs, and DOD's monitoring and oversight of the FIP process. To do this, GAO analyzed the FIAR Guidance, reviewed two selected FIPs--Navy Civilian Pay and Air Force Military Equipment--and reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed DOD and component officials..
What GAO Found
The FIAR Guidance provides a reasonable methodology for DOD components to use in developing and implementing their FIPs. The Guidance details the roles and responsibilities of the DOD components, and prescribes a standard, systematic process to follow to assess processes, controls, and systems. Overall, the procedures required by the FIAR Guidance are consistent with selected procedures for conducting a financial audit, such as testing internal controls and information system controls. The Guidance also requires components to take actions to correct any deficiencies identified during testing and document the results. DOD's ability to achieve departmentwide audit readiness is highly dependent on its military components' ability to effectively develop and implement FIPs in compliance with the FIAR Guidance. The Navy and Air Force did not adequately develop and implement their respective FIPs for Civilian Pay and Military Equipment in accordance with the FIAR Guidance. GAO found similar deficiencies in both FIPs. For example, internal controls and information systems controls were not sufficiently tested or documented, and conclusions reached were not supported by the testing results. In addition, neither component had fully developed and implemented corrective action plans to address deficiencies identified during implementation of the FIPs. As a result, the FIPs did not provide sufficient support for the Navy's and Air Force's conclusions that Civilian Pay and Military Equipment were ready to be audited. DOD and its military components have assigned to senior executive committees and designated individuals appropriate oversight roles and responsibilities for their financial improvement efforts. However, neither oversight committees nor Navy and Air Force officials effectively carried out their oversight responsibilities for the two FIPs, which did not support the components' conclusions of audit readiness. However, once the components indicated audit readiness, both the DOD Office of Inspector General and the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) performed reviews and concluded that the FIPs did not comply with the FIAR Guidance and did not demonstrate audit readiness. The lack of adequate oversight results in an ineffective FIP process and can impact the ability of components to meet established milestones. If the components are unable to achieve interim milestones, DOD will need to consider how these factors could affect its ability to achieve departmentwide auditability by the end of fiscal year 2017.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take various actions to improve the development, implementation, documentation, and oversight of DOD's financial management improvement efforts. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations and commented on actions being taken to implement them. |
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