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crs_97-1055 | crs_97-1055_0 | Political Background
When Turkmenistan gained independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the former republic's president and head of the Turkmen Communist Party, Saparamurad Niyazov, retained power. He was reelected president in another uncontested race in 1992, and a referendum in 1994 extended his term until 2002. Before facing reelection, however, constitutional amendments approved in 1999 proclaimed him president for life. The country's May 1992 constitution granted Niyazov overwhelming powers to rule by decree as head of state and government. According to several assessments, he was among the world's most authoritarian rulers, and his regime was highly corrupt and responsible for serious human rights abuses. Following the death of President Niyazov in December 2006, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was elected president in early 2007. A needs assessment mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) visited during the campaign. The new constitution reaffirmed Turkmenistan as a "secular democracy" with a powerful president able to rule by decree. The constitution included an impressive list of individual rights, but emphasized that the exercise of rights must not violate public order or damage national security. An early legislative election was held in December 2008. The National Revival Movement, a civic association headed by the president, nominated President Berdimuhamedow as its candidate. In January 2012, the CEC registered eight candidates. All of Berdimuhamedow's challengers were ministerial officials or state plant managers. Based on an inadequate legal and political framework to ensure a pluralistic election, the OSCE decided not to formally monitor the election. The CEC announced that Berdimuhamedow won over 97% of the vote and that turnout was over 96%. A legislative election is planned for December 15, 2013. The OSCE sent a needs assessment mission, but decided that the legal and human rights situation did not merit sending a full-scale monitoring mission, although a small assessment mission will issue a report with recommendations for Turkmenistan to follow to improve electoral conditions in the future. U.S. Policy
In Congressional testimony in late July 2012, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake praised Turkmenistan for providing some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and for constructing or planning rail and energy links to the country, including the prospective Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. He stated that such projects illustrate that Turkmenistan has the potential to be "a leader in the economic prosperity of the region." At the same time, he cautioned that to reach this potential, Turkmenistan must address its human rights problems. He reported that the United States would continue to offer assistance to help Turkmenistan democratize and respect human rights. Cumulative U.S. assistance to Turkmenistan has amounted to $351.57 million over the period FY1992-FY2010 (all agencies and programs). U.S. foreign assistance amounted to $11.01 million in FY2011, $9.2 million in FY2012, and an estimated $6.02 million in FY2013. The Administration has requested $6.455 million for FY2014. | When Turkmenistan gained independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the former republic's president and head of the Turkmen Communist Party, Saparamurad Niyazov, retained power. He was reelected president in another uncontested race in 1992, and a referendum in 1994 extended his term until 2002. Before facing reelection, however, constitutional amendments approved in 1999 proclaimed him president for life. The country's May 1992 constitution granted Niyazov overwhelming powers to rule by decree as head of state and government. According to several assessments, he was among the world's most authoritarian rulers, and his regime was highly corrupt and responsible for serious human rights abuses.
Following the death of President Niyazov in December 2006, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was elected president in early 2007. A new constitution approved in 2008 reaffirmed Turkmenistan as a "secular democracy" with a powerful president able to rule by decree. The constitution included an impressive list of individual rights, but emphasized that the exercise of rights must not violate public order or damage national security. An early legislative election was held in December 2008. International observers assessed the election as not free and fair. The next Mejlis election is scheduled for December 2013.According to some observers, the Berdimuhamedow government has retained many authoritarian features of the previous regime, and the human rights situation has deteriorated after an initial improvement at the time of the political succession.
A presidential election was held on February 12, 2012. The National Revival Movement, a civic association headed by the president, nominated incumbent President Berdimuhamedow as its candidate. In January 2012, the CEC registered eight candidates. All of Berdimuhamedow's challengers were ministerial officials or state plant managers. Based on an inadequate legal and political framework to ensure a pluralistic election, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided not to send a fully-staffed monitoring mission, although a smaller number of observers issued a report with recommendations for electoral reforms. The CEC announced that Berdimuhamedow won over 97% of the vote and that turnout was over 96%.
A legislative election is scheduled for December 15, 2013. For the first time, a newly created Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a pro-government party, has been permitted to field some candidates. The OSCE decided once more not to send a fully-staffed monitoring mission on the grounds that legal and human rights conditions remain inadequate, but will send a small team to issue a remediation report.
In Congressional testimony in late July 2012, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake praised Turkmenistan for providing some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and for constructing or planning rail and energy links to the country, including the prospective Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. He stated that such projects illustrate that Turkmenistan has the potential to be a leader in regional economic development. At the same time, he cautioned that to reach this potential, Turkmenistan must address its human rights problems. He reported that the United States would continue to offer assistance to help Turkmenistan democratize and respect human rights. Cumulative U.S. assistance to Turkmenistan has amounted to $351.55 million over the period FY1992-FY2010 (all agencies and programs). U.S. foreign assistance amounted to $11.01 million in FY2011, $9.2 million in FY2012, and an estimated $6.02 million in FY2013. The Administration has requested $6.455 million for FY2014 (these amounts include "Function 150" foreign assistance programs and exclude Defense and Energy Department funding). |
crs_RL32893 | crs_RL32893_0 | 109-54 . Introduction
The FY2006 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations law included funding for agencies and programs in three separate federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. The law also provided funds for agencies in two other departments: for the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as funds for the Environmental Protection Agency. This report is organized along the lines of the law. FY2006 Budget and Appropriations
Current Overview
The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill ( H.R. 2361 ) was signed into law on August 2, 2005 as P.L. On July 28 th , 2005, the House approved the conference agreement (410-10), and on July 29 th , 2005, the Senate agreed to the conference report (99-1). Congress also included in this law $1.50 billion in supplemental funds to cover a shortfall in veterans' health care resources. The FY2006 appropriations law provided $26.20 billion, an increase of 2% over the President's budget request for FY2006 of $25.72 billion, but a decrease of 3% below the FY2005 enacted level of $27.02 billion. The FY2006 total appropriation reflects an across-the-board rescission of 0.476% to be applied across accounts. However, it does not reflect a 1% across-the-board rescission, other rescissions, and emergency supplemental funds contained in P.L. 109-148 . Further, the figures used throughout this report do not reflect these supplemental funds or the rescissions in either law because their effect on individual agencies, programs, and activities has not yet been calculated. The FY2006 appropriations law reflected lower funding as compared to the FY2005 enacted level in areas including:
$-507.1 million for the Forest Service (FS); $-294.1 million for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); $-75.8 million for the National Park Service (NPS); and $-36.4 million for the Bureau of Land Management. The FY2006 appropriations law reflected higher funding than the FY2005 enacted level in areas including
$105.7 million for Indian Health Service; $31.5 million for the United States Geological Survey (USGS); $12.5 million for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); and $10.0 million total for National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). For FY2005, Congress appropriated $843.2 million for the drinking water SRF. | The FY2006 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for two agencies within other departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies; the Environmental Protection Agency, which was newly-transferred to the Appropriations subcommittees that deal with Interior and Related Agencies; and numerous other entities and agencies.
On August 2, 2005, H.R. 2361 was signed into law as P.L. 109-54, containing approximately $26.20 billion in FY2006 appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Congress also included in this law $1.50 billion in supplemental funds to cover a shortfall in veterans' health care resources. On July 28, 2005, the House approved the conference agreement (410-10), and on July 29, 2005, the Senate agreed to the conference report (99-1). The FY2006 appropriations law provided an increase of 2% over the President's request for FY2006 of $25.72 billion, but a decrease of 3% below the FY2005 enacted level of $27.02 billion. The FY2006 total appropriation reflects an across-the-board rescission of 0.476% ($126.0 million) to be applied across accounts. However, it does not reflect rescissions and emergency supplemental appropriations contained in P.L. 109-148. Further, the figures used throughout this report do not reflect the supplemental appropriations or the rescissions in either law because their effect on individual agencies, programs, and activities has not yet been calculated.
The FY2006 appropriation reflected lower funding than the FY2005 enacted level in areas including
$-507.1 million for the Forest Service (FS); $-294.1 million for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); $-75.8 million for the National Park Service (NPS); and $-36.4 million for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
The FY2006 appropriation reflected higher funding than the FY2005 enacted level in areas including
$105.7 million for the Indian Health Service (IHS); $31.5 million for the United States Geological Survey (USGS); $12.5 million for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); and $9.2 million for Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT).
During consideration of FY2006 funding, Congress debated many issues including appropriate funding for wildland fire fighting, land acquisition, NEA, select FWS programs, BIA schools, IHS hospitals, the Superfund, wastewater/drinking water needs, agency competitive sourcing activities, maintenance backlogs, Indian trust fund management, Outer Continental Shelf leasing, the Abandoned Mine Lands fund, and EPA's human dosing studies. This report is not expected to be updated. |
crs_RL33576 | crs_RL33576_0 | 20) Enacted
Following a series of three continuing resolutions, the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 ( P.L. 110-5 ), was enacted into law on February 15, 2007. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the resolution provides an estimated $144.4 billion in discretionary appropriations for Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) activities. Actual FY2007 appropriations for programs, projects, and activities were not specified by P.L. President's Budget Submitted
On February 6, 2006, the President submitted the FY2007 budget to Congress; the request was for $138.3 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED programs. 110-5 ; these amounts will become available at a later time. Budget Highlights
Overall, $138.3 billion in discretionary appropriations was requested for L-HHS-ED for FY2007, $9.0 billion (6.1%) less than the FY2006 amount of $147.3 billion; the FY2006 amount includes extra funds for relief related to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes and for pandemic influenza preparedness. For the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the FY2007 request proposed an increase of $181 million for Community Health Centers. The $550 million funding for Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) discretionary activities would be eliminated, as would the $630 million for the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG). It proposed five K-12 education initiatives of at least $100 million, including $1.5 billion for High School Reform. A decrease of $385 million was proposed for the Pell Grants program, and a decrease of $448 million for TRIO programs. No funds were requested for the $303 million GEAR UP program. For the related agencies, the FY2007 budget proposed to eliminate the two-year advance appropriations for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), which was provided with a two-year advance appropriation of $400 million in the FY2006 bill. Overall, the House bill would provide $63.7 billion in discretionary funds for HHS; $61.8 billion was requested; and $66.7 billion was provided for FY2006. Educational Technology State Grants would be funded at $272 million; no funds would be provided by the House bill. 109-289 through February 15, 2007. H.J.Res. Department of Labor
FY2006 discretionary appropriations for the Department of Labor (DOL) were $11.7 billion. Children's Hospital Graduate Medical Education (CHGME), funded at $297 million in FY2006, would be reduced by $198 million. The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), funded at $2.2 billion in FY2006, would be decreased by $379 million. The FY1998 L-HHS-ED appropriations, P.L. The FY2005 L-HHS-ED appropriations, P.L. 109-149 . Department of Education
FY2006 discretionary appropriations for the Department of Education (ED) were $57.6 billion. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) programs, funded in aggregate at $23.3 billion in FY2006, would be increased by $1.1 billion in the President's FY2007 budget request—see discussion below on the issue of whether there is an ESEA funding shortfall. For example, most FY2007 appropriations will be available for obligation from October 1, 2006, through September 30, 2007. Related Agencies
FY2006 discretionary appropriations for L-HHS-ED related agencies were $11.4 billion. The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) discretionary activities, funded at $2.7 billion in FY2006, would be increased by $271 million. | This report tracks FY2007 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and 14 related agencies. The report, which will be updated, summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues.
On February 6, 2006, the President submitted the FY2007 budget request to Congress, including $138.3 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds; the comparable FY2006 amount was $147.3 billion, enacted primarily through P.L. 109-149. The Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, H.J.Res. 20, provides an estimated $144.4 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED activities; the bill was signed into law on February 15, 2007, as P.L. 110-5. Actual FY2007 appropriations for programs, projects, and activities were not specified by P.L. 110-5; these amounts will become available at a later time. A series of continuing resolutions, beginning with P.L. 109-289, provided temporary L-HHS-ED funding from October 1, 2006, through February 15, 2007.
Department of Labor (DOL). DOL discretionary appropriations were $11.7 billion in FY2006; $11.0 billion was requested for FY2007. FY2007 funding for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs would be decreased by $822 million.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS discretionary appropriations were $66.7 billion in FY2006; $61.8 billion was requested for FY2007. Funding would be increased by $181 million for Community Health Centers. Funding would be decreased by $198 million for the Children's Hospital Graduate Medical Education (CHGME). The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) would be decreased by $379 million. The $550 million Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) and the $630 million Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) would be eliminated. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, funded at $5.4 billion in FY2006, would receive no new funds.
Department of Education (ED). ED discretionary appropriations were $57.6 billion in FY2006; $54.3 billion was requested for FY2007. Funding would be increased for Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) programs in aggregate, and five K-12 initiatives, including $1.5 billion for High School Reform, were proposed. Decreases of $385 million for Pell Grants and $448 million for TRIO were requested. Funding would be eliminated for the $272 million Educational Technology State Grants, the $303 million GEAR UP program, and the $1.9 billion education hurricane recovery programs.
Related Agencies. Discretionary appropriations for L-HHS-ED related agencies were $11.4 billion in FY2006; $11.2 billion was requested for FY2007. Two-year advance funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) would be eliminated. An increase of $271 million was requested for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) discretionary activities. |
crs_R41139 | crs_R41139_0 | Background
In a speech on April 22, 2009 (Earth Day), President Obama linked the importance of winning the technological race to develop clean energy sources with the economic problems associated with U.S. dependence on an oil-based society. Many of these measures also have the effect of equalizing the treatment of the independent oil producers to that of the major oil companies. The repeal of the expensing of intangible drilling expenses, and the rescinding of the manufacturing tax deduction for the oil industry, would increase the industry's tax payments by $25 billion through 2020. Repeal of the deduction, or less favorable tax treatment of the expenses, would be likely to reduce output if the profit margin on oil were low. Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests in Oil Properties
Repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties is a relatively small item in terms of deficit reduction contribution—$98 million from 2011 to 2015. Increase Geological and Geophysical Amortization Period
Geological and geophysical expenses are necessarily incurred during the process of oil and natural gas resource development. The Independent Petroleum Association of America estimates that independent producers would likely reduce exploration and development activities on a one-to-one dollar basis as a result of altering this tax provision. The Administration projects that repeal of the percentage depletion allowance would yield approximately $4.3 billion in deficit reduction over the period 2011 to 2015, and over $10 billion through 2020. Department of the Interior Budget
The Department of Interior (DOI) budget proposal contains several changes in fees and other revenue-generating items that would affect the oil and natural gas industries. In addition, the budget proposal includes a $4-per-acre fee on nonproducing leases. These same proposals, from an alternate point of view, can also be considered to be the elimination of tax preferences that have favored the oil and natural gas industries over other energy sources and made oil and gas products artificially inexpensive, with consumer costs held below the true cost of consumption, when the costs associated with climate change and energy dependence, among other effects, are included. | President Obama, in a speech on April 22, 2009 (Earth Day), addressed the linkage between the problems he associated with U.S. reliance on oil, especially imported oil, and the importance of a future based more on alternative energy sources. To move in the direction of accomplishing these goals, the Administration, in the FY2011 budget proposal, proposes that certain tax expenditures designed to increase domestic production of oil and natural gas be revised, thus reducing what the Administration sees as favorable treatment of the oil and natural gas industries.
The FY2011 budget proposal outlined a set of proposals, framed in terms of deficit reduction, or termination of tax preferences, that would potentially increase the taxes of the oil and natural gas industries, especially the independent producers. These proposals included repeal of the enhanced oil recovery and marginal well tax credits, repeal of the expensing of intangible drilling costs, repeal of the deduction for tertiary injectants, repeal of passive loss exceptions for working interests in oil and natural gas properties, elimination of the manufacturing tax deduction for oil and natural gas companies, increase of the amortization periods for certain expenses, and repeal of the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil and natural gas producers. In addition, a variety of inspection fee increases and a per-acre fee on unused leases were proposed to generate revenue for the Department of the Interior (DOI).
The Administration estimates that the tax changes would provide $18.2 billion in deficit reduction, or new revenues, over the period 2011 to 2015. The changes, if enacted, also would reduce the tax advantage enjoyed by independent oil and natural gas producers over the major integrated oil companies. On what would likely be a small scale, the proposals also would make oil and natural gas more expensive for U.S. consumers, likely achieving the intended effect of reducing consumption of those fuels.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33613 | crs_RL33613_0 | Pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), when a foreign national of a signatory State is arrested or otherwise detained, appropriate authorities within the receiving signatory State must inform him "without delay" of his right to have his consulate notified. In the consolidated cases of Moises Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson , decided on June 28, 2006, the Supreme Court considered arguments as to what judicial remedy, if any, is available to foreign nationals in U.S. criminal proceedings who are not provided requisite consular information. Implementation
The VCCR is a multilateral agreement codifying consular practices which have traditionally been governed by custom and bilateral agreements between nations. When the United States became a party to the VCCR, it also chose to become a party to the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Parties to the Optional Protocol agree to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes arising between nations with respect to the VCCR. Despite these measures, foreign nationals detained by state and local authorities are not always provided with requisite consular information. In the LaGrand Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States ), the ICJ concluded, inter alia , that (1) Article 36 provides covered individuals with a right to consular notification, and a violation of that right may require review and reconsideration of a foreign national's sentence and conviction in certain instances; and (2) the application of procedural default rules to bar the raising of Article 36 claims, at least in certain instances, prevents "full effect" from being given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 were intended. Subsequently in the case of Avena and Other Mexican Nationals ( Mexico v. United States of America ) , the ICJ reaffirmed LaGrand 's interpretation of U.S. obligations under VCCR Article 36. In reaffirming Breard , the Court considered the ICJ's decisions in LaGrand and Avena , and declined to follow the ICJ's ruling that procedural default should not prevent the consideration of Article 36 claims. While the Court noted that the ICJ's interpretation "deserves respectful consideration," it did not deem it to be binding. Perhaps the most notable unresolved issue concerns U.S. implementation of the ICJ's ruling in Avena with respect to the 51 Mexican nationals at issue in that case. The memorandum did not instruct state courts to reconsider Article 36 claims by persons who were not named in Avena. On November, 15, 2006, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals held in the case of Ex Parte Medellin that neither Avena nor the President's memorandum preempted state procedural default rules, and it rejected Medellin's petition for habeas relief. | The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is a multilateral agreement codifying consular practices originally governed by customary practice and bilateral agreements between States. Pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR, when a foreign national of a signatory State is arrested or otherwise detained, appropriate authorities within the receiving signatory State must inform him "without delay" of his right to have his consulate notified. Nevertheless, foreign nationals detained by U.S. state and local authorities are not always provided with requisite consular information.
Until March 2005, the United States was also party to the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Parties to the Optional Protocol agree to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes arising between nations with respect to the VCCR. Prior to U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, the ICJ ruled in the LaGrand Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States) and the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) that Article 36 confers an individually-enforceable right to consular notification. Further, the ICJ concluded that procedural default rules should not, at least in certain circumstances, bar the raising of Article 36 claims by foreign nationals who were not provided with requisite consular information and were subsequently convicted in criminal proceedings.
In the consolidated cases of Moises Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson, decided on June 28, 2006, the Supreme Court considered arguments as to what judicial remedy, if any, is available to foreign nationals in U.S. criminal proceedings who are not provided requisite consular information. By a vote of 5-3 the Court held that (1) suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding is never an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation; and (2) federal and state procedural default rules prevent the raising of Article 36 claims that were not made on a timely basis. Although the Court considered the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36 as deserving respectful consideration, it did not deem it to be legally binding or necessarily persuasive.
The Court did not determine whether Article 36 creates an individually-enforceable right. Nor did the Court assess the legal implications of the President's 2005 memorandum instructing state courts to give effect to the ICJ's decision in Avena with respect to the 51 Mexican nationals at issue in that case. On November 15, 2006, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in the case of Ex Parte Medellin that neither Avena nor the President's memorandum preempted state procedural default rules. |
crs_RS21113 | crs_RS21113_0 | Peron's mobilization of the working class had an enduring effect on Argentina's political system over the next four decades. Progress and Challenges for Kirchner
President Kirchner's bold policy moves in the areas of human rights, institutional reform, and economic policy have helped restore Argentines' faith in government. In June 2005, the Kirchner government was successful in restructuring more than $100 billion in defaulted bond debt at about 34 cents on the dollar, saving the country more than $67 billion in the largest debt-reduction ever achieved by a developing country. In January 2006, Argentina ultimately chose to repay its $9.5 million debt owed to the IMF in order to give the government autonomy on economic policy. For many observers, the October 2005 legislative elections served as a referendum on the Kirchner government and demonstrated continued strong support. Most analysts believe that Kirchner would likely win the October 2007 presidential election if he chooses to run. Congress has expressed concern regarding Argentina's investigation into the July 1994 bombing in Buenos Aires of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people. | Argentina's restructuring of over $100 billion in defaulted bond debt in June 2005 demonstrated the country's emergence from its 2001-2002 economic crisis that had caused severe stress on the political system. Current President Néstor Kirchner, elected in 2003, has made bold policy moves in the areas of human rights, institutional reform, and economic policy that have helped restore Argentines' faith in democracy. The October 2005 legislative elections demonstrated strong support for President Kirchner, whose popularity at this juncture bodes well for his re-election if he chooses to run in the October 2007 presidential election. Economic growth has rebounded since 2003, and in January 2006, Argentina paid off its $9.5 billion debt to the International Monetary Fund. Looking ahead, the government faces such challenges as reducing poverty and controlling inflation while maintaining strong economic growth. Issues of concern to Congress include continued cooperation with Argentina on counter-terrorism issues and progress in Argentina's investigation of the 1994 Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association bombing. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32637, Argentina ' s Sovereign Debt Restructuring , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). |
crs_97-736 | crs_97-736_0 | 97-736 -- Victims' Rights Amendment in the 106th Congress: Overview of Suggestions to Amend the Constitution
Updated January 12, 2001
Pro and Con
Arguments put forward in support of an amendment include assertions that:
� The criminal justice system is badly tilted in favor of criminal defendants and against victims' interests and a more appropriate balance should be restored;
� The shabby treatment afforded victims has chilled their participation in the criminal justice system to the detriment of all;
� Society has an obligation to compensate victims;
� Existing statutory and state constitutional provisions are wildly disparate in their coverage, resulting in uneven treatment and harmful confusion throughout thecriminal justice system; and
� Existing state and federal law is inadequate and likely to remain inadequate
Critics argue to the contrary that:
� The criminal justice system is not out of balance. S.J.Res. S.J.Res. S.J.Res. . . a sentence." 3 and H.J.Res. 64 would have conferred legislative authority in two ways. But an amendment to theUnited States Constitution stands on different footing. It amends the Constitution. Proponents of S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 spokeof both the need to establish aminimum victims' rights standard and the need for uniformity. | Thirty-three states have added a victims rights amendment to their state constitutions. Both the House and SenateJudiciary Committees held hearings on similar proposals in the 106th Congress to amend the UnitedStates Constitution (S.J.Res. 3 introduced bySenator Kyl for himself and Senator Feinstein and H.J.Res. 64 introduced by Representative Chabot). TheSenate Committee initially reported outan amended version of S.J.Res. 3 without a written report, but issued a report prior to floor consideration ofthe reported proposal, S.Rept. 106-254. Neither S.J.Res. 3 nor H.J.Res. 64 were ever brought to a vote on the floor. This is an overview ofthose proposals and is an abbreviatedform of Victims' Rights Amendment: Proposals to Amend the United States Constitution in the 106thCongress, CRS Report RL30525(pdf). Authorities identifiedthere have been omitted here in the interests of brevity |
crs_RS22833 | crs_RS22833_0 | The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from establishing a religion and guarantees citizens the right to freely exercise their religion. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the scope of these broad guarantees. This report provides an overview of the governing principles of the law of church and state. It explains the legal requirements for challenges under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause and the standards used to evaluate such challenges. The report includes current interpretations of these clauses and summarizes related statutes ( P.L. 103-141 , the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA, and P.L. 106-274 , the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA). | The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from establishing a religion and guarantees citizens the right to freely exercise their religion. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the scope of these broad guarantees. This report provides an overview of the governing principles of the law of church and state. It explains the legal requirements for challenges under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause and the standards used to evaluate such challenges. The report includes current interpretations of these clauses and summarizes related statutes (P.L. 103-141, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA, and P.L. 106-274, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA). |
crs_RS22184 | crs_RS22184_0 | Over the years, the OEA has provided planning and implementation assistance to communities, regions, and states in an effort to alleviate serious economic impacts that result from defense program changes, such as base closings, expansions, and openings; contract changes affecting firms; and personnel reductions or increases at military facilities. Currently, the OEA operates with a staff of 45 civilian and 3 military personnel. The Economic Development Administration (EDA), http://www.eda.gov , has provided grants from their appropriated funds in excess of $640 million since the first BRAC round in 1988, as well as administering $274 million of DOD funds and $8 million from the Department of Energy for defense adjustment projects that have included some closed military bases. President Bush's FY2006 budget request included the "Strengthening America's Communities Initiative," which outlined substantial changes and realignment in federal economic development programs, including the EDA. Congress has not acted on the President's proposals, nor set any timetable to do so. Other Assistance
In addition to the OEA and EDA, there are a number of other federal agencies and activities that may help communities adversely affected by base closures and realignments. The governor can reserve not more than 15% of the state's formula grant for state level activities, and not more than 25% for "rapid response" activities. The purpose of these grants is to plan a comprehensive response to a BRAC closure or realignment. States eligible to receive the Phase I planning grants are those states listed in the Secretary of Defense's May 13, 2005 announcement of installations being recommended for closure or realignment. Awards will be made in consultation with DOD. Other Assistance
In addition to the various federal programs designed to provide transition assistance to displaced workers, a variety of other programs might also provide assistance to those affected by base closure. | On September 15, 2005, President Bush approved the list of military facilities that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended be closed or realigned in the current round of base closures, known generally as "BRAC." (See http://www.brac.gov/finalreport.asp.) The list includes 22 major base closures and 33 major realignments and would result in a net reduction of more than 8,000 military and civilian personnel. (The original BRAC list from DOD indicated a reduction of more than 26,000 personnel, but this included more than 13,000 from overseas deployments that are not included in the BRAC Commission recommendations.) On October 27, the House failed to pass H.J.Res. 65, a motion of disapproval of this list. Thus, barring some future congressional action, the recommendations will take effect over the next six years. (See CRS Report RL32216, Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round, by [author name scrubbed], for additional information on the BRAC process.) Despite the difficulties inherent in a base closure, communities near facilities on the list must now face a very high probability of life without a local military base. Recognizing that closures and realignments can have a major impact on the economies of the affected regions, Congress has created a variety of different resources available both to communities and individual workers to help mitigate the resulting economic dislocation. This report is intended to summarize these various programs. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43014 | crs_R43014_0 | Introduction
International trade is a critical component of the U.S. economy, with U.S. goods trade amounting to about $4 trillion in 2014, with merchandise imports of $2.4 trillion and exports of $1.6 trillion (see Appendix B ). The efficient flow of legally traded goods in and out of the United States is thus a vital element of the country's economic security. While U.S. trade in imports depends on the smooth flow of legal cargo through U.S. ports of entry (POE), the goal of trade facilitation often competes with two additional goals: enforcement of U.S. trade laws and import security. Third, the import process and CBP's role in it are discussed. Congress has a direct role in organizing, authorizing, and defining CBP's international trade functions, as well as appropriating funding for and conducting oversight of its programs. There is an inherent tension between efforts to promote efficient trade flows, and a second goal of U.S. import policy: the enforcement of trade laws designed to protect U.S. consumers and business against illegal imports and to collect customs revenue. Some U.S. importers and some in Congress have criticized CBP for neglecting trade facilitation in favor of import security and trade enforcement. At the same time, others in Congress and in the trade community assert that the United States may remain vulnerable to a terrorist attack against a port of entry—with potentially catastrophic results—and that CBP should place greater emphasis on import security, even if the economic costs are high. In the Senate, on May 14, 2015, the text of S. 1269 was incorporated into H.R. 644 (which was renamed the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015) and subsequently passed by a vote of 78-20. On June 12, 2015, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 644 by a vote of 240-190. 644 addresses intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Also related to AD/CVD laws, the House version would establish a Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Division in CBP, direct CBP to identify evasion, authorize increased data sharing between CBP, the Department of Commerce, and the U.S. International Trade Commission for enforcement actions against evasion, and direct CBP to enter into agreements with customs officials in foreign countries to increase cooperation in combatting evasion The House version would also require CBP to assign sufficient personnel to prevent and investigate evasion, require CBP to submit an annual report to Congress detailing evasion policies and activities, terminate the ability of new shippers to post bonds during new shipper AD/CVD reviews, and require the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to submit a report to Congress on the effectiveness of CBP efforts in investigating and preventing AD/CVD duty evasion. DHS's bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been the lead agency facilitating, enforcing, and securing trade flows since 2003. 103-182 ), also known as the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act, or "Mod Act." Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296)
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA, P.L. 109-347 ) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (The 9/11 Act, P.L. 110-53 ). CBP's trade strategy also emphasizes layered enforcement , meaning that risk assessment and risk-based enforcement happen at a number of different points in the import process, beginning well before cargo arrives at a U.S. port of entry, and continuing long after cargo has been formally admitted to the United States. Trusted Trader Programs
One of CBP's primary tools for risk management is the use of trusted trader programs, including the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which was established in November 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, and subsequently authorized as part of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 (see " Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 ( )"). In May 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson extended the deadline for an additional two years. Customs Modernization
Customs modernization refers to the transition from CBP's Automated Commercial System (ACS) to its Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) for managing trade-related data (see " Pre-Entry: Advanced Cargo Screening, Scanning, and Inspections "), and the development of the International Trade Data System (ITDS). The Mod Act of 1993 (Title VI of P.L. | International trade is a critical component of the U.S. economy, with U.S. merchandise imports amounting to $2.4 trillion and exports to $1.6 trillion in 2014. The efficient flow of legally traded goods in and out of the United States is thus a vital element of the country's economic security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary agency charged with monitoring, regulating, and facilitating the flow of goods through U.S. ports of entry (POEs). CBP's policies are designed to (1) ensure the smooth flow of imported cargo through U.S. POEs; (2) enforce trade and customs laws designed to protect U.S. consumers and business and to collect customs revenue; and (3) enforce import security laws designed to prevent weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs, and other contraband from entering the United States—a complex and difficult mission. Congress has a direct role in organizing, authorizing, and defining CBP's international trade functions, as well as appropriating funding for and conducting oversight of its programs. In the Senate, on May 14, 2015, S. 1269 was incorporated into H.R. 644 (renamed the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015) and subsequently passed by a vote of 78-20. On June 12, 2015, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 644 by a vote of 240-190. Senate and House leaders have reportedly committed to resolve the two bill versions in a conference committee.
Laws currently authorizing the trade facilitation and enforcement functions of CBP (as outlined in the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act, Title VI of P.L. 103-182) emphasize a balanced relationship between CBP and the trade community based on the principles of "shared responsibility," "reasonable care," and "informed compliance." Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress has placed greater emphasis on import security and CBP's role in preventing terrorist attacks at the border. Legislation addressing customs procedures and import security includes the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347), and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).
CBP's current import strategy emphasizes a risk management approach that segments importers into higher and lower risk pools and focuses trade enforcement and import security procedures on higher-risk imports, while expediting lower-risk flows. CBP's "multi-layered" risk management approach means that security screening and enforcement occur at multiple points in the import process, beginning before goods are loaded in foreign ports (pre-entry) and continuing long after the time goods have been admitted into the United States (post-entry).
How effectively CBP has performed its import policy mission is a matter of some debate. Some participants in CBP's "trusted trader" programs argue that the concessions (e.g., expedited processing; fewer container inspections) CBP provides at the border do not adequately justify the effort and expense to certify their supply chains. Questions have also been raised about CBP's management of trade facilitation, especially the means through which the Automated Commercial System (ACS) trade data management system is being phased out in favor of the newer Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). Some critics also assert that CBP has not adequately fulfilled its trade enforcement role, especially its duties for preventing illegal transshipments, protecting U.S. intellectual property rights, and collecting duties. Still others criticize CBP's performance of its security functions, especially because it does not yet physically scan 100% of maritime cargo as mandated by the SAFE Port Act of 2006, as amended. In May 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson extended the deadline for an additional two years. |
crs_R41712 | crs_R41712_0 | Over the years, Congress has enacted a wide variety of tax preferences, direct subsidies, import restraints, and other federal programs intended to bolster the manufacturing sector, often with the goal of retaining or recapturing highly paid manufacturing jobs. Only a small proportion of U.S. workers is now employed in factories, as manufacturers have shifted low-value, labor-intensive production, such as apparel and shoe manufacturing, to other countries. Meanwhile, U.S. factories have stepped up production of goods that require high technological sophistication but relatively little direct labor. Recent data, however, challenge the belief that the manufacturing sector, taken as a whole, will continue to flourish. In particular, statistics showing that domestic value added represents a diminishing share of the value of U.S. factory output have been interpreted by many analysts as indicating that manufacturing is "hollowing out" as U.S. manufacturers undertake more high-value work abroad. Economic data have been slow to take note of this development, which raises the question of whether the United States will continue to generate highly skilled, high-wage jobs related to advanced manufacturing. While some data thus indicate that U.S. manufacturing is resilient and recovering well from the 2007-2009 recession, two facts in particular support the argument that the manufacturing sector is more challenged than the government's output and productivity measures imply:
Unlike previous expansions, the two most recent cyclical upturns in the U.S. economy have not brought more jobs in manufacturing. Value added represents one measure of the health of manufacturing. In essence, value added is meant to capture the share of the value of final products that is being added "in house." A number of conceptual issues and statistical deficiencies complicate interpretation. Accounting for research and development. This trend is strongly in evidence in the United States. The data discussed in this report shed light on a concern frequently raised in the context of national security, that U.S. manufacturers of vital products are critically dependent upon inputs from abroad. Evidence suggests that while the output of U.S. factories contains substantial foreign value added, many other countries are even more dependent upon foreign value added than is the United States, at least with respect to goods traded in international markets. The declining importance of physical production is in evidence in many countries, and is not a phenomenon limited to the United States. Nonetheless, available data still tend to treat manufacturing and services as unrelated economic activities, and it is not clear that existing data series on domestic economic activity, trade, and freight transportation completely capture changes in the nature of manufacturing, the sources of employment, and the creation of value. | The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector has been a long-standing concern of Congress. Although Congress has established a wide variety of tax preferences, direct subsidies, import restraints, and other federal programs with the goal of retaining or recapturing manufacturing jobs, only a small proportion of U.S. workers is now employed in factories. Meanwhile, U.S. factories have stepped up production of goods that require high technological sophistication but relatively little direct labor. Labor productivity in manufacturing, as measured by government data, has grown rapidly, suggesting that the manufacturing sector as a whole remains healthy.
Recent data, however, challenge the belief that the manufacturing sector, taken as a whole, will continue to flourish. Unlike previous expansions, the two most recent cyclical upturns in the U.S. economy have generated few jobs in manufacturing. Moreover, statistics suggest that domestic value represents a diminishing share of the value of U.S. factory output. One interpretation of these data is that manufacturing is "hollowing out" as companies undertake a larger proportion of their high-value work abroad. These developments raise the question of whether the United States will continue to generate highly skilled, high-wage jobs related to advanced manufacturing.
The evidence concerning "hollowing out" is ambiguous, as conceptual issues and statistical deficiencies make it difficult to determine whether the recent decline in manufacturing value added, relative to shipments, is a short-term phenomenon or a long-term trend. Despite improvements in recent years, U.S. statistical agencies still tend to treat manufacturing and services as unrelated economic activities, and it is not clear that existing data series on domestic economic activity, trade, and freight transportation adequately capture changes in the nature of manufacturing, the sources of employment, and the creation of value.
Nonetheless, evidence suggests strongly that physical production activities account for a diminishing share of the final value of manufactured products, with service-related inputs such as research, product development, and marketing becoming more important. Further, the production of many goods is dispersed across multiple locations along global supply chains, making it difficult to determine where value is added. Such shifts pose a challenge to efforts to capture economic value by promoting goods production in the United States.
In the context of national security, the fact that U.S. manufacturers of vital products are critically dependent upon inputs from abroad is frequently a subject of concern. International comparisons indicate that the United States is in no way unique in its dependence on foreign inputs to manufacturing. Although the output of U.S. factories contains a large proportion of foreign value added, many other countries appear to be even more dependent upon foreign value added than is the United States, at least with respect to goods traded in international markets. |
crs_R43701 | crs_R43701_0 | The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. The following year, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Congress created a pathway for DOD to directly transfer to federal and state agencies equipment (so-called "personal property") that was excess to the needs of the department and suitable for use in counter-drug activities. Under Section 1208, the Secretary of Defense could transfer defense equipment, including small arms and ammunition, from existing defense stocks without cost to the receiving agency. Materials Offered to Law Enforcement Agencies through the 1033 Program
The program is administered by the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), located at DLA Disposition Services Headquarters in Battle Creek, Michigan. Program Participants
Law enforcement agencies wishing to take part in the 1033 Program apply to the LESO through their state's 1033 Program coordinator (see below). According to the LESO, 11,000 law enforcement agencies are registered nationwide and 8,000 are currently using property provided through the program. Material Accountability
Each state participating in the program must set up a business relationship with DLA through the execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Each participating state's governor is required to appoint a state coordinator to ensure that the program is used correctly by the participating law enforcement agencies. This equipment is closely tracked by both the LESO and the relevant state coordinator and it must be returned to a DLA Disposition Services Site when no longer needed for law enforcement purposes. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that the Secretary determines is--
(A) suitable for use by the agencies in law enforcement activities, including counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities; and
(B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense. | The United States has traditionally kept military action and civil law enforcement apart, codifying that separation in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. On the other hand, Congress has occasionally authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to undertake actions specifically intended to enhance the effectiveness of domestic law enforcement through direct or material support.
One such effort is the so-called "1033 Program," named for the section of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997 that granted permanent authority to the Secretary of Defense to transfer defense material to federal and state agencies for use in law enforcement, particularly those associated with counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.
The 1997 act was preceded by 1988 legislation that expanded DOD's role in the interdiction of illicit drug trafficking. That was soon followed by temporary authority to transfer excess defense material, including small arms and ammunition, from excess DOD stocks to law enforcement agencies for use in counter-drug activities. This could be done at no cost to the receiving agency. The 1997 NDAA expanded that authority to include counter-terrorism activities and made it permanent. It is codified as 10 U.S.C. §2576a.
The 1033 Program is administered by the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Under it, local and state law enforcement agencies may apply to DLA to participate. DLA requires the governor of the state to execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and appoint a state 1033 Program coordinator, who is responsible for ensuring that the program is properly administered within the state and that appropriate property records are maintained. Approved agencies may request material from DLA through their state coordinators. The LESO retains final approval authority over the types and quantities of material transferred from DOD excess stocks to the agencies. Any material requiring demilitarization before being released to the public must be returned to DLA when no longer needed by the receiving law enforcement agency.
LESO states that 11,000 agencies nationwide are currently registered and that 8,000 of them use material provided through the 1033 Program. |
crs_R43958 | crs_R43958_0 | This report provides a list of selected health-related programs and activities under specified titles of the Social Security Act (SSA), including the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant (Title V), General Provisions, Peer Review, and Administrative Simplification (Title XI), Medicare (Title XVIII), Medicaid (Title XIX), and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP; Title XXI); the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended); as well as selected provisions from the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) that are scheduled to terminate during the first session of the 114 th Congress (i.e., by December 31, 2015). This report includes only those health care-related expiring provisions for which congressional action would be needed to extend the application of a provision once the expiration date is reached, and it does not include demonstration projects or pilot programs. Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, CRS cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here. The report focuses specifically on health care-related expiring provisions and, in that context, it defines what constitutes an expiring provision, clarifies which issues do not meet the definition of an expiring provision, lists the legislative history of each of the programs and policies that are due to expire before the end of the first session of the 114 th Congress, and includes future deadlines, when applicable, for those programs and policies. Report Organization and Legislative Acts
The expiring provisions are summarized below, organized by SSA or PHSA title and section, as appropriate. The last part of the report includes provisions with expiration dates in 2013 that were not extended in any subsequent legislation. | This report provides a list of selected health-related programs and activities under specified titles of the Social Security Act (SSA), including the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant (Title V), General Provisions, Peer Review, and Administrative Simplification (Title XI), Medicare (Title XVIII), Medicaid (Title XIX), and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP; Title XXI); the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended); as well as selected provisions from the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) that are scheduled to terminate during the first session of the 114th Congress (i.e., by December 31, 2015). This report includes only those health care-related expiring provisions for which congressional action would be needed to extend the application of a provision once the expiration date is reached, and it does not include demonstration projects or pilot programs. Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, CRS cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here.
The report defines what constitutes an expiring provision, clarifies which issues do not meet the definition of an expiring provision, lists the legislative history of each of the programs and policies that are due to expire before the end of the first session of the 114th Congress, and includes future deadlines, when applicable, for those programs and policies. The historical legislative actions that created, modified, or extended the expiring provisions covered in this report are also summarized.
Expiring provisions are organized by SSA section, ACA section, or PHSA title and section, as appropriate. The last part of the report includes provisions with expiration dates in 2013 that were not extended in any subsequent legislation. The main body of the text also includes a number of provisions that expired in 2014. |
crs_R44089 | crs_R44089_0 | Financial statements are also a primary means by which firms communicate with capital markets' stakeholders, including investors, creditors, regulators, and the public. Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934 to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. However, Congress retains its oversight responsibilities over the SEC. Since the creation of the SEC, domestic companies in the United States have used U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) to issue financial statements. Since 2002, the SEC has delayed the date of convergence and has changed direction on whether the United States will ultimately adopt or converge with IFRS or maintain and evolve U.S. GAAP independent of IASB. This report first provides a brief explanation of the different accounting standards and U.S. capital markets. The rules and guidelines in aggregate comprise U.S. GAAP or IFRS. As the name indicates, accounting standards in the United States are described as U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ; arguably, it can be asserted the rules-based accounting framework in the United States is guided by a set of accounting principles. In contrast to U.S. GAAP, IFRS is considered principles based. In many respects, U.S. GAAP is described as the "gold standard," because it has evolved since the 1930s within the U.S. institutional infrastructure through decades of due process that is uniquely sensitive to the needs of U.S. investors and capital markets. Since 2003, more than 100 countries at varying degrees have either adopted or converged with IFRS. Congressional Interest in SEC Actions on Convergence
One aspect of the powers Congress gave the SEC is the authority to establish accounting standards for the private sector in the United States. Although the SEC has the Office of the Chief Accountant, whose primary mission is to establish and enforce accounting and auditing policy to ensure that financial statements improve investment decisions, the SEC has relied on the private sector to establish accounting standards in the United States. Most recently, Congress expressed interest on the convergence of accounting standards at a March 2015 hearing on the SEC's FY2016 Budget Request held by the House Committee on Financial Services. In June 2014, the bipartisan joint Congressional Caucus on CPAs and Accountants wrote a letter to the SEC Chairman on the issue of convergence. Some Members of Congress have also expressed similar concerns publicly. To date, Congress has not enacted legislation on incorporating IFRS. Although the SEC has the statutory authority for establishing accounting standards in the United States, it has delegated the responsibility to FASB to continue to find common ground with IASB on specific standards. This section of the report examines the benefits and challenges of three of those policy options:
1. U.S. GAAP and Institutional Infrastructure
Switching to IFRS would have consequences beyond financial reporting. Need for Independent U.S. Standards Setter
An example of FASB's ability to maintain its independence and be responsive to the needs of U.S. capital markets is how it has addressed the concerns of U.S. firms over the implementation of the new revenue recognition standard. U.S. International GAAP
If the United States continues to maintain U.S. GAAP, an option to consider is to create and promote an international version of U.S. GAAP (I-GAAP), as proposed in a FASB-commissioned report in 2009. As previously discussed, competing standards (I-GAAP and IFRS) might lead to better standards that benefit capital markets. Adopt IFRS
A second policy option for Congress and the SEC to consider is the complete adoption of IFRS as the U.S. accounting standard. Another option would be to implement IFRS by specific industries over time. Convergence —Convergence might be described as a process by which a jurisdiction incorporates specific standards from International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) or modifies some or all of its Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to more closely resemble IFRS. | Capital markets function most efficiently when investors and creditors have a high degree of trust in the quality of information communicated by firms. Financial reports and disclosures are the primary means by which firms communicate about their performance with investors, creditors, regulators, and the public. Since the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1930s, domestic companies in the United States have used U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) to issue financial reports.
In 2002, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was established by select countries, including the United States, to develop International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a new global accounting standard. Since the creation of IFRS, more than 100 countries have either fully adopted IFRS or have converged their local accounting standards in varying degrees to more closely resemble IFRS. In addition, there has been an ongoing debate in the United States as to which accounting standard best suits the needs of U.S. capital markets. IFRS by design is a principles-based accounting standard that is subject to each jurisdiction's interpretation and institutional infrastructure. In contrast to IFRS, U.S. GAAP is generally understood to be a rules-based accounting standard that is less subject to interpretation. U.S. GAAP has evolved over 80 years within the U.S. institutional infrastructure to address the specific needs of the world's largest capital market—the United States.
Principles-based accounting standards provide broad flexible guidelines that can be applied to a range of situations, but they can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application. In contrast, rules-based accounting standards require specific guidelines to be followed, but they may not address unforeseen issues that arise in the normal course of business. At issue is whether the United States should adopt or converge with IFRS or remain on U.S. GAAP. Congress has asked the SEC to consult Congress as the SEC contemplates future actions on the issue of convergence.
The SEC was created under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-291) to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. Congress also gave the SEC authority to establish accounting standards for the private sector in the United States; Congress retains its oversight responsibilities over the SEC. The SEC has historically delegated its responsibility for establishing accounting standards to a private entity, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). To date, the SEC has not given a clear indication as to whether the United States should remain on U.S. GAAP or adopt or converge with IFRS; neither has the SEC taken any concrete steps to adopt or converge with IFRS. In its desire to ensure that capital markets function efficiently, Congress has continued to maintain interest in the IFRS issue through legislation, hearings, and a letter issued to the SEC Chairman. At a March 2015 budget hearing for SEC's FY2016 budget, some Members of Congress voiced concerns over converging with IFRS. Similarly, in 2014, the Congressional Caucus on CPAs and Accountants also raised concerns over issues surrounding convergence with IFRS.
This report briefly explains the different accounting standards and U.S. capital markets. It examines several IFRS policy options Congress might consider and the benefits and challenges of each of those options. One option is to maintain the independence of U.S. GAAP but continue to seek common ground (limited convergence) with IASB. Within the scope of this option, the SEC and FASB could consider developing an international version of U.S. GAAP (I-GAAP). Another option is to adopt IFRS. The last option discussed in this report examines various hybrid methods of allowing U.S. GAAP and IFRS to coexist in the United States. |
crs_R42366 | crs_R42366_0 | Introduction
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA I), in 1992, gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to collect fees from the pharmaceutical industry and use the revenue to support "the process for the review of human drug applications." 112-144 ); it extends the user fee program through September 30, 2017. The PDUFA reauthorization became Title I of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144 ), whose other 10 titles covered reauthorization of medical device user fees, new authorities for generic drug and biosimilar biological product user fees, and other topics such as pediatric drug research, medical device regulation, pharmaceutical supply chain security, antibiotic development incentives, expedited drug approval, drug shortages, and a set of miscellaneous provisions. This report describes (1) the origin of prescription drug user fees; (2) current law; (3) the impact of PDUFA on FDA application review time and the agency's Human Drugs Program budget; and (4) the PDUFA V package (legislative language and the performance goals Agreement). Industry, consumer groups, and FDA agreed that the time from submission of a drug or biologics application to FDA's decision was unacceptably long. With each reauthorization, Congress has amended that definition to expand the scope of activities covered by PDUFA. PDUFA II expanded the range of activities for which FDA could use prescription drug user fee revenue to include those related to the clinical trial phases of a new drug's development (from the IND to submission of an NDA). PDUFA V maintained the PDUFA IV scope of activities that PDUFA fees could support. PDUFA II and III continued that procedure, again referring to the letter ("PDUFA Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures"). As described below, the changes address both communication and timing concerns about the review process, and support of a broader range of FDA activities to continue the development and use of regulatory science "[t]o enhance communications between FDA and sponsors during drug development and to meet the challenges of emerging science." Drug safety. Information technology and performance management. The urgency to pass PDUFA reauthorization stems from PDUFA revenue's accounting for more than half the FDA Human Drugs Program budget. The overall vehicle, FDASIA, included 10 other titles. | Title I of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144) reauthorized the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) through September 30, 2017. Known as PDUFA V, this was the program's fourth five-year reauthorization. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), in 1992, gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to collect fees from the pharmaceutical industry and to use the revenue to support "the process for the review of human drug applications."
PDUFA fees provided 52% of the Human Drugs Program funding for FY2012, accounting for more than 2,000 full-time equivalent employees. Therefore, as each reauthorization deadline approaches, FDA, industry groups, and most Members of Congress see PDUFA as must-pass legislation. Congress originally intended PDUFA to diminish the backlog of new drug applications at FDA and shorten the time from submission to decision. The general view is that PDUFA has succeeded. FDA has added review staff and reduced its review times. At each reauthorization, however, discussion returns to certain issues in the context of PDUFA that also reflect broader FDA concerns. The issues—and results—differ. PDUFA II expanded the user fee program's scope to include activities related to the investigational phases of a new drug's development, and to increase FDA communications with industry and consumer groups. PDUFA III again expanded the scope of activities that user fees could support to include both preclinical development and a three-year postapproval period. PDUFA IV concentrated on new measures concerning postmarket drug safety.
The PDUFA V statutory language does not differ much from PDUFA IV. The accompanying FDA-industry agreement on performance and goals and procedures for FY2013 through FY2017 includes revised communication procedures and timing goals during the application review process and addresses expanded FDA efforts in regulatory science, drug development, drug safety, and information technology.
In addition to PDUFA reauthorization, FDASIA included 10 other titles that reauthorized medical device user fees, established generic drug and biosimilar biological product user fees, and addressed pediatric drug research, medical device regulation, pharmaceutical supply chain security, antibiotic development incentives, expedited drug approval, drug shortages, and a set of miscellaneous provisions. |
crs_R42432 | crs_R42432_0 | A number of legislative proposals and executive branch initiatives designed to increase domestic energy supply, enhance energy security, or amend the requirements of environmental statutes that apply to energy development are before the 115 th Congress. There are legislative proposals that include new revenue-sharing provisions for coastal states ( H.R. 4239 ) that would allow states the authority to manage federal energy leases within their state. The Trump Administration's theme of "energy dominance" has translated into several administration initiatives and executive orders, including the opening of ANWR under the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ), modifying monument designations, streamlining the permitting process for energy projects on federal land, and authorizing more leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) under a new Draft Proposed Program (DPP) for 2019-2024. The new DPP would supersede the current five-year leasing program (2017-2022). Conversely, there are congressional proposals that oppose this Administration's policy direction. A key question addressed in this discussion is how much oil and gas is produced in the United States each year and how much of that comes from federal versus nonfederal areas. Oil production has risen in federal areas (onshore and offshore) over the past 10 years but has increased at a faster rate on nonfederal lands. Nonfederal crude oil production rapidly increased in the past few years, primarily due to improved extraction technology, favorable geology, and the ease of leasing, more than doubling daily production between FY2008 and FY2017 (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ). The federal share of total U.S. crude oil production fell from its peak at nearly 36% in 2009 to less than 24% in 2017. U.S. Natural Gas Production: Federal and Nonfederal Areas
Natural gas production in the United States overall has steadily increased since 2008, while production on federal lands has declined each year from 2009 to 2017 (see Table 3 and Figure 2 ). Much of the decline can be attributed to offshore production falling by over 55%. Onshore production declines, beginning in FY2010, were less dramatic. Oil and Natural Gas Lease Data for Federal Lands
Based on the federal government's 2008 inter-agency Phase III report, 113 million acres of onshore federal lands were open and accessible for oil and gas development and about 166 million acres were off-limits or inaccessible. The BLM says it is addressing public concerns (including legal challenges) prior to a lease sale at a higher rate than in the past. Congressional debate has been ongoing for decades over how much federal land should be available for energy development or other uses and how much should be set aside (e.g., off limits or restricted) for conservation and environmental concerns. There has been recent controversy over revoking or modifying previously withdrawn areas. Streamlining the Application for Permits to Drill
Another issue that Congress may consider whether to continue addressing (for onshore federal lands) is streamlining the processing of applications for permits to drill (APDs). Some Members contend that this would be one way to help boost energy production on federal lands and would be consistent with the Trump Administration's energy policy of "energy dominance." Critics, including some Members of Congress and environmental groups, argue that the proposals to shorten the review timelines would limit public input into land use decisions and overlook important environmental impacts. | A number of legislative proposals and executive branch initiatives designed to increase domestic energy supply, enhance energy security, or amend the requirements of environmental statutes that apply to energy development are before the 115th Congress. There are legislative proposals that include new revenue-sharing provisions for coastal states that would allow states the authority to manage federal energy leases within their state. The Trump Administration's theme of "energy dominance" has translated into several administration initiatives and executive orders, including the opening of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) under the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97), modifying monument designations, streamlining the permitting process for energy projects on federal land, and authorizing more leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) under a new Draft Proposed Program (DPP) for 2019-2024. The new DPP would supersede the current five-year leasing program (2017-2022). Conversely, there are congressional proposals that oppose this Administration's policy direction.
A key question addressed in this discussion is how much oil and gas is produced in the United States each year and how much of that comes from federal versus nonfederal areas. Oil production has risen in federal areas (onshore and offshore) over the past 10 years but has increased at a faster rate on nonfederal lands. Nonfederal crude oil production rapidly increased in the past few years, primarily due to improved extraction technology, favorable geology, and the ease of leasing, more than doubling daily production between FY2008 and FY2017. The federal share of total U.S. crude oil production fell from its peak at nearly 36% in 2009 to less than 24% in 2017 at the same time overall production increased. Natural gas production in the United States overall has steadily increased since 2008. In contrast, production on federal lands declined each year from 2009 through 2017. Much of the decline can be attributed to offshore production falling by over 55%. Onshore production declines were less steep.
Based on the federal government's 2008 inter-agency Phase III report, 113 million acres of onshore federal lands were open and accessible for oil and gas development and about 166 million acres were off-limits or inaccessible. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM—a land and mineral managing agency within the Department of the Interior) says it is addressing public concerns (including legal challenges) prior to a lease sale at a higher rate than in the past.
Congressional debate has been ongoing for decades over how much federal land should be available for energy development or other uses and how much should be set aside (e.g., off limits or restricted) for conservation and environmental concerns. There has been recent controversy over revoking or modifying previously withdrawn areas.
Another issue that Congress is addressing (for onshore federal lands) is streamlining the processing of applications for permits to drill (APDs). Some Members contend that this would be one way to help boost energy production on federal lands and would be consistent with the Trump Administration's energy policy.
Critics, including other Members of Congress and environmental groups, argue that the streamlining proposals would limit public input into land use decisions and possibly overlook important environmental impacts. |
crs_R45413 | crs_R45413_0 | T he Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), excluding the U.S. Forest Service. This includes funding for FDA and USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the two primary federal agencies responsible for overseeing the safety of the nation's food supply. In March 2018, Congress enacted the FY2018 agriculture appropriation as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 , Division A). Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees have reported Agriculture appropriations bills for FY2019 ( H.R. 5961 , S. 2976 ). The Senate amended and passed its version as Division C of a four-bill minibus ( H.R. 6147 ). The enacted FY2018 appropriation and both the FY2019 House-reported bill and the Senate-passed bill include funding for food safety programs and related activities at FDA and USDA. Introduction
Numerous federal, state, and local agencies share responsibilities for regulating the safety of the U.S. food supply. Federal responsibility for food safety rests primarily with FDA and FSIS. FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for ensuring the safety of the majority of all domestic and imported food products (except for meat and poultry products). FSIS, an agency at USDA, regulates most meat, poultry, and processed egg products. Combined appropriations covering food safety activities at both FDA and USDA totaled nearly $2.1 billion in FY2018, which is roughly split between the two agencies ( Figure 1 , Table 1 ). The enacted FY2018 appropriation for FDA's food safety activities provided $1,041.6 million. For FSIS, the FY2018 appropriation provided $1,056.8 million. Collected user fees differ between the two agencies: At FDA, user fees authorized under the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353 ) have generated between $10 million and $20 million annually in recent years; at FSIS, authorized user fees have generated between $180 million and $250 million annually ( Figure 2 ). FDA's total budget for food safety programs and activities extends beyond the agency's Foods Program to encompass other food and veterinary medicine programs at FDA while also including aspects of other FDA program areas covering food additives, antimicrobial resistance, and nutrition labeling. FSMA was the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s, and FDA is still actively engaged in implementing the law and its regulations. Since FSMA became law in 2011, congressional appropriators have increased funding for the FDA Foods Program by $204.3 million—an increase of about 24% between FY2011 and FY2018—largely in an effort to support FDA's implementation of FSMA. Currently, FDA's annual appropriation to conduct its food safety oversight activities is roughly similar to that at FSIS ( Figure 1 , Table 1 ). Congressional appropriations are augmented by existing industry-paid user fees authorized by FSMA. The agency's Meat and Poultry Inspection Program conducts continual inspections at federal meat and poultry plants. | The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), excluding the U.S. Forest Service. Congress enacted the FY2018 agriculture appropriation in March 2018 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division A). Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees have reported Agriculture appropriations bills for FY2019 (H.R. 5961, S. 2976). The Senate amended and passed its version as Division C of a four-bill minibus (H.R. 6147).
Numerous federal, state, and local agencies share responsibilities for regulating the safety of the U.S. food supply. Federal responsibility for food safety rests primarily with FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, and also the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), an agency of USDA. FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of the majority of all domestic and imported food products—except for meat and poultry products, which are within USDA's jurisdiction to oversee meat, poultry, and processed egg products.
Combined appropriations covering food safety activities at both FDA and USDA totaled nearly $2.1 billion in FY2018. Congressional appropriations at both FDA and USDA are augmented by existing (currently authorized) user fees. FDA user fees authorized by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353) have generated between $10 million and $18 million annually in recent years. At FSIS, user fees have generated between $180 million and $250 million per year.
At FDA, ongoing efforts to improve food safety include implementation of FSMA. FSMA was enacted by the 111th Congress and was the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s. Since FSMA became law in 2011, congressional appropriators have increased annual funding for the FDA Foods Program by $204.3 million—an increase of about 24% between FY2011 and FY2018—largely in an effort to support FDA's implementation of FSMA. The enacted FY2018 appropriation for FDA's Foods Program provided $1,041.6 million. Currently, FDA funding for its food safety oversight activities is roughly similar to those of FSIS (Figure 1). FDA's total budget for food safety programs and activities extends beyond the agency's Foods Program, encompassing other food and veterinary medicine programs at FDA.
Food-safety-related activities at FSIS include continuous inspections at federal meat and poultry plants. The enacted FY2018 appropriation provided $1,056.8 million to carry out this function. Compared to FY2011—the year FSMA was enacted—annual congressional appropriations for FSIS have increased by $48.3 million (+5%).
For FY2019, congressional appropriators would increase funding for federal food safety activities, whereas the Administration's budget proposal would reduce food safety funding below FY2018 levels at both FDA and FSIS. |
crs_R42733 | crs_R42733_0 | Introduction
In an effort to curb youth smoking, Section 907(a)(1)(A) of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act) banned all flavorings in cigarettes except menthol. The ban took effect three months after the Tobacco Control Act became law. Among these agreements are the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO Members to treat "like" imported products no less favorably than "like" domestic products with respect to domestic regulations that set forth product characteristics. Indonesia brought a claim before the WTO, arguing, among other things, that imported clove cigarettes are like domestically produced menthol cigarettes; that the Tobacco Control Act treats clove cigarettes less favorably than menthol cigarettes in violation of Article 2.1; and that the Tobacco Control Act is more trade restrictive than necessary under Article 2.2. The panel hearing Indonesia's claim agreed with Indonesia as to Articles 2.1 and 2.12, but rejected its argument with respect to Article 2.2. The United States appealed the panel's finding with respect to Articles 2.1 and 2.12 to the Appellate Body. Although the Appellate Body disagreed with the panel's interpretation of certain terms, it upheld the panel's conclusion that the Tobacco Control Act violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, concluding that clove cigarettes are like menthol cigarettes and that clove cigarettes receive less favorable treatment under Section 907(a)(1)(A) than menthol cigarettes. It concluded that Article 2.1 should be interpreted in conjunction with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and that likeness under Article 2.1, therefore, is based on the competitive relationship of the products. In response to the Appellate Body's decision, the United States suggested that it will likely maintain the ban on clove cigarettes and stated that it will act in a way that respects its obligations under the WTO Agreement. However, it appears that the United States has not yet settled on a course of action. The Appellate Body noted that the United States did not challenge on appeal the panel's exclusion of non-menthol domestically produced flavored cigarettes from the determination of like products. Distinguishing legally binding subsequent interpretations adopted under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement from subsequent agreements under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, the Appellate Body rejected the U.S. argument. Because paragraph 5.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision provides that "reasonable interval" in Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement "shall be understood to mean" not less than six months, the Appellate Body concluded that paragraph 5.2 was a subsequent agreement on the meaning of "reasonable interval" within Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. In order to rebut a prima facie case, therefore, the responding member must establish
(i) that the "urgent circumstances" referred to in Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement surrounded the adoption of the technical regulation at issue; (ii) that producers of the complaining Member could have adapted to the requirements of the technical regulation at issue within the shorter interval that it allowed; or (iii) that a period of "not less than" six months would be ineffective to fulfill the legitimate objectives of its technical regulation. • Accordingly, the [panel] found that a ban on clove cigarettes meets the requirements of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and is thus no more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate public health objective. The United States and Indonesia agreed that 15 months—until July 24, 2013—was a reasonable period of time for the United States to comply with the Appellate Body decision. The Appellate Body also found that Section 901(a)(1)(A) violated Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement because it did not provide a "reasonable interval" between its publication and its effective date. It appears the United States has not yet decided how it intends to accomplish this goal. | In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act), which banned the sale of all flavored cigarettes, except menthol cigarettes, in Section 907(a)(1)(A). Indonesia, a major producer of clove cigarettes, challenged the Tobacco Control Act's ban on non-menthol flavored cigarettes before a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel, claiming, among other things, that it violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Article 2.1 requires WTO members to ensure that domestic regulations setting forth product characteristics treat like imported products no less favorably than like domestic products. Article 2.2 requires that such regulations be no more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective. The panel hearing the dispute agreed with Indonesia on Article 2.1 but found for the United States on Article 2.2. The United States appealed the panel's finding on Article 2.1.
On April 4, 2012, the Appellate Body issued a decision. Although the Appellate Body disagreed with certain legal standards applied by the panel, it ultimately upheld the panel's conclusion that menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes are like products and that the Tobacco Control Act's ban of non-menthol flavored cigarettes treats imported clove cigarettes less favorably than domestic menthol cigarettes. The Appellate Body stated that this case involved de facto discrimination and drew on jurisprudence developed under Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), which is similar to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, to hold that "likeness in Article 2.1 [] is based on the competitive relationship between and among products." The Appellate Body accepted that domestic regulations may legitimately distinguish between products to serve a public health interest. However, it found that the differential treatment of menthol and clove cigarettes in the Tobacco Control Act did not stem from a legitimate regulatory distinction. The Appellate Body, therefore, found that Section 907(a)(1)(A) violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
The panel found that Section 907(a)(10)(A), in providing a period of three months before the ban took effect, violated Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement, which requires a "reasonable interval" between publication of the law and its effective date. The United States appealed. The Appellate Body rejected Indonesia's argument that paragraph 5.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, which interpreted "reasonable interval" within Article 2.12 to mean "a period of not less than six months," was a legally binding interpretation of Article 2.12 under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). However, the Appellate Body found that paragraph 5.2 was a "subsequent agreement" under Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Appellate Body stated that under Article 2.12 the complaining Member must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that the technical regulation provides an interval between publication and effective date of less than six months; then the burden shifts to the responding Member to demonstrate that the interval provided is reasonable.
In response to the Appellate Body's decision, the United States has suggested that it will likely maintain the ban on clove cigarettes while fulfilling its obligations under the WTO Agreement. It appears the United States has not yet settled on how it will accomplish this. The United States and Indonesia agreed that the United States would comply with the Appellate Body decision by July 24, 2013. |
crs_RL34319 | crs_RL34319_0 | Overview
Foreign capital inflows are playing an important role in the economy. Indeed, during the 2008-2009 financial crises, dollar-denominated assets were the preferred safe haven investment of foreign investors. Over the past decade, the United States experienced a decline in its rate of saving and an increase in the rate of domestic investment. Disruptions in this role have important implications for the United States and for the smooth functioning of the international financial system. Withdrawal of Foreign Investment
This section analyzes four possible strategies a single large foreign investor or a group of foreign investors could employ to reduce or withdraw entirely their holdings of financial assets in the United States. These strategies include
a rapid liquidation of U.S. Treasury securities, a shift in the makeup of foreign investors' portfolios among various dollar-denominated assets, a rapid shift from dollar-denominated assets to assets denominated in other currencies, and a slow shift in the makeup of future accumulations of assets away from dollar-denominated assets to assets denominated in currencies other than the dollar. Given the dynamic nature of finance and credit markets and the instantaneous communication of information, such actions likely would occur within a very short time frame. The overall performance of the U.S. economy at the time of any attempted withdrawal would also influence the economic effect of the withdrawal. For instance, if the U.S. economy were experiencing a robust rate of economic growth, the impact of a withdrawal by foreign investors likely would be minimal, both in the short run and in the long run. However, if such a withdrawal were to occur at a time when the U.S. economy were not experiencing a robust rate of economic growth, or if the U.S. credit and financial markets were under duress, such a withdrawal may well have a more pervasive effect by undermining investors' confidence in the stability and performance of the markets and could result in higher interest rates and a lower exchange value of the dollar over the short run and prolong the adjustment process. If some foreign investors attempted to accomplish such a readjustment in their portfolios quickly by liquidating a portion of their holdings of corporate stocks and bonds and of Treasury securities, the prices of those assets would fall, given the current pervasive role foreign investors play in most U.S. financial markets. As a result of these losses, it seems unlikely that a foreign investor with large holdings or a group of foreign investors would attempt to liquidate their securities quickly. Such willingness on the part of the Federal Reserve to intervene in the financial markets to ensure stability likely makes a prolonged financial crisis arising from a liquidation of financial assets by one foreign investor or a group of foreign investors unlikely, even if those investors are foreign governments. | This report provides an overview of the role foreign investment plays in the U.S. economy and an assessment of possible actions a foreign investor or a group of foreign investors might choose to take to liquidate their investments in the United States. Concerns over the potential impact of disinvestment have grown as national governments have become more active investors in the U.S. economy and as innovation in creating financial instruments has increased volatility in financial markets. Such concerns seem out of step with the experience of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, during which the dollar became the preferred safe haven investment for foreign investors. If some foreign investors were to liquidate their holdings, these actions could affect the U.S. economy in a number of ways due to the role foreign investment plays in the United States and due to the current mix of economic policies the United States has chosen. The impact of any such action on the economy would also depend on the overall condition and performance of the economy and the financial markets. If the economy were experiencing a strong rate of economic growth, the impact of a foreign withdrawal likely would be minimal, especially given the dynamic nature of credit markets. If a withdrawal occurred when the economy was not experiencing a robust rate of growth or if credit financial markets were under duress, the withdrawal could have a stronger effect on economic activity.
The particular course of action foreign investors might choose to take and the overall strength and performance of the economy at the time of their actions could affect the economy in different ways. Congress likely would become involved as a result of its direct role in making economic policy and its oversight role over the Federal Reserve. In addition, the actions of foreign investors could complicate domestic economic policymaking. Foreign investors who decide to liquidate their holdings of one particular type of investment would normally need to look for other types of assets to acquire. While there are a multitude of possible strategies foreign investors could pursue, this analysis assesses the impact of four of the most likely strategies a single large foreign investor or a group of foreign investors could choose to employ to reduce or withdraw entirely their holdings of U.S. financial assets:
A rapid liquidation of U.S. Treasury securities. A shift in the makeup of foreign investors' portfolios among various dollar-denominated assets. A rapid shift from dollar-denominated assets to assets denominated in other currencies. A slow shift in the makeup of future accumulations of assets away from dollar-denominated assets to assets denominated in currencies other than the dollar. |
crs_RL32571 | crs_RL32571_0 | a. Brazil's specific charges and the WTO panel's findings. 3. Phase I V : WTO arbitration of Brazil's request for retaliatory countermeasures. 6. Phase II: Brazil's WTO Dispute Settlement Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program
In 2002, Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—expressed its growing concerns about U.S. cotton subsidies by initiating a WTO dispute settlement case (DS267) against certain features of the U.S. cotton program. U.S. trade officials argued that the U.S. export credit guarantee programs were consistent with WTO obligations. However, Brazil argued that U.S. program changes were insufficient and, on August 21, 2006, requested the establishment of a WTO compliance panel to review whether the United States had fully complied with panel and AB rulings. Under the prohibited subsidies arbitration case, Brazil was seeking two countermeasures:
1. a one-time countermeasure in relation to the Step 2 program of $350 million based on U.S. government payments made under the Step 2 program in marketing year 2005 (this corresponds roughly to the period that elapsed between the expiration of the prohibited subsidy compliance period on July 1, 2005, and the effective repeal of the Step 2 program by the U.S. Congress on August 1, 2006); and 2. annual countermeasures proportionate to the entire annual amount of GSM 102 export credit guarantees issued to all countries for export transactions involving unscheduled products—rice, pork, and poultry—valued at $1.155 billion during FY2006 (initially Brazil valued this countermeasure at $1.294 million) and composed of three parts: a. an interest rate subsidy component amounting to $234.7 million; b. the additional export sales obtained by the United States as a result of these discounts, including sales to creditworthy foreign obligors, referred to as marginal additionality and valued at $62.3 million; and c. the additional export sales to noncreditworthy foreign obligors, referred to as full additionality and valued at $855 million. Under the combined prohibited and actionable subsidy cases, Brazil asked for:
4. the right to engage in cross-retaliation (i.e., countermeasures in sectors outside of the trade in goods, most notably in the area of U.S. copyrights and patents, as well as services), stating that retaliation in goods would not be practicable or effective due to limited trade in goods between Brazil and the United States. As a result, the panel ruled that Brazil would be entitled to cross-retaliation, if (and only if) the overall retaliation amount (combining both the variable and fixed components) to which it would otherwise be entitled exceeds a variable annual threshold (described below). Brazil Targets Goods and Services for Countermeasures
On December 21, 2009, Brazil announced that it was authorized by the WTO to impose trade retaliation against up to $829.3 million in U.S. goods in 2010 (based on 2008 U.S. trade data). Brazil and United States Reach Framework Agreement
On June 17, 2010, U.S. and Brazilian trade negotiators concluded the Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the WTO (WT/DS267) for moving forward in the dispute settlement case. The framework agreement—which lays out a number of "steps and discussions"—represents a path forward toward the ultimate goal of reaching a negotiated solution to the dispute, while avoiding WTO-sanctioned trade retaliation by Brazil against U.S. goods and services. As a result, Brazil has suspended trade retaliation pending U.S. compliance with the framework agreement measures. Changes to Trade-Distorting Domestic Cotton Support Programs
The framework agreement includes quarterly discussions on potential limits to trade-distorting U.S. cotton subsidies (recognizing that actual changes to cotton-specific subsidies require legislation by Congress and are not likely to happen outside of the 2012 farm bill debate). The GSM-102 semi-annual operational reviews will coincide with the relevant quarterly cotton program discussions. Both parties to the dispute have said that a final mutually agreed solution would not be possible until after the 2012 farm bill, when the nature of any changes to U.S. domestic cotton subsidies has been made clear. Payments to the Brazilian Cotton Institute
The United States has agreed to pay $147.3 million annually into a Brazilian fund (known as the Brazilian Cotton Institute) for technical assistance and capacity building for Brazil's cotton sector. The two sides also discussed the average length of loan tenors made under the GSM-102 program. | The so-called "Brazil cotton case" is a long-running World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement case (DS267) initiated by Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—in 2002 against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program. In September 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel found that certain U.S. agricultural support payments and guarantees—including (1) payments to cotton producers under the marketing loan and counter-cyclical programs, and (2) export credit guarantees under the GSM-102 program—were inconsistent with WTO commitments. In 2005, the United States made several changes to both its cotton and GSM-102 programs in an attempt to bring them into compliance with WTO recommendations. However, Brazil argued that the U.S. response was inadequate. A WTO compliance panel ruled in favor of Brazil's non-compliance charge against the United States in December 2007, and the ruling was upheld on appeal in June 2008.
In August 2009, a WTO arbitration panel—assigned to determine the appropriate level of retaliation—announced that Brazil's trade countermeasures against U.S. goods and services could include two components: (1) a fixed amount of $147.3 million in response to U.S. cotton program payments, and (2) a variable amount based on U.S. GSM-102 program spending. In response to Brazil's argument that insufficient trade in goods occurred between the two countries, the arbitrators also ruled that Brazil would be entitled to cross-retaliation if the overall retaliation amount exceeded a formula-based variable annual threshold. Cross-retaliation involves countermeasures in sectors outside of the trade in goods, most notably in the area of U.S. copyrights and patents. Based on the arbitrators' formulas, using 2008 data, Brazil announced in December 2009 that it would impose trade retaliation starting on April 6, 2010, against up to $829.3 million in U.S. goods, including $268.3 million in eligible cross-retaliatory countermeasures.
The threat of sanctions led to intense negotiations between Brazil and the United States to find a mutual agreement and avoid the trade retaliation. In April 2010, the two parties reached a preliminary memorandum of understanding (MOU) spelling out certain actions which, if undertaken by the United States, would lead to suspension of Brazil's threatened retaliation. Then, on June 17, 2010, U.S. and Brazilian trade negotiators concluded the Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the WTO (WT/DS267). The framework agreement—which lays out a number of "steps and discussions"—represents a path forward toward the ultimate goal of reaching a negotiated solution to the dispute, while avoiding WTO-sanctioned trade retaliation by Brazil against U.S. goods and services. As a result, Brazil has suspended trade retaliation pending U.S. compliance with the framework agreement measures. Key aspects of the framework agreement include (1) payment by the United States of a $147.3 million annual fund to a newly created "Brazilian Cotton Institute" to provide technical assistance and capacity-building for Brazil's cotton sector, (2) quarterly discussions on potential limits of trade-distorting U.S. cotton subsidies (recognizing that actual changes will not occur prior to the 2012 farm bill), and (3) near-term modifications to the operation of the GSM-102 program coupled with a semi-annual review of whether U.S. GSM-102 program implementation satisfies certain performance benchmarks.
These U.S. commitments are intended to delay any trade retaliation until after the 2012 farm bill, when potential changes to U.S. cotton programs will be evaluated. However, in the interim, several failed legislative attempts have been made to ban U.S. payments to the Brazil Cotton Institute. |
crs_RL32322 | crs_RL32322_0 | Introduction(1)
On October 1, 2002, the Bush Administration notified Congress of the intention to enter intonegotiations leading to a free trade agreement with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). Two other countries in Central America have distinctivebackgrounds. (3)
The DR-CAFTA partner countries are basically small countries with limited population andeconomic resources, with some differences in level of development (see Table 1). The combined population of the countries is 45 million, ranging from Costa Rica with apopulation of 4.1 million to Guatemala with a population of 12.6 million. With a combined national income of about $92 billion, the Gross National Incomes (GNI)of the countries range from $4.5 billion for Nicaragua to $26.9 billion for Guatemala. In the early 1980s, with a revolutionary regime in Nicaragua and a threatening insurgencyin El Salvador, Congress responded to President Reagan's 1982 call for a Caribbean Basin Initiativeby increasing economic assistance to the Central American and Caribbean region, and by providingone-way duty-free trade preferences for the region for 12 years in the Caribbean Basin EconomicRecovery Act (CBERA). They also argued that the agreement willstrengthen economic reform and democracy in the affected countries. (13) On the eve of the signing of the CAFTA pact with CentralAmerican countries on May 28, 2004, several Democratic Members from the House and the Senatecriticized the labor and environmental provisions of the agreement. Agriculture. While many U.S. commodity organizationssupport the DR-CAFTA agreement, the U.S. sugar industry opposes it on grounds that the increasein the quota sets a precedent for other free trade agreements and would result in a substantial increasein sugar imports that would be damaging to U.S. producers. Duty-free treatment will be accorded to someapparel produced in Cental America and the Dominican Republic that contains certain fabrics fromNAFTA partners Mexico and Canada, or from other countries in the case of fabrics and materialsdeemed to be in "short supply" in the United States and Central America. The measure was signed into law ( P.L. 109-53 ) by President Bushon August 2, 2005, in the presence of legislators and regional ambassadors. In conjunction with thelate June votes in the relevant committees and in the Senate, the Administration agreed to takemeasures to limit sugar imports, to study the feasibility of using sugar for the production of ethanol,and to support multi-year assistance to regional countries to strengthen the enforcement of labor andenvironmental standards and to assist regional farmers who might be adversely affected by thepact. According to pressreports, the partner countries have tentatively agreed that the agreement will enter into force onJanuary 1, 2006, for approving countries. Relations with the United States
Relations with the United States have been strong. Major U.S. companies currently invested in Costa Rica include the following by sector. On September 6, 2005, theDominican Republic approved the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free TradeAgreement (DR-CAFTA). Foreign Aid. By signing DR-CAFTA, the Dominican Republic hopes to improve accessfor its exports to the U.S. market and to encourage new investment in its FTZs. (77)
Textiles and Apparel. government report. Critics argue that the labor provisions under DR-CAFTA are less stringent than thosecurrently in place under U.S. preferential trade arrangements. Crime and Human Rights. Military and Counternarcotics Issues. Migration Issues. market." | This report explains the conditions in five countries in Central America (Costa Rica, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and one country in the Caribbean (DominicanRepublic) that will be partners with the United States in the U.S.-Dominican Republic-CentralAmerica Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) signed in August 2004. All of the signatory countriesexcept Costa Rica have approved the pact. The agreement will enter into force for the approvingcountries on an agreed date, tentatively January 1, 2006. In U.S. approval action, the House andSenate passed the required implementing legislation ( H.R. 3045 ) on July 27 and 28,2005, and the President signed it into law ( P.L. 109-53 ) on August 2, 2005.
The DR-CAFTA partners are basically small countries with limited populations andeconomic resources, ranging in population from Costa Rica with a population of 4.1 million toGuatemala with a population of 12.6 million, and ranging in Gross National Income (GNI) from $4.5billion for Nicaragua to $26.9 billion for Guatemala. While El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaraguaexperienced extended civil conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, all of the countries have haddemocratically elected presidents for some time, and several of the countries have experienced recentelectoral transitions. For each of the countries the United States is the dominant market as well asthe major source of investment and foreign assistance, including trade preferences under theCaribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and assistance following devastating hurricanes.
The Bush Administration and other proponents of the pact argue that the agreement willcreate new opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers by eliminating barriers to U.S. goods andservices in the region. They also argue that it will encourage economic reform and strengthendemocracy in affected countries. Many regional officials favor the pact because it provides newaccess to the U.S. market and makes permanent many of the temporary one-way duty-free tradepreferences currently in place. Critics argue that the environmental and labor provisions areinadequate, that the pact will lead to the loss of jobs for workers in the United States and forsubsistence farmers in Central America, and that provisions relating to textiles/apparel and sugar willbe harmful to U.S. producers. In the context of legislative action, the Bush Administration promisedto limit sugar imports, to make some adjustments for textile industries, and to support multi-yearassistance to strengthen regional enforcement of labor and environmental standards.
Related information may be found in CRS Report RL31870 , The DominicanRepublic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), by J.F. Hornbeck; CRS Report RL32110 , Agriculture in the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American Free TradeAgreement , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22164 , DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues , by ClareRibando; and CRS Report RS22159 , DR-CAFTA Labor Rights Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34598 | crs_RL34598_0 | Most Recent Developments
On September 30, 2008, the President signed H.R. 2638 , the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, into law as P.L. 110-329 . This act included the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2009 (MILCON-VA Appropriations Act of 2009), as its Division E. The House passed H.R. The MILCON-VA Appropriations Act of 2009 provides a total of $40.9 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2009 (see Table 1 ), a $1.7 billion increase over the Administrations request and a $3.7 billion over the FY2008 enacted amount. P.L. 110-329 did not include any bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for the VHA for FY2009. Background
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules, including disability compensation and pensions, education, training and rehabilitation services, hospital and medical care, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. The Veterans Health Care System
The VHA operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. P.L. P.L. FY2009 VHA Budget
On February 4, 2008, the President submitted his FY2009 budget proposal to Congress. The Administration requested a total of $39.2 billion (excluding collections) for VHA. This is a 5.3% increase, or a $2.0 billion increase, over the FY2008 enacted level. Including total available resources (including medical collections) the Administration's budget would have provided $41.1 billion for VHA. FY2009 Congressional Budget Resolution49
On March 7, 2008, the House ( H.Con.Res. 312 ) and Senate ( S.Con.Res. 70 ) reported their respective budget resolutions. Similar to the House amounts, the Senate budget resolution provided $48.2 billion for discretionary veterans programs including health care, and $45.1 billion for mandatory programs. After negotiations between the House and Senate, the House agreed to an amended version of S.Con.Res. 70 (Conference Report; H.Rept. 110-659 ). The conference agreement provides $48.2 billion for FY2009 for discretionary veterans' programs, including medical care. On June 24, the House Appropriations Committee marked up the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill ( H.R. On August 1, the House passed H.R. 6599 . H.R. Senate Committee Action
On July 17, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version of the FY2009 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill ( S. 3301 , S.Rept. 110-428 ). The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $41.1 billion (excluding collections) for VHA for FY2009 (see Table 7 ). 2638 ). 110-329 . 6599 ( H.Rept. The Committee is directing the VA to increase Priority Group 8 enrollment by 10%, and has provided $568 million above the Administration's request for this purpose. 110-161 ) provided funding for VA to increase the beneficiary travel mileage reimbursement rate from 11 cents per mile to 28.5 cents per mile. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system.
On February 4, 2008, the President submitted his FY2009 budget proposal to Congress. The Administration requested a total of $39.2 billion (excluding collections) for VHA. This is a 5.3% increase (or $2.0 billion) over the FY2008 enacted level. Including total available resources (including medical collections) the Administration's budget would have provided $41.1 billion for VHA.
On March 7, 2008, the House (H.Con.Res. 312) and Senate (S.Con.Res. 70) reported their respective budget resolutions. After negotiations between the House and Senate, the House agreed to an amended version of S.Con.Res. 70 (Conference Report; H.Rept. 110-659). The conference agreement provided $48.2 billion for FY2009 for discretionary veterans' programs, including medical care, and provided $45.1 billion in mandatory funding for veterans programs.
On June 24, the House Appropriations Committee marked up the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill (H.R. 6599; H.Rept. 110-775) for FY2009. On August 1, the House passed H.R. 6599. The House-passed measure provided $40.8 billion (excluding collections) for VHA. On July 17, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version of the FY2009 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (S. 3301; S.Rept. 110-428). The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $41.1 billion (excluding collections) for VHA for FY2009.
On September 30, the President signed the H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, into law as P.L. 110-329. This act included the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2009. In total H.R. 2638 provides a total of $40.9 billion (excluding collections) for VHA.
P.L. 110-329 does not include bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for the VHA for FY2009. P.L. 110-329 has provided additional funding to increase Priority Group 8 enrollment in FY2009, and to increase the mileage reimbursement rate to 41.5 cents per mile.
With the passage of H.R. 2638 (P.L. 110-329), the appropriation process for funding VHA for FY2009 was completed by Congress. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43110 | crs_R43110_0 | Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill
The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—provides funding for:
all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, which is funded in the Interior appropriations bill, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, and in the House, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In even-numbered fiscal years, CFTC appears in the enacted Agriculture appropriation. The primary focus of this report is the FY2014 appropriation. Action on FY2014 Appropriations
Omnibus Action
The FY2014 Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriation was enacted as Division A of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-76 —an omnibus appropriation that included all 12 appropriations subcommittee bills ( Table 1 ). The Agriculture subcommittees subsequently were allocated $20.880 billion for discretionary appropriations in the omnibus. This is $1.165 billion (+5.9%) more than the post-sequestration amount for FY2013, after adjusting for the alternating year placement of CFTC in enacted bills. Mandatory spending amounts of $124.6 billion also are carried in the bill, but generally are determined by authorizing legislation such as the farm bill. The total Agriculture appropriation in FY2014, therefore, is $145.5 billion. Post-Sequestration Amounts for FY2013
The amount of budget authority that was available to agencies for FY2013 is unclear from many published appropriations documents for several reasons. 113-6 ). USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) regulates most meat, poultry, and processed egg products. The enacted FY2014 appropriation provides $1.493 billion for FSA salaries and expenses, $89 million (+6.3%) more than FY2013 post-sequestration levels. The FY2014 appropriation also limits mandatory funding under the Watershed Rehabilitation Program. P.L. The enacted appropriation authorizes $5.5 billion in electric loans, $1.6 billion (-22.5%) less than FY2013. 113-76 ), signed by the President on January 17, 2014. The FY2014 appropriation provides the CFTC with $215 million, up 10.8% from FY2013. Most agency operations (salaries and expenses) are financed with discretionary funds. Major discretionary programs include certain conservation programs; most rural development programs; research and education programs; agricultural credit programs; the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); the Food for Peace international food aid program; meat and poultry inspection; and food marketing and regulatory programs. The largest component of USDA's mandatory spending is for food and nutrition programs—primarily the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) and child nutrition (school lunch and related programs)—along with the farm commodity price and income support programs, the federal crop insurance program, and various agricultural conservation and trade programs. 2. 3. 4. | The annual Agriculture appropriations bill provides funding for all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, plus the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and, in even-numbered fiscal years, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The FY2014 Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriations bill was included as Division A of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, an omnibus appropriation that was enacted on January 17, 2014 (P.L. 113-76). It provides $20.880 billion of discretionary funding for agricultural and related programs. This is $1.165 billion (+5.9%) more than the post-sequestration amount for FY2013 (P.L. 113-6). Post-sequestration amounts for FY2013 programs became known during the development of the FY2014 appropriation, and are included in this report.
Although the appropriation's primary focus is allocating discretionary funds, it also carries mandatory spending for FY2014 that totals $124.6 billion, primarily for domestic nutrition assistance ($101.4 billion), crop insurance ($9.5 billion), and farm commodity and conservation programs ($12.5 billion), although these generally are determined by authorizing legislation such as the farm bill. The total Agriculture appropriation, therefore, with discretionary and mandatory authority is $145.5 billion in FY2014.
The largest discretionary items comprising the $20.88 billion discretionary appropriation are as follows.
Domestic nutrition programs, including the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), receive $7.15 billion, up 3% from FY2013 post-sequestration levels. FDA receives $2.56 billion of appropriated funding, up 7% from FY2013. Agricultural research agencies total $2.64 billion, up 10% from FY2013. Rural Development agencies receive $2.57 billion, up about 13% from FY2013. Foreign aid and trade programs receive $1.84 billion, up about 8% form FY2013. The Farm Service Agency and Risk Management Agency receive about $1.66 billion for salaries and expenses, and farm loans, up 6% from FY2013. USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service receives $1.01 billion, up 3% from FY2013. Conservation Operations and Watershed Rehabilitation programs receive $0.83 billion, up nearly 6% from FY2013. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service receives $0.82 billion, up 8% from FY2013.
The FY2014 appropriation also contains several policy directives that, among other things, limit USDA's ability to regulate livestock and poultry marketing practices, and encourage a delay in implementing some country-of-origin labeling rules. |
crs_RL34062 | crs_RL34062_0 | Introduction
This report examines the Department of Defense (DOD) use of aviation fuel and possibilities to reduce that use by examining related issues and presenting options Congress may choose to consider. DOD, the largest single consumer of energy in the United States, recognizes the need to reduce its reliance on fossil fuel. The largest portion of fossil fuel used by DOD is in the form of aviation fuel. Although formulated for use in aircraft, aviation fuel is also used in other, land-based, platforms such as tanks and generators to reduce DOD's logistics requirements. Reducing DOD's consumption of aviation fuel could, by itself, significantly reduce the department's overall use of and reliance on fossil fuel. In Fiscal Year 2005, DOD consumed roughly 125 million barrels of oil—approximately 1.2% of the nation's total. About 74% of DOD's energy powers its mobility vehicles—Air Force aircraft, Navy ships, and Army ground vehicles. Over half—roughly 52%—is aviation fuel. There are several options available to DOD for reducing its use of fossil-based aviation fuel. Each has advantages and disadvantages and no single option provides the perfect solution. Advanced technologies such as synthetic fuels offer potential sources of alternate fuel but further development and study are required before DOD can employ them on a large scale. DOD can also take measures to decrease its use of fuel. Possible options include upgrading aircraft engines and modifying operational procedures. Many of these measures, however, are costly and must compete for funding with other operational priorities. The Air Force has set a goal of using a domestically produced synthetic fuel blend for 50 percent of its aviation fuel by 2016. Some outside DOD seem to view it as a potential leader in the effort to develop and use alternative forms of energy, particularly synthetic fuel. When questioned by the House Armed Subcommittees on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities and Readiness regarding DOD's role in developing new technologies for alternative fuels, DOD witnesses consistently responded in language that drew clear boundaries around DOD's role:
Mr. John Young, DDR&E: So, across the board, I think the department is a partner with other agencies in the government and the commercial industry, which is helping to drive this space, and push the technology forward both on revolutionary spaces and then in areas where we see—or evolutionary spaces and then places where we see chances at a revolution...
Mr. Philip Grone, DUSD (I&E): So I do think there's a synergy between activities of the department, activities of the broader federal family and industry, both in research and development and the actual application of the technologies, the vehicles, where we can have an effect on understanding and ultimately of markets in terms of demonstrating the viability of certain technologies. 370 ) would allow DOD to enter into contracts for synthetic fuels for up to 25 years. REPORT ON ACTIONS TO REDUCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONSUMPTION OF PETROLEUM-BASED FUEL. ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN WEAPONS PLATFORMS. FY2007 Defense Appropriations Act ( H.R. | The Department of Defense (DOD) is a factor in the nation's discussion about national energy security. As the largest single consumer of fuel in the United States, DOD has the potential to make important contributions to the national effort to reduce the use of and reliance on fossil fuel. Aviation fuel makes up the largest portion of fossil fuel consumed by DOD and therefore represents the area of greatest potential energy savings. This report examines DOD's use of aviation fuel and possibilities to reduce that use by examining related issues and presenting options Congress may choose to consider.
Reducing DOD's consumption of aviation fuel could by itself significantly reduce the department's overall reliance on fossil fuel. In Fiscal Year 2005, DOD consumed roughly 125 million barrels of oil—approximately 1.2% of the nation's total. About 74% of that was used to power mobility vehicles—Air Force aircraft, Navy ships, and Army ground vehicles. Over half (roughly 52% ) was aviation fuel. (Note: aviation fuel is also used in "non-aircraft" systems such as tanks and generators in order to reduce logistics requirements on the battlefield.
There are several ways in which DOD can reduce its use of fossil-based aviation fuel. Each has advantages and disadvantages and no single option provides the perfect solution. Advanced technologies, such as synthetic fuels, offer potential alternatives but further development and study are required before DOD can employ them on a large scale. DOD can also take measures to decrease its use of fuel. Possible options include upgrading aircraft engines and modifying operational procedures. Many of these measures, however, are costly and must compete for funding with other operational priorities.
Congress also recognizes that DOD has a role to play in the nation's quest for alternative energy sources. Language contained in the FY2007 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts requires DOD to report to Congress on their actions to reduce consumption of fossil fuel, increase the energy efficiency of their weapon platforms, and explore the use of synthetic fuel made from coal. Additional proposed legislation would require DOD to further study coal as a fuel source and would remove certain DOD contracting restrictions viewed as a potential obstacle to synthetic fuel development.
DOD has publically expressed its intention to devote resources to this issue; Air Force leadership has stated a goal of using domestically produced synthetic fuel for half of its domestic aviation fuel by 2016. At the present time, however, DOD does not seem to have a comprehensive long-term energy strategy or centralized leadership focused on energy issues for the department. This may affect the department's ability to achieve its long-term energy goals. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45113 | crs_R45113_0 | Introduction
The aggregate student loan debt owed by borrowers in the United States has increased markedly over time. As overall student loan indebtedness has increased, many borrowers have found themselves unable to repay their student loans. Declaring bankruptcy is one means by which an individual may potentially obtain relief from a student loan that he cannot repay. This report provides a comprehensive overview of the various legal issues related to whether—and under what circumstances—a debtor may discharge a student loan in bankruptcy. The report begins by providing general background on bankruptcy law and the principles governing the discharge of outstanding debt. In so doing, the report explains how and why the Bankruptcy Code generally makes student loans nondischargeable absent an "undue hardship." The report then describes the variou s legal standards that courts have applied when determining whether a particular debtor is entitled to an undue hardship discharge. The report closes by describing various potential considerations for Congress, including ways in which Congress could alter the Bankruptcy Code's current treatment of student loans. Interpreting "Undue Hardship"
The Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship," and the legislative history of Section 523 does not precisely specify how courts should determine whether a debtor qualifies for an undue hardship discharge. The task of interpreting this statutory term has consequently fallen to the federal judiciary. The Brunner Test
The vast majority of courts—specifically the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia—have interpreted "undue hardship" to require the debtor to prove three things:
1. the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans; 2. additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor's inability to pay is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and 3. the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. The debtor must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. This standard is commonly called the " Brunner " test, after the Second Circuit case in which the standard originated. The Brunner test is highly fact-intensive, and not all courts apply the Brunner standard the same way. The "Totality-of-the-Circumstances" Test
Whereas the vast majority of courts apply the Brunner test to determine whether excepting a student loan from discharge would impose an undue hardship upon the debtor, two circuits have explicitly declined to adopt the Brunner standard. Defining "undue hardship" would also allow Congress to resolve one or more of the aforementioned doctrinal splits that currently exist in the federal courts, such as
whether undue hardship determinations should be governed by the Brunner test, the totality-of-the-circumstances test, or some other legal standard; whether a debtor seeking an undue hardship discharge may tithe a portion of her income that might otherwise go toward repaying her student loans to a religious institution; whether a debtor must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" or a "certainty of hopelessness" in order to obtain an undue hardship discharge; whether a debtor seeking an undue hardship discharge on the grounds of a medical disability must introduce corroborating medical evidence; whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the partial discharge of a student loan; whether, and to what extent, a debtor's eligibility for and participation in an IDR plan affects the debtor's eligibility for an undue hardship discharge; whether a cosigner of a student loan who does not directly obtain an educational benefit from the loan must demonstrate an undue hardship in order to discharge his own obligation for the loan in his own bankruptcy case; and whether courts should consider the value of the education that the loan financed when evaluating whether the debtor is entitled to an undue hardship discharge. | As overall student loan indebtedness in the United States has increased over the years, many borrowers have found themselves unable to repay their student loans. Ordinarily, declaring bankruptcy is a means by which a debtor may "discharge"—that is, obtain relief from—debts he is unable to repay. However, Congress, based upon its determination that allowing debtors to freely discharge student loans in bankruptcy could threaten the student loan program, has limited the circumstances in which a debtor may discharge a student loan. Under current law, a debtor may not discharge a student loan unless repaying the student loan would impose an "undue hardship" upon the debtor and his dependents.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship," and the legislative history of Section 523 does not precisely specify how courts should determine whether a debtor qualifies for an undue hardship discharge. The task of interpreting this statutory term has consequently fallen to the federal judiciary. Courts, however, have disagreed regarding exactly what a debtor must prove in order to discharge a student loan on undue hardship grounds.
The vast majority of courts have interpreted "undue hardship" to require the debtor to prove three things: (1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor's inability to pay is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. The debtor must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. This standard is commonly called the "Brunner" test, after the case in which the standard originated. The Brunner test is highly fact-intensive, and not all courts apply the Brunner standard the same way. Indeed, each factor has resulted in various subsidiary splits in the courts with respect to a host of issues.
Whereas the vast majority of courts apply the Brunner test to determine whether excepting a student loan from discharge would impose an undue hardship upon the debtor, two courts have explicitly declined to adopt the Brunner standard. Instead, these courts apply an alternative standard known as "the totality-of-the-circumstances test," weighing numerous, nonexclusive factors when considering whether student loan debt should be discharged.
In response to this split of authority, some Members of Congress and commentators have advanced numerous proposals to alter the way that student loans are treated in bankruptcy. This report therefore provides a comprehensive overview of the various legal issues related to whether, and under what circumstances, a debtor may discharge a student loan in bankruptcy. The report begins by providing general background on bankruptcy law and the principles governing the discharge of outstanding debt. In so doing, the report explains how and why the Bankruptcy Code generally makes student loans nondischargeable absent an "undue hardship." The report then describes the various legal standards that courts have applied when determining whether a particular debtor is entitled to an undue hardship discharge. The report closes by describing various potential considerations for Congress, including ways in which Congress could alter the Bankruptcy Code's current treatment of student loans. |
crs_RS22230 | crs_RS22230_0 | What Is a Congressional or Federal Charter? A congressional or federal charter is a federal statute that establishes a corporation. Enduring Issues
Congressionally chartered corporations have raised diverse issues for Congress, including (1) Title 36 corporations' membership practices; (2) prohibitions on Title 36 corporations engaging in "political activities"; (3) confusion over which corporations are governmental and which are private; and (4) federal management of these corporations. entities that have both governmental and private sector attributes). The Federal Management of Corporations
The management of government corporations has been made difficult by a few factors. This practice has fallen by the wayside; usually, Congress charters entities to have "perpetual succession." | A congressional or federal charter is a federal statute that establishes a corporation. Congress has issued charters since 1791, although most charters were issued after the start of the 20th century. Congress has used charters to create a variety of corporate entities, such as banks, government-sponsored enterprises, commercial corporations, venture capital funds, and quasi governmental entities. Congressionally chartered corporations have raised diverse issues for Congress, including (1) Title 36 corporations' membership practices; (2) prohibitions on Title 36 corporations engaging in "political activities"; (3) confusion over which corporations are governmental and which are private; and (4) federal management of these corporations. This report will be updated annually.
Readers seeking additional information about congressionally chartered organizations may consult:
CRS Report RL30365, Federal Government Corporations: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL30533, The Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both Government and Private Sector Legal Characteristics, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL30340, Congressionally Chartered Nonprofit Organizations ("Title 36 Corporations"): What They Are and How Congress Treats Them, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44655 | crs_R44655_0 | Developments in the 114th Congress
The 114 th Congress debated several gun control proposals following two high-fatality mass shootings in December 2015 and June 2016. After both shootings, congressional gun control debate coalesced around the following issues:
Should the Attorney General be given the authority to deny firearms (and explosives) transfers to persons she determines to be "dangerous terrorists"? Should federal background check requirements be expanded to include intrastate firearms transfers among private, unlicensed persons? Should grants be provided or withheld to encourage state, local, municipal, tribal, and territorial authorities to increase computer access to records on persons prohibited from possessing firearms for the purposes of background checks? Should definitions related to mental incompetency in federal gun control regulations be codified or revised? Debate on the latter three issues mirrored congressional debate in the Senate that followed the December 2012, Newtown, CT, mass shooting. While Congress did not pass any of these proposals, Congress included a provision in the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) that codified certain Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) procedures that address benefit claims, mental incompetency determinations, and firearms transfer and possession eligibility. For context, this report provides background on the two major federal gun control statutory frameworks: the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), as amended, and the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), as amended. It also provides analysis of several Senate-considered amendments in the 114 th Congress that would have addressed the above listed issues. On December 3, 2015, the Senate debated several gun control amendments during consideration of the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act ( H.R. This amendment would have also expanded federal firearms background check requirements to cover private, intrastate transfers between non-gun dealers, when such transfers were arranged in a public forum, such as on the Internet or at a gun show or flea market. Similar, but unsuccessful, efforts were made in the House of Representatives to bring gun control proposals to the floor for general debate and votes. 4750 ) that would have expanded federal background check requirements and captured more private, intrastate firearms transfers than under the Manchin-Toomey amendment. 4720 , S.Amdt. 4749 , S.Amdt. 4858 , and S.Amdt. Salient Gun Control Issues in the 114th Congress
On December 3, 2015, and June 16, 2016, the Senate debated gun control-related amendments that would have (1) authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms and explosives licenses to known or suspected dangerous terrorists; (2) expanded federal firearms-related background check requirements; (3) increased background check system access to records on persons prohibited from receiving and possessing firearms; and (4) revised and/or codified definitions related to mental incompetency and guns. 2908 and S.Amdt. 4751 ) also included provisions to increase information sharing on persons who are ineligible to receive or possess firearms for background check purposes. S.Amdt. S.Amdt. 2578 , the expected vehicle for S. 2837 ), Senator Christopher Murphy offered an amendment ( S.Amdt. The Murphy amendment ( S.Amdt. 2914 and S.Amdt. S.Amdt. 2908 ) to H.R. 4716) during consideration of the FY2017 Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations bill ( H.R. In addition, the President's gun safety initiative included
$35 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to address an increase in firearms background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS); $55 million for grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities under the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) and NICS Amendments Record Improvement Program (NARIP, P.L. | In the 114th Congress, the Senate debated several gun proposals following two high-fatality mass shootings in December 2015 and June 2016. After both shootings, Senate debate coalesced around the following issues:
Should the Attorney General be given the authority to deny firearms (and explosives) transfers to persons she determines to be "dangerous terrorists"? Should federal background check requirements be expanded to include intrastate firearms transfers among private, unlicensed persons? Should grants be provided or withheld to encourage state, local, municipal, tribal, and territorial authorities to improve computer access to records on persons prohibited from possessing firearms for the purposes of background checks? Should definitions related to mental incompetency in federal gun control regulations be codified or revised?
Debate on the latter three issues mirrored congressional debate that followed the December 2012, Newtown, CT, mass shooting. Similar efforts were made in the House of Representatives to bring gun control proposals to the House floor for general debate and votes, but those efforts proved unsuccessful. While Congress did not pass any of these proposals, Congress included a provision in the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) that codified certain Department of Veterans' Affairs procedures related to benefit claims, mental incompetency determinations, and gun control.
In December 2015, the Senate debated several gun control amendments during consideration of the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act (H.R. 3762). Two of those amendments (S.Amdt. 2910 and S.Amdt. 2912) addressed firearms transfers and dangerous terrorists. Another amendment (S.Amdt. 2908) would have expanded federal firearms background check requirements to cover private, intrastate transfers between non-gun dealers, when such transfers were arranged in public fora, such as on the Internet or at a gun show or flea market. Still another amendment (S.Amdt. 2914) would not have expanded the scope of federal background check requirements, but included provisions to improve background checks.
In June 2016, the Senate again debated several gun control amendments during consideration of the FY2017 Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations bill (H.R. 2578, the expected vehicle for S. 2837). One amendment (S.Amdt. 4750) would have expanded the scope of federal background check requirements and captured more private, intrastate firearms transfers than the amendment (S.Amdt. 2908) to H.R. 3762. In addition, several amendments were considered that would have addressed firearms transfers and dangerous terrorists (S.Amdt. 4720, S.Amdt. 4749, S.Amdt. 4858, and S.Amdt. 4859). As before, another amendment (S.Amdt. 4751) would not have expanded the scope of federal background checks requirements, but included provisions to improve information sharing for background check purposes on persons who are ineligible to receive or possess firearms.
For context, this report provides background on the two major federal gun control statutory frameworks: the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), as amended, and the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), as amended. It provides analysis of the Senate amendments offered in the 114th Congress that would have addressed the above listed issues. It tracks the status of gun control-related appropriations for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Federal Bureau of Investigation National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Section, National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP), and NICS Amendments Record Improvement Program (NARIP). |
crs_RL33244 | crs_RL33244_0 | (1)
Linkages with the United States
Sharing a 2,000-mile border and extensive interconnections through the Gulf of Mexico, theUnited States and Mexico are so intricately linked together in an enormous number of ways thatPresident George W. Bush and other U.S. officials have stated that no country is more important tothe United States than Mexico. At the same time, Mexican President Vicente Fox (2000-2006), thefirst president to be elected from an opposition party in 71 years, has sought to strengthen thebilateral relationship through what some have called a "grand bargain." (2) Under this proposed bargain,the United States would regularize the status of undocumented Mexican workers in the United Statesand economically assist the less developed partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) while Mexico would be more cooperative in border security and in controlling the illegaltraffic of drugs, people, and goods into the United States. Mexico is linked with the United States through trade and investment, migration and tourism,environment and health concerns, and family and cultural relationships. Mexico is the second mostimportant trading partner of the United States, and this trade is critical to many U.S. industries andborder communities. It also is the principal transit or source country for illicit drugs andit is a possible avenue for the entry of terrorists into the United States. As a result, cooperation withMexico is essential in dealing with migration, drug trafficking, and border, terrorism, health,environment, and energy issues. Mechanisms for Mexico-United States Interactions
The United States and Mexico have developed a variety of mechanisms for consultation andcooperation on the wide variety of issues on which they interact, with some overlapping in thefunctioning of the various fora. Grouped together to some extent by function and longevity, thesemechanisms include (1) periodic presidential meetings; (2) annual cabinet-level BinationalCommission meetings with 10 Working Groups; (3) annual meetings of congressional delegationsin the Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group Conferences; (4) NAFTA-related trilateralmeetings under various groups; (5) bilateral border area cooperation meetings hosted by such entitiesas the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the United States-Mexico BorderHealth Commission; and (6) trilateral meetings under the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)of North America, launched in March 2005. | This report provides information on the importance of Mexico to U.S. interests andcatalogues the many ways Mexico and the United States interact. The report is a snapshot of thebilateral relationship at the beginning of 2006. It will not be updated on a regular basis.
Sharing a 2,000-mile border and extensive interconnections through the Gulf of Mexico, theUnited States and Mexico are so intricately linked together in an enormous multiplicity of ways thatPresident George W. Bush and other U.S. officials have stated that no country is more important tothe United States than Mexico. At the same time, Mexican President Vicente Fox (2000-2006), thefirst president to be elected from an opposition party in 71 years, has sought to strengthen therelationship with the United States through what some have called a "grand bargain." Under thisproposed bargain, the United States would regularize the status of undocumented Mexican workersin the United States and economically assist the less developed partner in the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA), while Mexico would be more cooperative in efforts to control theillegal traffic of drugs, people, and goods into the United States.
The southern neighbor is linked with the United States through trade and investment,migration and tourism, environment and health concerns, and family and cultural relationships. Itis the second most important trading partner of the United States, and this trade is critical to manyU.S. industries and border communities. It is a major source of undocumented migrants and illicitdrugs and a possible avenue for the entry of terrorists into the United States. As a result, cooperationwith Mexico is essential to deal effectively with migration, drug trafficking, and border, terrorism,health, environment, and energy issues.
The United States and Mexico have developed a wide variety of mechanisms for consultationand cooperation on the range of issues in which the countries interact. These include (1) periodicalpresidential meetings; (2) annual cabinet-level Binational Commission meetings with 10 WorkingGroups on major issues; (3) annual meetings of congressional delegations in the Mexico-UnitedStates Interparliamentary Group Conferences; (4) NAFTA-related trilateral trade meetings undervarious groups; (5) regular meetings of the Attorneys General and the Senior Law EnforcementPlenary to deal with law enforcement and counter-narcotics matters; (6) a wide variety of bilateralborder area cooperation meetings dealing with environment, health, transportation, and bordercrossing issues; and (7) trilateral meetings under the "Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) ofNorth America" launched in Waco, Texas, in March 2005. |
crs_RL34427 | crs_RL34427_0 | The Fed then began directly assisting the markets for commercial paper and asset-backed securities. 4173 ) adds conditions to the Fed's emergency lending authority. 111-203 . Most emergency facilities were allowed to expire in February 2010, but the central bank liquidity swap lines were reopened in May 2010 to provide dollar liquidity to foreign countries needed as a result of the economic crisis in Greece. 4173 also made comprehensive changes to the financial regulatory system. CRS Report R40877, Financial Regulatory Reform: Systemic Risk and the Federal Reserve , analyzes the effects of this legislation on the Fed's role in the regulatory system. This report reviews the Fed's actions since August 2007 and analyzes the policy issues raised by those actions. Second, the Fed has reduced the federal funds target on numerous occasions over the course of the crisis. In December 2008, the Fed began providing so much liquidity that the interest rate target often fell close to zero. Many of the new facilities are aimed at other parts of the financial system, however, and the Federal Reserve Act is largely silent on the Fed's authority outside the banking system. At times before the federal funds target was reduced to zero in December 2008, the Fed faced conflicting goals—it sought to ensure that banks have enough reserves to remain liquid, but it also sought to maintain its target for the federal funds rate to meet its economic goals. P.L. Bear Stearns could not access the discount window directly because, at that point, only member banks could borrow directly from the Fed. Who Benefits From Assistance to AIG? Indeed, if the loans are repaid, they would increase the profits of the Fed, which in turn would increase the Fed's remittances to the Treasury. By the end of 2008, its loans and private assets holdings were much larger than its Treasury holdings (see Table 4 ). Thus, any potential losses on loans to the Fed would not involve taxpayer dollars flowing to the Fed unless the losses exceeded the sum of its other earnings and its capital and the Treasury decided it did not want the Fed to operate as technically insolvent. With an eye to the potential long-run inflationary effects of the growth in the Fed's balance sheet, the Fed and Treasury announced in March 2009 that they would seek "legislative action to provide additional tools the Federal Reserve can use to sterilize the effects of its lending or securities purchases on the supply of bank reserves." To date, legislation to allow the Fed to do so has not been considered. Limits on the Fed's Ability to Address Problems in the Financial Sector
The Fed's actions since 2007 have been primarily focused on restoring liquidity to the financial system—lending to financial firms to convert their illiquid assets into cash or U.S. Treasury securities. As discussed above, it has extended liquidity to non-bank financial firms since 2008 through new lending facilities. H.R. Institutions that are too big to fail are ones that are deemed to be big enough that their failure could create systemic risk , the risk that the financial system as a whole would cease to function smoothly. Although that theory can be debated, it is clearer that the precedent of the Fed's role in the Bear Stearns acquisition may strengthen the perception of other institutions and investors that any financial firm, regardless of whether it is a depository institution, will be bailed out in the future if it is too big to fail, or merely too interconnected to fail. Oversight, Transparency, and Disclosure of Emergency Programs
Because profits and losses borne by the Fed ultimately get passed on to taxpayers (see " Cost to the Treasury "), some Members of Congress have argued that more information about the Fed's emergency activities should be made available to the public. While GAO has had longstanding authority to audit the Fed's non-monetary policy functions, the Federal Banking Agency Audit Act of 1978 (31 USC 714(b)) restricts GAO from auditing certain Fed activities: (1) transactions with foreign central banks or governments; (2) "deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary matters, including discount window operations, reserves of member banks, securities credit, interest on deposits, and open market operations;" and (3) "transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market Committee." Since then, inflation has been stable. The authority allows lending to non-member banks, but some of the loans in the Bear Stearns and AIG agreements were to LLCs that the Fed created and controls, and have been used to purchase Bear Stearns' and AIG's assets. 4173 removes most GAO audit restrictions and requires disclosure of the identities of borrowers with a delay. The increase in the balance sheet could have already been automatically reversed by the decline in the Fed's direct lending, but the Fed has chosen to offset it through large-scale purchases of assets to maintain a high level of liquidity in the economy. | The Federal Reserve (Fed) has been central in the policy response to the financial turmoil that began in August 2007. It has sharply increased reserves to the banking system through open market operations and lowered the federal funds rate and discount rate on several occasions. Since December 2008, it has allowed the federal funds rate to fall close to zero. As the crisis deepened, the Fed's focus shifted to providing liquidity directly to the financial system through new policy tools. Through new credit facilities, the Fed first expanded the scale of its lending to the banking system and then extended direct lending to non-bank financial firms. The latter marked the first time since the Great Depression that firms that are not banks or members of the Federal Reserve System have been allowed to borrow directly from the Fed. After the crisis worsened in September 2008, the Fed began providing credit directly to markets for commercial paper and asset-backed securities. All of these emergency facilities had expired by the end of June 2010, but central bank liquidity swap lines were reopened in May 2010 in response to the crisis in Greece. The Fed also provided emergency assistance to Bear Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup over the course of the crisis; the Fed still holds assets from and loans to AIG and assets from Bear Stearns.
These programs resulted in an increase in the Fed's balance sheet of $1.4 trillion at its peak in December 2008, staying relatively steady since then. The Fed's authority and capacity to lend is bound only by fears of the inflationary consequences, which have been partly offset by additional debt issuance by the Treasury. High inflation has not materialized yet because most of the liquidity created by the Fed is being held by banks as excess reserves, but after the economy stabilizes, the Fed may have to scale back its balance sheet rapidly to avoid it. Asset sales could be disruptive, but the Fed has argued that it can contain inflationary pressures through the payment of interest on bank reserves, which it was authorized by Congress to do in 2008.
The statutory authority for most of the Fed's recent actions is based on a clause in the Federal Reserve Act to be used in "unusual or exigent circumstances." All loans are backed by collateral that reduces the risk of losses. Any losses borne by the Fed from its loans or asset purchases would reduce the income it remits to the Treasury, making the effect on the federal budget similar to if the loans were made directly by Treasury. It is highly unlikely that losses would exceed its other income and capital, and require revenues to be transferred to the Fed from the Treasury. To date, the Fed's crisis activities have increased its net income.
Two policy issues raised by the Fed's actions are issues of systemic risk and moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to the phenomenon where actors take on more risk because they are protected. The Fed's involvement in stabilizing Bear Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup stemmed from the fear of systemic risk (that the financial system as a whole would cease to function) if they were allowed to fail. In other words, the firms were seen as "too big (or too interconnected) to fail." The Fed regulates member banks to mitigate the moral hazard that stems from access to government protections. Yet Bear Stearns and AIG were not under the Fed's regulatory oversight because they were not member banks.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that certain details of the Fed's lending activities are kept confidential. H.R. 4173 (P.L. 111-203) adds conditions to the Fed's emergency lending authority, removes most GAO audit restrictions, and requires disclosure of the identities of borrowers with a delay. It also changes the Fed's role in the financial regulatory system (see CRS Report R40877, Financial Regulatory Reform: Systemic Risk and the Federal Reserve). |
crs_R40807 | crs_R40807_0 | Introduction
The misclassification of employees as independent contractors contributes to the tax gap. Consequently, congressional interest has been expressed about the importance of the proper classification of workers. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defines the gross tax gap as the difference between the aggregate tax liability imposed by law for a given tax year and the amount of tax that taxpayers pay voluntarily and timely for that year. A business owner "must withhold income taxes, withhold and pay Social Security and Medicare taxes, and pay unemployment tax on wages paid to an employee." In contrast, a business owner does not "have to withhold or pay any taxes on payments to independent contractors." Employers are more likely to withhold and submit taxes than independent contractors are to voluntarily pay their tax liabilities. In 1984, the IRS made its last comprehensive misclassification estimate, which found that 15% of employers misclassified 3.4 million workers as independent contractors, causing an estimated total tax loss of $1.6 billion in Social Security tax, unemployment tax, and income tax. Definition of Employee Versus Independent Contractor
Under common-law rules, a worker is an employee if the employer can control what the worker does and how the worker does it. The definition of "employee" has been affected by Section 530 "Safe Harbor Rules," IRS Ruling 87-41, and current IRS common-law rules. In response, Congress enacted Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-600 ), which established "safe harbor rules" generally allowing an employer to treat a worker as not being an employee for employment tax purposes, regardless of the individual's actual status under the common-law test. IRS Ruling 87-41
In January 1987, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 87-41 specifying 20 factors that identified whether or not an employee-employer relationship existed under common law. Current IRS Common Law Rules
Currently, the IRS states that three categories of common-law rules provide evidence of the degree of control and independence that an employer or worker can use to determine if the worker is an employee or an independent contractor. TIGTA Report
On February 4, 2009, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report concerning IRS actions "to address the misclassification of employees as independent contractors." Proposed Legislation in the 112th Congress
Two companion bills have been introduced in the 112 th Congress concerning the misclassification of employees as independent contractors. 3178 , the Employee Misclassification Prevention Act . President Obama's Proposal in the Budget for FY2012
In his 2012 budget, President Barack Obama proposed to "increase certainty with respect to worker classification" by a modification of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 197 8 . New IRS Programs Announced in September 2011
In September 2011, the Internal Revenue Service announced two new programs concerning worker misclassification: a "Memorandum of Understanding between the IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)" and a new "Voluntary Classification Settlement Program" (VCSP). Conclusions
The misclassification of employees as independent contractors contributes to the tax gap and imposes numerous costs on the economy. A reduction in this misclassification would reduce federal, state, and local tax gaps and provide other important benefits. But, the work necessary to reduce misclassification would impose significant costs. Accurate data on the current size of the tax gap caused by misclassification are unavailable. Furthermore, the magnitude of many effects of improved classification are unavailable or inherently subjective. With the current state of knowledge, whether or not the benefits of curtailing misclassification of workers outweigh the costs is a value judgment. | The misclassification of employees as independent contractors contributes to the tax gap. Consequently, congressional interest has been expressed about the importance of the proper classification of workers. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defines the gross tax gap as the difference between the aggregate tax liability imposed by law for a given tax year and the amount of tax that taxpayers pay voluntarily and timely for that year.
A business owner must withhold income taxes, withhold and pay Social Security and Medicare taxes, and pay unemployment tax on wages paid to an employee. In contrast, a business owner does not have to withhold or pay any taxes on payments to independent contractors. Employers are more likely to withhold and submit taxes than independent contractors are to voluntarily pay their tax liabilities. In 1984, the IRS made its last comprehensive misclassification estimate, which found that 15% of employers misclassified 3.4 million workers as independent contractors, causing an estimated total tax loss of $1.6 billion in Social Security tax, unemployment tax, and income tax.
Under common-law rules, a worker is an employee if the employer can control what the worker does and how the worker does it. The definition of "employee" has been affected by Section 530 "Safe Harbor Rules," IRS Ruling 87-41, and current IRS common law rules. Congress enacted Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-600), which established "safe harbor rules" generally allowing an employer to treat a worker as not being an employee for employment tax purposes, regardless of the individual's actual status under the common-law test. In January 1987, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 87-41 specifying 20 factors that identified whether or not an employee-employer relationship existed under common law. Currently, the IRS states that three categories of common-law rules provide evidence of the degree of control and independence: behavior, financial, and type of relationship.
On February 4, 2009, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report concerning IRS actions to address the misclassification of employees as independent contractors. In the 112th Congress, two companion bills have been introduced concerning the misclassification of employees: the Payroll Fraud Prevention Act (S. 770) and the Employee Misclassification Prevention Act (H.R. 3178). In his FY2012 budget, President Barack Obama proposed to "increase certainty with respect to worker classification" by a modification of the Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. In September 2011, the IRS announced two new programs concerning misclassification of employees: a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Department of Labor and a new "Voluntary Classification Settlement Program."
In conclusion, the misclassification of employees as independent contractors contributes to the tax gap and imposes numerous costs on the economy. A reduction in this misclassification would reduce federal, state, and local tax gaps and provide other important benefits. But, this decline in misclassification would impose significant costs. Accurate data on the current size of the tax gap caused by misclassification are unavailable. Furthermore, the magnitude of many effects of improved classification are unavailable or inherently subjective. With the current state of knowledge, whether or not the benefits of curtailing misclassification of workers outweigh the costs is a value judgment.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative and economic events. |
crs_RL34670 | crs_RL34670_0 | During this period, the DBA has processed 1,987 cases involving the death of a covered employee. 5136, Proposed Legislation to Deny Award Fees to Contractors due to Negligent Contractor Behavior
Congress has expressed concern over negligent contractor behavior that may jeopardize the health and safety of both contractors and government personnel. Accordingly, H.R. 5136 , the proposed NDAA for FY2011, includes a provision that requires the Secretary of Defense to report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, by September 1, 2011, on incidents where contractors have earned reduced award fees or been denied award fees because of incidents where the contractor jeopardized the health or safety of government personnel. P.L. 111-84 , the NDAA for FY2010, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to reduce or deny award fees due to such incidents, as defined in Section 823. Legislative History
The Defense Base Act, P.L. In 2006, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to examine ways it could improve its DBA procedures and Section 843 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (NDAA) requires DOD to change the way its contractors provide DBA coverage for their workers and to prepare a report to Congress on a new DOD acquisition strategy for DBA insurance. Selection of Defense Base Act Providers
Although many federal agencies have had or currently have overseas contracts subject to the DBA, the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the major DBA contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Department of Defense
DOD, with the exception of contracts issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-IA), permits its overseas contractors to purchase DBA insurance from any insurance company approved by DOL. Concerns have been raised over the following issues:
the overall cost and variability of DBA premiums paid; the basis for DBA premiums; the costs of the program to the federal government; the manner in which contractors select their DBA providers; and the coordination of the DBA with the WHCA. P.L. 5658 ) provision passed by the House provided an outline of several policy options that DOD was required to consider when formulating its overall DBA strategy. The three categories of policy options are
using a single contracted source, or a limited set of contracted sources, for all DOD DBA contracts, similar to the model used by DOS, USAID, and the USACE pilot program; using a rating system to set premiums based on past claims incurred, similar to the experience rating systems used in many private insurance lines; and having the federal government self-insure for all DBA costs similar to what is currently done with the workers' compensation for injuries and death related to war hazards under the WHCA and workers' compensation for federal employees under the FECA program. Single-Source Contract for DBA Insurance
Currently, DOS, USAID, and USACE use single-source contracts to provide DBA insurance for their contractors. Although there are indications that adoption by DOD of a single-source model for DBA insurance could result in cost savings, the size and complexity of the DOD and its contracts may result in difficulties in that agency adopting the system used by the smaller DOS and USAID. Although the DOD's analysis of four major policy alternatives is comprehensive, there are limitations to its utility as a guide for Congress in making changes to the overall DBA system. Appendix. List of Acronyms | Many overseas federal contractors are covered by the Defense Base Act (DBA), which mandates that they provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees. As the U.S. military has increased operations in Iraq, the size of the DBA program has grown. Since September 2001, there have been 49,472 DBA cases, including 1,584 cases involving the deaths of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nearly $200 million in cash and medical benefits were paid to DBA claimants in 2008.
Congress has become increasingly concerned with the costs involved in the DBA program because the federal government usually reimburses its contractors for their DBA premiums. The Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have seen some cost savings since adopting single-source models for their DBA insurance in which contractors for each agency are required to purchase insurance from a single company selected by the agency. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently testing such a model for its DBA system. For the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD), however, including the Army's large Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, individual contractors are free to select their own DBA insurers and negotiate their own rates, and one contractor, KBR, has been criticized by DOD auditors for failing to demonstrate that it sought to control DBA premium costs when selecting an insurer.
Although not directly related to the Defense Base Act, Congress has expressed concern over negligent contractor behavior that may jeopardize the health and safety of both contractors and government personnel. Accordingly, H.R. 5136, the proposed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, includes a provision that requires the Secretary of Defense to report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, by September 1, 2011, on incidents where contractors have earned reduced award fees or been denied award fees because of incidents where the contractor jeopardized the health or safety of government personnel. P.L. 111-84, the NDAA for FY2010, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to reduce or deny award fees due to such incidents, as defined in Section 823 of P.L. 111-84.
The NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417) includes a provision that requires DOD to change the way its contractors provide DBA coverage for their workers. In a report issued pursuant to this legislation, DOD concluded that making improvements to the current open-market DBA insurance system would best meet the criteria for reform recommended by Congress and the agency. The report also found advantages that could result from having the federal government self-insure, with third-party administration, for DBA costs. However, there may be limitations to the utility of the report as a guide for Congress in making overall changes to the DBA program.
This report provides an overview of the DBA and the systems used to provide DBA insurance at DOS, USAID, DOD, and USACE. Also included are criticisms of the current DOD DBA policy raised by GAO and Army auditors as well as responses to those criticisms by DOD and USACE. The report concludes with a discussion of several DBA reform options suggested by the House of Representatives in recent legislation and analyzed by DOD. A list of acronyms used in this report is provided in the Appendix. |
crs_RL33766 | crs_RL33766_0 | In September and October 2005, Mr. Michael Wynne, then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, issued instructions to the military departments and defense agencies in DOD to create a Business Plan for each of the recommendations drafted by the commission and approved by the President. Following is a series of frequently asked questions concerning these Business Plans. The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth since 1988. The plan describes necessary steps that must be taken to carry out the commission's recommendations and the estimated time-frames and costs associated with those steps. Will the Business Plans be updated? This review includes a legal assessment of whether the Business Plan meets the BRAC Commission's intent for the recommendation. To date, 219 of the 237 required plans have been approved. | As part of the implementation for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) required the military departments and defense agencies to create action plans for each of the BRAC Commission's recommendations. These plans, called "Business Plans", describe the implementing actions, their timing, cost, and other related issues. DOD is to use these plans as a mechanism to ensure proper coordination among the defense agencies, allocate BRAC resources more efficiently, and to monitor the status of the commission's recommendations. To date, 219 of the 237required plans have been completed and approved. This report answers frequently asked questions regarding the plans. It will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R40130 | crs_R40130_0 | Most of this report summarizes changes to current law across the major provisions of CHIPRA 2009. Where the provisions of the House and Senate versions are identical, the references in this report are simply to "CHIPRA 2009." Where the provisions differ, the House and Senate versions are described separately. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA 2009)
The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA 2009, H.R. 2 ) was passed in the House on January 14, 2009, and in the Senate on January 29, 2009. The overall structure of CHIPRA 2009 is similar to its two predecessors ( H.R. 3963 from the 110 th Congress). 976 and H.R. | The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA 2009, H.R. 2) was passed in the House on January 14, 2009, and in the Senate on January 29, 2009. The overall structure of CHIPRA 2009 is similar to its two predecessors, H.R. 976 and H.R. 3963 from the 110th Congress.
Most of this report summarizes changes to current law across the major provisions of CHIPRA 2009. Where the provisions of the House and Senate versions are identical, the references in this report will simply be to "CHIPRA 2009." Where the provisions differ, the House and Senate versions will be described separately. |
crs_RL33849 | crs_RL33849_0 | The continuing scientific process has resulted in an understanding of climate change that is increasingly robust and has withstood a multitude of challenges; in most respects, the evolving science confirms the broad conclusions made in previous decades by the preponderance of scientists. Many details and complexities, however, remain nebulous. The average global surface temperature has increased since the Industrial Revolution, by about 0.6 to 0.9 o Celsius (1.1 to 1.6 o Fahrenheit) from 1880 to today. The global climate of the past few decades is likely approaching, or has already passed, the warmest since the rise of human civilizations around 12,000 years ago. At a regional scale, such as for the United States, significant climate changes have also been measured. Likely Causes of Global Climate Change
The evidence is strong that the Earth's climate is changing; the forces thought to be driving observed climate changes are discussed below, including the evidence that human activities, particularly greenhouse gas emissions, have contributed a large influence on top of ongoing natural variability. In response to the climate change, other components of the Earth system may also adjust, resulting in feedbacks to the climate that can either amplify ( positive feedbacks ) or dampen ( negative feedbacks ) the initial change in climate. Greenhouse Gases
Greenhouse gas concentrations in the Earth's atmosphere have increased dramatically since the Industrial Revolution, with carbon dioxide growing from about 280 ppm in 1850 to about 380 ppm today. Over the past 150 years, CO 2 concentrations have increased globally by more than one-third, from about 280 ppm to current levels of about 380 ppm ( Figure 5 ). Several different lines of evidence discovered in the past decade have led a large majority of scientists to conclude that human-related greenhouse gas emissions have contributed substantially to the increase in global mean temperature and other climate changes observed since the 1970s, and probably over the past century. Most studies indicate, and experts generally agree, that growth of greenhouse gas forcing, if it continues unabated, will raise global average temperatures well above natural variability. Studies have found that future climate change will not be evenly distributed geographically or temporally: even if the global mean temperature were to change very little, regional climate changes could be dramatic because of the uneven distribution of forcings by different agents and the connectedness of regions within the climate system. Although almost all regions are expected to experience warming, some regions are projected to become wetter while others become drier. Thus, while most climate scientists conclude with high confidence that future climate change, forced by greenhouse gases, land use change, and natural factors, is probable, the magnitude, rapidity, and details of the changes are likely to remain unclear for many years, or even decades. For some areas and systems, these changes would be positive. Science cannot explain the recent patterns of climate change without including the influence of elevated greenhouse gas concentrations. Although many uncertainties remain concerning the future magnitude, rate, and other details of climate change, a preponderance of scientists conclude that greenhouse gases emitted by fossil fuel use and other human activities are virtually certain to induce global average warming by at least 1.8 o C (3.2 o F) over the 21 st Century—or as high as 4 o C (5.2 o F), and possibly more than 6 o C (more than 9 o F). Some scientists have found that estimated ultraviolet variance since 1915 correlates poorly with global average temperature. Feedbacks to clouds are among the least understood processes and account for large differences among climate model results. | Almost all scientists agree that the Earth's climate is changing, having warmed by 0.6 to 0.9o Celsius (1.1 to 1.6o Fahrenheit) since the Industrial Revolution. Science indicates that the Earth's global average temperature is now approaching, or possibly has passed, the warmest experienced since human civilizations began to flourish about 12,000 years ago. During the 20th Century, some areas became wetter while others experienced more drought. Most climate scientists conclude that humans have induced a large part of the climate change since the 1970s. Although natural forces such as solar irradiance and volcanoes contribute to variability, scientists cannot explain the climate changes of the past few decades without including the effects of elevated greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations resulting from fossil fuel use, land clearing, and industrial and agricultural emissions. Over the past 150 years, measured carbon dioxide concentrations have risen by more than one-third, from about 280 parts per million (ppm) to about 380 ppm. The United States contributes almost one-fifth of net global greenhouse gas emissions. Some impacts of climate change are expected to be beneficial (e.g., increased agricultural productivity in some regions), whereas others are expected to be adverse (e.g., drought in some regions, rising sea levels in some coastal areas).
Forecasting future climate conditions is challenging, and some major processes remain poorly understood. However, methods are improving to characterize the risks. Scientists have found it is very likely that rising greenhouse gas concentrations, if they continue unabated, will raise the global average temperature above natural variability by at least 1.5o Celsius (2.7o Fahrenheit) during the 21st Century (above 1990 temperatures), with a small likelihood that the temperature rise may exceed 5oC (9oF). The projections thought most likely by many climate modelers are for a greenhouse gas-induced temperature rise of approximately 2.5 to 3.5oC (4.5 to 6.3oF) by 2100. However, the magnitude, rapidity, and details of the change are likely to remain unclear for some time. Future climate change may advance smoothly or sporadically, with some regions experiencing more fluctuations in temperature, precipitation, and frequency or intensity of extreme events than others. Some scientists emphasize potential beneficial effects of climate change, or count on the ability of humans to adapt their behaviors and technologies to manage climate change in the future; other scientists argue that the benefits of climate change may be limited, even accounting for probable adaptation and its costs, and that there are risks of abrupt, surprising change with accompanying dislocations.
The continuing scientific process has resulted in a better understanding of climate change and generally confirms the broad conclusions made in previous decades by the preponderance of scientists: that human activities emit greenhouse gases that influence the climate, with potentially serious effects. Details have been revised or refined, but the basic conclusion of the risks persists. The principal questions remaining for the majority of scientists concern not whether greenhouse gases will result in climate change, but the magnitude, speed, geographic details, and likelihood of surprises, and the appropriate timing and options involved in addressing the human components of climate change. |
crs_R43072 | crs_R43072_0 | Introduction
The Federal Records Act of 1950 (FRA; 44 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33) provided the Administrator of General Services authority to "make provisions for the economical and efficient management of records of the federal agencies." The act requires federal agency employees to determine whether information they create qualifies as a federal record. This report provides answers to commonly asked questions about the laws, regulations, and policies that govern recordkeeping in the federal government. This report does not address the recordkeeping requirements of Congress, the Supreme Court, the President, or the Architect of the Capitol. What Is a Federal Record? On November 26, 2014, Congress passed and the President signed into law P.L. 113-187 , the Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014. §3301 as follows:
Records includes all recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of the data in them. What Is Not a Federal Record? The Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014 also amended the definition of what does not constitute a federal record. As noted earlier in this report, pursuant to provisions in the Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014 ( P.L. Records governed by the PRA are not subject to the requirements of the FRA. Which Agencies Are Required to Comply with the Federal Records Act? How Do Agencies Transfer or Dispose of Federal Records? | Federal departments and agencies create federal records in the course of their daily operations. Congress first enacted the Federal Records Act (FRA; 44 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33) in 1950. Congress deemed federal records worthy of preservation for their "informational value," and also because they document "the transaction of public business" and the "organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government." The FRA requires executive branch departments and agencies to collect, retain, and preserve—or dispose of—these records.
This report provides an introduction to federal records. It describes the scope and requirements of the FRA and its associated regulations. Among the questions this report addresses are the following:
What is a federal record? What is not a federal record? Which agencies are required to comply with the Federal Records Act? How do agencies transfer or dispose of federal records?
This report includes amendments to the Federal Records Act made by the Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014 (P.L. 113-187). The law, enacted on November 26, 2014, amends the FRA by, among other things, modifying the definition of federal record and clarifying the Archivist's role as the final determinant of whether certain materials qualify as a federal record.
This report focuses on federal recordkeeping laws, regulations, and policies. This report does not address the recordkeeping requirements of Congress, the Supreme Court, the President, or the Architect of the Capitol. Additional information on presidential records is available in CRS Report R40238, The Presidential Records Act: Background and Recent Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated at the beginning of each new Congress or in the event of significant legislative activity. |
crs_R44676 | crs_R44676_0 | The Role of Education Assistance in Development
This report is a descriptive profile of recent U.S. foreign aid education sector activities, outlining actors, policy, funding levels, and programs. The education sector has long been considered an important element of the U.S. foreign assistance program. Many organizations have found statistical support for the claim that education is crucial to bettering livelihoods and improving economic stability in developing countries. According to the World Bank, direct benefits of education include the following:
E conomic growth : An increase of one standard deviation in student reading and math scores is associated with an increase of two percentage points in annual GDP per capita growth. For those who attend school, the quality of education is often lacking. One estimate suggests that 25% of the 530 million children worldwide who complete four years of primary school—130 million children—have not learned basic literacy and numeracy. The Role of Congress: Policy and Funding
Congress affects education assistance in two ways: through policymaking and annual appropriations. Section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended) seeks "to reduce illiteracy, to extend basic education, and to increase manpower training in skills related to development." On September 7, 2016, the bill was approved by the House of Representatives. In FY2016, combined USAID and Department of State education programming of about $856 million composed nearly 4% of total USAID/State economic (i.e., nonsecurity) assistance program appropriations. At roughly $1.2 billion, total education obligations in FY2014 from all U.S. agencies, including the Peace Corps and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), accounted for nearly 4% of total economic aid obligations in that year. Under its Education Strategy 2011-2015 , USAID adopted three primary goals for its education initiatives:
improved reading skills for 100 million children in primary grades by 2015; improved ability of tertiary and workforce development programs to generate workforce skills relevant to a country's development goals; and increased equitable access to education in crisis and conflict environments for 15 million learners by 2015. In 2015, 2,580 volunteers (37% of all volunteers) worked on education in 45 different countries. The MCC currently focuses these efforts in several countries worldwide—in El Salvador, Georgia, and Morocco. To draw attention to and address the challenges girls face in educational attainment throughout the world, the Let Girls Learn initiative was launched in March 2015 by the Obama Administration through the leadership of first lady Michelle Obama as a collaboration of USAID, the MCC, the Peace Corps, and the Department of State using existing appropriated resources. U.S. Agency for International Development. The Peace Corps currently targets 35 countries for Let Girls Learn programming. Types of Education Activities
To achieve its education development goals, the U.S. government implements different types of assistance activities, including those focused on access and enrollment; education management and policy; teacher training; developing and distributing textbooks and learning materials; improving literacy; participant training and workforce development; and school construction. | Education has long been considered an important part of the U.S. foreign assistance strategy. There is general agreement that education is crucial to bettering livelihoods and improving economic stability in developing countries. According to the World Bank, an increase of one standard deviation in student reading and math scores is associated with an increase of two percentage points in annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth.
Access to and quality of education continues to pose a challenge to foreign aid donors. Approximately 263 million children and youth worldwide do not attend school. For those who attend school, the quality of education is lacking—one estimate suggests that 25% of children who complete four years of primary school have not learned basic literacy and numeracy skills.
Congress has played a role in education-sector assistance through authorization of education programs and annual funding of appropriations. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended) includes provisions on education assistance. Congress has also directed that specific amounts of foreign aid budgets be spent on basic and higher education purposes. In FY2016, combined U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State education programming amounts to about $856 million. On September 7, 2016, the Education for All Act (H.R. 4481) was approved by the House of Representatives.
Multiple U.S. departments and agencies provide education assistance to developing countries. However, three agencies—USAID, the Peace Corps, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)—accounted for 92% of assistance in FY2014. USAID makes up about two-thirds of annual funding for education. It offers an array of activities aimed at improving reading skills for 100 million primary school children, improving workforce development programs to build appropriate skills to meet developing country needs, and increasing equitable access to education in crisis and conflict environments. More than one-third of Peace Corps volunteers are in the education sector, teaching students and teachers in rural communities in 45 different countries. The MCC currently conducts programs in the education sector in two countries (El Salvador and Georgia); a program in Morocco is expected to begin soon.
To achieve its education development goals, the U.S. government implements different types of assistance activities, such as
education management and policy reform, teacher training, developing and distributing textbooks and learning materials, improving literacy, participant training and workforce development, and school construction.
In 2015, the Obama Administration launched the Let Girls Learn initiative to address the challenges girls face in educational attainment. When girls are educated, the development impact is especially strong—for example, an extra year of secondary school for girls can increase future earnings by 18%. USAID, MCC, the Peace Corps, and the Department of State are participants in Let Girls Learn efforts.
This report provides a descriptive profile of recent foreign aid education sector activities, outlining actors, policy, funding levels, and programs. |
crs_R41001 | crs_R41001_0 | Introduction to the Troubled Asset Relief Program
Following a boom and bust in residential real estate and a meltdown in financial markets, Congress enacted a program to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions in October 2008. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by Division A of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA). EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion of real estate related assets, or any other asset that the Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, believes the purchase of which will contribute to financial stability. Redirecting TARP Funds
Some policymakers have proposed redirecting funds under the Troubled Asset Relief Program to finance new policy proposals. One proposal, The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act ( S. 896 ), which was signed into law as P.L. 111-22 , redirected $1.3 billion from TARP to offset the cost of modifications to the Hope for Homeowners Program. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 ( H.R. 4173 ), which passed the House on December 11, 2009, would redirect $20.8 billion from TARP to offset $10.4 billion of the bill's various provisions. The Jobs for Main Street Act, 2010 ( H.R. When TARP was created, the Treasury did not collect and set aside $700 billion of revenue to finance the program—the Treasury Secretary was simply given legal authority to purchase $700 billion of assets. Therefore, Treasury holds no unused money under TARP that can be redirected toward new policy proposals. Like most spending programs, TARP expenditures are financed from general revenues. If the Treasury Secretary wished to purchase more TARP assets, it would be necessary to first issue federal debt (thereby increasing the budget deficit) to do so. These monies would not be considered a repayment of TARP funds and would not allow for the purchase of additional assets under TARP. Proposals to redirect TARP funds to finance other proposals rely, in essence, on a reduction in the amount that the Treasury Secretary is authorized to purchase under TARP. Since TARP is not near its ceiling today, any proposal that reduces TARP authority by less than $150 billion would not force TARP asset holdings to be reduced from the currently planned size. Thus, reducing the authorized size of TARP by less than $150 billion does not increase the revenues flowing to the Treasury because it does not force Treasury to sell any of the assets TARP currently holds. In effect, a new policy proposal that increases spending or reduces revenues would be deficit financed if it included a reduction in TARP authority of less than $150 billion under Treasury's current plan (since it would not result in any increase in revenues via a reduction in TARP assets outstanding). For official scoring purposes in 2009, the 2009 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. Therefore, a bill financed by redirecting any TARP funds would be officially scored as being offset by a decline in overall anticipated federal spending via a smaller TARP program since the March baseline assumed all $700 billion of TARP authority would be used in the future. For future TARP spending, CBO assumes a subsidy rate of 50%. Therefore, a dollar reduction in TARP authority reduces the official budget deficit by only 50 cents in a budget score. Likewise, the amount outstanding in TARP has not increased the budget deficit on a one-to-one basis, but rather by the present value of the subsidy. | Following a boom and bust in real estate and a meltdown in financial markets, Congress enacted a program to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions in October 2008. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA, P.L. 110-343). Under TARP, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to purchase up to $700 billion of "troubled" assets, including any asset that the Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, believes the purchase of which will contribute to financial stability. The amount outstanding under TARP is currently far below this limit, and Treasury has announced plans for no more than $550 billion to be outstanding in the future.
Some policymakers have proposed redirecting funds under the Troubled Asset Relief Program to finance new policy proposals. The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act (S. 896/P.L. 111-22), redirected $1.3 billion from TARP to finance modifications to the Hope for Homeowners Program. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), which passed the House, would redirect $20.8 billion of TARP funds to offset $10.4 billion of various provisions of the bill. The Jobs for Main Street Act (H.R. 2847), which passed the House, would redirect $150 billion of TARP funds to offset $75 billion of the bill's spending and tax provisions.
When TARP was created, the Treasury did not collect and set aside $700 billion of revenue to finance the program—the Treasury Secretary was simply given legal authority to purchase $700 billion of assets. Therefore, Treasury holds no unused money under TARP that can be redirected toward new policy proposals. Like most spending programs, TARP expenditures are financed from general revenues. If the Treasury Secretary wished to purchase more TARP assets, it would be necessary to first issue federal debt (thereby increasing the budget deficit) to do so.
Proposals to redirect TARP funds to finance other proposals rely, in essence, on a reduction in the amount that the Treasury Secretary is authorized to purchase under TARP. Since TARP is not near its ceiling today, any proposal that reduces TARP authority by less than $150 billion would not force TARP asset holdings to be reduced from the currently planned size. Thus, reducing the authorized size of TARP by less than $150 billion does not increase the revenues flowing to the Treasury because it does not force Treasury to sell any of the assets TARP currently holds. In effect, a new policy proposal that increases spending or reduces revenues would be deficit financed if it included a reduction in TARP authority of less than $150 billion under Treasury's current plan (since it would not result in any increase in revenues via a reduction in TARP assets outstanding).
The scoring of proposals to redirect TARP funds, however, differs from the actual effect of these proposals. For official scoring purposes, the 2009 budget resolution instructs CBO to use the baseline from March 2009. This March baseline assumed all $700 billion of TARP authority would be used in the future, as opposed to the $550 billion currently planned by Treasury. Therefore, a bill financed by redirecting any TARP funds would officially be scored as being offset by a decline in overall anticipated federal spending via lower future TARP purchases, although under current Treasury plans, future TARP purchases would not actually be reduced. The offset would not be one-for-one, however. Under Section 123 of EESA, the cost of asset purchases are scored as the net present value of the subsidy in the loan, modified for risk, and are not scored on a cash flow basis. For future TARP spending, CBO assumes a subsidy rate of 50%. Therefore, a dollar reduction in TARP authority is scored as reducing the official budget deficit by only 50 cents. |
crs_RL30120 | crs_RL30120_0 | was last reauthorized in 1994 by P.L. The authorization of appropriations under the MMPA expired at the end of FY1999. At issue for Congress are the terms and conditions of provisions to reauthorize and amend the MMPA to address a variety of concerns related to marine mammal management. This report identifies these concerns and provides background to facilitate a better understanding of various positions on these issues. Fish and Wildlife Service in P.L. Issues for Congress
The remainder of this report reviews issues that may be raised during discussions on reauthorizing the MMPA. Some of these issues could be addressed administratively, in regulations implemented by NMFS, FWS, or the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS, Department of Agriculture). Marine Mammals in Captivity
While some issues involving marine mammals in captivity discussed in this section may require amendment of the MMPA, many of these issues could also be addressed under the authority of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) or be addressed administratively in regulations implemented by APHIS (Department of Agriculture). For this reason, the effect of noise on marine mammals is subject to much speculation, presumption, and misinformation. Marine mammal scientists suggest that Congress may want to consider the benefits of encouraging international cooperative relationships on marine mammals by U.S. agencies. Directed Research Program
Although the MMPA emphasizes research, it does not create a national integrated marine mammal research program. Some critics suggest that the MMPA be amended to direct an external panel (e.g., the Marine Mammal Commission or the National Academy of Sciences) to carefully review the programs and procedures of federal management agencies for potential conflicting interests among their management, regulation, permit administration, scientific research, and funding roles with respect to marine mammals, and recommend actions that should be taken to address any problems identified. The requirements of the MMPA itself did not expire when the authorization of appropriations expired at the end of FY1999. The same subcommittee held a second oversight hearing on April 6, 2000, specifically on the implementation of the 1994 amendments related to the take reduction process, cooperative agreements with Alaska Native organizations, and co-management of subsistence use of marine mammals by Alaska Native communities. No further action was taken. The House passed H.R. Title IV of S. 1224 would have amended the MMPA to encourage development of fishing gear less likely to take marine mammals, expanded fisheries required to participate in the MMPA incidental take program to include recreational fisheries, and authorized appropriations for stock assessments and observer programs; in addition, Title III (Subtitle C) directed negotiation of international agreements to better protect cetaceans from commercial fishing gear and authorized a grant program to develop less harmful fishing gear. | The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was last reauthorized in 1994. The MMPA's authorization of appropriations expired at the end of FY1999. At issue for Congress are the terms and conditions of provisions designed to reauthorize and amend the MMPA to address a variety of concerns relating to marine mammal management. In the 109th Congress, the House passed a bill to reauthorize and amend the MMPA, but no further action was taken on this measure. The 110th Congress may again consider measures to amend and reauthorize the MMPA as well as bills to address specific marine mammal regulatory and management issues.
Several issues that may arise in reauthorization relate to modifying management of the interactions between marine mammals and commercial fishing operations. Other concerns relate to marine mammals in captivity and subsistence use of marine mammals by Native Americans. Additional issues include providing for trade in marine mammal products, managing robust marine mammal stocks, understanding the effect of noise on marine mammals, fostering international cooperation, regulating large incidental takes, modifying the scientific research permit process, improving agency compliance with MMPA deadlines, facilitating marine mammal research by federal scientists, dealing with harassment of marine mammals, considering a directed research program, and appropriating adequate funding for federal agency programs. While some of these issues could be addressed administratively, in regulations proposed and promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, others likely would require statutory changes.
Most potential participants in the reauthorization debate anticipate extended negotiations on some of these issues. Although the authorization for appropriations expired at the end of FY1999, the MMPA itself did not expire. Eventually, however, an extension of funding authority may need to be considered to continue federal program operations. Most of the issues associated with this law are not time-sensitive, and a number of oversight hearings have been held to increase understanding of various issues, positions, and possibilities.
This report lays out the range of issues likely to be raised during any reauthorization debate, the reasons behind them, and possible proposals that could be offered to address these concerns. This report will be updated as warranted to reflect the evolution of these issues. |
crs_RL34483 | crs_RL34483_0 | The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act (RHYA) was enacted in 1974 as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ( P.L. 93-415 ). RHYA authorizes funding for grant programs that provide direct services to youth—the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP)—and related training, research, and other activities. These programs and activities are administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau in the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families. Most recently, in the second session of the 110 th Congress, the President signed into law the Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act ( P.L. 110-378 ) to extend existing programs and authorize new activities under RHYA for FY2009 through FY2013. 110-378 represents a compromise between provisions that were included in two bills— H.R. 5524 and S. 2982 —to reauthorize RHYA. On March 4, 2008, Representative John Yarmuth introduced H.R. On June 9, 2008, the House approved the bill by voice vote under suspension of the rules. On May 6, 2008, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced S. 2982 , the Runaway and Homeless Youth Protection Act. On September 25, 2008, S. 2982 was approved by the Senate. 5524 . The House approved S. 2982 on September 26, 2008, and the President signed it into law as P.L. 110-378 on October 8, 2008. Table A-1 at the end of the report provides a side-by-side comparison of P.L. 110-378 with prior law, current regulation, and H.R. 5524 . It further requires HHS to reallocate unused BCP funds from one state to another. 110-378 allows youth to remain in a program funded under the BCP and TLP longer they were able to under the prior law, although the law imposes additional criteria for youth who stay longer at TLP-funded programs. Funding
Authorization of Appropriations
The prior law ( P.L. As the law existed prior to the enactment of P.L. Definition of "Homeless Youth" and "Runaway Youth"
Under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008, "homeless youth" for purposes of the BCP was defined as an individual younger than age 18 for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and for whom no other safe alternative living arrangement exists. Accountability
The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 includes provisions that seek to improve accountability of programs and activities authorized by RHYA, including requiring HHS to establish performance standards for BCP, TLP, and SOP grantees; directing GAO to evaluate the process by which grants are awarded under the three programs; and requiring HHS to periodically submit a report to Congress that contains estimates of runaway and homeless youth and certain characteristics of the population. The issues raised included inadequate levels of funding for RHYA grantees, limited information about the outcomes of runaway and homeless youth, and the need for greater education and workforce opportunities for these youth. | The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act (RHYA) was signed into law in 1974 as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415). RHYA authorizes funding for programs to support runaway and homeless youth, as well as related training, research, and other activities. These programs and activities are administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-378) to extend existing programs and establish new activities under RHYA for FY2009 through FY2013. The law represents a compromise between provisions that were included in two bills introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 5524 and S. 2982. On March 4, 2008, Representative John Yarmuth introduced H.R. 5524, the Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008, which passed the House on June 9, 2008. On May 6, 2008, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced S. 2982, the Runaway and Homeless Youth Protection Act, which passed the Senate on September 25, 2008. The House approved S. 2982 on September 26, and the President signed it into law as P.L. 110-378 on October 8, 2008.
This report discusses P.L. 110-378 and includes a table with a side-by-side comparison of its provisions to those in H.R. 5524, as well as to the law and regulations as they existed prior to the enactment of S. 2982. The new law amends and adds provisions related to program funding, requirements, and accountability. It extends the authorization of appropriations for the three programs under RHYA that provide direct services to youth: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). Unlike prior law, P.L. 110-378 enables HHS to reallot any unused BCP funds from one state to other states and permits youth to remain in BCP and TLP shelters for a longer period. Another change made by the law requires HHS to regularly submit a report to Congress that describes the incidence and prevalence of runaway and homeless youth. The law also directs the Government Accountability Office to report to Congress on the process by which HHS awards BCP, TLP, and SOP grants.
The provisions of P.L. 110-378 reflect issues raised by policymakers and advocates about RHYA during the reauthorization process. One issue was the amount of funding allocated to grantees under the three direct-service programs. Grantees expressed the concern that although Congress has periodically increased funding authorization for these programs, funding for individual grantees has remained relatively stable over time. A second issue was the lack of outcome data for youth who run away or experience homelessness. Finally, the bill addresses issues related to the educational and workforce needs of runaway and homeless youth.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42096 | crs_R42096_0 | Introduction
Murder, committed under any of more than 50 jurisdictional circumstances, is a federal capital offense. The Federal Death Penalty Act and related provisions establish the procedure that must be followed before a defendant convicted of a federal capital offense may be executed. Constitutional Considerations
The Federal Death Penalty Act reflects the constitutional boundaries identified in Furman and subsequent related Supreme Court decisions. There is no statute of limitations for capital offenses, but there is a preference for the trial of capital cases in the county in which they occur. The death penalty may be imposed under its provisions only after (1) the defendant is convicted of a capital offense; (2) in the case of murder, the defendant has been found to have acted with one of the required levels of intent; (3) the prosecution proves the existence of one or more of the statutory aggravating factors; and (4) the imbalance between the established aggravating factors and any mitigating factors justifies imposition of the death penalty. Deadlines between accusation and trial are the province of the constitutional and statutory speedy trial provisions. Justice Department Review : The decision to seek or not to seek the death penalty is ultimately that of the Attorney General. Death-Ineligible Offen d ers : Whether by statute, by constitutional command, or both, some offenders may not be exposed to a federal trial in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty for a federal capital offense; some may not be executed. An accused who is incompetent to stand trial may not be tried for a capital offense or any other crime. A defendant convicted of a capital offense may be executed, however, only if it is shown beyond doubt at a subsequent sentencing hearing that one of the statutory aggravating circumstances exists, and that he either (A) killed the victim intentionally; (B) intentionally inflicted serious injuries that resulted in the victim's death; (C) intentionally participated in an act, aware that it would expose a victim to life-threatening force, and the victim died as a consequence; or (D) intentionally engaged in an act of violence with reckless disregard of its life-threatening nature and the victim died as a consequence. Even in the presence of the necessary intent and at least one of the statutory aggravating factors, a defendant may only be sentenced to death, if the jury unanimously concludes that on balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors imposition of the death penalty is justified. This gives the defendant considerable latitude. (5) No prior criminal record. Certain drug kingpin offenses, however, are capital offenses even though they do not involve a murder. Presenting and Weighing the Factors : The Federal Death Penalty Act establishes the same capital sentencing hearing procedures for all capital offenses—murder, treason, espionage, or murder-less drug kingpin offenses. Capital punishment may only be recommended and imposed, if the jurors all agree that the aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors to an extent that justifies imposition of the death penalty. | Murder is a federal capital offense if committed in any of more than 50 jurisdictional settings. The Constitution defines the circumstances under which the death penalty may be considered a sentencing option. With an eye to those constitutional boundaries, the Federal Death Penalty Act and related statutory provisions govern the procedures under which the death penalty may be imposed.
Some defendants are ineligible for the death penalty regardless of the crimes with which they are accused. Children and those incompetent to stand trial may not face the death penalty; pregnant women and the mentally retarded may not be executed. There is no statute of limitations for murder, and the time constraints imposed by the due process and speedy trial clauses of the Constitution are rarely an impediment to prosecution.
The decision to seek or forgo the death penalty in a federal capital case must be weighed by the Justice Department's Capital Review Committee and approved by the Attorney General.
Defendants convicted of murder are death-eligible only if they are found at a separate sentencing hearing to have acted with life-threatening intent. Among those who have, capital punishment may be imposed only if the sentencing jury unanimously concludes that the aggravating circumstances that surround the murder and the defendant outweigh the mitigating circumstances to an extent that justifies execution.
The Federal Death Penalty Act provides several specific aggravating factors, such as murder of a law enforcement officer or multiple murders committed at the same time. It also permits consideration of any relevant "non-statutory aggravating factors." Impact on the victim's family and future dangerousness of the defendant are perhaps the most commonly invoked non-statutory aggravating factors. The jury must agree on the existence of at least one of the statutory aggravating factors if the defendant is to be sentenced to death.
The Federal Death Penalty Act permits consideration of any relevant mitigating factor, and identifies a few, such as the absence of prior criminal record or the fact that a co-defendant, equally or more culpable, has escaped with a lesser sentence.
The Federal Death Penalty Act recognizes other capital offenses that do not necessarily involve murder: treason, espionage, large-scale drug trafficking, and attempted murder to obstruct a drug kingpin investigation. The constitutional standing of these is less certain or at least different.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R42095, Federal Capital Offenses: An Overview of Substantive and Procedural Law, without some of the discussion, the footnotes, and much of the attributions of authority and quotations found there. |
crs_RL31126 | crs_RL31126_0 | This report is intended to provide a brief overview and summary of the federal laws, ethical rules, and regulations which may be relevant to the activities of those who lobby the United States Congress. The report provides a summary discussion of the federal lobbying registration and disclosure requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) (as amended by the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007" ( P.L. 110-81 , September 14, 2007)), the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the propriety of contingency fees for lobbying, restrictions on lobbying with federal funds, post-employment ("revolving door") lobbying activities by former federal officials, and House and Senate ethics rules which may be relevant to certain contacts by Members, officers, and employees of Congress with private lobbyists and their clients. Although the internal House and Senate rules apply directly only to those who come within their respective jurisdictions, the new statutory provisions amending the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 require a registered lobbyist to be familiar with the House and Senate ethics rules on gifts and reimbursements, prohibit lobbyists from offering gifts the receipt of which would violate those congressional rules, and require lobbyists to certify that no gifts have been offered to Members of Congress or staff which would be in violation of the chamber's rules. Who Is Covered Under the Act
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 is directed at so-called "professional lobbyists," that is, those who are compensated to engage in certain lobbying activities on behalf of a client or an employer. Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, as amended, if one is representing the interests of a foreign government or a foreign political party, such agent must continue to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, but then need not register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. Federal Funds Subsidizing or Reimbursing Lobbying
There are general restrictions under federal law and regulations against the use of federal funds for lobbying activities. Post-Employment Lobbying by Federal Officials
There are various "post-employment" or "revolving door" conflict of interest restrictions upon certain officers and employees of the federal government which may work to restrict their lobbying of the Congress, or of executive branch agencies or personnel, on particular matters or for a certain period of time after such officials leave office. General Restriction
The general, or "default" rule in the House and the Senate is that no gifts may be accepted by Members and staff from outside, private sources unless specifically permitted by the rules of the respective body. Other Exceptions to General Gift Rule
Other exceptions to the strict prohibition on the receipt of any gifts include anything for which fair market value is paid or anything not used and promptly returned; political contributions or attendance at political fund-raises sponsored by a political organization; payments to legal defense funds (other than those from lobbyists and foreign agents); gifts from another Member, officer, or employee of the Senate or House; food, refreshments, lodging, transportation and other benefits resulting from outside business or employment activities, from prospective employers, or provided by a political organization in connection with a fund-raise or campaign event; pensions and similar benefits from a former employer; informational materials sent to a Member's office in the form of books, articles, periodicals, written material, or tapes; awards or prizes in events open to the public; honorary degrees and non-monetary awards for public service; training if in the interest of the House of Representatives or the Senate; bequests and inheritances; items which may be received under the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, or other statute; anything paid for by federal, State, or local government; opportunities and benefits generally available to the public or to a group of federal or government employees; a plaque, trophy or commemorative item; anything for which the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the Senate Select Committee on Ethics provides a waiver; and home-State products donated to the Member primarily for promotional purposes such as display or free distribution, and which are of minimal value to any individual recipient. | This report provides a brief overview and summary of the federal laws, ethical rules, and regulations which may be relevant to the activities of those who lobby the United States Congress. The report provides a summary discussion of the federal lobbying registration and disclosure requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended by the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007," P.L. 110-81 ( S. 1 , 110 th Congress); the Foreign Agents Registration Act; the issue of the propriety of contingency fees for lobbying; restrictions on lobbying with federal funds; post-employment ("revolving door") lobbying activities by former federal officials; and House and Senate ethics rules relevant to contacts with private lobbyists.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was enacted to replace a nearly 50-year old lobbying registration law that was seen as vague and inadequate. The current lobbying registration and disclosure provisions establish clearer criteria and thresholds for determining when an organization should register its employees or staff as lobbyists or when a lobbying firm or individual lobbyist needs to register and identify clients. The act is directed at professional lobbyists, that is, those who receive payments to lobby for an employer or a client, and requires the registration and reporting of certain identifying information and general, broad financial data. In addition to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act requires the registration and reporting from those who act as agents of a foreign government or foreign political party, and who engage in "lobbying" or other similar political advocacy activities on behalf of their foreign principal.
Various provisions of federal law have been enacted and regulations promulgated to restrict the use of any federal funds for lobbying purposes, either by the agencies of the federal government or by federal contractors or grantees.
In attempts to limit what has been perceived to be potential undue or improper influence in governmental processes, restrictions have been adopted to limit the post-employment lobbying of certain high ranking officials of the federal government for a period of time after they leave government service ("revolving door" laws). Additionally, to deal with similar perceptions of undue or improper influence and access, both Houses of Congress have adopted internal rules regarding the acceptance of gifts and favors by Members, officers or employees of the House or Senate from private sources, particularly from registered lobbyists or agents of foreign principals, or their clients. No gifts may be accepted by Members, officers, or employees except as permitted in the rules of the respective chamber; and thus even small gifts, as well as more significant travel expenses for conferences or "fact finding" events provided to congressional Members and staff from private parties such as lobbyists and their clients, are regulated and restricted by the provisions of House and Senate rule. Under the new "ethics and lobbying" law ( P.L. 110-81 ), registered lobbyists must be familiar with these restrictions and regulations on gifts to Members of Congress in House and Senate rules, and must certify to the Government that they have not offered gifts or things of value to Members or staff which would violate these rules. |
crs_R41837 | crs_R41837_0 | In most countries, those who use the Internet to participate in their countries' political processes take for granted that they may use the Internet to engage openly in political discussions and to organize politically oriented activities. In some countries activists are in danger any time they access or even attempt to access a prohibited website or service or promote political dissent. Governments everywhere need the Internet for economic growth and technological development. Some also seek to restrict the Internet in order to maintain social, political, or economic control. Others believe that technology can offer a complementary (and, in some cases, better) solution to prevent government censorship than mandates imposed on companies. Hardware, software, and Internet services, in and of themselves, are neutral elements of the Internet; it is how they are implemented by various countries that makes them "repressive." Department of State
Since 2011, the State Department has worked to "protect and defend a free and open Internet" as an element of its policy supporting universal rights of freedom of expression and the free flow of information. The Task Force oversees U.S. efforts in more than 40 countries to help individuals circumvent politically motivated censorship by developing new tools and providing the training needed to safely access the Internet; Make Internet freedom an issue at the United Nations and the U.N. Human Rights Council in order to enlist world opinion and support for Internet freedom; Work with new partners in industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations to establish a standing effort to advance the power of "connection technologies" that will empower citizens and leverage U.S. traditional diplomacy; Provide new, competitive grants for ideas and applications that help break down communications barriers, overcome illiteracy, and connect people to servers and information they need; Urge and work with U.S. media companies to take a proactive role in challenging foreign governments' demands for censorship and surveillance; and Encourage the voluntary work of the communications-oriented, private sector-led Global Network Initiative (GNI). The Task Force supports Internet freedom by
monitoring Internet freedom, and reporting in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices the quality of Internet freedom around the world; responding in both bilateral and international forums to support Internet freedom; and expanding access to the Internet with greater technical and financial support for increasing availability of the Internet in the developing world. However, some anonymous technologies require users to download software and can be easily blocked by authorities. | Modern communication tools such as the Internet provide a relatively inexpensive, accessible, easy-entry means of sharing ideas, information, and pictures around the world. In a political and human rights context, in closed societies when the more established, formal news media is denied access to or does not report on specified news events, the Internet has become an alternative source of media, and sometimes a means to organize politically.
The openness and the freedom of expression allowed through social networking sites, as well as the blogs, video sharing sites, and other tools of today's communications technology, have proven to be an unprecedented and often disruptive force in some closed societies. Governments that seek to maintain their authority and control the ideas and information their citizens receive are often caught in a dilemma: they feel that they need access to the Internet to participate in commerce in the global market and for economic growth and technological development, but fear that allowing open access to the Internet potentially weakens their control over their citizens.
Internet freedom can be promoted in two ways, through legislation that mandates or prohibits certain activities, or through industry self-regulation. Past legislation has been aimed at prohibiting or requiring the reporting of the sale of Internet technologies and provision of Internet services to "Internet-restricting countries" (as determined by the State Department). Some believe, however, that technology can offer a complementary and, in some cases, better and more easily implemented solution to ensuring Internet freedom. They argue that hardware and Internet services, in and of themselves, are neutral elements of the Internet; it is how they are implemented by various countries that may be repressive. Also, Internet services are often tailored for deployment to specific countries; however, such tailoring is generally done to bring the company in line with the laws of that country, not with the intention of allowing the country to repress and censor its citizenry. In many cases, that tailoring would not raise many questions about free speech and political repression. |
crs_RL32199 | crs_RL32199_0 | Introduction
Overview
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or "mad cow disease") is a fatal degenerative neurological disease of cattle. United States:
December 23, 2003 , USDA announced the first U.S. case of BSE, a Holstein dairy cow in Washington state that was born in Alberta, Canada in April 1997; June 24, 2005, USDA confirmed the second (first native-born) U.S. BSE case, a 12-year-old Brahma cross cow from a Texas ranch. Some critics, nonetheless, have questioned whether these safeguards are providing adequate protection against BSE. Also at issue have been whether their costs to taxpayers and industry are justified; whether such steps are defensible scientifically and will fully restore foreign markets' confidence in the safety of U.S. cattle and beef; and whether other types of regulatory and/or legislative actions should be considered, among other questions. Safeguards in Place Prior to December 2003
In the wake of the far more extensive BSE outbreaks in the United Kingdom and other countries starting in 1986, U.S. officials had, by the late 1980s, begun erecting what they and beef industry leaders had termed the "three firewalls" to keep the disease out of the United States and to contain it immediately if it should occur here:
Restrictions on imports of ruminants and their products from countries with BSE; A ban on feeding most mammalian proteins to cattle and other ruminants; and A targeted domestic surveillance program. The new actions included:
Holding carcasses of tested animals until BSE-negative results are obtained (notice, January 12, 2004, Federal Register ); Banning nonambulatory ("downer") cattle from entering facilities that slaughter them for human food (interim final rule, January 12, 2004, Federal Register ); Keeping additional animal parts considered to be at higher risk—such as central nervous system and several other tissues of older animals—from the human food supply (interim final rule, January 12, 2004, Federal Register ); Prohibiting certain meat plant practices such as air injection stunning and some types of mechanical deboning operations (interim final rule, January 12, 2004, Federal Register ); Working on a national system to identify and track individual animals from their place of birth to slaughter; and Naming an international scientific panel to review the government's BSE response and recommend any needed improvements (the panel's findings are discussed below). On January 26, 2004, FDA announced it would publish changes to its own BSE safeguards, such as banning a number of bovine materials from the human foods and cosmetics it regulates; banning poultry litter, restaurant plate waste, and ruminant blood products from ruminant feed; and tightening feed manufacturing procedures and oversight. On October 6, 2005, FDA published its long awaited proposed rule to tighten feed restrictions, by banning, from all animal feeds, some higher-risk cattle parts (i.e., some SRM). A final rule had not been issued as of mid-May 2007. (For details on these developments, see later sections of this report). As the UK was coping with a then-rising number of BSE discoveries, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the lead agency for controlling animal diseases, began to impose a series of import restrictions here. Congressional Role
USDA and FDA so far have not recommended any statutory changes in import safeguards. The "Downer" Ban and Impact on Surveillance
Following the first finding of a cow with BSE, USDA announced, on December 30, 2003, a ban on downer cattle in the human food supply. Creekstone sued USDA in March 2006. These or other proposals aimed at addressing the food safety and animal welfare aspects of the BSE issue could re-emerge in the 110 th Congress. Most of these CCC funds were used to pay for the enhanced surveillance program. Various raw agricultural products have been exempt. | Through mid-May 2007, the United States had confirmed three cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease"): the first in December 2003 in a Canadian-born cow found in Washington state, the second in June 2005 in cow in Texas, and the third in March 2006 in a cow in Alabama.
Shortly after the first case, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other officials announced measures to improve existing safeguards against the introduction and spread of BSE. Previously, the major safeguards were: (1) USDA restrictions on imports of ruminants and their products from countries with BSE; (2) a ban on feeding most mammalian proteins to cattle and other ruminants, issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and (3) a targeted domestic surveillance program by USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the agency responsible for animal health monitoring and disease control.
Some argued that these safeguards were inadequate, as evidenced by findings of BSE here and subsequent federal efforts to bolster protections. Most new actions announced by USDA on December 30, 2003, were under the purview of USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), responsible for the safety of most U.S. meat and poultry. These actions took effect in January 2004 and included (1) holding tested carcasses until BSE-negative results are obtained; (2) banning nonambulatory ("downer") cattle from human food; and (3) banning certain additional animal parts from human food. USDA also increased work and spending on a national animal identification and tracking system, and undertook an enhanced BSE surveillance program, among other activities. On January 26, 2004, FDA announced planned changes to its safeguards, including additional bovine materials banned from the human foods and cosmetics it regulates; a ban on poultry litter, restaurant waste, and ruminant blood products from ruminant feed; and stricter oversight of feed manufacturing. In lieu of these changes, FDA on October 6, 2005, proposed a ban, in all types of animal feed, of some higher-risk cattle parts. A final rule is pending.
Many Members of the 110th Congress continue to closely follow these BSE developments; hearings and legislative proposals on various aspects of the issue are possible. Among the policy questions have been whether expanded agency actions have provided further protections against BSE, whether they are scientifically sound, and what costs they may have imposed on consumers, taxpayers, and industry. Also at issue have been whether USDA and FDA have effectively implemented and enforced the current safeguards; whether these safeguards will be sufficient to rebuild foreign markets' confidence in the safety of U.S. beef; and whether other types of actions should be considered, among other questions. Additional U.S. BSE cases could affect these policy deliberations.
This report will be updated if significant developments occur. |
crs_R43492 | crs_R43492_0 | It is not possible to clearly or definitively distinguish the effect of sanctions on Iran from the effect of other policy tools that have been employed. Debate Over Achievements of Sanctions
There has been substantial debate over the degree to which sanctions have contributed to altering Iranian policies—particularly regarding Iran's willingness to negotiate limits to its nuclear program. This debate has been affected significantly by the "Joint Plan of Action" (JPA) agreed on November 24, 2013, between Iran and the P5+1. The agreement, implementation of which began on January 20, 2014, requires Iran to halt further development of most aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for a modest and temporary easing of multilateral sanctions. On the other hand, some experts assert that Iran's signing of the JPA was attributable less to sanctions and more to Iran's perceptions of U.S. flexibility—in particular an apparent U.S. willingness to accept some long-term enrichment of uranium by Iran and pursue overall U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Improving Human Rights Practices . According to the Administration, "If Iran fails to meet its commitments, [the United States and its partners] will revoke the relief." The interim agreement does not require an easing of any U.S. sanctions that were imposed in the 1980s and 1990s primarily to address Iran's support for acts of international terrorism, or any sanctions that address Iran's alleged human rights abuses or its influence in neighboring countries. The Way Forward: Potential Scenarios for Iran Sanctions23
For the duration of the JPA period, international sanctions on Iran are likely to remain in a state of ambiguity—no international sanctions have been lifted or repealed, but many sanctions imposed by individual states are, at least temporarily, relaxed. The future course of Iran sanctions will almost certainly depend, at least in part, on the outcome of the ongoing P5+1 – Iran negotiations for a final settlement on Iran's nuclear program. If the Parties Reach a Comprehensive Nuclear Settlement
The text of the JPA states that a comprehensive solution on Iran's nuclear program "would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program." With respect to the JPA commitment not to impose new nuclear sanctions during the JPA period, the document states that "The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear related sanctions." We are in agreement with our partners in the P5+1 and the EU [European Union] and with Iran that any sanctions relief, should we get to a comprehensive agreement, will be phased in and will be in response to actions that Iran takes. That lifting some sanctions would require congressional action raises the issue of congressional responses to any comprehensive deal that is reached. There are potential consequences should Congress not lift nuclear-related sanctions after a comprehensive deal. If Negotiations Collapse
Iran sanctions are likely to pursue a far different course if negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear settlement collapse. It can be argued that partner countries would likely support increased sanctions if the collapse of negotiations were widely attributed to Iranian refusal to agree to what were perceived by partner countries as reasonable demands for a comprehensive nuclear settlement. An extension of the JPA has several potential implications for the course of Iran sanctions. The Administration has indicated that such an extension would apply to all provisions of the JPA, including the modest sanctions relief that could provide additional resources to the Iranian government. Congress might seek to enact additional sanctions, such as those included in H.R. There is potential for any of these groups, with or without the knowledge or involvement of Iran, to conduct a catastrophic attack in the Middle East or elsewhere. A related possibility is an attack in the United States by Iran or Iranian proxies, against U.S. or partner interests. According to this view, Iran-supported militants might seek to prevent Iran from potentially abandoning its commitment to militant causes in the region. Resurgence of a Popular Uprising in Iran . A shift in international views on sanctions could result from an Iranian decision to undertake direct military action in the region. | Most experts agree that the multilateral sanctions imposed on Iran since 2010 have contributed significantly to producing flexibility in Iran's position on the scope of its nuclear program. There is similar agreement that the effect of sanctions on Iran's foreign policy—particularly on its core interests in the Middle East region—and on its human rights practices, appear to have been minimal to date. In assessing effectiveness, however, it is difficult to separate the effect of sanctions from other variables such as Iran's purported economic mismanagement, attitudes of the Iranian public, and Iranian politics.
Interim Nuclear Deal of 2013
Sanctions have been eased temporarily under an interim nuclear deal of November 2013 ("Joint Plan of Action," JPA), which included a commitment from the United States to impose no new nuclear-related sanctions for the JPA period (until July 20, 2014). Virtually any next step in U.S. and multilateral sanctions on Iran is likely to depend on the course of negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program. Opinion in the United States on the future course of Iran sanctions is deeply divided. As Congress has been an active proponent of sanctions on Iran for many years, it will remain keenly interested in the future direction of Iran sanctions policy.
Proponents of Additional Sanctions
While negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear settlement are going on, some assert that additional sanctions would reinforce the pressure that appears to have encouraged Iran to accept the JPA and increase Iranian willingness to reach an acceptable permanent settlement. Proponents of increased sanctions maintain that additional sanctions will also prevent an erosion of existing sanctions caused by a perception that the JPA has ended Iran's international isolation.
Critics of Additional Sanctions
Critics of this approach maintain that additional sanctions imposed while comprehensive nuclear settlement talks are in progress would reinforce hardliners in Iran who oppose a nuclear agreement with the United States out of distrust of U.S. intentions. Adding sanctions could also cause U.S. partners to separate their Iran policies from those of the United States—particularly if there is a collapse in the negotiations that appears to stem from what others consider to be excessive U.S. demands. Alternatively, a failure of negotiations that is attributed to Iran's unwillingness to accept seemingly reasonable offers would likely lead to a broad international increase in sanctions on Iran.
The Joint Plan of Action and Additional Future Possibilities
The JPA commits the Administration and its negotiating partners to lifting "nuclear-related sanctions" on Iran if there is a comprehensive nuclear deal. Because of the substantial overlap between nuclear related sanctions and those imposed primarily because of other issues, in practice that represents a commitment to broad sanctions relief. Those who support that commitment maintain that Iran will not have the incentive to agree to a permanent settlement unless there is the prospect of substantial sanctions relief. Critics of this view argue that broad sanctions relief will provide Iran even more resources with which it can support militant movements that oppose U.S. interests in the Middle East, and will not likely compel Iran to conform to international standards of human rights practices.
The future course of Iran sanctions could also be affected by Iranian actions that are unrelated to the nuclear talks. Such actions might include a crackdown against any new popular unrest in Iran, a catastrophic terrorist attack by one of Iran's regional allies, expanded Iranian military intervention in Syria, or a power shift in Iran back toward opponents of a nuclear settlement.
Underlying these debates is a lack of consensus over what would constitute an acceptable final nuclear settlement. On the nuclear issues, some argue that any settlement must result in full dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program. The Administration has indicated in the JPA that it might accept an outcome that allows Iran to retain a limited and extensively monitored uranium enrichment program. |
crs_R41735 | crs_R41735_0 | State and local tax revenues have declined, expenditures for social insurance programs have increased, and federal assistance has begun to recede as federal aid related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) expires. Part of this concern has focused on debt issued by state and local governments. More generally, Congress has also held several hearings on policies addressing the fiscal health of state and local governments. The relative safety of state and local government debt and the federal income tax exclusion on interest payments on state and local bonds has created a strong demand for state and local government debt. The discussion relies on data provided publicly by the Federal Reserve Board and U.S. Bureau of the Census and attempts to establish the current debt position of state and local governments and how it has changed over time. State and Local Government Finances: 2002 to 2009
The recession that began in December 2007 and ended June 2009 created significant fiscal strain on state and local governments. These levels reflect a change in the mix of funding sources. Payments for already retired or separated workers are a significantly larger expense ($191 billion in FY2009). Currently, states are preparing the FY2012 budgets and are anticipating the need to increase revenue and reduce expenditures to replace the lost federal aid. As shown in Figure 6 (and Table A-3 ), state and local debt ranged from $2.4 billion in Wyoming to $373.7 billion in California. Economics of State and Local Government Debt
The use of public debt has important economic consequences that extend beyond the comparative metrics presented in this report. As such, the economic impact of state and local government debt issuance is generally perceived as of congressional interest as is the role of the federal government in either promoting or impeding the issuance of state debt. The latest estimate of the federal tax expenditure for tax-exempt state and local government debt is $177.6 billion over the 2011 to 2015 forecast window. Congress has recently held hearings examining the fiscal health of state and local governments and has offered legislation in two areas related to state and local fiscal health analyzed in this report: government debt and government pensions. In response, Congress may seek to increase oversight of the municipal bond market. | The financial consequences of the recession that spanned from December 2007 through June 2009 have increased congressional interest in the fiscal health of state and local governments. State and local tax revenues declined, expenditures climbed, and debt increased. Even though tax revenue has begun to rebound, expenditures for unemployment benefits and other social programs remain elevated. Also, federal aid to states, which had increased as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, has receded. Federal outlays for grants in aid to state and local governments rose from $538 billion in FY2009 to $608.4 billion in FY2010 and are estimated to be $625.2 billion in FY2011. The FY2012 budget provides $584.3 billion in outlays for aid to state and local governments in 2012.
In response to these state and local government fiscal headwinds, several hearings were held in the first session of the 112th Congress to examine the health of state and local government finances and the potential effects on the economic recovery. The hearings focused on a range of issues important to state and local governments as well as federal policy makers. The role of state and local government debt was one of these issues. The federal government has a significant stake in this debt market, as the tax expenditure for tax-exempt bonds issued by state and local governments was recently estimated to be $161.6 billion over the 2010 to 2014 budget window.
This report first provides a broad overview of state and local government finances and how these governments incorporate borrowing into their budgets. The second section reports data on state and local government debt and how that debt has changed over time. This section includes a comparative analysis of these debt parameters for each state. The third section discusses different economic perspectives on the use of debt by governments and if governments are intrinsically biased toward borrowing more than is considered economically optimal. The discussion provides background for Congress as it deliberates potential changes in the oversight of the primary and secondary markets for state and local government debt.
Issues related to state and local government finances, such as government pensions and health benefits, are also addressed. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_R42582 | crs_R42582_0 | Introduction
Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States has employed to advance U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus and funding levels of aid programs changing along with broader U.S. policy goals. U.S. assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s following the introduction of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. USAID manages ESF funds in conjunction with the State Department. As total aid levels to the region have declined in recent years, Congress and the Administration have gradually shifted the balance of the remaining assistance toward development and humanitarian assistance and away from security assistance (see Figure 3 below). FY2013 Request for Latin America and the Caribbean5
The Obama Administration's FY2013 foreign aid budget request would continue the recent downward trend in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration has requested approximately $1.7 billion for the region. U.S. assistance to the sub-region has declined in each decade since the 1980s. Assistance declined considerably during the 1990s as the Cold War and civil conflicts came to an end. Looking more recently at foreign aid appropriated for the State Department and USAID through the annual State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, U.S. assistance to the Caribbean amounted to $572 million in current U.S. dollars in FY2011 and an estimated $522 million in FY2012. They include the Department of Defense, the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps. Potential Issues for Congressional Consideration
Budget Priorities and Constraints
The Obama Administration maintains that its four priorities for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean—promoting economic opportunity, ensuring citizen security, strengthening effective institutions for democratic governance, and securing a clean energy future —guide its foreign aid budget request for the region. As noted above (" Legislative Action on FY2013 Appropriations "), House and Senate Appropriations Committees have marked up their versions of the FY2013 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure that respectively would reduce worldwide foreign aid funding by 11.8% and 4.7% from the Administration's FY2013 request. The House Committee on Appropriations held a markup of its bill ( H.R. If enacted, total funding levels in FY2013 would have been 2.3% lower than the FY2012 estimate and 4.7% lower than the Administration's request. It was unclear how much foreign assistance each of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would receive under the two bills since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs were not specified in the legislation or accompanying reports. Nevertheless, both of the reports expressed concerns over conditions in the region and noted the committees' intentions to provide assistance levels above the Administration's request to at least some Latin American and Caribbean nations. The House report ( H.Rept. The Senate report ( S.Rept. 5857 or S. 3241 . It delayed floor consideration of FY2013 appropriations bills until after the start of the new fiscal year and the November 2012 elections, instead enacting a six-month continuing resolution that would expire in March 2013 ( P.L. 112-175 ). In March 2013, before the continuing resolution expired, Congress approved new legislation ( P.L. 113-6 ) funding federal programs through the end of FY2013. Under that measure, State Department and Foreign Operations accounts were funded at the same level as in FY2012 with some exceptions. Funding, however, was also subject to the budget sequestration cuts set forth in the Budget Control Act of 2011( P.L. 112-25 ) and the American Taxpayers Relief Act ( P.L. 112-240 ). While sequestration reduced State Department-Foreign Operations funding by about 5%, those reductions will be applied at the account level, and as a result, country-level allocations for FY2013 are not yet available. | Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests in the region encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy toward the region is designed to promote economic and social opportunity, ensure citizen security, strengthen effective democratic institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance these priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial amounts of foreign assistance. In recent years, the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and influences executive branch policy toward the region.
Trends in Assistance
Since 1946, the United States has provided over $148 billion (constant 2010 dollars) in assistance to the region. Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance to the region spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance to the region remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for the region have fallen in each of the past two fiscal years, however, as Congress has sought to trim the foreign aid budget.
FY2013 Obama Administration Request
The Obama Administration's FY2013 foreign aid budget request would have continued the recent downward trend in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration requested some $1.7 billion for the region to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Beyond the assistance provided through the State Department and USAID, many Latin American and Caribbean nations will continue to receive additional aid from agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps.
Congressional Action
In May 2012, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations marked up their annual appropriations bills for the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (H.R. 5857 and S. 3241). Funding in the FY2013 House bill was 11.8% lower than the Administration's request, and funding in the Senate bill was 4.7% lower than the Administration's request. It is unclear how much foreign assistance each of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would have received under the two bills, however, since appropriation levels for individual countries and programs are generally not specified in the legislation or accompanying reports.
Ultimately no action was taken on these measures. Congress delayed floor consideration of FY2013 appropriations bills until after the start of the new fiscal year and the November 2012 elections, instead enacting a six-month continuing resolution that would expire in March 2013 (P.L. 112-175). In March 2013, before the continuing resolution expired, Congress approved new legislation (P.L. 113-6) funding federal programs through the end of FY2013. Under that measure, State Department and Foreign Operations accounts were funded at the same level as in FY2012 with some exceptions. Funding, however, was also subject to the budget sequestration cuts set forth in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) and the American Taxpayers Relief Act (P.L. 112-240). While sequestration reduced State Department-Foreign Operations funding by about 5%, those reductions will be applied at the account level, and as a result, country-level allocations for FY2013 are not yet available.
Note: The FY2013 foreign aid statistics cited in this report reflect the Administration FY2013 request for assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The discussion and analysis throughout this report reflect comparisons of the Administration's FY2013 request with FY2012 aid estimates. Discussion of FY2013 legislative action focuses on bills reported by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, but never considered by Congress. |
crs_R43794 | crs_R43794_0 | T he U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ensures the safety of all food except for meat, poultry, and certain egg products over which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has regulatory oversight. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the FDA has the authority to regulate the manufacturing, processing, and labeling of food, with the primary goal of promoting food safety. Congress has granted the FDA with the authority to take both administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The agency initiates and carries out administrative enforcement actions while judicial enforcement actions, including seizures and injunctions, require some type of involvement by the courts. Additionally, administrative enforcement actions, such as inspections and warning letters, tend to precede any judicial enforcement action. The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) expanded the FDA's enforcement authority with new and broader measures. This report focuses on the FDA's statutory authority to initiate the following administrative enforcement actions: inspections, warning letters, recalls, suspension of registration, administrative detention, and related legal issues. Inspections
The FDA conducts inspections of regulated facilities in order to oversee a firm's compliance with the FFDCA and corresponding regulations. The FFDCA grants the agency with the enforcement authority to inspect both facilities and records. Warning Letters
Section 309 of the FFDCA permits the FDA to decline to institute formal enforcement proceedings for "minor violations of this [act] whenever [the agency] believes that the public interest [would] be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning." These warning letters give recipient firms an opportunity to take voluntary corrective actions before the FDA initiates more formal enforcement action. Recalls
The recall process permits the FDA to enforce the adulteration and misbranding provisions of the FFDCA by encouraging industry participants to remove the product and correct the violation. This section concludes with an analysis of the due process concerns related to the mandatory recall enforcement authority. If the FDA has issued a mandatory recall, the FDA then issues a written order to the firm to recall the product. Suspension of Registration
The FFDCA requires all food facilities to register with the FDA and to renew such registration biennially so that the agency may effectively oversee all areas of food production. If the FDA determines that a food manufactured, processed, packed, received, or held by a facility has a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, the agency may suspend the registration of a facility that created, caused, or was otherwise responsible. Food facility registration and the suspension of such registration enable the agency to determine the location and source of an outbreak of food-borne illnesses and thus notify facilities that may be affected quickly and efficiently. Administrative Detention
Under Section 304 of the FFDCA, a designated FDA employee may order the detention of any article of food that is found during an FDA inspection if the employee has reason to believe that such article is adulterated or misbranded. Under this administrative detention authority, FDA may prevent holders of illegal articles from moving the food before a federal district court issues a warrant permitting the agency to seize the food. Upon such appeal, the FDA must then grant the claimant the opportunity for an informal hearing. | The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ensures the safety of all food except for meat, poultry, and certain egg products over which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has regulatory oversight. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the FDA has the authority to regulate the manufacturing, processing, and labeling of food with the primary goal of promoting food safety.
Congress has granted the FDA the authority to take both administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The agency initiates and carries out administrative enforcement actions while judicial enforcement actions, including seizures and injunctions, require some type of involvement by the courts. Additionally, administrative enforcement actions, such as inspections and warning letters, tend to precede any judicial enforcement action. The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) expanded the FDA's enforcement authority with new and broader measures. This report focuses on the statutory authority and legal issues relating to the following administrative enforcement actions: inspections, warning letters, recalls, suspension of registration, and administrative detention.
Inspections: The FDA conducts inspections of regulated facilities in order to oversee a firm's compliance with the FFDCA and corresponding regulations. The FFDCA grants the agency with the enforcement authority to inspect both facilities and records. However, the act narrowly tailors this authority in order to balance the protection of the facility owners' Fourth Amendment rights and the promotion of public health.
Warning Letters: Under the FFDCA, the FDA also has the ability to decline to institute formal enforcement proceedings for minor violations of the act if the agency believes that it could adequately serve public interest through written correspondence to violators. These warning letters give recipient firms an opportunity to take voluntary corrective actions before the FDA initiates a more formal enforcement action.
Recalls: The recall process permits the FDA to enforce the adulteration and misbranding provisions of the FFDCA by encouraging industry participants to remove the product and correct the violation. FDA regulations outline several steps that both the firm and agency must take when issuing either a voluntary or mandatory recall. FSMA granted the FDA the authority to issue a mandatory recall. FSMA also established the opportunity for an informal hearing, at which a firm may dispute these types of recalls, in order to protect the due process rights of the recalling firms.
Suspension of Registration: The FFDCA requires all food facilities to register with the FDA so that the agency may effectively oversee all areas of food production. If the FDA determines that a food manufactured, processed, packed, received, or held by a registered facility has a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, the agency may suspend the registration of a facility that created, caused, or was otherwise responsible. This enforcement authority is intended to permit the agency to determine the location and source of an outbreak of food-borne illness and thus notify facilities that may be affected quickly and efficiently.
Administrative Detention: Under the FFDCA, an FDA employee may order the detention of any article of food that is found during an FDA inspection if the employee has reason to believe that such article is adulterated or misbranded. Under this administrative detention authority, the FDA may prevent illegal articles from being moved or consumed until the court grants a seizure order. |
crs_RL32394 | crs_RL32394_0 | As the United States moved from the post-Cold War world to the war against terror, human rights concerns have increasingly been balanced against American security interests, and particularly the need to develop effective counterterror cooperation with Indonesia to combat radical Islamic groups. President Obama's Visit to Indonesia
President Obama's much anticipated November 2010 visit to Indonesia was, in the view of most, a success. President Yudhoyono indicated that he and President Obama discussed a range of topics including trade and investment, energy, climate change, education, counterterrorism, global and regional issues, the G-20, Myanmar [Burma], and the situation in the Middle East. While there has been increasing appreciation for Indonesia as a partner in the struggle against Islamist militants and as a key geopolitical actor positioned astride the strategic sea lanes in the previous administration, Obama's visit and the signing of the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement mark a broadening of that relationship with an expectation that more will be done on a range of issues in the future. The Strategic Dimension
One of Obama's key objectives for his Indonesia visit was to strengthen strategic ties with the world's largest Muslim population which is also one of the fastest growing economies in Asia and the largest democracy in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's parliamentary elections in April 2004, and the Presidential elections of July and September 2004, were deemed by international observers to be free and fair, and they did much to instill confidence in Indonesia's democratic process. Some observers are concerned about its indirect influence over politics. This manifested itself in the predominantly Catholic former Indonesian province of East Timor, which is now an independent state, as well as in the far west of Indonesia, in Aceh, and in the far eastern part of the nation, in Papua and West Papua. On the other hand, the United States has a strong interest in reaching out to the Islamic world, and is working with a now democratic Indonesia as a partner in the struggle against Islamist militancy and developing a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia that can further U.S. geopolitical interests. Much attention has been focused on the potential rise of Islamic sentiment in Indonesia in recent years. Despite having long been a key oil exporter, Indonesia has in recent years become a net oil importer. The agreement established a working group under the U.S.-Indonesia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Regional Dynamics
Indonesia's large population of 240 million, its strategic location, and its political leadership have established its central place in Southeast Asia. China's relations with Indonesia and Southeast Asia have shifted over the years. Other priorities of U.S. assistance include support for the further development of democracy in Indonesia, support for the rule of law and human rights, maternal and child health, and support for economic growth through the development of trade, investment, and infrastructure. Indonesia has participated in the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program, which includes intelligence cooperation, civil-military cooperation in combating terrorism and maritime security. Others remain focused on human rights abuses by the Indonesian military. | With a population of 240 million, Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia and the most populous Muslim-majority nation in the world. Its size, its emerging democracy and economic vibrancy, and its strategic position across critical sea lanes linking the Middle East with East Asia have led many to consider it an emerging middle-tier power. The U.S. maintains close relations with Indonesia, with considerable security, economic, and trade ties, although human rights concerns about the Indonesian armed forces have long been a thorn in the relationship.
In the 12 years since a catastrophic economic crisis led to the fall of longtime President Suharto, Indonesia has undergone a remarkable transformation. It has held two successful direct Presidential elections, both of which were considered largely free and fair, and conducts dozens of actively contested provincial and local elections each year. Its economy regularly posts growth of better than 6% annually, although poverty remains considerable and corruption widespread.
Discussion of Indonesia has shifted from speculation about its possible breakup due to separatist sentiments in places such as Aceh, the Malukus, West Papua, and the now independent state of Timor Leste to admiration of its democratic transformation, its relatively strong performance in the recent global economic crisis, its cooperation in efforts to combat terrorism, and its growing role in regional diplomatic institutions, international efforts to combat climate change, and its membership in the G-20.
In recent years, U.S. policy towards Indonesia has focused on cementing ties with a geopolitically important state that can play an active role in regional diplomatic institutions, and encouraging Indonesia to combat terrorism and effectively counter the rise of violent Islamic militancy. The United States has also sought to promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and to further American trade and investment interests in Indonesia.
The election of President Barack Obama, who spent part of his childhood in Indonesia, did much to spur expectations in Indonesia that the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship would be enhanced. President Obama's visit to Indonesia in November 2010, with the signing of a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), did much to meet these expectations. The agreement covers a range of issues including trade and investment, food security, science and technology, educational exchanges, and military cooperation.
Congressional concerns have included oversight of the Obama Administration's policies towards Indonesia, including the Comprehensive Partnership, Indonesia's role in regional diplomacy, the restarting of comprehensive military-military relations, and policies to encourage human rights performance, particularly in restive West Papua. |
crs_RL34068 | crs_RL34068_0 | Introduction1
In 1990, the state of Washington passed a law that allows for the civil commitment of sex offenders. Civil commitment, as it relates to sex offenders, is when a state retains custody of an individual, found by a judge or jury to be a "sexually dangerous person," by involuntarily committing the person to a secure mental health facility after the offender's prison sentence is done. With respect to sex offenders, civil commitment laws allow states, and now the federal government, to civilly commit sexually dangerous persons. An issue for Congress is whether civil commitment is a sustainable policy for dealing with sexually dangerous persons, or whether there is a different way to manage this population effectively. The issue of civil commitment raises a series of concomitant questions: How much do civil commitment programs cost? How dangerous are sex offenders? Is sex offender treatment effective? Can sexually dangerous persons be defined and identified? Are there less restrictive alternatives for managing sex offenders? Background on Civil Commitment
This section describes the history of civil commitment laws in the United States, two Supreme Court rulings on the constitutionality of civil commitment programs, and a description of the federal civil commitment program. However, the data indicate that sex offenders, when compared with other violent offenders, may not be the high-risk offenders that they are perceived to be. Others argue, however, that given the fact that sex offenders pose a similar risk to the community as other violent offenders, the need for special measures to monitor and control sex offenders, such as civil commitment, are unwarranted. Any discussion about recidivism almost inevitably includes a discussion about ways to decrease recidivism. Sex offender treatment is viewed as one way to decrease sex offender recidivism. Sex Offender Treatment
One of the key tenets of civil commitment is the belief that sex offenders can be treated; for if they cannot, it is likely that there will be a burgeoning population of civilly committed sex offenders that will never be released. Research indicates that treatment for incarcerated sex offenders (who are more likely to be violent sex offenders) is promising, but the findings are somewhat mixed. Some studies provided treatment for sex offenders that was questionably implemented. These issues include (1) the ability of the government to determine which offenders should be civilly committed, (2) the use of less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment, (3) the use of indeterminate sentences to punish sex offenders, and (4) the cost of civil commitment programs. Data indicate that sex offenders are more likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for a sex crime. Although researchers have made advancements in determining whether an offender is at-risk to re-offend, not as much progress has been made in developing methods to determine when it is safe to release sex offenders from custody. Data on sex offender recidivism is not conclusive. | The 109th Congress passed legislation (P.L. 109-248) that allows the federal government to civilly commit "sexually dangerous persons." Civil commitment, as it relates to sex offenders, is when a state retains custody of an individual, found by a judge or jury to be a "sexually dangerous person," by involuntarily committing the person to a secure mental health facility after the offender's prison sentence is done. In 1990, the state of Washington passed the first civil commitment law for sexually dangerous persons. Currently, 18 other states and the federal government have similar laws. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane, ruled that current civil commitment laws are constitutional.
The civil commitment of sex offenders centers on the belief that sex offenders are more likely than other offenders to re-offend. However, data on sex offender recidivism is varied. Data show that the recidivism risk for sex offenders may be lower than it is typically thought to be; in fact, some studies show that sex offenders recidivate at a lower rate than many other criminals. Other studies show that, given time, almost all sex offenders will commit a new sex crime. Most discussions about recidivism examine ways to decrease recidivism; for example, by providing sex offenders with treatment. Research on the efficacy of sex offender treatment is promising, but it cannot prove that treatment reduces recidivism. Cognitive-behavioral techniques appear to be the most promising type of treatment for sex offenders, although some research indicates that offenders who receive a diagnosis of psychopathy may be less amenable to treatment.
For civil commitment to be effective, practitioners must be able to identify sex offenders who pose a high risk of re-offending. Although the ability of practitioners to identify offenders has improved, there is still the possibility that an offender who would not re-offend might be committed. Moreover, determining when it is safe to release a sex offender from custody is still difficult for practitioners. Such concerns have raised questions about alternatives to civil commitment. One potential alternative is the use of less restrictive measures, such as intensive community supervision. Another alternative is the use of indeterminate sentences for sex offenders. The cost of civil commitment programs has fueled debate about other viable means for managing dangerous sex offenders. Data show that civil commitment programs are expensive when compared with traditional incarceration or community supervision. The cost of civil commitment programs is expected to grow as more offenders are committed.
An issue for Congress is whether civil commitment is a sustainable policy for dealing with sexually dangerous persons, or whether there is a different way to manage this population effectively. The issue of civil commitment raises a series of concomitant questions: How much do civil commitment programs cost? How dangerous are sex offenders? Is sex offender treatment effective? Can sexually dangerous persons be defined and identified? Are there less restrictive alternatives for managing sex offenders?
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL34397 | crs_RL34397_0 | Introduction
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are tax-advantaged accounts that individuals (or married couples) can establish to accumulate funds for retirement. This report describes the two kinds of IRAs that individual workers can establish: traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs. It also describes a tax credit for retirement savings contributions. Early distributions may be subject to an additional 10% penalty. The early withdrawal penalty does not apply to distributions before the age of 59½ if they
occur if the individual is a beneficiary of a deceased IRA owner; occur if the individual is disabled; are in substantially equal payments over the account holder's life expectancy; are received after separation from employment after the age of 55; are for unreimbursed medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of AGI; are for medical insurance premiums in the case of unemployment; are used for higher education expenses; are used to build, buy, or rebuild a first home up to a $10,000 withdrawal limit; occur if the individual is a reservist called to active duty after September 11, 2001; were distributions to residents in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma from around the storms' landfalls to January 1, 2007; were distributions to residents in areas affected by the Midwestern floods in 2008 from after the applicable disaster date and before January 1, 2010; or were distributions in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria from around the storms' landfalls to January 1, 2019. The key differences between traditional and Roth IRAs are that contributions to Roth IRAs are made with after-tax funds and qualified distributions are not included in taxable income; investment earnings accrue free of taxes. Eligibility and Contribution Limits
In contrast to traditional IRAs, Roth IRAs have income limits for eligibility. The amount of the conversion must be included in taxable income. A provision in P.L. 115-97 (originally called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) repealed a special rule that allowed IRA contributions to one type of IRA to be recharacterized as a contribution to the other type of IRA. Rollovers from Roth IRAs to other types of IRAs or to employer-sponsored retirement plans are not allowed. Distributions from inherited Roth IRAs are generally free of income tax. 107 - 16 ) authorized a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $1,000 for eligible individuals, or $2,000 if filing a joint return, who contribute to IRAs or employer-sponsored retirement plans. The Retirement Savings Contribution Credit, also referred to as the Saver's Credit, is in addition to the tax deduction for contributions to traditional IRAs or other employer-sponsored pension plans. The Saver's Credit is not available on form 1040EZ, which may limit the use of the credit. Table 8 provides data on IRA ownership and account balances among households that owned IRAs in 2016. Qualified Distributions Related to Natural Disasters
As part of the response to the 2005 hurricanes that affected the communities on and near the Gulf of Mexico, Congress approved provisions that exempted individuals affected by the storms from the 10% early withdrawal penalty for withdrawals from IRA. | In response to concerns over the adequacy of retirement savings, Congress has created incentives to encourage individuals to save more for retirement through a variety of retirement plans. Some retirement plans are employer-sponsored, such as 401(k) plans, and others are established by individual employees, such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).
This report describes the primary features of two common retirement savings accounts that are available to individuals. Although the accounts have many features in common, they differ in some important aspects. Both traditional and Roth IRAs offer tax incentives to encourage individuals to save for retirement. Contributions to traditional IRAs may be tax-deductible for taxpayers who (1) are not covered by a retirement plan at their place of employment or (2) have income below specified limits. Contributions to Roth IRAs are not tax-deductible and eligibility is limited to those with incomes under specified limits.
The tax treatment of distributions from traditional and Roth IRAs differs. Distributions from traditional IRAs are generally included in taxable income whereas distributions from Roth IRAs are not included in taxable income. Some distributions may be subject to an additional 10% tax penalty, unless the distribution is for a reason specified in the Internal Revenue Code (for example, distributions from IRAs after the individual is aged 59½ or older are not subject to the early withdrawal penalty).
Individuals may roll over eligible distributions from other retirement accounts (such as an account balance from a 401(k) plan upon leaving an employer) into IRAs. Rollovers preserve retirement savings by allowing investment earnings on the funds in the retirement accounts to accrue on a tax-deferred basis, in the case of traditional IRAs, or a tax-free basis, in the case of Roth IRAs. A provision in P.L. 115-97 (originally called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) repealed a special rule that allowed IRA contributions to one type of IRA to be recharacterized as contributions to the other type of IRA.
The Retirement Savings Contribution Credit (also known as the Saver's Credit) is a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $1,000. It was authorized in 2001 to encourage retirement savings among individuals with income under specified limits.
This report explains the eligibility requirements, contribution limits, tax deductibility of contributions, and rules for withdrawing funds from the accounts, and provides data on the account holdings. It also describes the Saver's Credit and provisions enacted after the Gulf of Mexico hurricanes in 2005, the Midwestern storms in 2008, and the hurricanes in 2012 and 2017 to exempt distributions to those affected by the disasters from the 10% early withdrawal penalty. |
crs_RS22154 | crs_RS22154_0 | The dispute settlement process consists of consultations, panels and possible appeals, and adoption by the DSB of the resulting panel and appellate reports. The URAA addresses the relationship of WTO agreements to federal and state law and prohibits private remedies based on alleged violations of WTO agreements. In addition, Section 102 of the URAA, as well as its legislative history, indicates that domestic law supersedes any inconsistent provisions of WTO agreements approved and implemented in the URAA and that WTO decisions involving U.S. laws or regulatory actions that are successfully challenged in the WTO do not have direct or automatic legal effect in the United States. Instead, specific congressional or administrative action, as the case may be, is required to implement these WTO decisions. In the event a statute permits implementation consistent with the WTO decision, Congress has specified procedures for agencies to follow in taking administrative action to comply. Congress has additionally stated in the statute that it intends, through the prohibition on private remedies:
to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or defense under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including by precluding any person other than the United States from bringing any action against any State or political subdivision thereof or raising any defense to the application of State law under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements—(A) on the basis of a judgment obtained by the United States in an action brought under any such agreement; or (B) on any other basis. When faced with such arguments, some federal courts have deemed WTO decisions to be "persuasive" or a source of useful reasoning to inform a court's decision, but have stated that WTO decisions are not binding on the United States, U.S. agencies, or the judiciary. Recent Legislation
Legislation introduced in recent Congresses generally reflected congressional concerns that the WTO Appellate Body had interpreted WTO agreements in an overly broad manner to the detriment of the United States and that the executive branch had in some cases too readily used existing statutory authorities to comply with these decisions, particularly where U.S. trade remedies were involved. Legislation focused particularly on the various WTO disputes in which the U.S. use of zeroing in antidumping proceedings was successfully challenged and the U.S. response to one of the first WTO decisions on this issue, discussed earlier in this report. | Congress has comprehensively dealt with the legal effect of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and dispute settlement results in the United States in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), P.L. 103-465. The act provides that domestic law prevails over conflicting provisions of WTO agreements and prohibits private remedies based on alleged violations of these agreements. As a result, provisions of WTO agreements and WTO panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by the WTO Members that are in conflict with federal law do not have domestic legal effect unless and until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, takes action to modify or remove the conflicting statute, regulation, or regulatory action. Violative state laws may be withdrawn by the state or, in rare circumstances, invalidated through legal action by the federal government.
The URAA also contains requirements for agencies to follow where a change in a regulation or the issuance of a new agency determination in a trade remedy proceeding is needed to comply with a WTO decision and existing law may be sufficient to carry out the action.
While the URAA prohibits private rights of action based on Uruguay Round agreements, plaintiffs, in cases brought under other statutes, have argued that the agency actions they are challenging in court are inconsistent with a WTO agreement or a WTO decision and should conform with U.S. WTO obligations. Although courts have deemed WTO decisions to be persuasive, they have also held that they are not binding on the United States, U.S. agencies, or the judiciary, leaving the issue of whether and how the United States complies in a particular WTO proceeding to the executive branch.
Legislation introduced in recent Congresses generally reflected congressional concerns that the WTO Appellate Body had interpreted WTO agreements in an overly broad manner to the detriment of the United States and that the executive branch had in some cases too readily used existing statutory authorities to comply with these decisions, particularly where U.S. trade remedies were involved. Legislation particularly focused on WTO decisions in which the U.S. use of "zeroing" in antidumping proceedings was successfully challenged. |
crs_R41534 | crs_R41534_0 | Introduction
After more than two years of negotiations, the European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) on October 6, 2010. Both the South Korean National Assembly and the EU Parliament have ratified the agreement, and it went into effect on July 1, 2011. The South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA) is the largest FTA in terms of market size that South Korea has entered into. The KOREU FTA reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in trade and investment flows between South Korea and the EU over the past decade, a period of time in which the 27 member states of the EU countries collectively passed the United States in economic importance to South Korea. The KOREU FTA is very comprehensive, generally mirroring the scope of the KORUS FTA, with some exceptions. As with the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA reduces and eliminates tariffs and other trade barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services and would also cover such trade-related activities as government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor rights, and environmental issues. For example, unlike the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA does not include a specific chapter on foreign direct investment and does not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of the labor and environment provisions have taken place. The KOREU FTA could have an impact on U.S.-South Korean trade by possibly diverting some South Korean trade away from the United States to the EU and could provide the EU with a "first mover" advantage since it entered into force on July 1, 2011, and the KORUS FTA is expected to enter into force no earlier than early 2012. This is similar to the KORUS FTA. It is not clear whether the difference in approaches between these two FTAs yields different levels of trade liberalization. Potential Economic Impact of the KOREU FTA
Most of the studies done on the impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will have a small but positive affect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that the larger relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. As with most other FTAs, the greatest economic impact of the KOREU FTA will be on specific sectors in each economy. EU services providers will be expected to experience gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of retail and wholesale trade; transportation services; financial services; and business services. In terms of trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods will be expected to gain from the KOREU FTA's implementation. At the same time, South Korean producers of cars, ships, wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment will be expected to increase their exports to the EU market. | On October 6, 2010, the 27-member European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). The South Korean National Assembly and the EU Parliament have ratified the agreement. The agreement went into effect on July 1, 2011. The South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA) is the largest FTA in terms of market size that South Korea has entered into. The KOREU FTA reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in trade and investment flows between South Korea and the EU over the past decade. On October 12, 2011, both houses of Congress passed implementing legislation for the U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA), which the President signed into law (P.L. 112-41) on October 21. The KORUS FTA is expected to enter into force in early 2012.
The KOREU FTA is very comprehensive. It would reduce and eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services and would also cover such trade-related activities as government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor rights, and environmental issues.
Most studies done on the potential impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will have a small but positive effect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that the larger relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. The greatest economic impact of the KOREU FTA would be on specific sectors in each economy. EU services providers would be expected to experience gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of retail and wholesale trade, transportation services, financial services, and business services. In terms of trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods would be expected to gain from the KOREU FTA's implementation. At the same time, South Korean manufacturers of cars, ships, wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment would be expected to increase their exports to the EU market.
The KOREU FTA is similar to the KORUS FTA in many respects. Both agreements are comprehensive and both would eliminate tariffs on most trade in goods soon after they enter into force. However, they differ in other respects. Phase-out periods for tariffs on some manufactured goods differ. In addition, the KOREU FTA does not cover investment protection. Unlike the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA does not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of the workers' rights and environment provisions have been deemed to occur. In addition, the KORUS FTA covers a broader range of trade in services than does the KOREU FTA. It is not clear whether these differences in the structures of the FTAs result in appreciable differences in outcomes in terms of economic gains and losses. |
crs_RL32521 | crs_RL32521_0 | Agriculture as a Target of Terrorism
Overview of Agroterrorism
The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. In this context, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear over the safety of food, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability. The goal of agroterrorism is not killing cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing economic crises in the agricultural and food industries, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at risk through contaminated food or if an animal pathogen is transmissible to humans (zoonotic). While agriculture may not be a terrorist's first choice because it lacks the "shock factor" of more traditional terrorist targets, an increasing number of terrorism analysts consider it a viable secondary target. Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems:
Farms are geographically disbursed in unsecured environments (e.g., open fields and pastures throughout the countryside). International trade in livestock, grains, and food products is often tied to disease-free status. Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and, while addressing terrorism more broadly, has implemented laws and appropriations with provisions important to agriculture. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has studied aspects of food safety, border inspections, interagency coordination, and physical security with respect to agroterrorism. The executive branch has responded by implementing the new laws, issuing several presidential directives, creating terrorism and agroterrorism task forces, and publishing protection and response plans. Appropriations
Appropriations and user fees for agriculture-related homeland security activities in USDA and DHS have more than tripled from the $225 million "pre-September 11" baseline to $818 million in FY2007. As a percentage of non-defense budget authority for homeland security, agriculture receives about 2.1% of the total. Consequently, the U.S. system is being upgraded to address the reality of agroterrorism. Legislation
Increasing the level of terrorism preparedness remains a concern, not only for agroterrorism, but also for other forms of terrorism. Several bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress to authorize funding or otherwise improve the level of preparedness or coordination of response to an agroterrorist attack. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 8, 2007, that—(1) identifies activities being carried out by the Department of Homeland Security to improve—(A) the targeting of agricultural inspections; (B) the ability of United States Customs and Border Protection to adjust to new agricultural threats; and (C) the in-service training for interception of prohibited plant and animal products and agricultural pests under the agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring program of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; and (2) describes the manner in which the Secretary of Homeland Security will coordinate with the Secretary of Agriculture and State and local governments in carrying out the activities described in paragraph (1). | The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability.
The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing economic damage, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at risk if contaminated food reaches the table or if an animal pathogen is transmissible to humans (zoonotic). While agriculture may not be a terrorist's first choice because it lacks the "shock factor" of more traditional terrorist targets, many analysts consider it a viable secondary target.
Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique vulnerabilities. Farms are geographically disbursed in unsecured environments. Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations, and transported or commingled with other herds. Many agricultural diseases can be obtained, handled, and distributed easily. International trade in food products often is tied to disease-free status, which could be jeopardized by an attack. Many veterinarians lack experience with foreign animal diseases that are eradicated domestically but remain endemic in foreign countries.
In the past five years, "food defense" has received increasing attention in the counterterrorism and bioterrorism communities. Laboratory and response capacity are being upgraded to address the reality of agroterrorism, and national response plans now incorporate agroterrorism.
Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and enacted laws and appropriations with agroterrorism-related provisions. The executive branch has responded by implementing the new laws, issuing several presidential directives, and creating liaison and coordination offices. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has studied several issues related to agroterrorism.
Appropriations and user fees for agriculture-related homeland security activities in USDA and DHS have more than tripled from a $225 million "pre-September 11" baseline in FY2002 to $818 million in FY2007. Agriculture now receives about 2.1% of the total non-defense budget authority for homeland security.
Increasing the level of agroterrorism preparedness remains a concern, as do interagency coordination and adequate border inspections. The 110th Congress may consider bills or oversight hearings to address funding and the level of preparedness or coordination to respond to an agroterrorist attack.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42719 | crs_R42719_0 | Introduction
On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in Arizona v. United States , ruling that some aspects of an Arizona statute intended to deter unlawfully present aliens from remaining in the state were preempted by federal law, but also holding that Arizona police were not facially preempted from running immigration status checks on persons stopped for state or local offenses. In reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court made clear that opportunities for states to take independent action in the field of immigration enforcement are more constrained than some had previously believed. In recent years, several state and local governments have adopted measures intended to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens within their jurisdiction. An Arizona measure enacted in 2010, commonly referred to as S.B. 1070, arguably represents the vanguard of recent attempts to test the legal limits of greater state involvement in immigration enforcement. Before S.B. 1070, as amended, was scheduled to go into effect, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought suit in federal district court seeking to preliminarily enjoin many (but not all) of the provisions of the Arizona measure, arguing that they were likely preempted by federal immigration law and therefore unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause. The district court granted the DOJ's motion to preliminarily enjoin four of the Arizona law's provisions (though it did not enjoin all the provisions of S.B. The Court's Decision in Arizona
Arguments at the Supreme Court centered on four major provisions of the Arizona statute, which can be divided into two categories: (1) those provisions seeking to bolster direct enforcement of federal immigration law by Arizona law enforcement, including through the identification and apprehension of unlawfully present aliens; and (2) those provisions that criminalize conduct which may facilitate the presence of unauthorized aliens within the state. The eight Justices who decided the case (Justice Kagan had recused herself) were asked only to consider whether the four enjoined provisions of S.B. Nor did it consider other constitutional challenges to the validity of the Arizona law, including claims that enforcement of S.B. 1070 would lead to impermissible racial profiling. 1070, which imposed criminal penalties upon unauthorized aliens who seek or obtain employment within Arizona. 1070, which authorized the warrantless arrest of aliens who have committed certain criminal offenses that constitute grounds for removal under federal law, is facially preempted. Immigration Status Determinations by State Police
Finally, the sitting Justices unanimously agreed that federal immigration law does not facially preempt Section 2(b) of S.B. 1070, which required Arizona police, whenever practicable, to investigate the immigration status of persons reasonably suspected of being unlawfully present when such persons are stopped, detained, or arrested pursuant to the enforcement of state or local law. 1070 were facially preempted by federal immigration law, and suggesting that a fourth provision could be susceptible to as-applied challenges, the Supreme Court clarified that the opportunities for states to take independent action in the field of immigration enforcement are more constrained than some had previously believed. Further, while the Court found that measures requiring or authorizing immigration status checks by state and local police are not facially preempted, the Court's decision suggests that such measures could be vulnerable to as-applied challenges, particularly if these status checks unreasonably prolong the detention of persons in state or local custody. However, the court enjoined the enforcement of the provision of S.B. 1070 was not facially preempted. In ruling that three provisions of Arizona's S.B. | On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in Arizona v. United States, ruling that some aspects of an Arizona statute intended to deter unlawfully present aliens from remaining in the state were preempted by federal law, but also holding that Arizona police were not facially preempted from running immigration status checks on persons stopped for state or local offenses. In reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court made clear that opportunities for states to take independent action in the field of immigration enforcement are more constrained than some had previously believed.
In recent years, several states and localities have adopted measures intended to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens within their jurisdiction. An Arizona measure enacted in 2010, commonly referred to as S.B. 1070, arguably represents the vanguard of these attempts to test the legal limits of greater state involvement in immigration enforcement. The major provisions of S.B. 1070 can be divided into two categories: (1) those provisions seeking to bolster direct enforcement of federal immigration law by Arizona law enforcement, including through the identification and apprehension of unlawfully present aliens; and (2) those provisions that criminalize conduct which may facilitate the presence of unauthorized aliens within the state.
Before S.B. 1070 was scheduled to go into effect, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought suit to preliminarily enjoin many (but not all) of S.B. 1070's provisions, arguing that they were likely preempted by federal immigration law and therefore unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause. The district court granted the DOJ's motion to preliminarily enjoin four of the Arizona law's provisions, and the injunction was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to review the case.
The eight Justices who decided the case (Justice Kagan recused herself) were asked only to consider whether the four enjoined provisions of S.B. 1070 were facially preempted by federal law. They did not consider other constitutional challenges to the validity of the Arizona law, including claims that enforcement of S.B. 1070 could lead to impermissible racial profiling. A majority of the Court found that the Arizona measure's criminal sanctions for alien registration violations and upon unauthorized aliens who seek employment in the state were preempted by federal law. The Court also ruled invalid a provision authorizing the warrantless arrest of aliens who have criminal offenses that constitute grounds for removal under federal immigration law. However, the sitting Justices unanimously agreed that federal law did not facially preempt a provision which requires Arizona police whenever practicable, to investigate the immigration status of persons reasonably suspected of being unlawfully present when such persons are stopped, detained, or arrested pursuant to the enforcement of state or local law—at least so long as the investigation does not extend these persons' detention by state or local law enforcement.
In ruling that three provisions of S.B. 1070 were facially preempted, and suggesting that a fourth provision could be susceptible to as-applied challenges, the Court clarified that opportunities for independent state action in the field of immigration enforcement are limited. In particular, the Court's decision would suggest that mirroring federal law when imposing criminal penalties upon conduct that could facilitate the presence of unauthorized aliens within a jurisdiction does not suffice to avoid preemption. Similarly, while finding that measures requiring or authorizing immigration status checks by state and local officers are not facially preempted, the Court suggested that the application of such measures could lead to new constitutional challenges. |
crs_R40495 | crs_R40495_0 | Introduction
Congress and the Executive Branch have historically identified the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as an important organization to help promote the U.S. goal of liberalizing international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world. It is unclear, however, what role APEC will play in future U.S. trade policy in Asia. This was widely seen as a counterforce to the efforts of some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pursue an alternative "Asian only" models for regional economic development that would exclude the United States. The uncertainty about the future role of APEC in U.S. trade policy comes just a year before the target deadline for the first of APEC's Bogor Goals—open trade and investment among the industrialized APEC members by 2010—and two years before the United States is scheduled to host the association's annual meetings in 2011. During the 1994 meetings in Bogor, Indonesia, APEC established the "Bogor Goals" of "free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing economies." In 2008, Peru chose the theme, "A New Commitment to Asia-Pacific Development." Fifth, the APEC leaders "strongly support" the G20 pledge to refrain from raising new trade barriers during the next 12 months. After further discussion, the meeting was held on November 22. Outlook for Future APEC Meetings
The official theme for the 2008 APEC meetings in Lima was not only overshadowed by the global financial crisis, it also was superseded by thoughts about the impending milestone for the Bogor Goals in 2010. Japan, the host of the 2010 meetings, has indicated an interest in using the event to take stock of APEC's progress on achieving the Bogor Goals. APEC and International Trade
The primary goal of APEC is to foster international trade by means of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. While the trade data appear to support the notion that APEC has promoted trade growth for its members, the results are not conclusive. Although APEC's exports and imports have grown at a faster rate than world trade figures since the creation of APEC, it is uncertain if its trade growth is the result of trade liberalization and facilitation, or caused by other economic factors. In general, observers focus on two methods by which APEC may help foster greater trade and investment liberalization. Also, there are oversight issues raised by U.S. participation in various APEC activities and, in particular, with respect to the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States. In addition, Congress may consider expressing its preferences regarding the agenda and content of the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States, possibly via appropriation legislation that provides funding for those meetings. In addition, the announcement made late in the Bush Administration that the United States was entering into negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Strategic and Economic Partnership (TPP) has brought into question U.S. commitment to APEC and its role in fostering a FTAAP. It is yet to be determined if the issue will be a high priority for the Obama Administration. | Congress and the Executive Branch have historically identified the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as an important organization to help promote the U.S. goal of liberalizing international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world. APEC's commitment to the goal of trade and investment liberalization is embodied in its Bogor Goals, in which APEC members pledged to free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing economies.
However, several alternative avenues for the promotion of trade integration in Asia have emerged, challenging the past U.S. focus on APEC. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is promoting the creation of various forms of an all-Asian free trade association that would exclude the United States. In addition, during its last few months, the Bush Administration indicated its intention to enter into negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP), an existing free trade agreement between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.
In November 2008, APEC held its annual Leaders' Meeting in Lima, Peru. Although the official theme for the meeting was "A New Commitment to Asia-Pacific Development," global economic events overshadowed the event, focusing discussion on resisting protectionist pressures and expediting economic recovery. In their joint meeting statement, the APEC leaders stated that they thought their economies would recover within 18 months. They also expressed their support for the G20 commitment to refrain from erecting new trade barriers for at least 12 months.
The next three years may be a critical period for APEC and its achievement of the Bogor Goals. The 2009 meetings are to be held in Singapore, traditionally a strong supporter of APEC and trade and investment liberalization. Japan is scheduled to be the host of the 2010 meetings—the target year for APEC's industrialized members to achieve the Bogor Goals. The United States will host the 2011 meetings.
Historical trade data is consistent with the premise that APEC has been successful in promoting greater trade within its member economies and with the rest of the world. Both the exports and imports of APEC members have grown faster than global trade since the creation of APEC. However, APEC's greater trade growth may be attributable to other factors than the liberalization of trade and investment policies among its members.
The 111th Congress has an opportunity to reexamine U.S. policy towards APEC. It has already increased APEC-related funding in FY2009, in part to provide for the preparations for the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States. In addition, there are other actions Congress may chose to take with respect to APEC, depending on its determination of APEC's role for trade promotion initiatives in Asia. Congressional attitudes and actions may also be influenced by the Obama Adminstration's trade policies in Asia—and the role APEC plays in those policies.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R42640 | crs_R42640_0 | Introduction
Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports. Medicaid is a federal and state partnership. The states are responsible for administering their Medicaid programs, and Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal government and the states. This report provides an overview of Medicaid's financing structure, including both federal and state financing issues. The " Medicaid Expenditures " section of the report discusses Medicaid in terms of national health expenditures, trends in Medicaid expenditures, economic factors affecting Medicaid, and state variability in spending. Medicaid Financing
The federal government and the states share the cost of Medicaid. The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
The federal government's share of most Medicaid expenditures is established by the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate, which generally is determined annually and varies by state according to each state's per capita income relative to the U.S. per capita income. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) included a couple of FMAP exceptions, such as the newly eligible federal matching rates and the expansion state federal matching rates. However, with the exceptions to the FMAP added by the ACA, the federal share of Medicaid expenditures has increased. As a result, there is significant variation from state to state in funding sources. Medicaid and National Health Expenditures
In 2014, Medicaid represented 16% of national health expenditures; in that same year, private health insurance and Medicare accounted for 33% and 20% of national health expenditures, respectively. For the other services, in 2014, Medicaid accounted for a smaller share of the national expenditures, with Medicaid paying 13% of durable medical equipment, almost 11% of physician and clinical expenditures, 9% of prescription drugs, 9% of dental expenditures, and 7% of other professional expenditures. Trend in Medicaid Expenditures
Over time, much of Medicaid's expenditure growth has been due to federal or state expansions of Medicaid eligibility criteria, and the ACA Medicaid expansion is expected to significantly increase Medicaid expenditures over the next few years. In FY2014, Medicaid spending on services and administrative activities in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories totaled $494 billion (see Table A-1 for state-by-state expenditures for FY2014). Per-Enrollee Medicaid Expenditures
In Medicaid, there are four main eligibility groups: children, adults, the aged, and individuals with disabilities. Factors Affecting Medicaid Expenditures
Medicaid expenditures are influenced by economic, demographic, and programmatic factors. Economic factors include health care prices, unemployment rates, and individuals' wages. Some of the state variation in Medicaid per-enrollee expenditures is due to demographic differences across states. Medicaid constitutes a significant portion of the federal budget, and federal Medicaid expenditures are expected to increase significantly over the next 10 years due to the ACA Medicaid expansion. As a result, Medicaid could be a focus of potential deficit reduction or other legislative proposals affecting the federal budget. Medicaid Expenditures by State
Table A-1 provides the most recent Medicaid expenditures for each state, including both the federal and state shares of spending on benefits, administrative services, and total Medicaid expenditures. | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports. Medicaid is a federal and state partnership that is jointly financed by both the federal government and the states.
The federal government's share for most Medicaid expenditures is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). Generally determined annually, the FMAP formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger portion of Medicaid costs in states with lower per capita incomes relative to the national average (and vice versa for states with higher per capita incomes). Federal Medicaid funding to states is open ended.
The federal government provides states a good deal of flexibility in determining the composition of the state share (also referred to as the nonfederal share) of Medicaid expenditures. As a result, there is significant variation from state to state in how the state share of Medicaid expenditures is financed.
In 2014, Medicaid represented 16% of national health expenditures; in that year, private health insurance and Medicare accounted for 33% and 20% of national health expenditures, respectively. Medicaid is a significant payer in the categories of health spending that include long-term services and supports and hospital expenditures. For the other services (such as durable medical equipment, physician and clinical services, prescription drugs, and dental services), Medicaid accounts for a smaller share of the national expenditures.
In FY2014, Medicaid expenditures totaled $494 billion, with the federal government paying $299 billion, or about 60% of the total. Over the next few years, Medicaid expenditures are expected to increase significantly due to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) Medicaid expansion. The federal government is paying the vast majority of the costs associated with the ACA Medicaid expansion due to the enhanced federal matching rates available to states that choose to implement the ACA Medicaid expansion.
Spending on managed care and long-term services and supports comprises more than half of Medicaid expenditures on benefits. Per-enrollee Medicaid expenditures for individuals with disabilities and the elderly are significantly higher than per-enrollee expenditures for adults and children, due in part to the higher utilization of long-term services and supports among individuals with disabilities and the elderly.
Medicaid expenditures are influenced by economic, demographic, and programmatic factors. Economic factors include health care prices, unemployment rates, and individuals' wages. In addition, state-specific factors, such as programmatic decisions and demographics, affect Medicaid expenditures and cause Medicaid spending to vary widely from state to state.
Medicaid constitutes a significant portion of the federal budget, and federal Medicaid expenditures are expected to increase significantly over the next 10 years due to the ACA Medicaid expansion. As a result, Medicaid could be a focus of any potential deficit reduction or other legislative proposals affecting the federal budget.
This report provides an overview of Medicaid's financing structure, including both federal and state financing issues. The "Medicaid Expenditures" section of the report discusses Medicaid in terms of national health expenditures, trends in Medicaid expenditures, economic factors affecting Medicaid, and state variability in spending. |
crs_R42343 | crs_R42343_0 | According to the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS, often called the March Supplement), in 2010, 90.0% of children had health insurance and 10.0% were uninsured. The CPS data show that the uninsured rate among children across the states ranges from 17.3% in Texas to 3.2% in Massachusetts. Private insurance includes employer-sponsored insurance and nongroup insurance (insurance purchased in the individual market); public coverage includes Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and any other means-tested public programs, as well as Medicare and military health care (e.g., TRICARE and Veterans Administration [VA] Health Care). Children may have more than one source of coverage, and those coverage types could be different. Sources of health insurance coverage vary according to a child's demographic and family characteristics. This report presents estimates of health insurance coverage of children under age 19 in the United States. The CPS is a monthly survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and is representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States. All estimates in this report at the national level are created using the most recent annual CPS data (representing data from 2010), as well as historical annual data from previous years. All estimates in this report at the state level are created using three-year averages of the three most recent years of CPS data (representing data from 2010, 2009, and 2008). For those children who have insurance, the source of coverage also varies by demographic characteristics, as discussed below. The higher rate of private coverage among older children does not off-set the lower rate of public coverage; children aged 13 to 18 are more likely to be uninsured compared with children under age six and children aged 6 to 12. Characteristics of Uninsured Children
As noted in the preceding discussion, health insurance coverage of children is likely influenced by children's demographic and family characteristics as well as state-specific factors (e.g., eligibility criteria for programs such as Medicaid). Children not living with at least one parent represent 4.3% of all children and 10.9% of uninsured children. The percentage of children who were uninsured fluctuated slightly during the period, between 2000 and 2010, decreasing 1.1 percentage points, from 11.1% to 10.0%. The slight fluctuations of the percentage of children who were uninsured were likely affected by the larger changes in the percentage of children who had private health insurance and those who had public coverage over the time period. Over that same period, the percentage of children with public coverage increased from 23.7% in 2000 to 37.2% in 2010, a 57% increase in public coverage for children. | In 2010, 90% of children had health insurance coverage in the United States, and 10% of children were uninsured. Among children with coverage, private health insurance, including employer-sponsored insurance and nongroup insurance, was the predominant source of coverage, followed by public coverage, including Medicaid and other means-tested public programs (e.g., the State Children's Health Insurance Program—CHIP), as well as Medicare and military health care.
These estimates, and the estimates detailed in this report, are from the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS, commonly known as the March Supplement). The CPS is representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States. National-level estimates in this report are created using the most recent CPS data, representing data from 2010, as well as historical data from previous years. State-level estimates are created using a three-year average of CPS data (representing data from 2008 to 2010), which provide reliable state estimates.
The national-level estimates provide only a limited understanding of the health insurance coverage of children under age 19. To better understand this population, the report provides an analysis of the variation in coverage by selected demographic and family characteristics, including age, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, poverty status, and family composition. For example, in 2010, non-citizen children, Hispanic children, and children not living with at least one parent/guardian were more likely to be uninsured compared with other children.
Another important factor affecting uninsurance rates among children is the variation across states. During the 2008-2010 period, the percentage of uninsured children ranged from a high of 17.3% in Texas to a low of 3.2% in Massachusetts. Not only does coverage vary by states, but the source of insurance coverage also varies by states. The percentage of children covered by private health insurance ranged from 80.1% in New Hampshire to 46.9% in Mississippi, and the percentage of children covered by public coverage ranged from 50.6% in the District of Columbia to 18.3% in Utah.
Finally, examining changes in coverage and source of coverage over time provides additional insight into insurance and sources of coverage for children. Between 2000 and 2010, the uninsured rate among children decreased by about 1 percentage point, while the percentage of children with private insurance decreased by more than 11 percentage points and the percentage with public coverage increased by 13.5 percentage points.
As Congress focuses on allocating limited resources to programs such as Medicaid and CHIP, a deeper understanding of the characteristics of uninsured children may prove useful to inform this discussion. |
crs_RL32012 | crs_RL32012_0 | Should it be mandatory? National interest intensified in the wake of such developments as the discovery in 2003 of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or "mad cow disease") in North America, and ongoing concerns about bioterrorism. In 2007, the need for, and design of, an animal ID program will be a topic during debate on a new omnibus farm bill. In addition, many animals have been identified as part of official disease eradication or control programs. Universal bar codes on processed food, including many meats, are widely used for tracking. Despite—some say because of—USDA's direction, some livestock producers and their organizations complained that the Department was beset by indecision, progressed much too slowly, and/or had sown considerable confusion about what type of program was evolving. A "U.S. A key goal has been the ability to identify all animals and premises potentially exposed to a foreign animal disease within 48 hours of its discovery. Other Selected Issues
Mandatory or Voluntary? Costs and Who Pays
An animal ID system will incur a variety of costs, such as for tags or other identifying devices and their application; data systems to track animals; and any government administrative expenses. A related policy question is who should pay. It could be argued, on the other hand, that the need to control federal spending should take precedence over public funding for an animal ID program, and that the industry, a primary beneficiary, should shoulder most if not all of the costs. For example, does it empower the Department to require producers to report data to a private entity? H.R. Another bill ( H.R. 3170 would have established a privately governed Livestock Identification Board to create and implement a mandatory system. With regard to funding, both the Senate-reported and House-passed versions of the USDA appropriation for FY2007 ( H.R. 5384 ) would have funded the Administration's budget request for another $33 million for animal ID development. However, the House version conditioned use of the money on the Secretary first providing the House Appropriations Committee with a "complete and detailed plan" for the program, "including, but not limited to, proposed legislative changes, cost estimates, and means of program evaluation, and such plan is published as an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register for comment by interested parties." Final action was uncertain as of mid-January 2007; USDA and its programs were operating under a continuing resolution at that time. 5384 , a floor amendment by Representative Paul to prohibit all funding for the animal ID program was defeated by a vote of 34 to 389. 3714 [Section 5(b)], the Ruminant Identification Program; S. 2008 , the National Farm Animal Identification and Records Act; H.R. | Many animal producers support establishment of a nationwide identification (ID) system capable of quickly tracking animals from birth to slaughter. While they believe such a system is needed to better deal with animal diseases or meet foreign market specifications, some consumer groups and others believe it also would be useful for food safety or retail informational purposes—and that the program should be able to trace meat products through processing and consumption.
However, despite years of effort on at least an animal ID program for disease purposes, many contentious issues remain unresolved. For example, should it be mandatory or voluntary? What types of information should be collected, on what animal species, and who should hold it, government or private entities? How much will it cost, and who should pay?
Following the first U.S. report of a cow with BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or "mad cow disease") in late December 2003, the Secretary of Agriculture promised to take the lead in implementing an animal ID program capable of identifying all animals of interest within 48 hours of a disease discovery (BSE or other). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has committed, through FY2006, $85 million to this effort, and all states now have systems for registering animal premises.
Some industry groups and lawmakers have criticized USDA for moving too slowly and/or not providing a clearer path toward a universal ID program. Others believe that USDA's progress to date simply reflects the deep divisions among producers and other interests over the many unresolved questions. A few livestock producers oppose any effort to establish broader programs, fearing they will be costly and intrusive.
The 109th Congress was asked to address these issues. A provision in the House-passed USDA appropriation for FY2007 (H.R. 5384) would have conditioned another $33 million in spending for animal ID on publication in the Federal Register of a "complete and detailed plan" for the program, "including, but not limited to, proposed legislative changes, cost estimates, and means of program evaluation." However, a House floor amendment to prohibit all ID program funding was defeated by a wide margin. A final FY2007 appropriation had not been passed by mid-January 2007, and USDA programs were operating under a continuing resolution.
Other bills included H.R. 1254, the National Farm Animal Identification and Records Act, H.R. 1256, to limit animal ID information disclosure, and H.R. 3170, creating a private Livestock Identification Board to oversee the program. The continuing differences over animal ID make it more likely that the topic will be part of the 2007 debate over a new omnibus farm bill. This CRS report will be updated if events warrant. |
crs_R43406 | crs_R43406_0 | The Rocky Flats Plant (CO) manufactured pits on a large scale during the Cold War until production halted in 1989. It took until FY2007 for the United States to produce even a small quantity, 11 pits per year (ppy), for the stockpile. While some pits in older weapons were made of uranium and plutonium ("composite pits"), modern pits use only plutonium because much less of that material is required to generate a given explosive force, permitting nuclear weapons to be smaller and lighter. That radioactive element increases the radiation dose to workers and is an impurity to weapons-grade plutonium. Accordingly, plutonium must be purified for use in new pits. Since the figure of 80 ppy was based on LANL's presumed pit production capacity using PF-4 and CMRR-NF (an existing building and one that has been deferred for at least five years), not on a strategic analysis of military needs, and since the range cited is 50 to 80 ppy, a capacity of less than 80 ppy might suffice. The Radiological Laboratory/Utility/ Office Building (RLUOB) figures in several options below and is discussed in " Existing Buildings at Los Alamos for Plutonium Work ." The fraction, in turn, is based on (1) the Airborne Release Fraction (ARF), the fraction of the MAR that the postulated fire could release into the air; (2) the Leak Path Factor (LPF), the fraction of ARF that actually escapes from the building into the air; some of it would be trapped, such as by the collapse of the building; and (3) the Respirable Fraction (RF), the fraction of the plutonium oxide particles released into the atmosphere that are of a size (3 microns or less) that could readily be inhaled and lodge in the lungs, where they would cause biological damage and, quite possibly, lung cancers; larger particles would fall to the ground or would be trapped in the nose. Table C-1 shows amounts of plutonium in various hazard and security categories. As a Radiological Facility, it is permitted to hold 26 grams (g) of WGPu. It has 19,500 square feet (sf) of laboratory space, as compared to 22,500 sf of lab space planned for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF), a building planned but not built, as described in " A Sisyphean History: Failed Efforts to Construct a Building to Restore Pit Production ," below. DOE initially considered restarting operations at Rocky Flats, but ultimately decided not to. However, Congress appropriated no funds for CMRR-NF for FY2013. Other nuclear weapons complex sites are under consideration for involvement, including [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Nevada National Security Site, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant], and perhaps [Savannah River Site]. Also at issue is the need for this facility. As such, this work requires high security and high MAR. Therefore, the most efficient use of PF-4 is for tasks requiring high MAR and high security. Low SC/High HC: Producing 80 ppy would require casting more hemishells, increasing MAR substantially. The report also considered performing Pu-238 work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) or Savannah River Site (SRS). If it is deemed desirable to do as much plutonium work as possible at LANL, what about a deeper look at other LANL options, starting with an existing building …
Option 8. Regulations limit the quantity of WGPu that RLUOB can hold to the volume of two nickels . Option 10. RLUOB might collapse in an earthquake. Build Modules Connected to PF-4 for High-MAR Plutonium Work
Los Alamos's preferred approach to the plutonium strategy is a three-part plan: maximize use of RLUOB, repurpose space in PF-4, and build modules linked to PF-4. Would moving it out free enough MAR and space for PF-4, especially in conjunction with RLUOB, to do the added pit work needed to reach 80 ppy? Is it needed now? This would involve many actions. Differing time horizons between Congress and NNSA, and between political and technical imperatives, cause problems . There are costs and risks to doing nothing . A facility can be safe without being compliant . The political system is more flexible than the regulatory system . Even so, while the regulator can present costs and benefits, only the political system has the authority, ability, and culture to decide which tradeoffs are worth making, and to offer regulatory relief. There are several potential paths forward: Several options discussed in this report have the potential to produce 80 ppy, resolve the Pu-238 issue, and permit other plutonium activities, all at relatively modest cost, in a relatively short time, with no new buildings, and with minimal environmental impact. Determining the cost, schedule, feasibility, and other characteristics of these options would require detailed study. A critical point is that legislation trumps regulation: since regulations, orders, and standards derive their authority from statutes, statutes can mandate changes in them. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. Establishment of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB): 42 U.S.C. By performing AC tasks best suited for hoods in RLUOB and AC tasks that can be performed in gloveboxes in PF-4, by studying how to maximize efficient use of space for AC, and perhaps by using two shifts per day instead of one, it seems likely that a configuration of PF-4 plus RLUOB with 1,000 g WGPu would have the space both to fabricate 80 ppy and to provide the AC necessary to support that level of production. | A "pit" is the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon. Until 1989, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) mass-produced pits. Since then, the United States has made at most 11 pits per year (ppy). U.S. policy is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense states that it needs the Department of Energy (DOE), which maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, to produce 50-80 ppy by 2030. While some argue that few if any new pits are needed, at least for decades, this report focuses on options to reach 80 ppy.
Pit production involves precisely forming plutonium—a hazardous, radioactive, physically quirky metal. Production requires supporting tasks, such as analytical chemistry (AC), which monitors the chemical composition of plutonium in each pit.
With Rocky Flats closed, DOE established a small-scale pit manufacturing capability at PF-4, a building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). DOE also proposed higher-capacity facilities; none came to fruition. In 2005, Congress rejected the Modern Pit Facility, viewing as excessive the capacity range DOE studied, 125-450 ppy. In 2012, the Administration "deferred" construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) on grounds of availability of interim alternatives and affordability.
Nonetheless, options remain:
Build CMRR-NF. Congress mandated it in the FY2013 cycle, but provided no funds for it then, and permitted consideration of an alternative in the FY2014 cycle. Remove from PF-4 tasks not requiring high MAR and security. Casting pits uses much plutonium that an accident might release ("Material At Risk," MAR) and requires high security. Making 80 ppy would require freeing more MAR and floor space in PF-4 for casting. Provide regulatory relief so RLUOB could hold 1,000 grams of plutonium with few changes to the building. AC for 80 ppy needs much floor space but not high MAR or high security. Several options involve LANL's Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB). Regulations permit it to hold 26 grams of weapons-grade plutonium, the volume of two nickels; AC for 80 ppy would require 500 to 1,000 grams and perhaps space elsewhere. Augmenting RLUOB to hold the latter amounts within regulations would be costly even though the radiation dose if the building collapsed would be very low. Regulatory relief would save time and money, but would raise concerns about compliance with regulations. A complementary option is to perform some AC at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Move plutonium-238 work to Idaho National Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Fabricating plutonium-238 into power sources for space probes entails high MAR, but not high security because it is not used in pits. Moving it would free MAR and floor space in PF-4. At issue is whether to conduct all plutonium work at LANL, the plutonium "center of excellence." Build concrete "modules" connected to PF-4. This would enable high-MAR work to move out of PF-4, so PF-4 and modules could do the needed pit work. At issue: are modules needed, at what cost, and when.
Several options have the potential to produce 80 ppy and permit other plutonium activities at relatively modest cost, in a relatively short time, with no new buildings, and with minimal environmental impact. Determining their desirability and feasibility would require detailed study.
Observations include:
Differing time horizons between Congress and DOE, and between political and technical imperatives, cause problems. Doing nothing entails costs and risks. Keeping a 1950s-era building open while options are explored exposes workers to a relatively high risk of death in an earthquake. Congress may wish to consider limiting a building's permitted plutonium quantity by estimated dose instead of MAR. A facility can be safe even if it is not compliant with regulations. The political system is more flexible than the regulatory system. Regulations derive their authority from statutes. Regulators, bound by these statutes, cannot make cost-benefit tradeoffs regarding compliance. In contrast, the political system has the authority, ability, and culture to decide which tradeoffs are worth making. |
crs_R40150 | crs_R40150_0 | Overview
In November 2007, Senator Barack Obama announced his intention, if elected President, to appoint a federal chief technology officer (CTO). On April 18, 2009, President Obama appointed Virginia Secretary of Technology Aneesh P. Chopra to serve as "America's Chief Technology Officer." In his capacity as assistant to the President and CTO, Mr. Chopra also serves as a member of the White House Domestic Policy Council under a provision of Executive Order 13500 (amending Executive Order 12859) issued by President Obama on February 5, 2009. In announcing the appointment of Mr. Chopra, President Obama broadly defined the role of the CTO as promoting "technological innovation to help achieve our most important priorities—from creating jobs and reducing health care costs to keeping our nation secure." Prior to Mr. Chopra's appointment, details related to the CTO position remained uncertain. Prior to Mr. Chopra's appointment, several analysts proposed a variety of roles for an Obama administration CTO. Since then, some federal agencies have established CTO positions. Among TA's duties:
to conduct technology policy analyses to improve United States industrial productivity, technology, and innovation; to determine the relationships of technological developments and international technology transfers to the output, employment, productivity, and world trade performance; to determine the influence of economic, labor and other conditions, industrial structure and management, and government policies on technological developments in particular industrial sectors worldwide; to identify technological needs, problems, and opportunities within and across industrial sectors that, if addressed, could make a significant contribution to the economy of the United States; to assess whether the capital, technical and other resources being allocated to domestic industrial sectors which are likely to generate new technologies are adequate; to propose and support studies and policy experiments to determine the effectiveness of measures with the potential of advancing United States technological innovation; to encourage and assist the creation of centers and other joint initiatives by State or local governments, regional organizations, private businesses, institutions of higher education, nonprofit organizations, or Federal laboratories to encourage technology transfer, to stimulate innovation, and to promote an appropriate climate for investment in technology-related industries; to propose and encourage cooperative research to promote the common use of resources, to improve training programs and curricula, to stimulate interest in high technology careers, and to encourage the effective dissemination of technology skills within the wider community; to serve as a focal point for discussions among United States companies on topics of interest to industry and labor, including discussions regarding manufacturing and discussions regarding emerging technologies; and to consider government measures with the potential of advancing United States technological innovation and exploiting innovations of foreign origin. Potential Challenges
Among the early challenges the CTO may face are defining and communicating the roles of the position; identifying and recruiting talent, from both inside and outside of government; and negotiating domains of responsibilities, formal and informal, within the White House and with executive branch agencies that have overlapping missions. CTO Structure and Activities in the Obama Administration
There is no official position description for the CTO, nor has President Obama sought legislation to create a statutory foundation for the CTO position. Accordingly, to date, the structure and official duties of the CTO remain largely undefined. In a December 2009 interview with a trade publication, Mr. Chopra described his role as CTO as an umbrella over his two-part service as assistant to the President and OSTP associate director for technology:
The Chief Technology Officer role has two components: the first is my service as Assistant to the President; the second is in my capacity as Associate Director for Technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Technology for government performance. The CTO would also conduct analysis and provide advice to the President and heads of federal departments and agencies with respect to major IT policies, plans, and programs of the federal government. What level of funding should be authorized and/or appropriated for the CTO? | In November 2007, Senator Barack Obama announced his intention, if elected President, to appoint a federal chief technology officer (CTO). He also identified several specific areas of responsibility of the CTO including transparency of government operations, computer and network security (sometimes referred to as cybersecurity), identification and adoption of best technologies and practices by federal agencies, and interoperability of emergency communications technologies for first responders.
On April 18, 2009, President Obama appointed Virginia Secretary of Technology Aneesh P. Chopra to serve in the newly created position of federal chief technology officer. In announcing the appointment, the President indicated that Mr. Chopra would undertake roles beyond what might be considered traditional CTO responsibilities. As the President described them, these roles include promoting technological innovation to help the United States create jobs, reduce health care costs, protect the homeland, and address other national goals. Mr. Chopra serves as assistant to the President and chief technology officer, as well as associate director for technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Under a provision of Executive Order 13500, issued on February 5, 2009, he also serves as a member of the White House Domestic Policy Council in his capacity as assistant to the President and CTO.
The CTO may face a variety of challenges in executing the mission envisioned by the President. Among the early challenges will be negotiating domains of responsibilities within the White House and with executive branch agencies that have overlapping missions. Some commentators have expressed concerns about the impact the creation of a CTO might have on existing offices and agencies with respect to the allocation and coordination of authorities and responsibilities. Other commentators have asserted that a high-level CTO could serve as an advocate for technological innovation and foster increased knowledge sharing among federal agencies to more effectively implement information technology solutions to meet disparate mission requirements. Mr. Chopra's appointment as both CTO and associate director for technology at OSTP may address, in part, questions related to mission alignment, coordination, and integration. Since assuming his dual roles, Mr. Chopra has publicly engaged in discussions covering a wide range of technology policy-related areas, including research and development, innovation, open government, government performance, education, science and engineering workforce, health care information technology, broadband, patent reform, and net neutrality.
Congress faces President Obama's appointment of Mr. Chopra and the President's stated plans for the federal CTO. There is currently no formal position description for the CTO. Accordingly, the official duties of the CTO remain largely undefined. Congress may elect to provide a statutory foundation for the CTO, define the roles and authorities of the CTO, authorize and appropriate funds, provide for oversight, and address other aspects of the position. |
crs_RL33858 | crs_RL33858_0 | Introduction
As early as his Senate confirmation hearing, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated a risk-based approach to homeland security. Increasingly, risk assessment and subsequent risk mitigation efforts influence many aspects of the department's work intended to enhance our nation's ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from future terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Indeed, Secretary Chertoff has stated "DHS must base its work on priorities driven by risk." However, risk assessment does not occur in a vacuum; the end goal is to reduce and mitigate risk. Others have written extensively about DHS grant programs and the allocation of such programs across the country. The report has three sections (1) the evolution of risk assessment from the Department of Justice in FY2002 to DHS in FY2007, (2) fundamental questions about risk analysis as applied to homeland security, and (3) possible options for Congress. This report may be updated. What follows is a chronological overview of the DHS risk assessment methodology examined through the prism of the Homeland Security Grant Program. Given the criticisms associated with the DHS risk assessment methods, a look at congressional interest in risk assessment as it relates to the homeland security grant programs may be instructive. Is the risk to people, infrastructure, the economy, or all of the above? Risk Management and Assessment: Complex Activities
The concept of risk—how to define, assess, and manage it—is relatively complex. In the insurance or financial sectors, the assessment of risk benefits from a rich and voluminous set of data which can be mined for patterns of historical behavior. Regardless of the complexity of the risk assessment methodology, due to the inherent uncertainties associated with assessing risk in a dynamic counterterrorism context, some level of flexibility in managing risk may be necessary. Empirical data based on historical terrorist attacks in the United States may, therefore, continue to play an important role in resource allocation designed to buy down risk. Such clarity and consistency are particularly important as the funds granted based on the DHS's risk methodology are the primary tools the federal government has to influence the behavior of state and local partners who will be the first on the scene of a terrorist attack and will be responsible for returning the community to pre-incident conditions. National Impact Assessment
By FY2008, more than $12 billion will have been provided to states, localities, and regions to buy down risk and enhance preparedness and capabilities to prevent a terrorist attack or to respond to such an attack or natural disaster should one occur. | As early as his Senate confirmation hearing, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated a risk-based approach to homeland security. Secretary Chertoff has stated "DHS must base its work on priorities driven by risk" and, increasingly, risk assessment and subsequent risk mitigation have influenced all of the department's efforts intended to enhance our nation's ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from future terrorist attacks and natural disasters. While the practice of risk analysis may be advanced in the insurance and financial industries, it is relatively less developed in the homeland security field. Although there are numerous reasons that account for this dynamic, two primary reasons include (1) the dynamic nature of terrorism and ability of terrorists to adapt to successful countermeasures, and (2) the lack of a rich historical database of terrorist attacks, which necessitates a reliance on intelligence and terrorist experts for probabilistic assessments of types of terrorist attacks against critical assets and/or regions. This report begins with an overview of the evolution of risk assessment methodologies from the Department of Justice in FY2002 to DHS in FY2007, and then discusses the discipline of risk management and risk assessment as applied to Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).
Terrorism risk analysis and assessment do not exist in a vacuum. Risk is analyzed and assessed as a means to mitigate or "buy down" risk over time by developing certain capabilities across the country. At DHS, the State Homeland Security Grant Program is the primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of State and local partners to take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of a terrorist attack and to respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe. Regardless of the complexity of the risk assessment methodology, due to the inherent uncertainties associated with assessing risk in a dynamic counterterrorism context, some level of flexibility in managing risk may be necessary. Empirical data on historical terrorist attacks in the United States may, therefore, continue to play an important role in resource allocation to reduce risk.
This report presents several risk assessment and related grant program options for congressional consideration: (1) maintain the status quo in the inextricably linked areas of risk assessment and grant allocation, (2) draft a national impact assessment to understand return on investment of the approximately $12 billion of HSGP spent by FY2008, (3) enhance the transparency of the risk allocation methodology to state and local governments, and (4) develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy for managing, assessing and mitigating risk. To achieve these goals, the department could opt to consider procedural or organizational changes. Possible approaches are discussed in the report's final section. This report may be updated. |
crs_R43100 | crs_R43100_0 | With Monsanto's withdrawal of its application to deregulate and commercialize the GE wheat, no GE wheat varieties have been approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the principal regulator of GE plants released into the environment. Preliminary tests by a scientist at the university indicated the possible presence of GE glyphosate-tolerant wheat plants. On May 3, the scientist notified APHIS of the preliminary test results, and APHIS began a formal investigation. Subsequent test results by APHIS indicated the presence of a glyphosate-tolerant wheat variety tested by Monsanto under APHIS approval at approximately 100 field trials in 16 states between 1998 and 2005. The agency had approved field testing of GE wheat in Oregon in 2001, but not on the site where the rogue GE wheat was discovered. APHIS also obtained samples of the producer's wheat harvests, including a sample of the producer's 2012 harvest. None of these samples of seed and grain tested positive for the presence of GE material. FDA has regulatory authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for the safety and nutritional quality of GE foods and feeds. APHIS regulates the importation, interstate movement, and field testing of GE plants and organisms that are or might be plant pests under the Plant Protection Act (PPA; 7 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.). 151 et seq.). FDA completed a voluntary consultation on the safety of food and feed derived from the glyphosate-tolerant GE wheat in 2004, and agreed with Monsanto that the GE wheat was not "materially different in composition, safety, or any other relevant parameter from wheat now grown, marketed, and consumed." The United States exports about 50% of its wheat crop, and Oregon exports nearly 90% of its wheat crop. APHIS stated in June 2013 that there was no evidence that GE wheat had entered commerce. Initial tests of wheat imported by Japan, Korea, and the European Union found no evidence of the unapproved GE trait. Many countries have zero-tolerance policies regarding imports of unapproved GE varieties. After the announcement of the GE wheat discovery, Japan (the largest buyer of U.S. wheat) and South Korea temporarily suspended new purchases of U.S. soft white wheat grown in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. APHIS Final Report on the GE Wheat Discovery and a New Investigation of GE Wheat Discovered in Montana
In September 2014, APHIS announced that its investigation of the Oregon incident was closed, and the agency released its findings. However, APHIS stated that it was unable to determine precisely how the GE wheat came to be growing in the single Oregon field. Monsanto Settlement Agreement Regarding the Oregon GE Wheat
In November 2014, Monsanto reached a settlement with U.S. wheat farmers who had sued the company. While not admitting liability, Monsanto agreed to pay a total of $250,000 to several wheat growers' associations. Monsanto also will pay $2.1 million into a settlement fund for soft white wheat farmers in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho who sold wheat between May 30, 2013, and November 30, 2013. The settlement also reimburses plaintiff's attorneys for costs associated with the litigation. As part of the settlement, three pending class action suits will be dismissed. In September 2014, a different variety of Monsanto's GE wheat was also discovered growing in a Montana field. The incidents are also likely to continue fueling criticism of those opposed to GE crops in general, and who question the strength and reliability of APHIS's regulatory oversight of the introduction of GE plants into the environment. | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced on May 31, 2013, that a variety of genetically engineered (GE) wheat had been discovered in a field in eastern Oregon. No varieties of genetically modified wheat have been approved, or deregulated, by the Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the USDA agency responsible for regulating the release of GE plants into the environment. Release of GE plants into the natural environment is regulated by APHIS under the Plant Protection Act (PPA, 7 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), as amended.
APHIS began a formal investigation in early May after notification by an Oregon State University scientist that preliminary tests of the wheat samples from the Oregon farm indicated the possible presence of GE glyphosate-tolerant wheat plants. Test results by APHIS indicated the presence of a variety tested by Monsanto Company under APHIS approval at approximately 100 field trials in 16 states between 1998 and 2005. The agency approved field testing of GE wheat in Oregon in 2001, but not on the field where the rogue GE wheat was discovered. In its September 2014 report on the investigation, APHIS stated that the incident was isolated to the one field, but they were unable to determine how the GE wheat came to grow in the field. A recent discovery of another variety of GE wheat in Montana was publicly reported in September 2014. A new APHIS investigation of this unauthorized wheat began in July.
The safety of GE organisms for food and feed is regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.). A voluntary consultation on the safety of food derived from the Monsanto GE wheat variety was completed by FDA in 2004. FDA had determined that this GE wheat variety was as safe for food and feed as non-GE wheat, and that there were no public health concerns.
In its September report, APHIS stated that there was no evidence that GE wheat had entered commerce. Initial tests of wheat imported by Japan, South Korea, and the European Union in June 2013 found no evidence of the unapproved GE trait. APHIS sampled 100 businesses that sold or purchased certified seed planted in the Oregon field. APHIS also obtained samples of the producer's wheat harvests, including a sample of the producer's 2012 harvest. None of these samples of seed and grain tested positive for the presence of GE material.
The presence of GE wheat in the market could have had significant trade implications if the variety turned out to be widespread. That has not been the case, and the trade implications were minimal. The United States is a major wheat exporter, exporting about 50% of its wheat crop. About 90% of Oregon's wheat crop is exported. Many countries, including Japan, the European Union, and South Korea, have zero-tolerance policies regarding imports of unapproved GE varieties. Japan, the largest buyer of U.S. wheat, and South Korea temporarily suspended new purchases of U.S. soft white wheat grown in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. Those purchases have resumed.
In November 2014, Monsanto reached a settlement with U.S. wheat farmers who had sued the company. While not admitting liability, Monsanto also agreed to pay $250,000 to several wheat growers' associations. Monsanto also will pay $2.1 million into a settlement fund for soft white wheat farmers in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and will reimburse plaintiff's attorneys for costs associated with the litigation. As part of the settlement, three pending class action suits will be dismissed.
The Oregon and Montana incidents are likely to continue fueling criticism of GE crops in general and the efficacy of APHIS regulatory oversight. |
crs_R44282 | crs_R44282_0 | T he Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program makes federal funds available to eligible metropolitan areas, states and local community-based organizations to provide a number of health care services for HIV/AIDS patients, including medical care, drug treatments, dental care, home health care, and outpatient mental health and substance abuse treatment. The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program reports that in 2014 it served 512,214 low-income people with HIV/AIDS, 25.4% of whom were uninsured and 64.2% of whom were living at or below 100% of the federal poverty level. 111-87 ). The program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) HIV/AIDS Bureau. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended) contains general provisions to increase access to health insurance and is expected to increase coverage for people living with HIV/AIDS. These provisions include prohibitions on the cancellation of coverage by an insurer due to a preexisting condition, elimination of lifetime caps on insurance benefits and annual limits on coverage, and eligibility for tax subsidies to help low- and middle-income individuals purchase coverage from health insurance exchanges. In addition, states have the option to broaden Medicaid eligibility to include single adults. ACA phases out the Medicare Part D so-called "doughnut hole"—a gap in prescription drug coverage—for individuals who are Medicare-eligible, including individuals with HIV/AIDS. The long-range impact of the health care law on HRSA's Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program (in which the health and treatment services provided under Ryan White are likely to be replaced to some extent by access to such services through health coverage via ACA) remains to be determined and may be of interest to policymakers given that authorization for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program has lapsed. Part A currently provides grants to 24 EMAs. Part D—Women, Infants, Children, and Youth
Part D provides grants to public and nonprofit entities for family-centered care for women, infants, children, and youth with HIV/AIDS. Part F—Demonstration and Training
Part F provides support for the AIDS Dental Reimbursement (ADR) Program, the Community-Based Dental Partnership Program, the AIDS Education and Training Centers (AETCs), the Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS) Program, and the Minority AIDS Initiative (MAI). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. The $9 million increase over FY2016 is requested for a new SPNS initiative to expand screening for and treatment of hepatitis C in people living with HIV. ACA and the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program
Prior to the implementation of the ACA ( P.L. For example, about half of ADAP clients would be Medicaid-eligible in expansion states, and the remainder would likely be eligible for premium subsidies to purchase health coverage on the exchange. HRSA and others note that Ryan White funds are increasingly being used for insurance premiums and cost sharing. ACA and the Future of the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program
The long-range impact of ACA on the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program—in which HIV care and treatment services provided under the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program are replaced by access to such services through health coverage via ACA—remains to be determined. In those states that do not participate in the Medicaid expansion, the need for the full range of services under Ryan White would remain. However, even if all states decide to cover the new Medicaid-eligible group provided under ACA, there will be gaps that the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program could continue to fill, such as coverage of those individuals with HIV/AIDS who are undocumented immigrants or legal immigrants within the five-year Medicaid ban. Ryan White also provides dental care and support services, such as medical transportation, that may not be provided under Medicaid or private health insurance. The program's authority is currently expired, but Congress continues to appropriate funds for the program to carry out Title XXVI and Title III of the PHS Act. 2029 , P.L. The measure provides a total of $2.323 billion for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program in FY2016, including the $25 million for SPNS, but did not agree to the consolidation of Parts C and D.
FY2017
The Obama Administration requests $2.298 billion in budget authority and $34 million via the PHS evaluation tap—for SPNS—resulting in a total of $2.332 billion for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program in FY2017. The FY2017 budget request again proposes a consolidation of Part C and Part D, which was proposed in the FY2015 and FY2016 budget requests and rejected by Congress. | The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program makes federal funds available to eligible metropolitan areas, states, and local community-based organizations to assist with health care costs and support services for individuals and families affected by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program reports that in 2014 it served 512,214 low-income people with HIV/AIDS in the United States, 25.4% of whom were uninsured and 64.2% of whom were living at or below 100% of the federal poverty level.
The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Its statutory authority is Title XXVI of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, originally enacted in 1990 and composed of four major parts and several other components. Part A provides grants to urban areas and mid-sized cities. Part B provides grants to states and territories; it also provides funds for the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP). Part C provides early intervention grants to public and private nonprofit entities. Part D provides grants to public and private nonprofit entities for family-centered care for women, infants, children, and youth with HIV/AIDS. The other components under Part F include the AIDS Dental Reimbursement (ADR) Program, the Community-Based Dental Partnership Program, the AIDS Education and Training Centers (AETCs), the Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS) Program, and the Minority AIDS Initiative (MAI). In October 2009, the 111th Congress passed and President Obama signed the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-87), which reauthorized the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program through September 30, 2013. The program's authority is currently expired, but Congress continues to appropriate funds for the program.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) contains general provisions to increase access to health insurance; therefore, the ACA has the potential to increase coverage for people living with HIV/AIDS. For example, ACA includes prohibitions on the cancellation of coverage by an insurer due to a preexisting condition, elimination of lifetime caps on insurance benefits and annual limits on coverage, and eligibility for tax subsidies to help low- and middle-income individuals purchase coverage from a health insurance exchange. ACA phases out the Medicare Part D "doughnut hole" (i.e., payment gap) for HIV/AIDS individuals who are Medicare eligible, which should increase coverage of HIV/AIDS drugs. Finally, the ACA permits states to broaden Medicaid eligibility to include non-elderly adults. There could be a significant impact on Ryan White ADAP clients in states that expand their Medicaid program; specifically, about half of ADAP clients would be Medicaid-eligible in expansion states, and the remainder would likely be eligible for premium subsidies to purchase health coverage on the exchange.
The long-range impact of ACA on the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program—in which HIV care and treatment services provided under Ryan White are replaced by access to such services through health insurance coverage via ACA—remains to be determined. Prior to the ACA's implementation, many Ryan White patients were insured and used Ryan White funds to pay premiums and cost sharing, and this need for funds is likely to remain as some Ryan White patients transition to private insurance. In states that decide not to participate in the Medicaid expansion, the need for the full range of Ryan White services would remain. However, even if all states decide to cover the new Medicaid-eligible group, there will be gaps that the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program could continue to fill, such as coverage of those individuals with HIV/AIDS who are undocumented immigrants, and training of health providers in HIV-related care. In addition, Ryan White provides dental care and support services, such as medical transportation, that may not be provided under Medicaid or private health insurance. The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program serves a public health role by keeping people in treatment and thereby decreasing the risk of transmitting HIV to others.
Funding for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program in FY2016, provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029, P.L. 114-113), is $2.323 billion. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requests $2.298 billion in budget authority and $34 million via a PHS transfer for the SPNS program, resulting in an FY2017 total of $2.332 billion for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program. The $9 million increase over FY2016 is for a new SPNS initiative to expand screening for and treatment of hepatitis C in people living with HIV. The FY2017 budget request again proposes a consolidation of Part C and Part D, which was proposed in the FY2015 and FY2016 budget requests and rejected by Congress. |
crs_R42918 | crs_R42918_0 | In 2006, the 109 th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policy makers have called for Congress to reauthorize this authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. Congressional policy makers have questioned the sufficiency of DHS efforts to identify these noncompliant "outlier" facilities. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration. For additional analysis of CFATS implementation, see CRS Report R43346, Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress . 4007 , which will provide new statutory authority through the Homeland Security Act to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The DHS has identified an additional factor in the delay of the inspection schedule: iteration between DHS and regulated entities regarding their site security plans. Inspection Rate
As of December 2014, 1,366 chemical facilities had been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with approval of inspected security measures by DHS. Several factors likely complicate and slow the inspection process. Some policy makers have questioned whether the low inspection rate is due to constraints in the number of chemical facility security inspectors hired by DHS or the availability of appropriated funding. Federal Preemption of State Activities
The original statute did not expressly address the issue of federal preemption of state and local chemical facility security statute or regulation. The DHS terminated some of these activities but continues others. Suggestions for such changes have included reducing the amount of chemical stored onsite and changing the chemicals used. Congress has directed DHS to detail and report to Congress the Department's definition of inherently safer technology as it relates to chemical facilities under the purview of CFATS. Many of the existing authorities are present in H.R. 4007 , but it also provides DHS with new authorities, such as the ability for certain covered chemical facilities to self-certify the sufficiency of their security plans. Of this legislation, the 113 th Congress has passed H.R. 4007
H.R. This bill will repeal Section 550 of P.L. 109-295 on the effective date of the act (30 days after enactment), but DHS may use the existing regulations and issue new regulations as necessary to implement the new authority. 68 was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on Homeland Security. Extend the Existing Authority
The current statutory authority to regulate security at chemical facilities expires on December 13, 2014. 4903 , Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015, would extend the current statutory authority to October 4, 2015. The report cites "the continued delays in the implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards (CFATS) program" and "the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division's (ISCD) inability to mitigate real risks" as the reason for the decrease. | The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes since the 109th Congress. The 113th Congress extended this authority through December 13, 2014, and has passed H.R. 4007, which provides new statutory authority. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority.
Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 900 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk. For additional analysis of CFATS implementation, see CRS Report R43346, Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.
Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and efforts; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the range of chemical facilities identified by DHS; and the ability of inherently safer technologies to achieve security goals.
The 113th Congress considered various approaches to this issue. Both the House and Senate homeland security appropriations acts would extend the duration of the statutory authority until October 4, 2015. The House and the Senate have passed an amended version of H.R. 4007. This bill will repeal Section 550 of P.L. 109-295 on the effective date of the act (30 days after enactment), and authorize the DHS to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes through the Homeland Security Act. Many of the existing authorities are present in H.R. 4007, but it also provides DHS with new authorities, such as the ability for certain covered chemical facilities to self-certify the sufficiency of their security plans. The DHS may use the existing regulations and issue new regulations as necessary to implement the new authority. |
crs_R40230 | crs_R40230_0 | Introduction
Over the past decade, the telecommunications sector has undergone a vast transformation fueled by rapid technological growth and subsequent evolution of the marketplace. Much of the policy debate over the evolving telecommunications infrastructure is framed within the context of a "national broadband policy." The issue for policymakers is how to craft a comprehensive broadband strategy that not only addresses broadband availability and adoption problems, but also addresses the long term impacts of next-generation networks on consumer use of the Internet and a regulatory framework that must keep pace with evolving telecommunications technology. By 2008, consumers had begun integrating communications technologies into their lives at unprecedented rates. Separately, each of these trends may have had a significant impact on consumer behavior, but taken together they created a previously unseen expectation for real-time access to information and an ability to share that information from virtually anywhere. Choices made today and in the near future regarding user authentication, privacy, digital rights management, filtering of unwanted information, wireless Internet standards, instant messaging, the deployment of IPv6 ("Internet Protocol version 6"), and how to link the telephone network to the Internet will all have a significant impact on the "future Internet" we see in coming years. The Policy Debate in Context
As discussed above, the way a "national broadband policy" is defined, and the particular elements that might constitute that policy, determine how and whether various stakeholders might support or oppose a national broadband initiative. 104-104 ). However, the telecommunications sector is dynamic and technological changes such as the advancement of Internet technology and the melding of data, voice, and video have resulted in additional trends which must be addressed. These trends include:
the transition from a circuit switched to a packet switched network, thereby enabling the integration of voice, video, and data; the transition from fixed to mobile service; the transition from narrowband to broadband, thereby enabling greater interactivity. The challenge facing today's policymakers is to develop a regulatory environment that not only addresses current trends, but contains the flexibility to accommodate future and as yet unanticipated changes in technology, applications, consumer expectations, and policy objectives. The growth of broadband networks and the proliferation of applications and devices has placed increasing pressure on policymakers to formulate a framework to address a broadband-based world. Many of these developments were not anticipated when the 1996 Telecommunications Act was passed and have led to the need to update the regulatory assumptions and subsequent regulatory framework the act was based on. As broadband becomes an integral component of society, however, regulators have been called upon to consider the application of social goals, that may or may not have been identified with traditional telephony, to the broadband world. Social objectives such as the advancement of universal service goals, timely and accurate emergency services, access for those with disabilities, and consumer protection that are part of traditional telephony regulatory policies, are migrating to the broadband policy environment. | Over the past decade, the telecommunications sector has undergone a vast transformation fueled by rapid technological growth and subsequent evolution of the marketplace. Much of the U.S. policy debate over the evolving telecommunications infrastructure is framed within the context of a "national broadband policy." The way a national broadband policy is defined, and the particular elements that might constitute that policy, determine how and whether various stakeholders might support or oppose a national broadband initiative. The issue for policymakers is how to craft a comprehensive broadband strategy that not only addresses broadband availability and adoption problems, but also addresses the long term implications of next-generation networks on consumer use of the Internet and the implications for a regulatory framework that must keep pace with evolving telecommunications technology.
Consumers have been integrating communications technologies into their lives at unprecedented rates. Trends include increased use of smartphones, increased subscribership on social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace, increased expectations of cross-platform accessibility, and development of "cloud computing" applications. Each of these trends taken alone likely would have had a significant impact on consumer behavior, but taken together they create a heretofore unseen demand for real-time access to information and an ability to share that information from wherever the consumer happens to be. Policy choices related to consumer use of the Internet, such as user authentication, privacy, digital rights management, filtering of unwanted information, wireless Internet standards, instant messaging, the deployment of IPv6 ("Internet protocol version 6"), and how to link the telephone network to the Internet will all have a profound impact on how broadband and next generation networks evolve.
The challenge facing today's policymakers is to develop a regulatory environment that not only addresses these more recent trends, but that also contains the flexibility to accommodate future and possibly unanticipated changes in technology, applications, and consumer demands. The growth of broadband networks and the proliferation of applications and devices has placed increasing pressure on policymakers to formulate a framework to address a broadband-based world. Many of these developments were not anticipated when the 1996 Telecommunications Act (P.L. 104-104) was passed and have led to the need to update the regulatory assumptions and subsequent regulatory framework upon which the act was based.
Technological changes such as the advancement of Internet technology and the melding of data, voice, and video have resulted in additional trends which must be considered. These trends include the transition from a circuit switched to a packet switched network, thereby enabling the integration of voice, video, and data; the transition from fixed to mobile service; and the transition from one-way to interactive service. Additionally, as broadband becomes an integral component of society, regulators have been called upon to consider how these trends may affect social goals that may or may not have been associated with traditional telephony. Social objectives such as the advancement of universal service goals, timely and accurate emergency services, disability access, and consumer protection that are part of traditional telephony regulatory policies are migrating to the broadband policy environment. |
crs_R43418 | crs_R43418_0 | These increases are due to (1) increased rates on dividends for taxpayers in the top income tax bracket enacted as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ); and (2) a 3.8% tax on net investment income, including dividends, for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income above certain thresholds. Before 2003, dividends were treated as ordinary income for tax purposes. Hence, as Congress evaluates tax reform options, changes to the tax treatment of dividends may be considered. In the context of a base-broadening, rate-reducing tax reform, increasing tax rates on qualified dividends is one option for raising revenue that could be used to reduce marginal tax rates. Taxing dividends as ordinary income could raise revenues sufficient to offset a 1.3% reduction in individual income tax rates, meaning the top tax rate could be reduced by roughly 0.5 percentage points, from 39.6% to approximately 39.1%. A rough static estimate suggests that taxing dividends at ordinary rates could allow corporate tax rates to be reduced by roughly 4.6%, allowing for a revenue-neutral reduction in statutory corporate rates from 35.0% to an estimated 33.2%. While many economists believe that taxes on dividends discourage investment and distort the allocation of capital in the economy, there is an alternative view in which changes in dividend tax policy do not affect investment incentives. Traditional concerns about the excess taxation of capital income include the distortion in favor of investments outside the corporate sector, the favorable treatment of debt versus equity within the corporate sector, and the differential treatment of dividends and capital gains, which favors retentions in the corporation. In addition, these open economy issues may be one consideration for evaluating various integration proposals discussed subsequently. When taxes on dividends were reduced in 2003, some predicted that the reduced tax rates on dividends would increase the price of U.S. traded equities. Economic Stimulus
Dividend tax relief might also be considered as a tool for economic stimulus. Debt-financing also tends to be tax-favored, as interest payments are deductible. Further reducing taxes on dividends or integrating the corporate and individual income tax systems could reduce federal revenues. Thus, policy options that reduce taxes on dividends, considered in isolation, would tend to reduce the progressivity of the overall tax system. With more than half of dividends paid not being taxed at the individual level, a substantial portion of capital income is taxed only once, at the corporate level. Shareholder (Imputation) Credit
Integration of the corporate and individual tax systems can also be achieved by granting a credit at the individual level for taxes paid at the corporate level. A dividend exclusion was also considered in 2003. Some have suggested taxing dividends at ordinary rate at the individual level, using the revenues to reduce corporate tax rates. Even if the revenues were used to decrease corporate tax rates, progressivity would likely increase. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp has proposed taxing dividends as ordinary income as part of the Tax Reform Act of 2014. For single individuals, the dividend exclusion was increased from $100 to $200. Under the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA; P.L. Appendix C. Taxation of Dividends in OECD Countries
With the reduced tax rates on dividends enacted in 2003, the U.S. moved from having a "classical" system, where dividends were taxed at the same rate as other types of capital income (e.g., interest), to a "modified classical" system, where dividends are taxed at the shareholder level, but at reduced rates. On average, combined (corporate and individual) statutory tax rates on dividends have decreased in OECD countries over the past decade. | The tax treatment of dividends has changed numerous times over the past century. Most recently, the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) increased the tax rate on dividends, from 15% to 20%, for taxpayers in the top income tax bracket. The change was effective for 2013. Also effective in 2013 is the 3.8% tax on net investment income for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income above certain thresholds ($200,000 for single, $250,000 for married filing jointly).
Further increases in the tax rate on dividends may be considered as part of a base-broadening, rate-reducing tax reform. Rough estimates suggest that taxing dividends as ordinary income could raise enough in revenue to offset a 1.3% reduction in individual income tax rates, which would reduce the top marginal rate from 39.6% to roughly 39.1%. If the revenues were instead used to reduce corporate rates, the corporate tax rate could be reduced by roughly 4.6%, from 35% to roughly 33.2%. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp's tax reform discussion draft, the Tax Reform Act of 2014, proposes that dividends be taxed as ordinary income, but provides an exclusion of 40% for dividend and capital gain income.
Before 2003, dividends were taxed as ordinary income. The tax rate on dividends was reduced as part of the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA; P.L. 108-27). Tax rates on dividends were reduced in 2003 to address some of the economic distortions that result from taxing dividends at both the corporate and individual level. Taxation of dividends in both the individual and corporate income tax systems leads to a preference for non-corporate as opposed to corporate investment. Taxation of dividends at both the corporate and individual levels also creates a bias in favor of debt-financed investments, where interest payments are deductible.
The reduced tax rate on dividends at the individual level reduces, but does not eliminate, tax-induced distortions in the allocation of capital. Integrating the corporate and individual tax systems, such that capital income is taxed only once, could further improve the allocation of capital in the economy. Rather than increasing taxes on dividends in a base-broadening tax reform, integration may be considered as an option for reducing tax-induced economic distortions. Options for integration include shareholder imputation credits (individual-level credits for corporate taxes paid), a dividends paid deduction, or a dividend exclusion. A trade-off to consider with integration proposals is the budget impact. If integration policies are deficit financed, higher interest rates could crowd out economic growth.
Open-economy considerations, in a globalized economy with trade, might also motivate changes in the tax treatment of dividends. Taxing dividends at ordinary rates at the individual level, using the additional revenues to reduce corporate rates, could encourage capital investment in the domestic corporate sector.
Increasing taxes on dividends at the individual level would likely increase the progressivity of the U.S. tax system. Correspondingly, a decrease in taxes on dividends would tend to decrease the progressivity of the overall tax system. Ultimately, any change in dividend tax policy is likely to have economic, distributional, and revenue consequences. The trade-offs between these various objectives are something to be considered by policymakers. |
crs_R42410 | crs_R42410_0 | This report provides government-wide, multi-agency, and individual agency analyses of the President's FY2013 request as it relates to R&D and related activities and congressional actions on appropriations legislation, and specific information on appropriations enacted by Congress in the FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, ( P.L. Agency FY2013 appropriations were subject to one or more rescissions as well as sequestration. For several agencies, research and development (R&D) funding is included in accounts with non-R&D activities. For such agencies, unless Congress provides funding at the full request level as requested, it is not possible to know the agency's R&D funding level. In such cases, the funding level may not be known until it is included in the President's FY2015 budget request and/or agency budget justifications. When final appropriations are not resolved until after the President's next fiscal year budget request is prepared (as was the case for FY2013 appropriations and the President's FY2014 request) funding for agency R&D may not be known until the subsequent year's budget request. However, some agencies may opt to provide funding estimates, publicly or privately (for example, in response to a CRS inquiry). Determination of funding levels can be complicated by a number of factors, including rescissions, sequestration, supplemental funding, transfers, and reprogramming. Agency analyses in this report use the most current information available at the time this report was published. President Obama's proposed FY2013 budget, released on February 13, 2012, included $140.820 billion for R&D in FY2013, a 1.4% increase over the estimated FY2012 R&D funding level of $138.869 billion. These acts sought to achieve this objective by authorizing increased funding for accounts at three agencies with a strong R&D emphasis in these disciplines: the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Commerce (DOC) National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) core laboratory research and R&D facilities construction funding (collectively referred to as the "targeted accounts"). Under President Obama's FY2013 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.8% of total federal R&D funding: Department of Defense (DOD), 50.6%; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (primarily the National Institutes of Health), 22.3%; Department of Energy (DOE), 8.5%; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 6.8%; National Science Foundation (NSF), 4.2%; Department of Commerce (DOC), 1.8%; and Department of Agriculture (USDA), 1.6%. The aggregate authorization levels in this act for the targeted accounts were consistent with an 11-year doubling path, slower than the America COMPETES Act's 7-year doubling path. National Nanotechnology Initiative
The President requested $1.766 billion in funding for the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) for FY2013, $70 million (4.1%) above the FY2012 estimated level of $1.696 billion. Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program
President Obama requested $3.807 billion in FY2013 funding for the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program, $69 million (1.8%) above FY2012 funding. Global Change Research Program
President Obama proposed $2.563 billion for the U.S. National Network for Manufacturing Innovation
The President's FY2013 budget also proposed establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) to promote the development of manufacturing technologies with broad applications. 113-6 included five regular appropriations acts as Divisions A-E:
Division A: Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013. Division E: Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013. Department of Homeland Security39
For the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the President requested $1.179 billion for R&D and related programs in FY2013, a 20% increase from FY2012. Funding for Research, Development, and Innovation (RDI) would have increased by $212 million. The request for the DOE Office of Science was $4.992 billion, an increase of 2.4% from the FY2012 appropriation of $4.874 billion. The America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. | President Obama's budget request for FY2013 included $140.820 billion for research and development (R&D), a $1.951 billion (1.4%) increase from the FY2012 estimated funding level of $138.869 billion. The FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-6), signed into law on March 26, 2013, provided year-long appropriations to all agencies for FY2013. The law included divisions incorporating five of the regular appropriations bills—Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies; Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies; Department of Defense; Department of Homeland Security; and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies—and included continuing appropriations for agencies covered under the other regular appropriations bills. Agency appropriations were subject to one or more rescissions as well as sequestration. For several agencies, research and development (R&D) funding is included in accounts with non-R&D activities. For such agencies, unless Congress provides funding at the full request level as requested, it is not possible to know the agency's R&D funding level. In such cases, the funding level may not be known until it is included in the President's FY2015 budget request and/or agency budget justifications. When final appropriations are not resolved until after the President's next fiscal year budget request is prepared (as was the case for FY2013 appropriations and the President's FY2014 request) funding for agency R&D may not be known until the subsequent year's budget request. However, some agencies may opt to provide funding estimates, publicly or privately (for example, in response to a CRS inquiry). Determination of funding levels can be complicated by a number of factors, including rescissions, sequestration, supplemental funding, transfers, and reprogramming. Agency analyses in this report use the most current information available at the time this report was published.
Funding for R&D is highly concentrated in a few departments. Under President Obama's FY2013 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.8% of total federal R&D funding, the largest among them being the Department of Defense (50.6%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (22.3%, primarily for the National Institutes of Health). Among the largest changes proposed in the President's request, the R&D budget of the Department of Defense would have fallen by $1.535 billion (2.1%), while R&D funding for the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) would have increased by $1.329 billion. The proposed NIST growth was fueled by increases in funding for its core research laboratories and by the establishment of two new initiatives: $1 billion for the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation, which seeks to promote the development of manufacturing technologies with broad applications, and $300 million for a Wireless Innovation (WIN) Fund to help develop cutting-edge technologies for public safety users.
President Obama also requested increases in the R&D budgets of NIST, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy's Office of Science that were targeted for doubling over 7 years, from their FY2006 levels, by the America COMPETES Act, and over 11 years by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. The funding requested for FY2013 was consistent with a doubling timeframe of 17 years, much longer than authorized by either act.
The President's budget request sought support for three multi-agency R&D initiatives in FY2013: $1.766 billion for the National Nanotechnology Initiative, an increase of $70 million (4.1%) over FY2012; $3.807 billion for the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program, an increase of $69 million (1.8%); and $2.633 billion for the U.S. Global Change Research Program, an increase of $136 million (5.6%). |
crs_RL34115 | crs_RL34115_0 | It is the taxation of U.S. business operations that has been the recent focus of policymakers, and that has raised the question of basic tax reform in the international sector: Is the current U.S. system for taxing U.S. international business appropriate in this age of globalized business operations, or is reform needed? The current U.S. system is a hybrid construct, embodying a mix of opposing jurisdictional principles. Not surprisingly, the mixed system—in conjunction with foreign host-country taxes—poses a patchwork of incentive effects for U.S. firms and their global operations, in some cases taxing foreign operations favorably and creating an incentive to invest abroad, and in other cases imposing high tax burdens and posing a disincentive to overseas investment. Prescriptions for a "good" tax system vary, and the hybrid system satisfies none of them fully. Along with deferral, another basic feature of the U.S. system is the foreign tax credit. Where U.S. taxes apply, foreign tax credits alleviate double taxation but are limited to offsetting U.S. tax on foreign income. Capital Ownership Neutrality
A new concept of neutrality has appeared in recent years. First, firms are assumed not to substitute operations in one location for those in another—capital is completely immobile across locations. These assets could be leased by the firm with the intangible asset. When the foreign country's tax is higher, the home country would have to refund the excess so that, again, the tax on the foreign investment would be the same as the tax on domestic investment. This feature of the tax system introduces elements of a territorial or source-based taxation into the system, and it also introduces a distortion in firms' decisions of whether to return profits to the United States or reinvest them abroad. Where current taxation applies—for example, to branch income—there is a disincentive to invest in high-tax countries and either an incentive or neutrality toward investment in low-tax countries, depending on whether the investing firm can use cross-crediting of foreign taxes. Some have argued, however, that although territorial taxation may not be the most efficient system in a perfect world, it is nonetheless superior to the hybrid, patchwork system that is the current U.S. system—a second-best argument. Grubert and Mutti described their proposal as a "dividend exemption" system, thus focusing on the chief modification their plan would make to the current regime: it would exempt from U.S. taxes dividends repatriated to U.S. parents from foreign subsidiary corporations, thus moving from current law's deferral for foreign income to a permanent exemption. First, the plan would not permit foreign tax credits to be claimed for foreign taxes paid with respect to repatriated earnings. A Residence-Based System in Practice
The capital export neutrality standard recommends a system that would be based on residence—that is, a system that taxes the income of home-country firms, regardless of where it is earned. They further note that their plan's reduction of tax rates at the corporate level would shift more of the overall U.S. tax burden on corporations from the corporate to the shareholder level—a virtue in the modern world in which capital is increasingly mobile because shareholder-level taxes are generally imposed on a residence basis and thus achieve allocative efficiency. The Administration earlier presented a framework for tax reform that mentioned five elements: the allocation of interest for deferred income, a tax on excess intangibles, a minimum tax on foreign-source income in low-tax countries, disallowing a deduction for the cost of moving abroad, and providing a 20% credit for costs of moving an operation from abroad to the United States. The plan moves to a territorial tax system but also introduces a destination-based cash flow tax for corporations and unincorporated business. These changes largely eliminate the corporate tax and replace it with a consumption tax. | A striking feature of the modern U.S. economy is its growing openness—its increased integration with the rest of the world. The attention of tax policymakers has recently been focused on the growing participation of U.S. firms in the international economy and the increased pressure that engagement places on the U.S. system for taxing overseas business. Is the current U.S. system for taxing U.S. international business the appropriate one for the modern era of globalized business operations, or should its basic structure be reformed?
The current U.S. system for taxing international business is a hybrid. In part, the system is based on a residence principle, applying U.S. taxes on a worldwide basis to U.S. firms while granting foreign tax credits to alleviate double taxation. The system, however, also permits U.S. firms to defer foreign-source income indefinitely—a feature that approaches a territorial tax jurisdiction. In keeping with its mixed structure, the system produces a patchwork of economic effects that depend on the location of foreign investment and the circumstances of the firm. Broadly, the system poses a tax incentive to invest in countries with low tax rates of their own and a disincentive to invest in high-tax countries. In theory, U.S. investment should be skewed toward low-tax countries and away from high-tax locations.
Evaluations of the current tax system vary, and so do prescriptions for reform. According to traditional economic analysis, world economic welfare is maximized by a system that applies the same tax burden to prospective (marginal) foreign and domestic investment so that taxes do not distort investment decisions. Such a system possesses capital export neutrality, and could be accomplished by worldwide taxation applied to all foreign operations along with an unlimited foreign tax credit. In contrast, a system that maximizes national welfare—a system possessing national neutrality—would impose a higher tax burden on foreign investment, thus permitting an overall disincentive for foreign investment. Such a system would impose worldwide taxation but would permit only a deduction, and not a credit, for foreign taxes.
A tax system based on territorial taxation would exempt overseas business investment from U.S. tax. In recent years, several proponents of territorial taxation have argued that changes in the world economy have rendered traditional prescriptions for international taxation obsolete and instead prescribe territorial taxation as a means of maximizing both world and national economic welfare. For such a system to be neutral, however, capital would have to be completely immobile across locations. A case might be made that such a system is less distorting than the current hybrid system, but it is not clear that it is more likely to achieve policy goals than other reforms, including not only a movement toward worldwide taxation by ending deferral but also proposals to provide a minimum tax and restrict deductions for costs associated with deferred income or restrict deferral and foreign tax credits for tax havens.
A House tax proposal, called the "Better Way" tax plan, would not only move to a territorial tax but convert the income tax into a consumption tax. In this case, equity capital would likely be attracted to the United States from foreign countries because of the elimination, in most respects, of a tax on capital income of firms in the United States. |
crs_RS22964 | crs_RS22964_0 | Measurement Techniques
Basic approaches for measuring agricultural and forest carbon inventories and change include on-site measurement, indirect measurement from off-site tools, and estimation using process models or inferences. Because of the inherent challenges associated with balancing the cost of measuring carbon and the accuracy of these measurements, any practicable system for measuring forest and agricultural carbon might require a mix of these different methods and approaches, rather than a single approach. Forestry and Agricultural Activities for Carbon Sequestration and/or Emission Reduction | Proposals to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases often include the use of forestry and agricultural practices and lands for carbon sequestration. However, uncertainty about the accuracy of measuring carbon from these activities has led some to question this potential. Basic approaches for measuring forest and agricultural carbon include on-site measurement; indirect measurement from off-site tools; and estimation using models or inferences. Because of challenges associated with balancing the cost and accuracy of these measurement tools, any practicable system for measuring forest and agricultural carbon might require a mix of these approaches. |
crs_RS22599 | crs_RS22599_0 | When a legal claim becomes moot while awaiting appellate review, the established practice is for the federal appeals court to reverse or vacate the judgment below and to remand the case to the district court with an instruction to dismiss the action. That consequence is because a moot case does not qualify as a "case or controversy" under Article III; due to the lack of jurisdiction, federal courts have no power to consider the merits of a constitutionally moot case. Cases may be rendered moot because of a change in the status of the parties or in the law, or because of an act of one of the parties that dissolves the controversy. Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine
The Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the mootness doctrine that, if found to apply to a case, would permit federal court adjudication of the dispute. | A case pending before a federal court may at some point in the litigation process lose an element of justiciability and become "moot." Mootness may occur when a controversy initially existing at the time the lawsuit was filed is no longer "live" due to a change in the law or in the status of the parties involved, or due to an act of one of the parties that dissolves the dispute. When a federal court deems a case to be moot, the court no longer has the power to entertain the legal claims and must dismiss the complaint. However, the U.S. Supreme Court over time has developed several exceptions to the mootness doctrine. This report provides a general overview of the doctrine of "mootness," as the principle is understood and used by federal courts to decide whether to dismiss certain actions for lack of jurisdiction. |
crs_R44440 | crs_R44440_0 | The unexpected death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016—in the middle of the Supreme Court's October 2015 term—has prompted questions about the process for filling the vacancy and how the Court will proceed in hearing cases and issuing opinions. These questions pertain to the constitutional role of the President and Senate in filling Supreme Court vacancies, whether and when the President and the Senate must act, and how the Supreme Court may proceed in hearing cases and issuing opinions with a vacant seat. This report provides answers to frequently asked legal questions about filling Supreme Court vacancies. Additionally, other CRS products address other procedural and historical issues surrounding Supreme Court vacancies. See CRS Report R44400, The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44083, Appointment and Confirmation of Executive Branch Leadership: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31980, Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure , by [author name scrubbed]. | The unexpected death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016—in the middle of the Supreme Court's October 2015 term—has prompted questions about the process for filling the vacancy and how the Court will proceed in hearing cases and issuing opinions. These questions pertain to the constitutional role of the President and Senate in filling Supreme Court vacancies, whether and when the President and the Senate must act, and how the Supreme Court may proceed in hearing cases and issuing opinions with a vacant seat. This report provides answers to frequently asked legal questions about filling Supreme Court vacancies.
Additionally, other CRS products address other procedural and historical issues surrounding Supreme Court vacancies. See CRS Report R44400, The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44083, Appointment and Confirmation of Executive Branch Leadership: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31980, Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40468 | crs_R40468_0 | 3200 , and the Affordable Healthcare for America Act of 2009, H.R. 3962 , to promote health care reform, and the Small Business and Infrastructure Jobs Tax Act of 2010, H.R. 4849 , to provide tax relief to small businesses and extend the Build America Bond program. The most recent preliminary revenue estimates project a revenue gain of $3.8 billion over 5 years and $7.7 billion over 10 years. Treaty shopping occurs where a foreign parent firm in one country receives its U.S.-source income through an intermediate subsidiary in a third country that is signatory to a tax-reducing treaty with the United States. Supporters of proposals to curb treaty shopping argue that it would restrict a practice that deprives the United States of tax revenue and that it is unfair to competing U.S. firms. Opponents maintain that proposals to curb treaty shopping would harm U.S. employment by raising the cost to foreign firms of doing business in the United States and may violate U.S. tax treaties. In addition, some Members of Congress have objected to the use of revenue-raising tax measures under the jurisdiction of tax-writing committees to offset increases in spending programs authorized by other committees
The Context: U.S. Treaty Shopping Proposals in the 111th Congress
In the 111 th Congress, both the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. The treaty provisions in H.R. The current U.S. model income tax treaty contains such provisions. Provisions designed to limit earnings stripping by foreign firms investing in the United States were enacted with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ( P.L. Importantly, however, in some cases foreign firms may be able to use treaty shopping to eliminate all U.S. tax on their U.S. earnings, and it is unlikely that foreign investors are so sensitive to U.S. taxes that the optimal tax rate on foreign investment is zero. If this is the case, economic theory suggests that it is likely that the proposal would increase U.S. economic welfare. 2419 , from the 110 th Congress, would abrogate existing U.S. tax treaties. | "Treaty shopping" occurs where a foreign parent firm in one country receives its U.S.-source income through an intermediate subsidiary in a third country that is signatory to a tax-reducing treaty with the United States. Supporters of proposals to curb treaty-shopping argue that it would restrict a practice that deprives the United States of tax revenue and that it is unfair to competing U.S. firms. Opponents maintain that proposals to curb treaty-shopping would harm U.S. employment by raising the cost to foreign firms of doing business in the United States and may violate U.S. tax treaties. In addition, some Members of Congress have objected to the use of revenue-raising tax measures under the jurisdiction of tax-writing committees to offset increases in spending programs authorized by other committees.
In the 111th Congress, the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, the Affordable Healthcare for America Act of 2009, H.R. 3962, and the Small Business and the Infrastructure Jobs Tax Act of 2010, H.R. 4849, include tax-treaty proposals which would restrict in certain cases the use of tax-treaty benefits by foreign firms with operations in the United States. The most recent preliminary revenue estimates projected a revenue gain of $3.8 billion over 5 years and $7.7 billion over 10 years, which would be used to partially offset either the cost of health care reform or provide tax relief to small businesses and extend the Build America Bonds. These provision are identical to the provision offered in the Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, during the 110th Congress.
Economic theory suggests there is an economically optimal U.S. tax rate for foreign firms that balances tax revenue needs with the benefits that foreign investment produces for the U.S. economy. Under current law, the treaty-shopping arrangements some foreign firms undertake may combine, in some cases, with corporate income-tax deductions to eliminate U.S. tax on portions of their U.S. investment. In these cases, economic theory suggests that added restrictions on treaty-shopping would improve U.S. economic welfare. This analysis, however, does not consider possible reactions by foreign countries where U.S. firms invest, nor does it consider possible abrogation of existing U.S. tax treaties.
This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_RL33502 | crs_RL33502_0 | Introduction
Continued revelations involving alleged disclosures of classified information to the news media or to others who are not entitled to receive it have renewed Congress's interest with regard to the possible need for legislation to provide for criminal punishment for the "leaks" of classified information. Opponents of any such legislation express concern regarding the possible consequences to freedom of the press and other First Amendment values. In its response to Congress, the Department of Justice concluded that existing statutes and regulations are sufficient to prosecute disclosures of information that might harm the national security. This report describes the current state of the law with regard to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including criminal and civil penalties that can be imposed on violators, as well as some of the disciplinary actions and administrative procedures available to federal agencies with respect to their employees, as such measures have been addressed by federal courts. The report also describes the background of legislative efforts to amend the laws, including the measure passed in 2000 and President Clinton's stated reasons for vetoing it. Criminal Statutes for the Protection of Classified Information
National defense information is protected by the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. The Espionage Act of 1917 has been challenged for vagueness without success. | Recent cases involving alleged disclosures of classified information to the news media or others who are not entitled to receive it have renewed Congress's interest with regard to the possible need for legislation to provide for criminal punishment for the "leaks" of classified information. The Espionage Act of 1917 and other statutes and regulations provide a web of authorities for the protection of various types of sensitive information, but some have expressed concern that gaps in these laws may make prosecution of some disclosures impossible. The 106th Congress passed a measure to criminalize leaks, but President Clinton vetoed it. The 108th Congress reconsidered the same provision, but instead passed a requirement for the relevant agencies to review the need for such a proscription. The Department of Justice in turn reported that existing statutes and regulations are sufficient to prosecute disclosures of information that might harm the national security.
This report provides background with respect to previous legislative efforts to criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; describes the current state of the laws that potentially apply, including criminal and civil penalties that can be imposed on violators; and some of the disciplinary actions and administrative procedures available to the agencies of federal government that have been addressed by federal courts. Finally, the report considers the possible First Amendment implications of applying the Espionage Act to prosecute newspapers for publishing classified national defense information. |
crs_R41992 | crs_R41992_0 | The national forests have been the focus of controversy for many years. Reduced timber harvests, increased wildfire risks, degraded forest health, and disagreements among users and other stakeholders have led to congressional disputes over appropriate management. Some interests have suggested third-party certification of sustainable management of the national forests as a possible solution to many of these difficulties. Most programs use independent, accredited third parties to verify compliance with the standards and have requirements that extend throughout the supply chain to maintain the certified label. The FSC standard is more prescriptive while the SFI standard allows more flexibility. The comparison is organized into six broad categories:
Forest management Wildlife and habitat management Water and soil resource management Other forest uses and values Decision-making and management planning Miscellaneous
Overall, the SFI and FSC certification programs have similar coverage in these categories. The programs each emphasize different sustainability objectives: the SFI program emphasizes sustainable timber harvesting, and places forest management as a tool to achieve that objective; the FSC program emphasizes sustainable forest management, and places timber harvests as one tool to achieve that objective. Despite these similarities, there are some differences between the forest management provisions in the FSC and SFI programs. The decision-making and management planning provisions within the SFI and FSC programs are similar in many regards. It is not clear how certification would affect the management of the national forests. However, certification could evaluate the extent to which the forest management plans align with the standards of each certification program, and then evaluate the extent to which those forest plans are being implemented. The results of these third-party evaluations of the forest plans and their implementation could potentially alleviate—or escalate—stakeholder and congressional disputes over the appropriate management of the national forests. It is unclear whether the Forest Service has the existing authority to certify the national forests. If Congress chooses to require certification of the national forests, there are other questions to consider, including which certification program(s) to require; what (if any) forest management process requirements (e.g., public involvement standards) might be relaxed; and what would be the impact on timber purchasers of processing certified sustainable wood. Congress may also consider if certification should occur across the entire National Forest System, or at the unit level, and then how many and which units should be certified. | The national forests have been the focus of controversy for many years. Reduced timber harvests, increased wildfire risks, degraded forest health, and disagreements among users and other stakeholders have led to congressional disputes over appropriate management. Some interests have suggested third-party certification of sustainable management of the national forests as a possible solution to many of these difficulties. There are two major certification programs in the United States: the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) program.
The FSC and SFI programs are very similar in many regards. Both programs use a multi-stakeholder approach that balances environmental, social, and economic interests to negotiate broadly acceptable standards of sustainable forest management. Both programs use independent, accredited third parties to verify compliance with the standards. Both programs have stakeholder involvement and public transparency requirements. Within the standards, both programs have similar coverage in terms of requirements for harvest operations, wildlife and habitat management, water and soil protection, and decision-making and management planning.
Despite these similarities, the SFI and FSC programs do have some distinct differences. The programs each emphasize different sustainability objectives: the SFI program emphasizes sustainable timber harvesting, and places forest management as a tool to achieve that objective; the FSC program emphasizes sustainable forest management, and places timber harvests as one tool to achieve that objective. The SFI standard is generally more flexible, while the FSC standard is generally more prescriptive with more on-the-ground performance requirements.
How certification would affect the management of the national forests is uncertain. However, certification could evaluate the extent to which the forest management plans align with the standards of each certification program, and then evaluate the extent to which those forest plans are being implemented. A third-party evaluation of the forest plans, and their implementation, could potentially alleviate—or escalate—stakeholder and congressional disputes over the appropriate management of the national forests.
It is unclear whether the Forest Service has the existing authority to certify the national forests. If Congress chooses to require certification of the national forests, there are other questions to consider, including which certification program(s) to require; what (if any) forest management process requirements (e.g., public involvement standards) might be relaxed; and what would be the impact on timber purchasers of processing certified sustainable wood. Congress may also consider if certification should occur across the entire National Forest System, or at the unit level, and then how many and which units should be certified. |
crs_R41179 | crs_R41179_0 | The recession that began in the United States in December 2007 and officially ended in June 2009 was one of the deepest and the longest since the Great Depression. The report first compares the prevalence of long-term unemployment across business cycles during the postwar period and offers explanations for its unusually high incidence during the most recent recession. The Trend in Long-Term Unemployment
The percentage of the labor force without jobs for longer than six months (the long-term unemployment rate)—like the unemployment rate—generally rises as economic activity falls. As the latest recession unfolded, the long-term unemployment rate increased from 0.9% in December 2007 to 2.9% in June 2009 (the official end of the recession). While restructuring in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries resulted in worker displacement, employees from these industries may be "better able to find alternative employment in other sectors of the economy because the skills they possess are more readily transferable to employment in other industries." This report compares the long-term unemployed at the end of the three most recent recessions (2007-2009, 2001, and 1990-1991). Figure 4 shows that in 2009 and 2001, unemployed women were as likely as unemployed men to be out-of-work for over half a year. In 1991, in contrast, unemployed women were significantly less likely than men to experience long-term joblessness. They were more likely to be without jobs for longer than 26 weeks in 2009, while their risk of long-term unemployment did not differ substantially from that of other educational groups in 2001 and 1991. Occupation
Both in 2009 and 2001, workers displaced from management, business, and financial occupations had a greater probability of being unemployed for more than six months compared to workers laid off from other occupations. Household Characteristics
Unemployment affects both the individuals who are without work and their families. This section compares workers who have been unemployed for 27 weeks or more with all unemployed workers and all employed workers. "All households" include married couples, single-parent households, and single individuals. The data from the CPS supplement have some limitations in analyzing the household characteristics of workers unemployed for more than six months. Since the supplement collects information for the previous year (when a long-term unemployed worker may have been employed), it may not fully capture the household characteristics of workers at the time the survey is conducted. Unemployed workers include both the long-term unemployed and other unemployed persons. Public Assistance and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Households that receive public assistance or benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program) have low incomes. In 2009, only 1.6% of the long-term unemployed received income from public assistance. Figure 12 shows that an estimated 55.2% of the long-term unemployed had health insurance coverage at some time during 2009. Homeownership
Employed workers are more likely than unemployed workers to own their own home. Figure 13 shows that in 2009, 71.0% of employed workers owned their own home, compared to 56.0% of unemployed workers and 57.7% of the long-term unemployed. Firms may also be reluctant to hire the long-term unemployed because they believe the group's skills have atrophied during their lengthy time away from the workplace. In addition, businesses may discriminate against older workers, who are more likely than younger workers to be among the long-term unemployed. Such a program may encourage high-tenure, high-wage workers to accept lower paying jobs in growing industries by compensating them for the difference in wages from their new and old jobs. | The recession that began in the United States in December 2007 and officially ended in June 2009 was one of the deepest and the longest since the Great Depression. One feature that distinguishes the recent recession from its postwar predecessors is the historically high percentage of workers who have been unemployed for more than six months (the long-term unemployed). This report analyzes the trend in long-term unemployment over the postwar period and offers explanations for its unusually high incidence during the most recent postwar recession. It compares the individual, job, and household characteristics of the long-term unemployed during the latest recession (2007-2009) with the long-term unemployed at the end of the two previous recessions (1990-1991 and 2001).
Long-term unemployment varies across individuals based on demographic and job characteristics. In each of the last three recessions, older unemployed workers were more likely than younger workers to have been unemployed for over six months. While an equal share of unemployed men and women were unemployed for over half a year during the last two recessions, unemployed women were less likely than men to have been out of work for 27 or more weeks at the end of the 1990-1991 recession. Unlike the two previous recessions, in 2009, unemployed workers with less than a high school education were more likely than unemployed workers with more education to have been out of work for at least six months. Also, in 2009, workers laid off from the financial activities and information industries were the most likely to have been jobless longer than 26 weeks. Workers displaced from management, business, and financial occupations were most at risk of long-term unemployment during recent recessions.
Unemployment affects both the individuals who are without work and their families. Households of the long-term unemployed have lower earnings and income than other households (where households include married couples, single parents, and single individuals). In 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, the long-term unemployed were more likely than all unemployed workers to live in households with incomes below the official poverty line. They were more likely than other unemployed workers to receive benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program) or be covered by Medicaid. In 2009, only 1.6% of the long-term unemployed received public assistance.
Slightly over half (55%) of the long-term unemployed had some type of health insurance coverage at some time during 2009, compared to a larger majority (83%) of employed workers. Although a small majority (58%) of the long-term unemployed were homeowners in 2009, they were less likely than employed workers (71%) to own their own homes.
As the economy recovers and employers increase hiring to meet the growing demand for goods and services, many currently unemployed workers will be able to find new jobs. However, finding work may be more difficult for the long-term unemployed if, for example, employers believe that their skills have deteriorated during their lengthy time away from the workplace. The long-term unemployed displaced from industries in which restructuring has occurred may also have a hard time finding new jobs in other industries, especially if the jobs require skills different from those they possess. Policies to encourage employers to hire the long-term unemployed include wage and training subsidies. Offering wage insurance and reemployment bonuses to unemployed workers may encourage them to accept jobs sooner than they otherwise might have. |
crs_R40641 | crs_R40641_0 | Introduction
An "inherently governmental function" is one that, as a matter of law and policy, must be performed by federal government employees and cannot be contracted out because it is "intimately related to the public interest." Concerned that the existence of multiple and/or inconsistent definitions of "inherently governmental functions" might be partly responsible for the alleged contracting out of inherently governmental functions by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies, the 110 th Congress enacted legislation ( P.L. 110-417 ) requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a "single consistent definition" of "inherently governmental functions." This definition is to "ensure that the head of each ... agency is able to identify each position within that department or agency that exercises an inherently governmental function." In response, on March 31, 2010, OMB, through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, issued a proposed policy letter which would adopt the FAIR Act definition as the single definition. Background
The current debate over which functions are inherently governmental is part of a larger debate about the proper role of the federal government vis-à-vis the private sector that is as old as the Republic itself. One key test focuses upon functions "affected with the public interest." The Public/Private Debate Surrounding Federal Contracting
Since World War I, one of the primary arenas for the public/private debate and the definition of inherently governmental functions has been federal contracting. These statutes greatly changed the federal procurement landscape, although they did not directly address which functions the government must perform (i.e., what is inherently governmental). Current Definitions of "Inherently Governmental Functions"
Two main definitions of inherently governmental functions currently exist within federal law and policy. One is a statutory definition, enacted as part of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. The other is a policy-oriented definition contained in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. Other statutes and regulations that define inherently governmental functions do so either by reproducing the language of the FAIR Act or OMB Circular A-76, or by incorporating the definitions of the FAIR Act or OMB Circular A-76 by reference. Other enacted legislation
requires the Secretary of Defense to include in the Annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report a "summary of the replacement during the preceding fiscal year of contract workyears providing support to major Department of Defense headquarters activities with military end strength or civilian full-time equivalents, including an estimate of the number of contract workyears associated with the replacement of contracts performing inherently governmental or exempt functions"; grants the Department of Defense authority to use appropriated funds available for the purchase of contract services that meet requirements anticipated to continue for five or more years to compensate civilian employees for performing the same requirements and calls for the promulgation of regulations ensuring that the department uses this authority to "build government capabilities that are needed to perform inherently governmental functions, functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and other critical functions"; classifies specific functions as inherently governmental; requires the Secretary of Defense to develop guidance related to personal service contracts establishing clear distinctions between DOD employees and the employees of DOD contractors; expresses the sense of Congress that
security operations for the protection of resources (including people, information, equipment, and supplies) in uncontrolled or unpredictable high-threat environments should ordinarily be performed by members of the Armed Forces if they will be performed in highly hazardous public areas where the risks are uncertain and could reasonably be expected to require deadly force
and requires that regulations to be issued under Section 862(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 ensure that private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in areas of combat operations; requires the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy to develop and issue a standard policy to prevent personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees performing acquisitions functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions; expresses Congress's sense that interrogation of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, retained persons, other detainees, terrorists, or criminals captured, confined, or detained during or in the aftermath of hostilities is an inherently governmental function and cannot appropriately be transferred to private sector contractors; requires DOD to develop guidelines and procedures to ensure that DOD considers using DOD civilian employees to perform new or currently contracted-out functions that are closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental functions, among other things; requires DOD to ensure that DOD's acquisition workforce is of the appropriate size and skill level to accomplish inherently governmental functions related to the acquisition of major systems and defines a "lead system integrator" as "a prime contractor under a contract for the procurement of services the primary purpose of which is to perform acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions with respect to the development or production of a major system"; requires the Commission on Wartime Contracting to make specific recommendations regarding, among other things, the process for determining which functions are inherently governmental in contingency operations, including whether providing security in an area of combat operations is inherently governmental; and requires OMB to develop an inventory to track contracts that, among other things, involve inherently governmental functions. The FAIR Act defines an inherently governmental function as "a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees," while OMB Circular A-76 defines an inherently governmental activity as an "activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel." to questions of policy (i.e., which of the functions that may lawfully be contracted out should be contracted out?). More Effective Oversight of Executive Branch Contracting Decisions
Congress receives some information about agencies' contracting decisions under the FAIR Act, but this information may be insufficient to enable Congress to adequately ascertain which functions agencies may be improperly contracting out. | An "inherently governmental function" is one that, as a matter of law and policy, must be performed by federal government employees and cannot be contracted out because it is "intimately related to the public interest." Two main definitions of "inherently governmental functions" currently exist within federal law and policy. One is a statutory definition, enacted as part of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. This definition states that an inherently governmental function is "a function so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." The other is a policy-oriented definition contained in OMB Circular A-76. This definition states that an inherently governmental activity is "an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel." Other statutes and regulations that define inherently governmental functions do so either by reproducing the language of the FAIR Act or OMB Circular A-76, or by incorporating one of these definitions by reference.
Concerned that the existence of multiple or inconsistent definitions of "inherently governmental functions" might be partly responsible for the alleged contracting out of inherently governmental functions by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies, the 110th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 110-417) requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a "single consistent definition" of "inherently governmental functions." This definition is to "ensure that the head of each ... agency is able to identify each position … that exercises an inherently governmental function." In response, on March 31, 2010, OMB, through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, issued a proposed policy letter which would adopt the FAIR Act definition as the single definition.
The current debate over which functions are inherently governmental is part of a larger debate about the proper role of the federal government vis-à-vis the private sector. This debate is as old as the Constitution, which prohibits privatization of certain functions (e.g., Congress's legislative function), a prohibition courts enforce under various judicial tests (e.g., nondelegation, functions "affected with the public interest," etc.). Since the 1920s, federal contracting has been a primary arena for the public/private debate, with the executive and legislative branches contesting (1) which functions the government must perform because they are inherently governmental; (2) which functions the government should perform because they are closely related to inherently governmental functions or for some policy reason; and (3) which functions should be left to the private sector.
Congress has several options if it is concerned that deficiencies in the existing definitions of inherently governmental functions may lead agencies to improperly contract out such functions. Options include (1) relying upon recent statutory changes and/or the policies of the Obama Administration, which proposes to limit contracting out generally, to effect desired changes in agency contracting; (2) changing the existing definition of "inherently governmental functions"; (3) placing limits on contracting out or use of appropriated funds; (4) addressing structural factors potentially prompting agencies to rely on contractors; (5) providing for more effective oversight of executive branch contracting decisions; and (6) focusing more on questions of contracting policy (i.e., what functions should the government perform?) than on contracting law (i.e., what functions must the government perform?). The 111th Congress has enacted or is considering several bills addressing inherently governmental functions, including P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-84, P.L. 111-117, H.R. 1436, H.R. 2142, H.R. 2177, H.R. 2682, H.R. 2736, H.R. 2868, and S. 924. |
crs_RL33257 | crs_RL33257_0 | Introduction
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are one way people can pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance) on a tax-advantaged basis. HSAs can be established and funded by eligible individuals when they have a qualifying high-deductible health plan (HDHP, i.e., high-deductible insurance) with a deductible in 2012 of at least $1,200 for self-only coverage and $2,400 for family coverage. With some exceptions, eligible individuals cannot have other health insurance coverage. HSA tax advantages can be significant for some people: contributions are deductible (or excluded from income that is taxable if made by employers), withdrawals are not taxed if used for medical expenses, and account earnings are tax-exempt. Unused balances may accumulate without limit. When coupled with high-deductible health plans, these accounts are part of what some call "consumer-driven health plans." One objective of these plans is to encourage individuals and families to set money aside for their health care expenses. Another is to give them a financial incentive for spending health care dollars prudently. Still another goal is to give them the means to pay for health care services of their own choosing, without constraint by insurers or employers. Since HSAs are still relatively new, the extent to which they will further these objectives is not yet known with any assurance, notwithstanding some early data. This report provides a summary of the principal rules governing HSAs, covering such matters as eligibility, qualifying health insurance, contributions, and withdrawals. It will be updated as the rules change, either by legislation or regulatory action. 109-432 ); and finally by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. Out-of-Pocket Limit
For self-only coverage, the annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits must not exceed $6,050 in 2012. For family policies, the limit must not exceed $12,100. Regular Contributions
The annual contribution limit in 2012 for self-only coverage is $3,100. The annual limit for family coverage is $6,250. Catch-Up Contributions
These contributions may be made by individuals who are at least 55 years of age but not yet enrolled in Medicare. In 2012, they may contribute an additional $1,000. | Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are one way people can pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance) on a tax-advantaged basis. HSAs can be established and funded by eligible individuals when they have a qualifying high-deductible health plan and no other health plan, with some exceptions. For 2012, the deductible for self-only coverage must be at least $1,200 (with an annual out-of-pocket limit not exceeding $6,050); the deductible for family coverage must be at least $2,400 (with an annual out-of-pocket limit not exceeding $12,100).
The annual HSA contribution limit in 2012 for individuals with self-only coverage is $3,100; for family coverage, it is $6,250. Individuals who are at least 55 years of age but not yet enrolled in Medicare may contribute an additional $1,000.
The tax advantages of HSAs can be significant for some people: contributions are deductible (or excluded from income that is taxable if made by employers), withdrawals are not taxed if used for medical expenses, and account earnings are tax-exempt. Unused balances may accumulate without limit.
HSAs and the accompanying high-deductible health plans are one form of what some call "consumer-driven health plans." One objective of these plans is to encourage individuals and families to set money aside for their health care expenses. Another is to give them a financial incentive for spending health care dollars prudently. Still another goal is to give them the means to pay for health care services of their own choosing, without constraint by insurers or employers. Since HSAs are still relatively new (they have been authorized for less than six years), the extent to which they will further these objectives is not yet known with any assurance, notwithstanding some early data.
This report is limited to a summary of the principal rules governing HSAs, covering such matters as eligibility, qualifying health insurance, contributions, and withdrawals. The major changes to HSAs in 2011 were a result of provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). These include changes to the definition of qualified expenses and increases to the penalty for distributions for non-qualified expenses. These are discussed in greater detail in this report.
This report will be updated as the rules change, either by legislation or regulatory action. |
crs_R43017 | crs_R43017_0 | Introduction
On March 12, 2013, Representative Paul Ryan, the chairman of the House Budget Committee, released the chairman's mark of the FY2014 House budget resolution. Additional detail on budgetary objectives and justifications was provided in Chairman Ryan's report entitled The Path to Prosperity: A Responsible Balanced Budget , issued the same day. The House Budget Committee considered the chairman's mark on March 13, 2013, and voted 22-17 to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 25 was introduced in the House March 15, 2013, and was accompanied by the House Budget Committee Report ( H.Rept. 113-17 ). The House agreed to H.Con.Res. 25 on March 21, 2013, by a vote of 221 to 207. The House budget resolution sets general budgetary parameters. In general, the budget proposal, as outlined in Chairman Ryan's Path to Prosperity report and in the committee report, suggests a change in the structure of the Medicare and Medicaid programs; the repeal of many of the provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , P.L. 111-152 ), including those that establish insurance exchanges; and changes to tort law governing medical malpractice. The collective details are referred to in this report as the "budget proposal" or Chairman Ryan's proposal. Long-Term Medicare Changes (FY2024 and Beyond)24
Starting in 2024, the Ryan budget proposal would phase in an increase in the age of eligibility for Medicare and would convert the current Medicare defined benefits program to a fixed federal contribution. 25 . The Path to Prosperity and the accompanying legislative language proposes to make two significant programmatic changes to the Medicaid program. Conversion of Medicaid to a Block Grant System
Another "illustrative policy option" included in the committee report is the restructuring of Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program. Repeal of Certain Private Health Insurance Provisions in ACA
H.Con.Res. | On March 12, 2013, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan released the chairman's mark of the FY2014 House budget resolution together with his report entitled The Path to Prosperity: A Responsible Balanced Budget, which outlines his budgetary objectives. The House Budget Committee considered and amended the chairman's mark on March 13, 2013, and voted to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 25 was introduced in the House March 15, 2013, and was accompanied by the committee report (H.Rept. 113-17). H.Con.Res. 25 was agreed to by the House on March 21, 2013.
A budget resolution provides general budgetary parameters; however, it is not a law. Changes to programs that are assumed or suggested by the budget resolution would still need to be enacted in separate legislation. Chairman Ryan's budget proposal, as outlined in his report and in the committee report, suggests short-term and long-term changes to federal health care programs including to Medicare, Medicaid, and the health insurance exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended (ACA, P.L. 111-148, P.L. 111-152).
Within the 10-year budget window (FY2014-FY2023), the budget proposal assumes that certain ACA provisions would be repealed, including those that expand Medicaid coverage to the non-elderly with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and those provisions that establish health insurance exchanges. The proposal also suggests restructuring Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program. Beyond the 10-year budget window, beginning in 2024, the budget proposal assumes an increase in the age of eligibility for Medicare and the conversion of Medicare to a fixed federal contribution program.
This report summarizes the proposed changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance as described in H.Con.Res. 25, the accompanying committee report, and Chairman Ryan's Path to Prosperity report. Additionally, it briefly examines the potential impact of the proposed changes on health care spending and coverage. |
crs_RS20476 | crs_RS20476_0 | Xinjiang was designated as an autonomous region for ethnic minorities and became formally known as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 1955. The PRC has been the target of bombings, sabotage, and other terrorist attacks, primarily thought to be committed by small groups of XUAR extremists. The PRC Constitution states:
All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal. China has signed or ratified several international human rights declarations, but Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both report that severe human rights violations occur in the XUAR. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the potential for Sino-U.S. cooperation against global terrorism may bring changes in the policy calculations of U.S. officials, who may seek to downplay traditional U.S. concerns in the interest of assuring PRC cooperation. | Since 1996, officials of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have seen an increasing security threat in the activities of minority nationalities in its heavily Muslim Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in China's far northwest. The PRC has been the target of bombings, sabotage, and other terrorist attacks, primarily thought to be committed by small groups of XUAR extremists (largely Uighurs). As a result, Beijing has increased police actions in the region, which many human rights organizations and Members of Congress allege have resulted in gross and increasing human rights violations. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, U.S. policymakers are faced with balancing these human rights concerns with what now appear to be common Sino-U.S. interests in combating fundamentalist global terrorism. |
crs_RL32733 | crs_RL32733_0 | Conditions in the Region
The Latin America and Caribbean region has made enormous strides over the past two decades in political development, with all countries but Cuba having regular free and fair elections for head of state. Despite this democratic progress, several nations face considerable challenges that could threaten political stability, including persistent poverty, violent guerrilla conflicts, autocratic leaders, drug trafficking, increasing crime, and the rise of radical populism in several Latin American countries. Presidents were re-elected in four races—Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, and Venezuela—and in five countries, former heads of government returned to power—Costa Rica, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, and St. Lucia. Only Guyana experienced an economic setback of 3% in 2005. U.S. Policy Overview
Legislative and oversight attention to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 109 th Congress focused on continued counternarcotics efforts in the region; trade issues, including the approval of implementing legislation for the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA); challenges to democracy in the region, especially in Venezuela; efforts to bring political stability and ameliorate poverty in Haiti; efforts to foster political change in Cuba; and cooperation on migration, border security, and anti-terrorism measures, especially with Mexico. From FY2000-FY2006, the United States has provided around $5 billion for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), the primary U.S. program supporting the Colombian government's efforts to combat drug trafficking and terrorist activity perpetrated by guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The 109 th Congress approved the Administration's request to continue ACI funding in FY2006 at approximately the same levels as in previous years. Action was not completed on FY2007 foreign aid appropriations, so the 110 th Congress will need to take action early in 2007. In the trade arena, Congress approved legislation in July 2005 ( P.L. 109-53 , signed into law August 2, 2005) implementing the DR-CAFTA that had been completed in 2004. In 2006, free trade agreements (FTAs) with Peru and Colombia were signed in April and November, respectively, and on December 19, U.S.-Panamanian FTA negotiations were completed. Implementing legislation for all three countries could be introduced early in the 110 th Congress. In late 2006, Congress also extended trade preferences for Andean imports and approved a special trade preferences measure for imports from Haiti as part of a trade and tax-extension bill ( P.L. 109-432 , Division D, Titles V and VII). With regard to democracy and political stability, Congress focused on continued support to Haiti, the hemisphere's poorest nation, under the new government of Rene Preval. Venezuela—a major supplier of oil to the United States—remained a congressional concern because of fears that President Hugo Chávez was using his political power to push toward authoritarian rule and to support leftist groups in other Latin American countries. With regard to U.S. policy toward Communist Cuba, Congress has continued to focus on the poor human rights situation and to debate whether loosening or tightening the U.S. embargo will encourage political change. 4437 and S. 2611 ), but did not complete action on the measures. | Over the past two decades, the Latin America and Caribbean region has made enormous strides in terms of political and economic development. In 2006, elections for head of government were held in 12 countries in the region, including the close election in Mexico in July, the re-election of presidents in Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, and Venezuela, and the election of former heads of government in Costa Rica, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, and St. Lucia. Although the region overall experienced an economic setback in 2002-2003, it has rebounded since 2004. Nevertheless, several nations faced considerable challenges that threatened political stability, including persistent poverty, violent guerrilla conflicts, autocratic leaders, drug trafficking, increasing crime, and the rise of a new form of populism in several countries.
Legislative and oversight attention to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 109th Congress focused on continued counternarcotics efforts; trade issues; challenges to democracy, especially in Venezuela; efforts to bring political stability and ameliorate poverty in Haiti; efforts to foster political change in Cuba; and cooperation on migration and border security, especially with Mexico. Since 2000, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) has been the primary U.S. program supporting the Colombian government's efforts to combat drug trafficking and terrorist activity perpetrated by guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In the first session, the 109th Congress approved the Administration's request to continue ACI funding in FY2006 at approximately the same levels as in previous years; the second session considered, but did not complete action, on the FY2007ACI request of $721.5 million, so the 110th Congress will need to take action early in 2007.
In the trade arena, Congress approved legislation in 2005 (P.L. 109-53) implementing the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) that had been completed in 2004. In 2006, free trade agreements (FTAs) with Peru and Colombia were signed in April and November, respectively, and on December 19, U.S.-Panamanian FTA negotiations were completed. Implementing legislation for all three countries could be introduced early in the 110th Congress. In late 2006, Congress also extended preferences for Andean imports and approved a special trade preferences measure for imports from Haiti as part of a trade and tax-extension bill (P.L. 109-432, Division D, Titles V and VII).
With regard to democracy, Congress provided continued support to Haiti, the hemisphere's poorest nation, under the new government of Rene Preval. Venezuela remained a congressional concern because of fears that President Hugo Chávez has been using his political power to push toward authoritarian rule. With regard to U.S. policy toward Cuba, Congress continued to debate whether loosening or tightening the U.S. embargo would encourage political change.
This report provides an overview of U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, focusing on the role of Congress and congressional concerns in the 109th Congress. It reflects final actions of the 109th Congress and will not be updated. For further information, see the CRS products listed after each topic. |
crs_R43242 | crs_R43242_0 | An exchange rate is the price of a country's currency relative to other currencies. At the heart of disagreements is whether or not countries are using policies to intentionally push down the value of their currency in order to gain a trade advantage at the expense of other countries. A weak currency makes exports cheaper to foreigners and imports more expensive to domestic consumers. This can lead to higher production of exports and import-competing goods, which could help spur export-led growth and job creation in the export sector. Instead, consumers and certain sectors may benefit when other countries have weak currencies. Specific Debates over Exchange Rates
In current debates about exchange rates and whether countries are engaged in unfair currency policies to weaken their currencies, two major types of concerns have been raised: first, concerns about countries engaged in interventions in foreign currency markets, and second, concerns about the effects of expansionary monetary policies in some developed countries on exchange rate levels. U.S. Laws Addressing Currency Manipulation
Some Members' concerns about currency manipulation and its impact on U.S. producers and workers have led to legislation over the past several decades. These designations occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s; Treasury has not determined that currency manipulation has occurred under the terms of the 1988 Trade Act since it last cited China in 1994. 114-26 ), the most recent TPA legislation signed into law in June 2015, includes for the first time principal negotiating objectives addressing currency manipulation. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
Currency manipulation is addressed in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act ( P.L. If a country has failed to adopt appropriate policies to correct the currency undervaluation and surplus after a year of enhanced bilateral engagement, the President is to take one or more of the following actions:
Prohibit the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) from approving any new financing for a project in that country; Prohibit the federal government from procuring goods or services from that country, as long as it can be done in a manner that is consistent with U.S. obligations under international agreements and would not impose an unreasonable cost on U.S. taxpayers; Instruct the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to call for additional rigorous surveillance of the macroeconomic and exchange rate policies of that country and, as appropriate, formal consultations on findings of currency manipulation; and/or Instruct the U.S. Trade Representative to take into account the extent to which the country has failed to adopt appropriate policies to correct undervaluation and surpluses in assessing whether to enter into bilateral or regional trade agreement with that country or participate in negotiations with respect to a bilateral or regional trade agreement with that country. To date, the IMF has never publicly cited a member country for currency manipulation. In the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trump Administration has identified combatting currency manipulation as a negotiating objective. In March 2018, the Administration announced that, through negotiating modifications to the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), the Treasury Department was finalizing a side agreement on currency with South Korea. South Korea has periodically intervened in foreign exchange markets to weaken its currency. During the 2016 presidential campaign, combatting currency manipulation, particularly by China, was a key issue for Donald Trump. Since assuming office, President Trump has continued to express concerns about the exchange rate policies of other countries, although the Treasury Department has not formally labeled a country as a currency manipulator. There are a number of options for doing so, some of which Members have pursued through legislation. Lower-cost imports may benefit U.S. businesses that purchase inputs from abroad and U.S. consumers. Some analysts have argued that stricter international rules on currency manipulation could place constraints on U.S. monetary policy, because monetary policy can indirectly impact the value of the U.S. dollar against other currencies. 114-125 ). The 114 th Congress addressed currency manipulation through TPA and customs legislation. | Exchange rates are among the most important prices in the global economy. They affect the price of every country's imports and exports, as well as the value of every overseas investment. Over the past decade, some Members of Congress have been concerned that foreign countries are using exchange rate policies to gain an unfair trade advantage against other countries, or "manipulating" their currencies. Congressional concerns have focused on China's foreign exchange interventions over the past decade to weaken its currency against the U.S. dollar, although concerns have also been raised about a number of other countries pursuing similar policies.
At the heart of disagreements is whether or not countries are using policies to undermine free markets and intentionally push down the value of their currency. A weak currency makes exports cheaper to foreigners, which can lead to higher exports and job creation in the export sector. There can also be implications for other countries. From the U.S. perspective, U.S exporters and U.S. firms producing import-sensitive goods may find it harder to compete in global markets. However, U.S. consumers and U.S. businesses that rely on inputs from abroad may benefit when other countries have weak currencies, because imports may become less expensive. When foreign countries intervene in foreign exchange markets, it may also help lower U.S. borrowing costs.
Through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), countries have committed to avoiding currency manipulation. There are also provisions in U.S. law to address currency manipulation by other countries. The IMF has never cited a country for currency manipulation, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury has not done so since it last cited China in 1994. There are differing views on why. Some argue that countries have not engaged in policies that violate international commitments on exchange rates or triggered provisions in U.S. law relating to currency manipulation. Others argue that currency manipulation has occurred, but the provisions do not effectively respond to exchange rate disputes.
Legislation in the 114th Congress
The 114th Congress responded to concerns about currency manipulation through Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and customs legislation. TPA legislation signed into law in June 2015 (P.L. 114-26) included, for the first time, principal negotiating objectives addressing currency manipulation in trade agreements. Currency manipulation was also addressed in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125). It enhanced Treasury reporting and bilateral engagement on exchange rate issues, and led to the creation of a new Treasury "monitoring list" on currency manipulation.
Recent Developments
During the 2016 presidential campaign, combatting currency manipulation, particularly by China, was a key issue for Donald Trump. Since assuming office, President Trump has continued to express concerns about the exchange rate policies of other countries, although the Treasury Department has not formally labeled a country as a currency manipulator. In the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trump Administration has identified combatting currency manipulation as a negotiating objective. In March 2018, the Administration announced that, through negotiating modifications to the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), the Treasury Department was finalizing a side agreement on currency with South Korea. |
crs_R40593 | crs_R40593_0 | Political and Economic Situation
Background
Costa Rica is a politically stable Central American country of 4.3 million people with a relatively well-developed economy. Arias Administration
Oscar Arias, a former president (1986-1990) and Nobel-laureate, was elected president in February 2006. Throughout his term, President Arias has advanced so-called "third-way" policies, embracing his party's traditional support for social welfare programs while rejecting state-led development in favor of market-oriented economic policies. Arias has sought to complement Costa Rica's considerable economic growth with moderate social welfare programs. These social investments, combined with substantial economic growth, have provided Costa Rica's citizens with a relatively high standard of living. Economic and social conditions have deteriorated recently, however, as a result of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession. Analysts assert that Costa Rica's economy showed signs of recovery in late 2009, and expect the country to rebound in 2010 with GDP growth of 3.3%. Former Vice President and Minister of Justice Laura Chinchilla (2006-2008) of the ruling PLN was elected president with 46.9% of the vote, well above the 40% needed to avoid a second-round runoff. Prospects for the Chinchilla Administration
Chinchilla is closely tied to President Arias' centrist faction of the PLN and is expected to largely continue the Arias Administration's policies. Throughout much of the electoral campaign, Chinchilla focused on improving public security. Costa Rica's unicameral National Assembly will present Chinchilla with considerable challenges in implementing her policy agenda. Environmental Leadership
Successive Costa Rican administrations have sought to address extensive deforestation and environmental degradation that resulted from decades of logging and agricultural expansion. The country's strong conservation system and innovative policies have done much to restore Costa Rica's environment and ecotourism has provided a significant source of economic growth. Costa Rica's efforts also have led many observers to recognize it as a world leader in environmental protection and have enabled the country to play an outsized role in the formulation of global environmental policies. Despite these accomplishments, some maintain that there are a number of environmental problems that must still be addressed by the country. U.S.-Costa Rican Relations
Relations between the United States and Costa Rica traditionally have been strong as a result of common commitments to democracy, free trade, and human rights. Costa Rica finally implemented CAFTA-DR in January 2009. U.S. Assistance
For more than a decade, Costa Rica has not been a large recipient of U.S. assistance as a result of its relatively high level of development; however, this is likely to change somewhat as a result of the "Mérida Initiative" and its successor program, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Free Trade Agreement
In August 2004, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the trade ministers from the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). | Costa Rica is a politically stable Central American nation with a relatively well-developed economy. Former president (1986-1990) and Nobel-laureate Oscar Arias of the historically center-left National Liberation Party was elected President in 2006. Throughout his term, Arias has advanced so-called "third-way" policies, embracing his party's traditional support for social welfare programs while rejecting state-led development in favor of market-oriented economic policies. Considerable economic growth and social protection programs have provided Costa Rica's citizens with a relatively high standard of living, however, conditions have deteriorated recently as a result of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession. Although Costa Rica's economy contracted and poverty increased in 2009, analysts believe President Arias' ambitious fiscal stimulus and social protection plan and improving global economic conditions should aid recovery in 2010.
On February 7, 2010, former Vice President Laura Chinchilla (2006-2008) of the ruling National Liberation Party was elected president, easily defeating her competitors. Chinchilla, who is closely tied to President Arias and the centrist faction of her party, will be Costa Rica's first female president. Throughout the campaign, Chinchilla pledged to maintain the Arias Administration's economic and social welfare policies while improving public security. She will need to form cross-party alliances to implement her policy agenda, however, as her party will lack a majority in Costa Rica's unicameral National Assembly. Chinchilla and the new legislature are scheduled to take office in May 2010.
Successive Costa Rican administrations have sought to address extensive deforestation and environmental degradation that resulted from decades of logging and agricultural expansion. The country's strong conservation system and innovative policies have done much to restore Costa Rica's environment and ecotourism has provided a significant source of economic growth. Costa Rica's efforts also have led many observers to recognize it as a world leader in environmental protection and have enabled the country to play an outsized role in the formulation of global environmental policies. Nonetheless, some maintain that a number of environmental problems in Costa Rica remain unaddressed.
The United States and Costa Rica have long enjoyed close relations as a result of the countries' shared commitments to strengthening democracy, improving human rights, and advancing free trade. The countries have also maintained strong commercial ties, which are likely to become even more extensive as a result of President Arias' efforts to secure ratification and implementation of CAFTA-DR. On April 28, 2009, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 76 (Burton), which mourns the loss of life in Costa Rica and Guatemala that resulted from natural disasters that occurred in January 2009. The resolution also expresses the senses of the House, that the U.S. government should continue providing technical assistance relating to disaster preparedness to Central American governments.
This report examines recent political and economic developments in Costa Rica as well as issues in U.S.-Costa Rica relations. For additional information, see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34039 | crs_RL34039_0 | On April 25, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan named Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to be the AKP's candidate for president. Nonetheless, secularists considered him to be a controversial candidate partly because of his prominent role in two past, banned, Islamist parties and mainly because his wife wears a strictly Islamic head scarf covering all of her hair (called a turban in Turkey). Power
The opposition also argued that Erdogan's insistence on an AKP president threatened Turkey's balance of powers. The AKP already controlled the prime ministry and parliament. Even before Erdogan's nomination of Gul, CHP leader Deniz Baykal had urged other parties in parliament to boycott the first round of the vote for president in order to deprive the AKP of the votes required to elect its candidate and to force early national elections. CHP then petitioned the Constitutional Court to nullify the vote. The AKP government has passed reforms to diminish the role of the military and to comply with European Union (EU) demands for civilian control over the military. Some secularists appeared to wish openly that the military would intervene in the process. He also proposed constitutional amendments to provide for the direct election of the president in two rounds, a five-year presidential term with the possibility of a reelection (instead of the current single seven-year term), a reduction in the term of parliament from five years to four, definition of the parliamentary quorum at 184 for both sessions and elections, and a lowering of the age of eligibility for Members of Parliament to 25. On July 5, the Court rejected the President's appeal, paving the way for a referendum on the amendments to be held on October 21, when they probably will be approved. Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections were held on July 22 instead of November 4, as otherwise scheduled. (The PKK is a Turkish Kurdish terrorist group that has taken safe haven in northern Iraq.) Analysis of Parties and Leaders
The electoral contest was not a simple one between Islamists and secularists or the AKP and the military; it was simultaneously both of these and more. By contrast, the U.S. Constitution defines a working congressional quorum as a majority. Nonetheless, most also agree that the military will be watching Gul to see if he is true to the words of his inaugural address, in which he said that he would advocate and strengthen the constitutional principles that the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state of law. His greatest challenge may be pursuing a "policy of unity." The European Union Factor
The prospect of EU membership had limited influence during the electoral crisis. Europeans are increasingly opposed to Turkey's accession. After the Turkish military intervention via the internet, U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormick said on April 30, "We have real confidence in Turkey's democracy and we have confidence in their constitutional processes and that all the parties involved in the election of the new president will abide by those constitutional processes." | The effort of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to elect one of its own to be president of the Republic provoked a crisis. The nominee, the otherwise respected Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, has roots in Turkey's Islamist movement and his wife wears a head scarf, which some secularists consider a symbol of both Islamism and backwardness. Moreover, because AKP already controls the prime ministry and parliament, it was argued that the balance of political power would be disturbed if the party also assumed the presidency.
The opposition engaged in mass demonstrations, boycotted the first round of the vote for president in parliament, and petitioned the Constitutional Court to annul the vote, while the General Staff of the armed forces warned that the military would act if "needs be" as the defender of secularism. After the Court invalidated the vote, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called early national elections and proposed a package of constitutional amendments, including one for the direct election of president. A national referendum on the amendments will be held on October 21.
National elections were held on July 22. AKP registered a victory of historic proportions, while two opposition parties and many independents also won seats in parliament. On August 28, the new legislature elected Gul president. The military and others will be closely monitoring his performance for Islamist tendencies. Meanwhile, the Erdogan government has a challenging program, including drafting a new constitution and advancing economic reforms.
During the crisis, the European Union and the U.S. government had urged Turks to adhere to their constitutional processes and warned the military not to intervene. Turkey is a candidate for EU membership, but the EU's influence in Turkey is limited because some European countries and many Turks have lost their enthusiasm for Turkey's accession. The official U.S. reaction to events appeared to lag behind that of the EU, with Washington issuing a somewhat belated warning to the military. Terrorism was a major issue in the campaign, and tensions between Turkey and the United States continue over U.S. inaction against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Turkish terrorist group harbored in northern Iraq. AKP's views on this issue are somewhat more considered than the nationalist opposition parties in parliament. Prime Minister Erdogan is pursuing a diplomatic approach, but the possibility of a Turkish military incursion into Iraq with attendant consequences for relations with the United States and Iraqi stability persists. This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R40484 | crs_R40484_0 | Introduction
The 114 th Congress may demonstrate an interest in U.S. ratification of the United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as CRC or the Convention), particularly if the Obama Administration submits it to the Senate for its advice and consent. CRC is an international treaty that addresses the rights of children worldwide. It calls on States Parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that children receive special rights, including the right to a name and nationality; access to healthcare, education, and parental care; and protection from exploitation, abuse, and neglect. CRC entered into force on September 2, 1990, and 195 countries are currently party to the Convention, making it the most widely ratified human rights treaty. Past Administrations have generally supported the overall objectives of CRC, but have had concerns as to whether the Convention is the most effective mechanism for addressing children's rights domestically and abroad. The George W. Bush Administration did not support ratification of CRC, citing "serious political and legal concerns" with the treaty. It questioned the impact of U.S. ratification on state and federal laws and argued that the treaty was at odds with the emphasis of the United States on the duty of parents to protect and care for their children. The election of President Obama brought renewed attention to the possibility of U.S. ratification of the Convention. CRC calls for the protection of children from economic, sexual, and other forms of exploitation; torture; and capital punishment for offenses committed before the age of 18. U.S. Actions
The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the President has not transmitted CRC to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Congressional opponents of U.S. ratification argue that the treaty would undermine U.S. sovereignty, particularly in policy areas traditionally addressed by states—including education and juvenile justice. Policy Issues
The question of U.S. ratification of CRC has generated passionate debate. Federal and State Laws
Perhaps more than other human rights treaties, CRC addresses areas that are usually considered to be primarily or exclusively under the jurisdiction of state or local governments. U.S. Supporters of the Convention emphasize that it was established not to circumvent the role of parents but to protect children against government intrusion and abuse. Many CRC advocates also emphasize what they view as the Convention's strong support for the role of parents and the family structure. As evidence of this, they emphasize that countries that many regard as abusers of children's rights—including Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and China—are party to the Convention. Supporters of CRC contend that it has enhanced children's rights in a number of countries that have ratified the Convention. The Convention as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy
Many CRC supporters hold that ratification of the Convention would strengthen U.S. credibility abroad and give the United States additional fora in which to pursue the advancement of children's rights. Further, some argue that U.S. ratification would provide the United States with an opportunity to influence international laws and standards in the area of children's rights. | U.S. ratification of the United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as CRC or the Convention) may be a key area of focus during the 114th Congress, particularly if President Barack Obama seeks the advice and consent of the Senate.
Background and Current Status
CRC is an international treaty that aims to protect the rights of children worldwide. It defines a child as any human being under the age of 18, and calls on States Parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that children's rights are protected—including the right to a name and nationality; freedom of speech and thought; access to healthcare and education; and freedom from exploitation, torture, and abuse. CRC entered into force in September 1990, and has been ratified by 195 countries, making it the most widely ratified human rights treaty in the world. Two countries, the United States and Somalia, have not ratified the Convention. The President has not transmitted CRC to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
U.S. Actions
Despite widespread U.S. support for the overall objectives of the Convention, policymakers have raised concerns as to whether it is an effective mechanism for protecting children's rights. The Clinton Administration signed the Convention in February 1995, but did not submit it to the Senate primarily because of strong opposition from several Members of Congress. The George W. Bush Administration opposed CRC and expressed serious political and legal concerns with the treaty, arguing that it conflicted with U.S. laws regarding privacy and family rights. The election of President Obama in 2008 focused renewed attention on the possibility of U.S. ratification. For the past several years, the Administration has stated that it supports the goals of the Convention and that the decision to pursue ratification of CRC is being determined through an interagency policy review.
Issues for Congress
The question of U.S. ratification of CRC has generated contentious debate. Opponents argue that ratification would undermine U.S. sovereignty by giving the United Nations authority to determine the best interests of U.S. children. Some are also concerned that CRC could interfere in the private lives of families, particularly the rights of parents to educate or discipline their children. Moreover, some contend that CRC is an ineffective mechanism for protecting children's rights. They emphasize that countries widely regarded as abusers of children's rights, such as China and Sudan, are party to the Convention. On the other hand, supporters of U.S. ratification hold that CRC's intention is not to circumvent the role of parents but to protect children against government intrusion and abuse. Proponents emphasize what they view as CRC's strong support for the role of parents and the family structure. They also hold that U.S. federal and state laws generally meet the requirements of CRC, and that U.S. ratification would strengthen the United States' credibility when advocating children's rights abroad.
Perhaps more than other human rights treaties, CRC addresses areas usually considered to be primarily or exclusively under the jurisdiction of state or local governments, including education, juvenile justice, and access to healthcare. Some of these conflicting areas will likely need to be resolved by the executive branch and the Senate before the United States ratifies the Convention. |
crs_R41237 | crs_R41237_0 | Since at least the 1980s, the border has played a central role in the debate over how to provide domestic security in the United States. Thus, the current border protection framework can be summarized as securing and managing the U.S. border through obtaining effective control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying and disrupting transnational criminal organizations. The five strategic commonalities to achieve these goals consist of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership, deployment of layered security, maximizing domain awareness, promotion of a shared agency culture, and expansion of the border through international and domestic partnerships. For congressional policymakers, the current state of border protection presents at least three questions: (1) What does the current border protection framework consist of? (2) Is it working? and (3) Are there more effective alternatives to achieve border protection? Competing Models: The Fortress and the Complex Organism
For critics and advocates of U.S. border protection policy, there are a host of competing policy alternatives for how to effectively protect the border. While some individuals want more enforcement and stricter admission criteria, others want to lessen these restrictions on cross-border activity. Ultimately, while neither camp is seeking to make the U.S. population less secure, the policy choices for building border protection are rooted in competing visions of what U.S. border policy should look like. These visions can be grouped into at least two camps: (1) a unilateral security model, based on a metaphorical "fortress," and (2) an interdependence (or cooperation-based) model, based on a metaphorical "complex organism." As previously stated, what has emerged from these efforts has been a generally agreed upon framework of mission and goals, but some might question whether a comprehensive strategy has yet been sufficiently mapped out. The broad framework currently in place generally consists of a QHSR underpinning supported by a collection of agency or function specific strategic elements that show some commonalities. Empirical Conclusions
Analysis of available data suggests that despite some support for the viability of the current border protection approach it is not seemingly providing sufficient deterrence to overcome labor market demand for illegal workers. First, the present border protection operation is an incomplete version of what policymakers envisioned in their development of the homeland security apparatus. Conclusion
The border protection framework goals of obtaining operational control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying and disrupting transnational criminal organizations are necessarily vague, as the breadth of the threats and activities at the border are wide. But these goals are rooted in the notion that a strategy based on enforcement can ultimately prevent or deter most actions that are undesirable. This assumption has been the source of much debate and continues to be the source of skepticism in certain circles. As the empirical analysis above suggested, few conclusive claims about the effectiveness of the current border protection framework can be made. Yet, even if enforcement-only measures do provide some level of deterrence and prevention against border violations, these efforts are both costly and do not necessarily address the underlying causes of such activities. | Since at least the 1980s, the border has played a central role in U.S. policy discussions. Policymakers have for years debated the best strategy for providing border protection. What has emerged from these efforts has been a generally agreed upon framework of mission and goals. However, some question whether the strategy has been sufficiently mapped out in a comprehensive fashion. The broad framework currently in place is generally supported by a collection of agency or function-specific strategic elements that show some commonalities.
For congressional policymakers, the current state of border protection strategy presents at least three questions: (1) What does the current border protection framework consist of? (2) Is it working? and (3) Are there more effective alternatives to achieve border protection? This report addresses these three questions through two competing models for conceptualizing a border protection system, through the analysis of existing documentation and data, and through the presentation of various legislative options.
For critics and advocates of U.S. border protection policy, there are a host of competing policy alternatives for how to effectively protect the border. While some individuals want more enforcement and stricter admission criteria, others want to lessen these restrictions. Ultimately, the policy choices are rooted in competing visions of what U.S. border policy should look like. These visions can be grouped into at least two camps: (1) the unilateral security model based on a metaphorical "fortress" and (2) an interdependence (or cooperation-based) model based on a metaphorical "complex organism."
The current border protection framework can be understood as consisting of a mission, three goals, and five strategic elements. The mission is securing and managing the U.S. border. The current border protection framework can be summarized as obtaining effective control of the borders, safeguarding lawful trade and travel, and identifying and disrupting transnational criminal organizations. Finally, the five strategic elements to achieve these goals consist of Department of Homeland Security leadership, deployment of layered security, maximizing domain awareness, promotion of a shared agency culture, and expansion of the border through international and domestic partnerships.
Analysis of available data suggests that despite some support for the viability of the current border protection approach in its present state, it is not seemingly providing sufficient deterrence to overcome labor market demand for illegal workers. Yet, definitive conclusions of effectiveness cannot be made because the current border protection operation is an incomplete version of what policymakers envisioned.
The border protection framework goals are necessarily vague, as the breadth of the threats and activities at the border are wide. But these goals are rooted in the notion that a strategy based on enforcement can ultimately prevent or deter most actions that are undesirable. This assumption has been the source of much debate and continues to be the source of skepticism in certain circles. As suggested above, few conclusive claims about the effectiveness of the current border protection framework can be made. Yet, even if enforcement-only measures do provide some level of deterrence and prevention against border violations, these efforts are both costly and do not necessarily address the underlying causes of such activities. Moreover, they can have unintended consequences. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45180 | crs_R45180_0 | Introduction
Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government's trade and development functions to advance various U.S. policy objectives. In the United States, the primary provider of development finance is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), but other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), also provide development finance. Moreover, potential reorganization of the executive branch has been a broader interest of the Trump Administration. The President's FY2019 budget proposed the consolidation of OPIC and other agency development finance functions, specifically noting the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of USAID, into a new U.S. development finance agency to advance a number of U.S. policy objectives. In February 2018, two proposed versions of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, H.R. 5105 in the House and S. 2463 in the Senate, were introduced on a bipartisan, bicameral basis to create a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). A major difference between the two bills, as introduced, was that S. 2463 H.R. Stakeholders differ in their views of particular aspects of the DFI proposal and certain issues remain open questions. In June 2018, the White House published a government-wide reorganization plan. Modifying Development Finance Functions
At the outset, Congress may consider the rationales for and against the United States being involved in development finance and modifying that involvement. A proposal to create a new DFI has been in the making for some time. Structuring a New DFI
If Congress pursues reorganization, it faces a number of issues regarding how to structure the proposed new DFI. Objective
The BUILD Act would create a new International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), a wholly owned U.S. government corporation, by consolidating all of OPIC's functions and USAID's DCA, enterprise funds, and development finance technical support functions. The Administration proposal and the legislation both call for USAID to transfer the Development Credit Authority to the new DFI. | Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government's trade and development functions to advance various policy objectives. In its 2019 budget request, the Trump Administration included a proposal to consolidate the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and other agency development finance functions, specifically noting the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), into a new U.S. development finance agency. The policy objectives that the new agency would aim to support include enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government functions and advancing U.S. national security interests. The Administration also proposed the creation of a new Development Finance Institution as part of a comprehensive government-wide reform and reorganization plan released in June 2018.
In February 2018, two proposed versions of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, H.R. 5105 in the House and S. 2463 in the Senate, were introduced on a bipartisan, bicameral basis to create a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). The companion bills would consolidate all of OPIC's functions and the DCA, enterprise funds, and development finance technical support functions of USAID. While there were some significant discrepancies between the two bills, as introduced, including the period of authorization, amendments made in both chambers have bridged some differences. Stakeholders differ in their views of particular aspects of the proposal and certain issues remain open questions.
Congress would play a major role in any reorganization of federal development finance functions. The proposal to create a new U.S. government agency involves legislative, oversight, and appropriations functions. Key questions for Congress may include the following:
What are the rationales for and against modifying and expanding OPIC's functions? Should development finance functions be reorganized or should alternative approaches be considered? If reorganization is pursued, how should a new development finance institution (DFI) be structured? How should a proposed new DFI be funded? What implications would a proposed new DFI have for USAID and U.S. development objectives? How can adequate coordination be ensured between the new DFI and other U.S. government agencies involved in development? What are the competitiveness and other strategic implications of the proposed DFI? |
crs_RL31630 | crs_RL31630_0 | Between FY2001 and FY2004, there were no other federal funds available for the specific purpose of reimbursing hospitals or states for emergency medical care provided to unauthorized aliens. On December 8, 2003 the President signed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 ( P.L. Additionally it is extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of money spent for emergency medical care for unauthorized aliens since most hospitals do not ask patients their immigration status. This language from the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 restates and carries forward a provision which had been enacted 10 years previously as an amendment to the Medicaid provisions of the Social Security Act. Funding for Emergency Services Prior to P.L. The federal government is wholly responsible for establishing immigration policy, and for policing the borders to keep out unauthorized aliens. However, others note that the provisions in PRWORA which limited immigrant access to public benefits were the result of a desire that immigrants be self-sufficient and not rely on public resources to meet their needs. Additionally, proponents of the provisions in PRWORA did not want the availability of public benefits to constitute an incentive for immigrants to migrate to the United States. Reimbursement of Certain Emergency Medical Expenses
In addition, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 authorized reimbursement of public hospitals and certain nonprofit hospitals for emergency medical assistance to unauthorized aliens. Reimbursement for Emergency Ambulance Services
IIRIRA also authorized reimbursement of state and local governments for emergency ambulance services provided aliens injured while crossing U.S. borders while in state custody. These programs would have been similar to the one created in BBA97. 108-173
Section 1011 of The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-173 ) signed into law on December 8, 2003, provides reimbursement states for emergency care afforded to unauthorized aliens. For each fiscal year FY2005-FY2008 the provision appropriates $250 million of which:
$167 million is allotted to states based on the percentage of unauthorized aliens residing in the state compared to the total number of unauthorized aliens in the United States; and $83 million is allocated to the six states with the highest percentage of unauthorized alien apprehensions for the fiscal year, based on the percentage of apprehensions in the state compared to the number of apprehensions for all such states. 1515 would provide reimbursement for the unreimbursed costs of emergency medical care to aliens paroled into the United States for medical reasons. H.R. Thus, they argue that the burden to pay for immigration-related cost should be born by the federal government, not the states. | There has been interest in the amount of money spent, as well as the amount of federal funds available to provide emergency medical care to unauthorized (illegal) aliens in the United States. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of money spent for emergency medical care for unauthorized aliens since most hospitals do not ask patients their immigration status. Additionally, prior to the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-173) on December 8, 2003 there were no federal funds available for the specific purpose of reimbursing hospitals or states for emergency medical care provided to unauthorized aliens (undocumented immigrants).
Although the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) barred unauthorized aliens from receiving most Medicaid benefits, they are eligible for emergency Medicaid services. Unauthorized aliens are also eligible for emergency medical services provided by the states.
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-173) signed into law on December 8, 2003 includes a provision, §1011, to provide reimbursement to states for emergency care afforded to unauthorized aliens. For each fiscal year FY2005-FY2008 the provision appropriates $250 million to states to be distributed based on estimates of the number of undocumented aliens residing in the state and on the number of apprehensions for the six states with the highest number of apprehensions. This program is similar to one created in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97) which had expired.
In addition, the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) authorized reimbursement of public hospitals and certain nonprofit hospitals for emergency medical assistance to unauthorized aliens, and reimbursement of state and local governments for emergency ambulance services provided aliens injured while crossing U.S. borders while in custody. Neither program has been funded. However, in FY1998 Congress appropriated money for a pilot program in Nogales, Arizona to attempt to reimburse state and local governments for ambulance services. INS concluded from the pilot program that reimbursement for ambulance services was not a feasible program. H.R. 1515 would provide reimbursement for the costs of emergency medical care and ambulance services furnished to aliens paroled for medical reasons.
The provisions in PRWORA which limited immigrant access to public benefits were the result of the desire that immigrants be self-sufficient and not rely on public resources to meet their needs. Additionally, proponents did not want the availability of public benefits to constitute an incentive for immigrants to migrate to the United States. Nonetheless, many contend that since the federal government is wholly responsible for establishing immigration policy, and for policing the borders to keep out unauthorized aliens the burden to pay for immigration related costs should be born by the federal government not the states. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_98-207 | crs_98-207_0 | The request was larger than the FY1998 appropriation of $21.2 billion. The Senate approved S. 2138 for $21.4 billion onJune 18,1998 by a vote of 98-1. TheHouse approved its version of the bill ( H.R. 4060 ) by a vote of 405-4 on June 22, 1998 for $21.1 billion. Theconference agreement, for $21.2billion, was reported out ( H.Rept. 105-749 ) on September 25, 1998, approved by the House on September 28, 1998,and approved by the Senate one day later,September 29, 1998. The President signed the bill ( P.L. 105-245 ) October 7, 1998. 105-277 ) added money to several programs funded inthe Energy and Water Appropriations bill, including theCorps of Engineers, DOE's renewable energy program and its defense activities program, and TVA. This additionalfunding is not incorporated in the budgettables that follow, but significant changes are noted in the text under Key Policy Issues. Energy and Water Development Appropriations TitleI: Corps of Engineers (in millions ofdollars)
Key Policy Issues
Funding for the Corps of Engineers civil programs is often a contentious issue between the Administration and the Congress, with appropriations typically endingup significantly higher than the amount requested. Title II: Department of the Interior
Table 4. Energy and Water Development Appropriations TitleII: Central Utah Project CompletionAccount (in millions of dollars)
* Includes funds available for Utah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation Commission activities and $5 million for the contribution authorized by �402(b)(2)of the Central Utah Project Completion Act ( P.L. Energy and Water Development Appropriations TitleIII: Department of Energy (in millions ofdollars)
*Senate bill increased solar and renewable funding by $70 million and decreased other programs by 1.6%. For civilian R&D programs, the request was $3.49 billion comparedwith $3.10 billion for FY1998, and for defenseR&D (nuclear weapons) programs, the request was $3.28 billion compared with $3.02 billion for FY1998. For nuclear energy programs -- including research and development, closing of surplus facilities,uranium programs, and international nuclear reactor safety -- the conference report provides $284 million, about$40 million below the DOE request. However, the House had cut theAdministration request by nearly $100 million, including a reduction of the nuclear energy research initiative to $5million and rejection of the nuclear plantoptimization program. Science. Theconferees did not provide any funds for DOE's portion of the Administration's Next Generation Internet initiative. Thedefense-related funding includes $228 million for the"privatization" of DOE waste management projects, such as the solidification of high-level radioactive waste atHanford, Washington -- less than half the DOErequest. The FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act( P.L. Energy and Water Development Appropriations TitleIV: Independent Agencies (in millions ofdollars)
Key Policy Issues
Tennessee Valley Authority. Despite the language in the conference report, and pending further consideration of the future of TVAand its non-power programs, theAdministration requested $77 million for TVA non-power programs for FY1999. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior'sBureau of Reclamation, much of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies,including the Appalachian Regional Commission, theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the appropriated programs of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The Administration requested $21.7 billionfor these programs for FY1999 compared with $21.0 billion appropriated for FY1998 and $19.97 billion forFY1997. The Senate, by a vote of 98-1, approved theEnergy and Water bill ( S. 2138 ) on June 18, 1998, for a total of $21.4 billion. The House , by a vote of 405-4approved its version of the bill( H.R. 4060 ) on June 22, 1998 for $21.1 billion. The conference agreement, appropriating $21.2 billion, wasreported out September 25, 1998. Theconference report ( H.Rept. 105-749 ) was approved by the House September 28, 1998, and approved by the SenateSeptember 29, 1998. The President signed thebill October 7, 1998.
Key issues involving the Energy and Water Development appropriations programs included:
Sharp cuts in the Corps of Engineers construction request. However, the House and Senate prevailed in supporting $1.43 billion, nearlydouble the amount of the request.
Significant proposed increases in DOE's research and development programs and in the nuclearweapons program. Increases over FY1998were approved by Congress, but the amount agreed to was 3.1% below the Administration's request. The nuclearweapons budget was hiked by about $300million over the FY1998 amount.
DOE's proposed "accelerated cleanup" of former weapons sites. Environmental cleanup programs were supported at near the level of theDOE request. However, the requested amount for the privatization of DOE waste management projects was cut inhalf by Congress.
Increased funding for nuclear energy programs. Congress supported funding for nuclear energy programs at $41 million over FY1998 but$42 million less than the DOE request.
Continued funding of TVA's non-power programs. Funding for TVA was not included in the Energy and Water Development bill forFY1999.
The FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. 105-277 ) added money to several programs funded in the Energy and Water Appropriations bill, including theCorps of Engineers, DOE's renewable energy program and its defense activities program, and TVA. This additionalfunding is not incorporated in the budgettables that follow, but significant changes are noted in the text under Key Policy Issues.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: ENR = Environment and Natural Resources; STM = Science, Technology, and Medicine. |
crs_R44072 | crs_R44072_0 | Overview
Since September 2013, China has undertaken extensive land reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly island chain in the southern part of the South China Sea, raising a variety of concerns in the United States and Asia. China's Foreign Ministry announced on June 16, 2015, that China would complete its reclamation work "in the upcoming days" and then turn its attention to building facilities on the newly created artificial islands. The reclamation activity continues a series of assertive actions by China in the South China Sea as Beijing seeks to more actively stress its sovereignty claims in the area. These actions have led the U.S. government to argue that China is seeking to strengthen its maritime territorial claims using threats, coercion, and other actions that fall short of direct conflict. Moreover, some features in their original form may not have extended above water at high tide, meaning no sovereignty claim to those features is recognized under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The reclamation arguably violates the spirit of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and makes discussions over a potential Code of Conduct more difficult. U.S. Strategy
The question of whether the United States has a strategy for dissuading China from continuing its land reclamation activities, or for responding to those activities, and if so, whether that strategy is adequate, is part of a larger question. In recent weeks, several observers have presented ideas on potential U.S. options for imposing such costs, including the following:
stronger U.S. statements to China about the consequences for China of continuing the land reclamation activities, and more generally, changing the U.S. tone of conversation with China; better publicizing China's land reclamation activities and other actions in the area, as well as their potential implications for international law and the treatment of the global commons, to the public and governments in the region and globally; opposing land reclamation activities in disputed waters by both China and other claimants; strengthening the capacity of allied and partner countries in the region to maintain maritime domain awareness (MDA), coast guard patrols, and fishing fleet operations in the area; further strengthening U.S. security cooperation with allied and partner countries in the region, and with India, to the point of creating a coalition for balancing China's assertiveness; increasing arms sales to Taiwan; and increasing U.S. Navy operations in the region. | Since September 2013, China has undertaken extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea, raising a variety of concerns in the United States and Asia. The reclamation has created over 2,000 acres (809 hectares) of artificial landmasses on Chinese-occupied reefs that are disputed between several countries and are located in some of the world's most heavily trafficked waters. China announced on June 16, 2015, that its reclamation work would be completed "in the upcoming days," and that when reclamation was finished, it would turn to building facilities on the newly created artificial islands.
The reclamation activity continues a series of assertive actions by China in the South China Sea as Beijing seeks to more actively stress its sovereignty claims in the area. These actions have led the U.S. government to argue that China is seeking to strengthen its maritime territorial claims using threats, coercion, and other actions that fall short of direct conflict. This, some observers argue, raises the question of whether the United States has developed a strategy for countering Chinese actions, and if so, whether that strategy is adequate. China states that its activities are legal, reflecting its claim of sovereignty over the affected features, and notes that other South China Sea claimants have also reclaimed areas on features that they occupy.
The reclamation and construction has military/operational, diplomatic, and legal implications. The Chinese government has stated that the work is intended to fulfill "the need of necessary military defense," as well as to serve non-military purposes. China's plans to use the artificial islands for military purposes could affect U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. The activity has complicated diplomatic processes intended to lower tensions in the region, and legal processes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), that could bring clarity to disputes over maritime rights in the area. According to many analysts, it violates the (non-binding) 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
This report assesses legal, military/operational, and diplomatic implications of the reclamation and construction activity. It surveys U.S. and Chinese statements on the situation, provides a history of reclamation activity by other nations including the United States and other South China Sea claimants, and discusses U.S. strategy and potential options for U.S. policymakers. |
crs_R40705 | crs_R40705_0 | Introduction
Home visiting is a strategy for delivering support and services to families or individuals in their homes. While home visiting may also be used to address needs of the chronically ill or elderly, this report deals exclusively with home visiting as a service strategy for families with young children or those who are expecting children. There are a variety of early home visiting models. These models typically seek to positively impact one or more child or family outcomes across three main domains: maternal and child health; early childhood social, emotional, and cognitive development; and family/parent functioning. Some estimates suggest that, at any point in time, as many as 400,000 to 500,000 families may be receiving early childhood home visitation services. Depending on the particular model of early childhood home visitation being used, the visitors may be specially trained nurses, other professionals, or paraprofessionals; visits may begin during a woman's pregnancy or later; and the visits may continue, regularly, until the child reaches his/her second birthday or enters school. Participation of families is voluntary. This appears to be driven in some part by newer research on how the human brain develops and, specifically, the significance of the prenatal and early childhood environments to later life. Further, at least since the 1960s, a variety of early childhood home visiting models have undergone many assessments and evaluations intended to test how effectively they achieve their goals. Overall, while researchers have cautioned that home visiting is not a panacea, they have generally encouraged its use as part of a range of strategies intended to enhance and improve early childhood. Apart from this research effort (described below), the federal government currently supports some ongoing programs in which home visitation is a primary strategy for achieving program goals (e.g., Early Head Start), others in which support for home visiting is explicitly permitted or strongly suggested by the program's statutory authority (e.g., Maternal and Child Health Block Grant and Promoting Safe and Stable Families), and still others where the broad purposes of the program allow use of funds for some or all of the activities supported by home visitation programs (e.g., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid). A number of legislative proposals to provide more support for home visitation programs have been offered, and the health care reform proposals passed by the House in November 2009 ( H.R. 3962 ) and Senate in December 2009 ( H.R. Proposed Grants to States for Home Visitation in Health Care Legislation
Health care reform bills passed, separately, in the House and in the Senate would establish a program of grants to states to support expanded delivery of evidence-based home visitation services to families with young children and those expecting children. There is no current law program that provides grants to states exclusively for the purpose of funding home visiting programs. Maternal and Child Health Block Grant
The Maternal and Child Health Block grant (Title V of the Social Security Act) is a public health program that seeks to (1) ensure access to and improve the quality of health care for mothers and children, especially those with low income or limited availability of care; (2) reduce infant mortality; (3) provide and ensure access to comprehensive prenatal and postnatal care to women (especially low-income and at-risk pregnant women); (4) increase the number of children receiving health assessments and follow-up diagnostic and treatment services; (5) provide and ensure access to preventive and child care services as well as rehabilitative services for certain children; (6) implement family-centered, community-based systems of coordinated care for children with special health care needs; and (7) provide toll-free hotlines and assistance in applying for services to pregnant women with infants and children who are eligible for Medicaid. States receiving funds under Part C are expected to establish such a council. | Health care reform legislation passed by the House in November 2009 (H.R. 3962) and in the Senate in December 2009 (H.R. 3590) would authorize and provide funds for grants to states to provide home visiting services, on a voluntary basis, to families with young children. (For a comparison of selected provisions in those proposals, see Table 4). There is no current law program that provides grants to states exclusively for home visiting programs. The Obama Administration requested authorization and funding for such a program as part of its FY2010 budget request. This proposal was not included in the President's FY2011 budget request, although the Administration has indicated its expectation that the pending health care reform legislation will be enacted.
Home visiting is a strategy for delivering support and services to families or individuals in their homes. This report deals exclusively with home visiting as a service strategy for families with young children or those expecting children. There are a variety of early childhood home visitation models. These models typically seek to positively impact one or more outcomes across three main domains: maternal and child health; early childhood social, emotional, and cognitive development; and family/parent functioning. Depending on the particular model of early home visitation being used, the visitors may be specially trained nurses, other professionals, or paraprofessionals. Visits, which often occur weekly, may begin during a woman's pregnancy or some time after the birth of a child and may continue until the child reaches his/her second birthday (in some cases) or enters kindergarten. Participation of families is voluntary.
Early childhood home visitation programs are in operation in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The current combined public and private annual investment in these services has been estimated at between $750 million and $1 billion. This funding supports services for an estimated 400,000-500,000 families, or about 3% of all families (17.4 million) with children under six years of age. In addition to private and state and local public funds provided for early childhood home visitation, a number of federal programs have been tapped to support home visitation programs. Among others, these include Medicaid, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, the Social Services Block Grant, the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program, Community-Based Grants to Prevent Child Abuse and Neglect, Even Start, Part C early intervention services for infants under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Maternal and Child Health Block Grant, Healthy Start, and Early Head Start.
The current popularity of early childhood home visitation draws, in some measure, from newer research on how the human brain develops and, specifically, the significance of prenatal and early childhood environments to later life outcomes. Further, since at least the 1960s, a variety of home visiting programs have undergone evaluations to test their effectiveness. While the results have been mixed, some research has shown results that promise both immediate and longer term benefits to children and their families, including improvements in birth outcomes, enhanced child cognitive development and academic success, and strengthened child-parent interactions. Overall, researchers caution that home visiting is not a panacea, but many have encouraged its use as part of a range of strategies intended to enhance and improve early childhood. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41474 | crs_R41474_0 | Fragmented care, where patients see multiple unrelated providers, has been found to be, among other things, both costly, since provider payments are not linked to performance or outcomes and services can be duplicative, and of lower quality, since providers lack financial incentives to coordinate care. Research has suggested that integrated care delivery models can reduce costs and improve quality. Section 3022 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , PPACA), as amended, directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary") to implement an integrated care delivery model in Medicare, the Medicare Shared Savings Program, using Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)—a model of integrated care formulated to reduce costs and improve quality. Appendix A outlines key parts of the proposed regulations, and Appendix B addresses antitrust issues. Appendix C discusses the Pioneer ACO Demonstration that "is designed for health care organizations and providers that are already experienced in coordinating care for patients across care settings." The key elements of an ACO, highlighted in the definition, are that
ACOs bring together and integrate, either actually or virtually, a broad range of providers across care settings; they emphasize primary care; they can achieve savings for a payer by effectively integrating care across providers; providers share with payers in the savings that providers generate; the savings are not at the expense of quality; providers are responsible for improving quality and reducing costs; and improvements are measured across a specified population. The emphasis is on physicians rather than insurers or hospitals since physicians "control (directly or indirectly) 87% of all personal health spending." Existing ACO Models and Are They Replicable
ACOs are modeled on entities seen as quality leaders in health care, such as Kaiser Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, and Geisinger Health System. If actual medical expenditures are less than the benchmark, adjusted for changes in costs, savings exceed the target, and quality measures are met, the ACO, and either directly or indirectly its providers, will share in the savings realized by the payer. Other groups of providers of services and suppliers as the Secretary determines. Section 5: Discussion and Likely Impact of PPACA § 3022
Scope of ACOs and Likely Savings
The CBO scored the Medicare Shared Savings Program as reducing Medicare expenditures $4.9 billion over the FY2013 through FY2019 period. Summary of HHS Draft Proposed Regulations
On March 31, 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for accountable care organizations. At the same time, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission issued a joint policy statement on ACOs to address antitrust issues. In addition, CMS and the HHS Office of the Inspector General issued a joint statement on the civil monetary penalties (CMP) law, federal anti-kickback statute, and the physician self-referral law for financial arrangements involving ACOs, and the Internal Revenue Service issued a statement on the participation of tax exempt organizations in ACOs. HHS will accept comments from stakeholders on the NPRM for 60 days and will release a final regulation some time afterwards. The primary care physician, however, is now a member of the ACO which has assumed responsibility for the patient's complete continuum of care. Though each proposed ACO under the Medicare Shared Savings Program will have different effects on the health care provider market, general principles may be extracted to provide guidance to market participants wishing to participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. | The provision of health care in the United States has been described as fragmented, with patients seeing multiple unrelated providers. Fragmented care has been found to be, among other things, both costly, since provider payments are not linked to performance or outcomes and services can be duplicative, and of lower quality, since providers lack financial incentives to coordinate care. Section 3022 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA), as amended, directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary") to implement an integrated care delivery model in Medicare, the Medicare Shared Savings Program, using Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)—a model of integrated care formulated to reduce costs and improve quality.
ACOs are modeled on integrated delivery systems such as the Mayo Clinic, Geisinger Health System, Kaiser Permanente, and Intermountain Healthcare. While ACOs can be designed with varying features, most models put primary care physicians at the core, along with other providers, and emphasize simultaneously reducing costs and improving quality. The emphasis is on physicians rather than insurers or hospitals because physicians influence almost 90% of all personal health spending.
In the simplest case, the ACO contracts with payers to be accountable for the entire continuum of care provided to a defined population, and if the costs of care provided are less than targeted amounts, and certain quality measures are achieved, the ACO and the payer will share the savings generated. Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will contract for ACOs to assume responsibility for improving quality of care provided, coordinating care across providers, and reducing the cost of care Medicare beneficiaries receive. If cost and quality targets are met, ACOs will receive a share of any savings realized by CMS. The Congressional Budget Office scored the Medicare Shared Savings Program as reducing Medicare expenditures $4.9 billion in the FY2013 through FY2019 period.
PPACA Section 3022 leaves many of the design features to be determined by the Secretary. On March 31, 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for accountable care organizations. At the same time, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission issued a joint policy statement on ACOs to address antitrust issues. In addition, CMS and the HHS Office of the Inspector General issued a joint statement on the civil monetary penalties law, federal anti-kickback statute, and the physician self-referral law for financial arrangements involving ACOs, and the Internal Revenue Service issued a statement on the participation of tax exempt organizations in ACOs. HHS will accept comments from stakeholders on the NPRM for 60 days and intends to release a final regulation some time afterwards. Appendix A outlines key parts of the proposed regulation, and Appendix B addresses antirust issues. Appendix C discusses the Pioneer ACO Demonstration "designed for health care organizations and providers that are already experienced in coordinating care for patients across care settings."
The Medicare Shared Savings Program is slated to begin January 1, 2012. While ACOs hold out the prospect of improving care, reducing costs, and raising quality, there are still gaps in knowledge of what existing ACOs have achieved and whether they can be widely replicated. Moreover, there may be unanticipated consequences from encouraging the formation of ACOs, such as further health provider market concentration, that could adversely affect efforts to control overall health costs. |
crs_RL32392 | crs_RL32392_0 | Introduction
The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brokered primarily by the United States, ended three yearsof war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had cost hundreds of thousands of lives and created over2 million refugees and displaced persons. The Dayton Peace Accords also resulted in the deployment of a NATO-led peacekeepingforce which has been charged with providing a secure environment for the implementation of thepeace agreement. A U.N.-appointed High Representative, created by the Dayton accords, overseesthe civilian peace implementation efforts. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
In the more than nine years since the accords, the United States and other countries havescored significant achievements in Bosnia, including sharply reduced inter-ethnic violence, restoredfreedom of movement, and the return of many refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Theinternational community has also helped Bosnia hold largely free and fair elections and set up manyof the institutions of a modern democratic state. However, these successes in some areas have notadded up to the accomplishment of the overall goal of international efforts in Bosnia: the creationof a stable, united Bosnia, able to continue reforms on its own and integrate with Euro-Atlanticinstitutions. Almost all progress on reforms and on promoting greater unity in Bosnia continues torequire direct or indirect intervention by Ashdown and other representatives of the internationalcommunity. Reform efforts continue to be met by obstructionism or passivity by the nationalistparties which control Bosnian governments at all levels. Some observers also assert that thecumbersome institutions set up by the Dayton Peace Accords are unworkable. According to critics of current international policy on Bosnia, international interventionismhas led to dependency and irresponsibility among local elites. This problem is all the more seriousas the international commitment to Bosnia in troops and funding has decreased in recent years. Another important issue is whether Bosnia is still important to U.S. interests, particularlygiven perhaps more pressing U.S. commitments in other countries and regions. However, many observers believe that theUnited States still has a stake in Bosnia's stability, as part of building a Europe "whole and free," theoverarching U.S. objective in the region. Continued U.S. involvement in Bosnia may be needed toarrest indicted war criminals, as well as to make sure that Bosnia is not used as a haven for organizedcrime or terrorists. In December 2004, The European Union took over peacekeeping duties. | The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brokered primarily by the United States, ended the war inBosnia, which had cost hundreds of thousands of lives and created over 2 million refugees anddisplaced persons. The Dayton Peace Accords also set up Bosnia's current political structure of twosemi-autonomous, ethnically-based "entities" and a relatively weak central government. It resultedin the deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force, which was charged with providing a secureenvironment for the implementation of the peace agreement. In December 2004, a European Unionforce took over peacekeeping duties from NATO. A U.N.-appointed High Representative, createdby the Dayton Accords, oversees the civilian implementation efforts.
In the more than nine years since the accords, the United States and other countries havescored significant achievements in Bosnia, including sharply reduced inter-ethnic violence, restoredfreedom of movement, and the return of many refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Theinternational community has also helped Bosnia hold largely free and fair elections and set up manyof the institutions of a modern democratic state. However, these individual successes have notadded up to the accomplishment of the overall goal of international efforts in Bosnia: the creationof a stable, united Bosnia, able to continue reforms on its own and integrate into Euro-Atlanticinstitutions. Almost all progress on reforms and on promoting greater unity in Bosnia continues torequire direct or indirect intervention by representatives of the international community. Reformefforts continue to be met by obstructionism or passivity by the nationalist parties that controlBosnian governments at all levels. Some observers also assert that the cumbersome governinginstitutions set up by the Dayton Peace Accords are unworkable.
Supporters of international activism in Bosnia say that the only way to move forward is tocontinue to impose reforms when necessary, and that when these reforms reach a critical mass, theywill become self-sustaining. According to critics of current international policy on Bosnia,international interventionism has led to dependency and irresponsibility among local elites. Thisproblem is all the more serious as the international commitment to Bosnia in troops and funding hasdecreased in recent years.
Another important issue is whether Bosnia is still important to U.S. interests. Some say thatpressing U.S. commitments in other countries and regions argue for transferring full responsibilityfor Bosnia to European countries. Others believe that the United States still has a stake in Bosnia'sstability, as part of building a Europe "whole and free," the overarching U.S. objective in the region. They say continued U.S. involvement in Bosnia may be needed to arrest indicted war criminals, aswell as to make sure that Bosnia is not used as a haven for organized crime or terrorists. The 109thCongress will likely be involved in such issues as appropriating foreign aid for Bosnia andexamining Bosnia's compliance with its obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42641 | crs_R42641_0 | The Administration proposed the GSCF with its FY2012 budget submission as a "pilot project" for State and the DOD to jointly fund and plan security-related assistance. Congress, demonstrating its interest in the experiment, provided GSCF authority as Section 1207 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 112-81 ) for four fiscal years rather than the three years requested. Many see the GSCF as an innovative first step in addressing problems inherent in the current agency-based budgeting and program development systems. Origins of the GSCF Concept
Although the GSCF was proposed as a means to secure flexible funding for emerging needs, the GSCF concept has its origins in long-standing perceptions that multiple deficiencies in current national security structures and practices have undermined U.S. efforts abroad. The first two of these purposes—security and counterterrorism training, and coalition support—are nearly identical to those of the Global Train and Equip authority provided by Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA, P.L. Deletion of Transitional Authorities for Horn of Africa Counterterrorism and Peacekeeping and Yemen Counterterrorism
In addition to the GSCF authority requested by the Administration, Section 1207(n) of the original legislation established three new transitional authorities that would permit the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to assist counterterrorism and peacekeeping efforts in Africa during FY2012. Despite the State Department's request for a $50 million appropriation, the FY2012 appropriations act provided no new money for the fund, but permitted DOD and the State Department to transfer up to the $250 million from other accounts, with a limit of $200 from DOD and $50 million from State. 112-74 appropriations act authority for DOD to transfer funds to the GSCF, the P.L. 112-81 authorizing legislation provided DOD with a new transfer authority of up to $200 million per fiscal year, permitting DOD to transfer funds from its defense-wide operation and maintenance account to the GSCF. FY2013 Funding
No funding was provided in FY2013. 113-76 ), Section 8003 of Division K (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014), permits the State Department to transfer up to $25 million to the GSCF from INCLE, FMF, and PKO. FY2015 Request
For FY2015, the Obama Administration does not request a GSCF appropriation under the State Department budget. Relevant DOD budget documents available as of this date seem to indicate there is no DOD FY2015 appropriation request. Section 8003(d) of the FY2014 omnibus appropriations legislation ( P.L. Current Status
For programs to be conducted under FY2012 funding, the Secretary of State designated seven countries as recipients of GSCF assistance: Nigeria, Philippines, Bangladesh, and Libya, as well as three Central European countries, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. In August and September, 2012, the State Department and DOD submitted requests to the Appropriations Committees to transfer $44.8 million from designated funds to the GSCF. As of the date of this report, detailed programs are still being developed. No further information on the progress of the FY2012 programs or on plans for potential FY2014 programs has been made available to CRS. The State Department Role
The GSCF puts the State Department, in the person of the Secretary of State, in the lead. Possible Drawbacks for DOD
For DOD, the GSCF may be perceived as entailing disadvantages as well. (Congress has, however, specifically provided DOD with authority to train police in Afghanistan and Iraq.) | The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81), Section 1207, created a new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) as a four-year pilot project to be jointly administered and funded by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department. The purpose of the fund is to carry out security and counterterrorism training, and rule of law programs. (There also are three one-year transitional authorities for assistance to Africa and Yemen.) The GSCF is placed under the State Department budget. Although decisions are to be jointly made by the Secretaries of State and Defense, the mandated mechanism puts the Secretary of State in the lead.
The GSCF was conceived of as an important step in improving U.S. efforts to enable foreign military and security forces to better combat terrorism and other threats. It incorporates features of previous legislation and reflects recommendations to address multiple deficiencies in current national security structures and practices. Many have hope that it will provide a model for interagency cooperation on security assistance that will overcome the disadvantages of the current system of agency-centric budgets and efforts. Extended start-up difficulties, however, have led to questions about the mechanism's utility.
To date, Congress has provided funds for the GSCF through transfers from other accounts, not from appropriations. While the Administration requested GSCF appropriations in FY2012, FY2013, and FY2014, Congress has appropriated no funding. In the FY2012 omnibus appropriations act (P.L. 112-74), Congress permitted DOD and the State Department to transfer up to the $250 million from specified accounts, with a limit of $200 million from DOD and $50 million from State. For FY2013, Congress made no provision for funding. In the FY2014 omnibus appropriations act (P.L. 113-76), Congress provided authority for DOD to transfer to the GSCF up to $200 million and for the State Department to transfer up to $25 million from specified accounts. For FY2015, the Obama Administration does not request a GSCF appropriation under the State Department budget. Relevant DOD FY2015 budget documents available as of this date seem to indicate there is no DOD FY2015 appropriations request.
The Administration has taken steps to program FY2012 funds. In mid-2012, it notified Congress that it would initiate programs for Yemen and East Africa under the "transitional" (Section 1207(n), P.L. 112-81) authority with authorized funding up to $75 million each. These are being implemented. Later in the year, the Administration transferred $44.8 million to the GSCF for programs under the core GSCF legislation, which provided for country selection by the Administration in the course of the fiscal year. The Secretary of State designated seven countries as eligible for this assistance: Nigeria, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Libya, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The Administration must notify congressional committees with detailed program plans before the programs can begin. The GSCF office has provided no further information to CRS as of this date.
Issues include whether the State Department has the ability and capacity to lead GSCF activities; possible drawbacks for DOD; the desirability of providing DOD with authority to train non-military security forces, including law enforcement; and the potential effectiveness of GSCF programs in the absence of a strategy for security assistance. |
crs_R44853 | crs_R44853_0 | Troops
Recent press articles suggest that the Administration is considering proposals to deploy additional ground forces to Afghanistan. These forces would likely be part of the Resolute Support Mission, the ongoing NATO mission to train and support Afghan security forces. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 9, 2017, General John Nicholson, Commander U.S. Forces–Afghanistan noted, based on a mission review, that he had adequate forces for the U.S. counterterrorism mission but there was "a shortfall of a few thousand troops" for RSM if what he described as a "stalemate" with the Taliban-led insurgency were to be broken. Recently, in April, about 300 U.S. Marines were deployed to Helmand Province to advise and assist Afghan forces in the region. Forces for Other Missions? | The Trump Administration is reportedly considering proposals to deploy additional ground forces to Afghanistan and somewhat broaden their mission. These forces would likely be part of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), the ongoing NATO mission to train and support Afghan security forces. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 9, 2017, General John Nicholson, Commander U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, noted based on a mission review that he had adequate forces for the U.S. counterterrorism mission but there was "a shortfall of a few thousand troops" for RSM if a "stalemate" with the Taliban-led insurgency is to be broken. Especially in light of recent Afghan National Defense and Security Force (ANDSF) shortcomings, notably the Taliban gains in Helmand Province and the April 21, 2017, attack on an Afghan Army installation near Mazar-i-Sharif, some observers maintain additional forces are necessary to shore up the ANDSF.
There is no consensus as to the best way to determine the suitability, size, and mission profile of the ground elements of any military campaign. This short report is designed to assist Congress as it evaluates various proposals to introduce more ground forces for RSM. |
crs_RS22485 | crs_RS22485_0 | Background1
Watters v. Wachovia Bank involves a challenge to a regulation promulgated by the federal agency that charters and regulates national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, ruled that NBA preempts state regulation of the mortgage lending activities of national bank operating subsidiaries. The basic premise of the opinion is that, under the NBA's real estate lending and incidental powers clauses, Congress gave national banks the power to conduct real estate lending activities in operating subsidiaries and that grants of authority to national banks generally preempt state law. In terms of the Court's analysis, the focus was on "the exercise of a national bank's powers , not its corporate structure." | In Watters v. Wachovia Bank , the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, ruled that Michigan mortgage lending requirements do not apply to a state-chartered operating subsidiary of a national bank. The decision was based on the Court's interpretation of various provisions of the National Bank Act, including provisions granting national banks the power to make real estate loans; the "incidental powers" clause, under which national banks have been authorized by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the regulator of national banks, to conduct banking activities in operating subsidiaries; and a provision granting the OCC exclusive "visitorial" powers over national banks. This report summarizes the rulings in the case and potential implications. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33777 | crs_RL33777_0 | Privatization, however, is not a recent phenomenon. 54)
Hence, privatization has been of perennial interest to Congress and likely will continue to be so. First, it enables policymakers who wish to improve the provision of a good or service to see that privatization is not an either/or proposition. Rather, privatization is a matter of degrees and there are myriad means, as this report explicates, through which the private sector may be brought into the process of the provision of a good or service. Different approaches to privatization of the components of an agency's provision of goods and service may provoke more or less controversy. Background: The Recent Political Salience of Privatization
The sources of the salience of privatization are manifold, but likely include privatization's rhetorically potent rationales, purported benefits, and political attractiveness. Collectively, though, these arguments amount to a criticism of the purported failures of "big government." Privatization is both a means and an end. The search for solutions has stimulated both the federal government and private firms to examine government activities, to develop proposals to transfer government functions to the private sector, and to make agencies operate more like the private sector. The federal government has contracted for goods since its founding. Prize Competitions
In recent years, federal agencies have held prize competitions. Privatization: Ramifications
Behavior of the Entity
The difference between having a governmental entity and a private firm perform an activity is significant. Marketization: An Alternative to Privatization? Hence, this report uses the term "marketization" to refer to the redesign of a government agency in order to make it provide goods and services in the manner of a private firm . Conclusion
In the past two decades, privatization emerged on the federal policy agenda. This report defines privatization as the use of the private sector in the provision of a good or service, the components of which include financing, operations (supplying, production, delivery), and quality control . This definition, though imperfect, is useful insofar as it enables one to view privatization activities upon a spectrum; that is, an agency may more or less privatize its provision of goods and services, depending on how many of the components of the provision process have been moved to private sector providers. This report also differentiates privatization from marketization. Those uncomfortable with privatization may find marketization a more attractive option. Meanwhile, implicit in the debate about privatization lurks the old and nettlesome question—"Which activities are essential to the state and should remain directly accountable to the elected representatives of the people and which may be carried out by the private sector?" | During the past two decades, the privatization of federal agencies and activities has been much debated. That said, privatization—here defined as the use of the private sector in the provision of a good or service, the components of which include financing, operations (supplying, production, delivery), and quality control—is not a recent phenomenon. Since its founding in 1789, the federal government has used private firms to provide goods and services. Hence, privatization, in all its forms, which include contracting out, vouchers, and prize competitions, is of perennial interest to Congress.
This report is an introduction to privatization in the federal governmental context. It discusses the emergence of privatization on the federal policy agenda in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To some, privatization appeared as an answer to the purported failures of "big government." Privatization attracted political support due to its rhetorically persuasive rationales, purported benefits, and political attractiveness. However, privatization also has been controversial. Critics have complained that privatization is a form of union busting and that privatization can have unforeseen and undesirable consequences.
This report also supplies a typology of the various means through which federal agencies and activities have been privatized. The typology shows that privatization is not an either/or proposition. Rather, privatization, as this report's definition implies, is a matter of degree. Policymakers may transfer to the private sector one or more of the components of government provision of goods and services—however many they deem appropriate.
Next, the report explains the distinction between privatization and marketization, an alternative to privatization, which is "the structuring of a government agency so that it provides goods and services in the efficient manner of a private firm." Marketization retains an activity within the governmental sector; privatization moves the components of an activity to the private sector. This distinction is significant because entities within these differing sectors tend to behave differently. Private sector firms tend to be self-directing and profit-seeking; government agencies tend to be process-oriented and pursue the multiple and sometimes conflicting goals assigned to them by Congress and the President. Hence, policymakers who wish to improve an agency's efficiency or performance, but are leery of privatization, may find marketization an attractive option.
Finally, the report notes that, whenever policymakers consider privatizing a federal agency or activity, a fundamental issue arises—"Which activities are essential to the state and should remain directly accountable to the elected representatives of the people and which may be carried out by the private sector?" This question is complex and value-laden; no definitive answer exists. Thus, the decision to privatize is inherently controversial.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41293 | crs_R41293_0 | Introduction
For 30 years, the Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds
There are two categories of breaches: significant breaches and critical breaches. As shown in Table 1 , a "significant" Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when the Program Acquisition Unit Cost or the Procurement Unit Cost increases 15% or more over the current baseline estimate or 30% or more over the original baseline estimate. A Program Acquisition Unit Cost is defined as the total cost of development, procurement, and construction divided by the number of units. A Procurement Unit Cost is defined as the total procurement cost divided by the number of units to be procured. Consequences of a Critical Nunn-McCurdy Breach
In the event of a critical breach, the Secretary of Defense is required to conduct a root-cause analysis to determine what factors caused the cost growth that led to a critical breach, and, in consultation with the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, assess
1. the estimated cost of the program if no changes are made to the current requirements, 2. the estimated cost of the program if requirements are modified, 3. the estimated cost of reasonable alternatives to the program, and 4. the extent to which funding from other programs will need to be cut to cover the cost growth of this program. For DOD to invoke this exception, the Secretary of Defense must provide Congress (within 60 days of the SAR being submitted to Congress) a written determination, along with an explanation of the basis for the determination, that
1. based on the root-cause analysis, but for the change in the number of units being acquired, the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost would not have increased by more than 5% of the current baseline estimate or 10% of the original baseline estimate and 2. the change in quantity was not made as a result of increasing costs, a delay in the schedule, or problems with meeting the requirements. How the Nunn-McCurdy Act Has Evolved
The Nunn-McCurdy Act has been amended nine times over the years (see Figure 5 ). One of the most significant changes to the reporting requirements occurred in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. The new standard, which prevents DOD from avoiding a Nunn-McCurdy breach by simply re-baselining a program, increased the number of programs breaching Nunn-McCurdy. Another significant change occurred in the FY2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform ( P.L. 111-23 ), when Congress included a requirement that programs with critical breaches be presumed terminated unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the program. For programs that are certified, DOD must (1) revoke the prior milestone approval, (2) restructure the program, and (3) provide Congress a written explanation of the root-cause of the cost growth. These changes were fueled in part over congressional concerns that programs with chronic cost growth and schedule delays were not being terminated and Congress was not being provided specific information on what was causing the cost growth. Nunn-McCurdy Does Not Require Reporting on Operations and Support (O&S) Costs
Some analysts suggest that Nunn-McCurdy is not a sufficiently comprehensive reporting mechanism because it does not apply to all elements of a weapon system's life-cycle costs, such as operations, support, or disposal. However, there have been some exceptions. 109-163 )
The FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act amended Nunn-McCurdy to include the original baseline estimate as a standard against which to measure cost growth. | The Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. §2433) requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to report to Congress whenever a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) experiences cost overruns that exceed certain thresholds. A program whose cost growth exceeds the statutory thresholds is said to have a Nunn-McCurdy breach.
There are two types of breaches: significant breaches and critical breaches. A significant breach is when the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (the total cost of development, procurement, and construction divided by the number of units procured) or the Procurement Unit Cost (the total procurement cost divided by the number of units to be procured) increases 15% or more over the current baseline estimate or 30% or more over the original baseline estimate. A critical breach occurs when the cost increases 25% or more over the current baseline estimate or 50% or more over the original baseline estimate.
The Nunn-McCurdy Act has been amended nine times. One of the most significant changes to the reporting requirements occurred in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163), when Congress added the original baseline estimate as a threshold against which to measure cost growth. The new standard prevents DOD from simply re-baselining a program to avoid a breach. Since 2007, there have been 37 Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Another significant change occurred in the FY2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (P.L. 111-23), which required programs with critical breaches to be presumed terminated unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the program. For programs that are certified, DOD generally must (1) revoke the prior milestone approval, (2) restructure the program, and (3) provide Congress a written explanation of the root cause of cost growth. These changes were fueled in part over congressional concern that programs with chronic cost growth were not being terminated and Congress was not being provided information on what caused the cost growth.
As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, Congress has increased visibility into the cost performance of the acquisition stage of MDAPs. However, some analysts suggest that Nunn-McCurdy is not a sufficiently comprehensive reporting mechanism because program managers can take steps to avoid reporting a breach; Nunn-McCurdy does not apply to all elements of a weapon system's life-cycle (such as operations and support costs); and the timelines for reporting are such that by the time Congress is notified of a breach, there is little opportunity for Congress to take action. |
crs_R44419 | crs_R44419_0 | O n February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia passed away unexpectedly at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court which he had held for nearly 30 years. Justice Scalia's lengthy tenure on the Court, coupled with his strongly held views on how constitutional and statutory texts are to be interpreted, led him to have significant influence on the development of the jurisprudence in various areas of law. He also was an active speaker and author outside the Court, having, among other things, recently coauthored a book which sought to articulate interpretative canons that would, in its authors' view, "curb—even reverse—the te ndency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy preferences" and "provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater respect for the rule of law." Like his approaches to many legal issues in his opinions, Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation in this book has prompted debate both over its desirability, as a normative matter, and over the consistency with which Justice Scalia applied that approach, among other things. This report discusses Justice Scalia's jurisprudence on key areas of law, as well as how that jurisprudence could be seen to have influenced the Court's approach to these subject matters. It begins with his views on two cross-cutting issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation—which highlight his well-known views about originalism, textualism, the importance of bright-line rules for judges to apply, and the proper role of the courts within the system of government established by the U.S. Constitution. It then addresses Justice Scalia's jurisprudence on fourteen separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from "administrative law" to "takings," and were specifically selected as key areas of law where Justice Scalia's absence from the Court could result in a change in its jurisprudence. The report concludes with an Appendix that lists the Supreme Court cases from the October 2010 term through the October 2015 term—the time period since the last vacancy on the Court—in which Justice Scalia was part of a bare five-member majority, indicating the legal issues where Justice Scalia's absence from the Court could result in a shift in the Court's jurisprudence. A separate report, in preparation, is to address the opinions of Merrick Garland, currently the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the President's nominee to fill the seat vacated by Justice Scalia. The two reports, taken together, may assist Members of Congress and their staff in assessing the impact that replacement of Justice Scalia might have upon the High Court's rulings. Other CRS reports address the procedural issues that the vacating of Justice Scalia's seat poses for the Court, as well as the processes for nominating and confirming Supreme Court Justices. See CRS Report R44400, The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote , by [author name scrubbed]. | On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia passed away unexpectedly at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court which he had held for nearly 30 years. Justice Scalia's lengthy tenure on the Court, coupled with his strongly held views on how constitutional and statutory texts are to be interpreted, led him to have significant influence on the development of the jurisprudence of various areas of law. He was also an active speaker and author outside the Court, having, among other things, recently coauthored a book which sought to articulate interpretative canons that would, in its authors' view, "curb—even reverse—the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy preferences" and "provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater respect for the rule of law." Like his approaches to many legal issues in his opinions on the Court, Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation in this book has prompted debate both over its desirability, as a normative matter, and over the consistency with which Justice Scalia applied that approach.
This report discusses Justice Scalia's jurisprudence on key areas of law, as well as how that jurisprudence could be seen to have influenced the Court's approach to these subject matters. It begins with his views on two cross-cutting issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation—which highlight his well-known views about originalism, textualism, the importance of bright-line rules for judges to apply, and the proper role of the courts within the system of government established by the U.S. Constitution. It then addresses Justice Scalia's jurisprudence on fourteen separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from "administrative law" to "takings," and were specifically selected as key areas of law where Justice Scalia's absence from the Court could result in a change in its jurisprudence. The report concludes with an Appendix that lists the Supreme Court cases from the October 2010 term through the October 2015 term in which Justice Scalia was part of a bare five-member majority, indicating the legal issues where Justice Scalia's absence from the Court could result in a shift in the Court's jurisprudence. A separate report is being prepared to address the opinions of Merrick Garland, currently the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the President's nominee to fill the seat vacated by Justice Scalia. The two reports, taken together, may assist Members of Congress and their staff in assessing the impact that replacement of Justice Scalia might have upon the High Court's rulings.
Other CRS reports address the procedural issues that the vacating of Justice Scalia's seat poses for the Court, as well as the processes for nominating and confirming Supreme Court Justices. See CRS Report R44400, The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44235, Supreme Court Appointment Process: President's Selection of a Nominee, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_95-804 | crs_95-804_0 | The provision of the Constitution that federal statutes regulating pornography are most likely to be in danger of contravening is the First Amendment's provision that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Although pornography in general is protected by the First Amendment, two types of pornography—obscenity and child pornography—are not. Therefore, pornography that does not constitute obscenity or child pornography may ordinarily be regulated only with respect to its time, place, and manner of distribution. Obscenity and child pornography, however, being without First Amendment protection, may be totally banned on the basis of their content, not only in the absence of a compelling governmental interest, but in the absence of any evidence of harm. To be obscene, pornography must, at a minimum, "depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct." The Supreme Court has created a three-part test, known as the Miller test, to determine whether a work is obscene. The Supreme Court has allowed one exception to the rule that obscenity, as defined by Miller , is not protected under the First Amendment. Prior to April 1988, it banned both obscene and indecent dial-a-porn in interstate commerce and foreign communications, but only if it involved persons under eighteen. However, the following federal statutes prohibit, among other things, obscenity on federal land or in federal buildings, in the mail, on radio and television, in interstate or foreign commerce, and on interstate highways and railroads even when the obscene material is transported intrastate. 109 - 248 (2006), § 506, makes it a crime knowingly to "produce[ ] with the intent to transport. Section 1467
This section provides for criminal forfeiture in obscenity cases. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, P.L. § 223(d)
Prior to its amendment by § 603 of the PROTECT Act, § 223(d) made it a crime knowingly to use "an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or ... to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any ... communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contem porary commun ity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs .... " (italics added) This prohibition seems equivalent to a prohibition of "indecent" material, but § 223(d) does not use the word "indecent," a fact of which the Supreme Court took note in Reno when it held § 223(d) unconstitutional. G. Children's Internet Protection Act
The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), P.L. 2763A-335, amended three federal statutes to provide that a school or library may not use funds it receives under these statutes to purchase computers used to access the Internet, or to pay the direct costs of accessing the Internet, and may not receive universal service discounts (other than for telecommunications services), unless the school or library enforces a policy "that includes the operation of a technology protection measure" that blocks or filters minors' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or "harmful to minors"; and that blocks or filters adults' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography. The sections of CIPA (1711 and 1712) that require schools and libraries to block or filter if they use federal funds for computers or for Internet access, provide that the blocking or filtering technology may be disabled "to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose." In 2003, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, finding CIPA constitutional. M. RICO
The Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was amended in 1984 to add the obscenity crimes specified in 18 U.S.C. | The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." In general, the First Amendment protects pornography, with this term being used to mean any erotic material. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the First Amendment does not protect two types of pornography: obscenity and child pornography. Consequently, they may be banned on the basis of their content, and federal law prohibits the mailing of obscenity, as well as its transport or receipt in interstate or foreign commerce.
Most pornography is not legally obscene; to be obscene, pornography must, at a minimum, "depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct." The Supreme Court has created a three-part test, known as the Miller test, to determine whether a work is obscene. Pornography that is not obscene may not be banned, but may be regulated as to the time, place, and manner of its distribution, particularly in order to keep it from children. Thus, the courts have upheld the zoning and licensing of pornography dealers, as well as restrictions on dial-a-porn, nude dancing, and indecent radio and television broadcasting.
Federal statutes, in addition to making it a crime to mail obscenity or to transport or receive it in interstate or foreign commerce, provide for criminal and civil forfeiture of real and personal property used in making obscenity pornography, and of the profits of obscenity—in some instances even when they were already used to pay a third party. In addition, obscenity crimes are included among the predicate offenses that may give rise to a violation of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
The Internet has given rise to three federal statutes designed to protect minors from sexual material posted on it. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 makes it a crime knowingly to use a telecommunications device (telephone, fax, or e-mail) to make an obscene or indecent communication to a minor, or knowingly to use an interactive computer service to transmit an obscene communication to anyone or an indecent communication to a minor. In 1997, however, the Supreme Court held the inclusion of "indecent" communications in this statute unconstitutional. In 1998, Congress, in response, enacted the less-broad Child Online Protection Act (COPA), but it was also held unconstitutional and never took effect. Finally, the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), enacted in 2000, requires schools and libraries that accept federal funds to purchase computers or Internet access to block or filter obscenity, child pornography, and, with respect to minors, material that is "harmful to minors." Filters may be disabled, however, "for bona fide research or other lawful purpose." In 2003, the Supreme Court held CIPA constitutional. |
crs_RL33332 | crs_RL33332_0 | During the 109 th Congress, the House and Senate each passed USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Acts, H.R. 3199 and S. 1389 respectively, which made permanent 14 of the 16 expiring USA PATRIOT Act sections and extended the sunset on section 206 (regarding FISA court orders for multipoint, or "roving," wiretaps) and section 215 (access to business records requested under FISA), as well as the sunset on section 6001(a) of IRTPA. 109-333 (2005). 3199 on December 14, 2005. On March 1, 2006, the Senate passed a separate bill, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 ( S. 2271 ), that provides three civil liberties safeguards not included in the conference report. 3199 and S. 2271 were signed into law by the President on March 9. This report provides a summary and legal analysis of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (the "Act" or the "Reauthorization Act"), P.L. 192 (2006), and, where appropriate, discusses the modifications to law made by the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, P.L. 109-178 , 120 Stat. It makes permanent most of the USA PATRIOT Act sections that were scheduled to expire. 225 (civil immunity for assistance in executing a FISA order)
USA PATRIOT Act Sections Still Subject to Sunset
The Act adopts a sunset of December 31, 2009, for USA PATRIOT Act sections 206 (regarding FISA court orders for multipoint, or "roving," wiretaps) and 215 (access to business records requested under FISA). Extension of the "Lone Wolf" Amendment, and the Material Support of Terrorism Amendments Made Permanent
The Act makes two changes to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, P.L. 278 (2006), addresses this omission by establishing a judicial review procedure for a section 215 nondisclosure orders. Section 113 of the Act expands the list of predicate offenses in which law enforcement may seek wiretap orders to include crimes relating to biological weapons, violence at international airports, nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats, explosive materials, receiving terrorist military training, terrorist attacks against mass transit, arson within U.S. special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, torture, firearm attacks in federal facilities, killing federal employees, killing certain foreign officials, conspiracy to commit violence overseas, harboring terrorists, assault on a flight crew member with a dangerous weapon, certain weapons offenses aboard an aircraft, aggravated identity theft, "smurfing" (a money laundering technique whereby a large monetary transaction is separated into smaller transactions to evade federal reporting requirements on large transactions), and criminal violations of certain provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Title III: Reducing Crime and Terrorism at America's Seaports Act of 2005
Title III of the Act, among other things, creates more severe criminal penalties concerning criminal and terrorist activities committed at U.S. seaports or aboard vessels. As the conference report accompanying H.R. Offenders face imprisonment for not more than 20 years. The conference report accompanying H.R. New National Security Division of the DOJ and new Assistant Attorney General
Section 506 of the Act creates a new National Security Division within the Department of Justice (DOJ), headed by a new Assistant Attorney General, comprising prosecutors from the DOJ's Criminal Division's Counterespionage and Counterterrorism sections and attorneys from the DOJ's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, the office that is responsible for reviewing wiretapping operations under FISA. Special Events of National Significance
Section 602 of the Act also creates a new federal crime relating to misconduct concerning "special events of national significance." | Several sections of the USA PATRIOT Act and one section of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 were originally scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005. In July 2005, both Houses approved USA PATRIOT reauthorization acts, H.R. 3199 and S. 1389 , and the conference committee filed a report, H.Rept. 109-333 . A separate bill, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 ( S. 2271 ), provided civil liberties safeguards not included in the conference report. Both H.R. 3199 and S. 2271 were signed into law ( P.L. 109-177 and P.L. 109-178 ) by the President on March 9, 2006.
This report describes the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (the Act) and, where appropriate, discusses the modifications to law made by the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006. Consisting of seven titles, the Act, among other things:
Makes permanent 14 of the 16 expiring USA PATRIOT Act sections as well as the material support of terrorism amendments scheduled to expire on December 31, 2006. Creates a new sunset of December 31, 2009, for USA PATRIOT Act sections 206 and 215 ("roving" FISA wiretaps and FISA orders for business records), and for the "lone wolf" amendment to FISA. Provides for greater congressional and judicial oversight of section 215 orders, section 206 roving wiretaps, and national security letters. Requires high-level approval for section 215 FISA orders for library, bookstore, firearm sale, medical, tax return, and educational records. Enhances procedural protections and oversight concerning delayed notice, or "sneak and peek" search warrants. Expands the list of predicate offenses in which law enforcement may obtain wiretap orders to include more than 20 federal crimes. Revises criminal penalties and procedures concerning criminal and terrorist activities committed at seaports or aboard vessels. Reenforces federal money laundering and forfeiture authority, particularly in connection with terrorist offenses. Allows the Attorney General to determine whether a state qualifies for expedited habeas corpus procedures for state death row inmates. Establishes a new National Security Division within the Department of Justice (DOJ), supervised by a new Assistant Attorney General. Creates a new federal crime relating to misconduct at an event designated as a "special event of national significance," whether or not a Secret Service protectee is in attendance. Intensifies federal regulation of foreign and domestic commerce in methamphetamine precursors.
Much of the information contained in this report may also be found under a different arrangement in CRS Report RL33239, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 3199): Section-by-Section Analysis of the Conference Bill . |
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