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crs_R43717 | crs_R43717_0 | In August 2014, this effort appears to be meeting with another potentially serious reversal as ongoing political protests in the capital may trigger a new round of direct military intervention in the country's governance. Pakistan's military, now led by Army Chief General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the prime minister), has launched three overt coups in Pakistan's 67-year history, and has dictated the country's foreign and national security policies even when not directly governing. As articulated by a State Department spokeswoman on August 20,
We support the constitutional and electoral process in Pakistan, which produced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The U.S. government has sought to help in developing Pakistan's economy and boosting the effectiveness of its security forces. Many observers in the United States, Pakistan, and elsewhere saw the peaceful transfer of power—the first in Pakistan's history from one elected government to another—as a historic milestone in Pakistan's struggle to establish sustainable representative government. The Prime Minister has met the Army Chief numerous times since the outbreak of the protests. The Pakistan army's reclaiming of more direct and robust control of the country's foreign and security policies may, over time, shift Pakistan's approach toward Afghanistan further into a policy framework that seeks to counter Indian influence there. It also could present new challenges to the goal of improving India-Pakistan relations, and put a damper on hopes for effective regional cooperation and commerce in South Asia. Many independent observers see the Pakistani Army obstructing efforts to deepen trade with India because it seeks a resolution of territorial disputes as a prerequisite. | Beginning on August 15, 2014, Pakistan's struggle to establish a sustainable democratic system has met with a new reversal in the form of major anti-government street protests in the capital. Crowds led by opposition figures have demanded the resignation of democratically elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The prime minister regards such demands to be inconsistent with the Pakistani Constitution, and the consensus view in Islamabad appears to support parliamentary processes. The strident and rigid nature of the protestors' demands, and their unwillingness to disperse from areas surrounding key government buildings has, however, created an impasse. After two weeks, the powerful Pakistan Army announced that it would act as "facilitator" in seeking resolution. This has led many analysts to anticipate a new round of military intervention in the country's governance. While few assess that Sharif's government now faces an imminent threat of ouster from office, many observers see the current unrest weakening Sharif and representing a setback to democratization in a country that has suffered three outright military coups in its 67 years of independence.
To many analysts, it appears unlikely that Pakistan in the near future will alter any of its foreign or security policies of interest to the United States. However, the U.S. government has sought to help in fostering Pakistan's democratic system, and that effort has been disrupted by the current unrest. The Pakistan Army's more openly direct control of the country's foreign and security policies may, over time, shift Pakistan's approach toward Afghanistan further into a policy framework that seeks to counter Indian influence there. It could also present new challenges to the goal of improving India-Pakistan relations, and put a damper on hopes for effective regional cooperation and commerce in South Asia. |
crs_R43402 | crs_R43402_0 | In this report, the caucus will be referred to as the Congressional STEM Education Caucus. STEM education system. The 2014 competition is called the House Student App Challenge. The 2014 House Student App Challenge
Congressional offices had until January 31, 2014, to register as a participant in the House Student App Challenge—the first Congressional STEM Competition to promote innovation in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Eligibility
Any student who lives in or is eligible to attend high school in a participating congressional district may compete. Text of the Academic Competition Resolution of 2013
House Committee on Administration Academic Competition Resolution of 2013
H.Res. 77
In the House of Representatives, U. Because of the importance of computer science it would be appropriate to initially challenge students to develop so-called ''apps'' for mobile, tablet, and computer platforms. CONGRESSIONAL COMPETITION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS. Appendix C. Regulations for the Academic Competition
Appendix D. Resources for the Conduct of the Challenge | In February 2013, the House of Representatives announced that there will be an annual Congressional Academic Competition for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education. The aim of the competition is to promote entrepreneurship and innovation. The annual competition is open to any enrolled high school or homeschooled student in a participating congressional district.
The first Congressional Academic Competition focuses on developing applications for mobile, tablet, and computer platforms. The 2014 competition is known as the House Student App Challenge. Recognizing that technology changes over time, the focus of the competition is intended to evolve in the future.
This report includes a brief history of the Congressional STEM Education Caucus, the legislation that created the competition (H.Res. 77), and the rules and regulations for conducting the competition in a congressional district. |
crs_RL32849 | crs_RL32849_0 | Appendix B
Recent and Proposed Funding For Child Welfare--Funds Distributed on a Discretionary or Competitive Basis
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Appendix C--Federal Funds Dedicated to Child Welfare, Distribution by State
Table C-1. The program authorizations for both the Promoting Safe and Stable Families and CAPTA'sCommunity-Based Grants provide for certain funds to be set aside for eligible tribes prior to allotment of remaining funds to eligible states. e. Other generally refers to technical assistance and/or program evaluation and support. There are no set asides for program evaluation, technical assistance or other purposes included in the program authorizationsfor Child Welfare Services or CAPTA state grants. If a state is shown as receiving a negative amount of dollars for a given kind of claim this means that an adjustment in federal funding wasmade in the given fiscal year for prior claims. These data include the portion of child support monies collected on behalf of children receiving Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments and whichare reimbursed to the federal government. Demonstration projectsmust be cost neutral to the federal government. c. HHS reports state claims related to the State Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS) (both for development and operation) separatelyfrom administration claims. Dedicated Federal Child Welfare Funding for the Adoption Assistance Program, FY2001-FY2003, byState
(by fiscal year in millions of dollars)
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). This file is believed to be the best estimate of annual federal expenditures under the Title IV-E adoption assistance program. Note: Title IV-E of the Social Security Act does not authorize tribes to receive direct Adoption Assistance funding from the federal government. States report to HHS any costs associated with their demonstration projects (waivers) under a separate expenditure category. Appendix D--Actual Distribution of Foster Care Funds and Hypothetical Distributions of Capped Foster Care Funds
The purpose of the hypothetical distributions shown in this Appendix is not to suggest that funding should be capped or that any of the hypothetical distributionsshown in this Appendix are the appropriate way to distribute funds or that theFY2003 funding level is an appropriate one to use. (FY2003 is the most recent Title IV-Eexpenditure data available.) Theseare -- (1) all children in the nation (including Puerto Rico) as shown by the 1990census; (2) all children in the nation (including Puerto Rico) as shown by the 2000census; (3) all children in foster care as of the last day of FY2001; (4) all children infoster care as of the last day of FY2003; and (5) the average number of all foster carechildren for FY2001-FY2003. The total fundingfor each of these hypothetical distributions is the FY2003 federal funding level,however the distribution (or relative share of the funds) is based on the state's relativeshare of all federal foster care claims in (1) FY1999; (2) FY2000; (3) FY2001; (4)FY2002 and (5) average distribution of average funding for FY1999-FY2003. The federal share of child support collections ranged from $25 million in FY2000 to $32 million inFY2003; comparable data are not available for FY1999. | Child welfare programs are designed to protect children from abuse or neglect. Services maybe offered to stabilize and strengthen a child's own home. If this is not a safe option for the child,however, he or she may be placed in foster care while efforts to improve the home are made. Inthose instances where reuniting the child with his or her parents is found to be impossible, a childwelfare agency must seek a new permanent (often adoptive) home for the child.
In FY2003, the most recent year for which complete data are available, the federalgovernment provided states with some $6.9 billion in funding dedicated to child welfare purposes. Most of this funding is authorized under Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Apartfrom these dedicated federal child welfare funds, however, states also use non-dedicated federalfunds--including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, Medicaid, andthe Social Services Block Grant--to meet child welfare needs. The most recent data available (forstate fiscal year 2002) suggests that states spent at least $4.8 billion in non-dedicated funds for childwelfare purposes. While non-dedicated funding streams have increased resources to child welfareagencies, current legislative and administrative proposals may jeopardize their continued use forchild welfare.
The way that the federal government distributes dedicated child welfare money to states hasbeen criticized as inflexible, out of sync with federal child welfare policy goals, and antiquated. Because most dedicated federal child welfare funding (about 65% in FY2003) may be used only forfoster care, critics charge that states have inadequate funds to prevent removal of children from theirhomes or to allow children to be reunited with their parents. In addition, a state's ability to claimmost of the dedicated child welfare funds is directly related to the number of foster and adoptivechildren it assists who meet the income, family structure, and other program rules of the nowdefunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (as that program existed on July16, 1996).
Attention to federal child welfare financing has focused almost exclusively on dedicated childwelfare funding streams and is driven in part by the belief that the current structure hampers theability of state child welfare agencies to achieve positive outcomes for children. This assumptionis not easy to prove. However, it is possible to say that the AFDC link, which ties federal fundingin foster care and adoption assistance to increasingly antiquated income standards, over time, willerode the share of program costs for which states may seek federal reimbursement.
Recent proposals to alter how dedicated federal child welfare funds are distributed included somethat would link eligibility for federally supported foster care and adoption assistance to TANF incomerules and others that would remove income restrictions entirely. The latter proposals, which wouldgreatly expand the number of children for whom the federal government would be committed toproviding support, have typically sought to cap (or block grant) some or all of what is now open-endedfederal funding for foster care and adoption assistance and/or to reduce the share of costs paid for eacheligible child by the federal government. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42403 | crs_R42403_0 | Introduction
On February 15, 2012, Senator Leahy introduced the Cyber Crime Protection Act Security Act ( S. 2111 ). The bill, which was then placed on the calendar, is identical to some of the provisions of the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011 ( S. 1151 ), approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee earlier. It would amend several provisions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. Numbered among its provisions are proposals to
expand the type of CFAA violations that qualify as racketeering (RICO) predicate offenses; increase the penalties for violations of CFAA; adjust CFAA's password trafficking offense to protect a wider range of computers and password equivalents; affirm that conspiring to commit a CFAA offense is punishable to the same extent as the underlying offense; amend CFAA's forfeiture provisions to permit confiscation of real property used to facilitate a CFAA violation and to authorize civil forfeiture proceedings; create a new offense for aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer, punishable by imprisonment for not less than three years nor more than 20 years; and clarify CFAA's "unauthorized access" element. The 112 th Congress adjourned without taking further action on S. 2111 or S. 1151 . There are other laws that address the subject of crime and computers. Statutes that establish a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for commission of a federal crime are neither common nor rare. The existing provisions call for criminal forfeiture of real and personal property derived from the proceeds of a CFAA violation and of personal property used to facilitate the offense. The purpose of the amendment would be "[t]o address civil liberties concerns about the scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" by amending it "to exclude from criminal liability conduct that exclusively involves a violation of a contractual obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy, or terms of service agreement." On the other hand, a second witness, a former Justice Department official, warned against the implications of the interpretation espoused in Drew . The change would represent an expansion both in the coverage of password equivalents and in scope of federal jurisdiction. Third, it provides a private cause of action with treble damages and attorneys' fees for the victims of a RICO violation. In the case of misdemeanors and five-year felonies, the maximum penalties are the same whether prosecution is under Section 1030 or under the general conspiracy statute. | The Cyber Crime Protection Security Act (S. 2111) would enhance the criminal penalties for the cybercrimes outlawed in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Those offenses include espionage, hacking, fraud, destruction, password trafficking, and extortion committed against computers and computer networks. S. 2111 contains some of the enhancements approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee when it reported the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act (S. 1151), S.Rept. 112-91 (2011).
The bill would (1) establish a three-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer; (2) streamline and increase the maximum penalties for the cybercrimes proscribed in CFAA; (3) authorize the confiscation of real property used to facilitate the commission of such cyberoffenses and permit forfeiture of real and personal property generated by, or used to facilitate the commission of, such an offense, under either civil or criminal forfeiture procedures; (4) add such cybercrimes to the racketeering (RICO) predicate offense list, permitting some victims to sue for treble damages and attorneys' fees; (5) increase the types of password equivalents covered by the trafficking offense and the scope of federal jurisdiction over the crime; (6) confirm that conspiracies to commit one of the CFAA offenses carry the same penalties as the underlying crimes; and (7) provide that a cybercrime prosecution under CFAA could not be grounded exclusively on the failure to comply with a term of service agreement or similar breach of contract or agreement, apparently in response to prosecution theory espoused in Drew. With the exception of this last limitation on prosecutions, the Justice Department has endorsed the proposals found in S. 2111.
The bill was placed on the Senate calendar, but the 112th Congress adjourned without taking further action on S. 2111 or S. 1151.
Related CRS reports include CRS Report 97-1025, Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws, available in abridged form as CRS Report RS20830, Cybercrime: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws. |
crs_RL31990 | crs_RL31990_0 | Introduction
Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United States. The report discusses several policy concerns relatedto federal pipeline security efforts: 1) federal threat information for pipelines, 2) criteria foridentifying "critical"assets, 3) TSA funding for pipeline security, and 4) federal agency cooperationin pipeline security. The report also focuses on TSA and the OPS as the lead pipelinesecurity and safety agencies. Despite substantial private and public efforts to promote security, it is widely recognized that pipelines are inherently vulnerable. (25) This title:
Authorizes DOT to inspect pipelines and enforce its regulations with fines, injunctions, and criminal penalties
Requires operators to report incidents, safety-related conditions and annualsummary data
Prescribes minimum pipeline safety requirements, including operatorqualifications for regulated functions
Imposes oil spill response plan requirements to reduce environmental impactof accidental discharges
Provides grants-in-aid to state pipeline safety compliance agencies that adoptdamage prevention programs
Requires operators to establish drug and alcohol programs. DOT administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) within the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). The actaccorded TSA with responsibility for security "in all modes of transportation, including "...modesof transportation that are exercised by the Department of Transportation." 107-296 ) creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). According to TSA, the agency expects pipelineoperators to maintain security plans based on the OPS/industry consensus security guidancecirculated in 2002 and subsequent revisions. (61) In 2003 the agency visited 24 of the largest 25-30pipeline operators to review their security plans and inspect their facilities. All but two of the 24 operators have provided TSAwith copies of their security plans and system maps, as well as critical infrastructure information. The OPS joined TSA on approximatelyone-third of its operator inspections in 2003. (65)
According to TSA, the agency intends to work with industry to help operators better identifytheir most critical assets. The President's 2003 infrastructure protection strategy, for example, noted that"pipeline facilities already incorporate a variety of stringent safety precautions" and that "as a whole,the response and recovery capabilities of the pipeline industry are well proven..." (71) Senior DHSofficials have also asserted that "pipelines are the best organized and have the best security practices"among maritime and land transportation sectors. TSA and the OPS currently cooperate on security inspections, but many inindustry are still concerned about the possibility of redundant, conflicting regulatory regimes. (76)
Identifying Critical Facilities
Various industry representatives state that they need clear and stable definitions of pipeline asset criticality so they will know exactly what assets to protect, and how well to protect them. (80)
Pipeline Security Resources at TSA
The President's FY2005 budget request for DHS does not include a separate line item forTSA's pipeline security activities. These staff willmaintain TSA's asset database, support TSA's multi-modal risk models, develop new securitystandards and issue regulations -- all with the consultation of industry and other federal agencies. While TSA believes it has an understanding with the OPS thatTSA will be the lead agency for pipeline security, a memorandum of agreement between the agencieshas not been signed. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline security activity fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect criticalinfrastructure. | Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United States. The nation's pipeline industry has made substantial investments to protect these systems and respond tothe possibility of terror attacks. However, U.S. pipelines are inherently vulnerable because of theirnumber and dispersion. Due to the essential role pipelines play in our economy, Congress isexamining the adequacy of federal pipeline security efforts.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for security in all modes of transportation -- includingpipelines. The agency oversees industry's identification and protection of critical pipeline assetsthrough security reviews, risk assessment and inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is the lead federal regulator of pipeline safety . While TSA and the OPS have distinct missions, pipeline security and safety are intertwined. Thereare questions about the appropriate division of responsibility between the agencies and about theresources they will have for mandated security activities.
As the lead agency for pipeline security, TSA expects pipeline operators to maintain security plans based on security guidance initially circulated in 2002. TSA also plans to issue pipelinesecurity regulations, although it is unclear if and when it will do so. This agency also intends to issuenew analytic models to help operators identify critical facilities and assess vulnerability to terroristattack. In 2003, TSA inspected 24 of the largest 25-30 pipeline operators to review their securitypractices and collect critical asset data. TSA found that nearly all of these operators had met orexceeded minimum security guidelines. All but two of the 24 operators also provided TSA with theirsecurity plans and critical infrastructure information. The OPS joined TSA on approximatelyone-third of these inspections and expects a continued security role. The agencies have no formalcooperative agreement defining responsibilities and at this point do not think they need one.
Industry and government agencies generally assert that efforts to promote U.S. pipeline security are on the right track. Nonetheless, TSA's current funding for pipeline security will provide onlylimited capability for inspections and enforcement of any future regulations. The President' sFY2005 budget request does not include a line item for TSA's pipeline activities; they will be fundedfrom the agency's general operational budget. In addition to appropriations issues, Congress isconsidering several policy concerns: Operators believe they need more specific federal threatinformation to improve security decisions. Many operators also believe they need clear and stabledefinitions of what constitutes a "critical" asset. Finally, operators are concerned about potentiallyredundant, conflicting regulatory regimes under TSA and the OPS. This report will be updated asevents warrant. |
crs_RL30202 | crs_RL30202_0 | Most Recent Developments
On September 29, 1999, President Clinton signed P.L. 106-113 , approved November 29, required a 0.38% cut in allfunding for FY2000. Among the independent agencies financed through P.L. Among other provisions adopted by the Senate, July 1, the following would
Convey federal land to the Columbia Hospital forWomen;
Amend the Social Security Act to require the Secretary ofHealth and Human Services to provide bonus grants to high performance Statesbased on certain criteria and collect data to evaluate the outcome of welfarereform;
Prohibit the use of funds to pay for an abortion or to pay for theadministrative expenses in connection with certain health plans that provide coveragefor abortions;
Provide additional funding to reduce methamphetamine usagein High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas;
Increase U.S. Customs Service funding to enable the hiring of500 new inspectors to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. and to facilitatelegitimate cross-border trade and commerce; and
Require the Secretary of the Treasury to develop an Internet sitewhere a taxpayer may generate a receipt for an income tax payment which itemizesthe portion of the payment which is allocable to various government spendingcategories. 2490. Across-the-Board Cuts
Pursuant to the provisions of P.L. Status of FY2000 Appropriations for the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President and GeneralGovernment
Budget and Key Policy Issues
Department of the Treasury
The Department of the Treasury has both financial and law enforcement functions. 106-58 funds the Department of the Treasury at $12,354,616,000. As passed by the Senate July 1, 1999, S. 1282 would have funded the department accounts at $12,234,649,000. As passed by the House July 15, 1999, H.R.2490 would have funded the accounts at $12,189,648,000. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The President's budget request for FY2000 would fund$8,248,774,000 to the IRS. Executive Office of the President and Funds Appropriated to the President
The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government appropriations bill funds all the offices in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), except the following threeoffices--the Council on Environmental Quality and the Office of Science andTechnology Policy (both funded under Veterans Affairs, Housing and UrbanDevelopment, and Independent Agencies appropriations), and the Office of theUnited States Trade Representative (funded under Commerce, Justice, State, and theJudiciary and Related Agencies appropriations). The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),which is located in the EOP, distributes the funds to federal and state entities. The FY2000 appropriations for the offices in the EOP that are funded by the Treasury appropriations act total $645,489,000, which is .9% more than the$639,498,000 requested by the President, and 3.7% less than the $670,112,000appropriated for FY1999. The specific accounts are discussed below. 104-21 . The Administration's request of $38.5 million constituted a 5.5% increase over the $36.5 million appropriated for the agency in FY1999. General Services Administration (GSA). 106-58 provides funding for GSA at$151,781,000, more than the Senate had voted and less than the House. Theprinciple difference is in the policy and operations account. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). This funding level is higher than either the House or Senate had originally passed. (This was the House-passed amount and is $1,000,000 lessthan the Senate-passed funding and the President's budget request.) TheFY2000 appropriations bill for those accounts (H.R. Major Funding Trends
In summary and prior to scorekeeping adjustments by the Congressional BudgetOffice (CBO), the Administration has requested a total of $27,997,054,000 foraccounts within this appropriation. The funding enacted for FY2000 under P.L.106-58 totals $27,972,418,000. The House and Senate data for FY1999 enacted are different. The House committeerecommended that funding level. Table 2. Table 4. The funds are under the control of the ONDCP. Account. Discretionary Spending. Mandatory Spending. Congressional Budget Office (CBO). | P.L. 106-58 (H.R. 2490), signed by the President September 29, 1999, to fund the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, several independent agencies and to providepartial funding for the U.S. Postal Service. The act funds the accounts at $27.99 billion, includingmandatories (before scorekeeping by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)). The consolidatedFY2000 funding measure, P.L. 106-113 , signed November 29, 1999, requires a cut by 0.38% in allaccounts. The administration's budget, to be submitted in early February, will contain a report onthe exact amounts of cuts for each of the accounts.
The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2490 would have funded the accounts at $27.77 billion and the House at $27.8 billion. The President's FY2000 budget, submitted February 1, 1999, requesteda funding level of $27.997 billion for the mandatory and discretionary accounts. This is an increaseover the FY1999 level enacted at just under $27 billion in regular appropriations, with additionalemergency funding. CBO scores the total for the FY2000 funding at $28.2 billion. The mandatoriesare $14.5 billion and the discretionary funding are $13.7 billion.
In summary, P.L. 106-58 , prior to the across-the-board cut, funds the Department of Treasury at $12,354.6 million, which is $ 282.6 million less than the FY1999 enacted (which includedemergency funding), $21.5 million less than requested, $165 million more than the House passed,and $120 million more than the Senate passed for FY2000. One principle point of difference is thefunding for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Both the House and Senate would have substantiallycut funding in several of the IRS accounts (See Table 4 for specifics).
Although the total appropriation for the U.S. Postal Service equals the request by the Administration, only $29 million of the $93.4 million is available in FY2000. The remainder willbe delayed until FY2001.
Title III of the Treasury appropriation funds the Executive Office of the President and accounts entitled, "Funds Appropriated to the President." Under the act, those accounts total $645.5 million. That funding level is $6 million more than the President's request, $9.3 million less thanHouse-enacted, and $75.4 million more than Senate-enacted. Both the House- and Senate-passedversions would have funded the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) at about $10million over the request. The major differences between the chamber action and the act are in theFunds Appropriated to the President, which are funds the ONDCP transfers to other entities for drugcontrol efforts.
The independent agencies are funded at $14.9 billion. That is $9.1 million less than requested, $16.6 million more than House-enacted and $2.5 million more than Senate-enacted. Funding for theGeneral Services Administration and the National Archives and Records Administration representthe largest differences.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: G&F = Government and Finance; DSP = Domestic Social Policy; RSI=Resources, Science, and Industry. |
crs_R41935 | crs_R41935_0 | 111-5 ), have altered the structure of this tax benefit. Specifically, the amount of the credit per child has increased and the credit has been made partially refundable, expanding the availability of the credit to some low-income families. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ) made the EGTRRA changes to the child tax credit permanent. 114-113 ) made the ARRA change to the child tax credit permanent. The economic analysis focuses on the equity (i.e., "fairness) of this tax provision, based on different definitions of equity, and examines the limited impact of the credit on taxpayer behavior. This report does not provide an in-depth examination of the history of the credit. The child tax credit has three key features. Amount: The credit equals a maximum of $1,000 per child. Prior to this expansion, the credit was largely available only to middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers. The child tax credit is refundable. Tax complexity associated with child-related tax provisions is particularly burdensome for lower-income families. The impact of modifications will depend on a taxpayer's income. Modifications that benefit middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers include increasing the amount of the credit per child and increasing the phase-out thresholds. Modifications that benefit lower-income taxpayers include reducing the refundability threshold or increasing the current refundability rate. These changes will likely have significant budgetary cost that policymakers may consider alongside policy goals they may achieve by increasing this tax benefit. Reducing the Refundability Earnings Threshold and Increasing the Refundability Rate
Among lower-income taxpayers, whose tax liability is less than the value of their child tax credit, the most relevant parameters of the child tax credits are those that affect refundability. The Impact of the EGTRRA and ARRA Changes to the Child Tax Credit
The most recent changes to the child tax credit were made by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. | The child tax credit is currently structured as a $1,000-per-child credit that is partially refundable for lower-income families with more than $3,000 in earnings. Prior to 2001, the child tax credit was a $500-per-child nonrefundable tax credit which generally benefited middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers.
Since 2001, legislative changes, particularly those made by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), have altered the structure of this tax benefit. Specifically, the amount of the credit per child has increased and the credit has been made partially refundable, expanding the availability of the credit to some low-income families. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) made the EGTRRA changes to the child tax credit permanent. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. 114-113) made the ARRA change to the child tax credit permanent.
In light of these recent changes to the structure of the child tax credit, this report provides an economic analysis of the current credit, focusing on the credit's impact on fairness (also referred to as "equity"). The report then explores how the credit has affected taxpayers' behavior about working and having children. Finally, this report examines the complexity of administering this tax provision in the context of other child-related tax benefits.
This report concludes with an overview of possible modifications to the child tax credit. The impact of these modifications will depend on a taxpayer's income. Modifications that benefit middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers include increasing the amount of the credit per child and increasing the phase-out thresholds. Modifications that benefit lower-income taxpayers include reducing the refundability threshold or increasing the current refundability rate. These changes will likely have significant budgetary cost that policymakers may consider alongside their policy goals.
This report does not provide an in-depth examination of the history of the credit. For more information on the legislative history of the credit, see CRS Report R41873, The Child Tax Credit: Current Law and Legislative History, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44347 | crs_R44347_0 | This funding expires at the end of the current fiscal year (September 30, 2016). CBO's Budget and Economic Outlook
Description
Each year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) releases a projection of budgetary and economic outcomes titled The Budget and Economic Outlook . The budget is required to include (1) estimates of spending, revenues, borrowing, and debt; (2) detailed estimates of the financial operations of federal agencies and programs; (3) the President's budgetary, policy, and legislative recommendations; and (4) information supporting the President's recommendations. The budget resolution reflects an agreement between the House and Senate on a budgetary framework for the upcoming fiscal year, designed to establish parameters within which Congress will consider subsequent budgetary legislation. The budget resolution does not become law: therefore, no money is spent or collected as a result of its adoption. Instead, it is meant to assist Congress in considering an overall budget plan. Such programs, also referred to as direct spending programs or entitlement programs, generally continue annually without any congressional action required. The content and consideration of revenue measures is shaped primarily by House and Senate rules and the budget resolution. Each year Congress passes legislation that affects revenue in varying degrees. Actions in 2016
This section will be updated to reflect actions on revenue legislation as they occur. Debt Limit Legislation
Description
The Constitution allows Congress to restrict the amount of federal debt that may be incurred as part of its "power of the purse." Such budgetary restrictions can take many forms. Congress has typically incorporated some type of internal budget enforcement in each recent Congress. The House Budget Committee held a number of hearings and released a series of "working papers focused on the committee's effort to overhaul the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and reform the congressional budget process." | The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse, but does not dictate how Congress must fulfill this constitutional duty. Congress has, therefore, developed certain types of budgetary legislation, along with rules and practices that govern its content and consideration. This set of budgetary legislation, rules, and practices is often referred to as the congressional budget process.
There is no prescribed congressional budget process that must be strictly followed each year, and Congress does not always consider budgetary measures in a linear or predictable pattern. Such dissimilarity can be the result of countless factors, such as a lack of consensus, competing budgetary priorities, the economy, natural disasters, military engagements, and other circumstances creating complications, obstacles, and interruptions within the policymaking process.
Since the budget process will vary significantly each year, it is better understood not as a definite set of actions that must occur annually, but instead as an array of opportunities for affecting the federal budget. This report seeks to assist in (1) anticipating what budget-related actions might occur within the upcoming year, and (2) staying abreast of budget actions that occur this year. It provides a general description of the recurrent types of budgetary actions, and reflects on current events that unfold in each category during 2016. In addition, it includes information on certain events that may affect Congress's work on the budget, such as the President's budget request and the Congressional Budget Office's budget and economic outlook. The most-recent budget actions will be noted at the beginning of the report. |
crs_RL32218 | crs_RL32218_0 | Introduction
The collection of fees to support U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pesticide program activities in the implementation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA; 7 U.S.C. §136-136y) and related requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. Enacted October 9, 2007, P.L. EPA reported the completion of 1,574 registration decisions subject to PRIA during FY2012, compared with 1,544 decisions during FY2011. EPA was also required to reevaluate older, registered pesticides (i.e., reregistration) and to reassess existing tolerances (i.e., tolerance reassessment) to ensure they meet current safety standards. Under the standards introduced by the 1996 amendments to FIFRA and FFDCA (the Food Quality Protection Act, or FQPA; P.L. 104-170 ), Congress, concerned with the continued pace of reregistration, extended EPA's authority to collect the annual maintenance fees through FY2001. These proposals were not adopted by Congress for those fiscal years, and at times, prohibited. Instead the FY2013 request acknowledged the need for reauthorization of the current fees at increased levels to cover a greater portion of relevant program operating costs. 100-532 ). 110-94 ) and the Pesticide Registration Improvement Act (PRIA 1; P.L. PRIA 3 also added authority for the EPA Administrator to provide a percentage reduction of maintenance fees for certain small business entities, and added new provisions for the enhancement of pesticide decision information tracking systems and for conducting preliminary screening of the content of a registration applications. (The phased out schedule applies only to registration fees not maintenance fees); continued the authority for use of funds in the Reregistration and Expedited Processing Fund to include use for "registration review" as stipulated initially under PRIA 2; pesticide registrations are to be reviewed every 15 years, as established under PRIA 2; continued to require EPA to identify reforms to the pesticide registration process to substantially reduce the decision review periods, and to provide annual reports summarizing activities and process improvements; and added a new requirement for EPA to provide a report analyzing the impact of maintenance fees on small businesses to the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee in Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry by October 1, 2016. EPA has initiated this process, and expects to complete product reregistration for conventional pesticides in 2014.
Review of Inert Ingredients and Expedited Processing of "Similar/Like" Product Applications52
PRIA 3 extended the authority to collect maintenance fees so as to explicitly designate the use of a portion between 1/9 th and 1/8 th (1/8 th and 1/7 th through FY2012 in PRIA 2) of the annual aggregate maintenance fees collected for each fiscal year FY2013 through FY2017 for
the review and evaluation of inert ingredients, the expedited processing of proposed initial or amended registration of an end-use pesticide product that is "similar" or identical to existing registered products, proposed label amendments that require no scientific review of data, and proposed registrations of public health pesticide uses. 112-177 amends FIFRA (7 U.S.C. 518; July 22, 1954), which, as passed, required the collection of fees "sufficient to provide adequate service" for establishing maximum residue levels (tolerances) for pesticides on food (see more detailed discussion below under " A Historical Overview of Pesticide Fee Authorities "). FIFRA and FFDCA Pesticide Fee Collection Authority
Authority for the collection of pesticide fees dates back as far as the 1954 amendments to FFDCA. The 1988 amendments to FIFRA ( P.L. P.L. The President's FY2013 budget request submitted to Congress February 13, 2012, did not include any proposed additional pesticide fees but rather indicated that legislative language would be proposed to reauthorize and increase existing maintenance and registration service fees to cover a greater portion of EPA's program operating costs. EPA reported expending $13.4 million of the $20.3 million total revenues available during the FY2012, which included $4.7 million carried forward from FY2011. The initial 1988 authorization ( P.L. The Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012 (PRIA 3; P.L. 112-177 ), enacted September 28, 2012, reauthorized and revised fee provisions under the Pesticide Registration Improvement Renewal Act (PRIA 2; P.L. 108-199 ), enacted January 23, 2004. | The Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012 (PRIA 3; P.L. 112-177), enacted September 28, 2012, amended the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to reauthorize and revise, through FY2017, the collection and use of fees to enhance and accelerate the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) pesticide licensing (registration) activities. Among other provisions, P.L. 112-177 increases the amounts of certain fees, revises the schedule for fee assessment and review deadlines for reviewing specific registration decisions, modifies provisions for small business reductions of fees, adds provisions for the enhancement of pesticide decision information tracking systems and for initial content preliminary screening activities, and eliminates pre-PRIA reregistration fee (1988) authorities. PRIA 2 (P.L. 110-94), enacted October 9, 2007, which was set to expire at the end of FY2012, reauthorized and revised fee collection provisions first established under PRIA 1 (P.L. 108-199), enacted January 23, 2004.
EPA is responsible for regulating the sale, use, and distribution of pesticides under the authority of two statutes. FIFRA (7 U.S.C. §136-136y), a licensing statute, requires EPA to review and register the use of pesticide products. FFDCA (21 U.S.C. §346a) requires the establishment of maximum limits (tolerances) for pesticide residues on food in interstate commerce. EPA was also required to reevaluate older, registered pesticides (i.e., "reregistration" for pesticides registered prior to 1984, and more recently, "registration review") and to reassess existing tolerances to ensure they meet current safety standards. Although U.S. Treasury revenues cover much of the costs for administering these acts, various fees paid by pesticide manufacturers and other registrants have supplemented EPA appropriations for many years as a means intended to, in part, increase the pace of the agency's activities under FIFRA and FFDCA.
In March 2013, EPA reported the completion of 1,574 pesticide registration-related decisions subject to PRIA 2 during FY2012, for a total of 12,165 decisions since the enactment of PRIA 1 in 2004. For FY2012, EPA reported expending $13.4 million of the $20.3 million in available revenues (composed of $15.6 million in net receipts of new registration service fees collected in FY2012 and $4.7 million carried forward from FY2011). Expenditures decreased by nearly 7% in FY2012 compared to $14.3 million in FY2011, primarily a result of a 35% reduction in expenditures for contracts.
Authority for collecting pesticide fees dates back to the 1954 FFDCA amendments (P.L. 518; July 22, 1954), which, as passed, required the collection of fees "sufficient to provide adequate service" for establishing maximum residue levels (tolerances) for pesticides on food. Authority to collect fees was expanded with the 1988 FIFRA amendments (P.L. 100-532). The 1996 amendments to FIFRA and FFDCA, or the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA; P.L. 104-170), extended EPA's authority to collect certain fees through FY2001. Prior to the enactment of PRIA 1 (P.L. 108-199) in 2004, Congress had extended these fee authorities annually through appropriations legislation. Since 1998, Presidents' budget requests have included proposals to modify existing fee structures to further increase revenues for pesticide activities, but were not adopted in legislation and in some cases specifically prohibited by Congress. The FY2013 President's budget request, submitted to Congress February 13, 2012, did not include similar proposals for supplemental fees, but instead acknowledged the need for reauthorization of the current fees at increased levels to cover a greater portion of relevant program operating costs. |
crs_RL33698 | crs_RL33698_0 | Overview1
The pending debate over reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is likely to be a high priority in the 110 th Congress. Funding authorizations for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100—the Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act ( P.L. 108-176 , hereafter referred to as Vision 100), as well as authorization of the existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund, are set to expire at the end of FY2007. Congress may consider a variety of financing options to maintain the ability of the aviation trust fund to provide a sufficient revenue stream for ongoing operational costs and planned infrastructure improvements, in the near-term and to support the long-term NGATS development efforts. Some have proposed that the FAA implement a systematic process, perhaps using something akin to the military's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, to address future consolidation plans for facilities and functions. In the long term, under NGATS, consolidation of air traffic services and air traffic facilities may be possible. Also, with regard to issues of passenger comfort, safety, and convenience in the airliner cabin, the use of cell phones and portable electronic devices (PEDs) has been an issue of growing interest. Growing concerns over global warming and environmental impacts may also prompt debate over options for reducing aircraft emissions. The strategy for addressing the impending wave of controller retirements is intended to be more proactive. As previously discussed, Congress may also consider whether a BRAC-like process may provide a mechanism for evaluating air traffic control facility consolidation options. Given the intense interest in UAV technologies and the safety concerns raised by other airspace users, the FAA's approach to regulating the safety of UAVs could be a topic of particular interest as Congress engages in debate over FAA reauthorization. A variety of issues may arise during the reauthorization debate, including
Whether sufficient progress on the NGATS effort has been made to date, and whether it is anticipated that NGATS plans can stay on schedule; Whether metrics to sufficiently define and monitor progress in the development of NGATS are available and can be adequately defined and measured; Whether timelines and milestones to reach NGATS objectives by 2025 need to be more explicitly defined through legislation; Whether the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), the organization charged with overseeing and integrating the NGATS project, has sufficient access and input into the budgeting and acquisition processes at the various agencies involved, including the FAA, NASA, and others; Whether the scope of the NGATS project is too broadly defined by considering security and environmental issues and defining air travel from airport curbside to airport curbside, and therefore should be narrowed to focus more intensively on the safe and efficient flow of aircraft (rather than passengers in the system); and Whether the JPDO has sufficient staffing to monitor the NGATS system integration, or whether the use of a systems integration contractor to oversee and integrate the NGATS project is needed;
To further examine these issues, the role of the JPDO, as set forth in Vision 100, and the JPDOs approach to defining and carrying out this role is considered in additional detail. Issues of particular interest in the current context include options for preventing runway overrun accidents, preventing runway incursions and collisions, improving maintenance oversight, mitigating the risk of fuel tank explosions on commercial airliners, monitoring aging aircraft and aircraft systems, and addressing safety concerns in the all-cargo industry. Other air tour operators may operate under general flight rules with minimal FAA oversight. These techniques could become part of an overall public health policy to control the spread of an infectious disease such as the avian flu. Further assessment of alternative fuels both for airport ground vehicles and for aircraft may arise as an issue during debate in Congress over FAA reauthorization. Coal-derived fuels can also be produced using processes similar to GTL. Aircraft Noise Reduction Technologies and Technology Policy
Policymakers may also face difficult decisions in setting realistic goals for future reductions in aircraft noise levels. | Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other aviation programs is likely to be a high priority in the 110th Congress. Funding authorizations for aviation programs, as well as authorization of existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund, are set to expire at the end of FY2007. Congress may consider a variety of financing options to maintain the ability of the aviation trust fund to provide a sufficient revenue stream for ongoing operational costs and planned infrastructure improvements. One particularly controversial alternative under consideration is a user fee system, which is supported by the airlines but strongly opposed by many other system users.
Faced with growing operational costs and fiscal needs to support system expansion, airport capital improvements, and modernization efforts, options to control costs within the FAA and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) may be a particular focus of reauthorization. Cost control options generally revolve around two overarching strategies: consolidation of facilities and functions, and competitive sourcing. Some have recommended that a formal process, similar to the military's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, be implemented to assess how the FAA could best consolidate its functions to control costs and address future system needs. Besides controlling costs, options to maintain and balance air traffic controller staffing levels are likely to be of particular interest, as the FAA is facing a large wave of controller retirements over the next five years. Options for improving and streamlining training, increasing productivity, better balancing staffing needs, and perhaps consolidating air traffic facilities over the long-term may be considered during reauthorization.
Congress may examine a variety of aviation safety issues during debate over FAA reauthorization. Options for preventing runway overruns and for reducing the risk of runway collisions may be of particular interest. The adequacy of FAA safety oversight has been a continuing concern, and recent accidents may draw particular attention to oversight of contract repair facilities, smaller passenger service operators, as well as air charter and air tour operators. Other safety issues that may arise include longstanding concerns, such as mitigating the risks of fuel tank explosions, addressing concerns over aging aircraft, and addressing the unique safety issues affecting all-cargo operations. Issues regarding airliner cabin health and safety may also be considered. Options to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases among aircraft occupants and the safety-of-flight implications of cell phones and portable electronic devices may also be examined.
Growing interest in alternatives to petroleum fuel may generate some debate over alternative fuel technologies for aircraft and airport ground vehicles, and growing international pressures to regulate aircraft emissions may prompt debate on aviation's environmental impacts. Longstanding aircraft noise policies may also be examined to assess whether quiet aircraft technologies and policy changes could further mitigate the community impacts of aircraft noise. This report will be updated. |
crs_R43609 | crs_R43609_0 | Introduction
In an increasingly interconnected world, public health concerns and crises have domestic and international implications. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FD&C Act or the Act) promotes national public health by preventing fraudulent activity with respect to food, drugs, and an array of other public health products. The FD&C Act and its implementing regulations contain standards to protect and promote public health, including requirements for prescription drug approval and food safety. Providing an overview of the Act's enforcement, this report discusses the Act's civil and criminal provisions and enforcement mechanisms. Overview of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The FD&C Act regulates most foods, food additives, color additives, dietary supplements, prescription and non-prescription drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and tobacco products for safety. The Act's primary purpose is to "safeguard" and "protect" consumers from "dangerous products" affecting public health and safety by regulating covered articles from the "moment of their introduction into interstate commerce all the way to the moment of their delivery to the ultimate consumer." The FD&C Act is enforced through a variety of measures such as formal and informal administrative actions, criminal and civil penalties, injunctions, recalls, and/or seizures of FD&C Act-covered goods. Section 301 generally makes it illegal to distribute directly or indirectly a covered product in interstate commerce that is "adulterated" or "misbranded." General Questions About the Enforcement of the FD&C Act
This section answers several basic and overarching questions about the Act's enforcement. Established under FD&C Act Section 1003, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the primary agency that administers and enforces the Act. Generally, FDA's mission is to promote and protect public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and truthful labeling of products subject to the Act. In addition to such pre-market authority, FDA also possesses significant post-market authority to monitor regulated products that have entered interstate commerce to ensure the product continues to adhere to the Act. FDA also uses "other enforcement tools not detailed in the FD&C Act," such as issuing warning and information letters to regulated entities that are violating the Act. These practices are discussed later in this report. Indeed, while FDA has significant authority to promote compliance with and to investigate violations of the Act, FDA, like most executive agencies, does not have independent litigating authority. Thus, to address noncompliance, FDA must coordinate with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to enforce the Act through product seizures, injunctions, civil penalty proceedings, or criminal prosecutions. In addition to DOJ, several other agencies have FD&C Act enforcement roles. To administer federal laws relating to imports, exports, and duties, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) "must work in close cooperation" with FDA to prevent articles that violate the FD&C Act from entering the United States. More broadly, because the Act covers a range of products and subject matters, other federal and state agencies have roles in regulating FD&C Act-covered products. Significantly, the FD&C Act does not contain a private right of action under which members of the public can sue to enforce the Act. While the Supreme Court has recognized that private lawsuits can be used to enforce laws with mandates similar to those of the FD&C Act, the onus for enforcing the Act lies almost exclusively with the federal government. A product's nexus with interstate commerce may arise from many activities. As a consequence, recent federal court decisions have found that the FD&C Act requirement that articles be in interstate commerce poses "no obstacle" to FDA enforcing the Act with respect to seemingly wholly intrastate activities. For the Court, the FD&C Act's general enforcement provision, Section 702, was permissive in nature, merely "authorizing" the Secretary of Health and Human Services (and through a delegation of that authority, the Commissioner of FDA) "to conduct examinations and investigations for the purposes of" the Act, and indicated Congress's intent to give FDA discretion over initiating enforcement proceedings. Absent DOJ involvement, FDA has several administrative tools for enforcing the Act, including warning and untitled letters, import alerts, recalls, debarments, and civil money penalties. FDA's other civil enforcement actions, including injunctions and seizures, require DOJ assistance. For example, in Bellarno International Ltd.v. Civil Money Penalties
Under the FD&C Act, FDA may impose monetary civil penalties for specified violations of the Act. Seizures
To prevent harmful goods from reaching consumers, the FD&C Act provides for the seizure of foods, drugs, devices, cosmetics, and tobacco products that are adulterated or misbranded. FDA has indicated that an injunction is the agency's remedy of choice when there are
current and definite health hazards or a gross consumer deception requiring immediate action to stop the violative practice and a seizure is impractical; significant amounts of violative products owned by the same person, a voluntary recall by the firm was refused or is significantly inadequate to protect the public, and a seizure is impractical or uneconomical; or long-standing (chronic) violative practices that have not produced a health hazard or consumer fraud, but which have not been corrected through use of voluntary or other regulatory approaches. Criminal Enforcement of the FD&C Act
In addition to civil enforcement mechanisms, the FD&C Act also subjects individuals to criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for violating certain provisions of the Act. Two Supreme Court cases established this principle. While the lack of a mens rea element in FD&C Act criminal cases could theoretically allow FDA and DOJ to "bring a criminal action ... in virtually every serious case" of an FD&C Act violation, two defenses may diminish the potential reach of the Act's criminal sanctions. Criminal Penalties Resulting from an FD&C Act Violation
Under Section 303(a)(1) of the FD&C Act, criminal violations of the Act are generally treated as misdemeanors, meaning they are punishable by a fine or imprisonment of a year or less. | In an increasingly interconnected world, public health concerns and crises have domestic and international implications. In the United States, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FD&C Act or the Act) promotes public health by preventing fraudulent activity with respect to food, drugs, and an array of other public health products that enter interstate commerce. Indeed, the Act's primary purpose is to "safeguard" and "protect" consumers from exposure to dangerous products affecting public health and safety. The FD&C Act does this by regulating covered articles from their introduction into interstate commerce to their delivery to the ultimate consumer. This report provides an overview of the FD&C Act, answers frequently asked questions about the Act's enforcement, and discusses the Act's various civil and criminal enforcement provisions.
The FD&C Act is the main federal law regulating the safety of most foods, food additives, color additives, dietary supplements, prescription and non-prescription drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and tobacco products. While the Act regulates a host of disparate products, it generally prohibits two basic acts: "adulteration" and "misbranding." Specifically, FD&C Act Section 301 makes it illegal to distribute directly or indirectly a covered product in interstate commerce that is adulterated or misbranded. The Act defines the terms "adulteration" and "misbranding" with respect to specific products.
The FD&C Act is chiefly enforced by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency whose general mission is to promote and protect the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and truthful labeling of the products it regulates. FDA enforces the Act through administrative mechanisms, such as pre-market reviews of certain products, examinations and investigations, and dissemination of information to the public. While primarily focused on interstate commerce, FDA's authority extends to intrastate activities that have a nexus with interstate commerce and concern a product that the Act covers. Supreme Court precedent recognizes that FDA enjoys significant discretion over enforcement of most FD&C Act provisions. Because FDA, like most executive agencies, does not have independent litigating authority, it must coordinate with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to pursue criminal or civil remedies. In addition to DOJ, other federal agencies play a role in enforcing discrete parts of the Act; private parties, however, do not have rights to enforce the FD&C Act through lawsuits.
For serious FD&C Act violations, the FDA, in coordination with DOJ, has a wide range of civil and criminal remedies. For example, the FD&C Act authorizes the government to sue violators of the Act in court in order to punish or prevent future violations. Such civil actions include imposing money penalties, injunctions, and seizures. Other enforcement actions include warning letters, import alerts, recalls, and debarments. For extremely serious violations, FDA and DOJ may collaborate to bring criminal charges. A criminal violation of the FD&C Act does not require that the perpetrator have a "guilty mind." Intentional or repeated violations of the Act may result in multiple years of imprisonment and significant criminal fines.
In an increasingly interconnected world, public health concerns and crises have domestic and international implications. In the United States, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FD&C Act or the Act) promotes public health by preventing fraudulent activity with respect to food, drugs, and an array of other public health products that enter interstate commerce. Indeed, the Act's primary purpose is to "safeguard" and "protect" consumers from exposure to dangerous products affecting public health and safety. The FD&C Act does this by regulating covered articles from their introduction into interstate commerce to their delivery to the ultimate consumer. This report provides an overview of the FD&C Act, answers frequently asked questions about the Act's enforcement, and discusses the Act's various civil and criminal enforcement provisions.
The FD&C Act is the main federal law regulating the safety of most foods, food additives, color additives, dietary supplements, prescription and non-prescription drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and tobacco products. While the Act regulates a host of disparate products, it generally prohibits two basic acts: "adulteration" and "misbranding." Specifically, FD&C Act Section 301 makes it illegal to distribute directly or indirectly a covered product in interstate commerce that is adulterated or misbranded. The Act defines the terms "adulteration" and "misbranding" with respect to specific products.
The FD&C Act is chiefly enforced by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency whose general mission is to promote and protect the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and truthful labeling of the products it regulates. FDA enforces the Act through administrative mechanisms, such as pre-market reviews of certain products, examinations and investigations, and dissemination of information to the public. While primarily focused on interstate commerce, FDA's authority extends to intrastate activities that have a nexus with interstate commerce and concern a product that the Act covers. Supreme Court precedent recognizes that FDA enjoys significant discretion over enforcement of most FD&C Act provisions. Because FDA, like most executive agencies, does not have independent litigating authority, it must coordinate with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to pursue criminal or civil remedies. In addition to DOJ, other federal agencies play a role in enforcing discrete parts of the Act; private parties, however, do not have rights to enforce the FD&C Act through lawsuits.
For serious FD&C Act violations, the FDA, in coordination with DOJ, has a wide range of civil and criminal remedies. For example, the FD&C Act authorizes the government to sue violators of the Act in court in order to punish or prevent future violations. Such civil actions include imposing money penalties, injunctions, and seizures. Other enforcement actions include warning letters, import alerts, recalls, and debarments. For extremely serious violations, FDA and DOJ may collaborate to bring criminal charges. A criminal violation of the FD&C Act does not require that the perpetrator have a "guilty mind." Intentional or repeated violations of the Act may result in multiple years of imprisonment and significant criminal fines. |
crs_R41603 | crs_R41603_0 | Introduction
Biomass energy, or bioenergy, may receive more attention from stakeholders as an alternative to fossil fuels because of its potential to minimize the environmental impacts of energy production, provide energy security, and promote economic development. The carbon-neutral designation typically is assigned to an energy-production activity that essentially produces no net increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a life-cycle basis (or one that absorbs the amount of carbon dioxide emitted during the power-production cycle). Some biomass feedstock producers and biopower generators, among other stakeholders, contend that biopower is carbon neutral because the carbon released during bioenergy production comes from a feedstock that removed the carbon from the atmosphere as it was growing—biomass. Additionally, biopower production may receive increased attention due to executive branch actions, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Clean Power Plan and EPA's proposed framework to account for emissions of biogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from stationary sources. No commonly accepted definition for a carbon-neutral activity exists in the biopower arena. A life-cycle assessment (LCA) is one method to calculate the environmental footprint. The first three phases of the biopower pathway (cultivation and harvest, transport, and electricity generation) are where the bulk of GHG emissions occur. GHG flux during the first three phases is site and operation specific and depends on many factors, including the biomass type, management strategies, and biopower generation technology. The LCA time frame can be long (e.g., "cradle to grave") or relatively short (e.g., "cradle to gate"). In August 2015, the EPA released the final rule for CO 2 emission reductions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants. This rule, commonly referred to as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), requires states to reach a state-specific CO 2 emission-reduction goal (measured in pounds of CO 2 emissions per megawatt-hour of electricity generation) by 2030. EPA reports that "qualified biomass"—biomass feedstock that has been demonstrated to be a method to control increases of CO 2 levels in the atmosphere—may be included in a state's plan. Framework for Assessing Biogenic CO2 Emissions from Stationary Sources
EPA released two draft frameworks—the first in 2011 and the second in 2014—that establish a process to evaluate and account for GHGs associated with the use of biomass to produce energy at stationary sources (e.g., biopower). EPA acknowledges that the 2014 framework is an analytical methodology and that some stakeholders may consider the framework a precursor to how EPA treats biogenic emissions for both the standards for GHG emissions from existing fossil-fueled power plants and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program (see " Prevention of Significant Deterioration/New Source Review Program and Title V Greenhouse Gas Permitting Requirements ," below). However, EPA reports that it "has not yet determined how the framework might be applied in any particular regulatory or policy contexts or taken the steps needed for such implementation." These findings included that "carbon neutrality cannot be assumed for all biomass energy a priori." Biopower's carbon neutrality is a contentious aspect of the bioenergy debate. Congress could decide to use existing legislative authorities to address carbon accounting for biopower. To the extent carbon neutrality continues to be a legislative concern, Congress could examine whether the current carbon-neutral assumption for biopower is adequate. Congress may consider if additional carbon accounting for biopower is warranted and what impact this accounting might have on renewable energy, agricultural, and environmental legislative goals. If biopower is a part of an RES or CES, the carbon-neutrality designation of biopower may need to be considered in response to environmental and sustainability concerns. | To promote energy diversity and improve energy security, Congress has expressed interest in biopower—electricity generated from biomass. Biopower, a baseload power source, can be produced from a large range of biomass feedstocks nationwide (e.g., urban, agricultural, and forestry wastes and residues). The two most common biopower processes are combustion (e.g., direct-fired or co-fired) and gasification, with the former being the most widely used. Proponents have stated that biopower has the potential to strengthen rural economies, enhance energy security, and minimize the environmental impacts of energy production. Challenges to biopower production include the need for a sufficient feedstock supply, concerns about potential health impacts to nearby communities from the combustion of biomass, and its higher generation costs relative to fossil fuel-based electricity. At present, biopower generally requires tax incentives to be competitive with conventional fossil fuel-fired electric generation.
An energy production activity typically is classified as carbon neutral if it produces no net increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a life-cycle basis. The legislative record shows minimal debate about the carbon status of biopower. The argument that biopower is carbon neutral has come under scrutiny in debate on its potential to help meet U.S. energy demands and reduce U.S. GHG emissions. Whether biopower is considered carbon neutral depends on many factors, including the definition of carbon neutrality, feedstock type, technology used, and time frame examined. Carbon flux (emission and sequestration) varies at each phase of the biopower pathway, given site- and operation-specific factors. A life-cycle assessment (LCA) is a common technique to calculate the environmental footprint, including the carbon flux, of a particular biopower pathway. However, past legislation would not have required a standardized LCA for biopower.
The carbon-neutral status of biopower may be of concern to stakeholders, especially if Congress expands support for biopower. Questions such as where the feedstock supply for biopower originates, if it is managed in a sustainable manner, and whether the associated air-quality impacts from biopower generation are tolerable are part of the biopower carbon-neutrality debate. Congress may decide whether the current approach regarding the carbon status of biopower is acceptable or whether additional carbon accounting for biopower is warranted and what impact this accounting might have on renewable energy, agricultural, and environmental legislative goals.
Two recent actions by the executive branch—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Clean Power Plan (CPP), which addresses carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reductions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric power plants, and EPA's proposed framework to account for biogenic CO2 emissions from stationary sources—could focus attention on biopower's carbon neutrality. The CPP—which was granted a stay by the Supreme Court on February 9, 2016—requires states to devise a plan that allows them to reach a state-specific CO2 emission reduction goal by 2030, using various options, including renewable energy (e.g., biopower). In the CPP final rule, EPA specifies that "qualified biomass" may be included in a state plan given certain conditions. In November 2014, EPA released its second biogenic accounting framework. The framework addresses some of the EPA Science Advisory Board's recommendations from the first framework, released in 2011, including the finding that "carbon neutrality cannot be assumed for all biomass energy a priori." EPA acknowledges that the framework is an analytical methodology and that some stakeholders may consider it an example of how EPA may treat biogenic emissions in both the CPP and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. However, EPA reports that it "has not yet determined how the framework might be applied in any particular regulatory or policy contexts or taken the steps needed for such implementation." |
crs_R41331 | crs_R41331_0 | This report describes the individual mandate as established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). It also discusses the ACA reporting requirements designed, in part, to assist individuals in providing evidence of having met the mandate. Individual Mandate
The ACA requires most individuals to have health insurance coverage or potentially to pay a penalty for noncompliance. Individuals are required to maintain minimum essential coverage for themselves and their dependents. Some individuals are exempt from the mandate and the penalty, and others may receive financial assistance to help them pay for the cost of health insurance coverage and the costs associated with using health care services. Because the penalties are assessed through the federal tax filing process, calendar year 2015 is the first year in which the penalty is assessed (for calendar year 2014). Minimum Essential Coverage
In general, individuals who are not exempt from the mandate must maintain minimum essential coverage to avoid the penalty. Those who do not meet the mandate may be required to pay a penalty for each month of noncompliance. If they still do not pay the penalty, the IRS can attempt to collect the funds by reducing the amount of their tax refund for that year or future years. However, individuals who fail to pay the penalty will not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty for such failure. The Secretary of the Treasury cannot file notice of lien or file a levy on any property for a taxpayer who does not pay the penalty. Hardship Exemption
Any individual whom the HHS Secretary determines has suffered a hardship with respect to the capability to obtain health insurance coverage will receive a hardship exemption. In regulations, HHS has identified a number of circumstances that allow individuals to receive a hardship exemption, including those in which an individual
experiences financial, domestic, or other circumstances that prevent him or her from obtaining coverage or the expense of purchasing coverage would cause him or her to experience serious deprivation of food, shelter, clothing, or other necessities; is unable to afford coverage based on projected household income; has income below the filing threshold (and therefore is eligible for the filing threshold exemption), except that he or she claimed a dependent with a filing requirement and had household income exceeding the filing threshold as a result; is ineligible for Medicaid based on a state's decision not to carry out the ACA expansion; is identified as eligible for affordable self-only ESI, but the aggregate cost of the ESI for all the employed members of the individual's family exceeds a certain percentage of household income; and is an Indian eligible for services through an Indian health care provider but is not eligible for an exemption based on being a member of an Indian tribe, or is eligible for services through the Indian Health Service. Information such as the number of individuals who were subject to the penalty in 2014, the amount of any penalties owed, and the number of individuals who were exempt from the mandate is not currently available. Every entity (including employers, insurers, and government programs) that provides minimum essential coverage to any individual must present a return to the IRS and a statement to the covered individual. | Since 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) has required most individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or potentially to pay a penalty for noncompliance. Specifically, most individuals are required to maintain minimum essential coverage for themselves and their dependents. Minimum essential coverage is a term defined in the ACA and its implementing regulations and includes most private and public coverage (e.g., employer-sponsored coverage, individual coverage, Medicare, and Medicaid, among others). Some individuals are exempt from the mandate and the penalty, and others may receive financial assistance to help them pay for the cost of health insurance coverage and the costs associated with using health care services.
Individuals who do not maintain minimum essential coverage and are not exempt from the mandate have to pay a penalty for each month of noncompliance with the mandate. The penalty is the greater of a flat dollar amount or a percentage of applicable income. In 2014, the annual penalty was the greater of $95 or 1% of applicable income; the penalty increased to the greater of $325 or 2% of applicable income in 2015. The penalty will increase again in 2016 and will be adjusted for inflation thereafter.
The penalty is assessed through the federal tax filing process. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can attempt to collect any owed penalties by reducing the amount of an individual's tax refund; however, individuals who fail to pay the penalty will not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty for such failure. The Secretary of the Treasury cannot file notice of lien or file a levy on any property for a taxpayer who does not pay the penalty.
Certain individuals are exempt from the individual mandate and the penalty. For example, individuals with qualifying religious exemptions and those whose household income is below the filing threshold for federal income taxes are not subject to the penalty. The ACA allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to grant hardship exemptions from the penalty to anyone determined to have suffered a hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage. The Secretary of HHS has identified a number of different circumstances that would allow individuals to receive a hardship exemption, including an individual not being eligible for Medicaid based on a state's decision not to carry out the ACA expansion and financial or domestic circumstances that prevent an individual from obtaining coverage (e.g., eviction or recent experience of domestic violence).
The ACA includes several reporting requirements designed, in part, to assist individuals in providing evidence of having met the mandate. Every entity (including employers, insurers, and government programs) that provides minimum essential coverage to any individual must present a return to the IRS and a statement to the covered individual that includes information about the individual's health insurance coverage. |
crs_R41339 | crs_R41339_0 | Background and Overview
Titles III and VI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, P.L. Title III allocates prudential supervision among three federal regulators. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) will now regulate federally chartered thrifts as well as national banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will now regulate state-chartered thrifts as well as state-chartered banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS); and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) will now regulate both bank holding companies (including financial holding companies) and thrift or savings and loan holding companies, as well as state-chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS). Many of the provisions of Titles III and VI appear to be designed to correct perceived inadequacies in terms of the prudential regulation of banks, savings associations, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies or discrepancies between the regulation of banks and savings associations. There are numerous provisions requiring greater coordination among regulators and provisions enhancing the authority of FRB to oversee all of the components of holding companies. Miscellaneous matters addressed in Title III include changing the basis of deposit insurance assessments imposed on banks; permanently increasing deposit insurance coverage to $250,000; applying that increase retroactively to January 1, 2008; and establishing offices of Minority and Women Inclusion in the Department of the Treasury and in the federal financial regulatory agencies. What follows are summaries of sections of Title III relating to substantive changes in the regulation of depository institutions and their holding companies. Section 313 abolishes the OTS and the position of Director of the OTS effective 90 days after the transfer. GAO is to evaluate the adequacy of the applicable regulatory frameworks and the consequences of subjecting the institutions to the BHC Act. If there has been a final enforcement action by a state attorney general, the conversion must be conditioned on compliance with its requirements. Subsection (a) contains an outright prohibition on proprietary trading by and ownership of interests in or sponsorship of hedge funds or private equity funds by a "banking entity." Market Making Activities. Agency Implementation
Many of the provisions of Titles III and VI of Dodd-Frank require implementation by the federal banking agencies involving studies, rulemaking, and other efforts. That process began shortly after enactment of the legislation, and each of the major federal bank regulatory agencies has provided some information on methodology. | The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, P.L. 111-203, has as its main purpose financial regulatory reform. Titles III and VI effectuate changes in the regulatory structure governing depository institutions and their holding companies and, thus, constitute a substantial component of the reform effort. Under Title III, there will no longer be a single regulator of federal and state-chartered savings associations, also known as thrifts or savings and loan associations. Title III abolishes the Office of the Thrift Supervision (OTS) and contains extensive provisions respecting the rights of affected employees as well as other administrative matters. It allocates the OTS functions among three existing regulators: the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) will regulate federally chartered thrifts; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), state-chartered thrifts; and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), savings and loan holding companies. Title III also makes certain changes to deposit insurance: it makes permanent the increase of deposit insurance coverage to $250,000, and makes that increase retroactive to January 1, 2008. It extends full insurance coverage of non-interest bearing checking accounts for two additional years and authorizes a similar program for credit unions. Included in Title III is also a requirement that the Department of the Treasury and each federal financial regulatory agency establish an office of Minority and Women Inclusion.
Title VI addresses some perceived inadequacies with respect to prudential regulation of depository institutions and their holding companies, including the existence of certain exceptions to the Bank Holding Company Act's (BHC Act's) general prohibition on affiliation of banking institutions and commercial or manufacturing concerns; investment in hedge funds or private equity funds and proprietary trading by banking institutions; gaps in the authority of the FRB to oversee all of the subsidiaries of bank holding companies; the need for greater coordination among the regulators with respect to enforcement actions, charter conversions, and mergers and acquisitions; and elimination of some of the differences affecting the regulation of thrifts and banks, state-chartered and federally chartered institutions, and bank and thrift holding companies.
Each of the federal banking agencies has begun the process of implementing applicable provisions of the legislation and has published information on projected activities. The full implications of Titles III and VI will not be apparent until the agencies promulgate the many implementing regulations required before many of the provisions go into effect. Generally, the legislation specifies a time period for when a particular rulemaking is to be completed; in some cases, studies are required before the rulemaking may occur. |
crs_RL33445 | crs_RL33445_0 | Overview of the Current Status of Negotiations
On March 8, 2006, then U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Rob Portman announced and notified Congress of the Administration's intent to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with Malaysia.. At the time, then USTR Portman indicated that he thought the negotiations could be completed "within a year." A proposed ninth round of talks were postponed until after President Barack Obama's inauguration. Conserted efforts to complete the negotiations of the free trade agreement (FTA) before the end of the Bush Administration were unsuccessful as talks foundered on a number of key issues. These include Malaysia's government procurement policies (which give preferential treatment to bumiputera -owned companies), market access for U.S. companies into Malaysia's services sectors (in particular, financial services), provisions for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and market access for U.S. exports of automobiles and agricultural crops. After Israel launched "Operation Cast Lead" on December 27, 2008, various political figures and interest groups in Malaysia called for a boycott of U.S. products and the suspension of the FTA talks to protest U.S. support for Israel's military operations in Gaza. Review of 2008 Negotiations
At one time, there were to be three rounds of talks in 2008, to be held in January, July and November, respectively. There will be no hard feelings." Ambassador Keith, stated that the United States was interested in concluding the FTA negotiations "as early as possible in the new administration." Malaysia has recently tightened its laws on and stepped up enforcement of protection of intellectual property, but problems still remain. Interests, Benefits and Potential Opposition
The proposed U.S.-Malaysia FTA is of interest to Congress because: (1) it requires congressional approval; (2) it would continue the past trend toward greater trade liberalization and globalization; (3) it may include controversial provisions; and (4) it would affect certain trade flows that would, in turn, affect U.S. businesses or farmers, particularly import-competing industries and those exporting to Malaysia. Several Malaysian industries have been generally supportive of the proposed FTA, principally because they believe that they will benefit from greater access to the U.S. market. As a moderate, democratic Muslim nation, Malaysia plays a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy. FTAs also create winners and losers. An FTA with Malaysia would be the third FTA negotiation by the United States with a Southeast Asian nation, following the U.S.-Singapore FTA that came into effect on January 1, 2004, and a proposed U.S.-Thailand FTA whose negotiations are currently stalled. For more information on the relative tariff rates of the two nations, see Appendix C .
The potential impact of an FTA depends on various other factors, including the relative size of the two nations, the amount and nature of their bilateral trade flows, the size of bilateral FDI in each nation, as well as existing trade relations with other nations. The Malaysian Economy
Table 1 provides a summary of Malaysia's key economic indicators. According to U.S. trade figures, Malaysia was the tenth largest trading partner of the United States in 2007. Trade in Services
According to current U.S. data, Malaysia is not and has not been a major services trading partner for the United States (see Table 5. The United States already is Malaysia's top export market for merchandise goods. | This report addresses the proposed U.S.-Malaysia free trade agreement (FTA). It provides an overview of the current status of the negotiations, a review of the 2008 talks, an examination of leading issues that have arisen during the negotiations, a review of U.S. interests in the proposed agreement, a summary of the potential effects of a FTA on bilateral trade, and an overview of the legislative procedures to be followed if the proposed FTA is presented to Congress for approval.
The proposed U.S.-Malaysia FTA is of interest to Congress because (1) it requires congressional approval; (2) it would continue the past trend toward greater trade liberalization and globalization; (3) it may include controversial provisions; and (4) it could affect trade flows for certain sensitive goods and industries in the United States.
Since the U.S. Trade Representative announced on March 8, 2006, the Bush Administration's intent to negotiate a free trade agreement with Malaysia, eight rounds of negotiations have been held. A proposed ninth round of talks scheduled for November 2008 were postponed until after President Barack Obama's inauguration once it became apparent that several outstanding issues remained unresolved. Since the postponement, Malaysia has suspended the bilateral negotiations, possibly in response to U.S. support for Israel's military operations in Gaza.
Efforts in 2008 to complete the FTA negotiations by the end of the Bush Administation were unsuccessful. There is general agreement that one major "sticking point" is Malaysia's government procurement policies, which give preferential treatment for certain types of Malaysian-owned companies. Other key outstanding provisions of the possible FTA as of the end of 2008 were intellectual property rights protection, protection of Malaysia's agricultural and automotive industry, and trade in services.
Areas of particular interest to U.S. exporters include a reduction of Malaysian trade barriers to automobiles and certain agricultural products, provisions for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and broader access to Malaysia's service sectors such as financial services, telecommunications, and professional services.
Both nations could potentially see economic benefits from the proposed FTA, but there will be both winners and losers in both nations, as well as in other nations not part of the bilateral agreement. Overall bilateral trade flows would probably rise, possibly at the expense of some domestic and foreign manufacturers and their workers. In 2007, the United States was Malaysia's largest trading partner, while Malaysia was the United States' tenth largest trading partner. The United States was Malaysia's top export market and its second largest supplier of imports in 2007.
In addition, the United States may also accrue some political benefits from the proposed FTA. An FTA with Malaysia would strengthen U.S. ties with a moderate, democratic Muslim nation. It would also support U.S. efforts to be viewed as more engaged in Southeast Asia.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL32233 | crs_RL32233_0 | Introduction
More than 80 benefit programs provide cash and noncash aid that is directedprimarily to persons with limited income. These benefit programs cost $522.2 billionin FY2002, a record high. This sum was up $45.3 billion (9.5%) from the previouspeak of FY2001, and it equaled 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Higher medical spending accounted for $32.8billion of the year's net increase, and 54 cents out of every welfare dollar went formedical benefits. That is, they transfer income, in the form of cash, goods, or services, to persons whomake no payment and render no service in return. However, in the case of the joband training programs and some educational benefits, recipients must work or studyfor wages, training allowances, stipends, grants, or loans. Further, the TANF blockgrant program requires adults to commence work (defined by the state) after a periodof enrollment, the Food Stamp program imposes work and training requirements,and public housing programs require recipients to engage in "self-sufficiency"activities or to perform community service. Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit(EITC.) is available only to workers. Table 1. Expenditures of Major Need-Tested Benefit Programs,by Form of Benefit and Level of Government,FY2000-FY2002 (millions of current dollars)
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Table 2. Spending Trends by Level ofGovernment. State-local welfare spending (constant dollars) rose from $24.5billion to $149 billion over the same period, an increase of 508%. Both federal and state-local outlays set successive new record highs inFY1998-FY2002. Aid Received by Poor Families With Children
The Census Bureau reports that 7.2 million families (including 5.4 million withchildren) in 2002 had total pre-tax money income -- after counting any cash from thewelfare programs of TANF, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and GeneralAssistance (GA) -- that was below their poverty threshold. Figure 3 depicts income-tested aid provided to families with children who were poor before receiving any cash aid from TANF, GA, or the EITC. In 2002, thesefamilies totaled 5.7 million (compared with 5.1 million in 2000): 3.4 million witha female householder and 2.3 million with a male householder (chiefly two-parentfamilies). Medical Aid
1. 9. Federal SSI spending represented 1.7% of all federaloutlays. 19. Educational Assistance
50. 53. 71. In FY2002, expenditures for TANF work programs and activities were reported at $2.7 billion, $2.1 billion (78%) from federal funds and $ 0.6 billion fromstate-local funds. WIA defines a low-income person as one who (a) receives cash welfare or is a member of a family that receives cash welfare, (b) receives food stamps or is amember of family that was eligible to receive food stamps in the previous 6 months;(c) had family income (359) for the preceding 6months no higher than the federal povertyguideline (a limit in 2003 throughout the 48 contiguous states and the District ofColumbia (360) of $ 18,400 for a family of fourpersons and $8,980 for a single person)or no higher than 70% of the lower living standard income level (LLSIL) (a ceilingthat ranged, effective on May 30, 2003, for a four-person family from $18,270 innon-metropolitan areas of the South to $22,230 in metropolitan areas of the Northeast -- and higher in Alaska, Hawaii and Guam); (d) is homeless, as defined in theStewart McKinney Homeless Assistance Act; (e) is a foster child on behalf of whomstate or local government payments are made; or (f) is a disabled person whose ownincome meets the program limit, but whose family income exceeds it. Number ever enrolled during the year. States may spend more,but data are not available. 2002 is an estimate. JOBS AND TRAINING
a. | More than 80 benefit programs provide aid -- in cash and noncash form -- that is directed primarily to persons with limited income. Such programs constitute thepublic "welfare" system, if welfare is defined as income-tested or need-basedbenefits. This definition omits social insurance programs like Social Security andMedicare.
Income-tested benefit programs in FY2002 cost $522.2 billion: $373.2 billion in federal funds and $149 billion in state-local funds (Table 1) . Welfare spendingrepresented almost 19% of all federal outlays, with medical aid accounting for 8%of the budget. Total welfare spending equaled 5% of the gross domestic product andset a new record high, up $45.3 billion (9.5%) from the previous peak of FY2001. In current dollars, spending increased during the year for all forms of aid except jobsand training. Higher medical spending accounted for $32.8 billion of the netincrease, and 54 cents of every welfare dollar went for medical assistance. Expressedin constant FY2002 dollars ( Table 2) , welfare spending increased by 7.9% from the2001 level.
The composition of welfare spending differed by level of government ( Tables 3 and 4 ). Medical aid consumed 80% of state-local welfare funds, but 43.9% offederal welfare dollars.
Most income-tested programs provide benefits, in the form of cash, goods, or services, to persons who make no payment and render no service in return. However,in the case of the job and training programs and some educational benefits, recipientsmust work or study. Further, the block grant program of Temporary Assistance forNeedy Families (TANF) requires adults to start work after a period of enrollment, thefood stamp program imposes work and training requirements, and public housingrequires residents to engage in "self-sufficiency" activities or perform communityservice. Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is available only to workers.
An unduplicated count of welfare beneficiaries is not available. Enrollment in TANF and food stamps remained far below 1994/1995 peak levels during2000-2002, but Medicaid enrollment set a new record high. Average 2002 monthlynumbers: Food stamps, 20.2 million; TANF, 5.1 million; and Supplemental SecurityIncome (SSI), 6.9 million. During the year 50.9 million persons received Medicaidservices, and in 2001, EITC payments went to an estimated 16.8 million tax filers. Census Bureau data indicate that 5.4 million families with children were poor in2002 before receiving cash aid from TANF, General Assistance (GA) or the EITC,compared with 6.7 million in 1996 (last full year of the pre-TANF welfare program). Among these families, the EITC was received by 53.7% of those with a female headand by 71.7% of those with a male present ( Figure 3) . |
crs_R42740 | crs_R42740_0 | On July 6, 2012, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order 13618 to assign those NS/EP communications functions effective immediately. Specifically, the order outlines the federal government's need and responsibility to communicate during national security and emergency situations and crises and provides direction for such communications. Some of these systems and programs include the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless Priority Service (WPS), and classified messaging related to the Continuity of Government Condition (COGCON). These communications systems are both federally and privately owned and operated. The 2010 National Security Strategy , the primary federal government guidance on national security, reiterates the notion that reliable and secure telecommunication is necessary to effectively manage emergencies, and that the United States must prevent disruptions to critical communications. This report addresses EO 13618 salient provisions and provides a summary of EO 13618. Conclusion
EO 13618 is a continuation of presidential authority assigned in the Communications Act of 1934, and modifies or revokes other executive orders related to federal NS/EP communications. As identified earlier in this report, EO 13618 changes federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions by dissolving the National Communications System, establishing an executive committee to oversee federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions, establishing a programs office within the Department of Homeland Security to assist the executive committee, and assigning specific responsibilities to federal government entities. | In the event of a national security crisis or disaster, federal, state, local, and territorial government and private sector communications are important. National security and emergency preparedness communication systems include landline, wireless, broadcast and cable television, radio, public safety systems, satellite communications, and the Internet. For instance, federal national security and emergency preparedness communications programs include the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service, Wireless Priority Service, and classified messaging related to the Continuity of Government Condition. Reliable and secure telecommunications systems are necessary to effectively manage national security incidents and emergencies.
On July 6, 2012, President Barrack Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13618 which addresses the federal government's need and responsibility to communicate during national security and emergency situations and crises by assigning federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions. EO 13618 is a continuation of older executive orders issued by other presidents and is related to the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §606). This executive order, however, changes federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions by dissolving the National Communications System, establishing an executive committee to oversee federal national security and emergency preparedness communications functions, establishing a programs office within the Department of Homeland Security to assist the executive committee, and assigning specific responsibilities to federal government entities. This report provides a summary of EO 13618 provisions, and a brief discussion of its salient points. |
crs_95-353 | crs_95-353_0 | Such groups view the programs as economically beneficial farmer self-help activities requiring minimal federal funding. Generic ads, on the other hand, have no connection to the name of a specific producer. Legal Challenges
Some producers have vigorously challenged mandatory check-off programs. Their key contention has been that the check-off is a "tax" to fund advertising and other activities they would not pay for voluntarily. Three cases have reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court said that the mushroom check-off is a stand-alone program that is not part of a broader regulatory scheme, as was the peach/nectarine marketing order, and "... for all practical purposes, the advertising itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory scheme...."
The Supreme Court issued its third decision on May 23, 2005. The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, ruled in favor of the government, upholding the program. Are Check-offs Effective? What Types of Activities Are Appropriate? | The U.S. Supreme Court in 2005 affirmed the constitutionality of the so-called beef check-off program, one of the 18 generic promotion programs for agricultural products that are now active nationally. Supporters view check-offs as economically beneficial self-help activities that need minimal government involvement or taxpayer funding. Producers, handlers, and/or importers are required to pay an assessment, usually deducted from revenue at time of saleâthus the name check-off . However, some farmers contend they are being "taxed" for advertising and related activities they would not underwrite voluntarily. The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the beef check-off is considered significant for the future of the other programs, although the Court left open the possibility of additional challenges. |
crs_R43872 | crs_R43872_0 | The National Forest System (NFS) is administered by the Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Although 87% of NFS lands are in the West, the FS administers more federal land in the East than all other federal agencies combined. ), livestock grazing, timber harvesting, watershed protection, and fish and wildlife habitats. Six years later, Congress stated that the forest reserves were
to improve and protect the forest within the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of the citizens of the United States. NFS management is still one of the three principal FS responsibilities. The other two principal responsibilities are providing assistance programs to nonfederal forest owners and conducting forestry research programs. Management of the National Forest System
Overview and Land Management Planning
The management goals for the national forests were articulated in Section 1 of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, which states:
It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes. The FS has developed 125 plans to guide the management of the 154 national forests and 20 national grasslands in the NFS. The various uses of NFS lands are to be balanced in the "combination that will best meet the needs of the American people" with the "harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources, each with the other ... in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output ... without impairment of the productivity of the land." Although not a stated statutory purpose of the national forests, many of the uses and services of the national forests generate revenue. This revenue may be used to offset agency costs, shared with the communities containing the national forests, or deposited into the General Treasury, depending on the use, location, and varying statutory requirements. The NFS also includes several other types of land designations. However, several of the mandatory accounts also fund NFS activities, although this report focuses on discretionary appropriations. In FY2016, Congress appropriated $1.51 billion to the NFS discretionary account. The NFS account includes several subaccounts, programs, and activities, many of which reflect the different ways the national forests are used. Forest Products funds activities to analyze, prepare, offer, award, and administer timber sales, stewardship contracts, and special forest products permits on NFS lands (FY2016: $359.8 million, 24% of NFS). The IRR proposal combined the forest products, wildlife and fish habitat management, vegetation and watershed management, and CFLRP subaccounts into one budget line item. The pilot was authorized to be conducted in three regions (1, 3, and 4). IRR proponents—notably, the FS—assert that the increased budgetary flexibility facilitates integrated land and resource management objectives to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire and improve forest resistance and resiliency to disturbance events. Congress has been concerned about the cost of WFM generally and suppression activities specifically. There are several ongoing concerns regarding wildfire management, including the total federal costs of wildfire management, the strategies and resources used for wildfire management, and the impact of wildfire on both the quality of life and the economy of communities surrounding wildfire activity. | The 193 million acres of the National Forest System (NFS) comprise 154 national forests, 20 national grasslands, and several other federal land designations. Management of the NFS is one of the three principal responsibilities of the Forest Service (FS), an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The other two principal responsibilities are providing assistance to nonfederal forest owners and conducting forestry research. Most NFS lands are concentrated in the western United States, although the Forest Service administers more federal land in the East than all other federal agencies combined.
The original forest reserves were established to improve and protect federal forests and watersheds and provide a source of timber. Today, the statutory mission of the National Forest System is to provide a variety of uses and values—timber production, watershed management, livestock grazing, energy and mineral development, outdoor recreation, fish and wildlife habitat management, and wilderness—without impairing the productivity of the land. Although there is not a statutory mandate to do so, many of the uses and services available on NFS lands generate revenue. The revenue may be used to offset agency costs, shared with the local communities containing the NFS lands, or returned to the Treasury. Growing demands for the various uses, values, and services have led to conflicts over the location and timing of activities.
In FY2016, the Forest Service received $1.5 billion to fund National Forest System management, approximately 24% of the $6.4 billion the agency received in discretionary appropriations. The NFS account includes several subaccounts, programs, and activities, many of which reflect the different ways in which national forests are used. These uses include activities related to recreation and wilderness, grazing, wildlife and fish habitat management, forest products and timber sales, and energy and minerals management. However, in FY2012, Congress authorized a pilot budget structure that consolidated several of the budget line items for three Forest Service regions. The Forest Service asserts that the budget flexibility provided in this Integrated Resources Restoration (IRR) program will facilitate various land and resource management objectives across the NFS.
Reducing the risk and expense of catastrophic wildfires on National Forest System lands has been a major focus of Congress, the Forest Service, and the public. Reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires involves land and resource management activities to restore the resilience and resistance of the forest ecosystem, such as reducing accumulated levels of biomass (which fuels fires) through timber sales, stewardship contracts, or prescribed burns. Many are also concerned about the cost of wildfires. Although wildfire management is funded separately from NFS management, some are concerned about the rising proportion of fire suppression costs on the rest of the Forest Service budget. In FY2006, wildfire management activities accounted for 44% of the agency's total discretionary appropriations; in FY2016, the $3.9 billion appropriated to wildfire management is 61% of the agency's total discretionary appropriation.
This report provides an overview of the history and management of the National Forest System, including a discussion of the statutory framework for making land management plans and decisions as well as for acquiring or disposing of system lands. The report also discusses the multiple uses of the NFS and the revenue generated by those activities, appropriations to manage the NFS, and wildfire management issues and costs. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress often debates regarding national forest management. |
crs_RL34186 | crs_RL34186_0 | Introduction and Review of Findings
Half the nation's electricity comes from coal, and most of that coal is delivered to power plants by railroads. The reliable supply of coal by rail is therefore important to the electric power system. Concern over reliable deliveries of coal and other commodities, limited rail system capacity, and related issues such as rail rates, sparked several congressional hearings in 2006. This report provides background information and analysis on coal transportation by rail to power plants. The report discusses:
Problems since 1990 with the rail delivery of coal. Implications of rail capacity limits on service reliability. The role of coal inventories as a backstop to reliable coal deliveries. Proposed legislation intended, in part, to improve the quality of rail service to coal-fired plants and other shippers. The report also identifies data and analysis gaps that complicate measuring the scope of rail service and capacity issues, determining the need for federal action, and evaluating the possible efficacy of proposed legislation. Since 2006, as rail service improved, the power industry has increased coal stocks. Railroads accounted for over 70% of coal shipments to power plants in 2005. The balance moved by truck, barge, and conveyor. The Staggers Act established a 15-point national Rail Transportation Policy, including:
(1) to allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and the demand for services to establish reasonable rates for transportation by rail;
(2) to minimize the need for Federal regulatory control over the rail transportation system and to require fair and expeditious regulatory decisions when regulation is required;
(3) to promote a safe and efficient rail transportation system by allowing rail carriers to earn adequate revenues, as determined by the Board;
(6) to maintain reasonable rates where there is an absence of effective competition and where rail rates provide revenues which exceed the amount necessary to maintain the rail system and to attract capital;
(12) to prohibit predatory pricing and practices, to avoid undue concentrations of market power, and to prohibit unlawful discrimination. An issue between power companies and railroads is how should the cost of improving reliability be shared between paying for larger stocks at power plants and building more rail capacity. Description of Legislative Proposals
S. 1125 , the Freight Rail Infrastructure Capacity Expansion Act of 2007 (FRICEA), was introduced on April 17, 2007, and its House counterpart ( H.R. The greatest difference in expectations is likely to be between shippers, such as electric power producers, and the railroads. Description of Legislative Proposals: Antitrust
S. 772 , the Railroad Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2007, was introduced on March 6, 2007, and its House counterpart ( H.R. Significant Disruptions in Deliveries of Coal to Power Generators Since 1990
Appendix B. | Half the nation's electricity comes from coal, and most of that coal is delivered to power plants by railroads. The reliable supply of coal by rail is therefore important to the electric power system. Concern over reliable deliveries of coal and other commodities, limited rail system capacity, and related issues such as rail rates, sparked several congressional hearings in 2006.
This report provides background information and analysis on coal transportation by rail to power plants. The report discusses:
Problems since 1990 with the rail delivery of coal. Implications of rail capacity limits on service reliability. The role of coal inventories as a backstop to reliable coal deliveries. Proposed legislation intended, in part, to improve the quality of rail service to coal-fired plants and other shippers.
The report also identifies data and analysis gaps that complicate measuring the scope of rail service and capacity issues, determining the need for federal action, and evaluating the possible efficacy of proposed legislation.
Freight rail transportation and electric power generation are mutually dependent network industries. Railroads accounted for over 70% of coal shipments to power plants in 2005, and due to economic and physical limitations on other modes (truck, barge, and conveyor) the heavy dependency of the power industry on rail transportation is likely to continue into the future. From the standpoint of the rail industry, coal transportation is an important business, accounting in recent years for about 20% of freight revenues for the major railroads.
The mutual dependency between the rail and power industries creates a complex business relationship. There are connections and to some degree tradeoffs between such factors as railroad investments in capacity and service enhancement, and power company tolerance for transportation risk and willingness to carry the cost of larger coal stockpiles. A central point is that increasing the reliability of coal deliveries to power plants costs money, as does coping with disruptions. A central issue between power companies and railroads is how these costs should be shared.
Proposed legislation before the 110th Congress discussed in this report includes the Freight Rail Infrastructure Capacity Expansion Act of 2007 (S. 1125 and H.R. 2116), the Railroad Competition and Service Improvement Act of 2007 (S. 953 and H.R. 2125), and the Railroad Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2007 (S. 772 and H.R. 1650).
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL33301 | crs_RL33301_0 | Introduction
Program evaluations can play an important role in public policy debates and in oversight of government programs, potentially affecting decisions about program design, operation, and funding. One technique that has received significant recent attention in the federal government is the randomized controlled trial (RCT). This report discusses what RCTs are and identifies a number of issues regarding RCTs that might arise when Congress considers making program evaluation policy. Issues regarding RCTs could also arise when actors in the policy process present specific program evaluations to Congress (e.g., in the President's budget proposals) to influence Congress's views and decision making. Are they performing the necessary types of evaluation? In addition, observers and practitioners sometimes disagree about the practical capabilities and limitations of various program evaluation methods, the quality of an individual evaluation, or how a study's findings should be interpreted and used. As discussed later in this report, an RCT attempts to estimate a program's impact on an outcome of interest . From the perspective of internal validity, the methodological rigor of an RCT study can depend on a number of factors, including, but not limited to the following:
how effectively the random assignment of units creates statistically equivalent groups; whether the group of subjects is sufficiently numerous to ensure that an impact large enough to be of interest to stakeholders, if it occurs, will be found statistically significant (the more numerous the units in the group being studied, the better chance there is of detecting a program's potential impact); whether attrition in the treatment and control groups (e.g., subjects dropping out of the study) is comparable with respect to the attributes of subjects; whether factors other than the treatment "contaminate" one group but not the other (e.g., due to problems with delivering the treatment or incomplete environmental controls); whether the behavior of researchers or subjects is affected because they know who is receiving a treatment or not receiving a treatment (ideally, RCTs are double-blind studies, in which neither the subjects nor the researchers know which group gets the treatment, but double-blind studies in social science are uncommon); whether the units being studied comply with the intervention being provided (e.g., did the patient take the medicine being studied? For example, many observers have argued that non-RCT studies, such as in-depth case studies and other observational or qualitative methods, are, among other things, (1) capable of casting doubt on an RCT's findings or causal claims by showing the RCT was contaminated or had poor design or implementation (i.e., revealing poor internal validity); (2) capable of showing a study's inferences are flawed or questionable (e.g., if the measured outcome of interest is judged to not fully reflect the program's goal(s), raising questions of construct validity); (3) essential for establishing the theory and conditions under which an intervention would be expected to make a favorable impact (increasing external validity); and (4) capable of establishing or strongly suggesting causation in certain circumstances (increasing internal validity), even if a study was not intended to estimate an impact. RCT Capabilities
There is wide consensus that, under certain conditions, well-designed and implemented RCTs provide the most valid estimate of an intervention's average impact for a large sample of subjects, as measured on an outcome of interest. However, RCTs are often seen as difficult to design and implement well. RCTs in Context: Program Evaluation and Systematic Review
Concerns About Single Studies and Study Quality
In a variety of research fields, there appears to be consensus that a single study, no matter how well designed or implemented, is rarely sufficient to reliably support decision making. Moreover, there have been widespread concerns about the quality of individual studies of any design. Recent Attention to Using RCTs in Program Evaluation
The following two subsections briefly illustrate how RCTs have been a subject of attention in two contexts: (1) setting program evaluation policy in one specific policy area (education) and (2) the citation and use of individual studies, or claimed lack thereof, to justify policy and budget proposals to Congress (in this case, as a component of the George W. Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool). Controversy in Education Policy: A Priority for RCTs? What Types of Evaluations are Necessary? How Should Congress Use Evaluation Information When Considering and Making Policy? Do Agencies Have Capacity and Independence to Properly Conduct, Interpret, and Objectively Present Program Evaluations? Some systematic reviews focus on RCTs (and might include quasi-experiments ), and others include disparate types of studies. | Program evaluations can play an important role in public policy debates and in oversight of government programs, potentially affecting decisions about program design, operation, and funding. One technique that has received significant recent attention is the randomized controlled trial (RCT). There are also many other types of evaluation, including observational and qualitative designs.
An RCT attempts to estimate a program's impact upon an outcome of interest (e.g., crime rate). An RCT randomly assigns subjects to treatment and control groups, administers an intervention to the treatment group, and afterward measures the average difference between the groups. The quality of an RCT is typically assessed by its internal, external, and construct validity. At the federal level, RCTs have been a subject of interest and some controversy in education policy and the George W. Bush Administration's effort to integrate budgeting and performance using the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In addition, in the 109th Congress, pending legislation provides for RCTs (e.g., Sections 3 and 15 of S. 1934; Section 114 of S. 667 (Senate committee-reported bill); and Section 5 of S. 1129).
Views about the practical capabilities and limitations of RCTs, compared to other evaluation designs, have sometimes been contentious. There is wide consensus that, under certain conditions, well-designed and implemented RCTs provide the most valid estimate of an intervention's impact, and can therefore provide useful information on whether, and the extent to which, an intervention causes favorable impacts for a large group of subjects, on average. However, RCTs are also seen as difficult to design and implement well. There also appears to be less consensus about what proportion of evaluations that are intended to estimate impacts should be RCTs and about the conditions under which RCTs are appropriate. Many observers argue that other types of evaluations are necessary complements to RCTs, or sometimes necessary substitutes for them, and can be used to establish causation, help bolster or undermine an RCT's findings, or in some situations validly estimate impacts. There is increasing consensus that a single study of any type is rarely sufficient to reliably support decision making. Many researchers have therefore embraced systematic reviews, which synthesize many similar or disparate studies.
A number of issues regarding RCTs might arise when Congress considers making program evaluation policy or when actors in the policy process present program evaluations to influence Congress. Should Congress focus on RCTs in these situations, a number of issues might be considered, including an RCT's parameters, capabilities, and limitations. In addition, Congress might examine the types of program evaluations that are necessary, question an evaluation's definitions or assumptions, consider how to appropriately use evaluation information in its learning and decision making, evaluate how much confidence to have in a study, and investigate whether agencies have capacity to properly conduct, interpret, and objectively present evaluations. This report will be updated in the 110th Congress. |
crs_R43023 | crs_R43023_0 | Although the Constitution grants Congress extensive legislative powers, it vests Congress with explicit authority to enact criminal law in only three places. Moreover, the authority it places in the hands of Congress includes an implementing power, that is, the authority to enact laws necessary and proper to the implementation of those other powers—authority that by implication includes the authority to enact reasonably related criminal laws. Whether understood as contextual, or structural, or implicit in the Tenth Amendment, they are the limitations of federalism, the limitations that flow from the fact the Constitution emerged as a compact between the sovereign it created and the sovereigns that created it. What follows is a discussion of selected recent cases that illustrate the scope and boundaries of Congress's power to enact criminal laws under the Constitution's necessary and proper, commerce, high seas, law of nations, spending, and military clauses. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Bond and Kebodeaux . The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Elk Shoulder , applied the same considerations and came to opposite conclusions in the case of a federal sex offender still under supervised release. The Fifth Circuit disagreed. Its criminal penalties only apply with respect to state sex offenders who travel in interstate commerce or to federal sex offenders. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that Mrs. When the case returned to the Third Circuit for a decision on the merits, the court was faced with the question of the extent to which principles of federalism limit congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement a United States treaty. Moreover, the Court held in Lopez that the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to enact statutes that outlawed possession of a firearm in a school yard and in Morrison that it does not permit creation of a federal cause of action for the victims of violent, gender-based animus. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, observed that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to require individuals to engage in commerce. However, the scope of the Commerce Clause defines the scope of congressional authority to enact implementing criminal legislation. United States v. Kebodeaux
Having concluded that application of SORNA in the case before it exceeded Congress's Necessary and Proper powers, the Fifth Circuit in Kebodeaux also rejected the suggestion that SORNA, as applied, might be considered a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers under the "channels of commerce," the "instrumentalities of commerce," or the "substantial effect on commerce" prong of the Clause. A dissenting member of the panel objected that the Foreign Commerce Clause should not be read to permit Congress to regulate all commercial activities once an individual has engaged in international travel. Article I, Section 8, Clause 10
The Congress shall have Power ... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations. It then decided that an offense must be contrary to customary international law in order to constitute an offense against the law of nations. Early on, the lower federal appellate courts concluded that Congress's power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations" vested it with authority to enact MDLEA. Its sole remaining concern was any due process limitation on Congress's ability to reach foreign nationals traveling outside U.S. territorial waters. The Supreme Court has said in the past that Congress's exercise of the Spending Clause is subject to certain limitations: "[F]irst[,] ... the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare.' Congress may employ the power of the purse to encourage the states to participate in a federal program; it may not use it to compel them to do so. | The powers of Congress begin and end with the Constitution. The Constitution vests Congress with explicit authority to enact criminal laws relating to counterfeiting, piracy, crimes on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations, and treason. It grants Congress other broad powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce. The Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to enact criminal laws when reasonably related to the regulation of commerce or to one of the other constitutionally enumerated powers. The Constitution also imposes limits on the powers of Congress, however. It places those limits in the terms it uses in its grants of authority, in explicit prohibitions, and in the Tenth Amendment reminder of the restrictions implicit in the federal union. Recently, the Supreme Court and the lower federal appellate courts have supplied several examples of the scope and limits of congressional authority.
In the case of the Commerce Clause, seven Justices of the Supreme Court endorsed separate opinions in National Federation explaining that the power to regulate interstate commerce does not include the power to require participation in commerce. The Fifth Circuit held in Kebodeaux that the Commerce Clause does not embody the power to outlaw purely intrastate movement with only an attenuated nexus to commercial activity. As for foreign commerce, the circuits disagree on whether Congress's regulatory authority is subject to the same constraints that apply to its powers over domestic commerce. The Ninth Circuit (Clark) believes it is not. The Third Circuit (Pendleton) disagrees. (The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, P.L. 113-4 (S. 47), eliminates the need to prove a foreign commerce element in the law that gave rise to the circuit split.)
In the realm of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Eleventh Circuit in Belfast observed that Congress may pass criminal legislation in order to implement a treaty obligation, and the Third Circuit in Bond held that it may do so without regard to federalism concerns. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Elk Shoulder that Congress may outlaw the unregistered movement within a state of a federally convicted sex offender who is on supervised release. The Fifth Circuit held in Kebodeaux, however, that the Clause does not permit enactment of a statute that outlaws such movement after the offender has been fully discharged. Although they did not join in a single opinion, seven Justices in National Federation concluded that Congress's power under the Spending Clause may not be used to compel the states to accept expansion of a federal regulatory regime or to face draconian economic consequences. The case did not involve criminal penalties, but a limit on Congress's Spending Clause power is a limit on its authority to enact implementing necessary and proper criminal legislation.
Article I, Section 8, clause 10 grants Congress the power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." Federal appellate courts have looked to customary international law for explanations of the power over offenses against the law of nations (Bellaizac-Hurtado) and piracy (Dire). The High Seas cases (Saac and Ibarguen-Mosquera) continue to acknowledge congressional authority to outlaw drug trafficking in international waters subject only to an elusive due process limitation. The Constitution's Military Clauses permit Congress to criminalize overseas assaults by Defense Department foreign contractors (Brehm), but do not permit it to punish an individual's conduct based solely on his status as a former member of the Armed Forces even when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause (Kebodeaux). |
crs_RS20826 | crs_RS20826_0 | Congress created the Federal Reserve (popularly known as the "Fed") as an independent entity to attend to the nation's credit and monetary needs without undue influence from political pressures. The current structure of the system has three major components established by the original act. Monetary Policy
A central responsibility of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is the formulation of monetary policy. Federal Reserve Banks
The 12 Federal Reserve Banks carry out the day-to-day operations of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Banks provide fiscal agency and depository services to the federal government. The 12 Reserve Banks provide banking services to depository financial institutions. Avenues of communication and oversight, both formal and informal, have developed over time. Aside from its appointment role, Congress exercises oversight in a variety of ways. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, was enacted on July 21, 2010. The omnibus financial regulatory reform law contains provisions that change the supervisory authority of the Federal Reserve Board and affect the operations and structure of Federal Reserve Board and the 12 Reserve Banks. Under the provisions of P.L. A member of the board would be designated by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as vice chairman for supervision. | In 1913, Congress created the Federal Reserve System to serve as the central bank for the United States. The Federal Reserve formulates the nation's monetary policy, supervises and regulates banks, and provides a variety of financial services to depository financial institutions and the federal government. The system comprises three major components: the Board of Governors, a network of 12 Federal Reserve Banks, and member banks.
Congress created the Federal Reserve as an independent agency to enable the central bank to carry out its responsibilities protected from excessive political and private pressures. At the same time, by law and practice, the Federal Reserve is accountable to Congress. The seven members of the board are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress routinely monitors the Federal Reserve System through formal and informal oversight activities.
This report examines the structure and operations of the major components of the Federal Reserve System and provides an overview of congressional oversight activities. The report identifies the provisions of P.L. 111-203 (the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) that affect the structure and operations of the system.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45389 | crs_R45389_0 | Under the PSLF program, borrowers of the U.S. Department of Education's (ED's) Direct Loans who are employed full-time in certain public service jobs for 10 years while making 120 separate qualifying monthly payments on their Direct Loans may be eligible to have any remaining balance of principal and interest forgiven. Borrowers first became eligible to apply for PSLF forgiveness benefits on October 1, 2017, based on service completed and payments made prior to that date. With the opportunity to apply for program benefits being made available recently, many issues that span multiple aspects of the program have been raised and have garnered congressional interest. 2. Interaction of the PSLF program with other programs and benefits, which from a borrower's perspective relates to understanding the interactions to make rational choices and maximize available benefits. From the federal government's perspective, interaction of program benefits relates to whether desired targeting of benefits is being achieved and the potential costs associated with such interactions. Legislative History
The PSLF program was first authorized in 2007 under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA; P.L. 110-84 ). Congress authorized the PSLF program in 2007 to encourage individuals to enter into and remain employed in public service and to alleviate the potential financial burdens associated with federal student loans of borrowers in public service who were presumed to generally earn less than their counterparts in other types of occupations. Prior to the enactment of the CCRAA, the ICR plan was the only income-driven repayment (IDR) plan available to borrowers. In relation to the PSLF program, there is no limit to the amount of loan forgiveness benefits that a borrower may realize under the program. Payments made under each of these plans qualify under the PSLF program. Selected Issues Related to the PSLF Program
Although borrowers have been eligible to apply for PSLF forgiveness benefits only since October 1, 2017, many issues that span several aspects of the program have arisen that have garnered congressional interest. Implementation Issues
Implementation issues relate to how the PSLF program's statutory requirements have been operationalized, difficulties experienced by borrowers in participating in the program, and program administration. They include how employment in a "public service job" has been operationally defined, how qualifying payments are determined, the effects of loan consolidation on a borrower's progress towards receiving PSLF benefits, and the administrative challenges and complexities faced by ED, borrowers, and student loan servicers. This has led to some perceived inequities among borrowers and difficulties in identifying eligible employers. In addition, requirements related to on-time payments and specific payment amounts necessary for a payment to qualify for PSLF benefit purposes may be difficult for borrowers to meet without an understanding of loan servicing practices. However, making payments under such plans may not be as valuable to borrowers in terms of eventual PSLF forgiveness benefits. Lump Sum Payments
Loan payments must be separate monthly payments to be considered qualifying for PSLF. Multiple reports have highlighted communication issues among parties regarding the program. Issues experienced by borrowers relating to communication about PSLF eligibility requirements include the following:
loan servicers not informing borrowers of the availability of PSLF and/or its requirements, despite knowing a borrower was employed in public service; loan servicers not explaining to borrowers that their FFEL or Perkins Loan program loans do not qualify for PSLF or that they are not enrolled in a qualifying repayment plan, despite borrowers informing the servicer that they are pursuing PSLF and believing they otherwise meet PSLF program requirements; and loan servicers not explaining to borrowers that if they consolidate their loans, any previous PSLF qualifying payments made will be lost. This involves borrowers' understanding of the various loan repayment plans available and the interaction between PSLF and other service benefits (e.g., loan repayment or forgiveness programs); deciding the amount of student loans to borrow; and being able to avail themselves of certain income tax provisions to maximize PSLF program benefits. They may also relate to consideration of how large PSLF program benefits should be, as well as consideration of the extent to which overlapping benefits might be provided and whether any may constitute an unintended "double benefit" for the same service. While this outcome potentially could occur for a variety of individuals borrowing different types of Direct Loans, it may be more likely for individuals who borrowed Direct PLUS Loans as graduate or professional students, because there are higher aggregate borrowing limits for Direct Unsubsidized Loans for graduate and professional students and there are no aggregate limits to the amount of PLUS Loans an individual may borrow. In addition, some hypothesize that the lack of student incentive to limit borrowing may also make some students less sensitive to the price of education. The evolution of the federal student loan programs since the PSLF program's enactment may also have a bearing on the types of individuals who receive program benefits and the amounts of debt relief they may realize under the program. For borrowers, key aspects of this issue include whether the same service that qualifies them for PSLF may also qualify them for other benefits and their understanding of how other benefits may interact with PSLF. One issue relates to how the program fits into the overall suite of federal postsecondary education benefits and a broadening of the federal approach to student aid by providing aid after enrollment. Other issues include the difficulty in estimating the potential participation in and costs of the program due to individuals only recently being eligible to apply for and receive program benefits and that borrowers are not required to submit information on their intent to participate in the program until they seek forgiveness benefits after 10 years of service and qualifying payments. The expansion of such loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs may be viewed as a broadening of federal policy toward providing more widely available assistance to individuals after postsecondary education costs (i.e., student loan debt) have been incurred and to alleviate some or all of the financial burdens associated with borrowing to pursue postsecondary education. Federal student aid awards are currently constructed on the basis of an individual's need at the time of enrollment; whereas, loan repayment and forgiveness program benefits are provided to individuals based on post-enrollment economic circumstances. Estimating Potential Costs and Participation
Granting loan forgiveness benefits results in costs to the federal government. Given that it has only recently become possible to claim benefits, little is known about what the costs associated with the program will be based on the experience of actual cohorts of borrowers. Because borrowers first became eligible to apply for PSLF forgiveness benefits on October 1, 2017, limited information is available on the actual and future costs to the government of the PSLF program. 2. | The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program provides Direct Loan borrowers who, on or after October 1, 2007, are employed full-time in certain public service jobs for 10 years while making 120 separate qualifying monthly payments on their Direct Loans with the opportunity to have any remaining balance of principal and interest on their loans forgiven. The program was enacted under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-84) to encourage individuals to enter into and remain employed in public service and to alleviate the potential financial burdens associated with federal student loans of borrowers in public service occupations who were presumed generally to earn less than their counterparts in other occupations.
With the opportunity to apply for program benefits first being made available on October 1, 2017, based on service completed and payments made prior to that date, many issues that span several aspects of the program have been raised and have garnered congressional interest. This report addresses numerous issues, which are highlighted below.
Program implementation issues that have surfaced relate to how the PSLF program's statutory requirements have been operationalized, difficulties experienced by borrowers in participating in the program, and difficulties in administering the program. Some of these issues include:
Operationally defining what constitutes a "public service job." This includes whether the definition in use is sufficiently targeted to meet congressional intent for the program and whether it has created inequities among types of borrowers. There have also been administrative difficulties associated with identifying and certifying qualifying employment. Determining what constitutes a "qualifying payment." Multiple criteria related to on-time payments, time periods over which payments must be made, and specific payment amounts must be met for a payment to be considered qualifying, which may cause confusion among borrowers and create administrative difficulties. Difficulties borrowers may face when determining which repayment plan to enroll in to maximize PSLF benefits. Payments made according to an income-driven repayment (IDR) plan may decrease the monthly dollar amount of payments made, which may ultimately lead to greater amounts of PSLF forgiveness benefits. Payments made under other plans may also qualify for PSLF but may not be as valuable to borrowers in terms of eventual PSLF forgiveness benefits. The effects of loan consolidation on a borrower's progress toward receiving PSLF benefits. Of particular importance, PSLF qualifying payments made prior to consolidation do not count toward forgiveness of the resulting Direct Consolidation Loan. The complexities and challenges that administering the program may present for the Department of Education, loan servicers, and borrowers. These include issues of communication among the parties regarding program requirements and processes, lack of coordination among loan servicers, loans servicers making errors or not completing tasks associated with the program in a timely manner, and the lack of automation of some administrative functions.
Issues pertaining to PSLF program interactions with other programs and benefits relate to whether borrowers understand the interactions well enough to make rational choices and maximize available benefits and, from the federal government's perspective, questions have arisen regarding whether the desired targeting of benefits is being achieved and about the potential costs associated with such interactions. Some of these issues include:
There is no limit to the amount of loan forgiveness benefits an individual may realize under the PSLF program. While it is possible that many borrowers may receive limited benefits, some Direct Loan borrowers may realize large forgiveness benefits under the program. This outcome may be more likely to occur for borrowers of Direct PLUS Loans for graduate and professional students, which have no aggregate borrowing limits, and which were newly authorized to be made just prior to the enactment of PSLF. Also, the variety of IDR plans has expanded greatly since the PSLF program's inception, with several of the new IDR plans providing for lower monthly payments than under the Income-Based Repayment plan—the primary IDR plan available when the PSLF program was enacted. This expansion may allow borrowers to lower monthly payments and potentially realize larger forgiveness benefits under the program. The current borrowing limits and variety of IDR plans, coupled with PSLF program benefits, have raised questions about whether certain types of students are not incentivized to limit borrowing and whether they may be less sensitive to the price of postsecondary education. Borrowers may receive benefits under a number of federal student loan repayment programs. Borrowers may also be able to avail themselves of certain income tax provisions to maximize PSLF program benefits. For borrowers, understanding whether the same service that qualifies for PSLF may also qualify for other loan repayment benefits is important, as is their understanding of how other benefits and tax provisions may interact with PSLF. From the perspective of the federal government, a key consideration may relate to what constitutes a "double benefit" for service performed by borrowers and the extent to which overlapping benefits might be provided.
Broad program-related issues relate to (1) how the program fits into the overall suite of federal student aid benefits and (2) the difficulty of estimating the potential participation in and costs of the program.
1. The enactment of the PSLF program is reflective of a broadening of the federal approach to student aid, providing more widely available assistance to individuals after a postsecondary education's costs have been incurred. This approach may place greater emphasis on providing aid on the basis of economic circumstances after enrollment, rather than at the time of enrollment. It also makes some aid available on a targeted basis—providing relief to individuals who pursue certain types of service or occupations, rather than providing aid more broadly to individuals who enroll in postsecondary education. 2. The granting of loan forgiveness benefits results in costs to the federal government, and there has been some speculation that the cost of PSLF could be much higher than anticipated. Limited information is available on the actual and future costs to the government of the PSLF program. It has just recently become possible to claim program benefits; thus, little is known about what the costs associated with the program will be based on the experiences of actual cohorts of borrowers. In addition, estimating potential costs may prove difficult as borrowers are not required to submit information on their intent to participate in the program until they seek forgiveness benefits after 10 years of service and qualifying payments. |
crs_R43323 | crs_R43323_0 | Most Recent Legislative Action
On December 11, 2013, Representative Paul C. Ryan and Senator Patty Murray, chairs of the House and Senate budget committees, respectively, and co-chairs of the group appointed to develop a budget compromise to avoid a sequester in mid-January 2014, introduced the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which raises defense and nondefense budget spending limits under the Budget Control Act (BCA) for FY2014 and FY2015. For FY2014, the bill raised the original BCA budget limit for National Defense (budget function 050) by $22 billion to a total of $520 billion, or $2 billion above the level set in the Continuing Resolution (CR) of 2014. For the Department of Defense (DOD), the new FY2014 limit was set at $497 billion rather than the current limit of $476 billion, just above the CR. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees are drafting FY2014 funding bills for DOD and other agencies that would conform to the newly revised budget caps. Similarly, for DOD, the new FY2015 limit would be $498 billion compared to $489 billion in current law, or $9 billion higher than the current limit, and $1 billion above the new limit for FY2014. Altogether, over the FY2012-FY2021 decade, National Defense spending would total $5.447 trillion, or $32 billion (or 6%) above the current limit. DOD spending would total $5.206 trillion rather than $5.176 trillion, a $30 billion or 6% increase over current limits. On January 15, 2014, the current CR ( P.L. Earlier, on October 17, 2013, the FY2014 Continuing Resolution (CR, P.L. 113-46 ) appropriated funds allowing the DOD and all other federal agencies to resume their normal operations through January 15, 2014, after a 16-day government shutdown went into effect because no FY2014 appropriations had been provided for the new fiscal year. In general, the CR allows DOD and other agencies to spend—during that period—at the rate at which each appropriations account was funded by P.L. Before passage of the CR, DOD, like most other agencies, was subject to a lapse in appropriations during which agencies are generally required to shut down because Congress had not acted on legislation to fund the federal government in FY2014 prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. 113-44 ; H.J.Res. For military activities of the Department of Defense that are covered by the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Obama Administration requested authorizations for discretionary budget authority (BA) totaling $632.7 billion, including the following:
$526.6 billion for the so-called "base budget"—that is, for costs not associated with combat activities; $80.7 million for war costs, officially designated overseas contingency operations (OCO); $18.9 billion for defense-related nuclear energy programs conducted by the Department of Energy; and $7.4 billion for other defense-related activities. For DOD's base budget, both the version of the FY2014 NDAA passed by the House ( H.R. 1960 ) and the version of the bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 20, 2013, ( S. 1197 ), differ from the President's overall request by less than $50 million. Enacted in 2011 to resolve the impasse that summer about raising the debt limit, the BCA required reductions in discretionary spending totaling about $2.1 trillion through FY2021 in return for raising the debt limit by the same amount. The FY2013 appropriations for DOD and all other federal agencies were not enacted until March 26, 2013, when the President signed the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013 ( H.R. If current law had not been amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 to change the BCA spending caps, the Administration's $552 billion national defense budget request for FY2014 (excluding war costs) would have to be reduced by $53.8 billion (about 9.8%) to a total of $498.1 billion in order to comply with BCA limits. As a part of the Administration's overall program, the BCA would be amended to defer application of the spending caps, thus accommodating the President's FY2014 defense budget request. 25 ) proposed $552 billion for national defense (excluding war costs). But, within that total, the BCA establishes separate limits (or caps) for defense and nondefense spending. Similarly, the Senate's FY2014 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. However, if the level of national defense spending allowed by the Senate resolution were to be enacted, there would have been a $53.8 billion sequester cut to discretionary spending in early January 2014—if the original BCA caps had not been amended by law. 113-46 ) slated to expire on January 15, 2014, Congress might pass individual appropriations bills, an omnibus funding bill, or another CR by that time. If DOD complies with the current FY2014 BCA caps, annual funding would decrease by an additional $20 billion or about 4% from the FY2013 post-sequester level. The remaining $7.41 billion of discretionary funding for National Defense is requested for defense-related activities in other agencies, the largest share of which ($4.80 billion) is for FBI activity, including counterintelligence operations. Most of the proposed changes would yield savings of less than $150 million each over the five-year period, but 10 of the changes—each projected to save more than $500 million—account for nearly 60% of the projected five-year savings, namely:
$2.06 billion would come from dropping plans to develop a "Block IIB" version of the SM-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptor (FY2014 savings of $216 million); $1.72 billion would come from cancellation of the Precision Tracking Space System, a satellite network intended to provide targeting data on incoming ballistic missiles (FY2014 savings of $270 million); $1.35 billion would be saved by deferring until FY2019 the construction of a new "IIIB" version of the Apache attack helicopter (upgrading existing Apaches to that standard, in the meantime) (FY2014 savings of $475 million); $1.09 billion would come from using Atlas rockets for some planned satellite launches instead of more expensive Delta rockets (FY2014 savings of $106 million); $684 million would be saved in the near term by slowing procurement of the Navy's SM-6 anti-cruise missile interceptor until more ships are equipped with a new version of the Aegis weapons control system that is needed to fully exploit the capabilities of the SM-6 (FY2014 savings of $58 million); $683 million would come from a reduction in the overhead cost budgeted for the carrier-launched version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (FY2014 savings of $8 million); $598 million would come from reducing the number of the Navy's F/A-18 fighters that would be rebuilt to like-new condition (FY2014 savings of $48 million); $593 million would be saved by reducing the Marine Corps ammunition inventory consistent with the retirement of one of three flotillas of pre-positioned supply ships carrying supplies and equipment for Marine combat units (FY2014 savings of $229 million); $528 million would come from savings as a result of buying DDG-51-class destroyers on a multi-year contract (FY2014 savings of $67 million); and $526 million would come from savings as a result of buying C-130J cargo planes on a multi-year contract (FY2014 savings of $83 million). 3304 , the version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act signed into law by President Obama on December 31, 2013,—like Administration's budget request and earlier versions of the NDAA passed by the House ( H.R. 1960 ) and reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee ( S. 1197 )—exceeded by more than $30 billion the cap on national defense spending in FY2014 that was established by the FY2014 Continuing Appropriations Resolution ( H.J.Res. 59 ), which the President also signed into law on December 26, 2013. 112-239 ), the final version of the FY2014 NDAA—like the versions of the FY2014 bill that earlier had been passed by the House and reported by the Senate committee—makes relatively few individual additions to the authorization levels proposed by the Administration for specific procurement and R&D programs, compared with the annual defense authorization bills enacted in the first decade of this century. But it also would add to the amounts requested funds that would roughly offset the funds removed by sequester from the destroyer programs in FY2013:
For two DDG-51-class ships, the budget requested $1.62 billion; the Senate bill would have increased the authorization by $100 million, while the House bill and the final version added $332 million (which is nearly the amount cut from this program in FY2013 by sequestration); To complete construction of three DDG 1000-class destroyers, authorized in FY2007-FY2009, the Senate bill would have authorized $231.7 million, as requested, while the House bill and H.R. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee-related provisions in H.R. Base Budget
For the FY2014 base budget, H.R. Defense Health Program (including TRICARE)
The FY2014 DOD appropriations bills passed by the House and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee each would add upwards of $500 million to the $33.1 billion requested in the base budget for DOD's health care system, which serves 9.6 million beneficiaries (active-duty and retired military personnel and their dependents). | Congressional action on DOD's FY2014 budget was hobbled by the prevailing uncertainty over the entire federal budget that dissipated only in mid-December, when Congress passed and the President signed H.J.Res. 59, which set binding caps on discretionary spending for defense and nondefense programs in FY2014. The bill's defense cap, while about $31 billion below the amount requested for defense programs by President Obama, was more than $20 billion higher than the FY2014 defense cap that had been set by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).
President Obama's FY2014 base budget request of $552.0 billion in discretionary budget authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related programs of other agencies (excluding war costs), exceeded by $53.9 billion the legally binding cap on defense funding for FY2014 that was enacted in 2011 as part of the BCA. Similarly, in their initial actions on the annual defense funding bills for FY2014, the House and the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the Senate approved defense funding totals (excluding war costs) that were very close to President Obama's so-called "base budget" (i.e., nonwar) request, regardless of the BCA cap.
For DOD's base budget, both the version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act passed by the House (H.R. 1960) and the version reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S. 1197) also exceeded the BCA cap, differing from the President's request by less than $50 million. For war-related operations ("overseas contingency operations" or OCO), the Senate committee version of the authorization bill made few changes to the Administration's $80.7 billion request, while the House-passed bill added $5.4 billion.
Similarly, the versions of the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2397) passed by the House and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee—in conjunction with funding for military construction and for defense-related spending in other agencies in other appropriations bills passed by the House and reported by the Senate committee—would result in total DOD base budget appropriations that would exceed the BCA defense limit for FY2014 by nearly as much as President Obama's initial request.
Because legislation to fund the federal government in FY2014 had not been enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013, DOD, like most other agencies, was then subject to a lapse in appropriations during which agencies are generally required to shut down. Under an OMB-defined exception for "national security activities," all active-duty military personnel and many DOD civilian employees remained on their jobs through October 17, 2013, when H.J.Res. 59, the FY2014 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 113-46) was enacted, allowing DOD and all other federal agencies to resume their normal operations through January 15, 2014. The resolution set funding at an annualized level equal to that provided by the FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-6) after reductions made on March 15, 2013, by the BCA-mandated sequestration process. Excluding war costs, the FY2014 CR funds DOD and defense-related programs of other agencies (which comprise the "National Defense" budget function) at an annual budget of $518 billion for about one-quarter of the year . That annual total amounts to a $34 billion or 6.2% decrease from the President's request for the FY2014 DOD base budget. However, it would exceed the BCA cap on National Defense spending in FY2014 by $21 billion (or about 4%).
If the BCA had not been amended, Congress would have had to cut the Administration's National Defense request by $53.9 billion (about 9.8%) to meet the BCA cap of $498.1 billion. But the FY2014 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 59), which President Obama signed into law on December 26, 2013, raised the BCA caps on defense and nondefense discretionary spending for FY2014 and FY2015 in addition to funding the operations of the federal government through January 15, 2014.
For National Defense, the new FY2014 budget limit is $520 billion rather than the original BCA limit of $498 billion. DOD's share of this new, higher total amounts to about $497 billion rather than $476 billion DOD would have been allowed under the original BCA cap. If Congress appropriates to these new limits, there would no longer be a need for an additional $20 billion sequester in January 2014.
For FY2015, the new limit, higher limits set by H.R. 59 (compared with the original BCA caps) are $521 billion rather $512 billion for National Defense and $498 billion rather than $489 billion for DOD. In each case, the FY2015 spending limit is increased by $9 billion over the original BCA limits. The spending cap in FY2015 thus would be $1 billion above the FY2014 level. In subsequent years, the original BCA spending limits would remain in force, rising by FY2021 to $590 billion for National Defense and $564 billion for DOD in nominal dollars.
In sum, the effect of the Murray-Ryan budget agreement embodied in H.J.Res. 59 is to set a cumulative limit for National Defense spending in FY2012-FY2021 totaling $5.447 trillion, which is $32 billion higher than the original BCA limit for that period. For DOD, the spending caps would total $5.202 trillion rather than $5.176 trillion, a $30 billion increase over the current limit. The FY2014 Administration's DOD budget plan for that decade totals $5.533 trillion, exceeding the proposed new limits by $326 billion or 6%.
On December 26, 2013, the President signed into law H.R. 3304, a compromise version of the FY2014 NDAA. It authorizes appropriation of nearly the amount the Administration originally requested for the DOD base budget, taking no account of the new BCA defense spending limit, which it would exceed by more than $30 billion. Like the earlier versions of the NDAA passed by the House and reported by the Senate committee, H.R. 3304 also includes provisions bearing on several controversial policy issues including the armed services' handling of sexual assault cases and the treatment of detainees currently held at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
DOD and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees are drafting FY2014 appropriations bills that would comply with the new spending caps by cutting about $32 billion from the Administration's FY2014 DOD budget request. Pending enactment of those bills, funding for DOD (and all other federal agencies) currently is slated to expire on January 15, 2014. |
crs_RL33242 | crs_RL33242_0 | The United States has not played a role in the EAS process nor was it invited to attend. Some fear that by shifting emphasis from APEC, an organization in whichthe United States has played a leading role and which encompasses the broader Pacific Rim, to anannual East Asia Summit, in which the United States is not a participant, America's overall positioncould become relatively less influential and the United States could potentially be excluded frompreferential trade agreements. Japan reportedly opposed such a definition of thegrouping. Singapore has taken a leading role in articulating thebenefits of an open regional framework for Southeast Asia. (30) China was recently able to gain observer status to the SouthAsian Association of Regional Cooperation, the main multilateral grouping in South Asia. (31)
Key Outcomes of the First East Asia Summit
The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, of December 14, 2005, madeseveral key declarations which are listed below. "... we have established the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broadstrategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promotingpeace, stability and prosperity in East Asia." It hasbeen observed that key outcomes of the summit are that ASEAN "successfully projected its politicalcentrality in a wider region fast becoming a function of the economic weight of China and India,"and those within ASEAN Plus Three who advocated a more inclusive membership were able to bringIndia, Australia, and New Zealand into the group. | The first East Asia Summit (EAS) met on December 14, 2005, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.It brought together the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), [Brunei, Burma,Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam] as well as the"plus three" states [China, South Korea, and Japan] and Australia, New Zealand, and India, todiscuss issues of common concern. Japanese officials have described the EAS as an "historic summitmeeting to be held with a view to establishing a future East Asia Community." (1) Such a group could potentiallyreplace Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as the main multilateral forum in Asia on tradeand investment liberalization and economic integration. Russia was invited to attend the EAS as aspecial guest. (2) Some inthe United States are concerned that the East Asia Summit marks a rise in Asian regionalism inwhich the United States is not playing a leading role. There is also concern that China may use theEast Asia Summit to consolidate a leading role in Asia. A key outcome of the first East Asia Summitis that ASEAN appears to have retained a central role in the process. This report will be updated ascircumstances warrant. |
crs_RL32918 | crs_RL32918_0 | 103-465 ), which is the law that implemented the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994), the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) must submit to the Congress every five years a report that analyzes the costs and benefits of continued U.S. participation in the WTO. Once Congress receives this comprehensive report, any Member of Congress may introduce a joint resolution withdrawing congressional approval of the Agreement establishing the WTO. On May 26, 2005, the House Ways and Means Committee reported the resolution adversely ( H.Rept. On June 9, 2005, the House defeated H.J.Res. 27 by a vote of 338-86. The withdrawal resolution offered the opportunity for Members to examine the costs and benefits of WTO participation, express the degree of satisfaction with WTO dispute decisions, or debate other aspects of WTO membership. In addition to considering the withdrawal resolution, the 109 th Congress will monitor WTO disputes involving U.S. interests and U.S. laws. At the same time, the United States and the other members of the WTO are participating in a multilateral round of trade negotiations. The main body of the report addresses selected issues for the United States: the economic costs and benefits to the United States, decisionmaking in the WTO and national sovereignty; the WTO dispute process; arguments on whether or not to include labor, environmental, and food safety standards in the WTO; and the WTO and developing countries. First, the governments of the member countries agree on a set of multilateral rules and principles for trade, which provide a stable and predictable basis for trade. Third, the WTO provides a forum for negotiations to reduce trade barriers. In the report that the President submitted to Congress on March 2, 2005, on the costs and benefits of U.S. participation in the WTO, the Administration has equated U.S. economic success with WTO membership through a variety of trade and non-trade statistics. Decisionmaking
Questions of governance and power are often at the heart of the debate over the WTO. Multinational corporations have no direct participation in WTO decision-making and cannot file dispute settlement actions on their own. Another issue is the relationship between WTO agreements and state laws and regulations. There have been complaints that countries have not adhered to dispute panels' findings. In the 108 th Congress, Senator Baucus introduced a bill ( S. 676 ) to establish a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission to review all reports of dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in proceedings initiated by other parties to the WTO that are adverse to the United States and that are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body. Although there are many complaints about the WTO dispute process, especially after a major WTO dispute decision against the United States, some Members of Congress look to the WTO dispute process as an important way to challenge the trade practices of other nations. They also argue that environmental protection in the United States has not been compromised. | The World Trade Organization (WTO) is of interest to the 109th Congress for several reasons. First, House Members considered a joint resolution (H.J.Res. 27) to withdraw congressional approval of the agreement establishing the WTO. The House Ways and Means Committee reported the resolution adversely on May 26, 2005, and the full House disapproved the resolution by a vote of 338-86 on June 9, 2005. Debate on the resolution offered Members an opportunity to examine the costs and benefits of WTO participation and examine other aspects of WTO membership.
Second, the 109th Congress will monitor WTO disputes involving U.S. interests and possibly consider whether or not to amend U.S. laws to address WTO dispute panel findings. Members have criticized the WTO dispute process for several reasons, but the process does offer a stable multilateral forum for trade disputes. Third, the United States and other WTO members are actively engaged in a multilateral round of trade negotiations in the WTO. The 109th Congress is monitoring those negotiations. Final agreements are not expected until 2006 or later.
In a report submitted to Congress on March 2, 2005, on the costs and benefits of continued participation in the WTO, the Administration cited a number of statistics that show growth in the U.S. and world economies since establishment of the WTO. Whether the growth cited was the result exclusively or mainly of activity in the WTO is arguable. Academic studies indicate that the United States would gain substantially from broad reductions in trade barriers worldwide. At the same time, some workers and industries might not share in those gains.
Questions of governance and power are among the issues at the heart of the debate on the WTO. Major decisions in the WTO are made by member governments, who determine their negotiating positions, file dispute challenges, and implement their decisions. However, some challenge the claim that the WTO is democratic in nature by arguing that smaller countries are left out of the decision-making and that governments tend to represent large commercial interests only.
The United States has been a frequent participant in WTO dispute proceedings, both as a complainant and as a respondent. There have been many complaints of the WTO dispute process, including the arguments that countries do not adhere to decisions and that U.S. trade remedy laws have not been judged properly. On the other hand, this multilateral trade dispute forum is unique, and the United States has been successful in many of its challenges.
Other issues include (1) the relationship between WTO rules and a country's right to establish domestic standards for labor, the environment, food safety, and other areas; and (2) U.S. policy toward developing countries, including a balance between providing assistance to those countries in the WTO and addressing their demands in trade negotiations. |
crs_R42106 | crs_R42106_0 | Secret, or closed, sessions of the House and Senate exclude the press and the public. They may be held for matters deemed to require confidentiality and secrecy—such as national security, sensitive communications received from the President, and Senate deliberations during impeachment trials. Although Members usually seek advance agreement for going into secret session, any Member of Congress may request a secret session without notice. When the House or Senate goes into secret session, its chamber and galleries are cleared of everyone except Members and officers and employees specified in the rules or designated by the presiding officer as essential to the session. When the chamber is cleared, its doors are closed. Authority: Constitution, Chamber Rules, and Precedents
Authority for the House and Senate to hold secret sessions appears in Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.... Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.... " Both chambers have implemented these constitutional provisions through rules and precedents. In the House, Rule XVII, clause 9 governs secret sessions. In addition, under Rule X, clause 11, paragraphs (g)(2)(D) through (g)(2)(G), the House Select Committee on Intelligence may move that the House hold a secret session to determine whether classified information held by the committee should be made public. In the Senate, any Senator may make a motion that the Senate go into closed session, and, if seconded by another Senator, the Senate will immediately proceed into a secret session. Under Senate Rule XXI, the presiding officer exercises no discretion about going into secret session if the motion is made and seconded. Once in a secret session, the Senate operates under applicable portions of Senate Rules XXIX and XXXI. The proceedings of a secret session are not published unless the relevant chamber votes, during the meeting or at a later time, to release them. Then, those portions released are printed in the Congressional Record . Frequency of Secret Sessions
The Senate met in secret until 1794, its first rules reflecting a belief that the body's various roles, including providing advice and consent to the executive branch, compelled it to act behind closed doors. Since 1929, the Senate has held 57 secret sessions, generally for reasons of national security or for consideration of impeachment questions. The House met frequently in secret session through the end of the War of 1812, mainly to receive confidential communications from the President, but occasionally for routine legislative business. Subsequent secret meetings were held in 1825 and in 1830. Since 1830, the House has met behind closed doors four times: in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 2008. | Secret, or closed, sessions of the House and Senate exclude the press and the public. They may be held for matters deemed to require confidentiality and secrecy—such as national security, sensitive communications received from the President, and Senate deliberations during impeachment trials. Although Members usually seek advance agreement for going into secret session, any Member of Congress may request a secret session without notice. When the House or Senate goes into secret session, its chamber and galleries are cleared of everyone except Members and officers and employees specified in the rules or designated by the presiding officer as essential to the session. After the chamber is cleared, its doors are closed.
Authority for the House and Senate to hold secret sessions appears in Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings…. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their judgment require Secrecy.... " Both chambers have implemented these constitutional provisions through rules and precedents.
In the House, Rule XVII, clause 9 governs secret sessions, including the types of business to be considered behind closed doors. In addition, House Rule X, clause 11 authorizes the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to bring before the House material to help it determine whether classified material held by the committee should be made public.
In the Senate, under Senate Rule XXI, the presiding officer exercises no discretion about going into secret session. Any Senator may make a motion that the Senate go into closed session, and, if seconded, the Senate will immediately proceed into a secret session. Once in a secret session, the Senate operates under applicable portions of Senate Rules XXIX and XXXI.
The Senate met in secret until 1794, its first rules reflecting a belief that the body's various special roles, including providing advice and consent to the executive branch, compelled it to conduct its business behind closed doors. Since 1929, when the Senate began debating nominations and treaties (referred to as executive business) in open session, the Senate has held 57 secret sessions, most often for reasons of national security or for consideration of impeachment proceedings.
The House met frequently in secret session through the end of the War of 1812, mainly to receive confidential communications from the President, but occasionally for routine legislative business. Subsequent secret meetings were held in 1825 and in 1830. Since 1830, the House has met behind closed doors four times: in 1979, 1980, 1983, and 2008.
A chamber's rules apply during a secret session. The proceedings of a secret session are not published unless the relevant chamber votes, during the meeting or at a later time, to release them. Then, those portions released are printed in the Congressional Record.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32363 | crs_RL32363_0 | Background
Introduction
Immigrant eligibility for major public assistance programs is an ongoing issue in Congress. (1) Prior to 1996, legal permanent residents (LPRs) were eligible for federal public assistance underterms comparable to citizens, and states were not permitted to restrict access to federal programs onthe basis of immigration status. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ) -- the original law authorizing the Temporary Assistance for NeedyFamilies (TANF) program -- dramatically changed noncitizen eligibility for public assistance. Itrestricted the eligibility of LPRs, refugees, asylees, and other noncitizens for means-tested public aid. (2) Aliens in theUnited States without authorization, commonlyreferred to as "illegal aliens," remained ineligible federal public assistance. The1996 welfare reform act gave states several options of placing further restrictions on noncitizeneligibility. (3) As Congress considersthe reauthorization of the welfare reform law, the issue of state options to restrict or expandassistance to noncitzens arises. The basic federal rules are asfollows: (4)
LPRs who entered the United States after August 22, 1996, are barred from TANF for five years, after which their coverage becomes a state option. (6) After this five-year term, refugeesand asylees may be eligible, at state option, forTANF. Refugees and asylees who meet the other program criteria are eligible for TANF benefits for five years. (11)
As of December 2002, 34 states and Washington, D.C. reported that they were exercising the option to provide TANF to LPRs after the five-year bar ends. reported that they have exercised the option to provide TANF to LPRs present in the UnitedStates before August 1996. As Table 3 indicates, 34 states and Washington, D.C. reported that they provide TANF to asylees and refugees who were residing in the United States at the time of the welfare reform act'spassage in 1996. Only 27 states and Washington, D.C., however, reported that they provide TANFto asylees and refugees who have surpassed the five-year limit for TANF and two reported that theydid not. Only WestVirginia reported a change in policy of providing TANF in 2000 but not in 2002 to asylees andrefugees who were residing in the United States at the time of the welfare reform act's passage. Funding Sources for Noncitizens
A total of 27 states and Washington, D.C. reported that they used their own funds as well as federal funds in 2000 and 2002 to cover the costs of providing TANF to those LPRs who were in theUnited States prior to the passage of the 1996 welfare reform act. An important source of funding for state assistance to noncitizens comes from the "maintenance of effort" (MOE) requirement. (12)
As of December 2002, 17 states reported using their state MOE money to provide public assistance to newly arriving LPRs who are barred from federal TANF for the first five years, as listedin Table 5 . Six states reported using their state MOE money in 2002 to provide TANF to LPRswhohad exhausted their eligibility or were currently barred: California, Colorado, Florida, New York,Utah, and Washington. Eight states reported contributing their state MOE money in 2002 to aseparate program for those LPRs who were excluded (e.g., barred first five years) or whose eligibilityhad expired (e.g., refugees after five years): California, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Pennsylvania,Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. That many states haveexercised one or more options to extend coverage to certain classes of LPRs has mitigated the effectsof the federal bars enacted in 1996. | The eligibility of immigrants for major public assistance programs is an ongoing issue in Congress. Prior to 1996, immigrants, i.e., legal permanent residents (LPRs), were eligible for federalpublic assistance under terms comparable to citizens, and states were not permitted to restrict accessto federal programs on the basis of immigration status. The Personal Responsibility and WorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ) -- the original law authorizing theTemporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program -- dramatically changed noncitizeneligibility for public assistance. It restricted the eligibility of LPRs, refugees, asylees, and othernoncitizens for all means-tested public aid. Aliens in the United States without authorization,commonly referred to as "illegal aliens," remained ineligible for federal public assistance. AsCongress considers the reauthorization of the welfare reform law, the issue of state options to restrictor expand assistance to immigrants arises.
The 1996 welfare reform act gave states several options of placing further restrictions on noncitizen eligibility or of expanding benefits to noncitizens. LPRs who entered the United Statesafter August 22, 1996, are barred from TANF for five years, after which their coverage becomes astate option. This five-year bar, however, does not apply to LPRs who entered the United States asrefugees and asylees. Refugees and asylees who meet the other program criteria are eligible forTANF for the first five years they are in the United States. After this period of time, refugees andasylees are only eligible for TANF at state option.
Many states have been exercising one or more of these options to extend coverage to certain classes of LPRs. As of December 2002, 34 states reported that they are exercising the option toprovide TANF to LPRs after the five-year bar ends. Thirty-five states reported that they haveexercised the option to provide TANF to LPRs present in the United States before August 1996. Furthermore, 34 states reported that they provide TANF to asylees and refugees who were residingin the United States at the time of the welfare reform act's passage in 1996. Only 27 states, however,reported that they provide TANF to asylees and refugees who have surpassed the five-year limit forTANF.
In terms of funding, 27 states and Washington, D.C. reported that they used their own funds as well as federal funds in 2000 and 2002 to cover the costs of providing TANF to those LPRs whowere in the United States prior to the passage of the 1996 welfare reform act. An important sourceof funding for state assistance to noncitizens comes from the TANF "maintenance of effort" (MOE)requirement. In 2002, 17 states reported using their state MOE money to provide public assistanceto newly arriving LPRs who are barred from federal TANF for the first five years. Six statesreported using their state MOE money in 2002 to provide TANF to LPRs who had exhausted theireligibility or were currently barred. Eight states reported contributing their state MOE money in2002 to a separate program for those LPRs who were excluded or whose eligibility had expired. This report may be updated if new data become available. |
crs_RL33802 | crs_RL33802_0 | Introduction
One of the motivating factors for Congress to create Medicare Part D in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) ( P.L. 108-173 ) was seniors' rising out-of-pocket drug costs. Medicare Part D was designed to take advantage of market competition. In accordance with market competition principles, the drug plans that administer the drug benefit are corporations who may rely on rebate negotiation and price-volume discounts as a way to affect prices. A provision in the MMA, termed the "noninterference" provision, prevents the federal government from being a third party in drug price negotiations between the Part D drug plans and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Both the new Speaker of the House and new Senate Majority Leader have expressed their support for repealing this "noninterference" provision, and regard it as a priority for consideration in the 110 th Congress. Should the "noninterference" provision be repealed, Congress may wish to provide guidance on how they expect the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate prices. In order to clarify and inform the debate, this report provides an overview of the pharmaceutical pricing policies used by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Medicaid—two of the largest federal purchasers of prescription drugs, other than Medicare. Unlike Medicare, which administers medical care through the private sector, the VA provides care directly to veterans. Currently, the VA utilizes four contracting mechanisms to acquire its pharmaceutical supplies: (1) the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS); (2) performance-based incentive agreements, or Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs); (3) pricing under the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-585 ); and (4) national standardization contracts. The national formulary took effect on June 1, 1997. The state programs operate independently under broad federal guidelines. In 2005, 25 state agencies report having established preferred drug lists for their Medicaid programs. States use other mechanisms as well to discourage unnecessary drug spending. Option 2: Mandate that Manufacturers Provide Rebates to Part D Plans
Another way of lowering out-of-pocket payments for beneficiaries might be to mandate larger rebates from manufacturers to Part D drug plans. Option 3: Establish a Medicare Pharmacy Purchasing System
A new Medicare pharmacy purchasing system would be another option that might help translate lower manufacturer drug prices for Medicare Part D into lower out-of-pocket and overall costs for beneficiaries. | The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) (P.L. 108-173) addressed seniors' rising out-of-pocket costs of prescription drugs by providing a mechanism for beneficiaries to obtain affordable prescription drug insurance coverage. The Medicare prescription drug benefit, otherwise known as Part D, was designed to take advantage of market competition. In accordance with market competition principles, the drug plans that administer the drug benefit are corporations who may rely on rebate negotiation and price-volume discounts as a way to affect prices.
A provision in the MMA, termed the "noninterference" provision, prevents the federal government from acting as a third party by negotiating the prices that the drugs plans would pay to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Both the new Speaker of the House and new Senate Majority Leader have reportedly expressed their support for repealing the "noninterference" provision, and regard it as a priority for consideration in the 110th Congress. Should the provision be repealed, Congress may wish to provide guidance on how it expects prices to be negotiated. In order to clarify and inform the debate, this report provides an overview of the pharmaceutical pricing policies used by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Medicaid—the largest federal purchasers of prescription drugs, other than Medicare.
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. Unlike Medicare, which operates as an insurer by reimbursing beneficiaries for the cost of medical care provided by doctors and other providers in private practice as well as by private and public hospitals, VHA provides care directly to veterans largely in VA clinics and VA hospitals. Currently VA utilizes four contracting mechanisms to acquire its pharmaceutical supplies: (1) the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS); (2) performance based incentive agreements; (3) pricing under the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992; and (4) National Standardization Contracts.
Medicaid, a state administered program that operates under broad federal rules, directly controls drug prices by putting a federal ceiling on reimbursements for drug products available from multiple sources and by requiring drug manufacturers to pay rebates to states for drugs purchased on behalf of Medicaid enrollees. States further control overall drug costs through multiple methods, including using formularies and preferred drug lists, requiring that Medicaid enrollees make copayments, and requiring generic substitution.
Several options exist for affecting out-of-pocket and overall prescription drug costs, including (1) establishing a federal price ceiling for Medicare (like Medicaid); (2) mandating that manufacturers provide larger rebates to Part D plans (like Medicaid); or (3) establishing a Medicare pharmacy purchasing system (like the VA). |
crs_RL31860 | crs_RL31860_0 | Introduction
This report discusses disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO) between the UnitedStates and the European Union (EU). The report begins with an overview of the issues to beaddressed, and continues with a brief description of the WTO dispute settlement process, a summaryof U.S.-EU dispute settlement history, and a review of issues arising from cases of longstandingnon-compliance. The 108th Congress inherits several U.S.-EU disputes where the WTO has ruled that U.S. laws violate world trade obligations. In some cases, barring abolition or significant modification of thestatutes in question, the EU could decide to retaliate against U.S. exports this year or next. U.S.-EU efforts to provide leadership to the world economy in recent years, however, have been affected by a number of trade disputes. Moreover, in cases involving beef hormones, bananas, export tax benefits, and other trade laws,attempts to settle disputes have met with refusal or inability by one side or the other to comply in atimely manner with the WTO panel rulings. (1) Non-compliance withWTO panel and Appellate Body rulings by a key Member arguably weakens the credibility andauthority of the WTO and serves as a poor model for the rest of the world. (4) The aim of the processis "to secure a positive solution to a dispute,"the preferred outcome being "a solution mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute andconsistent with the covered agreements"; absent such a solution, the primary objective of the processis withdrawal of an offending measure, with compensation and retaliation being avenues of lastresort. Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Reports (Art. The EU caseload against the United States may be viewed assomewhat heavier than the U.S. caseload against the EU because a number of the cases filed by theUnited States against the EU or its Member States involve the same or similar subject matter;moreover, the EU has pursued a greater number of cases through the full panel process. In the music licensing case, the disputing parties agreed to have the level of trade injury determined in an arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, which provides for binding arbitration asan alternative means of dispute settlement. (14)
Non-Compliance in Selected Cases
While the majority of U.S.-EU disputes do get resolved satisfactorily, a number of cases arecurrently testing the implementation articles of the DSU. Two of the more difficult of these cases-- beef hormones and the ETI Act export subsidy -- do not involve routine commercial disputesover trade or customs regulations, but rather tax policy and internal national regulation, particularlyof social and health matters. To deal with the problem of non-compliance, both Washington and Brussels may haveto give greater attention to a number of concerns and policy considerations, including choice of casesinitiated, limitations of panel decisions, the role of mediation and conciliation, and the adoption ofremedies that are trade liberalizing. Under thesecircumstances, some type of politically agreed upon compromise may be viewed as preferable to aquasi-judicial WTO ruling pending efforts to clarify the rules in subsequent multilateral negotiations. Assuming that some disputes with a highly charged political content are not well suited for the panel and appellate body process, greater efforts could be made to get the contending parties to settletheir differences through bilateral negotiations, through mediation, or by agreeing to arbitration froman outside ( i.e. , non-WTO) party. | U.S.-EU relations have been affected by a number of trade disputes in recent years. While the majority of trade disputes do get resolved, attempts to settle some of the disputes have been met withrefusal or inability by one or another of the parties to comply in a timely manner with the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) panel rulings. The 108th Congress inherits several of these disputeswhere the WTO has ruled that U.S. laws violate trade obligations. Absent U.S. compliance throughlegislative action, the EU could in some cases decide to retaliate against U.S. exports this year ornext. In the meantime, the EU remains in non-compliance with its WTO obligations to allowimports of beef treated with hormones. Beyond raising U.S.-EU trade tensions, non-compliance bya key WTO member arguably weakens the credibility and authority of the WTO and its disputesettlement process.
The initiation and resolution of disputes under WTO agreements is carried out under the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), considered a cornerstone of the WTOsystem. The WTO dispute settlement process has a more quasi-judicial orientation than thequasi-diplomatic orientation of the prior GATT system, in which negotiation and conciliationgenerally prevailed over multilateral enforcement of rules. The DSU provides for virtually automaticestablishment of panels, adoption of panel and appellate reports and, where requested, authorizationto impose retaliatory measures; deadlines are set out for various stages of the process. These featuresensure that complaints are heard and promote implementation of WTO rulings, thus makingavailable to all WTO Members the means to clarify trade rules and redress trade injury. At the sametime, the process continues to retain certain diplomatic elements in that its primary aim is to "securea positive solution to a dispute," with the preferred outcome being a "solution mutually acceptableto the parties to the dispute and consistent with the covered agreements." Opportunities forsettlement are provided at a number of points in a procedure.
U.S. and EU instances of longstanding non-compliance have for the most part not involved routine commercial disputes over trade or customs regulations, but rather tax policy and internalnational regulation, particularly of social and health matters. While ambiguity in WTO agreementsmay give rise to disputes in these difficult areas, the automatic features of the DSU also allow partiesto pursue such cases through the full dispute process, even though it may be evident from the outsetthat implementation of an adverse WTO ruling may be subject to overwhelming domestic oppositionin the defending country. To deal with the problem of non-compliance in difficult cases, bothWashington and Brussels may need to give greater attention to a number of concerns and policyconsiderations, including choice of cases initiated, limitations on panel decisions, role of mediationand conciliation, and adoption of remedies that are trade liberalizing. Assuming that some disputesare not well-suited for the DSU process, greater efforts may be needed to settle differences throughbilateral negotiations and political compromises, through mediation, or by agreeing to arbitrationfrom an outside ( i.e. , non-WTO) party. This report will be updated periodically. For more on theWTO dispute settlement process and U.S.-EU Trade Relations, see CRS Report RS20088 and CRS Issue Brief IB10087. |
crs_R41244 | crs_R41244_0 | Structurally, the Constitution establishes a federal government with discrete, limited powers, reserving authority not given to the federal government under the Constitution to the states and the people. As congressional assertions of authority have grown, the Supreme Court has had cause to delimit the reach of federal power in several legal contexts. Frequently contested provisions implicating federal versus state power include the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice John Paul Stevens has written notable opinions addressing each of these areas. These opinions generally indicate a viewpoint that it is difficult to clearly distinguish between federal and state spheres of power, and a tendency to recognize a limited federal role in issues that affect state prerogatives and local activities. Justice Stevens's concerns proved to be well-founded. This appeared to have ended the Court's attempt to substantively limit federal government regulation of the states. Section 5 empowers Congress to legislate to enforce the amendment. That is, the courts have upheld limits on state autonomy under § 5 that might not otherwise be sustainable under the Constitution. | Structurally, the Constitution establishes a federal government with discrete, limited powers, reserving authority not given to the federal government under the Constitution to the states and the people. The uncertain contours of this dual system have often resulted in Supreme Court decisions on the reach of the federal government's limited powers and the core autonomy of the states. Congress, for example, has invoked the Commerce Clause to regulate local, and sometimes non-economic, activities that historically have been subject to regulation under state police powers. Also, Congress has invoked its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate state activity that might otherwise be beyond its reach. States, on the other hand, have cited the Tenth Amendment to resist what they perceive as congressional overreaching into essential state functions.
During Justice John Paul Stevens's tenure on the Supreme Court, the Court has continued to develop its jurisprudence on these constitutional provisions in resolving tension between federal versus state authority. Justice Stevens himself has written notable opinions on a range of federalism issues. These opinions generally indicate a viewpoint that it is difficult to clearly distinguish between federal and state spheres of power, and a tendency to recognize a limited federal role in issues that affect state prerogatives and local activities. |
crs_R40851 | crs_R40851_0 | Introduction1
South Korea's shifting political landscape has had a significant impact in recent years on the nation's external relations, including its political and strategic relationship with the United States. Current South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, who belongs to the right-of-center Grand National Party (GNP), came to power in February 2008 pledging to boost domestic economic growth, improve alliance relations with the United States, and enhance South Korea's international status. After decades of authoritarian rule that ended in the late 1980s, South Korean leaders are now exposed to intense public scrutiny and are more dependent on public support to implement their policy agendas. In particular, the move has realigned South Korea with the United States and Japan in their attempt to pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program, while diverging somewhat from pro-engagement China. President Lee's Political Standing
A year and a half into his five-year, single term presidency, President Lee has encountered multiple political challenges that have damaged his popularity throughout much of his administration. One of the initial signs of trouble in the Lee administration was the massive anti-government protests that followed the April 2008 U.S.-Korea beef deal. Some polls indicate that Lee's approval ratings in the early fall of 2009 climbed back into the high 40% range, principally due to slightly improved economic forecasts for South Korea. The 2008 beef protests, which for weeks virtually paralyzed policy-making in Seoul, appear to have been fueled by a coalescing of several factors, including a perception that the beef deal symbolized Lee's allegedly "arrogant" decision-making style; a feeling that the avowedly pro-American Lee was too willing to concede to the United States on an issue of public safety; increased angst over South Korea's deteriorating economic situation, caused in part by rising inflation and global financial disruptions; and a desire by the main opposition party, the Democratic Party, to reverse electoral setbacks that had deprived its predecessor party of the presidency (in a December 2007 election) and control of the National Assembly (in April 2008 parliamentary elections). Issues in the U.S.-ROK Military Alliance
U.S. Force Deployment and Base Relocation Plans
The stationing of U.S. forward deployed forces in South Korea is a particularly sensitive issue for the Korean public and has become an issue that Pentagon planners have increasingly had to contend with in their calculations of U.S. force levels on the Peninsula. Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)
Another key issue is implementation of a bilateral agreement to transfer wartime operational control (commonly referred to as OPCON) of military forces from U.S. to South Korean command—part of a South Korean proposal to abolish the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and create separate U.S. and South Korean military commands. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States, and the United States is South Korea's third largest trading partner (after China and Japan). Inter-Korean Relations
Since entering office, Lee has made major changes to Seoul's policy toward North Korea. A key challenge for Lee and his successors will likely be to strike the right balance between economic competition and political and strategic cooperation with China over the long-term. Indeed, in at least a tacit acknowledgement of South Korea's increased clout, the Bush Administration took a number of steps—such as negotiating the KORUS FTA, admitting South Korea into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, and agreeing to move U.S. troops from the Yongsan base in Seoul—that were sought by South Korea. Indeed, President Lee's plan to enhance his nation's international profile along the lines of a "Global Korea" complements the "Joint Vision" that he signed with President Obama in June 2009—an agreement that provides a conceptual roadmap for upgrading bilateral cooperation to the global level. The next national legislative elections will be held in April 2012, which is also the year of South Korea's next presidential election (scheduled for December). | South Korea's maturing democracy and rapid economic development have had a significant impact on its external relations, including the strategic and economic relationship with the United States. After decades of close strategic alignment with the United States under authoritarian governments, the past several democratically elected leaders in Seoul have sought their own brand of foreign policy and relations with the United States. Now the 13th largest global economy, South Korea is a major U.S. trade partner and host to some 37,000 forward deployed U.S. troops.
President Lee Myung-bak entered office in 2008 planning to upgrade ties with the United States and carry out other ambitious proposals, but faced multiple political challenges early in his administration. One initial crisis was the massive anti-government protests against the April 2008 U.S.-Korea beef deal. Lee's approval ratings fell to the 20%-30% level, although his ratings had returned to the 40-50% range in the early fall of 2009 due to improved economic forecasts. Many experts agree his political support remains fragile, including within his Grand National Party (GNP), which controls South Korea's unicameral National Assembly. Lee's clout may be limited by his early "lame duck" status; by law, South Korean presidents are limited to one, five-year term. The next presidential election is scheduled for 2012, the same year as the next nationwide National Assembly elections.
Although many argue that Lee's early problems were of his own making, South Korea's politically charged and fractious democratic system presents unique challenges for its leaders. Korean presidents operate under extremely intense media and voter scrutiny, and are occasional targets of activist groups that use the Internet to mobilize mass demonstrations like the 2008 beef protests. Civic demonstrations are a carryover from the pro-democracy movement that helped to end South Korea's authoritarian rule just two decades ago.
South Korea's increased self-assurance has raised aspirations for greater international clout and respect from the United States as a more equal alliance partner. Over the past decade, Washington and Seoul have taken a number of steps to recognize South Korea's rise. President Lee's vision of a "Global Korea" reflects even greater ambitions for a higher profile on the world stage, including a more assertive role in regional diplomacy. Lee has also shifted his predecessor's policy of unconditional engagement of North Korea to a "reciprocal" policy toward Pyongyang. This move has reoriented South Korean diplomacy away from pro-engagement China and closer to the U.S. and Japanese position on pressuring the regime to give up its nuclear weapons program.
Despite an upswing in South Korean attitudes toward the United States, several outstanding agenda items are affecting bilateral relations. These include relocating the U.S. Army base at Yongsan to Pyongtaek; transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) from U.S. to South Korean command; South Korea's contribution to allied efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the pending bilateral KORUS Free Trade Agreement. Congress has a decisive role to play in approving appropriations for the base relocation plan and the ratification of the KORUS FTA.
Lee and President Obama nevertheless signed a "Joint Vision" statement during their bilateral summit in June 2009 that outlines a broad set of proposals for upgrading bilateral cooperation on global issues such as climate change and non-proliferation. But domestic political factors will likely set the parameters of Korea's efforts to become a greater stakeholder in the international community. A clearer understanding of these factors may help Congress and U.S. policymakers determine realistic goals for the U.S.-South Korean relationship over the mid to long term. |
crs_R43474 | crs_R43474_0 | Introduction
During the Obama Administration, the two federal agencies primarily responsible for administering the private health insurance provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within the Treasury Department—took a series of actions to delay, extend, or otherwise modify the law's implementation. This report discusses selected administrative actions taken by CMS and the IRS through February 2015 to address ACA implementation. The report is no longer being updated and is available primarily for reference purposes. A companion CRS report summarizes all the legislative actions taken by the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the ACA. On July 9, 2013, the IRS announced that it would not take any enforcement action against employers who fail to comply with the law's employer mandate until the beginning of 2015 (see Table 1 ). This ACA provision, which took effect on January 1, 2014, requires employers with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) to offer their full-time workers health coverage that meets certain standards of affordability and minimum value. Those employers who do not provide such coverage risk having to pay a penalty if one or more of their employees obtain subsidized coverage through an exchange. The IRS subsequently announced that employers with at least 50 but fewer than 100 FTEs will have an additional year to comply with the employer mandate (see Table 1 ). Renewal of Noncompliant Plans
Other controversial administrative actions include those taken in response to the decision by insurers to cancel individual and small-group health plans that do not meet the ACA's new standards for health insurance coverage, which also took effect on January 1, 2014. Arguments For and Against the Administrative Actions
Opponents of the ACA, who believe that the law is fundamentally flawed, argued that some of the Obama Administration's actions were effectively rewriting the ACA in an effort to make it work and add to the public's confusion about the law. The ACA's critics asserted that the actions taken by the Administration to delay enforcement of the employer mandate were illegal and raised concerns that the President was not upholding his constitutional duty to faithfully execute federal law. The Administration countered that its actions were not a refusal to implement and enforce the ACA as written. Instead, they represented temporary corrections necessary to ensure the effective implementation of a very large and complex law. 676 ) authorizing Speaker John Boehner, on behalf of the House, to sue the President or other executive branch officials for failing to "to act in a manner consistent with [their] duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to implementation of the [ACA]." A lawsuit was filed on November 21, 2014, consisting of two counts. First, it claimed that the Administration had violated the Constitution by delaying the ACA employer mandate. Second, the lawsuit challenged the ACA's cost-sharing subsidies. | During the Obama Administration, the two federal agencies primarily responsible for administering the private health insurance provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within the Treasury Department—took a series of actions to delay, extend, or otherwise modify the law's implementation.
This report summarizes selected administrative actions taken by CMS and the IRS through February 2015 to address ACA implementation. The report is no longer being updated and is available primarily for reference purposes. A companion product—CRS Report R43289—summarizes all the legislative actions taken by the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the ACA.
The most significant administrative action was the decision by the IRS to delay implementation of the law's "employer mandate." This ACA provision, which took effect on January 1, 2014, requires employers with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) to offer their full-time workers health coverage that meets certain standards of affordability and minimum value. Those employers who do not provide such coverage risk having to pay a penalty if one or more of their employees obtain subsidized coverage through an exchange. The IRS announced that it would not take any enforcement action against employers who fail to comply with the law's employer mandate until the beginning of 2015. Subsequently, the agency announced that employers with at least 50 but fewer than 100 FTEs would have an additional year to comply with the employer mandate.
Other controversial administrative actions include those taken in response to the decision by insurers to cancel individual and small-group health plans that do not meet the ACA's standards for health insurance coverage, which also took effect on January 1, 2014.
Opponents of the ACA argued that these administrative actions were an attempt to rewrite the law in order to make it work. They asserted that some of the Administration's actions were illegal and raised concerns that the President was not upholding his constitutional duty to faithfully execute federal law. The Administration countered that its actions were authorized by federal law and represented temporary corrections necessary to ensure the effective implementation of a very large and complex act.
On July 30, 2014, the House approved a resolution (H.Res. 676) authorizing Speaker John Boehner, on behalf of the House, to sue the President or other executive branch officials for failing to "to act in a manner consistent with [their] duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to implementation of the [ACA]." A lawsuit was filed on November 21, 2014, consisting of two counts. First, it claimed that the Administration had violated the Constitution by delaying the ACA employer mandate. Second, the lawsuit challenged the Administration's authority to pay cost-sharing subsidies, arguing that the law had not appropriated any funding for them. |
crs_R43812 | crs_R43812_0 | Introduction
Emergency departments (EDs) play an important public health role during emergencies and on a regular basis by providing access to emergency care to all patients regardless of their ability to pay (see Text Box 1 ). Although the original intent of EDs was to provide emergency care, this role has expanded, as patients often seek care in an ED when services are unavailable or inaccessible in the community. EDs provide a disproportionate amount of health care to the U.S. population. Specifically, the 4% of physicians who staff EDs are the treating physician in 28% of all acute care visits, and these visits disproportionately involve patients with more dangerous or worrisome symptoms, such as chest pain, respiratory complaints, and abdominal pain. The use of EDs to provide nonemergency care can be costly to payers because services provided in an ED are generally more expensive than those provided in community-based settings. The federal government is interested in the availability of ED services and their appropriate use for several reasons, including its role as a payer of health care services, its role in supporting emergency preparedness, and its role in supporting the health care safety net. Also, the federal government has made investments in emergency preparedness, programs and efforts that support the health care safety net, and efforts that support health care access in general. Given these investments, Congress may be interested in EDs because a well-functioning ED system is necessary to provide surge capacity in an emergency. The function of the ED system, in turn, often reflects its surrounding community's access to health care services; therefore, understanding the use of EDs, evaluating whether such use is appropriate, and examining strategies employed to reduce inappropriate use may all be of policy interest. This report describes EDs, the role they play in the health care delivery system, and current federal involvement in supporting EDs. It then discusses the causes and consequences of three commonly identified and interrelated challenges that EDs face: (1) crowding, (2) providing repeat care to a subset of patients who are frequent users, and (3) providing care to a large population who have behavioral health conditions when an ED lacks the appropriate resources to provide such treatment. The report concludes with policy options that Congress may consider to potentially improve ED functioning and reduce payer costs. EDs Provide Care to Safety Net Populations
ED use is also driven by the availability of community-based health service providers that accept safety net populations, such as the uninsured or Medicaid beneficiaries. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
The federal government requires—as a condition of Medicare participation—that hospitals with dedicated EDs screen and provide treatment to patients with emergent conditions regardless of a patient's ability to pay. Hospitals in MSAs are more crowded; as a result, they divert more ambulances and have longer wait times. The demand for ED care depends on the volume of patients requiring emergency care and the volume of patients who are seeking care in the ED because it is after-hours or because they lack another source of care (e.g., safety net patients). Effects on Hospitals
Crowding, in general, and boarding, in particular, affect hospital finances by reducing ED and inpatient volume and decreasing revenue earned from serving additional patients. Spending Through Discretionary Programs
Hospitals face a number of challenges related to providing primary and behavioral health care in part because of provider shortages. | Hospital-based Emergency Departments (EDs) are required to stabilize patients with emergent conditions regardless of the patients' ability to pay as a requirement of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). Given this requirement, EDs play an important part in the health care safety net by serving the uninsured, the underserved, and those enrolled in Medicaid. Open 24 hours a day, EDs provide emergency care, urgent care, primary care, and behavioral health care services in communities where these services are unavailable or unavailable after hours. EDs also play a key role during emergencies, such as natural disasters.
Some EDs are challenged to provide effective care. For example, EDs provide a disproportionate amount of health care to the U.S. population, in general, and to the safety net population, in particular. Specifically, while 4% of all U.S. physicians are ED physicians, they are the treating physicians in 28% of all acute care visits. Some EDs face financial challenges. ED services are costly both to payers, because services provided in an ED are more costly than those provided in community-based settings, and to hospitals, because operating an ED has high fixed costs and because if patients enter with an emergent condition, hospitals are required by EMTALA to stabilize the patient regardless of the patient's ability to pay.
As providers of uncompensated safety net care, some EDs are crowded, in part because hospitals lack staff or inpatient beds to transfer patients from the ED, and in part because of the large number of patients who seek care in the ED because care is unavailable or inaccessible in the community. Crowded conditions have resulted in some patients experiencing long wait times, which, at times, delays access to care and results in worse health outcomes. In addition, hospitals, particularly those in urban areas, are regularly diverting ambulances because they are too crowded to accept new patients.
This report describes EDs and the role they play in the health care delivery system. It also discusses the federal role and interest in supporting emergency care. The federal government is the largest payer for overall health care, through the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Also, the federal government has made investments in emergency preparedness, programs and efforts that support the health care safety net, and health care access in general. Given these investments, Congress may be interested in EDs because a well-functioning ED system is necessary to provide surge capacity in an emergency. The function of the ED system, in turn, reflects its surrounding community's access to health care services; therefore, understanding the use of EDs, evaluating whether such use is appropriate, and examining strategies employed to reduce inappropriate use may all be of policy interest.
This report discusses three commonly identified and interrelated challenges that EDs face: (1) crowding in EDs, (2) providing repeat care to a subset of patients who are frequent users, and (3) providing care to a large population who have behavioral health conditions when an ED lacks the appropriate resources to provide such treatment. Finally, this report concludes with some policy options that Congress might consider to improve ED functioning and reduce payer costs. This report focuses on EDs that are available to the general population; as such, it does not include EDs operated by the Departments of Defense or Veterans Affairs or those operated by the Indian Health Service. |
crs_R43336 | crs_R43336_0 | Brief Historical Overview of the WTO Case
The so-called "Brazil-U.S. cotton case" is a long-running WTO dispute settlement case (DS267) initiated by Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—in 2002 against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program. In addition, certain U.S. agricultural export programs were found to be illegal under WTO rules. In December 2007, a WTO compliance panel ruled in favor of Brazil's noncompliance charge against the United States, and the ruling was upheld on appeal in June 2008. 2. The two countries signed a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) that spelled out the terms of the agreement:
Brazil relinquishes its rights to countermeasures against U.S. trade or any further proceedings in the dispute; the United States agreed to new rules governing fees (i.e., must be risk-based fees with an additional fee component for longer tenors of greater than 12 but less than 18 months, or of 18 months) and tenor (i.e., maximum tenor of 18 month) for the GSM-102 export credit guarantee program; Brazil agreed to a temporary Peace Clause with respect to any new WTO actions against U.S. cotton support programs while the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ) is in force or against any agricultural export credit guarantees under the GSM-102 program as long as the program is operated consistent with the agreed terms; the United States would make a one-time final payment of $300 million to the Brazil Cotton Institute (BCI) with explicit use-of-fund conditions that included an expansion of the uses beyond technical and capacity-building activities related to cotton production in Brazil as defined under the Framework Agreement—additional uses are for infrastructure and for research conducted in conjunction with a U.S. institution (the provision was included in the 2014 farm bill); and both counties agreed to routine semi-annual reporting of compliance with the terms of the MOU. U.S. Policy Changes in Response to the Cotton Case
Since 2005, the United States has made several changes to both its cotton and export credit guarantee programs in an attempt to bring them into compliance with WTO recommendations. Modified or Eliminated Export Credit Guarantee Programs
In order to address the issue of export credit guarantees containing an implicit export subsidy prohibited under WTO rules—that is, the idea that benefits returned under the program are insufficient to cover the operating costs and losses of program implementation—several steps were taken by both USDA and Congress. However, Brazil continued to argue that the U.S. policy response was inadequate. Policy Changes Made in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79 ). These changes have resulted in cotton being singled out and treated differently from all other U.S. program crops. U.S. cotton no longer has access to the price and income support programs offered for other program crops, but instead will rely on a within-year, market-based insurance guarantee as its primary support measure. Under the new cotton program, producers have to pay into the program in order to participate, a loss (albeit at the county level) has to occur before a payment is made, and the sum of program payments is prohibited from exceeding the value of the crop insured in order to minimize any potential incentive. 1. 2. Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) . A Final Resolution
On October 1, 2014, Brazil and the United States reached an agreement to resolve the long-running cotton dispute in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Conclusion
In the end, the successful resolution of the WTO cotton dispute avoided a trade war between two of the world's major agricultural trading nations, the United States and Brazil, while resulting in substantial and substantive changes in U.S. domestic support programs for upland cotton and the U.S. export credit guarantee program in general. | On October 1, 2014, Brazil and the United States reached an agreement to resolve the long-running cotton dispute in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The two countries signed a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) that spelled out the terms of the agreement: Brazil relinquishes its rights to countermeasures against U.S. trade or any further proceedings in the dispute; the United States agreed to new rules governing fees and tenor for the GSM-102 export credit guarantee program; Brazil agreed to a temporary Peace Clause with respect to any new WTO actions against U.S. cotton support programs while the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) is in force or against any agricultural export credit guarantees under the GSM-102 program as long as the program is operated consistent with the agreed terms; the United States would make a one-time final payment of $300 million to the Brazil Cotton Institute (BCI) with explicit use-of-fund conditions; and both counties agreed to routine semi-annual reporting under the MOU.
The cotton dispute settlement case (DS267) was initiated by Brazil—a major cotton export competitor—in 2002 against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program. In September 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled that (1) certain U.S. agricultural support payments for cotton distorted international agricultural markets and should be either withdrawn or modified to end the market distortions; and (2) U.S. Step-2 payments and agricultural export credit guarantees for cotton and other unscheduled commodities were prohibited subsidies under WTO rules and should be withdrawn.
In 2005, the United States made several changes to both its cotton and export credit guarantee programs in an attempt to bring them into compliance with WTO recommendations; however, Brazil argued that the U.S. response was inadequate. A WTO compliance panel ruled in Brazil's favor and was upheld on appeal. The United States made additional changes to its export credit program in the 2008 farm bill, but Brazil found the overall level of changes to fall short of the WTO ruling. The threat of retaliation led Brazil and the United States to negotiate a temporary agreement, referred to as the Framework Agreement (June 17, 2010), to avoid trade retaliation with the understanding that the WTO cotton dispute would be resolved definitively within the context of the next U.S. farm bill.
In this regard, the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) included several substantive changes to both U.S. cotton support programs and the export credit guarantee program. These changes have resulted in cotton being singled out and treated differently from all other U.S. program crops. Cotton no longer has access to the price and income support programs offered for other program crops, but instead will rely on a within-year, market-based insurance guarantee—referred to as the Stacked Income Protection Program or STAX—as its primary support measure. Under this new cotton program, producers would have to pay into the program in order to participate, a loss (albeit at the county level) would have to occur before an indemnity payment would be made, and the sum of program indemnity payments under STAX and any other crop insurance policy would be prohibited from exceeding the value of the insured crop to minimize any production incentive. In addition, U.S. export credit guarantee programs have been substantially reformed, including a shortened tenor (i.e., contract length) of only 24 months—down from 36 months—and increased user fees to ensure that the program's operating costs are fully covered by fees so as to avoid any implicit subsidy. New farm legislative language also included expanded flexibility for USDA to negotiate with Brazil concerning the compliance of export credit guarantee implementation. |
crs_R42008 | crs_R42008_0 | 2434 , the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012. 2434 would have provided $42.97 billion for agencies funded through the House Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition, H.R. 2112 , the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2012, would provide $172 million for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Total FY2012 funding provided by the House would have been $43.14 billion, about $5.58 billion below the President's FY2012 request and $1.55 billion less than FY2011 enacted amounts. On September 15, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2012 financial services bill, S. 1573 . The committee's bill would have provided $44.64 billion for FSGG agencies, including $240 million for the CFTC, for FY2012, which would have been $4.09 billion below the President's FY2012 request and $47.67 million less than FY2011 enacted amounts. On December 23, 2011, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ), which funded the government through FY2012. FSGG agencies, including the CFTC, were provided a total of $44.41 billion for FY2012, which is $4.31 billion less than the President's request and $277 million below FY2011 funding levels. Overview
The FSGG appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. Congressional Action
House
On July 7, 2011, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill ( H.R. Administrative Provisions
The House and Senate committee reports on the FSGG bill ( H.R. Appropriations for the CFTC are under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Subcommittee in the House, and the Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee in the Senate. The President requested $308 million for the CFTC for FY2012, would have been $105 million more than FY2011 enacted appropriations. The Recovery Board is funded through the FSGG appropriations bill for the first time in FY2012. United States Postal Service161
The U.S. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. Among those independent agencies are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded in the House through the Agriculture appropriations bill and in the Senate through the FSGG bill. CFTC funding is included in all FSGG funding tables in this report.
On February 14, 2011, President Obama submitted his FY2012 budget request. The request included a total of $48.72 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $308 million for the CFTC. The President's request would have increased funding $4.03 billion above FY2011 enacted amounts.
On July 7, 2011, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 2434, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012. H.R. 2434 would have provided $42.97 billion for agencies funded through the House FSGG Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition, the CFTC would have received $172 million through the FY2012 agriculture appropriations bill, H.R. 2112. Total FY2012 funding provided by the House would have been $43.14 billion, about $5.58 billion below the President's FY2012 request and $1.55 billion less than FY2011 enacted amounts.
On September 15, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2012 financial services bill, S. 1573. The Senate committee's bill would have provided $44.64 billion for FSGG agencies, including $240 million for the CFTC, for FY2012, which would have been $4.09 billion below the President's FY2012 request and $47.67 million less than FY2011 enacted amounts.
On December 23, 2011, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), which funded the government through FY2012. FSGG agencies, including the CFTC, were provided a total of $44.41 billion for FY2012, which is $277 million below FY2011 funding levels and $4.31 billion less than the President's request. |
crs_R43917 | crs_R43917_0 | TIP is of significant interest to the United States as a serious human rights concern and a prolific area of contemporary criminal activity. TIP is both an international and domestic crime that involves violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards, as well as criminal law. Domestically, anti-TIP efforts include protection for victims, education of the public, and the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses. The most recent reauthorization of the TVPA was in the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Title XII of P.L. 113-4 ). This report discusses domestic human trafficking-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant interest in the 114 th Congress. 159 ), as passed by the House on January 27, 2015. 181 ), as passed by the House on January 27, 2015. To Improve the Response to Victims of Child Sex Trafficking ( H.R. Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act of 2015 (SAVE Act, H.R. 285 ), as passed by the House on January 27, 2015. Human Trafficking Prevention, Intervention, and Recovery Act of 2015 ( H.R. Human Trafficking Prevention Act ( H.R. 460 ), as passed by the House on January 27, 2015. Enhancing Services for Runaway and Homeless Victims of Youth Trafficking Act of 2015 ( H.R. 468 ), as passed by the House on January 26, 2015. 514 ), as passed by the House on January 26, 2015. International Megan's Law to Prevent Demand for Child Sex Trafficking ( H.R. 515 ), as passed by the House on January 26, 2015. Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act of 2015 ( S. 166 ), as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 26, 2015. 181 , H.R. 350 , S. 166 , and S. 178 ) seeks to improve services to victims. The Human Trafficking Prevention, Intervention, and Recovery Act of 2015 ( H.R. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 ( H.R. These monies would be deposited into a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund that S. 178 would also establish. Money from the fund could be used to award certain grants authorized by the TVPA or enhance victims' programming under the Victims of Child Abuse Act, including for victims of child pornography. For instance, the House has passed three bills that seek to strengthen the federal and state responses to trafficking through a variety of service systems. 246 would ensure that reports to a federally funded tipline of sexually exploited children can include children who are victims of sex trafficking. The Enhancing Services for Runaway and Homeless Victims for Youth Trafficking Act of 2015 ( H.R. In addition, H.R. As mentioned, S. 178 would establish a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund. A pending bill, the Strengthening the Child Welfare Response to Trafficking Act of 2015 ( H.R. 469 would direct HHS to report to Congress on child sex and labor trafficking, including (1) the specific type and prevalence of severe forms of trafficking (both sex and labor trafficking) perpetrated against children who have been identified for services or intervention while under the care and placement of the child welfare agency (including a state or Indian child welfare agency or Indian tribe); (2) the practices and protocols used by states under the CAPTA state grants program to identify and serve children who are, or are at-risk of becoming, victims of trafficking; and (3) any barriers in federal laws or regulations that may prevent identifying and assessing children who are such victims, including an evaluation of the extent to which states are able to address the needs of trafficked children without amending the definition of "abuse and neglect" under CAPTA. 159 and S. 166 would incentivize states to enact safe harbor laws that would (1) treat each minor involved in commercial sexual activity as a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, (2) discourage the charging and prosecution of these minors for prostitution or sex trafficking offenses, and (3) encourage the diversion of these minors to child protection services. The Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act of 2015 ( S. 166 ) would direct the Attorney General to implement and maintain a National Strategy for Combating Human Trafficking that includes (1) integrating federal, state, local, and tribal efforts to investigate and prosecute human trafficking cases; (2) coordinating cases within the Department of Justice; (3) addressing annual budget priorities and federal efforts dedicated to preventing and combating human trafficking; (4) continually assessing future trends, challenges, and opportunities to enhance federal, state, local, and tribal efforts to combat human trafficking; and (5) encouraging the cooperation, coordination, and mutual support between the private sector and federal agencies to combat human trafficking. Among other things, the Human Trafficking Prioritization Act ( H.R. Training
While U.S. The Human Trafficking Detection Act of 2015 ( H.R. Separately, the Trafficking Awareness Training for Health Care Act of 2015 ( H.R. | Legislation aimed at combating trafficking in persons (TIP) is a top item on the legislative agenda for the 114th Congress. TIP is of significant interest to the United States as a serious human rights concern, and it is believed to be one of the most prolific areas of contemporary criminal activity. TIP is both an international and domestic crime that involves violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards, as well as criminal law. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)—most recently reauthorized in March 2013 (Title XII of P.L. 113-4)—is the primary law that addresses human trafficking. Domestically, anti-TIP efforts provided under the TVPA include protection for victims, the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses, and education of the public. This report discusses TIP issues that have received legislative action or are of significant interest in the 114th Congress.
As human trafficking issues intersect with many different policy areas (e.g., immigration, child welfare, the criminal justice system, missing and exploited youth), legislation to address human trafficking is varied. This is illustrated by the panoply of bills that have recently passed the House. For example, the Human Trafficking Prevention, Intervention, and Recovery Act of 2015 (H.R. 350), Trafficking Awareness Training for Health Care Act of 2015 (H.R. 398), and the Human Trafficking Prioritization Act (H.R. 514), as passed by the House, would address interagency coordination, efficiency, and best practices as they relate to combating human trafficking. The Human Trafficking Prevention Act (H.R. 357) and the Human Trafficking Detection Act of 2015 (H.R. 460), as passed by the House, would enhance training for officials to help identify victims of trafficking. The International Megan's Law to Prevent Demand for Child Sex Trafficking (H.R. 515), as passed by the House, would create a new center in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that would be responsible for notifying the destination country of international travel by child-sex offenders, where appropriate.
Several other bills, as passed by the House, would strengthen the federal and state responses to trafficking through a variety of service systems. H.R. 246, To Improve the Response to Victims of Child Sex Trafficking, would ensure that reports to a federally funded tipline of sexually exploited children can include children who are victims of sex trafficking. The Enhancing Services for Runaway and Homeless Youth Victims for Youth Trafficking Act of 2015 (H.R. 468) would use the Runaway and Homeless Youth program as a vehicle to enhance services to youth who are vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking. The Strengthening Child Welfare Response to Trafficking Act of 2015 (H.R. 469) would strengthen state child welfare agencies' responses to the trafficking of children.
A number of bills would amend criminal justice policy in an attempt to obstruct human trafficking. For instance, the Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act of 2015 (SAVE Act, H.R. 285, as passed by the House), would provide penalties for knowingly advertising, or knowingly selling advertising that offers, certain commercial sex acts. The Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act (H.R. 159, as passed by the House, and S. 166, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee) would incentivize states to enact safe harbor legislation—which would ensure that children who are found in prostitution would be treated as victims rather than perpetrators—and increase restitution amounts for victims.
Several pending bills, such as the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (H.R. 181; S. 178), the Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act of 2015 (H.R. 159), and the Human Trafficking Prevention, Intervention, and Recovery Act of 2015 (H.R. 350), all as passed by the House, would adopt a multi-prong approach to anti-TIP efforts, including improving services to victims. For example, H.R. 181 and S. 178 would create new grant programs for law enforcement and victims services, and would amend the criminal code (Title 18 of the U.S. Code) for certain trafficking-related activities. S. 178 would also impose an additional $5,000 penalty on anyone convicted of certain trafficking-related and other offenses and would establish a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund into which revenues from such penalties would be deposited and used to award certain grants authorized by the TVPA or to enhance victims' services. |
crs_RL30458 | crs_RL30458_0 | The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to the budget resolution process. The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to change current law to bring revenue and spending levels into conformity with the policies of the budget resolution. Accordingly, reconciliation is probably the most potent budget enforcement tool available to Congress for a large portion of the budget. Reconciliation is a multi-stage process. First, reconciliation instructions are included in the budget resolution directing the appropriate committees to develop legislation achieving the desired budgetary outcomes. The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation by the House and Senate under expedited procedures. Reconciliation was first used by the House and Senate during the administration of President Jimmy Carter in calendar year 1980 for FY1981. As an optional procedure, it has not been used every year. Since FY1981, 20 omnibus reconciliation measures have been enacted into law, and four have been vetoed (see Table 1 ). Congress established a deadline of June 15 for the completion of action on any required reconciliation legislation. Overall Record of Experience
The record of experience with reconciliation legislation over the period covering 1980 to the present indicates considerable variation in the time needed to process such measures from the date the reconciliation instructions take effect (upon final adoption of the budget resolution) until the resultant reconciliation legislation is approved or vetoed by the President. As Figure 2 shows, the processing interval for the 20 enacted and four vetoed reconciliation measures ranged from a low of 27 days (for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) to a high of 384 days (for the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2006). On average, completing the process took about five months (155 days), well beyond the two months contemplated by the timetable in the 1974 Congressional Budget Act. As Table 2 shows, action on 11 such measures was completed during the first session and on 13 such measures during the second session. It should be noted, however, that six of the measures (the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1983; the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985; the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005; the Tax Increase Prevention, Reconciliation Act of 2005; the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010; and the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015) were enacted (or vetoed) between January and May of the second session and were from reconciliation directives included in the prior session. On the other hand, the reconciliation process can be lengthy and drawn out: In four instances, reconciliation measures were not enacted or vetoed until December, and in six other instances, they carried over until the following year. | The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 that operates as an adjunct to the annual budget resolution process. The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to change current law in order to bring revenue and spending levels into conformity with the policies of the budget resolution. Accordingly, reconciliation may be the most potent budget enforcement tool available to Congress for a large portion of the budget.
Reconciliation is a two-stage process in which reconciliation instructions are included in the budget resolution directing the appropriate committees to develop legislation achieving the desired budgetary outcomes, and the resultant legislation (usually incorporated into an omnibus bill) is considered under expedited procedures in the House and Senate.
Reconciliation was first used by the House and Senate in calendar year 1980 for FY1981. As an optional procedure, it has not been used every year. Since 1980, 20 reconciliation measures have been enacted into law, and four have been vetoed. Most recently, President Obama vetoed the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 on January 8, 2016.
Under a revised timetable in effect since FY1987, the annual budget resolution is scheduled for final adoption by the House and Senate by April 15. The current timetable prescribes June 15 as the deadline for completing action on any required reconciliation legislation, but there is no explicit requirement to that effect.
The record of experience with reconciliation legislation over the period since 1980 indicates considerable variation in the time needed to process such measures from the date the reconciliation instructions take effect (upon final adoption of the budget resolution) until the resultant reconciliation legislation is approved or vetoed by the President. The interval for the 24 reconciliation measures ranged from a low of 27 days (for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) to a high of 384 days (for the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005). On average, completing the process took about five months (155 days), well beyond the two months contemplated by the timetable in the 1974 Congressional Budget Act.
With regard to the use of reconciliation by congressional session, action was completed on 11 such measures during the first session and on 13 such measures during the second session. The time taken to initiate and conclude the reconciliation process has varied greatly. In some cases, reconciliation measures were enacted or vetoed before the end of August. On the other hand, the reconciliation process can be lengthy and drawn out: In some instances reconciliation measures were not enacted or vetoed until the following calendar year.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL33422 | crs_RL33422_0 | The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: parent location, paternity establishment, establishment of child support orders, review and modification of support orders, collection of support payments, distribution of support payments, and establishment and enforcement of medical child support orders. In FY1999, the CSE caseload was 17.3 million families; by FY2010, it had dropped to 15.9 million families. Third, states collect child support on behalf of families receiving TANF to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of TANF cash payments to the family. Pursuant to P.L. 109-171 . Financing Issues
Some policymakers view the federal reimbursement of state CSE expenditures as too high. On the other hand, state budgets (in aggregate) were positively affected by the CSE program for the first 24 years of the program, in the sense that the income generated by the CSE program for the state (the federal share of state CSE expenditures—i.e., the amount of federal matching funds provided to the state—plus incentive payments to the states, plus the state share of child support collections made on behalf of TANF and foster care families) exceeded CSE program costs. The increasing federal "losses" on the CSE program and the switch from "gain" to "loss" for the state governments are in part attributable to the decline in the AFDC/TANF caseload. Child Support Financing and Welfare Costs
An alternative analysis of the revenue gains and losses of the CSE program takes into account the consideration that child support collections retained by the federal government and states are offsets to expenditures on TANF cash benefits, rather than offsets to CSE programs. The share of AFDC/TANF cash expenditures reimbursed by child support collections grew consistently during the period from FY1994 through FY2002, when CSE collections for welfare families remained relatively stable, while cash welfare payments decreased dramatically, from $22.7 billion in FY1994 to $9.4 billion in FY2002. Between FY2002 and FY2010, AFDC/TANF cash expenditures fluctuated up and down. In FY1994, retained child support collections for welfare families as a percentage of total cash welfare expenditures was 11%; by FY2010, it was about 18%, after reaching a high point of nearly 31% in FY2002 (see Figure 5 ). In FY2010, the CSE program collected $4.88 in child support payments (from noncustodial parents) for every dollar spent on the program. The CSE program used to be unique in that it was a social welfare program that added money to state treasuries, this is no longer the case, with the exception of a handful of states. State CSE programs are now in the position of having to compete with all other state interests in obtaining funds from the general treasury or county treasuries. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) made changes to the CSE program that have resulted in less federal financial support to state CSE programs. 104-193 required states to pay the federal government the federal government's share of TANF collections. | The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171) made changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program that will result in less federal financial support to state CSE programs. The CSE program serves families that are recipients of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and non-recipient families. It provides seven major services: parent location, paternity establishment, establishment of child support orders, review and modification of support orders, collection of child support payments, distribution of support payments, and establishment and enforcement of medical child support orders. In FY2010, the CSE system handled 15.9 million cases, of which 86% (13.7 million) were non-TANF cases. In FY2010, the CSE program expenditures amounted to nearly $5.8 billion and the program collected $4.88 in child support payments (from noncustodial parents) for every dollar spent on the program.
The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE goals. Most child support collections for TANF families are kept by the federal government and states to reimburse themselves for the cost of providing TANF cash payments to those families. Collections for non-TANF families generally are paid to the families (via the state CSE disbursement unit).
Some policymakers are concerned that the federal government's role in financing CSE is too high, and contend that the states should pay a greater share of the program's costs. Comparing CSE expenditures with the income generated by retained collections for TANF families, the federal government has lost money each year since 1979 (the FY2009 "loss" to the federal government was $2.9 billion). Although in the past the income generated by the CSE program for states (in the aggregate) exceeded their expenses, this no longer holds true (the FY2009 "loss" to states was $718 million). The increasing federal "losses" on the CSE program and the switch from "gain" to "loss" for the state governments is in part attributable to the decline in the TANF caseload.
An alternative analysis views retained child support collections as reimbursement for a portion of cash welfare expenditures for families with children, rather than as "income" to the state. The share of AFDC/TANF cash expenditures reimbursed by child support collections grew consistently during the period from FY1994 through FY2002, when CSE collections for welfare families remained relatively stable, while cash welfare payments decreased dramatically, from $22.7 billion in FY1994 to $9.4 billion in FY2002. Between FY2002 and FY2010, AFDC/TANF cash expenditures fluctuated up and down. In FY1994, retained child support collections for welfare families as a percentage of total cash welfare expenditures was 11%; by FY2010, it was about 18% (after reaching a high point of nearly 31% in FY2002).
The change in the composition of the CSE caseload, together with changes made pursuant to P.L. 109-171, are expected to result in state CSE programs having to compete with all other state interests in obtaining funds from the general treasury or county treasuries. This is a dramatic departure from the past, when the CSE program was unique among social welfare programs in that it added money to state treasuries. |
crs_R44672 | crs_R44672_0 | U ruguay is a small nation of 3.4 million people located on the Atlantic coast of South America. Uruguay has drawn increased congressional attention in recent years as a result of the country's controversial decisions to legalize cannabis and grant refugee status to six men who had been detained at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Domestic Situation
President Tabaré Vázquez of the center-left Broad Front ( Frente Amplio ) coalition was inaugurated to a five-year term on March 1, 2015. Since taking power in 2005, the Broad Front has maintained market-oriented economic policies while gradually expanding social welfare programs, establishing a more progressive tax system, and implementing union-empowering labor reforms. The Broad Front also has enacted several far-reaching social policy reforms, some of which have been controversial domestically. Although President Vázquez sought to build on Uruguay's socioeconomic advancements with campaign pledges to improve the quality of the education system and create a Comprehensive National Care System to address the needs of infants, the disabled, and the elderly, he has spent much of his second term dealing with the country's deteriorating economic situation. The economy is expected to continue slowing in 2016, with 0.1% growth. The slowdown appears to be largely the result of external conditions, including declines in international prices for Uruguay's agricultural commodity exports and economic recessions in Argentina and Brazil, which are two of Uruguay's top trading partners as fellow members of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) customs union. The economic deceleration has depressed revenue collection and contributed to growing fiscal deficits. The Vázquez Administration has taken steps to respond to these challenges. This discontent, combined with rising security concerns, has taken a toll on Vázquez's approval rating. U.S.-Uruguayan Relations
U.S.-Uruguayan relations are strong and have grown closer in recent years. Some analysts predicted that bilateral relations would deteriorate following the Broad Front's assumption of power, given ideological opposition to working with the United States by some sectors of the coalition. Trade and Investment
Commercial ties between the United States and Uruguay have grown considerably over the past decade. Bilateral trade declined by 13% between 2013 and 2015, however, largely as a result of the slowing Uruguayan economy. Foreign direct investment has increased substantially since the United States and Uruguay signed a bilateral investment treaty in 2005. The accumulated stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Uruguay increased from $609 million in 2005 to $1.6 billion in 2015. The Uruguayan government also has supported the Obama Administration's efforts to close the detention center at the U.S. U.N. Security Council
In 2015, Uruguay won the support of the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean to secure one of the 10 non-permanent seats on the 15-member U.N. Security Council for the 2016-2017 term. Peacekeeping Operations
Reflecting the country's commitments to international law and peaceful dispute resolution, Uruguay is one of the largest per capita contributors of forces globally to U.N. peacekeeping missions. The United States has urged Uruguay to maintain its contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions and has sought to strengthen Uruguay's peacekeeping capabilities. Over the past four years, the U.S. government has obligated $14.6 million in assistance for Uruguay through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which aims to increase the international community's capacity to carry out U.N. peacekeeping missions (see Table 1 ). The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014 ( P.L. 113-66 ) required the Secretary of Defense to determine that steps would be taken to "substantially mitigate the risk" that transferred individuals would engage in activities that threaten the United States, U.S. citizens, or U.S. interests. Thirty years after the end of the dictatorship and fifteen years after a major economic crisis, Uruguay once again stands out in Latin America for its strong democratic institutions and comparatively prosperous and egalitarian society. The center-left Broad Front coalition has benefitted politically from presiding over more than a decade of strong economic growth and improvements in living standards. | Uruguay is a small nation of 3.4 million people located on the Atlantic coast of South America between Brazil and Argentina. The country stands out in Latin America for its strong democratic institutions; high per capita income; and low levels of corruption, poverty, and inequality. As a result of its domestic success and commitment to international engagement, Uruguay plays a more influential role in regional and international affairs than its size might suggest.
Uruguay has drawn increased congressional attention in recent years as a result of several high-profile and controversial decisions. Some Members of Congress are tracking the implementation of Uruguay's cannabis-legalization measure as they consider the implications of marijuana-legalization initiatives in a growing number of U.S. states. Uruguay's decision to grant refugee status to six individuals who had been detained at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2014 also has drawn congressional scrutiny. Some Members contend that the Obama Administration failed to ensure that the Uruguayan government would take steps to "substantially mitigate the risk" of the transferred individuals engaging in activities that threaten the United States as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-66). The Administration disputes that assertion.
Domestic Situation
The center-left Broad Front (Frente Amplio) coalition has governed Uruguay since 2005, having won the presidency and legislative majorities in three consecutive elections. Since taking office, the coalition has pursued a social democratic policy mix that has combined market-oriented economic policies with progressive taxation, an expansion of the social welfare system, and union-empowering labor reforms. The Broad Front also has enacted several far-reaching social policy changes, legalizing abortion; expanding rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals; and legalizing and regulating Uruguay's marijuana market.
President Tabaré Vázquez, who began his second nonconsecutive five-year term in March 2015, has spent much of his time in office dealing with Uruguay's deteriorating economic situation. After nearly a decade of strong growth, the Uruguayan economy has slowed dramatically as a result of softening global commodity prices and economic turbulence in Argentina and Brazil—Uruguay's main trading partners and fellow members of the Mercosur customs union. This economic weakness has depressed tax collection and contributed to growing fiscal deficits but has not brought down Uruguay's persistently high inflation. Vázquez has sought to address these economic challenges by reducing expenditures, increasing taxes, holding down wage increases, and investing in infrastructure through public-private partnerships. As economic growth has continued to slow in 2016 to an estimated 0.1%, the Vázquez Administration's approval rating has fallen to 33% and its disapproval rating has risen to 45%.
U.S.-Uruguayan Relations
U.S.-Uruguayan relations have strengthened over the past decade despite initial expectations by some analysts that ties would deteriorate following the Broad Front's assumption of power. The United States and Uruguay signed a bilateral investment treaty in 2005 and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2007. In 2015, the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Uruguay reached $1.6 billion and bilateral merchandise trade amounted to $1.9 billion. The United States and Uruguay also collaborate on efforts to address international security concerns. Uruguay is serving alongside the United States on the U.N. Security Council for the 2016-2017 term and is one of the largest per capita contributors globally to U.N. peacekeeping missions. The United States has provided more than $14.6 million in assistance to Uruguay over the past four years to bolster the country's peacekeeping capabilities. |
crs_RL32796 | crs_RL32796_0 | Summit Results
Major Africa commitments at Gleneagles included the following:
increasing official developmentassistance to Africa by $25 billion per year by 2010,doubling assistance as compared to2004;
developing and implementing "apackage for HIV prevention, treatment, and care, with theaim as close as possible to universal access to treatment forall those who need it by 2010"; (1)
increasing investment in thedevelopment of an HIV/AIDS vaccine, and "taking forwardwork" on market incentives for the development ofvaccines, microbicides, and drugs to combat AIDS,tuberculosis, malaria, as well as other neglecteddiseases;
investing in improved health systemsand helping Africa train and retain doctors, nurses, andcommunity health workers; and
contributing an additional $1.5 billionper year to preventing and treatingmalaria. Reactions
Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, who chaired the G8 summit, did not win theendorsement he had sought for an International Finance Facility (IFF, see below), which would havechanneled $25 billion in additional annual aid to Africa beginning in 2006. Background
Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer (Treasury), [author name scrubbed],prior to the Gleneagles summit, launched a major diplomatic effort aimed at marshaling theresources they see as needed to eradicate extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Their objectiveis the realization, in Africa, of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). (13) Specifically, Blair and Brown sought a substantial aid increase for Africa through the IFF, 100%forgiveness of African debt, and the removal of barriers to African exports. Climate change was the second focus of the G8 meeting. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32489(pdf) , Africa: Development Issues and Policy Options , and CRS Issue Brief IB95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues . Overview
Prime Minister Blair has championed a "Marshall Plan" for sub-Saharan Africa for severalyears. On March 11, 2005, the commission issued a 450-page report (15) that helped set theGleneagles agenda. The report recommended $25 billion in additional annual aid over the next three to fiveyears, followed by a review and a move to $50 billion if there has been sufficient progress inimproving the managerial and administrative capabilities of African governments. Donors would commit themselves to repaying the bonds in the years after2015. (19) Rice went on to suggestthat the IFF would lack a mechanism to assure that the money was well spent. Supporters of the IFFargued that since it would disburse funds through existing aid agencies, such as the World Bank andbilateral G7 aid organizations, with their own mechanisms for oversight and evaluation,accountability should not be a problem. Another increase in U.S. foreign aid was agreed to in late February 2005, when the United Statesgave its support to a three-year 25% boost in the resources of the World Bank's InternationalDevelopment Association (IDA), which assists poor countries. Noting that considerable progress has already been made in forgiving bilateraldebt, the report called for a focus on multilateral debt, owed principally to the World Bank'sInternational Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Bank's AfricanDevelopment Fund. In addition, Blair's initiative sought forgiveness of Africa's debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Blair and Brown, meanwhile, urged that debt to the IMF be repaid either by "revaluing"or selling gold held by the IMF. The IMF will absorb theloss from its own resources and will not sell gold. However, some were concerned that this commitment would be difficult tomonitor; and some also argued that an agreement on the IFF at the London meeting would have beenof far greater benefit to Africa. Many feel that the G8 have not done nearly enough. | Prior to the July 2005 G8 summit, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair launched a majordiplomatic effort to marshal the resources he sees as needed to eradicate extreme poverty insub-Saharan Africa. As summit chair, he focused the meeting, held at Gleneagles Hotel in Scotland,July 6-8, on this initiative. Blair pushed for a substantial aid increase for Africa beginning in 2006,through an "International Finance Facility" (IFF), and for 100% forgiveness of poor country debt tothe international financial institutions. The IFF would have issued bonds to finance an additional $25billion in annual aid to Africa for three to five years, followed by another $25 billion boost if Africangovernments improved their managerial and administrative capabilities. IFF bonds would have beenbacked by a promise from the G7 leading economic powers to repay them after 2015. Poor countrydebts to the World Bank and the African Development Bank would have been repaid by the G7,while debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would have been paid by revaluing or sellingIMF gold. Finally, Blair sought the removal of barriers to Africa's exports.
Blair has long championed a "Marshall Plan" for Africa as part of a "deal" to help the regionachieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), U.N.-endorsed targets for 2015 that includeuniversal primary education and sharp cuts in poverty. In exchange, he expects further governanceand free-market economic reforms in Africa. On March 11, 2005 a high-level Commission forAfrica appointed by Blair issued a comprehensive report elaborating the initiative, which wonsupport from President Chirac of France and Germany's Chancellor Schroeder.
The Bush Administration reacted cooly to the proposed IFF on grounds that it lacks a meansof assuring that new aid funds would be well spent. Officials also argued that the IFF wouldunconstitutionally bind future Congresses to appropriations. IFF supporters noted that the fundswould be passed through existing aid agencies with their own monitoring mechanisms. Some alsoargued that the United States routinely agrees to repay debt in the future. At Gleneagles, the IFFproposal was dropped, but the participants agreed on a $25 billion increase in annual aid to Africaby 2010. Moreover, the G8 ratified an agreement on debt forgiveness for 18 of the world's poorestcountries, including 14 in Africa. The donors are to compensate the World Bank and the AfricanDevelopment Bank for the lost repayments. The IMF will fund the loss from its own resources, butnot sell gold. Participants reiterated that they supported the removal of trade barriers, but no specificactions were taken. Many development experts welcomed the summit's results as an important stepforward; but several non-governmental organizations argued that the summit had done too little ontrade or to mobilize "new money."
Previous G8 meetings have also focused on Africa. There has been much debate overwhether G8 countries have fulfilled past promises -- and over whether the African states have mettheir own promises of reforms. This report will not be updated. For further information see CRS Report RL32489(pdf) , Africa: Development Issues and Policy Options , and CRS Issue Brief IB95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues . |
crs_RS22296 | crs_RS22296_0 | Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities by places of public accommodations, and has been the basis of numerous legal actions. Legislation has been introduced since the 106 th Congress to require that a plaintiff provide notice of non compliance with the ADA to an entity prior to commencing a legal action. Legislation in the 111th and 112th Congresses
Representative Hunter introduced H.R. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, and public accommodation and services operated by private entities. Since the 106th Congress, legislation has been introduced to require plaintiffs to provide notice to the defendant prior to filing a complaint regarding public accommodations. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 881 was introduced by Representative Hunter to amend Title III of the ADA to require notification. |
crs_RL34569 | crs_RL34569_0 | Introduction
On May 30, 2007, President Bush announced that he would request $30 billion for the reauthorization of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which is the coordinated U.S. government effort to combat HIV/AIDS globally. The President estimated PEPFAR would support treatments for 2.5 million people infected with the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), the prevention of more than 12 million new HIV infections, and care for more than 12 million HIV-affected people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. In 2003, Congress authorized $15 billion for U.S. efforts to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria from FY2004 through FY2008 with the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P.L. On July 24, 2008, Congress authorized $48 billion for U.S. global efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria and for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) from FY2009 through FY2013 through H.R. 5501 , the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Lantos-Hyde Act). 110-293 ) was signed into law on July 30, 2008. It details actual and requested funding for U.S. bilateral and multilateral efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria globally through FY2009. The report discusses key policy debates surrounding international HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis programs and funding as the 110 th Congress considered legislation to reauthorize PEPFAR programs. It describes the differences, similarities, and possible policy implementation implications of key proposals included in H.R. Finally, this report details key changes to programs and funding for U.S. international efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs as directed by the 110 th Congress in the Lantos-Hyde Act as enacted. It required that from FY2006 through FY2008 at least 33% of these prevention funds must be spent on abstinence-until-marriage programs. OGAC calculates PEPFAR funding as the total of enacted funding for U.S. efforts to combat HIV/AIDS globally, U.S. efforts to combat tuberculosis internationally, and U.S. contributions to the Global Fund. Key Reauthorization Proposals and Debates
On May 30, 2007, President Bush urged Congress to extend PEPFAR from FY2009 through FY2013 with a $30 billion authorization. Funding Authorization Increase
H.R. Global Malaria Coordinator) at USAID. 5501 proposed adding Vietnam as a Focus Country as well as those countries listed in H.R. 108-25 , the Leadership Act. 5501 also proposed requiring the U.S. strategy to combat global AIDS to "situate United States efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria within the broader United States global health and development agenda, establishing a roadmap to link investments in specific disease programs to the broader goals of strengthening health systems and infrastructure and to integrate and coordinate HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria programs with other health or development programs, as appropriate." 5501 as passed by the Senate proposed eliminating the language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that statutorily bars foreign nationals with HIV/AIDS from entering the United States. The Lantos-Hyde Act authorizes $48 billion from FY2009 through FY2013 for U.S. efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria globally ( Table 4 ) . The Lantos-Hyde Act also directs a number of key changes to U.S. global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs ( Table 5 ) . | The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25) authorized $15 billion for U.S. global efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria from FY2004 through FY2008. It also authorized the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) to oversee U.S. government efforts to combat HIV/AIDS internationally. This coordinated U.S. government effort to combat HIV/AIDS globally implements the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a five-year initiative proposed by President Bush in January 2003.
In 2007, President Bush urged Congress to extend PEPFAR for an additional five years by authorizing $30 billion from FY2009 through FY2013. The Administration estimated $30 billion would support HIV/AIDS treatments for 2.5 million people, prevent more than 12 million new HIV infections, and care for more than 12 million HIV-affected people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children.
On July 24, 2008, the 110th Congress authorized $48 billion for U.S. international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs from FY2009 through FY2013 by passing H.R. 5501, the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Lantos-Hyde Act). On July 30, 2008, H.R. 5501 was enacted into law as P.L. 110-293.
The Lantos-Hyde Act made a number of changes to U.S. international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs. It authorized increased funding for U.S. efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria and for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). It added Vietnam to the list of PEPFAR Focus Countries; authorized the use of compacts or framework agreements between the United States and countries already receiving U.S. funds to fight HIV/AIDS; and removed the 33% spending requirement on abstinence-until-marriage programs within HIV/AIDS prevention efforts, as well as the 20% spending recommendation on prevention efforts overall. It authorized a U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and emphasized strategies to promote the sustainability of health care systems in affected countries. It eliminated Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) language that statutorily barred foreign nationals with HIV/AIDS from entering the United States.
This report provides background on PEPFAR implementation and results. It details actual and requested funding for U.S. bilateral and multilateral efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria globally through FY2009. It discusses key policy debates surrounding international HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis programs and funding as the 110th Congress considered legislation to reauthorize PEPFAR programs. It describes key proposals included in H.R. 5501 at two points during its consideration by the 110th Congress and the possible policy implementation implications of these proposals. Finally, this report details key changes to programs and funding for U.S. international efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs as directed by the 110th Congress in the Lantos-Hyde Act as enacted. The policy debates surrounding and program and funding authorizations resulting from the Lantos-Hyde Act may be a prelude to the work of the 111th Congress, as it considers whether and at what level to fund these activities in FY2009 through FY2011. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44921 | crs_R44921_0 | Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), domestic terrorists— people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements —have not received as much attention from federal law enforcement as their violent jihadist counterparts. Possibly contributing to domestic terrorism's secondary status as a threat at the federal level, a large number of those labeled as domestic terrorists do not necessarily use traditional terrorist tactics such as bombings or airplane hijackings. These individuals can be motivated to commit crimes in the name of ideas such as animal rights, white supremacy, and abortion, for example. It separates domestic terrorists from U.S.-based terrorists motivated by the ideologies of foreign terrorist organization s . According to DHS and the FBI, a HVE is "a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization." While not naming specific groups , DOJ and the FBI have openly delineated domestic terrorist threats . The extensive use of such examples in this report does not imply the prominence of animal rights extremism or eco terrorism over other domestic terrorist threats. In this case, however, they do not rise to that level." Protected Activities vs. Terrorism—Divergent Perceptions of the ALF
The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and terrorist activity has received much attention in public discussions of domestic terrorism. 109-374)
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act ( P.L. 109-374 ; AETA) expanded the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the 1992 Animal Enterprise Protection Act ( P.L. 102-346 ; AEPA). First, domestic terrorists likely have been responsible for numerous incidents since 9/11. Third, domestic terrorists—much like their violent jihadist analogues—are often Internet savvy and use the medium as a resource for their operations. These are often bundled under the concept of "paper terrorism." The Internet and Domestic Terrorists
In the counterterrorism world, there has been much concern regarding violent jihadist use of the Internet and social media. A number of examples stand out. First, on an operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or individuals (lone wolves) engage in movement-related illegal activity without any centralized direction or control from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and membership rosters. Second, on another level, the above-ground public face (the "political wing") of the movement propagandizes and disseminates ideology—engaging in protected speech. This can be seen as a form of leaderless resistance. They have weaknesses. | The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists—people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements—have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist "threats." These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion.
The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is highlighted by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights—one area in which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-346).
This report is intended as a primer on the issue, and four discussion topics in it may help explain domestic terrorism's relevance for policymakers:
Level of Activity. Domestic terrorists have been responsible for orchestrating numerous incidents since 9/11. Use of Nontraditional Tactics. A large number of domestic terrorists do not necessarily use tactics such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings. They have been known to engage in activities such as vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, for example. Exploitation of the Internet. Domestic terrorists—much like their jihadist analogues—are often Internet and social-media savvy and use such platforms to share ideas and as resources for their operations. Decentralized Nature of the Threat. Many domestic terrorists rely on the concept of leaderless resistance. This involves two levels of activity. On an operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and membership rosters. On another level, the above-ground public face (the "political wing") of a domestic terrorist movement may focus on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology—engaging in protected speech. |
crs_RL32058 | crs_RL32058_0 | Introduction
Suicide attacks by terrorist organizations have become more prevalent globally, and assessingthe threat of future suicide attacks against the United States has gained in strategic importance. This report focuses on the following questions: What are suicide attacks? What have been the patterns and motivations for terrorist organizations using suicide attacks in the past? What terroristgroups and other organizations are most likely to launch such attacks? How great a threat areterrorist suicide attacks to the United States, at home and abroad? How can the United Statescounter such a threat? In short, the goal of this report is to summarize the key lessons of theinternational experience with suicide attacks in the modern era and examine their relevance to theUnited States in the current threat environment. (17) A partial list of terrorist groups that actively usesuicide attacks includes Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of YassirArafat's Fatah movement, Al-Ansar Mujahidin in Chechnya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-taiba of Pakistan/Kashmir, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, BarbarKhalsa International(BKI) of India, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers)of Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey, and Al Qaeda. (18) It is the apparentlygrowing use of suicide attacks internationally and the increased targeting against Americans thatconcerns counterterrorism experts. Although research indicates that individual suicide attackers make choices and are nottechnically "crazy," according to experts they are often manipulated by the pressures and beliefstructures of the group. Secular groups use such techniques as well. Women and Suicide Attacks
The role of women in carrying out suicide attacks has been the focus of increasing concern. The Threat to the United States
Until very recently, most of the groups engaging in suicide attacks have been interested in pursuing a cause that is geographically distant from the United States, usually limited to territory thatis connected somehow to the origin of the group. The most effective globalized network of terrorist organizations is associated with Al Qaeda--the only organization that has successfully used suicide attacks on U.S. soil. Nonetheless, there are both offensive and defensive measures that may reduce the number and/or severity of attacks. Among the offensive measures are preemptive strikes against the organizations that orchestratesuicide attacks (especially their leaders), vigorous intelligence collection, and efforts to reduce theability of terrorist organizations to recruit suicide candidates. These include the full range of measures in homeland defense, from physical barriers to securityscreening to strict border controls. Implications for U.S. Policy
The question of how to reduce the threat of suicide attacks against the United States and its interests at home and abroad is extremely important to Congress. | Suicide attacks by terrorist organizations have become more prevalent globally, and assessing the threat of suicide attacks against the United States and its interests at home and abroad hastherefore gained in strategic importance.
This report focuses on the following questions: What are suicide attacks? What have been the patterns and motivations for terrorist organizations using suicide attacks in the past? What terroristgroups and other organizations are most likely to launch such attacks? How great a threat areterrorist suicide attacks to the United States, at home and abroad? How can the United Statescounter such a threat? It analyzes the key lessons of the international experience with suicide attacksand examines their relevance to the United States.
Important conclusions include evidence that suicide attackers generally make choices and are not impulsive or "crazy." They are usually carefully recruited, indoctrinated and then targeted byorganizations. It is important, therefore, to concentrate on analyzing the culture and structure of theorganization when fashioning a response. Historically, suicide attackers have been used by bothsecular and religious groups. The Tamil Tigers, a secular group, carried out the most ruthlesscampaign of suicide attacks in the 20th century; but there has been an increasing number of casualtiesinternationally, notably as a result of attacks by Palestinian groups against Israelis and byorganizations in various countries believed associated with or incited by Al Qaeda. The use ofwomen as suicide attackers is not historically unprecedented, but its frequency among groups suchas the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (or LTTE), the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and nowthe Palestinian Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Chechens, may indicate a socialbroadening of the phenomenon. While the organization is predominant in the execution of the attack,over time it cannot recruit and sustain itself without the acquiescence of the larger society.
The greatest threat to U.S. citizens comes from the possibility of further attacks orchestrated or inspired by Al Qaeda, either in the U.S. or abroad. Furthermore, suicide attacks on U.S. citizensand civilians in Iraq are a mounting concern. To counter the threat, the United States may use bothoffensive and defensive measures. Offensive measures include counterterrorism efforts such aspreemptive strikes against terrorist organizations, vigorous intelligence collection, and longer termefforts to reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit suicide candidates. Defensivemeasures include physical protection of U.S. assets, psychological preparation of the population,and the full range of anti-terrorism efforts required for a robust homeland defense.
The report concludes with a discussion of the implications for Congress of the increase in suicide attacks, and a range of options for meeting the threat. It will not be updated. |
crs_R40888 | crs_R40888_0 | Recent media revelations that the President authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence from communications involving U.S. persons within the United States, without obtaining a warrant or court order, raise numerous questions regarding the President's authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance. The President has stated that he believes his order to be fully supported by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and the Attorney General clarified that the Administration bases its authority both on inherent presidential powers and the joint resolution authorizing the use of "all necessary and appropriate force" to engage militarily those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ("AUMF"). Although the resolution does not expressly specify what it authorizes as "necessary and appropriate force," the Administration discerns the intent of Congress to provide the statutory authority necessary take virtually any action reasonably calculated to prevent a terrorist attack, including by overriding at least some statutory prohibitions that contain exceptions for conduct that is "otherwise authorized by statute." Specifically, the Administration asserts that a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that punishes those who conduct "electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute " does not bar the NSA surveillance at issue because the AUMF is just such a statute. On December 22, 2005, the Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs released a letter to certain members of the House and Senate intelligence committees setting forth in somewhat greater detail the Administration's position with regard to the legal authority supporting the NSA activities described by the President. This memorandum lays out a general framework for analyzing the constitutional and statutory issues raised by the NSA electronic surveillance activity. It then outlines the legal framework regulating electronic surveillance by the government, explores ambiguities in those statutes that could provide exceptions for the NSA intelligence-gathering operation at issue, and addresses the arguments that the President possesses inherent authority to order the operations or that Congress has provided such authority. | The Revelations in December 2005 that President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence from communications involving U.S. persons within the United States, without obtaining a warrant or court order, raised numerous questions regarding the President's authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance. President Bush stated that he believes his order to be fully supported by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and Attorney General Gonzales clarified that the Administration based its authority both on inherent presidential powers and the joint resolution authorizing the use of "all necessary and appropriate force" to engage militarily those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ("AUMF"). Although the resolution does not expressly specify what it authorizes as "necessary and appropriate force," the Administration discerned the intent of Congress to provide the statutory authority necessary to take virtually any action reasonably calculated to prevent a terrorist attack, including by overriding at least some statutory prohibitions that contain exceptions for conduct that is "otherwise authorized by statute." Specifically, the Administration asserts that a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that punishes those who conduct "electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute" does not bar the NSA surveillance at issue because the AUMF is just such a statute. On December 22, 2005, the Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs released a letter to certain members of the House and Senate intelligence committees setting forth in somewhat greater detail the Administration's position with regard to the legal authority supporting the NSA activities described by the President.
This report lays out a general framework for analyzing the constitutional and statutory issues raised by the NSA electronic surveillance activity. It then outlines the legal framework regulating electronic surveillance by the government, explores ambiguities in those statutes that could provide exceptions for the NSA intelligence-gathering operation at issue, and addresses the arguments that the President possesses inherent authority to order the operations or that Congress has provided such authority.
This report supersedes CRS memorandum product WD00002, Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31832 | crs_RL31832_0 | The EAA provides the statutory authority for export controls on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, items that have both civilian and military applications, including those items that can contribute to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry. The EAA, which originally expired in 1989, periodically has been reauthorized for short periods of time, with the last incremental extension expiring in August 2001. At others times, including currently, the export licensing system created under the authority of EAA has been continued by the invocation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)( P.L. Other Members and some national security analysts contend that liberalization of export controls over the last decade has contributed to foreign threats to U.S. national security, that some controls should be tightened, and that Congress should weigh further liberalization carefully. This report discusses the Export Administration Act in terms of its evolution in the 20 th century, its major features including the types of controls authorized by the act, the Commerce Control List and export licensing procedures, and issues concerning the maintenance of export controls under IEEPA. Finally, it discusses competing business and national security perspectives concerning several of more contentious themes in the export control debate: the controllability of technology, the effectiveness of multilateral control regimes, the organization of the export control system, and the impact of export controls on the U.S. economy and business. Short-supply controls were to be used to prevent the export of scarce goods that would have a deleterious impact on U.S. industry and national economic performance. 111th Congress
On July 31, 2009, Representative Sherman introduced the Export Control Improvements Act ( H.R. 3515 ), co-sponsored by Representative Manzullo and Representative A. Smith, that contains provisions on export controls enforcement, integration of export control data in the AES, and diversion control. Changes in agency structure may also require legislation, although that it less clear. Analysis of Provisions in EAA Legislation
Several principles and concepts have been common to the EAA and to efforts to renew and reauthorize the legislation. Types of Control Authority
Since the 1949 Act, U.S. dual-use export controls have restricted certain items based on national security, foreign policy, or for the effect of domestic exports on the national economy. Foreign Policy Controls
The EAA authorizes the President to control exports for the purpose of promoting foreign policy objectives, complying with international obligations, or deterring and punishing terrorism. In addition to discrete items on the CCL, nearly all U.S.-origin commodities are "subject to the EAR." License Review Procedures
The EAA and the implementing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) establish policies and procedures for the review of license applications and the resolution of interagency disputes. Currently, retail encryption products and technology can be exported to western countries , and to non-governmental end-users in other countries through a license exemption that requires notification of the transaction. Stealth technology falls into two categories. The dilemma that encapsulates U.S. export control policy to China is how to benefit from the potentially vast Chinese market and low Chinese production costs while minimizing the risk to U.S. security interests of exporting sensitive dual-use technologies to China. The Licensing Process and Organization of the Export Control System
As noted earlier, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of Commerce (DOC) is responsible for regulating dual-use exports. Through the U.S. | The 111th Congress may consider legislation to renew, modify, or reauthorize the Export Administration Act (EAA). On July 31, 2009, Representative Sherman introduced the Export Control Improvements Act (H.R. 3515), co-sponsored by Representative Manzullo and Representative A. Smith, that contains provisions on export controls enforcement, integration of export control data in the AES, and diversion control. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is also reportedly working to produce as comprehensive rewrite of the EAA. As part of the Administration's export control review, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has proposed creating a unified export control structure merging the dual-use and munitions export control regimes, some aspects of which may require legislative consent.
Through the EAA, Congress delegates to the executive branch its express constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce by controlling exports. The EAA provides the statutory authority for export controls on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies: items that have both civilian and military applications, including those items that can contribute to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry. The EAA, which originally expired in 1989, periodically has been reauthorized for short periods of time, with the last incremental extension expiring in August 2001. At other times and currently, the export licensing system created under the authority of EAA has been continued by the invocation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). EAA confers upon the President the power to control exports for national security, foreign policy or short supply purposes. It also authorizes the President to establish export licensing mechanisms for items detailed on the Commerce Control List (CCL), and it provides some guidance and places certain limits on that authority. The CCL currently provides detailed specifications about dual-use items including equipment, materials, software, and technology (including data and know-how) likely requiring some type of export license from the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). BIS administers the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which, in addition to the CCL, describe licensing policy and procedures such as commodity classification, licensing, and interagency dispute resolution procedures.
In debates on export administration legislation, parties often fall into two camps: those who primarily want to liberalize controls in order to promote exports, and those who believe that further liberalization may compromise national security goals. While it is widely agreed that exports of some goods and technologies can adversely affect U.S. national security and foreign policy, some believe that current export controls can be detrimental to U.S. businesses and to the U.S. economy. According to this view, the resultant loss of competitiveness, market share, and jobs can harm the U.S. economy, and that harm to particular U.S. industries and to the economy itself can negatively impact U.S. security. Others believe that security concerns must be paramount in the U.S. export control system and that export controls can be an effective method to thwart proliferators, terrorist states, and countries that can threaten U.S. national security interests. Controversies have arisen with regard to particular exports such as high performance computers, encryption technology, stealth materials, satellites, machine tools, "hot-section" aerospace technology, and the issue of "deemed exports." The competing perspectives on export controls have clearly been manifested in the debate over foreign availability and the control of technology, the efficacy of multilateral control regimes, the licensing process and organization of the export control system, and the economic effects of U.S. export controls. |
crs_R43577 | crs_R43577_0 | Introduction
Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States has employed to advance U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus and funding levels of aid programs changing along with broader U.S. policy goals. It examines historical and recent trends in aid to the region as well as the Obama Administration's FY2015 request for State Department and U.S Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance. Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has provided the region over $160 billion in constant 2012 dollars (or nearly $77 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) since 1946. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts (see Figure 1 ). U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. More recently, the United States provided significant amounts of assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of its massive January 2010 earthquake. The Administration requested $1.3 billion for the region, which is 10% ($149 million) below the FY2014 estimate and 27% lower than the amount provided in FY2012—the last year before budget sequestration took effect (see Table 1 ). Funding provided to the region through each of the security assistance accounts would decline under the FY2015 request. This decline is almost entirely the result of cuts to the four major U.S. security programs in the region: Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative for Mexico, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Although the request would cut aid to Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico, those three countries would continue to be the top regional recipients of U.S. foreign aid, and would together account for more than 52% of U.S. assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative Action
Since Congress has not enacted a foreign assistance authorization measure since FY1985, annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bills tend to serve as the primary legislative vehicles through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and influences executive branch foreign policy. Instead, Congress chose to include foreign aid funding in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which President Obama signed into law on December 16, 2014. The legislation includes some $33.2 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance worldwide. This global funding level is about 1.2% higher than the Administration's request (as amended), 5.7% higher than S. 2499 , and 9.6% higher than H.R. 5013 . It is unclear how much foreign assistance will be directed to each of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, however, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are not specified in the legislation or the accompanying explanatory statement. The legislation also provides at least $64 million more than was requested for aid to Mexico. Moreover, the legislation includes at least $24 million more than was requested for security and justice sector assistance programs in Colombia, and $10.5 million more than was requested for environmental programs in the Brazilian Amazon. The Obama Administration's framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean centers on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity, ensuring citizen security, strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance, and securing a clean energy future. | Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policy makers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy is designed to promote economic and social opportunity, ensure citizen security, strengthen effective democratic institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance these priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial amounts of foreign assistance.
Trends in Assistance
Since 1946, the United States has provided over $160 billion (constant 2012 dollars) in assistance to the region. Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have fallen in each of the past four fiscal years, however, as Congress has sought to trim the foreign aid budget and countries have been seen to require less assistance.
FY2015 Obama Administration Request
The Obama Administration's FY2015 foreign aid budget request would continue the recent downward trend in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration requested some $1.3 billion to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is 10% below the FY2014 estimate and 27% lower than the amount provided in FY2012—the last year before budget sequestration took effect. Under the request, the balance of U.S. assistance to the region would shift toward development aid and away from security aid, as each of the four major U.S. security initiatives would see cuts. Aid levels for Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico would decline, but they would continue to be the top three recipients in the region, accounting for 52% of all U.S. aid to Latin America and the Caribbean.
Congressional Action
In recent years, the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) in June 2014, no action was taken on those measures. After funding foreign aid programs through a series of continuing resolutions, Congress included foreign assistance appropriations in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), which the President signed into law on December 16, 2014. The legislation includes some $33.2 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance worldwide; this funding level is about 1.2% higher than the Administration's request (as amended), 9.6% higher than the House bill, and 5.7% higher than the Senate bill.
It is unclear how much foreign assistance will be directed to each of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, however, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are not specified in the legislation or the accompanying explanatory statement. Nevertheless, funding for a number of countries and programs will exceed the Administration's request. The legislation provides at least $24 million more than was requested for Colombia, $64 million more than was requested for Mexico, and $130 million more than was requested for the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). |
crs_R44600 | crs_R44600_0 | Each chamber today retains oversight over its own restaurants, but the House and the Senate each utilize private food service contractors to manage the day-to-day operations in their restaurants. Because the House and Senate restaurants operate within a unique congressional environment, information particular to their history may be useful for discussions about their current and future operations. Several new dining options became available to serve Members, staff, and visitors in the Capitol and in the House office buildings by the mid-twentieth century, yet these additional facilities did not adequately meet the needs of the House. For much of the twentieth century, the House and Senate restaurants were operated by the House and the Senate, respectively. Today, both the House and Senate restaurant systems are operated by private contractors. Although the particular entities involved have changed over time, the general operational pattern for the House and Senate restaurants has remained similar. Typically, day-to-day activities are overseen by a restaurant manager; key administrative decisions have been made by a designated Member of Congress, congressional officer, or committee; and a House or Senate committee oversees the overall restaurant system operation for the respective chamber. The House and Senate have always maintained a formal role in restaurant oversight, viewing any private restauranteurs, contractors, or other legislative branch partners as their agents. Privatization of Senate Restaurants, 1947-1961
As an attempt to alleviate financial problems attributable "largely to the poor physical layout of the restaurants, the one-meal-a-day business, and the fluctuations in volume of business due to recesses and variations in the schedules of Congress," the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration adopted a resolution in 1947 to enable a private contractor to run the Senate restaurants. Table 3 provides information about the various food service providers in the House since 1986. Concluding Observations
The House and Senate restaurants were once virtually the only dining option for Members of Congress, congressional staff, and visitors to the Capitol. Providing convenient service has consistently been a primary goal of the House and Senate restaurant systems over time, as it helps facilitate legislative and representational work. Some aspects of House and Senate dining operations, however, remain necessarily unique, because they continue to operate within the Capitol complex and with a degree of congressional involvement and oversight in their operations. Over time, many of the challenges facing the restaurant systems have remained similar, including concerns about restaurant finances, facilities, food services provided, and employee wages and benefits. | The restaurants, cafeterias, and carry-out facilities operated by the House of Representatives and the Senate serve Members of Congress, congressional employees, constituents, and other visitors to the Capitol or congressional office buildings on a daily basis. Although their services may seem similar, food operations are separately administered and managed for the House, for the Senate, and for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC). The House and Senate restaurant systems have operated continually since they were first created in the early 1800s, reflecting the necessary role they fulfill as congressional support services. Providing efficient and convenient food service has been a priority for the House and Senate restaurant systems, as it helps facilitate legislative and representational work.
This report provides historical background on the House and Senate restaurant systems, addressing major changes in facilities, management, and oversight. Information and issues for Congress related to the present operations of the House and Senate restaurants is available in CRS Report R44601, House and Senate Restaurants: Current Operations and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. Although the particular entities involved have changed, the general operational pattern for the House and Senate restaurants has remained similar for both chambers over time. Typically, day-to-day activities are overseen by a restaurant manager; key administrative decisions have been made by a designated Member of Congress, congressional officer, or committee; and a House or Senate committee oversees the overall restaurant system for the respective chamber.
Running the House and Senate dining systems is different from running other large institutional dining systems in some ways because the congressional restaurants must operate within the Capitol complex and in conjunction with other congressional offices, like the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and committees in each chamber. Historical information about the House and Senate restaurants can provide useful, institution-specific context for current restaurant oversight and administration, especially since many of the challenges the House and Senate restaurants face today are similar to those they have faced in the past.
Some of the ongoing concerns related to the House and Senate dining systems include restaurant finances, facilities, food services provided, and employee wages and benefits. For many years, the House and Senate operated their own restaurants, but today, both chambers use private contractors to provide dining services and retain a formal role in restaurant oversight. During the twentieth century, Members and others periodically debated whether congressional operation or private management would better meet the needs of restaurant customers, employees, and congressional administrators. These discussions often revealed how management choices could affect operating costs, services provided, oversight and accountability, and other important elements of the restaurants' operations. |
crs_R44366 | crs_R44366_0 | Importance for Congress
Title XVII of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ( P.L. 113-291 ) established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to conduct a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army (see the Appendix ). The NCFA reported its findings to Congress and the Administration on January 28, 2016, and made a number of recommendations that may or may not be acted upon. Some have suggested the historical post-war practice of reducing defense budgets, in part, contributed to the perceived need for a commission to address proposed changes to the Army. The decision to establish an NCFA was also likely influenced by two previous commissions that also addressed contemporary military issues—the 2014 National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force and the 2015 Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. The Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI)
Some say the Army's 2013 Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) significantly influenced the decision to establish the NCFA. NCFA's Major Recommendations
On January 28, 2016, the NCFA released its final report. As part of the report, the NCFA produced a classified appendix (see topic outline and access instructions in Appendix E of the report), which is available to those with the appropriate clearance and a "need to know." The Army should forward station an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe. Regarding the Army's proposed Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI), the commission recommends the Army maintain 24 manned AH-64 Apache battalions—20 in the Regular Army and 4 in the National Guard. The Impact of the Commission's Recommendations on the "Corporate" Army
As previously discussed, the NCFA final report contained 63 recommendations for the Nation, the President, Congress, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, the Army, and Army Service Component Commands (Appendix B of the report). Potential Issues for Congress
How Would Congress and the Administration Implement NCFA's Recommendations? How Much Would It Cost to Implement the Recommendations? Potential Difficulties in Implementing the NCFA's Recommendations
There are a number of potential difficulties associated with implementing the commission's recommendations. How Would Congress Oversee the Implementation of the NCFA's Recommendations? Title XVII, P.L. National Commission on the Future of the Army. (2) Considerations.—In undertaking the study required by subsection (a), the Commission shall give particular consideration to the following:
(A) An evaluation and identification of a structure for the Army that—
(i) has the depth and scalability to meet current and anticipated requirements of the combatant commands;
(ii) achieves cost-efficiency between the regular and reserve components of the Army, manages military risk, takes advantage of the strengths and capabilities of each, and considers fully burdened lifecycle costs;
(iii) ensures that the regular and reserve components of the Army have the capacity needed to support current and anticipated homeland defense and disaster assistance missions in the United States;
(iv) provides for sufficient numbers of regular members of the Army to provide a base of trained personnel from which the personnel of the reserve components of the Army could be recruited;
(v) maintains a peacetime rotation force to avoid exceeding operational tempo goals of 1:2 for active members of the Army and 1:5 for members of the reserve components of the Army; and
(vi) manages strategic and operational risk by making tradeoffs among readiness, efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and affordability. | Title XVII of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to conduct a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army. The NCFA reported its findings to Congress and the Administration on January 28, 2016, and made a number of recommendations that may or may not be acted upon.
Some have suggested the historical post-war practice of reducing defense budgets contributed to the perceived need for a commission to address proposed changes to the Army. The perceived success of two previous commissions—the 2014 National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force and the 2015 Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission—also likely played a role in the establishment of the commission. Some say controversy surrounding the Army's 2013 Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) significantly influenced the decision to establish the NCFA.
As part of its final report, the NCFA produced a classified appendix, which is available to those with the appropriate clearance and a "need to know." The 208-page report contained 63 recommendations for the Nation, the President, Congress, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, the Army, and Army Service Component Commands. Some of the report's major recommendations include forward stationing an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe; retaining an 11th Regular Army Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and forward stationing it in Korea; and recommending the Army maintain 24 manned AH-64 Apache battalions—20 in the Regular Army and 4 in the National Guard.
Major themes of the NCFA's report include developing "One Army" and the prioritization of training and readiness. Some general observations of the commission's recommendations include the importance of the NCFA classified appendix; the impact of the commission's recommendations on the "Corporate" Army; the history and challenges of past and current Army initiatives; and force structure issues outside the Title XVII mandate.
Potential issues for Congress include
to what extent will Congress and the Administration implement NCFA's recommendations; how much would it cost to implement the recommendations; potential difficulties in implementing the NCFA's recommendations; and how Congress would oversee the implementation of the NCFA's recommendations.
The author of this report served on the staff of the National Commission on the Future of the Army from June 1, 2015, until September 30, 2015. The information and analysis contained in this report are derived from open source data. Participation on this commission informed but did not influence the content of this report. |
crs_RL32726 | crs_RL32726_0 | Introduction
In the 109th Congress, for the third consecutive Congress, companion bills have beenintroduced ( S. 1155 / H.R. 2470 ) that, if enacted, would establish aCommission on the Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA). The commission's recommendations would then be packaged into animplementation bill that would receive expedited congressional consideration, including prohibitionson amendments and restrictions on procedural delays. Nonbinding provisions in the FY2006budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. 95 ) also called for establishing a CARFA-likecommission. Finally, President George W. Bush said in his FY2006 budget submission that hewould put forward, as part of his President's Management Agenda (PMA), legislation authorizinghim to propose "results commissions." These commissions would consider and revise Administrationproposals to restructure and consolidate programs and agencies. Proposalsapproved by such a results commission and the President would be considered by Congress underexpedited procedures. 3276 / S. 1399 ) that substantially incorporated the Administration's draft language thatwould allow the establishment of results commissions. However, the CARFA proposal also has significantdifferences from the BRAC framework, as discussed later in this report. In addition, OMB hastestified to Congress that, if Congress established CARFA, the commission should use the BushAdministration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to evaluate programs. The report's fourth section then analyzes several issues that may beof interest in the 109th Congress in the event that the CARFA legislation or similar proposals toestablish a review commission are further considered. Nearly identicalprovisions appeared in several budget process reform bills (108th Congress, H.R. Budget Process Reform Bill and Hurricane Cost OffsetBill. These differences relate to:
establishment of commission(s) (e.g., under the results commission proposal,necessity for further congressional action, under expedited procedures, to establish unlimited numberof President's proposed results commissions, while the proposed CARFA Act would, without usingexpedited procedures, establish one commission);
appointment and size of membership (e.g., 7 members appointed by thePresident under the results commissions proposals, versus 12 members appointed by the Presidentor the President and Members of Congress under the House and Senate versions, respectively, of theproposed CARFA Act);
scope of commission review and recommendations (e.g., possibly narrowerscope under a single results commission, albeit with unlimited ability of President to proposeestablishment, under expedited congressional procedures, of multiple results commissions in manypolicy areas, compared to wider scope under CARFA under a single commission); and
standards and criteria for decision making (e.g., none specified for resultscommissions, in contrast with several criteria under CARFA). The proposed CARFA would be required to:
under the House version, evaluate all executive branch agencies and programs, excluding agencies and programs within the Department of Defense (DOD), entitlement programs,"any agency that solely administers entitlement programs," and perhaps the EOP; (31) and, under the Senateversion, evaluate all executive branch agencies and programs, including the EOP; (32)
determine, according to brief definitions in the legislation, if an agency orprogram is duplicative , wasteful , inefficient , outdated , irrelevant , or failed ;and
submit to the President and Congress, not later than two years after the dateof enactment, a plan with recommendations of how any such agencies and programs should berealigned or eliminated, along with supporting documentation and proposed legislation to implementthe recommendations. Under the House version of the CARFA legislation, a committee would be allowed to report theimplementation bill "without amendment." The commission's scope under this legislation would have been narrower than the CARFA proposal in some respects (e.g., H.R. Expedited Congressional Consideration. Potential Alternatives or Complements to a Commission
A CARFA could provide a mechanism for the President and Congress -- through thePresident's appointees to the commission (under both the House and Senate versions of the CARFAlegsilation), congressional leaders' appointees (under the Senate version), and Congress'sconsideration of the commission recommendations -- to consider "elimination or realignment ofduplicative, wasteful, or outdated functions" in certain programs and agencies. | In the 109th Congress, companion bills have been introduced ( S. 1155 / H.R. 2470 ) that, if enacted, would establish a Commission on the Accountabilityand Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA). Either version of the proposed CARFA Act wouldrequire this 12-member commission to review certain federal agencies and programs to determineif any are duplicative , wasteful , inefficient , outdated , irrelevant , or failed . The House version wouldinclude within the commission's scope only non-defense, non-entitlement agencies and programs inthe executive branch, while the Senate version would include all executive branch agencies andprograms, including the Executive Office of the President. The commission would be required or,in some cases allowed, to recommend that any such programs and agencies be realigned oreliminated. The commission's recommendations would be packaged into an implementation bill thatwould receive expedited congressional consideration. Nearly identical provisions appeared in abudget process reform bill ( H.R. 2290 ) and a bill to offset costs from Hurricane Katrinaand Hurricane Rita ( S. 1928 ). In addition, nonbinding provisions in the FY2006 budgetresolution ( H.Con.Res. 95 ) called for enacting a CARFA-like commission. PresidentGeorge W. Bush said in his FY2006 budget that he would propose, as part of his President'sManagement Agenda (PMA), legislation authorizing him to propose "results commissions," whichwould consider and revise Administration proposals to restructure and consolidate programs andagencies. Proposals approved by such a results commission and the President would be consideredby Congress under expedited procedures. The Administration suggested that the resultscommissions legislation would be similar to the CARFA proposal. Bills have been introduced( H.R. 3276 / S. 1399 ) that largely incorporated the Administration's draftlanguage.
Proponents have argued that, if enacted, a CARFA could evaluate programs and agencies,use a successful model for congressional consideration of commission recommendations, andthereby eliminate or reform wasteful agencies and programs. The Bush Administration has suggestedthat a CARFA should use the Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). Criticsmight likely contend that the legislation is too narrowly focused -- looking only at discretionary,non-defense programs (House version); that the commission should be equally balanced alongpartisan lines or less under the President's control; that expedited procedures undermine thedemocratic process; and that the decision making criteria are too subjective. This report summarizesthe legislation's history and provisions, discusses other review commission legislation, and highlightsperspectives about the CARFA proposal from the 108th Congress. Next, the report analyzes issuesthat may be of interest in the 109th Congress in the event that the CARFA legislation or similarproposals to establish a review commission are further considered. Finally, the report discussespotential success factors for commissions and potential alternatives or complements to acommission. A short version of this report is available ( CRS Report RS21980 , ProposedCommission on the Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA): A Brief Overview ). This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33566 | crs_RL33566_0 | Introduction
A Multi-Dimensional Conflict1
Hezbollah's July 12, 2006, attack in northern Israel, in which two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped, elicited an Israeli military response that again embroiled the region in a multi-dimensional conflict. Though the primary combatants were part of a triangular dynamic in which Israel was (and still is) at war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with Palestinian militants, including Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, there were secondary players who added additional layers of complexity to the conflict, namely Iran and Syria. The "Root Causes" of the Conflict
Hezbollah's July 2006 attack inside Israeli territory and repeated Israeli-Palestinian clashes in the Gaza Strip and West Bank illustrated not only the risk posed by terrorist groups operating along Israel's borders, but more importantly, the risk to regional security in the absence of comprehensive peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, Lebanon, and Syria. The Cease-Fire
U.N. Security Council Resolution 17015
After more than four weeks of fighting between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah, on August 11, 2006 the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701, calling for a "full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations." The resolution provides: expansion of the existing U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 2,000 to a maximum of 15,000; deployment of UNIFIL plus a Lebanese Army force to southern Lebanon to monitor the cease-fire; withdrawal of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon "in parallel" with the deployment of U.N. and Lebanese forces to the south; a ban on delivery of weapons to "any entity or individual" in Lebanon, except the Lebanese Army. The kidnappers and their supporters have insisted that the Israeli soldier be exchanged for some of the thousands of Palestinian prisoners being held by Israel. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan announced on September 5 that Israel and Hezbollah had agreed to have him mediate an exchange of prisoners for the release of the two Israeli soldiers kidnapped on the northern border of Israel by Hezbollah on July 12 and that he would appoint an envoy to conduct "secret" negotiations. However, their use of air and artillery strikes appears to have been curtailed somewhat. For more background information on the Shib'a Farms issue, see CRS Report RL31078, The Shib ' a Farms Dispute and Its Implications , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). (Res.) Condemning Hezbollah
Observers have condemned Hezbollah's indiscriminate firing of rockets into northern Israeli towns and cities in order to terrorize the population and cause extensive damage to infrastructure. U.S. Efforts and Other Efforts to Combat Hezbollah
U.S. Some observers suggest a variety of theoretical incentives that the West could provide Syria, including the end of its isolation by the United States and the removal of Syria from the State Department's terrorism list and the relaxation of economic sanctions; the tacit recognition of its influence in Lebanese politics; the ratification of the EU Association Agreement with Syria that provides it with certain trade benefits; diminished international pressure regarding the U.N.-led investigation into the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri; increased financial support, possibly from Arab Gulf states; and finally (though less likely), a resumption of negotiations over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights - a longstanding Syrian goal since its defeat in the June 1967 Six-Day War. It will not be updated. Meanwhile, Palestinian militants continue to fire rockets into southern Israel. House Resolution 954 called on the President to appoint a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. A Senate resolution, S.Res. | This report analyzes the conflict between Israel and two U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the Lebanese Shiite Muslim group Hezbollah and the radical Palestinian Hamas organization. On July 12, 2006, what had been a localized conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip instantly became a regional conflagration after Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in a surprise attack along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel responded by carrying out air strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, and Hezbollah countered with rocket attacks against cities and towns in northern Israel. In order to push Hezbollah back from its border, Israel launched a full-scale ground operation in Lebanon with the hopes of establishing a security zone free of Hezbollah militants. Meanwhile, Israeli clashes with Hamas and other Palestinian militants have continued in the Gaza Strip.
A United Nations-brokered cease-fire came into effect on August 14, 2006. Based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 passed a few days earlier, the cease-fire is intended to be monitored by the Lebanese Armed Forces in conjunction with an expanded U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The international community initially hesitated to contribute troops, though it appears now that enough countries have stepped forward to significantly expand the existing U.N. force (UNIFIL).
On July 18, 2006, the Senate passed S.Res. 534, which, among other things, calls for the release of Israeli soldiers who are being held captive by Hezbollah or Hamas; condemns the governments of Iran and Syria for their continued support for Hezbollah and Hamas; urges all sides to protect innocent civilian life and infrastructure; and strongly supports the use of all diplomatic means available to free the captured Israeli soldiers. On July 20, 2006, the House passed H.Res. 921, which also condemns Hezbollah's attack on Israel and urges the President to bring sanctions against the governments of Syria and Iran for their alleged sponsorship of Hezbollah.
The extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the Lebanese arena created a multifaceted crisis that cut across a number of U.S. policy issues in the Middle East. This report provides an assessment of the month-long war and its implications for regional stability and other key U.S. policy issues. This report will be updated periodically. A number of CRS analysts have contributed to this report. For additional questions, please contact the individual specialist listed under each section of the report. For more information on the major countries in the current conflict, please see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33509, Lebanon; CRS Report RL33487, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33961 | crs_RL33961_0 | Background
The Arab League, or League of Arab States, is an umbrella organization comprising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities. The U.S. government has often been at the forefront of international efforts to end enforcement of the boycott and to seek the Arab League's revocation of it. U.S. legislative action related to the boycott dates from 1959 and includes multiple statutory provisions expressing U.S. opposition to the boycott, usually in foreign assistance legislation. In 1977, Congress passed laws making it illegal for U.S. companies to cooperate with the boycott and authorizing the imposition of civil and criminal penalties against U.S. violators. Current Status of the Boycott
The boycott has three tiers. The primary boycott prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any entity world-wide that does business with Israel. A blacklist of global firms that engage in business with Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its nationals from doing business with a company that in turn deals with companies that have been blacklisted by the Arab League. Impact of the Boycott
Since the boycott is sporadically applied and ambiguously enforced, its impact, measured by capital or revenue denied to Israel by companies adhering to the boycott, is difficult to measure. The effect of the primary boycott appears limited since intra-regional trade and investment are small. Enforcement of the secondary and tertiary boycotts has decreased over time, reducing their effect. Thus, it appears that since intra-regional trade is small, and that the secondary and tertiary boycotts are not aggressively enforced, the boycott may not currently have an extensive effect on the Israeli economy. Despite the apparent lack of economic impact on either Israeli or Arab economies, the boycott remains of strong symbolic importance to all parties. 115-31 ) states that it is the sense of Congress that
1. the Arab League boycott of Israel, and the secondary boycott of American firms that have commercial ties with Israel, is an impediment to peace in the region and to U.S. investment and trade in the Middle East and North Africa; 2. the Arab League boycott, which was regrettably reinstated in 1997, should be immediately and publicly terminated, and the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel immediately disbanded; 3. all Arab League states should normalize relations with their neighbor Israel; 4. the President and the Secretary of State should continue to vigorously oppose the Arab League boycott of Israel and find concrete steps to demonstrate that opposition by, for example, taking into consideration the participation of any recipient country in the boycott when determining to sell weapons to said country; and 5. the President should report to Congress annually on specific steps being taken by the United States to encourage Arab League states to normalize their relations with Israel to bring about the termination of the Arab League boycott of Israel, including those to encourage allies and trading partners of the United States to enact laws prohibiting businesses from complying with the boycott and penalizing businesses that do comply. | The Arab League, an umbrella organization comprising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948. The boycott is administered by the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League.
The boycott has three tiers. The primary boycott prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any entity world-wide that does business in Israel. A blacklist of global firms that engage in business with Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its nationals from doing business with a company that deals with companies that have been blacklisted by the Arab League.
Since the boycott is sporadically applied and ambiguously enforced, its impact, measured by capital or revenue denied to Israel by companies adhering to the boycott, is difficult to measure. The effect of the primary boycott appears limited since intra-regional trade and investment are small. Enforcement of the secondary and tertiary boycotts has decreased over time, reducing their effect. Thus, it appears that since intra-regional trade is small, and that the secondary and tertiary boycotts are not aggressively enforced, the boycott may not currently have an extensive effect on the Israeli economy.
Despite the lack of economic impact on either Israeli or Arab economies, the boycott remains of strong symbolic importance to all parties. The U.S. government has often been at the forefront of international efforts to end the boycott and its enforcement. Despite U.S. efforts, however, many Arab League countries continue to support the boycott's enforcement. U.S. legislative action related to the boycott dates from 1959 and includes multiple statutory provisions expressing U.S. opposition to the boycott, usually in foreign assistance legislation. In 1977, Congress passed laws making it illegal for U.S. companies to cooperate with the boycott and authorizing the imposition of civil and criminal penalties against U.S. violators. U.S. companies are required to report to the Department of Commerce any requests to comply with the Arab League Boycott.
This report provides background information on the boycott and U.S. efforts to end its enforcement. More information on Israel is contained in CRS Report R44281, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, coordinated by Jim Zanotti. |
crs_R40505 | crs_R40505_0 | The NIC is responsible for the U.S. intelligence community's most authoritative assessments of major issues affecting the national security. Their work is essentially internal to the federal government. 102-496 ) provided a statutory authorization for the NIC. Congressional Options and the NIC
Most observers believe that congressional committees benefit from the testimony of NIC members either in open or closed sessions. A number of observers point to the time consumed in preparing NIEs and other products that may not provide the best source of intelligence support for policymakers. (b) Composition
(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence. | The National Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of some 18 senior analysts and national security policy experts, provides the U.S. intelligence community's best judgments on crucial international issues. NIC members are appointed by the Director of National Intelligence and routinely support his office and the National Security Council. Congress occasionally requests that the NIC prepare specific estimates and other analytical products that may be used during consideration of legislation.
It is the purpose of this report to describe the statutory provisions that authorize the NIC, provide a brief history of its work, and review its role within the federal government. The report will focus on congressional interaction with the NIC and describe various options for modifying congressional oversight. |
crs_RL31243 | crs_RL31243_0 | Introduction
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Title XIV of the Public Health Service Act, is the key federal law for protecting public water supplies from harmful contaminants. First enacted in 1974 and substantially amended in 1986, 1996, and 2016, the act is administered through programs that establish standards and treatment requirements for public water supplies, finance drinking water infrastructure projects, promote water system compliance, and control the underground injection of fluids to protect underground sources of drinking water. The 1974 law established the current federal-state arrangement in which states may be delegated primary implementation and enforcement authority for the drinking water program. The state-administered Public Water Supply Supervision (PWSS) Program remains the basic program for regulating the nation's public water systems, and 49 states have assumed this authority. In the SDWA amendments of 1996, Congress reauthorized appropriations for most SDWA programs through FY2003. Although the authorization of appropriations has expired for most provisions, Congress has continued to appropriate funds for the ongoing SDWA programs. Enacted in December 2016, the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WINN) Act, P.L. This report summarizes the act's major provisions, programs, and requirements and provides statistics on the universe of regulated public water systems. Located at the end of the report, Table 2 cross-references sections of the act with the major U.S. Code sections of the codified statute, and Table 3 identifies authorizations of appropriations under the act. The first major amendments ( P.L. 104-182 ). In 2002, several drinking water security provisions were added to the SDWA through the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 ). 113-64 ] explicitly exempted fire hydrants from coverage under the act's lead plumbing restrictions. ) Enacted August 7, 2015, the Drinking Water Protection Act ( P.L. 114-45 ) directed EPA to develop a strategic plan to assess and manage the risks associated with algal toxins in public drinking water supplies. Enacted December 11, 2015, the Grassroots Rural and Small Community Water Systems Assistance Act ( P.L. Included in the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 ( P.L. The WIIN Act ( P.L. The agency is directed to provide technical assistance to the states and municipalities in administering their public water system regulatory responsibilities. | This report summarizes the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and its major programs and regulatory requirements. It reviews revisions to the act since its enactment in 1974, including the drinking water security provisions added to the SDWA by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) and lead reduction provisions as amended by P.L. 111-380 (including amendments made by P.L. 113-64 to explicitly exempt fire hydrants from coverage under the act's lead plumbing restrictions). It also reviews P.L. 114-45, enacted August 7, 2015, directing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop a strategic plan to assess and manage the risks associated with algal toxins in public water supplies; P.L. 114-98, the Grassroots Rural and Small Community Water Systems Assistance Act, enacted December 11, 2015; and P.L. 114-322, the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act, enacted December 16, 2016.
The SDWA, Title XIV of the Public Health Service Act, is the key federal law for protecting public water supplies from harmful contaminants. First enacted in 1974 and substantially amended and reauthorized in 1986 and 1996, the act is administered through programs that establish standards and treatment requirements for public water supplies, promote compliance capacity of public water systems, provide technical assistance to small water systems, control the underground injection of fluids, finance infrastructure projects, and protect sources of drinking water. The 1974 law established the current federal-state arrangement in which states may be delegated primary implementation and enforcement authority (primacy) for the drinking water program and the underground injection control (UIC) program. The state-administered Public Water Supply Supervision (PWSS) Program remains the basic program for regulating the nation's public water systems, and 49 states have assumed this authority.
In the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 (P.L. 104-182), Congress reauthorized appropriations for most SDWA programs through FY2003. As with other EPA-administered statutes having expired funding authority, Congress has continued to appropriate funds for the ongoing SDWA programs.
In addition to reviewing key programs and requirements of the SDWA, this report includes statistics on the number and types of regulated public water systems and lists all major amendments with the year of enactment and public law number. Located at the end of the report, Table 2 cross-references sections of the act with the major U.S. Code sections of the codified statute, and Table 3 identifies authorizations of appropriations under the act.
This report expands on a brief discussion of the SWDA in CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency. That report provides summaries of the principal environmental statutes administered by EPA. |
crs_R40440 | crs_R40440_0 | Introduction
On November 4, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense , a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of a "small disadvantaged business" (SDB) program of the Department of Defense (DOD). The Federal Circuit's decision in Rothe was followed on February 27, 2009, by a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, to which the case had been remanded for entry of judgment. This decision enjoined defense agencies from implementing other programs authorized by Section 1207 because these programs were "contingent" on the subsections containing the price preference and must "also fall" when those subsections did. However, the 111 th Congress responded to the District Court's decision by enacting legislation authorizing defense agencies to provide assistance similar to that authorized under Section 1207 to MSIs. On September 9, 2011, the Obama Administration proposed amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in light of the decisions by the Federal Circuit and the district court in Rothe . Among other things, the proposed changes would delete those provisions of the FAR which govern price evaluation adjustments to bids or offers submitted by small disadvantaged businesses for defense contracts, as well as relocate and amend those provisions of the FAR regarding monetary incentives and evaluation factors for subcontracting with small disadvantaged businesses. The report examines the Rothe decision in detail; describes existing contracting programs for minority-owned and women-owned small businesses; and analyzes Rothe 's potential effect on these programs, including the Business Development Program under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. These programs were not at issue in Rothe and would not be substantively changed by the Obama Administration's proposed amendments to the FAR. However, as numerous commentators and the Small Business Administration (SBA) have recognized, the Rothe decision could have significant implications for other federal contracting programs for small businesses. The district court entered its judgment on February 27, 2009, prohibiting defense agencies not only from implementing price evaluation adjustments for offers from small disadvantaged businesses but also from implementing technical and infrastructure assistance programs for certain minority-serving institutions (MSIs) of higher education, including historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs), Alaska Native- and Native Hawaiian-serving institutions (ANNHIs), and majority-minority institutions (MMIs). | This report discusses Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense, a case involving a constitutional challenge to a minority contracting program authorized under Section 1207 of the Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act of 1987. This program allowed DOD to take 10% off the price of offers submitted by "small disadvantaged businesses" in determining which offer had the lowest price or represented the best value for the government. Section 1207 also incorporated a presumption that minorities are socially and economically disadvantaged.
On November 4, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit struck down the DOD preference program, holding that Section 1207 was facially unconstitutional because Congress did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that there was racial discrimination in defense contracting when it reauthorized the program in 2006. Later, on February 27, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, to which the case had been remanded for entry of judgment, enjoined defense agencies from implementing other programs authorized by Section 1207 because these programs were "contingent" on the subsections containing the price preference and must "also fall" when they do. These programs included technical and infrastructure assistance for certain minority-serving institutions (MSIs) of higher education, including historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs), Alaska Native- and Native Hawaiian-serving institutions (ANNHIs), and majority-minority institutions (MMIs). However, the 111th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 111-84) that authorizes defense agencies to provide assistance similar to that authorized under Section 1207 to MSIs.
On September 9, 2011, the Obama Administration proposed amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in light of the decisions by the Federal Circuit and district court in Rothe. Among other things, the proposed changes would delete those provisions of the FAR which govern price evaluation adjustments to bids or offers submitted by small disadvantaged businesses for defense contracts, as well as relocate and amend those provisions of the FAR regarding monetary incentives and evaluation factors for subcontracting with small disadvantaged businesses.
The report examines the Rothe decision in detail; describes existing contracting programs for minority-owned and women-owned small businesses; and analyzes Rothe's potential effect on these programs, including the Business Development Program under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. These programs were not at issue in Rothe and would not be substantively changed by the Obama Administration's proposed amendments to the FAR. However, as numerous commentators and the Small Business Administration (SBA) have recognized, the Rothe decision could have significant implications for other federal contracting programs for small businesses. |
crs_RL33391 | crs_RL33391_0 | Federal habeas corpus as we know it is by and large a procedure under which a court may review the legality of an individual's incarceration. It is an intricate weave of statute and case law whose reach has flowed and ebbed over time. And with narrow exception, state prisoners may not employ federal habeas as a means to assert, or retroactively claim the benefits of, a previously unrecognized interpretation of constitutional law (i.e., a "new rule"). "If the prisoner asserts a claim that he has already presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be dismissed in all cases." The AEDPA offered a streamlined habeas procedure in cases involving state death row inmates to those states that fill this gap, 28 U.S.C. References to competence standards for appointed counsel were removed. Habeas for Federal Convicts: The Section 2255 Substitute
Federal prisoners who claim that they are being held by virtue of a conviction or sentence rendered contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States must ordinarily repair to section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code for collateral review. The Court has noted, however, that the lower federal courts have applied the Teague rule to section 2255. The Judiciary Act of 1789 declared that "all the before mentioned courts of the United States [the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and district courts] shall power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus.... And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts shall power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.... "
After the Civil War, Congress conferred additional habeas authority upon the federal courts as a check against state authorities in the newly reconstructed South by making the writ available to anyone held in violation of the Constitution and other laws of the United States. 2229 (2008). | Federal habeas corpus is a procedure under which a federal court may review the legality of an individual's incarceration. It is most often the stage of the criminal appellate process that follows direct appeal and any available state collateral review. The law in the area is an intricate weave of statute and case law.
Current federal law operates under the premise that with rare exceptions prisoners challenging the legality of the procedures by which they were tried or sentenced get "one bite of the apple." Relief for state prisoners is only available if the state courts have ignored or rejected their valid claims, and there are strict time limits within which they may petition the federal courts for relief. Moreover, a prisoner relying upon a novel interpretation of law must succeed on direct appeal; federal habeas review may not be used to establish or claim the benefits of a "new rule." Expedited federal habeas procedures are available in the case of state death row inmates if the state has provided an approved level of appointed counsel. The Supreme Court has yet to hold that a state death row inmate who asserts he is "actually innocent" may be granted habeas relief in the absence of an otherwise constitutionally defective conviction. The Court has made it clear in the case of the Guantanamo detainees that the privilege of the writ may not be legislatively extinguished unless there is an adequate substitute, Boumediene v. Bush , 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report RS22432, Federal Habeas Corpus: An Abridged Sketch , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40977 | crs_R40977_0 | Introduction
The Group of Twenty, or G-20, is a forum for advancing international economic cooperation and coordination among 20 major advanced and emerging-market economies. Originally established in 1999, the G-20 rose to prominence during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. G-20 countries account for about 85% of global economic output, 75% of world exports, and two-thirds of the world's population. The G-20 leaders meet annually, and meetings among lower-level officials are held throughout the year. Congress exercises oversight over the Administration's participation in the G-20, including the policy commitments that the Administration is making in the G-20 and the policies it is encouraging other G-20 countries to pursue. Additionally, legislative action may be required to implement certain commitments made by the Administration in the G-20 process. This report analyzes why countries coordinate economic policies and the historical origins of the G-20; how the G-20 operates; major highlights from previous G-20 summits, plus an overview of the agenda for the next G-20 summit; and debates about the U.S. role in the G-20 and its effectiveness as a forum for economic cooperation and coordination. Meetings among finance ministers and central bank governors typically preceded the summit meetings. U.S. The G-20 meeting and outcomes are contributing to ongoing debate about the U.S. leadership in the world under the Trump Administration. Some commentators are concerned that the United States was isolated at the G-20, reflecting a growing trend of abdication of U.S. leadership and abandonment of U.S. allies. Others are more optimistic, arguing that differences between the United States and other countries were overblown and that President Trump is pursuing foreign policies consistent with his campaign pledges. The 2018 Summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina
Argentina is chairing the G-20 in 2018 and hosting the annual summit on October 4-5 in Buenos Aires. Argentina's theme is "building consensus for fair and sustainable development." To advance this agenda, Argentina is proposing a focus on three key issues: (1) the future of work; (2) infrastructure for development; and (3) food security. In addition, Argentina will seek to build on previous G-20 work on empowering women, fighting corruption, strengthening financial governance, building a strong and sustainable financial system, improving the fairness of the global tax system, cooperating on trade and investment, taking responsibility on climate action, and transitioning toward cleaner, more flexible, and more transparent energy systems. There are questions about how discussions will proceed at the summit. The 2017 G-20 summit was contentious, with the United States increasingly isolated on trade and climate change issues. It is not clear that divisions on these issues have resolved over the past year. The G-7 summit hosted by Canada was also divisive, with President Trump taking the unprecedented step of withdrawing his initial support for the G-7 communiqué. Trade divisions have also arisen in G-20 discussions among finance ministers and central bank governors in July 2018, amid escalating tariffs among many G-20 countries. Meanwhile, Argentina is embroiled in its own financial crisis, with the government struggling to regain investor confidence following rapid depreciation of its currency and IMF program in June 2018, raising questions about the extent to which the Argentine government will be able to focus its energies on the G-20 process. Some argue it is a vital forum for a diverse set of countries to discuss their differences. Others wonder whether the G-20, which initially brought together leaders to coordinate the response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, has become less consequential over time. | The Group of Twenty (G-20) is a forum for advancing international cooperation and coordination among 20 major advanced and emerging-market economies. The G-20 includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU). G-20 countries account for about 85% of global economic output, 75% of global exports, and two-thirds of the world's population.
Originally established in 1999, the G-20 rose to prominence during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and is now the premier forum for international economic cooperation. Since the crisis, the G-20 leaders typically meet annually (at "summits"). Meetings among lower-level officials, including finance ministers and central bank governors, are scheduled throughout the year. G-20 meetings primarily focus on international economic and financial issues, although related topics are also discussed, including development, food security, and the environment, among others.
Congress exercises oversight over the Administration's participation in the G-20, including the policy commitments that the Administration is making in the G-20 and the policies it is encouraging other G-20 countries to pursue. Additionally, legislative action may be required to implement certain commitments made by the Administration in the G-20 process.
The G-20 in 2018
Argentina is chairing the G-20 in 2018 and hosting the annual summit on October 4-5 in Buenos Aires. Argentina's theme for the year is "building consensus for fair and sustainable development." To advance this agenda, Argentina is proposing a focus on three key issues: (1) the future of work; (2) infrastructure for development; and (3) food security. In addition, Argentina will seek to build on previous G-20 work on empowering women, fighting corruption, strengthening financial governance, building a strong and sustainable financial system, improving the fairness of the global tax system, cooperating on trade and investment, taking responsibility on climate action, and transitioning toward cleaner, more flexible, and more transparent energy systems.
There are questions about how discussions will proceed at the summit. The 2017 G-20 summit was contentious, with the United States increasingly isolated on trade and climate change issues. It is not clear that divisions on these issues have resolved over the past year. The G-7 summit hosted by Canada was also divisive, with President Trump withdrawing his initial support for the communiqué. Trade divisions have also arisen in G-20 discussions among finance ministers and central bank governors earlier this year. Meanwhile, Argentina is embroiled in its own financial crisis, with the government struggling to regain investor confidence following rapid depreciation of its currency and IMF program in June 2018.
U.S. Leadership and Effectiveness of the G-20
The G-20 meeting and outcomes are contributing to ongoing debate about the U.S. leadership in the world under the Trump Administration. Some commentators are concerned that U.S. isolation at international summits reflects a growing trend of abdication of U.S. leadership and abandonment of U.S. allies. Others are more optimistic, arguing that differences between the United States and other countries were overblown and that President Trump is pursuing foreign policies consistent with his campaign pledges.
The summit also raises questions about the G-20's usefulness. Some argue it is a vital forum for a diverse set of countries to discuss their differences. Others wonder whether the G-20, which initially brought together leaders to coordinate the response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, has become less consequential over time. |
crs_98-747 | crs_98-747_0 | History of the Secretary of the Senate
The first Secretary of the Senate, Samuel Allyne Otis, was elected on April 8, 1789, two days after the Senate first achieved a quorum. Many of the duties of the Secretary of the Senate are defined by the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Areas of Responsibility
The Secretary of the Senate's duties and responsibilities can be divided into three broad categories: financial, administrative, and legislative. Financial Responsibilities
The Secretary is the chief financial officer of the Senate. | The Secretary of the Senate is an officer of the Senate elected at the beginning of each Congress by the membership of the Senate. The Secretary has financial, administrative, and legislative responsibilities derived from law, Senate rules, and other sources. In addition, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration maintains oversight authority over the Secretary of the Senate and issues policies and regulations governing the Secretary's duties and responsibilities. The Secretary of the Senate was established during the First Congress (1789-1791), when Samuel Allyne Otis was elected on April 8, 1789. |
crs_R40245 | crs_R40245_0 | In 2007, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act amended disclosure and reporting requirements to require quarterly, instead of semi-annual reporting. The Clerk and the Secretary are required to
review, verify and ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the registration and disclosure statements; make a list of registered lobbyists, lobbying firms, and clients publicly available; create a computerized filing system; make all filing available for public inspection; retain registration and disclosure statements for a period of at least six years; summarize information contained in registrations and reports on a semi-annual basis; notify lobbyists or lobbying firms in writing of non-compliance; and notify the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia of non-compliance by a lobbyist or a lobbying firm if the registrant has been notified in writing and has failed to provide an appropriate response within 60 days. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007 amended the LDA. Disclosure
The HLOGA amendments to the LDA made several changes to disclosure requirements. These semi-annual contribution reports are to contain the following information:
the name of the person (including employer) or organization; the names of all political committees established or controlled by the person or organization; the name of each federal candidate or officeholder, leadership PAC, or political party committee, to whom aggregate contributions equal to or exceeding $200 were made by the person or organization, or a political committee established or controlled by the person or organization, and the date and amount of each such contribution made; the date, recipient, and amount of funds contributed or disbursed during the semiannual period by the person or organization or a political committee established or controlled by the person or organization; the name of each Presidential library foundation, and each Presidential inaugural committee, to whom contributions equal to or exceeding $200 were made by the person or organization, or a political committee established or controlled by the person or organization, within the semiannual period, and the date and amount of each such contribution within the semiannual period; a certification by the person or organization filing the report that the person or organization has read and is familiar with those provisions of the Standing Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the House of Representatives relating to the provision of gifts and travel; and has not provided, requested, or directed a gift, including travel, to a Member of Congress or an officer or employee of either House of Congress with knowledge that receipt of the gift would violate rule XXXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate or rule XXV of the Rules of the House of Representatives. Registration, Termination, and Disclosure Analysis
The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate have collected registration and disclosure data since the passage of the LDA in 1995. The following sections examine registration and disclosure data filed under the LDA between 2001 and 2007, and between 2008 and 2010 following the passage of the HLOGA amendments. All data are presented from the Clerk's lobbying disclosure website. Analyzing the registration, termination, and disclosure data before and after the HLOGA amendments allows a systematic examination of the amendments impact on the lobbying community. The HLOGA amendments to LDA, for the first time, required electronic filing to the Clerk and the Secretary. As more lobbyists and lobbying firms register with the Clerk and the Secretary, more termination forms may be submitted. The trend toward a greater number of year-end terminations evident under the LDA continues under the HLOGA amendments. Figure 5 shows the number of mid-year and year-end reports filed by lobbyists and lobbying firms between 2001 and 2007. Pursuant to the HLOGA amendments, disclosure reports were changed beginning in 2008 from semi-annual reports to quarterly reports. To reflect the reporting change, Figure 6 shows the volume of quarterly disclosure reports filed between 2008 and 2010. It is possible that the number of disclosures filed in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 2010 was a result of decreased lobbying activity. The most significant change in reporting occurred for the filing of disclosure statements. Lobbying Registration and Disclosure Definitions
Pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, as amended by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (Chapter 26, Title 2, United States Code ), the following definitions are applicable to the registration and disclosure process. | On September 14, 2007, President George W. Bush signed S. 1, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81), into law. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) amended the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 (P.L. 104-65, as amended) to provide, among other changes to federal law and House and Senate rules, additional and more frequent disclosure of lobbying contacts and activities. This report focuses on changes made to lobbying registration, termination, and disclosure requirements and provides analysis of the volume of registration, termination, and disclosure reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate before and after the HLOGA's passage. This report does not analyze the content of these reports.
Under the LDA, as amended by the HLOGA, the Clerk and the Secretary manage the collection of registration, termination, and disclosure reports made by lobbyists and lobbying firms. Prior to the HLOGA, lobbyists and lobbying firms were required to submit semi-annual reports to the Clerk and the Secretary. The HLOGA amendments to the LDA modified reporting requirements to require quarterly filing of disclosure and termination reports. These forms are available for public inspection from the Clerk's and Secretary's websites.
The filing of registration, termination, and disclosure reports under the HLOGA amendments has continued at approximately the same pace as under the LDA. Examining data for filings between 2001 and 2007 under the LDA, and for 2008 through 2010 under the HLOGA amendments, reveals that the number of new registrations has remained mostly consistent under the HLOGA amendments. The termination reports filed by lobbyists and lobbying firms no longer representing a client have also remained constant following the implementation of the HLOGA amendments. Only disclosure reports, now filed quarterly, show a change between 2007 and 2010. Under the HLOGA amendments, the number of disclosure reports filed in the fourth quarter between 2008 and 2010 has decreased from filings between 2001 and 2007.
For further analysis on the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act and its other provisions, including amendments to House and Senate gift rules, travel restrictions, and campaign contributions, see CRS Report RL34166, Lobbying Law and Ethics Rules Changes in the 110th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL31126, Lobbying Congress: An Overview of Legal Provisions and Congressional Ethics Rules, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22566, Acceptance of Gifts by Members and Employees of the House of Representatives Under New Ethics Rules of the 110th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34377, Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007: The Role of the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R40091, Campaign Finance: Potential Legislative and Policy Issues for the 111th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44233 | crs_R44233_0 | Introduction
This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East. It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific country programs, and analysis of current foreign aid issues. The foreign aid data in this report is based on a combination of resources, including the United States Agency for International Development's U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Database (also known as the "Greenbook"), appropriations data collected by the Congressional Research Service from the Department of State and USAID, data extrapolated from executive branch agencies' notifications to Congress, and information published annually in the State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications. On the other hand, violence in Syria and Iraq has led to some significant changes in U.S. foreign assistance to the region, as the Administration and Congress have used new sources of funding beyond traditional bilateral or State Department/USAID-controlled accounts to address challenges created by these conflicts. The FY2016 Funding Request for the Middle East
For FY2016, the Administration has requested overall non-humanitarian bilateral aid for Near East and North Africa countries totaling $7.14 billion, or about 13% of the State Department's International Affairs request. Similar to FY2013 and FY2014 assistance levels to the region, more than 80% of this FY2016 total would support assistance for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza. Also within the overall FY2015 and FY2016 requests, but not allocated by country or region, is emergency humanitarian aid, largely within Migration and Refugee Assistance OCO (MRA-OCO) and International Disaster Assistance OCO (IDA-OCO) accounts. Regional Program Aid
In addition to assistance provided directly to certain countries, the United States provides aid to Middle Eastern countries through regional programs, including:
Middle East Regional (MER) . For FY2016, the State Department is requesting $70 million in ESF funding for MEPI. U.S. assistance earmarked for Israel is generally delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year, while most other recipients normally receive aid in installments. Recent Legislative Action
On June 15, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee reported a FY2016 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill ( H.R. On July 9, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of a FY2016 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill ( S. 1725 ). Both bills' accompanying committee reports ( H.Rept. 114-154 and S.Rept. 114-79 ) include a number of Middle East-related provisions. Common Foreign Assistance Acronyms and Abbreviations | This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East and North Africa. It includes a review of the President's FY2016 request for the region, a description of selected country programs, and an analysis of current foreign aid issues. We anticipate updating it annually.
Since 1946, the United States has provided an estimated total of between $282 billion to $292 billion (obligations in current dollars) in foreign assistance to the region. For FY2016, overall non-humanitarian bilateral aid requested for Middle East and North Africa countries amounts to $7.14 billion, or about 13% of the State Department's International Affairs budget request. The State Department estimates that the Middle East stands to receive 35% of the geographically-specific assistance in the budget request, more than any other region. Like previous years' assistance levels to the region, more than 80% would support assistance for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza.
The foreign aid data in this report is based on a combination of resources, including the United States Agency for International Development's U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Database (also known as the "Greenbook"), appropriations data collected by the Congressional Research Service from the Department of State and USAID, data extrapolated from executive branch agencies' notifications to Congress, and information published annually in the State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications.
In order to more accurately compare the Administration's FY2016 foreign assistance request to previous years' appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State Department or USAID and is requested for individual countries or regional programs. While this represents the majority of U.S. assistance to the Middle East, it is important to note that there are several other sources of U.S. aid to the region, such as International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), and Transition Initiatives (TI). Likewise, some nations receive assistance from U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense, which is touched upon briefly below. Since foreign assistance provided through these accounts and agencies is not requested for individual countries, and country-level figures are not publicly available until after the fiscal year has passed, these accounts and agencies are excluded from this analysis. For foreign aid terminology and acronyms, see the glossary appended to the report.
On June 15, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee reported a FY2016 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill (H.R. 2772). On July 9, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the bill (S. 1725). Both bills' accompanying committee reports (H.Rept. 114-154 and S.Rept. 114-79) include a number of Middle East-related provisions. |
crs_R41427 | crs_R41427_0 | Introduction
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. EESA was passed by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush to address an ongoing financial crisis that reached near-panic proportions in September 2008. Financial turmoil began in August 2007 when asset-backed securities, particularly those backed by subprime mortgages, suddenly became illiquid and fell sharply in value as an unprecedented housing boom turned to a housing bust. Uncertainty about future losses on illiquid and complex assets led to some firms having reduced access to private liquidity, with the loss in liquidity being catastrophic in some cases. September 2008 saw the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the near collapse of AIG, which was averted with an $85 billion loan from the Fed. There was widespread unwillingness to lend in the financial markets because participants were unsure which firms might be holding so-called toxic assets now worth much less than previously estimated, thus making these firms unreliable counterparties in financial transactions. EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter "the Secretary") to either purchase or insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets owned by financial firms. EESA granted this authority for a maximum of two years from the date of enactment, meaning it expired on October 3, 2010. This authority granted in EESA was very broad. In particular, the definitions of both "troubled assets" and "financial institutions" allowed the Secretary wide latitude in deciding what assets might be purchased or guaranteed and what might qualify as a financial institution. TARP Programs
Treasury reacted quickly after the enactment of EESA, announcing the TARP Capital Purchase Program on October 14, 2008, and several other programs followed. Credit Market Programs
Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). This program provided funds and guarantees for purchases of mortgage-related securities from bank balance sheets. Most of these funds are classified by Treasury as "outstanding." In preparing the budget cost estimates for TARP, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are directed by Section 123 of EESA to adjust their estimates by current market borrowing rates, as opposed to the borrowing rate paid by Treasury. The 113th Congress and TARP
In addition to the numerous oversight mechanisms in the original statute, Congress has continued to directly oversee various aspects of TARP through committee hearings, with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform creating a subcommittee specifically focused on TARP and financial services during the 112 th Congress. TARP and the Dodd-Frank Act18
Unlike EESA, which was a temporary response to the immediate financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) was a broad bill that permanently changed many parts of the U.S. financial regulatory system. Section 1302 of Dodd-Frank made three primary changes to EESA:
reduced the overall authorization to purchase from nearly $700 billion to $475 billion; removed the implicit authority for the Secretary to reuse TARP funds when TARP assets are sold; and limited the authorities under the act to programs or initiatives initiated prior to June 25, 2010. This exceptional assistance included the purchase of an additional $20 billion of Bank of America preferred shares through the TARP Targeted Investment Program and a joint guarantee on a pool of up to $118 billion of Bank of America's assets (largely acquired through its merger with Merrill Lynch) through the TARP Asset Guarantee Program, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve. The PPIP Legacy Securities Program was designed to deal with existing mortgage-related securities on bank balance sheets. The initial $0.1 billion in disbursements from TARP have been repaid. Table A-8 summarizes the support for the automakers, including current and peak asset holdings or loan amounts, losses or gains, and conditions of the assistance. | The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343) in October 2008. EESA was enacted to address an ongoing financial crisis that reached near-panic proportions in September 2008. The act granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to either purchase or insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets owned by financial institutions. This authority was granted for up to two years from the date of enactment and was very broad. In particular, the definitions of both "troubled asset" and "financial institution" allowed the Secretary wide leeway in deciding what assets might be purchased or guaranteed and what might qualify as a financial firm.
The financial crisis grew out of an unprecedented housing boom that turned into a housing bust. Much of the lending for housing during the boom was based on asset-backed securities that used the repayment of housing loans as the basis of these securities. As housing prices fell and mortgage defaults increased, these securities became illiquid and fell sharply in value, causing capital losses for firms holding them. Uncertainty about future losses reduced many firms' access to private liquidity, with the loss in liquidity being catastrophic in some cases. September 2008 saw the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the near collapse of American International Group (AIG), which was saved only by an $85 billion loan from the Federal Reserve. There was widespread lack of trust in the financial markets as participants were unsure which firms might be holding so-called toxic assets that might now be worth much less than previously estimated, thus making these firms unreliable counterparties in financial transactions. This uncertainty prevented firms from accessing credit markets to meet their liquidity needs.
As EESA moved through Congress, most attention was focused on the idea of the government purchasing mortgage-related toxic assets, thus alleviating the widespread uncertainty and suspicion by cleaning up bank balance sheets. The initial TARP Capital Purchase Program, however, directly added capital onto banks' balance sheets through preferred share purchases rather than removing assets that had become liabilities through purchasing mortgage-related assets. Several other TARP programs followed, including an asset guarantee program; programs designed to spur consumer and business lending; financial support for companies such as AIG, GM, and Chrysler; and programs to aid homeowners at risk of foreclosure. Eventually, the Public-Private Investment Program resulted in the purchase of some mortgage-related assets, but this remained a relatively small part of TARP. Most TARP programs are now closed.
With the immediate crisis subsiding through 2009, congressional attention to financial services turned largely to consider broad regulatory changes. The resulting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) amended TARP's authority, including (1) reduction of the overall amount to $475 billion; (2) removal of the ability to reuse TARP funds that had been repaid; and (3) removal of the authority to create new TARP programs or initiatives. The original TARP authority to purchase new assets or enter into new contracts expired on October 3, 2010. Outlays under the existing contracts, however, may continue through the life of these contracts. Overall budget-cost estimates for TARP have decreased significantly since the passage of EESA, with the most recent Congressional Budget Office estimates foreseeing $27 billion in costs and Office of Management and Budget estimates foreseeing $39 billion in costs. Most of these costs are from aid for homeowners, for the insurer AIG, and for U.S. automakers. The assistance to banks is generally showing a gain for the government. In the 113th Congress, oversight of TARP has continued, including a hearing held by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. |
crs_RL31362 | crs_RL31362_0 | In 2007, the Bush Administration restructured U.S. foreign aid programs to better serve the goal of transformational development , which places greater emphasis on U.S. security and democracy building as the principal goals of foreign aid. Other sources of growth include the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These countries have received the bulk of the increases in U.S. foreign aid (non-food) to Asia (excluding Afghanistan), although funding for aid programs in India and the Philippines reached a peak in 2006 and fell in 2007 and 2008. Foreign Aid Restrictions
In the past decade, the United States has imposed restrictions on non-humanitarian development aid, Economic Support Funds (ESF), and military assistance to some Asian countries in order to pressure them to improve performance related to democracy, human rights, weapons proliferation, foreign debt payments, and other areas. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 placed human rights conditions upon portions of the U.S. military assistance grants to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan. The FY2008 and FY2009 Budgets
The Administration's FY2008 budget request for the East Asian countries that are covered in this report ($453 million) represented a slight increase compared to FY2007 ($442 million). The FY2008 budget raised assistance to South Asian countries by 8% (from $900 million in FY2007 to $974 million). 2764 , signed into law as P.L. East Asia
Since 2001, foreign aid spending in East Asia has grown markedly, largely due to counterterrorism efforts in the Philippines and Indonesia. In November 2005, the Secretary of State waived restrictions on FMF to Indonesia on national security grounds pursuant to Section 599F(b). The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 ( P.L. 109-13 ) appropriated $631 million for tsunami recovery and reconstruction in East and South Asia. The United States government has pledged $600 million in economic and security assistance and $50 million in earthquake reconstruction aid on an annual basis through FY2009. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan was designated as a front-line state in the war on terrorism and received dramatically increased U.S. aid levels. Since 2003, President Bush has annually exercised the waiver authority on coup-related sanctions against Pakistan. FY2008 Appropriations
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008, Section 699G, withheld FMF from Sri Lanka, with the exception of technology or equipment related to maritime and air surveillance and communications, unless the following conditions were met:
the Sri Lankan military is suspending and the Sri Lankan government is bringing to justice members of the military who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian law, including complicity in the recruitment of child soldiers; the Sri Lankan government is providing access to humanitarian organizations and journalists throughout the country consistent with international humanitarian law; and the Sri Lankan government has agreed to the establishment of a field presence of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Sri Lanka with sufficient staff and mandate to conduct full and unfettered monitoring throughout the country and to publicize its findings. | This report analyzes annual budget justifications and legislation for foreign operations appropriations and discusses U.S. foreign aid trends, programs, and restrictions in 16 East Asian and South Asian countries. It does not cover aid to Pacific Island nations, North Korea, and Afghanistan. Country tables do not include assistance from U.S. State Department programs funded outside the foreign operations budget, such as educational and cultural exchange programs, and assistance from other departments and agencies.
Since the war on terrorism began in 2001 and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) were launched in 2004, the United States has increased foreign aid spending dramatically in some regions, including East and South Asia. The United States has raised military, economic, and development assistance primarily for counterterrorism objectives in the East Asia-Pacific (EAP) and South Asia regions, with Pakistan, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia receiving the bulk of the increases. In 2007, the Bush Administration restructured U.S. foreign aid programs to better serve the goal of transformational development, which places greater emphasis on U.S. security and democracy building as the chief goals of foreign aid.
In the past decade, the United States government has restricted foreign assistance to many countries in East and South Asia in order to encourage democracy and respect for human rights. Some sanctions have been waived or lifted. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161) placed human rights conditions upon portions of the U.S. military assistance grants to Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Since 2003, President Bush has annually exercised the waiver authority on coup-related sanctions against Pakistan. In 2005, the United States government resumed full military assistance to Indonesia, based upon the satisfaction of legislative conditions and national security grounds.
The FY2008 budget for the East Asian countries that are covered in this report represented a slight increase compared to FY2007. The FY2008 budget raised assistance to South Asian countries by 8%, according to estimates. In September 2008, the House and Senate passed the continuing resolution (CR), H.R. 2638 (Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009). The bill was signed into law as P.L. 110-329. The House and Senate approved $36.6 billion and $36.7 billion, respectively, for Department of State and Foreign Operations in FY2009, compared to $32.8 billion enacted in FY2008. The CR for FY2009 continues most funding through March 6, 2009, at FY2008 levels.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R43615 | crs_R43615_0 | Introduction
Social Security's minimum benefit provision, the Special Minimum Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is an alternative benefit formula that increases benefits paid to workers who had low earnings for many years and to their dependents and survivors. Unlike the standard Social Security benefit formula, which is based on a worker's average lifetime earnings, the Special Minimum PIA is based on the number of years a person has worked. Beneficiaries receive the higher of the two amounts. In 2017, about 39,347 (or about 0.6%) of the 62 million Social Security recipients qualified for the minimum benefit. Four provisions affect both the regular benefit and the Special Minimum benefit:
1. the a ctuarial reduction , which reduces monthly benefits as a percentage of the PIA for people who claim benefits before their FRA; 2. the re tirement earnings test (RET) , which withholds benefits for beneficiaries younger than the FRA who have earnings that exceed a specified dollar amount; 3. the g overnment pension offset (GPO) , which reduces the monthly benefit amount for people who have pensions from employment that is not covered by Social Security, but who are entitled to Social Security spouse or survivor benefits based on a spouse or deceased spouse's work record in covered employment; and 4. the f amily maximum benefit , which limits the total benefit that can be received by all members of a family, varying from 150% to 188% of the retired or deceased worker's PIA. The Social Security Administration projects that the provision will have no effect on people turning 62 years old in 2019 or later. 92-603), at the same time as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Another argument is that means-tested programs, such as SSI, are a more appropriate way to supplement the incomes of people with low incomes and assets. Who Receives the Minimum Benefit Under the Proposal? As noted above, the effect of the Special Minimum PIA has diminished to the point of being unnoticeable because the Special Minimum PIA is linked to prices while regular Social Security benefits are linked to wages, which generally grow faster than prices. A beneficiary would receive the minimum benefit if it was higher than the standard benefit. CBO analyzed an option that would increase the standard benefit for low-wage workers by up to 40%. A new program could also be established. | Social Security's special minimum benefit provision, also known as the Special Minimum Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is an alternative benefit formula that increases benefits paid to workers who had low earnings for many years, and to their dependents and survivors. The Special Minimum PIA is based on the number of years a person has worked, whereas the standard benefit formula is based on a worker's average lifetime earnings. The worker receives the higher of the two benefits.
However, the Special Minimum PIA has virtually no effect on the benefits paid to today's new retirees. Under current law, it grows with price levels, whereas the standard benefit is linked to wages. Because wages generally grow faster than prices, the Special Minimum PIA affects fewer beneficiaries every year. In 2017, about 39,347 of the 62 million Social Security recipients qualified for the minimum benefit. Beneficiaries who received higher benefits due to the provision had an average increase to monthly benefits of about $46 in June 2013. The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates that the provision will have no effect on workers turning 62 in 2019 or later.
Some recent proposals would redesign the minimum benefit. This renewed interest has been sparked by Social Security proposals that would reduce the regular benefit and by concern over poverty rates among beneficiaries who had low wages throughout their careers. However, some have suggested to allow the minimum benefit to phase out, arguing that the provision does not accurately target the working poor, and that there are other programs that are more appropriate for supplementing the incomes of low-income, low-asset people.
Increases in Social Security benefits targeted at lifetime low earners could be implemented in various ways. For example, a new minimum benefit provision could be introduced, the standard benefit could be increased for people who worked for many years at low earnings, or a fixed-dollar benefit could be introduced. Similar provisions could also be introduced through other programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). |
crs_R41119 | crs_R41119_0 | The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) contains statutory provisions that are applicable to the majority of federal education programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), as well as provisions related to the powers and responsibilities of ED. The first part of this report highlights some of the key provisions contained in GEPA. This is followed by a section-by-section overview of the act. The report concludes with an analysis of some of the policy issues that have arisen in the past or that may arise in the future with respect to GEPA. While these provisions cover topics as varied as appropriations and evaluations to privacy and enforcement, several provisions are particularly worth noting, especially with respect to the development of new programs or the appropriation of funds for existing programs. Extension of the period available for the obligation and expenditure of appropriation funds (Section 421). Automatic extension of the authorization of an applicable program for one additional fiscal year (Section 422). Prohibition on using funds for transportation of students or teachers to overcome a racial imbalance or to carry out a desegregation plan (Section 426). Prohibition on federal control of education (Section 438). Privacy provisions that require educational agencies that receive federal funds to provide parents with access to children's educational records and that prohibit such agencies from releasing such records without written consent (Section 444). General prohibition on the use of funds provided to ED or to an applicable program to support a national test unless it is explicitly authorized in statutory language (Section 447). | The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) contains a broad array of statutory provisions that are applicable to the majority of federal education programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), as well as provisions related to the powers and responsibilities of ED. While these provisions cover topics as varied as appropriations and evaluations to privacy and enforcement, several provisions are particularly worth noting, especially with respect to the development of new programs or the appropriation of funds for existing programs. These provisions include an extension of the period available for the obligation and expenditure of appropriation funds; an automatic extension of the authorization of an applicable program for one additional fiscal year; a prohibition on using funds for transportation of students or teachers to overcome a racial imbalance or to carry out a desegregation plan; a prohibition on federal control of education; privacy provisions that require educational agencies that receive federal funds to provide parents with access to children's educational records and that prohibit such agencies from releasing such records without written consent; and a general prohibition on the use of funds provided to ED or to an applicable program to support a national test unless it is explicitly authorized in statutory language.
The first part of this report highlights some of the key provisions contained in GEPA. This is followed by a section-by-section overview of the act. The report concludes with an analysis of some of the policy issues that have arisen in the past or that may arise in the future with respect to GEPA. |
crs_RL34023 | crs_RL34023_0 | H.R. Congress completed action on the bill the week of December 17, 2007, and the President signed it on December 26 ( P.L. 110-161 ). The State Department operations and foreign aid programs comprise and total $35 billion, including $2.4 billion in emergency supplemental funds. The international affairs budget can be divided into two components—State Department/Diplomacy/Broadcasting and Foreign Operations. FY2008 Budget Request: State Department and Related Agencies3
The Administration's FY2008 budget request for the Department of State is $10.014 billion, representing a 10.5% increase over the FY2007 estimate, but a decline of 4.3% as compared with the FY2006 actual appropriation (the most recent enacted appropriation for the Department of State), including rescissions and supplementals. Specific aspects of Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy include:
Global repositioning. Highlights follow. The act ( P.L. This level of increase is the largest within the budget request government-wide, and continues the general trend of increases since September 11, 2001. Strategic objectives have been created and linked to country categories. The FY2008 budget continues a focus on the war on terrorism and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as assistance to front-line states. Congress approved a FY2007 supplemental bill ( H.R. On October 22, 2007, a second emergency supplemental request was sent to Congress. Iraq and Afghanistan Share of Total Aid Budget
Including both base budgets and supplemental appropriations, the share of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance going to Iraq and Afghanistan has increased sharply since FY2002. 2764 , the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill, became the vehicle for a $555 billion omnibus spending bill that included funding for domestic agencies and for some of the FY2008 emergency supplemental funding requested by the White House. House Appropriations Action
On June 5, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies marked up the FY2008 spending measure. The bill provides a total of $34.243 billion. In other full committee action, a number of amendments were approved
to increase military assistance to Pakistan by $50 million; to require a report, rather than a certification, from the Secretary of State on human rights in Indonesia; to encourage the President to use $50 million for democracy promotion in Iran; to encourage the President to use $10 million in previous years' funds to protect Iraqi Christians; to direct the Secretary of State to review the need for enhanced facilities of the Haitian Parliament and to consider granting an exception to current Department policy, allowing a portion of the $23.9 million requested for democracy assistance to be used by Haiti to purchase the U.S. Embassy property adjacent to the Haitian Parliament; to clarify the dates on which the State Department must report to Congress with regard to restrictions on family planning funds; to require a report from the State Department on the evidence and criteria used if the Department should determine that an organization or program supports and participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization; to recommend that Development Assistance funding for countries in the Western Hemisphere be increased by $56 million to restore country program levels to at least FY2006 levels. Senate Appropriations Action
On June 28, 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs bill. The Senate appointed conferees also on September 6. The House bill maintains separate accounts. The overall funding level remains the same as the committee-reported bill and the House-passed measure. | The annual State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making in general. Funding for Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting programs has been steadily rising since FY2002, and amounts approved for FY2004 in regular and supplemental bills reached an unprecedented level compared with the past 40 years. Emergency supplementals enacted since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to assist the front-line states in the war on terrorism, fund Afghanistan and Iraq reconstruction, and upgrade State Department operations and security upgrades, also have pushed spending upward.
This report analyzes the FY2008 budget request and funding trends, including major issues Congress may consider, and tracks congressional action. Major issues confronting the 110th Congress include:
The overall size of the budget request that represents an 11% increase over FY2007 enacted levels; A foreign aid reform plan that seeks to align assistance with U.S. strategic objectives; Significant increases for Presidential initiatives; Continued costs relating to Iraq and Afghanistan; and Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy initiative for the State Department.
Congress completed action on all appropriations bills in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764) during the week of December 17, 2007. The President signed the Act on December 26 (P.L. 110-161). The act also included $2.4 billion in emergency supplemental funds for international affairs. The Senate-passed State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill was the vehicle used for the consolidated bill. On February 6, 2007, the Administration sent to Congress its FY2008 budget that included significant increases for the international affairs budget. On June 5, 2007, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies marked up the FY2008 measure providing a total of $34.243 billion; full committee consideration followed on June 12. The House passed the bill, H.R. 2764, on June 22. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the bill on June 28, and the Senate passed it on September 6, approving the same level of total funding as the House bill. The President sent an FY2008 supplemental request to Congress on October 22 seeking, among other funds, an additional $3.6 billion for international affairs.
This report will be updated to further reflect congressional action. |
crs_RL33590 | crs_RL33590_0 | The Administration set two objectives for the mission: (1) to secure a North Korean commitment to resume participation in the six party nuclear negotiations, which North Korea had boycotted since April 2009; and (2) to secure a North Korean commitment to implement a September 2005 six party statement in which North Korea had pledged to work toward "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula." The North Koreans reportedly told Bosworth that a peace treaty was more important than the establishment of U.S.-North Korean diplomatic relations and that a peace treaty was necessary to demonstrate that the United States had reversed its "hostile policies" toward North Korea. The Clinton Mission, North Korea's Nuclear Test, and Withdrawal from the Six Party Talks
On August 4-5, 2009, former President Bill Clinton traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, met with North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, and secured the release of two American women, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, whom North Korean authorities had arrested in March 2009 on the North Korean-Chinese border. On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second test of a nuclear bomb. U.N. On June 12, 2009, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 1874. It calls on U.N. member states to apply several sets of sanctions against North Korea. The major sanctions are:
—A ban on financial transactions related to North Korea's trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD technology. Bush Administration-North Korean Agreements and Failure of Implementation
Three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading up to North Korea's provocative acts, and these continue to influence the Obama Administration in developing a strategy toward the North Korean nuclear issue. A second was the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008, and the apparent subsequent emergence of a collective group of leaders including an influential element of the North Korean military. A third development was the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a set of tough negotiating demands for future round of nuclear negotiations with the United States. The Bush Administration negotiated three agreements with North Korea between February 2007 and October 2008; two were issued in February and October 2007 as agreements of the parties to the six party talks over North Korea's nuclear programs (United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia). North Korea responded by re-starting the Yongbyon facilities. North Korea tested an atomic device in October 2006. North Korea retaliated by halting the disablement process at Yongbyon and announcing that it would restart the plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. One was the issue of inspectors being able to take samples of nuclear materials at the Yongbyon installations for laboratory analysis. Issues Facing the Obama Administration
The Obama Administration appears to face at least four sets of issues in dealing with North Korea on the nuclear question in the wake of North Korea's withdrawal from six party talks, its call for strictly bilateral talks with the United States, and its May 25, 2009, nuclear test. North Korea repeatedly has defined the "U.S. nuclear threat" to include the composition and major operations of U.S. military forces in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula and the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" over South Korea embodied in the U.S.-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. Such a negotiation could involve a range of difficult issues, which the Bush Administration decided to set aside in its negotiations with North Korea in 2008: North Korea's atomic weapons, its plutonium stockpile, a verification system (which the Bush Administration unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate after July 2008), North Korea's highly enriched uranium program (which North Korea admitted to for the first time in June 2009), and its proliferation activities with Iran and Syria. In 2009, North Korea announced that it would resume nuclear weapons production. This nuclear collaboration reportedly was ongoing since 1997. Thus, Pyongyang probably would not produce additional Nagasaki-type bombs but would retain sufficient weapons-grade plutonium until it could use it to produce a nuclear warhead. | Since August 2003, negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons programs have involved six governments: the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Since the talks began, North Korea has operated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and apparently has produced weapons-grade plutonium estimated as sufficient for five to eight atomic weapons. North Korea tested a plutonium nuclear device in October 2006 and apparently a second device in May 2009. North Korea admitted in June 2009 that it has a program to enrich uranium; the United States had cited evidence of such a program since 2002. There also is substantial information that North Korea has engaged in collaborative programs with Iran and Syria aimed at producing nuclear weapons.
On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test. On April 14, 2009, North Korea terminated its participation in six party talks and said it would not be bound by agreements between it and the Bush Administration, ratified by the six parties, which would have disabled the Yongbyon facilities. North Korea also announced that it would reverse the ongoing disablement process under these agreements and restart the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading to North Korea's announcement: the failure to complete implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korean agreement, including the Yongbyon disablement, because of a dispute over whether inspectors could take samples of nuclear materials at Yongbyon; the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008; and the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a tough set of negotiating positions, including an assertion that the United States must extend normal diplomatic relations prior to any final denuclearization agreement rather than in such an agreement; and that U.S. reciprocity for North Korean denuclearization must be an end of the "U.S. nuclear threat," meaning major reductions of and restrictions on U.S. military forces in and around the Korean peninsula.
The Obama Administration reacted to the missile and nuclear tests by seeking United Nations sanctions against North Korea. It secured U.N. Security Council approval of Resolution 1874 in June 2009. The resolution calls on U.N. members to restrict financial transactions in their territories related to North Korean sales of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to other countries. It also calls on U.N. members to prevent the use of their territories by North Korea for the shipment of WMD to other countries. In December 2009, the Administration sent a special envoy to North Korea in an attempt to secure North Korean agreement to return to the six party talks. North Korea gave a general positive statement regarding six party talks; but it raised other issues, including its proposal for negotiation of a U.S.-North Korean peace treaty, and appeared to seek a continuation of bilateral meetings with the United States.
North Korea seemed to moderate its provocative policies in August 2009. It invited former President Bill Clinton to North Korea, where he secured the release of two female American reporters who were taken prisoner by the North Koreans along the China-North Korea border. It also released a South Korean worker at the Kaesong industrial complex in North Korea, whom the North Koreans had arrested in March 2009. A North Korean delegation came to Seoul for the funeral of former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and met with President Lee Myung-bak. This raised the prospect of renewed U.S.-North Korean negotiations over the nuclear issue, but any future negotiations appear to face daunting obstacles.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R41004 | crs_R41004_0 | Perceived Threat
The U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. Proceeds from the drug trade are critical to the continued funding of such terrorist groups as the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Other U.S. government documents characterize the confluence of transnational organized crime and international terrorism as a growing phenomenon. U.S. Government Strategies
To combat this apparent criminal-terrorist connection, recent Administrations have issued several key strategic documents to guide U.S. government efforts and approach the issue from the perspectives of national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence. In July 2011, the Obama Administration issued its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime . Patterns in Crime-Terrorism Interaction
Limited unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections. Partnership Motivations and Disincentives
The underlying rationales for criminal and terrorist group partnerships as well as the conditions that may facilitate the evolution or transformation of a criminal or terrorist group into the other may vary. Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, bolstering their capabilities, strengthening their infrastructure, and increasing their wealth. Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include a lack of in-house capabilities and demand for special skills to conduct particular operations. Appropriation of Tactics
Criminals and terrorists often share similar tactics to reach their operational goals. These include acts of terrorism and political violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and government corruption. Mexican government officials, for example, have been targeted by traffickers, at times in reprisal for their role in cartel arrests. A purely criminal group may transform to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include, among others, ASG, Al Qaeda's affiliates, D-Company, PKK, FARC, Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah. While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, questions remain about how and whether issues related to the interaction of the two threats are handled most effectively across the multiple U.S. agencies involved. Is there a need to expand or adjust existing congressional authorities to combat the combined crime-terrorism threat? | This report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In addition, the report discusses the U.S. government's perception of and response to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options.
In recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections, observers often focus on several common patterns.
Partnership Motivations and Disincentives: Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness. Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations. Appropriation of Tactics: Although ideologies and motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials. Organizational Evolution and Variation: A criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda's affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah.
To combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a role in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for example, the Obama Administration issued the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which emphasized, among other issues, the confluence of crime and terrorism as a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests.
While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs, and resources sufficiently responds to the combined crime-terrorism threat. Common foreign policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation. |
crs_R44369 | crs_R44369_0 | Introduction
Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules, which may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then provides four tables that summarize each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, and scheduling of witnesses ( Table 1 ); hearing quorum, business quorum, and amendment filing requirements ( Table 2 ); proxy voting, polling, and nominations ( Table 3 ); and investigations and subpoenas ( Table 4 ). Table 4 also identifies selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. Reporting. Some committees restate this rule in their own rules. | Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for certain Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules to govern its own proceedings. These rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees may also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules but are not specifically addressed by Senate rules. In sum, Senate committees are allowed some latitude to establish tailored procedures to govern certain activities, which can result in significant variation in the way different committees operate.
This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committee actions. The report then provides tables that summarize selected, key features of each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category.
The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules, and provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's Standing Rules are not included.
This report will be not be updated further during the 114th Congress. |
crs_RL33973 | crs_RL33973_0 | It is widely accepted that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work. Thus, addressing unauthorized employment and eliminating job opportunities for unauthorized immigrants has been seen as key to curtailing illegal immigration. Estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of the unauthorized alien population are somewhat lower. This changed with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to add a new §274A. The §274A provisions are sometimes referred to collectively as employer sanctions . Under INA §274A, it is unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Employers are required to participate in a paper-based employment eligibility verification system, commonly known as the I-9 system, in which they examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work eligibility, and complete and retain I-9 verification forms. Employers violating INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties. As discussed below, DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for enforcing the INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment. E-Verify
Building on the employment verification system established by IRCA, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) directed the Attorney General to conduct three pilot programs for employment eligibility confirmation that were to be largely voluntary—the Basic Pilot program, the Machine-Readable Document Pilot program, and the Citizen Attestation Pilot. Under the Basic Pilot program (renamed E-Verify by the Bush Administration), the only one of the three pilots still in operation, participating employers verify new hires' employment eligibility by accessing Social Security Administration (SSA) and, if applicable, DHS databases. Options for Addressing Unauthorized Employment
A variety of options has been put forth to curtail unauthorized employment and related practices, a selection of which is discussed below. Some of these options would build on the current employment eligibility verification system, while others represent new approaches to address unauthorized employment. While there is considerable support for making electronic employment eligibility verification mandatory, concerns have been expressed about discrimination, employer noncompliance, and privacy. workers." Selected Legislation in the 111th Congress
Multiple bills related to unauthorized employment have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. Among them, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( H.R. 1105 ), as passed by the House on February 25, 2009, includes a provision in Division J to extend E-Verify, which is set to terminate on March 6, 2009, through September 30, 2009. The House earlier approved E-Verify provisions as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( H.R. 1 were provisons to extend the program until November 2013 and to require that none of the funds made available under the act be used to enter into a contract with an entity that does not participate in E-Verify. These House-passed provisions, however, were not included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1 or in the final enacted version of the bill. | As immigration reform and the illegal alien population have gained congressional and public attention in the past several years, the issue of unauthorized employment has come to the fore. It is widely accepted that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work. Thus, eliminating employment opportunities for these aliens has been seen as key to curtailing unauthorized immigration.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to add provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, that made it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to work. These provisions also established a paper-based employment eligibility verification system, known as the I-9 system, which requires that employers examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work eligibility, and complete and retain I-9 verification forms. There is general agreement that the I-9 process has been undermined by fraud. Employers violating INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment may be subject to civil or criminal penalties. The Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS/ICE) is responsible for enforcing the INA prohibitions on unauthorized employment.
Building on the employment verification system established by IRCA, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) directed the Attorney General to conduct three pilot programs for employment eligibility confirmation. Under the Basic Pilot program (known now as E-Verify), the only one of the three pilots still in operation, participating employers verify new hires' employment eligibility by submitting information about these workers that is checked against Social Security Administration (SSA) and, if applicable, DHS databases. E-Verify is scheduled to terminate on March 6, 2009, in accordance with Division A of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009.
A variety of options has been put forth to curtail unauthorized employment and related practices, a selection of which is discussed in this report. Some of these options would build on the current employment eligibility verification system; these include making electronic verification mandatory, increasing existing penalties, or increasing resources for worksite enforcement. Others represent new approaches to address unauthorized employment, such as shifting responsibility for employment eligibility verification from employers to the federal government.
Multiple bills related to unauthorized employment have been introduced in the 111th Congress. Among them, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105), as introduced and as passed by the House, includes a provision to extend E-Verify through September 30, 2009. Several other provisions on the E-Verify program, including provisions to extend the program until November 2013 and to require that none of the funds made available under the act be used to enter into a contract with an entity that does not participate in E-Verify, were included in the House-passed version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1). These provisions, however, were not included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 1 or in the final enacted version of the bill.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R41891 | crs_R41891_0 | An attack could contaminate some square miles, disrupt the economy, cost tens of billions of dollars to remediate, increase the long-term cancer rate, and cause panic in the target area and beyond. This report examines radiation and its effects, steps to prevent, respond to, and recover from an attack, and issues for Congress. As a guide to quantities of material that should be protected, in 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revised its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Threats and Impediments
An RDD could cause prompt casualties, which would most likely come only from the explosion of a dirty bomb; panic; economic disruption, which might result if a port or city center were contaminated with radioactive material; asset denial, in which public concern over the presence of radioactive material might lead people to abandon a subway system or an area of a city for months to years; a requirement for decontamination, which would be costly; and long-term casualties resulting from exposure to or inhalation of radioactive material. Terrorists would need to learn about radiation for self-protection. Many government agencies and other entities have taken steps to secure these sources. Since 9/11, the NRC has issued orders and regulations requiring its licensees to take various measures to enhance radiation source security. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy. CRS Report R40154, Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations , by Jonathan Medalia, discusses detection. Preventing an Attack: Global Efforts
Securing Radioactive Sources
Because an RDD attack might occur outside the United States, or material obtained abroad might be used for an RDD attack on this nation, the United States and others—including international organizations and foreign governments—are working to secure sources worldwide. The partnership has many programs to reduce CBRN threats. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC helps regulators in other nations implement the IAEA Code of Conduct, such as by helping them develop national registries of radioactive sources, helping them with safety and security regulatory oversight, and holding workshops that describe the NRC's requirements for physical protection of materials and the U.S. regulatory framework. How Secure Are Radioactive Sources in Other Nations? According to the U.S. Department of State, "Of the 222 events reported to the IAEA from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 involving radiological and nuclear materials outside legitimate control, most involved incidents overseas and roughly 10 percent occurred in the U.S. All of the incidents the U.S. reported to the IAEA during this time involved detections of radioactively contaminated materials coming into the U.S."
In 2009, the IAEA reported "a persistent problem with illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, with thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities and events." Accordingly, the federal government has planned for a response. Key authorities for response include the Stafford Act, P.L. In 2008, FEMA issued its "Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents," which provides detailed guidance on response. Some states and localities have developed response plans and held exercises. Issues for Congress
Priority for Countering Radiological Terrorism
What priority should be given to countering radiological vs. other forms of terrorism? (1) Despite concerns about terrorist interest in RDDs, no successful RDD attack has occurred. (3) Most planning, training, equipment, and supplies that would help respond to an RDD attack would be of use in other disasters as well, so it is difficult to determine the balance between funds to counter all hazards and those to counter RDDs only. (4) Since costs resulting from an RDD attack could be tens of billions of dollars, some measures directly relevant to an RDD attack, such as decontamination R&D and securing radioactive sources, may be cost-effective. Domestic vs. Overseas Expenditures to Secure Radioactive Sources
Where are U.S. funds to secure radioactive sources most effectively spent? One argument is that it is better to spend money to secure domestic radiological sources because if they are illicitly obtained they could be used promptly in an RDD, avoiding the risk of detection in other countries and at U.S. ports of entry. Radiation Detection Networks
While attention has focused on explosive-driven "dirty bombs," an unobtrusive RDD attack could go undetected for hours, giving material time to spread and to irradiate people. Techniques to decontaminate areas struck by an RDD would help decontaminate the much larger area struck by radioactive fallout from an IND. Waste Disposition and RDDs
Many studies have considered how to dispose of nuclear waste. | Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven "dirty bombs" are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.
Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.
Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use these weapons in an attempt to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include:
RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection.
Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. Other nations have taken steps to secure sources as well. Key points include:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security.
Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework "establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response." The federal government has expertise and equipment to use for recovery. Key points include:
Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. Response planning fell short in the wake of Katrina and the Gulf oil spill, raising questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to an RDD attack.
Issues for Congress include:
The priority for countering RDDs vs. other types of CBRN weapons. The proper balance of effort for securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources. Whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; how to dispose of potentially large volumes of radioactive waste that could result from an RDD attack. Whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources. How to improve radiological forensics capability.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R41890, "Dirty Bombs": Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress, by Jonathan Medalia. |
crs_R45280 | crs_R45280_0 | Postal Service Board of Governors
The Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service (hereinafter, the Board) was created by the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970 (PRA, 39 U.S. C. §202). The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) describes the Board as " comparable to a board of directors of a private corporation ." Additionally, the Board includes the Postmaster General, who is appointed, or may be removed, by the Governors, and the Deputy Postmaster General, who is appointed, or may be removed, by both the Governors and the Postmaster General. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA, P.L. 109-435 ) reduced the Governors' staggered terms to seven years. Similarly, the Deputy Postmaster General is only appointed, or may be removed by the Postmaster General and the Governors. No term limits exist for either the Postmaster General or Deputy Postmaster General. It is unclear whether the appointment or removal clauses of 39 U.S.C. §202 could operate as written, given the Board's current composition. Current and Former Members of the Board
As of the date of this report, the Board has no Governors. The Board's membership as a whole includes the Postmaster General, Megan J. Brennan, and the Deputy Postmaster General, Ronald A. Stroman. In the 115 th Congress, President Trump sent four nominations for Governors of the USPS to the Senate on October 30, 2017. Responsibilities of the Governors Compared with Those of the Board
Although many authorities and responsibilities are given to the Board, certain matters are reserved for decision by the Governors alone. However, under 39 U.S.C. § 205 , vacancies may not prevent the Board from conducting its business as long as there is a quorum of members. Just prior to the loss of its quorum, the Board adopted a resolution delegating its authority to a Temporary Emergency Committee (TEC) , in order to "provide for continuity of [postal] operations" in light of the loss of a Board quorum. Further, unlike the loss of quorum, the loss of the final Governor leaves the USPS without legal authority for several actions that must be authorized by the Governors. The Board will continue without a quorum until four or more Governors have been confirmed. | Unlike other executive agencies, the United States Postal Service is governed not by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency head, but rather by an entity known as the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service (hereinafter, the Board) was created by the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970 (PRA, 39 U.S.C. §202). The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) describes the Board as "comparable to a board of directors of a private corporation."
As currently constructed under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (PAEA, P.L. 109-435), the Board consists of the Postmaster General, the Deputy Postmaster General, and nine Governors, appointed to staggered terms of seven years. The Governors appoint, or may remove, the Postmaster General; the Deputy Postmaster General is appointed, or may be removed, by both the Governors and the Postmaster General. Currently, there are no Senate-confirmed Governors and the only members on the Board are the Postmaster General and the Deputy Postmaster General. It is unclear whether the appointment or removal clauses of 39 U.S.C. §202 could operate as written, given the Board's current composition. President Trump sent four Governor nominations to the Senate on October 30, 2017; however, as of the date of this report, none of the nominations have been confirmed.
Under 39 U.S.C. §205, vacancies may not prevent the Board from conducting its business as long as there is a quorum of members. Without any appointed Governors, the Board cannot have a quorum. Just prior to the loss of its quorum, the Board adopted a resolution delegating its authority to a Temporary Emergency Committee (TEC), in order to "provide for continuity of [postal] operations." The Board will continue without a quorum until four or more Governors have been confirmed.
Although the Board, as a whole, has many authorities and responsibilities, certain matters are reserved for decision by the Governors alone. The lack of any appointed Governors leaves the USPS without legal authority for actions that must be authorized by the Governors, such as
the establishment of rates and classes of competitive products; the adjustment of rates for market dominant products; and setting compensation for the Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster General. |
crs_R41131 | crs_R41131_0 | The program was developing the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35. Successive Administrations proposed terminating the alternate engine program in the FY2007 through FY2010 budgets. On December 2, 2011, General Electric and Rolls-Royce announced that they were ending development of the F136 engine, terminating the F-35 engine competition. In FY1996, Congress required development of an alternate engine for the F-35. Opponents of the Administration's proposal to terminate the alternate engine program argue the following:
The Administration's proposal to terminate the alternate engine program does not comply with Section 213 of the FY2008 defense authorization act ( H.R. Cost Issues
Cost has been a significant issue in the alternate engine debate. DOD officials argue that terminating the F136 alternate engine program poses little operational risk. 1540 includes language barring funds from being spent for performance improvements to the F-35's engine unless the engine is developed and procured competitively, and other language requiring DOD to preserve existing F136 engines and tooling and to allow the contractor to perform research and development on the engine at the contractor's expense. Senate
On May 26, 2011, the Senate passed S. 1867 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. FY2012 Defense Appropriations Act
House
On July 8, 2011, the House passed H.R. The bill included no funds for the F-35 alternate engine. (F) The impact that canceling the F136 competitive engine would have on the high-performance military engine industrial base, and on the Department of Defense's ability to make competitive engine choices for future combat aircraft systems beyond the Joint Strike Fighter. The House Appropriations Committee report ( H.Rept. The Committee also directs the Department of Defense to fund the continued development of both engines in future budget submissions. (a) Limitation on Use of Funds for an Alternative Propulsion System for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be obligated or expended for the development or procurement of an alternate propulsion system for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a certification in writing that the development and procurement of the alternate propulsion system—
(1) will—
(A) reduce the total life-cycle costs of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program; and
(B) improve the operational readiness of the fleet of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; and
(2) will not—
(A) disrupt the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program during the research, development, and procurement phases of the program; or
(B) result in the procurement of fewer F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft during the life cycle of the program. FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill ( H.R. 5136 states:
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Extra Engine: The Administration strongly objects to the addition of $485 million for the extra engine program and to associated legislative provisions that limit the obligation of overall JSF development funding to 75 percent of the amount authorized until the funds for FY 2011 have been obligated for the extra engine program, require the Secretary to ensure that each budget in the Future Years Defense Plan include, and expend, sufficient funding to continue the program, and designate the F135 and F136 engine development and procurement programs as major subprograms. | On December 2, 2011, General Electric and Rolls-Royce announced that they were ending development of the F136 alternate engine for the F-35, ending what had been a contentious and long-running battle.
The alternate engine program began in FY1996, when defense authorization conferees directed DOD to ensure that the JSF (then "JAST") program "provides for adequate engine competition" and required the Department of Defense to develop an alternative to the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Development of the alternative, the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine, was funded in Administration budgets from FY1996 to FY2006. From FY2007 to FY2010, Congress rejected Administration proposals to terminate the program. In FY2011, Congress agreed not to fund the alternate engine, and the alternate engine program was terminated in April 2011. The Administration's FY2012 budget submission again requested no funds for the program.
Through FY2009, Congress provided approximately $2.5 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine program. The program is projected to need an additional $1.9 billion-2.9 billion through 2016 to complete the development of the F136 engine.
Critics of the proposal to terminate the F136 alternate engine argue that termination was driven more by immediate budget pressures on the department than the long-term pros and cons of the F136 program. They argue that engine competition for the F-15 and F-16 saved money and resulted in greater reliability. Some who applaud the proposed termination say that single-source engine production has been the norm, not the exception. Long-term engine affordability, they claim, is best achieved by procuring engines through multiyear contracts from a single source.
Canceling the F136 engine poses questions on the operational risk—particularly of fleet grounding—posed by having a single engine design and supplier. Additional issues include the potential impact this termination might have on the U.S. defense industrial base and on U.S. relations with key allied countries involved in the alternate engine program. Finally, eliminating competitive market forces for DOD business worth billions of dollars may concern those seeking efficiency from DOD's acquisition system and raises the challenge of cost control in a single-supplier environment.
Continuing F136 development raises issues of impact on the overall F-35 acquisition program. It also raises issues of the outyear costs and operational concerns stemming from the requirement to support two different engines in the field.
FY2012 defense authorization bill: On May 26, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1540, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. H.R. 1540 includes language barring funds from being spent for performance improvements to the F-35's engine unless the engine is developed and procured competitively, and other language requiring DOD to preserve existing F136 engines and tooling and to allow the contractor to perform research and development on the engine at the contractor's expense.
FY2012 DOD appropriations bill: The House Defense Appropriations Committee report included no funds for the F-35 alternate engine. |
crs_R40110 | crs_R40110_0 | Introduction
With recent high energy prices, the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ), and the passage of the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), there is ongoing congressional interest in promoting greater use of alternatives to petroleum fuels. Biofuels—transportation fuels produced from plants and other organic materials—are of particular interest. Ethanol and biodiesel, the two most widely used biofuels, received significant federal support in the form of tax incentives, loan and grant programs, and regulatory programs. However, many incentives for biofuels production and use expired at the end of 2011, while many farm-bill related programs will expire at the end of FY2012. The ongoing congressional debate over budget deficits and the national debt make the prospect of extending these incentives less likely. For example, six of the eight tax incentives listed in this report expired at the end of 2011 and the remaining two are set to expire at the end of 2012. This report outlines 22 current, expired, or pending federal programs that provide direct or indirect incentives for biofuels. The incentives for biofuels are summarized in the Appendix . The RFS requires the use of renewable fuels (including ethanol and biodiesel) in transportation fuel. Several key biofuels incentives had expired or were set to expire (e.g., a tariff on ethanol imported from most countries, as well as tax credits for biodiesel, renewable diesel, and ethanol) before the passage of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ). The incentives included in that law were extended through the end of 2011, but support for extending these tax incentives beyond 2011 was limited. 109-58 ); significantly modified by the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, §9008 ( P.L. Qualified applicant: Wide range of possible applicants For more information: http://www.brdisolutions.com/default.aspx
Other USDA Programs
The following programs within the Rural Business Cooperative Service could possibly be used to assist biofuels producers indirectly:
Business and Industry (B&I) Guaranteed Loans Rural Business Enterprise Grants (RBEG) Value-Added Grants Rural Economic Development Loan and Grant Programs
Department of Energy (DOE)
Biorefinery Project Grants
Administered by: Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Annual funding: Approximately $200 million appropriated annually for the biomass program—not all of this funding will go toward biorefinery project grants Appropriations: $220 million in FY2010 for overall biomass program; approximately $175 million for overall biomass program in each of FY2011 and FY2012 Established: FY2001 through funding authorized in various statutes Scheduled termination: None Description: This program provides funds for cooperative biomass research and development for the production of fuels, electric power, chemicals, and other products. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—Import Duty for Fuel Ethanol
Administered by: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Annual funding: N/A Established: 1980 by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 ( P.L. Summary of Federal Incentives Promoting Biofuels | With recent high energy prices, the passage of major energy legislation in 2005 (P.L. 109-58) and 2007 (P.L. 110-140), and the passage of a farm bill in 2008 (P.L. 110-246), there is ongoing congressional interest in promoting alternatives to petroleum fuels. Biofuels—transportation fuels produced from plants and other organic materials—are of particular interest. However, many incentives for biofuels production and use expired at the end of 2011, and ongoing congressional debate over budget deficits and the national debt make the prospect of extending these incentives less likely.
Until recently, ethanol and biodiesel, the two most widely used biofuels, received significant government support under federal law in the form of mandated fuel use, tax incentives, loan and grant programs, and certain regulatory requirements. While the mandate remains, several tax incentives and other programs have terminated in recent years. The 22 programs and provisions listed in this report were established over the past three decades, and were administered by five separate agencies and departments: Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Internal Revenue Service, and Customs and Border Protection. These programs targeted a variety of beneficiaries, including farmers and rural small businesses, biofuel producers, petroleum suppliers, and fuel marketers. Arguably, in prior years the most significant federal programs for biofuels had been tax credits for the production or sale of ethanol and biodiesel. However, with the establishment of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) under P.L. 109-58, Congress has mandated biofuels use; P.L. 110-140 significantly expanded that mandate. In the long term, the mandate may prove even more significant than tax incentives in promoting the use of these fuels.
The 2008 farm bill—The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008—amended or established various biofuels incentives, including lowering the value of the ethanol excise tax credit, establishing a tax credit for cellulosic biofuel production, extending import duties on fuel ethanol, and establishing several new grant and loan programs (all of which are set to expire at the end of FY2012).
Several key biofuels incentives had expired or were set to expire (e.g., a tariff on ethanol imported from most countries, as well as tax credits for biodiesel, renewable diesel, and ethanol) before the passage of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312). The incentives included in that law were extended through the end of 2011, and Congress has not acted to extend these incentives into 2012.
This report outlines federal programs that provide direct or indirect incentives for biofuels. For each program described, the report provides details including administering agency, authorizing statute(s), annual funding, and expiration date. The Appendix provides summary information in a table format. |
crs_RL33929 | crs_RL33929_0 | Introduction
Each year, Congress provides funding to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to renew the more than 2.1 million Section 8 vouchers—also called Housing Choice Vouchers—authorized by Congress (see Table 1 below). This report discusses the renewal funding formula changes that Congress has enacted as a part of the annual appropriations process, starting in FY2003, and concludes with a discussion of their effects. Low utilization rates were a major concern of Congress for several years. FY2003-FY2006: The Emergence of "Budget-Based" Funding
FY2003 Funding Changes
In FY2003, Congress changed the way PHAs were funded in an attempt to limit recaptures of unspent funds and provide funding levels that better reflected actual use. HUD was directed in the annual appropriations bill to fund PHAs based on their average annual per-voucher cost from the previous year, increased by the inflation factor, and multiplied by the number of vouchers the PHA could reasonably be expected to lease in that year (rather than the larger number of authorized vouchers). As a result, PHAs had to alter the way in which they budget for their voucher programs to a calendar-year cycle. FY2007-Present: A Cost and Utilization-Based Funding Model
FY2007 Funding Formula
In FY2007, the debate continued between a strictly "budget-based" funding formula, in which PHAs are given a fixed pot of funding in which to administer their programs (such as in FY2006), and a "unit-based" formula, in which PHAs are funded based on what they need to maintain a certain voucher level (such as pre-FY2003). Again, Congress rejected the President's request. Regardless of the reason, some PHAs found that their CY2009 funding was insufficient to cover the costs of all the vouchers they were using to serve families. This policy change effectively increased the amount of set-aside renewal funding provided to HUD in FY2009 to adjust agencies' budgets (originally, $100 million) and expanded its purposes to allow it to be used to prevent the termination of assistance. FY2011 and FY2012 Funding Formula
As in FY2010 and each year since FY2007, in FY2011 and FY2012 Congress directed HUD to allocate Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher renewal funding to PHAs based on their costs and utilization. Implications of Changes, FY2007-Present
As noted earlier, just prior to, and shortly after, the formula changes that began in FY2003, PHAs were serving as many, and in some cases more families, than they were authorized to serve, and they were spending nearly every federal dollar they received. Legislative Reform Proposals
In recent years, some Members of Congress from both parties have introduced voucher reform legislation containing statutory changes to the voucher renewal funding formula, generally similar to the cost and utilization based formulas contained in recent appropriations acts. Under the budget-based funding formulas in place in FY2005 and FY2006, PHAs' funding did not necessarily decrease if their costs decreased (for example, due to changes in the types of families served or changes in the rental market). The budget-based funding formula changes enacted through FY2006 were controversial with low-income housing advocates and PHA industry groups. In FY2007, PHAs were funded based on the amount of funding they were using in the previous year, rather than the amount of money they had received in the previous year. As a result, PHAs that had large funding surpluses were eligible for less funding in FY2007, although funding for the program was sufficient to provide all PHAs with over 105% of their formula eligibility, meaning PHAs could continue to serve at least all of the families they had been serving, and additional families, as long as they were not overleasing. The FY2008 and FY2009 formulas followed the FY2007 formula closely, although they included reductions in the budgets of agencies that had more reserve funding than they were legally permitted to spend, paired with rescissions. Now that the strictly "budget-based" funding model has been replaced with a cost and utilization-based model, PHAs again have an incentive to increase their utilization and spend all of their funding. Since costs and utilization are rising, so is the cost of the program to Congress. | Changes enacted by Congress during the appropriations process in each of the past several years have significantly altered the way that public housing authorities (PHAs) receive funding to administer the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. Prior to FY2003, PHAs received funding for each voucher they were authorized to administer, based on their average costs from the previous year, plus inflation, referred to as "unit-based" funding. Most PHAs were not using all of their vouchers, due in part to rental market conditions, and each year the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was able to recapture unspent funds. In FY2001 and FY2002, some Members of Congress began expressing concern about the underutilization of vouchers and the amount of recaptures.
Beginning in FY2003, and culminating in FY2006, Congress fundamentally changed the way PHAs received voucher funding. The changes were designed to limit the amount of unspent funds held by PHAs and limit the cost of vouchers, which had begun to grow rapidly in 2001 and 2002, due in part to market changes and in part to policy changes. In FY2006, PHAs were funded based on the amount of funding they had received in the previous year (regardless of changes in their costs and utilization), plus an inflation adjustment, prorated to fit within the amount appropriated. Under this formula, the funding needs of the program became more predictable, but some agencies received more funding than they were legally permitted to spend, while other agencies did not receive enough funding for all of the vouchers they were authorized to administer. The Bush Administration supported this conversion to a "budget-based" formula and requested that Congress enact permanent reforms to complement the new funding method. Low-income housing advocates and PHA industry groups generally opposed both the funding changes and the Bush Administration's proposed policy reforms.
In FY2007, Congress again changed the funding formula through the appropriations process. PHA funding was based on what they were spending in the previous year (rather than what they had been allocated in the previous year). As a result, PHAs that had not been spending all of their funding in FY2006 saw a reduction in funding in FY2007. Nonetheless, the funding provided was sufficient so that all PHAs received more than 100% of their 2006 costs and utilization. In FY2008 and FY2009, Congress adopted a cost and utilization-based formula similar to FY2007, but with a reduction in funding for PHAs with excess unspent funding in reserve. In FY2009, concerns were raised about how the implementation of the FY2009 formula may have left some PHAs without sufficient funding to continue serving all eligible families. Ultimately, Congress provided HUD with access to additional funding to help address shortfalls that could have resulted in families losing assistance. In FY2010-FY2012, Congress again adopted a cost and utilization-based formula, a hybrid of the "unit-based" and "budget-based" models. While Congress did not include a reduction for excess reserves in FY2010-FY2011, they did in FY2012.
During the period of solely "budget-based" funding formulas, utilization of both authorized vouchers and of available funding declined. Since the adoption of a cost and utilization-based funding model, utilization has begun to increase again. As utilization increases, the cost of the program to Congress increases. This presents a set of policy tradeoffs between the goal of cost containment and the goal of serving as many eligible families as possible. The Section 8 voucher renewal funding formula continues to be a source of debate in the annual appropriations cycle, as well as in Section 8 voucher reform bills, which have contained proposals for statutory formula changes. This report describes changes in the formula included in appropriations bills for FY2003 to the present. |
crs_RS22489 | crs_RS22489_0 | One of these content protection schemes is the Audio Protection Flag (APF or "audio flag"), which would protect the content of digital radio transmissions against unauthorized dissemination and reproduction. Background
What Is Digital Audio? Digital audio technologies include digital radio broadcasts (such as high-definition radio, or "HD Radio"), satellite radio, Internet radio, compact discs, and MP3-format music files. Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits any person from circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work. The "Audio Flag"
One form of DRM technology that may be used to protect the content of digital audio transmissions from unauthorized distribution and reproduction is the "audio flag." Those advocating the use of an audio flag for digital radio programming include musicians, songwriters, record labels, and other providers of audio content that could be broadcast to the public through digital transmissions. Rights That May Be Affected by the Audio Flag Proposal
Critics of the audio flag proposal raise concerns that such a government-mandated measure may stifle technological innovation and restrict the rights of consumers to record broadcast radio—conduct that, according to audio flag opponents, is protected by the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, as well as "fair use" principles in copyright law. Two bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress that would have delegated such authority; these may represent legislative approaches that could be taken in the 110 th Congress. H.R. 4861, the Audio Broadcast Flag Licensing Act of 2006
This bill would have empowered the FCC to promulgate regulations governing the licensing of "all technologies necessary to make transmission and reception devices" for digital broadcast and satellite radio. S. 2686, the Digital Content Protection Act of 2006
Title IV, Subtitle C of S. 2686 would have granted the FCC the authority to issue "regulations governing the indiscriminate redistribution of audio content with respect to—digital radio broadcasts, satellite digital radio transmissions, and digital radios." | Protecting audio content broadcasted by digital and satellite radios from unauthorized dissemination and reproduction is a priority for producers and owners of those copyrighted works. One technological measure that has been discussed is the Audio Protection Flag (APF or "audio flag"). The audio flag is a special signal that would be imbedded into digital audio radio transmissions, permitting only authorized devices to play back copyrighted audio transmissions or allowing only limited copying and retention of the content. Several bills introduced in the 109th Congress would have granted the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to promulgate regulations to implement the audio flag. The parties most likely affected by any audio flag regime (including music copyright owners, digital radio broadcasters, stereo equipment manufacturers, and consumers) are divided as to the anticipated degree and scope of the impact that a government-mandated copyright protection scheme would have on the "fair use" rights of consumers to engage in private, noncommercial home recording. Critics of the audio flag proposal are concerned about its effect on technological innovation. However, proponents of the audio flag feel that such digital rights management (DRM) technology is needed to thwart piracy or infringement of intellectual property rights in music, sports commentary and coverage, and other types of copyrighted content that is transmitted to the public by emerging high-definition digital radio services (HD Radio) and satellite radio broadcasters.
This report provides a brief explanation of the audio flag and its relationship to digital audio radio broadcasts, and summarizes legislative proposals considered by the 109th Congress, including H.R. 4861 (Audio Broadcast Flag Licensing Act of 2006) and S. 2686 (Digital Content Protection Act of 2006), that would have authorized its adoption. Although not enacted, these two bills represent approaches that may be taken in the 110th Congress to authorize the use of an audio flag for protecting broadcast digital audio content. |
crs_RL32149 | crs_RL32149_0 | Brief History of the Cloture Rule
Proposals to limit Senate debate are as old as the Senate itself. The most important debate-limiting procedure enacted was the adoption in 1917 of the "cloture rule," codified in paragraph 2 of Senate Rule XXII. Under the current version of this rule, a process for ending debate on a given measure or matter may be set in motion following a super-majority vote of the Senate. Proposed Changes to Cloture Procedure
Concern by some Senators over an inability to halt debate and obtain a confirmation vote on several pending judicial nominations led to a renewed interest in the 108 th Congress and the 109 th Congress in amending the Senate cloture rule. Senator Walter F. Mondale observed, " ... the Rule XXII experience was significant because for the first time in history, a Vice President and a clear majority of the Senate established that the Senate may, at the beginning of a new Congress and unencumbered by the rules of previous Senates, adopt its own rules by majority vote as a constitutional right. His resolution ( S.Res. Under S.Res. Miller Proposals
Two other proposals to amend the cloture rule were introduced in the 108 th Congress by Senator Zell Miller. 138 , except where the Frist resolution would have applied only to presidential nominations, Senator Miller's proposal to have a gradually declining threshold for invoking cloture would have applied to all Senate business except changes to the Senate's standing rules. Before the cloture rule was enacted in 1917, it was not possible to stop debate without achieving unanimous consent. This would presumably also apply to amendments to the Senate's standing orders. | Paragraph 2 of Senate Rule XXII, also known as the "cloture rule," was adopted in 1917. It established a procedure, amended several times over the intervening years, by which the Senate may limit debate and act on a pending measure or matter. Aside from unanimous consent agreements, cloture is the only way the Senate can limit debate.
Recently, concern by some Senators over an inability to halt consideration and obtain a confirmation vote on several pending judicial nominations has led to a renewed interest in amending the Senate cloture rule. One option, called the "nuclear option" by some and the "constitutional" option by others, would seek to use a ruling by the presiding officer or a majority vote of the chamber to end debate outside of the terms of Rule XXII. It is possible that this option may be attempted in the 109th Congress.
Several measures were introduced in the 108th Congress to amend the cloture rule. S.Res. 138, which was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist would have established a diminishing threshold for invoking cloture on presidential nominations that were subject to Senate approval. S.Res. 85, which was introduced by Senator Zell Miller, would have applied the same idea to all Senate business, with the exception of amendments to the Senate's standing rules. A third proposal, S.Res. 249, also authored by Senator Miller, called for the elimination of the cloture rule altogether.
This report provides a brief history of the Senate cloture rule, outlines past and present proposals to amend it, and presents arguments both in support of, and in opposition to, the Senate's tradition of unlimited debate.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22772 | crs_RS22772_0 | Proponents view the treaty as bringing what are already very close allies even closer together by facilitating defense trade between the two states and members of their respective defense industries. The Strategic and Political Context and U.S. Interests
The treaty would further draw Australia into a very small circle of closely trusted allies that have stood with the United States not only in past conflicts but also in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would do this at a time when the United States is increasingly unpopular in the world. This is quite remarkable given that Australia is a longstanding treaty ally that has fought alongside the United States in most of America's wars and established a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States in 2005. By using a treaty, which must be ratified by the Senate, to redefine defense trade cooperation with Australia, the Administration appears to some to be putting in place an arrangement that avoids the existing regulatory structure. | The United States and Australia signed a Treaty on Defense Trade Cooperation in September 2007 that would facilitate defense trade and cooperation between the two nations. On the strategic level, the treaty would further develop ties between two very close allies who have fought together in most of America's conflicts, including most recently in Iraq and in Afghanistan. This treaty is proposed at a time when the United States has found few friends that have been willing to work as closely with the United States in its efforts to contain militant anti-Western Islamists as Australia has proven to be. The treaty with Australia needs to be ratified by the U. S. Senate to come into force. |
crs_RS21573 | crs_RS21573_0 | Introduction
Four types of tax-advantaged accounts can be used to pay for qualifying unreimbursed medical expenses: Health Care Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs), Health Reimbursement Accounts (HRAs), Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), and Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). This report describes current law surrounding these accounts and provides a side-by-side comparison of their key features. Although the accounts differ in many ways, each account contains contributed income that the account holder uses to pay for qualifying medical expenses. Background
In general, qualifying medical expenses are defined in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) at Section 213(d) and typically include deductibles, copayments, and goods and/or services not covered by insurance. The goods and/or services can include medical services rendered by physicians, surgeons, dentists, and other medical practitioners. The costs of equipment, supplies, devices, and prescription drugs are also qualifying expenses. In each case, the reimbursement is for qualifying medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance. Flexible Spending Accounts
FSAs are employer-established arrangements that reimburse employees for qualifying expenses. FSAs are usually funded through salary reduction agreements in compliance with Section 125(i) of the IRC, under which employees receive lower monetary wages in exchange for equivalent contributions to their flexible spending accounts. Employers can choose one of three mutually exclusive policies for the treatment of contributions in any given year that were not used to reimburse qualifying medical treatment in that year:
employees forfeit unused balances at the end of the year, employees have a grace period for additional claims of up to 2½ months after the end of the year (i.e., so medical expenses incurred by March 15, 2013, could be reimbursed from the FSA from the 2012 contribution), or employees have a carry-over period where they can transfer up to $500 in unused contributions into an FSA for the next plan year; the employer may specify a lower carry-over amount. Health Reimbursement Accounts
HRAs are employer-established accounts used to reimburse employees and in some instances former employees for qualifying medical expenses. Health reimbursement accounts are sometimes termed health reimbursement arrangements . However, contributions cannot be made through the employees' salary reduction agreements; only employers may contribute. Health Savings Accounts
HSAs are tax-exempt accounts that are used to pay for qualifying medical expenses. Unlike FSAs and HRAs, they are established by individuals with an insurance plan meeting certain criteria. The principal difference between HSAs and MSAs is that MSA eligibility is limited to people who are self-employed or employed by a small employer (50 or fewer employees, on average). Account Usage
Data limitations make it difficult to compare measures of account usage across the four accounts. According to the BLS survey, 40% of all civilian workers in 2012 had access to a health care FSA. Unlike with FSAs, those who hold HSAs must have HDHPs. According to a survey of private employers conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research & Educational Trust (KFF/HRET) in 2012, 26% of firms offering health benefits offered an HSA-qualified HDHP. | Four types of tax-advantaged accounts can be used to pay for unreimbursed qualifying medical expenses: health care flexible spending accounts (FSAs), health reimbursement accounts (HRAs), health savings accounts (HSAs), and medical savings accounts (MSAs). Qualifying unreimbursed medical expenses are defined in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and typically include deductibles, copayments, and goods and/or services not covered by insurance. The goods and/or services can include medical services rendered by physicians, surgeons, dentists, and other medical practitioners. The costs of equipment, supplies, diagnostic devices, and prescription drugs are also qualifying medical expenses.
Although these four tax-advantaged health accounts share some common features, they also differ in important respects. This report provides brief summaries of the tax-exempt accounts and compares them with respect to eligibility, contribution limits, use of funds, and other characteristics for tax year 2013. A basic discussion of the four accounts is followed by a side-by-side comparison of their key features. The accounts can be summarized as follows, where all accounts reimburse qualifying medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance.
FSAs are employer-established accounts that reimburse employees for qualifying expenses. They are usually funded through salary reduction agreements under which employees receive lower monetary wages in exchange for equivalent contributions to their FSAs. HRAs are employer-established arrangements that reimburse employees for qualifying expenses. Contributions cannot be made through the employees' salary reduction agreements; only employers may contribute. Health reimbursement accounts and health reimbursement arrangements are synonyms. HSAs are savings accounts that the account holders use to pay for qualifying expenses. They are established by individuals who must hold high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) in order to establish or contribute to the HSA. Contributions to the accounts can be made by any individual or firm. MSAs are accounts that the account holders use to pay for qualifying expenses. They were established by individuals who held high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) in order to establish or contribute to the MSA. Individuals generally cannot open MSAs after December 31, 2007, but those who had accounts by this date may maintain them. MSA eligibility was limited to people who were self-employed or employed by an employer with fewer than 50 employees. Contributions may be made by the employer or account holder, but not both in the same year.
The report concludes with a brief discussion of the usage in these four accounts. Comparing usage is difficult because no single data source contains comparable information on all four accounts and the years of data availability differ across data source. In broad terms, 40% of all civilian workers in 2012 had access to a health care flexible spending account. Of those private firms offering health benefits in 2012, 26% offered an HSA-qualified HDHP. |
crs_R44012 | crs_R44012_0 | Tax expenditures—revenue losses associated with targeted provisions outside the normal tax code—are a long-standing feature of the U.S. income tax code. In some ways, tax expenditures resemble direct spending. They both have similar budgetary effects and provide incentives that alter the allocation of resources. Tax expenditures, like direct spending, are one of the ways that the federal government plays a role in shaping the economy. Tax expenditures, however, do not regularly receive the same level of scrutiny as direct spending programs. Also, unlike direct spending programs, the revenue loss associated with most tax expenditures is only limited by eligibility—much like mandatory spending programs. A consequence of the limited oversight placed on tax expenditures is that activities may be supported by tax expenditures that have insufficient political support for funding through a direct spending program. Tax expenditures are a common target when base-broadening tax reform is pursued—like with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-514 ). This may be the result of tax expenditures being defined as being outside the normal tax code—making them a clear source for base broadening. As a result, tax expenditures are generally tax provisions that are not structural features of the income tax or necessary to measure income accurately. As defined in the Congressional Budget Act, the concept of tax expenditure refers to the corporate and individual income taxes. One, the distribution of tax expenditures is skewed slightly away from corporations. Second, most of the revenue lost comes from relatively few tax expenditures, with the top 10 individual tax expenditures accounting for roughly 66% of the forgone revenue from individual tax expenditures. As a result, comparisons using Figure 3 should be made based upon the relative distance between the levels of tax expenditures and spending over the time period. Some Tax Expenditures Have Broad Based Support
Tax expenditures reduce the taxes owed by a large number of taxpayers each year. | Tax expenditures—revenue losses associated with targeted provisions that move the income tax away from a "theoretical normal" tax system—are a long-standing feature of the U.S. tax code. In some ways, tax expenditures resemble direct spending programs. They both have similar budgetary effects and provide incentives that alter the allocation of resources. Hence, tax expenditures, like direct spending, are one of the ways that the federal government plays a role in shaping the economy.
Tax expenditures, however, do not regularly receive the same level of scrutiny as direct spending programs. Also, unlike direct spending programs, the revenue loss associated with most tax expenditures is only limited by eligibility—much like mandatory spending programs. A consequence of the limited oversight placed on tax expenditures is that activities may be supported by tax expenditures that have insufficient political support for funding through a direct spending program.
During the last 40 years, the level of tax expenditures has varied both as a function of taxes collected and as a share of the economy. One possible explanation for this variability is that tax reform historically reduces the scope of tax expenditures, which otherwise grow. Growth in tax expenditures has exceeded that of discretionary spending, but not mandatory spending, over the same time period.
The revenue loss from tax expenditures is concentrated among a limited number of provisions, with 66% of the revenue loss attributed to the top 10 tax expenditures against the individual income tax. In addition, the benefits of tax expenditures against the individual income tax are concentrated among upper-income taxpayers. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of selected tax expenditures found that 51% of the benefits went to the top 20% of taxpayers.
Tax expenditures are a common target when base-broadening tax reform is pursued—like with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). This may be the result of tax expenditures being defined as being outside the normal tax code—making them a clear source for base-broadening. However, there are impediments to base broadening by eliminating or reducing tax expenditures, as some may serve important purposes, others are important for distributional reasons, and many are technically difficult to change or are broadly used by the public and quite popular. |
crs_RS21835 | crs_RS21835_0 | The terms are rather general, and the White House determines whether a trip is for official or political purposes, or for a combination of the two. The travel policies of specific Administrations concerning the reimbursement of expenses for unofficial travel generally are not publicly available. However, the Reagan Administration established written guidelines in 1982 to determine when the President, Vice President, and any assistants accompanying them on military aircraft travel at government expense and when they, or the political organizations on whose behalf they travel, are to reimburse the government with the equivalent of the airfare that they would have had to pay had they traveled on commercial airlines. It appears likely that subsequent Administrations have used the Reagan Administration guidelines as a foundation for their own travel policies. Official and Unofficial Travel
When White House personnel are on official travel, certain personal expenses, which include per diem (food and lodging), car rentals, and other incidentals, are paid by the government. On such trips, they pay for their own food, lodging, and other incidental expenses. When travel involves both official and political functions, the White House uses a formula to determine how much airfare is to be paid by the traveler, and how any per diem and other travel-related costs are to be paid by the government. Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a trip, or part of a trip, should be characterized as official or unofficial. Security considerations are also the primary reason for use of military aircraft by the Vice President and First Lady. | For security and other reasons, the President, Vice President, and First Lady use military aircraft when they travel. The White House generally categorizes the trips as fulfilling either official or political functions. Often, a trip involves both official and political, or unofficial, activities. When a trip is for an official function, the government pays all costs, including per diem (food and lodging), car rentals, and other incidental expenses. When a trip is for political or unofficial purposes, those involved must pay for their own food and lodging and other related expenses, and they must also reimburse the government with the equivalent of the airfare that they would have paid had they used a commercial airline. When a trip involves both official and political activities, a formula determines the amount to be reimbursed for that part of the trip involving political activities. Whether a trip is for official or political purposes, the Air Force pays all operational and other costs incurred by the use of the aircraft. While the travel policies of specific Administrations concerning the reimbursement of expenses for unofficial travel generally are not publicly available, it appears that policy guidelines developed by the Reagan White House have served as a basis for the travel policies of subsequent Administrations. This report will be updated as new information becomes available. |
crs_RL33182 | crs_RL33182_0 | Introduction
Judge Samuel Alito, who has been nominated by President Bush to take retiring JusticeSandra Day O'Connor's seat as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has been a judge on theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit since 1990. This report examines his major judicialopinions, both for the majority and in dissent, in freedom of speech cases. (1) It also briefly discusses somecases in which he joined the opinion for the court but did not write it. (2) This report examines JudgeAlito's free speech opinions by subject area. | Judge Samuel Alito, who has been nominated by President Bush to take retiring JusticeSandra Day O'Connor's seat as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has been a judge on theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit since 1990. This report examines his major judicialopinions, both for the majority and in dissent, in freedom of speech cases. It also briefly discussessome cases in which he joined the opinion for the court but did not write it. This report examinesJudge Alito's free speech opinions by subject area. |
crs_R43223 | crs_R43223_0 | Introduction
Preventing the domestic workforce from being undermined by the employment of foreign workers and protecting foreign workers from exploitation have shaped federal law governing the hiring and employment of foreign workers by U.S. employers. In the United States, there are three main sources of labor protections for foreign workers: (1) the conditions imposed on employers hiring foreign workers through the DOL labor certification/attestation and DHS petition process; (2) federal labor laws stipulating that employers adhere to certain requirements governing wages and other conditions; and (3) private causes of action that foreign workers may have under state and local laws regarding labor, contracts, and torts. With a view towards clarifying the framework for foreign workers protections under federal laws, this report will briefly survey current federal laws related to foreign workers' rights, including immigration-related labor conditions and federal labor laws. In addition, this report will take note of private causes of action that foreign workers may have under various state and local laws. Federal Immigration Laws
Protections for foreign workers are generally provided pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and are strongest for nonimmigrant (i.e., temporary) workers in visa categories generally associated with lower-skilled occupations, such as H-2A agricultural workers and H-2B forestry/logging workers, since such workers are perceived as more vulnerable to exploitation and less likely to have sufficient resources to enforce their rights effectively. Employers who desire to hire foreign workers who are not already authorized to work in the United States, in either immigrant or nonimmigrant employment-based visa classes, must follow a two-step process. Responsible for administering and approving labor certification applications/attestations submitted by employers, the DOL generally has authority over non-compliance with labor certifications. Following the election, Sure-Tan asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the precursor to the DHS immigration divisions, to investigate the immigration status of some of the employees who voted in the election. The Court revisited the issue of backpay awards in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , a 2002 case involving the termination of undocumented workers who supported a union organizing campaign. Also, foreign guest workers have sued employers for claims under state laws regarding tort and breach of contract in addition to state labor laws paralleling federal laws on wages and other working conditions. Legislation in the 113th Congress
Legislation in the 113 th Congress would reform foreign guest worker visa categories to strengthen worker protections while increasing flexibility and responsiveness to employer needs. | One challenge of immigration law has been to balance the interests of the domestic workforce with employer interests in hiring foreign workers who are not already authorized to work in the United States while preventing the exploitation of foreign workers. There are three main sources of labor protections for foreign workers in the United States: (1) the conditions imposed on employers hiring foreign workers through the Department of Labor (DOL) labor certification/attestation and DHS petition process; (2) federal labor laws stipulating that employers adhere to certain requirements governing wages and other conditions; and (3) worker rights under state and local laws regarding labor, contracts, and torts.
Streamlining and easing certain labor and immigration requirements that are perceived as unnecessarily onerous and insufficiently flexible may benefit certain employers with immediate labor needs. On the other hand, stronger protections for foreign workers may not only guard those workers from exploitation and abuse but may also serve to protect the interests of the domestic workforce by reducing to some employers the attractiveness of hiring foreign workers who are not already authorized to work in the United States. Legislative proposals to reform employment-based visa programs in the current Congress reflect some of these tensions.
This report will discuss the DOL labor certification/attestation and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) petition process as well as aspects of the applicability of federal labor laws to foreign workers. It will also briefly address state and local laws regarding labor, contract, and torts that sometimes provide foreign workers with additional rights. Federal labor laws that apply regardless of immigration status, including those concerning health and safety and employment discrimination, as well as state occupational certification and licensing requirements are outside the scope of this report.
For a comprehensive look at employment-based immigration and related federal labor policies and programs, see CRS Report RL33977, Immigration of Foreign Workers: Labor Market Tests and Protections, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32044, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest Worker Programs, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42434, Immigration of Temporary Lower-Skilled Workers: Current Policy and Related Issues, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43161, Agricultural Guest Workers: Legislative Activity in the 113th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34739, Temporary Farm Labor: The H-2A Program and the U.S. Department of Labor's Proposed Changes in the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS21186, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB and Backpay Awards to Undocumented Aliens, by [author name scrubbed]. (pdf) |
crs_R43927 | crs_R43927_0 | T he U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has a statutory mission to ensure the safety of all food except for meat, poultry, and certain egg products over which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has regulatory oversight. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the FDA has the authority to regulate the manufacturing, processing, and labeling of food, with the primary goal of promoting food safety. Congress has vested the FDA with the authority to take both administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The agency initiates and carries out administrative enforcement actions while judicial enforcement actions, including seizures and injunctions, require some type of involvement by the federal courts. While the FDA gathers information to recommend a judicial enforcement action, the Department of Justice represents the FDA before a federal court. This report focuses on the statutory authority for both the FDA and federal courts to initiate the following judicial enforcement actions: injunctions, seizures, and criminal prosecution. For more information about FDA administrative enforcement actions, see CRS Report R43794, Food Recalls and Other FDA Administrative Enforcement Actions , by [author name scrubbed]. Injunctions
An injunction is a civil judicial order initiated against an industry participant to stop or prevent a violation of the FFDCA and to halt the flow of violative products in interstate commerce. An injunction also provides an opportunity for the involved parties to correct the conditions that triggered the violation before the FDA takes additional enforcement action. The FFDCA grants federal district courts with the jurisdiction to issue such an order. The standard for a statutory injunction initiated by the government, however, differs from the injunction standard for private litigants. Seizure
Under Section 304(a)(1) of the FFDCA, the government may seize an article of food in interstate commerce that is adulterated or misbranded. A seizure is a civil action used by the federal government when the removal of adulterated or misbranded goods from interstate commerce is necessary to reduce consumer accessibility to those goods in order to protect public health. Pursuant to the arrest warrant, a U.S. Criminal Prosecution
The FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations conducts and coordinates criminal investigations and prosecutions against individuals and corporations for violations of the FFDCA. Potential defendants of a criminal prosecution are strictly liable for these violations. The section then analyzes the Supreme Court's Park doctrine, which grants the government the ability to prosecute both corporations and corporate officials. When prosecuting an FFDCA violation, the government does not need to prove awareness of the wrongdoing—the conventional requirement for criminal conduct. The government charged both the corporation and the defendant with violating the FFDCA. Related Legislation in the 114th Congress
Food safety and oversight, including enforcement actions such as those described above, are of a continual interest to Congress. 609 and S. 287 ) introduced in the 114 th Congress proposing the restructuring of federal oversight of food would impact the federal government's enforcement of various food safety issues. H.R. | The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has a statutory mission to ensure the safety of all food except for meat, poultry, and certain egg products over which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has regulatory oversight. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the FDA has the authority to regulate the manufacturing, processing, and labeling of food, with the primary goal of promoting food safety.
Congress has vested the FDA with the authority to take both administrative and judicial enforcement actions. The agency initiates and carries out administrative enforcement actions while judicial enforcement actions, including seizures and injunctions, require some type of involvement by the federal courts. While the FDA gathers information to recommend a judicial enforcement action, the Department of Justice represents the FDA before a federal court. This report focuses on the statutory authority for both the FDA and federal courts to initiate the following judicial enforcement actions: injunctions, seizures, and criminal prosecution. For more information about FDA's administrative enforcement actions, see CRS Report R43794, Food Recalls and Other FDA Administrative Enforcement Actions, by [author name scrubbed].
Injunctions: An injunction is a civil judicial order initiated against an industry participant to stop or prevent a violation of the FFDCA and to halt the flow of violative products in interstate commerce. An injunction also provides an opportunity for the industry participant to correct the conditions that triggered the violation before the FDA takes additional enforcement action. The FFDCA grants federal district courts with the jurisdiction to issue such an order. Unlike the legal standard for injunctions for private litigants, the government does not need to prove irreparable harm for a court to grant an injunction.
Seizure: The government may seize an article of food that is adulterated or misbranded in interstate commerce. A seizure is a civil action used by the federal government when the removal of adulterated or misbranded goods from interstate commerce is necessary to reduce consumer accessibility to those goods. The government proceeds by filing a Complaint for Forfeiture and obtaining a warrant for the arrest directing the U.S. Marshal to seize the article of food.
Criminal Prosecution: The FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations conducts and coordinates criminal investigations and prosecutions for violations of the FFDCA. Potential defendants of a criminal prosecution are strictly liable for violations of the act. The government grants potential defendants notice and a hearing before proceeding with any criminal investigations. The government may prosecute both corporations and corporate officials for violations of the FFDCA under the Park doctrine, which grants the government the ability to prosecute both corporations and corporate officials. The FFDCA also outlines various penalties for persons and/or companies found guilty of violations of the act.
Food safety and oversight, including enforcement actions such as those described above, are of a continual interest to Congress. H.R. 609 and S. 287, introduced in the 114th Congress, propose restructuring federal oversight of food safety and would impact the federal government's enforcement of various food safety issues. |
crs_R41642 | crs_R41642_0 | Subsequent Congresses have extended this authority. This statutory authority expires on March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills ( S. 3216 and H.R. 5855 ) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013. The DHS has responded to the House-passed funding level, stating that this level of appropriations would
drastically curtail DHS's ability to: 1) implement the statutory and regulatory requirements for the security of high-risk chemical facilities as specified in CFATS; 2) continue development of the proposed Ammonium Nitrate Security Program; and 3) fully implement the program improvements identified in the ISCD Action Plan. Some issues, such as whether DHS has sufficient funds to adequately oversee chemical facility security; whether federal chemical facility security regulations should preempt state regulations; and how much chemical security information individuals may share outside of the facility and the federal government, will exist even if Congress extends the existing statutory authority without changes. Rate of Inspection
As of September 2012, two chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of security measures by DHS. Several factors likely complicate and slow the inspection process. Federal Preemption of State Activities
The original statute did not expressly address the issue of federal preemption of state and local chemical facility security statute or regulation. Suggestions for such changes have included reducing the amount of chemical stored onsite and changing the chemicals used. Congress might also take legislative action to extend further the existing statutory authority by revising or repealing its sunset provision; codify the existing regulations; amend the existing statutory authority; address existing programmatic activities; or restrict or expand the scope of chemical facility security regulation. In the case where Congress allows the statutory authority to expire, but Congress appropriates funds for enforcing the CFATS program, DHS will likely be able to enforce the CFATS regulations. The removal of the sunset date would maintain the current discretion granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop regulations and might allow assessment of the efficacy of the existing regulations. The DHS and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have called for additional authorities to regulate water and wastewater treatment facilities:
The Department of Homeland Security and the Environmental Protection Agency believe that there is an important gap in the framework for regulating the security of chemicals at water and wastewater treatment facilities in the United States. The Senate Committee on Appropriations, in the report accompanying S. 3216 , Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, directs the DHS Deputy Secretary to continue to report on efforts to harmonize chemical security responsibilities. Congress could choose to continue the current policy or provide DHS with statutory authority regarding inherently safer technologies at regulated chemical facilities. Congress might choose to amend the existing statutory authority to address policy concerns. 112-175 ) extends the statutory authority through March 27, 2013, and provides appropriations for CFATS implementation. Congress is considering extending the existing authority through authorization legislation. 901
H.R. H.R. 908 , the Full Implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act, was reported as amended by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 916
H.R. 2055/P.L. S. 473
S. 473 , the Continuing Chemical Facilities Antiterrorism Security Act of 2011, was reported with an amendment by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 225
H.R. 225 , the Chemical Facility Security Improvement Act of 2011, was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on Homeland Security. 2890
H.R. | The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 112th Congress has extended this authority through March 27, 2013. The Obama Administration has requested extension of this authority until October 4, 2013. Congressional policymakers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider legislation establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current law's effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of federal funding for chemical facility security exacerbate the tension between continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority.
Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS's effectiveness in implementing the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. No chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection. Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is sufficient to address this homeland security issue.
Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and efforts; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the range of chemical facilities identified by DHS; and the ability of inherently safer technologies to achieve security goals.
The 112th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might substantively change the current regulation's implementation, scope, or impact by amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical facility security to state and local governments.
Both appropriation and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress address chemical facility security. P.L. 112-175 extended the existing authority until March 27, 2013. Both FY2013 homeland security appropriations bills (S. 3216 and H.R. 5855, as passed by the House) would extend the existing authority until October 4, 2013. Authorizing legislation includes H.R. 225; H.R. 901, reported as amended by the House Committee on Homeland Security and referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; H.R. 908, reported as amended by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; H.R. 916; H.R. 2890; S. 473, reported as amended by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; S. 709; and S. 711. |
crs_RS22079 | crs_RS22079_0 | The Kurdish regional authority effectively split into KDP and PUK entities. The Kurds welcomed the U.S. invasion of Iraq and have cooperated with U.S. political and military officials in Iraq since. In return for what they assert has been their consistent pro-U.S. orientation, the Kurds have sought U.S. support for their positions in their various disputes with the other groups in Iraq, and have sought to ensure that the planned December 2011 end to U.S. military involvement does not cause the United States to abandon Iraq, and the Kurds. The Kurdish region fully participated in the Iraqi elections of January 30, 2005—which included provincial council elections nationwide and elections for the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), as well as national elections for an interim government. A draft was adopted by the KNA on June 25, 2009. Major Issues Between Baghdad and the Kurds
The 2005 constitution and post-Saddam politics—coupled with the Kurdish leaders' close relations with the United States—gave the Kurds substantial political strength. However, that strength caused Iraqi minorities in the north, Iraq's neighbors, and Iraq's Arab leaders to perceive the Kurds as asserting excessive demands and threatening Iraq's integrity. Kurdish Strength in Baghdad Reduced by March 7, 2010 Elections
The next phase of KRG-government relations is being shaped by the outcome of the March 7, 2010, parliamentary elections. However, Gorran, the Kurdish opposition group, ran on a separate slate, as is another Kurdish faction called the Kurdistan Islamic Union. As a result of the elections, many observers assess that the main Kurdish factions are no longer "kingmakers" in central government politics. The number of seats held by the two main factions was reduced from 53 in the 2006-2010 Assembly to 43 seats in the current Assembly. As a result, the two main Kurdish parties have not taken clear or definitive positions on the composition of the next full term government, even though nearly seven months have elapsed since the election and no executive branch has been chosen. (For more information on efforts to form the next executive, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks , by [author name scrubbed]). The Independence Question
The question of outright Kurdish independence is not an active source of friction between the Iraqi Kurds and the central government at this time, but it remains a concern of Iraq's neighbors that have Kurdish minorities. Because Sunni Arabs fully participated in the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, the Kurdish influence in the two provinces of Nineveh and Diyala—the location of several disputed terrorities—was sharply reduced. The Kurds refuse to recognize Nujaifi's authority in Kurdish-inhabited areas of the province. The 2009 version presumably contains more eligible Kurds, because Kurds have moved back to northern Iraq as time has elapsed since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Eruption of Territorial Tensions
Despite the Kurd-Arab tensions in the north, clashes between the pe shmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were defused with the help of the U.S. military and U.S. diplomats in Baghdad. However, the then overall commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Gen. Raymond Odierno, became sufficiently concerned about the tensions that in August 2009, he unveiled a plan to build confidence between the security forces of the two sides. | The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq has been relatively peaceful and prosperous since the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, the Iraqi Kurds' political autonomy, and territorial and economic demands, have caused friction with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other Arab leaders of Iraq, and with Christian and other minorities in the north. As the United States transitions to a support role in Iraq, these tensions are assessed by U.S. commanders as having the potential to erode the security gains that have taken place in Iraq since 2007. Some U.S. officials want to establish clear policies and provisions to contain these frictions in advance of the expected completion of the U.S. military departure from Iraq at the end of 2011. Turkey and Iran were skeptical about Kurdish autonomy in Iraq but have reconciled themselves to this reality and have emerged as major investors in the Kurdish region of Iraq.
The major territorial, financial, and political issues between the Kurds and the central government do not appear close to resolution. Tensions increased after Kurdish representation in two key mixed provinces was reduced by the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. The disputes nearly erupted into all-out violence between Kurdish militias and central government forces in mid-2009, and the Kurds continue not to recognize the authority of the Sunni Arab governor of Nineveh Province in Kurdish-inhabited areas of the province. The low-level clashes in 2009 caused the U.S. military to propose new U.S. deployments designed to build confidence between Kurdish and government forces; joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish militia patrols began in January 2010. The Kurds also perceive that their role as "kingmakers" in Iraq's central government - their ability to throw their parliamentary votes toward one side or another – was reduced by the March 7, 2010 elections which saw the seats held by the major Kurdish factions lowered from previous levels.
The Kurds' political clout in Baghdad is further reduced by the political ferment in the Kurdish region itself. The Kurdish region voted for president and for members of the Kurdistan National Assembly on July 25, 2009. The results, in which an opposition list won almost 25% of the vote, have threatened the previously iron grip on the politics and economy of the region exercised by the two main factions—the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The two main factions competed as a joint list in the March 7, 2010, national elections for the next full-term government. However, the Kurdish opposition competed separately and won several seats on its own—parliamentary votes which the opposition might not necessarily place at the disposal of the mainstream Kurdish leaders for the purpose of bargaining with Iraq's Arabs. For more on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40745 | crs_R40745_0 | Introduction
Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111 th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs will require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans. The first is to improve patient safety by eliminating medical errors and other adverse events. The final challenge is to eliminate unnecessary and ineffective care that compromises quality, drives up costs, and neglects the needs of patients. Health Care Delivery Reform
While primarily focused on health care financing issues, the health reform debate has embraced a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on (1) expanding the primary care workforce, (2) encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and (3) strengthening the role of chronic care management. Drivers of Reform
Health care delivery reform cannot happen unless mechanisms are in place to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, perhaps most importantly, alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Congress took an important first step toward reforming the health care delivery system when it enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) in February 2009. It also established an interagency advisory panel to help coordinate and support the research. In addition, ARRA incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) for the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders. 3200 ). The legislation was jointly developed by the House Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor, which share jurisdiction over the federal health statutes. H.R. Finally, Division C, entitled "Public Health and Workforce Development," includes a series of provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. The House legislation also would create a multi-billion dollar Public Health Investment Fund to provide additional funds for the programs. Medicare subsidizes medical residency programs through its Graduate Medical Education (GME) program, which makes two types of payments to teaching hospitals. National Health Service Corps
This section would amend PHSA Sec. Title VII, Part D, Sec. The first such provision would create a new loan repayment program, analogous to the NHSC program, for individuals who agree to practice in medically underserved areas whose health care needs are not being met by the NHSC. Title VIII, Sec. Medicare and Medicaid Nursing Homes
Secs. Provisions in the Public Health Service Act
Sec. Study of Optometrists and Funding for Optometry
This section would require the Secretary to conduct a study addressing, among other things: (1) the projected need for primary eye and vision care, including among underserved, rural, and senior populations; (2) the role and impact of optometrists in the early diagnosis and treatment of glaucoma, cataracts, diabetes, and other conditions; (3) whether optometrists should be recognized and supported as primary care providers; (4) the existence and extent of barriers to the recruitment and participation of underrepresented minorities in optometry, including the potential role played by the lack of eligibility of optometrists, optometry students, and facilities for certain federal health programs; and (5) federal support for clinical optometric education and options for enhancing that support to address barriers to underrepresented minority recruitment and participation in optometry and to improve access to primary eye and vision care, especially in underserved and rural areas. | Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. But efforts to improve access to care and control rising health care costs also will require changes to the health care delivery system. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans. Major challenges to the delivery of high-quality care include improving patient safety by eliminating medical errors, eradicating disparities in care, reducing the burden of chronic disease, and eliminating unnecessary and ineffective care that compromises quality, drives up costs, and neglects the needs of patients.
The health reform debate has embraced a number of proposals to address these challenges and improve the delivery of health care services. They include initiatives to encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles, and to change the way that physicians and other providers treat and manage disease. Delivery reform proposals focus on expanding the primary care workforce, encouraging the use of clinical preventive services, and strengthening the role of chronic care management. However, health care delivery reform cannot happen unless mechanisms are in place to drive change in the systems of care. Key drivers include performance measurement and the public dissemination of performance information, comparative effectiveness research, adoption of health information technology, and, most importantly, the alignment of payment incentives with high-quality care.
Congress took an important first step toward reforming the health care delivery system when it enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) in February 2009. ARRA included $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research and established an interagency advisory panel to help coordinate and support the research. It also incorporated the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which is intended to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT) for the electronic sharing of clinical data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care stakeholders.
The health reform legislation (H.R. 3200) introduced in the House and approved by the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. H.R. 3200 would amend and expand on many of the existing health workforce programs authorized under Title VII (health professions) and Title VIII (nursing) of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). It would create a Public Health Workforce Corps and establish a new loan repayment program, modeled on the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), for individuals who agree to practice in medically underserved areas with unmet health care needs. The House bill also would make a number of changes to the Medicare Graduate Medical Education (GME) program, which subsidizes medical residency programs, in part to encourage the training of more primary care physicians.
In addition, H.R. 3200 would bolster quality improvement activities, including performance measurement, and broaden Medicare and Medicaid coverage of clinical preventive services. The legislation would establish a multi-billion dollar Public Health Investment Fund to provide additional funding for these and other new programs and activities. |
crs_R45157 | crs_R45157_0 | What Is a "Traditional" Budget Resolution? The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Budget Act) establishes a requirement for Congress to adopt a budget resolution each year. The idea of a "traditional" budget resolution means a budget resolution as defined by the Budget Act, which specifies the way that a budget resolution shall be developed and considered and what components it must include. Provisions triggering the reconciliation process . The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123), enacted February 9, 2018, amended the statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019. BBA 2018 comprised several other components as well, one of which was related to a congressional budget resolution for FY2019. The budget resolution provisions included in the BBA 2018 require the House and Senate Budget Committee chairs to each file a statement of budgetary levels, which would have effect in the respective chamber as if they had been included in a budget resolution. The existence of the BBA 2018 provisions, however, does not preclude Congress from acting on a traditional budget resolution for FY2019, so Congress still has the option to consider a budget resolution that differs from the levels and components included in the BBA 2018 budget resolution provisions. Are the Budget Resolution Provisions Included in the BBA 2018 Uncommon? In each case noted below, the levels required to be filed were baseline levels of spending and revenue that would occur if existing law were left unchanged. | The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123), enacted February 9, 2018, amended the statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019. BBA 2018 comprised several other components as well, one of which was related to a congressional budget resolution for FY2019. These BBA 2018 "budget resolution" provisions (which may be referred to as a "deemer" or a budget resolution substitute) provide the House and Senate with enforceable levels of spending and revenue for FY2019 in ways that a "traditional" budget resolution would. While it is not unusual for Congress to employ such budget resolution substitutes, these substitutes differ from a "traditional" budget resolution in several ways.
The idea of a "traditional" budget resolution means a budget resolution as defined by the Congressional Budget Act, which specifies the way that a budget resolution shall be developed and considered and what components it must include. Budget resolution substitutes, such as the one in the BBA 2018, are not developed or considered in the manner specified by the Congressional Budget Act, nor do they include all of the components required by the act. Further, traditional budget resolutions often reflect a budget plan that differs from current law, while substitutes such as the BBA 2018 provisions set budgetary levels that are a reflection of baseline levels of spending and revenue that would occur if existing law were left unchanged. Additionally, traditional budget resolutions often include provisions triggering the budget reconciliation process; substitute provisions do not.
These provisions, however, do not preclude Congress from acting on a traditional budget resolution for FY2019. This means that Congress still has the option to consider a budget resolution for FY2019 even if it differs from the levels and components included in the BBA 2018 budget resolution provisions. |
crs_R41422 | crs_R41422_0 | Introduction
Exclusive Rights of Copyright Holder
Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act grants a copyright holder the exclusive right to distribute copies of a copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. In addition to the general distribution right, Section 602(a) of the Copyright Act provides a copyright holder with the right to prohibit the importation into the United States of copies of a work that have been acquired outside the United States; such importation, if done without the authority of the copyright holder, is considered an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies of the work under § 106. Limitations on Rights of Copyright Holder
However, the Copyright Act's "first-sale" doctrine, codified at § 109(a), provides a limitation to the copyright holder's distribution right: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy … lawfully made under this title … is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy." Owners of copies of a copyrighted work that have been "lawfully made under" title 17 of the U.S. Code (where the Copyright Act is codified) are thus immunized from copyright infringement liability when they transfer ownership of those copies to other individuals. Gray-Market Goods
So-called "gray-market" goods are products that have been manufactured and purchased abroad and thereafter imported into the United States (without the authorization of the intellectual property holder) for resale to U.S. customers (usually at discounted prices) . Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A. Costco obtained authentic Omega watches from the "gray market"—from third parties that had purchased the watches from authorized Omega distributors overseas. While Omega had authorized the initial foreign sale of its watches, it did not authorize their importation into the United States or Costco's domestic sale of the watches. Omega sued Costco for infringing its distribution and importation rights under §§ 106(3) and 602(a) of the Copyright Act; Costco defended itself by arguing that the first sale doctrine, § 109(a), precludes Omega's infringement claims. Without explanation, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment to Costco on the basis of the first sale doctrine. Ninth Circuit's Opinion
In September 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to imported goods that were manufactured and first sold abroad. The appellate court reached this determination by asserting that copies of copyrighted works made and first sold outside the United States are not considered "lawfully made" within the meaning of § 109(a); thus, these copies are not subject to the first sale doctrine, and Costco is precluded from raising such defense to Omega's infringement claims. On December 13, 2010, the Court issued a per curiam opinion that simply stated: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court." The Court's action in Costco upholds the Ninth Circuit's ruling but does not establish controlling precedent for other federal circuits on the question of whether the copyright law's first sale doctrine applies to goods manufactured abroad and then imported into the United States. Conclusion
Because of the equal division of the Supreme Court in Costco , the Ninth Circuit's decision remains the law in that circuit, while other federal circuits are free to issue opinions that agree or conflict with the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court could revisit the legal question in a future case involving importation of gray-market goods. Also, Congress could consider legislation to clarify the relationship between the Copyright Act's § 109(a) first sale provision and the § 602(a)(2) importation right. | Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act grants a copyright holder the exclusive right to distribute copies of a copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. In addition, § 602(a) of the Copyright Act generally prohibits the importation into the United States, without the authority of the copyright holder, of copies of a work that have been acquired outside the United States; such importation is considered an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies of the work under § 106. However, the Copyright Act's "first-sale" doctrine, codified at § 109(a), provides a limitation to the copyright holder's distribution rights—it entitles the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work that has been "lawfully made under" title 17 of the U.S. Code (where the Copyright Act is codified) to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy, without the prior permission of the copyright holder. In other words, once a copyright holder agrees to sell particular copies of his work to others (constituting the "first sale" of such copies), the copyright holder may not thereafter further control subsequent transfers of ownership of those copies.
At issue in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A. was the scope of the first sale doctrine with respect to so-called "gray-market" goods—products that have been manufactured and purchased abroad and thereafter imported into the United States for resale at often discounted prices to U.S. customers. The case involved the sale by Costco of authentic Omega watches made in Switzerland. Costco had purchased these watches (which bear a copyrighted design on their underside) from third parties that had purchased the watches from authorized Omega distributors located abroad. While Omega had permitted the initial foreign sale of its watches, it had not authorized their importation into the United States or Costco's domestic sale of the watches. Omega sued Costco for infringing its distribution and importation rights under §§ 106(3) and 602(a) of the Copyright Act; Costco defended itself by arguing that the first sale doctrine, § 109(a), precluded Omega's infringement claims. In September 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Costco, holding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to imported goods that had been manufactured and first sold abroad. The appellate court reached this determination by asserting that copies of copyrighted works made and sold outside the United States are not considered "lawfully made" within the meaning of § 109(a); thus, these copies are not subject to the first sale doctrine, and Costco is precluded from raising such defense to Omega's infringement claims. In reaction to this decision, some observers expressed concern that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the first sale doctrine creates incentives for outsourcing, as manufacturers would desire to move production abroad of goods containing copyrighted aspects (thus avoiding the first sale doctrine's effect and providing the manufacturer with greater control over distribution of the goods).
On December 13, 2010, in a one sentence per curiam decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment due to a 4-4 tie vote among the participating justices (Justice Elena Kagan had recused herself because of her involvement in the case as U.S. Solicitor General prior to becoming a member of the Court). The Court's action in Costco Wholesale Corp. upholds the Ninth Circuit's ruling but does not establish controlling precedent for other federal circuits on the question of whether the copyright law's first sale doctrine applies to goods manufactured abroad and then imported into the United States. Therefore, those federal circuits are free to issue opinions that agree or conflict with the Ninth Circuit's judgment on this matter, and the Supreme Court could revisit the legal question in a future case. Also, Congress could consider legislation to clarify the relationship between the Copyright Act's § 109(a) first sale provision and the § 602(a)(2) importation right. |
crs_RL31065 | crs_RL31065_0 | The federal government has numerous programs to support forest management on state and private forestlands, primarily administered by the Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The House and Senate Agriculture Committees often examine these programs in the periodic legislation to reauthorize agriculture programs, commonly known as farm bills. Both the House ( H.R. 2642 ) and Senate ( S. 954 ) versions of the 2014 farm bill contain a forestry title (as did four of the previous five enacted farm bills) and also address forests and forestry practices in several other titles. Note that some programs are combined for funding purposes. Some programs provide assistance for protecting forestlands from wildfire, insects, diseases, and for preventing conversion of forests to non-forest uses (e.g., agriculture, residences). In addition, International Forestry has been included in this report, because (a) it provides technical assistance to other nations on forestry matters, and (b) it has often been funded out of S&PF appropriations. Some programs provide only technical assistance, which can range from relevant existing information to advice and aid on specific projects. Other programs provide financial assistance. Typically these programs are grants (with or without contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (with varying levels of matching contributions from recipients), although two programs have other "financial" provisions: (1) Forest Health Protection funds FS activities to survey and to control insects or diseases on state or private lands (with the consent and cooperation of the landowner); and (2) Forest Legacy includes federal purchase of lands or easements as well as grants to states. Historically, forestry assistance has included programs with cost-share assistance to private landowners for forestry practices on their lands, but the forestry-specific landowner assistance program created in the 2002 farm bill (the Forest Land Enhancement Program) was not reauthorized in the 2008 farm bill, and both the House and Senate versions of the 2014 farm bill propose to repeal the program. Section 8001 of the 2008 farm bill added a set of national priorities for Forest Stewardship of private forest conservation through federal support for state assistance. Assistance to private landowners is through the state agencies. Authorized funding is at "such funds as may be necessary" and does not terminate. To provide flexibility in implementing programs, states may request consolidated payments for all the authorized cooperative forestry assistance programs. Several programs provide financial and/or technical assistance through the states for planning and implementing forest management practices (e.g., tree planting, site preparation for reforestation, thinning, pruning, fertilizing, prescribed burning, and other activities) and sometimes practices to enhance other resources (e.g., restoring watersheds, improving wildlife habitat, and other activities). Appropriations for forestry assistance programs have fluctuated greatly since FY2000. The largest sustained levels of funding have been for the forest protection programs—forest health (for insect and disease identification and control), wildfire assistance, and forest legacy (for easements to prevent forest clearing). However, funding for all of those programs has been declining since FY2010. In comparison, forest management assistance funding has remained relatively constant. | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has numerous programs to support management of state and private forests. These programs are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees and are often examined in the periodic legislation to reauthorize agricultural programs, commonly known as farm bills. Both the House (H.R. 2642) and Senate (S. 954) versions of the 2014 farm bill contain a forestry title with provisions affecting forestry-specific assistance programs. Both versions of the farm bill propose to repeal, reauthorize, and modify some of these programs.
Forestry-specific assistance programs (in contrast to agriculture conservation programs that include forestry activities) are primarily administered by the USDA Forest Service (FS), with permanent authorization of funding as needed. The House version of the 2014 farm bill (H.R. 2642) proposes to eliminate the permanent authorization for many of these programs. Some programs provide technical assistance—information, advice, and aid on specific projects. Other programs provide financial assistance, usually through grants (with or without matching contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (typically though state agencies, with varying levels of contributions from recipients). Many programs provide both.
Most of the programs provide assistance to state partner agencies. The state agencies can use the assistance on state forestlands or to assist local governments or private landowners. How the states use the funds is largely at the discretion of the states, within the authorization of each program; however, the 2008 farm bill added national priorities for state assistance and state-wide assessments and strategies to focus state efforts on achieving the national priorities. Funds are appropriated for planning and implementing forestry and related land management practices—site preparation for reforestation, tree planting, thinning, pruning, fertilizing, prescribed burning, restoring watersheds, improving wildlife habitats, and other activities. Other programs provide support for protecting forestlands from wildfires, insects and diseases, and from clearing forests for non-forest uses (such as growing crops or building houses). Two programs are designed specifically to assist landowners to recover or restore forests following catastrophic events, such as wildfires. In addition, International Forestry is often included as a forestry assistance program, because it provides technical forestry help and because it has often been funded out of FS appropriations for forestry assistance programs. Finally, states are authorized to request consolidated payments, for flexibility in program administration, and several coordinating or advisory groups exist to coordinate programs or for specific purposes under one or more programs.
Overall funding for forestry assistance programs in FY2013 was $354 million. After a high of $429 million in FY2010, funding has decreased for three successive years. Funding for the forest management assistance programs—forest stewardship and urban and community forestry—has remained relatively constant over the past five years. However, funds for forest protection programs—forest health (for insect and disease identification and control), fire assistance, and forest legacy (for easements to prevent forest clearing)—are at five-year lows. |
crs_RL33991 | crs_RL33991_0 | Introduction
On February 18, 2007, the Washington Post published the first in a series of articles describing problems with outpatient medical care and other services provided at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC). Some reports have, however, been problematic in their descriptions of the respective roles of DOD and VA in providing health care and other benefits to injured servicemembers, or in their descriptions of the health care and other benefits systems in the two departments. This report describes disability evaluation in general, including evaluations used by DOD and VA, as well as civilian evaluations used by the Social Security Administration and by workers' compensation programs. Next, the DOD and VA disability rating processes are described, respectively, in greater detail. This report emphasizes the disability evaluation systems at DOD and VA, with illustrative comparisons made to civilian systems when appropriate. Overview of Disability Evaluation
There are significant differences between the disability evaluations performed by the DOD, the VA, the Social Security Administration (SSA), and workers' compensation programs (WC). Department of Defense Disability Evaluation
The DOD disability evaluation is focused on the effect of any disabling condition on the performance of the servicemember ' s duties in the military. Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Evaluation
The VA evaluates a qualified individual ' s disability based on the likely prognosis—the progression of severity of the disability over time—and the effect of the disability on employability within the civilian job market. DOD/VA Disability Evaluation System Pilot
Section 1612 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ( P.L. A letter is sent to the veteran explaining the rating and the basis for the rating. | On February 18, 2007, the Washington Post published the first in a series of articles describing problems with outpatient medical care and other services provided at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC). The series noted, among other things, concerns about the processes used to evaluate disability in injured military servicemembers. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) conduct disability evaluations and assign disability ratings to servicemembers or veterans under their respective authorities. An individual's disability rating, from either department, affects the scope of pay and benefits for which he or she is eligible, and the cost to the respective department of providing such benefits.
There are significant differences between the disability evaluations performed by DOD and VA, as well as civilian disability evaluations conducted by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and workers' compensation programs. Most notably, the DOD disability evaluation is focused on the effect of any disabling condition on the performance of the servicemember's duties in the military, whereas the other three systems evaluate the impact of a disability on gainful employment in the civilian economy.
During the 110th Congress, legislation was enacted for the care of injured servicemembers. Title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181), contained Wounded Warrior provisions related to the care and transition of injured servicemembers, including the use of pilot programs to improve the disability evaluation process.
This report will describe disability evaluation in general, including evaluations used by DOD and VA, as well as civilian evaluations used by the SSA and by workers' compensation programs. Next, the DOD and VA disability rating processes are described, respectively, in greater detail. This report emphasizes the disability evaluation systems at DOD and VA, with illustrative comparisons made to civilian systems when appropriate. It will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33220 | crs_RL33220_0 | Introduction
Article I of the Constitution, in Sections 2 and 3, authorizes the House of Representatives and Senate to choose their own officers. The number of such congressional support personnel, as well as their specific responsibilities, is left to the discretion of each chamber. Over time, both chambers have authorized a number of offices to assist them, collectively or individually, in their work. These offices perform legislative, administrative, financial, and ceremonial functions. They also ensure the protection of Congress and preserve its institutional memory. The roles of House support offices have been established by House Rules, statute, and custom. They may also be shaped by congressional authorities with oversight, funding, or appointing responsibility for the offices. This report is an overview of the relationships among, and different roles and functions performed by, the "daily operations" offices in the U.S. House of Representatives. The organizational authorities are also addressed. Certain entities shared with the Senate, like the legislative support agencies, are included in this report, although it focuses whenever possible on their service to the House. Offices with responsibilities in more than one area are addressed in successive sections. More detailed information on select offices is available in additional Congressional Research Service products identified throughout. The three legislative branch agencies, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), serve both chambers. Clerk of the House
The Clerk of the House is an elected officer of the House who performs legislative, administrative, educational, and preservation duties. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) executes both administrative and financial duties. The House Sergeant at Arms is a member of the Congressional Accessibility Services Board (see " Office of Congressional Accessibility Service "). House Office Building Commission
The section of the U.S. Code governing the operations and maintenance of the Capitol complex states that
the House of Representatives Office Building ... shall be under the control and supervision of the Architect of the Capitol, subject to the approval and direction of a commission consisting of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and two other Representatives in Congress, to be appointed by the Speaker. Legal and Regulatory Offices
Three support offices, including the Inspector General, the Office of Compliance, and the Office of General Counsel, work to ensure that the House of Representatives maintains proper oversight over its internal activities and complies with legal requirements regarding employment and other practices. | Article I of the Constitution, in Sections 2 and 3, authorizes the House of Representatives and Senate to choose their own officers. The number of such congressional support personnel, as well as their specific responsibilities, is left to the discretion of the chambers. Over time, both chambers have authorized a number of offices that assist them, collectively or individually, in their work.
In the House, these offices include the Clerk of the House, Chief Administrative Officer, Sergeant at Arms, Office of the Legislative Counsel, Office of the Parliamentarian, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, Office of Interparliamentary Affairs, House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, Office of the Inspector General, Office of General Counsel, House Chaplain, and the Historian of the House. These offices perform legislative, administrative, financial, and ceremonial functions. They also ensure the protection of Congress and preserve its institutional memory.
The roles of House support offices have been established by House Rules, statute, and custom. They are also shaped by the congressional authorities with policy, oversight, and funding responsibilities for the offices. These include the House Administration Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, the House Office Building Commission, and the Office of the Speaker.
This report is an overview of the different roles performed and the organizational authorities that govern the "daily operations" offices in the House of Representatives. Certain entities that assist both the House and Senate, like the Architect of the Capitol, Office of Congressional Accessibility Services, Office of Compliance, the Office of the Attending Physician, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), are included in this report, although the focus here is on their services to the House.
The report is organized by function, with sections on offices supporting legislative duties; administrative, operational, and financial offices; legal and regulatory offices; ceremonial and historical offices; and security offices. Offices with responsibilities in more than one area are addressed in successive sections. More detailed information on select offices is also available in additional CRS products identified throughout. |
crs_RS22955 | crs_RS22955_0 | Recent COOL Developments
On May 18, 2015, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body confirmed the findings of previous panels that U.S. country-of-origin labeling (COOL) for beef and pork violated U.S. WTO obligations by discriminating against imported livestock. In June 2015, Canada and Mexico requested permission from the WTO to impose about US$3 billion in concessions, in the form of retaliatory tariffs, against products imported from the United States. The United States objected to the request, and an arbitration panel was established to determine the appropriate level of concessions. On December 7, 2015, the arbitration panel released its report, which found that Canada could request retaliation of C$1.055 billion (US$781 million) and Mexico US$228 million. 2393 ) passed in June 2015, the repeal language in P.L. Canada and Mexico have stated that they are pleased with the repeal of COOL. Although the threat of retaliation now has been removed, Canada and Mexico are likely to retain the authority to retaliate until USDA formally rescinds existing COOL regulations for beef and pork, and until Canada and Mexico are assured that cattle and hog trade is unimpeded as the repeal of COOL is implemented. On March 2, 2016, USDA issued the final rule to amend COOL regulations for beef, pork, and ground beef and pork by striking all references to beef and pork. 114-113 . 107-171 , §10816). These amendments were incorporated into P.L. ):
applies to ground and muscle cuts of beef (including veal), lamb, and pork, fish and shellfish, peanuts, "perishable agricultural commodities" as defined by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (i.e., fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), goat meat, chicken, pecans, macadamia nuts, and ginseng (these are referred to as "covered commodities"); requires method of production information (farm-raised or wild-caught) for fish and shellfish to be noted at the final point of sale to consumers; exempts these items if they are an ingredient in a processed food; covers only those retailers that annually purchase at least $230,000 of perishable agricultural commodities, and requires them to inform consumers of origin "by means of a label, stamp, mark, placard, or other clear and visible sign on the covered commodity or on the package, display, holding unit, or bin containing the commodity at the final point of sale"; and exempts from these labeling requirements such "food service establishments" as restaurants, cafeterias, bars, and similar facilities that prepare and sell foods to the public. For covered red meats and chicken, the COOL law:
permits the U.S. origin label to be used only on meats from animals that were exclusively born, raised, and slaughtered in the United States, with an exception for those animals present here before July 15, 2008; permits meats or chicken with multiple countries of origin to be labeled as being from all of the countries in which the animals may have been born, raised, or slaughtered; requires meat or chicken from animals imported for immediate U.S. slaughter to be labeled as from both the country the animal came from and the United States; requires products from animals not born, raised, or slaughtered in the United States to be labeled with their correct country(ies) of origin; and requires , for ground meat and chicken products, that the label list all countries of origin, or all "reasonably possible" countries of origin. It then found that the COOL measure (1) treated imported livestock less favorably than "like domestic livestock," particularly in the labeling of muscle cut meats (beef and pork), in violation of the national treatment obligation in the TBT's Article 2.1; and (2) failed to meet the legitimate objective of providing information to consumers on the origin of meat products, and thus violated the TBT's Article 2.2. The U.S. meat sector expressed mixed reactions. The AB, however, reversed the DS panel's finding that COOL does not fulfill its legitimate objective to provide consumers with information on origin. However, the AB did not determine if COOL was more trade restrictive than necessary. Once WTO findings are adopted by the DSB, a compliance deadline is established. On May 24, 2013, the United States notified the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that it had complied with the WTO findings on COOL. Both Canada and Mexico argued that USDA's May 23, 2013 revised COOL rule fails to bring the United States into compliance with its WTO obligations. The compliance panel issued its report on October 20, 2014. Although the panel found that COOL is a legitimate objective, it found that the manner in which COOL is implemented treats imported livestock unfavorably. Congress Repeals COOL for Beef and Pork
On December 18, 2015, in response to the WTO arbitration panel's decision to allow Canada and Mexico to retaliate against imported products from the United States, Congress used the annual appropriations process to permanently repeal COOL for beef and pork and their ground products. Section 759 of the enacted Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 , Division A). Appellate Body on the Dispute Panel Report
The United States appealed the DS panel's finding that COOL treats imported livestock less favorably than domestic livestock (i.e., that COOL is inconsistent with TBT's Article 2.1). To determine if the revised rule was more trade restrictive than necessary, the panel examined the risks of not fulfilling the objective of COOL and examined four alternative labeling schemes, provided by Canada and Mexico, that would demonstrate that the revised COOL rule was more trade restrictive than necessary. | Since the final rule to implement country-of-origin labeling (COOL) took effect in March 2009, most retail food stores have been required to inform consumers about the country of origin of fresh fruits and vegetables, fish, shellfish, peanuts, pecans, macadamia nuts, ginseng, and ground and muscle cuts of beef, pork, lamb, chicken, and goat. The rules were required by the 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171) as amended by the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246). COOL for beef and pork resulted in a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement case with Canada and Mexico that started in 2009 and finally concluded in 2015.
Canada and Mexico challenged U.S. COOL in the WTO, arguing that COOL had a trade-distorting impact by reducing the value and number of cattle and hogs shipped to the U.S. market, thus violating WTO trade commitments. In November 2011, the WTO dispute settlement panel found that COOL treated imported livestock less favorably than U.S. livestock, and did not meet its objective to provide complete information to consumers on the origin of meat products. In March 2012, the United States appealed the WTO ruling.
In June 2012 the WTO's Appellate Body (AB) upheld the panel's finding that COOL treated imported livestock less favorably than domestic livestock. But the AB reversed the finding that COOL did not fulfill its legitimate objective to provide consumers with information on origin. The United States welcomed the WTO's affirmation of the right to adopt labeling requirements to inform consumers on the origin of their meat. Participants in the U.S. livestock sector had mixed reactions, reflecting the ongoing heated debate on COOL.
In order to meet a compliance deadline of May 23, 2013, USDA issued a revised COOL rule requiring that labels show where each production step (born, raised, slaughtered) occurred and prohibited the commingling of muscle-cut meat from different origins. COOL's supporters applauded the revised rule for providing consumers with specific, useful information on origin.
In September 2013, a compliance panel was formed to determine if the revised COOL rule complied with WTO agreements. On October 20, 2014, the panel found that the revised COOL rule treated imported livestock less favorably than domestic livestock. The panel confirmed that COOL was a legitimate objective, but could not determine if the rule was more trade restrictive than necessary. The United States appealed the compliance panel findings in November 2014, and the AB heard the appeal in February 2015. The AB report, released in May 2015, again found that COOL violated U.S. WTO obligations.
On June 4, 2015, Canada and Mexico requested authorization to retaliate against U.S. imported products in the amount of US$3 billion. The United States objected to the requests, and on September 15-16, 2015, an arbitration panel met to determine the appropriate level of retaliation. On December 7, 2015, the arbitration panel set the retaliation levels at C$1.055 billion (US$781 million) for Canada and at US$228 million for Mexico.
On December 18, 2015, Congress repealed the COOL requirements for beef and pork and ground beef and pork in the enacted Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). After the repeal by Congress, USDA halted enforcement of COOL for beef and pork.
On December 21, 2015, the WTO authorized Canada and Mexico to retaliate against products imported from the United States. Canada and Mexico stated that they were pleased with the repeal of COOL but will retain the authority to retaliate until they are assured that cattle and hog trade is unimpeded as the repeal of COOL is implemented.
On March 2, 2016, USDA issued a final rule that amended the COOL regulations to bring them into conformity with P.L. 114-113. Congressional repeal of COOL for beef and pork and the amended regulations have brought the United States into compliance with its WTO obligations. |
crs_RS21900 | crs_RS21900_0 | In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing government officials to protect information pertaining to military and naval installations. The report of the Joint Inquiry was completed in 2002 and referred to the executive branch for a classification review, which determined that three of the four parts of the report could be disclosed to the public, but that the disclosure of a portion of the report would pose national security risks. Handling of Unauthorized Disclosures
Under E.O. Officers and employees of the United States (including contractors, licensees, etc.) (b) Was classified information compromised? There is no blanket prohibition on the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. 13526 describes safeguarding of classified information from unauthorized disclosure and preventing access to such information by "unauthorized persons." | This report provides an overview of the relationship between executive and legislative authority over national security information. It summarizes the current laws that form the legal framework protecting classified information, including current executive orders and some agency regulations pertaining to the handling of unauthorized disclosures of classified information by government officers and employees. The report also summarizes criminal laws that pertain specifically to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, as well as civil and administrative penalties. Finally, the report describes some recent developments in executive branch security policies and relevant legislative activity. |
crs_R41670 | crs_R41670_0 | Introduction
The Title I-A program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ), is the largest source of federal funding for elementary and secondary education. States that receive Title I-A funding must comply with certain requirements related to measuring and evaluating student achievement. To help states pay the costs of meeting the expanded Title I-A requirements regarding standards and assessments, the NCLB authorized a new annual Grants for State Assessments program (Section 6111). The primary purpose of this report is to explore issues related to the cost of assessments and to provide an understanding of the factors that influence the overall cost of assessment systems. As Congress considers the reauthorization of the ESEA, it is likely that the standards and assessment provisions within Title I-A will be reviewed and debated. State assessments are currently the primary policy tool used to measure whether schools, LEAs, and states are meeting certain academic targets. As such, the effectiveness of federal policy is dependent upon a valid state assessment system. Designing an assessment system requires states to consider certain tradeoffs in order to meet the requirements of the NCLB while meeting state requirements and containing costs. Decisions made in the design of a state assessment system have direct implications for the validity of the NCLB accountability system and direct consequences for schools. In addition, ESEA statutory provisions, as amended by the NCLB, specify that state assessments shall
be used to measure the achievement of all students; be aligned with the state's academic content and performance standards, and provide coherent information about student attainment of such standards; be used for purposes for which such assessments are valid and reliable, and be consistent with relevant, nationally recognized professional technical standards; be used only if the state educational agency (SEA) provides to the Secretary of Education (hereafter referred to as the Secretary) evidence from the test publisher or other relevant sources that the assessments used are of adequate technical quality for each purpose required by the ESEA; measure the proficiency in mathematics, reading or language arts, and science for grades 3 through 8 and one grade in high school; involve multiple up-to-date measures of student academic achievement, including measures that assess higher-order thinking skills and understanding; provide for "reasonable" adaptations and accommodations for students with disabilities; provide for the inclusion of limited English proficient students, who shall be assessed, "to the extent practicable," with assessments in the language that is most likely to yield accurate data on achievement; include students who have attended schools in an LEA for a full academic year; produce individual student reports that allow parents, teachers, and principals to understand the academic needs of the students, and include information regarding achievement aligned with state academic content standards in an understandable format as soon as is practicably possible; enable results to be disaggregated within each state, LEA, and school by gender, race/ethnicity, English language learner (ELL) status, migrant status, students with disabilities as compared to nondisabled students, and economically disadvantaged students as compared to students who are not economically disadvantaged; be consistent with accepted professional testing standards; objectively measure academic achievement, knowledge, and skills; and not evaluate or assess personal or family beliefs and attitudes or publicly disclose personally identifiable information; and enable itemized score analyses to be produced and reported to LEAs and schools so that parents, teachers, principals, and administrators can interpret and address the specific academic needs of students as indicated by the students' achievement on assessment items. It focuses on assessment development, scoring, policy choices, and implementation practices. State Variability in Expenditures
Previous reports of state expenditures on assessment activities required by the NCLB have clearly demonstrated the variability across states. Across states with varying populations, consistent average trends emerge. Factors that likely contribute to the cost of state assessment systems are design elements of assessment development, scoring, and differences in policy choices and implementation practices (see " Factors that Influence the Cost of State Assessment Systems "). Efficiencies may also require balancing state independence with promoting state consortia in order to realize economies of scale. One option is the use of distributed scoring. Technology
As technology becomes less expensive, online delivery of state assessments may lower the cost of state assessment systems. Under the Grants for State Assessments program, statutory provisions specify that the Secretary shall make grants to states for the following purposes:
to pay the costs of the development of the additional state assessments and standards required by Section 1111(b) of the NCLB, which may include the costs of working voluntary partnerships with other states, at the sole discretion of each state; and if a state has developed the assessments and standards required by Section 1111(b) of the NCLB, to administer assessments or carry out other activities related to ensuring that the state's schools and LEAs are held accountable for the results. | The Title I-A program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110), is the largest source of federal funding for elementary and secondary education. States that receive Title I-A funding must comply with certain requirements related to measuring student achievement by using state-level standards and assessments. The standards and assessment requirements adopted in the NCLB have resulted in vast growth in and demand for new types of assessment products. Estimates of annual expenditures on NCLB-required assessments range from $500 million to $900 million. The NCLB authorized a new grant assessment program to help states pay the additional costs of meeting the expanded assessment requirements. The purpose of this report is to provide an understanding of the factors that influence the overall cost of student assessment and a description of state expenditures on assessment systems.
This report describes factors that influence the cost of student assessment systems, including assessment development, scoring, and the effect of certain policy choices and implementation practices. It also reports and examines the results of existing research on state assessment expenditures, which highlight the variability among states in assessment expenditures. Next, the report presents the results of an analysis of how state assessment expenditures differ across states of varying populations. Results suggest that state assessment expenditures are dependent, in part, on a state's population; however, there are other factors that contribute to the overall cost of state assessment systems (e.g., design choices regarding assessment development and scoring).
This report examines assessment issues that Congress may address during the reauthorization of the ESEA. As Congress considers reauthorization, it is likely that the standards and assessment provisions will be reviewed and debated. State assessments are currently the primary policy tool used to measure whether schools, LEAs, and states are meeting certain academic targets. As such, the effectiveness of federal policy is dependent upon a valid state assessment system. Designing an assessment system requires states to consider certain tradeoffs in order to meet the federal assessment requirements while meeting state requirements and containing costs. Decisions made in the design of a state assessment system have direct implications for the validity of the federal accountability system and direct consequences for schools. This report examines assessment practices that may be cost-effective and could be promoted by federal policy, including the following:
The use of various scoring practices—such as distributed scoring, teacher scoring, and artificial intelligence—that may have the potential to lower the cost of state assessment systems while maintaining quality. The use of state consortia that promote information sharing and other collaborative practices across states that may reduce assessment costs by realizing economies of scale. The use of technology, which may increase the efficiency of assessment administration. As technology becomes less expensive, online delivery of state assessments may lower administration and scoring costs. |
crs_R44159 | crs_R44159_0 | During consideration of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) proposals to limit the amount of benefit excluded from tax under this provision were addressed. The final bill did not limit the amount of benefits employees can exclude from income and payroll taxes, but it did include a related provision that is popularly termed the Cadillac tax . This provision imposes an excise tax on the cost of ESI coverage that is in excess of a predetermined threshold. 114-113 ). It is imposed on the coverage provider, either a third-party insurer or, in the case of self-financed plans, the plan administrator (which may be the employer). This tax rate is applied on a tax-exclusive basis , as is generally the case with excise tax rates. That is, like a sales tax, it applies to the price or cost excluding the tax. By contrast, the tax rate relevant to an income tax exclusion is on a tax-inclusive basis : it is applied to a base that includes the tax. As noted, the Cadillac tax was originally nondeductible from the insurer's gross income (or the employer's gross income, in cases where the employer self-insures). Deductibility was allowed in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. The Cadillac tax was originally to take effect in 2018. The Consolidated Appropriations Act delayed the effective date to 2020. The tax is projected to be imposed on plans that cost more than $10,800 for single health plans and $29,100 for non-single (e.g., family) plans. The exempt amount is indexed for inflation, and, because health costs tend to grow faster than inflation, the share of premiums covered by the tax and the revenue collected is expected to grow. (The threshold was indexed for health care costs for 2019, however.) This report examines several issues. It evaluates the potential of the Cadillac tax to affect health insurance coverage and, therefore, the health market. It also examines the expected incidence (burden) of the tax—that is, which group will pay the price of the tax. In addition, the report discusses the efficiency of the tax in the context of administrative cost. Estimated Effects of the Tax on Health Care Prices and Quantities
The Cadillac tax will affect the overall medical care market by effectively reducing government subsidies for health insurance and therefore reducing insurance coverage, which would likely lead to an increased cost of medical care for the consumer. This decline is estimated to range from 1.9% to 2.2% in 2025. Prices could fall by up to 1.3% in 2025, although costs to some consumers would increase as the Cadillac tax reduced the subsidy for health insurance. Overall expenditure (the sum of the fall in quantity and the fall in price) could decline by 2.2% to 3.2% in 2025. In other words, the tax could result in a gross reduction of $47.6 billion to $69.2 billion in national health expenditures covered by private insurance by 2025, based on the same CMS baseline projections of health spending mentioned above. These higher wages would be subject to income and payroll taxes. Effects of the Tax on Wages
The Cadillac tax will be applied as a tax-exclusive rate and imposed at a rate of 40%. Although the transmission mechanism of the economic burden of the Cadillac tax might be different in these two cases, the ultimate effects are equivalent: employees bear the economic burden of the Cadillac tax in the form of lower wages (for those that retain plans subject to the Cadillac tax) or taxes on the increase in taxable compensation (for those that forgo plans subject to the Cadillac tax). | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) included a provision to impose an excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) coverage beginning in 2018 (recently delayed until 2020). This provision, popularly termed the Cadillac tax, imposes an excise tax on ESI coverage in excess of a predetermined threshold. The tax is imposed on the coverage provider, typically the health insurance provider or the entity that administers the plan benefits.
Currently, employers' spending on ESI coverage and most employees' contributions to ESI plans are exempt from income and payroll taxes. Although proposals to limit the amount of health insurance benefits eligible for this exclusion were considered, the ACA, as enacted, did not limit the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance coverage. The Cadillac tax discourages high-cost employer health plans through another approach.
The Cadillac tax is imposed at a rate of 40%. This tax rate is applied on a tax-exclusive basis, as is generally the case with excise tax rates. That is, like a sales tax, the rate applies to the price or cost excluding the tax. By contrast, the tax rate relevant to an income tax exclusion is on a tax-inclusive basis: it is applied to a base that includes the tax. The Cadillac tax was originally nondeductible from the insurer's gross income (or the employer's gross income, in cases where the employer self-insures), but deductibility was allowed in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113).
The Cadillac tax was originally to take effect in 2018. The Consolidated Appropriations Act delayed the effective date to 2020. The tax is projected to be imposed on plans that cost more than $10,800 for single health plans and $29,100 for non-single (e.g., family) plans. The exempt amount is indexed for inflation, and, because health costs tend to grow faster than inflation, the share of premiums covered by the tax and the revenue collected is expected to grow. (The threshold was indexed for health care costs for 2019, however.)
This report examines several issues. It evaluates the potential of the Cadillac tax to affect health insurance coverage and the health care market. It also examines the expected incidence (burden) of the tax—that is, which group's income will be reduced by the tax. Finally, the report discusses implications for economic efficiency in the context of tax administration.
Estimates suggest that the Cadillac tax could lead to an overall decline in the quantity of health services financed by private insurance as some firms reduce the size of their insurance coverage. This decline is estimated to range from 1.9% to 2.2% in 2025 (a year for which data are available to project effects). Prices could fall by up to 1.3% in 2025 (although costs paid by some consumers could rise due to cutbacks in Cadillac plans). Overall expenditure (the sum of the fall in quantity and the fall in price) could decline by 2.2%-3.2% in 2025. In other words, the tax could result in a gross reduction of $47.6 billion-$69.2 billion in national health expenditures paid by private insurance in 2025.
Although the tax is imposed on insurers or employers, the burden is expected to fall on wages. In some cases, employers will retain the Cadillac insurance plans and pass the tax on to workers in the form of lower wages. In other cases, employers will substitute taxable wages for insurance coverage in excess of the threshold, and employees will be subject to income and payroll taxes on those wages. Revenue projections assume the latter situation will be more common. |
crs_RL32860 | crs_RL32860_0 | For each bill listed in this report, a brief description and a summary of action are given,including references to committee hearings and reports. Also, a selected list of hearings on energyefficiency and renewable energy is included. In the first session, action focused on omnibus energy policy bill H.R. 109-58 ). The House version of H.R.6 incorporated H.R. 109-190 ) contains provisions thatauthorize or reauthorize several energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. It also establishesseveral new commercial and consumer product efficiency standards, sets new goals for energyefficiency and renewable energy in federal facilities and fleets, broadens the Energy Star productsprogram, expands programs for hydrogen fuel cell buses, extends daylight savings time, and sets arenewable fuels standard for increased use of ethanol and biodiesel. Other action in the first session focused on the Transportation Equity Act ( H.R. 3 ). The enacted version of H.R. 109-203 ) has some provisions on clean(renewable) fuels, energy conservation, and advanced vehicle technologies. Specific provisionsinclude sections 1113, volumetric excise tax credit for alternative fuels; 1121, high occupancyvehicle (HOV) facilities; 1307, magnetic levitation transportation; 1807, nonmotorizedtransportation pilot program; 1808, additions to congestion mitigation and air quality (CMAQ);1952, congestion relief; 1954, bicycle transportation and pedestrian walkways; 3005, metropolitantransportation planning; 3010, clean fuels grant program; 3016, national research and technologyprograms; 3044, clean fuels grants; 3045, national fuel cell bus technology development program;4149, office of intermodalism; 5301, intelligent transportation systems; 5502, congestion reliefresearch initiative; 6001, transportation planning; 6015, clean school buses; and 9002, study of highspeed rail. Action After the Conference Report on H.R.6. 6 was issued on July 27, 2005. In July 2006, about 30 bills were introduced with provisions for energy efficiency and/orrenewable energy. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Bills by Topic, 109th Congress (Bills introduced after the H.R. 109-54 ( H.R. P.L. 109-58 ( H.R. P.L. 109-59 ( H.R. P.L. 109-97 ( H.R. P.L. 109-102 ( H.R. 3057 )
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2006. P.L. 109-103 ( H.R. 109-108 ( H.R. P.L. 2863 )
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2006. P.L. P.L. Includes funding for DOE'senergy efficiency and renewable energy programs. Section 1335 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005( P.L. Title V on Electricity and Renewables includes provisionsto extend the renewable energy production tax credit, establish a renewable energy portfolio standard(RPS), extend and expand clean renewable energy bonds, create a tax credit for wind equipment atresidences and businesses, and an extension of the tax credit for residential energy efficient property. FY2007 Budget Request forthe Department of Energy . Department of EnergyBudget. CRS Reports
CRS Report RL33599 , Energy Efficiency Policy: Budget, Electricity Conservation, and FuelConservation Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. | This report reviews the status of energy efficiency and renewable energy legislationintroduced during the 109th Congress. Action in the second session has focused on appropriationsbills; the first session focused on omnibus energy policy bill H.R. 6 ( P.L. 109-58 ), H.R. 3 ( P.L. 109-59 ), and several appropriations bills.
The enacted version of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 , H.R. 6 )authorizes or reauthorizes several energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. It alsoestablishes several new commercial and consumer product efficiency standards, sets new goals forenergy efficiency and renewable energy in federal facilities and fleets, broadens the Energy Starproducts program, expands programs for hydrogen fuel cell buses, extends daylight savings time,and sets a renewable fuels standard for increased use of ethanol and biodiesel. Further, it extendsthe renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) for two years, but it does not includeSenate-proposed provisions for oil conservation, a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), or a broaderrange of legislated equipment efficiency standards.
The enacted version of the Transportation Equity Act ( P.L. 109-59 , H.R. 3 ) hasprovisions for clean (renewable) fuels, energy conservation, and advanced vehicle technologies. Specific sections include 1113, volumetric excise tax credit for alternative fuels; 1121, highoccupancy vehicle (HOV) facilities; 1307, magnetic levitation transportation; 1807, nonmotorizedtransportation pilot program; 1808, additions to congestion mitigation and air quality (CMAQ);1952, congestion relief; 1954, bicycle transportation and pedestrian walkways; 3005, metropolitantransportation planning; 3010, clean fuels grant program; 3016, national research and technologyprograms; 3044, clean fuels grants; 3045, national fuel cell bus technology development program;4149, office of intermodalism; 5301, intelligent transportation systems; 5502, congestion reliefresearch initiative; 6001, transportation planning; 6015, clean school buses; and 9002, study ofhigh-speed rail.
Appropriations bills have also been a focus, including P.L. 109-54 ( H.R. 2361 ,Environmental Protection Agency energy efficiency programs for climate protection); P.L. 109-103 ( H.R. 2419 , Department of Energy programs for energy efficiency and renewableenergy); P.L. 109-97 ( H.R. 2744 , Department of Agriculture program for renewableenergy grants and loans); P.L. 109-108 ( H.R. 2862 , telecommuting program at severalagencies); P.L. 109-102 ( H.R. 3057 , Department of State funding for energy efficiencyand renewable energy in developing nations); and H.R. 2863 (Department of Defensewind energy project for an Air Force base).
More than 290 energy efficiency and renewable energy bills have been introduced thus far,including more than 140 that were introduced after the conference report on H.R. 6 wasfiled on July 27, 2005. For each bill listed in this report, a brief description and a summary of actionare given, including references to committee hearings and reports. Also, a selected list of hearingson renewable energy is included. This report will be updated periodically. It supplements thetracking of issues that appear in CRS Report RL33588 and CRS Report RL33599 . |
crs_R42534 | crs_R42534_0 | Given the history between the egg industry and animal protection groups, UEP stunned the animal agriculture community in July 2011 with an announcement that it would work jointly with HSUS to push for federal legislation to regulate how U.S. table eggs are produced. The agreement between UEP and HSUS was signed July 7, 2011, and called for legislation that would set cage sizes, establish labeling requirements, and regulate other production practices. As part of the agreement, HSUS agreed to immediately suspend state-level ballot initiative efforts in Oregon and Washington to end the use of conventional cages. The bills also include labeling requirements to disclose how eggs are produced, and air quality, molting, and euthanasia standards for laying hens. UEP views the bills as being in the long-term survival interest of American egg farmers, and a wide range of groups have expressed support for the legislation. Legislative Activity
113th Congress
On April 25, 2013, the Egg Products Inspection Act Amendments of 2013 were introduced in the Senate ( S. 820 ) and House ( H.R. 1731 ). The two bills are identical and reflect the 2011 agreement between UEP and HSUS (see " UEP-HSUS Agreement ," below) that would establish uniform, national cage size requirements for table egg-laying hen housing over a 15- to 16-year phase-in period. The egg legislation was not included in the committee draft, nor was it considered during the May 14, 2013, Senate Agriculture Committee markup of the 2013 farm bill. During the floor debate on the Senate farm bill ( S. 954 ), Senator Feinstein submitted the egg bill as S.Amdt. 1057 , but it was not considered by the Senate. 1731 . The King amendment was not included in the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. UEP-HSUS Agreement
United Egg Producers (UEP)
United Egg Producers (UEP) is the largest U.S. egg producer group in the United States. The agreement included seven key provisions pertaining to the production of shell eggs and egg products that would:
require, over a phase-in period, that conventional cage systems be replaced with enriched cage systems that double the amount of floor space per laying hen; require that the new enriched cage systems provide perches, nesting boxes, and scratching areas so that laying hens can express natural behaviors; mandate labeling on all egg cartons nationwide to inform consumers of the housing method used to produce the eggs; prohibit withholding of feed or water to force molting to extend the laying cycle; require standards approved by the American Veterinary Medical Association for euthanasia for egg-laying hens; prohibit excessive ammonia levels in henhouses; and prohibit the buying and selling of eggs and egg products that do not meet the standards. UEP and HSUS have been adversaries for many years over the use of conventional cages in table egg production, and the agreement is a marked shift in direction for both organizations. For HSUS, the agreement to work with a major livestock group could result in significant federal farm animal welfare legislation. Both UEP and HSUS have indicated that it was in the interest of both sides to halt costly state-by-state battles over caged eggs that result in a variety of laws across the country. For California, S. 820 and H.R. 1731 set deadlines for adding enrichments and expanding floor space requirements based on whether cages are new or existing (see " Housing Requirements ," below). The legislation also requires that any eggs bought or sold in California meet the California requirements in the legislation, no matter where the eggs are produced. For California, S. 820 and H.R. S. 820 and H.R. 3798 and S. 3239 were endorsed by agricultural, veterinary, consumer, and animal protection groups. Opponents argue that pursuing legislation at the federal level had consequences that could impact all livestock and poultry producers. Similar legislation for other livestock or poultry industries seemed unlikely. Opponents were also concerned that the egg legislation would be a move away from the long established position shared among animal agriculture groups that animal husbandry decisions affecting welfare should be based on the best available science. As the UEP-HSUS agreement and H.R. Legislation has been introduced in the past several congresses to address farm animal welfare. | The United Egg Producers (UEP), the largest group representing egg producers, and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), the largest animal protection group, have been adversaries for many years over the use of conventional cages in table egg production. In July 2011, the animal agriculture community was stunned when the UEP and HSUS announced that they had agreed to work together to push for federal legislation to regulate how U.S. table eggs are produced. The agreement between UEP and HSUS called for federal legislation that would set cage sizes, establish labeling requirements, and regulate other production practices. As part of the agreement, HSUS agreed to immediately suspend state-level ballot initiative efforts in Oregon and Washington.
On April 25, 2013, the Egg Products Inspection Act Amendments of 2013 (S. 820 and H.R. 1731) were introduced in the 113th Congress. The bills are nearly identical to the legislation that was introduced during the 112th Congress (S. 3239 and H.R. 3798). The provisions in S. 820 and H.R. 1731 reflect the 2011 agreement between UEP and HSUS to establish uniform, national cage size requirements for table egg-laying hens. The bills would codify national standards for laying-hen housing over a 15- to 16-year phase-in period, including labeling requirements to disclose how eggs are produced, and set air quality, molting, and euthanasia standards for laying hens.
Compared with the bills from the 112th Congress, S. 820 and H.R. 1731 add provisions specific to California that establish deadlines based on whether or not cages are new or existing, and add a four-step phase-in period for California producers. The legislation also requires that any eggs bought or sold in California meet the California requirements in the legislation, no matter where the eggs are produced.
The agreement and legislation were a marked shift in direction for both UEP and HSUS. UEP views the legislation as being in the long-term survival interest of American egg farmers. It says that egg producers would benefit from national egg standards that halt costly state-by-state battles over caged eggs that result in a variety of laws across the country. For HSUS, which has actively campaigned for cage-free egg production, accepting enriched cages was a compromise, but one that could result in significant federal farm animal welfare legislation. Egg legislation has been endorsed by a wide range of agricultural, veterinary, consumer, and animal protection groups.
Farm group opponents have criticized egg legislation for several reasons. First, they are concerned that the bills federally mandate management practices for farm animals, something that has not been done in the past. These groups argue that the bills could set a precedent, paving the way for future legislation on animal welfare for other livestock and poultry industries. Opponents hold the view that the cage requirements are not science-based, and undermine long-standing views that animal husbandry practices should be based on the best available science. They also argue that codifying cage standards today ignores innovations that could appear in the future. Additionally, opponents are concerned that the capital cost of transitioning to enriched cages would be high, and could be prohibitive for small producers.
UEP and HSUS and other supporters favor moving egg legislation forward through the farm bill process, but other livestock groups strongly oppose this legislative route. Reportedly, S. 820 was considered for inclusion in the Senate Agriculture Committee 2013 farm bill draft, but it was not included. Senator Feinstein's submitted egg bill amendment (S.Amdt. 1057) was not considered during the Senate farm bill (S. 954) floor debate. The House-passed farm bill (H.R. 2642) included Section 12312, known as the King amendment, which would have prohibited states from imposing standards on agricultural products produced in other states. The final Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) did not include the amendment. |
crs_RL34736 | crs_RL34736_0 | The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 ( P.L. This report provides an overview of the history of science and technology (S&T) advice to the President and discusses selected issues and options for Congress regarding OSTP's Director, OSTP management and operations, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). Overview of OSTP
Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy as an office within the EOP to, among other things, "serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government." 94-282 establishes the position of OSTP Director, whose primary function is "to provide, within the Executive Office of the President, advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government." In addition, the OSTP Director is to:
advise the President of scientific and technological considerations involved in areas of national concern including, but not limited to, the economy, national security, homeland security, health, foreign relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of resources;
evaluate the scale, quality, and effectiveness of the federal effort in science and technology and advise on appropriate actions;
advise the President on scientific and technological considerations with regard to federal budgets, assist the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with an annual review and analysis of funding proposed for research and development in budgets of all federal agencies, and aid [OMB] and the agencies throughout the budget development process; and
assist the President in providing general leadership and coordination of the research and development programs of the Federal Government. In addition to establishing the position of OSTP Director, P.L. Some Presidents have appointed their science advisors, however, not only to the Senate-confirmed position of OSTP Director, but also as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST). Congress can require the OSTP Director to testify before Congress. In contrast, APSTs may assert the right not to testify before Congress in accordance with the principles of separation of powers and/or executive privilege. The OSTP Director (when serving as APST) manages the National Science and Technology Council, established by Executive Order 12881, which is charged with coordinating S&T policy across the federal government, establishing national goals for federal S&T investments, and preparing coordinated R&D strategies. Final budget decisions. Further international cooperation in science and technology. These include:
the need for science advice within the Executive Office of the President; the title, rank, roles, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the number and policy foci of OSTP Associate Directors; the funding and staffing levels provided for OSTP; the compliance of OSTP with statutory restrictions on the use of appropriated funds; the participation of OSTP and NSTC in federal agency coordination, priority-setting, and budget allocation; the role of OSTP in ensuring scientific integrity in federally funded and supported research, including the communication of scientific and technical information by federal agency scientists and engineers; the efforts by OSTP to effect change in federal policies regarding public access to the results of federally funded research and development; the attempt by OSTP to consolidate federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs; and the stature and influence of PCAST. Some experts in the S&T community have proposed that the OSTP Director also be given the title of APST or Cabinet rank. Congress may wish to maintain the current staffing approach. 113-76 ). P.L. In the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. Shortly thereafter, in its FY2014 budget request (released in April 2013), the Administration proposed a reorganization of the federal STEM education effort. This joint-chair approach has continued through succeeding Administrations, with the APST co-chairing the Obama Administration PCAST. Activities in the 113th Congress
The 113 th Congress has taken several legislative actions regarding OSTP and NSTC. 113-6 as described below. P.L. The OSTP Director would submit this plan to Congress. | Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states that "The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government." Further, "The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government."
The President nominates the OSTP Director, who is subject to confirmation by the Senate. In many Administrations, the President has concurrently appointed the OSTP Director to the position of Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST), a position that allows for the provision of confidential advice to the President on matters of science and technology. While Congress can require the OSTP Director to testify, the APST may decline requests to testify on the basis of separation of powers and/or executive privilege. The APST manages the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), an interagency body established by Executive Order 12881 that coordinates science and technology (S&T) policy across the federal government. The APST also co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), a council established by Executive Order 13539 and composed of external advisors who provide advice to the President. In the Obama Administration, John Holdren is both the OSTP Director and the APST.
The OSTP has engaged in several activities of interest to the 113th Congress. Following disagreements starting in FY2011 between OSTP and Congress regarding OSTP participation in certain activities with China and Chinese-owned companies, Congress statutorily restricted OSTP's ability to use appropriated funds in certain ways. This restriction was continued explicitly in P.L. 113-6, implicitly in P.L. 113-46 and P.L. 113-73, and explicitly in P.L. 113-76. In February 2013, OSTP Director Holdren issued a memorandum requiring federal agencies annually investing at least $100 million in research and development to develop policies allowing the general public access to the results of this investment. Finally, OSTP has inventoried federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education investments and developed a strategic plan for them. The President also proposed in his FY2014 budget request a reorganization of STEM education programs, which Congress did not approve.
Among other issues Congress may wish to consider are the need for science advice within the EOP; the title, rank, and responsibilities of the OSTP Director; the policy foci of OSTP; the funding and staffing for OSTP; the roles and functions of OSTP and NSTC in setting federal science and technology policy; and the status and influence of PCAST. Some in the S&T community support raising the OSTP Director to Cabinet rank, contending that this would imbue the position with greater influence within the EOP. Others have proposed that the OSTP Director play a greater role in federal agency coordination, priority setting, and budget allocation. Both the Administration and Congress have identified areas of policy focus for OSTP staff, raising questions of policy setting and oversight. Some experts say NSTC has insufficient authority over federal agencies engaged in science and technology activities and PCAST insufficient influence on S&T policy; they question the overall coordination of federal science and technology activities. Finally, some in the scientific community support increasing the authority of the OSTP Director in the budget process to bring greater science and technology expertise to federal investment decision making. |
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