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crs_R40239 | crs_R40239_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plays a central role in shaping and implementing U.S. global health policy. CDC is also an implementing partner in three presidential initiatives that comprise the bulk of U.S. global health assistance: the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) Program, both of which are coordinated by USAID, and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which is coordinated by the State Department. This report highlights the health-related activities conducted by CDC, outlines how much the agency has spent on such efforts from FY2001 to FY2011, and highlights FY2012 proposed funding levels. Today, CDC is a partner in a number of global disease control and prevention efforts, including those related to HIV/AIDS, influenza (flu), polio, malaria, measles, tuberculosis (TB), and emerging diseases. In addition, CDC's global health efforts aim to address other global health challenges, such as chronic disease, injury prevention, child and maternal health, and environmental health concerns. CDC's Global Health Programs
Congress appropriates funds to CDC for global health efforts through Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (Labor-HHS) appropriations. The bulk of funds for CDC's global health programs are provided by Congress to the Center for Global Health, historically through five main budget lines: Global HIV/AIDS, Global Malaria, Global Disease Detection, Global Immunization, and Other Global Health. For example, CDC receives support transferred from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) at the U.S. Department of State, for the implementation of PEPFAR programs, and from USAID for its role in PMI and the NTD Program, among other programs. From FY2006 through FY2008, USAID transferred an estimated $25 million to CDC for global malaria programs. This figure includes funding for International Emergency and Refugee Health efforts. CDC also leverages other resources to respond to global requests for technical assistance related to disease outbreak response; prevention and control of injuries and chronic diseases; emergency assistance and disaster response; environmental health; reproductive health; and safe water, hygiene, and sanitation. Specifically, CDC supports global health programs aimed at TB, influenza, and neglected tropical diseases. In FY2005, Congress provided emergency supplemental funds for U.S. efforts related to global pandemic influenza preparedness and response. CDC Global Health Spending: FY2001-FY2012
From FY2001 to FY2011, Congress provided CDC roughly $3.5 billion for global health activities. The Administration requests that Congress provide about $381.2 million for CDC's global health programs in FY2012, some 10% more than FY2010 ( Table 1 ). The FY2012 budget request included several programmatic changes. | A number of U.S. agencies and departments implement U.S. government global health efforts. Overall, U.S. global health assistance is not always coordinated. Exceptions to this include U.S. international responses to key infectious diseases; for example, U.S. programs to address HIV/AIDS through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), malaria through the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and neglected tropical diseases through the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) Program. Although several U.S. agencies and departments implement global health programs, this report focuses on funding for global health programs conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a key recipient of U.S. global health funding.
Congress appropriates funds to CDC for its global health efforts through five main budget lines: Global HIV/AIDS, Global Immunization, Global Disease Detection, Malaria, and Other Global Health. Although Congress provides funds for some of CDC's global health efforts through the above-mentioned budget lines, CDC does not, in practice, treat its domestic and global programs separately. Instead, the same experts are mostly used in domestic and global responses to health issues. As such, CDC often leverages its resources in response to global requests for technical assistance in a number of areas that also have domestic components, such as outbreak response; prevention and control of injuries and chronic diseases; emergency assistance and disaster response; environmental health; reproductive health; and safe water, hygiene, and sanitation.
CDC also partners in programs for which it does not have specific appropriations, such as efforts to address international tuberculosis (TB) and respond to pandemic influenza globally. Congress does, however, appropriate funds to CDC to address these diseases domestically. In addition, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) transfer funds to CDC for its role as an implementing partner in U.S. coordinated initiatives, including PEPFAR, PMI, and the NTD Program.
From FY2001 to FY2011, Congress provided CDC roughly $3.5 billion for global health activities, including $330.2 million in FY2011. The President requested that in FY2012, Congress appropriate $358.6 million to CDC for global health programs—an estimated 5% increase over FY2010-enacted levels.
There is a growing consensus that U.S. global health assistance needs to become more efficient and effective. There is some debate, however, on the best strategies. This report explains the role CDC plays in U.S. global health assistance, highlights how much the agency has spent on global health efforts from FY2001 to FY2011, and discusses the FY2012 budget proposal for CDC's global health programs. For more information on U.S. global health funding more broadly, see CRS Report R41851, U.S. Global Health Assistance: Background and Issues for the 112th Congress. |
crs_RS20598 | crs_RS20598_0 | The 105th Congress, in response to what is seen as a growing terrorist threat, created the ten-person, bi-partisan National Commission on Terrorism to evaluateU.S. Theresulting NTC report, Countering theChanging Threat of International Terrorism, was issued on June 5, 2000. It calls on the U.S. government toprepare more actively to prevent and deal with afuture mass casualty, catastrophic terrorist attack. In citingincidences of such a drift in policy, the report suggests there is a softening of U.S. positions on Iran and Syria andpoints to a perceived U.S. weakness in notaggressively confronting Pakistan's support for terrorist groups. Issues for Congress
Protecting civil liberties, while effectively combating terrorism, remains a strong area of concern in Congress. A number of the Commission's recommendationshave drawn sharp criticism from civil libertarian and Arab-American groups. Issues within the purview of the Commission's mandate, but not addressed in its report or in the reports cited above include:
(1) Who should be in charge of U.S. counterterrorism policy, and what are the best organizational mechanisms for policy formulation and implementation;
(2) How does one effectively utilize the gamut of tools available to policymakers to combat terrorism: i.e., public diplomacy, economic and political sanctions,covert action, military force, and international cooperation and agreements;
(3) How does one prioritize for budget purposes whatever is viewed as an appropriate mix of counterterrorism resources to facilitate assuring that importantcomponents are neither short-changed or overfunded depending on political "clout";
(4) How effective are sanctions and military force as policy tools; how might their use be improved; and how are commercial interests balanced in the equation. For example, if U.S. trade with China is deemed to produce a moderating effect on China's rogue human rights policy, supporters of the "carrot" approach mightargue that trade with Libya could have a moderating effect on that nation's rogue terrorism policy. Conclusion
The National Commission on Terrorism's report and recommendations on countering the changing threat of international terrorism are likely to spur strongcongressional interest in counterterrorism policy during the 107th Congress. The most likely areas ofscrutiny include: (1) more productive counterterrorismpolicies and mindsets; (2) enhanced use of legislative authority to impose sanctions on states that support or activelycountenance terrorism, and (3) methods ofachieving a more cohesive, better coordinated federal counterterrorism effort through enhanced budget coordinationmechanisms. | On June 5, 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism (NTC), a congressionallymandated bi-partisan body, issueda report providing a blueprint for U.S. counter- terrorism policy with both policy and legislative recommendations.The report could be significant in shaping thedirection of U.S. policy and the debate in Congress. It generally argues for a more aggressiveU.S. strategy in combating terrorism. Critics, however, argue thatNTC conclusions and recommendations ignore competing U.S. goals and interests; i.e that a proactive strategymight lead to the curbing of individual rights andliberties, damage important commercial interests, and widen disagreements between the U.S. and its allies overusing the "stick" as opposed to the "carrot"approach in dealing with states that actively support or countenance terrorism.
The NTC report is likely to stimulate strong congressional interest in counterterrorism policy in the 107th Congress. Likely areas of focus are (1) a more proactivecounterterrorism policy; (2) a stronger state sanctions policy; and (3) a more cohesive/better coordinated U.S.federal counterterrorism response. January 23, 2001press reports indicate that Rep. J.C. Watts (R-Okla) has urged House Speaker Dennis Hastert to create a HouseSelect Committee on Domestic Terrorism. In the106th Congress, H.R. 4210, which passed the House, would also give added attention todomestic terrorism by establishing a President's Council onDomestic Preparedness in the White House. Moreover, in the 106th Congress, S. 3205, the(Kyl-Feinstein) Counteterrrorism Act of 2000, whichpassed the Senate, incorporated a number of recommendations of the NTC including measures to ensure (1)enhanced policy emphasis on control of biologicalpathogens and terrorist funding raising; (2) better sharing of FBI intelligence; (3) easier recruitment of CIAcounter-terrorism informants; and (4) maintainingSyria and Iran on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32693 | crs_RL32693_0 | Although economic analysis can be used to estimate the distribution of the tax system, or a tax change (a positive or descriptive analysis), it cannot be used to provide a normative or prescriptive analysis. Is a Progressive Federal Tax Structure Justified? The income tax is progressive, and even provides subsidies (negative taxes) for lower-income working individuals, often through the earned income credit. The corporate income tax is imposed on corporate profits as a proportional tax, but its burden on individuals depends on behavioral responses, as discussed subsequently in the " Incidence Assumptions " subsection of this report. Yet the standard does not answer the question of how much more. How Should Income in the Economy be Distributed? It is also important to keep in mind that even if the federal tax is progressive, such progressivity may be needed to offset state and local taxes that tend to be regressive, in order to avoid an overall regressive U.S. tax system. When effective tax rates rise with income a tax system is progressive, it is proportional when effective tax rates are relatively constant, or regressive, if effective tax rates fall as income increases. The measure of income can also affect impressions of tax burden unless distributional tables are presented based on population shares rather than measures of income. For example, imposing an excise tax may lead to a price increase. At the same time, all sources depict a similar qualitative picture about the progressivity of the federal tax burden distribution. Payroll, or social insurance, taxes rise slightly and then fall. The estate tax is the most progressive of all, although it is small. The estimates in Table 11 reflect current federal law; the actual pattern of tax changes will depend on whether and to what extent the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent and what changes might be made to the alternative minimum tax, which, if it is not addressed, will eventually apply to a very large fraction of taxpayers, especially those with large families. Nevertheless, examining tax burdens from a lifetime perspective is likely to reduce the progressivity of the tax system, as some of the progressivity observed in a single cross section reflects the tendency of individuals to have lower incomes in the early and later years of life. Some of the measures that have been presented include (1) the share of taxpayers benefitted that fall below an income level; (2) the percentage reduction in taxes paid; (3) the tax cut as a percentage of income (both pre-tax and disposable); (4) the distribution of the tax cut by income class; and (5) the average tax cut. As suggested in the previous section, the percentage change in federal tax liability shows the largest percentage changes at the lower income and the smaller ones at higher levels, except for the very top level. A very different picture is presented with the distributional effect measured as a change in after tax income based on analysis by the Brookings-Urban Tax Policy Center (TPC), using the measure they favor, percentage change in after tax income. Thus, while the Treasury table seems to suggest that this group benefitted more than average ("15%" as compared with an overall benefit of 11%), many people would not characterize the relative benefits in this way. | Distributional issues often lie at the center of tax policy debates. Distributional analysis may address several issues: How should the tax burden be distributed or, are progressive (increasing as a share of income as income rises) taxes justified? What is the estimated distribution of the current system? How does a particular proposal change that distribution?
Unlike many analyses that study optimal behavior related to allocative issues and economic efficiency, economic analysis cannot be used to answer the questions of how the tax burden should be distributed. Such an answer would depend on social preferences. Economic analysis can, however, identify trade-offs and frame the issue analytically. For example, a number of plausible answers to this question could justify progressive tax structures.
Methodological issues, such as the income classifier, the unit of analysis, and assumptions regarding incidence all affect the estimates of the distribution of the current tax burden. Yet all show a similar qualitative result: the federal tax system is progressive throughout its range, although it tends to get much flatter at the top. This pattern is primarily due to the individual income tax, which is quite progressive, and actually provides subsidies at lower-income levels. The other major tax is the payroll tax, which is a larger burden than the individual income tax for more than 80% of the population. This tax is first progressive and then regressive (effective tax rates fall with income). The corporate income and the estate taxes, while much smaller, are also progressive, whereas excise taxes are regressive. This overall progressive pattern has been in place historically, and is expected to continue in the future, although effective tax rates are currently low compared with other periods.
Unlike the federal tax system, state and local taxes tend to be regressive. Thus, a progressive federal tax system would be necessary to prevent overall U.S. taxes from being regressive. The combined taxes appear slightly progressive. Looking at taxes from a lifetime perspective would move the system more toward a proportional tax because average lifetime incomes reduces the variability of income. Studies have suggested that overall lifetime taxes are roughly proportional to income.
Many different measures have been used to characterize the effects of a particular tax change on the distribution of income. A very different impression of tax changes may be obtained depending on the measure used. One popular measure, the percentage change in tax, can be misleading, because as taxes become very small even a negligible absolute change in taxes leads to a very large percentage change. For measuring the relative distribution of income, percentage change in disposable income provides a better measure of how resources are distributed. By this measure, the recent tax cuts made incomes less equal.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33692 | crs_RL33692_0 | Introduction
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was created by President Truman in 1951. As a result, the Departments of Commerce (DOC) and Defense (DOD) formulated a contingency plan to meet the nation's airlift needs in times of crisis. When the Department of Transportation (DOT) was created, it assumed DOC's role in the CRAF program, and today, DOD and DOT work together to manage the CRAF program. Background
The CRAF supports DOD airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capacity of DOD's organic airlift fleet. All CRAF participants must be U.S. carriers fully certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and meet the stringent standards of the Federal Aviation Regulations pertaining to commercial airlines (Part 121). CRAF Structure
The CRAF has three main segments: international, national, and aeromedical evacuation. The international segment is further divided into the long-range and short-range sections, while the national segment is divided into the domestic and Alaskan sections. Assignment of aircraft to a segment depends on the nature of the requirement and the aircraft performance characteristics needed. Contractual Relationship
The airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments of CRAF, ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for civil carriers to commit aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the United States of adequate airlift reserves, the government makes peacetime airlift business available to civilian airlines that obligate aircraft to the CRAF through the International Airlift Services. Table 1 summarizes current CRAF members:
Analysis: Potential Future of CRAF
CRAF presents benefits and opportunities for both the DOD and the U.S. airline industry—by all accounts it appears to be a symbiotic relationship. Yet, as circumstances change, pressures and diverging interests may emerge that could bring changes to CRAF. | The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was created by executive order in 1951. As a result, the Departments of Commerce (DOC) and Defense (DOD) formulated a contingency plan to meet the nation's airlift needs in times of crisis. When the Department of Transportation (DOT) was created, it assumed DOC's role in the CRAF program, and today, DOD and DOT work together to manage the CRAF program.
The CRAF supports DOD airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of the military aircraft fleet. All CRAF participants must be U.S. carriers fully certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, and meet the stringent standards of Federal Aviation Regulations pertaining to commercial airlines.
The CRAF has three main segments: international, national, and aeromedical evacuation. The international segment is further divided into the long-range and short-range sections and the national segment into the domestic and Alaskan sections. Assignment of aircraft to a segment depends on the nature of the requirement and the performance characteristics needed.
The commercial airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments of CRAF, ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for civil carriers to commit aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the United States of adequate airlift reserves, the government makes peacetime airlift business available to civilian airlines that obligate aircraft to the CRAF. DOD offers business through the International Airlift Services.
CRAF presents benefits and opportunities for both DOD and U.S. airlines. By all accounts it appears to be a symbiotic relationship. Yet, as circumstances change, pressures and diverging interests may emerge that could bring changes to CRAF. A number of factors may be considered when examining the future size, character and role of CRAF. These factors include cost, other potential government / commercial arrangements, potential change in DOD requirement for CRAF, and industrial base or financial assistance to U.S. air carriers.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43562 | crs_R43562_0 | Federal agencies adopt rules to implement statutes that Congress has enacted. As such, agencies have considerable power to establish and interpret federal law. To control the process by which agencies create these rules, Congress has enacted statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that dictate what procedures an agency must follow to establish a final, legally binding rule. Other statutes govern issues such as how agencies must operate internally with respect to hiring and labor practices, the maintenance of federal records, financial management, and a diverse range of other topics. In order to understand these statutes, one must know to which entities these laws actually apply. Congress has not provided one all-encompassing definition of an agency. Instead, the term "agency" can mean different things in different contexts, depending on what statute is at issue. For example, the definition of agency under the APA differs from its definition under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Generally speaking, executive agencies are subject to direct presidential control, while independent agencies are typically designed by statute to be comparatively free from presidential control. Typically, to ensure this level of independence, Congress provides the independent agency with certain structural characteristics that limit the President's control over the agency's actions. However, Congress has prohibited OMB and the President from revising the budget requests of certain agencies. Judicial and Legislative Branch Agencies
While most federal agencies can be divided into two broad categories—executive agencies and independent agencies—there are also agencies within the legislative and judicial branches. It is, therefore, arguably the most important statute to understand in administrative law. The scope of the definition of "agency" under the Paperwork Reduction Act appears to be broad, but, by its terms, limited to the executive branch. | Congress has created a variety of federal agencies to execute the law. To this end, agencies may adopt rules to implement laws and adjudicate certain disputes arising under such laws. As such, agencies enjoy considerable power to regulate different industries and affect the legal rights of people. In order to control the manner in which agencies operate, Congress has passed numerous statutes that impose procedural requirements on federal agencies. The Administrative Procedure Act, for example, dictates the procedures an agency must follow to establish a final, legally binding rule. Other statutes govern how agencies must operate internally with respect to hiring and labor practices, the maintenance of federal records, financial management, and a diverse range of other topics.
However, Congress has not provided one definition of an agency. Rather, the term "agency" can mean different things in different contexts, depending on which statute is at issue. In order to understand how different statutes operate, therefore, one must know to which entities these laws actually apply. Aside from judicial and legislative branch agencies, most agencies can be broadly divided into two general categories—executive agencies and independent agencies. The former are considered to be under direct presidential control, and the latter are designed to be comparatively more independent from the President. To ensure this level of independence, Congress often provides an independent agency with structural characteristics designed to protect it from presidential interference. This report will first examine six common indicia of independence that such agencies often have in common.
Next, the report will explore several important statutes that regulate agencies and these statutes' respective definitions of "agency." These statutes include the Administrative Procedure Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Records Act, statutes governing federal employees, and the Paperwork Reduction Act. In interpreting the reach of these statutes, courts have sometimes limited their application based on an agency's operational proximity to the President, or how much control the executive branch has over the entity. |
crs_RL33621 | crs_RL33621_0 | Introduction
The six capital punishment decisions which were decided during the 2005-2006 Term involved issues concerning: (1) a challenge to the lethal injection protocol as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8 th Amendment ( Hill v. McDonough) , (2) constitutionality of a death penalty state statute that requires death if plus and minus factors are in balance ( Kansas v. Marsh ), (3) whether petitioner's compelling new evidence, though at the very least a colorable claim of actual innocence, was as a matter of law insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence before the state courts ( House v. Bell ), (4) disagreement among the courts regarding whether witness testimony was "mitigating evidence" (designed to spare the 18 year old from lethal injection) or "alibi evidence"(that went directly to whether the defendant was guilty) which should have been presented during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial ( Oregon v. Guzek ), (5) whether State's law governing admissibility of third-party guilt evidence violates the capital defendant's constitutional right to present a complete defense premised on due process, confrontation, and compulsory process clauses ( Holmes v. South Carolina ), and (6) whether a new trial is warranted if two of several aggravating factors found by the jury are later held to be invalid ( Brown v. Sanders ). In three cases the Court kept alive the appeals of the death row inmates in Florida, Tennessee, and South Carolina. In the other three cases, the Court affirmed the States' death penalty sentences. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for civil rights violations, rather than under the habeas corpus provisions. The petitioner (Hill) challenged Florida's injection protocol under 42 U.S.C. They declined to reach, however, the question left open in Herrera , whether the Constitution precludes execution of an "actually innocent" defendant found guilty and sentenced in a constitutionally adequate trial. Kansas v. Marsh42
On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the death penalty in Kansas in a 5-4 decision which reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and ruled that the Kansas' death penalty statute does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments when it allows imposition of the penalty should the jury determine that the aggravating and mitigating factors are of equal weight. In Walton , the Court held that a state death penalty statute may give the defendant the burden to prove that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances. Oregon tried Guzek, who was 18 at the time he was convicted, for the offense of capital murder. The Court reasoned that states may put reasonable limits on the evidence a defendant may present. | During the 2005-2006 Term, the Supreme Court gave favorable decisions to the defendants in three out of the six death penalty cases it announced. In Hill v. McDonough, the Court ruled unanimously that the method-of-lethal injection claims can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than under the habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. §2254). In House v. Bell, a case involving a death row inmate who claimed that DNA evidence proved he did not commit the crime for which he was found guilty, the Court found in a 5 -3 ruling that the petitioner had satisfied the "gateway" standard for habeas review, but left open the question of whether the Constitution precludes execution of an "innocent" defendant found guilty and sentenced following a constitutionally adequate trial. In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Court unanimously held that a capital defendant cannot be denied the right to introduce evidence of third party guilt. The other cases, in which the Court upheld application of state death penalty statutes, appear to reveal a greater division among the justices over the fairness of capital punishment. The 5-4 decision in Kansas v. Marsh centered around a debate concerning capital punishment as much as it did a ruling on the unusual statute in Kansas which provided that juries should sentence a defendant to die – rather than serve life in prison – when the evidence for and against imposing death is equal. In Brown v. Sanders, a second 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the petitioner's death sentence even though two of the sentencing factors presented to the jury were declared invalid. In Oregon v. Guzek, the Court held that states may reasonably refuse to allow convicted capital defendants to offer alibi evidence for the first time at the sentencing phase of their trials; two Justices would have permitted the exclusion of any evidence at sentencing that cast doubt upon the jury's guilty verdict, but the majority were obviously unwilling to go that far. |
crs_RL34552 | crs_RL34552_0 | The President signed H.R. Most recently, the 111 th Congress passed a continuing resolution ( P.L. 111-6 ) to provide funding through March 11, 2009. 110-329 , which continued funding for most State-Foreign Operations through March 6, 2009, at FY2008 levels. President Bush signed it into law on September 30, 2008. P.L. Congressional Action
Regular State-Foreign Operations Appropriations
The House introduced H.R. The Senate passed the bill with those same funding levels on March 10, 2009, and President Obama signed the bill into law on March 11, 2009. (More details will be provided in the next update of this report.) The Senate State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee and full Appropriations Committee marked up and reported out its bill ( S. 3288 /S. Rept 110-425) on July 18. The FY2009 Supplemental Request and the Remaining FY2008 Supplemental
On May 2, 2008, the George W. Bush Administration sent an FY2009 supplemental budget request to Congress amending its FY2009 regular request by a total of $5.12 billion for international affairs accounts—$2.24 billion for the Department of State and $2.88 billion for foreign assistance. The Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2008 ( P.L. (For account-by-account detail, see the tables in Appendix C and Appendix D . Also, for more information on the current supplemental appropriations, see CRS Report RL34451, FY2008 Spring Supplemental Appropriations and FY2009 Bridge Appropriations for Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes (P.L. 110-252) , by [author name scrubbed] et al.) FY2009 Budget Request Overview
On February 4, 2008, the President sent his FY2009 regular international affairs (Function 150 account) budget request to Congress. | On February 4, 2008, President Bush sent his FY2009 budget request to Congress. The House Appropriations State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee marked up its then-unnumbered bill on July 16. The Chairwoman's Mark totaled $36.62 billion, $3.82 billion more than FY2008 enacted levels. No further action on that bill occurred. The Senate took up its State Department-Foreign Operations appropriation bill (S. 3288) on July 18; the full Senate Appropriations Committee reported it out the same day with $36.78 billion for FY2009. With no further progress on several appropriations bills, on September 24, the House approved a continuing resolution (H.R. 2638) that continued most funding through March 6, 2009, at FY2008 levels. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 110-329) on September 30. The 111th Congress passed another CR on March 6, 2009 (P.L. 111-6) funding the government through March 11, 2009.
On May 2, 2008, the Administration requested supplemental funds for FY2009. Congress took action on both the pending FY2008 and newly requested FY2009 supplemental appropriations (H.R. 2642) in May and June. Congress passed the supplemental at the end of June; the President signed it into law (P.L. 110-252) on June 30, 2008. (For more detail, see CRS Report RL34451, FY2008 Spring Supplemental Appropriations and FY2009 Bridge Appropriations for Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes (P.L. 110-252), by [author name scrubbed] et al.)
This report analyzes the FY2009 request, recent-year funding trends, and congressional action for FY2009. This report will be updated to further reflect congressional action. |
crs_R43901 | crs_R43901_0 | On December 18, 2015, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations law for FY2016 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; P.L. 2029 ), and the President signed it the same day. Division K of the law provides $52.83 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) for FY2016. This amount is 1.7% greater than the FY2015 estimate and 0.2% below the President's FY2016 request. Of the total, $14.90 billion is designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds, as directed by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (see below). On November 2, 2015, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( H.R. 1314 ; P.L. It increased both security (from $523.1 billion to $548.1 billion) and nonsecurity funding levels (from $493.5 billion to $518.5 billion) and raised OCO funding by $32 billion, divided equally over the two years and between defense and nondefense. For nondefense (SFOPS) OCO, the minimum is $14.9 billion in FY2016 and FY2017. On October 6, the chairman and ranking member of the Senate SFOPS subcommittee introduced a supplemental appropriations bill ( S. 2145 ) to provide an additional $1 billion in FY2016 emergency funding, through the Migration and Refugee Assistance account, to address the refugee crisis caused by conflict in the Middle East. Minibus Legislation. On October 5, 2015, four "minibus" appropriations bills were introduced in the Senate, including S. 2130 , which bundled the Senate FY2016 SFOPS bill ( S. 1725 ) with the Senate FY2016 bills making appropriations for the Department of Defense, Energy and Water Development, Department of Homeland Security, Military Construction, and Department of Veterans Affairs. On September 30, 2015, the House and Senate approved, and President Obama signed into law, a resolution to provide temporary FY2016 continuing appropriations through December 11, 2015 ( P.L. 114-53 ). On June 11, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee approved an FY2016 SFOPS bill ( H.R. Totaling $48.19 billion, before rescissions, H.R. On April 30, 2015, the House agreed to a conference report that set the FY2016 budget authority for International Affairs enduring funds at $40.20 billion; the Senate agreed to the same on May 5, 2015. Hearings. In February and March, Secretary of State John Kerry and Acting USAID Administrator Alfonso Lenhardt testified before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, as well as the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees on the FY2016 SFOPS request. Overview
On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress its FY2016 budget request, which included $54.08 billion for the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations (SFOPS). Of the total SFOPS request, $17.54 billion was for programs funded through the State operations and related agencies accounts (a 10.9% increase over FY2015 estimates that include emergency Ebola funds), and $36.53 billion was for Foreign Operations accounts (a 1.2% increase from FY2015 estimates that include emergency Ebola funds). For FY2016, $7.05 billion, or about 13% of the SFOPS request, was designated as OCO. State Department Operations
For FY2016, the Administration sought to grow funding for the State Department and Related Accounts category by 10.6% over FY2015-estimated levels, to $17.55 billion. The proposal was not funded by appropriators in FY2015. This is about 3% more than requested for FY2016 and 4% above FY2015 foreign operations estimates. The House committee bill, H.R. 114-113 / H.R. P.L. Excluding the Ebola funds, the request was a 3% decrease from the FY2015 estimate. 114-113 . The Senate committee report, S.Rept. The committee report ( H.Rept. 2772 and the committee report ( H.Rept. | On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress its budget request for FY2016. The request for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) totals $54.08 billion, or a 4% increase from FY2015-estimated levels. Within that amount
$47.04 billion is requested for enduring or core funding and $7.05 billion is designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, excluding add-ons and rescissions; $17.55 billion of the total request is for State Department Operations and related agencies (10.6% increase over FY2015 estimates); $36.53 billion is for Foreign Operations (1.2% above the FY2015 estimates); excluding the FY2015 Ebola supplemental funding, the State Department Operations FY2016 request is a 10.9% increase over FY2015 estimates, and the Foreign Operations FY2016 request is a 7% increase over FY2015 funding estimates.
House and Senate committees held several hearings on various aspects of the international affairs budget in February and March. Both chambers passed FY2016 budget resolutions in late March. The House (on April 30, 2015) and the Senate (on May 5, 2015) reconciled budget resolution funding levels in conference (H.Rept. 114-96); however, OCO suballocations were not established.
The House Appropriations Committee reported its FY2016 SFOPS bill out of committee on June 11, 2015. The House committee bill (H.R. 2772; H.Rept. 114-154) recommended $48.19 billion in total funding, excluding rescissions, but including $7.33 billion designated as OCO.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2016 bill out of committee on July 9, 2015. The Senate committee bill (S. 1725; S.Rept. 114-79) recommended $49.77 billion in total funding, excluding rescissions, but including $9.48 billion designated as OCO and $759 million in emergency funds.
On September 30, 2015, the House and Senate approved, and President Obama signed into law, a resolution (P.L. 114-53) to provide temporary FY2016 continuing appropriations through December 11, 2015.
On October 5, 2015, the Senate SFOPS bill was incorporated in a national security-related "minibus" bill (S. 2130), one of four minibus bills into which Senate FY2016 appropriations bills were bundled.
On October 6, Senate SFOPS leaders introduced supplemental appropriations legislation (S. 2145) to increase FY2016 migration and refugee assistance funding by $1 billion to address the Middle East refugee crisis.
On November 2, 2015, the President signed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74), which raises the discretionary spending limit by $50 billion for FY2016 and $30 billion for FY2017 (thus increasing spending caps for defense and nondefense for those years), and increases OCO funding by $16 billion for each year, equally divided between DOD and SFOPS.
On December 18, 2015, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations law for FY2016 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; P.L. 114-113/H.R. 2029), and the President signed it the same day. Division K of the law provides $52.83 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) for FY2016. This amount is 1.7% greater than the FY2015 estimate and 0.2% below the President's FY2016 request.
This report provides an overview of the FY2016 SFOPS request, a discussion of key issues and historic context, and account-by-account funding comparisons with FY2014 actuals, available FY2015 estimates, FY2016 proposals and P.L. 114-113. This is the final update of this report, unless supplemental appropriations legislation is considered by Congress during FY2016. |
crs_RL33774 | crs_RL33774_0 | Introduction and Statutory Intent
The General Services Administration (GSA), through its Public Buildings Service (PBS), is the primary federal real property and asset management agency, with a portfolio consisting of 8,847 buildings and structures with an estimated replacement value of $68.8 billion in FY2006. GSA is also responsible for completing needed repairs and renovations to the federal facilities it manages. Congress enacted the Public Buildings Act Amendments in 1972, and established the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF) within GSA to finance the operating and capital costs associated with federal buildings. Created as a revolving fund, the FBF is financed by income from rental charges assessed to tenant agencies occupying GSA-owned-and-leased space that approximate commercial rates for comparable space and services. While rent deposits to the FBF are the principal source of funding, Congress annually prescribes how GSA may allocate its FBF assets as new obligational authority in appropriations funding. Congress also may provide additional appropriations to the fund. Generally, FBF revenues are used first for GSA's building operating expenses. Early Factors Contributing to Reduced FBF Revenues
The 92 nd Congress established the Federal Buildings Fund with the objective that income derived from agency rental assessments would provide a more predictable source of revenue for new construction and capital improvements than direct congressional appropriations. However, the FBF did not generate sufficient revenues for capital expenditures due, in large part, to statutory obligations and limitations placed on the FBF when it was created. Current Conditions of GSA Real Property Inventory
After meeting its primary obligation to finance building operating expenses, the FBF has historically not produced sufficient revenues to fund needed repairs in GSA's real property inventory. Reliance on Leased Office Space
Because of long-standing problems with a buildings portfolio that has not been financially self-sustaining, GSA has relied on leasing as the only practicable method available to meet increased space needs. Legislation enacted in the 108 th Congress authorized the GSA Administrator to convey real property by sale, lease, or exchange agreements, with net proceeds deposited into the FBF for future real property capital acquisitions and improvements. Efforts to Address Problems in Real Property Inventory
Capital reinvestment is one of the largest challenges confronting GSA officials, who have described their buildings inventory as predominantly aging, with maintenance and repair needs that far exceed available FBF revenues. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law on December 26, 2007, authorized that an additional amount of $84 million be deposited in the Federal Buildings Fund. | The General Services Administration (GSA), through its Public Buildings Service (PBS), is the primary federal real property and asset management agency, with a portfolio consisting of 8,847 buildings and structures with an estimated replacement value of $68.8 billion in FY2006. GSA is also responsible for completing needed repairs and renovations to the federal facilities it manages. Congress enacted the Public Buildings Act Amendments in 1972, and established the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF) within GSA to finance the operating and capital costs associated with federal facilities. Created as a revolving fund, the FBF is financed by income from rental charges assessed to tenant agencies occupying GSA-owned-and-leased space that approximate commercial rates for comparable space and services. While these deposits to the FBF are the principal source of funding, Congress annually prescribes how GSA may allocate its FBF assets as new obligational authority in appropriations funding. Congress also may appropriate additional monies into the fund. Generally, FBF revenues are used first for GSA's building operating expenses. Congress then allocates FBF funds for new construction, repairs, and renovations.
The 92nd Congress established the Federal Buildings Fund with the objective that income derived from agency rental assessments would provide a more predictable source of revenue for new construction and capital improvements than direct congressional appropriations. However, the FBF did not generate sufficient revenues for capital expenditures due, in large part, to statutory obligations and limitations placed on the FBF when it was created. After meeting its primary obligation to finance building operating expenses, the FBF has historically not produced sufficient revenues to fund needed repairs in GSA's real property inventory. Because of long-standing problems with a buildings portfolio that has not been financially self-sustaining, GSA has relied on leasing as the only practicable method available to meet increased space needs.
Capital reinvestment is one of the largest challenges confronting GSA officials, who have described their buildings inventory as predominantly aging, with maintenance and repair needs that far exceed available FBF revenues. Legislation enacted in the 108th Congress authorized the GSA Administrator to convey real property by sale, lease, exchange, or buyback agreements, with net proceeds deposited into the FBF for future real property capital acquisitions and improvements. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law on December 26, 2007, authorizes that an additional amount of $84 million be deposited in the Federal Buildings Fund. The President's FY2009 budget requests that $525 million be deposited in the FBF.
This report was originally written by [author name scrubbed], who has retired from CRS, and will not be updated. |
crs_R41868 | crs_R41868_0 | Introduction
On June 30, 2007, the United States and South Korea signed the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The provisions concerning automobiles and auto parts are among the most controversial elements of the KORUS FTA. On December 3, 2010, the United States and South Korea reached a further agreement that modified the auto sector provisions. These rules will be used to determine if automotive goods imported from South Korea are eligible to receive duty-free or reduced tariff benefits under the KORUS FTA, and whether automotive goods from the United States are eligible for corresponding benefits upon export to South Korea. Finally, it discusses whether the domestic content rules in the KORUS FTA could enable circumvention of the rules of origin by allowing automotive components produced in North Korea's Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) to enter the United States duty-free in assembled motor vehicles, and thereby receive the benefits provided by the agreement. Roughly 15,000 components are needed to assemble a motor vehicle. Today, few, if any, vehicles are built entirely from parts made in any one country. An RVC test requires that a certain percentage of the value of a manufactured product (as determined by the cost of inputs, labor, and other direct costs of processing operations) originate in the FTA region. The value of inputs from South Korea and the United States is added together, and if their total value exceeds 35% of the adjusted value of the vehicle or the component, the product would qualify for the benefits of the KORUS FTA. In addition to the KORUS FTA, the South Korean government has negotiated a trade agreement with the European Union, referred to as the KOREU FTA. This agreement enters into force on July 1, 2011. Notwithstanding these differences, Administration experts assert that the regional value content requirements in the KORUS and KOREU FTA are roughly equivalent. One enforcement issue is whether the KORUS FTA could encourage manufacturers in South Korea to incorporate goods produced in the KIC into products exported to the United States, effectively circumventing the U.S. restrictions on goods from North Korea and also enabling North Korea to obtain duty-free access to the U.S. market, to which it is not entitled under the agreement. Although current U.S. regulations effectively prohibit any North Korean goods, including auto parts, from being incorporated into South Korean products that are exported to the United States, if OFAC were to approve a license application, then the KORUS FTA rules of origin for automobiles would apply. As North Korea is not a party to the KORUS FTA, the North Korean inputs would not be counted as regional value content under the rules discussed in a previous section of this report. Sample Regional Value Content Calculation | The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) was signed on June 30, 2007. The provisions on the automotive sector were among the most difficult areas negotiated, and were among those in which the Obama Administration and South Korean officials reached further agreement on December 3, 2010.
The agreement's effect on the automotive sector has drawn particular scrutiny as Congress considers implementation of the KORUS FTA. In particular, the specific rules of origin (ROO) for automobiles and auto parts have become a matter of debate. These rules determine whether the products imported into an FTA participating country are eligible to receive the duty-free or reduced tariff benefits of the agreement. For autos and auto parts, a certain percentage of the parts, labor, and other associated costs must come from the region. This is known as a regional value content (RVC) test.
Few vehicles built today are built of parts made in any one country. The roughly 15,000 parts needed to produce a single motor vehicle are typically supplied by a complex web of manufacturers located throughout the world. This makes it challenging to determine whether a particular vehicle or a complex component, such as an engine or a transmission, qualifies for duty-free access to the U.S. or South Korean markets under the KORUS FTA.
Based on analysis of the regional value content required under the KORUS FTA rules of origin, a significant proportion of a vehicle's value would need to originate in South Korea or the United States for that vehicle to enter the United States duty-free. Simply assembling a product from inputs obtained from other countries would likely result in insufficient regional value content for a product to qualify for the tariff benefits of the KORUS FTA. It appears that the requirements under the KORUS FTA are roughly equivalent to those imposed upon South Korean and European Union vehicles under the South Korea-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which takes effect July 1, 2011.
Content produced in North Korea is not presently allowed into the United States, a situation that the KORUS FTA would not change. If at some future time the United States were to ease trade restrictions on North Korea, U.S. and South Korean negotiators would then need to discuss the treatment of North Korean inputs to South Korean products under the agreement. The KORUS FTA contains provisions to promote cooperation between the two countries' customs officials. Nonetheless, ensuring that North Korean parts are not used in South Korean products exported to the United States will remain a challenge, whether or not the KORUS FTA takes effect. |
crs_RS22681 | crs_RS22681_0 | Introduction
This report discusses proposals to raise the cigarette tax to help pay for reauthorization of the State Children's Health Insurance Program. H.R. 2 passed the House on January 14, 2009 and it included the same cigarette tax as proposed in the 110 th Congress, an increase of 61 cents per pack, raising the tax from 39 cents to $1. The Senate version and the final legislation, P.L. 111-3 includes taxes similar to H.R. Federal cigarette taxes are $0.39 per pack, accounting for 94% of federal tobacco tax revenue. There is a 4 cent tax on a package of small cigars. Large cigars are the only tobacco product with a tax based on price, but they also have a cap; the price-based tax rises in proportionally, but the cap increases by much more, from 5 cents per cigar to $0.40 in the House bill ($0.4026 in the Senate Finance bill and the final legislation). Tobacco tax receipts in the United States in FY2007 included $7.5 billion in federal tax, $16.2 billion in state and local taxes, and $8 billion in payments from the Master Tobacco Settlement. CRS estimates suggest there will be a loss of revenue to the states approaching $1.5 billion. Are tobacco taxes the most desirable source of revenue? In addition, smoking is more prevalent among lower income individuals. To illustrate, in 1998 the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that a 76 cent tax increase (brought about through a proposed federal tobacco settlement) would raise the effective tax rate on average by 0.3% of income, but would increase the burden of those with incomes below $10,000 by 2% of income and the burden of those in the $10,000-$20,000 income by 0.6% of income. The ceiling was lowered to $3 on the Senate floor in the 2007 legislation and the ceiling in the House bill was $1 in 2007. H.R. | On January 15, the House passed H.R. 2, a bill which included increased tobacco taxes to finance State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). This legislation was similar to that passed in the 110th Congress (H.R. 976 and H.R. 3162) although the initial House proposal had smaller tax increases.. H.R. 2 increases cigarette taxes, the primary source of tobacco tax revenues from 39 cents to $1.00. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the cigarette tax will raise $6.4 billion in federal revenues in FY2010 with all federal tobacco taxes increases raising $7.1 billion. A similar tax increase was contained in the Senate bill, and in the final proposal, P.L. 111-3 (although in both case the tax was increased by an additional two thirds of a cent, to $1.0066.) The analysis suggests that state and local governments will lose about $1 billion in cigarette tax revenues and up to $0.5 billion in lost revenues from the tobacco settlement payments. The legislation is now being considered in the Senate.
A justification is to discourage teenage smoking, but this effect is probably small; a reservation is that the burden falls heavily on low-income individuals. Taxes on other tobacco products are also increased, although cigarette taxes account for most tobacco revenues.
In the 110th Congress, the President vetoed the 110th Congress SCHIP proposal on October 3, 2008, the House failed to override the veto and a new bill, H.R. 3963 passed the House and Senate, with no changes in the cigarette tax, but changes in spending rules, and the President vetoed that version on December 12, 2008. |
crs_RL32885 | crs_RL32885_0 | Most Recent Developments
The President signed the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies (SSJC) appropriations bill into law on November 22, 2005 ( P.L. 109-108 ). The law provides $61.8 billion for the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations subcommittee of the House. The appropriations of the major departments and their related agencies were: Department of Justice—$21.7 billion; Department of Commerce—$6.6 billion; Department of State—$9.0 billion; Science—$22.1 billion; and Related Agencies—$2.1 billion. The most recent FY2006 302(b) allocation for SSJC was $58.2 billion. The Administration submitted its FY2006 budget to Congress on February 7, 2005. The Administration requested $64.2 billion for the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations subcommittee of the House and $54.2 billion for the Agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations subcommittee in the Senate. The House Appropriations Committee reported its SSJC bill ( H.R. 2862 , H.Rept. 109-118 ) on June 7, 2005 and the House enacted the bill on June 16 after three days of debate and 43 amendments. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) bill ( H.R. 2862 , S.Rept. The Senate passed the CJS bill on September 15, 2005 after consideration of 122 amendments by a vote of 91-4. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its State, Foreign Operations Appropriation bill ( H.R. 109-96 ) on June 30. It contains the Senate figures of $9,709.2 for the Department of State, International Broadcasting, and related agencies which the full Senate passed on July 20 th . Appropriations bills reflect the jurisdiction of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in which they are considered. In the 108 th Congress, both the House and Senate subcommittees had identical jurisdiction and produced the Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies appropriations bills. In the 109 th Congress, jurisdiction for the Judiciary appropriation was removed to the Treasury, Transportation, HUD Subcommittees in the House and the Senate. Science appropriations, namely the National Aeronautical and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation were transferred to the former CJS subcommittees in both chambers. In the Senate, appropriations for the Department of State were transferred to the Foreign Operations subcommittee, however, they remains under the jurisdiction of SSJC in the House. 109-272 ). 2862 was signed by President Bush on November 22, 2005 ( P.L. On June 23, 2005, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $324.5 million for the LSC for FY2006 ( S.Rept. 109-88 ). In its report ( H.Rept. The House agreed to the conference report on November 9 by a vote of 397 to 19, and the Senate agreed to the conference report on November 16 by a vote of 94 to 5. | This report monitors actions taken by the 109th Congress for the House's Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies (SSJC) and the Senate's Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) FY2006 appropriations legislation. Appropriations bills reflect the jurisdiction of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in which they are considered. Jurisdictions for the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees changed at the beginning of the 109th Congress. In the 108th Congress, both the House and Senate subcommittees had identical jurisdiction and produced the Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies appropriations bills. In the 109th Congress, jurisdiction for the Judiciary appropriation was removed to the Treasury, Transportation, HUD Subcommittees in the House and the Senate. Science appropriations, namely the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) were transferred to the former CJS subcommittees in both chambers. In the Senate, Appropriations for the Department of State was transferred to the Foreign Operations subcommittee, however, it remains under the jurisdiction of SSJC in the House.
The President signed the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies (SSJC) appropriations bill into law on November 22, 2005 (P.L. 109-108). The law provides $61.8 billion for the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations subcommittee of the House. The appropriations enacted for the major departments and their related agencies are: Department of Justice—$21.7 billion; Department of Commerce—$6.6 billion; Department of State—$9.0 billion; Science—$22.1 billion; and Related Agencies—$2.1 billion. The most recent FY2006 302(b) allocation for SSJC was $58.2 billion.
The Administration requested $64.2 billion/$54.2 billion for SSJC/CJS appropriations in its FY2006 budget request sent to Congress on February 7, 2005. The House Appropriations Committee reported its SSJC bill (H.R. 2862, H.Rept. 109-118) on June 7, 2005 and the House enacted the bill on June 16 after three days of debate and 43 amendments. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its bill (H.R. 2862, S.Rept. 109-88) on June 23, 2005. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its State, Foreign Operations Appropriation bill (H.R. 3057/S.Rept. 109-96) June 30. It contains the Senate figures of $9,709.2 for the Department of State, International Broadcasting, and related agencies. The full Senate passed the bill on July 20. The Senate passed the CJS bill on September 15, 2005 after consideration of 122 amendments by a vote of 91-4. The Conference Report (H.Rept. 109-272) was filed on November 7, 2005. The House approved the measure by a vote of 397-19 on November 9; the Senate approved it on November 11 by a vote of 94-5. It was signed into law by President Bush on November 22, 2005 (P.L. 109-108). |
crs_R44364 | crs_R44364_0 | DHS has responsibility for protecting unclassified federal civilian systems and networks and assisting agencies in responding to cyber threats and attacks. Executive Branch Efforts to Define and Identify the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce
The executive branch has several initiatives to define and identify the federal cybersecurity workforce: (1) the national cybersecurity workforce framework, (2) cybersecurity data codes, and (3) a federal cybersecurity workforce dataset. All agencies—identify their top five cyber talent gaps using OPM's cybersecurity dataset. Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Applicable to DOD and DHS Cybersecurity Positions
Congress has authorized hiring and pay flexibilities for DOD and DHS to enhance the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity professionals. In many cases, these incentives can be given to all federal employees. If such interest continues, Congress could enhance its oversight of these efforts to increase its awareness and knowledge of their implementation. OPM, however, is not currently required to report on its progress in identifying and coding all federal cybersecurity positions to Congress, nor has it released its cybersecurity dataset or a government-wide count of the cybersecurity workforce to Congress. Further, OMB's CSIP does not require agencies to report identified skills gaps in their cybersecurity workforces to Congress. Congressional knowledge of the progress of these evolving efforts, therefore, might be limited or incomplete, which might make it difficult for Congress to (1) identify potential conflicting efforts between OMB, OPM, and Congress in assessing the capabilities of the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) gauge the utility of hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. OPM is also required under P.L. This discretion can create the potential for discrepancies between the intended and actual use of the flexibilities. Lack of Data on Use of Certain Cybersecurity Hiring Flexibilities at DOD and DHS
The law for DOD intelligence positions, and the OPM-issued hiring flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions, do not require the departments to report, among other things, (1) the total number of employees hired using the flexibilities, (2) the specific types of positions filled through the flexibilities, or (3) in which components the positions are located. Training on Structure and Use of Flexibilities
The laws governing flexibilities for DOD intelligence, DHS cybersecurity, and DOD cybersecurity positions at the U.S. Cyber Command do not include provisions to require human resources staff (including component-level hiring managers and department-level staff in the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer) to receive training on the availability, structure, and operation of cybersecurity hiring and pay flexibilities. In its oversight capacity, Congress could additionally direct GAO to study the operation and effectiveness of the OPM cybersecurity dataset one year after it becomes operational. 4. Report on the Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities
The Inspectors General at DOD and DHS could be required to report on how effective the hiring and pay flexibilities authorized through statute—and the specific features—have been in recruiting and retaining qualified cybersecurity professionals. | The federal cybersecurity workforce is responsible for protecting U.S. government systems and networks against cyber threats and attacks. Federal agencies, however, have reported difficulty in assessing the size and capabilities of their cybersecurity workforces. DOD and DHS, which play prominent roles in the nation's cybersecurity posture, have also noted certain obstacles affecting the recruitment and retention of qualified cybersecurity professionals to fulfill their departments' cybersecurity missions.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is constructing a dataset to catalog all federal cybersecurity positions in the executive branch. The dataset had not been released to Congress or the public. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to identify their top five cyber talent gaps by December 31, 2015. Congress has also authorized hiring and pay flexibilities that can be used to fill cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. The flexibilities aim to enhance the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity professionals by expediting the federal hiring process and providing such professionals with monetary incentives that are not available to all federal employees. OPM has also established temporary hiring flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions.
Congress, pursuant to its oversight authority, might seek to increase its awareness and knowledge of these initiatives. OPM is not required to report to Congress on agencies' progress in coding their federal cybersecurity positions or in completing the agency's cybersecurity dataset. Further, DOD and DHS are not required to report on the use or effectiveness of certain hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. Congress may find it difficult to identify potential implementation issues, such as (1) conflicting efforts to define and identify the federal cybersecurity workforce, (2) discrepancies between the intended and actual use of hiring and pay flexibilities, and (3) measuring the overall effectiveness of the flexibilities.
Congress could consider enhancing its oversight of executive branch initiatives to define and identify federal cybersecurity positions by (1) requiring OPM to notify Congress of its progress on completing the cybersecurity dataset, and (2) directing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the operation and effectiveness of the cybersecurity workforce dataset upon its completion. Congress could also enhance its oversight of the implementation of hiring and pay flexibilities for DOD and DHS by (1) conforming reporting requirements among the three laws governing hiring and pay flexibilities, (2) requiring additional reporting on the use of certain flexibilities, (3) directing DOD and DHS, or GAO, to evaluate the effectiveness of the hiring and pay flexibilities, and (4) requiring DOD and DHS human resources staff to receive training on the structure and operation of the flexibilities. |
crs_R42845 | crs_R42845_0 | Introduction
Emergency management generally refers to activities associated with avoiding and responding to natural and human-caused hazards. Emergency management in the United States is highly decentralized and contextual in nature. Multiple jurisdictions as well as a vast number of agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities are often involved. Consequently, the number and type of actors involved in an incident vary tremendously depending on the context and severity of the event. Similarly, the legal framework through which emergency management functions and activities are authorized is also decentralized and stems from multiple authorities. This report provides Members of Congress and their staffs with an introduction to the principles and foundations of federal emergency management in the United States. It examines the activities of several federal agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Guard, Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Forest Service, and Small Business Administration. In addition, this report discusses the four phases of emergency management: (1) mitigation, (2) preparedness, (3) response, and (4) recovery; the process for requesting federal assistance for major disasters, emergencies, and fires; and the types of assistance provided through each type of Stafford Act declaration. This report also includes a description of federal-to-state cost shares under the Stafford Act, a discussion on how federal assistance is funded, and the process through which FEMA requests assistance from other federal entities. This report also outlines the frameworks that guide various emergency management activities at the federal and state level, and discusses some of the key federal laws and policies influencing federal emergency management and highlights federal entities that provide assistance to states and localities. The following sections provide examples of the types of activities that take place in each phase. The frameworks are intended to assign roles and responsibilities to various federal agencies with mission areas involved with aspects of federal emergency management. The National Mitigation Framework is distinct from the other planning frameworks because most mitigation activities take place at the local level; the role of the federal government in the National Mitigation Framework is not as prominent as with the other planning frameworks. National Disaster Recovery Framework
Issued in September 2011, the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) coordinates and assigns roles and responsibilities to entities involved in disaster recovery. Federal Assistance Through Stafford Declarations
The system of emergency management in the United States is scalable. The activities carried out by other agencies through Mission Assignments are generally reimbursed by FEMA through the DRF. These statutes and policies organize and define the federal role in emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and disaster relief. Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
A wide range of reforms in federal emergency management were made in response to the 2005 hurricane season. Most of these changes were related to terrorism. The concluding section highlights of some of the key agencies that provide emergency and disaster assistance to states and localities including a brief description of the work performed by each agency. For example, since 2005, ER funding allocations for Gulf Coast Hurricane response have totaled over $3 billion. EPA is the lead federal agency for the water sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. | The federal government plays a significant role in emergency management, which generally refers to activities associated with avoiding and responding to natural and human-caused hazards. Emergency management in the United States is highly decentralized and contextual in nature: activities often involve multiple jurisdictions as well as a vast number of agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities. In addition, the number and type of actors involved in an incident will vary tremendously depending on the context and severity of the event. Similarly, the legal framework through which emergency management functions and activities are authorized is also decentralized and stems from multiple authorities.
Congress annually appropriates funds for a wide range of activities and efforts related to emergency management. For example, between 2005 and 2011 Congress provided an average of $12 billion annually to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the lead federal agency responsible for disaster relief through regular and supplemental appropriations. Congress has also invested over $120 billion through various federal agencies to help the Gulf Coast Region recover from the hurricanes that hit the Gulf Coast in 2005 and 2008.
In recent years congressional interest in emergency management has focused on funding, program administration, and program coordination—both among federal agencies and state emergency management agencies. This report provides an introduction to the principles and foundations of federal emergency management in the United States and a description of the activities of the federal agencies that provide assistance, focusing primarily on the Federal Emergency Management Agency, but also including information on the National Guard, Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Forest Service, and Small Business Administration.
This report is designed to provide Members of Congress and congressional staff with a general overview of principles and foundations of federal emergency management in the United States as well as the types of activities provided by various federal agencies. The report begins with a description of the four phases of emergency management: (1) mitigation, (2) preparedness, (3) response, and (4) recovery, and includes examples of some of the activities that take place in each of these phases. The report then discusses a recent movement at the federal level to carry out these phases of emergency management through a system of frameworks. The frameworks include (1) the National Prevention Framework, (2) the National Protection Framework, (3) the National Mitigation Framework, (4) the National Response Framework, and (5) the National Disaster Recovery Framework. The frameworks are used to designate roles and responsibilities and coordinate various activities.
Next, this report describes the process for requesting federal assistance for major disasters, emergencies, and fire suppression. The declaration section also includes brief summaries of the types of assistance provided through each type of declaration. This discussion is followed by description of federal-to-state cost shares, how federal assistance is funded, and the process through which FEMA requests assistance from other federal entities. The section then provides a description of the close-out process—the process in which FEMA terminates its recovery efforts. The report includes a discussion of key federal laws and policies that influence federal emergency management, and concludes by highlighting some of the federal activities that take place in response to emergencies and disasters. |
crs_R44346 | crs_R44346_0 | The Department of the Treasury
This report examines FY2016 appropriations for the Treasury Department and its operating bureaus, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Organizational Structure and Functions
At its most basic level of organization, the Treasury Department is a collection of departmental offices and operating bureaus. The operating budgets for most Treasury bureaus and offices are funded largely through annual discretionary appropriations. This is the case for the IRS, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Office of the Inspector General, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. These details are provided for each of the Treasury appropriation accounts (which number 9 or 10, depending on whether funding for the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) is counted as a separate account or folded into the DO account). Departmental Offices
Budget Request
The President's FY2016 budget request for the Treasury Department included $332 million in appropriations for DO, or $9.3 million more than the amount enacted for FY2015. 2995
The House Appropriations Committee reported a bill ( H.R. S. 1910
S. 1910 , as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 30, would have given DO $326 million in appropriations in FY2016, or $116 million more than the amount enacted for FY2015 but $6 million less than the budget request. Departmentwide Systems and Capital Investments
Budget Request
The FY2016 Treasury budget request called for $10.7 million in appropriations for DSCIP, or about $8 million more than the amount enacted in FY2015. H.R. 2995
As reported by the House Appropriations Committee, the bill would have provided $233.5 million in appropriations for the CDFIF in FY2016, or $3.0 million more than the amount enacted for FY2015 and the same as the budget request. Issue for Congress
The three proposals for funding the CDFIF in FY2016 raised the question of the future status of two current programs: the Healthy Food Financing Initiative and the Bank Enterprise Award Program. On the one hand, the Obama Administration asked Congress to increase funding for the former from $22 million in FY2015 to $35 million in FY2016, but to provide no funds for the latter. 2995 recommended separate funding for the HFFI in FY2016, but both would have funded the BEA. Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF)
The Treasury Department's budget request included a proposal to cancel permanently $875.0 million in unobligated balances from the TFF in FY2016. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016
The act mandated a rescission of $700 million from the unobligated balances in the TFF in FY2016. Of this amount, $2.409 billion would have gone to taxpayer services, $5.400 billion to enforcement (including a $352.1 million program integrity cap adjustment under Section 251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 ( P.L. According to the IRS's budget request for FY2016 was intended to address the following priorities:
Taxpayer Service Improving the level of taxpayer assistance through the IRS's toll-free telephone service Meeting increased demand from taxpayers for help in complying with ACA requirements Delivering enhanced online service options to taxpayers Providing greater assistance to low-income taxpayers and those in need of tax relief because of financial hardship Enforcement Improving tax compliance by implementing FATCA, ACA, and the Information Return Document Matching program for merchant payment cards, third-party reimbursements, and basis reporting for stock transactions Reducing the revenue loss from tax return fraud, including fraud from identity theft Reversing recent declines in examination and collection efforts Increasing the number of criminal investigations Rebuilding public trust in IRS's enforcement of compliance in the tax-exempt sector Infrastructure Maintaining critical IT infrastructure Upgrading IRS facilities to address health and safety concerns Upholding the integrity of "revenue financial systems" Business Systems Modernization Developing new IT capabilities such as increasing self-service options at IRS.gov, including the Get Transcript tool which gives taxpayers direct online access to their tax accounts IRS Direct Pay, which offers a free, secure online option for scheduling and making tax payments IRS2Go, which allows taxpayers to find out the status of their refund through the IRS website Developing a shared platform for case management
Reducing the federal tax gap is an ongoing priority for the IRS. H.R. Another issue was the timing of information returns. S. 1910
The bill, as reported by the Senate Finance Committee, would have provided $10.475 billion in appropriations for the IRS in FY2016, or $470.0 million less than the amount enacted for FY2015 and $2.456 billion less than the budget request. | At its most basic level of organization, the Treasury Department is a collection of departmental offices and operating bureaus. The bureaus as a whole account for 95% of Treasury's budget and workforce. Most bureaus and offices are funded through annual appropriations.
Treasury appropriations were distributed among 10 accounts in FY2015: (1) Departmental Offices (DO), (2) Departmentwide Systems and Capital Investments Program (DSCIP), (3) Office of Inspector General (OIG), (4) Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), (5) Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), (6) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), (7) Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS), (8) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (ATTB), (9) Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFIF), and (10) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
The President's budget request for FY2016 included $13.456 billion in appropriations for the Treasury Department, including a rescission of $875 million for the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF). Of the requested amount, $12.931 billion would go to the IRS; $364 million to the BFS; $332 million to DO; $233.5 million to CDFIF; $167 million to TIGTA; $113 million to FinCEN; $101 million to ATTB; $41 million to SIGTARP; $35 million to OIG; and $11 million to DSCIP.
In early July 2015, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill (H.R. 2995) that provided appropriations for the Treasury Department and several other agencies in FY2016. Under the measure, Treasury would have received $10.758 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $721 million from the TFF; this amount was $764 million less than the amount enacted for FY2015 and $2.698 billion less than the budget request.
Later the same month, the Senate Appropriations Committee also reported a bill (S. 1910) to fund Treasury and the same other agencies in FY2016. Under the measure, Treasury would have received $11.139 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $700 million from the TFF. This amount was $383 million less than the amount enacted for FY2015 and $2.317 billion less than the budget request.
The House and Senate agreed in mid-December 2015 on an omnibus appropriations measure (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-113) for FY2016 that included funding for the Treasury Department. Under the act, Treasury received $11.942 billion in appropriations, or $420 million more than the amount enacted for FY2015 but $1.514 billion less than the budget request.
The three FY2016 budget proposals for Treasury raised several issues for Congress. One concerned the status of funding for the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI): H.R. 2995 as reported would have created a separate appropriations account for the TFF, whereas both the Administration's budget request and S. 1910 as reported proposed combining funding for the Office with overall DO funding. Another issue was the future status of two CDFIF programs: the Healthy Food Initiative and the Bank Enterprise Award Program. The budget request included funding for the former but no funding for the latter, but S. 1910 and H.R. 2995 would have funded the latter without funding the former.
Proposed funding for the IRS in FY2016 raised three additional issues: (1) the potential impact of the three proposals on taxpayer service and tax law enforcement, (2) the advantages and disadvantages of using discretionary funding cap adjustments under the Balanced Budget Act of 2011 to increase funding for IRS enforcement activities, and (3) the implications of the current budget scoring convention of disregarding the net revenue effect of agency administrative programs for the size of the IRS budget. |
crs_98-210 | crs_98-210_0 | The conference report ( H.Rept. 105-647 ) for H.R. This is an additional $216M to the House bill and a reduction of $31Mfrom the Senate bill. Military construction accounts received emergency supplemental appropriations money for FY1999 in the Omnibus Consolidation bill( H.R. The bill fundsconstruction projects and real property maintenance of the active Army, Navy &Marine Corps, Air Force, and their reserve components; defense-wide construction;U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program (formerly called theNATO Infrastructure Program); and military family housing operations andconstruction. 1. 4328 , H.Rept. 105-825 ) in October 1998. Due to monsoons inKorea and Hurricanes Georges & Bonnie, military construction projects secured anadditional $209 million in funding. The conference report ( H.Rept. Even with the additional funds, the FY1999 totalis $759M less than what was enacted for FY1998. The Senate passed their bill on June 25, with the SAC-approved total. The Senate Appropriations Committee hasallocated $8.484 billion in budget authority for military construction, which is anadditional $700 million (an increase of 8.9% ) than the President's request of $7.8billion. Authorization Process
On May 21, the House approved $8.2 billion for military construction in its FY1999 defense authorization bill ( H.R. On May 7, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) approved $500 million more than the Administration's FY1999 budget in S. 2057 . 105-532 ) and the SASC ( S.Rept. 105-736 ) passed the House on September 24, and the Senate on October 1. The FY1999 authorizationbill became P.L. 105-261 on October 17, 1998. Its report on the FY1998 Military Construction Appropriations Bill ( H.Rept. 103-337 ), however, incorporated Senator McCain's criteria as a sense of the Senate provision, providingthat the unrequested projects should be:
1. essential to the DOD's national security mission,
2. not inconsistent with planned base closures,
3. in the services' Future Years Defense Plans (see above),
4. executable in the year they are authorized and appropriated, and
5. offset by reductions in other defense accounts, through advice from theSecretary of Defense. 1. The debate on the military construction line item veto highlights the issues that arise with adding projects to the military construction budget. Prospects for Congressional Additions to the FY1999 Military Construction Budget. The conference for the FY1999Military Construction Appropriations Bill recommended $8.450B, which is anadditional $666M to the President's request. Ongoing Issues
Importance of Housing to the Quality of Life for Servicemembers. Privatization of Military Family Housing. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Concerns. Environmental Issues. Use of Advanced Procurement for Army Military Construction. 105-189 ). 353) on July 29, 1998. Senate Agreed to Conference Report by the Yeas and Nays: 87-3 on September 1,1998. Became P.L. 105-237 on September 20, 1998. | The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill finances (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations and construction;(3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) most base realignment andclosure costs.
This report reviews the appropriations and authorization process for military construction. The congressional debate perennially centers on the adequacy of the President's budget for militaryconstruction needs and the cases for and against congressional additions, especially for Guard andReserve projects. This year, key Members of Congress have argued that the Pentagon has neitherfunded nor planned adequately for military construction.
For FY1999, the Administration has requested budget authority of $7.8 billion. This is down from the FY1996 level of $11.1 billion, the FY1997 level of $9.8 billion and the FY1998 level of$8.9 billion. On May 21, the House passed their version of the FY1998 defense authorization bill, H.R. 3616 ( H.Rept. 105-532 ). On May 7, the Senate Armed Services Committeefinished marking up its version, S. 2057 ( S.Rept. 105-189 ). The Senate passed thedefense authorization bill on June 25. The conference report ( H.Rept. 105-736 ) passed the Houseon September 24, and the Senate on October 1. The FY1999 authorization bill became P.L. 105-261 on October 17, 1998.
The military construction appropriations subcommittees have finished their work. Theconference committee submitted their report ( H.Rept. 105-647 ) for H.R. 4059 on July24. The House agreed to the conference report (417-1), on July 29, with the Senate agreeing (87-3)on September 1. It became P.L. 105-237 on September 20, 1998.
The conference recommended $8.450B. The conference committee added $666M to the President's request. Even with the additional funds, the FY1999 total is $759M less than what wasenacted for FY1998. This is an additional $216M to the House bill and a reduction of $31M fromthe Senate bill.
Military construction accounts received emergency supplemental appropriations money for FY1999 in the Omnibus Consolidation bill ( H.R. 4328 , H.Rept. 105-825 ) in October1998. Due to monsoons in Korea and Hurricanes Georges & Bonnie, military construction projectssecured an additional $209 million in funding.
Appropriations and authorization hearings on the FY1999 military construction budget have highlighted the following issues:
importance of housing to the quality of life forservicemembers;
privatization of military family housing and barracksimprovements;
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) concerns;
environmental issues; and
advanced procurement for Army military construction.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: F = Foreign Affairs. |
crs_RL31235 | crs_RL31235_0 | Introduction
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the federal budget deficit for FY2009 was $1,414 billion, triple the $459 billion deficit recorded in FY2008. CBO expects the deficit for FY2010 to be $1,349 billion. The budget deficit in FY2009 was, in dollar terms, unprecedented. Compared to the overall economy, the $1.4 trillion budget deficit equaled 9.9% of gross domestic product (GDP). In 1943, the budget deficit reached 30.3% of GDP. Since 1946 and before now, the largest the budget deficit had been, relative to the overall economy, was 6% of GDP in 1983. In 2001, the surplus fell from 2.4% of GDP the previous year to 1.3% of GDP. Fiscal Policy in the Short Run
Over fairly short periods of time, say three or four years, fiscal policy can affect the rate of economic growth by adding to, or subtracting from, aggregate demand. For a time, the size of the economy may even increase by more than the initial increase in government spending. Whether because of higher interest rates or rising prices, any effects of an increase in government spending, or a tax cut, on the rate of economic growth tend to diminish as the economy approaches full employment. Estimates of the multiplier effect of a change in fiscal policy vary, but most of them suggest that it reaches a peak value of somewhere between one and one-and-a-half times the original stimulus. In most economic models, that peak effect is realized within one or two years of the initial change in policy. The Standardized Budget
One measure economists use to assess fiscal policy is the structural, or standardized-employment, budget. This measure estimates, at a given time, what outlays, receipts, and the surplus or deficit would be if the economy were at full employment. Between 1997 and 2001, the actual surplus was larger than the standardized measure. Between 1992 and 2000, the actual budget surplus increased from -4.5% to 2.5% of potential GDP, a shift of 7.0 percentage points. Over the same period, the standardized measure rose from -3.3% to 1.1% of GDP. That suggests that a little more than half of the shift during that period was the result of changes in policy, and a little less than half was attributable to improving economic conditions. Between 2000 and 2003, the standardized surplus fell, suggesting that fiscal policy was expansionary. In the long run, economic growth is determined primarily by three factors: growth in the labor force, the rate of technological advance, and the amount of capital available to the workforce. Of the three, the last one may be the most susceptible to the influence of policymakers. The larger the capital stock, the more productive the labor force tends to be. Although it may be possible for fiscal policy to have an effect on the rate of technological progress in the way public money is spent, it probably has a much larger effect on growth through its influence on the size of the domestic stock of capital and the amount of capital available to each worker in the labor force. That is, the budget deficit is equal to the interest payment. | The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the federal budget deficit for FY2009 was $1,414 billion, triple the $459 billion deficit recorded in FY2008. The CBO expects the deficit for FY2010 to be $1,349 billion. The estimate for 2010 is based on current law. The budget deficit in FY2009 was, in dollar terms, unprecedented. Compared to the overall economy, the $1.4 trillion budget deficit equaled 9.9% of gross domestic product (GDP). In 1943, the budget deficit reached 30.3% of GDP. Since 1946 and before now, the largest the budget deficit had been, relative to the overall economy, was 6% of GDP in 1983.
Over fairly short periods of time, say three or four years, fiscal policy can affect the rate of economic growth by adding to, or subtracting from, aggregate demand. For a time, the effect on the economy may even be larger than the initial change in the budget. These effects, however, tend eventually to diminish because of either higher interest rates or rising prices. There are varying estimates of the total effect on the economy of a change in fiscal policy, but most of them suggest that it reaches a peak somewhere between one and one-and-a-half times the size of the change in the budget. Most macroeconomists believe that effect is realized within one or two years of the initial change in policy.
One measure economists use to assess fiscal policy is the structural, or standardized-employment, budget. This measure estimates, at a given time, what outlays, receipts, and the surplus or deficit would be if the economy were at full employment. Although the actual budget was in surplus beginning in 1998, the standardized measure first registered a balanced budget in 1999. Between 1992 and 2000, the actual budget surplus increased from -4.5% (a deficit of 4.5%) to 2.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), a shift of 7.0 percentage points. During the same period, the standardized measure rose from -3.3% to 1.1% of GDP. That suggests that a little more than half of the shift was the result of changes in policy, and a little less than half was attributable to the economic expansion. Between 2000 and 2007, the actual surplus fell from 2.5% to -1.2% of GDP, whereas the standardized measure fell from 0.9% to -1.6% of GDP. That the two measures were so close in 2007 suggests that the economy was then near full employment. That the standardized measure fell between 2000 and 2007 indicates an expansionary fiscal policy over the period. Between 2007 and 2009, the standardized budget deficit increased from 1.2% to 7.3% of GDP, indicating a substantially expansionary fiscal policy.
In the long run, economic growth is determined primarily by three factors: growth in the labor force, the rate of technological advance, and the amount of capital available to the workforce. Of the three, the last one may be the most susceptible to the influence of policymakers. The larger the capital stock, the more productive the labor force tends to be. Although it is possible for fiscal policy to have an effect on the rate of technological progress in the way public money is spent, many believe that it has a larger effect on growth through its influence on the size of the domestic stock of capital and the amount of capital available for each worker in the labor force. |
crs_RL32723 | crs_RL32723_0 | Overview
On September 15, 2008, Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe for more than two decades, and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement to resolve a political standoff stemming from flawed elections earlier in the year. As part of the deal, which was not implemented until February 2009 under pressure from regional powers and the international community, Tsvangirai became prime minister of a new coalition government. Cabinet positions have been divided among the parties. For further discussion of the coalition government and other current events, please see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The Transitional Government and Implications for U.S. Policy , by Lauren Ploch. Background
After years of economic sanctions by the international community and a decades-long civil war that resulted in more than 30,000 dead, the white minority rule government of Southern Rhodesia concluded a series of agreements with the black majority in 1979 that resulted in the establishment of the government of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The referendum was rejected by 55% of voters and was seen as a victory for a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Substantial political violence and human rights violations have accompanied elections. The MDC proved formidable in the 2000 referendum and in the 2000 parliamentary election; some contend their success may have prompted a range of repressive actions against the party and its supporters. The government continued to use repressive laws to suppress freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement... At the same time, in a country where almost half the population was considered by the World Food Program at that time to be malnourished, domestic groups reported numerous incidents of opposition supporters being denied access to state food supplies. March 2008 Election Results
Parliament
The MDC, which split into two factions in 2005 (known as MDC-T and MDC-M for their respective leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara), remained divided for the March elections, and this division likely cost the party several parliamentary seats. These concerns were echoed by the United States and others. U.S. Political violence surrounding the 2002 elections forced others from their homes, reportedly displacing more than 100,000. Although its infection rate remains high, Zimbabwe is one of several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in which HIV prevalence rates have declined, after reportedly peaking at 36% in the mid-1990s. Following significant international intervention, the country's CFR has since decreased substantially. The Economy
The turmoil in Zimbabwe in the past decade led to a severe economic contraction, a sharp drop in living standards for the rural and urban poor, and a massive exodus of Zimbabweans in search of work. The Military and the Economy
Critics contend that President Mugabe has bought the continued loyalty of the country's security forces through patronage and bribery. International Perspectives
The international community has been divided on how to respond to Zimbabwe's economic and political crises. This has changed to an extent in recent years, however, with some African leaders concluding that the Zimbabwe situation has been damaging to regional interests and that political and economic reforms are needed. U.S. Policy
The United States government has been critical of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF for their poor human rights record and lack of respect for the rule of law, but has expressed cautious support for the transitional government. President Obama most recently renewed the sanctions in March 2011, stating,
While some advances have been made in Zimbabwe, particularly on economic stabilization, since the signing of the power-sharing agreement, the absence of progress on the most fundamental reforms needed to ensure rule of law and democratic governance leaves Zimbabweans vulnerable to ongoing repression and presents a continuing threat to peace and security in the region and the foreign policy of the United States. European Union
The European Union was among the first to take action against Mugabe's government in the early 2000s. Botswana refused to recognize Mugabe as president after the June 2008 runoff. Prospects for Zimbabwe's youngest generation remain poor.. | Zimbabwe's prospects appeared promising in 1980, as it gained independence after a long liberation war. However, rising inflation and unemployment bred discontent in the 1990s and led in 1999 to the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC surprised many with its initial success, campaigning against a 2000 referendum that would have legalized the president's continued rule, made government officials immune from prosecution, and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for redistribution to black farmers. The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half the seats in the 2000 parliamentary election. President Robert Mugabe's ruling party subsequently took numerous actions to bolster its power that were deemed undemocratic by many in the international community.
President Mugabe's government was seen as increasingly autocratic and repressive by its critics, and its human rights record was poor. The government suppressed freedom of speech and assembly, and many contend that the ruling party restricted access to food, already scarce, in opposition areas. The MDC, divided over how to respond, split into two factions in 2005, hampering its ability to challenge the ruling party. Reports of political violence rose sharply after Zimbabwe's March 2008 elections, when, for the first time since independence, Mugabe's party lost its majority in the National Assembly. Mugabe's re-election as president in the June runoff was viewed as illegitimate by the United States and the United Nations Secretary-General, among others. In September 2008, after several weeks of negotiations, Mugabe and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the political standoff. As part of the deal, Tsvangirai became prime minister of a new coalition government in February 2009, and cabinet positions were divided among the parties.
Zimbabwe's economic output had decreased dramatically in the decade prior to the signing of the power-sharing agreement in 2008. At that time, many considered the economy to be in a state of collapse, with official inflation having risen above 200,000,000%. Although the economy has since stabilized, unemployment remains over 90%. An adult HIV prevalence rate of almost 14% has contributed to a sharp drop in life expectancy, and a nationwide cholera outbreak from late 2008 through early 2009 resulted in almost 100,000 infections and over 4,300 deaths. The number of Zimbabweans requiring food aid has declined significantly since 2008, but chronic malnutrition rates remain high and localized food insecurity persists. The deterioration of economic and humanitarian conditions over the past decade led many to emigrate to neighboring countries, which has created a substantial burden on the region. Zimbabwe appears to be making a gradual shift from humanitarian crisis toward recovery, but much of the population remains highly vulnerable. Political uncertainty continues to threaten the country's economic outlook.
Robert Mugabe has historically enjoyed considerable popularity in Africa as a former liberation leader, but some African leaders have viewed his policies as increasingly damaging to the continent and have urged democratic reforms in recent years. Following controversial elections in 2000 and citing abuses of human rights and the rule of law, the United States and some other former allies of the government became vocal critics. The United States has enforced targeted sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002. This report provides background on events leading up to and surrounding the country's most recent elections, in March and June 2008. For further discussion of Zimbabwe's power sharing agreement, its transitional government, and other more recent developments, please see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The Transitional Government and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch. |
crs_R41514 | crs_R41514_0 | Introduction: Issues for Congress
Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical movement that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928 that has branches throughout the world. The United States, Israel, the European Union, and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist organization because of (1) its violent resistance to what it deems Israeli occupation of historic Palestine (constituting present-day Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip), and (2) its rejection of the off-and-on peace process involving Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Hamas seeks assistance and training from other Arab, Islamic, and international actors and organizations, and receives it from Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah (see " Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah " below). The overarching U.S. goal regarding Hamas is to deter, transform, marginalize, or neutralize it so that it no longer presents a threat to Israel's security, to a peaceful and lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to other U.S. interests—either in its own right or as a proxy of Iran or other actors. Various legislative and policy initiatives designed to accomplish this goal have at most achieved temporary or partial success. Overview
Since Hamas's inception in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of political support and its military command in the Gaza Strip—a territory it has controlled since June 2007—while also having a significant presence in the West Bank. The movement's political leadership is currently headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria. For additional information on Hamas's historical background and on U.S. policy regarding Hamas, see Appendix A . Comparison with Other Middle East Terrorist Groups
Hamas is often discussed alongside other groups in the region that engage in militant and terrorist activities to achieve their ends. Yet Hamas has confined its militancy to Israel and the Palestinian territories—distinguishing it from the broader violent jihadist aspirations expressed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Possible Options for Congress
In considering legislative and oversight options, Congress can assess how Hamas has emerged and adapted over time, and also scrutinize the track record of U.S., Israeli, and international policy to counter Hamas. For fuller detail on this subject, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States , by [author name scrubbed]. For additional information on U.S. support for Egyptian anti-smuggling measures, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34346, The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. It is possible to conclude that U.S. and other international support for Israel and the PA/PLO/Fatah has been counterproductive to some extent when comparing Hamas's domestic, regional, and international strength in the early 1990s—measured by factors such as popularity, military force, and leverage with other actors (including Israel and Fatah)—to its current strength. The Israeli-Egyptian closure regime in Gaza and various U.S. and international initiatives constrain and isolate Hamas to a point and may exacerbate internal organizational tensions and tactical disagreements. In this context, any U.S. policy decision going forward will likely present considerable risks and difficult trade-offs. The fruits of U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the PA continue to be debated. | This report and its appendixes provide background information on Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, and U.S. policy towards it. It also includes information and analysis on (1) the threats Hamas currently poses to U.S. interests, (2) how Hamas compares with other Middle East terrorist groups, (3) Hamas's ideology and policies (both generally and on discrete issues), (4) its leadership and organization, and (5) its sources of assistance. Finally, the report raises and discusses various legislative and oversight options related to foreign aid strategies, financial sanctions, and regional and international political approaches. In evaluating these options, Congress can assess how Hamas has emerged and adapted over time, and also scrutinize the track record of U.S., Israeli, and international policy to counter Hamas.
Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical movement that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States, Israel, the European Union, and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist organization because of (1) its violent resistance to what it deems Israeli occupation of historic Palestine (constituting present-day Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip), and (2) its rejection of the off-and-on peace process involving Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Since Hamas's inception in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of political support and its military command in the Gaza Strip—a territory it has controlled since June 2007—while also having a significant presence in the West Bank. The movement's political leadership is currently headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria. Hamas receives assistance and training from Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah. Hamas is often discussed alongside other groups in the region that engage in militant and terrorist activities to achieve their ends, yet Hamas has confined its militancy to Israel and the Palestinian territories—distinguishing it from the broader aspirations expressed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
The overarching U.S. goal regarding Hamas is to deter, transform, marginalize, or neutralize it so that it no longer presents a threat to Israel's security, to a peaceful and lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to other U.S. interests—either in its own right or as a proxy of Iran or other actors. Various legislative and policy initiatives designed to accomplish this goal have at most achieved temporary or partial success. It is possible to conclude that U.S. and other international support for Israel and the Palestinian Authority/PLO dominated by Fatah (Hamas's main rival faction) has been counterproductive to some extent when comparing Hamas's domestic, regional, and international strength in the early 1990s—measured by factors such as popularity, military force, and leverage with other actors (including Israel and Fatah)—to its current strength. The Israeli-Egyptian closure regime in Gaza and various U.S. and international initiatives constrain and isolate Hamas to a point and may exacerbate its internal organizational tensions and tactical disagreements. Yet, the threats Hamas continues to pose to Israel, to prospects for a two-state solution and to the future of Palestinian democracy present considerable risks and difficult trade-offs for any U.S. policy decisions going forward.
The following CRS reports contain additional information on Hamas: CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40101, Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009), coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44414 | crs_R44414_0 | T he Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program was established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). The purpose of the program is to foster the creation of CO-OPs—nonprofit, member-run health insurance issuers that sell health plans in states in which they are licensed. The CO-OP program is intended to increase competition and improve choice in private health insurance markets. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the CO-OP program, has awarded loans to 24 CO-OPs since 2012. One of the 24 was unable to secure a state license to operate and was dropped from the program prior to offering coverage. CMS awarded about $2.4 billion to the remaining 23 CO-OPs. Seven of the 23 CO-OPs are operational as of the date of this report. The fact that more than half of the CO-OPs have failed has prompted questions about the program's design, administration, and funding and about the operations of the CO-OPs. In addition, the report provides information about the loan amounts awarded and the current operating status of the CO-OPs. in this report.) CMS has awarded loans to 24 CO-OPs. The other 16 CO-OPs (of the 23 that ever offered health plans) are considered non-operational, which means either they are not offering health plans in 2016 or there is an indication that they will not renew or offer health plans in the future. | The Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program was included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) in an effort to increase the competitiveness of state health insurance markets and improve choice. Under the program, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) uses appropriated funds to award low-interest loans to organizations applying to become CO-OPs—nonprofit, member-run health insurance issuers that sell health insurance in the state(s) in which they are licensed.
CMS awarded loans to 24 CO-OPs. One of the 24 CO-OPs was dropped from the program prior to offering health plans. Among the remaining 23 CO-OPs, 7 are considered operational—meaning they are offering health plans and there is no indication that they will stop doing so in the future—as of the date of this report. The other 16 CO-OPs offered health plans at one time but are currently in various stages of shutting down. CMS awarded about $2.4 billion to the 23 CO-OPs that ever offered health plans.
The fact that more than half of the CO-OPs have ceased operations has generated a lot of interest in the program. The purpose of this report is to address frequently asked questions about the CO-OP program. The report includes information about the structure of the CO-OP program, program requirements, the loan awards, and the current operating status of the CO-OPs. |
crs_R45141 | crs_R45141_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to elementary and secondary education. The ESEA was last reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) in 2015. The Title I-A program has always been the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Title I-A grant amounts are primarily driven by the number of children from low-income families in an LEA, although all four formulas also include an expenditure factor based on education expenditures, minimum state grant provisions, and LEA hold harmless provisions. This report analyzes issues related to three of the major debates surrounding the Title I-A formulas: (1) the effect of different formula factors and provisions on grant amounts, (2) whether the formulas are more favorable to certain types of LEAs and states, and (3) how effectively the Title I-A formulas target funds on concentrations of poverty. The report is intended to complement CRS Report R44898, History of the ESEA Title I-A Formulas , which provides a detailed examination of the history of the Title I-A formulas and of the underlying tensions in the policy debates about the design of the formulas from enactment of the original ESEA through enactment of the ESSA. The original Basic Grant formula was based on (1) the number of children from low-income families (commonly referred to as formula children) and (2) each state's average per pupil expenditures (APPE) for public elementary and secondary education. The Concentration Grant formula was added in the 1970s in an attempt to provide additional funding for LEAs with concentrations of poverty. During the consideration of ESEA reauthorization in the early 1990s, the House and the Senate proposed formulas (Targeted Grants and EFIG, respectively) intended to target concentrations of poverty more effectively by providing more funding per child to LEAs with higher numbers or percentages of formula children. With respect to formula child counts and APPE, formula child counts are estimated to explain 95% of the variance in overall LEA grant amounts, while APPE is estimated to explain less than 1% of it. A similar pattern is found for each of the individual formulas, with formula child counts estimated to explain between 90% and 98% of the variance in grant amounts in independent examinations of each of the formulas. The minimum grant and hold harmless provisions provide a relatively large increase in overall grant amounts and grant amounts per formula child to the states and LEAs receiving them but cause a relatively small decrease in the Title I-A grant amounts of other states and LEAs. Title I-A Allocation Patterns
Since the initial enactment of Title I-A in 1965, the formulas have been criticized for being more favorable to more densely populated and typically urban areas due to how formula child counts are calculated, and for being more favorable to wealthier states due to the inclusion of factors based on education expenditures. Formula Child Counts and Rates: Densely Populated Versus Less Densely Populated Areas
There has been an ongoing debate about whether the Title I-A formulas are more favorable to densely populated or less densely populated areas. A debate over the relative emphasis that should be placed on the percentage versus the count of formula children in an LEA has also been consistently present and continues to exist regarding the current law formulas. Under current law, the debate is reflected in two formula child weighting scales used in the determination of grants under the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas, the newer Title I-A formulas that were introduced to enhance targeting to LEAs serving concentrations of low-income students. As shown above, the top category in each weighting scale is open-ended. Because of this, LEAs with large numbers of formula children are often able to apply the highest weights to larger proportions of their formula children than smaller LEAs with relatively high percentages of formula children can. Thus, the majority of the LEAs included in the analysis have a higher weighted formula child count based on the percentage weighting scale versus the number weighting scale. However, in general, LEAs whose weighted formula child counts are calculated using the numbers scale received a higher grant per formula child than LEAs whose weighted formula child counts are calculated using the percentage scale. The expenditure factor was also intended to compensate states with a higher cost of living. Lower-spending states have generally benefitted from the changes to the expenditure factor over time. The historical changes to the expenditure factors that tied them more closely to national APPE have benefitted any state with a state APPE that is less than the national APPE and not benefitted any state with a state APPE that exceeds the national APPE. Any change to the expenditure factor that allows it to vary more closely with state APPE only (e.g., no bounds) would favor states with relatively high APPEs and disadvantage those with relatively low APPEs. Targeting Title I-A Funds on Concentrations of Poverty
Since its initial enactment, the Title I-A program has been intended to address "the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs." While there are some concerns about whether having a high number or high percentage of formula children should result in larger LEA grants per formula child, as evidenced by the current debate among densely populated and less densely populated areas discussed above, there has also been a broader debate about how much to target Title I-A funds on areas with concentrations of poverty and how best to do so. Under current law, when FY2016 Title I-A funds are allocated under all four Title I-A formulas, the overall percentage of Title I-A funds provided to LEAs in a given range increases as the percentage of formula children increases. The reason that the current four formula strategy renders better targeting of Title I-A funds is because the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas are more effective than the Basic Grant and Concentration Grant formulas at targeting funds to areas with concentrations of formula children, due in part to the use of the formula child weighting scales used in determining Targeted Grant and EFIG formula grant amounts. Examining the targeting of Title I-A funds to LEAs with relatively high numbers of formula children indicates a similar pattern: the addition of Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and EFIG to Basic Grants has resulted in more effective targeting of Title I-A funds on concentrations of formula children, a proxy for concentrations of poverty. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to elementary and secondary education. The ESEA was last reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) in 2015. The Title I-A program has always been the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families.
The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The current four-formula strategy has evolved over time, beginning with the Basic Grant formula when the ESEA was originally enacted in 1965. The Concentration Grant formula was added in the 1970s in an attempt to provide additional funding for LEAs with concentrations of poverty. During consideration of ESEA reauthorization in the early 1990s, there was an attempt to replace the two existing formulas with a new formula that would target Title I-A funds more effectively to areas with concentrations of poverty. Both the House and the Senate developed formulas intended to accomplish this goal (Targeted Grants and EFIG, respectively). A compromise on a single new formula was not reached; nor was there agreement on eliminating the existing formulas. As a result, funds are allocated through four formulas under current law.
Title I-A grant amounts are primarily driven by the number of "formula children"—principally children from low-income families—in an LEA, although all four formulas also include an expenditure factor based on education expenditures, minimum grant provisions, and hold harmless provisions. Since the initial enactment of Title I-A in 1965, the formula(s) have been criticized for being more favorable to more densely populated and typically urban areas due to how children from low-income families are counted, and for being more favorable to wealthier states due to the inclusion of factors based on education expenditures.
This report analyzes issues related to three of the major debates surrounding the Title I-A formulas: (1) the effect of different formula factors and provisions on grant amounts, (2) whether the formulas are more favorable to certain types of LEAs and states, and (3) how effectively the Title I-A formulas target funds on concentrations of poverty. The report is intended to complement CRS Report R44898, History of the ESEA Title I-A Formulas, which provides a detailed examination of the history of the Title I-A formulas and of the underlying tensions in the policy debates about the design of the formulas from enactment of the original ESEA through enactment of the ESSA. Some of the themes highlighted in this report are as follows.
All four Title I-A formulas include both formula child counts and state average per pupil expenditures (APPE) as factors used to determine LEA grant amounts. Based on regression analysis, formula child counts are estimated to explain 95% of the variance in overall LEA grant amounts, while APPE is estimated to explain less than 1% of it. A similar pattern is found for each of the individual formulas, with formula child counts estimated to explain between 90% and 98% of the variance in grant amounts under each formula. The state minimum grant and LEA hold harmless provisions that are included in each of the four formulas provide a relatively large increase in overall grant amounts and grant amounts per formula child to the states and LEAs benefitting from these provisions, but result in a relatively small decrease in the Title I-A grant amounts of other states and LEAs. There has been an ongoing debate about whether the Title I-A formulas are more favorable to densely or less densely populated areas. This debate has centered on the relative emphasis that should be placed on the percentage of formula children versus the count of formula children in an LEA. Under current law, the debate is reflected in the two formula child weighting scales used in the determination of grants under the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas. An LEA's grant is calculated using whichever weighting scale is more favorable. Both formulas were introduced to enhance targeting toward concentrations of low-income students and both apply weights based on the number of formula children served by LEAs or the percentage of an LEA's students that formula children comprise. The percentage weighting scale (intended to be more favorable to less densely populated areas) applies larger weights than the numbers weighting scale (intended to be more favorable to densely populated areas). This has the appearance of being advantageous to less densely populated areas. However, because the top category in each weighting scale is open-ended, LEAs with large numbers of formula children are often able to apply the highest weights in the scale to larger proportions of formula children. As a result, in general, LEAs whose weighted formula child counts are calculated using the numbers scale receive a higher grant per formula child than LEAs whose grants are calculated using the percentage scale. The expenditure factor used in the Title I-A formulas to account for differences in cost of living has changed over time. Historical changes that have placed bounds on the extent to which variation across states' APPE can influence allocations have resulted in the expenditure factor being more closely tied to national APPE. These changes have generally benefitted states with a state APPE that is less than the national APPE and not benefitted states with a state APPE that exceeds the national APPE. When changes to the expenditure factor that would loosen or remove bounds are examined, such changes typically allow it to vary more closely with state APPE and would favor states with relatively high APPEs and be disadvantageous to those with relatively low APPEs. Current expenditure factors allow for some consideration of variation across states' APPE in allocations but also limit the effect of variation on allocations. Since its initial enactment, the Title I-A program has been intended to address the effects that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of LEAs to provide "adequate" educational programs. While there are clearly some concerns about whether having a high number or high percentage of formula children should result in larger LEA grants per formula child, there has also been a broader debate about how much to target Title I-A funds on areas with concentrations of poverty and how best to do so. While Title I-A funds currently reach LEAs with varying concentrations of formula children, a proxy measure for concentrations of poverty, the targeting of Title I-A funds on the basis of higher concentrations of formula children has increased over time (measured by either numbers or percentage of such children in LEAs) . The addition of Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and EFIG to Title I-A did, to some extent, improve the targeting of funds to LEAs in this manner. Among the four Title I-A formulas, the newest formulas (Targeted Grants and EFIG), which are allocating growing shares of Title I-A funds in recent years, appear to be most effective at targeting funds toward higher concentrations of poverty. |
crs_R42394 | crs_R42394_0 | Introduction
This report describes and compares the drug- and crime-related policy restrictions contained in selected federal programs that provide assistance to low-income individuals and families: the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), and the three primary federal housing assistance programs (the public housing program, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, and the project-based Section 8 rental assistance program). However, the programs also differ. Further, when resources are limited, these policies may be intended to direct assistance to other households who are deemed more worthy of assistance. "Worthiness" has been defined both by judgments of economic need—are families or individuals truly unable to meet their needs without assistance?—and judgments of character, often as evidenced by certain behaviors. It also added prohibitions on assisting "fleeing felons" to all federal assistance programs, including TANF, SNAP, and housing assistance. The TANF cash assistance program provides aid to very poor families with children. States have considerable discretion in designing these programs, which are not subject to time limits, work requirements, or the drug testing and crime-related restrictions discussed in this report. Drug Testing and Crime-Related Restrictions
This section of the report describes specific federal TANF, SNAP, and housing assistance policies on drug testing and pertaining to drug-related and other criminal activity engaged in by applicants and recipients. State policies (other than Florida) generally require actual testing of only certain applicants and recipients. TANF Drug Felon Ban
The 1996 welfare law bars states from providing TANF assistance to persons convicted of a felony for possession, use, or distribution of illegal drugs, but it also gives states the ability to opt-out of the ban or modify the period for which the ban applies. New additions to this area of SNAP law were contemplated and added in the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. Some states have chosen to modify the ban by legislating that those convicted of a drug felony may be eligible for SNAP benefits subject to a drug test. PHAs and property owners across all three housing assistance programs are required under federal law to establish policies that deny admission to the programs to households that include tenants
who are determined by the administrator to be currently engaging in illegal use of a drug; whose illegal use of a drug or pattern of illegal use of a drug is determined by the administrator, based on reasonable cause, to interfere with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents; whose abuse of alcohol or pattern of alcohol abuse is determined by the administrator, based on reasonable cause, to interfere with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents; or who were evicted from federally assisted housing within the last three years for drug-related criminal activity, unless the tenant has completed a drug rehabilitation program or the circumstances leading to the eviction no longer exist (i.e., the offending tenant is no longer a member of the household). In all of these cases in which federal law requires the adoption of policies that allow for or make cause for termination of tenancy, the law does not go so far as to require the termination of tenancy (except in the case of production of methamphetamines on federally assisted property). They may also reflect the similarities and differences in the programs themselves, including the goals of the programs, how they are administered, the populations they serve, and what benefits are provided. Similarities and Differences
TANF, SNAP, and the major housing assistance programs are all administered either at the state or local level, and they have left a great deal of discretion to state or local decisionmakers. As a result, the experiences of similarly situated families will differ based both on where they live and in which assistance programs they wish to participate. Since societal concern about crime and drug use is not generally associated with persons who are elderly or have disabilities, SNAP and housing program administrators have a different set of considerations about how and to whom to apply crime- and drug-related policies than do TANF administrators. This report also observes that while some states are increasing their drug-related sanctions (specifically, implementing drug testing policies), most states are opting-out of or modifying the federal drug felon ban in TANF and SNAP. Also, the current sets of crime- and drug-related restrictions were established in the 1980s and 1990s, when rates of violent crime, particularly drug-related violent crime, were much higher than they are today. State Policies on Drug Testing in TANF | Throughout the history of social assistance programs, administrators have attempted to limit access only to those families considered "worthy" of assistance. Policies about worthiness have included both judgments about need—generally tied to income, demographic characteristics, or family circumstances—and judgments about moral character, often as evidenced by behavior. Past policies evaluating moral character based on family structure have been replaced by today's policies, which focus on criminal activity, particularly drug-related criminal activity. The existing crime- and drug-related restrictions were established in the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, when crime rates, especially drug-related violent crime rates, were at peak levels. While crime rates have since declined, some remain interested in expanding these policies.
The three programs examined in this report—the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), and federal housing assistance programs (public housing and Section 8 tenant and project-based assistance)—are similar, in that they are administered at the state or local level. They are different in the forms of assistance they provide. TANF provides cash assistance and other supports to low-income parents and their children, with a specific focus on promoting work. SNAP provides food assistance to a broader set of poor households including families with children, elderly households, and persons with disabilities. The housing assistance programs offer subsidized rental housing to all types of poor families, like SNAP.
All three programs feature some form of drug- and other crime-related restrictions and all three leave discretion in applying those restrictions to state and local administrators. Both TANF and SNAP are subject to the statutory "drug felon ban," which bars states from providing assistance to persons convicted of a drug-related felony, but also gives states the ability to opt-out of or modify the ban, which most states have done. The 2014 farm bill also added new restrictions for certain ex-offenders seeking SNAP assistance. Housing assistance programs are not subject to the drug felon ban, but they are subject to a set of policies that allows local program administrators to deny or terminate assistance to persons involved in drug-related or other criminal activity. Housing law also includes mandatory restrictions related to specific crimes, including sex offenses and methamphetamine production. All three programs also have specific restrictions related to fugitive felons.
Recently, the issue of drug testing in federal assistance programs has risen in prominence. In the case of TANF, states are permitted to drug-test recipients; however, state policies involving suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants and recipients have been successfully challenged in courts. Most state policies on drug testing TANF applicants and recipients require the state to have a "reasonable suspicion" that he or she is using illegal drugs. SNAP law does not explicitly address drug testing, but given the way that SNAP and TANF law interact, state TANF drug testing policies may affect SNAP participants. The laws governing housing assistance programs are silent on the topic of drug testing.
The current set of crime- and drug-related restrictions in federal assistance programs is not consistent across programs, meaning that similarly situated persons may have different experiences based on where they live and what assistance they are seeking. This variation may be considered important, in that it reflects a stated policy goal of local discretion. However, the variation may also be considered problematic if it leads to confusion among eligible recipients as to what assistance they are eligible for or if the variation is seen as inequitable. Proposals to modify these policies also highlight a tension that exists between the desire to use these policies as a deterrent or punishment and the desire to support the neediest families, including those that have ex-offenders in the household. |
crs_R44577 | crs_R44577_0 | 4909 ) on May 26, 2016. 114-328 ) on December 23, 2016. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report. The USFSPA has since been modified on a number of occasions. 4909 and Senate-passed S. 2943 . The 2016 NDAA ( P.L. Reference(s) : Previously discussed in CRS Report R44120, FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R43647, FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , and CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues . The conferees direct the Department to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, on the Department's efforts to: 1) identify, to the extent practicable, any shortfalls in employee screening processes in local school districts educating military family members; and 2) provide recommendations to help address those shortfalls in the future. As a result, DOD periodically reviews inquiries by Members of Congress and reevaluates its historical records. This Appendix includes reports related to military personnel issues that are required by the final bill. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on H.R. 4909 as passed by the House on May 26, 2016, S. 2943 as passed by the Senate on July 21, 2016, and the final enacted bill (P.L. 114-328) which was signed by the President on December 23, 2016. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections in each bill that pertain to selected personnel policies. These include issues such as military end-strengths, pay and benefits, military healthcare (TRICARE), military retirement, and other major policy issues.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual national defense authorization act (NDAA) legislative process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, or tax implications of policy choices, topics that are addressed in other CRS products. Issues that have been discussed in the previous year's defense personnel reports are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report. |
crs_R45214 | crs_R45214_0 | FY2019 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2019 legislative branch appropriations, with subsections covering each action to date, including
the initial submission of the request on February 12, 2018; hearings held by the House Legislative Branch Subcommittee in April 2018 and hearings held by the Senate Legislative Branch Subcommittee in April and May 2018; House subcommittee markup held on April 26, 2018; House full committee markup on May 8, 2018; the May 24, 2018, inclusion of a modified text of the legislative branch bill ( H.R. 5895 , which included legislative branch funding as Division B; House consideration of a special rule for H.R. 5895 on June 7 and 8, 2018, followed by House passage on June 8, 2018; Senate full committee markup and reporting of its version of the legislative branch appropriations bill ( S. 3071 ) on June 14, 2018; Senate consideration of H.R. 115-244 ; the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019). It contains a request for $4.960 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities. By law, the legislative branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget without change. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised following the enactment of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in that act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. For purposes of this report, however, FY2019 requested levels refer to the requested levels originally submitted unless otherwise noted. House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch Markup
On April 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch held a markup of the FY2019 bill. The following amendments were considered:
a manager's amendment, offered by Chairman Yoder of Kansas, which was agreed to by voice vote, with technical and other changes, including (1) the repeal of authorizations for office space, office expenses, franking and printing privileges, and staff for former Speakers of the House; and (2) directing the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) to hire an external contractor to conduct a House employee salary study; an amendment offered by Representative Wasserman Schultz of Florida, related to the House historical buildings revitalization trust fund, which was not agreed to; and an amendment offered by Representative Kilmer of Washington and Representative Cuellar of Texas, containing language expressing the sense of Congress that the Comptroller General should present an annual report on the fiscal state of the nation, which was withdrawn. 5894 , H.Rept. 115-696 ). 5894 was included in a print issued by the House Rules Committee entitled "Text of Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act 2019" (Committee Print 115-71, which also contained the text of H.R. 5895 and H.R. The House Rules Committee met on June 5 and 6, 2018, to consider a special rule for the consideration of H.R. H.Res. Of the seven amendments to Division B made in order by H.Res. 918 , six were offered and four were agreed to:
H.Amdt. H.R. 5895 was passed in the House on June 8, 2018, by a vote of 212-179 ( Roll N o. 257 ). One amendment was offered as part of a manager's package, which was agreed to by unanimous consent, and the bill was ordered reported ( S. 3071 , S.Rept. 115-274 ). Senate Floor Consideration and Passage
The Senate began its consideration of FY2019 legislative branch appropriations on June 18, 2018, as part of a "minibus" appropriations package that also included the text of the energy and water and military construction and veterans affairs appropriations bills. An amendment in the nature of a substitute ( S.Amdt. 5895 ). H.R. 5895 , as amended, was passed in the Senate on June 25, 2018, by a vote of 86-5 (Rollcall Vote No. 139 Leg.). 115-929 ) was filed on H.R. The conference report was agreed to in the Senate on September 12 (92-5, Record Vote Number 207) and in the House the following day (377-20, Roll No. The President signed the bill on September 21 ( P.L. It provides $4.836 billion for the legislative branch for FY2019 (Division B). The FY2019 funding level represents an increase of $136.0 million (+2.9%) from the FY2018 level. The $4.700 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $260.0 million (+5.9%) from the FY2017 enacted level. The $4.440 billion provided by the act represented a $77.0 million increase (+1.7%) from the FY2016 enacted level. The $4.300 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from FY2014. 113-76 ), providing $4.259 billion for the legislative branch for FY2014. The act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), not including across-the-board rescissions required by Section 3004 of P.L. 112-74 ) provided $4.307 billion for the legislative branch. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. The Senate-passed bill ( H.R. The House-requested level of $573.6 million, also included in the House-passed bill and the act, represents an increase of $10.998 million (+2.0%) from the level provided in FY2017 and FY2018. As stated above, the budget request levels were developed prior to the enactment of full-year appropriations for FY2018. 3. Government Publishing Office Business Operations Revolving Fund —The FY2019 enacted level of $6.0 million (a decrease of $2.5 million, or -29.7%, from FY2018) is equivalent to the funding requested by GPO and included in the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of the FY2019 bill. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center.
The FY2019 legislative branch budget request of $4.960 billion was submitted on February 12, 2018. The budget request levels were developed prior to the enactment of full-year appropriations for FY2018. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. For purposes of this report, however, FY2019 requested levels refer to the requested levels originally submitted unless otherwise noted. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change.
The House Appropriations Committee's Legislative Branch Subcommittee held hearings in April to consider the FY2019 legislative branch requests. On May 8, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the bill. Three amendments were considered: one, a manager's amendment, was adopted, and the bill was ordered reported.
On May 24, 2018, the text of H.R. 5894 was included in a print issued by the House Rules Committee entitled "Text of Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act 2019" (Committee Print 115-71, which also contained the text of H.R. 5895, H.R. 5894, and H.R. 5786). On June 5 and 6, the House Rules Committee met to consider rules for the consideration of H.R. 5895, which included legislative branch funding as Division B; the bill has sometimes been referred to as a "minibus" appropriations package. The rule for consideration (H.Res. 918, H.Rept. 115-711) was agreed to in the House on June 6, 2018. Of the seven amendments to Division B made in order by H.Res. 918, six were offered and four were agreed to (three by voice vote and one by roll call vote). H.R. 5895 passed in the House on June 8, 2018, by a vote of 212-179 (Roll No. 257). The House-passed total for legislative branch activities, excluding Senate items, was $3.811 billion (H.R. 5894, H.Rept. 115-696).
The Senate Appropriations Committee's Legislative Branch Subcommittee held hearings in April and May of 2018 to consider FY2019 legislative branch requests. On June 14, the Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup of its version of the FY2019 bill and reported S. 3071 (S.Rept. 115-274), which proposed $3.367 billion for legislative branch activities, excluding House items. The Senate began consideration of FY2019 legislative branch appropriations on June 18, 2018, agreeing to an amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 2910) that was made to H.R. 5895. Four amendments were agreed to for the legislative branch section of the bill, which is in Division B. H.R. 5895, as amended, was passed in the Senate on June 25, 2018, by a vote of 86-5 (Rollcall Vote No. 139 Leg.). The Senate-passed bill would have provided $4.796 billion for the legislative branch, including House items.
On September 10, 2018, a conference report (H.Rept. 115-929) was filed on H.R. 5895, the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019. The conference report was agreed to in the Senate on September 12 and in the House the following day. The President signed the bill, which provides $4.836 billion for the legislative branch, an increase of $136.0 million (+2.9%) from the FY2018 level, on September 21 (P.L. 115-244).
The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141) provided $4.700 billion, an increase of $260.0 million (+5.9%) from FY2017. The FY2017 level of $4.440 billion was an increase of $77.0 million (+1.7%) from FY2016. The FY2016 level of $4.363 billion represented an increase of $63 million (+1.5%) from the FY2015 level of $4.300 billion, and the FY2015 level represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from the FY2014 funding level of $4.259 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level of $4.307 billion represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a decrease of $125.1 million (-2.7%) from FY2010.
The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. |
crs_R43956 | crs_R43956_0 | Introduction
The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) was enacted in 1990 and provides one-time cash benefits to certain persons who participated in atomic weapons testing or lived near the Nevada Test Site during periods of atmospheric (above-ground) atomic weapons testing. All RECA claimants must have contracted one of the medical conditions specified in the statute after possible exposure to ionizing radiation from the detonation of an atomic weapon or after working in the uranium industry. The RECA program is administered by the Civil Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). To date, DOJ has approved more than 30,000 RECA claims for nearly $2 billion in benefits. RECA Benefits
Compensation Payments
The following benefits are available under the RECA program:
$75,000— Onsite participants (persons who were present at a test site during an atmospheric atomic weapons test); $50,000— Downwinders (persons who were present in certain areas north and west of NTS during periods of atmospheric atomic weapons testing); and $100,000— Uranium Workers (uranium miners, uranium millers, and uranium ore transporters). Millers and Ore Transporters
Uranium millers and ore transporters may qualify for RECA benefits if they meet specific exposure and disease requirements. Eligibility Areas in the Original RECA Statute and the 2000 Amendments
The original RECA statute included a smaller downwinder eligibility area than is currently covered by the program. The intent of the RECA program, as expressed in Section 2 of the statute is to make "partial restitution" to persons who were affected by fallout from atomic weapons tests and uranium miners who were working in mines "that were providing uranium for the primary use and benefit of the nuclear weapons program of the United States Government," in recognition that the "lives and health of uranium miners and of individuals who were exposed to radiation were subjected to increased risk of injury and disease to serve the national security interests of the United States." An expansion of RECA to cover post-1971 uranium activities would largely cover workers in the commercial uranium sector, which would expand the program beyond its original statutory intent. | The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) provides one-time benefit payments to persons who may have developed cancer or other specified diseases after being exposed to radiation from atomic weapons testing or uranium mining, milling, or transporting. Administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), RECA has awarded nearly $2 billion in benefits to more than 30,000 claimants since its inception in 1990. The RECA program is scheduled to sunset in 2022.
RECA benefits are available to the following groups:
onsite participants—$75,000 to persons who participated onsite in the atmospheric test of an atomic weapon and developed one of the types of cancers specified in the statute; downwinders—$50,000 to persons who were present in one of the specified areas near the Nevada Test Site during a period of atmospheric atomic weapons testing and developed one of the types of cancers specified in the statute; and uranium miners, millers, and ore transporters—$100,000 to persons who worked in mining, milling, or transportation of uranium between 1942 and 1971 and developed one of the types of diseases specified in the statute.
The RECA statute was last amended in 2000. Since then, Congress has frequently considered legislation to expand the downwinder-eligibility area by making persons who were affected in other states during periods of atmospheric atomic weapons testing eligible for benefits and by allowing uranium miners, millers, and ore transporters to qualify for benefits based on work after 1971. However, an expansion of the downwinder-eligibility area is not supported by a congressionally mandated National Research Council report on atomic test fallout and the inclusion of post-1971 uranium work, which was largely for commercial rather than governmental purposes, and is not consistent with the stated intent of the program. |
crs_R41983 | crs_R41983_0 | T he Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversees the approval and regulation of drugs entering the U.S. market. The agency, part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is led by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, who executes the agency's responsibilities on behalf of the HHS Secretary. First, FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of new drugs that manufacturers wish to market in the United States; this process is called premarket approval or preapproval review . Legislative History of Drug Regulation
The regulation of drugs by the federal government began with the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which prohibited the interstate commerce of adulterated and misbranded drugs. To get that approval, the manufacturer must demonstrate the drug's safety and effectiveness according to criteria specified in law and agency regulations, ensure that its manufacturing plant passes FDA inspection, and obtain FDA approval for the drug's labeling—a term that covers all written material about the drug, including, for example, packaging, prescribing information for physicians, and patient brochures. The drug development process begins before the law requires FDA involvement. Before testing in humans—called clinical testing —the drug's sponsor (usually its manufacturer) must file an investigational new drug (IND) application with FDA. Unless FDA objects, a manufacturer may then begin clinical testing. New Drug Application (NDA)
Once a manufacturer completes clinical trials, it submits a new drug application (NDA) to FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). The FFDCA requires "substantial evidence" of drug safety and effectiveness. Supplemental NDA. Regarding clinical data, the applicant must submit descriptions and analysis of controlled and uncontrolled clinical studies, as well as "a description and analysis of any other data or information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug product obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source, foreign or domestic, including information derived from clinical investigations, including controlled and uncontrolled studies of uses of the drug other than those proposed in the application, commercial marketing experience, reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished scientific papers." For drugs that address unmet needs or serious conditions, have potential to offer better outcomes or fewer side effects, or meet other criteria associated with improved public health, FDA uses several formal mechanisms to expedite the development or review processes
Fast track and breakthrough product designations affect the administrative processes for the development of a drug and review of an application, for example, by providing for more frequent drug development-related meetings and interactions between the sponsor and FDA. Accelerated approval and animal efficacy approval change what is needed in an application. How FDA Regulates Approved Drugs
FDA's role in making sure a drug is safe and effective continues after the drug is approved and it appears on the market. FDA Drug-Regulation Activities
FDA postmarket drug safety and effectiveness activities address aspects of drug production, distribution, and use. This section highlights nine activities that have traditionally interested Congress in relation to drug safety and effectiveness: product integrity, labeling, reporting, surveillance, drug studies, risk management, information dissemination, off-label use, and direct-to-consumer advertising. Protecting the supply chain from counterfeit, diverted, subpotent, substandard, adulterated, misbranded, or expired drugs remains an essential concern of the agency. Health professionals and patients may report adverse events to FDA's reporting system at any time. Two sets of situations—distinguished by when the requirement is set—involve required postapproval studies: when a requirement is attached to the initial approval of the drug and when FDA informs the sponsor of a required study once a drug is on the market. Animal Efficacy. Based on New Information Available to Secretary. The Secretary, under specified conditions after a drug is on the market, may require a study or a clinical trial. Risk Management
With authority under the FFDCA or by its own practices, FDA has long implemented various tools in its attempt to ensure that the drugs it has approved for marketing in the United States are safe and effective for their intended and approved uses. Elements to assure safe use (ETASU). Among other things, the draft guidance provides examples of the kinds of information that the agency considers consistent with FDA-required labeling for a product (e.g., information that provides additional context about adverse reactions associated with a drug's approved use[s] as reflected in the FDA-required labeling), as well as the kinds of information that are not consistent with FDA-required labeling for a product (e.g., if a drug is approved for treatment of only one disease, and the company's communication provides information about using the product to treat a different disease). This guidance has not been finalized. | The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a regulatory agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, regulates the safety and effectiveness of drugs sold in the United States. FDA divides that responsibility into two phases. In the preapproval (premarket) phase, FDA reviews manufacturers' applications to market drugs in the United States; a drug may not be sold unless it has FDA approval. Once a drug is on the market, FDA continues its oversight of drug safety and effectiveness. That postapproval (postmarket) phase lasts as long as the drug is on the market. Beginning with the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Congress and the President have incrementally refined and expanded FDA's responsibilities regarding drug approval and regulation.
The progression to drug approval begins before FDA involvement. First, basic scientists work in the laboratory and with animals; second, a drug or biotechnology company develops a prototype drug. That company must seek and receive FDA approval, by way of an investigational new drug (IND) application, to test the product with human subjects. It carries out those tests, called clinical trials, sequentially in Phase I, II, and III studies, which involve increasing numbers of subjects. The manufacturer then compiles the resulting data and analysis in a new drug application (NDA).
At that point, FDA reviews the NDA with three major concerns: (1) safety and effectiveness in the drug's proposed use; (2) appropriateness of the proposed labeling; and (3) adequacy of manufacturing methods to assure the drug's identity, strength, quality, and purity. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and associated regulations detail the requirements for each step. FDA uses a few special mechanisms to expedite drug development and the review process when a drug might address an unmet need or a serious disease or condition. Those mechanisms include accelerated approval, animal efficacy approval, fast track designation, breakthrough therapy designation, and priority review.
Once FDA has approved an NDA, the drug may enter the U.S. market, but FDA continues to address drug production, distribution, and use. Its activities, based on ensuring drug safety and effectiveness, address product integrity, labeling, reporting of research and adverse events, surveillance, drug studies, risk management, information dissemination, off-label use, and direct-to-consumer advertising, all topics in which Congress has traditionally been interested.
FDA seeks to ensure product integrity through product and facility registration; inspections; chain-of-custody documentation; and technologies to protect against counterfeit, diverted, subpotent, adulterated, misbranded, and expired drugs. FDA's approval of an NDA includes the drug's labeling; the agency may require changes once a drug is on the market based on new information. It also prohibits manufacturer promotion of uses that are not specified in the labeling. The FFDCA requires that manufacturers report to FDA adverse events related to its drugs; clinicians and other members of the public may report adverse events to FDA. The agency's surveillance of drug-related problems, which had primarily focused on analyses of various adverse-event databases, is now expanding to more active uses of evolving computer technology and links to other public and private information sources.
The FFDCA allows FDA to require a manufacturer to conduct postapproval studies of drugs. The law specifies when FDA must attach that requirement to the NDA approval and when FDA may issue the requirement after a drug is on the market. To manage exceptional risks of drugs, FDA may also require patient or clinician guides and restrictions on distribution. The agency publicly disseminates information about drug safety and effectiveness; and regulates the industry promotion of products to clinicians and the public. |
crs_RS22666 | crs_RS22666_0 | This report will provide an overview of these federal employment and training programs targeted to veterans, and federal policies to assist veterans in obtaining federal employment. Outlined below are the major federal programs and policies to assist veterans seeking civilian jobs. Transition Assistance Programs
The Department of Labor (DOL), in cooperation with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), operates the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) and Disabled Transition Assistance Program (DTAP). These are state positions, funded by the federal government, that provide outreach and assistance to veterans seeking employment. P.L. 112-56 provides that a servicemember may be certified as a preference eligible for federal employment if he or she is within 120 days of separation from military service. | There are federal employment and training programs and policies specifically targeted to help veterans seeking employment in the civilian economy. Transition assistance programs are operated by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Labor (DOL) to assist servicemembers as they prepare to leave the military. DOL operates grant programs to states to provide outreach and assistance to veterans in finding civilian employment. In addition, the federal government has policies (including veterans preference) that assist veterans in obtaining jobs with the federal government and federal contractors.
P.L. 112-56 makes several changes to the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for separating servicemembers and permits a servicemember who is within 120 days of separation from military service to be certified as a preference eligible for federal employment.
This report provides a brief overview of these federal programs and policies. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R42646 | crs_R42646_0 | Background
Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to long-standing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt. In FY2010, the government held 77,700 buildings it identified as either not utilized or underutilized and spent $1.67 billion dollars operating and maintaining them. Federal agencies have indicated that their disposal efforts are often hampered by legal and budgetary disincentives, and competing stakeholder interests. In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. The government's inability to efficiently dispose of and utilize its property is a major reason that federal real property management has been identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as a "high-risk" area since 2003. Real property officials at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have said the McKinney-Vento Act—which mandates that all surplus property be screened for homeless use—can add as much as two years to the disposal process. The Department of the Interior has said that it can be stymied by the competing concerns of local and state governments, historic preservation offices, and political factors, when attempting to dispose of some of its unneeded real property. The quality of the FRPP data has been questioned. 1734: Civilian Property Realignment Act
H.R. While sections of S. 2232 are similar or even identical to sections of H.R. S. 2178: Federal Real Property Asset Management Reform Act
S. 2178 was introduced on March 8, 2012, and reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute by the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on June 29. 665: Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act
H.R. | Federal executive branch agencies hold an extensive real property portfolio that includes approximately 399,000 buildings. These assets have been acquired over a period of decades to help agencies fulfill their diverse missions. Agencies hold buildings with a range of uses, including offices, health clinics, warehouses, and laboratories. As agencies' missions change over time, so, too, do their real property needs, thereby rendering some assets less useful or unneeded altogether. Healthcare provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), for example, has shifted in recent decades from predominately hospital-based inpatient care to a greater reliance on clinics and outpatient care, with a resulting change in space needs. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DOD) reduced its force structure by 36% after the Cold War ended, and has engaged in several rounds of base realignments and installation closures.
Real property disposition is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to pressing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or towards other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt.
In FY2010—the most recent data available—the government held 77,700 buildings it identified as either not utilized or underutilized and spent $1.67 billion dollars operating and maintaining them. Agencies have said that their efforts to dispose of unneeded space are often hampered by legal and budgetary disincentives, and competing stakeholder interests. In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive, real property data. The government's inability to efficiently dispose of its unneeded property is a major reason that federal real property management has been identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as a "high risk" area since 2003.
This report begins with an explanation of the real property disposal process, and then discusses some of the factors that have made disposition relatively inefficient and costly. It then examines four bills introduced in the 112th Congress that would address those problems: the Federal Real Property Asset Management Reform Act (S. 2178), the Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act (H.R. 665), and two bills titled the Civilian Property Realignment Act (H.R. 1734 and S. 2232) which are similar, but not identical. This report concludes with a discussion of policy options for enhancing both the disposal process and congressional oversight of it. |
crs_R43307 | crs_R43307_0 | Introduction
Native Americans living on reservations or other tribal lands are more likely to experience poor housing conditions, such as living in housing that is physically substandard or overcrowded, than the population as a whole. In 1996, Congress passed the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA). In addition to providing funding for affordable housing for Native Americans, the law focused on self-determination for tribes, giving tribes broad authority to choose how to use the affordable housing funds they receive under NAHASDA. NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program to help tribes and Alaska Native villages access financing for affordable housing activities and authorizes funding for training and technical assistance. It then describes the programs authorized by NAHASDA: the Native American Housing Block Grant, the Title VI Loan Guarantee Program, and the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant, as well as funding for training and technical assistance. Legal Status of Tribal Land
The legal status of tribal land poses some distinctive challenges for housing for Native Americans. Many issues contribute to poor housing conditions in tribal areas. Both the public housing program and the Mutual Help program were administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) after that department was established in 1965, and these two programs provided the bulk of housing assistance to Native Americans until NAHASDA reorganized the federal government's Native American housing programs into today's block grant system. Despite the availability of a number of affordable housing programs in tribal areas, poor housing conditions in tribal areas persisted. The centerpiece of NAHASDA was a reorganization of most of the existing federal housing assistance for Native Americans into a single block grant program, the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG). In 2000, the law was amended to add a block grant providing housing assistance for Native Hawaiians. The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013. (The Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005.) Each year, Congress appropriates funding for the NAHBG to HUD, which then distributes formula grants to eligible tribes and Alaska Native villages, or to organizations that tribes or Alaska Native villages have identified to administer their grants (known as tribally designated housing entities, or TDHEs). Over the life of the program through FY2014, NHHBG funds have been used to build, acquire, or substantially rehabilitate homes for 570 households and to provide counseling or other services to over 1,500 households. In general, tribes rehabilitate more units with NAHBG funds than they build or acquire, and tribes are more likely to use funds for owner-occupied housing than for rental housing. HUD estimates that over 100,000 housing units have been built, acquired, or rehabilitated with NAHBG funds since the program began. Rental Units
In general, many tribes choose to use NAHASDA funds to develop more new owner-occupied units rather than rental units. | Native Americans living in tribal areas experience some of the poorest housing conditions in the United States. Native Americans in tribal areas are several times more likely to live in housing that is physically substandard or overcrowded than the U.S. population as a whole. They are also more likely to live in poverty than the general population, further contributing to housing problems. In addition, a number of issues, such as the legal status of tribal land, pose unique barriers to housing for many people living in tribal areas.
In light of these conditions, and the federal government's trust responsibility to Native American tribes, Congress has provided funding for Native American housing programs for several decades. The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) reorganized the previous system of housing assistance for Native Americans and replaced it with a single block grant program, the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG). In addition, the law focused on self-determination for tribes, giving tribes broad authority to choose how to use the affordable housing funds they receive under NAHASDA.
Through the NAHBG, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) distributes formula funding to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages, or to organizations the tribes have designated to administer the funding (known as tribally designated housing entities (TDHEs)). Tribes and TDHEs, in turn, use the funding for a range of affordable housing activities to benefit low-income tribal households. These activities include developing new housing for rental or homeownership, maintaining or operating existing housing units, providing infrastructure, and offering housing-related services.
In addition to the NAHBG, NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program to help tribes obtain private financing for housing activities (the Title VI Loan Guarantee program) and authorizes funding for training and technical assistance. An amendment to NAHASDA in 2000 established the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG) program to provide housing assistance for Native Hawaiians similar to the assistance provided under the NAHBG.
HUD estimates that about 100,000 housing units have been built, acquired, or rehabilitated since the NAHBG began. The majority of these units have been substantially rehabilitated rather than built or acquired. In general, many tribes choose to use their NAHBG funds to develop more homeownership units than rental units, in part because homeownership units have fewer ongoing costs for tribes. The NHHBG has been used to build, acquire, or rehabilitate nearly 600 homes since the program began, and to provide services or training to another 1,500 households.
The authorization for NAHASDA programs, other than the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant, expired at the end of FY2013. (The Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant program has not been reauthorized since its initial authorization expired at the end of FY2005.) Congress has been considering bills to reauthorize NAHASDA. |
crs_R44775 | crs_R44775_0 | In recent years, opinion polls have reported increased levels of support for President Putin. Since Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, Freedom House has noted a new rise in authoritarian governance in Russia. Foreign Relations
In recent years, many Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers have paid growing attention to Russia's active and increasingly forceful foreign policy, both toward neighboring states, such as Georgia and Ukraine, and in regard to operations further afield, such as the intervention in Syria and interference in political processes in Europe and the United States. During the Obama Administration, the United States and Russia cooperated in a number of areas. This cooperation resulted in the following:
establishment of a U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, with 21 working groups that met regularly until activities were suspended as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine; a new strategic arms control agreement (the 2010 New START Treaty); ground and air transit of supplies through Russia to supply U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network; cooperation in Afghan counternarcotics and combat helicopter maintenance; Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization; the imposition of new multilateral sanctions on Iran and development of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA); U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea; and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In 2014, U.S. relations with Russia deteriorated further in reaction to Russia's invasion and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and its subsequent support of separatists in eastern Ukraine. Questions concerning the extent of Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election also have imposed constraints on the Administration's ability to improve relations with Russia. The Administration has expressed a desire to pursue cooperation with Russia on a range of pursuits (e.g., Syria, North Korea, cybersecurity). Secretary Tillerson's April 2017 meeting with Putin covered other issues as well. On several occasions, he has stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place "until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered" them. The law codifies sanctions on Russia provided for in existing Ukraine-related and cyber-related executive orders. Congressional Action in the 115th Congress
In the first several months of the 115 th Congress, many Members have expressed their sense that the United States should adhere to core international commitments and principles in its dealings with Russia. As of August 2017, congressional committees have held more than 20 hearings on matters relating to Russia, including on U.S. election interference, other influence campaigns, sanctions, INF Treaty violations, civil society, Russian military and security policy, and U.S. responses to Russian activities. The 115 th Congress has passed, and the President has signed into law, the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 ( P.L. Legislation also has been introduced calling on the U.S. government to assess and respond to Russian influence operations, illicit financial activities abroad, or INF treaty violations. Currently, the New START Treaty and the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty are the two fundamental nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and Russia. In doing so, Members of Congress may consider several issues, including but not limited to the following:
monitoring the Administration's implementation of new sanctions requirements on Russia; monitoring the Administration's implementation of programs intended to respond to Russian interference in U.S. and European domestic political processes; assessing current and possible future measures to reassure European allies and partners and to deter potential Russian aggression; considering ways to promote Russia's compliance with its commitments to resolve the Ukraine conflict; developing responses to Russian violations of the INF Treaty; determining whether additional possibilities exist to cooperate with Russia in the resolution of the Syria conflict and the fight against the Islamic State; and examining whether other policy areas still exist in which cooperation with Russia remains both possible and in the U.S. interest (e.g., North Korea nuclear program, arms control, cybersecurity dialogue, space). | Over the last five years, Congress and the executive branch have closely monitored and responded to new developments in Russian policy. These developments include the following:
increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidential post in 2012; Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine; violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; Moscow's intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad's government; increased military activity in Europe; and cyber-related influence operations that, according to the U.S. intelligence community, have targeted the 2016 U.S. presidential election and countries in Europe.
In response, the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions related to Russia's actions in Ukraine and Syria, malicious cyber activity, and human rights violations. The United States also has led NATO in developing a new military posture in Central and Eastern Europe designed to reassure allies and deter aggression.
U.S. policymakers over the years have identified areas in which U.S. and Russian interests are or could be compatible. The United States and Russia have cooperated successfully on issues such as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, support for military operations in Afghanistan, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the International Space Station, and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. In addition, the United States and Russia have identified other areas of cooperation, such as countering terrorism, illicit narcotics, and piracy.
Like previous U.S. Administrations, President Donald J. Trump has sought to improve U.S.-Russian relations at the start of his tenure. In its first six months, the Trump Administration expressed an intention to pursue cooperation or dialogue with Russia on a range of pursuits (e.g., Syria, North Korea, cybersecurity). At initial meetings with President Putin in April and July 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump said they agreed to find ways to improve channels of communication and begin addressing issues dividing the two countries.
At the same time, the Administration has indicated that it intends to adhere to core international commitments and principles, as well as to retain sanctions on Russia. Secretary Tillerson has stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place "until Moscow reverses the actions that triggered" them. Secretary Tillerson and other officials also have noted the severity of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the need for an appropriate response.
Since the start of the 115th Congress, many Members of Congress have actively engaged with the Administration on questions concerning U.S.-Russian relations. As of August 2017, Congress has held more than 20 hearings on matters directly relating to Russia, codified and strengthened sanctions through the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II), and considered other measures to assess and respond to Russian interference in the 2016 elections, influence operations in Europe, INF Treaty violations, and illicit financial activities abroad.
This report provides background information on Russian politics, economics, and military issues. It discusses a number of key issues for Congress concerning Russia's foreign relations and the U.S.-Russian relationship. |
crs_RS22951 | crs_RS22951_0 | The largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will go first, on September 21. The following day, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will hold its internal election, with the winner set to assume Japan's premiership by virtue of the LDP's majority in the Lower House, the more powerful of Japan's two parliamentary chambers. Taro Aso (67 years old) is widely considered to be the front-runner. During his stint as Foreign Minister (2005-2006), he and then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe tried to deepen Japan's alliance with the United States. Aso has a reputation as a "revisionist" on historical issues, which could lead to tensions with China and South Korea if he becomes prime minister. The DPJ's Platform
If Lower House elections are held in the near future, the DPJ is expected to use the same strategy of emphasizing economic and social issues that propelled it to victory in the July 2007 elections for the Upper House of Japan's Diet. As a result, for much of its history, the DPJ has a reputation of not being able to formulate coherent alternative policies to the LDP. Implications for the United States6
In general, U.S. interests are likely to be negatively affected by political gridlock in Tokyo. Afghanistan
The political gridlock in Tokyo does not bode well for the continuation of Japanese support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Most analysts think that even Aso, who is known as a nationalist politician, is likely to follow Abe and Fukuda's lead and avoid provoking China. | On September 1, 2008, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda stunned observers by resigning his post, saying that a new leader might be able to avoid the "political vacuum" that he faced in office. Fukuda's 11-month tenure was marked by low approval ratings, a sputtering economy, and virtual paralysis in policymaking, as the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) used its control of the Upper House of Japan's parliament (the Diet) to delay or halt most government proposals. On September 22, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will elect a new president, who will become Japan's third prime minister in as many years. Ex-Foreign Minister Taro Aso, a popular figure known for his conservative foreign policy credentials and support for increased deficit spending, is widely expected to win. Many analysts expect that the new premier will dissolve the Lower House and call for parliamentary elections later in the fall. As a result, Japanese policymaking is likely to enter a period of disarray, which could negatively affect several items of interest to the United States, including the passage of budgets to support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and the renewal of legislation that authorizes the deployment of Japanese navy vessels that are refueling ships supporting U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan.
This report analyzes the factors behind and implications of Japan's current political turmoil. It will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_RL33062 | crs_RL33062_0 | 97-241 renamed ICA to be the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). As of October 1, 1999, USIAwas abolished and its functions were merged back into the Department of State. After the abolishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 and theterrorist attacks two years later, the U.S. government expedited implementation of public diplomacyto help win its war on terrorism. More recently, the President created the Muslim World Outreach Policy CoordinatingCommittee in July 2004 which replaced the Strategic Communications Policy CoordinatingCommittee. Thisreport reviews 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been identified by theDepartment of State as being credible reports with valuable suggestions and compares therecommendations. A brief discussion of recommendationsimilarities and differences follows each matrix. Recommendations on improving government coordination of public diplomacy entities and programs include
(1) the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy suggests assigning the StateDepartment's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources with the responsibility foroverseeing the strategic planning of all public diplomacy programming andresources;
(2) the Heritage Foundation seeks better coordination through the White House,specifically through the Office of Global Communications;
(3) the Public Diplomacy Council recommends that a new U.S. Agency for PublicDiplomacy be responsible for coordinating all U.S. government public diplomacyefforts and establish an Interagency Committee on PD at the Cabinet level tocoordinate and direct the national PD strategy;
(4) the Council on Foreign Relations recommends that a coherent strategic andcoordinating framework for public diplomacy be developed, including a presidentialdirective on public diplomacy and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led bythe president's personal designee;
(5) the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World advisesa strengthening of the role of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to coordinategovernment-wide public diplomacy activities, review country program plans withrespect to public diplomacy, allocate human and financial resources, and play a rolein performance evaluations. 2001. "America Needs a Voice Abroad," Washington Post, February 26, 2005. Foreign Policy Association. September 2003. I. II. | Public diplomacy has been officially acknowledged as a tool in the foreign policy arsenalsince World War I. Later, during World War II, it became part of the U.S. government structurewhen in 1942 the President issued an executive order to create the Office of War Information (OWI). OWI aired the first Voice of America program on February 24, 1942, in Europe. These activitieswere carried out without any authority or formal recognition by Congress.
More recently, during the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, public diplomacy was viewed asa low priority, and was often seen by lawmakers as a source of funds to tap for other programs. Thisculminated in 1999 when Congress abolished the agency primarily concerned with public diplomacy-- the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) -- and merged its public diplomacy functions into theDepartment of State.
Following the elimination of the USIA and after the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S.government officials, foreign policy experts, and academicians began to assess the direction of, andthe increased need for, public diplomacy.
This report looks at 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been identified bythe Department of State as being credible reports with valuable suggestions. Variousrecommendations from these studies are similar. This report organizes the recommendations andprovides a brief discussion of them. CRS takes no position on the recommendations.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL30591 | crs_RL30591_0 | Background
Budgets for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), aswell as U.S. contributions to United Nations (U.N.) International Organizations and Peacekeepingare all within the Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agency (CJS) appropriations. On April 1, 1999, largely for budgetary savings and streamlining U.S. foreign policy,consolidation of the foreign policy agencies began with the merger of the functions of the ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department; as of October 1, 1999, thefunctions of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), excluding international broadcasting, also camedirectly under the State Department. Although not part of the CJS appropriations, the U.S. Agencyfor International Development (USAID) was required to reorganize and come directly under theauthority of the Secretary of State by April 1, 1999. The Administration's FY2001 State Department and International Broadcasting budgetrequest totaled $6.96 billion, 10.5% above the FY2000 enacted funding level. On June 26 the House passed H.R. The Senate received H.R. 4690 on June 27, 2000. TheSenate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the bill July 18, 2000, recommending $6.1billion for the Department of State and $441.6 million for international broadcasting. On October27, 2000 Congress passed the CJS conference report ( H.R. 4942 , H.Rept. 106-1005 ). After numerous continuing resolutions, the President signed into law ( P.L. 4942 as contained in H.R. 5548 . Theenacted FY2001 appropriation provides $6.6 billion for the Department of State and $451.5 millionfor international broadcasting for a total of $7.1 billion--nearly $100 million more than the ClintonAdministration had requested. The final amount passed by Congress is $3.168 billion with$410 million for worldwide security upgrades. The Capital Investment Fund (CIF) -- CIF was established by the ForeignRelations Authorization Act of FY1994/95 ( P.L. International Organizations and Conferences
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) -- CIO provides funds forU.S. The remainder is being withheld until U.N. reforms arecompleted. The House Appropriations Committee recommended a continuation of theFY2000 funding level for FY2001. Congress compromised with an enacted level of $56.2 million. The House Appropriations Committee recommended continuing The AsiaFoundation at its FY2000 level and the House agreed. P.L. Therefore, Congress agreednot to merge broadcasting functions into the State Department, but to maintain the BroadcastingBoard of Governors (BBG) as an independent agency as of October 1, 1999. TheFY2001 budget request for international broadcasting was $448.4 million, a 6.3% increase. The Senate Committee reported in its version of H.R. | On February 7, 2000, the President submitted his FY2001 budget request which includednearly $7 billion for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Thisrepresented an increase of $661.5 million (or 10.5%) from the FY2000 enacted level which Congresshad passed in an omnibus bill on November 19, 1999; the President had signed it into law ( P.L.106-113 ) on November 29, 1999.
Earlier, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1999 ( P.L. 105-277 , section1001) had required the foreign policy agencies to be reorganized before FY2000. Subsequently, theArms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) merged its functions into the Department of State,and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reorganized and came directly underthe authority of the Secretary of State as of April 1, 1999. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA)consolidated its information and exchange functions into the Department of State, while as ofOctober 1, 1999 the broadcasting functions became an independent agency referred to as theBroadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).
The Administration's FY2001 request would have: 1) provided more than $1 billion forworldwide security upgrades at U.S. facilities, 2) continued increasing the capital investment fund,and 3) increased U.S. Contributions to the U.N.'s International Organizations (CIO) and its U.N.Contributions to International Peacekeeping (CIPA) funds. In addition, the internationalbroadcasting budget request of $6.96 billion represented a 6.3% increase over the FY2000 level.
The House Commerce, Justice, State (CJS) Appropriations Subcommittee reported out itsversion of the CJS FY2001funding legislation on June 6, 2000. The full House AppropriationsCommittee reported out its version on June 15th. The bill ( H.R. 4690 ) was formallyintroduced on June 19, 2000. House floor action occurred on June 22nd and 23rd; the House passedthe bill (214-195-1) on June 26, 2000 after agreeing to transfer $10 million out of State and into theLegal Services Corp. The House funding level for the State Department and internationalbroadcasting totaled $6.55 billion.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported their version of H.R. 4690 onJuly 18, 2000. The Senate Committee recommended no significant increase in worldwide securityupgrade funding, but a 30% increase in the Capital Investment Fund and 10% increase in exchangeprograms. The Senate Committee recommended a total FY2001 funding level of $6.56 billion forState and international broadcasting.
On October 27, 2000, Congress approved the CJS conference report ( H.R. 4942 ; H.Rept. 106-1005 ). The President signed the measure into law on December 21, 2000( H.R. 5548 as contained in the conference report on H.R. 4942 ; P.L.106-553 ).
This is the final update of this report. |
crs_R43254 | crs_R43254_0 | Introduction
Significance for Congress
Many Members of Congress have become increasingly concerned about what can be done to address student bullying. This has spurred interest in ensuring that schools are safe, secure places for students, so that they can receive the full benefits of their education. Several bills that address school bullying have been introduced in the 113 th Congress, although none as of the date of this report have been enacted. However, currently 49 states have anti-bullying laws, although there is considerable variation in the content of these laws. Efficacy of Anti-bullying Programs
Some of the research on anti-bullying programs has found mixed success from anti-bullying programs, particularly in the United States. However, a cross-national meta-analysis of 44 evaluations identified particular characteristics of school-based bullying programs that may help reduce bullying. This study found the intensity and duration of a program, as well as the number of program elements, to be linked with effectiveness. Other elements found important to effectiveness were parent training, parent meetings, firm disciplinary methods, classroom rules, classroom management, and improved playground supervision. There has been an increased focus in recent years on the importance of school climate to preventing bullying and improving a variety of other school indicators. The majority of these laws direct school districts to adopt anti-bullying policies. However, the requirements placed on schools by these laws are quite varied. The report noted the surge in state legislation addressing bullying in recent years, with 120 bills or amendments to existing legislation introduced between 1999 and 2010. According to the report, the landscape of state legislation has been changing as new bills (or amendments to existing laws) that address student bullying have been introduced that reflect:
the rapidly evolving political and policy environment surrounding bullying in schools, where lawmakers are continually refining legislative expectations for schools in response to the new problem dimensions (e.g., the growth of cyber-bullying), and to emerging research concerning effective policy strategies for combating student bullying. Federal Agency Efforts on Bullying
There are currently several federal initiatives that address student bullying. However, many of these initiatives are not solely or primarily focused on student bullying, but permit some funds to be used for this purpose. Interagency Initiatives
Representatives from the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, the Interior, and Justice; the Federal Trade Commission; and the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders have formed a Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention Steering Committee. The Federal Partners work to coordinate policy, research, and communications on bullying topics. The Federal Partners have created a website, http://www.stopbullying.gov , which provides extensive resources on bullying, including information on how schools can address bullying. Legal Issues
Currently, there are no federal statutes that explicitly prohibit student bullying or cyber-bullying. Under some circumstances, however, bullying in schools may be prohibited by certain federal civil rights laws. In addition, bullying may, in some instances, constitute a violation of state criminal or tort law. | Many Members of Congress have become increasingly concerned about what can be done to address student bullying. This concern has arisen in response to high-profile bullying incidents that have occurred in recent years, and due to a growing body of research on the negative consequences of school bullying. Congress is interested in ensuring that schools are safe, secure places for students, so that they can receive the full benefits of their education. Several bills that address school bullying have already been introduced in the 113th Congress, although none has been enacted as of the date of this report.
Some of the research on anti-bullying programs has found mixed success, particularly in the United States. However, a meta-analysis of 44 evaluations identified particular characteristics of school-based bullying programs that may help reduce bullying. This study found the intensity and duration of a program, as well as the number of program elements, to be linked with effectiveness. Other factors found to be important to effectiveness were parent training, parent meetings, firm disciplinary methods, classroom rules, classroom management, and improved playground supervision.
Currently, there is no federal statute that explicitly prohibits student bullying or cyber-bullying. Under some circumstances, however, bullying may be prohibited by certain federal civil rights laws. In addition, bullying may, in some instances, constitute a violation of state criminal or tort law.
There are several federal initiatives that are specifically focused on student bullying, including interagency initiatives. In addition, there are a variety of federal initiatives that are not solely or primarily focused on student bullying, but permit some funds to be used for this purpose. Representatives from the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, the Interior, and Justice, as well as the Federal Trade Commission and the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, have formed a Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention Steering Committee. The Federal Partners work to coordinate policy, research, and communications on bullying topics. The Federal Partners have created a website, http://www.stopbullying.gov, which provides extensive resources on bullying, including information on how schools can address bullying.
Although there is currently no federal anti-bullying statute, there has been a surge in state legislation in recent years. A Department of Education (ED) study found that between 1999 and 2010, 120 bills and amendments to existing bills were introduced by states. Currently, 49 states have passed anti-bullying legislation. The majority of these laws direct school districts to adopt anti-bullying policies. However, the requirements placed on schools by these laws are quite varied. In addition, many of these laws do not contain all the key components of anti-bullying legislation that the U.S. Department of Education identified as important in a document it distributed to school districts. |
crs_RL31201 | crs_RL31201_0 | Introduction
Under the United States Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field of domestic relations. Despite the lack of direct authority to legislate domestic relations issues, Congress continues to utilize a number of indirect approaches to enact numerous federal laws which impact on family law questions. Thus, the individual states have the primary authority and responsibility to legislate in the domestic relations arena, which includes incidents of marriage, divorce, and child welfare. The rationale behind this approach is the lack of overriding national considerations in the family law area. However, states' freedom to legislate has led to substantial variation between the individual states on many of these topics, although more uniformity now exists than at any time in the past. This report discusses the extent to which Congress is constitutionally authorized to legislate on family law questions, and includes examples of present laws utilizing the various approaches available in this area. | Under the United States Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field of domestic relations. The primary authority and responsibility to legislate in the domestic relations arena lies with the individual states. The rationale behind this approach is the lack of overriding national considerations in the family law area. However, states' freedom to legislate has led to substantial variation between the individual states on many topics including incidents of marriage, divorce and child welfare. As such, Congress continues to utilize a number of indirect approaches to enact numerous federal laws which impact on family law questions. This report discusses the extent to which Congress is constitutionally authorized to legislate on family law questions, and includes examples of present laws utilizing the various approaches available in this area. |
crs_R40534 | crs_R40534_0 | In order to elucidate the Supreme Court's decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. , this report begins by providing background on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) premarket regulation of medical devices and an overview of federal preemption of state law. The report discusses arguments for and against federal preemption of state law tort claims with respect to medical devices. The report then explains the Supreme Court's decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. , as well as the concurring and dissenting opinions. Finally, the report analyzes the implications of the Court's decision in Riegel for Congress, consumers, medical device manufacturers, and preemption jurisprudence. This report focuses on Class III medical devices because it is federal preemption of state law requirements that are "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements for Class III devices with premarket approval (PMA) that was at issue in Riegel . Class III devices generally require a premarket notification as well as PMA. Preemption
This section will first provide an overview of federal preemption of state law. Where express preemption provisions are not present, federal law may preempt state law implicitly. Arguments Against Federal Preemption of State Law Tort Claims with Respect to Devices
In contrast, arguments against federal preemption of common law in the medical device field focus on (1) congressional intent and legislative history; (2) protections for consumers, who may otherwise be left without a remedy; (3) the change in the FDA's view with regard to preemption, as well as the general presumption against preemption; (4) viewing FDA approval as a preliminary step—a "floor" rather than a "ceiling"—that does not hold manufacturers accountable for safety concerns; and (5) questioning the agency's capabilities in terms of resources and its reliance on industry. The FFDCA contains an express preemption provision with respect to medical devices. The patient and his wife raised New York state common law claims of "strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and negligence in the design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale of the catheter." The Supreme Court found that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) preempted state tort law claims because the common law negligence and strict liability claims fell into the category of "any requirement" in the bolded language below. and (2) If the answer to the first question is yes, are the plaintiffs' common law claims (such as negligence in the design, labeling, and marketing of the catheter) based on state requirements that are "different from, or in addition to" the federal requirements, "and that relate to safety and effectiveness"? To the extent that the lawsuit raises claims that "'parallel' rather than add to, federal requirements," such as a state "damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations," it does not appear that such suits would be preempted. Legislative Proposals
In the 111 th Congress, bills were introduced that would have overturned the Court's decision in Riegel by modifying the statute at issue: H.R. 1346 , H.R. 4816 , and S. 540 . Similar legislation has not been introduced in the 112 th Congress. | In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held in an 8 to 1 decision that if the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) grants premarket approval (PMA) to a medical device, the device manufacturer is immune from certain suits under state tort law, due to an express preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA). This holding establishes that FDA PMA preempts claims such as strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence in design, testing, manufacturing, labeling, distribution, sale, inspection, or marketing of the device to the extent that such state law claims are "different from, or in addition to" federal PMA requirements. However, the Supreme Court held that the MDA's express preemption provision did not prohibit state "claims premised on a violation of FDA regulation." The Court stated that such claims "'parallel,' rather than add to, federal requirements." Post-Riegel, the lower courts have come to differing conclusions when determining whether particular state law claims, such as manufacturing defect claims, "parallel" federal requirements, and thus are not preempted, or rather are state requirements "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements, and thus are preempted under Riegel.
The Supreme Court's decision has been a cause for concern for some Members of Congress who disagree with the ruling, as well as trial lawyers and patients. However, advocates of more limited tort liability, including the previous Administration, agree with the ruling. The decision has broad implications for consumers of Class III medical devices, who are prevented from suing device manufacturers on most state common law claims, as well as manufacturers, who are shielded from many suits if their device receives FDA PMA. In the 111th Congress, bills were introduced—H.R. 1346, H.R. 4816, and S. 540—that would have overturned the Court's decision in Riegel by modifying the statute at issue. As of the date of this report, similar legislation has not been introduced in the 112th Congress.
This report will provide a brief overview of federal premarket regulation of medical devices. The report then provides an overview of federal preemption of state law, as well as arguments for and against federal preemption of state law tort claims with respect to medical devices. The report explains the Supreme Court's decision in Riegel and examines the concurring and dissenting opinions. Finally, the report analyzes the legal, procedural, policy, and legislative implications for Congress, consumers, and medical device manufacturers. |
crs_RL32522 | crs_RL32522_0 | (2) The recommendations of the9/11 Commission, as they relate to strategy content and implementation, appear consistent with, andsupportive of, the National Strategy. (20)
The 9/11 Commission Report
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States["9/11 Commission"] issued its final report. (25)
On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Actof 2004 ( S. 2845 , P.L. 108-458 ) establishing the position of National IntelligenceDirector (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principalintelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of theintelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed toserve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and tocoordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Centerwill also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President. (33)
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one, and likenthe Commission's recommendations to picking the "low hanging fruit on the tree while avoidinggoing after the higher -- more difficult to reach, yet richer -- clusters." (34) For example, theCommission, as its first recommendation, suggests identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuarieswith a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists increasingly return to theirpolitically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blend into local communities, where theirtraining camps are in civilian housing complexes, and where their bomb factories are in privateresidences. (35)
A number of the Commission's recommendations fall within the category of preventing thegrowth of Islamist extremism and both the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Reportto a large degree equate the terrorist threat with al Qaeda and affiliated groups. Another issuecentral to combating Islamist extremism, not addressed in the 2003 National Strategy or the 9/11Commission recommendations, is that of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted,countenanced, or facilitated by the action, or inaction, of nation states. | On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls for changesto be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively protect our nation in an ageof modern terrorism and provides forty-one concrete recommendations. Generally, therecommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to strategy content and implementationappear consistent with, and supportive of, the National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 CommissionReport's overarching premise that U.S. counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation canbe improved.
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one and suggestthat the Commission consciously avoids tackling some of the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, the Commission, as its first recommendation, stresses the need for identifying andprioritizing terrorist sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terroristsare increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blendinto local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing complexes, and wheretheir bomb factories are in private residences. Although a number of the Commission'srecommendations fall within the category of preventing the growth of Islamic extremism, noneaddresses directly the issue of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced,or facilitated by the action -- or inaction -- of nation states.
With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice, many argue thata successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures will need similar flexibility. Thedegree to which such flexibility will be built into strategy, and into any new institutional structuresrecommend by the 9/11 Commission, is yet to be determined.
On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Actof 2004 ( S. 2845 , P.L. 108-458 ) establishing the position of National IntelligenceDirector (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principalintelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of theintelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed toserve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and tocoordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Centerwill also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President. |
crs_R40938 | crs_R40938_0 | Recent Developments
On January 8, 2013, Vice President Nicolás Maduro announced that President Chávez would not be sworn into office on January 10 as planned because he was still recovering from cancer surgery in Cuba, but that he would be sworn into office at a later date, as provided for in Article 231 of the Constitution. On October 7, 2012, President Chávez won reelection to another six-year term by a margin of 11%, capturing about 55% of the vote compared to 44% for opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. Political Situation
For more than a decade, Venezuela has experienced significant political changes under the rule of populist President Hugo Chávez, and for a number of years there has been concern about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of expression in the country. Chávez's Health Status and Political Implications
Since mid-2011, President Chávez's precarious health situation has raised questions about Venezuela's political future. If Chávez does not recover, Venezuela will face a new presidential election. Article 233 of the Constitution requires that a new election is to be held within 30 days if the president dies or is incapacitated during the first four years of his term. U.S. Policy
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, but there has been significant friction with the Chávez government. For several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela's military arms purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries, and the use of Venezuelan territory by Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Despite tensions in relations, the State Department maintains that the United States remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts. In the aftermath of President Chávez's October 2012 reelection, the Obama Administration, while acknowledging differences with Chávez, congratulated the Venezuelan people on the high level of participation and the relatively peaceful electoral process (see " Election Results and Implications " above). In terms of congressional action on FY2013 foreign aid appropriations, the report to the House Appropriations Committee bill, H.R. 5857 ( H.Rept. In contrast, the report to the Senate Appropriations Committee bill, S. 3241 ( S.Rept. The 112 th Congress did not complete action on a FY2013 full-year foreign operations appropriations, but it did approve a Continuing Appropriations Resolution, FY2013 ( P.L. 112-175 ) in September 2012, which funds regular foreign aid accounts at the same level as in FY2012, plus 0.612% through March 27, 2013, although specific country accounts are left to the discretion of responsible agencies. The 113 th Congress will need to address foreign aid appropriations for the balance of FY2013. Human Rights Concerns
Human rights organizations and U.S. officials have expressed concerns for several years about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of speech and press in Venezuela under the Chávez government. 112-220 , H.R. The United States has imposed sanctions on individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress
P.L. H.Res. The resolution would have called on the Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism and urged increased and sustained cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives between the United States and allies in the region. H.R. 112-172 ) by the Senate Committee on Appropriations May 24, 2012. The report to the House bill directs that $5 million in ESF be provided for democracy programs in Venezuela, the same amount appropriated in FY2012, and $2 million more than the Administration's request. In contrast, the report to the Senate bill recommends $3 million for democracy programs in Venezuela to be administered by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) instead of USAID or the Department of State; this is the same amount requested by the Administration, but would be for NED. The report was to contain a description of any activities by the government of Venezuela to supply any terrorist organization with planning, training, logistics, and lethal material support; activities to provide direct or indirect support to any terrorist organization; activities to provide other types of assistance that could provide material support for the activities of any terrorist organization; activities or assistance to governments currently on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and activities by the government of Venezuela in the Western Hemisphere that undermine the national interest of the United States. 3783 , which would require the Administration to develop a "strategy to address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere." In September 2008, the Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on Rangel for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons trafficking. On December 15, 2009, the House approved H.R. | Under the rule of populist President Hugo Chávez, first elected in 1998, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution and unicameral legislature, and even a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Human rights organizations have expressed concerns about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of expression under the Chávez government. President Chávez won reelection to another six-year term on October 7, 2012, by a margin of 11%, capturing about 55% of the vote compared to 44% for opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. On December 11, 2012, however, Chávez faced a fourth difficult operation in Cuba for an undisclosed form of cancer that has raised questions about Venezuela's political future. Because of significant health complications, Vice President Nicolás Maduro announced on January 8, 2013, that President Chávez would not be sworn into office on January 10 as planned, but that he would be sworn into office at a later date, a decision supported by Venezuela's Supreme Court. Looking ahead, if President Chávez does not recover, the Constitution calls for a new election to be held within 30 days if the president dies or is incapacitated during the first four years of his term.
U.S. Policy
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign oil, but there has been friction in relations under the Chávez government. Over the years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela's military arms purchases, its relations with Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts has been a major concern. The United States has imposed sanctions: on several Venezuelan government and military officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons trafficking; on three Venezuelan companies for providing support to Iran; and on several Venezuelan individuals for providing support to Hezbollah. Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts. In the aftermath of President Chávez's reelection, the White House, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez, congratulated the Venezuelan people on the high level of participation and the relatively peaceful election process.
Legislative Initiatives
As in past years, there were concerns in the 112th Congress regarding the state of Venezuela's democracy and human rights situation and its deepening relations with Iran, and these concerns will likely continue in the 113th Congress. The 112th Congress approved H.R. 3783 (P.L. 112-220), which requires the Administration to conduct an assessment and present "a strategy to address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere." Other initiatives that were not approved include: H.R. 2542, which would have withheld some assistance to the Organization of American States unless that body took action to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter regarding the status of democracy in Venezuela; H.R. 2583, which included a provision prohibiting aid to the government of Venezuela; and H.Res. 247, which would have called on the Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism.
In action on FY2013 foreign aid appropriations, the report to the House Appropriations Committee bill, H.R. 5857 (H.Rept. 112-494, reported May 25, 2012), directs that $5 million in Economic Support Funds be provided for democracy programs in Venezuela, the same amount appropriated in FY2012, and $2 million more than requested by the Administration. In contrast, the report to the Senate Appropriations Committee bill, S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172, reported May 24, 2012), recommends $3 million for democracy programs in Venezuela to be administered by the National Endowment for Democracy. Ultimately, the 112th Congress did not complete action on a FY2013 full-year foreign operations appropriations measure, but it did approve a Continuing Appropriations Resolution, FY2013 (P.L. 112-175) in September 2012, which funds regular foreign aid accounts at the same level as in FY2012, plus 0.612% through March 27, 2013. Specific country accounts, however, are left to the discretion of responsible agencies. The 113th Congress will need to address foreign aid appropriations for the balance of FY2013.
Note: This report provides background on political and economic changes in Venezuela, U.S. policy, and U.S. legislative action and initiatives from 2009-2012 covering the 111th and 112th Congress. It will not be updated. |
crs_R44876 | crs_R44876_0 | For more than a decade, Washington and New Delhi have pursued a "strategic partnership." U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change
President Trump's June announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change generally was received poorly in India, where both government and private sector are focused in earnest on developing renewable energy sources (see the "Energy and Climate Issues" section below). In recent years, Indian nationals have accounted for the great majority of such U.S. visa issuances—70% in FY2016—as well as work visas for their spouses. Meanwhile, the results brought into high relief the weakened position of India's opposition parties. This relates to some of the human rights concerns expressed by some in the U.S. Congress, among others. India's Foreign Relations and U.S. Interests
India's long-held focus on maintaining "non-alignment" in the international system—more recently conceived by Indian officials as "strategic autonomy"—is, in the current century, shifting toward increased bilateral engagements, perhaps especially with the United States and with greater energy under the Modi government. India shares lengthy disputed borders with both countries and sits astride vital sea lanes. What follows is a brief review of five key Indian bilateral relations having direct bearing on perceived U.S. national interests, those with Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Japan, and Iran. Relations only began to blossom in the current century after being significantly undermined by India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests. Today, leaders from both countries acknowledge numerous common values and interests as they engage in a "strategic and global partnership" formally launched in 2006. In 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense pact outlining planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increased opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, and expanded collaboration related to missile defense. Despite general optimism among U.S. officials and independent boosters about India's potential in this realm, some analysts contend that India's ability to influence regional security dynamics significantly will continue to remain limited in coming years and decades. Navy-to-navy collaboration—with annual, large-scale, and now multilateral "Malabar" joint exercises—appears to be the most robust in terms of exercises and personnel exchanges. India's military is the world's third-largest, and New Delhi seeks to transform it into one with advanced technology and global reach, reportedly planning up to $100 billion on new procurements over the next decade to update its mostly Soviet-era arsenal. Despite some reports of progress in the areas of intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation—in 2016, Secretary Kerry told an Indian audience that American and Indian intelligence agencies "now exchange information constantly" —there has been asymmetry in the willingness of the two governments to move forward: Washington has tended to want more cooperation from India and is willing to give more in return, while it appears that officials in New Delhi remain hesitant and their aspirations are more modest. India became a member of the MTCR in June 2016. The Trump Administration is reviewing this policy. U.S.-India Bilateral Trade and Investment Relations
The United States has viewed India—one of the world's fastest-growing economies and its third-largest on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis—as an important strategic partner in advancing common interests regionally and globally. These and other developments continue to raise concerns for the U.S. regarding localization barriers to trade in India. India may be in the midst of one of history's largest energy transformation project, with a rapidly growing renewables sector. As described in this report, key legislative and oversight considerations for Congress in U.S.-India relations include the following:
what levels of U.S. foreign assistance to provide India; whether to continue bilateral clean and renewable energy cooperation programs even in the absence of the Administration's support for the Paris Agreement; whether to enact legislation tightening U.S. immigration policy, especially with respect to H-1B visas; how vigorously to support bilateral defense trade with India, including whether to allow or otherwise seek to influence potential future major arms sales and/or co-production agreements, such as the one recently proposed for F-16 combat aircraft; what avenues of engagement on U.S.-India trade and investment issues to support, including whether to advocate for continuing U.S.-India BIT negotiations; whether to renew U.S. support for APEC membership for India; whether to support U.S. trade promotion and financing programs, such as Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and TDA, that have been active in India; whether to reconsider India's GSP status in light of concerns with the country's IPR protection and enforcement; whether to continue efforts supporting India's membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other expert control regimes; and how to respond to human rights abuses in India, among others. | India will soon be the world's most populous country, home to about one of every six people. Many factors combine to infuse India's government and people with "great power" aspirations: the Asian giant's rich civilization and history, expanding strategic horizons, energetic global and international engagement, critical geography (with more than 9,000 total miles of land borders, many of them disputed) astride vital sea and energy lanes, major economy (at times the world's fastest growing) with a rising middle class and an attendant boost in defense and power projection capabilities (replete with a nuclear weapons arsenal and triad of delivery systems), and vigorous science and technology sectors, among others.
In recognition of India's increasingly central role and ability to influence world affairs—and with a widely-held assumption that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the United States in and of itself—the U.S. Congress and two successive U.S. Administrations have acted both to broaden and deepen America's engagement with New Delhi. Such engagement is unprecedented after decades of Cold War-era estrangement and today takes place "across the spectrum of human endeavor for a better world," as described in a 2015 U.S.-India Declaration of Friendship. Washington and New Delhi launched a "strategic partnership" in 2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale joint military exercises and significant defense trade. Bilateral trade and investment have increased while a relatively wealthy Indian-American community is exercising newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals account for a large proportion of foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information technology sector.
Yet more engagement has meant more areas of friction in the partnership, many of which attract congressional attention. India's economy, while slowly reforming, continues to be a relatively closed one, with barriers to trade and investment deterring foreign business interests. Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in the area of nonimmigrant work visas, remain unresolved; New Delhi views these as trade disputes. India's intellectual property protection regime comes under regular criticism from U.S. officials and firms. The June 2017 announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change dismayed many in India and brought into question significant ongoing bilateral collaboration in the energy field. Other stumbling blocks—on localization barriers and civil nuclear commerce, among others—add to sometimes argumentative associations. Meanwhile, cooperation in the fields of defense trade, intelligence, and counterterrorism, although vastly superior to that of only a decade ago, runs up against the obstacles variously posed by India's bureaucracy, limited governmental capacity, difficult procurement process, seemingly incompatible federal institutions, and a lingering shortage of trust, not least due to America's ongoing security relationship with and aid to India's key rival, Pakistan. Finally, Members of Congress take notice of human rights abuses in India, perhaps especially those related to religious freedom.
Despite these many areas of sometimes serious discord, the U.S. Congress has remained broadly positive in its posture toward the U.S.-India strategic and commercial partnership. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has thus far issued amicable rhetoric overall (with some lapses) that suggests an intention to maintain the general outlines of recent U.S.-India ties.
This report reviews the major facets of current U.S.-India relations, particularly in the context of congressional interest. It discusses areas in which perceived U.S. and Indian national interests converge and areas in which they diverge; other leading Indian foreign relations that relate to U.S. interests; the outlines of bilateral engagement in defense, trade, and investment relations, as well as important issues involving energy, climate change; and human rights concerns. This report will be updated. |
crs_R40506 | crs_R40506_0 | Introduction
This report discusses the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) authority to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from mobile sources of pollution. In Massachusetts v. EPA , the Supreme Court had held in 2007 that the existing CAA authorized the agency to address GHG emissions. The key to using this authority was for the EPA Administrator to find that GHG emissions are air pollutants that endanger public health or welfare, and that motor vehicles cause or contribute to that pollution. Following the issuance of the findings, EPA promulgated four sets of standards for motor vehicles:
1. standards for Model Year (MY) 2012-2016 light-duty motor vehicles (cars, SUVs, crossovers, minivans, and most pickups), May 7, 2010; 2. standards for MY2017-MY2025 light-duty vehicles, October 15, 2012; 3. standards for MY 2014-2018 medium- and heavy-duty trucks and engines, September 15, 2011; and 4. standards for MY2021-MY2027 medium- and heavy-duty trucks and engines and MY2018-MY2027 trailers, October 25, 2016. Under the Trump Administration, it is unclear whether this authority will be put to further use, and whether some of the standards already promulgated but not yet implemented might be rolled back or modified. In general, the auto manufacturing and trucking industries have been supportive of EPA's GHG regulations, partly because of concerns that states would implement a patchwork of standards in the absence of federal action. As the standards have been implemented, however, industry concerns have arisen regarding a lack of harmonization between EPA, NHTSA, and related California GHG and fuel efficiency programs. The 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle regulations provided for a Midterm Evaluation of the 2022-2025 standards for these vehicles, which offered an opportunity to modify the standards. These standards, which were promulgated in October 2016, would reduce oil consumption by up to 2 billion barrels over the lifetime of the vehicles sold under the program, saving vehicle owners fuel costs of about $170 billion according to EPA. In October 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed on international CO 2 emission standards for aircraft, beginning in 2020. ICAO also agreed on a system for offsetting future carbon emissions from aviation. The emission standards and the offset system would be implemented in the United States by EPA regulations issued under the CAA. U.S. airlines and aircraft manufacturers participated in the ICAO negotiations and have been supportive of the resulting agreements; whether EPA actions to implement them would run contrary to the President's and the Administration's broader views on regulation and climate change is unclear. This report focuses on these three actions to limit GHG emissions from mobile sources. Following the discussion of these issues, the report provides background information on GHG emissions from other mobile sources, including ships, nonroad vehicles and engines, locomotives, and fuels. As announced by President Obama, May 19, 2009, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (which administers fuel economy standards for cars and trucks under authorities that began with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975) would integrate corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for new cars and light trucks (collectively known as "light-duty motor vehicles") with national greenhouse gas emission standards to be issued by EPA. The manufacturers agreed to reduce GHG emissions from new cars and light trucks by about 50% by 2025, compared to 2010, with fuel economy standards rising to nearly 50 miles per gallon. In general, however, the truck standards—with the exception of the portion dealing with trailers—have been well-received, leaving in question whether general opposition to GHG rules will shape Congress's reaction more than the views of the affected industries. It is unclear whether that determination, which left the already promulgated GHG standards in place, could be subject to the Congressional Review Act. | This report discusses EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as it pertains to mobile sources, including cars, trucks, aircraft, ships, locomotives, nonroad vehicles and engines, and their fuels. The Supreme Court held in 2007 that the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes the agency to address GHG emissions. The key to using this CAA authority was for the EPA Administrator to find that GHG emissions endanger public health or welfare, a step taken in December 2009.
Under the Trump Administration, it is unclear whether this authority will be put to further use. Other questions concern what steps EPA and Congress may take with regard to already promulgated—but not yet implemented—standards for GHG emissions from cars and trucks. In principle, the auto manufacturing and trucking industries have been supportive of EPA's GHG regulations, in part because of concerns that states would implement a patchwork of standards in the absence of federal action. As the standards have been implemented, however, industry concerns have arisen regarding a lack of harmonization between EPA's GHG standards, fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and related California GHG and fuel efficiency programs.
One issue concerns the Model Year (MY) 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle regulations. Under these standards, GHG emissions from new light-duty vehicles (i.e., cars, SUVs, crossovers, minivans, and most pickup trucks) will be reduced about 50% compared to 2010 levels, and average fuel economy will rise to nearly 50 miles per gallon by 2025. When EPA and NHTSA promulgated the standards in 2012, EPA committed to a Midterm Evaluation (MTE) of the 2022-2025 portion of the GHG standards. This evaluation was completed on January 12, 2017, with EPA deciding to maintain the standards as promulgated. Given industry concerns about the standards, there is speculation as to whether the Administration will reconsider the MTE decision.
A second issue concerns GHG emission and fuel economy standards for medium- and heavy-duty trucks. EPA and NHTSA promulgated a second phase of these standards on October 25, 2016, covering trucks and engines beginning with the 2021 model year and truck trailers beginning in 2018. These standards could be reconsidered by the two agencies, or Congress could review them under the Congressional Review Act. GHG emissions are directly related to fuel combustion. In order to reduce GHG emissions, EPA expects the standards to increase fuel efficiency, lowering oil consumption by up to 2 billion barrels over the lifetime of 2018-2029 trucks and saving vehicle owners about $170 billion in fuel costs as a result. In general, the truck standards – with the exception of the portion dealing with trailers—have been well-received, leaving in question whether general opposition to GHG rules will shape Congress's and the new Administration's reaction to the rules more than the views of the affected industries.
A third potential issue concerns GHG emission standards for aircraft. In October 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed on international carbon dioxide (CO2) emission standards for aircraft, beginning in 2020, and on a system for offsetting future CO2 emissions from aviation. The emission standards would be implemented in the United States by EPA regulations issued under the CAA. U.S. airlines and aircraft manufacturers participated in the ICAO negotiations and have been supportive of the resulting agreements; whether EPA actions to implement them would run contrary to the President's and the Administration's broader views on regulation and climate change is unclear.
In addition to a discussion of these three issues, this report provides background on GHG emissions from other mobile sources, including ships, nonroad vehicles and engines, locomotives, and fuels. |
crs_RL31176 | crs_RL31176_0 | The first two methods are unlikely to have an effect on economic growth (aggregate demand) in the short run. The expansion in aggregate demand caused by greater military outlays is largely offset by the contraction in aggregate demand caused by higher taxes or lower non-military government spending. The latter two financing methods increase aggregate demand. Thus, a by-product of wars has typically been a short-term economic boom and an increase in employment in excess of the economy's sustainable rate of growth. Just as a military buildup in wartime typically boosts aggregate demand, the reduction in defense expenditures after a war typically causes a brief economic contraction as the economy adjusts to the return to peacetime activities. Although some price inflation may be associated with borrowing from the public, money creation is typically a more inflationary method of finance. Use of Price Controls
Under normal circumstances, money creation as a means of government finance would be expected to lead to price inflation. The Vietnam Conflict, the Reagan Military Buildup, and the Desert Storm Operation were not large enough events that they could be thought to dominate cause and effect in the economy at the time. And to equal the military outlays (as a percentage of GDP) undertaken at the peak of the Reagan military buildup, military outlays today would need to more than double from their level in 2001. The Revenue Act of 1942 included provisions that made the individual income tax a "mass tax" for the first time, increased the corporate tax, increased excise taxes, increased the excess profits tax to 90%, and created a 5% Victory tax that was to be repaid through a post-war tax credit. Korean Conflict
In contrast to World War II, President Truman relied largely on taxation and a reduction of non-military outlays, rather than borrowing from the public or money creation, to finance the Korean Conflict. Unlike World War II and the Korean Conflict, non-military expenditures were increased throughout the Vietnam era, beginning with the Great Society programs. As a result, increased military outlays and tax cuts led to budget deficits and a reduction in non-military outlays as a percentage of GDP. Since the United States operated a floating exchange rate in the 1980s, as it does at present, economists believe that one result of the large budget deficits were the large trade deficits of the mid-1980s, which were the result of foreign capital being attracted to the United States by the high interest rates that budget deficits had caused. First, it was the only military operation considered that did not require any increase in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. The budget deficit rose during the conflict, but it would be difficult to claim that military spending contributed to the rise in the deficit when overall military spending was declining during this time. Ongoing War in Iraq and Afghanistan
This section discusses spending and economic trends through 2008 surrounding the war in Iraq that began in 2003. The increased government outlays associated with wars can be financed in four ways: through higher taxes, reductions in other government spending, government borrowing from the public (the issuance and sale of U.S. Treasury securities to the public), or money creation. | The increased government outlays associated with wars can be financed in four ways: through higher taxes, reductions in other government spending, government borrowing from the public, or money creation. The first two methods are unlikely to have an effect on economic growth (aggregate demand) in the short run: the expansion in aggregate demand caused by greater military outlays is offset by the contraction in aggregate demand caused by higher taxes or lower non-military government spending. The latter two methods increase aggregate demand. Thus, a by-product of American wars has typically been a wartime economic boom in excess of the economy's sustainable rate of growth. Wars may shift resources from non-military spending to military spending, but because military spending is included in GDP, it is unlikely to lead to a recession. Just as wars typically boost aggregate demand, the reduction in defense expenditures after a war removes some economic stimulus as the economy adjusts to the return to peacetime activities.
The economic effect of World War II stands in a class of its own. More than one-third of GDP was dedicated to military outlays. Budget deficits were almost as large; these large deficits were made possible through policies that forced individuals to maintain a very high personal saving rate. Money creation was a significant form of financing, but the inflation that would typically accompany it was suppressed through widespread rationing and price controls. Private credit was directed toward companies producing war materials. There was a significant decrease in non-military outlays and a significant increase in taxes, including the extension of the income tax system into a mass tax system and an excess profits tax. President Truman attempted to avoid financing the Korean Conflict through borrowing from the public or money creation—budget deficits were much lower than during any other period considered—but the economy boomed anyway. Tax increases and a reduction in non-military spending largely offset the increases in military outlays. President Truman relied on price controls to prevent the money creation that did occur from being inflationary.
Vietnam, the Reagan military buildup, and the two wars in Iraq were not large enough to dominate economic events of their time. The beginning of the Vietnam Conflict coincided with a large tax cut. Non-military government spending rose throughout the Vietnam era. Most of the conflict was deficit financed, although tax increases occurred at the peak of the conflict. Inflation rose throughout the period, and President Nixon turned to price controls to suppress it. The beginning of the Reagan military buildup also coincided with a large tax cut, as well as an effort by the Federal Reserve to disinflate the U.S. economy. Thus, borrowing from the public, and later a reduction in non-military outlays, offset most of the rise in military spending. Unlike earlier conflicts, liberalized international capital markets allowed the United States to borrow significantly abroad for the first time, which many economists believe caused the large trade deficits of the mid-1980s. Desert Storm took place among rising budget deficits and rising taxes. It was the only military operation considered to largely occur in a recession. The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan took place at a time of sluggish economic recovery, tax cuts, and rising budget deficits. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R40885 | crs_R40885_0 | H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200 , America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. Overview of H.R. 3962
This report summarizes the key provisions affecting private health insurance in the Affordable Health Care for America Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. The bill focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, providing financial assistance to certain individuals, and, in some cases, small employers. In general, H.R. 3962 would include the following:
Individuals would be required to maintain health insurance, and employers would be required to either provide insurance or pay a payroll assessment, with some exceptions. Several market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to acceptable health insurance coverage, which would meet required minimum standards and incorporate the market reforms included in the bill. Acceptable coverage would include coverage under a qualified health benefits plan (QHBP), which could be offered either through the newly created Exchange or outside the Exchange through new employer plans; grandfathered employment based plans; grandfathered nongroup plans; and other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The Exchange would offer private plans alongside a public option. Certain individuals with incomes below 400% of the federal poverty level could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs and cost-sharing; these subsidies would be available only through the Exchange. In the individual market (the nongroup market), a plan could be grandfathered indefinitely, but only if no changes were made to the terms and conditions of the plan, including benefits and cost-sharing, and premiums were only increased as allowed by statute. Most of these provisions would be effective beginning in 2013. The report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance in Division A of H.R. H.R. The Exchange would not be an insurer; it would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way (in the same way, for example, that Travelocity or Expedia are not airlines but provide access to available flights and fares in a comparable way). 3962 , the Secretary of HHS would establish a public health insurance option through the Exchange. Any individual eligible to purchase insurance through the Exchange would be eligible to enroll in the public option, and may also be eligible for income-based premium and cost-sharing credits. 3962 , the Secretary would be required to negotiate payment rates for health care providers, and items and services (including prescription drugs), subject to limits. Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) Program
The bill would also require the Commissioner to establish, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, a Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program under which the Commissioner would make grants and loans for the establishment of not-for-profit, member-run health insurance cooperatives in the Exchange. 3962 , Exchange-eligible individuals could receive a credit in the Exchange if they
are lawfully present in a state in the United States, with some exclusions; are not enrolled under an Exchange plan as an employee or their dependent (through an employer who purchases coverage for its employees through the Exchange and satisfies the minimum employer contribution amounts); have modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) of less than 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL); are not eligible for Medicaid; are not enrolled in an employer's QHBP, a grandfathered plan (group or nongroup), Medicare, Medicaid, military or veterans' coverage, or other coverage recognized by the Commissioner; and are not a full-time employee in a firm where the employer offers health insurance and makes the required contribution toward that coverage. | This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance, including provisions to raise revenues, in Division A of H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means.
Division A of H.R. 3962 focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. In general, H.R. 3962 would require individuals to maintain health insurance and employers to either provide insurance or pay a payroll assessment, with some exceptions. Several insurance market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to acceptable health insurance coverage, which would meet required minimum standards and incorporate the market reforms included in the bill. Acceptable coverage would include (1) coverage under a qualified health benefits plan (QHBP), which could be offered either through the newly created Health Insurance Exchange (the Exchange) or outside the Exchange through new employer plans; (2) grandfathered employment based plans; (3) grandfathered nongroup plans; and (4) other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The Exchange would offer private plans alongside a public option. Based on income, certain individuals could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs and cost-sharing (deductibles and copayments); these subsidies would be available only through the Exchange. In the individual market (the nongroup market), a plan could be grandfathered indefinitely, but only if no changes were made to the terms and conditions of that plan, including benefits and cost-sharing, and premiums were only increased as allowed by statute. Most of these provisions would be effective beginning in 2013.
The Exchange would not be an insurer; it would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way. The Exchange would consist of a selection of private plans as well as a public option. Individuals wanting to purchase the public option or a private health insurance not through an employer or a grandfathered nongroup plan could only obtain such coverage through the Exchange. They would only be eligible to enroll in an Exchange plan if they were not enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, and acceptable employer coverage as a full-time employee. The public option would be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), would offer three different cost-sharing options, and would vary premiums geographically. The Secretary would negotiate payment rates for medical providers, and items and services. The bill would also require that the Health Choices Commissioner to establish a Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program under which the Commissioner would make grants and loans for the establishment of not-for-profit, member-run health insurance cooperatives. These co-operatives would provide insurance through the Exchange.
Only within the Exchange, credits would be available to limit the amount of money certain individuals would pay for premiums and for cost-sharing (deductibles and copayments). (Although Medicaid is beyond the scope of this report, H.R. 3962 would extend Medicaid coverage for most individuals under 150% of poverty; individuals would be ineligible for Exchange coverage if they were eligible for Medicaid.) |
crs_RL33878 | crs_RL33878_0 | U.S. relations with Malaysia have been generally positive over the last few years. In addition, Malaysia and the United States appear to have conflicting views of the future of regional economic integration in East Asia. However, an unexpectedly weak showing for Badawi's political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and its Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition partners in the March 8, 2008 parliamentary elections may have implications for U.S.-Malaysian relations. Malaysia's 2008 Elections
UMNO and its coalition partners have been in power since Malaysia's independence in 1957. Among the people removed from the cabinet was Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz, who had held the position of Minister of International Trade and Industry for over 20 years. In addition, opposition control of five of Malaysia's 13 states may also curtail Badawi's power. This came to be known as the "Malayan Emergency." The Prime Minister is the head of the Federal Government, which has 25 ministries. Each state has a state legislature. Malaysia has also called for ASEAN states to discuss defense issues as well as foreign and economic policy. According to Malaysia's trade figures, both Malaysia's exports to the United States and its imports from the United States declined in 2007, by 14.6% and 9.1% respectively. The government sees the formation of the proposed ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the trade liberalization and facilitation efforts of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the current efforts by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for greater liberalization of trade in goods and services as being consistent with its overall trade policy. U.S.-Malaysia Bilateral Trade
In general, trade relations between the United States and Malaysia are dominated by the outsourcing of the production of machinery, and electronic and electrical products by multinational corporations with operations within the United States and Malaysia. In addition, the United States and Malaysia concluded a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) in May 2004, are currently negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA), and are parties to various regional trade associations that are considering multilateral trade and investment agreements. Among the outstanding issues in the negotiations are: (1) market access for U.S. exports to Malaysia of agricultural goods, automobiles, and automotive parts and components; (2) market access for Malaysian exports to the United States of agricultural goods; (3) market access for U.S. services, especially financial services, in Malaysia; (4) Malaysia's enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection; and (5) Malaysia's government procurement system and its preferential treatment for businesses owned and operated by ethic Malays, or bumiputera . Other Aspects of U.S.-Malaysia Relations
Bilateral relations between the United States and Malaysia are viewed as having improved since Badawi came to power. In the past, the relationship suffered from what a U.S. official called "blunt and intemperate public remarks" critical of the United States by former Prime Minister Mahathir, who generally subscribed to a view of the United States as a neo-colonial power strongly under the influence of a coterie of Zionist Jews. The increasingly perceived comity of interests after September 11, 2001, improved the bilateral relationship. Within this context Ambassador Black made special reference to Malaysia's contribution to the war against terror in Asia. | This report discusses key aspects of the U.S.-Malaysia relationship (including economics and trade, counterterrorism cooperation, and defense ties) and the possible impact of Malaysia's 2008 elections on the future of the relationship.
In parliamentary elections held on March 8, 2008, the Barisan Nasional (BN), which has ruled Malaysia since independence in 1957, was struck by a "political tsunami" that saw it lose its two-thirds "supermajority" for the first time since 1969. Malaysia's major opposition parties won 82 of the 222 parliamentary seats up for election. In addition, the opposition parties won control of five of Malaysia's 13 state governments. The election results are widely seen as a vote against the current policies of the Malaysian government, which could have implications for relations with the United States.
Prior to the elections, the bilateral relationship has been generally positive and constructive, particularly in the area of trade. Malaysia is a key trading partner of the United States and is regarded as an effective and cooperative regional player in the war against terror. The United States and Malaysia also have informal defense ties including commercial access to Malaysian ports and repair facilities. Despite these positive dynamics, the bilateral relationship has at times been strained. Past differences have stemmed from disagreements between Malaysia's former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the United States over such issues as the internal suppression of dissent in Malaysia, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, globalization, Western values, and world trade policy. Relations are perceived as having improved since Abdullah Badawi became prime minister in 2003.
After years of strong economic growth, Malaysia has become a middle income country. Much of its gain in economic prosperity has come from the export of electronics and electrical products, with the United States as its top export market. According to U.S. trade figures, Malaysia exports over $30 billion of goods each year to the United States and imports over $11 billion from the United States.
The United States and Malaysia have enjoyed a positive trade relationship over the last few years, in part because both nations favor trade and investment liberalization in Asia. Malaysia is the United States' 10th largest trading partner. Building on their common perspective of international trade, Malaysia and the United States concluded a trade and investment framework agreement in 2004 and are currently negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement. Key issues still to be resolved in the negotiations principally revolve around market access for key goods and services in both the United States and Malaysia, and intellectual property rights protection in Malaysia. In addition, the dismissal of Malaysia's chief negotiator, Trade Minister Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz, may complicate future talks.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R43999 | crs_R43999_0 | They argue that the additional regulation has resulted in significant regulatory burden, particularly for small banks, that has stymied economic growth and reduced consumers' access to credit. Financial regulation can result in both benefits and costs. "—include protecting consumers from fraud, discrimination, and abuse; ensuring that banks are less likely to fail; and promoting stability in the financial system. The cost associated with government regulation and its implementation is referred to as regulatory burden . The concept of regulatory burden can be contrasted with the phrase unduly burdensome . Whereas regulatory burden generally refers to the costs associated with a regulation, unduly burdensome refers to the relationship between the benefits and costs of a regulation. For example, some would consider a regulation to be unduly burdensome if costs are in excess of benefits or if the same benefits could be achieved at lower costs. But the mere presence of regulatory burden does not mean that a regulation is unduly burdensome. Consumer Protection Regulation . If the rule is determined to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, the regulator that is issuing the rule is required
to describe, among other things, (1) the reasons why the regulatory action is being considered; (2) the small entities to which the proposed rule will apply and, where feasible, an estimate of their number; (3) the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule; and (4) any significant alternatives to the rule that would accomplish the statutory objectives while minimizing the impact on small entities. In addition, financial regulators are required to give consideration during the rulemaking process about what effect rules would have on small banks. Supervision and enforcement are also structured to pose less of a burden on small banks than larger banks. Because of this requisite differential treatment of small and large banks, one could argue that there not is a "one-size-fits-all" approach to bank regulation. Most aspects of the regulation of small banks are designed to impose less of a burden on small banks than larger banks, but that does not necessarily prove whether the existing regulatory structure is unduly burdensome for small banks. Thus, if small banks are facing unduly burdensome regulation, it is either in absolute terms, as a result of numerous rulemakings implementing the Dodd-Frank Act and other recent acts, or because small banks have less capacity for regulatory compliance than large banks (because there is economies to scale to regulatory compliance, for example), and not because small banks face relatively more regulatory burden than large banks. Nevertheless, given the role of large banks in the crisis, policymakers have been particularly focused on the systemic risk posed by large banks and ensuring that they are not "too big to fail" (meaning that policymakers would "bail them out" to prevent their failure because of systemic risk concerns). Economies of Scale to Compliance
Another potential rationale for regulating small banks differently from large banks would be if there are economies of scale to regulatory compliance costs. The Paperwork Reduction Act ( P.L. The spectrum of options ranges from regulating banks in the same way regardless of size to a separate regulatory regime for small banks and large banks, with various approaches in between. Maintain Status Quo (Ad Hoc Exemptions)
Absent change to the status quo, all banks will continue to be assigned a primary regulator by charter and subject to the same regulations except in cases where exemptions or tailoring based on size has been provided by statute or regulator discretion. For example, 13 of the 14 "major" rules issued by banking regulators pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act either include an exemption for small banks or are tailored to reduce the cost for small banks to comply. Accurately assessing regulatory burden and determining whether the burden rises to the level of being unduly burdensome, therefore, is important for policymakers to make informed judgments. Quantifying the magnitude of regulatory burden has been a challenge for researchers, however, because banks do not track their compliance costs and regulators do not typically provide estimates of the costs of new rules. | Since the financial crisis, policymakers have focused on addressing the failures that led to turmoil and ensuring that the financial system and the economy are better positioned to withstand future market disruptions. Some believe that the actions taken to realize these goals have been beneficial; others argue that the pendulum of regulation has swung too far and that the additional regulation has stymied economic growth and reduced consumers' access to credit. Much of the debate has centered on how new regulation has affected small banks.
A central question about the regulation of small banks is whether an appropriate tradeoff has been struck between the benefits and costs of regulation. The benefits of financial regulation include protecting consumers from fraud, discrimination, and abuse; ensuring that banks are less likely to fail; and promoting stability in the financial system. The costs associated with government regulation and its implementation is referred to as regulatory burden. The concept of regulatory burden can be contrasted with the phrase unduly burdensome, which refers to the relationship between benefits and costs. Some would consider a regulation to be unduly burdensome if costs exceed benefits or if the same benefits could be achieved at lower costs. The presence of regulatory burden does not mean that a regulation is unduly burdensome. Critics who believe that regulation is unduly burdensome point to the significant decline in the number of small banks over time. There could be other factors driving consolidation, however. For example, mergers are the largest cause of consolidation, and could occur when banks are financially strong or weak.
Of the 14 "major" rules issued by banking regulators pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203), 13 either include an exemption for small banks or are tailored to reduce the cost for small banks to comply. In addition, during the rulemaking process, financial regulators are required to consider the effect of rules on small banks. Supervision and enforcement are also structured to pose less of a burden on small banks than larger banks, such as by requiring less frequent bank examinations for certain small banks. This report provides several examples that could be offered to counter views that there is a "one-size-fits-all" approach to bank regulation and that new regulation has increased regulatory burden relative to large banks. If small banks are facing unduly burdensome regulation, it is either in absolute terms or because small banks have less capacity for regulatory compliance than large banks do.
Quantifying the magnitude of regulatory burden has been a challenge for researchers because, among other reasons, federal statute does not require regulators to make quantitative estimates for all rules that they issue and because banks do not track the compliance costs spread throughout their operations. The difficulty in accurately assessing regulatory burden and in determining whether the burden rises to being unduly burdensome can make it challenging for policymakers to make informed judgments about the merits of proposals to provide regulatory relief.
The status quo is best characterized as applying ad hoc exemptions to certain regulations for banks based on their size and volume of activity, and most legislative proposals would adjust those exemption levels. Alternatives to the status quo range from regulating all banks in the same way, regardless of size, to implementing a separate regulatory regime for small and large banks, with various approaches in between. A focus on taxpayer protection and avoiding regulatory arbitrage would argue in favor of regulating all banks consistently. Rationales for regulating small banks differently from large banks include the systemic risk posed by large banks, economies of scale to regulatory compliance, a lack of critical mass of small banks to which some regulations would be relevant, and a desire by some policymakers to promote small banks. |
crs_RL33563 | crs_RL33563_0 | On February 6, 2006, the President sent Congress his budget request for FY2007, which included a request for $597.2 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. On June 9, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5576 , the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2007 (TTHUD). The bill would appropriate $597 million in special federal payments for the District. In support of post-secondary education, H.R. Instead, the House bill would provide the requested $20 million as an earmark under the Department of Transportation's capital investment account. The Senate bill includes $15 million in special federal payments to support improvements in the city's library system, and it would provide a $4 million special federal payment for improvements to the Navy Yard Metro Station. These four functions (court operations, defender-related services, offender supervision, and criminal justice coordination) represent $455.8 million, or 76%, of the President's proposed $597.2 million in federal payments to the District of Columbia. FY2007: District's Budget Request
On May 9, 2006, the District's city council unanimously approved the city's $9.2 billion operating budget for FY2007 and forwarded it to the President for review, approval, and transmittal to Congress. The proposed budget included a request for $634 million in special federal payments. Senate Bill
On July 13, 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved and ordered reported the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for 2007, S. 3660 ( P.L. The bill would appropriate $597 million in special federal payments. This is $21.8 million more than recommended by the House and approximately the same amount as appropriated in FY2006. The bill also includes $206.6 million in special federal payments for court operations, which is $13 million less than recommended by the House. 5576 , including the following:
$4.5 million for bioterrorism preparedness activities and a forensic laboratory for the District; $5 million for the construction of a nature trail along the Anacostia River; $2 million for improvements in the city's foster care system; $4 million for improvements to the Navy Yard Metro Station; $4 million for marriage development accounts, and $15 million for improvements to the city's public library system. The budget also provides $2.341 billion in capital outlays, including $63 million to finance the construction of a new baseball stadium. 5576 as approved by the House on June 14, 2006, and S. 3660 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee also includes a provision that would have retained the current law prohibiting the use of federal and District funds for a needle exchange program. Medical Marijuana
The city's medical marijuana initiative is another issue that engenders controversy. During its consideration of the District budget for FY2007, the city council included language that would prohibit the use of federal, but not District, funds to implement the initiative. 5576 , and the S. 3660 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee include a provision that would continue to prohibit the use of both District and federal funds for abortion services, except in instances of rape or incest, or when pregnancy endangers the life of the mother. The House version of the TTHUD Appropriations Act for FY2007, consistent with the provision first included in the District's FY2002 Appropriations Act, includes a general provision that allows the use of District, but not federal, funds to administer the program. | On February 6, 2006, the Bush Administration released its FY2007 budget request, which included $597.2 million in proposed special federal payments to the District of Columbia. Four payments (court operations, defender services, offender supervision, and criminal justice coordination) represented $455.767 million, or 76.3%, of the proposed $597.2 million in total federal payments to the District requested by the Administration.
On May 9, 2006, the District's city council approved the city's $9.2 billion operating budget for FY2007. The District's budget is submitted for the approval of Congress, as required by the District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reorganization Act, P.L. 93-198 (87 Stat. 801). It also included $2.6 billion in capital outlays, including an additional $63 million to finance a new major league baseball stadium, and $634 million in special federal payments. The 109th Congress was unable to complete its passage of the District Appropriations Act, but did included a provision in a continuing budget resolution allowing the District to implement its FY2007 Budget and Financial Plan (120 Stat. 1315).
On June 9, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5576—the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2007 (TTHUD). The House approved the bill on June 14, 2006. The Senate approved the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2007, S. 3660, on July 13, 2006. The House bill would appropriate $575.2 million in special federal payments to the District, including $75.9 million in special federal payments in support of elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education initiatives. The Senate bill would appropriate $597 million in special federal payments. The House bill also recommends $478.8 million for criminal justice activities, including court operations, defender services, offender supervision, and the criminal justice coordinating council. This is $11 million more than the $467.8 million recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Senate bill would appropriate $15 million in special federal payments for public library improvements and $4 million for expansion of the Navy Yard Metro Station. The House bill does not include funding for library improvements. It does include $20 million for expansion of the Navy Yard Metro Station, but not as a special federal payment to the District as requested by the Administration. Instead it would be funded as part of the federal Transportation Department's capital investment fund account.
Consistent with provisions included in previous appropriations acts, the House and Senate bills would prohibit the use of federal and District funds to finance or administer a needle exchange program; fund abortion services, except in an instance of rape or incest, or when the life of the mother is threatened; and implement the city's medical marijuana initiative, which would decriminalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes. The bills also include provisions that would prohibit the use of federal and District funds to support activities aimed at achieving statehood for the District or voting representation in Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33105 | crs_RL33105_0 | The United States and the UK share an extensive and mutually beneficial trade and economic relationship, and each is the other's largest foreign investor. Domestic Political Situation
The government of the UK is led by Prime Minister Theresa May of the Conservative Party. Prime Minister May was able to form a Conservative minority government after concluding a deal for support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the largest unionist political party in Northern Ireland, which holds 10 seats in Parliament. The Conservatives granted the DUP more budgetary resources for Northern Ireland as a key part of the two parties' parliamentary support deal, and the DUP remains a significant factor in Brexit negotiations related to Northern Ireland. Brexit Negotiations and Relations with the EU
On March 29, 2017, Prime Minister May invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, formally giving notice of the UK's intention to leave the EU and opening a two-year window for conducting withdrawal negotiations. The first phase would deal with the terms of a withdrawal agreement, focusing initially on three priority topics: the status and rights of EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU, a financial settlement addressing remaining UK obligations to the EU, and arrangements for the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. On December 15, 2017, the European Council determined that sufficient progress had been made on the three priority topics to open the second phase of negotiations, dealing with the transition period and framework for future relations. The prime minister called for a custom tailored economic relationship with the EU rather than the UK choosing from an existing model such as Canada (free trade agreement) or Norway (a member of the single market/European Economic Area), or simply trading with the EU on World Trade Organization (WTO) terms. The draft suggested the possibility of a free trade agreement that avoids tariffs and quotas but has only limited coverage of services (including financial services) and less potential for regulatory cooperation and mutual recognition of standards. The UK continues to look to the United States for close partnership and has sought to reinforce its U.S. ties following Brexit. President Trump appears to have a largely positive view of the UK as well, but there have been points of tension and uncertainty in the relationship over the past year, arising on the UK side over both the substantive nature of some of the Trump Administration's policies and because of some of President Trump's statements and tweets. Although the UK cannot formally negotiate trade agreements until it leaves the EU, some suggest that positive indications of a likely future agreement with the United States could help bolster the UK's position in negotiations with the EU on the terms of Brexit and the UK's post-Brexit economic relationship with the EU. UK leaders have emphasized their continued commitment as a leading country in NATO, and the UK has taken a strong role in efforts to deter Russian aggression. Despite this close cooperation, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about cuts to UK defense spending and reductions in the size and capabilities of the British military in recent years. President Trump and some Members of Congress have expressed support for the idea of concluding a bilateral free trade agreement with the UK. Analysts believe that close U.S.-UK cooperation will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as counterterrorism, intelligence, economic issues, and the future of NATO, as well as on numerous global and regional security challenges. With the UK commonly regarded as the strongest U.S. partner in the EU, a partner that commonly shares U.S. views, and an essential voice in efforts to develop stronger EU foreign and defense policies, some U.S. officials have conveyed concerns that the UK's withdrawal could make the EU a less capable and less reliable partner on security and defense issues. | Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United States' closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; a large and mutually beneficial economic relationship; and extensive cooperation on foreign policy and security issues.
Conservative-Led Minority Government Following 2017 Election
The government of the UK is led by Prime Minister Theresa May of the Conservative Party. Her leadership position was weakened after she triggered an early election in June 2017, which resulted in the Conservatives losing their absolute majority in the 650-seat House of Commons. Prime Minister May formed a government after the Conservative Party reached a deal for support from the Democratic Unionist Party, the largest unionist political party in Northern Ireland. The Labour Party, led by Jeremy Corbyn, performed unexpectedly well in the 2017 election and constitutes the largest opposition party.
Managing Brexit
The UK's pending exit from the European Union (commonly referred to as Brexit) is the central issue facing the government. Prime Minister May has sought to manage differing views on the UK's future relationship with the EU and the resultant divisions within her Cabinet and the Conservative Party. The UK intends to leave the EU single market and customs union, while pursuing a free trade agreement with the EU and seeking to partner with the EU on a range of other issues.
Brexit Negotiations
The UK has been engaged in complex negotiations with the EU about the terms of withdrawal and arrangements for a transition period. The prime minister opened the process in March 2017, and withdrawal negotiations are to be completed within two years. The first phase focused on citizens' rights, a financial settlement, and a difficult combination of issues related to Northern Ireland and the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The two sides reached a broad understanding on these issues in December 2017 and the EU published a draft withdrawal agreement in February 2018, but many details and unresolved differences remain to be clarified and agreed upon.
In December 2017, the EU determined that sufficient progress had been made to begin talks on the future trade and economic relationship. With initial negotiating guidelines established in March 2018, the EU appears less optimistic than the UK about the possibility of a deep and ambitious agreement that includes areas such as financial services and regulatory cooperation.
U.S.-UK Relationship
Since deciding to leave the EU, the UK has sought to reinforce its close ties with the United States and reaffirm its place as a leading country in NATO. President Trump has expressed a largely positive view of the UK, but there have been tensions and backlash from the UK side over both substantive differences and various statements made by the President.
Most analysts believe that the two countries will remain close allies that choose to cooperate in many important areas, such as counterterrorism, economic issues, and the future of NATO, as well as numerous global and regional security challenges. President Trump and some Members of Congress have expressed support for the idea of concluding a bilateral free trade agreement with the UK after it leaves the EU (see CRS Report R44817, U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement: Prospects and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]). The UK has the world's fifth-largest defense expenditure, but U.S. officials have expressed concerns about past UK defense cuts and their effect on the UK's military capabilities.
Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK, Brexit negotiations, and the UK's relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. For a broader analysis of EU issues, see CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43410 | crs_R43410_0 | Introduction
Growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources have led to calls for more private sector involvement in the provision of highway and transit infrastructure through what are known as "public-private partnerships" or "P3s." P3s can offer a means of injecting additional resources into highway and public transportation systems while reducing costs, project delivery time, and public sector risk. A wide variety of public-private partnerships in highways and transit exists, but this report focuses on the two types that are generating the most debate: (1) the leasing by the public sector to the private sector of existing infrastructure, sometimes referred to as "brownfield" facilities; and (2) the building, leasing, and owning of new infrastructure by private entities, sometimes known as "greenfield" facilities. Types of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships
In the traditional method of providing transportation infrastructure, known as "design, bid, build," the public sector decides there is a need for a new facility, plans its development with a wide variety of community input, organizes the funding and financing, lets out contracts to design and construct the facility, and operates and maintains the facility after completion. In addition to the designing, building, and operation of an infrastructure project, these types of P3s transfer to the private sector much of the long-term financing responsibility. This involved a Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loan of $589 million and $589 million in tax-exempt private-activity bonds. The program explicitly provided for private investment. The most recent surface transportation authorization law, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. Some, including GAO, have suggested that a more systematic approach to identifying and evaluating the public interest in P3s needs be developed and employed, as has been done in other countries such as Australia. Tolling, both public and private, accounts for about 5% of highway revenues. Diversion of resources may also be of more general concern in that new private resources attracted to transportation infrastructure may substitute for public resources in the transportation sector rather than supplementing them, with no net gain in funding. One major risk is that construction will cost more and/or take longer than foreseen. What Are the Effects of P3s on Operation of the Highway Network? It is generally assumed that projects for which proposals are solicited from the private sector will have come through a public planning process. There are two broad policy options for expanding use of P3s. The first would be to actively encourage P3s with program incentives, as was done in MAP-21, but with relatively tight regulatory controls. The second would be to aggressively encourage the use of P3s through program incentives and deregulation, particularly in the areas of tolling and financing. The proposed Surface Transportation Authorization Act (STAA) of 2009 would have made P3s involving federal-aid highway funds subject to various federal requirements, including a weighing of the costs and benefits of the P3 against traditional public delivery methods. The proposal also contained requirements regarding public information and public involvement and a prohibition against non-compete clauses in P3 agreements. A national infrastructure bank could be designed to promote development of P3. | Growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources have led to calls for more private sector involvement in the provision of highway and transit infrastructure through what are known as "public-private partnerships" or "P3s." A P3, broadly defined, is any arrangement whereby the private sector assumes more responsibility than is traditional for infrastructure planning, financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance. Some P3s involve the leasing by the public sector to the private sector of existing infrastructure, while others provide for a private role in designing, financing, building, and operating new infrastructure.
P3 proponents argue that, in addition to injecting additional resources into surface transportation infrastructure, private sector involvement potentially reduces costs, project delivery time, and public sector risk, and may also improve project selection and project quality. Detractors, on the other hand, argue that the potential for P3s is limited, and that, unless carefully regulated, P3s will disrupt the operation of the surface transportation network, increase driving and other costs for the traveling public, and subvert the public planning process.
Evidence suggests that there is significant private funding available for investment in surface transportation infrastructure, but that it is unlikely to amount to more than 10% of the ongoing needs of highways over the next 20 years or so, and probably a much smaller share of transit needs. With competing demands for public funds, there is also a concern that private funding will substitute for public resources with no net gain in transportation infrastructure. The effect of P3s on the planning and operation of the transportation system is a more open question because of the numerous forms they can take, and because they are dependent on the detailed agreements negotiated between the public and private partners. Many highway and bridge P3s involve tolling, raising questions about equity and traffic diversion and, more broadly, concerns about whether there is a national public interest justifying federal oversight of P3s.
This report discusses two broad policy options for Congress as it considers reauthorizing federal surface transportation programs. The first would be to actively encourage P3s with program incentives as has been done in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), but with relatively tight regulatory controls. This might include a requirement for an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the P3 against traditional public delivery methods, new requirements regarding public information and public involvement, and a prohibition against non-compete clauses in P3 agreements (which could prevent public authorities from providing new, competitive infrastructure near a privately controlled facility). The second broad option would be to aggressively encourage the use of P3s through program incentives and deregulation. This might include fewer restrictions on the tolling of Interstate Highways and the enhancement of existing financing programs that encourage P3s, such as the TIFIA (Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act) program and private activity bonds, or new initiatives, such as the creation of a national infrastructure bank. |
crs_RL32311 | crs_RL32311_0 | 4818 ), the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, within which Foreign Operations is included as Division D. As enacted, the measure provides $19.64 billion for Foreign Operations after adjusting for a required 0.8% across-the-board rescission. Although this is $1.68 billion, or nearly 8% below the President's request, Congress increased amounts passed earlier by the House ($19.39 billion) and the Senate ($19.61 billion). Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistance budget and influences major aspects of executive branch foreign policy making generally. It contains the largest share—about two-thirds—of total international affairs spending by the United States. While funding for regular, continuing foreign aid programs also rose modestly during this period, supplemental spending for special activities, such as Central American hurricane relief (FY1999), Kosovo emergency assistance (FY1999), Wye River/Middle East peace accord support (FY2000), a counternarcotics initiative in Colombia and the Andean region (FY2000 and FY2002-FY2004), aid to the front line states in the war on terrorism and Iraq-war related assistance (FY2003-FY2004), was chiefly responsible for the growth in foreign aid appropriations. While Foreign Operations appropriations had been rising for five consecutive years, amounts approved in FY2003 and FY2004 reached unprecedented levels over the past 40 years. The regular Foreign Operations bill, signed by the President on January 23, 2004, combined with an earlier Iraq supplemental approved in November 2003 ( P.L. 108-287 ), brought FY2004 appropriations to $39.4 billion (constant FY2005 dollars), the highest level, in real terms, since the early 1960s. The budget proposal was $2.05 billion, or 10.6% higher than Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2004, excluding funds approved for Iraq reconstruction. Despite the large overall increase for Foreign Operations, much of the added funding was concentrated in a few areas. The FY2005 budget continued to highlight foreign aid in support of the war on terrorism as the highest priority, with a one-third increase for anti-terrorism programs. In addition, two recently launched foreign aid initiatives—the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—were slated for significant funding increases. The MCC would grow from $994 million in FY2004—its first year of operation—to $2.5 billion for FY2005. PEPFAR, also in its first year, would rise from $1.6 billion in FY2004 to $2.2 billion in the FY2005 request. (Additional PEPFAR funds were proposed in the Labor/HHS appropriation measure, bringing the total FY2005 PEPFAR request to $2.82 billion.) The FY2005 request further included substantial increases for the Peace Corps and for debt reduction, primarily for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There were no funds requested, however, for Iraq reconstruction. Conference Agreement
On November 18, 2004, Congress approved the Foreign Operations conference report (Division D of H.R. 108-447 ). (Funding for international HIV/AIDS included elsewhere in P.L. 108-106 ). For FY2005, substantial debate focused on the following. Congressional Action
H.R. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. It contains the largest share—about two-thirds—of total U.S. international affairs spending.
Funding for Foreign Operations programs have been rising for five consecutive years, although amounts approved in FY2003 and FY2004 have reached unprecedented levels over the past 40 years. Substantial supplementals in both years for assistance to the front line states in the war on terrorism and Afghanistan and Iraq reconstruction, have pushed spending upward. The regular Foreign Operations bill, signed by the President on January 23, 2004, combined with an earlier Iraq supplemental approved in November 2003 (P.L. 108-106), bring current year appropriations to $39.4 billion (constant FY2005 dollars), the highest level, in real terms, since the early 1960s.
For FY2005 President Bush asked Congress to appropriate $21.32 billion. The budget proposal was $2.05 billion, or 10.6% higher than Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2004, excluding funds approved for Iraq reconstruction. Despite the large overall increase for Foreign Operations, much of the added funding was concentrated in a few areas. The FY2005 budget blueprint continued to highlight foreign aid in support of the war on terrorism as the highest priority. Two recently launched foreign aid initiatives—the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—were slated for significant funding increases. The MCC would have grown from $994 million in FY2004 to $2.5 billion for FY2005. PEPFAR would have risen from $1.6 billion in FY2004 to $2.2 billion in the FY2005 request. (Additional PEPFAR funds were proposed in the Labor/HHS appropriation measure, bringing the total FY2005 PEPFAR request to $2.82 billion.) The FY2005 request further included substantial increases for the Peace Corps and for debt reduction.
The FY2005 Foreign Operations debate included a discussion of several major policy issues, including foreign aid as a tool in the global war on terrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account, programs to combat HIV/AIDS, international family planning programs, and Afghan reconstruction. Although no additional funds were sought for Iraq reconstruction, attention also focused on implementation efforts for the roughly $23.8 billion appropriated in FY2003/ 2004.
On November 18, Congress approved the Foreign Operations conference report (Division D of H.R. 4818; P.L. 108-447). As passed, the measure provides $19.64 billion after adjusting for a required 0.8% across-the-board rescission. Although this is $1.68 billion, or nearly 8% below the request, Congress increased amounts passed earlier by the House and Senate, adding additional funds for the Millennium Challenge Account and emergency appropriations for the Darfur region in Sudan.
This report will be updated to reflect congressional action on the legislation. |
crs_R42872 | crs_R42872_0 | A tax deduction reduces the amount of a tax filer's income that is subject to taxation, ultimately reducing the tax filer's tax liability. Every tax filer has the option to claim deductions when filing their income tax return. However, some tax filers and policymakers may not have detailed knowledge of tax deductions, including future changes in the requirements to claim certain deductions. In addition, tax deductions may be of interest to Congress from a budgetary perspective, as some deductions are classified as tax expenditures , and result in losses in federal revenue. This report first describes what tax deductions are, how they vary in their effects on reducing taxable income, and how they differ from other provisions (e.g., exclusions or credits). Next, it discusses the rationale for deductions as part of the tax code. The final section includes tables that summarize each individual tax deduction, under current law. In contrast, a tax credit reduces tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis because it would be applied after the marginal tax rate schedule. Deductions serve four main purposes in the tax code. First, they can account for large, unusual, and necessary personal expenditures, such as the deduction for extraordinary medical expenses. Second, they are used to encourage certain types of activities, such as homeownership and charitable contributions. Third, they account for and ease the burden of paying for nonfederal forms of taxes, such as state and local taxes. Fourth, deductions adjust for the expenses of earning income, such as deductions for work-related employee expenses. These deductions are commonly referred to as above-the-line deductions, because they reduce a tax filer's AGI (the line). In contrast, itemized and standard deductions are sometimes referred to as below-the-line deductions, because they are applied after AGI is calculated to arrive at taxable income. Itemized Versus Standard Deductions
As previously discussed, tax filers have the option to claim either a standard deduction or the sum of their itemized deductions. Whichever deduction the tax filer claims—standard or itemized—the deduction amount is subtracted from AGI to arrive at final tax liability. The standard deduction was introduced into the federal tax code with the passage of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 (P.L. Itemized Deductions
Alternatively, tax filers claiming itemized deductions must list each item separately on their tax return and be able to provide documentation (i.e., in the event of an IRS audit) that the expenditures have been made. Some itemized deductions can only be claimed if they meet or exceed minimum threshold amounts (usually a certain percentage of AGI) in order to simplify tax administration and compliance. In addition, some deductions are subject to a cap (also known as a ceiling ) in benefits or eligibility. Caps are meant to reduce the extent that tax provisions can distort economic behavior, limit revenue losses, or reduce the availability of the deduction to higher-income tax filers. | Every tax filer has the option to claim deductions when filing their income tax return. Deductions serve four main purposes in the tax code: (1) to account for large, unusual, and necessary personal expenditures, such as extraordinary medical expenses; (2) to encourage certain types of activities, such as homeownership and charitable contributions; (3) to ease the burden of taxes paid to state and local governments; and (4) to adjust for the expenses of earning income, such as unreimbursed employee expenses.
Some tax deductions can be taken by individuals even if they do not itemize. These deductions are commonly referred to as above-the-line deductions, because they reduce a tax filer's adjusted gross income (AGI, or the line). In contrast, itemized and standard deductions are referred to as below-the-line deductions, because they are applied after AGI is calculated to arrive at taxable income.
Tax filers have the option to either claim a standard deduction or itemize certain deductions. The standard deduction, which is based on filing status, is, among other things, intended to reduce the complexity of paying taxes, as it requires no additional documentation. Alternatively, tax filers claiming itemized deductions must list each item separately on their tax return and be able to provide documentation that the expenditures being deducted have been made. Only tax filers with deductions that can be itemized in excess of the standard deduction find it worthwhile to itemize. Whichever deduction the tax filer claims—standard or itemized—the amount is subtracted from AGI.
Deductions differ from other tax provisions that can reduce a tax filer's final tax liability. Deductions reduce final tax liability by a percentage of the amount deducted, because deductions are calculated before applicable marginal income tax rates. In contrast, tax credits generally reduce an individual's tax liability directly, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, because they are incorporated into tax calculations after marginal tax rates are applied.
Some deductions can only be claimed if they meet or exceed minimum threshold amounts (usually a certain percentage of AGI) in order to simplify tax administration and compliance. In addition, some deductions are subject to a cap (also known as a ceiling) in benefits or eligibility. Caps are meant to reduce the extent that tax provisions can distort economic behavior, limit revenue losses, or reduce the availability of the deduction to higher-income tax filers.
Because some tax filers and policymakers may not have detailed knowledge of tax deductions, this report first describes what they are, how they vary in their effects on reducing taxable income, and how they differ from other provisions (e.g., exclusions or credits). Next, a discussion concerning the rationale for deductions as part of the tax code is provided. Because some deductions are classified as tax expenditures, or losses in federal revenue, they might be of interest to Congress from a budgetary perspective. The final section of this report includes tables that summarize each individual tax deduction, under current law. Many of these deductions are part of the permanent income tax code. The Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) extended several temporary provisions through 2016 (for the 2017 tax filing season). |
crs_RL34067 | crs_RL34067_0 | These bills fall into six major categories: (1) research on the causes and effects of climate change and on methods to measure and predict climate change; (2) deployment of emission-reducing technologies in the United States or other countries; (3) requirements for U.S. participation in international climate agreements; (4) investments in systems to adapt to changes in climate; (5) establishment of greenhouse gas (GHG) monitoring systems as a basis for research or for any potential reduction program; and (6) implementation of mandatory GHG emission reduction programs. As of the date of this report, Members have introduced more than 100 bills that would directly address climate change issues. Congress has enacted six legislation proposals that address climate change to some degree:
P.L. In addition, the act establishes within the Department of Transportation an Office of Climate Change and the Environment to coordinate research and implement strategies to address transportation issues associated with climate change. P.L. Among other provisions, this statute directs EPA to promulgate regulations that require mandatory reporting of GHG emissions "above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy." P.L. In addition to many non-climate related provisions, the act directs the Department of Defense to assess the risks of projected climate change to the department's facilities, capabilities, and missions. P.L. Among other provisions, the act requires the Secretary of Energy, when reviewing research and development activities for possible inclusion in the steel research and development initiative, to expand the plan in order to consider among steel project priorities the development of technologies that reduce GHG emissions. P.L. Among many other provisions, the act (Section 2709) directs the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish technical guidelines to "measure the environmental services benefits from conservation and land management activities in order to facilitate the participation of farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in emerging environmental services markets." USDA is to give priority to carbon markets. P.L. Among many other provisions, the legislation provides a tax credit for select (geologic) carbon sequestration activities. In addition, the act directs the Department of Treasury to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to "undertake a comprehensive review of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to identify the types of and specific tax provisions that have the largest effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and to estimate the magnitude of those effects." NAS is to report its findings to Congress by October 3, 2010. Climate Change Research and Studies
Global climate change is a complex issue. | Congressional interest in climate change legislation has grown in recent years. In the 110th Congress, Members have introduced numerous bills that directly address various aspects of climate change. These bills cover a wide spectrum, ranging from climate change research to comprehensive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions cap-and-trade programs. As of the date of this report, Congress has enacted six broader pieces of legislation that—among many other non-climate-related provisions—address climate change in some fashion:
P.L. 110-140 expands the carbon capture research and development program, requires a national assessment of geologic storage capacity for CO2, and supports technologies for the large-scale capture of CO2 from industrial sources. The act also establishes an Office of Climate Change and the Environment to coordinate research and implement strategies to address climate change-related transportation issues.
P.L. 110-161 directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop regulations that establish a mandatory GHG reporting program that applies "above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy."
P.L. 110-181 directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to assess the risks of projected climate change to the department's facilities, capabilities, and missions.
P.L. 110-229 requires the Secretary of Energy, when reviewing research and development activities for possible inclusion in the steel research and development initiative, to expand the plan in order to consider among steel project priorities the development of technologies that reduce GHG emissions.
P.L. 110-246 directs the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish technical guidelines to "measure the environmental services benefits from conservation and land management activities in order to facilitate the participation of farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in emerging environmental services markets." USDA is to give priority to carbon markets.
P.L. 110-343 provides a tax credit for select (geologic) carbon sequestration activities. In addition, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is "to identify the types of and specific tax provisions that have the largest effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and to estimate the magnitude of those effects." NAS is to report its findings to Congress by October 3, 2010.
This report briefly discusses the basic concepts on which climate change bills are based, and compares major provisions of the bills in each of the following categories: climate change research; emissions reduction technologies; U.S. actions pursuant to international emission reduction agreements; adaptation to the effects of climate change; GHG reporting and registration; and GHG emissions reduction programs. |
crs_RL33643 | crs_RL33643_0 | He announced the transfer of 14 terrorist suspects to the U.S. military facility at Guantanamo Bay from CIA custody in locations outside of the United States. This report provides background information regarding the controversy and discusses the possible legal frameworks that may apply. It is based on available open-source documentation, as cited, and not on any independent CRS investigation into factual allegations. It focuses on protections accorded to persons under international law, and is not intended to address intelligence operations or policy. It also focuses primarily on the allegations relating to Europe, although the practice extended elsewhere, and includes in its Appendix a status discussion concerning the relevant investigations conducted by the European Parliament and the Council on Europe. By the end of 2006, none had found specific evidence to confirm the existence of the U.S. secret prisons in Europe. U.S. Legal Framework and Issues
The arrest, transfer, detention, and treatment of persons are governed by a web of human rights treaties and in some cases, treaties regulating the conduct of armed conflict, as well as relevant tenets of customary international law. In the context of the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT), there are significant differences of opinion as to which legal regimes govern the arrest and detention of suspected terrorists. The Bush Administration characterizes the arrests and detentions as the wartime capture and internment of combatants, and argues that human rights law is thus inapplicable. The Administration previously took the position that the Geneva Conventions applicable to international armed conflicts do not apply with respect to Al Qaeda, because Al Qaeda is neither a state nor a party to the Conventions, and that the minimal set of rights set forth in the Conventions for armed conflicts "not of an international nature" do not apply because the GWOT is international in scope. However, the Supreme Court rejected that position in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to apply regardless of the nature of the conflict. Congress, in enacting the Detainee Treatment Act of 2006 as part of National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-163 ), used human rights terminology in explicitly prohibiting the "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody, or control of the United States Government." From this perspective, such persons would be entitled in most cases to a trial or other process of law to determine the lawfulness of their continued detention. It is widely held by international legal experts that, at a minimum, all detainees are entitled to humane treatment that meets their basic needs, are to be protected against treatment that amounts to torture or inhumane, cruel or degrading treatment, and may not be subjected to punishment without a fair trial. In their responses, no government affirmed official involvement in the detention or transport of terrorist suspects. | President Bush's announcement on September 6, 2006, that 14 "high-value detainees" suspected of terrorist activity have been transferred from locations abroad to the U.S. detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station confirmed for the first time the existence of secret U.S. prison facilities abroad, the subject of previously unsubstantiated media allegations and investigations by foreign governments and human rights bodies. Before September, the Bush Administration had neither admitted nor denied the allegations, but had defended the related long-standing practice of transporting terrorist suspects to other countries through a process known as "extraordinary rendition." President Bush stated that no more suspects were being held in CIA prisons but that the Administration reserved the option of establishing overseas prisons to hold and interrogate terrorist suspects that may be captured in the future.
The arrest, transfer, detention, and treatment of persons are governed by a web of human rights treaties and, in some cases, treaties regulating the conduct of armed conflict (humanitarian law), as well as customary international law related to either category of law. In the context of the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT), there are significant differences of opinion as to which legal regimes govern the arrest and detention of suspected terrorists. The Bush Administration has characterized the arrests and detentions as the wartime capture and internment of combatants, and has argued that human rights law is thus inapplicable. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Administration argued that treaties regarding humanitarian law did not apply to the detainees. However, the Supreme Court rejected the position that Al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan are not entitled to any protection under the Geneva Conventions, finding instead that all persons captured in the context of an armed conflict are entitled at least to the minimum protections required under Common Article 3. Congress, in enacting the Detainee Treatment Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-163), prohibited cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in U.S. custody regardless of their geographical location; the 110th Congress may remain engaged on related aspects of detainee treatment.
States parties to human rights treaties generally agree to prevent violations of the civil rights of persons under their jurisdiction, which ordinarily entail the right to a trial or other process of law before a person can be deported or subjected to prolonged detention. The existence of secret prisons on a state's territory or the use of its airfields to transport prisoners, with or without the involvement or knowledge of the government involved, may entail a breach of international obligations.
This report provides background information regarding the subject and discusses the possible legal frameworks that may apply. It is based on available open-source documentation, as cited, and not on any independent CRS investigation. It focuses on protections accorded to persons under international law, and is not intended to address intelligence operations or policy. It includes in its Appendix a status discussion concerning relevant investigations being conducted by the European Parliament and the Council on Europe. |
crs_R40835 | crs_R40835_0 | The United States is relying heavily, apparently for the first time during combat or stability operations, on private firms to supply a wide variety of security services. Security contractors come from all over the world to work in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much of the attention given to PSCs is a result of numerous high-profile incidents in which security contractors were accused of shooting civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving in a manner that has raised concerns (see below " Can the Use of PSCs Undermine U.S. Efforts? As a result, the following CRS analysis includes the past two and a half years, ending March 31, 2011. As of March 2011, there were more than 28,000 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq, representing 18% of DOD's total contractor workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan
Number of Contractors
Since December 2009, the number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has exceeded the number of PSC personnel in Iraq. According to DOD, as of March 2011, there were 18,971 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan. Iraq
Number of Security Contractors
According to DOD, as of March 2011, there were 9,207 private security contractor personnel working for DOD in Iraq. Despite the Department of State's increasing reliance on PSCs, the overall number of PSC personnel working in Iraq for the United States is not increasing. As stated above, the number of PSC personnel working for DOD has declined by more than 6,000—more than offsetting the estimated additional 3,000 PSC personnel that the Department of State anticipates having to hire as a result of the transition from DOD to State. The number of PSCs peaked at 15,279 in June 2009. This trend was reversed in June 2009 and as discussed above, the number of PSC personnel working for DOD in Iraq has since dropped by 40%. DOD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees all contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. | The United States relies on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Afghanistan and Iraq, including armed security. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Afghanistan and Iraq DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. Much of the attention given to private security contractors (PSCs) by Congress and the media is a result of numerous high-profile incidents in which security contractors have been accused of shooting civilians, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving inappropriately. Some analysts believe that the use of contractors, particularly private security contractors, may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As of March 31, 2011, there were more than 28,000 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq, representing 18% of DOD's total contractor workforce in those two countries. Since December 2009, the number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq.
In Afghanistan, as of March 2011, there were 18,971 private security contractor personnel working for DOD, the highest number since DOD started tracking the data in September 2007. The number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has more than tripled since June 2009.
In Iraq, as of March 2011, there were 9,207 private security contractor personnel working for DOD, down from a high of 15,279 in June 2009. As a result of the transition of activities from DOD to the Department of State, State anticipates increasing its reliance on PSCs. However, the overall number of PSC personnel working in Iraq for the United States is not increasing. From June 2009 to March 2011, the number of PSC personnel working for DOD has declined by more than 6,000—more than offsetting the estimated additional 3,000 PSC personnel that the Department of State anticipates having to hire as a result of the transition.
This report examines current PSC trends in Afghanistan and Iraq, steps DOD has taken to improve oversight and management, and the impact using private security personnel can have on military operations. It also reviews steps Congress has taken to exercise oversight over the use of PSCs and includes options for Congress. |
crs_R40136 | crs_R40136_0 | Limitations on Congressional Access to Certain National Intelligence
By virtue of his constitutional role as commander-in-chief and head of the executive branch, the President has access to all national intelligence collected, analyzed, and produced by the Intelligence Community. Because the intelligence agencies are part of the executive branch, the President's position affords him the authority—which, at certain times, has been asserted —to restrict the flow of intelligence information to Congress and its two intelligence committees, which are charged with providing legislative oversight of the Intelligence Community. The issue of restricting the flow of intelligence information to Congress, a perennial point of conflict between the legislative and executive branches, has most recently resurfaced in the wake of the Fort Hood Army base shootings in November 2009, the subsequent Christmas Day airline bombing plot, and the Afghanistan suicide bombing that killed seven Central Intelligence Agency employees later that year. Together, these incidents underscored the degree of sensitivity with which Congress views the executive branch's statutory obligation to keep the legislative branch fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities. While some Members of Congress reportedly voiced satisfaction with executive branch efforts to keep them informed about some of these attacks, other Members have generally criticized the White House's notification efforts, particularly with regard to the Fort Hood shootings are concerned. As a result of its control over intelligence, the executive branch, including the President, the vice president and a small number of presidentially-designated Cabinet-level officials —in contrast to Members of Congress —arguably have access to a greater overall volume of intelligence and to more sensitive intelligence information, including information regarding intelligence sources and methods. The President's otherwise exclusive control over national intelligence, however, is tempered by a statutory obligation to keep Congress, through its two congressional intelligence committees, "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." Congress Generally Has Routine Access to Most "Finished Intelligence"
Congress generally receives access to most finished intelligence products that are published for general circulation within the executive branch. A finished intelligence product is one in which an analyst evaluates, interprets, integrates, and places into context raw intelligence. DNI Efforts to Improve Intelligence Source Transparency
The Intelligence Community says it continues in its efforts to strike an appropriate balance between protecting its intelligence sources while providing intelligence analysts and consumers—including those in Congress—more information about the reliability of those sources. Congress Also Has Access to Intelligence Information Through Briefings
Although Congress receives numerous written intelligence products, it receives the preponderance of its intelligence information through briefings, which generally are initiated at the request of congressional committees, individual members, or staff. | This report examines the role of Congress as a consumer of national intelligence and examines several issues that Congress might address during the second session of the 112th Congress.
The President, by virtue of his role as commander-in-chief and head of the executive branch, has access to all national intelligence collected, analyzed and produced by the Intelligence Community. By definition, the President, the Vice President, and certain Cabinet-level officials, have access to a greater overall volume of intelligence and to sensitive intelligence information than do members of the congressional intelligence committees. Moreover, since the intelligence agencies are part of the executive branch, the President has the authority to restrict the flow of intelligence information to Congress and its two intelligence committees.
The Fort Hood Army base shootings in November 2009, followed later that year by the Christmas Day airline bombing plot and the Afghanistan suicide bombing that killed seven Central Intelligence Agency employees refocused congressional attention on a number of intelligence issues, including the role Congress plays as a consumer of intelligence. Each of these cases serves to underscore the sensitivity with which Congress views the executive branch's statutory obligation to keep the legislative branch fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.
While some Members of Congress reportedly have voiced satisfaction with executive branch efforts to keep them informed about some of these attacks, other Members generally have criticized the White House's notification efforts on national security issues and particularly its efforts to keep Congress apprised of the results of some of its reviews of the Fort Hood shootings.
Congress generally has routine access to "finished intelligence," or to those intelligence products that are published for general circulation within the executive branch. A finished intelligence product is one in which an analyst evaluates, interprets, integrates and places into context raw intelligence. Congress receives the preponderance of its intelligence information through briefings, which generally are initiated at the request of congressional committees, individual members or staff.
Congress does not routinely have access to the identities of intelligence sources, methods employed by the Intelligence Community in collecting analyzing intelligence, "raw" or unevaluated intelligence, or certain written intelligence products tailored to the specific needs of the President and other high-level executive branch policymakers.
Among the issues the 112th Congress may choose to examine is whether the executive branch is meeting its statutory obligation to keep Congress fully and currently informed of all intelligence matters. Congress also may choose to review what the Intelligence Community says is its intention to strike an appropriate balance between protecting intelligence sources while providing intelligence analysts and consumers—including those in Congress—more information about the reliability of those sources. |
crs_R44776 | crs_R44776_0 | Introduction
Money laundering is a term generally associated with various types of financial transactions that are conducted by criminals to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds. Money laundering is not a new problem and efforts to stem such activity remain a global policy concern. Despite the existence of long-standing domestic regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as international commitments and guidance on best practices, policymakers are challenged to identify and address policy gaps and new laundering methods that criminals continue to exploit. The U.N. report further estimated that the United States, in 2010, likely generated some $300 billion in illicit proceeds (excluding tax evasion), or roughly 2% of U.S. GDP. estimates." Anti-Money Laundering Policy Overview
U.S. Legal Framework
In the United States, the legislative foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act. Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits. Key elements to the BSA's AML legal framework, which are codified in Titles 12 (Banks and Banking) and 31 (Money and Finance) of the U.S. Code, include requirements for reporting, customer identification and due diligence, recordkeeping, and the establishment and maintenance of BSA/AML compliance programs. Substantive criminal statutes in Titles 31 and 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the U.S. Code prohibit money laundering and related activities and establish civil penalties and forfeiture provisions (see text box below on enforcement actions). Moreover, federal authorities apply administrative forfeiture, non-conviction based forfeiture, and criminal forfeiture tools to confiscate assets, with more than $4.4 billion in assets confiscated in 2014. In response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the BSA's AML policy framework to incorporate additional provisions to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). Legislation following the September 11 attacks, including Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, provided the executive branch with greater authority and additional tools to counter the convergence of illicit threats, including the financial dimensions of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Action plans and other steps to address beneficial ownership. U.S. Department of the Treasury . World Bank and International Monetary Fund
Both the World Bank and IMF contribute to international AML efforts. Drawing from past legislative activity, the 115 th Congress may also revisit proposals to require the executive branch to develop a roadmap for identifying key AML policy challenges and balancing AML priorities in a national strategy. Although the national and international consequences of money laundering have the potential to be economically and politically significant, and despite robust AML efforts in the United States, challenges, both new (e.g., cyber-enabled financial crimes and emerging payment methods) and old (e.g., exploitation of cash and international trade for money laundering), remain. Over time, the scale of global money laundering and the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system has not diminished. Gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes, including uneven availability of international training and technical assistance for AML purposes, continue to limit the application of a globally consistent policy approach to AML. Some see the beginning of the 115 th Congress as an opportunity to revisit the existing AML policy framework, assess its effectiveness, and propose regulatory and statutory changes. | Anti-money laundering (AML) refers to efforts to prevent criminal exploitation of financial systems to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds. Despite the existence of long-standing domestic regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as international commitments and guidance on best practices, policymakers remain challenged to identify and address policy gaps and new laundering methods that criminals exploit. According to United Nations estimates recognized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, criminals in the United States generate some $300 billion in illicit proceeds that might involve money laundering. Rough International Monetary Fund estimates also indicate that the global volume of money laundering could amount to as much as 2.7% of the world's gross domestic product, or $1.6 trillion annually.
Money laundering is broadly recognized to have potentially significant economic and political consequences at both national and international levels. Despite robust AML efforts in the United States, the ability to counter money laundering effectively remains challenged by a variety of factors. These include
the scale of global money laundering; the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system; the introduction of new and emerging threats (e.g., cyber-related financial crimes); the ongoing use of old methods (e.g., bulk cash smuggling); gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes, including uneven availability of international training and technical assistance for AML purposes; and the costs associated with financial institution compliance with global AML guidance and national laws.
AML Policy Framework
In the United States, the legislative foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act. Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits.
Key elements to the BSA's AML legal framework, which are codified in Titles 12 (Banks and Banking) and 31 (Money and Finance) of the U.S. Code, include requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping, reporting, and compliance programs intended to identify and prevent money laundering abuses. Substantive criminal statutes in Titles 31 and 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the U.S. Code prohibit money laundering and related activities and establish civil penalties and forfeiture provisions. Moreover, federal authorities have applied administrative forfeiture, non-conviction based forfeiture, and criminal forfeiture tools.
In response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the BSA's AML policy framework to incorporate additional provisions to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). Although CFT is not the primary focus of this CRS report, post-9/11 legislation provided the executive branch with greater authority and additional tools to counter the convergence of illicit threats, including the financial dimensions of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism.
Policy Outlook for the 115th Congress
Although CFT will likely remain a pressing national security concern for policymakers and Congress, some see the beginning of the 115th Congress as an opportunity to revisit the existing AML policy framework, assess its effectiveness, and propose regulatory and statutory changes. Such efforts could further address issues raised in hearings and proposed legislation during the 114th Congress, including beneficial ownership, the application of targeted financial sanctions, and barriers to international AML information sharing. Drawing from past legislative activity, the 115th Congress may also revisit proposals to require the executive branch to develop a roadmap for identifying key AML policy challenges and balancing AML priorities in a national strategy. Some observers have gone further to propose broader changes to the BSA/AML regime. The 115th Congress may also seek to address tensions that remain in balancing the policy objectives of improving financial services access and inclusion while also accounting for money laundering risks and vulnerabilities that may result in the exclusion (or "de-risking") of others from the international financial system. |
crs_R43894 | crs_R43894_0 | A partial list of CRS reports on related topics includes:
CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R42761, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41108, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41952, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
Background and History of ADIZs
An ADIZ is a designated area of airspace over land or water within which a country requires the immediate and positive identification, location, and air traffic control of aircraft in the interest of the country's national security. ADIZs are located primarily over waters off coastal nations and often include large swaths of airspace beyond the boundaries of territorial lands and waters. Additionally, regulations require that aircraft operating in an ADIZ comply with any special security instructions that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may issue. The ECS ADIZ asserted coverage of the airspace over the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan and claimed by the PRC as the Diaoyu Islands and by Taiwan as the Diaoyutai Islands. Moreover, the ECS ADIZ overlaps with the existing ADIZs of Japan, ROK, and Taiwan. The rules warn that "China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions." Chinese officials and scholars defended China's right to establish an ADIZ, but officials from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other countries strongly protested the move (see later sections). There are several possible explanations for the PRC's apparent restraint in enforcing its ADIZ regulations. Relatedly, Beijing might have set up the ECS ADIZ for prestige. Responses
Promptly after the PRC announced the ECS ADIZ on November 23, 2013, Defense Secretary Hagel called the development a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo, stated that the announcement would not change U.S. military operations, and reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. Reportedly, the United States and Japan agreed to increase their reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the East China Sea, presumably to monitor Chinese practices in the new ADIZ. Guidance to Commercial Airlines "). Furthermore, the new overlapping area could increase the risk of an incident. Implications for U.S. Policy
The PRC's ECS ADIZ has implications for U.S. policy in terms of the potential for conflict, escalation of tension, Sino-Japanese tensions, a strategic challenge to the United States, and U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges. The action is consistent with an assessment in 2013 by several experts that found that the most likely challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance over the next 15 to 20 years is not a full-scale military conflict between China and Japan or the United States but the more likely attempts by China to use coercively its growing military capabilities to influence or resolve disputes with Japan in China's favor without resorting to an attack. He urged the Administration to consider China's actions as the use of coercion to change the status quo. 412 states that the Senate "urges the Government of the [PRC] to refrain from implementing the [ECS ADIZ], which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace ... " The resolution reaffirms the strong support of the U.S. Government for freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region and states that it is U.S. policy, inter alia, to assure the continuity of U.S. operations in that region. The United States neither recognizes nor accepts China's declared East China Sea ADIZ and has no intention of changing how we conduct operations in the region. Text of ECS ADIZ Announcement
The PRC MND issue the following statement on November 23, 2013:
The Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as follows:
First, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must abide by these rules. | In November 2013, the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) announced that it would establish an "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)," covering a large swath of airspace over the East China Sea, including over small islands that are the subject of a territorial dispute among Japan, the PRC, and Taiwan. Beijing did not formally consult with other countries prior to the announcement, and its initial statement seemed to warn that China might use force against aircraft that did not follow its ADIZ guidelines. Senior officials from the United States and East Asian countries criticized China's action and raised concerns that the new ADIZ could escalate tensions surrounding the territorial dispute and even lead to conflict.
Some key considerations for Congress are the potential for military conflict in the East China Sea, escalation of tensions over the territorial dispute, challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the impact on U.S.-China relations, including military-to-military exchanges.
An ADIZ is an area of airspace beyond a country's sovereign territory within which the country requires the identification, location, and air traffic control of aircraft in the interest of its national security. There is no international law that specifically governs ADIZs, although various norms pertain, especially freedom of navigation. The Convention on Civil Aviation advises that all nations refrain from the use of weapons against civilian aircraft. The United States was the first country to establish an ADIZ, which it did in 1950 during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
There are several possible reasons why the PRC designated its "East China Sea ADIZ" (ECS ADIZ). The ADIZ appears to be part of an effort by China to challenge Japan's administration of the disputed islands, known as Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan. The ECS ADIZ may also be intended as a means to bolster both China's own claims to the islands and its justification for opposing U.S. military surveillance activities near its airspace. In the initial period after the PRC announcement, the PLA did not take "defensive emergency measures" against aircraft that ignored the Chinese ADIZ directives.
In addition to criticisms by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense that the ECS ADIZ was "destabilizing" and increased the risks of conflict in the region, the United States announced that it "neither recognizes nor accepts China's declared East China Sea ADIZ." As of early 2015, the U.S. military continues to fly aircraft through the zone without notifying China or responding to requests for identification. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), however, distributed China's requirements for operating in the ECS ADIZ to commercial airlines as part of its routine dissemination of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs).
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan each voiced opposition to China's designation of the ECS ADIZ, which overlapped with their pre-existing ADIZs, and have continued normal military practices in the zone. South Korea requested that China redraw the boundary to remove this overlap, but Beijing refused the request, prompting Seoul to extend the boundaries of its ADIZ in December 2013. Japan called the PRC's action an attempt to change the status quo on the Senkaku Islands by coercion. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands because they are administered by Japan.
This report analyzes the legal, diplomatic, and security implications of the ECS ADIZ for U.S. interests. The concluding section briefly discusses some policy options for Congress and for U.S. policy in general. |
crs_R44733 | crs_R44733_0 | The agency administers the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which was passed in 1936. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) significantly expanded the CFTC's jurisdiction to include over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, also called swaps. The CFTC Reauthorization Process
The CFTC was last reauthorized in 2008 as part of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act ( P.L. 110-246 ), which included authorization of appropriations through FY2013. Although the underlying authority in the statute to administer programs does not have an explicit expiration, the authorization of appropriations only applied through FY2013. As a consequence, the authorization of appropriations assumes Congress will periodically act to authorize future appropriations. It has not been uncommon, however, for Congress to continue to fund the CFTC for several years beyond the expiration of previous authorizations of appropriations. 238 , the Commodity End-User Relief Act, which was passed by the House on January 12, 2017, and referred to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on January 17, 2017. 238 shares substantial similarities with the 114 th Congress CFTC reauthorization bill, H.R. 2289 , that the House passed, but differs in some respects from the Senate Agriculture Committee reauthorization bill, S. 2917 , which did not see Senate floor action in the 114 th Congress. Historically, the reauthorization process often has been one of the principal vehicles for modifying the CFTC's regulatory authority and evaluating the efficacy of its regulatory programs. The current CFTC reauthorization process is the first since the Dodd-Frank Act's passage brought the more than $400 trillion U.S. swaps market under regulatory oversight. 238 would authorize to be appropriated $250 million per year for each of FY2017 through FY2021 for the CFTC. The section currently authorizes the appropriation of "such sums as are necessary to carry out" the chapter of the CEA "through 2013." Both H.R. H.R. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $330 million. 238 would expand the CEA's current 5 cost-benefit analysis provisions listed above to 12 considerations. In addition, Section 202 would add a requirement that the CFTC conduct quantitative as well as qualitative assessments of costs and benefits. The requirement for quantitative cost-benefit analysis appears to mark a change from previous practice. 238 would modify the definition of a financial entity, potentially enabling a wider range of companies to claim the end-user exception to the clearing requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act. 238 would make changes to the definition of bona fide hedging in the CEA, discussed below, in a way that is substantially similar to the CFTC reauthorization bills passed by the House and reported by the Senate Agriculture Committee in the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 238 would mandate that, starting 18 months from its enactment, the swaps regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets must be considered comparable to those of the United States —unless the CFTC issues a rule or order finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements are not comparable to or as comprehensive as those of the United States. | The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), created in 1974, regulates futures, most options, and swaps markets. The CFTC administers the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA; P.L. 74-765, 7 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.), enacted in 1936, to monitor trading in certain derivatives markets. The CFTC was last reauthorized in 2008 as part of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act (P.L. 110-246), which included authorization of appropriations through FY2013. Although the underlying authority in the statute to administer programs does not have an explicit expiration, the authorization of appropriations only applied through FY2013. As a consequence, the authorization of appropriations assumes Congress will periodically act to authorize future appropriations. It has not been uncommon, however, for Congress to continue to fund the CFTC for several years beyond the expiration of previous authorizations of appropriations.
The current CFTC reauthorization process is the first since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) brought the roughly $400 trillion U.S. swaps market under regulatory oversight. Historically, the reauthorization process has often been one of the principal vehicles for modifying the CFTC's regulatory authority and evaluating the efficacy of its regulatory programs.
In the 115th Congress, a CFTC reauthorization bill—H.R. 238, the Commodity End-User Relief Act—that also would make changes to the CEA passed the House on January 12, 2017, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on January 17, 2017. H.R. 238 shares substantial similarities with the 114th Congress CFTC reauthorization bill, H.R. 2289, that the House passed, but differs in some respects from the Senate Agriculture Committee reauthorization bill, S. 2917, which did not see Senate floor action in the 114th Congress.
This report examines selected major H.R. 238 provisions that would
authorize appropriations for the CFTC of $250 million for each of FY2017 through FY2021. Both prior reauthorization bills introduced in the 114th Congress would have authorized "such sums as are necessary" to carry out the CEA, rather than a specific amount. The CFTC requested $330 million for FY2017 and received $250 million. expand the current 5 cost-benefit analysis provisions in the CEA to 12 considerations. It would add a requirement that the CFTC conduct quantitative as well as qualitative assessments, which appears to mark a change from previous practice. modify the definition of a financial entity, potentially enabling a wider range of companies to claim certain exemptions from the Dodd-Frank derivatives requirements. potentially broaden the bona fide hedging definition to allow anticipated, as well as current, risks to be hedged, which might increase the number of swaps that qualify as hedges. Bona fide hedging is often used to determine which swaps count toward registration requirements, position limits, large trader reporting, and other regulatory requirements. mandate that, starting 18 months from enactment, the regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets be considered comparable to those of the United States—unless the CFTC issued a rule finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements were not comparable to U.S. requirements. |
crs_RL34253 | crs_RL34253_0 | Scope of the Issue
Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, successive U.S. The past three U.S. National Security Strategy documents all point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing or exacerbating conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. However, as U.S. policy toward these states has grown in priority and cost—particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—some U.S. officials and other analysts have begun to question the effectiveness of the Administration's policies for dealing with these types of problem states. In recent years, this has resulted in a proliferation of new programs designed to address the challenges of strengthening weak and failing states. The report first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states and U.S. national security and development challenges. Second, it surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states and identifies remaining issues related to the new programs. Finally, it highlights potential legislative issues that Congress may be asked to consider. Challenges to Development
In addition to the potential transnational security threats that weak and failing states pose to the United States, they also present unique challenges from a development perspective—a dimension of U.S. international policy that the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy elevated in priority to be equivalent to U.S. policy on defense and diplomacy. They include (1) civilian post-conflict management authorities, (2) DOD transfer authority to the State Department for Security and Stabilization Assistance, (3) DOD global train and equip authorities and funding, (4) foreign police training authorities, and (5) interagency policy effectiveness. At the State Department's request, Congress is considering new authorizations to develop civilian post-conflict stabilization capabilities in the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 ( S. 613 , H.R. 1084 , and H.R. 5658 ). These bills seek to authorize funding for stabilization and reconstruction assistance in failing states, as well as the creation of a Response Readiness Corps. Under authority stated in Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-163 , H.R. In the conference report that accompanied H.R. At the heart of this debate is a temporary congressional authority to allow DOD to train and equip foreign military forces for counter-terrorism operations and military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are involved (under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 [ P.L. | Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War. Numerous U.S. government documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability.
The U.S. government remains in the early stages of developing targeted capabilities and resources for addressing a complex mix of security, development, and governance challenges confronting weak states. U.S. programs and initiatives fall under five main categories: (1) conflict and threat early warning, (2) international cooperation and diplomacy, (3) foreign development assistance, (4) post-conflict stability operations, and (5) interagency coordination. However, as U.S. policies toward weak and failing states have grown in priority and cost, particularly since 9/11, some policy makers and analysts have begun to question the Administration's commitment to addressing effectively the problems posed by these states.
Congress plays a crucial role in the funding and oversight of programs designed to address weak and failing states. Several recent bills in the 110th Congress and laws directly relate to and have changed aspects of U.S. policy toward these states. Among these include efforts to address (1) civilian post-conflict management authorities and funding (S. 613/H.R. 1084, S. 3288, and H.R. 5658), (2) temporary Department of Defense (DOD) funding transfer authorities to the State Department for security and stabilization assistance (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), (3) temporary DOD security assistance authorities and funding (S. 3001/H.R. 5658), and (4) options for reforming foreign assistance and interagency coordination (as mandated in P.L. 108-199 and P.L. 109-364).
This report first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states, U.S. national security, and development challenges. Second, the report surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states. Finally, it highlights relevant issues about U.S. policy toward these states that Congress may consider.
For further analysis, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34243 | crs_RL34243_0 | The Administration also unveiled in early 2006 a restructuring of foreign aid programs administered by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition, a number of recent studies have made specific recommendations for both policy and organizational reforms. Criticisms of Current Foreign Aid Structures and Programs
The current structure of U.S. foreign aid entities and the conduct and effectiveness of aid programs have come under increasing scrutiny on a number of fronts. Aid policy is considered lacking in focus and coherence. Specific points of contention include:
the level of U.S. assistance, usually in relation to other international donors, and the composition of aid, generally the ratio of humanitarian and development aid to security assistance, by region; the coordination of aid among programs in USAID, the State Department, and independent agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and several regionally focused funds, such as the Inter-American Foundation, and the African Development Foundation; the coordination of aid among numerous domestic agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC), that administer some type of foreign assistance program; the coordination of bilateral and multilateral assistance; the coordination of aid with other international donors; the involvement of the Department of Defense in aid programs that some observers believe should be carried out by civilian agencies; the perceived ambiguity with regard to who sets foreign aid policy among the State Department and USAID; the effectiveness of aid programs, especially in light of a steady diminution of technical expertise at USAID, and the increasing reliance on contractors both in Washington and in the field to carry out aid programs; and the lack of a foreign assistance strategy to guide and justify the provision of aid generally, and one that deals with programs, specifically, that responds simultaneously to recipient country needs and U.S. priorities. In the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, aid programs lost their Cold War underpinnings. Foreign assistance has long been defended as a way to either promote U.S. exports by creating new customers for U.S. products, or by improving the global economic environment in which U.S. companies compete. The present national security rationale for foreign affairs programs has transitioned from a largely anti-communist orientation for some 40 years following World War II to a more recent focus on anti-terrorism in the post September 11, 2001, environment. Trends in Foreign Assistance Funding
Historic Trends
Spending for U.S. foreign assistance programs, that began in earnest in the 1940s with a four-year $13 billion (current dollar) investment in rebuilding Europe under the Marshall Plan, has fluctuated in response to world events. With the FY2008 budget request, this pledge would be exceeded. At the same time, under President Carter, human rights considerations entered into foreign aid policy. To that end, she created a new State Department position, Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), and a new Bureau of Foreign Assistance (F). The DFA serves concurrently as Administrator of USAID. In 2006, the DFA presented a new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance that links aid programs to U.S. strategic objectives. First, the U.S. National Security Strategy, as articulated in 2002 and restated in 2006, elevates global development as a third pillar, along with defense and diplomacy, of national security. Give the Secretary of State the authority to ensure all aid, government-wide, is in U.S. foreign policy interest. | Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role of foreign assistance as a tool of foreign policy has come into sharper focus. The President elevated global development as a third pillar of national security, with defense and diplomacy, as articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, and reiterated in 2006. At the same time that foreign aid is being recognized as playing an important role in U.S. foreign policy, it has also come under closer scrutiny by Congress, largely in response to a number of presidential initiatives, and by critics who argue that the U.S. foreign aid infrastructure is cumbersome and fragmented, and that aid policy is unfocused.
In recent years, several initiatives have heightened congressional interest in, and caused a re-examination of, U.S. foreign assistance policy and programs, including organizational structure. In January 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced an initiative to bring coordination and coherence to U.S. aid programs. The Secretary created a new State Department position—Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA)—the occupant of which serves concurrently as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A new Bureau of Foreign Assistance (F) was created to coordinate assistance programs, led by the DFA, who in 2006, developed a Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance to align U.S. aid programs with strategic objectives. The Framework guided the writing of the FY2008 and FY2009 budgets, and is expected to be reflected in the FY2010 budget request.
U.S. foreign aid programs began in earnest with the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe following World War II. Arguably, the underlying rationale for aid during most of the post-war period was to counter Communist influence in the world. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, aid programs have increasingly been justified within the context of anti-terrorism. Despite changing global conditions and challenges, U.S. foreign aid programs, their organizational structure, and their statutory underpinnings, reflect the Cold War environment in which they originated.
These factors are, arguably, motivating the heightened interest in re-evaluating how U.S. aid programs function, and in revamping how they are administered. There is also a growing recognition of the role that foreign assistance can play as a foreign policy tool that is equal to the role of diplomacy and defense within the current international environment characterized by regional conflicts, terrorist threats, weapons proliferation, concerns with disease pandemics, and the difficulty in overcoming poverty. As a result, a number of recent high-profile studies have made recommendations for specific reforms.
This report, written by [author name scrubbed], a former CRS Specialist, will be updated by Susan Epstein to reflect continuing developments. |
crs_R41648 | crs_R41648_0 | The payroll tax exemption for employers expired on December 31, 2010. In December 2010, Congress approved a temporary 2 percentage point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax rate for employees and the self-employed in 2011 as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 3765 ) to extend the payroll tax reduction for workers for two months (through February 2012). The Social Security payroll tax for workers in effect through December 2012 is 4.2% (rather than 6.2%). The Social Security payroll tax rate in 2011 was 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for the self-employed. 111-312 made no changes to the Social Security payroll tax rate for employers (6.2%) or to the amount of annual wages and net self-employment income subject to the Social Security payroll tax ($106,800 in 2011). The temporary reduction in the payroll tax for employees and the self-employed in 2011 was intended to provide an economic stimulus by increasing workers' take-home pay. For example, the annual Social Security withholding for a worker earning the average wage in 2011 (an estimated $44,687) was lower by about $894. The annual Social Security withholding for a worker earning the maximum taxable wage ($106,800 in 2011) was lower by $2,136. In August 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust funds as a result of the temporary payroll tax reduction in 2011 would total $111 billion. H.R. 3765, P.L. 3765 was passed by the House and the Senate and signed into law by President Obama ( P.L. 112-78 ). House Republican Proposal to Extend the Payroll Tax Reduction for Workers Through 2012 (H.R. The measure would extend the 2 percentage point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax for workers through the end of calendar year 2012 (i.e., from March through December 2012). On February 17, 2012, the House agreed to the conference report on H.R. President Obama signed the measure into law on February 22, 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ). It provides general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust funds to make up for the loss of payroll tax revenues. Views Among Opponents
Despite the general revenue transfers to protect the trust funds from a loss of payroll tax revenues, some observers have expressed concern about the potential impact of the temporary reduction in the payroll tax for employees and the self-employed on Social Security's long-term finances. These observers point out that, although the payroll tax reduction is temporary, the possibility remains that Congress could continue to extend the payroll tax reduction or make the payroll tax reduction permanent in response to political or other pressures without providing transfers from general revenues. Opponents maintain that the general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust funds introduce an element of general revenue financing to the Social Security program, signaling a departure from the self-financing mechanism that has been in place since the program's enactment in the 1930s. Views Among Supporters
Some observers support the temporary reduction in the Social Security payroll tax on the basis that it will stimulate economic recovery and create jobs at a time when the United States continues to experience high rates of unemployment. They maintain that the immediate increase in take-home pay will spur additional consumer spending, increasing the demand for products and services, which in turn will increase production and employment. Temporarily reducing Social Security payroll taxes is a policy option that has been advanced in various forms by recent deficit reduction commissions, among others, as an effective way to stimulate economic growth and job creation consistent with long-term fiscal discipline. | In December 2010, Congress approved a temporary 2 percentage point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax rate for employees and the self-employed in 2011 as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312). The Social Security payroll tax rate in 2011 was 4.2% for employees and 10.4% for self-employed workers. P.L. 111-312 made no changes to the Social Security payroll tax rate for employers (6.2%) or to the amount of wages and net self-employment income subject to the Social Security payroll tax ($106,800 in 2011). It provided general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust funds to make up for the loss of payroll tax revenues. A worker's future benefits are not affected.
The temporary reduction in the payroll tax for employees and the self-employed in 2011 was intended to provide an economic stimulus by increasing workers' take-home pay. For example, the annual Social Security withholding for a worker earning the average wage in 2011 (an estimated $44,687) was lower by about $894. The annual Social Security withholding for a worker earning the maximum taxable wage ($106,800 in 2011) was lower by $2,136.
On December 23, 2011, a measure to extend the payroll tax reduction for workers for two months (through February 2012) was passed by the House and the Senate and signed into law by President Obama (H.R. 3765, P.L. 112-78). On February 17, 2012, the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report on H.R. 3630, which further extends the payroll tax reduction for workers through the end of calendar year 2012. H.R. 3630 was signed into law by President Obama on February 22, 2012 (P.L. 112-96). The Social Security payroll tax for workers in effect through December 2012 is 4.2% (rather than 6.2%). In March 2012, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the transfers from the general fund to the Social Security trust funds resulting from the 2 percentage point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax for workers in calendar years 2011 and 2012 will total $224 billion in FY2011-FY2013.
The temporary reduction in the Social Security payroll tax for employees and the self-employed has drawn mixed reactions from policymakers. Some observers express concern about the potential impact of the payroll tax reduction on Social Security's long-term finances, despite the general revenue transfers to protect the trust funds from a loss of payroll tax revenues. These observers point out that, although the payroll tax reduction is temporary, the possibility remains that Congress could continue to extend the payroll tax reduction or make the payroll tax reduction permanent in response to political or other pressures. In addition, they maintain that the general revenue transfers to the Social Security trust funds introduce an element of general revenue financing to the Social Security program, signaling a departure from the self-financing mechanism that has been in place since the program's enactment in the 1930s that could jeopardize the future of the program.
Others support the payroll tax reduction on the basis that it will stimulate economic recovery and create jobs at a time when the United States continues to experience high rates of unemployment. They maintain that the immediate increase in take-home pay will spur additional consumer spending, increasing the demand for products and services, which in turn will increase production and employment. Supporters point to the payroll tax exemption for employers in 2010 for hiring certain unemployed workers as a precedent. They also point out that temporarily reducing Social Security payroll taxes is a policy option that has been advanced in various forms by recent deficit reduction commissions, among others, as an effective way to stimulate economic growth and job creation consistent with long-term fiscal discipline. |
crs_R44443 | crs_R44443_0 | Broadly speaking, high-frequency trading (HFT) is conducted through supercomputers that give firms the capability to execute trades within microseconds or milliseconds (or, in the technical jargon, with extremely low latency ). The term HTF has no universal or legal definition. Neither the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued regulations defining it. By most accounts, HFT has grown substantially over the past 10 years: it now accounts for roughly 55% of trading volume in U.S. equity markets and about 40% in European equity markets. In general, traders that employ HFT strategies are attempting to earn small amounts of profit per trade. Some analyses broadly categorize these strategies into passive and aggressive trading strategies. The CFTC oversees any HFT, along with other types of trading, in the derivatives markets it regulates. These include futures, swaps and options on commodities, and most financial instruments or indices, such as interest rates. The SEC oversees HFT and other trading in the securities markets and the more limited securities-related derivatives markets in which it regulates. Some evidence, however, exists that these HFT strategies may also be employed in futures markets. Various observers, including SEC staff, have said that two related types of HFT, dubbed aggressive strategies in contrast to the other passive strategies should be a central focus of public policy concerns as they "… may present serious problems in today's market structure— order anticipation and momentum ignition ." Arbitrage trading is profiting from price differentials for the same or related securities. The line between this strategy and front-running , which is not permitted, can be nuanced. In addition, regulators have expressed concern over whether certain aggressive HFT strategies may be associated with increased market fragility and volatility, such as that demonstrated in the "Flash Crash" of May 6, 2010; August 24, 2015 market crash in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than 1,000 points in early trading; and October 15, 2014 day of extreme volatility in Treasury markets, among others. Recent CFTC Anti-Spoofing Efforts
Section 747 of the Dodd Frank Act ( P.L. The CFTC has used its new anti-spoofing authority in a number of recent enforcement actions. On November 24, 2015, the CFTC released a proposed rule, Regulation Automated Trading (Reg AT), governing certain HFT practices (without using the term HFT). The purpose of Reg AT broadly is to update the CFTC's rules on trading practices in response to the evolution from pit trading to electronic trading. Reg AT mandates risk controls for the exchanges; large financial firms called clearing members of the exchanges; and firms that trade heavily on the exchanges for their own accounts. The rule also proposes requiring the registration of proprietary traders engaging in algorithmic trading on regulated exchanges through what is called direct electronic access . FINRA Registration for High-Frequency Securities Traders
On the securities front, in 2015, the SEC took steps toward a registration requirement for certain HFT broker-dealers, which requires them to register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Barclays and Cred it Suisse . In January 2016, Barclays Plc and Credit Suisse each settled allegations with the New York attorney general (NYAG) and the SEC that they had misled their investors in managing their private trading platforms known as dark pools. The SEC charged that Credit Suisse failed to operate its dark pool and alternate trading systems as advertised. Congressional Interest
The 114 th Congress has seen the introduction of some legislation potentially impacting HFT and has held hearings touching on the subject of HFT practices and regulation as part of congressional oversight authority over the SEC and the CFTC. Legislative Proposals
Although no legislation has been introduced in the 114 th Congress directly impacting the regulation or oversight of HFT, several bills have been introduced imposing a tax on a broad array of financial transactions involving securities and derivatives. These include S. 1371 , S. 1373 , and H.R. | High-frequency trading (HFT) generally refers to trading in financial instruments, such as securities and derivatives, transacted through supercomputers executing trades within microseconds or milliseconds (or, in the technical jargon, with extremely low latency). There is no universal or legal definition of HFT, however. Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which oversees securities markets, nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates most derivatives trading, have specifically defined the term. By most accounts, high frequency trading has grown substantially over the past 10 years: estimates hold that it accounts for roughly 55% of trading volume in U.S. equity markets and about 40% in European equity markets. Likewise, HFT has grown in futures markets—to roughly 80% of foreign exchange futures volume and two-thirds of both interest rate futures and Treasury 10-year futures volumes.
The CFTC oversees any HFT, along with other types of trading, in the derivatives markets it regulates. These include futures, swaps and options on commodities, and most financial instruments or indices, such as interest rates. The SEC oversees HFT and other trading in the securities markets and the more limited securities-related derivatives markets which it regulates.
In general, traders that employ HFT strategies are attempting to earn small amounts of profit per trade. Broadly speaking, these strategies can be categorized as passive or aggressive strategies. Passive strategies include arbitrage trading—attempts to profit from price differentials for the same stocks or their derivatives traded on different trading venues; and passive market making, in which profits are generated by spreads between bid and ask prices. Aggressive strategies include those known as order anticipation or momentum ignition strategies. Various observers, including SEC staff, have said that these aggressive strategies should be a central focus of public policy concerns. This may be because such strategies can share some similarities to practices such as front-running and spoofing, which are generally illegal. In addition, regulators have expressed concern over whether certain aggressive HFT strategies may be associated with increased market fragility and volatility, such as that demonstrated in the "Flash Crash" of May 6, 2010; the October 15, 2014, extreme volatility in Treasury markets; and the August 24, 2015, market crash in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than 1,000 points in early trading.
The SEC and CFTC have taken recent steps to bring some HFT under closer scrutiny, both through recent regulatory proposals and enforcement actions. The SEC has proposed requiring certain HFT broker-dealers to register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which oversees broker-dealers. In January 2016, the SEC announced settlements with Barclays and Credit Suisse totaling more than $150 million, over allegations that Barclays had misled its investors on HFT practices permitted on its private trading platforms known as dark pools, and that Credit Suisse failed to operate its trading systems as advertised.
The CFTC has cracked down on spoofing, using the anti-spoofing authority granted in the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) in a number of recent enforcement actions involving algorithmic trading. On November 24, 2015, the CFTC released a proposed rule, Regulation Automated Trading (Reg AT), governing certain HFT practices. The purpose of Reg AT broadly is to update the CFTC's rules on trading practices in response to the evolution from pit trading to electronic trading. Reg AT mandates risk controls for the exchanges; large financial firms called "clearing members" of the exchanges; and firms that trade heavily on the exchanges for their own accounts. The rule also proposes requiring the registration of proprietary traders engaging in algorithmic trading on regulated exchanges through what is called "direct electronic access."
Although no legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress directly impacting the regulation or oversight of HFT, several bills have been introduced imposing a tax on a broad array of financial transactions that could impact HFT. These bills include S. 1371, S. 1373, and H.R. 1464. Congress has also held hearings in the 114th Congress touching on HFT issues as part of its oversight of the SEC and CFTC.
This report provides background on various HFT strategies and some associated policy issues, recent regulatory developments and selected enforcement actions by the SEC and CFTC on HFT, and congressional action such as proposed legislation and hearings related to HFT. |
crs_RL33286 | crs_RL33286_0 | Introduction
On June 24, 2005, 11 years after Congress directed the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to issue a regulation on the sounding of train horns at grade crossings, FRA's Rule on the Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings took effect. The train horn rule requires that locomotive horns be sounded at all public highway-rail grade crossings, except where there is no significant risk to persons, where supplementary safety measures fully compensate for the absence of the warning provided by the horn, or where sounding the horn as a warning is not practical. FRA exempted the Chicago region from the rule, pending a re-analysis of grade-crossing accident data for that area. The FRA train horn rule preempted roughly 2,000 existing state and local whistle bans. In some cases communities may establish quiet zones without making any safety improvements; in other cases, communities will be required to make safety improvements to grade crossings in order to obtain FRA approval to establish a quiet zone. Collisions at these intersections are typically responsible for nearly 40% of all railroad-related deaths. Reducing the number of injuries and deaths resulting from grade-crossing collisions has been a federal concern for decades. The number of deaths from grade-crossing collisions has declined by around 30% since the train horn rule took effect, from 358 in 2005 to around 250 annually since 2009 (see Figure 1 ). There has also been a significant decline in most other types of highway deaths since 2005. The regulation preempts state and local train whistle bans. The rule did not establish a new safety standard. Requirements for Establishing Quiet Zones
In permitting exceptions to the law requiring the sounding of train horns at crossings, FRA sought "to ensure that quiet zones, while providing for quiet at grade crossings, also continue to provide the level of safety for motorists and rail employees and passengers that existed before the quiet zones were first established, or in the alternative, the level of safety provided by the average gated public crossing where locomotive horns are routinely sounded." As of April 2013, FRA reports having received 549 applications for quiet zones. FRA acknowledged that whistle bans established prior to the rule reflected a policy choice made by local communities in weighing the risks of grade-crossing accidents against the quality of life of residents. Federal Funding for Grade-Crossing Safety Improvements
Federal funding is available to reduce the risk of grade-crossing collisions. | Numerous communities across the United States imposed bans on the sounding of train whistles at highway-rail grade crossings beginning in the late 1970s to address complaints and concerns of nearby residents about noise from train whistles. In 1990, a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) study of train whistle bans in Florida showed a positive correlation between nighttime whistle bans and the number of accidents at highway-rail crossings. In 1994, partially in response to the FRA study, Congress enacted the Swift Rail Development Act (P.L. 103-440), which directed FRA to issue a regulation on the sounding of train horns at grade crossings.
Reducing the number of accidents and injuries at rail grade crossings has been a federal concern for decades. Accidents at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths and injuries, accounting for nearly 40% of railroad-related deaths.
On June 24, 2005, FRA's Rule on the Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings took effect. The rule requires that locomotive horns be sounded at all public highway-rail grade crossings, except where there is no significant risk to persons, where supplementary safety measures fully compensate for the absence of the warning provided by the horn, or where sounding the horn as a warning is not practical. FRA exempted the Chicago region from the rule, pending a re-analysis of grade-crossing accident data for that area. That exemption remains in effect.
The number of deaths from grade-crossing collisions has declined by around 30% since the train horn rule took effect. However, grade-crossing fatalities were already declining prior to adoption of the rule, and there has also been a significant decline in most other types of highway deaths since 2005. The impact of the rule on highway fatalities is thus unclear. In 2012, there were 271 grade-crossing fatalities.
The rule preempts all state and local laws dealing with bans on the sounding of locomotive horns at crossings ("whistle bans"), affecting roughly 2,000 bans in 260 localities. Communities may create "quiet zones" in which the sounding of locomotive horns is banned (except in an emergency); in some cases, these new quiet zones may not require any safety improvements by the community, but in other cases communities will have to provide safety improvements in order to establish a quiet zone. As of April 2013, FRA had received 549 notifications from communities that had established, or intended to establish, a quiet zone. Grade-crossing improvements to reduce the risk of accidents or to implement quiet zones are eligible expenses under several federal highway programs. Selection of projects for such funding is generally made by state highway administrations, subject to federal approval. |
crs_R40944 | crs_R40944_0 | Although an author need not register his or her work with the U.S. Copyright Office to obtain copyright protection, registration does come with several advantages. Like the Tasini case , Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick is a class action lawsuit. The District Court's Opinion
The plaintiffs in Reed Elsevier consist of individual authors and trade groups representing authors who produced written works for certain publishers on a freelance basis. After the Tasini decision had affirmed the plaintiffs' right to control electronic reproduction of their works, the district court referred the parties to mediation. In 2005, after more than three years of negotiations, the parties reached an agreement that sorted plaintiffs' claims into three groups for compensation purposes. The defendants responded that Category C claimants were adequately represented and treated fairly because they would otherwise have been unable to bring actions for infringement at all under 17 U.S.C. §411(a) because their copyrights were unregistered. After prolonged proceedings, the district court granted final class certification and final settlement approval in September 2005. The Second Circuit's Opinion
Before hearing oral argument, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals "became concerned that the District Court and the parties had passed over a nettlesome jurisdictional question" and sua sponte ordered the parties to address "whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over claims concerning the infringement of unregistered copyrights." A divided panel of the Second Circuit disagreed. Concepts, Inc. and distinguishing the Supreme Court's ruling in Eberhart v. United States , the appellate court held that the requirement of copyright registration prior to an infringement suit is jurisdictional and that the phrase "copyright claim" referred to each claim within a purported class. Thus, because many of the plaintiffs' copyrights were unregistered, the Second Circuit held that the district court lacked the authority to certify the class and, as a result, lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement. §411(a) restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright infringement actions?" 17 U.S.C. Next, she argued that the integrity of the judicial process precludes the parties from waiving §411(a) because both parties invoked the jurisdictional bar before the district court to defend the fairness of their settlement, which rewarded the owners of registered copyrights at the expense of unregistered copyright owners. The Supreme Court's Opinion
On March 2, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court ruled that while the Copyright Act's registration requirement is a precondition to filing a claim for infringement, §411(a) does not limit or deprive a federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works. Finally, the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the fairness, resonableness, or adequacy of the settlement. The Supreme Court also expressly declined to decide whether §411(a) is a mandatory precondition to suit that district courts may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement claims that involve unregistered works. Concluding Observations
The Reed Elsevier case is now remanded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to consider the settlement's merits and the objections to the settlement's approval. However, the appellate court may pay particular attention to the objections to the settlement's proposed damages formula, as suggested by Judge Walker's dissent to the Second Circuit's ruling in this case:
On the merits, the failure to create a sub-class consisting of those members holding primarily "C-class" claims, and separate representation for those members, is a serious problem in my view, because the named representatives hold more "A-class" and "B-class" claims than most class members, and thus have an incentive to favor holders of A- and B-class claims over holders of primarily C-class claims. | Although an author need not register his or her work with the U.S. Copyright Office to obtain copyright protection, registration is a statutory prerequisite to bringing suit for infringement of the copyright, as mandated by 17 U.S.C. §411(a). The question in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick is whether this section of the Copyright Act restricts the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works.
The plaintiffs in Reed Elsevier, consisting of individual authors and trade groups representing authors, brought a class action lawsuit against several publishers when those publishers licensed the authors' articles for print publication but failed to secure an additional license to reproduce them electronically. The Supreme Court had earlier affirmed the plaintiffs' right to control electronic reproduction of their copyrighted works in its 2001 opinion New York Times, Co. v. Tasini. After this opinion, the district court in Reed Elsevier referred the parties to mediation. After more than three years of negotiations, the parties reached an $18 million agreement that sorted the plaintiffs into three categories based, in part, on whether or not their copyrights had been registered. The settlement assigned a different damages formula to each category, with owners of registered copyrights receiving more than owners whose copyrights were unregistered.
Several freelance authors who fell within "Category C" (composed of unregistered copyrights) objected to the settlement agreement, arguing that the settlement was unfair and inadequate because they were paid too little. Proponents of the settlement responded that "Category C" claimants were treated fairly because, as owners of unregistered copyrights, they would normally be barred from bringing infringement suits at all under 17 U.S.C. §411(a). The district court granted final class certification and approved the settlement in September of 2005. The objectors appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Before oral argument, the Second Circuit asked the parties to address whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over claims concerning the infringement of unregistered copyrights, or whether §411(a) restricted the court's jurisdiction.
Both the authors and publishers argued that §411(a) is not jurisdictional in nature. However, a divided panel of the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the requirement of copyright registration prior to an infringement suit is jurisdictional and therefore, because many of the plaintiff's copyrights were unregistered, the district court lacked the power to certify the class and approve the settlement. The publishers appealed the appellate court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a unanimous decision issued on March 2, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit panel. The Court characterized the Copyright Act's registration requirement as a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional condition. Therefore, a copyright holder's failure to satisfy the statutory registration requirement does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to adjudicate his copyright infringement claim. While the Supreme Court held that the Reed Elsevier district court possesses the authority to approve the settlement between the authors and the publishers, the Court offered no opinion on the fairness, resonableness, or adequacy of the settlement. On remand, the court of appeals must now consider the settlement's merits and decide whether to uphold the district court's approval of the settlement. The Supreme Court also expressly declined to decide whether §411(a) is a mandatory precondition to suit that district courts may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement claims that involve unregistered works. |
crs_R44111 | crs_R44111_0 | On June 4, 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed that a cyber intrusion into its information technology systems and data "may have compromised the personal information of [approximately 4.2 million] current and former Federal employees." Later in June, OPM reported a separate cyber incident, which it said had compromised its databases housing background investigation records and resulted in the theft of sensitive information of 21.5 million individuals. Officials do not believe that the intruders are still in the system. In the aftermath of the intrusions, Katherine Archuleta has stepped down as the director of OPM amid criticisms of how the agency managed its response to the intrusions and secured its information systems. Beth Cobert has taken on the role of acting director. In addition, OPM's Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) application, the "web-based automated system that was designed to facilitate the processing of standard investigative forms used when conducting background investigations," has been taken offline for "security enhancements." Uses of Stolen OPM Data
It remains unclear how data from the OPM breaches might be used if they are indeed now in Chinese government hands. Experts in and out of government suspect that "China may be trying to build a giant database of federal employees" that could help identify U.S. officials and their roles. For instance, compromised Social Security numbers and other personally identifiable information (PII) may be used for identity theft and financially motivated cybercrime, such as credit card fraud. The lack of stolen OPM data appearing in the criminal underworld has led some to speculate the breaches were more likely conducted for espionage rather than criminal purposes. If the IC's database were linked with OPM's, this could potentially help the hackers gain access to intelligence agency personnel and identify clandestine and covert officers. Protecting Federal Information Systems
The cybersecurity of most federal information systems is governed by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA, 44 U.S.C. §3551 et seq. In addition, 40 U.S.C. A potential question for Congress is whether those and other provisions of law give agencies the legislative authority and resources they need to adequately address the risks of future intrusions. Congress is currently considering legislation to reduce perceived barriers to information sharing among private-sector entities and between them and federal agencies. | On June 4, 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed that a cyber intrusion had impacted its information technology systems and data, potentially compromising the personal information of about 4.2 million former and current federal employees. Later that month, OPM reported a separate cyber incident targeting OPM's databases housing background investigation records. This breach is estimated to have compromised sensitive information of 21.5 million individuals.
Amid criticisms of how the agency managed its response to the intrusions and secured its information systems, Katherine Archuleta has stepped down as the director of OPM, and Beth Cobert has taken on the role of acting director. In addition, OPM's Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) application, the system designed to help process forms used in conducting background investigations, has been taken offline for security improvements.
Officials are still investigating the actors behind the breaches and what the motivations might have been. Theft of personally identifiable information (PII) may be used for identity theft and financially motivated cybercrime, such as credit card fraud. Many have speculated that the OPM data were taken for espionage rather than for criminal purposes, however, and some have cited China as the source of the breaches.
It remains unclear how the data from the OPM breaches might be used if they are indeed now in the hands of the Chinese government. Some suspect that the Chinese government may build a database of U.S. government employees that could help identify U.S. officials and their roles or that could help target individuals to gain access to additional systems or information. National security concerns include whether hackers could have obtained information that could help them identify clandestine and covert officers and operations.
The cybersecurity of most federal information systems is governed by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA, 44 U.S.C. §3551 et seq.). Questions for policymakers include whether existing provisions of law give agencies the legislative authority and resources they need to adequately address the risks of future intrusions. In addition, effective sharing of cybersecurity information has been considered an important tool for protecting information systems from unauthorized intrusions and exfiltration of data. The 114 th Congress is considering legislation to reduce perceived barriers to information sharing among private-sector entities and between them and federal agencies. |
crs_R44221 | crs_R44221_0 | Introduction
The Impact Aid program, administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), is one of the oldest federal education programs, dating from 1950. Impact Aid compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for a "substantial and continuing financial burden" resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children whose parents work or live on federal land and children living on Indian lands. The federal government provides compensation because LEAs are unable to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the Armed Forces living on military bases) or their employers, even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs for the resulting loss of tax revenue
The Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 ( P.L. As Congress has not acted to reauthorize the Impact Aid program, appropriations for it are currently not explicitly authorized. However, because the Impact Aid program continues to receive annual appropriations, these appropriations are considered to be implicitly authorized. This report begins with a general overview of the various payments made under the Impact Aid program, followed by a detailed discussion of each section of Title VIII. This discussion is followed by information about recent appropriations for Impact Aid. The report concludes with an overview of programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that are often referred to as the "DOD Impact Aid" programs. Overview of Impact Aid Payments
ESEA Title VIII authorizes several types of Impact Aid payments. These are children who reside with a parent who is a member of the uniformed services living on or off federal property; with a parent who is an accredited foreign military officer living on or off federal property; on Indian lands; in low-rent public housing; or with a parent who is a civilian working or living on federal land. Section 8003(b) authorizes "basic support payments" for federally connected children. Types of Federally Connected Children and Their Formula Weights
Table 1 shows the categories of federally connected children and the weights that the act assigns to them. Section 8003(d): Payments for Children with Disabilities
In addition to basic support payments, Section 8003 authorizes payments to LEAs serving certain federally connected children who are eligible to receive services under the IDEA. Moreover, the basic support payments (Section 8003(b)) alone accounted for 89.3% of the appropriations. | The Impact Aid program, administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and authorized by Title VIII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is one of the oldest federal education programs, dating from 1950. Impact Aid compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for "substantial and continuing financial burden" resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children whose parents work or live on federal land and children living on Indian lands. The federal government provides compensation because LEAs are unable to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the Uniformed Services living on military bases) even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs for the resulting loss of tax revenue. Authorizations of appropriations for the program were explicitly authorized through FY2007. Congress has not acted to reauthorize the Impact Aid program, though it continues to receive annual appropriations (which are thus considered to be implicitly rather than explicitly authorized).
The Impact Aid program authorizes several types of payments:
Federal Property (Section 8002), Federally Connected Children: Basic Support Payments (Section 8003(b) and Payments for Children with Disabilities (Section 8003(d), Construction (Section 8007), and Facilities Maintenance (Section 8008).
Overall, the Impact Aid program received about $1.3 billion in FY2015. The largest Impact Aid payment is basic support payments for federally connected children (Section 8003(b)), accounting for nearly 90% of the total appropriation. Federally connected children are children who reside with a parent who is a member of the Uniformed Services living on or off federal property; with a parent who is an accredited foreign military officer living on or off federal property; on Indian lands; in low-rent public housing; or with a parent who is a civilian working or living on federal land. Basic support payments are allocated directly to LEAs based on a formula that uses weights assigned to different categories of federally connected children and cost factors to determine maximum payment amounts.
This report begins with a general overview of the various payments made under the Impact Aid program, followed by a detailed discussion of each section of Title VIII. This discussion is followed by information about recent appropriations for Impact Aid. The report concludes with an overview of programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that are often referred to as the "DOD Impact Aid" programs. |
crs_RL32845 | crs_RL32845_0 | Introduction
Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" has sparked a great deal of interest in Congress andelsewhere. Some hope that Ukraine may finally embark on a path of comprehensive reforms andEuro-Atlantic integration after nearly 15 years of half-measures and false starts. Others are interestedin the geopolitical implications of a pro-Western Ukraine in the former Soviet region and in relationsbetween Russia and the West. Some analysts detect a new wave of democracy sweeping thepost-Soviet region, from the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia in November 2003-January 2004, to the"Orange Revolution" in November 2004-January 2005, and possibly to the overthrow of the regimein Kyrgyzstan in March 2005. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated against the fraud,in what came to be known as the "Orange Revolution," after Yushchenko's chosen campaign color. Ukraine's Priorities
President Yushchenko has set an ambitious set of domestic priorities for the new government.Yushchenko has said that his key domestic priorities include reducing the size of the unofficial,"shadow" economy, especially by reducing taxes and eliminating loopholes and exemptions forfavored businesses. Other priorities include improving the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary; andattracting foreign investment. (2) Yushchenko has vowed to prosecute those guilty of crimes,including fraud during the election, the 2000 murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgi Gongadze, andthe attempt on Yushchenko's own life. NATO and Ukraine formed a NATO-Ukraine Commission tofoster cooperation. Yushchenko calledRussia a permanent strategic partner of Ukraine, but insisted that he will subordinate participationin the Russian-led Single Economic Space (SES) and the Commonwealth of Independent States tohis goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. U.S. Policy
U.S. officials supported the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, warning the former regime ofnegative consequences if it engaged in fraud, sharply criticizing fraud in the November 21 runoffvote, and hailing Yushchenko's ultimate victory. The Administration also called for"immediately" ending the application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Ukraine. Current U.S. aid levels for Ukraine are relatively modest. As noted in the April 2005 Bush-Yushchenko joint statement, the United States will beinterested in seeing how the new government tackles such issues as weapons proliferation andhuman trafficking. After an April 4 meeting with President Yushchenko,President Bush said that Yushchenko was "fulfilling a campaign pledge. Administration officials have tried toavoid confrontation with Moscow on the issue, saying that the United States is only interested inpromoting democracy in the region and throughout the world. (9)
Congressional Response
During the Ukranian presidential election campaign and during the ensuing electoral crisis,the 108th Congress approved legislation calling for free and fair elections in Ukraine and urged theAdministration to warn Ukraine of possible negative consequences for Ukraine's leaders and forU.S.-Ukraine ties in the case of electoral fraud. The Jackson-Vanik amendment bars permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status forcountries with non-market economies that do not permit freedom of emigration. | In January 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became Ukraine's new President, after massivedemonstrations helped to overturn the former regime's electoral fraud, in what has been dubbed the"Orange Revolution," after Yushchenko's campaign color. The "Orange Revolution" has sparkeda great deal of interest in Congress and elsewhere. Some hope that Ukraine may finally embark ona path of comprehensive reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration after nearly 15 years of half-measuresand false starts. Others are interested in the geopolitical implications of a pro-Western Ukraine inthe former Soviet region and in relations between Russia and the West. Some analysts detect a newwave of democracy sweeping the post-Soviet region.
Yushchenko has said that his key domestic priorities include reducing the size of theunofficial, "shadow" economy, maintaining macroeconomic stability, and fighting corruption, amajor problem in Ukraine. Other critical priorities include improving the independence andeffectiveness of the judiciary and attracting foreign investment. Yushchenko has vowed to prosecutethose guilty of crimes, including fraud during the election, the 2000 murder of Ukrainian journalistGeorgi Gongadze, and an attempt on Yushchenko's life during the campaign, which has left himdisfigured. In foreign policy, Ukraine seeks closer ties with the European Union, NATO, and theUnited States, with the goal of eventual NATO and EU membership. Yushchenko has said that heviews Russia as a "strategic partner" of Ukraine, but that integration with the West will supercedeRussian-led integration efforts.
The Bush Administration has hailed the "Orange Revolution" as a part of a wave ofdemocratization sweeping the region and the world, and has proposed a modest increase in U.S. aidto Ukraine. Experts believe that prompt U.S. and international assistance may be needed to help thenew government to boost public support before crucial March 2006 parliamentary elections. TheUnited States has also expressed hopes that the United States and Ukraine will work together moreeffectively on such issues as weapons proliferation and trafficking in persons. The Administrationhas downplayed Yushchenko's decision to honor a campaign pledge to pull Ukraine's troops out ofIraq by the end of this year. President Yushchenko visited the United States on April 4-7.
During the Ukranian presidential election campaign and during the ensuing electoral crisis,Congress approved legislation calling for free and fair elections in Ukraine and urged theAdministration to warn the previous regime of possible negative consequences for Ukraine's leadersand for U.S.-Ukraine ties in the case of electoral fraud. The 109th Congress will consider aid fundingfor Ukraine, and may take up extending permanent Normal Trade Relations to Ukraine, terminatingthe application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Ukraine, which bars permanent NTR status forcountries with non-market economies that do not permit freedom of emigration. This report will notbe updated. For background on the Orange Revolution, see CRS Report RL32691(pdf) , Ukraine'sPolitical Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42778 | crs_R42778_0 | Operating budgets for all standing and select committees of the House (except for the Committee on Appropriations) are authorized pursuant to a chamber funding resolution, and funding is provided by annual appropriations in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill and other appropriations acts. On March 17, 2017, the House adopted H.Res. 173 , providing for the expenses of certain committees of the House of Representatives in the 115 th Congress, by voice vote. The use of committee funds is subject to chamber rules, law, and regulations promulgated by the Committee on House Administration, the Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, and the Ethics Committee, among other House entities. Committee funds may be used only to support the conduct of official committee business. Information on individual committee spending is published quarterly in the Statements of Disbursement of the House . This report is organized into three sections. The first provides an overview of the committee funding process in the House and analyzes funding levels since 1996. The second reviews House floor and committee action on committee funding in the 115 th Congress. The final section provides illustrations of the rules and regulations that structure the use of committee funds, and analyzes actual committee funding spending patterns during six previous years. House Committee Funding: Process
Contemporary funding for House committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations) follows a two-step process of authorization and appropriation. The resolution authorized a total of $266.3 million for committee expenses, $132.7 million for the first session and $133.6 million for the second session. | Funding for House committees (except for the Committee on Appropriations) follows a two-step process of authorization and appropriation. Operating budgets for all standing and select committees of the House (except for the Committee on Appropriations) are authorized pursuant to a simple resolution, and funding is provided in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill and other appropriations acts. Subsequent resolutions may change committee authorizations.
On March 17, 2017, the House adopted H.Res. 173, providing for the expenses of certain committees of the House of Representatives in the 115th Congress, by voice vote. The resolution authorized a total of $266.3 million for committee expenses, $132.7 million for the first session and $133.6 million for the second session.
The use of committee funds is subject to chamber rules, law, and regulations promulgated by the Committee on House Administration, the Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, and the Ethics Committee. Committee funds may be used only to support the conduct of official business of the committee. They may not be used for personal or campaign purposes. Information on individual committee spending is published quarterly in the Statements of Disbursement of the House.
This report is organized in three sections. The first provides an overview of the committee funding process in the House and analyzes funding levels since 1996. The second reviews House floor and committee action on committee funding in the 115th Congress. The final section summarizes the rules and regulations that structure the use of committee funds, and analyzes committee spending patterns during several previous years. |
crs_R44598 | crs_R44598_0 | Why This Issue Is Important for Congress
Active Protection Systems (APSs) are subsystems integrated into or installed on a combat vehicle to automatically acquire, track, and respond with hard or soft kill capabilities to a variety of threats, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). APS technologies are not new, and a number of nations have already employed APS on the battlefield. The U.S. military is now beginning to include APS as part of its formal combat vehicle modernization plans and, if the initial deployment of APS proves successful, could expand the use of APS to potentially thousands of tactical military vehicles—a complex and potentially costly undertaking. Proliferation of Advanced RPGs and ATGMs
RPGs
The proliferation of advanced RPGs and ATGMs is of concern to some defense officials and policymakers alike. These weapons—RPGs in particular—have been especially popular with insurgents because they are readily available, relatively inexpensive, and require little training. The 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and the 2014 Gaza Conflict
Some experts cite Israeli combat experiences in 2006 and 2014 as demonstrative of the value of APS. Basic APS Considerations and Theory
Proposed Criteria for a Successful APS
It has been suggested that an APS should meet both technical and operational criteria to be effective, including
be able to work under extremely demanding circumstances and compressed timelines; be robust against countermeasures; minimize the threat to friendly forces and civilians; fit in the space and power allocated to it on the vehicle; and be affordable. A Brief History of Selected U.S. APS Efforts
According to the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), "Active Protection Systems have been in the design and development stages since the early 1950s, but none have successfully made the transition from development to integration on a [U.S.] platform." Current U.S. Army and Marine Corps APS Efforts
General74
Both Army and Marine officials emphasized to CRS that their respective APS efforts are not in any sense either acquisition programs or Programs of Record by DOD definition. The Army's APS Effort76
The Army is currently involved in two separate parallel and distinct APS efforts—the Expedited, Non-Developmental Item (NDI) APS effort and the Modular Active Protection System (MAPS) effort. The Marine Corps APS Effort81
The Marines describe their APS efforts as a "technology demonstration" whereby the Marines would attempt to install an existing Trophy on the M-1A1 tank in coordination with the Army Expedited NDI effort. Potential Issues for Congress
Are Current NDI APSs Effective and Safe Enough for Operational Use? What Are the Benefits of MAPS Relative to Non-Developmental Efforts? How Does MAPS Affect NDI APS Performance and Costs? What Are the Army's and Marines' Detailed Plans for APS Fielding? | Active Protection Systems (APSs) are subsystems integrated into or installed on a combat vehicle to automatically acquire, track, and respond with hard or soft kill capabilities to a variety of threats, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). APS technologies are not new, and a number of nations have already employed APS on the battlefield. The U.S. military is now beginning to include APS as part of its formal combat vehicle modernization plans and, if the initial deployment of APS proves successful, could expand the use of APS to potentially thousands of tactical military vehicles—a complex and potentially costly undertaking.
The proliferation of advanced RPGs and ATGMs is of concern to some defense officials and policymakers, including Congress. These weapons—RPGs in particular—have been particularly popular with insurgents because they are readily available, relatively inexpensive, and require little training. Israel's experiences with RPGs and ATGMs in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and the 2014 Gaza Conflict and growing concerns with Russian military capabilities and activities in Eastern Europe have possibly served as catalysts for intensifying U.S. APS efforts. Technical and operational challenges to APS include being able to work under extremely demanding circumstances and compressed timelines, robustness against countermeasures, minimizing the threat to friendly forces and civilians, being compatible with the space and power allocated to it on the vehicle, and affordability.
A number of nations have operationally deployed APS on combat vehicles—Russia and Israel most notably—and some experts characterize U.S. efforts as somewhat lagging. U.S. military officials contend there are still a number of developmental and safety challenges that must be overcome before current APS systems are suitable for battlefield deployment.
According to the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), "Active Protection Systems have been in the design and development stages since the early 1950s, but none have successfully made the transition from development to integration on a platform."
The Army's and Marines' current APS efforts are described as technology demonstrations and have not progressed to formal Programs of Record. The Army and Marines are coordinating their respective efforts, although no joint program currently exists. The Army is currently involved in two separate parallel and distinct APS efforts—the Expedited, Non-Developmental Item (NDI) APS effort and the Modular Active Protection System (MAPS) effort. The Marines describe their APS efforts as a "technology demonstration" whereby the Marines would attempt to install a Trophy APS on the M-1A1 tank in coordination with the Army's Expedited NDI effort. The Marines have a number of unique APS requirements—including the ability to be transported by ship and withstand salt water corrosion—which will also factor into their eventual APS plans.
Potential issues for Congress include whether current NDI APSs are effective and safe enough for operational use, the benefits of MAPS relative to non-developmental efforts, MAPS' impacts on NDI APS performance and costs, the Army's and Marines' detailed plans for APS fielding, and APS adaptability to future threats. |
crs_R45279 | crs_R45279_0 | As such, buprenorphine's effectiveness, safety, and availability are of considerable interest to policymakers seeking to address the ongoing opioid crisis in the United States. Congressional actions taken in recent years to address the opioid crisis, including the SUPPORT Act, have included attempts to increase access to buprenorphine. About This Report
This CRS report attempts to answer questions policymakers may have about the following topics:
the effectiveness of buprenorphine as a treatment for opioid use disorder, the demand for buprenorphine as a treatment for opioid use disorder, and access to buprenorphine as a treatment for opioid use disorder. Buprenorphine comes in different formulations, each of which has been evaluated separately. What is buprenorphine? When compared to methadone (the most common treatment for opioid abuse), buprenorphine appears to be equally as effective in promoting abstinence from drug use. How well does buprenorphine maintain people in treatment? Therefore, the higher the dose of buprenorphine and the longer individuals are on the medication, the more likely they are to remain in treatment, abstain from opioid use, and successfully complete treatment. Demand for Buprenorphine
Buprenorphine is one of three medications currently used to treat adults addicted to opioids. Despite marked increases in opioid abuse, deaths attributed to opioids, and related hospital admissions, the majority of individuals in need of treatment do not receive it. Access to Buprenorphine
Buprenorphine is regulated differently when used for opioid use disorder than when used for pain. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) limits who may prescribe (or administer or dispense) buprenorphine to treat opioid use disorder, and the circumstances under which they may do so. These limits have implications for how patients gain access to buprenorphine and how they pay for buprenorphine. also have implications for how patients gain access to buprenorphine and how they pay for it. How has use of buprenorphine to treat opioid addiction changed? The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), which oversees the buprenorphine waiver program, provides daily updates on the number of DATA waivers. This provides the capacity for almost 3.6 million patients to be treated with buprenorphine. Despite this increase, access to substance abuse treatment such as buprenorphine has not kept pace with the mounting rates of opioid addiction in the United States. Admissions to substance abuse treatment facilities involving prescription opioids nearly quadrupled between 2002 and 2014. In 2015, 18.3% of individuals in need of treatment for an illicit drug problem, including prescription pain relievers, received it. In 2016, one-fifth (21.1%) of those with any opioid use disorder received specialty treatment, including 37.5% of those with heroin use disorder and 17.5% of those with prescription pain reliever use disorders. Determination of the cost effectiveness of buprenorphine, particularly compared to other treatment options such as methadone, awaits further research. Overall, buprenorphine appears to be an effective medication for treatment of opioid dependence. | Buprenorphine is a medication used to treat adults addicted to opioids (it is also used in the treatment of pain). Buprenorphine's effectiveness, safety, and availability in the treatment of opioid addiction are of considerable interest to policymakers seeking to address the ongoing opioid epidemic in the United States. Congressional actions taken in recent years to address the opioid crisis have included attempts to increase access to buprenorphine. This report addresses questions policymakers may have about the effectiveness of buprenorphine, the demand for buprenorphine, and access to buprenorphine.
Effectiveness of Buprenorphine
Overall, buprenorphine appears to be an effective medication for treatment of opioid dependence. When compared to other treatments for opioid addiction such as methadone, buprenorphine appeared equally as effective in promoting abstinence from drug use. Buprenorphine does not seem to retain individuals in treatment as well as methadone, however, though the reasons for this remain unclear. The research on buprenorphine suggests that it works better at higher daily doses (16mg or higher). The higher the dose of buprenorphine and the longer people used the drug, the more likely they were to remain in treatment, abstain from opioid use, and successfully complete treatment. Preliminary data suggest that buprenorphine may be safer and more cost effective than methadone; comparison of the safety and costs of buprenorphine with other treatments awaits further research.
Demand for Buprenorphine
Admissions to substance abuse treatment facilities involving prescription opioids nearly quadrupled between 2002 and 2014; in 2015 18% of individuals in need of treatment for opioid use disorders received it. In 2016, one-fifth (21.1%) of those with any opioid use disorder received specialty treatment, including 37.5% of those with heroin use disorder and 17.5% of those with prescription pain reliever use disorders. Despite marked increases in opioid abuse, deaths attributed to opioids, and related hospital admissions, the majority of individuals in need of treatment do not receive it.
Access to Buprenorphine
Buprenorphine is regulated differently when used to treat opioid use disorder than when used to treat pain. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) limits who may prescribe (or administer or dispense) buprenorphine to treat opioid use disorders, and the circumstances under which they may do so. These limits have implications for how patients gain access to buprenorphine and how they pay for buprenorphine. Buprenorphine comes in different formulations, and these modes of administration also have implications for how patients gain access to buprenorphine and how they pay for buprenorphine.
As of December 1, 2018, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration has estimated the U.S. capacity for health providers to treat with buprenorphine at over 3.6 million patients. Nonetheless, access to substance abuse treatment such as buprenorphine has not kept pace with the mounting rates of opioid addiction in the United States. |
crs_RL33430 | crs_RL33430_0 | (20) Based on industry flighthour estimates, growth in the use of air ambulances has been increasing at a rate of about 4.5% peryear over the past 15 years, and most observers believe that this steady growth in both the size of thededicated air ambulance fleet in the United States and the utilization of air ambulances will continueover the next several years. Pilot knowledge or "situation awareness" regarding weather conditions and terrain has also been found to be a significant factor in a large number of air ambulance accidents. Pilot Situation Awareness of Weather Conditions. In its most recent review of air ambulance safety, the NTSB found that situation awareness can oftenbe lacking in air ambulance operations for a variety of reasons, but was chiefly concerned with thelack of formal flight dispatch procedures among operators. However, neither the FAA nor theNTSB has identified maintenance practices among air ambulance aircraft as a specific area forconcern. Consequently, present efforts to prevent air ambulance crashes are focused, instead, on riskfactors associated with flight operations and pilot performance. Options for Improving Safety
Based on available data summarized above suggesting that flight operational factors are thecentral cause of the large majority of air ambulance accidents, options for improving safety havefocused on possible changes to flight operations and practices among air ambulance operators. These various options have been framed in terms of possible alternatives for changing regulatorystandards and oversight of air ambulance operators, incorporating system safety and riskmanagement principles into the decision making processes regarding air ambulance missions,providing additional or supplemental training for flight crews as well as medical crews, andincorporating various technologies to aid pilots and improve safety in low visibility conditions. The NTSB also noted that when patients are not on board, forexample during positioning flights or en route to an accident scene, air ambulance operators mayoperate under a less stringent set of regulations, because the FAA regards medical personnel onboard as essential crew members. Therefore, in addition to addressing the broaderquestion of whether air ambulance flights should adhere to commercial flight regulations during allphases of a mission, including times when patients are not on board, policymakers may considerpossible changes in pilot duty time and flight time regulations to address concerns over the potentialrole of fatigue in the safety of flight operations. As previouslymentioned, little attention has been given to the oversight of maintenance practices at facilities thatmaintain and repair air ambulance aircraft. Aircraftcrashworthiness and accident survivability is another regulatory issue that hasn't received muchattention with regard to air ambulance safety. (50) While theseefforts suggest that the industry as a whole is concerned about the current level of safety among airambulance operators and desires to take positive steps to improve safety, some, including the NTSB,argue that voluntary measures to improve safety such as this are insufficient, and certainsafety-related changes such as formal dispatch procedures and risk management practices shouldrequire mandatory, industry-wide compliance. (53)
In the airline industry, several initiatives to improve the collection and analysis ofsafety-related operational data have taken root and are now common practice. (62)
Technology to Improve Safety in Low Visibility Conditions
Various technologies are available to improve visibility and pilot situation awareness ofterrain, obstacles, and weather. Terrain Warning Systems. | The estimated rate of air ambulance accidents has been steadily rising since the early 1990s,and has increased at a rapid rate since 1998 when the industry began to expand more rapidly and shifttoward a model of more independent private air ambulance services that cover larger geographicareas. Statistics indicate that the large majority of air ambulance accidents are attributable tooperational factors related to pilot situation awareness and decision making when faced with adverseenvironmental conditions such as darkness, deteriorating weather, rugged terrain, or somecombination of these factors.
Initiatives to improve air ambulance safety to date have consequently focused on additionalpilot training, implementing risk management practices to improve the safety of flight operations,and using various technologies to improve pilot situation awareness in restricted visibility conditions. However, implementation of these safety measures has strictly been voluntary. The NationalTransporation Safety Board (NTSB) and other aviation safety experts are advocating the mandatoryuse of formal flight dispatch procedures and risk management practices among air ambulanceoperators as well as mandatory installation of terrain warning systems on air ambulance aircraft. TheNTSB also found that many air ambulance accidents occur when patients are not on board, such asen route to an accident scene. Present regulations allow air ambulances to operate under a lessstringent set of rules with regards to weather minimums and pilot duty times when not carryingpatients. However, the NTSB believes that air ambulance flights should operate under morestringent commercial operating rules at all times that medical personnel are carried on board. Although maintenance issues have been identified in about 20 percent of all air ambulance accidents,neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) nor the NTSB has placed any specific emphasison oversight of operators or repair stations that maintain air ambulance aircraft. The presentemphasis on air ambulance safety has, instead, been dominated by concerns over flight crewperformance and weather-related factors.
A variety of options are available to improve safety among air ambulance operators. Theseoptions include intensified oversight of air ambulance operators and regulatory changes to bring allphases of air ambulance operations under the same set of operational rules regarding weatherminimums and pilot duty times; possible regulatory changes to provide for sharing and analysis ofsafety-related data and observations with some degree of impunity; possible aircraft designconsiderations to improve crash survivability; expanded application of system safety and formal riskmanagement principles to mission planning and flight operations; enhanced training for both pilotsand support personnel and operational procedures to improve coordination and situation awarenessamong the entire air ambulance crew and ground support team; and the use of various technologiesto improve pilot situation awareness and augment pilot vision in low visibility conditions.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34463 | crs_RL34463_0 | Introduction
Federal white-collar employees paid under the General Schedule (GS), Foreign Service Schedule, and certain Veterans Health Administration Schedules are intended by law to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509 , the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. Although the annual adjustment and the locality payment are sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither is based on measures of the cost of living. FEPCA has never been implemented as originally enacted. FEPCA requires the annual pay adjustment for GS employees to be based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures change in private-sector wages and salaries. Locality-Based Comparability Payments10
GS employees are also intended to receive locality-based comparability payments. (In January 2009, there are 32 pay areas nationwide.) By law, the disparity between non-federal and federal salaries is to be reduced to 5%. By January 2002, and continuing each year thereafter, FEPCA specified that amounts payable could not be less than the full amounts necessary to reduce the pay disparity of the target gap to 5%. January 2010 Pay Adjustment
The President's Recommendation
The President usually includes a proposal on the federal civilian pay adjustment in the Budget of the United States issued in February of each year. Consolidated Appropriations Act
Division C, Section 744(a) of P.L. 111-117 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010 ( H.R. 3288 ), enacted on December 16, 2009, provides an average 2.0% pay adjustment for federal civilian employees, including DOD and DHS employees at Section 744(a). On December 23, 2009, the President issued Executive Order 13525, which implemented the law and the allocation of the pay increase as a 1.5% annual basic pay adjustment and a 0.5% locality pay adjustment. | Federal white-collar employees are intended by law to receive an annual pay adjustment and a locality-based comparability payment, effective in January of each year, under Section 529 of P.L. 101-509, the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990. The law has never been implemented as originally enacted; annual and locality payments pursuant to the statute have been reduced each year. Federal white-collar employees received a 1.5% annual pay adjustment and a 0.5% locality-based comparability payment in January 2010. President Barack H. Obama authorized the average 2.0% pay adjustment in Executive Order 13525, issued on December 23, 2009. Although the annual adjustment and the locality payment are sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither is based on changes in the cost of living.
The annual pay adjustment is based on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures changes in private-sector wages and salaries. The size of the locality payment is determined by the President and is based on a comparison of non-federal and General Schedule (GS) salaries in 32 pay areas nationwide. (The GS is the pay schedule that covers white-collar employees under the Civil Service.) By law, the disparity between non-federal and federal salaries was to be gradually reduced to 5% during the years 1994 to 2002. Continuing in each year thereafter, FEPCA requires that amounts payable may not be less than the full amounts necessary to reduce the pay disparity to 5%.
The President's FY2010 budget proposed a 2.0% federal civilian pay adjustment. Division C, Section 744(a) of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010 (H.R. 3288), enacted on December 16, 2009, provides the 2.0% pay adjustment for federal civilian employees, including employees in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
This report will be updated as events dictate. |
crs_RS22638 | crs_RS22638_0 | Since its inception, ITS has assembled archives of some 50 million Holocaust- and post-war-era documents in Bad Arolsen, Germany relating to approximately 17.5 million civilian victims of Germany's National Socialist (Nazi) regime. ITS officials traditionally administered the service based on an understanding that ITS was established to act primarily as a tracing service for victims of Nazi war crimes. To this end, access to information in the Bad Arolsen archives had been limited almost exclusively to civilian victims of such crimes and their descendants. Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. Recent Developments and Outstanding Issues
In May 2006, after more than five years of debate, and in response to increasing public and political pressure, the International Commission of the ITS unanimously agreed to amend the 1955 Bonn Accords to open the ITS archives to researchers and make digital copies of archived materials available to designated institutions in Commission member states. Holocaust Memorial Museum highlight several priorities and concerns relating to the future of the archives, including ensuring prompt digitization and transfer of the files to research institutions in Commission member states; designing and implementing a classification system to allow for more efficient searches of archived and digitized documents; continuing to reduce the backlog of requests for information from the archives, and training and hiring staff to better assist researchers in navigating the archives; and, in the long term, contemplating reform of what many consider a cumbersome administrative and oversight structure. Some 17.9 million digital images making up the archives' Incarceration/Concentration Camp Collection and a so-called Central Names Index of about 17.5 million names which appear in the archives have been transferred to the Holocaust Museum thus far. Members of the public will be able to access these files with the assistance of museum staff beginning in January 2008. | On November 28, 2007, the International Tracing Service (ITS) opened its vast archives of materials on victims of Germany's National-Socialist (Nazi) regime to the public, granting direct access to the archives for the first time since their establishment shortly after World War II. Access to information in the archives was previously limited to victims of Nazi crimes and their descendants, and as recently as 2006, ITS had a recorded backlog of over 400,000 requests for information. As part of its May 2006 agreement to open the archives, the 11-nation International Commission overseeing ITS agreed to provide a digital copy of the collections to designated research institutions in Commission member states. To date, digital copies of the archives' Central Name Index of about 17.5 million names, and of some 13 million records documenting deportations to Nazi concentration camps, have been transferred to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Museum officials expect these documents to be accessible to the public by early 2008, and hope that all the ITS archives will be digitized and transferred to the museum by late 2010. Access to the archives has been an issue of ongoing interest to many Members of Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL30732 | crs_RL30732_0 | The United States and EU are parties to the largest two-way trade and investment relationship in the world. The EU is also the largest U.S. trading partner in services. They are nothing new nor unexpected given the huge volume of commercial interactions. In the middle of this decade, however, Washington and Brussels are still at loggerheads over a number of issues, ranging from bio-engineered food products and aircraft to the treatment of agriculture in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Do the political disputes reflect differences between the two partners in terms of basic values and orientations? These include producers and workers, as well as consumer and environmental interest groups. U.S.-EU trade conflicts vary according to the nature of the demand for protection. Trade conflicts involving agriculture, aerospace, steel, and 'contingency protection' fit prominently in this grouping. These are examples of traditional trade conflicts, prompted by trade barriers such as tariffs, subsidies or industrial policy instruments, where the economic dimensions of the conflict predominate. During this period, the majority of U.S. Foreign Policy Conflict: Clashing State Interests
This category comprises conflicts where the United States or the European Union has initiated actions or measures to protect or promote their political and economic interests, often in the absence of significant private sector pressures. The underlying causes of these disputes are quite different foreign policy goals and priorities, if not interests. U.S. The four disputes summarized below are rooted in different regulatory approaches and public preferences. Beef Hormones
The dispute over the EU ban, implemented in 1989, on the production and importation of meat treated with growth-promoting hormones has been one of the most bitter and intractable trade disputes between the United States and Europe. Conflict Management
The three categories of trade conflicts—traditional, foreign policy, and regulatory—appear to offer different possibilities for conflict management. This is due not only to the fact that the causes and dimensions of these categories of conflicts differ, but also because the institutional relationships and forces that affect the supply of and demand for protection are operative in varying degrees from category to category. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements can dampen the inclination of governments to supply protection and the private sector to demand protection by providing a fairly detailed "road map" of permissible actions and obligations. Regulatory Policy Conflict
U.S.-EU trade disputes have focused increasingly on differences in regulation, rather than traditional barriers such as tariffs or subsidies. Similarly, U.S.-EU trade conflicts may not be as ominous and threatening as they appear. Trade conflicts rather appear to have real, albeit limited, economic and political consequences for the bilateral relationship. Leadership Impact
Trade disputes may have discernible impacts on U.S.-EU efforts to provide leadership of the world economy. | The United States and the European Union (EU) share a huge, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship the largest in the world, but it is also arguably the most important. Agreement between the two partners in the past has been critical to making the world trading system more open and efficient.
Given the high level of U.S.-EU commercial interactions, trade tensions and disputes are not unexpected. In the past, U.S.-EU trade relations have witnessed periodic episodes of rising trade tensions and conflicts, only to be followed by successful efforts at dispute settlement. This ebb and flow of trade tensions occurred again in 2006 with high-profile disputes involving the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations and production subsidies for the commercial aircraft sector.
Major U.S.-EU trade disputes have varied causes. Some disputes stem from demands from producer interests for support or protection. Trade conflicts involving agriculture, aerospace, steel, and 'contingency protection' fit prominently into this grouping. These conflicts tend to be prompted by traditional trade barriers such as subsidies, tariffs, or industrial policy instruments, where the economic dimensions of the conflict predominate. Other conflicts arise when the U.S. or the EU initiate actions or measures to protect or promote their political and economic interests, often in the absence of significant private sector pressures. The underlying cause of these disputes over such issues as sanctions, unilateral trade actions, and preferential trade agreements are different foreign policy goals and priorities of Brussels and Washington. Still other conflicts stem from an array of domestic regulatory policies that reflect differing social and environmental values and objectives. Conflicts over hormone-treated beef, bio-engineered food products, protection of the audio-visual sector, and aircraft hushkits, for example, are rooted in different U.S.-EU regulatory approaches, as well as social preferences.
These three categories of trade conflicts—traditional, foreign policy, and regulatory—possess varied potential for future trade conflict. This is due mostly to the fact that bilateral and multilateral agreements governing the settlement of disputes affect each category of disputes differently. By providing a fairly detailed map of permissible actions and obligations, trade agreements can dampen the inclination of governments to supply protection and private sector parties to demand protection.
In sum, U.S.-EU bilateral trade conflicts do not appear to be as ominous and threatening as the media often portray, but they are not ephemeral distractions either. Rather they appear to have real, albeit limited, economic and political consequences for the bilateral relationship. From an economic perspective, the disputes may also be weakening efforts of the two partners to provide strong leadership to the global trading system. |
crs_R41351 | crs_R41351_0 | In general, the federal government does not provide housing counseling services directly. Rather, the federal government provides some financial support for private housing counseling agencies, primarily through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Separate from HUD's housing counseling program, Congress has appropriated additional housing counseling funding specifically for foreclosure mitigation counseling since FY2008. Congress has appropriated this funding to NeighborWorks America, a federally chartered nonprofit agency with a nationwide network of affiliated organizations. NeighborWorks administers this funding through the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program. In addition to HUD's housing counseling program and NeighborWorks, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Defense all provide some support for housing counseling, or for broader financial counseling programs that may include housing counseling, that is aimed at specific groups. Housing counseling is itself a broad term that can refer to a wide variety of activities. However, only nonprofit organizations can be certified by HUD and therefore be eligible for HUD grants. Brief Overview of the Literature on Housing Counseling Effectiveness
While some studies have been done on whether housing counseling affects housing outcomes, most of these studies have been limited in scope. Through this program, HUD certifies housing counseling agencies that meet certain criteria and provides competitive grants to some of these HUD-approved housing counseling agencies. HUD-Approved Housing Counseling Agencies
This section describes the types of housing counseling agencies that HUD certifies, the process for becoming a HUD-approved housing counseling agency, and the requirements governing counseling programs at HUD-approved housing counseling agencies. HUD certifies four different types of housing counseling agencies: local housing counseling agencies, multi-state organizations, regional intermediaries, and national intermediaries. Local housing counseling agencies (LHCAs) and multi-state organizations (MSOs) both provide counseling services directly to clients within limited geographic areas. Multi-state agencies are agencies that have one main office and one or more branch offices in two or more states. HUD Approval Process for Housing Counseling Agencies
Housing counseling agencies that are certified by HUD receive a certificate of HUD approval, are listed on HUD's website, and are eligible to apply for HUD housing counseling funds. (Congress also appropriated funding for HUD to fund a demonstration counseling program in FY1972.) National and regional intermediaries that receive HUD grants pass on the funding that they receive to their branches or affiliates. Types of Counseling Activities
In recent years, the majority of housing counseling activities carried out by HUD-approved housing counseling agencies have consisted of some type of homeownership counseling (pre-purchase counseling, mortgage delinquency counseling, or other types of post-purchase counseling). Other Federal Funding for Housing Counseling
While the federal government primarily provides financial support for housing counseling through appropriations to HUD's housing counseling program, it also provides some funding for housing counseling through other sources. NeighborWorks is a government-chartered, nonprofit corporation with a national network of affiliated organizations that engage in a variety of community revitalization activities, such as generating investment in communities and providing training and technical assistance related to affordable housing. Congress did not provide funding to this program in FY2011 or FY2012. This does not mean that individual agencies do not rely on HUD funding to a larger degree, but among all HUD-approved agencies, HUD housing counseling funding appears to be a relatively small portion of total funding. While Congress has often provided increased funding for housing counseling in recent years, both through increased appropriations to HUD's housing counseling program and funding for NeighborWorks's NFMCP, it is unclear whether the increase in funding has kept up with increased demand on housing counseling agencies to provide counseling to borrowers facing default or foreclosure. | The term "housing counseling" refers to a wide variety of educational activities geared toward homebuyers, homeowners, renters, senior citizens, or other populations with particular housing goals. Some potential topics of housing counseling include pre-purchase counseling for potential homebuyers; post-purchase counseling on subjects such as budgeting or home maintenance; foreclosure prevention counseling; counseling on helping renters find or maintain rental housing; and counseling on fair housing, predatory lending, or other topics, among other things. The federal government does not provide housing counseling directly, nor does it require housing counseling for most housing-related decisions. Rather, the federal government provides some support for private housing counseling programs, primarily through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD certifies housing counseling organizations that meet certain criteria, and Congress appropriates funding to HUD each year to provide competitive grants to housing counseling agencies that have been certified by the department. Not all housing counseling agencies that are approved by HUD will receive federal housing counseling grants. Even for organizations that do receive grants from HUD, federal funding generally makes up a relatively small part of their total funding.
Housing counseling agencies that are approved by HUD can be one of two basic types. The first type consists of local housing counseling agencies or multi-state organizations, which generally provide counseling directly through only one or a few branch offices located in a limited geographic area. Local housing counseling agencies and multi-state organizations generally apply for HUD housing counseling grants on their own behalf. Alternatively, HUD-approved housing counseling agencies can be national or regional intermediaries, which provide funding and technical support for housing counseling to a network of affiliates and branch offices that operates in a much larger geographic area. National and regional intermediaries apply for HUD housing counseling grants on behalf of their affiliates and branches, and pass through funding they receive to their network of organizations.
Congressional appropriations for HUD's housing counseling program had increased significantly in recent fiscal years, until Congress opted not to fund HUD's housing counseling program in FY2011. Congress did provide funding for this program in FY2012. Since FY2008, Congress has also appropriated additional housing counseling funds specifically for counseling to help households avoid foreclosure. Rather than appropriating this foreclosure mitigation funding to HUD, Congress has appropriated it to NeighborWorks America, a government-chartered nonprofit agency that is also a HUD-certified national intermediary. NeighborWorks administers this funding through the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMCP).
Issues currently facing the housing counseling industry include efforts to standardize housing counseling curricula and counselor training, the amount of housing counseling funding, and questions regarding counseling's effectiveness. While some studies have suggested that some types of housing counseling produce positive outcomes in certain circumstances, existing research into housing counseling tends to be limited, and the overall effectiveness of housing counseling is unclear.
This report describes housing counseling in general, with a focus on HUD's processes for certifying housing counseling agencies and distributing housing counseling funding. It also provides a brief overview of other sources of federal funding for housing counseling activities, including the NFMCP, and discusses current issues surrounding housing counseling. |
crs_RS22492 | crs_RS22492_0 | In June 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , a case that involved questions about the scope of the retaliation provision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In a 9-0 decision with one justice concurring, the Court held that the statute's retaliation provision encompasses any employer action that "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant." This standard, which is much broader than a standard that would have confined the retaliation provision to actions that affect only the terms and conditions of employment, generally makes it easier to sue employers if they retaliate against workers who complain about discrimination. | This report discusses Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, a recent case in which the Supreme Court considered the scope of the retaliation provision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Specifically, the Court held that the retaliation provision, which bars employers from retaliating against employees who complain of discrimination, is not limited only to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment, but rather covers a broader range of actions that would be materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. This new standard is significant because it clarifies the protection from retaliation that is available to employees who complain of discrimination and makes it easier for workers to sue for retaliation. |
crs_RL30201 | crs_RL30201_0 | Most Recent Developments
On October 22, 1999, the President signed into law the FY2000 appropriationsact for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and related agencies ( P.L. 106-78 , H.R. Discretionary Spending
Approximately three-fourths of total USDA spending is classified as mandatory, which by definition occurs outside the control of annual appropriations. An annual appropriation is also made to reimburse the Commodity CreditCorporation for losses it incurs in financing the commodity support programs and thevarious other programs it finances. 106-78 , a consolidated appropriations act for FY2000 ( P.L. A separate Coburn amendment also was agreed to by a 217-214 votewhich prevents FDA from using any FY2000 funds for the approval of RU-486, orany other drug to induce abortion. The conference agreement contains $60.559 billion in regular (non-emergency) FY2000 appropriations for USDA and related agenciesand $8.7 billion in emergency spending for economic and disaster assistance forfarmers. 3194 ) are a number of provisions affectingagricultural programs, including additional emergency USDA funding of $576million, primarily in response to damage caused by Hurricane Floyd in the Southeast,a two-year extension of the Northeast dairy compact until September 30, 2001, anda requirement that USDA adopt a federal milk pricing option (1A) supported byEastern and Southern dairy farmers, but opposed by dairy processors and UpperMidwest dairy farmers. 106-113 also includes a 0.38% across-the-board cut intotal discretionary budget authority for FY2000, which will require a $49 million cutwithin USDA and a $4 million cut in FDA programs funded through P.L. 106-78 , with specific cuts to be determined by the Administration. 1906 , theAdministration request, and the FY1999 levels. 106-113). Included in the total is $186 million in farm disaster paymentsand $10 million in livestock assistance added to the $1.2 billion in disaster paymentsand $200 million in livestock assistance provided by P.L. In FY1999, two emergency spending packages were enacted, including $6 billion provided in October 1998 in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations act ( P.L.105-277 ) and $574 million in a supplemental appropriations act ( P.L. 106-113 ) signed into law on November 29, 1999 contains provisions ( H.R. Commodity Credit Corporation
Outlays for the farm commodity programs, farm disaster payments and certain farm export and conservation programs are funded through USDA's CommodityCredit Corporation (CCC). 106-78 provides an appropriation of $951 million for P.L. 1906 would have provided an FY2000 appropriation for P.L. 106-78 does not include a provision that would have exempted agricultural exports fromeconomic sanctions that the United States imposes on certain countries for foreignpolicy reasons. 105-185 ),or for the Fund for Rural America. The amount in P.L.106-78 is lower than both the House and Senate level primarily because of a"downward re-estimate" of required funding for the food stamp program. P.L.106-78 provides: (1) $19.6 billion for food stamp expenses, which is $500 millionbelow the original request, and reflects a re-estimate of the needs of the program; (2)$100 million for the food stamp contingency reserve, instead of the $1 billionproposed by the Administration; (3) no advance funding for FY2001 (compared with$4.8 billion proposed by the Administration); and (4) $1.27 billion, the same as theAdministration and the House and Senate bills for Nutrition Assistance for PuertoRico. Included in P.L. | The FY2000 appropriations bill ( P.L. 106-78 , H.R. 1906 ) for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and related agencies was signed into law on October 22, 1999. P.L. 106-78 contains regular (non-emergency) appropriations of $60.559 billion, which is $2 billion below theAdministration request, but nearly $6 billion above the FY1999 level. Just over three-fourths($46.57 billion) of the total amount in the act is classified as mandatory spending (primarily foodstamps and farm programs funded through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation), which inessence is governed by authorizing statutes and is out of the direct control of appropriators. Theremaining spending of $13.988 billion is for discretionary programs, which require an annualappropriation.
In addition to the regular appropriations, P.L. 106-78 provides $8.7 billion in emergency spending for farm income and disaster assistance, including $5.5 billion in direct payments to grainand cotton farmers and $1.2 billion in natural disaster assistance. An additional $576 million in farmdisaster assistance, primarily in response to damage caused by Hurricane Floyd, is included in theFY2000 consolidated appropriations act ( P.L. 106-113 , H.R. 3194 ) signed into law onNovember 29, 1999. Controversial dairy policy provisions that were considered but not included in P.L. 106-78 are part of P.L. 106-113 , including a 2-year extension of the Northeast dairy compactand a mandate that USDA adopt a milk pricing scheme for fluid farm milk that is close to currentprice levels. P.L. 106-113 also includes a 0.38% across-the-board cut in total discretionary budgetauthority for FY2000, which will require a $49 million cut within USDA and a $4 million cut inFDA programs, with specific cuts to be determined by the Administration.
Exclusive of the FY2000 emergency spending provisions, most of the difference between the FY1999 and FY2000 enacted levels in P.L. 106-78 is explained by a $5.9 billion increase in therequested appropriation for the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The CCC is the fundingmechanism for the commodity support programs and farm disaster assistance. It borrows directlyfrom the Treasury and subsequently requests an appropriation for a reimbursement of its net losses. CCC spending was at a 12-year high in FY1999, because of a weak farm economy and regionalnatural disasters, and some $6 billion in supplemental spending approved by the Congress in FY1999for emergency assistance to farmers.
To stay within the measure's allocation for discretionary spending, P.L. 106-78 contains spending restrictions for several mandatory programs, including a new research program, certainconservation programs, and the Fund for Rural America. Separately, conferees deleted a provisionin the House bill that would have prevented FDA from using any FY2000 funds for the approvalof RU-486, or any other drug to induce abortion. P.L. 106-78 also does not include a Senate-passedprovision that would have exempted the export of agricultural and medical products from currentand future unilateral trade sanctions on Cuba and other countries.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science and Industry; G&F = Government and Finance; DSP= Domestic Social Policy. |
crs_R41466 | crs_R41466_0 | There was also the potential for an antitrust action for restraints of trade or fraud prosecutions by the Department of Justice (DOJ). The principal purpose of the 1977 Act was to prevent corporate bribery of foreign officials. It had three major provisions to attempt to accomplish this purpose. It was argued that, in nations in which acceptance of a fee or payment by a government official from one doing business with the government is customary and not unlawful under the laws of that nation, no violation of a United States law should occur. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988
In response to these criticisms, Congress for a number of years considered amending the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. After considerable debate through at least three Congresses, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 were signed into law as Title V of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 on August 23, 1988. Although the amendments maintained the three major parts of the 1977 Act discussed above—the accounting standards, the requirements of SEC registered issuers, and the anti-bribery provisions—the 1988 amendments made some significant changes to the 1977 Act. Section 5002 of the Trade Act amended Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to provide that no criminal liability shall be imposed for violation of the accounting standards unless a person knowingly circumvents or knowingly fails to implement a system of accurate and reasonable accounting controls. However, the "knowing" requirement was intended to encompass the "conscious disregard" and "willful blindness" standards, including a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1998
In 1998 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was again amended in order to implement the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions. The 1998 Amendments expanded the scope of persons covered to include certain foreign nationals, such as any officer of a public international organization. The 1998 Amendments also extended the act's jurisdiction beyond the borders of the United States. For example, during the 111 th Congress, there was interest in prohibiting businesses convicted of violating the Act from receiving government contracts. 3588 would have debarred persons found guilty of violating the FCPA from contracting with the federal government. H.R. 616 in the 114 th Congress would provide that the FCPA shall apply to any immigrant visa application under Section 203(b)(5)of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive Branch Enforcement
The executive branch has conducted oversight of American businesses for alleged violations of the act. Both the DOJ and the SEC have brought actions under their shared enforcement authority. It has been reported that DOJ is intensifying its efforts to find violators of the FCPA. | The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) was enacted principally to prevent corporate bribery of foreign officials. This act had three major parts: (1) it required the keeping by corporations of accurate books, records, and accounts; (2) it required issuers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission to maintain a responsible internal accounting control system; and (3) it prohibited bribery by American corporations of foreign officials.
For a number of years after passage of the act, Congress debated amending it in response to numerous criticisms. On August 23, 1988, the President signed into law the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, of which Title V is known as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988.
The amendments maintained the three major parts of the 1977 Act, but significant changes were made. One of these changes enacted a "knowing" standard in order to find violations of the act. This standard was intended to encompass "conscious disregard" and "willful blindness." The amendments provided certain defenses against finding violations of the act, such as that the gift is lawful under the laws of the foreign country and that the gift is a bona fide and reasonable expenditure or for the performance or execution of a contract with the foreign government.
In 1998 the act was further amended in order to implement the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. These amendments expanded the scope of coverage to include some foreign persons and extended jurisdiction beyond the borders of the United States.
Criticisms of the act have continued. There have been, for example, suggestions that businesses convicted of violating the FCPA should be debarred from receiving federal government contracts. Bills specifically amending the FCPA were introduced in the 111th and 112th Congresses. In the 113th and 114th Congresses, there appear to be bills only tangentially mentioning the act. For example, H.R. 616, 114th Congress, would provide that the FCPA shall apply to any immigrant visa application under Section 203(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The executive branch has brought actions for alleged violations of the Act. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) share enforcement authority—DOJ, primarily enforcement of criminal provisions; SEC, civil provisions. There have been a number of settlements and indictments, resulting in both successes and losses for the federal government. It has been reported that DOJ is intensifying its efforts to prosecute violators of the FCPA. |
crs_R41860 | crs_R41860_0 | Under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, the federal government provides funds to states, tribes, and territories for the provision of services to children and their families, whether those children are living in their own homes (biological, adoptive, or extended); have been removed from their homes and placed in temporary foster care settings; or have left foster care for any reason. Title IV-B funds are provided primarily through two formula grant programs. In FY2014, these two programs received combined federal funding of $649 million, of which $269 million was for CWS and $380 million was for the PSSF program. Funding authorization for the CWS and PSSF programs was most recently extended (through the last day of FY2016) by the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act (2011, P.L. Children depend on adults—usually their parents—to protect, support, and nurture them in their homes. The broadest mission of public child welfare agencies is to strengthen all families in ways that ensure children can depend on their parents to protect their safety, provide them with a stable and permanent home, and ensure their well-being. More specifically, public child welfare agencies are expected to identify families where children are at risk of abuse or neglect and to provide services to prevent maltreatment. Public child welfare agencies are also expected to identify children who have been abused and neglected and to provide services and supports necessary to ensure no further maltreatment occurs. Again, these services might be provided while the child remains living in his/her parent's home or might mean moving the child to foster care. CWS funds may be used to provide case planning and review services to children in foster care (without regard to their federal foster care (Title IV-E) eligibility status) and both CWS and PSSF funds may be used to provide other services to children in foster care and their families (e.g., parenting skills training or substance abuse treatment to promote reunification). The CWS and PSSF programs under Title IV-B have overlapping purposes and may be used to fund some, but not all, of the same services. At the same time, they have distinct program requirements, funding, and funding distribution methods. Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services Program (CWS)
Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act (Sections 420-425, 428)
The CWS program provides funds to states, territories, and tribes and is intended to "promote state flexibility" to develop and expand a program of services to children and families that uses community-based agencies and works to
protect and promote the welfare of all children; prevent abuse, neglect or exploitation of children; permit children to remain in their own homes, or to return to those homes whenever it is safe and appropriate; promote safety, permanency, and well-being for children in foster care or those in adoptive families; and provide training, professional development, and support to ensure a well-qualified child welfare workforce. States also planned to spend more than 38% of their FY2013 CWS funds on the four categories of services (family support, family preservation, time-limited family reunification, and adoption promotion and support) for which they are required to spend the majority of funds they received under the PSSF program (the program is described later in this report). A state must also assure under its CWS plan that each child in foster care has a written case plan that is regularly reviewed, outlines the child's permanency goals, and provides other protections for children in foster care. Use of PSSF Funds for Child and Family Services
For FY2014, states, territories and tribes received $305 million in federal funds to support four categories of services:
Family support services are meant to strengthen families and enable children to safely remain in their own homes; Family preservation services target the same kinds of services on families where a child is at high risk of being removed from the home, or where the child has been removed and the goal is to reunite the child and his/her parents. States are required to spend a "significant portion" of program funding on each of those four categories of child and family services and, their combined spending on all four categories must be no less than 90% of the federal PSSF child and family services funding they receive. At the same time, three of the four categories of services for which states must spend the majority of their federal PSSF funds target services, in whole or in part, on children in, or formerly in, foster care and the families of those children. 112-34 ), Congress extended the provisions targeting PSSF funds for these purposes through FY2016. | Children depend on adults—usually their parents—to protect, support, and nurture them in their homes. The broadest mission of public child welfare agencies is to strengthen all families in ways that ensure children can depend on their parents to protect their safety, ensure they have a stable and permanent home, and enhance their well-being. More specifically, public child welfare agencies are expected to identify families where children are at risk of abuse or neglect and to provide services to prevent maltreatment. Public child welfare agencies are also expected to identify children who have been abused and neglected and to provide services and supports necessary to ensure no further maltreatment occurs. These services may be provided while the child remains living in his/her parent's home or, if an out-of-home placement is necessary to ensure the child's safety, while the child is living in foster care.
Under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, the federal government provides funds to states, tribes, and territories to help ensure children's safety, permanence, and well-being through the provision of child welfare-related services to children and their families. These services may be made available to any child, and his or her family, and without regard to whether the child is living in his or her own home, living in foster care, or was previously living in foster care. Title IV-B funds are primarily distributed to states via two formula grant programs. Combined FY2014 federal funding for these two programs—the Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services (CWS or Subpart 1) and the Promoting Safe and Stable Families (PSSF or Subpart 2) program—was $649 million ($269 million for CWS and $380 million for PSSF). Funding for these two programs, which represented 94% of the total $689 million in federal FY2014 funding provided for all programs and activities under Title IV-B, has been declining in recent years.
The CWS and PSSF programs have overlapping purposes and are used to fund some of the same services. At the same time, the programs have distinct federal requirements and spending patterns. Many requirements under the CWS program are specific to protecting and otherwise ensuring the safety and permanency of children in foster care. By contrast, requirements under the PSSF program primarily focus on state planning for the delivery of child and family services for a broader population, including setting goals and regularly reviewing progress toward those goals.
Under the CWS program states must ensure provision of case review and permanency planning for each child in foster care, including those children who do not meet the federal eligibility criteria to receive those services under the Title IV-E foster care program. Spending for "protective services"—including child abuse and neglect investigations; caseworker visits to, and permanency planning for, children in foster care; and other activities—represents the largest share of federal funds expended under the CWS program. Combined, states anticipated spending close to 41% of their federal FY2013 CWS funding on that purpose. At the same time, they expected to spend close to that same share of CWS funding (more than 38%) on the four categories of child and family services for which they are required to use their PSSF funding (i.e., family support, family preservation, time-limited family reunification, and adoption promotion and support).
States are required to spend no less than 90% of their PSSF child and family services funds on four categories of services. Family support services are considered "upfront" spending in that these dollars are spent to strengthen families so that children's developmental needs are met and neither abuse nor neglect occurs. The three remaining categories for which states must spend their PSSF funds target some, or all, services on children in foster care and their families: Family preservation services may be used to prevent a child's placement in foster care, or to help children in care reunite with their parents. Time-limited family reunification services and adoption promotion and support services target children in foster care—either to permit their expeditious return home or, when this is not possible, to find them a new adoptive home. Adoption support services may also be used to provide post-adoption services to children living in new permanent families.
In November 2011 (P.L. 112-34), Congress extended funding authorization for the CWS and PSSF programs through the last day of FY2016. |
crs_RS22881 | crs_RS22881_0 | Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 4121 imposes an excise tax on domestically-mined coal when it is sold by the producer to the first purchaser. In 1998, a federal district court held that the tax on such coal clearly violated the Export Clause. Claims for Damages Under the Export Clause
Some coal producers and exporters brought suits under the Export Clause seeking damages from the United States in the amount of unconstitutional coal excise taxes they paid. They brought the suits in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that it had jurisdiction to hear them under the Tucker Act. In a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co. , the Supreme Court held that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax must comply with the IRC refund process. Legislation in the 110th Congress
The Senate-passed version of H.R. 6049 , § 114 (Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) and H.R. 7060 , § 114 (Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008), passed by the House on September 26, 2008, would provide an alternative administrative procedure for refunding the unconstitutionally-imposed coal excise tax. | In 1998, a U.S. district court held that the imposition of the coal excise tax, or black lung excise tax, on exported coal was unconstitutional. Refunding the tax has been controversial. This is because some coal producers and exporters attempted to bypass the limitations in the Internal Revenue Code's refund scheme by bringing suit under the Export Clause in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking damages from the United States in the amount of coal excise taxes paid. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held there was Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear some of the suits and allowed them as an alternative to the Code's refund process. However, in a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., the Supreme Court held that taxpayers must comply with the Code's refund process. Meanwhile, several bills would provide an alternative method for coal excise tax refunds, including the amended version of H.R. 6049 (Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) that was passed by the Senate on September 23, 2008, and H.R. 7060 (Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008), which was passed by the House on September 26, 2008. |
crs_R42555 | crs_R42555_0 | Introduction
On January 13, 2012, President Obama asked Congress for authority to reorganize and consolidate into one department the business- and trade-related functions and programs of six federal entities: Department of Commerce; Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank); Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); Small Business Administration (SBA); Trade and Development Agency (TDA); and Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). U.S. policy interest in the organizational structure of U.S. government trade functions has grown in recent years, stimulated by congressional and federal efforts to promote U.S. exports and employment, including through the National Export Initiative (NEI), in response to the global and U.S. economic downturn; concerns about the international competitive position of U.S. industries vis-à-vis emerging markets, such as China, Brazil, and India; efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of government service by reducing duplication of functions and improving coordination; national debates on reducing federal spending and the size of the U.S. government; and concerns about the size of the U.S. trade balance. Members of Congress would play a significant role in a trade reorganization debate through their legislative and oversight responsibilities. Congress could conduct oversight, engage in consultations with the Administration, hold hearings, grant reorganizational authority to the President, introduce and enact trade reorganization legislation separate from the President's plan, and/or consider other policy alternatives. He may resubmit his request for reorganizational authority in the 113 th Congress. The President's FY2014 budget request for the six agencies in the proposed reorganization reflects the current organizational structure of U.S. trade functions. Previous Legislative Proposals Related to Trade Reorganization23
Trade reorganization has been a recurring theme in various Administrations and Congresses. Legislation introduced focused largely on creating some form of a "Department of Trade" that included consolidation of the USTR and the trade-related functions of the Department of Commerce and other agencies. These proposals were motivated by efforts to reduce federal spending and eliminate institutions and functions deemed to be unnecessary or duplicative or considered to be subsidies for U.S. businesses. Rationales for Trade Reorganization
Rationales for the reorganization of U.S. trade functions tend to be derived from the assumption that the structure of the U.S. trade policy apparatus constrains the effectiveness of U.S. trade policy. Some opponents of trade reorganization contend that, while changes in trade policy—and by extension the policymaking structure—may benefit individual U.S. businesses and workers in the short-run, they have little influence in the long-run on U.S. export and employment levels and trade balances. Some General Pros and Cons of Trade Reorganization
Public policy debate about trade reorganization generally is rooted in a central question of whether trade reorganization would enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. trade policy and administration structure or merely result in a superficial exercise of bureaucratic reshuffling. In addition, opponents assert that the diffusion of trade functions across the government helps to advance the diverse range of interest in U.S. trade policy by providing specialized support, such as for small businesses and agricultural exporters. Some also express concern that the federal government's capacity to negotiate trade policy could be constrained under the proposed reorganization. Maintain Status Quo
Congress could consider maintaining the current trade policy structure. Privatize or Terminate Certain Trade Functions
Policy debate about the arrangement of trade functions in the U.S. trade policy apparatus has been related to questions about whether the federal government should even be involved in carrying out certain functions. One option could be to strengthen existing coordinating bodies for trade functions. | On January 13, 2012, President Obama asked Congress for authority to reorganize and consolidate, into one department, the business- and trade-related functions of six federal entities: Department of Commerce; Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank); Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); Small Business Administration (SBA); Trade and Development Agency (TDA); and Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). Bills based on the proposal were introduced in the 112th Congress. The President reiterated the proposal in his FY2014 budget request, and he may resubmit his request for reorganizational authority in the 113th Congress. U.S. policymakers' interest in the organizational structure of U.S. government trade functions has grown in recent years, stimulated by federal efforts to promote U.S. exports and employment, as well as national debates on reducing federal spending and the size of the U.S. government.
Reorganization has been a recurring theme in U.S. trade policy. Over the past several decades, Congress, successive Administrations, and other stakeholders have crafted and debated proposals to reorganize the trade functions and structure of the federal government in order to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. trade policy and promotion efforts; improve U.S. trade policy coordination; avoid duplication of functions and activities; boost the international competitiveness of U.S. industries; and for other reasons. Previous proposals have called for a range of actions, including consolidation of all U.S. export- or trade-related programs under one federal agency (such as a "Department of Trade") to provide a "one-stop-shop" for the trade community; termination or transfer of functions of departments and agencies considered to be duplicative or unnecessary to U.S. trade policy priorities; and strengthening coordination of federal trade-related agencies.
Debates about the U.S. trade policy structure raise the question of whether reorganization would enhance the effectiveness of U.S. trade policy or merely result in bureaucratic reshuffling. On one hand, proponents of reorganization proposals believe that they may eliminate duplication of federal trade functions, provide a more streamlined organizational structure for U.S. trade-related activities and policy based on more clearly defined goals and priorities, and reduce overall government costs. They argue that federal trade policy efforts could be enhanced through a more centralized government body. On the other hand, critics contend that such proposals could result in the creation of a large, costly federal bureaucracy, possibly making certain trade functions and agencies less effective if they are subsumed in a larger bureaucracy. They also assert that the diffusion of trade functions across the federal government helps to advance various aspects of U.S. trade policy, and express concern that a "one-stop" federal source may not be responsive to the unique needs of certain types of exporters. Furthermore, some contend that, while changes to U.S. trade policy—and by extension the policymaking structure—may benefit individual U.S. businesses and workers in the short-run, they have little influence in the long-run on U.S. export and employment levels and trade balances, which relate more closely to macroeconomic factors.
Congress would play a significant role in a trade reorganization debate through its legislative and oversight responsibilities; it could engage in consultations with the Administration, hold hearings, grant reorganizational authority to the President, and/or introduce and enact trade reorganization legislation separate from the President's plan. In addition to considering possible reorganizational authority for the executive branch, Congress could consider policy alternatives such as to maintain the current trade organizational structure, privatize or terminate certain trade functions, strengthen or revise existing coordination of trade functions, or create a trade reorganization commission to examine the issue further. |
crs_98-311 | crs_98-311_0 | Introduction
The Senate imposes some general procedural requirements and prohibitions on its committees, but, in general, the Senate's rules allow each of its standing committees to decide how to conduct business. Most of the chamber's requirements for committees are found in Senate Rule XXVI. Because the committees are agents of the Senate, they are obligated to comply with all Senate directives that apply to them. This report identifies and summarizes the provisions of the Senate's standing rules, standing orders, precedents, and other directives that relate to legislative activity in the Senate's standing committees. The report covers four main issues: committee organization, committee meetings, hearings, and reporting. The coverage of this report is limited to requirements and prohibitions that are of direct and general applicability to most or all Senate committees, as they consider most legislative matters. Scheduling meetings ; Standing Orders of the Senate; Section 401 of S.Res. This provision does not apply to the Appropriations Committee. | The Senate imposes some general procedural requirements and prohibitions on its committees, but, in general, the Senate's rules allow each of its standing committees to decide how to conduct business. Most of the chamber's requirements for committees are found in Senate Rule XXVI. Because the committees are agents of the Senate, they are obligated to comply with all Senate directives that apply to them.
This report identifies and summarizes the provisions of the Senate's standing rules, standing orders, precedents, and other directives that relate to legislative activity in the Senate's standing committees. The report covers four main issues: committee organization, committee meetings, hearings, and reporting. The coverage of this report is limited to requirements and prohibitions that are of direct and general applicability to most or all Senate committees as they consider most legislative matters.
The report does not cover any special provisions contained in Senate resolutions concerning the Select Committee on Ethics, the Select Committee on Intelligence, or the Special Committee on Aging. Similarly, it does not encompass other provisions of law or the Senate's rules or standing orders that apply to (1) only one committee, such as the provisions of Rule XVI governing appropriations measures and the provisions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act governing budget resolutions and reconciliation and rescission measures; or (2) only certain limited classes of measures, such as provisions of the Congressional Accountability Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. |
crs_RS22700 | crs_RS22700_0 | As such, the agreement is considered a "conspiracy in restraint of trade" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The practice, particularly when a floor has been set under permissible resale prices ( minimum RPM), has been considered a per se violation of the antitrust laws since 1911, when the Court decided in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company that such imposition and agreement was not analytically different from an agreement among the dealers themselves to fix their prices, thus depriving consumers of the advantages of competition. It required the plaintiff in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. to provide evidence of activity on the part of the manufacturer and the non-terminated dealer that "tends to exclude the possibility that [they] were acting independently" (465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). Finally, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. the Court determined that neither (1) all of those agreements which affect price (because nearly all vertical agreements do), nor (2) all of those which contain the word "price" should be treated as per se violations. Per se illegality should be reserved for only those restraints that include "some [express or implied] agreement on price or price levels" (485 U.S. 717, 719, 728 (1988)). Notwithstanding that the per se treatment of maximum RPM had been in effect for approximately 30 years, Justice O'Connor noted, the Court had never been confronted with an "unadulterated" maximum RPM arrangement, and so found the "conceptual foundations [of that rule to be] gravely weakened." Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.7
Continuing the erosion of its precedents in the law of vertical restraints/RPM, a divided (5-4) Court overruled Dr. at 2709. Although the lawfulness of particular practices is often determined pursuant to the Rule of Reason, they acknowledged, there are some practices whose "likely anticompetitive consequences" are either so serious, with so few possible justifications, or whose justifications are "so difficult to prove [that] this Court has imposed a rule of per se unlawfulness—a rule that instructs courts to find the practice unlawful all (or nearly all) of the time" (127 S.Ct. 2652, 2007 WL 1804336), "argues [here] against overturning Dr. Miles " (127 S.Ct. at 2737. | The plaintiff in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. successfully asked the Supreme Court to soften the longstanding treatment of resale price maintenance (RPM, vertical imposition of direct, minimum price restraints) as a per se (automatic, and not capable of being justified) antitrust offense. RPM had been so analyzed since the Court decided in 1911 that a manufacturer of patent medicines could not lawfully agree with retailers of its products on the prices at which those products would be sold (Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373). Such agreements, the Court had said in Dr. Miles, constituted both unlawful restraints of trade under the common law, and violations of the Sherman Act's prohibition against "contract[s] or combination[s] ... in restraint of trade" (15 U.S.C. § 1). Leegin's practice of entering into contracts with its retailers of the Brighton line of leather products to set the prices at which the dealers would resell those products was challenged by a discounting retailer whose replacement shipments were terminated; the trial court found a per se violation of section 1 (2004 WL 5254322), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision (171 Fed.Appx. 464 (2006)). Leegin argued in the Supreme Court that because RPM may sometimes be pro-consumer (might, for example, allow the retailers to profitably provide extra services desired by some consumers), the practice should not be conclusively presumed unreasonable "without elaborate inquiry as to 'its precise harm or business justification for its use.'" Agreeing with Leegin, the Court overruled Dr. Miles, stating that allowing RPM to be analyzed as a Rule of Reason violation (pursuant to which the procompetitive effects of a judicially determined antitrust violation are weighed against the anticompetitive results of the challenged activity) should be allowed: "Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that [RPM] always tend[s] to restrict competition ...." 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2709 (2007), quoting, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32186 | crs_RL32186_0 | (a) In General.âExcept as provided in subsection (b), this title and the amendments made by this title (other than sections 203(a) 203(c), 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219, 221, and 222, and the amendments made by those sections) shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005. H.R. Introduction
Subsection 224(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act (the act) indicates that various sections in Title II of the act are to remain in effect only until March 10, 2006. What is a "potential offense"? 1030 (computer fraud and abuse) on the list; section 201 contributes:
18 U.S.C. The subsections use the same definitions for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and foreign intelligence information:
The term "foreign intelligence information" means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect againstâ
âactual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or its agent;
âsabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent; or
âclandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates toâ
âthe national defense or the security of the United States; or
âthe conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. It split off the grand jury components from the second proposal, and permitted sharing of grand jury matters only with court approval, §§154, 353, H.R. Permanent authority elsewhere allows for law enforcement sharing. What Does Not Expire
The authority under section 204 ends on March 10, 2006 except for investigations relating to offenses or potential offenses begun or occurring before then. The content provision has been repealed and replaced; the records provision has not, 18 U.S.C. Section 220 (Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence)
Before the act, federal authorities could gain access to a communications service provider's customer records and the content of their electronic communications either through the use of a search warrant or in some instances a court order, 18 U.S.C. Section 207 (Duration of FISA Surveillance of Non-United States Persons Who Are Agents of a Foreign Power)
Under FISA before passage of the act, FISA wiretap orders with the agent of a foreign power as their target had a maximum duration of 90 days, and could be extended in 90 day increments, 50 U.S.C. There are no subsequent amendments to the act or to FISA that alter the consequences of that reversion, but the impact of expiration may be mitigated by changes in the law governing "national security letters" that provide access to a wider range of business records after sunset. What Does Not Expire
Section 218 sunsets on March 10, 2006 except with respect to foreign intelligence investigations initiated before that date. However, the USA PATRIOT Act, along with changes in Attorney General Guidelines and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court procedures, brought down this wall separating intelligence from law enforcement and greatly enhanced foreign intelligence information sharing among federal law enforcement and national security personnel, intelligence agencies, and other entities entrusted with protecting the nation from acts of terrorism. The wall prevented effective communication and cooperation in terrorism cases; removal has been beneficial. Section 223 (Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized Disclosures)
Section 223 is discussed above. USA PATRIOT Act Sections of Title II That Do Not Expire
Subsection 224(a) cites several sections and subsections of Title II that are not subject to its declaration of sunset. 3103a(b); section 216 (modification of authorities relating to the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices) ((1) modifies the pen register/trap and trace device procedureâthe procedure for court orders authorizing law enforcement installation and use of pen registers or trap and trace devices (essentially surreptitious caller id devices that identify only the source and destination of telephone calls)âto apply to electronic communications (e.g., e-mail addresses and Internet URL's); and (2) permits execution of the orders anywhere within the United States, rather than only in the judicial district in which the order is issued), 18 U.S.C. | Several sections of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act (the act) and one section of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act each relating to enhanced foreign intelligence and law enforcement surveillance authority were to expire on December 31, 2005; their expiration date has been postponed until March 10, 2006. The authority remains in effect only with respect to foreign intelligence investigations begun before sunset or to offenses or potential offense begun or occurring before that date. Aside from the fact there may be some disagreement of whether a "potential offense" is a suspected crime, and/or an incomplete crime, and/or a future crime, after March 10, 2006 the law reverts to its previous form unless it has been amended or extended in the interim.
The consequences of sunset are not the same for every expiring section. In some instances the temporary provision has been replaced with a permanent one; in some, other provisions have been made temporary by attachment to an expiring section; in still others, the apparent impact of termination has been mitigated by related provisions either in the act or elsewhere.
The temporary provisions are: sections 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases), 202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony cases), 203(b) (sharing wiretap information), 203(d) (sharing foreign intelligence information), 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen register/trap & trace exceptions), 206 (roving FISA wiretaps), 207 (duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power), 209 (seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants), 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance), 214 (FISA pen register/ trap and trace authority), 215 (FISA access to tangible items), 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications), 218 (purpose for FISA orders), 220 (nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence), 223 (civil liability and discipline for privacy violations), and 225 (provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance); and in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, section 6001 ("lone wolf" FISA orders).
The unimpaired provisions of Title II are: sections 203(a)(sharing grand jury information), 203(c)(procedures for grand jury and wiretap information sharing that identifies U.S. persons), 205 (employment of translators by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), 208 (adding 3 judges to FISA court), 210 (access to payment source information from communications providers), 211 (communications services by cable companies), 213 (sneak and peek warrants), 216 (law enforcement pen register/ trap and trace changes), 219 (single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism), 221 (trade sanctions), and 222 (provider assistance to law enforcement agencies). This report is available in an abridged version (without its footnotes, chart, and most of its citations to authority) as CRS Report RS21704, USA PATRIOT Act Sunset: A Sketch . Related reports include CRS Report RL33239, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 3199): Section-by-Section Analysis of the Conference Bill , and CRS Report RS22348, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 3199): A Brief Look ). |
crs_RL33177 | crs_RL33177_0 | Introduction
Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses wasnormally included in general insurance policies without a specific premium being paid. In response to the new appreciation of the threat and the perceived inability to calculate theprobability and loss data critical for pricing insurance, both primary insurers and reinsurers pulledback from offering terrorism coverage. Many argued that terrorism risk is essentially uninsurableby the private market due to the uncertainty and potentially massive losses involved. Becauseinsurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, many feared that a lack of insuranceagainst terrorism loss would have wider economic impact, particularly on large-scale developmentsin urban areas that would be tempting targets for terrorism. Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism RiskInsurance Act of 2002 (1) (TRIA), which was signed by the President in November 2002. TRIA created the Terrorism RiskInsurance Program, which was enacted as a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, to calmthe insurance markets through a government backstop for terrorism losses and give the privateindustry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insuranceto cover terrorism risk. Terrorism insurance has become widely available under TRIA and the insurance industry hasgreatly expanded its financial capacity in the past three years. Legislative Action
Congress responded to the impending expiration of TRIA with two different bills thatinitially passed the respective houses. The Senate bill, Senator Christopher Dodd's S. 467 , was approved by the Senate on November, 18, 2005. The large majority of the language fromthe House bill, Representative Richard Baker's H.R. 4314 , was inserted into S.467 and passed by the House on December 7, 2005. S. 467 was entitled theTerrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act, whereas H.R. 4314 was entitled the TerrorismRisk Insurance Revision Act and the titles did reflect essential differences between the two bills. As amended, S. 467 would have extended the current program two years andfurther increased the private sector's exposure to terrorism risk over the life of the act, as did theoriginal legislation. During the three years covered by the initial act, insurance industry deductiblesand aggregate retention rose each year. S. 467 continued to increase these. It would havealso reduced the types of insurance covered by the program and increased the size of a terrorist eventnecessary to trigger the program. 4314)
H.R. In the case of a terrorist act, the deductibles and event triggers would havereset to lower levels, with deductibles possibly as low as 5% in the event of a large attack. | Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses wasnormally included in general insurance policies without cost to policyholders. Following the attacks,both primary insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage, citing particularlyan inability to calculate the probability and loss data critical for insurance pricing. Some argued thatterrorism risk would never be insurable by the private market due to the uncertainty and potentiallymassive losses involved. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, it wasfeared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have wider economic impact.
Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism RiskInsurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA created a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, tocalm the insurance markets through a government backstop for terrorism losses and to give theprivate industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for privateinsurance to cover terrorism risk. From 2002 to 2005, terrorism insurance became widely availableand largely affordable, and the insurance industry greatly expanded its financial capacity. There was,however, little apparent success on a longer term private solution and fears persisted about widereconomic consequences if insurance were not available. To a large degree, the same concerns andarguments that accompanied the initial passage of TRIA were before Congress as it considered TRIAextension legislation.
Congress responded to the impending expiration of TRIA with the passage of two differentbills. The Senate bill, S. 467 , was approved by the Senate on November 18, 2005. Thelarge majority of the language from the House bill, H.R. 4314 , was inserted into S.467 and passed by the House on December 7, 2005. S. 467 was titled theTerrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act, whereas H.R. 4314 was titled the Terrorism RiskInsurance Revision Act. These titles did reflect essential differences between the two bills. S.467 extended the current program by two years and further increased the private sector'sexposure to terrorism risk, as did the original act. (During the three years covered by the initial act,insurance industry deductibles and aggregate retention rose each year.) S. 467 continuedto increase these and also reduced the types of insurance covered by the program and increased thesize of terrorist event necessary to trigger the program. H.R. 4314 extended the programfor two or possibly three years and substantially revised many aspects of it. Among the notablechanges, it excluded some lines of coverage and included others that were not covered before. Itsegmented lines of insurance, introducing different deductibles for different lines. It included theconcept of resetting the deductibles and the trigger amount to lower amounts if a terrorist attackoccurs in the future. The final version signed into law closely tracked the Senate legislation.
This report briefly outlines the issues involved with terrorism insurance and includes aside-by-side of the initial TRIA, TRIA-extension legislation as considered in the House and Senate,and the final bill as signed by the President. It will not be updated. |
crs_RL34223 | crs_RL34223_0 | Introduction
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." The language is commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The two clauses serve to balance the collective freedom so that the government may neither coerce nor prohibit citizens' participation in religion. The U.S. Supreme Court historically has rendered its decisions on both clauses without applying bright line rules. Since taking office in 2001, President George W. Bush has implemented the Faith-Based Initiative, which has brought several First Amendment issues to the Court. The Charitable Choice legislation of the 1990s provides public funding to religious organizations with a social purpose. Furthermore, the makeup of the Court has changed, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. This may result in a shift in the Court's understanding of the religion clauses. In sum, political events have continued to raise church-state issues in the Court. In conclusion, in the cases that the Court has considered, the balance between non-establishment and free exercise continues to be debated on a case-by-case basis. The Court has decided somewhat similar cases differently, with the outcome turning on the details, implying that specific context may be the most determinative factor in church-state jurisprudence. | The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." The language is commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The two clauses serve to balance the collective freedom so that the government may neither coerce nor prohibit citizens' participation in religion. The U.S. Supreme Court historically has rendered its decisions on both clauses without applying brightline rules.
Political developments have raised new questions of church-state relations. Since taking office in 2001, President George W. Bush has implemented the Faith-Based Initiative, which has brought several First Amendment issues to the Court. Legislation provides vouchers for private schools and public funding to religious organizations with a social purpose. Furthermore, the makeup of the Court has changed, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. This may result in a shift in the Court's understanding of the religion clauses.
In the cases decided in the midst of these changes, the balance between non-establishment and free exercise continues to be decided on the basis of the facts specific to each case. The Court has decided somewhat similar cases differently, with the outcome turning on the details, suggesting that specific context may be the most determinative factor in church-state decisions. This report explains the holdings of each of the Court's church-state cases since 2002, and also explains the position of Justices who concurred in the judgments or dissented in each case.
This report is intended to supplement CRS Report 98-65, The Law of Church and State: Developments in the Supreme Court Since 1980, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf) (last updated in 2002). It will be updated as the Supreme Court renders relevant new decisions. |
crs_RL32877 | crs_RL32877_0 | Will Budget Deficits Constrain Long-Term Defense Budget Plans? * Administration projections. Figures for FY2005 and beyond do not include additionalsupplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, while the FY2004 figures includes such funds. National Defense Budget Authority and Outlays, FY1950-FY2010
This relatively modest pace comes after several years of substantially higher growth. Should Further Increases in Military Pay and Benefits be Restrained? The rate of increase in personnelcosts may slow over the next few years, though starting from a higher base than just a few years ago,provided Congress does not authorize additional major increases in personnel benefits. Will Increasing Operation and Maintenance Costs Compete with Weapons Modernization? Many things explain the trend: (1) the steadilygrowing cost of operating and maintaining new generations of more capable and sophisticatedweapons; (2) efforts to improve the extent and quality of military training; (3) efforts to ensure thatthe quality of life in the military keeps up with the quality of life in the civilian sector as the militaryhas shifted to an all volunteer, older, more commonly married, and more skilled force; (4) the growthin health care costs for military personnel and their dependents; (5) requirements that the DefenseDepartment, like other Federal agencies and private organizations, reduce pollution and clean upearlier contamination; and (6) modest but steady real growth in the compensation of DOD civilianpersonnel, most of whom are paid with O&M funds. In the FY2006 budget, the Navy is requesting $394.5 million for "Completion of PriorYear Shipbuilding Programs," and the Navy's long-term program includes and additional $449.8million in FY2007 and $502.5 million for cost growth. Moreover, the Navy is now beginning toreestimate future shipbuilding costs in light of recent experience. What Are the Implications of Changes in Military Strategy for Budget Priorities? A final long-term question is how changes in the international environment -- and in U.S.perceptions of it -- will affect defense budget priorities. Perhaps the key issue in the QDR is to what extent Defense Department priorities may bereshaped in view of new assessments of long term challenges to U.S. security. | Over the next few months, Congress will be considering Administration requests for morethan half a trillion dollars for national defense, including money in the regular defense budget forFiscal Year 2006 (FY2006), supplemental appropriations for costs of ongoing military operationsin FY2005, and, possibly, additional funds in FY2006 to provide a "bridge" until future supplementalappropriations for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are available.
The Administration's defense budget plans face some potentially daunting, though by nomeans unprecedented, long-term challenges, including:
Will projected budget deficits constrain the Administration's long-term defensebudget plans?
Should Congress try to restrain further increases in military personnel pay andbenefits, as some Administration officials have argued, in view of dramatic increases in personnelcosts in recent years?
What are the implications of continuing, perennial increases in defenseoperation and maintenance costs for the affordability of the Administration'splan?
How affordable is the Administration's long-term plan for modernizing militaryforces in light of substantial and continuing cost growth in many systems?
How might recent widely discussed changes in defense strategy affect prioritieswithin the defense budget?
This report reviews long-term trends in the defense budget and discusses the challengesCongress and the Defense Department may face in trying to adjust plans in the face of fiscalconstraints. It will be updated periodically to reflect congressional action and new information. |
crs_R41304 | crs_R41304_0 | Introduction
On March 19, 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reissued a 1996 final rule aimed at reducing underage smoking and use of smokeless tobacco products (e.g., snuff, chewing tobacco). The agency's rulemaking was mandated by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), which was enacted in 2009 after the Supreme Court, in a 2000 case entitled FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , determined that FDA lacked statutory authority to regulate tobacco products. The new law expressly amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to give FDA broad statutory authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, advertising, sale, and use of cigarettes and other tobacco products. Among its provisions, the rule prohibits the sale of tobacco products to any person under age 18; requires retailers to verify a purchaser's age by photo ID; restricts the sale of tobacco products through vending machines and self-service displays; limits tobacco advertising in publications to which children and adolescents are exposed to a black-on-white, text-only format; prohibits the sale of tobacco brand-identified promotional items such as caps and T-shirts; and prohibits brand-name sponsorship of sporting and other cultural events. To that end, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act ( H.R. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA) was signed into law on June 22, 2009 ( P.L. 111-31 ). Finally, the FSPTCA instructed FDA to consider modifications to the original rule's ban on outdoor cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising (e.g., billboards, posters) within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds so as to address First Amendment case law, including the 2001 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly . The reissued final rule does not include the outdoor advertising ban. FDA has instead reserved a section in the rule for future rulemaking on outdoor advertising restrictions. In a separate advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the agency has requested public comment on this issue and offered several options for more narrowly tailored outdoor advertising restrictions that it believes would not violate the First Amendment. In August 2009, several tobacco companies filed a federal lawsuit against FDA claiming that the FSPTCA violated their constitutional right to commercial free speech. On January 5, 2010, a federal district court judge struck down the tobacco rule's provision that limits advertising in publications with significant youth readership to a black-on-white text-only format. Comparison of FDA Rule with the Master Settlement Agreement
The FDA rule builds on the youth access, marketing, and advertising restrictions that the tobacco companies agreed to as part of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). | On March 19, 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reissued a 1996 final rule aimed at reducing underage smoking and use of smokeless tobacco products (e.g., snuff, chewing tobacco). The agency's rulemaking was mandated by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which was enacted last year in response to a 2000 decision by the Supreme Court holding that FDA lacked the statutory authority to regulate tobacco products. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (P.L. 111-31) expressly gives FDA broad statutory authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to regulate the manufacture, distribution, advertising, sale, and use of cigarettes and other tobacco products.
The new FDA tobacco rule builds on the youth access, marketing, and advertising restrictions that the tobacco companies agreed to as part of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, which settled lawsuits filed by the states to recover the public health costs of tobacco-related illness. Among its provisions, the rule prohibits the sale of tobacco products to any person under age 18; requires retailers to verify a purchaser's age by photo ID; restricts the sale of tobacco products through vending machines and self-service displays to adult-only facilities; limits tobacco advertising in publications to which children and adolescents are exposed to a black-on-white, text-only format; prohibits the sale of tobacco brand-identified promotional items such as caps and T-shirts; and prohibits brand-name sponsorship of sporting and other cultural events. The rule became effective on June 22, 2010.
The original 1996 rule included a ban on outdoor cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising (e.g., billboards, posters) within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds. The reissued rule does not incorporate such a ban. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a similar outdoor advertising ban in Massachusetts, arguing that it violated the First Amendment protection of commercial speech. FDA has reserved a section in the reissued rule for future rulemaking on outdoor advertising restrictions. In a separate advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the agency has requested public comment on this issue and offered several options for more narrowly tailored outdoor advertising restrictions that the agency believes would not violate the First Amendment.
In August 2009, several tobacco companies filed a federal lawsuit against FDA claiming that the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act violates their constitutional right to commercial free speech. On March 19, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's decision striking down the tobacco rule's provision that limits advertising in publications with significant youth readership to a black-on-white, text-only format. |
crs_R44960 | crs_R44960_0 | Introduction
Under a growing number of consumer and employment agreements, companies are requiring disputes to be resolved through arbitration, a method of dispute resolution involving a neutral, private third party, rather than a judicial proceeding. While arbitration is often viewed as a faster and less expensive alternative to litigation, consumer advocates and others maintain that mandatory arbitration agreements create one-sided arrangements that deny consumers and employees advantages afforded by a judicial proceeding, such as the availability of a jury trial. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) was enacted in 1925 to ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements in any "maritime transaction or ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce[.]" The U.S. Supreme Court (Court) has recognized the FAA as evidencing "a national policy favoring arbitration." The application of the FAA, however, particularly in light of various state law requirements and the use of different types of arbitration agreements, has raised numerous legal questions and been the subject of several cases before the Court. Concern over a perceived lack of "meaningful choice" to decide whether to submit a claim to arbitration has also spurred recent federal regulatory action, as well as legislation that would amend the FAA to render pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable. This report examines the FAA and reviews the Court's decisions involving the statute's preemption of state law requirements. The report also explores the Court's decisions involving mandatory arbitration agreements that prohibit a consumer or employee from maintaining a class or collective action. In its October 2017 term, the Court will consider three consolidated cases that challenge such agreements on the grounds that they violate the right to engage in "other concerted activities" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The question of whether the FAA preempts a state law or judicial rule is a subject of recurring litigation that has come before the Court more than a dozen times. In these cases, the Court has routinely held that the FAA supersedes state requirements that restrain the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements. The CFPB final rule circumscribes the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in two main ways. Examples include the following:
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 ( H.R. 1374 / S. 537 ). | Arbitration is a method of legal dispute resolution in which a neutral, private third party, rather than a judge or jury, renders a decision on a particular matter. Under a growing number of consumer and employment agreements, companies have come to require arbitration to resolve disputes. While arbitration is often viewed as an expeditious and economical alternative to litigation, consumer advocates and others contend that mandatory arbitration agreements create one-sided arrangements that deny consumers and employees advantages afforded by a judicial proceeding.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 to ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements in any "maritime transaction or ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce[.]" The U.S. Supreme Court (Court) has recognized the FAA as evidencing "a national policy favoring arbitration." The application of the FAA, however, particularly in light of various state law requirements and the use of different types of arbitration agreements, has raised numerous legal questions and been the subject of several cases before the Court.
The question of whether the FAA preempts a state law or judicial rule is a subject of frequent litigation. In these cases, the Court has routinely held that the FAA supersedes state requirements that restrain the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements. This report examines the FAA and reviews the Court's decisions involving the statute's preemption of state law requirements. The report also explores the Court's decisions involving mandatory arbitration agreements that prohibit a consumer or employee from maintaining a class or collective action. In its October 2017 term, the Court will consider three consolidated cases that challenge such agreements on the grounds that they violate the right to engage in "other concerted activities" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Finally, concern over a perceived lack of "meaningful choice" to decide whether to submit a claim to arbitration has prompted regulatory activity, as well as legislation that would amend the FAA to render certain types of pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable. The report discusses some recent examples of federal regulatory action that aim to restrict the use of mandatory arbitration in the consumer arena, and reviews bills like the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 (H.R. 1374/S. 537), which would prohibit the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that requires arbitration for an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute if the agreement was executed prior to the dispute's occurrence. |
crs_R43764 | crs_R43764_0 | Introduction and Background
Recent high-profile incidents of sexual violence on campus have heightened congressional and administrative scrutiny of the policies and procedures that institutions of higher education (IHEs) use to address such violence. Meanwhile, legislators have introduced several bills that seek to strengthen or build on existing laws pertaining to campus sexual violence, including, in the 114 th Congress, the Campus Accountability and Safety Act (CASA, H.R. Currently, there are two federal statutes that address sexual violence on college campuses: the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, as amended (Clery Act), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). Sexual Violence at IHEs
Campus sexual violence is a widely acknowledged problem. These estimates vary considerably across studies. Under Clery, all public and private IHEs that participate in HEA Title IV student financial assistance programs must track crimes in and around their campuses, and report these data to their campus community and to ED. In contrast, Title IX is a civil rights law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex under any education program or activity that receives federal funding. Under Title IX, sexual harassment, which includes sexual violence, is a form of unlawful sex discrimination. Unlike the Clery Act, whose coverage is limited to IHEs that receive student financial aid funds under the HEA, Title IX is applicable to education programs or activities that receive any type of federal funding, including any public or private elementary, secondary, and postsecondary school that receives such funds. ED's Federal Student Aid (FSA) office oversees educational institutions' compliance with the student financial aid requirements under Title IV of the HEA, including requirements related to the Clery Act. In this role, FSA conducts program reviews of institutions' compliance with Title IV student financial aid requirements, including compliance with the Clery Act. Although each agency enforces Title IX compliance among its own recipients, ED, which administers the vast majority of federal education programs, is the primary agency conducting administrative enforcement of Title IX. Such enforcement by ED's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) may occur as part of a routine compliance audit or in response to a complaint filed by an individual. As per the Clery Act, an ASR must include campus crime statistics, as well as a statement of campus policies regarding
campus law enforcement (including the law enforcement authority of campus security personnel, and the relationship between campus security personnel and local or state law enforcement agencies); procedures to report criminal actions and emergencies; policies to encourage crime reporting (when the victim elects or is unable to do so); and policies concerning the institution's response to such reports; programs to prevent sexual violence, procedures the institution will follow in response to a report of sexual violence, and the standard of evidence that will be used in any institutional proceedings that result from such a report; sexual violence awareness and prevention programs for all incoming students and new employees, including a statement from the IHE prohibiting such violence; the definition of sexual violence in the applicable jurisdiction and definition of consent; and options for bystander intervention and risk reduction; sanctions that may be imposed following a final determination in an institutional proceeding arising from a report of sexual violence; procedures that alleged victims should follow after sexual violence has occurred; including evidence preservation, information about to whom the alleged offense should be reported, and options for reporting (or not reporting) such incidents to campus authorities or law enforcement; as well as (where applicable) information about orders of protection and similar orders that may be obtained through a court process; procedures for institutional disciplinary action, including a clear statement that such proceedings shall provide a prompt, fair, and impartial investigation and resolution; and be conducted by officials who receive annual training on issues relating to sexual violence and on how to conduct investigations and hearings in response to a report of such violence; both the accuser and accused are entitled to have others present during such proceedings (including an advisor of choice); and shall receive simultaneous notification in writing of the outcome of such proceedings, appeal procedures, changes in the results that occur before final determination, and the final determination. Some concerns have been expressed about the sufficiency of Clery Act enforcement, including staff levels, at ED. | In recent years, a number of high-profile incidents of sexual violence at institutions of higher education (IHEs) have heightened congressional and administration scrutiny of the policies and procedures that IHEs use to address sexual violence on campus. Among other things, concerns have been expressed about standards of evidence used in institutional proceedings that occur in response to a report of sexual violence on campus, the sufficiency of current legal remedies, and Department of Education (ED) guidance to IHEs.
Further, although sexual violence on campus is a widely acknowledged problem, its prevalence can be challenging to establish. Published estimates of the scope and scale of sexual violence at IHEs vary considerably across studies and data sources. Efforts to improve these data are an ongoing focus of federal policy.
Currently, there are two federal laws that address sexual violence on college campuses: the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, as amended (Clery Act), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). These two statutes differ in significant respects, including in their purpose, coverage, enforcement, and remedies.
The Clery Act requires all public and private IHEs that participate in the student financial assistance programs under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA), to track crimes in and around their campuses and to report these data to their campus community and to ED. The Clery Act also requires IHEs to publish information about certain campus safety policies, including policies related to reports of sexual violence. Under the Clery Act, such policies must address campus disciplinary proceedings, crime reporting, victim support, and related topics. ED's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) oversees compliance with Title IV, including the requirements related to the Clery Act. In this role, FSA conducts program reviews of IHEs' compliance with student aid and Clery provisions, and may levy fines against IHEs that are in violation.
In contrast, Title IX is a civil rights law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex under any education program or activity that receives federal funding. Under Title IX, sexual harassment, which includes sexual violence, is a form of unlawful sex discrimination. Unlike the Clery Act, whose coverage is limited to IHEs that receive student financial aid funds under the HEA, Title IX is applicable to education programs or activities that receive any type of federal funding, including any public or private elementary, secondary, and postsecondary school that receives such funds. Although each federal agency enforces Title IX compliance among its own recipients, ED, which administers the vast majority of federal education programs, is the primary agency conducting administrative enforcement of Title IX. Such enforcement by ED's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) may occur as part of a routine compliance audit or in response to a complaint filed by an individual.
Federal policymakers have been actively involved in seeking ways to improve how IHEs respond to, investigate, and adjudicate incidents of campus sexual violence. Members of the 114th Congress have introduced several bills that seek to strengthen existing laws pertaining to campus sexual violence. In April 2014, the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault issued its first report—Not Alone—and created a website to address campus sexual violence. |
crs_R40900 | crs_R40900_0 | 3962 , Affordable Health Care for America Act, was introduced in the House of Representatives on October 29, 2009. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200 , America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. 3962 was further modified by the manager's amendment posted on November 3, 2009. A Republican alternative amendment in the nature of a substitute, dated November 3, 2009, is addressed in a separate CRS report. 3962 as passed by the House on November 7, 2009. 3962
H.R. 3962 proposes sweeping reforms of the U.S. health insurance and health care system. The three major components of the bill are designated Divisions A, B, and C. Division A, "Affordable Health Care Choices," focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Division B, "Medicare and Medicaid Improvements," proposes modifications to the largest two public health insurance programs to make them consistent with the changes proposed in Division A and to amend other provisions in existing federal statute. For Medicaid, among other major proposals, Division B would expand Medicaid eligibility for traditional and non-traditional beneficiary categories up to 150% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Division C, "Public Health and Workforce Development," would amend and expand existing health professions and nursing workforce programs. Waste, Fraud, and Abuse. Payments to Territories. Demonstrations and Pilot Programs. Full Medicaid benefits would be available to these "non-traditional" individuals, and would be fully financed by the federal government (i.e., the applicable federal medical assistance percentage would be 100%) for the periods before 2015, decreasing to 91% beginning in 2015. Provisions of H.R. This provision in H.R. The Medicaid financing provisions in H.R. Division B, Title VII—Medicaid and CHIP, Subtitle A—Medicaid and Health Reform contains a DSH financing provision, and Subtitle E—Financing, contains provisions on prescription drugs and GME. 3962 includes another provision (described below) that would increase Medicaid spending caps in the territories for each of FY2011 through FY2019. These requirements include reporting and monitoring waste, fraud, and abuse. States would be required under H.R. Accountable Care Organization Pilot Program
Under H.R. Demonstration Project for Stabilization of Emergency Medical Conditions by Institutions for Mental Diseases. 3962 , the "Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2009," contains a number of sections related to improving American Indian and Alaska Natives' access to the Medicaid and CHIP programs. Expanded Payment
H.R. Studies and Reports
H.R. The Secretary's responsibilities for implementing the CMS office or program for coordination and protection for dual eligibles would include the following:
(1) examination of Medicare and Medicaid payment systems to develop strategies to foster more integrated and higher quality care;
(2) development of methods to facilitate dual eligibles' access to post-acute and community-based services and to identify actions to improve coordination of community-based care;
(3) a study of enrollment in Medicare Savings Program or MSP (for both Medicare and Medicaid) to identify methods to more efficiently and effectively reach and enroll dual eligibles;
(4) an assessment of communication strategies aimed at dual eligibles, including the Medicare website, 1-800-MEDICARE, and the Medicare handbook;
(5) research and evaluation of areas where service utilization, quality, and access to cost sharing protection could be improved and an assessment of factors relating to enrollee satisfaction with services and delivery;
(6) collection and dissemination to the public of data and a database that describes eligibility, benefits, and cost-sharing assistance available to dual eligibles by state;
(7) support for coordination of state and federal contracting oversight for dual eligible coordination programs;
(8) support for state Medicaid agencies by providing technical assistance for Medicaid and Medicare coordination initiatives to improve integration of acute and long-term care services for duals;
(9) monitoring total combined Medicare and Medicaid program expenditures in serving dual eligibles and making recommendations to optimize total quality and cost performance across both programs; and
(10) coordination of Medicare Advantage plan activities under Medicare and Medicaid. | The 111th Congress has devoted considerable effort to health reform that seeks to increase health insurance coverage for more Americans and help to control costs, while improving quality and patient outcomes. The Affordable Health Choices for America Act (H.R. 3962) was introduced in the House of Representatives on October 29, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. H.R. 3962 was further modified by the manager's amendment posted on November 3, 2009. H.R. 3962, as passed by the House on November 7, 2009, proposes sweeping reforms of the health care delivery system, described in the three divisions. Division A, "Affordable Health Care Choices," focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and small employers. Division B, "Medicare and Medicaid Improvements," proposes modifications to the largest two public health insurance programs to make them consistent with provisions in Division A and to amend other provisions in existing federal statute. Division C, "Public Health and Workforce Development," would amend and expand existing health professions and nursing workforce programs. A Republican alternative amendment in the nature of a substitute, dated November 3, 2009, is addressed in a separate CRS report.
This report summarizes the major provisions affecting Medicaid and CHIP in H.R. 3962 (as passed), including modifications made by the manager's amendment. The report focuses primarily on provisions in Division B, Title VII—Medicaid and CHIP, plus selected provisions in Title IX—Miscellaneous Provisions. It also describes selected sections of Titles I and II of Division D, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2009, related to improving access to Medicaid and CHIP for American Indians and Alaskan Natives. Due to the breadth of the changes proposed in H.R. 3962, some provisions of Divisions A and C also could affect Medicaid, but these are not Medicaid-specific. The Division B provisions would modify existing law and add new provisions affecting Medicaid eligibility; benefits; financing; waste, fraud, and abuse; payments to territories; demonstrations and pilot programs; and other miscellaneous Medicaid components. A major provision in Division B would expand Medicaid eligibility for traditional and non-traditional beneficiary categories up to 150% of the federal poverty level. The federal government would fully finance the costs for certain of these expanded beneficiary categories for periods before 2015, decreasing to 91% beginning in 2015. With respect to benefits, Medicaid programs would be required to cover preventive services, and would be allowed to cover nurse home visitation and birthing center services.
There are a number of financing changes that would affect Medicaid under H.R. 3962, including reducing Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments by $10 billion by FY2019, increasing prescription drug rebates, and raising provider payments for certain primary care services. Additional waste, fraud, and abuse provisions affecting Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) include requirements to deny payment for health care acquired conditions, require new Medicaid Integrity Program evaluations and reports, and require states to implement a national correct coding initiative, similar to the Medicare program. Under H.R. 3962, spending caps for the territories would be increased, and a series of demonstrations would be approved, including a medical home program, an accountable care organization program, and a program for stabilization of emergency medical conditions by mental disease institutions. |
crs_R42519 | crs_R42519_0 | Against this backdrop, young people ages 16 to 24 experienced their steepest decreases in labor force participation and employment; however, in recent years employment levels have steadily been recovering. Some studies have found that early labor market experiences and outcomes have lasting impacts on employability and wages. The report then discusses these data for the post-World War II period, with a focus on trends since 2000, comparing labor force outcomes based on age, sex, and race/ethnicity. Education and Employment Pathways for Young People
For the purposes of this report , youth refers to young people ages 16 through 24. Age
The labor market experiences of youth are different based on their age. Further, the employment-population ratio for young adults generally exhibited a more upward trajectory. The indicators for both age groups began recovering following the 2007 to 2009 recession, with greater gains in the labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio for teens (see Table A-1 and Table A-2 in the Appendix ). In addition, other factors—lower fertility, declines in marriage rates, and increased likelihood of divorce—have played a role in women's increased participation in the labor force, among other factors that are not easy to quantify (e.g., shifts in expectations about roles based on sex). Black and Asian youth had similarly low employment-population ratios relative to their white and Hispanic counterparts. Hispanic and black young adults made inroads in the labor market since the most recent recession (2007-2009), such that Hispanic youth had similar employment-population ratios to white youth and the employment-population ratio for black young adults reached an all-time high of 61% in 2017 (similar, but still higher, to levels in the late 1990s). In general, firms are more likely to hire workers with more experience and availability. The table shows that youth labor force participation rates and the youth employment-population ratio in 2017 were generally lower than in 2000 and 2007; however, the youth unemployment rate was about the same, at 9%, in both 2000 and 2017, suggesting that young people gained some footing in the labor market following the recession. The table also shows the following trends:
Both females and males ages 16 to 24 experienced sharp decreases in their labor force participation rate and employment-population ratios from 2000 to 2017. Labor force participation and employment-population ratios for all racial and Hispanic ethnic groups decreased from 2000 to 2017. The changes in youth labor force participation rates and labor force outcomes from 2014 to 2017 reflected overall improvements in the economy. The first two tables in the Appendix display this same labor force data for youth, as breakouts for teens ages 16 to 19 ( Table A-1 ) and young adults ages 20 to 24 ( Table A-2 ). One major factor is that youth have less education and experience relative to older workers. Youth may also face increased competition for jobs that require less education. Further, a growing number of young people are enrolled in school, particularly post-secondary education, and therefore may be out of the labor force. Their rates of college completion nearly tripled from 2000 to 2016. Additionally, the unemployment rate for females decreased while the unemployment rate for males increased. Findings in this research area have been somewhat mixed. Effects of Youth Labor Force Trends
The effects of decreasing labor force participation and employment among youth have not been fully explored in the research literature. It shows that teens and young adults were withdrawing from the labor force over the time periods discussed, and those in the labor force were less likely to be employed than older workers. | Congress has indicated a strong interest in ensuring that today's young people (ages 16 to 24) attain the education and employment experience necessary to make the transition to adulthood as skilled workers and taxpayers. This report provides context for Congress on trends in the labor force for youth. It discusses youth labor force data since 1948, with a focus on the period from 2000 to the present.
The labor market experiences of youth ages 16 to 24 have varied based on their age and other factors. Over the post-World War II period, teens ages 16 to 19 generally have had a lower labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio than young adults ages 20 to 24. These two indicators for teens fluctuated from the 1950s through the 1990s, and then began a steady decline before stabilizing in recent years. The labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio for young adults was on an upward trajectory in most years following World War II. This was the result of increases in labor force participation and employment among young women. Both labor force measures declined for young adults in the 2000s. They have ticked back up in recent years, but remain below 2000 levels.
Beginning in the early 2000s, young people ages 16 to 24 began to experience a more pronounced decline in their labor force participation rate and employment, along with a corresponding increase in unemployment. In 2000, they had a participation rate of nearly 66%, an employment-population ratio of about 60%, and an unemployment rate of 9%. These measures eroded even as the economy grew in the mid-2000s, and then declined further immediately following the recession. Although the labor force situation improved for young people in recent years, their labor force participation rate (56%) and employment-population ratio (50%) in 2017 were lower than in 2000, and their rate of unemployment was about the same (9%).
Labor force indicators have trended differently for males and females ages 16 to 24. Beginning in the 1970s, the labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio for females increased as they entered the workforce in greater numbers.
Labor force trends have also been distinct across racial and ethnic groups. Generally, the labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio have been highest for white youth, followed by Hispanic youth. Black and Asian youth have been the least likely to participate in the labor market or to be employed. The 2017 employment-population ratios for youth ages 16 to 24, by race and ethnicity, were as follows: white, 57%; Hispanic, 53%; black, 52%; and Asian, 42%. Black youth have experienced labor force gains in recent years. Education and other factors likely play a role in these labor market outcomes.
Decreases in labor force participation and the employment-population ratios for young people appear to be due to a confluence of demand and supply factors. On the demand side, youth have less education and experience relative to older workers. Youth may also face increased competition for jobs that require less education. On the supply side, a growing number of young people are enrolled in school, particularly post-secondary education, and thus have competing demands on their time. Overall, firms are more likely to hire workers with greater experience and availability.
The changes in the labor market landscape for youth have not been fully explored. Research in this area has hypothesized that reductions in human capital, such as deterioration of skills and foregone work experience, may have lasting impacts on the employability and wages of youth. |
crs_R42744 | crs_R42744_0 | The Basel Capital Accords
The work by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on the first Basel Capital Accord, Basel I, provided an international consensus framework for bank safety and soundness regulation. In a further response to the financial crisis, the Basel III regulatory framework reforms Basel II by revising the definition of regulatory capital and increasing the amounts banks must hold, among other requirements. The requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III were approved by the 27 member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities on September 12, 2010. Basel III compliance requires banks to satisfy the enhanced requirements by 2019. The federal banking regulators issued a proposed rule on June 7, 2012; the final rule to implement most of the Basel III recommendations in the United States was approved by July 9, 2013. Enhanced Safety and Soundness Requirements Under Dodd-Frank
The Basel III final rule adopted by the U.S. federal banking regulators also implements some provisions from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ), which also addressed capital reserve requirements for banks. Regulators were required to find other appropriate standards by which to determine the financial risks of bank portfolio holdings while enforcing the mandatory capital requirements, and they must also transmit reports to Congress that contain descriptions of all regulatory modifications made pursuant to the section. Section 171: The Collins Amendment
The Collins Amendment of Dodd-Frank provides for the development of consistent capital requirements for all insured depository institutions, depository institution holding companies, and systemically important non-bank financial companies. Appendix C discusses the increase in stress testing requirements for all U.S. banks, which are likely to result in banks holding levels of required capital that exceed the minimum ratio compliance thresholds. The leverage ratio requirements for U.S. banks appear below. On April 8, 2014, the U.S. federal banking regulators issued a final rule that would add an additional capital buffer of at least 2% to the current supplementary leverage ratio of 3% for banks with more than $700 billion in total consolidated assets or $10 trillion in total assets, thus raising the total supplementary leverage ratio requirement to a 5% minimum. Do Higher Capital Requirements Curb Lending, (Systemic) Risks, or Both? Higher capital requirements can reduce vulnerability of banking institutions to insolvency (failure). Furthermore, under circumstances when a bank failure is unavoidable, higher capital may reduce the size of claims or perhaps the need to draw from the deposit insurance fund that is maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, thus avoiding possible taxpayer losses. Bank capital levels may also become more misleading or less effective at mitigating financial risks when a significant amount of lending occurs outside the regulated banking system. When large amounts of lending activity occur in parts of the financial system that are not regulated for safety and soundness, raising capital requirements for depository institutions would not necessarily address the rise in the various types of financial risks in the economy. On October 9, 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation separately announced final rules requiring national banks and federal savings associations with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more to conduct annual stress tests; the Federal Reserve released its final rule on October 12, 2012. | The Basel III international regulatory framework, which was produced in 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements, is the latest in a series of evolving agreements among central banks and bank supervisory authorities to standardize bank capital requirements, among other measures. Capital serves as a cushion against unanticipated financial shocks (such as a sudden, unusually high occurrence of loan defaults), which can otherwise lead to insolvency. The Basel III regulatory reform package revises the definition of regulatory capital and increases capital holding requirements for banking organizations. The quantitative requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III were approved by the 27 member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities on September 12, 2010, and endorsed by the G20 leaders on November 12, 2010. Basel III recommends that banks fully satisfy these enhanced requirements by 2019. The Basel agreements are not treaties; individual countries can make modifications to suit their specific needs and priorities when implementing national bank capital requirements.
In the United States, Congress mandated enhanced bank capital requirements as part of financial-sector reform in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203, 124 Stat.1376). Specifically, the Collins Amendment to Dodd-Frank amends the definition of capital and establishes minimum capital and leverage requirements for banking subsidiaries, bank holding companies, and systemically important non-bank financial companies. In addition, Dodd-Frank removes a requirement that credit ratings be referenced when evaluating the creditworthiness of financial securities. Instead, the U.S. federal banking regulators (i.e., the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) are required to find other appropriate standards by which to determine the financial risks of bank portfolio holdings when enforcing the mandatory capital requirements.
This report summarizes the higher capital requirements for U.S. banks regulated for safety and soundness. The U.S. federal banking regulators announced the final rules for implementation of Basel II.5 on June 7, 2012, and for the implementation of Basel III on July 9, 2013. On April 8, 2014, the federal banking regulators adopted the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio for bank holding companies with more than $700 billion of consolidated assets or $10 trillion in assets under custody as a covered bank holding company. Although higher capital requirements for most U.S. banking firms may reduce the insolvency risk of the deposit insurance fund, which is maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, they arguably could translate into more expensive or less available bank credit for borrowers. Whether higher capital requirements would result in a reduction of overall lending or systemic risk remains unclear. Prior to the financial crisis, banks maintained capital levels that exceeded the minimum regulatory requirements, yet the economy still saw widespread lending. Bank capital reserves also may have limited effectiveness as a systemic risk mitigation tool if a significant amount of lending occurs outside of the regulated banking system. For an introduction to some of the topics covered in this report, see CRS Report R43002, Financial Condition of Depository Banks, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41123 | crs_R41123_0 | Introduction
Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama's 2010 State of the Union address, and the issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens, including those in transit to U.S. soil, have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities, and the investments that underlie them, insufficiently address the threat. The federal government's biodefense efforts span many agencies and vary widely in their resources, scope, and approach. Conflicting views of the bioterrorism threat and the breadth of the federal biodefense effort, which crosses congressional committee jurisdictions, complicate congressional oversight of the overall biodefense enterprise. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report cannot address all aspects and associated programs related to this issue. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures. Although outside the scope of this report, state and local governments, private industry, and our international partners play key roles in defending against the threat of bioterrorism. Policymakers, analysts, and other experts have criticized federal efforts at strategic planning. Through oversight activities, congressional committees of jurisdiction have a key role in assessing the completeness of ongoing planning. Since 2001, the federal government has often reexamined programs in these areas. Congress may consider whether the federal government appropriately leverages efforts by other stakeholders including state government, academia, and the private sector. These efforts have met with mixed success. Congress, through oversight activities as well as authorizing and appropriations legislation, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack. | Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama's 2010 State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat.
Key questions face congressional policymakers: How adequately do the efforts already under way address the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress and other stakeholders? Should Congress alter, augment, or terminate these existing programs in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others?
Several strategy and planning documents direct the federal government's biodefense efforts. Many different agencies have a role. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat.
Despite these efforts, congressional commissions, nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives, and other experts have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government could significantly improve its efforts to address the bioterrorism threat.
Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures.
Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs or creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting or creating programs may result in additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges. Maintaining or shrinking programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack. |
crs_R40861 | crs_R40861_0 | Overview of S. 1679
This report summarizes the key provisions affecting private health insurance in Title I of S. 1679 , the Affordable Health Choices Act, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) on July 15, 2009. Title I of the bill focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. In general, the bill includes the following:
Individuals would be required to maintain health insurance, and employers with more than 25 employees would be required to either provide insurance or pay a fee, with some exceptions. Several market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and insurance renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to qualifying health insurance coverage. Qualifying coverage would include qualified health plans offered through a Gateway, and employment-based and nongroup plans not offered through a Gateway that meet specified criteria, including meeting required minimum standards and the market reforms established in the bill; grandfathered employment-based plans; grandfathered nongroup plans; and other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. Gateways would offer private plans alongside a community health insurance option. Certain individuals with incomes below 400% of the federal poverty level could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs; these subsidies would be available only through the Gateways. New plans could also be sold in both the individual and group market outside of the Gateway, but only those new plans that meet the minimum requirements would satisfy the mandates for individuals and employers. Most of these provisions would be effective one year after enactment, or on the date on which a state becomes a participating or establishing state. Individuals would be required to maintain qualifying coverage, defined as coverage under a group health plan or heath insurance coverage that an individual is enrolled in on the date of enactment or coverage that meets or exceeds the criteria for minimum qualifying coverage, Parts A and B of Medicare, Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, CHIP, Tricare, certain veteran's health care program coverage, Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), state health benefits high-risk pools, coverage for the Peace Corps, and coverage under a qualified health plan. Gateways would not be insurers but would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way (in the same way, for example, that Travelocity or Expedia are not airlines but provide access to available flights and fares in a comparable way). Community Health Insurance Option
Under S. 1679 , the Secretary of HHS would establish a community health insurance option through each Gateway. Any individual eligible to purchase insurance through Gateways would be eligible to enroll in the community option and may also be eligible for income-based premium credits. The community option would have to meet the requirements that apply to all plans participating in the Gateway unless otherwise excluded. The community health insurance option would provide coverage only for the essential health benefits, unless it is required by the state to include additional benefits. The Secretary would be required to negotiate with medical providers to set payment rates, subject to limits. | This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance in S. 1679, the Affordable Health Choices Act, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) on July 15, 2009.
Title I of the bill focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. In general, the Senate HELP bill would require individuals to maintain health insurance and employers to either provide insurance or pay a fee in lieu of coverage, with some exceptions. Several insurance market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to qualifying health insurance coverage. Qualifying coverage would include (1) coverage under a qualified health plan (QHP) obtained through the newly created American Health Benefits Gateways; (2) new group or individual coverage that meets or exceeds minimum qualifying coverage; (3) grandfathered employment-based plans; (4) grandfathered nongroup plans; and (5) other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The Gateways would offer private plans alongside a community health insurance option. Based on income, certain individuals could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs; these subsidies would be available only through a Gateway. Currently existing plans could be grandfathered indefinitely, if the plan had not been altered to a significant extent. Most of these provisions would be effective one year after enactment, or on the date on which a state has an operating Gateway. A state would be required to have an operating Gateway within four years of enactment, or the Secretary of Health and Human Services would establish one in the state as a federal fallback.
A Gateway would not be an insurer; it would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way. A Gateway would consist of a selection of private plans as well as a community health insurance option. A community health insurance option is a public plan created by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that generally meets the requirements that apply to all private Gateway plans. Eligible individuals for a Gateway plan could purchase the community health insurance option or a private health insurance plan. Individuals would be eligible to enroll in a Gateway plan only if they were not eligible for certain other coverage, including coverage through an employer, Medicare, and Medicaid, among others. The community health insurance option established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) would offer the essential benefits package plus any state mandated benefits. For the community health insurance option, the Secretary would be required to negotiate with medical providers to set payment rates, subject to limits. Credits to limit the amount of money certain individuals would pay for premiums would be available only within a Gateway.
New plans could also be sold in both the individual and group market outside of the Gateway, but only those new plans that meet the minimum requirements would satisfy the mandates for individuals and employers. |
crs_RS20173 | crs_RS20173_0 | Health Insurance (HI) Trust Fund
What It Is
Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for individuals aged 65 and over and certain disabled persons. Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A or Hospital Insurance (HI); Part B or Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); Part C or Medicare Advantage (MA); and Part D, the prescription drug benefit. Medicare's financial operations are accounted for through two trust funds, the HI trust fund and the SMI trust fund, which are maintained by the Department of the Treasury. The Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; these are credited to the HI trust fund. The Part B and D programs are financed primarily through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI trust fund. For beneficiaries enrolled in MA, Part C payments are made on their behalf in appropriate portions from the HI and SMI trust funds. Projected Insolvency Date
The 2009 report projects that, under intermediate assumptions, the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2017, two years earlier than projected in the 2008 report. The 2009 report projects insolvency nine years earlier than did the 2003 report, issued prior to the enactment of Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. The legislation increased spending under Parts A, B, and C. In addition, it added a new prescription drug benefit under Part D; spending for this benefit is recorded as a separate account in the SMI trust fund. Required Response
There is concern that over time the economy will be unable to support the increasing reliance on general revenues which in large measure comes from taxes paid by the under-65 population. Specifically, a determination must be made as to whether general revenue financing will exceed 45% of total Medicare outlays within the next seven years (on a fiscal year basis). MMA (Sections 802-804) requires that if an excess general revenue funding determination is made for two successive years, the President must submit a legislative proposal to respond to the warning. Because the Medicare trustees issued such a warning in 2008, the MMA required that the President submit legislation to Congress responding to the warning within the 15-day period, beginning on the date of the budget submission to Congress this year. | Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for individuals aged 65 and over and certain disabled persons. Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A or Hospital Insurance (HI); Part B or Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); Part C or Medicare Advantage (MA); and Part D, the prescription drug benefit. The Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; these are credited to the HI trust fund. The Part B program is financed through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI trust fund. Beneficiaries can choose to receive all their Medicare services, except hospice, through managed care plans under the MA program; payment is made on their behalf in appropriate parts from the HI and SMI trust funds. A separate account in the SMI trust fund accounts for the Part D drug benefit; Part D is financed through general revenues and beneficiary premiums.
The HI and SMI trust funds are overseen by a board of trustees that makes annual reports to Congress. The 2009 report projects that under intermediate assumptions, the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2017, two years earlier than projected in 2008. The HI fund fails to meet both the short- and long-range tests for financial adequacy. Because of the way it is financed, the SMI fund does not face insolvency; however, the trustees project that SMI expenditures will continue to grow rapidly.
The trustees stress the importance of considering the Medicare program as a whole. There is concern that over time the economy will be unable to support the increasing reliance on general revenues, which in large measure come from taxes paid by the under-65 population. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) requires that if the Medicare trustees project that 45% or more of Medicare's funding will come from general tax revenues within the current fiscal year or next six years, for two years in a row, the President must submit legislation to slow spending. For the fourth consecutive year, the 2009 Trustees Report estimated that general revenue funding will exceed 45% of total Medicare expenditures within seven years (in 2014). As a result of this new warning, in 2010, the President will be required to submit a legislative proposal to Congress that would lower the ratio below the 45% level.
This CRS report will be updated upon receipt of the 2010 trustees' report or as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R40602 | crs_R40602_0 | Introduction
A primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, Department) is to "prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. To support this mission, DHS has had an intelligence component since its inception in 2003. In July 2005, following "a systematic evaluation of the Department's operations, policies and structures" (commonly called the Second Stage Review or "2SR"), former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, initiated a major reorganization of DHS. In an effort to improve how DHS manages its intelligence and information sharing responsibilities, he established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the Intelligence Community (IC) as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private sector partners. Since the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements on DHS through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007:
Integrate information and standardize the format of intelligence products produced within DHS and its components. These include I&A, the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, and the Intelligence Division of the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (all located at the DHS headquarters), and the intelligence elements of six operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). The Department and USCG are statutory members of the IC. On February 11, 2010, the Senate confirmed President Obama's selection of Caryn Wagner to serve as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. As she assumes responsibility for the DHS IE, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Department's intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHS IE produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. The next step in the Department's QHSR process is to conduct a "bottom-up review" to systematically link strategy to program to budget. This report will focus on the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components; how it is organized; and how it supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning, border security, critical infrastructure protection, and support to and the sharing of information with state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It will also discuss oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues. Congress formally established the HSTC in the Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. U.S. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)
In February 2010, DHS produced its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive assessment outlining its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Department's programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The results of that review will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for DHS. | The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, the Department) is to "prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States." Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).
Following a major reorganization of the DHS (called the Second Stage Review or "2SR") in July 2005, former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private sector partners.
Today, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) consists of I&A, two headquarters elements supported by I&A, and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS).
Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department's intelligence component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
On February 11, 2010, the Senate confirmed President Obama's selection of Caryn Wagner to serve as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. As she assumes responsibility for the DHS IE, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Department's intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHS IE produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. In February, DHS produced its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive assessment outlining its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Department's programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The next step in the Department's QHSR process is to conduct a "bottom-up review" to systematically link strategy to program to budget. The results of that review will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for DHS.
This report provides an overview of the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHS IE is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues. This report may be updated. |
crs_RS22622 | crs_RS22622_0 | In the 1970s, a series of lawsuits began challenging the funding disparities among school districts within the states. Spurred by concerns that such disparities discriminated against students in poor school districts or resulted in an inadequate education, school finance plaintiffs began filing lawsuits in federal and state courts based on theories involving educational equity or adequacy. | Over the past several decades, a series of lawsuits have challenged funding disparities that exist among school districts within the states. Spurred by concerns that such disparities discriminated against students in poor school districts or resulted in an inadequate education, school finance plaintiffs began filing lawsuits in federal and state courts based on theories involving educational equity or adequacy. This report provides an analysis of litigation regarding school financing, including an overview of the legal issues involved in such litigation and a description of the leading school finance cases at both the federal and state level. |
crs_RS20830 | crs_RS20830_0 | Introduction
In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw
computer trespassing in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3); computer trespassing resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or commercial information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5); committing fraud an integral part of which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4); threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(7); trafficking in passwords for a government computer, or when the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(6); accessing a computer to commit espionage, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)
Subsection 1030(b) makes it a crime to attempt or conspire to commit any of these offenses. Subsection 1030(c) catalogs the penalties for committing them, penalties that range from imprisonment for not more than a year for simple cyberspace trespassing to imprisonment for not more than 20 years for a second espionage-related conviction. Subsection 1030(d) preserves the investigative authority of the Secret Service. Subsection 1030(e) supplies common definitions. Subsection 1030(f) disclaims any application to otherwise permissible law enforcement activities. Subsection 1030(g) creates a civil cause of action for victims of these crimes. 1030(g). There are five types of protected computers or computer systems. The five include computers (1) used exclusively for or by the United States Government; (2) used exclusively for or by a bank or other financial institution; (3) used in part for or by the United States Government where the damage "affects" government use or use on the government's behalf; (4) used in part for or by a bank or other financial institution where the damage "affects" use by or on behalf of the institution; and (5) used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce or communications. Computer Fraud (18 U.S.C. 1030(g). | The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, outlaws conduct that victimizes computer systems. It is a cyber security law. It protects federal computers, bank computers, and computers connected to the Internet. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded by other federal criminal laws. This is a brief sketch of CFAA and some of its federal statutory companions, including the amendments found in the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, P.L. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008).
In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw
computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3); computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or computer-housed information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., a worm, computer virus, Trojan horse, time bomb, a denial of service attack, and other forms of cyber attack, cyber crime, or cyber terrorism), 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5); committing fraud an integral part of which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4); threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(7); trafficking in passwords for a government computer, or when the trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(6); and accessing a computer to commit espionage, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1).
Subsection 1030(b) makes it a crime to attempt or conspire to commit any of these offenses. Subsection 1030(c) catalogs the penalties for committing them, penalties that range from imprisonment for not more than a year for simple cyberspace trespassing to a maximum of life imprisonment when death results from intentional computer damage. Subsection 1030(d) preserves the investigative authority of the Secret Service. Subsection 1030(e) supplies common definitions. Subsection 1030(f) disclaims any application to otherwise permissible law enforcement activities. Subsection 1030(g) creates a civil cause of action for victims of these crimes. Subsections 1030(i) and (j) authorize forfeiture of tainted property.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report 97-1025, Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by [author name scrubbed], stripped of the authorities and footnotes found there. |
crs_R43476 | crs_R43476_0 | The unemployment rate declined markedly in 2013, to 6.7% in December from 7.9% in January, seeming to signal that the labor market is approaching full employment. Other economic and labor market indicators paint a more pessimistic picture, however. It concludes by analyzing the implications of these developments for macroeconomic stabilization policy, as policy makers grapple with the transition from the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy put in place during the "Great Recession." If the labor market has experienced structural changes, it would also have implications for labor market and other microeconomic policies (e.g., spending or tax provisions that increase the incentives to hire, seek work, delay retirement, or train), which are beyond the scope of this report. Only the 1980s recovery faced a comparably long return to full employment, nearing full employment after 19 quarters. And, because the unemployment rate was so high at its peak in the Great Recession and has fallen slowly, it has been at historically high levels for most of the recovery. It has remained around that level in the first quarter of 2014. Since World War II, the participation rate has never before fallen significantly in an expansion and has exhibited only modest cyclicality —it declined by less than one percentage point during the 1980, 1991-1992, and 2001 recessions, and did not decline in the others. Workers can leave for various reasons, including retirement, injury or illness, family reasons, study or training, or because they have become discouraged and stopped looking for a job. It could be cyclical, caused by the Great Recession, or it could be structural, caused by long-term forces unrelated to the recession. The increase in workers classified by BLS as discouraged or marginally attached to the labor force, from about 1% of the labor force before the recession to 1.5% of the labor force since, is further evidence that some of the recent decline in the participation rate is cyclical. Some groups have lower employment and higher unemployment rates than the overall labor force, and these groups have experienced a weaker rebound during the economic recovery than the overall labor force. It then fell to 2.6% at the end of 2013; despite the decline, it remained higher than at any point from 1948 to 2008. The slow decline in the unemployment rate and continued lack of employment opportunities for youth and the long-term unemployed in the current recovery have raised concerns that the natural rate of unemployment may have risen recently. There are several other indicators of slack in the economy and the labor market, but, as long as those measures are relatively well correlated with the headline unemployment rate, as they typically are, the unemployment rate provides a simple rule-of-thumb gauge of how close the economy is to full employment. As this report has discussed, other indicators have diverged from the unemployment rate and suggest that significant slack remains in the economy. Policy makers have two macroeconomic stabilization tools, fiscal policy and monetary policy, at their disposal. Congress has delegated the operation of monetary policy to the Federal Reserve, but exercises oversight. A common view among economists is that the government should run deficits when the economy is far below full employment and balanced budgets or surpluses when the economy is near full employment. In other words, the Fed intends to raise interest rates only when it judges the economy to be closer to full employment. The current unemployment rate would seemingly call for a near-term tightening of fiscal and monetary policy. If there is still considerable slack in the economy, despite the decline in the unemployment rate, then tightening policy could be premature and there is less concern that continued stimulus would cause inflation to rise. This would be the case if structural changes or the Great Recession (i.e., hysteresis) permanently reduced the potential capacity of output and labor markets, so that the economy is no longer capable of returning to the historical trend. | Until recently, the economy and labor market were experiencing an unusually slow recovery from the longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression compared to other expansions since World War II. The rapid decline in the unemployment rate from 7.9% in January to 6.7% in December 2013 (where it remained in the first quarter of 2014) would seem to indicate that the labor market is returning to normal. The current unemployment rate is only 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points higher than the consensus range of full employment.
Unusually, the unemployment rate may not currently be a good proxy for the overall state of the labor market or economy. Some of the decline in the unemployment rate in 2013 is attributable to a recovery in employment, but some is attributable to workers dropping out of the labor force. The labor force participation rate has continued to fall during the recovery and is at its lowest level since the 1970s. In fact, it has fallen more in the past five years than at any time since data have been collected. Studies have identified multiple reasons for the decline. Some workers have left the labor force because they have become discouraged and given up on seeking employment. Others have left for reasons stemming from long-term trends that are unrelated to the recession, such as age or enrollment in school or training. This trend could reverse—for example, more workers returned to the labor force than found jobs in the first quarter of 2014, which prevented the unemployment rate from falling.
Other evidence also points to more slack in the economy than the headline unemployment rate suggests. Economic output and employment have grown since mid-2009 and 2010, respectively, but at relatively sluggish rates. The long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment rates have fallen only modestly since the recession ended and are still at historically high levels. Inflation has remained slightly lower than the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) goal of 2%.
These other economic indicators could be sending a misleading signal about significant slack in the economy, however, if the economy's potential capacity has been eroded by structural changes or by the length and depth of the Great Recession. Cyclical deterioration in the U.S. labor market is usually considered temporary—recessions are thought to have no lasting effect on overall employment and unemployment rates. This recession could cause a departure from conventional wisdom if labor market problems that started as cyclical persisted so long that they became structural. For example, long-term unemployment could have caused workers' skills to erode, which would then prevent them from finding a job when the economy recovered.
Congress conducts fiscal policy and oversees the Fed's implementation of monetary policy, the two tools of macroeconomic stabilization. Policy makers are grappling with the transition from the highly expansionary monetary and fiscal policy put in place during the Great Recession. Many economists advocate reducing the budget deficit only when the economy is at or near full employment. Likewise, the Fed has stated that it would begin to raise interest rates once the economy is near full employment. If the economy remains far from full employment, then declining unemployment would not yet call for a tightening of monetary and fiscal policy. Alternatively, if lower unemployment is being driven by a cyclical upswing and the economy is now closer to full employment than historical experience would predict, policy would likely need to be tightened sooner in order to avoid rising inflation. It would also suggest that structural policies (e.g., those that increase the incentives to hire, seek work, delay retirement, or train) would be more effective at improving labor market conditions than counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies. |
crs_R41808 | crs_R41808_0 | Proponents maintain that climate-relevant investments would promote low-emissions, high-growth economic development while simultaneously protecting the more vulnerable countries and communities from the effects of climate change. Higher-income countries, including the United States, have pledged financial assistance to lower-income countries in such fora as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992). More recently, the Copenhagen Accord (2009) stipulated—and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010) restated—that the wealthiest countries in aggregate would commit to provide up to $30 billion "fast start" financing in the 2010-2012 period and to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020 to promote mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and capacity building efforts in lower-income countries. The funding is to come from "a wide variety of sources, [both] public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance." 4. Many in Congress and the public at large may question why the United States should help finance other countries' efforts to reduce GHG emissions or to adapt to climate variability and change. Some claim that international financing would incur costs to the United States, or redirect funds that could be used for domestic purposes and send them overseas. Others, however, contend that international financing may offer potential benefits to the United States in terms of environmental protection, expanded commercial markets, and national security. While markets that are privately constituted and self-regulated have delivered moderately to climate change investments world-wide, public institutions—including national governments, international organizations, and official financing mechanisms of the UNFCCC —continue to be key drivers for climate change investments, specifically in lower-income countries. a. A global FTT, as currently debated, would be a new and additional source for climate finance. Caveats Regarding Sources
The Role of Market s : The economic debate within international climate change policy has been dominated by assessments of market-based mechanisms aimed at changing price incentives so that investment in low-emissions development becomes more attractive (e.g., cap and trade, carbon fees, loan guarantees). Many agree that private investment will likely have a predominant role to play in any low-emissions economic future, and that establishing a price on GHG emissions will likely have a part in any effective policy agenda. However, concerns remain whether such mechanisms can induce the required shifts in production and consumption patterns and mobilize the necessary investment. Public sectors mechanisms would include contributing countries' Official Development Assistance (ODA) as well as many of the multilateral environment and development trust funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility (GEF)) and the concessional lending windows housed at the various institutions at the World Bank Group. Many critics contend that the overall architecture of financial mechanisms to address climate change is underfunded and unnecessarily complex. The array of funds and financial institutions lack both strategic mandate and adequate coordination, leaving many gaps, overlaps, and inefficiencies. Divisions have arisen over the proper financial instruments to employ in lower-income countries (e.g., grants or loans) as well as the role shared by the public and private spheres. Contributions to International Climate Change Financial Assistance
Congressional Authority, Oversight, Appropriations
The United States has relied mostly on direct budget appropriations to finance climate change actions internationally. Historically, the United States' credibility on international climate change financing has been impaired by periodic under-funding. | Many voices, domestic and international, have called upon the United States to increase foreign assistance to address climate change. Proponents maintain that such assistance could help promote low-emissions and high-growth economic development in lower-income countries, while simultaneously protecting the more vulnerable countries from the effects of a changing climate. Recent studies estimate the needs for climate change financing in the developing world to range from US$4 billion to several hundred billion annually by the year 2030. The United States has pledged funds in such fora as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the wealthiest countries, in aggregate, agreed to provide up to $30 billion in "fast start" financing for the 2010-2012 period and to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020. Pledged funds are to come from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. Lower-income countries have sought assistance that is new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained.
The fundamental dispute concerning international financing for climate change centers upon who should pay for it and how. The debate has been dominated by economic assessments of market-based mechanisms aimed at changing price incentives so that investment in low-emissions development becomes more attractive (e.g., cap and trade, carbon fees, loan guarantees). Many agree that private sector investment will likely have a significant role to play in any low-emissions future, and that establishing a price on GHG emissions will likely have a part in any effective policy agenda. However, concerns remain whether such mechanisms can induce the required shifts in production and consumption patterns, mobilize the necessary investment, and contribute adequately to international financial assistance. From this perspective, public funds—including from national governments and international organizations—continue to be a key driver for climate change investment, specifically in low-income countries.
Many methods for disbursing international climate change financing currently exist. All have a role in catalyzing climate action. They include private sector funding through such avenues as foreign direct investment (FDI), export credit markets, multilateral development banks and finance corporations, and the various U.N. Kyoto Protocol market mechanisms, as well as public sector funding through official development assistance (ODA), multilateral trust funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Climate Investment Funds (CIF), Green Climate Fund (GCF)), and the concessional lending windows housed at the World Bank Group. Many contend that the financial architecture is underfunded, unnecessarily complex, and lacks both strategic mandate and adequate coordination. Debate has arisen over the proper financial instruments to employ in lower-income countries as well as the role shared by the public and private spheres.
Up to this point, the United States has relied mostly on direct budget appropriations to finance climate change actions internationally, but recent Congresses have considered several alternatives that could generate new financing for international purposes. Many in Congress and the public at large may question why the United States should help finance other countries' efforts on climate change. Some claim that international financing would incur costs to the United States, or redirect funds that could be used for domestic purposes and send them overseas. Others, however, contend that international financing may offer potential benefits to the United States in terms of global environmental protection, expanded commercial markets, and increased national security. |
crs_RL31889 | crs_RL31889_0 | (1) TheQatari monarchy, which also has closely aligneditself with U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region, was embarking upon a limited course of politicalliberalization and believed that modernizing Arab media was central to its reform effort. (6)
However, for all of the praise Al-Jazeera has received, there has been an equal amount of criticism regarding the network's perceived lack of objectivity. Issues of Concern for U.S. Foreign Policy
Iraq
Al-Jazeera's coverage of Iraq has drawn both praise and criticism. (33)
Despite the novelty of Israeli officials on Arab television, some analysts have pointed out that, in covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Al-Jazeera follows a similar approach to its coverage ofthe war in Iraq and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan: it uses vivid, violent montages of Palestiniansuffering to introduce news segments; it employs language which describes suicide bombings as"martyrdom operations;" and it calls the Israeli army an "occupation force." Although the images of Al-Jazeera broadcasts are often disturbing and beyond the normsfound on U.S. television, proponents of Al-Jazeera claim that they present a more realistic pictureof the day-to-day hardships of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the present conflict. (39)
Al-Jazeera's impact on the Middle Eastern media as a whole remains unclear. With the United States heavily engaged in Iraq,Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Al-Jazeera will continue to play a role in reporting and interpreting U.S.foreign policy to the Arab world. | Al-Jazeera, the Arab world's first all-news network was started by the Persian Gulf monarchy of Qatar. It has come to be recognized as a key player in covering issues of central importance toU.S. foreign policy in the Middle East: the conflict in Iraq, the war on terrorism, and theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. Al-Jazeera has become so publicly influential that U.S. officials nowregularly appear on the network. Although Al-Jazeera has received praise for its uncensored formatand for airing interviews with U.S. and Israeli officials, as well as Arab critics of the policies of Arabgovernments, it has drawn criticism from many observers in the United States and elsewhere for aperceived lack of objectivity in covering these conflicts, including the activities of Al Qaeda. Fortheir part, officials from Al-Jazeera have claimed that they merely reflect Arab popular resentmentof U.S. policy in the Middle East.
This paper provides an overview of Al-Jazeera and explores the debate surrounding its objectivity. This report also analyzes Al-Jazeera's coverage of events in the Middle East,specifically, its coverage of events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel and the West Bank and GazaStrip. The final section of this report discusses policy options regarding U.S. public diplomacyefforts in the Middle East region. This paper will be updated periodically. |
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