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crs_R42876 | crs_R42876_0 | At the same time, price competition has forced airlines to contain costs. This report focuses on U.S. passenger airlines because their outsourcing of maintenance, especially to foreign countries such as China and El Salvador, has generated specific concern among Members of Congress. Engine Repair and Overhaul . MRO Outsourcing and Employment
All airlines outsource some of their aircraft maintenance. The MRO sector in China has grown along with the airline industry. The issues raised have included quality control procedures; the level of regulatory oversight; mechanic pay, skill, training, and experience; the degree of qualified supervision; the lack of English language skills or requirements to read and comprehend maintenance manuals; and the absence of drug and alcohol testing programs on par with those required at U.S. repair stations. Statistical analysis of the relationship between airline service reliability and maintenance outsourcing also is inconclusive. Moreover, there are concerns that FAA's resources and capabilities to inspect foreign repair stations are spread thin. 112-95 ) address concerns over bilateral aviation safety agreements with respect to FAA inspection authority. Workforce Issues
Considerable concern has been raised in the media regarding pay rates for foreign repair station workers, particularly those located in Latin America. Consequently, limited English language skill among workers at these facilities may not, by itself, be cause for significant concern. Reflecting these concerns, Congress included provisions related to the oversight of foreign repair stations in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( P.L. Part 145 by February 14, 2013, with assessments based on the type, scope, and complexity of work performed; FAA to ensure that foreign repair stations are subject to appropriate inspections consistent with existing U.S. requirements; That agreements with foreign aviation authorities or other foreign government agencies provide an opportunity for FAA to conduct independent inspections of foreign repair stations when warranted by safety concerns; FAA to notify congressional oversight committees within 30 days of initiating formal negotiations with foreign governments on new maintenance safety or maintenance implementation agreements; FAA to issue an annual report describing improvements to identify and track where air carrier (14 C.F.R. Part 121) maintenance is performed; a staffing model regarding the number and geographic placement of FAA inspectors; inspector training; and a quality assessment of FAA and foreign authority inspections performed under existing agreements; FAA to request that all member countries of the International Civil Aviation Organization establish drug and alcohol testing programs encompassing all safety-sensitive maintenance workers that perform work on commercial air carrier aircraft; FAA to publish a proposed rule by February 14, 2013, to require drug and alcohol testing programs at all Part 145 repair stations that service Part 121 aircraft, consistent with the laws of the country where the work is performed; and FAA to conduct annual inspections at all foreign repair stations consistent with obligations under international agreements. Policy Implications
While U.S. airlines are increasingly sending aircraft overseas for major repairs and overhauls, highly skilled maintenance workers in the United States working on foreign aircraft have helped the United States retain a positive trade balance of aircraft maintenance work in the globalized MRO industry. Safety concerns raised regarding work performed by foreign repair stations over the past decade have largely been anecdotal, and detailed studies have not identified specific indications that outsourcing maintenance to foreign MROs has increased risk. Nonetheless, examination of maintenance offshoring practices reveals several potential policy implications both for U.S. jobs and for airline safety. The greatest threat to such standing does not appear to be primarily from the offshoring of heavy maintenance, but rather from the possibility that other countries may invest heavily in advanced training and technical capabilities to compete more directly with the United States on high-value engine and component repair and overhaul operations. Implications for Aviation Safety
With regard to safety, FAA has limited resources to allocate to oversight and inspection of foreign repair stations, thus necessitating reliance on foreign regulators and airline auditors to conduct routine oversight of foreign repair facilities. | Airlines outsource maintenance to countries like China and El Salvador to achieve cost savings from the comparatively lower wages and from lower costs to build and maintain repair facilities. In some cases, particularly in China, government investment and other incentives, along with backing from national airlines, have spurred rapid expansion of the foreign aircraft maintenance industry over the past decade. While airline maintenance work outsourced to foreign repair facilities has increased considerably over the past decade, there are no conclusive data indicating that this has directly resulted in the loss of U.S. jobs. Despite increased maintenance outsourcing, the United States continues to maintain a positive trade balance for airline maintenance work, a trend that likely reflects the United States' advanced capabilities on high-value engine and aircraft component work.
While investigative reports and labor union sponsored studies of airline outsourcing practices have been critical of foreign repair facilities, more detailed statistical analysis does not support conclusions that maintenance outsourcing or offshoring has had measurable negative impact on safety, quality control, or reliability. Although some experts believe that safety is being compromised and the regulation and oversight of foreign repair stations needs to be improved, analyses of recent trends do not provide obvious evidence that maintenance outsourcing has adversely affected airline safety.
Specific concerns have been raised regarding the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) limited resources to oversee foreign repair stations, and FAA's extensive reliance on foreign regulators and the airlines to monitor these facilities. Additional concerns have been raised over worker training and qualifications at foreign facilities, the relatively low numbers of workers at these facilities with FAA certification, and the lack of English language skills necessary to read and comprehend maintenance manuals and instructions.
Congress also has been concerned about the adequacy of drug and alcohol testing programs at foreign repair stations that work on U.S. aircraft. In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95), it mandated drug and alcohol testing at those locations in a manner consistent with existing bilateral aviation safety agreements and the laws of countries where the repair stations are located. Additionally, the act directed FAA to ensure that foreign repair stations are subject to appropriate inspections consistent with existing U.S. requirements and bilateral air safety agreements; inspect foreign repair stations annually; and carry out independent inspections when warranted by safety concerns.
The United States has continued to maintain a positive trade balance with respect to airline maintenance work. However, future foreign investment in advanced training and technical capabilities related to high-value engine and component repair and overhaul could lead to more direct foreign competition in these areas. While available data do not indicate that offshoring of maintenance work has negatively impacted safety, specific areas for potential improvement include the allocation of FAA inspectors and resources focused on the oversight of foreign repair stations; FAA certification and qualification standards for individuals assigned to supervisory roles at foreign repair stations; and standards or guidelines for English language proficiency and comprehension of written technical materials among foreign repair station mechanics. |
crs_RL34352 | crs_RL34352_0 | 110-246 . A new Specialty Crop Research Initiative received a total of $215 million in mandatory funds in addition to annual appropriations authority of $100 million for FY2008-FY2012. The bill explicitly directed the Under Secretary to coordinate research between ARS and NIFA, and to recommend funding for all the programs within USDA's research mission area. The Senate bill provided $160 million in mandatory research funding over the five-year life of the farm bill. 110-246 ) reorganizes the Department's Research, Education, and Economics mission area, which currently comprises four agencies that separately administer intramural and extramural programs supporting agricultural research and development (R&D). The enacted farm bill's research title (Title VII) classifies all current research, extension, and education programs into two groups—capacity programs and competitive programs—based upon the way in which their funding is distributed to recipients. Title VII creates an umbrella coordinating entity known as the Research, Education, and Extension Office (REEO) in Office of the Under Secretary for Research, Education, and Economics, and designates the Under Secretary as the Chief Scientist of USDA. The REEO will coordinate and plan both capacity and competitive programs, as well as USDA-administered intramural (Agricultural Research Service (ARS)) and extramural programs. Extramural programs (both capacity and competitive), currently administered by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)), will be transferred to a new National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA), and CSREES will cease to exist on October 1, 2009. Within the new NIFA, the existing National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program (NRI) will be expanded into an Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI). It will incorporate the purposes of the former Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems (IFAFS), whose authority the new farm bill repeals. 2419 , and the enacted Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. Comparison of the Research Titles of the House- and Senate-Passed Farm Bills and the Enacted Bill (P.L. | The 110th Congress passed an omnibus farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) to authorize and direct the implementation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) major programs across the spectrum of its mission areas through FY2012. The enacted bill reorganizes the Department's Research, Education, and Economics mission area, which currently comprises four agencies that separately administer intramural and extramural programs supporting agricultural research and development (R&D).
The research title of P.L. 110-246 (Title VII) classifies all current research, extension, and education programs into two groups—capacity programs and competitive programs—based upon the way in which their funding is distributed to recipients. Title VII creates an umbrella coordinating entity known as the Research, Education, and Extension Office (REEO) in the Office of the Under Secretary for Research, Education, and Economics, and designates the Under Secretary as the Chief Scientist of USDA. The REEO will coordinate and plan both capacity and competitive programs, as well as USDA-administered intramural (Agricultural Research Service (ARS)) and extramural programs. Extramural programs (both capacity and competitive), currently administered by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)), will be transferred to a new National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA), and CSREES will cease to exist on October 1, 2009.
Within the new NIFA, the existing National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program (NRI) will be expanded into an Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI). It will incorporate the purposes of the former Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems (IFAFS), whose authority the new farm bill repeals.
The House and Senate versions of the farm bill would have provided $865 million and $160 million, respectively, in mandatory funding for certain research programs over the five-year life of the bill. The enacted bill provides a total of $333 million in mandatory funds for (1) a new specialty crop research initiative ($230 million); (2) research on fresh produce food safety ($25 million); and (3) organic agriculture research ($78 million).
The enacted farm bill research title includes major initiatives to provide capacity-building support to Hispanic-serving agricultural colleges and to make them eligible to receive funding through a wider range of grant programs.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42130 | crs_R42130_0 | Introduction
Medical device regulation is complex, in part because of the wide variety of items that are categorized as medical devices. The federal agency responsible for regulating medical devices is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) is primarily responsible for medical device premarket review. CDRH activities are funded by congressional appropriations and user fees collected from device manufacturers, which together comprise the program level budget. User fees account for 43% of FDA's total FY2016 program level and 28% of CDRH's FY2016 program level. FDA's authority to collect medical device related user fees, originally authorized in 2002 ( P.L. 107-250 ), has been reauthorized in five-year increments and was reauthorized through FY2017 by the 112 th Congress via Title II of the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144 ). Congress has historically been interested in balancing the goals of allowing consumers to have access, as quickly as possible, to new and improved medical devices with preventing devices that are not safe and effective from entering or remaining on the market. Problems related to medical devices can have serious consequences for consumers. Reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) have voiced concerns about FDA's device review process. In 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 GAO included FDA's oversight of medical products on the GAO list of high-risk areas. FDA classifies devices according to the risk they pose to consumers. There are two main paths that manufacturers can use to bring moderate- and high-risk devices to market with FDA's permission. One path consists of conducting clinical studies, submitting a premarket approval (PMA) application, and requires evidence providing reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. The other path is shorter and less costly. It involves submitting a 510(k) notification demonstrating that the device is substantially equivalent to a device already on the market (a predicate device ) that does not require a PMA. The 510(k) process is unique to medical devices and results in FDA clearance . Substantial equivalence is determined by comparing the performance characteristics of a new device with those of a predicate device. Class III devices are those under current law which "cannot be classified as a class I device because insufficient information exists to determine that the application of general controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device," and "cannot be classified as a class II device because insufficient information exists to determine that the special controls ... would provide reasonable assurance of [their] safety and effectiveness," and are "purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health," or present "a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury, [are] to be subject ... to premarket approval to provide reasonable assurance of [their] safety and effectiveness." Generally speaking, under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), manufacturers
are prohibited from selling an adulterated product; are prohibited from misbranding a product; must register their facility with FDA and list all of the medical devices that they produce or process; must file the appropriate premarket submission with the agency at least 90 days before introducing a non exempt device onto the market; and must report to FDA any incident that they are aware of that suggests that their device may have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury. The CDRH program level budget in FY2016 is $450 million, including $127 million in user fees. In 2015, 98% of PMAs accepted for filing were approved by FDA. According to FDA data, 85% of 510(k)s accepted for review in 2015 were determined to be substantially equivalent. The Medical Device Review Process:Post-Market Requirements
Once approved or cleared for marketing, manufacturers of medical devices must comply with various regulations on labeling and advertising, manufacturing, and postmarketing surveillance. | Prior to and since the passage of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Congress has debated how best to ensure that consumers have access, as quickly as possible, to new and improved medical devices and, at the same time, prevent devices that are not safe and effective from entering or remaining on the market. Medical device regulation is complex, in part, because of the wide variety of items that are categorized as medical devices; examples range from a simple tongue depressor to a life-sustaining heart valve. The regulation of medical devices can affect their cost, quality, and availability in the health care system.
In order to be legally marketed in the United States, many medical devices must be reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency responsible for protecting the public health by overseeing medical products. FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) is primarily responsible for medical device review. CDRH activities are funded by congressional appropriations and user fees collected from device manufacturers, which together comprise the program level budget. User fees account for 43% of FDA's total FY2016 program level and 28% of CDRH's FY2016 program level. The CDRH program level budget in FY2016 is $450 million, including $127 million in user fees. FDA's authority to collect medical device user fees, originally authorized in 2002 (P.L. 107-250), has been reauthorized in five-year increments and was reauthorized through FY2017 in the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144).
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), all medical device manufacturers must register their facilities and list their devices with FDA and follow general controls requirements. FDA classifies devices according to the risk they pose to consumers. The FFDCA requires premarket review for moderate- and high-risk devices. There are two main paths that manufacturers can use to bring such devices to market. One path consists of conducting clinical studies and submitting a premarket approval (PMA) application that includes evidence providing reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. The other path involves submitting a 510(k) notification demonstrating that the device is substantially equivalent to a device already on the market (a predicate device) that does not require a PMA. The 510(k) process results in FDA clearance and tends to be much less expensive and less time-consuming than seeking FDA approval via PMA. Substantial equivalence is determined by comparing the performance characteristics of a new device with those of a predicate device. Demonstrating substantial equivalence does not usually require submitting clinical data demonstrating safety and effectiveness. Once its device is approved or cleared for marketing, a manufacturer must comply with regulations on manufacturing, labeling, surveillance, device tracking, and adverse event reporting. In 2015, FDA approved 98% of PMAs accepted for review and 85% of 510(k)s accepted for review were determined to be substantially equivalent.
Problems related to medical devices can have serious consequences for consumers. Defects in medical devices, such as artificial hips and pacemakers, have caused severe patient injuries and deaths. Reports published in 2009 through 2011—by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, and the Institute of Medicine—have voiced concerns about FDA's device review process. In 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 FDA's oversight of medical products was included on the GAO list of high-risk areas. In response to these concerns, FDA has conducted internal reviews and has implemented changes, including plans for a new National Evaluation System for health Technology (NEST). |
crs_R43746 | crs_R43746_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Constitution established only one federal court—the U. S. Supreme Court. In the years following the ratification of the Constitution, Congress has regularly exercised its power to create a host of different federal tribunals that adjudicate a variety of legal disputes. The two central types of federal "courts"—courts established under Article III and those tribunals that are not—differ in many respects, including with regard to their personnel, purposes, and powers. Article III or Constitutional Courts
Courts established pursuant to Article III are mainly defined by the three central constitutional provisions to which they are subject. The Constitution did this by "insulating the federal judiciary" from potential pressures, from either the political branches or the public, which could potentially "skew the decision making process or compromise the integrity or legitimacy of federal court decisions." Non-Article III or Legislative Courts
As noted above, Article III of the Constitution commands that "the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Notwithstanding this command, Congress has assigned to non-Article III bodies—that is, forums with judicial officers who do not enjoy Article III guarantees—the authority to adjudicate a large swath of cases that would seemingly fall within the "judicial power" traditionally allocated to Article III courts. There are two main categories of non-Article III courts. The first is commonly referred to as "legislative courts" or "Article I courts." These are standalone courts, created under Congress's Article I power, which have similar authority as Article III courts, such as entering their own judgments and issuing contempt orders. Examples of legislative courts include the U.S. Tax Court; the Court of Federal Claims; the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and federal district courts in Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The second category of non-Article III tribunals has commonly been referred to as "adjuncts" to Article III courts. This category is mainly comprised of federal administrative agencies and magistrate judges. Finally, Congress has established non-Article III tribunals to avoid the constitutional restrictions imposed upon Article III courts. An "adjunct" is an adjudicator—most often an administrative agency or a magistrate judge—that does not function as an independent court, but instead acts as a subordinate to the federal courts. These agencies perform a host of various functions including making policy, promulgating rules, and adjudicating questions arising under federal law. For example, under the Federal Magistrates Act, upon the consent of the parties, a magistrate judge "may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.... " Moreover, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, a district court, with the "consent of all parties to the proceeding," is permitted to refer a "proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments.... " Other federal laws may provide for arbitration over discrete legal issues to occur based on the consent of the parties involved. | The U.S. Constitution established only one federal court—the U.S. Supreme Court. Beyond this, Article III of the Constitution left it to the discretion of Congress to "ordain and establish" lower federal courts to conduct the judicial business of the federal government. From the very first, Congress established a host of different federal tribunals to adjudicate a variety of legal disputes. The two central types of federal "courts"—courts established under Article III and those tribunals that are not—differ in many respects, including with regard to their personnel, purposes, and powers.
Courts established pursuant to Article III are mainly defined by the three central constitutional provisions to which they are subject: resolution of cases that only present live "cases or controversies," lifetime tenure, and salary protection. The primary purpose for these safeguards was to insulate the federal judiciary from potential pressures, from either the political branches or the public, which might improperly influence the judicial decision-making process.
Notwithstanding Article III's seemingly literal command that the "judicial power" shall extend to all cases "arising under" the Constitution or federal law, Congress has assigned a host of cases arising under federal law to non-Article III bodies. Unlike Article III judges, these bodies, generally referred to as "non-Article III courts," "legislative courts," or "Article I courts," enjoy neither lifetime tenure nor salary protection. There are two main categories of non-Article III courts. The first are standalone courts, created under Congress's Article I power, which have similar authority as Article III courts, such as entering their own judgments and issuing contempt orders. Examples of legislative courts include the U.S. Tax Court; the Court of Federal Claims; the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and federal district courts in Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The second category of non-Article III tribunals is commonly referred to as "adjuncts" to Article III courts. This category is mainly comprised of federal administrative agencies and magistrate judges.
These non-Article III bodies have been justified on several grounds. First, the Court has held that in certain limited instances, Article III's absolute command must give way to Congress's exercise of its Article I powers. This theory has been used to justify the creation of territorial courts, military courts, and the adjudication of cases involving rights created by Congress (commonly referred to as "public rights" cases). The second rationale is the use of "adjuncts," judicial officers who do not function as independent courts but instead act as a subordinate to the federal courts with direct review of their decisions. Examples of adjuncts include the thousands of administrative law judges who adjudicate cases coming before federal agencies and federal magistrate judges who assist district court judges with everything from deciding motions, hearing evidence, and trying both criminal and civil cases. Lastly, certain questions arising under federal law may be resolved by non-Article III tribunals if the parties to the proceeding consent to such an adjudication. |
crs_97-122 | crs_97-122_0 | The Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Until the late 19 th century, this clause was applied by the Supreme Court only to condemnation : the formal exercise by government of its eminent domain power to take property coercively, upon payment of just compensation to the property owner. When the sovereign appropriated or caused a physical invasion of property, as when a government dam flooded private land, the Court found that the property had been taken just as surely as if the sovereign had formally condemned. In 1922, in the most historically important taking decision, the Supreme Court extended the availability of takings actions from government appropriations and physical invasions of property, as described above, to the mere regulation of property use. The ascendancy of the regulatory taking concept since the 1970s is hardly surprising. The pendulum may yet be swinging again: the four takings cases decided by the Court during its 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 terms were all decided in favor of the property owner, though mostly as to narrow issues. * * * * *
This report compiles only Supreme Court decisions addressing issues with special relevance to takings (inverse condemnation) actions, not those on formal condemnation or property valuation. On the other hand, a scattering of substantive due process decisions is interspersed where they have been cited by the Court as authority in its takings decisions. In Lingle , the Court summed up the four types of takings claims it now recognizes, in addition to those based on outright government appropriations:
a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may ... alleg[e] a "physical" taking, a Lucas -type "total regulatory taking," a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan . The Dawn of Regulatory Takings Law: Pennsylvania Coal Co. (1922) to 1978
The principle that government may "take" property in the Fifth Amendment sense merely through regulatory restriction of property use—that is, without physical invasion or formal appropriation of the property—was announced in 1922. Aside from making clear that regulatory takings occur only with the most severe of property impacts, the Court's opinions during this period display little in the way of principled decision-making. Appropriations and Physical Takings Only: 1870 to 1922
The 1870s marked the Supreme Court's first clear acknowledgment that the Takings Clause is not only a constraint on the government's formal exercise of eminent domain, but the basis as well for suits by property owners challenging government conduct not attended by such formal exercise. were typical. When cases involving mere restrictions on the use of property reached the Court, they were tested under due process, scope of the police power, or ultra vires theories. | This report is a reverse chronological listing of U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing claims that a government entity has "taken" private property, as that term is used in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." A scattering of related, substantive due process decisions is also included.
Under the Takings Clause, courts allow two distinct types of suit. Condemnation (also "formal condemnation") occurs when a government or private entity formally invokes its power of eminent domain by filing suit to take a specified property, upon payment to the owner of just compensation. By contrast, a taking action is a suit by a property holder against the government, claiming that government conduct has effectively taken the property notwithstanding that the government has not filed a formal condemnation suit. Because it is the procedural reverse of a condemnation action, a taking action is often called an "inverse condemnation" action. A typical taking action complains of severe regulation of land use, though the Takings Clause reaches all species of property, real and personal, tangible and intangible. The taking action generally demands that the government compensate the property owner, just as when government formally exercises eminent domain.
Finding the line between government interferences with property that are takings and those that are not has occupied the Supreme Court in most of the 100-plus decisions compiled here. The Supreme Court's decisions in these takings actions reach back to 1870, and are divided in this report into three periods.
The modern period, 1978 to the present, has seen the Court settle into a taxonomy of four fundamental types of takings—total regulatory takings, partial regulatory takings, physical takings, and exaction takings. The Court in this period also has sought to develop criteria for these four types, and to set out ripeness standards and clarify the required remedy. In the preceding period, 1922 to 1978, the Court first announced the regulatory taking concept—the notion that government regulation alone, without appropriation or physical invasion of property, may be a taking if sufficiently severe. During this time, however, it proffered little by way of regulatory takings criteria, continuing rather its earlier focus on appropriations and physical occupations. In the earliest period of takings law, 1870 to 1922, the Court saw the Takings Clause as protecting property owners only from appropriations and physical invasions, two forms of government interference with property seen by the Court as most functionally similar to an outright condemnation of property. During this infancy of takings law, regulatory restrictions were tested under other, non-takings theories, such as whether they were within a state's police power, and were generally upheld.
The four takings cases decided by the Supreme Court during its 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 terms attest to the Court's continuing interest in the takings issue. |
crs_R40536 | crs_R40536_0 | Introduction
According to the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in 2007 about 11% of adults (23.7 million) experienced serious psychological distress, such as anxiety and mood disorders, that resulted in functional impairment that impeded one or more major life activities. It is estimated that less than half of these individuals received mental health care due to various social, financial, and systemic barriers. Congress has been increasingly interested in transforming the mental health system in the aftermath of tragedies involving mentally ill individuals—such as the shootings at Columbine and Virginia Tech, which led to heightened public interest in the adequacy of the mental health care system. In the past decade, Congress passed two far-reaching laws on mental health care. The first law, the Children's Health Act, reauthorized the SAMHSA in 2000 and called for greater focus on the measurement of mental health care outcomes. The second law, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, expands federal requirements for mental health coverage and requires health insurers who choose to cover mental illness to provide mental health benefits on par with that for physical health. Mental illnesses are common in the United States. While there have been recent advances in treatment options, the delivery system and financing mechanisms have been slow to transform. Despite substantial investments that have enormously increased the scientific knowledge base and have led to developing many effective treatments, a commission established under President George W. Bush reported that many Americans were not benefiting from these investments. Each of the elements considered in this report—providers, settings, and financing—has implications for the quality of mental health care delivered. Federal entities that attempt to measure the quality of mental health care are those that provide for mental health care (VA, DOD, SAMHSA, HRSA, CMS) and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Access to competent mental health providers is scarce in rural areas and even some urban areas. Health insurance coverage of mental illness is often less comprehensive than that of physical illnesses. Mental health care is often not coordinated with other care that an individual may be receiving or may need. These reports are consistent in their recommendations for reforming the mental health care system. A crosswalk of the recommendations of the four federal reports mentioned above in the context of the issues facing the mental health care delivery system is included in the Appendix . Transformation of the mental health care system, in this view, would require incorporating in a timely fashion evidence-based practices as part of routine practice, resolving workforce shortage issues, ensuring access to care by removing financial barriers, coordinating mental health care with general health care and social services, and developing a way to systematically measure and improve the quality of care delivered. While each of these recommendations may result in some benefits, evidence suggests a comprehensive transformation of the mental health system could be necessary to ensure the availability and accessibility of quality mental health care to all individuals who need it. | In the past decade, four federal reports have offered insight into the nation's mental health care system and recommended a fundamental transformation of the system. According to these reports, transformation of the mental health care system would require timely incorporation of evidence-based practices in routine practice, resolution of workforce shortage issues, removal of financial barriers, coordination of mental health care with general health and social services, and systematic measurement and improvement of the quality of care delivered. While each of these recommendations may result in some benefits, the findings suggest that a comprehensive transformation of the mental health system could be necessary to ensure the availability and accessibility of quality mental health care to all individuals who need it.
In 2007 about 11% of adults (23.7 million) in the United States experienced serious psychological distress, such as anxiety and mood disorders, that resulted in functional impairment that impeded one or more major life activities. Different types of providers deliver care in a range of settings and are financed by various combinations of public and private payers. Congress has been increasingly interested in transforming the mental health system in the aftermath of tragedies involving mentally ill individuals—such as the shootings at Columbine and Virginia Tech, which led to heightened public interest in the adequacy of the mental health care system. Two federally funded efforts, one through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the other through the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), attempt to measure the quality of mental health care on an annual basis. At this time, neither effort is adequately developed to guide the transformation of the system.
SAMHSA estimates that less than half of individuals with serious psychological distress receive mental health care due to various social, financial, and systemic barriers. While there have been advances in treatment options, the delivery system and financing mechanisms have been slow to transform and apply these findings in routine practice. For this reason, despite substantial investments that have increased the knowledge base about mental illness and have led to the development of many effective treatments, experts agree that many Americans are not benefiting from these investments. Mental health care is often not coordinated with other care that an individual may be receiving or may need. Access to competent mental health providers is scarce in rural areas and even some urban areas. Coverage for mental illness provided by private health insurance, Medicare and Medicaid, is sometimes less comprehensive than that for physical illnesses, negatively affecting access. In addition, some issues, such as social stigma around mental illness, and inadequate public awareness that mental health problems are treatable create disincentives for individuals to seek care. These issues affect both the access to, and the quality of, care delivered and, by consequence, the mental health outcomes achieved.
In the past decade, Congress passed two far-reaching laws on mental health care. The first law, the Children's Health Act, reauthorized the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) in 2000 and called for greater focus on measurement of mental health care outcomes. The second law, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, expands federal requirements for mental health coverage. Congress could consider transformation of the mental health system as part of larger health care reform efforts. |
crs_R44938 | crs_R44938_0 | DOJ was established in 1870 with the Attorney General as its leader. Since its creation, DOJ has added additional agencies, components, offices, boards, and divisions to its organizational structure. DOJ, along with the judicial branch, operates the federal criminal justice system. The department enforces federal criminal and civil laws, including antitrust, civil rights, environmental, and tax laws. Through agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), it investigates terrorism, organized and violent crime, illegal drugs, and gun and explosives violations, among others. Marshals Service (USMS), it protects the federal judiciary, apprehends fugitives, and detains alleged offenders who are not granted pretrial release. DOJ investigates and prosecutes individuals accused of violating federal laws, and it represents the U.S. government in court. DOJ's Bureau of Prisons (BOP) houses individuals accused and convicted of federal crimes. In addition to its role in administering the federal criminal justice system, the department also provides grants and training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and judicial and correctional systems. 115-31 ) provided a total of $28.962 billion for DOJ. The act provided $2.713 billion for the U.S. Marshals, $9.006 billion for the FBI, $2.103 billion for the DEA, $1.259 billion for the ATF, and $7.142 billion for the BOP. The remaining funding (approximately $6.739 billion) was for DOJ's other offices—such as the U.S. FY2018 Administration's Request
The Trump Administration requested $28.205 billion for DOJ for FY2018. The requested amount was 2.6% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation. The Administration proposed reductions for several DOJ accounts. The Administration also proposed reductions for the following:
State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance (-$340 million, -26.6%), Juvenile Justice Programs (-$21 million, -8.3%), and Community Oriented Policing Services (-$4 million, -1.5%). While the Administration's FY2018 budget request included several reductions for DOJ, it also included several proposed increases:
The Offices of the United States Attorneys (+$22 million, 1.1%), The U.S. Marshals Service's Federal Prisoner Detention account (+$82 million, 5.6%), The National Security Division (+$5 million, +5.2%), Interagency Law Enforcement (+$9 million, +1.7%), The Bureau of Prisons' Salaries and Expenses account (+$76 million, +1.1%), The Drug Enforcement Administration (+$61 million, +2.9%), The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (+$15 million, +1.2%), and The Executive Office for Immigration Review (+$60 million, +13.9%). 3354)
H.R. Compared to the FY2017 enacted appropriation, the House-passed bill included an $88 million (+3.2%) increase for the USMS, a $54 million (+2.6%) increase for the DEA, and a $36 million+ (2.8%) increase for the ATF. The Senate Committee-Reported Bill (S. 1662)
The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations would have provided $29.068 billion for DOJ, 2.6% more than the Administration's request and 0.4% more than the FY2017 enacted appropriation. 115-141)
For FY2018, DOJ received a total of $30.384 billion in funding, which included $30.299 billion in regular appropriations provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division B, P.L. Total FY2018 funding for the department is 4.9% greater than the FY2017 appropriation (4.6% greater without emergency-designated funding) and 7.3% greater than the Administration's request (7.0% greater without emergency-designated funding). Nearly every DOJ account was funded at a level above the FY2017 enacted appropriation and the Administration's request, though there were a few exceptions. Attorneys. Attorneys. | The Department of Justice (DOJ) was established in 1870 with the Attorney General as its leader. Since its creation, DOJ has added additional agencies, offices, boards, and divisions to its organizational structure. DOJ, along with the judicial branch, operates the federal criminal justice system. The department enforces federal criminal and civil laws, including antitrust, civil rights, environmental, and tax laws. Through agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), it investigates terrorism, organized and violent crime, illegal drugs, and gun and explosives violations, among others. Through the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), it protects the federal judiciary, apprehends fugitives, and oversees the detention of alleged offenders who are not granted pretrial release. DOJ prosecutes individuals accused of violating federal laws, and it represents the U.S. government in court. DOJ's Bureau of Prisons (BOP) houses individuals accused or convicted of federal crimes. In addition to its role in administering the federal criminal justice system, the department also provides grants and training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and judicial and correctional systems.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) appropriated $28.962 billion for DOJ. The act provided $2.713 billion for the U.S. Marshals, $9.006 billion for the FBI, $2.103 billion for the DEA, $1.259 billion for the ATF, and $7.142 billion for the BOP. The remaining funding (approximately $6.739 billion) was for DOJ's other offices, such as the U.S. Attorneys Offices, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Attorney General's office.
The Trump Administration requested $28.205 billion for DOJ for FY2018. This amount was 2.6% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation. The Administration proposed reductions for several DOJ accounts, including a $232 million (-2.6%) reduction for the FBI, a $340 million (-26.6%) reduction for State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance, and a $21 million (-8.3%) reduction for Juvenile Justice Programs. While the Administration's FY2018 budget request included several reductions for DOJ accounts, it also included several increases, including an additional $22 million (+1.1%) for the Office of the United States Attorneys, an $82 million (+5.6%) increase for the USMS's Federal Prisoner Detention account, a $76 million (+1.1%) increase for BOP's Salaries and Expenses account, and a $61 million (+2.9%) increase for the DEA.
The House-passed bill (H.R. 3354) would have included $29.310 billion for DOJ, which was 1.2% greater than the FY2017 enacted appropriation and 3.5% greater than the Administration's request.
The Senate committee-reported bill (S. 1662) would have included $29.068 billion for DOJ, which was 0.4% greater than the FY2017 enacted appropriation and 2.6% greater than the Administration's request.
For FY2018, DOJ received a total of $30.384 billion in funding through the annual appropriations process, which included $30.299 billion in regular and $85 million in emergency-designated funding. Total FY2018 funding for the department is 4.9% greater than the FY2017 appropriation (4.6% greater without emergency-designated funding) and 7.3% greater than the Administration's request (7.0% greater without emergency-designated funding). Nearly every DOJ account was funded at a level higher than the FY2017 enacted appropriation and the Administration's request. |
crs_R41112 | crs_R41112_0 | Current Conditions
On February 27, 2010, an earthquake of magnitude 8.8 struck off the coast of central Chile. Centered 70 miles northeast of Chile's second-largest city, Concepción, at a depth of 22 miles, the earthquake was the second-largest ever recorded in Chile and the fifth-largest recorded worldwide since 1900. Over 100 aftershocks of magnitude 5.0 or greater were recorded following the initial earthquake. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami, which struck Chile's coast roughly 20 minutes after the earthquake and moved 2,000 feet onto shore in some places, have devastated portions of the country. The Chilean government is leading the relief operation and coordinating assistance. Despite offers of assistance, thus far the international humanitarian relief operation has been limited pending further requests for assistance from the government. In addition, there are more than 16,000 Chilean military personnel providing humanitarian relief and maintaining public order. Preliminary Numbers at a Glance
Although there are reports of varying casualty numbers, according to the Ministry of the Interior, the official death toll is 507 (497 bodies have been identified; 10 remain unidentified). The numbers of missing persons are not yet known. According to the Chilean government, approximately 200,000 houses have been badly damaged or destroyed. Estimates suggest as many as 2 million people may have been affected by the earthquake, an unknown number of whom were injured or displaced. At least two elements of the Chilean government's initial response have been criticized in Chile. The first is that the coastal and island communities did not receive timely warning about the tsunami waves that caused so many of the reported casualties. The second Chilean government response that has been widely questioned is the speed with which the Chilean military was deployed to quell looting and violence in the disaster zone. While critics point to weaknesses in the initial government response, later assessments by disaster managers gave the Chilean government higher marks. Many credited the Bachelet government with success given the scope of the disaster and some labeled it a model. The Chilean government's response to the earthquake has been complicated by the fact that President Bachelet departed office on March 11, 2010, and was succeeded by Sebastián Piñera, the leader of a center-right coalition that won the country's recent presidential election. President Bachelet held a series of meetings with President-elect Piñera in order to ease the transition. USAID
On February 27, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. government would assist with earthquake rescue and recovery efforts, pending a request from the Chilean Government. On February 28, 2010, U.S. Ambassador to Chile Paul E. Simons issued a disaster declaration, and through OFDA, authorized $50,000 for the initial implementation of an emergency response program. OFDA deployed a 16-member USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). As of March 10, 2010, USAID/OFDA reports that it has provided $10.7 million for emergency response activities in Chile. Regular U.S. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the U.S. government agency charged with coordinating U.S. government and private sector assistance. 431 . H.Res. 1144 . H.R. | On February 27, 2010, an earthquake of magnitude 8.8 struck off the coast of central Chile. Centered 70 miles northeast of Chile's second-largest city, Concepción, at a depth of 22 miles, the earthquake was the second largest ever recorded in Chile and the fifth largest recorded worldwide since 1900. Over 100 aftershocks of magnitude 5.0 or greater were recorded following the initial earthquake. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami, which struck Chile's coast roughly 20 minutes after the earthquake and moved 2,000 feet onto shore in some places, devastated parts of the country. Although there are reports of varying casualty numbers, according to Chile's Ministry of the Interior, the official death toll is 507 (497 bodies have been identified; 10 remain unidentified). The numbers of missing persons are not yet known. Approximately 200,000 homes have been badly damaged or destroyed. Estimates suggest as many as 2 million people may have been affected by the earthquake, an unknown number of whom were injured or displaced.
The Chilean government, through the Chilean National Emergency Office, is leading the relief operation and coordinating assistance. Despite offers of assistance, thus far the international humanitarian relief operation has been limited pending further requests for assistance from the government. In addition, there are more than 16,000 Chilean military personnel providing humanitarian relief and maintaining public order. At least two elements of the Chilean government's initial response have been criticized in Chile. The first is that the coastal and island communities did not receive timely warning about the tsunami waves that caused so many of the reported casualties. The second Chilean government response that has been widely questioned was the speed with which the Chilean military was deployed to quell looting and violence in the disaster zone. While critics point to weaknesses in the initial response, later assessments by disaster managers gave the Chilean government's response higher marks. Many credited the government of President Michelle Bachelet with success given the scope of the disaster and some labeled the government's response a model. The Chilean government's response to the earthquake has been complicated by the fact that President Bachelet left office on March 11, 2010, and has been succeeded by Sebastián Piñera, the leader of a center-right coalition that won the country's recent presidential election. President Bachelet held meetings with President-elect Piñera in order to ease the transition.
On February 27, 2010, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. government would assist with earthquake rescue and recovery efforts, pending a request from the Chilean Government. On February 28, 2010, U.S. Ambassador to Chile Paul E. Simons issued a disaster declaration, and through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), authorized $50,000 for the initial implementation of an emergency response program. OFDA deployed a 16-member USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team. As of March 10, 2010, USAID/OFDA reports that it has provided $10.7 million for emergency response activities in Chile. The U.S. Department of Defense is also providing limited assistance. Policy issues of potential interest include levels of U.S. assistance to Chile, burdensharing and donor fatigue, tsunamis and early warning systems, and managing risk through building codes. Related legislation includes S.Res. 431, H.Res. 1144, H.R. 4783. For more background on Chile, see CRS Report R40126, Chile: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations. |
crs_R42437 | crs_R42437_0 | In March 2010, Congress passed P.L. 111-148 , the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) and amended it by passing P.L. 111-152 , the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA). Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in multiple courts challenging various aspects of the new law. Supreme Court Cases
On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court granted three petitions for certiorari to decide issues raised by the Affordable Care Act cases: (1) National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , No. On June 28, 2012, the Court issued its decision in the case, National Federation of Independent Business et al. Below are links to documents related to these cases before the Court. | In March 2010, Congress passed P.L. 111-148, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), and amended it by passing P.L. 111-152, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA). Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in multiple courts challenging various aspects of the new law. Many of these cases were heard in the district courts and a few were appealed to appellate courts. In November 2011, the Supreme Court granted three petitions for certiorari in one of these cases. On June 28, 2012, the Court issued its decision in the case, National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius.
This report contains resources for retrieving background information and selected legal material relevant to these cases. It also includes information on CRS experts and products to assist in understanding the legal and policy issues related to the act. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R41086 | crs_R41086_0 | Numerous studies have attempted to estimate the economic effects of potential climate legislation currently being considered by Congress. These studies have examined both the economy-wide effects, as well as the effects to specific sectors, such as the U.S. agriculture and forestry sectors. These potential effects have been estimated by various governmental agencies, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as well as by several universities and farm industry groups. General Study Conclusions
The EPA and USDA studies generally concluded that the overall economic costs of the proposed climate legislation to farmers and landowners would be "modest" and that "agriculture will benefit from energy and climate legislation if it includes a robust carbon offset program and other helpful provisions." The quantity and type of domestic offsets that might be available and used in a cap-and-trade system are subject to considerable uncertainty. Potential Land Conversion
Both the USDA and EPA models have projected the conversion of substantial U.S. agricultural land to tree plantings in response to expected favorable conditions in future carbon offset markets However, many in the U.S. agricultural community are concerned that this could take millions of agricultural acres out of production, removing farmers and employees from the business of food production and raising food prices to consumers. Considering the general uncertainty about the possible outcomes of a regulatory process, following the still-uncertain passage of climate legislation in Congress, it is not possible to confidently predict or quantify the extent to which available U.S. cropland might be converted to woodlands. by 2050. Nevertheless, these results illustrate the importance of the underlying assumptions about the market carbon price in influencing the modeling results within the agricultural and forestry offset market. Potentially Disproportionate Benefits
Some in the U.S. farming community have expressed concern that only certain landowners and agricultural producers might be able to participate in the carbon offset market. They suggest that only larger landowners and farming operations would benefit from a carbon program, and this may result in further industry consolidation in the farming sectors, exacerbating difficult business conditions for smaller, traditional farmers. Others are concerned that if only certain crop producers in some regions benefit from participating in the new carbon offset market, this could result in inequities across all crop producers, benefitting some while not benefitting others. Some evidence suggests that larger landowners and farming operations may have greater opportunities to participate in carbon markets, because of their economies of scale and their likely lower transactions costs compared to smaller landowners and farmers. Alternatively, smaller-sized operations might have greater opportunities to participate in carbon offset projects, because they are more likely to own their land and generally tend to be more operationally diverse, and because given the expected continued role of designated middlemen in generating and marketing carbon offsets. Projected Land Conversion
Many variables complicate the economic analyses and related estimates. Missing Costs—EPA and USDA analyses do not account for all likely farm-level costs, such as transaction costs associated with the future regulatory regime and possible foregone revenue from farm support programs associated with commodity crop production if farmers chose to participate in a carbon market. It is unclear how this could influence the results of the modeling analyses. Land Tenure—EPA and USDA analyses do not reflect possible legal and contractual constraints that might affect participation in the carbon market, given differences in the U.S. crop sectors between farmland ownership and leasing in the United States. The evidence and speculation on the possibly inequitable distribution of benefits is mixed. | Numerous studies have attempted to estimate the economic effects of potential climate legislation currently being considered by Congress. These studies have examined both the economy-wide effects, as well as the effects to specific sectors. Two principal reports on the economic effects to the U.S. agriculture and forestry sectors were conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). As described by USDA, these studies generally concluded that the overall economic costs to the agricultural community of the proposed legislation would be modest. Both studies further suggested that farm revenues from carbon offsets could result in net economic gains for the U.S. agricultural sectors.Concerns have been raised regarding the results of the EPA and USDA analyses, as well as the potential effects of a carbon offset market established by a cap-and-trade system. Many in the U.S. farming community have expressed concern that these analyses estimate that 60 to 65 million acres of U.S. agricultural land could be converted to woodlands by 2050. This conversion would be the result of farmers and landowners choosing to participate in the emerging carbon markets through additional tree-planting, in response to expected high carbon prices. Some believe this could take land out of crop production, removing farmers from the business of food production, and raising food prices to consumers. In addition, some in the farming community have expressed concern that only certain landowners and agricultural producers might benefit in the carbon offset market. Some worry that only larger landowners and farmers might benefit from a carbon offset program, which could result in further industry consolidation in the farming sectors, exacerbating difficult business conditions for smaller, traditional farmers. Others worry that only certain crop producers will benefit, resulting in inequities across all crop producers.
Given the general uncertainty about the possible outcomes of a likely regulatory process, following the still uncertain passage of climate legislation in Congress, it is not possible to definitively predict or provide a quantitative assessment of the potential implications or participation rates within a future carbon offset program. Regarding available economic modeling projections of land-use changes, many variables and factors complicate the analyses and projections of cropland conversion rates should be regarded with caution. Among the types of factors are: assumptions in the models of high and rising carbon prices that substantially influence the modeling results; missing farm-level costs, such as transaction costs associated with the future regulatory regime and possible foregone revenue from farm support programs; regional and biological variability that might not be precisely reflected in the model; possible physical capacity constraints and limitations to support substantial afforestation efforts; and possible legal and contractual constraints that might affect participation in the carbon market, given differences in the U.S. crop sectors between farmland ownership and leasing in the United States.
The available economic models are even more limited in their ability to predict land-use changes or other potential changes under a carbon offset market, differentiating among producers and production areas. Anecdotally, the evidence about whether or not some operations and production regions might benefit more than others is mixed. Some evidence suggests that larger landowners and farming operations may have greater opportunities to participate in carbon markets, because of their economies of scale and their likely lower transactions costs compared to smaller landowners and farmers. Alternatively, smaller-sized operations might have greater opportunities to participate in carbon offset projects, because they are more likely to own their land and generally tend to be more operationally diverse, and the expected continued role of designated middlemen in generating and marketing carbon offsets. |
crs_R42057 | crs_R42057_0 | Introduction
Congress has a long-standing interest in the criminal alien population and has supported efforts since the late 1980s to identify, detain, and remove these individuals. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that about 184,000 non-citizens were incarcerated in 2011 ( Table 2 ) and that the total non-citizen correctional population—which represent a subset of all aliens ever convicted of a crime—may be about 572,000 (see " Other Estimates of the Criminal Alien Population " below). The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency operates four key programs to identify and remove criminal aliens and other removable aliens. First, when, if ever, should DHS exercise its "prosecutorial discretion" by not asserting its full enforcement authority? Some Members of Congress have objected to these policies, and some support legislation to limit the exercise of discretion (see " DHS Enforcement Priorities and Discretion "). A second set of questions concerns the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement. After describing how these programs function and key differences among them, the report reviews their recent appropriations history and enforcement statistics. The final sections of the report describe the controversies surrounding certain programs targeting criminal aliens—particularly the Secure Communities program and the §287(g) program—and legislative issues that may arise as a result. Three groups of criminal aliens can be distinguished. Thus, as Figure 3 illustrates, the noncitizen proportion of the incarcerated population in 2001-2011 mapped closely to the proportion of noncitizens in the U.S. population overall. In 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated the U.S. criminal alien population in federal prisons and criminal alien incarcerations for state prisons and local jails. ICE currently operates four programs wholly or partly focused on criminal aliens (discussed in more detail below): CAP, Secure Communities, the §287(g) program, and the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP). The CAP, Secure Communities, and §287(g) programs are "jail enforcement" programs that screen individuals for possible immigration violations and for criminal-related grounds for removal in federal and state prisons and local jails. NFOP is a "task force" program that targets at-large criminal aliens, including fugitive aliens who have not been convicted of a crime (i.e., prior to entering the criminal justice process) and aliens who have been convicted of crimes and subsequently released from prison. By their nature, jail enforcement programs are not highly targeted: they are designed to screen the entire population of people passing through some part of the criminal justice system. The Obama Administration has published a series of memoranda to prioritize certain aliens for removal and to exercise prosecutorial discretion in other cases (see "DHS Enforcement Priorities and Discretion"). Yet ICE and its partner agencies only have the detention bed space and institutional capacity to remove about 400,000 aliens per year. Concerns about State and Local Enforcement
State and Local Enforcement Programs May Not Focus on Serious Criminals
A number of observers have raised concerns that ICE's enforcement programs, which ostensibly focus on identifying and prosecuting the most dangerous criminal aliens, also detain large numbers of noncriminal aliens and aliens convicted only of minor offenses. Involving State and Local Law Enforcement in Immigration-Related Screening May Harm Community-Police Relations
ICE's three jail enforcement programs interact in different ways with state and local law enforcement agencies, but all of them rely on such agencies, at least indirectly, as points of contact with potentially removable aliens as they are processed through the criminal justice system. Most removable aliens have never been convicted of a criminal offense. | Congress has a long-standing interest in seeing that immigration enforcement agencies identify and deport criminal aliens. The expeditious removal of such aliens has been a statutory priority since 1986, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its predecessor agency have operated programs targeting criminal aliens since 1988. These programs have grown substantially since FY2005, and deportations of criminal aliens—along with other unauthorized immigrants—have grown proportionally.
Despite the interest in criminal aliens, inconsistencies in data quality, data collection, and definitions make it impossible to precisely enumerate the criminal alien population, defined in this report as all noncitizens ever convicted of a crime. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates the number of noncitizens incarcerated in federal and state prisons and local jails—a subset of all criminal aliens—at 183,830 in 2011 (the most recent year for which complete data are available), with state prisons and local jails each accounting for somewhat more incarcerations than federal prisons. The overall proportion of noncitizens in prisons and jails corresponds closely to the proportion of noncitizens in the total U.S. population.
DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operates four programs designed in part to target criminal aliens: the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), Secure Communities, the §287(g) program, and the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP). CAP, Secure Communities, and the §287(g) programs are jail enforcement programs that screen individuals for immigration-related violations as they are being booked into jail and while they are incarcerated; the NFOP is a task force program that target at-large criminal aliens. This report describes how these programs work and identifies their common features and key differences among them.
While consensus exists on the overarching goal of identifying and removing serious criminal aliens, these programs have generated controversy, in part because many of the aliens identified by ICE have never been convicted of a crime, or have been convicted only of minor criminal offenses. Thus, the programs focus attention on questions about when—if ever—DHS should exercise "prosecutorial discretion" by not asserting its full enforcement authority in certain cases. ICE and DHS officials have testified that resource constraints mean that the department can deport only about 400,000 aliens per year—far fewer than the total number of potentially removable aliens identified. Officials have released a series of memoranda describing criteria to prioritize certain aliens for removal, and to consider exercising discretion in other cases. Some Members of Congress have objected to the Obama Administration's exercise of discretion, and some have proposed legislation that effectively would limit such discretion.
A second set of questions concerns the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement. Supporters of jail enforcement programs, including the Obama Administration, see them as efficient and even-handed ways to identify criminal aliens. The Administration has particularly focused on Secure Communities, which was deployed in every law enforcement jurisdiction in the country in FY2013. Yet some have raised concerns that jail enforcement programs are not narrowly targeted at serious criminal offenders. Critics also argue that involving state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement may damage police-community relations, may result in racial profiling, and may result in the wrongful detention of people who have not been convicted of criminal offenses and may not be subject to removal. Although ICE and DHS have taken steps to address both sets of questions, they remain topics of legislative interest in the 113th Congress. |
crs_95-1135 | crs_95-1135_0 | The Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment is only constitutionally required in federal cases. Organizational Matters
Jurisdiction
The authority of a federal grand jury is sweeping, but it is limited to the investigation of possible violations of federal criminal law triable in the district in which it is sitting. In many cases, the government will have already conducted an investigation and the attorney for the government will present evidence to the panel. Like the attorney-client privilege, it is subject to a crime/fraud exception. The Sixth Amendment, however, does not assure a grand jury witness of the right to have an attorney present when the witness testifies before the grand jury. Generally it will not. Once before the grand jury, a witness may decline to present self-incriminating testimony. The areas beyond the cloak of grand jury secrecy may include instances where: (1) the individual with the information is not bound to maintain the grand jury's secrets; (2) disclosure does not constitute disclosure of "matters occurring before the grand jury;" (3) subsequent use of the information presented to the grand jury is not "disclosure;" (4) the disclosure is to an attorney for the government or a government employee for use in the performance of the attorney's duties; (5) disclosure is "directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;" (6) a defendant seeks to dismiss an indictment because of grand jury irregularities; (7) an attorney for the government discloses the information to another grand jury; (8) disclosed to state officials for purposes of enforcing state law; (9) disclosure is expressly permitted by statute; and (10) continued secrecy would be inconsistent with history of the grand jury's relationship with the court and of the common law origins of the rule. The district court which empanels the grand jury receives such communications and enjoys the discretion to determine the extent to which the reports should be sealed, expunged or disclosed. | The federal grand jury exists to investigate crimes against the United States and to secure the constitutional right of grand jury indictment. Its responsibilities require broad powers.
As an arm of the U.S. District Court which summons it, upon whose process it relies, and which will receive any indictments it returns, the grand jury's subject matter and geographical jurisdiction is that of the court to which it is attached.
As a general rule, the law is entitled to everyone's evidence. Witnesses subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury, therefore, will find little to excuse their appearance. Once before the panel, however, they are entitled to benefit of various constitutional, common law and statutory privileges including the right to withhold self-incriminating testimony and the security of confidentiality of their attorney-client communications. They are not, however, entitled to have an attorney with them in the grand jury room when they testify.
The grand jury conducts its business in secret. Those who attend its sessions other than witnesses may disclose its secrets only when the interests of justice permit.
Unless the independence of the grand jury is overborne, irregularities in the grand jury process ordinarily will not result in dismissal of an indictment, particularly where dismissal is sought after conviction.
The concurrence of the attorney for the government is required for the trial of any indictment voted by the grand jury. In the absence of such an endorsement or when a panel seeks to report, the court enjoys narrowly exercised discretion to dictate expungement or permit distribution of the report.
This report is available in an abridged form—without footnotes or citations to authority—as CRS Report RS20214, Federal Grand Juries: The Law in a Nutshell. |
crs_R44782 | crs_R44782_0 | Current Federal Status of Marijuana and the Policy Gap with States
While the federal government maintains marijuana's current placement as a Schedule I controlled substance, states have established a range of laws and policies regarding its medical and recreational use. These developments have spurred a number of questions regarding potential implications for federal drug enforcement activities and for the nation's drug policies as a whole. Trends in States
Over the past few decades, most states have deviated from an across-the-board prohibition of marijuana, and as of March 2017, nearly 90% of the states, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, allowed for the medical use of marijuana in some capacity. Also, eight states and the District of Columbia now allow for the recreational use of marijuana. It is now more so the rule than the exception that states have laws and policies allowing for some manufacturing, sale, distribution, and possession of marijuana—all of which are contrary to the CSA, except for the purposes of sanctioned research. Federal Response to State Divergence
Enforcement Focused on Traffickers
Rather than targeting individuals for drug use and possession, federal law enforcement has generally focused its counterdrug efforts on criminal networks involved in the drug trade. Attorneys
After some states began to legalize the medical use of marijuana, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reaffirmed that marijuana growth, possession, and trafficking remain crimes under federal law irrespective of how individual states may change their laws and positions on marijuana. Select Implications of State Marijuana Legalization
While the majority of the American public supports marijuana legalization, some have voiced concern over possible negative implications, particularly with respect to recreationa l legalization. These implications include, but are not limited to, the potential impact of legalization on (1) use of marijuana, particularly among youth; (2) traffic-related incidents involving marijuana-impaired drivers; (3) trafficking of marijuana from states that have legalized it into neighboring states that have not; and (4) U.S. compliance with international treaties. On the other hand, some have been encouraged by the potential outcomes from marijuana legalization, including new tax revenue for states and a potential decrease in marijuana-related arrests. Not all potential implications are discussed in this report, and some are yet to be fully measured. Selected Issues Before Congress—The Path Forward
Given the current federal marijuana policy gap with certain states, there are a number of issues that Congress may address. These include, but are not limited to, issues surrounding financial services for marijuana businesses, federal tax issues for these businesses, oversight of federal law enforcement, allowance of states to implement medical marijuana laws and involvement of federal health care workers, and consideration of marijuana's designation as a Schedule I drug. It has only been a few years since states began to legalize recreational marijuana, but over 20 years since they began to legalize medical marijuana. In addressing state-level legalization efforts, Congress could take one of several routes. It could elect to take no action, thereby upholding the federal government's current marijuana policy and enforcement priorities. Alternatively, Congress could choose to reevaluate marijuana's placement as a Schedule I controlled substance. | Under federal law, the cultivation, possession, and distribution of marijuana are illegal, except for the purposes of sanctioned research. States, however, have established a range of laws and policies regarding marijuana's medical and recreational use. Most states have deviated from an across-the-board prohibition of marijuana, and it is now more so the rule than the exception that states have laws and policies allowing for some cultivation, sale, distribution, and possession of marijuana—all of which are contrary to the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). As of March 2017, nearly 90% of the states, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, allow for the medical use of marijuana in some capacity. Also, eight states and the District of Columbia now allow for some recreational use of marijuana. These developments have spurred a number of questions regarding their potential implications for federal law enforcement activities and for the nation's drug policies as a whole.
Thus far, the federal response to state actions to decriminalize or legalize marijuana largely has been to allow states to implement their own laws on marijuana. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has nonetheless reaffirmed that marijuana growth, possession, and trafficking remain crimes under federal law irrespective of states' positions on marijuana. Rather than targeting individuals for drug use and possession, federal law enforcement has generally focused its counterdrug efforts on criminal networks involved in the drug trade.
While the majority of the American public supports marijuana legalization, some have voiced apprehension over possible negative implications. Opponents' concerns include, but are not limited to, the potential impact of legalization on (1) marijuana use, particularly among youth; (2) road incidents involving marijuana-impaired drivers; (3) marijuana trafficking from states that have legalized it into neighboring states that have not; and (4) U.S. compliance with international treaties. Proponents of legalization have been encouraged by potential outcomes that could result from marijuana legalization, including a new source of tax revenue for states and a decrease in marijuana-related arrests. Many of these potential implications are yet to be fully measured.
Given the current marijuana policy gap between the federal government and many of the states, there are a number of issues that Congress may address. These include, but are not limited to, issues surrounding availability of financial services for marijuana businesses, federal tax treatment, oversight of federal law enforcement, allowance of states to implement medical marijuana laws and involvement of federal health care workers, and consideration of marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the CSA. The marijuana policy gap has widened each year for some time. It has only been a few years since states began to legalize recreational marijuana, but over 20 years since they began to legalize medical marijuana. In addressing state-level legalization efforts and considering marijuana's current placement on Schedule I, Congress could take one of several routes. It could elect to take no action, thereby upholding the federal government's current marijuana policy. It may also decide that the CSA must be enforced in states and not allow them to implement conflicting laws on marijuana. Alternatively, Congress could choose to reevaluate marijuana's placement as a Schedule I controlled substance. |
crs_R44242 | crs_R44242_0 | This report attempts to show how options to broaden the tax base by placing limitations on itemized deductions can potentially work against the expansionary effects of reducing marginal tax rates. The report considers the effects on labor supply and savings (which affects the stock of capital) in turn. The report also analyzes the eventual effects of restricting itemized deductions, along with other base-broadening provisions, such as slowing depreciation, on the capital stock. Labor Supply
The effect of marginal tax rates on labor supply occurs through what economists term the "substitution effect." Effects on investment, where the effective marginal rate is only one input, are examined in the " Capital Stock " section. The remainder of this section estimates effective marginal tax rates and changes in effective marginal tax rates for the following policy options:
Elimination of itemized deductions for state and local taxes Elimination of itemized deductions for charitable giving Elimination of itemized deductions for state and local taxes and charitable giving Elimination of itemized deductions Capping itemized deductions at $17,000 Capping itemized deductions at $25,000
These policy options were chosen to illustrate the potential effects, though they do not necessarily reflect current policy proposals. Conversely, the option to eliminate all itemized deductions results in the largest effect in all cases. Recent surveys of labor supply responses of men indicated that labor supply was largely inelastic. For the work force as a whole, a substitution elasticity of 0.1 to 0.3 was indicated and is reported in Table 4 . In tax reform proposals, these negative effects on labor supply from base broadening would partly offset the positive effects on labor supply from lower marginal tax rates. 1 , 113 th Congress), found labor supply increases ranging from 0.4% to 0.8% for FY2014-FY2023. One is to move to the alternative depreciation system that forms the baseline used by the Joint Committee on Taxation for measuring the benefits of accelerated depreciation. The other two provisions are to depreciate two types of intangible investments, research and development and advertising, over a 10-year period. Repeal of the production activities deduction, which allows a 9% deduction from taxable income for certain domestic production, such as manufacturing. Indexation of interest deductions and payments for inflation. H.R. In addition to firm-level taxes on equity investment that can be compared to the statutory rate, these numbers also provide an overall tax rate that includes the effects of other elements in the tax system: shareholder-level taxes (dividends and capital gains) on corporate equity investments, as well as the tax benefits of borrowing and deducting nominal interest at the firm's rate while only part of this interest is taxed to the creditor. Accelerated Depreciation
The most significant base-broadening provision overall, and in the case of any measure of the effect on the effective tax rate, is the move to the alternative depreciation system (third row of Table 10 ), increasing the overall tax rate by 4.6 percentage points. It may be useful to compare these effects of itemized deduction limits to the effect of lowering the statutory corporate tax rate, which is one of the objectives of tax reform. These findings indicate that tax reform that affects savings and investment is unlikely to have significant effects on growth in capital. A 10 percentage point corporate rate reduction, the tax rate reduction proposed in The Tax Reform Act of 2014 and a common target for proposed tax reforms, would increase the capital stock by 0.4% to 0.8%. Conclusion
The analysis in this report shows that provisions that broaden the base can offset in part or more than offset effects of changing tax rates. The analysis also suggests that the goal of increasing economic growth as part of a revenue and distributionally neutral tax reform may not be easily attainable, a view consistent with the findings of economists considering growth effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Disallowing itemized deductions for state and local taxes increased the rate by 1.69 percentage points, and disallowing all itemized deductions increased the rate by 2.5 percentage points. | One source of interest in a tax reform that broadens the base and lowers the rate is the potential increase in growth, as labor supply and investment respond to lower marginal tax rates. Yet, studies of a signature reform in the past, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, found little effect on growth. The act was revenue and distributionally neutral, which is a goal of some recent tax reform proposals. One reason advanced for the limited effects on growth is that the effects of provisions that broaden the base to finance lower statutory rates increase effective marginal tax rates for some taxpayers.
This report shows how options to broaden the tax base by placing limitations on itemized deductions can potentially work counter to the growth effects of reducing marginal tax rates, primarily through reducing labor supply. It also shows how these effects—along with other base-broadening provisions, such as slowing depreciation—limit the effects on investment and savings and can eventually reduce the size of the capital stock in the economy. The effects on labor supply and the capital stock are considered in turn.
To examine the potential effects of base broadening on effective tax rates facing labor, the analysis examines provisions to eliminate itemized deductions for state and local taxes, for charitable contributions, and for both. It also examines provisions to eliminate itemized deductions altogether or to impose dollar caps ($17,000 and $25,000). Eliminating itemized deductions would raise effective marginal tax rates by almost two percentage points on average and is estimated, using common behavioral responses, to reduce labor supply by 0.2% to 0.6%. These effects are significant compared to projected effects in the Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1, 113th Congress), where labor supply was projected to increase by 0.4% to 0.8%. More limited restrictions to itemized deductions result in smaller reductions in labor supply.
Similar to the analysis for labor supply, the potential effects of base broadening on effective tax rates for capital investment are examined. The analysis includes two itemized deduction restrictions: disallowing the deduction for state and local taxes and disallowing all itemized deductions. Eliminating these provisions increases the effective marginal tax rate on business income, interest income, dividends, and capital gains. It also included the effects of three provisions that affect how quickly an investment is recovered. One is to move to the alternative depreciation system that forms the baseline for measuring the benefits of accelerated depreciation. The other two provisions are to depreciate two types of intangible investments, research and development and advertising, over a 10-year period. The analysis also considered repeal of the production activities deduction (which allows a 9% deduction from taxable income for certain domestic production, such as manufacturing) and indexation of interest deductions and payments for inflation.
Moving to the alternative depreciation system had the greatest effect, reducing the long-run capital stock (using a range of behavioral responses) by 0.8% to 1.6%. It more than offset the effect of a 10 percentage point corporate rate reduction. Indexing interest deductions and payments for inflation had the next largest effect, 0.5% to 1.1%. Repealing itemized deductions for state and local taxes reduced the capital stock by 0.1% to 0.2%, and repealing all itemized deductions reduced it by 0.1% to 0.3%. Repealing all itemized deductions offset about a third of the effect of reducing the statutory corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points.
An inevitable characteristic of a revenue-neutral tax reform is a tendency to balance out positive and negative effects on labor supply and growth. Revenue-neutral tax reform may have other virtues, but given the inevitable trade-off of such an approach, a major impact on growth may not be one of them. |
crs_R44722 | crs_R44722_0 | O n September 9, 2016, Representative John Kline, chairman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce in the 114 th Congress, issued a discussion draft of a bill that would autho rize a new multiemployer pension plan called a composite plan . A composite plan would contain features of two types of existing pension plans: (1) defined benefit (DB), in which participants receive regular monthly benefit payments in retirement (which some refer to as a "traditional" pension), and (2) defined contribution (DC) plans (of which the 401(k) plan is the most common), in which participants have individual accounts that are the basis of income in retirement. Since composite plans would be neither DB nor DC plans, authorizing legislation is necessary to implement the proposal. Multiemployer pension plans are sponsored by employers in the same industry and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. Congress approved changes to multiemployer DB pension funding rules in the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (MPRA, enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015; P.L. 113-235 ). Overview of the Discussion Draft
As a result of the challenges facing multiemployer DB pension plans, stakeholders have sought alternative pension plan designs that could alleviate some of the concerns but retain some of the beneficial features. Composite plans would not feature withdrawal liability. Requirements for a Composite Plan
A composite plan would be an employer-sponsored multiemployer pension plan that would be neither a DB plan (in which the benefit is fixed and cannot be reduced except under MPRA) nor a DC plan (in which participants have ownership of funds in an account). This would relieve employers in the plan from the obligation to increase contributions in response to investment losses. The adjustable benefit plan differs from the composite plan proposal in several aspects: the plan would be responsible if there were insufficient assets from which to pay the floor benefits (as might occur if there were large investment losses); benefits would be insured by PBGC; the plan would continue to pay PBGC premiums; and employers would still be subject to withdrawal liability. Employers would likely find the absence of withdrawal liability an attractive feature of composite plans. The composite plan proposal would provide monthly income in retirement for the life of the participant (and spouse, if married). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Insurance
Participants' benefits in composite plans would not be insured by PBGC. If the plan were to become insolvent and unable to pay benefits, PBGC would not provide financial assistance and participants would not receive their benefits. A composite plan might have to address these, or similar, changes to the value of plan liabilities with the realignment program, which could include proposed contribution increases and potentially mandatory benefit reductions. Because composite plans would not be covered by PBGC insurance, the plans would not pay premiums to PBGC. | Multiemployer pension plans are sponsored by more than one employer in the same industry and are maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. The challenges facing one type of multiemployer plans—defined benefit (DB) plans, in which participants receive regular monthly benefit payments in retirement—have led stakeholders to seek alternative pension plan designs that could alleviate some of the concerns but retain some of the beneficial features.
On September 9, 2016, Representative John Kline, chairman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce in the 114th Congress, issued a discussion draft of a bill that would authorize a new multiemployer pension plan called a composite plan. A composite plan would be neither a DB pension nor a defined contribution (DC) pension (such as 401(k) plans, in which participants have individual accounts that are the basis of income in retirement). Since composite plans would be neither DB nor DC plans, authorizing legislation would be necessary to implement the proposal.
The composite plan proposal is the third element of a proposal by representatives of an organization of multiemployer pension and health plans to reform multiemployer DB pension plans. The first two elements were adopted as the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (MPRA, enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015; P.L. 113-235). These elements consist of (1) proposals to strengthen the current multiemployer system and (2) measures to assist plans in very poor financial condition.
The main features of a composite plan include the following:
Employer contributions would generally be a stable amount and would not need to increase in response to investment losses. Participants would receive monthly benefits for the lifetime of the participant (and spouse, if married). Participants' benefits could decrease if the plan's assets experienced investment losses. Composite plans would not be covered by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insurance and would not receive financial assistance from PBGC if a composite plan were to become insolvent and unable to pay participants' benefits. Composite plans would not feature withdrawal liability, which is an exit fee employers in underfunded multiemployer DB plans must pay to leave the plan.
For employers, composite plans would offer several advantages over DB plans. For example, employers would not have to pay withdrawal liability when leaving the plan and the plan would not have to pay PBGC insurance premiums. In addition, the likelihood of stable contributions likely would be an attractive feature.
Retired participants in composite plans would receive monthly benefit payments. However, the benefit amounts could increase or decrease, depending on the investment experience of the plan. The composite plan proposal contains a procedure to address situations in which plan assets fall below 120% of plan liabilities, such as could occur if there were investment losses. This realignment program includes proposed, though not mandatory, contribution increases and mandatory benefit reductions. |
crs_RS20430 | crs_RS20430_0 | Introduction
In 1999, a federal district court judge approved a settlement agreement and consent decree in Pigford v. Glickman , a class action discrimination suit between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and black farmers. The multiple claims that were subsequently filed were consolidated into a single case, In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation (commonly referred to as Pigford II ), and an agreement was reached to settle these claims. This report discusses both the original Pigford consent decree and the subsequent Pigford II settlement. In August 1997, a proposed class action suit was filed by Timothy Pigford (and later by Cecil Brewington) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of black farmers against the USDA. Some also suggested—including many of the claimants—that the class counsel was responsible for the inadequate notice and overall mismanagement of the settlement agreement. Approximately 15,645 (69%) prevailed in the Track A claims process. The federal government provided a total of approximately $1.06 billion ($1,058,577,198) in cash relief, estimated tax payments, and debt relief to prevailing claimants (Track A and Track B). In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation (Pigford II)
Due to concerns about the large number of applicants who did not obtain a determination on the merits of their claims under the original Pigford settlement, Congress included a provision in the 2008 farm bill that permitted any claimant who had submitted a late-filing request under Pigford and who had not previously obtained a determination on the merits of his or her claim to petition in federal court to obtain such a determination. On February 18, 2010, Attorney General Holder and Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack announced a $1.25 billion settlement of these Pigford II claims. However, because $100 million was made available for payment of Pigford II claims in the 2008 farm bill, meaning that payment was otherwise provided for, the Pigford II settlement was contingent upon congressional approval of an additional $1.15 billion in funding. After a series of failed attempts to appropriate funds for the settlement agreement (see " Legislative Action " section below), the Senate passed the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 ( H.R. 4783 ) to provide the $1.15 billion appropriation by unanimous consent on November 19, 2010. Like the original Pigford decision, the Pigford II settlement provides both a "fast-track" adjudication process and a track for higher payments to claimants who go through a more rigorous review and documentation process. On October 27, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted final approval of the settlement agreement. Under the terms of the court order, claims could be submitted beginning on November 14, 2011. The deadline for submitting claims was May 11, 2012. According to the third-party information management firm overseeing the claims process, approximately 89,000 claim forms were mailed out. Nearly 40,000 of them ultimately were filed. Of those, approximately 34,000 were deemed complete, timely, and eligible. A determination of the validity of the claims is expected to be completed in June /July 2013, after which the claims administrator will begin distributing payments to successful claimants. Preliminary estimates from the Claims Administrator suggest that 17,000-19,000 Track A claims are likely to be positively adjudicated under Pigford II , a rate of approximately 50%-56%. Thus, the number of claims filed cannot be viewed as an accurate representation of the number of awards that have been or will be made under the two settlements. The Senate bill was then passed by the House on November 30 and signed by the President on December 8, 2010. | On April 14, 1999, Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia approved a settlement agreement and consent decree in Pigford v. Glickman, a class action discrimination suit between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and black farmers. The suit claimed that the agency had discriminated against black farmers on the basis of race and failed to investigate or properly respond to complaints from 1983 to 1997. The deadline for submitting a claim as a class member was September 12, 2000. Cumulative data show that as of December 31, 2011, 15,645 (69%) of the 22,721 eligible class members had final adjudications approved under the Track A process, and 104 (62%) prevailed in the Track B process for a total cost of approximately $1.06 billion in cash relief, tax payments, and debt relief.
Many voiced concern over the structure of the settlement agreement, the large number of applicants who filed late, and reported deficiencies in representation by class counsel. A provision in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) permitted any claimant who had submitted a late-filing request under Pigford and who had not previously obtained a determination on the merits of his or her claim to petition in federal court to obtain such a determination. A maximum of $100 million in mandatory spending was made available for payment of these claims, and the multiple claims that were subsequently filed were consolidated into a single case, In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation (commonly referred to as Pigford II).
On February 18, 2010, Attorney General Holder and Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack announced a $1.25 billion settlement of these Pigford II claims. However, because only $100 million was made available in the 2008 farm bill, the Pigford II settlement was contingent upon congressional approval of an additional $1.15 billion in funding. After a series of failed attempts to appropriate funds for the settlement agreement, the Senate passed the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (H.R. 4783) to provide the $1.15 billion appropriation by unanimous consent on November 19, 2010. The Senate bill was then passed by the House on November 30 and signed by the President on December 8 (P.L. 111-291).
Like the original Pigford case, the Pigford II settlement provides both a fast-track settlement process (Track A) and higher payments to potential claimants who go through a more rigorous review and documentation process (Track B). A moratorium on foreclosures of most claimants' farms will remain in place until after claimants have gone through the claims process. On October 27, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted final approval of the settlement agreement. Under the terms of the court order, claims could be submitted beginning on November 14, 2011, with a deadline for filing claims of May 11, 2012. Approximately 89,000 claim forms were mailed out. Nearly 40,000 of them ultimately were filed. Of those, approximately 34,000 were deemed complete and timely. A determination of the validity of the claims is expected to be completed in June/July 2013, after which the claims administrator will begin distributing payments to successful claimants. Preliminary estimates from the claims administrator suggest that 17,000-19,000 claims will be positively adjudicated under Pigford II, a lower proportion of successful claims than under Pigford I.
This report highlights some of the events that led up to the original Pigford class action suit and the subsequent Pigford II settlement. The report also outlines the structure of both the original consent decree in Pigford and the settlement agreement in Pigford II. In addition, the report discusses the number of claims reviewed, denied, and awarded under Pigford, as well as some of the issues raised by various parties under both lawsuits. It will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL30526 | crs_RL30526_0 | Introduction
Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, covers a broad range of medical services including physician services, laboratory services, durable medical equipment, and outpatient hospital services. Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage, or MA) provides private plan options, such as managed care, for beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Parts A and B. Part D provides optional outpatient prescription drug coverage. Medicare Payment Rules
Medicare has established specific rules governing payment for covered services. Payments for physician services, clinical laboratory services, and certain durable medical equipment covered under Part B are made on the basis of fee schedules. In general, the program provides for annual updates of the program payments to reflect inflation and other factors. However, updates to the physician fee schedule are determined by a statutory formula, known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system, which links annual updates to how cumulative actual expenditures compare with a cumulative expenditures target. Beneficiary Out-of-Pocket Payments
In addition to premiums, there are two aspects of beneficiary payments to providers: required cost-sharing amounts (coinsurance, copayments, or deductibles) and the amounts that beneficiaries may be billed over and above Medicare's recognized payment amounts for certain services. For Part C, cost sharing is determined by the private plans. The bidding mechanism established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) allows plans to charge a premium to cover basic Medicare benefits if the costs to the plan exceed the maximum amount the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will pay for Medicare-covered benefits. Under Part A, providers agree to accept Medicare's payment as payment in full and cannot bill a beneficiary amounts in excess of the coinsurance and deductibles. Recent Congressional Actions with Respect to Payments
Because of its rapid growth, both in terms of aggregate dollars and as a share of the federal budget, the Medicare program has been a major focus of legislative attention, as outlined below. With a few exceptions, savings in program spending have been achieved largely through reductions in the updates to provider payments, primarily hospitals, physicians, and MA plans. Though the ACA payment changes to Medicare providers and plans is expected to slow the growth in Medicare spending and extend the solvency of the Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Fund, some have suggested that such a policy may not be sustainable in the long run, "without unprecedented improvements in health care provider productivity." Unlike other agencies that advise Congress, IPAB's recommendations are to be automatically implemented unless Congress acts. Payments for most Medicare benefits will be subject to a maximum 2% reduction each year from March 2013 through 2021. In the case of Medicare Parts C and D, reductions are made to the monthly payments made to the private plans that administer these parts of the program. This report provides a guide to Medicare payment rules by type of benefit. The first column in each table lists the type of payments that may be received by the provider (e.g., the separate operating and capital payments paid to short-term general hospitals under the prospective payment system as described in Medicare Payment Policies ( Table 1 ), or lists subcategories of providers under the general provider category (such as the different types of non-physician providers that are all listed in Table 7 ). A complete list of acronyms used in this report is included the Appendix . This report is updated to reflect the most recent legislative changes to the program and payment updates available through January 2013. | Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Part A of the program, the Hospital Insurance program, covers hospital, post-hospital, and hospice services. Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, is optional and covers a broad range of complementary medical services including physician, laboratory, outpatient hospital services, and durable medical equipment. Part C provides private plan options for beneficiaries enrolled in both Parts A and B. Part D is an optional outpatient prescription drug program.
Medicare has established specific rules for payment of covered benefits. Some, such as physician services and most durable medical equipment, are based on fee schedules. A fee schedule is a list of Medicare payments for specific items and services, which are calculated according to statutorily specified formula and take into account the actual amount of care provided. Many services, including inpatient and outpatient hospital care, are paid under different prospective payment systems (PPSs). A prospective payment system is a method of paying hospitals, or other providers, amounts or rates of payment that are established in advance for a defined period and are generally based on an episode of care, regardless of the actual amount of care used. Other payments are based, in part, on a provider's bid (an estimate of the cost of providing a service) relative to a benchmark (the maximum amount Medicare will pay). Bids and benchmarks are used to determine payments in Medicare Parts C and D. Payments for some items of durable medical equipment in specified locations are also based on the bids of competing providers.
In general, the program provides for annual updates to these payment amounts. The program also has rules regarding the amount of cost sharing, if any, that beneficiaries can be billed in excess of Medicare's recognized payment levels. Unlike other services, Medicare's outpatient prescription drug benefit can be obtained only through private plans. Further, while all Part D plans must meet certain minimum requirements, they differ in terms of benefit design, formulary drugs, premiums, and cost-sharing amounts.
Medicare payment policies and potential changes to these policies are of continuing interest to Congress. The Medicare program has been a major focus of deficit reduction legislation since 1980. In each Congress since the 105th Congress, laws have been passed to both increase, but more often slow, the rate of growth of payments to Medicare providers and private plans. Perhaps of particular interest in the 113rd Congress is the update to the Medicare physician fee schedule. The method for updating the physician fee schedule amount, known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR), would have resulted in negative updates for physician payments in recent years, except that Congress has stepped in to stop the updates. Physician payment rates, which would have fallen 26.5% in the absence of congressional action, are frozen through December 31, 2013. Under current law, Medicare physician fee schedule payments are to be reduced by 24.4% beginning January 2014.
This report provides an overview of Medicare payment rules by type of service, outlines current payment policies, and summarizes the basic rules for payment updates. In addition to the payment information provided in the tables of this report, Medicare is subject to a maximum 2% payment reduction due to sequestration. This report will be updated twice a year to reflect recent fiscal year and calendar year changes, and will be updated to reflect the details of how the 2% reduction in payments will be applied. |
crs_R40474 | crs_R40474_0 | The four main statutes or bills at issue are (1) federal provisions under the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968; (2) the D.C. Firearms Control Regulation Act of 1976, as in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller ; (3) the proposed Second Amendment Enforcement Act introduced in February 2011 ( H.R. 645 ); and (4) the District's legislation that permanently amends its gun laws—the Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008 (FCAA), and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008 (IPAA). Congressional proposals to address the District's firearms laws often arise when the issue of voting rights for the District is before Congress; thus, it is worth noting another congressional proposal from the 111 th Congress to amend the District's gun laws, Title II of S. 160 , which was the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009. 6842 , which was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 266-152. The Senate did not pass H.R. As the House passed H.R. Analysis of DC Gun Laws Under the Proposed Amendments
Overall, the FCAA and IPAA not only amended firearms provisions of the DC Code that were at issue in Heller , but also provided a different range of restrictions on the regulation of firearms and firearm ownership. Congress nonetheless retains the ability to legislate for the District, as well as to impose limits on the legislative authority of the District of Columbia government. Both H.R. 645 would amend the DC Code to remove this provision. | In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which declared three firearms provisions of the DC Code unconstitutional, a flurry of legislation was introduced both in Congress and in the District of Columbia Council.
In the 110th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 6842, the Second Amendment Enforcement Act. In the 111th Congress, similar provisions were incorporated as an amendment to the District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009 (S. 160), which was passed by the Senate. Later, separate measures, which also would have overturned or loosened many of the District's gun provisions, were introduced in both the House of Representatives (H.R. 5162) and the Senate (S. 3265). Meanwhile, the District Council passed its own legislation that made permanent amendments to DC's firearms control regulations. The two bills from the District are the Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008 and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008, which amended the DC Code in an effort to comply with the ruling in Heller as well as provide a different range of restrictions on firearm possession.
In the 112th Congress, Representative Mike Ross introduced H.R. 645, "To restore Second Amendment rights in the District of Columbia." This measure is identical to H.R. 5162 from the previous Congress. This report provides an analysis of the District's firearms laws and congressional proposals. |
crs_R43967 | crs_R43967_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of FY2015 appropriations actions for accounts traditionally funded in the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). The L-HHS-ED bill provides appropriations for the following federal departments and agencies:
the Department of Labor; the majority of the Department of Health and Human Services, except for the Food and Drug Administration (provided in the Agriculture appropriations bill), the Indian Health Service (provided in the Interior-Environment appropriations bill), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (also funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill); the Department of Education; and more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Railroad Retirement Board. FY2015 Omnibus Appropriations
On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). The enacted law provided regular, full-year appropriations for 11 of the 12 annual appropriations bills, including L-HHS-ED (see Division G). This law appropriated $164 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED (not counting emergency Ebola funds), which is roughly comparable to amounts provided in FY2014 (+0.05%) and the FY2015 President's request (-0.1%). In addition, the FY2015 omnibus provided an estimated $681 billion in mandatory L-HHS-ED funding, for a total of $846 billion for L-HHS-ED as a whole. FY2015 Continuing Resolutions
The FY2015 omnibus followed three government-wide continuing resolutions (CRs), which had provided temporary funding earlier in the fiscal year ( P.L. 113-203 , P.L. 113-202 , P.L. 113-164 ). Congressional Actions on a Stand-Alone L-HHS-ED Bill
FY2015 Action in the Senate
On June 10, 2014, the Senate L-HHS-ED Subcommittee approved an FY2015 bill by voice vote. The bill was not marked up by the full committee, but on July 24, the Senate Appropriations Committee released a copy of the subcommittee-approved bill and draft subcommittee report. These draft materials suggest that the subcommittee-approved bill would have provided $167 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED. This is about 2% more than the comparable FY2014 funding level and the FY2015 President's request. In addition, the Senate subcommittee-approved bill would have provided an estimated $681 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of nearly $848 billion for L-HHS-ED as a whole. FY2015 President's Budget Request
On March 4, 2014, the Obama Administration released the FY2015 President's budget. The President requested $164 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the L-HHS-ED bill (0.2% more than comparable FY2014 levels). In addition, the President's budget requested roughly $681 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $846 billion (6% more than comparable FY2014 levels) for the L-HHS-ED bill as a whole. This law provided $164 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED. Annual L-HHS-ED appropriations laws direct funding to most (but not all) HHS agencies (see box, below, for all agencies supported by the L-HHS-ED bill). This is about $45.89 billion (+7.1%) more than the comparable FY2014 funding level and $1.68 billion (+0.2%) more than the FY2015 request. HRSA
The FY2015 omnibus provided $6.1 billion in discretionary funding for HRSA. FY2015 ED Appropriations Overview
The FY2015 omnibus provided roughly $70.47 billion in combined mandatory and discretionary funding for ED. This is $166 million (-0.2%) less than the comparable FY2014 discretionary funding level and $1.45 billion (-2.1%) less than the discretionary amount requested in the FY2015 President's budget. | This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2015 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations bill. This bill provides funding for all accounts subject to the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The L-HHS-ED bill also provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA).
Enacted Appropriations: On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), which provided FY2015 appropriations for L-HHS-ED in Division G. This law appropriated $164 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED (not counting emergency Ebola funds), which is roughly comparable to amounts provided in FY2014 (+0.05%) and the FY2015 President's request (-0.1%). In addition, the FY2015 omnibus provided an estimated $681 billion in mandatory L-HHS-ED funding, for a total of $846 billion for L-HHS-ED as a whole. The FY2015 omnibus followed three government-wide continuing resolutions (CRs), which provided temporary funding earlier in the fiscal year (P.L. 113-164, P.L. 113-202, and P.L. 113-203).
DOL: The FY2015 omnibus provided roughly $11.9 billion in discretionary funding for DOL, roughly 0.8% less than the comparable FY2014 funding level of $12.0 billion. HHS: The FY2015 omnibus provided roughly $71.0 billion in discretionary funding for HHS, roughly 0.3% more than the comparable FY2014 funding level of $70.7 billion. ED: The FY2015 omnibus provided roughly $67.1 billion in discretionary funding for ED, roughly 0.2% less than the comparable FY2014 funding level of $67.3 billion. Related Agencies: The FY2015 omnibus provided roughly $14.2 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED related agencies, roughly 0.8% more than the comparable FY2014 funding level of $14.1 billion.
Earlier L-HHS-ED Congressional Action: Prior to the start of the fiscal year, the Senate Appropriations L-HHS-ED Subcommittee initiated action on a full-year FY2015 bill. On June 10, 2014, the Senate subcommittee approved an FY2015 L-HHS-ED appropriations bill by voice vote. This bill was not reported by the full committee. However, on July 24, 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee released a copy of the subcommittee-approved bill and draft subcommittee report. The subcommittee-approved bill would have provided $167 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds, which is about 2% more than the comparable FY2014 funding level and the FY2015 President's request. In addition, the Senate subcommittee bill would have provided an estimated $681 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $848 billion for L-HHS-ED as a whole. The House did not take action on a stand-alone FY2015 L-HHS-ED bill.
President's Request: On March 4, 2014, the Obama Administration released its FY2015 budget. The President requested $164 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the L-HHS-ED bill (0.2% more than comparable FY2014 levels). In addition, the President's budget requested roughly $681 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $846 billion (6% more than comparable FY2014 levels) for the L-HHS-ED bill as a whole. |
crs_RL33230 | crs_RL33230_0 | Under present tax law, the designation of an area as a "combat zone" confers tax benefits only to military personnel serving in the combat area. No comparable provision under present tax law provides tax relief for civilian or contract employees of the government. However, certain income tax exclusions exist for U.S. citizens who work overseas. 1974 and S. 1166 , the Federal Employee Combat Zone Tax Parity Act) and government contractors. This report provides information about the tax treatment of both the earned income of members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones and the earned income of U.S. citizens abroad; a brief synopsis of the current legislative proposal to expand income tax incentives to federal civilian employees; and an analysis of the relevant policy issues. 878 to extend the combat zone exclusion benefits to DOD civilians working in a combat zone. Policy Arguments
Current legislation proposes extending the combat zone income tax exclusion to civilian DOD personnel, but other proposals have been made in the past that would also extend the exclusion to civilian contractors. In the case of extending an exclusion to federal civilian employees or civilian contract employees serving in a combat zone, the primary issues revolve around the purpose of the extension, which has not been stated by proponents. The purpose could be to provide additional compensation for certain individuals serving in combat and thus facilitate recruitment for such work. Alternatively, the purpose could be one of equity, to make civilian employee benefits equal to those of the armed forces. Efficiency: Additional Compensation to Individuals Serving in Combat
If the intent of the exclusion is to provide additional compensation to individuals serving in combat, then a question of efficiency arises as to whether a tax subsidy is more appropriate than a direct payment. Equity: Among Individuals Serving in Combat
If the intent of extending the combat zone exclusion to civilians is to make civilian benefits equal to those of the Armed Forces, then the distinctions between military service and civilian employment become important in the analysis of the policy. In that context, it has been observed that military personnel cannot resign when facing danger; they cannot refuse assignment; they are considered to be on duty 24 hours a day, every day; and they may be required to work until the job is done with no specific relationship to compensation. Whereas military personnel must perform those duties, civilian employees may or may not, depending on for whom they work, or the contracts they have negotiated, and those contracts could include monetary and other incentives for working in combat zones not available to military personnel. | Legislative proposals have been made to extend the combat zone income tax exclusion to civilian employees who are on active service in a combat zone. Under present tax law, the designation of an area as a "combat zone" confers tax benefits only to military personnel serving in the combat area. No comparable provision under present tax law provides tax relief for civilian or contract employees serving in combat. However, certain income tax exclusions exist for U.S. citizens who work overseas. As an example, the proposed combat zone exclusions in the Federal Employee Combat Zone Tax Parity Act (H.R. 1974 and S. 1166) would grant added tax relief to federal civilians who are not eligible for existing exclusions.
In the case of extending an exclusion to federal civilian employees or civilian contract employees serving in a "combat-type" zone, the primary issues revolve around the purpose of the extension, which has not been stated by proponents. The purpose could be to provide additional compensation for certain individuals serving in combat and thus facilitate recruitment for such work. Alternatively, the purpose could be one of equity, to make civilian employee benefits equal to those of the Armed Forces.
If the purpose of the extension is to provide additional compensation to individuals serving in combat, than a question of efficiency arises as to whether a tax subsidy is more appropriate than a direct payment. Direct spending programs are often more successful at fulfilling policy objectives than indirect subsidies made through the tax system.
If the purpose of extending the combat zone exclusion to civilians is to make civilian benefits equal to those of the Armed Forces, then the distinctions between military service and civilian employment become important in the analysis of the policy. In that context, it has been observed that military personnel cannot resign when facing danger; they cannot refuse assignment; they are considered to be on duty 24 hours a day, every day; and they may be required to work until the job is done with no specific relationship to compensation. Whereas military personnel must perform those duties, civilian employees may or may not, depending on for whom they work or the contracts they have negotiated, and those contracts could include monetary and other incentives for working in combat zones not available to military personnel. Also, there are distinctions between civilian DOD employees and civilian contractors that complicate the issue of equalization.
This report provides information about the tax treatment of both the earned income of members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones and the earned income of U.S. citizens working overseas. A brief discussion of the possible expansion of income tax exclusion to government civilian employees in a combat zone and an analysis of the relevant policy issues is also included.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative events. |
crs_R44995 | crs_R44995_0 | This report provides background information and context on the U.S. military presence in Niger, and several related issues, in response to frequently asked questions. Congress has shaped U.S. engagement with Niger and the U.S. military footprint in the country through its authorization and appropriation of funding for U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs, and through its authorization of funding for U.S. military construction. What is the security situation in Niger? How big is the U.S. military presence in Niger? This trend is the product of several overlapping developments, including:
A stated U.S. interest in responding to the proliferation and spread of Islamist insurgent groups in West Africa since the collapse of the Qadhafi regime in Libya in 2011, the start of Mali's internal crisis in 2012, and the escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2014; DOD's provision of logistical and intelligence support for France's multicountry counterterrorism operation in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, which France launched in 2014 following its 2013 military intervention in Mali; and An interest, both in Congress and under the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, in "building partner capacity" to counter terrorism, in part as a stated effort to preclude large-scale U.S. combat operations (see " What are the broader implications of building partner capacity? For what purposes are U.S. military personnel in Niger, and what role has Congress played in the U.S. military presence there? Is the U.S. military presence in Niger related to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)? What is the state of U.S.-Niger relations and aid? Where else in Africa are U.S. military personnel deployed? Medical evacuation: What is the "golden hour" and does it apply to troop deployments in Africa? What are the broader implications of building partner capacity in Niger for DOD? Who were the four U.S. soldiers killed in Niger on October 4? What do we know about the alleged perpetrators of the October 4 attack? Outlook and Issues for Congress
For many Members of Congress, the events of October 4 and their aftermath have highlighted broad issues and challenges related to the effective congressional oversight of U.S. military deployments, U.S. counterterrorism policy in remote regions, and executive-legislative branch information sharing. Appendix. Chronology | A deadly attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger and their local counterparts on October 4, 2017, has prompted many questions from Members of Congress about the incident. It has also highlighted a range of broader issues for Congress pertaining to oversight and authorization of U.S. military deployments, evolving U.S. global counterterrorism activities and strategy, interagency security assistance and cooperation efforts, and U.S. engagement with countries historically considered peripheral to core U.S. national security interests. This report provides background information in response to the following frequently asked questions:
What is the security situation in Niger? How big is the U.S. military presence in Niger? For what purposes are U.S. military personnel in Niger, and what role has Congress played in the U.S. military presence there? Is the U.S. military presence in Niger related to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)? What is the state of U.S.-Niger relations and aid? Where else in Africa are U.S. military personnel deployed? Medical evacuation: What is the "golden hour" and does it apply to troop deployments in Africa? What are the broader implications of building partner capacity in Niger for DOD? Who were the four U.S. soldiers killed in Niger on October 4? What do we know about the alleged perpetrators of the October 4 attack?
It also identifies potential issues for Congress as Members look ahead to ongoing and future authorization, appropriations, and oversight activities. A chronology of terrorist attacks in the Sahel and related developments is provided in an Appendix. Additional details surrounding the October 4 ambush and its aftermath may continue to emerge as information becomes available.
The following CRS products provide additional analysis of issues discussed in this report:
CRS In Focus IF10172, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Related Groups, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44563, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42699, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44313, What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44602, DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34561 | crs_RL34561_0 | At the same time, the United States is the largest foreign direct investor in the world and also the largest recipient of foreign direct investment. This dual role means that globalization, or the spread of economic activity by firms across national borders, has become a prominent feature of the U.S. economy and that through direct investment the U.S. economy has become highly enmeshed with the broader global economy. The globalization of the economy also means that the United States has important economic, political, and social interests at stake in the development of international policies regarding direct investment. With some exceptions for national security, the United States has established domestic policies that treat foreign investors no less favorably than U.S. firms. In light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, however, some Members of Congress have been reexamining some elements of this open-door policy and have argued for greater consideration of the long-term impact of foreign direct investment, especially where that investment takes the form of an acquisition, a merger, or a take-over of an existing U.S. company. In particular, these concerns have centered around the impact of such investments on the structure and the industrial capacity of the economy, and on the ability of the economy to meet the needs of U.S. defense and security interests, including a terrorist attack. Within the United States, for instance, such differences exist among Members of Congress and between Congress and the Administration over the role foreign investment should play in the economy. There is no precise way, however, to estimate the exact dollar amount for the economic costs and benefits of national policies that attempt to direct or restrict foreign direct investment for national security concerns. Part of this debate is focused on determining a working set of parameters that establish a functional definition of the national security implications of foreign direct investment. In part, this issue reflects differing assessments of the economic impact of foreign investment on the economy and differing political and philosophical views among Members of Congress and between the Congress and the Administration. Since 2006, the United States has participated in discussions spearheaded by the OECD to develop a set of best practices to serve as guidelines for national policies that restrict foreign investment for national security objectives. | The United States is the largest foreign direct investor in the world and also the largest recipient of foreign direct investment. This dual role means that globalization, or the spread of economic activity by firms across national borders, has become a prominent feature of the U.S. economy and that through direct investment the U.S. economy has become highly enmeshed with the broader global economy. This also means that the United States has important economic, political, and social interests at stake in the development of international policies regarding direct investment. With some exceptions for national security, the United States has established domestic policies that treat foreign investors no less favorably than U.S. firms.
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, spurred some Members of Congress and others to call for a reexamination of elements of the traditionally open environment in the United States for foreign investment. In particular, some Members argue that greater consideration must be given to the long-term impact of foreign direct investment on the structure and the industrial capacity of the economy and on the ability of the economy to meet the needs of U.S. defense and security interests. In addition, policymakers from a broad group of nations are evaluating their national policies concerning foreign investment within the context of their national security concerns. As a result of these initiatives, Members of Congress may be pressed to address U.S. policies that focus on the role of foreign direct investment more extensively within a broader national security framework.
This report assesses recent international developments as the leaders from a number of nations work to reach a consensus on an informal set of best practices regarding national restrictions on foreign investment for national security purposes. This report also provides one possible approach for assessing the costs and benefits involved in using national policies to direct or to restrict foreign direct investment for national security reasons. Within the United States, there is no consensus yet among Members of Congress or between the Congress and the Administration over a working set of parameters that establishes a functional definition of the national economic security implications of foreign direct investment. In part, this issue reflects differing assessments of the economic impact of foreign investment on the U.S. economy and differing political and philosophical convictions among Members and between the Congress and the Administration. |
crs_R45020 | crs_R45020_0 | Introduction
This report provides a broad overview of U.S. immigration policy. The section also covers worksite enforcement and immigration fraud. The third section addresses policies for unauthorized aliens residing in the United States. Immigration Inflows and Related Topics
U.S. immigration policy is governed largely by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was first codified in 1952 and has been amended significantly several times since. N onimmigrant s refers to foreign nationals temporarily and lawfully admitted to the United States for a specific purpose and period of time, including tourists, diplomats, students, temporary workers, and exchange visitors, among others. Permanent Immigration5
Four general principles underlie the current system of permanent immigration: family reunification, U.S. labor market contribution, origin-country diversity, and humanitarian assistance. Family reunification occurs primarily through family-sponsored immigration. Humanitarian assistance occurs primarily through the U.S. refugee and asylee programs. Diversity Immigrant Visa
The diversity immigrant visa fosters legal immigration from countries that send relatively few immigrants to the United States. It involves border security where foreign nationals enter the United States (at ports of entry) and along U.S. borders (between ports of entry), as well as enforcing immigration laws in the U.S. interior, including worksite enforcement. Removal
Removing foreign nationals who violate U.S. immigration laws is central to immigration enforcement, and the INA provides broad authority to DHS and DOJ to remove certain foreign nationals from the country. Absent other factors, unlawful presence in the United States is a civil violation, not a criminal offense, and removal and its associated administrative processes are civil proceedings. | U.S. immigration policy is governed largely by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was first codified in 1952 and has been amended significantly several times since. At a fundamental level, U.S. immigration policy can be viewed as two sides of a coin. One side emphasizes the faciliation of migration flows into the United States according to principles of admission that are based upon national interest. These broad principles currently include family reunification, labor market contribution, humanitarian assistance, and origin-country diversity.
The United States has long distinguished permanent immigration from temporary migration. Permanent immigration occurs through family and employer-sponsored categories, the diversity immigrant visa lottery, and refugee and asylee admissions. Temporary migration occurs through the admission of visitors for specific purposes and limited periods of time, and encompasses two dozen categories of visitors, including foreign tourists, students, temporary workers, and diplomats.
The other side of the immigration policy coin emphasizes the restriction of entry to and removal of persons from the United States who lack authorization to reside in the country, are identified as criminal aliens, or whose presence in the United States is not considered to be in the national interest. Such immigration enforcement is broadly divided between border enforcement—at and between ports of entry—and other enforcement tasks including detention, removal, worksite enforcement, and combatting immigration fraud.
The dual role of U.S. immigration policy creates challenges for balancing major policy priorities, such as ensuring national security, facilitating trade and commerce, protecting public safety, and fostering international cooperation. |
crs_RL31599 | crs_RL31599_0 | American foreign policy interests in Nepal have sought to strengthen democracy and to prevent the collapse of Nepal which, should it become a failed state, could provide a base of support for terrorists or insurgents in the region. Political instability and insurgency-related violence has undermined the country's economy. Recent Developments
On April 24, 2006, mounting popular resistance in support of the political parties led King Gyanendra to hand over power to the Seven Party Alliance. With this development, Nepal began a process that promises to end a period of intense political conflict between the king and the political parties, and armed struggle with the Maoists. Under the peace agreement, constituent assembly elections were to be held by the end of June 2007. According to one source, the "Maoists appear to be the most organized political force in the country" and the seven party alliance has "a history of bickering among themselves, a weakness that both the Maoists and the royalists would be quick to exploit." There is also growing concern that the constituent assembly election be held as soon as possible. Unrest in the Terai, including demands for greater political representation in parliament, remains unresolved. Maoist leader Prachanda, who has not taken a seat in parliament, addressed a Maoist rally in February 2007 and called for Nepal to become a republic. Under the previously negotiated agreement, it is up to the constituent assembly to decide the fate of the king and disposition of the government. New Unrest
The most recent threat to the political stability of Nepal stems from a number of groups representing Madhesis of the Terai region in southern Nepal. Two Maoist splinter groups are thought to be fomenting violence in the Terai by attacking police stations and sponsoring strikes while other groups unrelated to the Maoists have also been using violent means, such as blockade of customs stations and transport strikes, to attract attention to their cause and put pressure on the government to address their concerns. Under Resolution 1740, UNMIN will undertake the following tasks:
Monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides; Assist the parties through the Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement; Assist in the monitoring of the cease fire; Provide technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly; and Provide a small team of election monitors. In this way they seek to achieve politically what they have been unable to gain on the battlefield. Many observers felt that a military solution to the conflict with the Maoists was not achievable and that a concerted effort by the king and the democrats was needed to establish a unified front to defeat the Maoists. Key Country Issues
Governance
Nepal, the world's only officially Hindu country, has been an independent kingdom since 1768. This government drafted a constitution in November 1990 establishing Nepal as a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch as head of state. The Kathmandu government faced additional turmoil in June 2001, when Crown Prince Dipendra reportedly shot and killed his parents, King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, seven other members of the royal family, and himself after a disagreement over whom he should marry. Amnesty has called for an investigation into these events. The Economy
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world. The United States apparently supported India in taking a leading role in the situation in Nepal in the wake of the February 2005 takeover by the king. U.S. | The three-way contest for control of Nepal—among King Gyanendra, a coalition of seven parties seeking democracy for the country, and the Maoists—ended with the king relinquishing power to the democrats in April 2006 after large scale popular demonstrations against him. King Gyanendra's inability to subdue the Maoist insurgency and his repression of pro-democratic elements in the country undermined his legitimacy and led to his fall from power. The United States sought to assist the government of Nepal in its struggle against the Maoist armed insurgency and has promoted the democratic development of Nepal. It has also sought to promote stability in Nepal to keep it from becoming a destabilizing element in the region.
This shift of power from monarchy to democracy was followed in November 2006 by a peace agreement between the Maoists and the new government which led to the laying down of arms, a parliament that includes Maoists, and the scheduling of elections for a constituent assembly. The constituent assembly is to address the question of whether the king is to have a place in the future government of Nepal and, if so, to what extent. The constituent assembly is also expected to act on calls for Nepal to become a republic and redraw constituencies to more equitably represent the Nepali people, particularly in the Terai in southern Nepal, which experienced much unrest in 2007.
A landlocked Himalayan kingdom between India and China, Nepal ranks among the world's poorest countries. In 1990, following a democratization movement, it became a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch. Although this led to a process of economic restructuring and market liberalization, the country's economic growth and reform effort was undercut by political instability and years of increasingly dire internal security challenges brought on by the civil war with the Maoists. Compounding the country's difficulties was the June 2001 tragedy in which ten members of the royal family, including King Birendra, were killed in an assassination-suicide, reportedly carried out by Crown Prince Dipendra.
Nepal has a long way to go before its democratic gains can be effectively consolidated. The need to more fully integrate the Maoists into the political process and ensure that they, or any splinter groups, do not resort to the force of arms or coercion in the lead-up to the constituent assembly elections remains a key challenge. In addition, mounting political tension over Madhesi calls for greater representation in the political process will demand attention. The Madhesis are an indigenous ethnic group that inhabit the lowlands of Nepal who feel they have not been fairly represented. Some Madhesi demonstrations have turned violent. The need to develop the economy and bring prosperity to the people will remain whatever the outcome of the constituent assembly election. |
crs_R42833 | crs_R42833_0 | Background
Congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has focused in part on ways through which the United States could secure more economical and reliable fossil fuel resources both domestically and internationally. Recent expansion in natural gas production, primarily as a result of new or improved technologies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing) used on unconventional resources (e.g., shale, tight sands, and coal-bed methane), has made natural gas an increasingly significant component in the U.S. energy supply. Distribution . Sources of emissions include pad, road, and pipeline construction; drilling, completion, and flowback activities that occur during the development of a well; and gas processing and transmission equipment such as controllers, compressors, dehydrators, pipelines, and storage vessels. Pollutants include, most prominently, methane and volatile organic compounds, of which the natural gas industry is one of the highest emitting industrial sectors in the United States. Pollutants also include nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and various forms of hazardous air toxics, including n-hexane, the BTEX compounds (i.e., benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene), and hydrogen sulfide. While there may be significant emissions from the natural gas sector as a result of the combustion of other fossil fuels for process heat, power, and transportation, as well as the associated release of particulate matter from construction and road use, the primary focus of this report is on air quality issues related to the resource itself (i.e., the fugitive release of natural gas and its combustion during operations). Sources
Natural gas systems include many activities and pieces of equipment that have the potential to emit air pollutants. Drilling. Pollutants
Through provisions in the Clean Air Act (CAA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies air pollutants under several different categories, including the following:
Criteria Pollutants . Sulfur Dioxide (SO 2 ) . The Clean Air Act and the Federal Role in Air Quality Issues in Natural Gas Systems
The Clean Air Act (CAA) seeks to protect human health and the environment from emissions that pollute ambient, or outdoor, air. Some of the regulations implementing these sections have been revised by federal air standards promulgated by EPA on August 16, 2012. Section 112 of the CAA requires EPA to promulgate regulations establishing standards to control emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). On February 4, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. EPA's cost-benefit analysis, as put forth in its Regulatory Impact Analysis for the proposed air standards, has been critiqued as both too high and too low by industry and environmental stakeholders, respectively. Issues for Congressional Consideration
The expansion of both industry production and government regulation of natural gas systems has sparked discussion on a number of outstanding issues. The Regulatory Role of Federal, State, and Local Governments
According to EPA, the 2012 federal air standards are designed to provide minimum requirements for emissions of air pollutants from the crude oil and natural gas sector that can both protect human health and the environment and allow for continued growth in production. In total, these facilities accounted for GHG emissions of 225 MMtCO 2 e. Of note in the reporting: (1) The crude oil and natural gas sector is the second-largest stationary source of U.S. GHG emissions, behind power plants; (2) CO 2 emissions from the crude oil and natural gas sector account for 142 MMtCO 2 e, and methane emissions account for 83 MMtCO 2 e; (3) Onshore crude oil and natural gas production is the largest contributor, covering approximately 41% of reported emissions; (4) Emissions from onshore production facilities are primarily methane (such as leaks from equipment and vented emissions) while emissions from natural gas transmission and processing facilities are primarily CO 2 (such as combustion emissions associated with compressors); and (5) While the total emissions of CO 2 e reported by industry is consistent with the total emissions previously reported by EPA's national inventory, the ratio of CO 2 to methane emissions is notably different, with more CO 2 (and less methane) reported by the industry than estimated by EPA. Due to this unique linkage, pollution abatement has the potential to translate into economic benefits for the industry, as producers may be able to offset compliance costs with the value of natural gas and its byproducts recovered and sold at market. EPA estimates the 2012 air standards would yield a cost savings of $11 million to $19 million in 2015, as pollution abatement costs would be offset by the value of natural gas and condensate recovered and sold at market. Debate over the costs of compliance, covered sources and pollutants, and the proper regulatory institutions (i.e., local, state, or federal) continues. | Natural Gas Systems and Air Pollution
Congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has focused in part on ways through which the United States could secure more economical and reliable fossil fuel resources both domestically and internationally. Recent expansion in natural gas production, primarily as a result of new or improved technologies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing, directional drilling) used on unconventional resources (e.g., shale, tight sands, and coal-bed methane), has made natural gas an increasingly significant component in the U.S. energy supply. This expansion, however, has prompted renewed questions about the potential impacts of natural gas systems on human health and the environment, including impacts on air quality. Unlike the debate over groundwater contamination or induced seismicity—where questions exist as to whether or not production activities contribute significantly to these impacts—there is little question that natural gas systems emit air pollutants. The concerns, instead, are the following:
Which pollutants? How much of each pollutant? From which sources? What are the impacts of the emissions? How much is the cost of abatement? What are the respective roles of federal, state, and local governments?
Air pollutants are released by natural gas systems through the leaking, venting, and combustion of natural gas; the combustion of other fossil fuel resources; and the discharge of particulate matter during associated operations. Emission sources include pad, road, and pipeline construction; well drilling, completion, and flowback activities; and gas processing and transmission equipment such as controllers, compressors, dehydrators, pipes, and storage vessels. Pollutants include, most prominently, methane and volatile organic compounds—of which the natural gas industry is one of the highest-emitting industrial sectors in the United States—as well as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and various forms of hazardous air pollutants.
EPA's 2012 Air Standards
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in response to a consent decree issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, promulgated air standards for several source categories in the crude oil and natural gas sector on August 16, 2012. These standards—effective October 15, 2012—revised existing rules and promulgated new ones to regulate emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), sulfur dioxide, and hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from many production and processing activities that had never before been covered by federal oversight. The standards control air pollution, in part, through the capture of fugitive releases of natural gas. Thus, compliance with the standards has the potential to translate into economic benefits, as producers may be able to offset abatement costs with the value of product recovered and sold. Using this assumption, EPA estimated the annual benefits of the standards to be VOC reductions of 190,000 tons, HAP reductions of 12,000 tons, methane reductions of 1.0 million tons, and a net cost savings of $11 million to $19 million after the sale of recovered product. Industry and other stakeholders have disputed these figures as both too high and too low. Moreover, the expansion of both industry production and government regulation of natural gas has sparked discussion on a number of outstanding issues, including the following:
defining the roles of local, state, and federal governments, determining the proper coverage of pollutants and sources, establishing comprehensive emissions data, understanding the human health and environmental impacts of emissions, and estimating the costs of pollution abatement.
Scope and Purpose of This Report
The report begins by briefly outlining the production, processing, transmission, and distribution phases of the natural gas industry, then characterizes the types and sources of pollutants in the sector. It then turns to the role of the federal government in regulating these emissions, including the provisions in the Clean Air Act and the regulatory activities of the EPA. It concludes with an extended discussion of the aforementioned outstanding issues. For an abbreviated version of this report, see CRS Report R42986, Air Quality Issues in Natural Gas Systems: In Brief. |
crs_RL30718 | crs_RL30718_0 | The Act also required that the previously existing cost-based reimbursementsystem for Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and Rural Health Clinics (RHCs) be phasedout over a 6-year period. Includedin that bill by reference was the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Actof 1999 (BBRA 99), a bill largely comprised of Medicare provisions, but which also included anumber of changes to Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP;described below). H.R. On December 15, 2000, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2001 ( H.R. 4577 )was passed by the House and Senate; it was signed into law on December 21 ( P.L. 106-554 ). It also included major provisions amendingother health programs. With respect to Medicaid, a number of changes are made to disproportionate share hospital(DSH) funding. Additional funds are provided for certain state public hospitals not receiving DSH payments andhaving a low-income utilization rate in excess of 65%. The are two other major Medicaid provisions in the agreement. The agreement also modifies proposedHHS rules governing upper payment limits on inpatient and outpatient services provided by certaintypes of facilities, and requires that final regulations be issued by the end of 2000. With respect to SCHIP, the agreement extends the availability of unused FY1998 andFY1999 SCHIP allotments. (3) Following specific formulas, these unspent funds are redistributedto both those states that have and those that have not fully exhausted their original allotments withinrequired time frames. Current law redistributes unused funds only to those states that spend theirallotments. With respect to other programs, the agreement requires that outreach efforts be implementedto identify individuals who may be eligible for Medicaid payment of Medicare cost-sharing and thatthose individuals are notified of the availability of such assistance. The agreement increases theauthorization of annual appropriations for the MCH Services Block Grant from $705 million to $850million for FY2001 and thereafter. In addition, the bill extends for 1 year, to FY2003, the authorityfor grants to be made for both the Special Diabetes Programs for Type I Diabetes and the SpecialDiabetes Programs for Indians. Finally, the agreement provides for a direct appropriation of $475 million forFY2001, in addition to funds appropriated in the FY2001 Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill,for the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund. For detailed information on the Medicare provisions contained inthe Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, see CRS Report RL30707(pdf) , Medicare Provisions in H.R. 5661: Medicare, Medicaidand SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (available upon request). | While largely comprised of Medicare provisions, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIPBenefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 ( H.R. 5661 ), a compromiseagreement between House and Senate committees and the leadership, includes a number of importantchanges to Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). It also includesmajor provisions amending other programs. The provisions of H.R. 5661 areincorporated, by reference into H.R. 4577 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2001. H.R. 4577 was passed by the House and Senate on December 15, 2000 and was signedinto law on December 21 ( P.L. 106-554 ).
Among the major Medicaid modifications are several provisions affecting disproportionateshare hospital (DSH) payments provided to hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of uninsuredand Medicaid enrollees. The agreement increases the disproportionate share hospital allotments forstates. It also extends a special DSH payment rule for public hospitals in California to qualifyingfacilities in all states, and provides additional funds to certain public hospitals not receiving DSHpayments. In addition to these DSH provisions, the bill replaces cost-based reimbursement with aprospective payment system for Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and Rural HealthCenters (RHCs). The agreement also modifies proposed rules governing upper payment limits oninpatient and outpatient services provided by certain types of facilities, and requires that the finalregulations be issued by the end of 2000.
One major SCHIP provision extends the availability of unused funds from FY1998 andFY1999 and redistributes these unused funds among both those states that spend and those that donot spend their full original allotments for these years. Current law requires that these unused fundsbe distributed only to those states that spend their allotments.
Among other major provisions, the agreement requires that outreach efforts be implementedto identify individuals who may be eligible for Medicaid payment of Medicare cost-sharing and tonotify these persons of the availability of such assistance. It increases the authorization of annualappropriations for the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant under Title V. In addition,the bill extends for 1 year, to FY2003, the authority for grants to be made for both the SpecialDiabetes Program for Type I Diabetes and the Special Diabetes Programs for Indians and increasestotal funding for FY2001 through FY2003. Finally, the agreement provides an additional FY2001direct appropriation for the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund.
For information on the Medicare provisions, see CRS Report RL30707(pdf) , Medicare Provisionsin H.R. 5661: Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Actof 2000 (available upon request). |
crs_RL34654 | crs_RL34654_0 | Overview of the Higher Education Opportunity Act
In the 110 th Congress, the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ) was enacted to amend, extend, and establish new programs under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329). In most cases, funding authorization for programs extended or newly established under the HEOA is provided through FY2014. The HEOA also makes amendments to and extends funding authorization within a number of other laws. The HEA authorizes a broad array of federal student aid programs that assist students and their families with paying for or financing the costs of obtaining a postsecondary education, as well as programs that provide aid to institutions of higher education (IHEs). The HEA, as amended by the HEOA, is organized into eight titles. HEA programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The Higher Education Act of 1965 was enacted as P.L. Prior to the enactment of the HEOA, the last comprehensive reauthorization of the HEA occurred in 1998, under the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 ( P.L. 105-244 ), which authorized funding for most HEA programs through FY2003. During the period leading up to the enactment of the HEOA, authorization for HEA programs had been extended for one additional fiscal year under the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), and then incrementally through a series of Higher Education Extension Acts. 109-171 ). In the 110 th Congress, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA; P.L. Additionally, in Spring 2008, emergency changes to the federal student loan programs were made under the Ensuring Continuing Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (ECASLA; P.L. 110-227 ). In the first session of 110 th Congress, the Senate passed S. 1642 , the Higher Education Amendments of 2007 ( S.Rept. 110-231 ), to amend and extend the HEA. In the second session of the 110 th Congress, the House passed an HEA reauthorization bill, H.R. 4137 , the College Opportunity and Affordability Act of 2008 ( H.Rept. 110-500 ). Many of the provisions contained in either or both the Senate and House bills were agreed to by House and Senate conferees in approving the conference report to H.R. 4137 ( H.Rept. 110-803 ). Both the House and the Senate passed H.R. 4137 , renamed as the Higher Education Opportunity Act, on July 31, 2008; and it was signed into law by the President on August 14, 2008 ( P.L. 110-315 ). Title XI: Studies and Reports
In addition to performance reporting requirements and formal evaluations mandated for the various programs of the HEA, The HEOA authorizes 24 studies and reports to be conducted by the following designated entities:
Government Accountability Office
Study on Foreign Graduate Medical Schools Employment of Postsecondary Education Graduates Study on IPEDS Report on Proprietary IHEs Endowment Report Study on Regional Sensitivity in the Needs Analysis Formula Study on the Financial and Compliance Audits of the Federal Student Loan Program Study and Report on Nonindividual Information Feasibility Study for Student Loan Clearinghouse Study on Department of Education Oversight of Incentive Compensation Ban
National Academy of Sciences
Analysis of Federal Regulations on IHEs Independent Evaluation of Distance Education Programs Review of Costs and Benefits of Environmental, Health, and Safety Standards Study on Bias in Standardized Tests Study on Teaching Students with Reading Disabilities Nursing School Capacity
Secretary of Education
Report and Study on Articulation Agreements Study of Minority Male Academic Achievement Study of Correctional Postsecondary Education, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General Study of Aid to Less-than-Half-Time Students Study of the Impact of Student Loan Debt on Public Service, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget and coordination with the National Academy of Public Administrators or the American Society for Public Administration Report on Income Contingent Repayment Through the Income Tax Withholding System, with the Secretary of the Treasury Developing Additional Measures of Degree Completion Summit on Sustainability, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
Appendix. | The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329), as amended, authorizes a broad array of federal student aid programs that assist students and their families with paying for or financing the costs of obtaining a postsecondary education. The HEA also authorizes a series of programs that provide federal aid and support to institutions of higher education. HEA programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED).
In the 110th Congress, the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315) was enacted to amend, extend, and establish new programs under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). In most cases, funding authorization for programs extended or newly established under the HEOA is provided through FY2014. The HEOA also makes amendments to a number of other laws. Prior to the enactment of the HEOA, the last comprehensive reauthorization of the HEA occurred in 1998, under the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 (P.L. 105-244), which authorized funding for most HEA programs through FY2003.
Reauthorization of the HEA was considered during the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses. While reauthorization of the HEA was being considered, funding authorization for HEA programs had been extended under the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) and a series of Higher Education Extension Acts. Separate from bills to reauthorize the HEA, significant changes to several HEA programs were made under the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 (HERA; P.L. 109-171), the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA; P.L. 110-84), and the Ensuring Continuing Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (ECASLA; P.L. 110-227).
In the first session of 110th Congress, the Senate passed S. 1642, the Higher Education Amendments of 2007 (S.Rept. 110-231), to reauthorize the HEA. In the second session, the House passed H.R. 4137, the College Opportunity and Affordability Act of 2008 (H.Rept. 110-500). Many of the provisions contained in either or both the Senate- and House-passed bills were agreed to by House and Senate conferees in the conference report to H.R. 4137 (H.Rept. 110-803). The House and the Senate passed H.R. 4137, the Higher Education Opportunity Act, on July 31, 2008. The President signed it into law as P.L. 110-315, on August 14, 2008.
This report begins with a brief overview of the HEA, its organization into various titles, and the major programs and program requirements specified under each title. It then identifies and describes selected amendments made to the HEA and other laws by the HEOA. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R40418 | crs_R40418_0 | Introduction
The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing capacity shortages for diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratories. High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to a biological attack and a better understanding of the bioterrorism threat. However, they could also increase the risk of a biological attack by being a source of materials or training. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and increased focus on existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? With multiple agencies expanding high-containment laboratory capacity, is a plan coordinating these efforts necessary? Does increasing laboratory capacity and the number of trained scientists increase the risk of accidents and/or opportunities for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose? Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the expansion of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and recent examples of community resistance to the laboratories. The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommended tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories. Congress could choose to wait until some or all of these groups have completed their efforts and made their recommendations. Concerned Members of Congress might require the submission of a needs assessment from specific agencies or from multiple agencies in addition to capacity information. Directly Regulate High-Containment Laboratories
One approach to licensing might be applying the Select Agent Program requirements to all high-containment laboratories, regardless of the pathogens used at the laboratory. Efforts to enhance personnel oversight at high-containment facilities may pose a series of implementation challenges. Looking Ahead
Regardless of U.S. domestic efforts, biocontainment technologies are widely dispersed around the globe and used by many scientists in many countries. Absent international harmonization, the threat of a high-containment laboratory being the source of a bioterror weapon may be only partially addressed by solely domestic policy changes. A key challenge for congressional policymakers is to define the goal of enhanced oversight of high-containment laboratories. For example, focusing on a registry of existing high-containment laboratory capacity may have benefits for planning, coordination, and efficiency of use but provide relatively limited security benefits. Similarly, a rigorous oversight program including facility and personnel licensure, mandatory training, and restricted construction of new facilities may provide security benefits at the cost of regulatory burden, increased federal expenditures, and impeded scientific progress in countermeasure research, bioforensics, and public health. When weighing potential policy options to address these complex policy issues, policymakers may have to reconcile many competing and potentially conflicting national needs. | The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. Several departments and agencies have increased or are in the process of increasing their laboratory capacity. High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Indeed, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommends tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories.
Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose?
Interested Members of Congress might take action to address some or all of these concerns. Alternatively, they might defer action until efforts currently under way assess and make recommendations regarding the existing regulatory structure. If Congress chooses to enhance oversight, it might require a survey of existing facilities and their use and a national needs assessment, perhaps barring further construction until these are complete. Stakeholders could focus on enhancing self-regulatory activities such as improving or standardizing laboratory worker training or building a mechanism for sharing lessons learned. Rather than relying on self-regulation, policymakers might enhance oversight through additional regulation of high-containment facilities, requiring laboratory or personnel certification, or by broadening the Select Agent Program. Which agencies should implement any new mandates remains an open question.
Biocontainment technologies are widely used by scientists around the world. Efforts to increase control of U.S. high-containment laboratories may put domestic industry at a competitive disadvantage and inhibit international academic collaboration. Absent international harmonization, the United States can only partially address the threat of a high-containment laboratory being the source of a bioterror weapon.
A key task for policymakers is to define their goals for enhancing oversight of high-containment laboratories. The focus of the oversight effort may affect which policy issues are addressed. For example, focusing on a registry of existing high-containment laboratory capacity may improve planning, coordination, and efficiency of use but provide relatively limited security benefits. Similarly, a rigorous oversight program including facility and personnel licensure, mandatory training, and restricted construction of new facilities may provide security benefits at the cost of regulatory burden, increased federal expenditures, and impeded scientific progress in countermeasure research, bioforensics, and public health. When weighing options to address these complex policy issues, policymakers may have to reconcile many competing and potentially conflicting national needs. |
crs_R41785 | crs_R41785_0 | Introduction
During the past few years, economists have been debating how much of the increase in unemployment since the start of the 2007-2009 recession is due to reduced demand for goods and services compared with compositional changes entailing worker reallocation across industries and areas. Their relative contribution to the increase in the unemployment rate since 2007 has different implications for the pace at which the economy can grow without spurring inflation and for which public policies are most appropriate to lower an unemployment rate that remains elevated long after the latest recession's end in June 2009. Fiscal and monetary policies often have been used to jump-start aggregate demand and job growth for the cyclically unemployed. If the increase in unemployment is largely due to the sluggish pace of output growth since the recession's end, then economic theory suggests that fiscal and monetary stimulus would be suitable strategies for lowering the unemployment rate from its still-elevated average of 8.1% in 2012. Given the different implications of cyclical and structural unemployment for policymakers, this report distinguishes between the relative magnitude of the two in recent years. Structural unemployment arises from obstacles to the worker-to-job-matching process that lengthen unemployment spells. Impediments to unemployed workers quickly moving to firms with available jobs include mismatches (between the skills or locations of jobless workers and the skill requirements or locations of available jobs), the composition of the unemployed (toward workers who permanently lost jobs vis-à-vis workers temporarily laid off, for example), and the characteristics of labor market institutions (such as the wage-replacement rate and duration of unemployment benefits). Under certain conditions, however, cyclical unemployment may evolve into structural unemployment. As discussed in detail below, this finding is supported by several empirical studies which estimated that any increase in structural unemployment that occurred accounted for a minority of the rise in the U.S. unemployment rate. The results do not suggest that the nation is facing a "new normal" of elevated unemployment rates for years to come. Rates returned to pre-recession levels in only construction and the federal government. Evidence of Somewhat Increased Structural Unemployment
Anomalies that occurred during the latest recession and ongoing recovery suggest that structural impediments to efficiently matching workers with jobs may have contributed more to the increase in the unemployment rate from 5.0% in December 2007 to a peak of 10.0% in October 2009 than they did during earlier fluctuations in the business cycle. Their conclusion that the U.S. labor market has not attained "a new normal" of high unemployment rates for years to come is partly due to the temporary nature of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program enacted in 2008 and most recently extended by Congress through 2013. At no other time during the postwar period was long-term unemployment more prevalent. The Vacancy Rate and the Unemployment Rate
Yet a third anomaly suggestive of structural problems in the labor market is the nature of the relationship between the job vacancy (openings) rate and the unemployment rate after the recession's end in June 2009. | The unemployment rate greatly increased after the onset of the latest recession in December 2007, when it measured 5.0%. The rate peaked at 10.0% in October 2009, four months after the recession's official end in June 2009. More than three years into the recovery, the unemployment rate averaged 8.1% in 2012. Given its still elevated level, policymakers may continue to be concerned about how to spur economic growth and create jobs.
Over the past few years, Congress has used fiscal policy and the Federal Reserve (Fed) has used monetary policy to put the economy on a path toward the level of demand for goods and services that preceded the 2007-2009 recession. Firms react to recessions by laying off workers, and the deeper the downturn in the business cycle, the greater the rise in unemployment that results. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies commonly have been used to remedy what is known as cyclical unemployment.
The unemployment rate has not been as responsive as had been hoped to the countercyclical measures undertaken by Congress and the Fed. Consequently, some have suggested that an increase in another type of unemployment—referred to as structural unemployment—has accounted for much of the rise in the unemployment rate from pre-recession levels. These observers assert that the rise in unemployment due to change in the structure of the economy represents "a new normal" of elevated unemployment rates for years to come.
Structural unemployment develops for different reasons than cyclical unemployment. Structural unemployment results when jobseekers do not move quickly into vacant jobs. Obstacles that lengthen the spell of unemployment (i.e., prolong the period of job search) include mismatches between the skills or locations of jobless workers and the skill requirements or locations of available jobs. Another impediment is the composition of the unemployed, such as more workers whose connection to their former employers is permanently severed (i.e., fewer workers likely to be recalled from layoffs once business revives at their former employers). A third factor that may contribute to long-term unemployment is known as labor market institutions, such as unemployment benefit programs.
The measures enacted by Congress have chiefly focused on alleviating cyclical unemployment. To the extent that the still-high unemployment rate results from the slow pace of output growth during the recovery, economic theory suggests that fiscal and monetary stimulus would be suitable strategies for further reducing joblessness. To the extent that structural factors have contributed to the still-high unemployment rate, economic theory suggests measures such as promoting the education and retraining of workers who permanently lost jobs in hard-hit industries (e.g., home building) so that they can acquire the skills needed to obtain employment in other industries.
This report assesses the relative magnitudes of cyclical and structural unemployment as they respond to different policy measures. An analysis of changes since 2007 in a variety of labor market indicators across industries and areas finds patterns that strongly suggest most of the increase in the U.S. unemployment rate is cyclical (i.e., due to depressed aggregate demand). Empirical studies suggest that, although structural unemployment has temporarily increased, it accounted for a minority of the rise in the unemployment rate in recent years. |
crs_R43459 | crs_R43459_0 | Beginning in summer 2013, media reports of foreign intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) have been published and are apparently based on unauthorized disclosures of classified information by Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor. The reports have focused on two main NSA collection activities conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The first is the bulk collection of telephony metadata for domestic and international telephone calls. The second involves the interception of Internet-based communications and is targeted at foreigners who are not within the United States, but may also inadvertently acquire the communications of U.S. persons. This report provides a description of these two programs and the various constitutional challenges that have arisen in judicial forums with respect to each. FISA also establishes a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) to provide appellate review of decisions made by the FISC. Fourth Amendment Challenges to Telephony Metadata Program
Upon public revelation of the NSA's bulk telephony metadata program, several lawsuits were filed in federal district courts challenging the constitutionality of this program under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition to publicly released FISC rulings on this issue, four district courts have reached the merits of this Fourth Amendment question, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed, but did not resolve, the constitutional claims brought before it. In ACLU v. Clapper , Judge Pauley of the S.D.N.Y. On May 7, 2015, the Second Circuit held that the bulk telephone metadata program exceeded congressional authorization under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. While the court refrained from ruling on the merits of the Fourth Amendment question raised by the plaintiffs, the opinion did note the "vexing issues" raised by such a challenge. In a ruling on the merits mirroring that of the Southern District of New York, Chief Judge Winmill of the federal district court of Idaho upheld Section 215 against a Fourth Amendment challenge, noting that Smith and the third-party doctrine have not been overruled and continue to bind lower courts until the Supreme Court rules otherwise. Doubting the metadata program has significantly aided the government in conducting time-sensitive terrorism investigations, and in light of the serious privacy intrusions found, the court concluded that the bulk metadata program was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Constitutional Challenges to Acquisition of Internet Communications
Constitutional challenges to the NSA's acquisition of Internet communications of overseas targets under FISA have arisen in a number of different contexts. First, such challenges have arisen in the FISC and FISCR as part of those courts' roles in approving the parameters of these collection activities. Secondly, constitutional challenges have been brought in traditional federal courts as civil actions by plaintiffs asserting an injury or in criminal proceedings by defendants who have been notified that evidence against them was obtained or derived from collection under Section 702. | Beginning in summer 2013, media reports of foreign intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) have been widely published. The reports have focused on two main NSA collection activities approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The first is the bulk collection of telephony metadata for domestic and international telephone calls. The second involves the interception of Internet-based communications and is targeted at foreigners who are not within the United States, but may also inadvertently acquire the communications of U.S. persons. As public awareness of these programs grew, questions about the constitutionality of these programs were increasingly raised by Members of Congress and others. This report provides a brief overview of these two programs and the various constitutional challenges that have arisen in judicial forums with respect to each.
A handful of federal courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment issues raised by the NSA telephony metadata program. FISC opinions declassified in the wake of the public's awareness of the NSA telephony metadata program have found that the program does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, in ACLU v. Clapper, the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a constitutional challenge to the telephony metadata program was not likely to be successful on the merits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refrained from reaching the merits of this Fourth Amendment challenge, but instead resolved the case on statutory grounds, holding that the metadata program exceeded statutory authorization under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. However, the panel did engage in a general discussion about the Fourth Amendment principles implicated by this program, including the effect of modern technology on American's expectations of privacy. Both the district courts for the Southern District of California and the District of Idaho have found the bulk metadata program constitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent. In Klayman v. Obama, the federal District Court for the District of Columbia held that there is a significant likelihood that a challenge to the constitutionality of the NSA telephony metadata program would be successful.
Constitutional challenges to the NSA's acquisition of Internet communications of overseas targets under FISA have arisen in a number of different contexts. First, such challenges have arisen in both the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review as part of those courts' roles in approving the parameters of these collection activities. Secondly, constitutional challenges have been brought in traditional federal courts as civil actions by plaintiffs asserting an injury or in criminal proceedings by defendants who have been notified that evidence against them was obtained or derived from collection under Section 702. While the FISA courts have at times curbed the government's ability to engage in surveillance activity to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the one federal court to address the issue has upheld the program against constitutional challenge. |
crs_RS22190 | crs_RS22190_0 | In the mid-1950s, the structure for the procurement of food and consumable items changed. Defense Logistics Agency
DLA is an agency under the Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Today DLA provides worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime to the military services, civilian agencies, and foreign countries. Under DLA, DLA Troop Support is responsible for nearly all of the food, clothing, and medical supplies used by the military. Procurement Authority and Policy
Military food items are procured in accordance with the provisions of the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act (BAA). The Berry Amendment [Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C. ), Section 2533a] requires DOD to give preference to the procurement of domestically produced, manufactured, or home grown products, notably food, clothing, and fabrics. The DLA Troop Services Subsistence Directorate
The Subsistence Directorate is divided into the following business units: Food Services, Operational Rations, Produce, Food Safety Office, and Supplier Support. | Military food items, also known as subsistence items, are generally procured under the auspices of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), an agency of the Department of Defense (DOD) which provides worldwide logistics support for the U.S. military services. Under DLA, DLA Troop Services (formerly the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia) is the inventory control point for food, clothing, textiles, medicines, medical equipment, general and industrial supplies, and services for the military, their eligible dependents, and other non-DOD customers worldwide. DLA Troop Services buys and manages about $13.4 billion worth of food, clothing, textiles, and other products. Under DLA Troop Services, the Subsistence Directorate serves as the operational manager for all food operations. These items are procured in accordance with the provisions of the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act (BAA). The Berry Amendment requires DOD to give preference to the procurement of domestically produced, manufactured, or home grown products, notably food, clothing, and fabrics. This report will describe the origin, authority, and policy in the procurement of food for the military. |
crs_R45301 | crs_R45301_0 | I nitial coin offerings (ICOs) are a hot topic among federal legislators, regulators, financial market professionals, and even athletes and celebrities. An ICO is a method of raising capital in exchange for digital "coins" or "tokens" that entitle their holders to certain rights. The popularity of ICOs has surged over the past 18 months. China and South Korea have banned ICOs altogether, and policymakers in a number of other countries have warned that certain unregistered ICOs may run afoul of their securities laws. Other countries have developed proposed rules or legislation specifically directed at regulating ICOs, while still others have released guidance clarifying the application of existing laws to ICOs. U.S. securities regulators have also actively monitored the rise of ICOs. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has cautioned that depending on their features, ICOs may qualify as offerings of "securities" subject to federal regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The Chairman of the SEC has indicated that the agency's Division of Enforcement will "vigorously" police ICOs for violations of the Acts' registration and anti-fraud provisions. Consistent with this representation, the SEC has brought a number of enforcement actions related to unregistered and fraudulent ICOs, and has reportedly issued a number of subpoenas to other token issuers. While the SEC's enforcement efforts do not present a complete picture of the agency's views on when ICOs will qualify as offerings of "securities," they provide insight into the agency's general approach to these transactions. This report discusses the principles that the SEC and courts use to determine whether a transaction qualifies as an offering of "securities" under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and the application of those principles to ICOs. Second, the report reviews a popular method for structuring ICOs—the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT)—that has been developed with the goal of allowing the tokens issued pursuant to certain ICOs to trade free from SEC oversight. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act
Whether an ICO involves an offering of "securities" has important legal implications. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co . , the Court explained that a transaction is an "investment contract" when it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profit, (4) to be derived solely from the efforts of others. Accordingly, in applying the test, the Court has emphasized the importance of the "economic realities underlying a transaction," as opposed to a transaction's form or the name that its promoters give it. Because the coins or tokens issued pursuant to ICOs are incredibly diverse, and the Howey test's application depends upon highly fact-intensive evaluations of a transaction's specific features, it is impossible to draw broad conclusions concerning the application of the Howey test to all ICOs. Specifically, the SAFT's developers argue that tokens issued pursuant to SAFTs may not involve the required "expectation of profit" derived from the "efforts of others" because (1) token purchasers are motivated primarily by a desire to use or consume products or services, and (2) the relevant "efforts" to make the tokens useful occur before the tokens are delivered to investors. However, courts and the SEC have not evaluated whether the SAFT framework in fact achieves its intended goal of avoiding regulation under the securities laws. The DAO Report
In July 2017, the SEC issued a report of investigation concerning an unregistered sale of digital tokens by an unincorporated entity organization called "The DAO." Munchee
In December 2017, the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Munchee, Inc., the creator of an iPhone application involving restaurant reviews. Possible Exemptions from Registration
In light of the various uncertainties with the application of the Howey test to ICOs and the limited guidance offered by the SEC to date, commentators have discussed whether, assuming ICOs qualify as offerings of "securities," certain exemptions from the Securities Act's registration requirements may be available to token issuers. However, commentators have raised concerns about such offerings. Regulation A provides exemptions for two "tiers" of offerings. The subsections below review a number of these proposals. The SEC is responsible for regulating virtual currencies that qualify as "securities." | Initial coin offerings (ICOs)—a method of raising capital in exchange for digital coins or tokens that entitle their holders to certain rights—are a hot topic among legislators, regulators, and financial market professionals. In response to a surge in the popularity of ICOs over the past 18 months, regulators in a number of countries have banned ICOs. Other foreign regulators have cautioned that unregistered ICOs may violate their securities laws, issued guidance clarifying the application of their securities laws to ICOs, or proposed new rules or legislation directed at regulating ICOs. ICOs have also attracted the attention of U.S. securities regulators. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has cautioned that depending on their specific features, ICOs may qualify as offerings of "securities" subject to federal regulation.
Whether an ICO involves an offering of "securities" has important legal consequences. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) requires issuers of securities to register their offerings with the SEC or conduct them pursuant to a specific exemption from registration. Issuers and sellers of securities also face anti-fraud liability under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The SEC has the authority to investigate and punish violations of the securities laws, and has indicated that it will "vigorously" police the burgeoning ICO market for such violations.
To determine whether a transaction involves an offering of "securities," courts employ a four-part test outlined by the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. Under that test, a transaction qualifies as an offering of "securities" if it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with a reasonable expectation of profit, (4) to be derived from the efforts of others. In applying the Howey test, the Court has emphasized the importance of analyzing "the economic realities" of a transaction, as opposed to its form or the label that its promoters give it.
Because ICOs are incredibly diverse, it is impossible to draw broad conclusions about their status under the securities laws, which will depend on fact-intensive inquiries into details that vary among different ICOs. As a general matter, though, ICOs are more likely to qualify as offerings of "securities" when token purchasers (1) are motivated primarily by a desire for financial returns (as opposed to a desire to use or consume some good or service for which tokens can be exchanged), and (2) lack a meaningful ability to control the activities on which their profits will depend. In light of these principles, attorneys have developed a method for structuring ICOs—the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT)—that attempts to avoid classification of the tokens issued pursuant to certain ICOs as "securities." However, whether the SAFT achieves its intended goal remains subject to significant debate.
The SEC has pursued a number of enforcement actions related to unregistered ICOs. In July 2017, the SEC issued a report of investigation concluding that tokens issued by an unincorporated organization called "The DAO" qualified as "securities" under the Howey test. And in December 2017, the agency reached the same conclusion about tokens issued by Munchee, Inc., the creator of an iPhone application involving restaurant reviews. These enforcement actions, and a prominent speech given by an agency official in June 2018, offer some guidance on the SEC's views on when ICOs will qualify as offerings of "securities."
The Securities Act and related regulations offer a number of exemptions from the Act's registration requirements for offerings that meet certain conditions. However, some commentators have doubted the attractiveness of the relevant exemptions for ICOs. Commentators have also proposed a number of policies to improve the regulation of ICOs, ranging from a specific registration exemption for ICOs to a "safe harbor" for certain token exchanges. |
crs_R43080 | crs_R43080_0 | Introduction and Overview
This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2014 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2013 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The FY2014-requested appropriations were taken from S.Rept. 113-78 . The amounts recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations were taken from H.Rept. 113-171 and the amounts recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations were taken from S.Rept. 113-78 . FY2014-enacted appropriations were taken from the joint explanatory statement to accompany the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), printed in the January 15, 2015, Congressional Record . FY2014 Appropriations
For FY2014, the Administration requested a total of $63.310 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual CJS bill. The Administration's request included $8.596 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.405 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.347 billion for the science agencies, and $962.1 million for the related agencies. On July 17, 2013, the House Committee on Appropriations approved its version of the FY2014 CJS appropriations bill ( H.R. 2787 ). The committee recommended a total of $58.601 billion for the CJS agencies and bureaus. The bill included $7.544 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.658 billion for the Department of Justice, $23.599 billion for the science agencies, and $800.5 million for the related agencies. On July 18, 2013, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved S. 1329 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014. The committee recommended $63.586 billion for CJS. The bill included $8.679 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.503 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.442 billion for the science agencies, and $962.1 million for the related agencies. On January 17, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. The act provides a total of $61.623 billion for CJS, of which $8.181 billion is for the Department of Commerce, $27.737 billion is for the Department of Justice, $24.824 billion is for the science agencies, and $881.8 million is for the related agencies. FY2013 Appropriations
On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. The act provided a total of $60.638 billion for CJS. After rescissions and sequestration, the act provided a total of $57.936 billion for CJS, of which $7.510 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $25.830 billion was for the Department of Justice, $23.769 billion was for the science agencies, and $827.9 million was for the related agencies. 113-76 . | On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). The act provides a total of $60.638 billion for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). After rescissions and sequestration, the act provided a total of $57.936 billion for CJS, of which $7.510 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $25.830 billion was for the Department of Justice, $23.769 billion was for the science agencies, and $827.9 million was for the related agencies.
On April 10, 2013, President Obama submitted his FY2014 budget to Congress. The Administration requested a total of $63.310 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill. The Administration's request included $8.596 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.405 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.347 billion for the science agencies, and $962.1 million for the related agencies.
On July 17, 2013, the House Committee on Appropriations approved its version of the FY2014 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 2787). The committee recommended a total of $58.601 billion for the CJS agencies and bureaus. The bill included $7.544 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.658 billion for the Department of Justice, $23.599 billion for the science agencies, and $800.5 million for the related agencies.
On July 18, 2013, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved S. 1329, the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014. The committee recommended a total of $63.586 billion for CJS. The bill included $8.679 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.503 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.442 billion for the science agencies, and $962.1 million for the related agencies.
On January 17, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76). The act provides a total of $61.623 billion for CJS, of which $8.181 billion is for the Department of Commerce, $27.737 billion is for the Department of Justice, $24.824 billion is for the science agencies, and $881.8 million is for the related agencies.
This report tracks and describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2014 appropriations for CJS accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2013 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS.
The FY2013-enacted and the FY2014-requested appropriations were taken from S.Rept. 113-78. The amounts recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations were taken from H.Rept. 113-171 and the amounts recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations were taken from S.Rept. 113-78. FY2014-enacted appropriations were taken from the joint explanatory statement to accompany the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), printed in the January 15, 2015, Congressional Record. |
crs_R42748 | crs_R42748_0 | Introduction
Career and technical education (CTE), sometimes referred to as vocational education, provides occupational and non-occupational preparation at the secondary, postsecondary, and adult education levels. As defined in a publication by the U.S. Department of Education's (ED's) National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), CTE prepares students for roles outside the paid labor market, teaches general employment skills, and teaches skills required in specific occupations or careers. As the unemployment rate remains higher than at the onset of the latest recession in December 2007, Congress has highlighted the need to more effectively support workforce development in order to reduce unemployment and the associated economic and social issues. This report provides a primer on CTE to support the workforce development discussion. Overview of Career and Technical Education
CTE is offered by a variety of institutions: high schools, area CTE centers, community colleges, vocational schools, and employers through apprenticeships and on-the-job training. Career pathways generally refer to a series of connected education and training strategies and support services that enable individuals to secure industry relevant certification and obtain employment within an occupational area and to advance to higher levels of future education and employment in that area. The Appendix includes the related career pathways for each career cluster. States use career clusters to inform education reform at the secondary and postsecondary levels and to enhance economic development. CTE is seldom offered at the elementary school level. At the secondary school level, schools often offer occupational and non-occupational CTE. Nearly all public high school graduates (88%) earned at least one CTE credit in 2009, and 19% were CTE concentrators, earning at least three CTE credits in a single occupational area. Some schools are designed to ensure students are prepared to enter the workforce immediately with an industry-recognized credential after completion of a career pathway in high school or after one to two additional years of postsecondary education or training. Of the CTE graduates working for pay but not enrolled in postsecondary education, 30% were in an occupation related to their high school CTE concentration. There was no significant difference in average wages between all graduates working for pay but not enrolled in postsecondary education and CTE graduates working for pay but not enrolled in postsecondary education. The standards do not define career-ready. The CCTC provides standards for each of the 16 career clusters and their career pathways. While a terminal CTE program is designed to lead directly to employment, many of the courses are not transferable for credit toward a more advanced credential. The ability or inability to transfer CTE credits toward a bachelor's degree highlights the dual and often conflicting purpose of CTE at the postsecondary education level. The difficulty in structuring every postsecondary CTE program to include the first one to two years of general bachelor's degree requirements is that the CTE program will likely require more time to accomplish and may be of less interest to the CTE student. CTE in Adult Education
CTE for adults is work-related course-taking that adults participate in to acquire, maintain, and upgrade their workforce skills. CTE for adults may consist of formal postsecondary CTE as described above that does not lead to a credential, or it may incorporate adult basic education (ABE). The rates at which adults engaged in work-related course-taking increased with age, labor market engagement, and education. Earnings Outcomes of CTE Credentials
A recent effort to gather data on potential earnings benefits that may be associated with alternative credentials (such as educational certificates or professional certification and licenses) suggests that for individuals at subbaccalaureate levels such credentials are associated with an earnings premium in most cases. According to Census, alternative credentials are associated with a statistically significant wage premium for populations with no postsecondary degree when compared to others with comparable levels of formal education ( Table 1 ). Vocational certificates and associate's degrees in more technical CTE fields like computer and information services are associated with substantially higher earnings than vocational certificates and associate's degrees in less technical fields like business. Career Clusters and Career Pathways | Career and Technical Education (CTE), often referred to as vocational education, provides occupational and non-occupational preparation at the secondary, postsecondary, and adult education levels. CTE is an element of the nation's workforce development system. As such, CTE plays a role in reducing unemployment and the associated economic and social ills. This report provides a primer on CTE to support congressional discussion of initiatives designed to rationalize the workforce development system.
CTE prepares students for roles outside the paid labor market, teaches general employment skills, and teaches skills required in specific occupations or careers. In order to focus and structure programs, curricula, and resources, practitioners at the local, state, and federal levels often organize CTE into 16 career clusters and various career pathways for each career cluster. CTE career clusters include several occupational areas, such as health science and manufacturing. Career pathways generally refer to a series of connected education and training strategies and support services that enable individuals to secure industry-recognized credentials and obtain employment within an occupational area and to advance to higher levels of future education and employment in that area.
At the secondary level, CTE is offered in high schools, area CTE centers, community colleges, and detention centers. Nearly all 2009 public high school graduates (88%) earned at least one CTE credit, and 19% earned at least three CTE credits in a single occupational area. Four issues confound the offering of CTE at the secondary level. The first is whether CTE courses should be offered to (1) broaden the students' education and provide early exposure to several career options or (2) ensure students are prepared to enter the workforce immediately with an industry-recognized credential after completion of a career pathway in high school or after one to two additional years of postsecondary education or training. The second issue is the expense of maintaining and updating the instructional resources and equipment for a single career cluster or pathway, particularly at the secondary level. The third issue is whether CTE adds value to a college preparatory high school curriculum. For example, U.S. Department of Education statistics of 2004 public high school graduates demonstrated no significant difference in average wages between all graduates working for pay but not enrolled in postsecondary education and CTE graduates working for pay but not enrolled in postsecondary education. However, of the CTE graduates working for pay but not enrolled in postsecondary education, only 30% were in an occupation related to their high school CTE concentration. The final issue is related to state adoption in recent years of the common core standards that are termed college- and career-ready standards, although the standards do not define career-ready and thus may not provide immediate career preparation.
At the postsecondary level, CTE is offered by community colleges, vocational schools, and employers through apprenticeships and on-the-job training. Some CTE programs are terminal (few courses are transferable for credit toward a more advanced credential), while others may lead to stackable credentials (a sequence of credentials leading to more advanced qualifications). The ability or inability to transfer CTE credits toward a credential with higher earning potential or a bachelor's degree highlights one conflict among policymakers. The difficulty in structuring every postsecondary CTE program to include the first one to two years of general bachelor's degree requirements is that the CTE program will likely require more time to accomplish and may be of less interest to the CTE student.
CTE for adults is work-related course-taking that may incorporate adult basic education (ABE). At the adult level, CTE is offered by secondary and postsecondary CTE providers, employers, and community and government organizations. The rates at which adults engage in work-related course-taking increases with age, labor market engagement, and education.
The Bureau of Census collects earnings data for the adult population with various educational credentials. The most recent data available on subbaccalaureate populations suggests that alternative credentials (such educational certificates or professional certification and licenses) are associated with a statistically significant wage premium for populations with no postsecondary degree when compared to others with comparable levels of formal education. In addition, vocational certificates and associate's degrees in more technical CTE fields like computer and information services are associated with substantially higher earnings than vocational certificates and associate's degree in less technical CTE fields like business. |
crs_RL33209 | crs_RL33209_0 | Introduction
Casework in a congressional office refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide to constituents who request assistance. In contemporary times, thousands of constituents seek assistance annually from Members of Congress, with requests ranging from the simple to the complex. Members and their staffs help individual constituents deal with administrative agencies by acting as facilitators, ombudsmen, and, in some cases, advocates. In addition to providing services to individual constituents, some congressional offices also consider their liaison activities between the federal government and local governments or businesses concerned about the effects of federal legislation or regulation to be casework. As part of the process of determining how to carry out their congressional duties, Members of Congress determine the scope of their constituent service activities. Casework is conducted for various reasons, including constituent demand and a broadly held understanding among Members and their staff that casework is integral to the representational duties of a Member of Congress. Others believe that casework activities can be part of an outreach strategy to build political support among constituents. Casework might also be seen by some as an evaluative stage of the legislative process. Constituent inquiries about specific policies, programs, or benefits may also suggest areas in which programmatic or policy changes require additional institutional oversight, or further legislative consideration. One challenge to congressional casework is the widely held public perception that Members of Congress can initiate a broad array of actions resulting in a speedy, favorable outcome. The rules of the House and Senate, and laws and regulations governing federal executive agency activities, however, closely limit the extent of an intervention made on behalf of a constituent. When conducting casework, congressional staff cannot force an agency to expedite a case or act in favor of a constituent. Congressional staff may intervene to facilitate the appropriate administrative processes involved, encourage an agency to give a case consideration, and sometimes advocate for a favorable outcome. Subsequent sections of this report discuss House and Senate rules and guidelines, laws, and regulations affecting congressional casework, as well as the role of caseworkers. This report also provides sample outlines and document templates for establishing and managing congressional casework. Further casework materials are available at the CRS Casework Resources web page at http://crs.gov/resources/Pages/CS-Casework.aspx . Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Unemployment United States Forest Service Veterans' Clinic Veterans' Hospitals Veterans' Services Veterans' Service Organizations (VSO) Visas/Entry Permits, Education Visas/Entry Permits, Emergency Visas/Entry Permits, Work Washington Visitors
CRS Resources
CRS In Focus IF10503, Constituent Services: Overview and Resources
Congressi onal Liaison Offices , at http://www.crs.gov/resources/liaisonoffices
CRS Video WVB00093, Introduction to Congressional Casework
CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources
CRS Report R44696, Casework in Congressional Offices: Frequently Asked Questions
CRS Report CASEWORK, Constituent Services: Casework , Webpage, available at http://www.crs.gov
CRS Report RL32113, Congressional Intervention in the Administrative Process: Legal and Ethical Considerations
CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management
CRS Report RS20500, Medical Records Privacy: Questions and Answers on the HIPAA Rule
CRS Report RS22450, Procedural Analysis of Private Laws Enacted: 1986-2015
Sample Documents and Release Forms
Sample Constituent Guide/Newsletter Piece/Outreach Handout
Initial Correspondence with Constituents Opening a Case
Simple Privacy Act Release Form
Sample Privacy Act and HIPAA Release Form
Case Information and Privacy Act Release Form
Response Correspondence 1: Completed Response from Agency
Response Correspondence 2: Partial/Interim Response from Agency | In a congressional office, the term casework refers to the response or services that Members of Congress provide to constituents who request assistance. Each year, thousands of constituents turn to Members of Congress with a wide range of requests, from the simple to the complex. Members and their staffs help constituents deal with administrative agencies by acting as facilitators, ombudsmen, and, in some cases, advocates. In addition to serving individual constituents, some congressional offices also consider as casework liaison activities between the federal government and local governments, businesses, communities, and nonprofit organizations.
Members of Congress determine the scope of their constituent service activities. Casework is conducted for various reasons, including a broadly held understanding among Members and staff that casework is integral to the representational duties of a Member of Congress. Casework activities may also be viewed as part of an outreach strategy to build political support, or as an evaluative stage of the legislative process. Constituent inquiries about specific policies, programs, or benefits may suggest areas where government programs or policies require institutional oversight or legislative consideration.
One challenge to congressional casework is the widely held public perception that Members of Congress can initiate a broad array of actions resulting in a speedy, favorable outcome. The rules of the House and Senate, and laws and regulations governing federal executive agency activities, however, closely limit interventions made on the behalf of constituents. When performing casework, congressional staff cannot force an agency to expedite a case or act in favor of a constituent. However, congressional staff can intervene to facilitate the appropriate administrative processes, encourage an agency to give a case consideration, and sometimes advocate for a favorable outcome.
This report discusses House and Senate rules and guidelines, laws, and regulations affecting congressional casework, as well as the role of caseworkers. It also provides sample outlines and document templates for implementing and managing congressional casework. Further casework materials are available at the CRS Casework Resources web page at http://crs.gov/resources/Pages/CS-Casework.aspx. |
crs_RL31906 | crs_RL31906_0 | Roh campaigned on a platform of reform -- reform of Korean politics, economic policymaking, andU.S.-ROK relations -- to narrowly defeat conservative candidate Lee Hoi Chang in the generalelection. The 2002 election was notable for several inter-related reasons. First, itexposed the deep generational divide among South Koreans. Second, Roh's victory was due in part to his call for South Korea to become a more "equal" partner in the U.S.-ROK alliance and to his criticism of U.S. policies on the Korean peninsula. Rohpledged to largely continue Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea. Althoughthese views resonated most strongly among younger generations of South Koreans, they have enteredthe mainstream of Korean society, as shown by the massive demonstrations in late 2002 protestingthe acquittal of two U.S. servicemen who were operating a military vehicle when it killed twoKorean schoolgirls. Third, the election and the anti-American demonstrations highlighted the growing influence and sophistication of Korean civil society groups, which now have a significant voice in determiningpolicy outcomes in Seoul. Furthermore, both the ruling MDP and oppositionGNP are under significant internal stress, and there is speculation that there will be a major politicalrealignment before the next legislative election. As mentioned above, the next legislative elections willbe held in April 2004. In reality, however, the President continues to be the dominant force in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National Assembly from initiatingmajor pieces of legislation. Presently, there are three major political parties in South Korea: President Roh Moo-hyun's center-left ruling Millennium Democratic Party ( MDP , formerly the National Congress for NewPolitics), which has 101 seats in the National Assembly (137 seats constitutes a parliamentarymajority); the generally conservative opposition Grand National Party ( GNP ), which at 153 seatshasa majority in the Assembly; and the smaller (14 seats) conservative United Liberal Democrats(ULD), which is led by the veteran politician Kim Jong-pil and has declined dramatically in size andinfluence in recent years. "Anti-Americanism". And,Roh bucked South Korean tradition by not traveling to the United States during the campaign. Yet suspicions of the Bush Administration's policy toward North Korea among manySouth Koreans arguably will make it politically costly for President Roh to support a moreconfrontational approach if the United States decides to pursue this course, particularly during a yearwhen Roh's party is trying to capture the National Assembly. | In December 2002, South Koreans elected Roh Moo-hyun, a little-known, self-educated lawyer, as their president. The left-of-center Roh narrowly defeated the conservative candidate, Lee HoiChang. Roh ran on a platform of reform, pledging to make South Korean politics more transparentand accountable, to make the economy more equitable, and to make South Korea a more equalpartner in its alliance with the United States. During the campaign, Roh pledged to continue hispredecessor, Kim Dae Jung's, "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea, and harshly criticized theBush Administration's approach to Pyongyang.
The 2002 election was notable for several inter-related reasons. First, it exposed the deep generational divide among South Koreans. Roh was favored by voters under the age of 45, whoemerged during the election as an anti-status quo force. In contrast, Lee easily won the votes ofthose over 45. Second, Roh's victory was due in part to his criticisms of the United States, and hebenefitted from the massive demonstrations in late 2002 protesting the acquittal of two U.S.servicemen who were operating a military vehicle when it killed two Korean schoolgirls. Third, theelection and the anti-American demonstrations highlighted the growing influence and sophisticationof Korean civil society groups, which now have a significant voice in determining policy outcomesin Seoul.
These shifts in the South Korean polity, particularly the rise in anti-Americanism, confront the Bush Administration with a policy dilemma: how to manage the U.S.-ROK alliance while pursuinga more confrontational approach toward North Korea than that favored by many, if not most, SouthKoreans.
Institutionally, the South Korean presidency has few checks on its power. While the unicameral National Assembly's influence has been slowly rising since South Korea became a democracy in1987, it is hampered by formal and informal limitations on its power. The National Assembly iscontrolled by the opposition, right-of-center Grand National Party (GNP). The second-largestgrouping is President Roh's party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Both major parties areunder significant internal stress, and there is speculation that they will split and be reconstitutedbefore the next quadrennial legislative election, to be held in April 2004.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R44341 | crs_R44341_0 | O n October 10, 2017, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan (CPP), an Obama Administration rule that would limit carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The action came in response to Executive Order 13783, in which President Trump directed federal agencies to review existing regulations and policies that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources. Among the E.O. 's specific directives was that EPA review the CPP, which was one of the Obama Administration's most important actions directed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. EPA promulgated the CPP on August 3, 2015. The rule set standards for CO 2 emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Besides EPA's proposal to repeal the rule, the rule is the subject of ongoing litigation: a number of states and other entities have challenged it, while other states and entities have intervened in support of it. On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court granted applications to stay the rule for the duration of the litigation. GHG emissions decreased substantially in 2008 and 2009 as a result of a variety of factors—some economic, some the effect of government policies at all levels. A: The U.S. electricity generation sector contributed about 29% of all U.S. GHG emissions in 2015. Statutory Authority
Q: Under what authority did EPA promulgate the Clean Power Plan rule? The court, therefore, did not reach the question of whether the flexible approach taken by EPA for mercury controls (i.e., a cap-and-trade system) met the requirements of Section 111(d). As discussed in more detail below, in the CPP rule, EPA determined the BSER for existing power plants based on three "building blocks": (1) efficiency improvements at affected coal-fired power plants, (2) generation shifts among affected power plants, and (3) renewable generating capacity. States determine which measure they want to use to be in compliance. Although it has been widely reported that the rule would require a 32% reduction in CO 2 emissions from the electricity sector by 2030, compared to 2005 levels, this reduction was EPA's estimate of the rule's ultimate effect nationwide. The CO 2 emission reduction already achieved represents 77% of the reduction that EPA expected the electric power sector to achieve by 2030 under the CPP. Q: What are the state-specific mass-based targets? Q: How does EPA's Clean Power Plan interact with existing GHG emission reduction programs in the states, namely the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California's climate policies? A: The respective roles of actions that individual power plants take (i.e., "inside the fence" actions, such as the adoption of pollution control devices or fuel switching) versus actions by other actors, including energy consumers ("outside the fence" actions) have been the subject of much of the controversy surrounding the CPP. The final rule, as promulgated, set a deadline of September 6, 2016, for each state to submit a State Implementation Plan to EPA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard oral arguments in the case in September 2016, but agreed on April 28, 2017, to an EPA request to hold the case in abeyance while the agency conducts the review required by Executive Order 13783. A: Although the agency has proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan, it did not propose repeal of the GHG "endangerment finding," the 2009 agency finding that emissions of CO 2 and other GHGs endanger public health and welfare. Without addressing this finding, the agency appears to have a continuing obligation to limit emissions of CO 2 from power plants. Thus, in addition to the proposed repeal of the CPP, on December 18, 2017, EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit information on whether it is appropriate to issue another rule to replace the CPP and if so, in what form and scope. | On October 10, 2017, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan (CPP), the Obama Administration rule that would limit carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The action came in response to Executive Order 13783, in which President Trump directed federal agencies to review existing regulations and policies that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources. Among the E.O.'s specific directives was that EPA review the CPP, which was one of the Obama Administration's most important actions directed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
The Clean Power Plan was promulgated in August 2015 to reduce GHG emissions from the generation of electric power. Fossil-fueled electric power plants are the largest individual U.S. sources of GHG emissions, accounting for about 29% of the U.S. total from all sources. The rule set individual state targets for average emissions from existing power plants—interim targets for the period 2022-2029 and final targets to be met by 2030. The targets for each state were derived from a formula based on three "building blocks"—efficiency improvements at individual coal-fired power plants and increased use of renewable power and natural gas combined-cycle power plants to replace more polluting coal-fired units. Although EPA set state-specific targets, states would determine how to reach these goals, not EPA.
EPA has said it would expect the rule's targets to reduce total power plant CO2 emissions by about 32% when fully implemented in 2030 as compared with 2005 levels. A variety of factors—some economic, some the effect of government policies at all levels—have already reduced power sector CO2 emissions more than ¾ of this amount as of 2016.
Although EPA is proposing to repeal the CPP, it did not propose repeal of the GHG "endangerment finding," the 2009 agency finding that emissions of CO2 and other GHGs endanger public health and welfare. Without addressing the finding, EPA appears to have a continuing obligation to limit emissions of CO2 from power plants. Thus, in addition to the proposed repeal of the CPP, EPA has issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit information on systems of emission reduction that it might require in a future rule to replace the CPP.
Besides EPA's proposal to repeal the rule, the rule is the subject of ongoing litigation in which a number of states and other entities have challenged it (while other states and entities have intervened in support of it). On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed implementation of the rule for the duration of the litigation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard oral arguments in the case in September 2016, but agreed to an EPA request to continue to hold the case in abeyance while the agency proceeds to repeal the CPP.
This report provides background information, discusses the statutory authority under which EPA promulgated the rule, and describes the rule's current status as of November 2017. The Clean Power Plan relies on authority asserted by EPA in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). This section has been infrequently used and seldom interpreted by the courts, so a number of questions have arisen regarding the extent of EPA's authority and the mechanisms of implementation.
The report also summarizes the provisions of the Clean Power Plan rule as it was finalized on August 3, 2015, including
how large an emission reduction would be achieved under the rule nationwide, how EPA allocated emission reduction requirements among the states, the potential role of cap-and-trade systems and other flexibilities in implementation, what role the actions of individual power plants (i.e., "inside the fence" actions) and actions by other actors, including energy consumers (i.e., "outside the fence" actions) might play in compliance strategies, and what role there would be for existing programs at the state and regional level, such as the nine-state Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and for broader GHG reduction programs such as those implemented in California.
The report also discusses options that Congress has to influence EPA's action. |
crs_R44248 | crs_R44248_0 | Introduction
Federal advisory committees are designed to collect a variety of viewpoints and to provide advice or recommendations to the executive and legislative branches of the federal government from nonfederal sources. Pursuant to FACA, the General Services Administration (GSA) promulgates regulations and produces management guidelines for federal advisory committees. While there is a cap on the number of discretionary advisory committees that can be created by federal agencies, there are no limitations on the number of advisory committees that Congress and the President may establish. In FY2015, 1,009 FACA committees reported as active. From FY2004 to FY2015, the number of new active FACA committees declined inconsistently from 66 annually to 42 (-36.4%), ranging from a low of 23 new FACA committees in FY2014 to a high of 147 new FACA committees in FY2010. The data show that the Department of Health and Human Services reported the largest number of FACA committees with 248 (25.6% of total active FACA committees). HHS consistently operates the largest number of FACA committees in the executive branch. FACA Committee Members
Total Number of Members
Roughly 70,000 FACA committee and subcommittee members serve in any fiscal year. In FY2015, 72,200 members served on advisory committees. FACA Meetings
Total Number of Meetings
According to the FACA Database, in FY2015, 791 federal advisory committees held 7,494 meetings. From FY2014 to FY2015, however, total annual operating costs increased $32,917,950 (9.8%) from $334,650,420 in FY2014 to $367,568,370 in FY2015. This increase in costs from FY2014 to FY2015 can be attributed primarily to increases in the costs of federal staff salaries (a $13,314,594 increase in FY2015), though each of the other five cost categories also experienced increases over the past fiscal year. In contrast, salary costs for members and consultants have remained relatively stable. Potential Policy Options
Federal advisory committees can be effective tools for gathering expertise from a variety of federal and nonfederal experts. The data discussed and analyzed throughout this report show that advisory committees have certain commonalities, but each committee has a unique structure, operation, and mission. Clarifying Data Reporting Requirements
Consistency in Reporting Information
As discussed earlier in this report, GSA requires committees to report certain data elements (e.g., the number of members serving on the committee or the total costs incurred by the committee). Congress may, however, decide that making such a change to data entry practices could add time and costs to operating and maintaining the FACA Database. Changing Member Pay
In FY2015, FACA committee data demonstrated that the federal government paid nonfederal members of federal advisory committees $37.3 million. | Federal advisory committees are established to allow experts from outside the federal government to provide advice and recommendations to Congress, the President, or an executive branch agency. Federal advisory committees can be created either by Congress, the President, or an executive branch agency.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires agencies to report on the structure, operations, and costs of qualifying federal advisory committees. The General Services Administration (GSA) is authorized to collect, retain, and review the reported information, and does so using an online tool called the FACA Database.
Generally, the data show that the number of active FACA committees has remained relatively stable over time, hovering around 1,000 committees in any given fiscal year. Around 70,000 people serve as members of FACA committees and subcommittees in any given year.
The Department of Health and Human Services consistently operates the greatest number of federal advisory committees, with 248 active committees in FY2015. The Department of Agriculture had the second greatest number of active committees in FY2015 with 163. In any given year, around half of the active FACA committees are established by statute. In FY2015, Congress established 20 new FACA committees by statute.
Costs to operate federal advisory committees have varied over time and ranged from a low of $334.7 million in FY2014 to a high of $451.3 million in 2006. Federal advisory committee operating costs dropped from FY2010 to FY2014. In FY2015, however, costs to operate federal advisory committees rose 9.8% from FY2014 levels. The increase in costs from FY2014 to FY2015 coincides with increases in the number of members serving on federal advisory committees as well as the number of meetings held by those committees.
In FY2015, 1,009 federal advisory committees held 7,421 meetings with 72,200 members and cost more than $367 million to operate.
This report provides an in-depth examination of FACA committee operations and costs, using the data collected by GSA. The report also analyzes policy options that Congress can consider when deliberating current or future legislation to amend FACA, including clarifying FACA data reporting requirements, changing FACA committee member pay, and removing advisory committees that assist the grant making process from the FACA Database. |
crs_R44831 | crs_R44831_0 | In recent years, however, domestic shipborne commerce has generally lost ground to truck and rail freight. One reason for the declining cargo volumes of domestic coastal and Great Lakes shipping is that aspects of federal maritime policy tend to raise the cost of transporting goods by ship relative to other modes. They do not need to acquire and maintain rights-of-way like railroads and pipelines. These ships are useful for carrying such prevalent types of cargo as steel products and large pieces of equipment. The Decline of U.S. Coastal Shipping
Despite their inherent efficiencies, domestic coastal and Great Lakes shipping carry barely half as much cargo today as they did in 1960 ( Figure 1 ), even though the U.S. economy is much larger today. Reviving coastal shipping could dramatically increase the capacity of the nation's freight network. Moreover, some of the necessary infrastructure is largely in place, as many of the harbors the federal government dredges for deep-draft vessels currently have little or no ship traffic. The question is whether a different mix of federal policies would make coastal trade an attractive option for shippers and ship owners. Although barges also must be built in the United States, the cost of a U.S.-built ship is six to eight times greater than the cost of the equivalent cargo capacity in barge tows. The comparatively high cost of building ships domestically is related to the absence of foreign competition and the lack of economies of scale. Although the total tonnage carried by vessel along the coasts and on the Great Lakes has declined by 44% since 1960, closer analysis shows that ship tonnage on these waterways has decreased by 61% over that period, while barge tonnage has increased by 356%. Vessels in the U.S.-flag international fleet do not have to be U.S.-built (and none are), but they are required to have U.S. crews and be U.S.-owned. Comparatively high cargo-handling costs, especially for containers, appear to put coastwise shipping at a disadvantage with respect to other modes of transportation. U.S. container ports are widely considered to be much less efficient than ports in Europe and Asia, some of which are fully automated. A 2013 study examining the feasibility of coastal container services on the East Coast found that port handling costs were the largest cost element, greater than ship fuel and vessel capital cost, the second- and third-largest cost elements. Market Response to High Coastal Shipping Costs
U.S. shippers—that is, the owners of cargo—have responded to the comparatively high cost of domestic ships by turning to truck, rail, and pipeline transport, importing goods instead of sourcing domestically, and utilizing barges instead of ships for a growing share of coastal transport. Today, 35% of domestic ocean-shipping tonnage is employed on services between Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska and the U.S. mainland—routes where overland modes are not available. | In recent years, domestic shipborne commerce has lost much of its market to other modes. Although potential shipping routes run parallel to congested truck, railroad, and pipeline routes along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Great Lakes region, the volume of cargo carried by domestic ships has declined by 61% since 1960, while the volume carried by other modes, including river barges, has more than doubled. Use of domestic ships has retreated to routes where overland modes are not available, such as between Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska and the U.S. mainland, and where oil pipelines do not exist or are at capacity.
One reason for the comparatively lower usage of domestic coastal and Great Lakes shipping is that despite their inherent efficiencies, ships are often not the lowest-cost option for domestic shippers.
U.S.-built ships cost six to eight times more to build than the equivalent cargo capacity provided by rail and barge equipment. The comparatively high cost is related to the absence of foreign competition in shipbuilding and the lack of economies of scale at U.S. shipyards. U.S. container ports are widely considered to be much less efficient than ports in Europe and Asia, some of which are fully automated. A 2013 study examining the feasibility of coastal container services on the East Coast found that port handling costs were the largest cost element ship operators would face. Ship crewing costs are inflated by subsidies provided to U.S. crews aboard U.S. international trading ships that have government-impelled cargoes reserved for them. Domestic ship lines compete with the international fleet when hiring maritime officers.
U.S. cargo shippers have responded to the comparatively high cost of domestic ship transport by turning to land modes, exporting goods instead of selling them domestically, and utilizing oceangoing barges instead of ships for coastal transport. Oceangoing barges cost less to construct, and can require only a third as many crew as coastal ships. Since 1960, coastwise and Great Lakes tonnage carried by barges has increased 356%, while ship tonnage carried on these waters has decreased by 61%. However, oceangoing barges have significant disadvantages: they are less efficient for longer voyages, and their use does not preserve the shipbuilding and maritime crewing capabilities Congress has sought to protect. Oceangoing barges mainly carry petroleum products, suggesting that commercial shippers do not find them attractive for other types of cargo.
Reviving coastal shipping would dramatically increase the capacity of the nation's freight network. Moreover, some of the necessary infrastructure is largely in place, as many of the harbors the federal government dredges for deep-draft vessels currently have little or no ship traffic. The question is whether a different mix of federal policies would make coastal trade an attractive option for shippers and ship owners. To revive coastal shipping, the cost issues would need to be addressed. Further information on the causes of the high cost of U.S.-built ships, the justification for the crewing disparity between oceangoing barges and coastal ships, and whether automation would lower cargo-handling costs at ports would be useful in evaluating policies that might revitalize coastal shipping. |
crs_RS21067 | crs_RS21067_0 | Proposed CO 2 reduction schemes present large uncertainties in terms of the perceived reduction needs and the potential costs of achieving those reductions. In an attempt to prevent any CO 2 control program from incurring unacceptable costs, several cost-limiting "safety valves" have been proposed to bound costs. This report examines four such safety valves: (1) a straight carbon tax, (2) a contingent reduction scheme, (3) unlimited permit purchases, (4) cost-based excess emissions penalties. In short, employing a safety valve shifts much of the emission reduction debate from compliance targets to the specifications of the safety valve. | Proposed CO2 reduction schemes present large uncertainties in terms of the perceived reduction needs and the potential costs of achieving those reductions. Several cost-limiting "safety valves" have been proposed to bound costs of any CO2 control program, including (1) a straight carbon tax, (2) a contingent reduction scheme, (3) unlimited permit purchases, and (4) cost-based excess emissions penalties. Employing a safety valve shifts much of the emission reduction debate from compliance targets to the specifications of the safety valve, in particular, the level of the tax or fee involved. This report will be updated if events warrant. |
crs_RL31833 | crs_RL31833_0 | In June 2009, Congress approved the FY2009 supplemental appropriations ( P.L. 111-32 , H.R. 2346 ), providing $439 million in ESF and $20 million in INCLE. The $1 billion in ISFF funding appropriated in P.L. 110-252 was rescinded and reappropriated in this bill. The CERP appropriation of $453 million is to be shared with Afghanistan. For detailed discussion of the Iraq political and security situation, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security , by [author name scrubbed]. In the first several years of the U.S. effort in Iraq, the bulk of U.S. assistance was provided through a specially created Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), placed under the direct control of the President, supporting aid efforts in a wide range of sectors, including water and sanitation, electricity, oil production, training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, education, democracy, and rule of law. It provided no funding for Iraq. The Administration asked that the $1 billion appropriated in the FY2009 "bridge" appropriation to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), which supports training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, be rescinded and re-appropriated in this new FY2009 supplemental bill. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) request, totaling $453 million, was, as for other years, to be shared by both Afghanistan and Iraq. These reconstruction programs have shown mixed results. Reconstruction Priorities: 2007-2010
Reconstruction priorities in the period from 2007 mainly reflect the "surge" strategy enunciated by the Bush Administration in January 2007 as well as the fact that IRRF funds are exhausted and large-scale infrastructure programs, which chiefly characterized IRRF economic efforts, are no longer funded as plentifully by the United States. Economic-social-democratization assistance has been funded mostly with Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance, categorized under three "tracks":
Security Track. | A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq since mid-2003. To date, over $49 billion has been appropriated for Iraq reconstruction.
Most recently, in June 2009, Congress provided $439 million in ESF and $20 million in INCLE funds for Iraq in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-32, H.R. 2346). The $1 billion in ISFF funding appropriated previously in P.L. 110-252 was rescinded and reappropriated in this bill. The CERP appropriation of $453 million is to be shared with Afghanistan.
A significant number of reconstruction activities, especially those involving construction of road, sanitation, electric power, oil production, and other infrastructure, are completed or near completion. Security concerns slowed progress and added considerable expense to these efforts.
Reconstruction priorities and funding mechanisms have changed over time. The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), the main U.S. assistance account in the first few years, is no longer available, and most large-scale infrastructure programs are no longer funded. However, many small-scale, targeted community-level infrastructure efforts are funded under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The key emphases of the aid program are the training of Iraqi forces and programs assisting the development of Iraqi governing capacities and supporting the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
The report will be updated as events warrant. For discussion of the Iraq political situation, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43451 | crs_R43451_0 | Introduction
Recent disclosures of various National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and data collection programs have prompted increased attention on the government's collection of foreign intelligence. Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reviews government applications to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISA Court of Review) reviews decisions of the FISC. Due to concerns about the size and scope of the foreign intelligence collection programs authorized by orders of the FISC, many have suggested substantive changes to the underlying legal authorities relied on by the government to collect foreign intelligence, while others have proposed altering the practices and procedures of the FISA Courts. Third, the report will consider measures designed to displace the authority to designate judges to the FISA Court. Finally, the last section discusses the legal implications of proposals that would require the executive branch to release FISA Court opinions. A Brief Overview of the FISA Courts
The FISC is an Article III court composed of 11 district court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from at least seven of the regional judicial circuits. First, an advocate would oppose the government's request for FISA orders on behalf of the privacy and civil liberties interests of the public. A permanently constituted advocate seeking injunctive relief based on a violation of law in the interest of the general public might be viewed as engaging in a government function; while a private party appointed temporarily to litigate on behalf of the public might not be considered an arm of the government. Assuming a public advocate is an officer, the next question would be whether an advocate is a principal or inferior officer, because principal officers must be appointed by the President with the Senate's confirmation. For example, the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy prevents a party, including the government, from litigating against itself. Housing the Advocate in the Judicial Branch
In contrast to proposals placing a public advocate in the executive branch, other measures would house the public advocate within the judiciary. Granting a judicial agency power to exercise typical executive branch functions—such as seeking relief in aid of the United States' legal interests—might run afoul of these restrictions. While there does not appear to be a constitutional issue with permitting the FISC to appoint amici who would provide views on civil liberties to the court, several proposals require the FISA Courts to appoint an amicus curiae , possibly implicating constitutional concerns. One might argue that this forces the judiciary to rule in a matter outside of a true case or controversy. Legislation requiring a federal court to sit en banc in specific situations does not appear to raise major constitutional questions. Selection of FISA Court Judges
Aside from altering the procedures of the FISA Courts, some have suggested modifying how its judges are chosen. These proposals appear to raise several novel legal issues. However, extending similar designating authority to the President or to a lower federal court over a court it does not oversee has never been resolved as a constitutional matter. However, proposals that vest the designation authority in Congress may raise a separate constitutional question. Disclosure of FISA Court Opinions
Several other FISA proposals seek to reduce the secretive nature of the FISA Courts by requiring the public disclosure of FISA opinions. Consequently, proposals that allow the executive branch to first redact classified information from FISA opinions before public release appear to be on firm constitutional ground; while a proposal that mandated all past FISA opinions be released in their entirety—without any redactions by the executive branch—might raise a separation of powers issue. | In the wake of recent disclosures concerning various National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and data collection programs, several legislative changes to the government's intelligence operations authority have been suggested. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reviews government applications to conduct surveillance and engage in data collection for foreign intelligence purposes, and the FISA Court of Review reviews rulings of the FISC. Some have proposed altering the underlying legal authorities relied on by the government when applying to the FISC, while others have suggested changes to the practices and procedures of the FISA Courts. This report provides a brief overview of the legal implications of the latter group of proposals.
Some have proposed establishing an office led by a "public advocate" who would represent the civil liberties interests of the general public and oppose the government's applications for foreign surveillance. This proposal raises several constitutional issues. For example, assuming the advocate is an agent of the government, depending on the scope of the authority provided and the amount of supervision placed over the FISA advocate's office, the lawyer who leads such an office may be a principal or inferior officer of the United States whose appointment must abide by the Appointments Clause's restrictions. Moreover, an advocate might not satisfy Article III of the Constitution's requirements for parties seeking relief. In contrast, proposals that would allow an advocate to generally share its views of the law as a friend of the court or amicus curiae are far less likely to run afoul of the Constitution's restrictions. In addition, Article III generally prevents the government from litigating against itself, making it potentially constitutionally problematic to have an intra-branch dispute over foreign surveillance resolved by a federal court. Likewise, Article III might be an impediment to efforts to make appeals of FISA Court decisions more frequent. In addition, one might argue that allowing a public advocate protected by "for cause" removal restrictions to seek judicial relief on an issue of national security could invade core executive branch prerogatives. Proposals to house an advocate in the judicial branch might implicate the separation of powers principle that no branch may aggrandize itself at the expense of a co-equal branch.
Another proposal seeks to increase the amount of judicial review given to FISA applications by requiring that the FISC sit en banc. This does not appear to raise major constitutional questions as such a proposal would likely not hinder the FISC from performing its core constitutional functions. There have also been calls to alter the voting rules of the FISA Courts, although the legal implications of such proposals are less clear.
Aside from altering the procedures of the FISA Courts, other proposals focus on how judges are chosen. Some have suggested permitting the chief judges of the circuit courts, the President with Senate confirmation, or the congressional leadership to designate judges to the FISA Courts. Due to the novelty of these proposals, the legal implications of extending delegation authority to the President or lower federal courts are unclear. However, proposals that allow congressional leadership to appoint FISA Court judges are likely to raise constitutional questions.
Finally, because most FISA opinions are classified by the executive branch, some have raised concerns that this practice permits the government to rely upon "secret law" to justify its activities, and have proposed requiring the public release of FISA opinions. Proposals that allow the executive branch to first redact classified information from FISA opinions before public release appear to be on firm constitutional ground, while a proposal that mandated all past FISA opinions be released in their entirety—without any redactions by the executive branch—might raise a separation of powers issue. |
crs_R43504 | crs_R43504_0 | The Conservation title (Title II) of the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. Debate on the 2014 farm bill focused on a number of controversial issues. While many did not consider conservation to be controversial, nonetheless, a number of policy issues shaped the final version of the title and ultimately its role in the enacted farm bill. Prior to the 2014 farm bill, there were over 20 distinct conservation programs with annual spending greater than $5 billion. Discussion about simplifying or consolidating conservation programs to reduce overlap and duplication, and to generate savings, has continued for a number of years. The 2014 farm bill contained several program consolidation measures, including the repeal of 12 active and inactive programs, the creation of two new programs, and the merging of two programs into existing ones. One of the most controversial issues in the 2014 farm bill debate was whether federal crop insurance subsidies should be included on the list of program benefits that could be lost if a producer were found to be out of compliance. Ultimately the 2014 farm bill did add federal crop insurance subsidies to the list of benefits that could be lost and extended limited protection for native sod in select states (sodsaver). Budget and Baseline
Most farm bill conservation programs are authorized to receive mandatory funding. The Conservation title makes up 6% of the total projected farm bill spending, or $58 billion of the total $956 billion in 10-year mandatory funding authorized in the 2014 farm bill. Program Changes
The 2014 farm bill reauthorized, repealed, consolidated, and amended a number of conservation programs. The two main working lands programs are the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). Other working lands programs, such as the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) and Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (AWEP), were repealed and incorporated into either new or existing programs. The 2014 farm bill repealed the conservation easement programs—Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), Farmland Protection Program (FPP), and GRP—and created a new Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). ACEP retains most of the program provisions in the repealed easement programs by establishing two types of easements: agricultural land easements (similar to FPP and GRP) that limit non-agricultural uses on productive farm or grass lands, and wetland reserve easements (similar to WRP) that protect and restore wetlands. The Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) creates partnership opportunities to target and leverage federal conservation funding for specific areas and resource concerns. RCPP incorporates the Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (AWEP), the Cooperative Conservation Partnership Initiative (CCPI), the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Program (CBWP), and the Great Lakes Basin Program for soil erosion and sediment control (GLBP). 113-79 are included in brackets in the "Enacted 2014 Farm Bill" column. | The Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill, P.L. 113-79) was enacted on February 7, 2014. After years of debate and deliberation, the enacted 2014 farm bill included a number of changes to the Conservation title (Title II), including program consolidation and reauthorization, amendments to conservation compliance, and a reduction in overall funding. Debate on the 2014 farm bill focused on a number of controversial issues. While many did not consider conservation to be controversial, nonetheless, a number of policy issues shaped the final version of the title and ultimately its role in the enacted farm bill.
Prior to the 2014 farm bill, there were over 20 distinct conservation programs. Discussion about simplifying or consolidating conservation programs to reduce overlap and duplication, and to generate savings, has continued for a number of years. The 2014 farm bill contained several program consolidation measures, including the repeal of 12 active and inactive programs, the creation of two new programs, and the merging of two programs into existing ones. Overall changes include the following.
The act reauthorizes larger conservation programs through FY2018, including the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). It authorizes a new Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP), which retains most of the program provisions in the repealed easement programs (Wetlands Reserve Program [WRP], easements under the Grasslands Reserve Program [GRP], and Farmland Protection Program [FPP]). ACEP establishes two types of easements: agricultural land easements and wetland reserve easements. It authorizes a new Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) from the repealed partnership programs (Agricultural Water Enhancement Program [AWEP], Cooperative Conservation Partnership Initiative [CCPI], Chesapeake Bay Watershed Program [CBWP], and Great Lakes Basin Program for soil erosion and sediment control [GLBP]). RCPP creates partnership opportunities to target and leverage federal conservation funding for specific areas and resource concerns. It incorporates other programs, such as the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) and grazing contracts under GRP, into larger reauthorized programs—EQIP and CRP, respectively.
One of the most controversial issues in the 2014 farm bill debate was whether federal crop insurance subsidies should be included on the list of program benefits that could be lost if a producer were found to be out of compliance with conservation requirements on highly erodible land and wetlands. Ultimately the 2014 farm bill did add federal crop insurance subsidies to the list of benefits that could be lost and extended limited protection for native sod in select states.
The 2014 farm bill also reduced funding for the Conservation title by $3.97 billion over 10 years. Most farm bill conservation programs are authorized to receive mandatory funding, and the Conservation title makes up 6% of the total farm bill 10-year baseline, or $58 billion of the total $956 billion in mandatory funding authorized in the 2014 farm bill. |
crs_R41630 | crs_R41630_0 | Introduction
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ). The ACA also reenacts, amends, and permanently reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). Another report, CRS Report R41152, Indian Health Care: Impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) , by [author name scrubbed], more briefly summarizes the major changes made by the ACA to IHCIA and includes a discussion of other provisions in the ACA that may affect the Indian Health Service (IHS), American Indian and Alaska Native health, and their access to health care. IHCIA authorizes many specific IHS activities, sets out the national policy for health services administered to Indians, and sets health condition goals for the IHS service population to reduce "the prevalence and incidence of preventable illnesses among, and unnecessary and premature deaths of, Indians." Overview of Report
This report summarizes the provisions of the IHCIA Reauthorization and Extension Act as enacted by Section 10221 of the ACA. This report is primarily for reference purposes. The material in it is intended to provide context to help the reader understand the intent of the ACA's individual provisions at the time of enactment. This title includes provisions related to personnel recruitment, scholarships, and other educational programs that seek to augment the Indian health workforce. The purpose of IHCIA Title I is to increase the number, and also enhance the skills, of Indian and non-Indian health professionals and other health personnel in the IHS. The ACA amends a number of programs in this title. | On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148). Among its provisions, the ACA reenacts, amends, and permanently reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). IHCIA authorizes many specific Indian Health Service (IHS) activities, sets out the national policy for health services administered to Indians, and sets health condition goals for the IHS service population to reduce "the prevalence and incidence of preventable illnesses among, and unnecessary and premature deaths of, Indians." The reauthorization of IHCIA in the ACA amends the IHCIA to, among other changes, expand programs that seek to augment the IHS health care workforce, increase the amount and type of services available at facilities funded by the IHS, and increase the number and type of programs that provide behavioral health and substance abuse treatment to American Indians and Alaska Natives.
This report provides a brief overview of IHCIA and summarizes the provisions of the Indian Health Care Improvement Reauthorization and Extension Act of 2009 as enacted and amended by Section 10221 of the ACA. Appendix A presents a timeline of the deadlines included in the act. Another report, CRS Report R41152, Indian Health Care: Impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), by [author name scrubbed], more briefly summarizes the major changes made by the ACA to IHCIA and includes a discussion of other provisions in the ACA that may affect IHS and American Indian and Alaska Native health and their access to health care.
This report is primarily for reference purposes. The material in it is intended to provide context to help the reader better understand the intent of ACA's individual provisions at the time of enactment. The report does not track or discuss ongoing ACA-related regulatory and other implementation activities. |
crs_R40825 | crs_R40825_0 | The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." The Establishment Clause prohibits government actions that would provide preferential treatment of one religion over another or preferential treatment of religion generally over nonreligion. Alleged violations of the Establishment Clause must meet a threshold requirement known as standing, the legal principle that governs whether a particular individual is the proper party to raise an issue before the courts. This report analyzes the constitutional issues associated with standing, specifically related to cases arising under the Establishment Clause. It provides a background on the doctrine of standing, including the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of various types of standing, such as standing to sue as a citizen, as a taxpayer, and on behalf of another party. It also examines the current standing rules related to the Establishment Clause. Legal Issues Related to Standing Generally
Standing is a constitutional principle that serves as a restraint on the power of federal courts to render decisions. Under general standing rules that apply to any case, an individual must have an individualized interest that has actually been harmed under the law or by its application to bring that case to court. In some instances, such as the Establishment Clause, an individual may wish to challenge a governmental action that injures the individual as a member of society. The individual may assert that injury as a citizen dissatisfied with a governmental action, as a taxpayer dissatisfied with a governmental expenditure, or as a citizen dissatisfied with treatment of other citizens. The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the requirements to raise such cases narrowly, and individuals seeking to litigate such alleged injuries must meet both constitutional and prudential standing requirements. In particular, the Court has specifically allowed taxpayer standing for claims arising under the Establishment Clause. Under the Flast exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing, taxpayers may raise challenges of actions exceeding specific constitutional limitations (such as the Establishment Clause) taken by Congress under Article I's Taxing and Spending Clause. The Court has maintained its narrow interpretation of this exception, refusing to extend it to permit taxpayer lawsuits challenging executive actions or taxpayer lawsuits challenging actions taken under powers other than taxing and spending. | The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The Establishment Clause prohibits government actions that would provide preferential treatment of one religion over another or preferential treatment of religion generally over nonreligion. Alleged violations under the Establishment Clause must meet a threshold requirement known as standing, the legal principle that governs whether an individual is the proper party to raise an issue before the courts.
Standing is a constitutional principle that serves as a restraint on the power of federal courts to render decisions. Under general standing rules that apply to any case, an individual must have an individualized interest that has actually been harmed under the law or by its application that can be redressed by the lawsuit in order to bring that case to court. In some instances, such as the Establishment Clause, an individual may wish to challenge a governmental action that injures the individual as a member of society. The individual may assert that injury as a citizen dissatisfied with a governmental action, as a taxpayer dissatisfied with a governmental expenditure, or as a citizen dissatisfied with treatment of other citizens. The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the requirements to raise such cases narrowly, and individuals seeking to litigate such alleged injuries must meet both constitutional and prudential standing requirements.
The Court has made some exceptions to the general rules of standing and specifically allowed taxpayer standing for certain claims arising under the Establishment Clause. Under the Flast exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing, taxpayers may raise challenges of actions exceeding specific constitutional limitations (such as the Establishment Clause) taken by Congress under Article I's Taxing and Spending Clause. The Court has maintained its narrow interpretation of this exception, refusing to extend it to permit taxpayer lawsuits challenging executive actions or taxpayer lawsuits challenging actions taken under powers other than taxing and spending.
This report analyzes the constitutional issues associated with standing, specifically related to cases arising under the Establishment Clause. It provides a background on the doctrine of standing, including the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of various types of standing, including standing to sue as a citizen, as a taxpayer, and on behalf of another party. It also examines the current standing rules related to the Establishment Clause. |
crs_R42503 | crs_R42503_0 | Introduction
Since the mid-1980s, budget experts have debated whether the best method of measuring the subsidy cost of federal credit (direct loans or loan guarantees) is the cost to the government or the fair value cost. Federal credit is direct loans and loan guarantees. The cost to the government would reflect the actual budget cost measured by discounting of expected cash flows associated with each program at the interest rate on risk-free Treasury securities. The measure of the cost to the government would place the cost of federal credit on the same basis as a grant or a tax expenditure; consequently, policymakers would have an incentive to use the most appropriate means to cover the cost of a government program. The fair value cost estimate would include market risk and reflect the opportunity cost of shifting capital from the private sector to the public sector, thus reflecting the social cost of the programs. Proponents argue that the social cost rather than the budgetary cost should be used to allocate resources between the public and private sectors. This debate has yet to be resolved. The U.S. government uses federal credit to allocate financial capital to a range of areas including home ownership, student loans, small business, agriculture, and energy. A direct loan is "a disbursement of funds by the government to a nonfederal borrower under a contract that requires the repayment of such funds with or without interest." A loan guarantee is "a pledge with respect to the payment of all or part of the principal or interest on any debt obligation of a non-federal borrower to a non-federal lender." At the end of FY2011, outstanding federal direct loans totaled $838 billion and outstanding guaranteed loans totaled $2,017 billion. In the 112 th Congress, six bills have been introduced that would provide for calculation of subsidy costs using fair value accounting: companion bills S. 1651 / H.R. 3414 (Honest Budget Act), H.R. 3581 (Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2011), H.R. 3844 (Honest Budget Act of 2012), House Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Resolution ( H.Con.Res. 34 , 112 th Congress), and House Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Resolution ( H.Con.Res. Before FY1992, federal credit programs were measured on an annual cash flow basis. Under this arrangement, a new federal direct loan was treated as a budget outlay in the current fiscal year, and repayments of principal and payments of interest were treated as offsetting collections (negative outlays) in the fiscal years in which they were repaid. To remedy these problems, Congress and the executive branch debated options to convert the budgetary treatment of federal credit from cash flow accounting to accrual accounting (measuring the cost over the life of the loan or loan guarantee). One of the primary decisions concerned whether the cost of federal credit should be measured by the "cost to the government" or the "fair value" cost. "Fair Value Cost"
An alternative would be to use the fair value cost, which would equal the cost that the credit recipient would have had to pay to borrow on the private credit market. 101-508 , 104 Stat. Beginning with FY1992, FCRA changed the methodology in the unified budget for measuring and reporting the cost of federal direct loans and federal loan guarantees from cash flow to accrual accounting, using the cost to the government concept. This report gives a chronological examination of this debate since the 1980s. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
On November 5, 1990, the President signed P.L. 1388, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90). | Since the mid-1980s, budget experts have debated whether the best method of measuring the subsidy cost of federal credit (direct loans and loan guarantees) is the cost to the government or the fair value cost. The cost to the government would reflect the actual budget cost measured by discounting of expected cash flows associated with each program at the interest rate on risk-free Treasury securities. The measure of the cost to the government would place the cost of federal credit on the same basis as a grant or a tax expenditure; consequently, policymakers would have an incentive to use the most appropriate means to cover the cost of a government program.
The fair value cost would equal the cost that the credit recipient would have had to pay to borrow on the private credit market. The fair value cost would include market risk and reflect the opportunity cost of shifting capital from the private sector to the public sector. Proponents argue that the social cost rather than the budgetary cost should be used to allocate resources between the public and private sectors. This debate has yet to be resolved.
The U.S. government uses federal credit to allocate financial capital to a range of areas, including home ownership, student loans, small business, agriculture, and energy. A direct loan is a disbursement of funds by the government to a nonfederal borrower under a contract that requires the repayment of such funds with or without interest. A loan guarantee is a pledge by the federal government to repay all or part of the principal or interest on any debt obligation of a non-federal borrower to a non-federal lender. At the end of FY2011, outstanding federal direct loans totaled $838 billion and outstanding guaranteed loans totaled $2,017 billion.
Before FY1992, federal credit programs were measured on an annual cash flow basis. A new federal direct loan was treated as a budget outlay in the current fiscal year, and repayments of principal and payments of interest were treated as offsetting collections (negative outlays) in the future fiscal years in which they occurred. In the year it was granted, a loan guarantee was a contingent liability, which means the federal government was only responsible for repayment in the event of a default. Congress and the executive branch debated options to convert the budgetary treatment of federal credit from cash flow accounting to accrual accounting, which would record the subsidy cost of federal credit over the entire life of a loan or loan guarantee. One of the primary decisions concerning accrual accounting was whether the subsidy cost of federal credit should be measured by the "cost to the government" or the "fair value" cost.
On November 5, 1990, the President signed P.L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90), which included the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). Beginning with FY1992, FCRA changed the methodology in the unified budget for measuring and reporting the cost of federal direct loans and federal loan guarantees from cash flow to accrual accounting with the cost to the government used in measuring subsidy costs.
In the 112th Congress, six bills have been introduced that would provide for calculation of subsidy costs using fair value accounting: companion bills S. 1651/H.R. 3414 (Honest Budget Act), H.R. 3581 (Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2011), H.R. 3844 (Honest Budget Act of 2012), House Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 34, 112th Congress), and House Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 112, 112th Congress). This report presents a chronology of this still unresolved debate, which dates from the mid-1980s.
This report will be updated as issues develop and new legislation is introduced. |
crs_R43594 | crs_R43594_0 | Drought conditions persist in all counties in California, with a majority classified as in either extreme or exceptional drought. Notwithstanding March rains, California is experiencing its third consecutive dry year, which has resulted in abnormally low reservoir levels, as well as low surface and groundwater levels. Current drought conditions in California and much of the West have fueled congressional interest in drought and its effects on water supplies, agriculture, and fish and wildlife. Several bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to address different aspects of drought in California and other regions. Some provisions in S. 2198 as introduced were broadened to apply to states outside of California; however, the Senate-passed version of S. 2198 dropped many of these provisions. S. 2198 as passed by the Senate would direct the Secretary of Agriculture (added since introduction), the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to undertake numerous actions that would address emergency drought impacts in California and other states, by aiming to increase water supplies for California water users, prioritizing and expediting program funding for certain drought mitigation activities (e.g., projects providing drinking water and avoiding loss of permanent crops, and including grants for pilot projects increasing reservoir supplies in the Colorado River Basin), providing for emergency environmental reviews, and addressing Klamath River Basin water issues. The Senate-passed version of S. 2198 includes eight sections, whose provisions range from mandating maximization of California water supplies—consistent with laws and regulations—through specific project development, management, and operations directives and addressing project environmental reviews, to prioritizing funding for certain emergency drought activities under existing water laws and directing development of a comprehensive National Academy of Sciences study on increasing water supplies through control of an invasive plant species known as saltcedar (Tamarix ramosissima). This policy approach is aimed at addressing drought, and in doing so, touches upon many long-standing and controversial issues associated with operations of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP), managed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (hereinafter referred to as Reclamation), and the State Water Project (SWP), managed by the California Department of Water Resources. The final five sections of S. 2198 are the focus of this report. Specifically, Section 8 states that the authority for this section of the bill would expire when the governor suspends the state drought emergency declaration. According to the section, this operation is to be consistent with the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) order for a temporary urgency change (TUC) in terms of response to the drought, effective January 31, 2014, as modified by subsequent orders. There are some questions and potential issues that could arise from changes in the operations of the Delta Gates. The practical effect of the provision would depend on how the state and federal agencies or courts determine what and when such actions are consistent with laws and regulations. These basins would have to directly affect the water supply of California (including the Colorado River basin). | Over the past five years, portions of the country have been gripped with extensive drought, including the state of California. Drought conditions in California are "exceptional" and "extreme" in much of the state, including in prime agricultural areas of the Central Valley, according to the U.S. Drought Monitor. Such conditions pose significant challenges to water managers who before this dry winter were already grappling with below-normal surface water storage in the state's largest reservoirs. Groundwater levels in many areas of the state also have declined due to increased pumping over the last three dry years. While March rain had improved the water year outlook somewhat—moving the year from the driest on record in terms of precipitation to date to the third-driest—water managers are fearful of the long-term impacts of a relatively dry winter and little existing snowpack to refresh supplies later in the year.
Because of the extent of the drought in California, drought impacts are varied and widespread. Most of the San Joaquin Valley is in exceptional drought, and federal and state water supply allotments are at historic lows. The state has also had to restrict diversions from some rivers and streams, including the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, two of the state's largest rivers. Many farmers are fallowing lands and some are removing permanent tree crops. Cities and towns have also been affected, and the governor has requested voluntary water use cutbacks of 20%. The effects of the drought are also likely to be felt on fish and wildlife species and the recreational and commercial activities they support, potentially including North Coast salmon fisheries.
Congress is considering several bills that would address drought conditions in California. This report discusses S. 2198, as passed by the Senate on May 22, 2014. S. 2198 would address drought impacts in California and assist with drought response. The Senate-passed version of S. 2198 contains eight sections, whose provisions range from mandating maximization of California water supplies, through specific emergency project development, management, and operations directives and addressing project environmental reviews (as long as actions are consistent with applicable law and regulations and not highly inefficient), to prioritizing funding for certain emergency drought activities under existing water laws. In maximizing water supplies, the bill would address project operations that relate to long-standing and controversial issues associated with management of the federal Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project (CVP) and the California Department of Water Resources' State Water Project (SWP), which are operated in coordination under a coordinated operations agreement (COA). Title II of S. 2198 as introduced, which would have expanded the assistance potentially available under an emergency declaration for drought (or other emergencies), was not included in the Senate-passed version of S. 2198. |
crs_R41720 | crs_R41720_0 | During his January 25, 2011 State of the Union speech, President Obama proposed a Clean Energy Standard (CES) policy framework that would result in 80% of U.S. electricity generation coming from "clean energy" sources by 2035. Each of these will be discussed below. Previous CES proposals have addressed multiple policy design parameters, including (1) technologies that qualify, (2) base quantities of electricity, (3) goals and requirements, (4) alternative compliance payments. This report evaluates design elements of previous CES proposals, summarizes the Administration's CES policy framework, provides state-level baseline CES compliance analysis, and presents several policy options that Congress might consider as part of a CES debate. Summary and Design Elements of Previous Clean Energy Standard Proposals
During the 111 th Congress several Clean/Renewable Energy Standard policies were proposed, although none became law. All proposals were compared in order to assess areas of commonality and divergence. President Obama's Clean Energy Standard Proposal
On January 25, 2011, during the State of the Union address, President Obama announced a clean energy goal for the country: "By 2035, 80% of America's electricity will come from clean energy sources." On February 3, 2011, the White House released a document titled "President Obama's Plan to Win the Future by Producing More Electricity Through Clean Energy," which summarizes the goals of the President's plan. Primary objectives of the Administration's plan include:
Double the share of clean electricity in 25 years Draw on a wide range of clean energy sources Deploy capital investment to sustain and create jobs Drive innovation in clean energy technologies Complement the clean energy research and development agenda
Furthermore, President Obama's plan described five core principles for the Clean Energy Standard proposal. Such level of analysis is beyond the scope of this report. Should the Policy Provide Credit to Existing and/or Incremental "Clean Energy" Generation? President Obama's CES proposal states that 40% of U.S. electricity is generated from "clean energy" sources. What Should Be the Value of Alternative Compliance Payments? Should Utility Companies of a Certain Size Be Exempt? Should Preference Be Given to Renewable Energy Generation? Qualified "clean energy" sources described in President Obama's CES proposal include (1) renewable electricity, (2) nuclear power, and (3) partial credits for clean coal and efficient natural gas. Sorting out qualified "clean energy" sources and determining the amount of whole and partial credits awarded for various electricity generation types could warrant further analysis in consideration of a federal Clean Energy Standard. Such issues include:
1. 2. 3. 5. Methodology
Calculating the generation mix for each state started with data from EPA 2009, which provides information regarding state-by-state electricity generation. With electricity generation from NGCC power plants now available, the pivot table from the EPA 2009 was modified to include NGCC generation and "Other Natural Gas" generation. Energy sources categorized as "Clean Energy Generation" include:
Geothermal Hydroelectric Conventional Natural Gas Combined Cycle (50% of generation) Nuclear Biomass Pumped Storage Solar Thermal and Photovoltaic Wind Wood and Wood-derived fuels
Energy sources categorized as "Other Generation" include:
Coal Natural Gas Combined Cycle (50% of generation) Natural Gas Other Other Gases Petroleum Other
In order to calculate the percent of generation from sources that qualify as "clean energy," the sum of "Clean Energy Generation" was divided by the total amount of generation. | During his State of the Union speech on January 25, 2011, President Obama announced an energy goal for the country: "By 2035, 80% of America's electricity will come from clean energy sources." The White House, on February 3, 2011, released a Clean Energy Standard (CES) framework focused on U.S. electricity generation. The framework describes the fundamental goals and objectives of such a policy to include doubling clean electricity, sustaining and creating jobs, and driving clean energy innovation.
Congress, if it chooses to take up CES legislation, will likely sort through and evaluate a number of policy options that might be considered during the formulation of a federal Clean Energy Standard policy. Understanding previous CES proposals, the Administration's CES policy framework, state-level baseline CES compliance, and policy considerations might assist a CES debate during the 112th Congress. These areas are the focus of this report.
CES and related concepts have been debated for more than a decade and several Clean/Renewable Energy Standard proposals were offered during the 111th Congress, although none became law. The scope of this report includes a comparative analysis of four proposals of the 111th Congress: S. 20, Clean Energy Standard Act of 2010; S. 3464, Practical Energy and Climate Plan Act of 2010; S. 3813, Renewable Electricity Promotion Act of 2010; and a substitute amendment offered for H.R. 2454, American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. This analysis, which illustrates commonality and key differences among the legislative proposals, includes an assessment of each bill based on a uniform set of design elements. While the proposals considered generally agree on the definition of "renewable energy" (wind, solar, geothermal, etc.), they differ on certain policy aspects including (1) base quantities of electricity, (2) target/goal for the standard, and (3) alternative compliance payments, among others.
The Administration's proposal states that 40% of delivered electricity is generated from "clean energy" sources today and 80% should be generated from clean energy sources by 2035. Clean energy sources are defined to include (1) renewable energy, (2) nuclear power, and (3) partial credits for clean coal and efficient natural gas. However, the amount of partial credits received by clean coal and efficient natural gas generation is not explicitly defined.
CRS analysis of 2009 electricity generation data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) also suggested that 40% of electricity generated could be considered clean energy if renewable energy, nuclear power, and 50% of electricity generated from natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants are classified as clean energy. Further analysis of EIA data assessed the amount of clean energy generation in each state. This work revealed differences among the states regarding existing clean energy generation, with some states currently generating more than 80% of electricity from such clean energy sources and other states generating less than 5%.
Finally, the Clean Energy Standard debate involves several policy design options that Congress might consider, including (1) Should the policy credit existing and/or incremental clean energy generation? (2) What should be the value of alternative compliance payments? (3) Should utility companies of a certain size be exempt? (4) Should preference be given to renewable energy generation? and (5) Which generation sources would qualify as clean energy? These, and other, policy options are presented and discussed in this report. |
crs_R41823 | crs_R41823_0 | The major need-tested programs discussed in this report provide cash, food, housing, and educational and medical assistance to families and individuals with limited financial resources, and they had collective FY2013 federal outlays of $606 billion. Need-Tested Programs
The common feature of need-tested programs is that they provide benefits, services, or funding based on a measure of low financial resources (income and sometimes assets). However, beyond that the programs differ considerably in their target populations, benefits, services, and focus. These programs also tend to be substantially larger (in spending) than need-tested programs. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) represents the refundable portion of the earned income tax credit. Family Support, as categorized for this report, includes outlays for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, and federal grants to help support state child care subsidy programs. In total, spending for low-income assistance in inflation-adjusted terms has been higher at the end of each decade. 111-5 )), in response to the deep recession from 2007 to 2009. Federal outlays for selected programs declined from FY2011 to FY2012. The temporary increases in funding for these programs under ARRA expired during this period. Total federal outlays for these programs again increased from FY2012 to FY2013. Growth in the enrollment of these programs—particularly in two periods (the late 1960s through the 1970s, and the late 1980s through the early 1990s)—contributed to Medicaid spending increases. Non-cash benefits or services, particularly health care, began to account for an increasing share of aid to low-income families and persons. The projected health outlays include the estimated costs of the expansions made in the 2010 health reform law, such as the expansion of Medicaid coverage for currently uncovered persons under age 65 with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty level and the refundable portion of the health tax credit that subsidizes health insurance purchased through state exchanges for those with incomes under 400% of the federal poverty level. The 1990s
The 1990s was the decade of welfare reform. In that decade, total spending on non-health low-income assistance programs increased. For low-income families with children, policies were shifted away from providing a safety net for families without earnings toward a policy to support work among low-income parents. However, aid to working poor families with children was increased during the 1990s through other programs. 2000-2007
The major legislated expansions in aid in the 2000s before the onset of the recession were in the EITC and child tax credit. Recent Years
There were large increases in spending for low-income aid in recent years in response to the 2007-2009 recession. Federal Outlays for Low-Income Assistance Programs as a Percentage of the Gross Domestic Product
Federal outlays for major low-income assistance programs measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) provide a sense of how large these programs are relative to the size of the national economy. All of that increase reflects the growth of health care spending. Conclusion
At the beginning of the period examined in this report (FY1962), federal aid to address low income was dominated by grants to the states to provide public assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled and families with dependent children. CRS Report R42505, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Primer on Eligibility and Benefits , by [author name scrubbed]. The 10 largest need-tested programs discussed in CRS Report R41625 were (1) Medicaid; (2) SNAP; (3) SSI; (4) EITC; (5) Pell Grants; (6) the ACTC (the refundable portion of the child tax credit); (7) Title I-A Education for the Disadvantaged; (8) Medicare Part D, the Prescription Drug Low-Income Subsidy; (9) TANF; and (10) Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) makes its baseline budget projections in terms of outlays for each budget account. | This report examines the spending trends of 10 major need-tested benefit programs or groups of programs: (1) health care from Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP); (2) the refundable portion of the health insurance tax credit enacted in the 2010 health care reform law; (3) the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); (4) assisted housing; (5) financial assistance for post-secondary students (Pell Grants); (6) compensatory education grants to school districts; (7) the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); (8) the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC); (9) Supplemental Security Income (SSI); and (10) Family Support Payments. The common feature of need-tested programs is that they provide benefits, services, or funding based on a measure of limited financial resources (income and sometimes assets). However, other than that common feature, the programs differ considerably in their target populations, services, and focus.
In total and in inflation-adjusted terms, federal outlays for major need-tested programs increased in each decade examined in this report, from the 1960s to the present. There were particularly large increases in need-tested outlays during the FY2007 through FY2011 period, attributable to the effects of the recent deep recession (which increased the number of people eligible for aid) and policy responses to it that increased federal funding and benefits for certain programs. Spending for these programs declined from FY2011 to FY2012, as the effects of many of the temporary funding increases for these programs made in response to the recession expired. Total outlays for these programs began to rise again from FY2012 to FY2013. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts that under current law, federal outlays for need-tested programs would increase, even in inflation-adjusted terms, in the upcoming decade. However, that increase is attributable to health care programs. For programs other than health care, total inflation-adjusted spending is projected to decrease over the period from FY2013 through FY2024.
Different programs also have different spending trends. Cash benefits—to the aged, blind, and disabled and needy families with dependent children—comprised most aid to low-income families in the early 1960s. However, over the period from the 1960s through the end of the 1980s, most of the growth in aid was for non-cash benefits in the form of education, food, housing, and medical assistance.
The 1990s was the decade of "welfare reform." The policies affecting low-income families with children, in particular, were substantially altered, with less emphasis on providing a "safety net" for families without a worker and more emphasis on aiding low-income workers in a system geared to "make work pay." Federal funding for cash assistance for needy families with children fell, but this was far more than offset by increases in the EITC, which supplements the earnings of lower-income families, as well as federal funding for other programs that support lower-earning families (e.g., child care subsidies).
Outlays for major low-income assistance programs continued to increase in the 2000s even before the onset of the recent recession. This increase stemmed from increased spending on the refundable EITC and child tax credits, SNAP, education programs, and Medicaid. |
crs_RL33219 | crs_RL33219_0 | Background
Influenza A/H5N1 is one of many strains of avian influenza that can cause illness in poultry. That year, 18 people in Hong Kong contracted the virus; of whom 6 died. Since 2003, when the virus resurfaced and killed 4 people, scientists have closely monitored resurgent H5N1 outbreaks. At last count, H5N1 has infected birds in more than 50 countries and infected 261 people, of whom 157 have died. More than 200 million birds in Europe, the Middle East and Africa have either died from H5N1 or have been culled in containment exercises. In 2006, human H5N1 cases were being reported outside of Asia for the first time. In some countries, H5N1 has only been found in wild birds. Congressional Response
P.L. 109-13 , FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, provided the first appropriation for global avian flu efforts, though agencies and departments had already launched initiatives to combat the virus. USAID transferred $15 million of the funds to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Congress provided $6.1 billion for those efforts in two supplemental appropriations; appropriating $3.8 billion in P.L. 109-148 , FY2006 Defense Appropriations and $2.3 billion in P.L. 109-234 , FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations. U.S. agencies and departments might contribute additional resources to global avian flu efforts not specifically provided through these appropriations. Of the $7.1 billion related to international activities, the President requested:
$200.0 million for HHS to undertake a number of activities, including international pandemic preparedness planning initiatives and pandemic influenza disease surveillance; $18.3 million for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to undertake research and development initiatives and to provide avian influenza surveillance and prevention technical assistance globally; $120.0 million for the Department of Defense (DOD) to increase worldwide surveillance and upgrade related equipment; $10.0 million for DOD to assist military partner nations in procuring protective equipment, portable field assay testing equipment, and related laboratory equipment; $17.0 million for DOS to implement public diplomacy, training, and international outreach activities related to avian influenza and pandemic preparedness; $1.5 million for DOS International Visitors Program to provide 100 additional professional exchanges of doctors, health practitioners, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); $75.2 million to USAID for efforts that encourage behavior change and raise awareness about avian flu awareness, diagnostic support initiatives, and pandemic preparedness and planning activities; and $56.3 million for International Disaster and Famine Assistance Funds of USAID to pre-position supplies and equipment, such as antiviral medication and protective equipment. 109-148 , FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, provided $91.3 million to USDA for avian flu and pandemic preparedness initiatives, of which $19.5 million was committed to global efforts. Other U.S. Agencies and Departments
A number of other U.S. agencies and departments participate in global avian and pandemic influenza preparedness efforts, including the following:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
DHS supports DOS in its coordination of U.S. global avian flu efforts. Many health experts hope that Tamiflu remains effective if H5N1 becomes effectively transmissible among people. Supporters of greater spending on global avian flu efforts urge Congress to provide additional funds for international efforts and to enact legislation in the 110 th Congress similar to those bills introduced in the 109 th Congress which sought to increase resources to global avian and pandemic influenza preparedness (for a list of the bills see Appendix ). H5N1 Cases, WHO Pandemic Phases, U.S. 5522 , FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations, would have provided $25 million for USAID's global avian flu efforts, $30 million below requested levels. | Influenza A/H5N1 is one of many influenza (flu) strains currently spreading throughout the world. Although it is a bird flu, it has infected some people and killed more than half of those infected. Since 1997, when the first human contracted H5N1 in Hong Kong, the virus has resurfaced and spread to more than 50 countries across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa—infecting more than 260 people and killing more than 150 of those infected. In February 2006, the virus spread from Asia and central Europe to western Europe. By March 2006, health experts had confirmed new bird flu cases in more than 20 countries across Europe, Asia, and Africa. The first human H5N1 fatalities outside of Asia occurred in that year, with Turkey and Iraq reporting H5N1-related human deaths for the first time in January and February, followed by Azerbaijan and Egypt in March.
Congress has provided funds for U.S. international avian flu efforts through three appropriations. P.L. 109-13, FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, provided $25 million to combat the spread of avian influenza. The act also permitted the Secretary of State to transfer up to $656 million for U.S. avian flu initiatives. Ultimately, $6.3 million was transferred to USAID for those purposes, providing a total of $31.3 million for U.S. global avian flu activities from those appropriations. P.L. 109-148, FY2006 Defense Department appropriations, included $3.8 billion to address pandemic influenza. P.L. 109-234, FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, provided $2.3 billion for avian and pandemic flu efforts, of which $30 million was appropriated to USAID for international avian flu efforts and $200 million was appropriated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for global and domestic disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, research, and other activities. Relevant FY2007 U.S. department and agency budget justifications included some $205 million for global H5N1 initiatives. As in previous fiscal years, U.S. agencies and departments might commit additional resources to global avian flu efforts that were not specifically appropriated for those purposes.
This report provides an up-to-date account of global H5N1-related human infections and deaths, outlines U.S. global avian flu programs, and presents some foreign policy issues for Congress. This report will be updated should Congress provides additional funds for global purposes, and then only if H5N1 becomes effectively transmissible from person-to-person. For information on U.S. domestic preparedness efforts, agricultural issues, and anti-avian flu efforts of overseas governments, see CRS Report RL33145, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33795, Avian Influenza in Poultry and Wild Birds, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33871, Foreign Countries' Response to the Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus: Current Status, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). |
crs_R44349 | crs_R44349_0 | Introduction
The phrase "Glass-Steagall" generally refers to the separation of commercial banking from investment banking. Congress effected a separation of commercial and investment banking through four sections of the Banking Act of 1933—Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32—that were designed "to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations...." These four statutory provisions are commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-Steagall debate is not centered on prohibiting risky financial services; rather, the debate is about whether to permit inherently risky commercial and investment banking activities to be conducted within a single firm—specifically within firms holding federally insured deposits. Some have argued that the partial repeal either was a cause of the financial crisis that resulted in the so-called Great Recession or that it fueled and worsened the crisis's deleterious effect. On the other hand, some policymakers argue that Glass-Steagall issues were not significant causes of the crisis, and that the Glass-Steagall Act would have made responding to the crisis more difficult if it had remained in place. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) was Congress's primary legislative prescription to prevent a similar financial crisis in the future. It did, however, include some arguably Glass-Steagall-like provisions, which were designed to, among other things, address perceived inadequacies of the financial regulatory system at the time of the Great Recession so as to promote financial stability going forward; reduce various speculative activities of banks; and reduce the likelihood that the U.S. government would have to provide taxpayer support to avert or minimize a future financial crisis. Some believe that a more effective way of accomplishing these policy objectives would be to fully reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act. In fact, multiple bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress with that stated purpose. These bills include: S. 1709 / H.R. 3054 , The 21 st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2015, and H.R. 381 , the Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2015. Others argue that the Glass-Steagall Act is ill-suited for the current financial system and that the recent financial crisis would have occurred even if GLBA had never partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. Glass-Steagall's Erosion
Over the course of the nearly 70-year-long Glass-Steagall era, the separation of traditional commercial banking and securities activities gradually eroded. As previously mentioned, this erosion was the result of a confluence of matters, including market changes, statutory changes, and regulatory and judicial interpretations, which are addressed in turn. Policy Implications of Reinstituting a Glass-Steagall Regime
Less than a decade after GLBA's repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act's affiliation restrictions, the United States suffered its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. How the Dodd-Frank Act Addressed the Relationship Between Commercial and Investment Banking
Although the Dodd-Frank Act neither reinstated the sections of the Glass-Steagall Act repealed by GLBA nor eliminated the ability of banking firms to affiliate with securities firms, it included various provisions designed to meet some of the same policy objectives of the Glass-Steagall Act. Even if the Dodd-Frank Act had completely re-enacted the repealed provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, the financial history of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s shows that regulatory walls could be difficult to maintain or enforce. | The phrase "Glass-Steagall" generally refers to the separation of commercial banking from investment banking. Congress effected a separation of commercial and investment banking through four sections of the Banking Act of 1933—Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. These four statutory provisions are commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act.
Key Takeaways of This Report
The Glass-Steagall debate is not centered on prohibiting risky financial services; rather, the debate is about whether to permit inherently risky commercial and investment banking activities to be conducted within a single firm—specifically within firms holding federally insured deposits. Over the course of the nearly 70-year-long Glass-Steagall era, the clear-cut separation of traditional commercial banking and securities activities gradually eroded. This erosion was the result of a confluence of matters, including market changes, statutory changes, and regulatory and judicial interpretations. The Glass-Steagall era formally ended in 1999 when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on affiliations between commercial and investment banks. Less than a decade after GLBA, the United States suffered its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Some have argued that the partial repeal either was a cause of the financial crisis that resulted in the so-called Great Recession or that it fueled and worsened the crisis's deleterious effect. On the other hand, some policymakers argue that Glass-Steagall issues were not significant causes of the crisis, and that the Glass-Steagall Act would have made responding to the crisis more difficult if it had remained in place. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) was Congress's primary legislative prescription to prevent a similar financial crisis in the future. The Dodd-Frank Act neither reinstated the sections of the Glass-Steagall Act that were repealed by GLBA nor substantially modified the ability of banking firms to affiliate with securities firms. It did, however, include some arguably Glass-Steagall-like provisions, which were designed to promote financial stability going forward, reduce various speculative activities of commercial banks, and reduce the likelihood that the U.S. government would have to provide taxpayer support to avert or minimize a future financial crisis. Some believe that a more effective way of accomplishing these policy objectives would be to fully reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act. In fact, multiple bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress with that stated purpose. These bills include: S. 1709/H.R. 3054, The 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2015, and H.R. 381, the Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2015. On the other side of the policy discussion, some argue that the Glass-Steagall Act is ill-suited for the current financial system and that the recent financial crisis would have occurred even if GLBA had never partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. Even if the Dodd-Frank Act had completely re-enacted the repealed provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, the financial history of the Glass-Steagall era shows that regulatory walls could be difficult to maintain or enforce. |
crs_R43079 | crs_R43079_0 | Introduction
The President and some leading Members of Congress have indicated that income tax reform is a major policy objective. The major itemized deductions are for mortgage interest, state and local taxes, charitable contributions, and medical costs. Reducing incentives and subsidies that alter taxpayers' choices is one potential objective of tax reform. For a given revenue target, tax reform can involve a trade-off between a broader base and lower rates. For an introduction to tax deductions, see CRS Report R42872, Tax Deductions for Individuals: A Summary , by [author name scrubbed]. For general tax data analysis on itemized tax deductions, see CRS Report R43012, Itemized Tax Deductions for Individuals: Data Analysis , by [author name scrubbed]. Detailed tables showing the number of claimants and the size of deductions for each type of itemized deduction are shown in Appendix A . These restrictions could be justified in several different ways, including
to increase federal revenue; to allow a reduction in statutory tax rates, while holding revenue constant; to reduce economic distortions, where individuals pursue economic behaviors that they would not otherwise do, absent the influences of tax policy (also referred to as inefficiencies ); to increase the progressivity of the federal income tax (an issue of vertical equity ); to reduce discrepancies in the taxation of individuals with similar abilities to pay taxes (also referred to as horizontal equity ); or to simplify the tax code. Effects of Base-Broadening on Marginal Tax Rates, Labor Supply, and Saving
The increasing attention to across-the-board proposals for itemized deductions and, in some cases, other tax expenditures, suggests that the primary focus of base-broadening for some could be the goal of lowering tax rates (or preventing them from rising due to revenue needs) rather than reducing subsidies for undesirable or inefficient activities. It is the EMTR—not the statutory tax rate—that could discourage the supply of labor or savings. Simplification and Administration
One objective of tax reform may be to simplify the tax code. Rather than eliminate itemized deductions, a percentage could be disallowed. An option to choose a deduction for state and local sales taxes in lieu of the deduction for state and local income taxes is part of the extenders, which is temporarily in effect through 2013. On the other hand, some options could result in significant increases in revenue, such as ceilings on the mortgage interest deduction and the floors on the charitable deduction. If deductions rise as a share of income, the implication is that the deduction out of each marginal dollar is growing, and thus the elimination of deductions would increase effective taxation at the margin even in a revenue neutral tradeoff for lower statutory rates. These provisions primarily include deductions for state and local income taxes and charitable gifts. For example, in the tradeoff between ending itemized deductions at the top for a 5 percentage point rate reduction, and a net reduction of effective marginal tax rate of 0.6 percentage points, an estimate that used the statutory rate reduction would produce behavioral effects that are more than 8 times as large as they should be (5/0.6)
Even if a proposal could lead to higher effective marginal tax rates for some tax filers, however, this issue could be of limited importance since most evidence suggests these marginal effects on labor supply and saving behavior are relatively small. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that tax reform undertaken for the purpose of lowering statutory rates, rather than addressing the particular economic effects of the tax subsidized activities, may not accomplish its purpose. The mortgage interest deduction and deduction of real property taxes are not the only provisions that reduce the cost of acquiring and maintaining a home. Adding a floor to the deduction for charitable contributions is often discussed as one option for reform. The following section of the report analyzes various options to restrict itemized deductions from these two standards of economic equity. Some have proposed to have more revenue raised from higher income classes. In addition to administrative issues, there are also transitional issues. | The President and leading Members of Congress have indicated that income tax reform is a major policy objective. Some itemized deductions are visible candidates for "broadening the base" of the individual income tax and cutting back on tax expenditures and primarily consist of deductions for mortgage interest, state and local taxes, and charitable contributions. The benefits of itemized deductions are concentrated among higher-income individuals, and that is particularly the case for state and local income tax deductions and charitable deductions.
Proposals for addressing these provisions fall into two general classes. One approach could include repealing or restricting all itemized deductions. A different approach would consider each type of deduction and tailor a reform to the particular objectives and merits of the deductions, such as a lower ceiling on home mortgage interest deduction and a floor for charitable contributions.
This report analyzes various proposals to restrict itemized deductions—both across-the-board and individually tailored—using standard economic criteria of economic efficiency, distribution, simplicity, and estimated revenue effects. In particular, this report estimates each proposal's potential to contribute to revenue-neutral reductions in income tax rates and the consequences for economic behavior. For an introduction to tax deductions, see CRS Report R42872, Tax Deductions for Individuals: A Summary, by [author name scrubbed]. For general tax data analysis on itemized tax deductions, see CRS Report R43012, Itemized Tax Deductions for Individuals: Data Analysis, by [author name scrubbed].
Regardless of the class of reform undertaken, for a given revenue target, tax reform involves a trade-off between a broader base and lower income tax rates. One objective of lower rates is presumably to reduce the distortionary effects on labor supply and saving. The analysis in this report, however, shows that this trade-off, with respect to effects on labor supply or saving, may be more apparent than real. Economic theory indicates that the tax rate that should determine the supply responses is not the statutory marginal tax rate but the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). If part of the earnings of the last dollar is spent on tax exempt uses, then EMTRs are lower, and eliminating these deductions raises them.
It is possible for a revenue-neutral tax reform to have no effect on EMTRs, or even raise them, which, for some, may defeat the purpose of tax reform. Analysis in this report suggests that eliminating itemized deductions would increase the top EMTR by approximately 4½ percentage points but permit a statutory rate reduction in a distributionally and revenue-neutral change by about 5 percentage points. Thus, the net effect of this change is a reduction of ½ a percentage point (a tenth the size of the statutory reduction). Proposals with ceilings could easily raise EMTRs.
A traditional concern of tax expenditures is generally that they distort economic behavior. However, for each type of deduction there are also some justifications, although the magnitude may be in question. The provision that may have the most support from an economic efficiency standpoint is the deduction for charitable contributions.
Some types of tax reform may simplify the tax code, but others can make it more complex. In addition, transitional rules may be needed for the mortgage interest deduction to limit the impact on taxpayers with large mortgages and to soften the potential impact on the housing market. |
crs_R42104 | crs_R42104_0 | On September 22, 2011, a group of Members from the House and the Senate introduced the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011 (RAA, H.R. 3010 and S. 1606 ). The House passed H.R. 3010 on December 2, 2011, by a vote of 253-167. The RAA would make the most significant legislative changes to the APA since its enactment in 1946. The RAA would modify and enact into law numerous new general procedures for rulemaking that appear in narrower form in existing law, executive orders, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) documents. The White House has issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on H.R. The RAA would impose new requirements on independent regulatory agencies, such as consultation with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and cost-benefit analysis. H.R. The following RAA amendments would not apply to pending or completed rulemakings on the date of the RAA's enactment: the RAA's amendments to the informal and formal rulemaking sections of the APA; the RAA's definition of "substantial evidence"; the RAA's new provisions that a court shall not defer to an agency's cost/benefit determinations and economic and risk assessments if the agency failed to conform to OIRA-established guidelines and that a court shall not defer to agency determinations made in the adoption of an interim rule; the RAA's addition of court reviews (for abuse of discretion) of agency denials of petitions during high-impact rule hearings "by an interested person who has participated in the rulemaking" related to "other issues relevant to the rulemaking," due to an agency "determin[ation] that consideration of the issues at the hearing would not advance consideration of the rule or would, in light of the nature of the need for agency action, unreasonably delay completion of the rulemaking"; and the RAA's addition of court reviews (for abuse of discretion) of agency denials of petitions for hearings under the APA's formal rulemaking provisions, 5 U.S.C. Some of the most significant changes are listed here. 3010 version of the RAA would:
Require agencies to adopt the "least costly" rule that meets "relevant statutory objectives" unless the benefits justify additional costs. Provide for judicial review of certain requirements and determinations, for which judicial review is not presently available or for whether there is a question as to whether judicial review is available. Overhaul the current notice-and-comment (informal) rulemaking process by codifying and modifying existing requirements and instituting many procedural and substantive additions to informal rulemaking. Raise questions regarding how the RAA would interact with existing statutory requirements for cost-benefit analysis and statutory prohibitions on cost considerations. Impact existing case law on judicial deference to agency interpretations of rules and agency guidance. Provide that interim rules shall cease to have the effect of law if such rules are not finalized or rescinded in accordance with the RAA's requirements within 270 days of publication of the interim rule or 18 months if the rule is a major or high-impact rule. Mandate trial-like formal rulemaking procedures for high-impact rules. Mandate the identification of costs and benefits, and assure that such benefits justify the cost, in major guidance documents and guidance that involves a novel legal or policy issue arising out of statutory mandates. Establish minimum time periods for comment in rulemakings. Grant the OIRA Administrator, in statute, increased powers and responsibilities. Enable IQA petitions under existing APA hearing requirements to determine if an agency's proposed rule does not comply with the IQA. | In the fall of 2011, a group of Members from the House and the Senate introduced the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011 (RAA, H.R. 3010 and S. 1606). The RAA would make the most significant legislative changes to the rulemaking process since the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. The RAA would modify and enact into law numerous new general procedures for rulemaking that appear in narrower form in existing law, executive orders, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) documents. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3010 on December 2, 2011. The Obama Administration has issued a Statement of Administration Policy against H.R. 3010. Some of the most significant changes the bill would make are listed here. H.R. 3010 would:
Require agencies to adopt the "least costly" rule that meets "relevant statutory objectives" unless the benefits justify additional costs. Provide for judicial review of certain requirements and determinations, for which judicial review is not presently available or for which there is a question as to whether judicial review is available. Overhaul the current notice-and-comment (informal) rulemaking process by codifying and modifying existing requirements and instituting many procedural and substantive additions to informal rulemaking. Raise questions regarding how the RAA would interact with existing statutory requirements for cost-benefit analysis and statutory prohibitions on cost considerations. Impose new requirements on independent regulatory agencies, including cost-benefit analysis and regulatory review by OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Impact existing case law on judicial deference to agency interpretations of rules and agency guidance. Provide that interim rules shall cease to have the effect of law if such rules are not finalized or rescinded in accordance with the RAA's requirements within 270 days of publication of the interim rule or 18 months if the rule is a major or high-impact rule. Create a new category of rules, "high-impact" rules, and mandate trial-like formal rulemaking procedures for such rules. Require advance notices of proposed rulemaking for certain rules. Mandate the identification of costs and benefits, and assure that such benefits justify the cost, in major guidance documents and guidance that involves a novel legal or policy issue arising out of statutory mandates. Establish minimum time periods for comment in rulemakings. Grant the OIRA Administrator, in statute, increased powers and responsibilities. Enable Information Quality Act (IQA) petitions to determine if an agency's proposed rule does not comply with the IQA. |
crs_R40749 | crs_R40749_0 | Problems with quality of health care in the United States earned the attention of the public with, and have steadily gained in importance since, the release of the first in a series of Institute of Medicine (IOM) reports on this topic, "To Err is Human: Building A Safer Health System," in 1999. The release of the IOM report represented a changing approach to addressing suboptimal health care quality, from one focused primarily on quality assurance to one focused on quality improvement broadly through the realignment of systems of delivering and financing care to incentivize quality of care. This issue now occupies a prominent position on the national agenda for health care reform and is the subject of considerable congressional interest. Policy makers and others have offered a wide range of policy options to improve health care quality. This report provides information on the issue of quality measurement, which serves as the basis of several of the options policy makers are offering for addressing this problem. Specifically, recently introduced health reform bills have included a strong focus on supporting and expanding a coordinated national quality measurement infrastructure. These include efforts that would broadly support the development of national priorities in the area of performance measurement; the development of new quality measures and identification of gaps in existing measures; the expansion of the endorsement process for quality measures; and the delineation of a process, in rulemaking, for selecting and implementing new quality measures for use in public health care programs. This report begins with a brief description of health care quality activity conceptually, the types of quality information that support these activities, and how quality measurement can be placed within these frameworks. It provides a discussion of the definition of quality measurement and a description of the life cycle of quality measures, including the development of quality measures (across provider types); the process of endorsement of quality measures; and the process for implementing those measures. Overviews of selected examples of implementation, including the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI) and the Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU), are included. The report concludes with an overview of key technical and policy issues in quality measurement. | Problems with quality of health care in the United States earned the attention of the public with, and have steadily gained in importance since, the release of the first in a series of Institute of Medicine (IOM) reports on this topic, "To Err is Human: Building A Safer Health System," in 1999. The release of the IOM report represented a changing approach to addressing suboptimal health care quality, from one focused primarily on quality assurance to one focused on quality improvement broadly through the realignment of systems of delivering and financing care to incentivize quality of care. This issue now occupies a prominent position on the national agenda for health care reform and is the subject of considerable congressional interest.
Policy makers and others have offered a wide range of policy options to improve health care quality. This report provides information on the issue of quality measurement, which serves as the basis of several of the options policy makers are offering for addressing this problem. Specifically, recently introduced health reform bills have included a strong focus on supporting and expanding a coordinated national quality-measurement infrastructure. These include efforts that would broadly support the development of national priorities in the area of performance measurement; the development of new quality measures and identification of gaps in existing measures; the expansion of the endorsement process for quality measures; and the delineation of a process, in rulemaking, for selecting and implementing new quality measures for use in public health care programs.
This report begins with a brief description of health care quality activity conceptually, the types of quality information that support these activities, and how quality measurement can be placed within these frameworks. It provides a discussion of the definition of quality measurement and a description of the life cycle of quality measures, including the development of quality measures (across provider types), the process of endorsement of quality measures, and the process for implementing those measures. Overviews of selected examples of implementation, including the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI) and the Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU), are included. The report concludes with an overview of key technical and policy issues in quality measurement. |
crs_R45229 | crs_R45229_0 | P roposals to index capital gains for inflation have recently reentered the public debate. The proposed change would eliminate taxes on the part of capital gains that reflects inflation. It would increase the basis (the amount subtracted from sales price to determine capital gains) by inflation occurring since acquisition of the asset. President Trump's head of the White House National Economic Council, Larry Kudlow, has long proposed the indexation of capital gains for inflation through regulation, and Americans for Tax Reform has written a letter urging Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to index capital gains. Past analyses (as discussed in " History of Proposals to Index Capital Gains " section below) indicate that the change would require legislation. Senators Ted Cruz and James Inhofe have introduced S. 2688 , the Capital Gains Inflation Relief Act of 2018, which would index the basis of assets for purposes of the capital gains tax. Similar bills, H.R. 2017 and H.R. 6444 , have been introduced in the House by Representative Jack Emmer and Representative Devin Nunes. Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Kevin Brady has indicated that some discussion of this issue is ongoing. Capital gains on corporate stock are also largely effectively exempt from income tax when they are held in a pension or individual retirement plan. Explanation of Indexing for Capital Gains
Indexing would increase the basis of the asset (i.e., the amount deducted from the sales price to determine gain or loss) by the change in the price level between the date of acquisition and the date of sale. Asset Coverage
The effect of the indexing also depends on what assets are included and whether the provision applies to both short-term and long-term gains, or some other category based on holding period. These legal issues were also discussed in a recent article by Lee Sheppard, who concluded that Treasury does not have the authority to index capital gains for inflation. How Indexing Capital Gains Compares with Fixed Exclusions or Rates
This section compares, using effective tax rates, indexing capital gains to alternative tax benefits (exclusions or lower rates) by holding period, using examples of an appreciating asset with deferral such as corporate stock, and a depreciating asset such as real estate, and a fixed asset such as land (which yields current income). Effective Tax Rates by Asset and Holding Period
Table 1 shows the effective tax rates for investors subject to the maximum capital gains tax under present law with and without indexing for five types of assets:
1. a no-dividend stock (a purely appreciating asset that pays no current return), 2. a stock that pays a dividend and appreciates more slowly, 3. a commercial building that earns rent and depreciates, 4. a residential building that earns rent and depreciates, and 5. an asset that earns a rent and neither appreciates nor depreciates in real value (illustrated by land). It would favor stocks that pay dividends over growth stocks. Residential buildings would receive less benefit than other real estate, and their benefit relative to stocks depends on whether they are held long enough to have little or no basis to index. Some of these patterns may not be consistent with the objectives of capital gains relief, as discussed in more detail in the following sections. Should Indexing Capital Gains be Added to or Substitute for Existing Benefits? The analysis of a variety of issues depends on whether indexing is an addition or a substitute, not only in the types of assets affected, but in concerns such as revenue cost, distribution, and lock-in effects. Economic Growth
An argument has been made that lowering the taxes on capital gains via inflation indexing would boost economic growth. The second approach divides the revenue estimate by the estimated capital stock to provide a direct estimate of the change in the cost of capital, which is 0.07%, or 7 basis points. Administrative and Compliance Issues
Indexing capital gains for inflation would be more complicated than an exclusion or lower rate, because a different inflation adjustment would have to be applied to each vintage of investments. | Recently, proposals to index capital gains for inflation have reentered the public debate. The proposed change would eliminate the part of capital gains that reflects inflation by increasing the basis (i.e., the amount subtracted from sales price to determine capital gains) by inflation occurring since acquisition of the asset. President Trump's head of the White House National Economic Council, Larry Kudlow, has long proposed the indexation of capital gains for inflation through regulation, and Americans for Tax Reform has urged Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to index capital gains. Senators Ted Cruz and James Inhofe have introduced S. 2688, the Capital Gains Inflation Relief Act of 2018, which would index the basis of assets for purposes of the capital gains tax. Similar bills, H.R. 2017 and H.R. 6444, have been introduced in the House by Representative Jack Emmer and Representative Devin Nunes. Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Kevin Brady has indicated that some discussion of this issue is ongoing.
Capital gains already receive benefits including (along with dividends) lower tax rates, tax deferral until assets are sold, and gains exclusion on assets passed on at death. Capital gains earned in retirement and pension plans are also effectively exempt from income tax. Other types of earnings from capital (such as interest and business investments) are also taxed on nominal income, but those effects are also offset by other tax benefits.
The effects of capital gains indexing depend on a variety of features: the choice of the price index, assets covered (by type and holding period), whether indexing generates or increases losses, whether indexing applies to past as well as future inflation, and whether indexing is in addition to or a substitute for current tax benefits.
Past legislative proposals to index capital gains for inflation have never been enacted, although in some cases proposals led to alternatives such as exclusions or lower rates. In 1992, a proposal advanced to index capital gains for inflation by regulation was eventually rejected based on findings that the Department of the Treasury does not have the authority to index capital gains.
Compared with an exclusion or lower rate, indexing favors short-term assets relative to long-term ones. Indexing provides the smallest exclusion equivalents to growth stocks that pay little or no dividends and the largest equivalents to gains from land, commercial buildings, and to a lesser extent residential buildings and stocks that pay substantial dividends. Some of these patterns may not be consistent with policy objectives that may favor lower rates on stocks and assets held for a long period. Compared to an exclusion, inflation indexing would favor risky assets.
The analysis of various economic issues depends on whether indexing is in addition to or a substitute for current benefits. Questions arise as to whether interest, depreciation, and inventories should also be indexed.
As an additional provision, depending on the design, estimates suggest a range of $10 billion to $30 billion per year in revenue costs. Economic growth effects would be relatively small, with even the largest revenue estimate pointing to a decrease in the cost of capital of 6 to 7 basis points (lower required returns of 0.06% to 0.07%). Evidence also suggests that the savings effect would be small and likely to be offset by crowding out of private investment by government borrowing if debt-financed. The change would favor high-income individuals, with about 60% benefiting the top 0.1% and around 90% benefiting the top 1% in the income distribution.
Favorable treatment for capital gains on stocks has been advanced due to the double taxation of dividends, but the 2017 tax changes have made that justification less persuasive. Capital gains indexing would reduce the distortion between debt and equity but increase the favoritism of retaining earnings over paying dividends. It would reduce the lock-in effect that causes individuals to retain current assets because of the tax, although not as much as an exclusion equivalent. Administrative and compliance costs would increase because each vintage of assets would require a different exclusion, but improved computing facilities make that issue less burdensome. |
crs_RL33162 | crs_RL33162_0 | (3) The U.S.-Chile free trade agreement is an example of a bilateralFTA. For example, the United States recently ratified CAFTA-DR and is movingforward on negotiations with Panama and the Andean countries as part of its overall trade strategyfor free trade in the Americas. Economic Effects of Trade Integration
Supporters of trade integration in the Americas view hemispheric free trade as supportingU.S. economic and political interests in several ways. They argue that the movement towards tradeintegration is beneficial for U.S. economic prosperity and will serve to strengthen democraticregimes and support U.S. values and security interests. Forming closer economic relations withcountries in the region is seen by some as a means to improve cooperation on other issues such asthe environment and anti-drug efforts. U.S. opponents to regional integration in the Americas areconcerned that hemispheric free trade would lead to a loss of jobs in the United States. They arguethat trade agreements would result in U.S. companies shifting production to lower-wage countrieswith weak labor and environmental standards. U.S. Trade Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean
Since the passage of NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have pursued tradeliberalization through bilateral, regional, and multilateral negotiations. The last round was held in February 2005. U.S.-Panama merchandise trade is small. imports. (33)
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
The 1994 vision of hemispheric free trade has been embraced by President George W. Bushand promoted by the formal negotiations in the FTAA process but also by the expansion of bilateralfree trade agreements. An FTAA could have 34 members and nearly 800 million people. Thispopulation would be nearly twice the population of the European Union. (39)
Regional Integration Initiatives in the Americas
Countries in the Western Hemisphere have been forming regional trade agreements since1961 when the Central American Common Market was formed. (40) In an effort to increasetrade with other countries, Mexico has negotiated a total of 12 trade agreements involving over 40countries (see Table 4). Officials from the Caribbean and Mercosur countries held talks in February2005 about establishing a free trade agreement between the two regions. (60) Leaders expect that theintegration of South America would put South American countries in a stronger position innegotiations with the rest of the world, including a possible free trade agreement with the EU andthe Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). (61)
Policy Issues and Implications
Continuation of Bilaterals and Regional Trade Agreements
In the absence of an FTAA, it is highly possible that the number of bilateral RTAs in theWestern Hemisphere may continue to increase. (70)
Trade Integration and U.S. Interests
Trade integration in the Americas has gained momentum since the 1990s. The possibilityof forming an FTAA or trade agreements with Andean countries and Panama is of interest topolicymakers because of the economic and political implications for the United States. As theeffects of NAFTA on the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian economies become clearer, policymakers arefaced with the issue of whether trade agreements are beneficial to the United States and how theUnited States should proceed in its trade policy in the Western Hemisphere. As pointed out earlier, some analysts do not believe that bilateral tradeagreements are the best course of action because they take away the focus from energizing the FTAAnegotiations and are slowing down the process. | Since the 1990s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been a focus ofUnited States trade policy, as demonstrated by the passage of the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, and, more recently, the CentralAmerica-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The Bush Administration hasmade trade agreements important elements of U.S. trade policy. The United States currently is inthe process of completing trade negotiations with Andean countries for a free trade agreement (FTA)and on reactivating talks for a U.S.-Panama FTA and a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA is an on-going regional trade initiative that was first discussed in 1994 and formallystarted in 1998. The last FTAA trade ministerial meeting was held in Miami in November 2003, butthe talks are currently stalled.
The efforts of the United States in regional trade integration in the Americas are significantfor Congress because U.S. entry into any free trade agreement may only be done with the legislativeapproval of the Congress. U.S. supporters of trade integration in the Americas believe it helps U.S.economic and political interests in several ways. Proponents believe that the movement towardstrade integration of the Americas is beneficial for U.S. prosperity, and also serves to strengthendemocratic regimes and support U.S. values and security. Forming closer economic relations withcountries in the region is seen by some as a means to improve cooperation on other issues such asthe environment and anti-drug efforts. U.S. opponents of trade integration proposals are mainlyconcerned that hemispheric free trade would lead to a loss of jobs in the United States throughincreased import competition or as a result of U.S. companies shifting production to lower-wagecountries with weak labor standards.
The number of regional trade agreements in the Americas has been increasing since the1990s. Major trade arrangements include NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, the Southern Common Market(Mercosur) in South America , the Andean Community (CAN), the Caribbean Community andCommon Market (CARICOM), the Central American Common Market (CACM), and the LatinAmerican Integration Association (ALADI). With a total of 12 trade agreements involving over 40countries, Mexico is one of the countries with the highest number of agreements. Supporters notethat if countries in the Western Hemisphere ultimately establish an FTAA, it could have as many as34 members and nearly 800 million people, nearly twice the population of the European Union.
Trade integration in the Americas is of interest to policymakers because of the implicationsfor the United States. Issues under debate include the pros and cons of deepened trade relations withLatin America and the Caribbean, and whether the current focus on bilateral and regional FTAs isthe most appropriate trade policy. Some analysts do not believe that such a policy is a good ideabecause it is creating a complicated network of trade agreements throughout the region could slowdown the FTAA process. Others believe that regional trade agreements lead to the consolidation ofregional trade areas into larger free trade areas, and although a slow process, may eventually lead toa hemispheric free trade area. |
crs_93-792 | crs_93-792_0 | Thus, no benefits are paid for the month of death. The check (or direct bank deposit) for each month's benefit is issued in the following month. If a beneficiary dies late in the month, family members or the executor of the estate may not notify the Social Security Administration (SSA) in time to stop the payment. Subsequently, they are informed that the check must be returned to the government. Arguments For and Against Paying Benefits for the Month of Death
Arguments for Changing the Current Policy
Critics of the current policy argue that withholding benefits for the month of death does not make sense. They maintain that a person's bills do not stop at the beginning of the month in which they die. Critics contend that the public views the policy as an anomaly—as a mistake in the design of the Social Security system. SSA estimates that paying full benefits for the month of death would cost $1.6 billion annually. SSA also estimated the increase in benefit payments under a proposal in which (1) a full benefit for the month of death would be payable to a surviving spouse (the surviving spouse would not be required to have been living with the beneficiary when the death occurred or to be entitled to benefits), or (2) if there is no surviving spouse, a pro-rated benefit based on the number of days the beneficiary was alive during the final month would be payable. Supporters of the current policy also point out that the system pays benefits to an individual beginning with his or her first month of entitlement, regardless of when entitlement began during the month, and that this provides rough balance in the system for not paying benefits for the month of death. They contend that there is little appreciation for the administrative difficulties (and potential costs) involved in determining who should receive the deceased beneficiary's benefit for the month of death. Given that more than 2 million beneficiaries die each year, this would require a labor-intensive process, similar to the taking of regular benefit applications. | Social Security benefits are not paid for the month in which a beneficiary dies. In most cases, the check that an individual receives in a given month represents payment for the preceding month. In other words, by design, the check (or direct bank deposit) arrives after the month for which it applies. In cases where a beneficiary dies late in the month, the Social Security Administration often is not notified of the death in time to stop the payment. When family members are informed that the check must be returned, they often complain that the policy is unfair and creates a financial hardship because the deceased beneficiary incurred expenses for part (or even most) of the month.
Over the years, legislation has been introduced that would provide a full benefit for the month of death or a pro-rated benefit based on the proportion of the month that the beneficiary was alive. Supporters of such legislation argue that withholding benefits for the month of death does not make sense given that a person's bills do not stop at the beginning of the month in which they die. They argue that the public views the policy as anomalous in a system designed to provide monthly income to retirees, the disabled, and survivors of deceased workers.
Critics of such legislation argue that paying full benefits for the month of death would cost an estimated $1.6 billion annually (excluding administrative costs). They point out that a deceased beneficiary's spouse and children can collect survivor benefits for the month of death, regardless of when the death occurred; that survivors may be entitled to a $255 lump-sum death payment; and that those seeking to have benefits paid for the month of death have little appreciation for the administrative difficulties involved in determining who should get the more than 2 million final benefit checks issued each year. |
crs_R43928 | crs_R43928_0 | Although the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is not party to the lawsuit, in a process known as a character of s ervice determination, the VA plays a separate, but related, role in assessing entitlement to veterans' benefits for individuals whose character of discharge does not automatically meet basic eligibility criteria. The circumstances surrounding a servicemember's discharge from the military have implications for his or her ability to claim entitlement to a wide range of gratuitous benefits administered by the VA, including service-connected disability compensation, health care, education assistance, non-service-connected pension, burial benefits, housing benefits, and vocational rehabilitation, among others. Specifically, the individual must meet certain active duty service requirements and minimum length-of-service requirements, and have a discharge or separation from the military under conditions that are "other than dishonorable." Entitlement to veterans' benefits is generally denied to former servicemembers who do not meet the statutory definition of a veteran. This report discusses the discharge or separation requirement for veteran status or, more specifically, how the VA assesses character of service to determine whether a former servicemember's separation from the military can be considered other than dishonorable. However, if the characterization of discharge may preclude access to veteran's benefits, the VA must develop the case, through an assessment of service records and other evidence related to a claimant's time in the military. In addition, if a claimant has more than one period of service, this may further complicate the determination. See a description of the discharge categories in Appendix A . Servicemembers receiving a bad conduct discharge by a general court-martial or a dishonorable discharge are legally barred from receiving veterans' benefits unless, during the course of developing the character of service, the VA determines that they were insane at the time of the offense that led to the discharge or if eligibility for benefits can be established based on a prior period of other than dishonorable service. In determining potential eligibility for veteran's benefits, the VA adheres to a separate set of statutory and regulatory criteria than the military and considers mitigating factors that may have led to an adverse discharge, such as insanity. §3.13, a former servicemember may be entitled to certain VA benefits based on a prior period of honorable service for the purposes of VA benefits, even if his or her most recent discharge is characterized as dishonorable. However, if the outcome is an unfavorable finding of dishonorable service, the VA is to notify the claimant of the effect on his or her entitlement to VA benefits, which will generally deprive the former servicemember of any VA benefits (except for the SGLI to VGLI conversion), pending the outcome of any subsequent appeals as discussed in the " Appealing an Unfavorable VA Determination " section below. Any notification of an unfavorable determination would also include information on how the former servicemember can seek a review of his or her discharge through the military department. To reiterate, veteran status is established by the former servicemember meeting three primary criteria:
1. full-time active duty (other than active duty for training) military service (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) or commissioned officers of the Public Health Service, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or its predecessor, the Environmental Science Services Administration; 2. minimum active duty requirement of 24 months of service or the period called to service if activated for less than 24 months—Reservists and National Guard members called to active duty by a federal order (for other than training purposes) and completing the full call-up period would qualify; 3. discharge or release from active military service under conditions other than dishonorable—VA accepts discharges that are characterized as honorable or general (under honorable conditions), as other than dishonorable for VA benefit purposes. A veteran who does not receive an honorable or general discharge (under honorable conditions) from the military may still receive health care services from the VHA. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers a broad range of benefits to veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces and to certain members of their families; however, a claimant must meet the basic eligibility criteria. A benefit claimant must prove that he or she meets the statutory definition of a "veteran," which includes (1) service in the active military (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) or commissioned officers of the Public Health Service (PHS), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); (2) minimum length of service requirements; and (3) discharge or separation from military service under conditions "other than dishonorable."
This report focuses on the discharge or separation requirement for veteran status or, more specifically, how the VA determines that a former servicemember's military service can be characterized as under conditions other than dishonorable. The conditions surrounding a servicemember's discharge from the military can have important implications for his or her ability to subsequently claim entitlement to a host of benefits provided through the VA. The VA may deny benefits to former servicemembers whose military separation is characterized as "other than honorable" (OTH) or if they have received a punitive discharge adjudicated by a court-martial. In addition, certain types of misconduct could create a legal bar to receiving veterans' benefits.
The VA generally accepts discharges that are characterized as "honorable" or "general" (under honorable conditions) for purposes of veterans' benefits. Such discharges generally do not disqualify a veteran for a wide range of VA benefits, including disability compensation and pension, health care services, educational assistance, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, home loan guaranty, and memorial and burial services. However, for purposes of the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill, a veteran must have received an honorable discharge. Furthermore, with certain exceptions, VA health care will be furnished for any disability incurred in or aggravated during a period of service terminated by a discharge under OTH conditions.
However, an adverse discharge may preclude a former servicemember from receiving one or more VA benefits based on a complex set of statutory and regulatory restrictions. In these instances, the VA must develop the character of service, through an assessment of facts and other evidence related to a claimant's time in the military, to determine whether his or her military service meets the general statutory and regulatory criteria for entitlement to veterans' benefits.
This report primarily focuses on the VA adjudication process for claimants who—as a result of an adverse discharge—are entitled to a character of service determination resulting in either a favorable finding of "other than dishonorable" service or an unfavorable finding of "dishonorable" service for the purposes of VA benefits. This report does not address Department of Defense (DOD) policy on military discharge procedures aside from descriptions of how military discharges impact the potential receipt of veterans' benefits. Although a former servicemember may also exercise the right to seek redress through the Discharge Review Board (DRB) or the Board for Correction for Military/Naval Records (BCM/NV) of his or her military department, the VA has no involvement in DOD administrative remedies and therefore a discussion of DOD-related discharge issues is outside the scope of this report. Situations where policy or program overlap occurs between the VA and DOD are addressed where appropriate. |
crs_R45150 | crs_R45150_0 | Agency R&D budgets are developed internally as part of each agency's overall budget development process. As Congress acts to complete the FY2019 appropriations process, it faces two overarching issues: the amount of the federal budget to be spent on federal R&D and the prioritization and allocation of the available funding. This report begins with a discussion of the overall level of President Trump's FY2019 R&D request, followed by analyses of the R&D funding request from a variety of perspectives and for selected multiagency R&D initiatives. 112-25 ) that were enacted on February 9, 2018, in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). The new definition (experimental development) is used throughout this report for FY2017 and FY2019, except in the section " Department of Defense ." Subsequent to the release of the President's budget, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), appropriating full-year funding for FY2018, rendering the CR levels identified in the budget no longer relevant. Therefore, the analysis of government-wide R&D funding in this report preceding the individual agency analyses compares the President's request for FY2019 to the FY2017 level. As information about the agencies' FY2018 R&D levels becomes available, the agency sections of this report will be updated to reflect that information and to make comparisons to the President's FY2019 request; some agency sections have been updated. Under the new definition of R&D, and including the $12.9 billion proposed in the addendum, President Trump is proposing approximately $131.0 billion for R&D for FY2019, an increase of $5.7 billion above the FY2017 level (4.5%). Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2019 R&D request represents a constant-dollar increase of 1.2% from the FY2017 actual level. Under President Trump's FY2019 budget request, eight federal agencies would receive more than 96% of total federal R&D funding: the Department of Defense, 48.4%; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), primarily the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 20.9%; Department of Energy (DOE), 10.7%; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 9.0%; National Science Foundation (NSF), 3.5%; Department of Agriculture (USDA), 1.6%; Department of Commerce (DOC), 1.2%; and Veterans Affairs (VA), 1.1%. Excluding the $12.9 billion in R&D funding requested in the addendum, nearly every federal agency would see its R&D funding decrease under the President's FY2019 request compared to their FY2017 levels. President Trump's FY2019 budget is largely silent on funding levels for these efforts and whether any or all of the nonstatutory initiatives will continue. Some activities related to these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and may be addressed in the agency analyses later in this report. Consequently, R&D data presented in the agency analyses in this report may differ from R&D data in the president's budget or otherwise provided by OMB. As of the date of this report, the House had completed action on six of the 12 regular appropriations bills; the Senate had completed action on nine of the bills. Division C of P.L. 115-245 provides for continuing appropriations for the agencies included in the remaining seven bills until "the enactment into law of an appropriation for any project or activity provided for in this Act; (2) the enactment into law of the applicable appropriations Act for fiscal year 2019 without any provision for such project or activity; or (3) December 7, 2018." This report will be updated as Congress takes additional actions to complete the FY2019 appropriations process. 6157 , as amended). 115-245 provides:
the Army with $11.384 billion in RDT&E funding (base plus OCO/GWOT), $481 million (4.4%) above the FY2018 enacted level, $900 million (8.6%) above the request, $971 million (9.3%) above the House-passed levels, and $247 million (2.2%) above the Senate-passed level;
the Navy with $18.678 billion in RDT&E funding (base plus OCO/GWOT), $440 million (2.4%) above the FY2018 enacted level, $29 million (0.2%) above the request, $852 million (4.8%) above the House-passed level, and $482 million (2.5%) below the Senate-passed level;
the Air Force with $41.551 billion in RDT&E funding (base plus OCO/GWOT), $3.738 billion (9.9%) above the FY2018 enacted level, $1.059 billion (2.6%) above the request, $320 million (0.8%) above the House-passed level, and $367 million (0.9%) above the Senate-passed level;
the Defense-wide account with $24.095 billion in RDT&E funding (base plus OCO/GWOT), $679 million (2.9%) above the FY2018 enacted level, $1.578 billion (7.0%) above the request, $1.365 billion (6.0%) above the House-passed level, and $350 million (1.4%) below the Senate-passed level; and
OTE with $381 million in RDT&E funding (base plus OCO/GWOT), $170 million (80.7%) above the FY2018 enacted level, $160 million (72.4%) above the request and the House-passed level, and equal to the Senate-passed level. Research . The President's request for R&D is 13.7% of NOAA's total discretionary budget request of $4.553 billion. U.S. Geological Survey
The USGS accounts for more than two-thirds of all DOI R&D funding. Because final FY2018 funding was not available at the time the FY2019 budget was prepared, requested R&D funding is compared to the FY2017 actual funding. 115-141 for FY2018, most of which have been included in previous fiscal year appropriations. | President Trump's budget request for FY2019 includes approximately $131.0 billion for research and development (R&D), of which $118.056 billion is included in the President's budget and an estimated additional $12.9 billion in nondefense discretionary R&D is requested as part of an addendum to the President's budget. The additional funding requested in the addendum followed enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised defense and nondefense discretionary spending caps for FY2018 and FY2019. In April 2018, the Administration issued amendments to the President's request, including language needed to clarify the funds requested in the addendum. Agencies appear to have included this proposed funding in their budget justifications, and this funding is included in the agency analyses in this report.
Final FY2018 funding had not been enacted at the time the President's FY2019 budget was prepared; therefore, the budget included the FY2017 actual funding levels, 2018 annualized continuing resolution (CR) levels, and the FY2019 request levels. Subsequent to the release of the President's budget, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), appropriating full-year funding for FY2018, rendering the CR levels identified in the budget no longer relevant. The analysis of government-wide R&D funding in this report preceding the individual agency analyses compares the President's request for FY2019 to the FY2017 level. As information about the agencies' FY2018 R&D levels becomes available, the agency sections of this report will be updated to reflect that information and to make comparisons to the President's FY2019 request; some agency sections have been updated. As of the date of this report, the House had completed action on 6 of the 12 regular appropriations bills; the Senate had completed action on 9; 5 had been enacted as law. Division C of P.L. 115-245 provides for continuing appropriations for the agencies included in the remaining seven bills until December 7, 2018. This report will be updated as Congress acts to complete the FY2019 appropriations process.
In FY2018, OMB adopted a change to the definition of development, applying a more narrow treatment it describes as "experimental development." This approach was intended to better harmonize the reporting of U.S. R&D funding data with the approach used by other nations. The new definition is used in this report. Under the new definition of R&D (applied to both FY2017 and FY2019 figures), and including the estimated $12.9 billion included in the budget addendum, President Trump is requesting approximately $131.0 billion for R&D for FY2019, an increase of $5.7 billion (4.5%) above the FY2017 level. OMB notes that under the previous definition, total federal R&D would be $38.7 billion higher, or approximately $170 billion. Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2019 R&D request represents an increase of 1.2% above the FY2017 level.
Funding for R&D is largely concentrated among a few departments and agencies. In FY2017, eight federal agencies received 96.3% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (39.3%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (27.3%) combined accounting for more than two-thirds of all federal R&D funding. President's Trump's FY2019 budget is largely silent on funding levels for a number of multiagency R&D initiatives. However, some activities supporting these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and are reported in the agency analyses in this report.
The request represents the President's R&D priorities; Congress may opt to agree with none, part, or all of the request, and it may express different priorities through the appropriations process.
In recent years, Congress has completed the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year. Failure to complete the process by the start of the fiscal year and the accompanying use of continuing resolutions can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and the acquisition of R&D-related equipment. |
crs_R44196 | crs_R44196_0 | Introduction
China (officially known as the People's Republic of China, PRC) is building a modern and regionally powerful military with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations away from China's immediate periphery. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort is a central issue in U.S. defense planning and foreign policy. Congress's decisions on this issue could affect U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, and the U.S. defense industrial base. The short war with Vietnam in 1979 was China's last major conflict, and the PLA has not been involved in sustained combat since the Korean War (1950-1953) and the brief border war with India (1962). China's Military Modernization
China has engaged in a sustained and broad effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low-technology, ground forces-centric military into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations and naval and air power projection. Quantity
China's military modernization efforts have emphasized quality over quantity, in both equipment and personnel. China's Intentions for Its Military
The intentions of China's leaders regarding their use of the PLA are a key factor, alongside the PLA's capabilities, in assessing the Chinese military. There appears to be agreement among many American China-watchers that Beijing's main reason for strengthening the PLA is first to ensure the Communist Party's survival in power and then to defend China's "territorial integrity," primarily its claim to Taiwan. Experts believe that other reasons for China's military modernization are its ambitions to become the leading regional power in a more multipolar East Asia and to defend China's expanding economic interests, including shipping lanes. China is also investing heavily in developing a number of different UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) platforms. Alongside modernization of aircraft, the PLA has invested in improvements to its air defenses. The main areas of investment have been submarines, large multi-mission surface vessels, aircraft carriers, and arming PLAN vessels with modern anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Weaknesses and Limitations
The rapid improvement in the overall capability of the PLA has been the main narrative of outside observers for many years, but persistent weaknesses and limitations hamper the PLA's effectiveness. By its own assessments, the PLA has weaknesses in training, jointness, administration, human capital, force development, and logistics. From 2005 through 2014, the official military budget increased at an average rate of 9.5% per year, after adjusting for inflation. Congress has restricted U.S.-China mil-mil contacts through legislation. Responses to China's Changing Military Capability
As China's military capabilities have improved after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government appears to have addressed this development in a variety of ways. Differing geographic scope of responsibilities. In addition to legislation, Congress influences U.S. policies toward the PRC and the PLA through budget allocations, hearings, and public statements. 101-246 , Section 902), the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 ( P.L. Report ing on U.S. defense policy responses. FY2013 NDAA: Section 1271 requests coverage of numerous additional topics: China's electronic warfare capabilities and details on the number of malicious cyber incidents originating from China against DOD infrastructure; China's space and counter-space programs; nuclear program; anti-access and area denial capabilities; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) modernization program; navy and paramilitary and maritime law enforcement vessels, including their response to U.S. naval activities; military-to-military relationships with other countries; any significant sale or transfer of military hardware, expertise, and technology from China, and any significant assistance to and from "any selling state with military-related research and development programs in China." | China is building a modern and regionally powerful military with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations away from China's immediate periphery. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort is a central issue in U.S. defense planning and foreign policy. Congress's decisions on this issue could affect U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, and the U.S. defense industrial base.
China has engaged in a sustained and broad effort over more than 25 years to transform its military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), from an infantry-heavy, low-technology military into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations and naval and air power. China has emphasized quality over quantity during this modernization: the number of military personnel and certain platforms (e.g., aircraft, tanks, certain vessels) has declined even as overall capabilities have improved.
From 2005 through 2014, China's official military budget increased at an average rate of 9.5% per year in real terms, allowing the PLA to improve its capabilities in many dimensions. PLA naval forces feature quieter submarines, large surface combatants with improved air defenses and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, and a nascent aircraft carrier program. New air power capabilities include modern fighter aircraft, more supporting platforms, and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in production and under development. The PLA has increased the number and accuracy of its ballistic missiles for both nuclear and conventional strike missions. China has launched numerous satellites for military communications, surveillance, and navigation, and also has developed a variety of counter-space capabilities. The cyber operations of the PLA are harder to characterize, but reports indicate that China has invested heavily in this area.
Despite the acquisition of modern equipment, the PLA has weaknesses and limitations that constrain the effectiveness of its operations, including training, jointness, human capital, and logistics. The short war with Vietnam in 1979 was China's last major conflict, and the PLA has not been involved in sustained combat since the Korean War (1950-1953) and a limited border war with India (1962). Although PLA planning and force posture is concentrated on contingencies in China's periphery, including the East China Sea and South China Sea, since the late 2000s the PLA has expanded the geographic scope of its operations.
Many American China-watchers assert that China's main reason for strengthening the PLA is to ensure that the status of Taiwan is resolved on terms favorable to Beijing. Experts believe that other reasons for China's military modernization are to weaken the U.S. network of alliances and to become the leading regional power in a more multipolar East Asia. Experts emphasize the improvements in China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities—modern aircraft, vessels, and missiles that can prevent opposing militaries from operating freely in the skies and seas near China, and can prevent reinforcements from arriving.
Congress could choose to address the issue of China's changing military capabilities through hearings, authorizing and policy legislation, defense budget allocations, and other means. Some examples of past legislation with significant, continuing impacts include the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act; the 1991 law prohibiting U.S. arms exports to China; and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000, which sets guidelines for U.S.-China military-to-military contacts. In recent hearings, resolutions, and laws, especially NDAAs, Congress has provided prescriptions and guidance regarding U.S. policy toward Asia-Pacific security issues. Budget allocations for specific U.S. defense programs might also be tied to assessments of China's military capabilities and intentions. |
crs_RL31880 | crs_RL31880_0 | Nine persons so far have served as CBO director: Alice Rivlin, Rudolph Penner, Robert Reischauer, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter R. Orszag, Douglas Elmendorf, and Keith Hall. The current director, Keith Hall, was first appointed on March 3, 2015. Eleven persons have served as deputy director; five of them also served as the acting director (for periods amounting in total to about three years). The current deputy director, Robert A. Sunshine, was appointed to the position in August 2007; he served as acting director during the two-month interregnum between directors Orszag and Elemendorf. Appointment Process
The requirements regarding the appointment and tenure of the CBO director, which are simple and straightforward, are set forth in Section 201(a) of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended, and codified at 2 U.S.C. The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly appoint the director after considering recommendations received from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committee chairs inform the congressional leaders of their recommendations by letter. The appointment usually is announced in the Congressional Record . Section 201(a) requires that the selection be made "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties." Media reports over the years indicate that the CBO director is selected under informal practices in which the House and Senate Budget Committees alternate in recommending a nominee to the Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate. These reports also indicate that the Speaker and President pro tempore have adhered to the Budget Committees' recommendations in making past selections. To the extent that these practices are informal, there may be disagreement with regard to their operation in the future selection of a CBO director. The director is appointed to a four-year term that begins on January 3 of the year that precedes the year in which a presidential election is held. If a director is appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term, then that person serves only for the unexpired portion of that term. There is no limit on the number of times that a director may be reappointed to another term. Section 201(a) also authorizes a CBO director to continue to serve past the expiration of his term until a successor is appointed. A CBO director may be removed by either house by resolution. Section 201(a) also provides that the director shall appoint a deputy director. The deputy director serves during the term of the director that appointed the deputy director (and until his or her successor is appointed) but may be removed by the director at any time. The deputy director serves as the acting director if the director resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise absent. 601(a)) | The requirements regarding the appointment and tenure of the CBO director, which are simple and straightforward, are set forth in Section 201(a) of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended, and codified at 2 U.S.C. 601(a). The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly appoint the director after considering recommendations received from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committee chairs inform the congressional leaders of their recommendations by letter. The appointment is usually announced in the Congressional Record.
Section 201(a) requires that the selection be made "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties." Media reports over the years indicate that the CBO director is selected under informal practices in which the House and Senate Budget Committees alternate in recommending a nominee to the Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate. These reports also indicate that the Speaker and President pro tempore have adhered to the Budget Committees' recommendations in making past selections. To the extent that these practices are informal, there may be disagreement with regard to their operation in the future selection of a CBO director.
The director is appointed to a four-year term that begins on January 3 of the year that precedes the year in which a presidential election is held. If a director is appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term, then that person serves only for the unexpired portion of that term. There is no limit on the number of times that a director may be reappointed to another term. Section 201(a) also authorizes a CBO director to continue to serve past the expiration of his term until a successor is appointed. A CBO director may be removed by either house by resolution.
Section 201(a) also provides that the director shall appoint a deputy director. The deputy director serves during the term of the director that appointed the deputy director (and until his or her successor is appointed) but may be removed by the director at any time. The deputy director serves as the acting director if the director resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise absent.
Nine persons so far have served as CBO director: Alice Rivlin, Rudolph Penner, Robert Reischauer, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter R. Orszag, Douglas Elmendorf, and Keith Hall. The current director, Keith Hall, was appointed on March 3, 2015. Eleven persons have served as deputy director; five of them also served as the acting director (for periods amounting in total to about three years). The current deputy director, Robert A. Sunshine, was appointed to the position in August 2007; he served as acting director during the two-month interregnum between directors Orszag and Elemendorf.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL33247 | crs_RL33247_0 | Of the 160 nominations for the Supreme Court, 12 never reached the floor and 13 others never received a final vote, although they were debated on the floor. The emphasis of this report is on the 148 nominations on which some form of formal proceedings took place on the Senate floor, not on the ways in which the nominations might have been handled in committee or other pre-floor stages. A study of the 160 nominations sent to the Senate finds that the Senate's floor consideration of Supreme Court nominations breaks down relatively naturally into five patterns over time. Nominations neither approved nor rejected by the Senate during the session at which they are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted upon at the time of such adjournment or recess shall be returned to the President and shall not be afterwards acted upon, unless again submitted to the Senate by the President; and all motions pending to reconsider a vote upon a nomination shall fall on such adjournment or recess; and the Secretary of the Senate shall thereupon make out and furnish to the heads of departments and other officers the list of nominations rejected or not confirmed, as required by law. The remaining 10 nominations which saw floor action came up on the floor more than two days after the committee reported, sometimes significantly more than two days later. Three live quorum calls were taken during consideration of the nomination. Unanimous Consent Agreements, 1968 to present
In the modern era, Senate practices of floor consideration generally have come to be dominated by the use of unanimous consent agreements, under which Senators agree to limit their rights to debate and to take procedural actions. The present study focuses chiefly on three that are readily identifiable and often referred to
the kind of vote (or other action) by which the Senate disposed of the nominations; the amount of time the Senate spent considering them on the floor; and the forms of procedural action that occurred during their consideration. Well over half the 124 confirmations (73, or 59% of the 124 confirmed) took place by voice vote, and the remaining 51 (41% of confirmations) by roll call. Combining these 26 nominations with the 11 that were rejected, it may be said that just 37 of the Senate's 135 votes on confirmation indicated the presence of "significant" opposition. From this perspective, accordingly, it can be held that just about two-thirds of the 148 Supreme Court nominations reaching the Senate floor have met no more than scattered opposition. Proceedings on 78 of the 148 nominations were procedurally simple in the sense of involving no optional procedural actions. Again as Table 4 shows, procedural roll calls occurred on 26 of the 70 nominations on which any optional procedures were used (18% of the total 148 nominations on which floor action occurred). This percentage is comparable to the 62% of nominations reaching the floor that faced no significant opposition and the 68% that received action on only a single day. No departure from these routine forms of proceeding occurred before 1835, when the nominations of Taney and Barbour, though eligible for the normal procedures, were called up instead by a roll call vote on a motion to proceed to consider. Some of these motions continued to be adopted by voice vote, but others were either adopted or rejected on roll call votes. 1890-1967
After 1890, the frequency of optional procedural action during consideration declined further; from then through 1967, such action appeared on just 14 of the 50 nominations that reached the floor. | From 1789 through 2009, the President submitted to the Senate 160 nominations for positions on the Supreme Court. Of these nominations, 148 received action on the floor of the Senate, and 124 were confirmed. On August 5, 2010, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Solicitor General Elana Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, making her the 124th Justice on the Court.
The forms of proceeding by which the Senate considered the 148 nominees to reach the floor break down relatively naturally into five patterns over time. First, from 1789 through about 1834, the Senate considered the nominations on the floor on the day after they were received from the President. The second period (1835-1867) was distinguished by the beginning of referral of nominations to the Committee on the Judiciary. The third period (1868-1921) was marked by rule changes that brought about more formalization of the process. During the fourth period (1922-1967), the Senate began using the Calendar Call to manage the consideration of Supreme Court nominations, and the final time period, 1968 to the present, is marked by routine roll call votes on confirmation and the use of unanimous consent agreements to structure debate.
Of the 124 votes by which the Senate confirmed nominees, 73 took place by voice vote and 51 by roll call, but on only 26 of the roll calls did 10 or more Senators vote against. Of the 36 nominations not confirmed, the Senate rejected 11 outright, and 12 others never received floor consideration (some, apparently because of opposition; others were withdrawn). The remaining 13 nominations reached the floor but never received a final vote, usually because some procedural action terminated consideration before a vote could occur (and the President later withdrew some of these). Including those that received incomplete consideration, were rejected, or drew more than 10 negative votes, just 50 of the 160 total nominations experienced opposition that might be called "significant."
Of the 148 nominations that reached the floor, 100 received one day of consideration, while 26 received more than two days, including four on which floor action took seven days or more. Of these 148 nominations, optional procedural actions that indicate the presence of an attempt to delay or block a confirmation vote occurred on 58, of which 26 involved procedural roll calls. Among a wide variety of procedural actions used, the more common ones have included motions to postpone, recommit, and table; motions to proceed to consider or other complications in calling up; live quorum calls, and unanimous consent agreements.
Neither extended consideration, the presence of extra procedural actions, nor the appearance of "significant" opposition affords definitive evidence, by itself, that proceedings were contentious. For example, some nominations considered for one day still faced procedural roll calls, some considered for three days or more faced no optional procedures, and some opposed by more than 10 Senators were still considered only briefly and without optional procedures. Of the 148 nominations to reach the floor, however, 76 were confirmed in a single day of action with neither optional procedural actions nor more than scattered opposition.
This report will be updated to reflect action on additional nominations to the Court. |
crs_R42508 | crs_R42508_0 | Introduction
In 2002, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA, also called MDUFA I) gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to collect fees from the medical device industry. Medical devices are a wide range of products that are used to diagnose, treat, monitor, or prevent a disease or condition in a patient. Manufacturers of certain kinds of medical devices must obtain FDA approval or clearance before marketing in the United States. The Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) has primary responsibility within FDA for medical device premarket review. The purpose of user fees is to support the FDA's medical device premarket review program and to help reduce the time it takes the agency to review and make decisions on marketing applications. Lengthy review times affect the industry, which waits to market its products, and patients, who wait to use these products. The user fee law provides revenue for FDA; in conjunction, the agency negotiates with industry to set performance goals for the premarket review of medical devices. Like the prescription drug and animal drug user fee programs, the medical device user fee program has been authorized in five-year increments. Just before expiration, FDA's medical device user fee authorities were reauthorized through September 30, 2012, by the Medical Device User Fee Amendments of 2007 (MDUFA II). For MDUFA III, FDA announced in February 2012 that it had reached agreement with the medical device industry on proposed recommendations for the reauthorization of the medical device user fee program. The draft MDUFA III package—composed of statutory language and the FDA-industry agreement on performance goals and procedures—was posted on the FDA website in March 2012 and a public meeting on the draft was held later that month. Following a 30-day comment period, a final recommendation was submitted to Congress. On July 9, 2012, the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144 ) became law. FDA's authority to collect medical device user fees was reauthorized for FY2013 through FY2017 via Title II of FDASIA. However, under the FY2013 continuing resolution (Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, P.L. 112-175 ), although FDA is collecting the new user fees allowed by MDUFA III/FDASIA, it can only spend fees up to the FY2012 level. For FY2012, 35% of FDA's total budget comes from user fees. User fees are an increasing proportion of FDA's device-related budget, as shown in Table 1 . User fees were 7.1% of FDA's devices and radiological health program level budget in FY2002 when MQSA was the sole user fee, and 14.2% of FDA's devices and radiological health program level budget in FY2012, with both MQSA and medical device user fees being collected by the agency. Other Issues
In addition to MDUFA III, Congress, in FDASIA, also reauthorized PDUFA and included new authorities for a Generic Drug User Fee Act and a Biosimilars User Fee Act. | The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the agency responsible for the regulation of medical devices. These are a wide range of products that are used to diagnose, treat, monitor, or prevent a disease or condition in a patient. A medical device company must obtain FDA's prior approval or clearance before marketing many medical devices in the United States. The Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) within FDA is primarily responsible for medical device review and regulation. CDRH activities are funded through a combination of public money (i.e., direct FDA appropriations from Congress) and private money (i.e., user fees collected from device manufacturers), which together comprises FDA's total.
Congress first gave FDA the authority to collect user fees from medical device companies in the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-250). Five years later, the user fees were reauthorized through September 30, 2012, by the Medical Device User Fee Amendments of 2007 (MDUFA II; Title II of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, FDAAA; P.L. 110-85). Over the years, concerns raised about medical device user fees have prompted Congress to carefully consider issues such as which agency activities could use fees, how user fees can be kept from supplanting federal funding, and which companies should qualify as small businesses and pay a reduced fee.
The purpose of the user fee program is to help reduce the time in which FDA can review and make decisions on marketing applications. Lengthy review times affect the industry, which waits to market its products, and patients, who wait to use these products. The user fee law provides a revenue stream for FDA; in conjunction, the agency negotiates with industry to set performance goals for the premarket review of medical devices. In February 2012, FDA reached agreement with the medical device industry on proposed recommendations for the second user fee reauthorization—referred to as MDUFA III. The draft MDUFA III package—composed of statutory language and the FDA-industry agreement on performance goals and procedures—was posted on the FDA website in March 2012. Following a public meeting and a 30-day comment period on the draft, a final MDUFA III recommendation was submitted to Congress.
On July 9, 2012, the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144) became law. MDUFA III was included in FDASIA as Title II. FDA's authority to collect medical device user fees was reauthorized for another five years, FY2013 through FY2017. FDASIA also reauthorized the prescription drug user fee program, created new user fee programs for generic and biosimilar drug approvals, and modified FDA authority to regulate medical products.
However, under the current FY2013 continuing resolution (P.L. 112-175), although FDA is collecting the new user fees allowed by MDUFA III/FDASIA, it can only spend fees up to the FY2012 level. Since medical device user fees were first collected in FY2003, they have comprised an increasing proportion of FDA's device budget. All user fees (as enacted) accounted for 35% of FDA's total FY2012 program level, and device user fees accounted for 14% of the device and radiological health program level, which was $376 million in FY2012, including $53 million in user fees. |
crs_R45269 | crs_R45269_0 | O n July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to succeed Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who is scheduled to retire from active status on July 31, 2018. Judge Kavanaugh has served as an appellate judge for the D.C. He has also sat, by designation, on judicial panels for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Eighth Circuit), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit), and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. During his tenure on the bench, Judge Kavanaugh has adjudicated more than 1,500 cases, almost all while a member of either a three-judge or en banc panel of the D.C. But in part because of the D.C. Circuit's location in the nation's capital and the number of statutes providing it with special or even exclusive jurisdiction to review certain agency actions, legal commentators generally agree that the D.C. Circuit's docket, relative to the dockets of other circuits, contains a greater percentage of nationally significant legal matters. Cases adjudicated by the D.C. Circuit are more likely to concern the review of federal agency action or civil suits involving the federal government than cases adjudicated in other circuits, while the D.C. Circuit docket has a lower percentage of cases involving criminal matters, prisoner petitions, or civil suits between private parties. This report provides tabular listings of 306 cases in which Judge Kavanaugh authored a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. Arguably, these written opinions provide the greatest insight into Judge Kavanaugh's judicial approach, as a judge's vote or decision to join an opinion authored by a colleague may not necessarily represent full agreement with a colleague's views. The opinions discussed in this report are categorized into three tables: Table 1 identifies 148 opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh on behalf of a unanimous panel; Table 2 contains 47 controlling opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh in which one or more panelists wrote a separate opinion; and Table 3 lists 111 cases where Judge Kavanaugh wrote a concurring or dissenting opinion, including cases where Judge Kavanaugh wrote both the majority opinion and a separate concurrence. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order based on where the case appears in the Federal Reporter . While this report identifies and briefly describes opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh during his tenure on the federal bench, it does not analyze the implications of those opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters will be discussed in a forthcoming CRS report. | On July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to succeed Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who is scheduled to retire from active status on July 31, 2018. Judge Kavanaugh has served as a judge on the D.C. Circuit since May 30, 2006. He has also sat, by designation, on judicial panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and also served on three-judge panels of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
During his tenure on the bench, Judge Kavanaugh has adjudicated more than 1,500 cases, almost all while a member of either a three-judge or en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit. In part because of the D.C. Circuit's location in the nation's capital and the number of statutes providing it with special or even exclusive jurisdiction to review certain agency actions, legal commentators generally agree that the D.C. Circuit's docket, relative to the dockets of other circuits, contains a greater percentage of nationally significant legal matters. Cases adjudicated by the D.C. Circuit are more likely to concern the review of federal agency action or civil suits involving the federal government than cases adjudicated in other circuits, while the D.C. Circuit docket has a lower percentage of cases involving criminal matters, prisoner petitions, or civil suits between private parties.
Arguably, Judge Kavanaugh's authored opinions provide the greatest insight into the nominee's judicial approach, as a judge's vote or decision to join an opinion authored by a colleague may not necessarily represent full agreement with a colleague's views. This report provides a tabular listing of 306 cases in which Judge Kavanaugh authored a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. The opinions are categorized into three tables: Table 1 identifies 148 opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh on behalf of a unanimous panel; Table 2 contains 47 controlling opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh in which one or more panelists wrote a separate opinion; and Table 3 lists 111 cases where Judge Kavanaugh wrote a concurring or dissenting opinion (decisions where Judge Kavanaugh wrote both the controlling opinion and a separate concurrence are included in this final table). Opinions are identified and briefly discussed in each table in reverse chronological order based on where the case appears in the Federal Reporter. The opinions are also categorized by their primary legal subjects (e.g., administrative law, criminal law & procedure, environmental law, federal courts & civil procedure, labor & employment law, and national security).
While this report identifies and briefly describes judicial opinions authored by Judge Kavanaugh during his time on the federal court, it does not analyze the implications of his judicial opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters will be discussed in a forthcoming CRS report. Key CRS products related to the Supreme Court vacancy and Judge Kavanaugh's nomination are collected in CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10160, Supreme Court Nomination: CRS Products, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44780 | crs_R44780_0 | To that end, this report provides a synopsis of poverty measurement in the United States, focusing on the following:
the official measure of poverty, which is used to obtain official counts and percentages of the poor; the Supplemental Poverty Measure, which is used for research purposes only and was developed to improve upon some limitations of the official measure; and the Health and Human Services (HHS) poverty guidelines, which are used in administering programs for low-income persons but not to measure the poor population. Poverty measures convey the number or percentage of people falling below given income amounts, which are intended to represent a level of economic privation and are computed using some factually based measurement of basic needs. A family's income is compared against a dollar amount representing some measure of need, called a threshold , which typically varies by a family's size and composition. Those with family income less than the threshold are considered to be "in poverty," or poor; those with incomes greater than or equal to the threshold are not considered to be in poverty. All members of the same family have the same poverty status. They are financial measures, and do not directly capture the physical, mental, or social effects of being poor. Poverty Measures Are Not the Same as Sufficiency Measures
Even within their focus on financial resources, the purpose of these poverty measures when they were developed was to accurately measure economic privation rather than to describe the full complement of resources a person or family needs to be self-sufficient. Poverty Measures Are Estimates Based on Survey Data
Poverty data are obtained from surveys, and are therefore estimates that have margins of error. Poverty estimates derived from different data sources—even those using the same definition of poverty—will almost always differ. The Supplemental Poverty Measure
There has been broad agreement among poverty scholars that the limitations noted above represent serious drawbacks to the official poverty measure, and also that fixing them has not been a straightforward task. In 2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) convened an Interagency Technical Working Group (ITWG) to consolidate the research and propose a single Supplemental Poverty Measure, which would be used for research purposes only. Legal Authority for Poverty Measurement
Neither the official poverty measure nor the Supplemental Poverty Measure was established in statute. OMB, the successor agency to the Bureau of the Budget, issued Statistical Policy Directive 14 in 1978, reconfirming the measure as official and directing federal agencies to use it for statistical purposes. The directive explicitly stated that the measure was not developed for administrative purposes, and allowed for other measures of poverty to be developed, as long as the data for those measures were distinguished from the official series. Unlike the measures discussed in this report, the poverty guidelines are not used to count the number of people or families in poverty. Simplification of the Poverty Thresholds for Administrative Use
As explained earlier, the official poverty thresholds were based on empirical measures of dietary need, the amount that a family in economic distress might need to spend on food in order to attempt to meet its dietary needs, and the spending patterns of families across the income distribution (to determine what percentage of an average family's budget was spent on food). | Poverty measures convey the number or percentage of people falling below given income amounts, which are intended to represent a level of economic privation and are computed using some factually based measurement of basic needs. The poverty measures discussed in this report—the official U.S. poverty measure and the research Supplemental Poverty Measure—focus on financial resources. A family's income is compared against a dollar amount representing some measure of need, called a threshold, which typically varies by family size and composition. Those with family income less than the threshold are considered to be "in poverty," or poor; those with incomes greater than or equal to the threshold are not considered to be in poverty. All members of the same family have the same poverty status.
The poverty measures discussed here are financial measures; they do not directly capture the physical, mental, or social effects of being poor. They were developed to accurately measure economic privation rather than to describe the full complement of resources a person or family needs to be self-sufficient.
Poverty data are obtained from surveys, and are therefore estimates that have margins of error. Poverty estimates derived from different data sources—even those using the same definition of poverty—will almost always differ.
The official poverty thresholds were developed in the early 1960s, and were based on empirical measures of dietary need, on the amount that a family in economic distress might need to spend on food to attempt to meet its dietary needs, and on the spending patterns of families across the income distribution. This information was used to determine what percentage of an average family's budget was spent on food, and in turn, to compute the amounts representing total family income.
There has been broad agreement among poverty scholars that the official poverty measure has serious limitations, and decades of research were undertaken to address them. In 2009, an interagency technical working group, convened under the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), put forth the Supplemental Poverty Measure to consolidate the research and emphasize not only sound concepts and methodology in the measure's development, but also practicality in the measure's maintenance, computation, and usage. The Supplemental Poverty Measure was not intended to replace the official measure, and it was expected that refinement of the Supplemental Poverty Measure's methodology and data sources would continue.
Neither the official poverty measure nor the Supplemental Poverty Measure was established in statute. The Bureau of the Budget and its successor agency, OMB, directed federal agencies to use the official measure for statistical purposes. The directive explicitly stated that the measure was not developed for administrative purposes, and allowed for other measures of poverty to be developed, as long as the data for those measures were distinguished from the official series.
For administrative uses, such as determining whether an individual or family is eligible for assistance from a program, a different set of dollar amounts called poverty guidelines is used. Poverty guidelines are different from the official poverty thresholds, are published by the Department of Health and Human Services, and are not used to count the poverty population. However, any program that relies on counts of the poverty population, such as for formula grants, uses the official poverty thresholds and not the guidelines. |
crs_R44877 | crs_R44877_0 | T his report describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2018 funding for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2017 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations. CRS Report R44938, FY2018 Appropriations for the Department of Justice . The vast majority of funding for the science agencies goes to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation. FY2017 Enacted Appropriations
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ) provided a total of $66.360 billion for CJS. The total appropriation included $9.237 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.962 billion for DOJ, $27.240 billion for the science agencies, and $921 million for the related agencies. The Administration's FY2018 Budget Request
The Trump Administration requested a total of $62.331 billion for CJS for FY2018, a $4.029 billion (6.1%) reduction compared to the FY2017 enacted appropriation. The request included $7.817 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.205 billion for the DOJ, $25.751 billion for the science agencies, and $559 million for the related agencies. The Administration's budget included funding reductions for many CJS agencies and bureaus. The House-Passed Bill (H.R. 3354)
On July 17, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2018 CJS appropriations bill ( H.R. 3267 ). Subsequently, the text of the committee-reported FY2018 CJS appropriations bill was included as Division C of an omnibus appropriations bill ( H.R. 3354 ) that was passed by the House on September 14, 2017. The bill included
$8.350 billion for the Department of Commerce (6.9% more than the Administration's request, but 9.6% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation), $29.310 billion for DOJ (3.5% more than the Administration's request and 1.2% more than the FY2017 enacted appropriation), $27.217 billion for the science agencies (5.7% more than the Administration's request, but 0.1% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation), and $842 million for the related agencies (50.7% more than the Administration's request, but 8.5% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation). The House-passed bill would have funded Department of Commerce accounts at an amount above the Administration's request. The Senate Committee-Reported Bill (S. 1662)
On July 27, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2018 CJS appropriations bill ( S. 1662 ). The bill would have provided $65.991 billion for CJS. The Senate committee-reported bill included
$9.161 billion for the Department of Commerce (17.2% more than the Administration's request, but 0.8% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation), $29.068 billion for DOJ (2.6% more than the Administration's request and 0.4% more than the FY2017 enacted appropriation), $26.846 billion for the science agencies (4.3% more than the Administration's request, but 1.4% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation), and $916 million for the related agencies (64.0% more than the Administration's request, but 0.5% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation). The Senate Committee on Appropriations also declined to follow the Administration's request to eliminate several CJS agencies and programs. FY2018 Enacted Appropriations
For FY2018, Congress and the President appropriated a total of $72.119 billion for CJS. This includes $70.921 billion in regular appropriations provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) and $1.198 billion in emergency-designated funding provided in the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). The FY2018 enacted appropriation for the Department of Commerce is $12.137 billion ($11.137 billion without emergency-designated funding), for the Department of Justice it is $30.384 billion ($30.299 billion without emergency-designated funding), for the science agencies it is $28.609 billion ($28.511 billion without emergency-designated funding), and for the related agencies it is $989 million ($974 million without emergency-designated funding). | This report describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2018 appropriations for the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2017 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations.
Division B of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) provided a total of $66.360 billion (which includes $109 million in emergency-designated funding) for CJS. Under the act, the Department of Commerce received $9.237 billion, the Department of Justice received $28.962 billion, the science agencies received $27.240 billion, and the related agencies received $921 million.
The Trump Administration requested a total of $62.331 billion for CJS for FY2018, a $4.029 billion (6.1%) reduction compared to the FY2017 enacted appropriation. The request included $7.817 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.205 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.751 billion for the science agencies, and $559 million for the related agencies. The Administration's budget included cuts for most CJS accounts. In addition to the funding reductions, the Administration proposed to eliminate several CJS agencies and programs, including the Economic Development Administration, the Minority Business Development Administration, the Legal Services Corporation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Office of Education.
On July 17, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2018 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 3267). The text of the FY2018 CJS committee-reported appropriations bill was included as Division C of an omnibus appropriations bill that was passed by the House on September 14, 2017 (H.R. 3354). The House-passed bill, as amended, would have provided $65.719 billion for CJS, which is 1.0% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation, but 5.2% greater than the Administration's request. The bill included $8.350 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.310 billion for the Department of Justice, $27.217 billion for the science agencies, and $842 million for the related agencies. The House-passed bill would have provided funding for the agencies and programs the Administration proposed eliminating.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2018 CJS appropriations bill (S. 1662) on July 27, 2017. The committee-reported bill recommended a total of $65.991 billion for CJS for FY2018, an amount that was 0.6% less than the FY2017 enacted appropriation, but 5.7% more than the Administration's request. The committee-reported bill included $9.161 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.068 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.846 billion for the science agencies, and $916 million for the related agencies. The Senate committee-reported bill would have provided funding for the agencies and programs the Administration proposed eliminating.
For FY2018, Congress and the President provided $72.119 billion for CJS in enacted appropriations. This includes $70.921 billion in regular appropriations provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division B, P.L. 115-141) and $1.198 billion in emergency-designated funding provided in the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The total FY2018 enacted appropriation is $12.137 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.384 billion for the Department of Justice, $28.609 billion for the science agencies, and $989 million for the related agencies. Nearly all CJS accounts saw an increase in funding for FY2018. In addition, Congress declined to adopt the Administration's earlier proposal to eliminate funding for several CJS agencies and programs. |
crs_97-690 | crs_97-690_0 | The United States pledged $48.6 million in addition to FY2010 appropriated foreign assistance and FY2011 requested aid (see below). Kyrgyzstan joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994 and has participated in several PFP exercises in the United States, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Pamela Spratlen stated that the United States is "fully committed to cooperating with the government and people of the Kyrgyz Republic to meet the most urgent development needs throughout the country. He also praised Kyrgyzstan's participation as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of U.S. and NATO equipment to and from Afghanistan, and the country's hosting of the U.S. Manas Transit Center for military air flights in and out of Afghanistan (see below). According to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, cumulative U.S. budgeted foreign aid to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2010 was $1.22 billion (FREEDOM Support Act and agency funds), with Kyrgyzstan ranking third in such aid per capita among the Soviet successor states (however, much support for the Manas Transit Center is not included in this total; see below). After an April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan and ethnic violence in June 2010 in the south of the country, the United States committed about $90 million in urgent humanitarian and other assistance in addition to appropriated foreign assistance of $53.6 million for FY2010. Country totals for FY2013 are not yet available. U.S. priorities in FY2014 include $14.2 million for strengthening the legislature, civil society, independent media, and political parties, and facilitating judicial reform and ethnic reconciliation. The program was completed in FY2010. These experiences may have prompted Kyrgyzstan's approval almost immediately after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States of a U.S. request to use Kyrgyz airspace for counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the Manas international airport near Bishkek, and it became operational in December 2001. Missions include support for personnel and cargo transiting in and out of the theater, aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical evacuation. The Manas Transit Center reported in 2013 that there are about 1,500 U.S. troops and U.S. contractors at the center, as well as KC-135 and C-17 aircraft, and that it transports nearly 300,000 troops and other personnel into and out of Afghanistan per year. Kyrgyz media reported that these officials stressed that the airbase would be closed in 2014. Russia has 51% of the shares in GAK and Kyrgyzstan has 49%. | Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor Central Asian country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, bolster economic reform and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. Special attention long has been placed on bolstering civil society and democratization in what has appeared to be the most receptive—but still challenging—political and social environment in Central Asia.
The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Kyrgyzstan offered to host U.S. forces at an airbase at the Manas international airport outside of the capital, Bishkek, and it opened in December 2001. The U.S. military repaired and later upgraded the air field for aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, medical evacuation, and support for U.S. and coalition personnel and cargo transiting in and out of Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government threatened to close down the airbase in early 2009, but renewed the lease on the airbase (renamed the Manas Transit Center) in June 2009 after the United States agreed to higher lease and other payments. President Almazbek Atambayev and the legislature have stated that the basing agreement will not be renewed when it expires in 2014. As of 2013, the Manas Transit Center reports that it hosts about 1,500 U.S. troops and U.S. contractors and a fleet of KC-135 refueling tankers and C-17 transport aircraft. Besides hosting the Manas Transit Center, Kyrgyzstan also participates as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of military supplies to and from Afghanistan.
Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2010 was $1.22 billion (all agencies and programs). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capita among the Soviet successor states, indicative of U.S. government and congressional support in the early 1990s for its apparent progress in making reforms and more recently to support anti-terrorism, border protection, and operations in Afghanistan. After an April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan and ethnic violence in June 2010 in the south of the country, the United States committed about $90 million in urgent humanitarian and other assistance in addition to appropriated foreign assistance. Foreign assistance was $41.36 million in FY2011 and $47.399 million in FY2012. The Administration has requested $51.82 million for FY2014. Country totals for FY2013 are not yet available. |
crs_RL31410 | crs_RL31410_0 | The Superfund trust fund is used to clean up sites contaminated by releases of hazardous substances. Without dedicated taxes, and with a relatively small balance in the trust fund, Congress has been using general revenues for a larger percentage of cleanup funds. 99-499 ), created the Superfund program to clean up the nation's worst hazardous waste sites and directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prepare a National Priorities List (NPL) to identify sites that present the greatest risk to human health and the environment. According to EPA, PRPs conduct cleanup at more than 70% of the sites on the NPL. Superfund Taxes
The trust fund has had several sources of revenue over the years, the most important being dedicated taxes on petroleum, chemical feedstocks, and corporate income. The Administration's critics use the "polluter pays" term in a broader sense, however, to mean that the tax money that is used to clean up the other 30% of the sites should come from industries that profited from the sale or use of the chemicals being cleaned up, but who may not be directly related to a particular release of a hazardous substance. Thus, they support resumption of the dedicated taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks as well as the Corporate Environmental Income Tax, arguing that this approach is more appropriate than funding the trust fund through general Treasury revenues. Expiration of the Taxing Authority
The taxes that supported the trust fund expired at the end of 1995. In FY2005, the entire appropriation ($1.25 billion) came from general revenues. By the end of FY2001, the fund's unobligated balance had declined to $860 million. OMB includes these estimates in the Appendix to the annual Budget of the United States Government (hereafter referred to as the President's budget request for a particular fiscal year). Similar to recent years, the Administration's FY2009 budget request proposed $1.26 billion for the Superfund appropriation to consist of "sums available in the Trust Fund on September 30, 2008" (i.e., the end of FY2008, therefore the FY2009 starting balance) and "up to [$1.26 billion] as a payment from general revenues," if the trust fund balance is not sufficient to fund the total appropriation. Regardless, the vast majority of the FY2009 appropriation would come from general Treasury revenues. The study looked at all major elements of the Superfund program, including the removal program (for emergency and short-term cleanups); the remedial program (long-term cleanup); site assessment activities; program staff, management, and support costs; program administration; and Superfund-related work of other programs and agencies. First, the fund's unobligated balance, which remained relatively high (see Figure 1 ) during the years of Superfund taxes (and the two fiscal years following the tax expiration), has decreased steadily since FY1997, reaching zero at the end of FY2003. In fact, between FY2004 and FY2007, the President's Superfund budget proposals exceeded the annual amount that was subsequently appropriated by Congress. | This report discusses the role of dedicated taxes and other sources of revenue in funding the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund. Congress makes annual appropriations to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from this trust fund and from general Treasury revenues for the purpose of supporting the Superfund program. The Superfund program addresses both short-term (emergency) and long-term cleanup activity of hazardous substances at contaminated sites.
Three dedicated taxes (on petroleum, chemical feedstocks, and corporate income) historically provided the majority of the trust fund's income. The taxes expired at the end of 1995, however, and the amount of unobligated money in the fund gradually dwindled. By the end of FY2003, the fund's unobligated balance was zero, down from a high of $3.8 billion in 1996.
The Administration's decision to not request reinstatement of the taxes has been supported by Congress, although some Members introduced legislation to do so. The annual budgets have compensated for the lack of dedicated tax revenue by increasing the contribution from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. In fiscal years 2004-2008, virtually the entire Superfund program appropriation came from general Treasury revenues.
Proponents of reinstating the dedicated taxes contend that the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and releases (e.g., spills and leaks) should rely on taxes paid by the chemical and petroleum industries and companies that used the hazardous substances being cleaned up, not taxpayers. Proponents refer to this as the "polluter pays" principle. They also contend that in the context of federal budget deficits, it may be difficult to maintain spending at needed levels without dedicated taxes. Opponents of reinstating the tax argue, for example, that the tax is overreaching and unfair, as it applies to all industry sectors and to both compliant and noncompliant companies. In general, this funding debate applies to 30% of the sites on the National Priorities List; the remaining 70% of the sites, according to EPA, are cleaned up by responsible parties.
Several reports, including one for the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and reports by the EPA Inspector General, have concluded that spending has fallen short of the program's needs. From FY2004 through FY2008, the President's Superfund budget requests declined each year. However, during most of those years, the President's Superfund budget proposals exceeded the amounts appropriated by Congress. |
crs_RL30143 | crs_RL30143_0 | (1)
This controversy about the W-88 warhead raised policy issues about whether U.S. securitywas further threatened by the PRC's suspected use of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets in its developmentof smaller nuclear warheads and new ICBMs, as well as whether the Administration's response tothe security problem was effective or mishandled and whether it fairly used or abused itsinvestigative and prosecuting authority. In a publicly known fifth case, on April 9, 2003, in Los Angeles,authorities arrested a retired FBI agent who directed the FBI's counter-China efforts in Los Angelesuntil 2000, James J. Smith, and his informant and mistress, a Chinese-American businesswomannamed Katrina M. Leung, for involvement in allegedly mishandling national defense information-- some classified -- related to China. He was notcharged with espionage. (21)
Damage Assessments on the W88
Concerning the serious case of China's suspected acquisition of the W88 data that becamepublic in early 1999, there were concerns about China's modernization of its nuclear-armed ballisticmissile force and implications for U.S. national security. (23)
President on U.S. Superiority
On April 7, 1999, President Clinton presented a public assessment that in the U.S.-Chinastrategic balance, U.S. nuclear forces still maintained decisive superiority over China's relativelylimited strategic nuclear forces. In part, because of our engagement, China has, at best, onlymarginally increased its deployed nuclear threat in the last 15 years. (29)
According to the unclassified key findings released by the DCI, the Intelligence Community'sdamage assessment, with concurrence by the independent panel, confirmed that "China obtained byespionage classified U.S. nuclear weapons information that probably accelerated its program todevelop future nuclear weapons." nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II" that delivers the W88 warhead as well as "avariety of U.S. weapon design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutronbomb." Cox Committee's Report
Findings. (44) On March 25, 1999, Senator Shelby, the committee's chair,announced that it voted unanimously to begin an investigation into whether China obtained U.S.nuclear weapon secrets and how the Administration dealt with counter-intelligence at the labs. Section 3146 of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. (54)
National Nuclear Security Administration(NNSA). 2032 to establisha Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy. The ClintonAdministration acknowledged that improvements to security measures were required at the nuclearweapon labs and said that it took a number of corrective actions in response to indications in 1995that China may have obtained secrets about the W88 in the 1980s. Critics arguedthat the Clinton Administration was slow to respond to concerns about China and the labs and thatDOE officials resisted reforms for years. (145)
Indictment of Wen Ho Lee. (147)
By December 1999, the FBI completed the specific investigation that focused on Lee'stransfers of computer files, which were discovered just before he was fired in March 1999, afterwhich, FBI agents later searched his home in April 1999. Then, on September 10,2000, the prosecution and defense revealed that they had negotiated a plea agreement, under whichLee would plead guilty to one felony count of unlawful retention of national defense information,help the government to verify that he destroyed the seven tapes (as he maintained), and thegovernment would drop the other 58 counts and free Lee (with sentencing to the nine months healready served in jail). | This CRS Report discusses China's suspected acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets,including that on the W88, the newest U.S. nuclear warhead. This serious controversy becamepublic in early 1999 and raised policy issues about whether U.S. security was further threatened byChina's suspected use of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets in its development of nuclear forces, as wellas whether the Administration's response to the security problems was effective or mishandled andwhether it fairly used or abused its investigative and prosecuting authority. The ClintonAdministration acknowledged that improved security was needed at the weapons labs but said thatit took actions in response to indications in 1995 that China may have obtained U.S. nuclear weaponsecrets. Critics in Congress and elsewhere argued that the Administration was slow to respond tosecurity concerns, mishandled the too narrow investigation, downplayed information potentiallyunfavorable to China and the labs, and failed to notify Congress fully.
On April 7, 1999, President Clinton gave his assurance that partly "because of ourengagement, China has, at best, only marginally increased its deployed nuclear threat in the last 15years" and that the strategic balance with China "remains overwhelmingly in our favor." On April21, 1999, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, reported the IntelligenceCommunity's damage assessment. It confirmed that "China obtained by espionage classified U.S.nuclear weapons information that probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclearweapons." It also revealed that China obtained information on "several" U.S. nuclear reentryvehicles, including the Trident II submarine-launched missile that delivers the W88 nuclear warheadas well as "a variety of" design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutronbomb.
On May 25, 1999, the House's Cox Committee reported that China stole classifiedinformation on the W88 and six other U.S. nuclear warheads. On June 15, 1999, the President'sForeign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) called the Department of Energy a "dysfunctionalbureaucracy" and urged the creation of a semi-autonomous or independent agency to oversee nuclearweapons. In September 1999, Congress passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act tocreate a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within DOE on March 1, 2000.
As one result of the W-88 case, the FBI investigated a Taiwan-born U.S. scientist at the LosAlamos lab, Wen Ho Lee. He was never charged with espionage. In December 1999, the JusticeDepartment indicted Lee on 59 felony counts for mishandling nuclear weapons information (notclassified at the time). Lee was jailed without bail until a plea agreement on September 13, 2000,when he pleaded guilty to one count of mishandling national defense information (for making copiesof his computer files). The judge apologized to Lee. Meanwhile, in April 1999, the FBI expandedits counterintelligence investigation beyond the focus on Los Alamos, and in 2000, the probe shiftedto missile secrets and to the Defense Department. In April 2003, an ex-FBI agent, James Smith, andhis informant, Katrina Leung, were arrested for allegedly mishandling national defense informationrelated to China. |
crs_R40824 | crs_R40824_0 | This mission is called Operation New Dawn (OND). Figure 1 charts the deaths of civilians and police and security forces as reported by the Iraq Ministry of Health. The Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (ICCC) is another nonprofit group that, like the IBC, tracks Iraqi civilian and Iraqi security forces deaths using media reports of deaths. Earlier studies include "the Lancet study." In 2007, a British firm, Opinion Research Business (ORB), conducted a survey in Iraq in which it asked 2,411 Iraqis, "How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 (i.e., as a result of violence rather than a natural death such as old age)? Finally, the Brookings Institution has used numbers from the following sources to develop its own composite estimate for Iraqi civilians, police, and security forces who have died by violence: the U.N. Human Rights Report , the Iraq Body Count, the U.S. Central Command's General David Petraeus's congressional testimony given on September 10-11, 2007, Iraqi government sources, and other sources. Table 4 provides Iraqi civilian, security forces, and police officers casualty estimates from nongovernmental sources. These estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, and therefore readers should exercise caution when using and comparing these statistics. | This report presents U.S. military casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND) as well as governmental and nongovernmental estimates of Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces casualties.
For several years, there were few estimates from any national or international government source regarding Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces casualties. Now, however, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is reporting civilian casualty estimates. In addition, several Iraqi ministries have released monthly or total casualty statistics.
Nongovernmental sources also have released various estimates of Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces casualties. This report includes estimates from Iraq Body Count (IBC), the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (ICCC), Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS), the most recent study published in the Lancet, the Brookings Institution, and the British survey firm, Opinion Research Business (ORB).
Because the estimates of Iraqi casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43505 | crs_R43505_0 | Malaysia, a majority Muslim nation of 31 million people, is a partner in numerous U.S. security and economic initiatives in Southeast Asia. Malaysian statements along these lines have moderated in recent years, especially under Prime Minister Najib. The United States' withdrawal from the TPP agreement, and other actions taken by the Trump Administration, such as seeking to block arrivals to the United States from select Muslim nations, has created uncertainty in Malaysia about the United States' approach and commitment to the region, and has contributed to perceptions that the U.S. may turn inward or may become anti-Islamic. Domestic Politics
Malaysia has displayed a high degree of political stability since it gained independence in 1957 despite strong political divides among its population. Political coalitions led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the country's dominant political party, have ruled Malaysia without interruption since independence. In the decades since, the question of the NEP's bumiputra preferences (i.e., favoring ethnic Malays and other indigenous groups), and more broadly of ethnic identity, has become one of the defining issues in Malaysian politics. Human rights groups have criticized the measures as overly restrictive. The position of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim is of particular sensitivity in Malaysia, and in U.S.-Malaysia relations. U.S.-Malaysia Relations
Bilateral ties between the United States and Malaysia have been both highly cooperative and publicly contentious. Malaysia is a strong partner in many U.S. security and economic initiatives, but domestic Malaysian sensitivities, particularly regarding the nation's identity in the Muslim world, have constrained Malaysian leaders from undertaking high-profile partnerships with the United States. The State Department upgraded Malaysia's ranking in its Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report from Tier 3 (the worst ranking) in 2014 to Tier 2 Watch List in 2015, sparking a controversy. Critics of the State Department's decision, including the more than 175 Members of Congress who signed letters to the Secretary of State, allege that the State Department overlooked evidence that the Malaysian government has failed to improve its human trafficking problems. The U.S. and Malaysian defense establishments have built ties through frequent military exercises, combined training, ship visits, and military education exchanges. In 2016, Malaysia was the 24 th -largest market for U.S. goods exports and the 14 th -largest supplier of U.S. goods imports. Trade Agreements
Malaysia had worked with the United States and other nations since 2010 on the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA). The TPP text included enforceable commitments on a range of trade and investment issues from tariff and nontariff barriers to labor and environmental standards. Neither country publicly has expressed interest to date in returning to bilateral FTA negotiations, but there may be interest in Malaysia in some type of economic dialogue such as a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). RCEP does not include the United States. South China Sea Maritime Disputes
Malaysia is one of four Southeast Asian nations with maritime territorial disputes with China (the others are Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnam). Over the past decade, Malaysia regularly has sought to foster more cooperation among Southeast Asian claimants in efforts to resolve their own disputes and to bolster their claims in disputes with China. Security Cooperation
The Malaysian military participates in a variety of cooperative security activities on a bilateral and multilateral basis with partners from Southeast Asia and outside the region. Within Southeast Asia, Malaysia has played an active role as a mediator in conflicts between rebel Muslim groups and the central government in both Thailand and in the Philippines. | Malaysia, an ethnically diverse majority Muslim nation in Southeast Asia, has long been a partner in U.S. security and economic initiatives in the region, although political sensitivities in Malaysia have constrained both sides from forging deeper ties. Bilateral relations have improved over the past decade. Prime Minister Najib Razak, who came to power in 2009, made relations with the United States a priority early in his administration. More recently he has moved to deepen trade and economic ties with China. Congress has shown interest in a variety of issues in U.S.-Malaysia relations over the years, especially regarding trade, counterterror and security cooperation, human rights, the environment, and Malaysia's external relations.
Malaysia is considered a middle-income country that is relatively prosperous when compared to other Southeast Asian countries. The United States and Malaysia are major trade and investment partners. In 2016, Malaysia was the 24th-largest market for U.S. exports and the 14th-largest supplier of U.S. imports. The two countries negotiated and signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA), which would have removed tariff and nontariff barriers to trade between the United States, Malaysia, and the other 10 participants. President Trump withdrew from the pact in January, stating an intent to negotiate future FTAs bilaterally, potentially with TPP partners. To date, there appears to have been little discussion of resuming bilateral U.S.-Malaysia FTA negotiations, but there may be interest in Malaysia in some type of economic dialogue with the United States such as a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Malaysia is also seeking to develop deeper regional trade ties through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which does not include the United States.
Malaysia has enjoyed considerable political stability since it gained independence in 1957 despite potential cleavages within its multiethnic and multireligious social fabric. Political coalitions led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the country's dominant political party, have ruled Malaysia without interruption since independence. UMNO is a staunch proponent of economic and social preferences for ethnic Malays and other indigenous groups, collectively known as bumiputra. It has supported a wide-ranging economic program known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), which attempts to address socio-economic disparities by privileging bumiputra in government contracts, education, and government hiring. Malaysia has also enjoyed broad success in achieving higher income levels for its citizens since independence.
The United States occasionally has criticized the Malaysian government for its weak human rights protections, its record on combatting human trafficking, constraints on press freedom, and prosecution of opposition political leaders like Anwar Ibrahim. The U.S. State Department upgraded Malaysia's ranking in its Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report from Tier 3 (the worst ranking) in 2014 to Tier 2 Watch List in 2015, sparking a controversy. Many Members of Congress questioned the improved ranking and asserted that the State Department had overlooked serious human trafficking problems in order to facilitate approval of the TPP.
Malaysia is actively engaged in diplomacy on numerous regional and global issues. Efforts to promote moderate Islam and marginalize religious extremism have been a major part of Malaysian diplomacy, including acting as a mediator in conflicts between Muslim separatist groups and the central government in both the Philippines and Thailand. Malaysia maintains good relations with its neighbors and has promoted cooperation among the 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Malaysia is one of several Southeast Asian countries with maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, although it has assumed a relatively low profile in those disputes. U.S.-Malaysia security cooperation includes counter-terrorism activities, numerous military exercises, ship visits, and military education exchanges. |
crs_97-722 | crs_97-722_0 | Introduction
Decisions in July 1997 by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to revise the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter (PM) refocused attention on the criteria and the process by which these decisions are made. These issues were the subject of numerous oversight hearings as well as litigation, which culminated in a Supreme Court ruling February 27, 2001. The court upheld those NAAQS setting procedures at question, in particular definitively rejecting the consideration of costs in setting NAAQS. However, the court's ruling also raised questions concerning the implementation of the EPA's new ozone standard. With the court's decision, continuing controversy over the PM and ozone standards, along with other concerns about the Clean Air Act (CAA), the expiration in 1998 of the authorizations for appropriations in the statute, and the Bush Administration's air quality initiative that would amend the Act, it is possible that the Congress may take up amendments to the CAA. If so, the NAAQS decisionmaking process may command attention, especially with respect to how scientific evidence is used – and possibly reopening the question of whether costs should be considered in setting NAAQS. Because of discrepancies in views on what transpired—or should have transpired—in EPA's development of the 1997 ozone and PM standards, this report provides background on the processes and procedures for setting and revising NAAQS. The 1977 amendments formally established the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) and the 5-year review process. The Act provides for "primary standards" to protect health with a margin of safety and for "secondary standards" to protect welfare. Also, the federal government continues to prepare "guidance documents" spelling out available control measures for the NAAQS pollutants. The CAA is quite specific on certain steps of the process: in particular, on the preparation of a "criteria document" summarizing the scientific information, on the review of that document by an independent scientific committee, on the criteria to be used by the Administrator in deciding on the final standard, and on the procedural process for promulgating the standard. In addition, EPA has administratively added a key step, the preparation of a "staff paper" that summarizes the criteria document and lays out policy options; and Executive Order 12866 requires a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), although the economic analysis it contains is legally irrelevant to the actual decision on the standard. This document is not required by the CAA; it is an administrative step designed to facilitate the EPA Administrator's decision. Like the criteria document, the staff paper is reviewed by the scientific advisory committee. In using this language in amending the act, as discussed in the report on the bill, the Committee intended—
(1) To emphasize the preventative or precautionary nature of the act, i.e., to assure that regulatory action can effectively prevent harm before it occurs ...;
(2) To authorize the Administrator to weigh risks and make reasonable projections of future trends ...;
(3) To assure consideration of the cumulative impact of all sources of a pollutant in setting ambient and emission standards, not just the extent of the risk from the emissions from a single source or class of sources of the pollutant; ...
(4) To provide the same standard of proof for regulation of any air pollutant ...;
(5) To assure that the health of susceptible individuals, as well as healthy adults, will be encompassed in the term ' public health, ' regardless of the section of the act under which the Administrator proceeds; and
(6) To reflect awareness of the uncertainties and limitations in the data which will be available to the Administrator in the foreseeable future to enable him to execute his rulemaking duties under this act, because of the limitations on research resources and the fact that decisionmaking about the risks to public health from air pollution falls on ' the frontiers of scientific and medical knowledge. ' The NAAQS-Setting Process
Appendix B. | The decisions by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in July 1997 to revise ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter refocused attention on the criteria and the process by which these decisions are made. The new standards were the subject of numerous oversight hearings as well as litigation, which culminated in a Supreme Court ruling February 27, 2001. The court upheld the NAAQS-setting procedures at question, in particular definitively rejecting the consideration of costs in setting NAAQS.
However, the court's ruling also raised questions concerning the implementation of the EPA's new ozone standard. With continuing controversy over the PM and ozone standards, along with other concerns about the Clean Air Act (CAA), the expiration in 1998 of the authorizations for appropriations in the statute, and the Bush Administration's proposal for amendments, it is possible that the Congress may take up amendments to the CAA. If so, the NAAQS decisionmaking process may command attention, especially with respect to how scientific evidence is used. Because of the role NAAQS might play in bringing amendments onto the legislative agenda, this report provides background on the processes and procedures for setting and revising NAAQS. The basic steps are as follows:
EPA identifies a pollutant that is emitted from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources and that endangers public health or welfare. EPA prepares a "criteria document" that summarizes the scientific information relevant to the pollutant; this document is formally reviewed by a Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC). EPA prepares a "staff paper" that summarizes the criteria document and lays out policy options for the Administrator; it is also reviewed by CASAC. Based on the criteria document, the staff paper, and CASAC's "closure letters," the Administrator proposes a NAAQS; this proposal is published in the Federal Register, a "docket" created, and an opportunity for public review and comment provided. And, The Administrator's final decision, "which, in the judgment of the Admin-istrator, ... [is] requisite to protect the public health ... or public welfare."
The CAA spells out requirements for the criteria document, the CASAC review, the basis on which the Administrator chooses the standard, and the procedural process for promulgating the standard. EPA administratively added the preparation of a "staff paper"; in addition, Executive Order 12866 requires a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), although the economic analysis is essentially irrelevant to the decision a NAAQS. Other laws also raise regulatory assessment issues. The Act requires EPA to revisit each NAAQS every 5 years, following the same process.
Several aspects in the NAAQS-setting process have been the foci of attention in the past and might be revisited: these include the Act's requirement that NAAQS be set to protect health with an adequate margin of safety, without consideration of costs; the process for verifying the scientific underpinnings of a proposed standard; the boundaries on the Administrator's judgment in accounting for risk and uncertainty in setting NAAQS; EPA's responsiveness to public comments; and the extent to which EPA must respond to requirements exogenous to the CAA that direct EPA to consider impacts of its regulations. |
crs_R40002 | crs_R40002_0 | The Pew Research Center's unauthorized alien population estimate for 2012 was 11.2 million, which included some 8.1 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to examine the performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers. More specifically, the INA Section 274A provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in INA Section 274A—or worksite enforcement—has been the job of DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) since 2003. Under the worksite enforcement guidance issued in 2009, homeland security remains a primary concern of ICE's worksite enforcement program. Penalties
As discussed above, employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in employers and other individuals being charged with crimes other than unlawful employment, such as document fraud or harboring unauthorized aliens, and being subject to the relevant penalties for those violations. With respect to criminal arrests, the potential population of employers and workers committing worksite-related criminal violations is not known. More generally, the values of the various measures for the years shown seem quite small relative to the estimated size of the unauthorized workforce. Conclusion
The data provided here on Final Orders, administrative fines, administrative and criminal arrests, criminal indictments and prosecutions, and criminal fines offer a way to assess DHS's worksite enforcement strategy over the years and in its current form. | Under current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance on immigration-related worksite enforcement, the agency uses available civil and administrative tools, including civil fines and debarment, to penalize and prevent unlawful employment. According to 2012 estimates, there are some 8.1 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian labor force.
DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for immigration-related worksite enforcement, or enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA Section 274A provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Today, ICE's worksite enforcement program is focused primarily on cases that involve critical infrastructure facilities and cases involving employers who commit "egregious" violations of criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation.
Employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to civil monetary penalties and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in defendants being charged with crimes beyond unlawful employment and being subject to the relevant penalties for those violations.
Various measures are available to examine the performance of ICE's worksite enforcement program. They include Final Orders for civil monetary penalties, administrative fines, administrative arrests, criminal arrests, criminal indictments, criminal convictions, and criminal fines and forfeitures. In addition to examining annual changes and trends in the various performance measure data, these data can be considered in relation to the estimated size of the unauthorized workforce or the potential number of employers employing these workers. When considered in this context, ICE's worksite enforcement program can seem quite limited.
Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to curtail unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers. |
crs_R40445 | crs_R40445_0 | By 2022, EISA requires the use of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels, and much of this would likely be ethanol from a variety of feedstocks. However, there is a key obstacle to the use of so much ethanol in gasoline. Before EPA's decision on the Growth Energy waiver petition, the amount of ethanol that could be blended in gasoline for all conventional gasoline vehicles and engines was limited to 10% by volume (E10) by guidance developed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act (CAA), as well as by vehicle and engine warranties, and certification procedures for fuel-dispensing equipment. On March 6, 2009, Growth Energy (on behalf of 52 U.S. ethanol producers) applied to EPA for a waiver from the CAA E10 limit. The application requested an increase in the maximum concentration to 15% (E15). The waiver would allow the use of significantly more ethanol in gasoline than was permitted under the 10% limit. In a November 2009 letter to Growth Energy, EPA noted that "it is clear that ethanol will need to be blended into gasoline at levels greater than the current limit of 10 percent" to meet the EISA mandates. In the letter, EPA noted that long-term testing on newer vehicles had not been completed, but that the agency expected that model year 2001 and newer vehicles "will likely be able to accommodate higher ethanol blends, such as E15." EPA estimates that MY2007 and later vehicles will represent 29% of the cars and light trucks on the road in 2011. As noted by EPA, granting Growth Energy's petition to increase gasoline ethanol content to 15% addresses only one component of the blend wall. Further, for EPA to allow the sale of E15, a fuel supplier still needs to register the fuel with EPA and submit health effects testing for EPA to review—a process that has not yet been started. Second, automakers currently warranty their vehicles to operate on ethanol/gasoline blends up to 10%. Third, most existing infrastructure (e.g., underground gasoline storage tanks, fuel pumps) is designed and certified to deliver blends up to E10. The EPA Administrator, upon application of any manufacturer of any fuel or fuel additive, may waive the prohibitions established under paragraph (1) or (3) of this subsection or the limitation specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, if he determines that the applicant has established that such fuel or fuel additive or a specified concentration thereof, and the emission products of such fuel or fuel additive or specified concentration thereof, will not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control device or system (over the useful life of the motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle in which such device or system is used) to achieve compliance by the vehicle or engine with the emission standards with respect to which it has been certified pursuant to Sections 206 and 213(a) of this title. However, based on communication between EPA's Office of Transportation and Air Quality (OTAQ) and the Minnesota Department of Agriculture, as well as a presentation made by a member of OTAQ staff to the American Petroleum Institute Technology Committee, a submission must
include both evaporative and exhaust emissions; be comprehensive, assessing the emissions effects both short-term and over the full useful life of the vehicle; include tests on a variety of vehicles (e.g., new and used, car, truck, and motorcycle), and the selection of vehicles should reflect their frequency on the road; and assess the durability of vehicles and vehicle parts using the fuel, including assessments of the compatibility of the new fuel (or blend level) with engine materials, and the effects on operability and performance. EPA received that data and expanded the waiver in January 2011. On October 13, 2010, EPA granted a partial waiver for newer (MY2007 and later) passenger cars and light trucks, initially deferring a decision on MY2001-MY2006 passenger vehicles before granting the partial waiver on January 26, 2011, and denied the waiver for older passenger vehicles as well as all other vehicles. In its October 13 decision, EPA determined that there were insufficient data to alleviate concerns over potential emissions increases from older passenger vehicles and non-road engines. EPA took comments through December 17, 2010, on updating its guidance to include ways for owners to demonstrate compatibility with E15. This may be especially difficult for small-engine manufacturers and users who are currently concerned about the effects on their engines from E10, let alone higher blends of ethanol. Because of concerns over potential misfueling, a group of automobile and equipment manufacturers has challenged the partial waiver in court. Many state laws and regulations limit the use of ethanol in gasoline to 10%. These state rules would also need to be updated to allow widespread use of E15. Further, gasoline retailers are concerned that they could lose insurance coverage if they distribute gasoline with higher than 10% ethanol concentration. A key issued raised with EPA's partial waiver decision is the likelihood of misfueling of E15 in vehicles and engines not approved for its use. EPA finalized the misfueling rules in June 2011. | On March 6, 2009, Growth Energy (on behalf of 52 U.S. ethanol producers) applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a waiver from the Clean Air Act (CAA) limitation on ethanol content in gasoline. Ethanol content in gasoline for all uses had been capped at 10% (E10); the application requested an increase in the maximum concentration to 15% (E15). A broad waiver would allow the use of more ethanol in gasoline than is currently permitted.
On October 13, 2010, EPA issued a partial waiver for the use of E15 in model year (MY) 2007 and later passenger cars and light trucks. At the same time EPA denied the waiver request for the use of E15 in MY2000 and older vehicles, and in motorcycles, heavy trucks, and non-road applications, citing a lack of sufficient data to alleviate concerns about potential emissions increases from these engines. EPA deferred a decision on MY2001-MY2006 cars and light trucks until January 2011, when the agency expanded the waiver for those vehicles after analyzing final testing data from the Department of Energy (DOE). Concerned about potential damage by E15 to equipment not designed for its use, a group of vehicle and engine manufacturers has challenged the partial waiver in court.
Of key concern before the waiver decision was made is the fact that a 10% limitation on ethanol content leads to an upper bound of roughly 15 billion gallons of ethanol in all U.S. gasoline. This "blend wall" will likely limit the fuel industry's ability to meet an Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA, P.L. 110-140) requirement to use increasing amounts of renewable fuels (including ethanol) in transportation. To meet the high volumes mandated by EISA, EPA recognized in a November 2009 letter to Growth Energy that "it is clear that ethanol will need to be blended into gasoline at levels greater than the current limit of 10 percent." The partial waiver for MY2001 and later vehicles—roughly two-thirds of the cars and light trucks on the road in 2011—will allow the use of more ethanol going forward, assuming other conditions are met.
To receive a waiver, the petitioner must establish to EPA that the increased ethanol content will not "cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control device or system" to meet emissions standards. In addition to the emissions concerns, other factors affecting consideration of the blend wall include vehicle and engine warranties and the effects on infrastructure. Currently, no automaker warrants its vehicles to use gasoline with higher than 10% ethanol. Small engine manufacturers similarly limit the allowable level of ethanol. In addition, most gasoline distribution systems (e.g., retail pumps and tanks) are designed to dispense up to E10. While some of these systems may be able to operate effectively on E15 or higher, their warranties/certifications would likely need to be modified. Further, many current state laws prohibit the use of blends higher than E10. Questions have been raised whether fuel suppliers would be willing to sell E15 alongside or in lieu of E10.
As EPA's waiver only applies to newer vehicles, a key question is how fuel pumps might be labeled to keep owners from using E15 in older vehicles and other equipment. Along with the waiver decision, EPA proposed new rules, including pump labeling, to prevent misfueling of E15 in vehicles not approved for its use. EPA finalized those rules in June 2011. EPA also sought comment (through December 17, 2010) on how to update guidance for underground storage tank (UST) owners, who must demonstrate compatibility of UST components with E15 before they may sell the fuel. Further, for EPA to allow the sale of E15, a fuel supplier would still need to register E15 with EPA and submit health effects testing for EPA to review—a process that had not been started as of late June 2011. |
crs_97-1058 | crs_97-1058_0 | Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others assessed the election as progressive but still falling short of a free and fair race. Kazakhstan's progress in meeting these pledges was mixed at best, according to most observers. Economic Developments
Kazakhstan is the most economically developed of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Most of the U.S. and other FDI historically has been in the oil and gas and mining sectors. Kazakhstan completed its sections of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline in 2009-2010. Kazakhstan's assertion of its national interests has contributed to recent tensions in Kazakhstan-Russia relations. According to the Obama Administration's Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations , the U.S. "strategic aim in Kazakhstan is to ensure and maintain the development of the country as a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous partner that respects international standards and agreements, embraces free-market competition and the rule of law, and is a respected regional leader." At the same time, he stressed that the United States would continue to support the Kazakh government's further efforts to democratize and respect human rights. Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for Kazakhstan in fiscal years 1992 through 2010 was $2.05 billion (all-agency funding), with Kazakhstan ranking fifth in aid among the 12 Soviet successor states. A large part of this U.S. aid has supported Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR) programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Budgeted aid for FY2011 was $17.6 million and was $19.3 million for FY2012. Requested aid for FY2014 is $12.2 million (these latter amounts include foreign assistance listed in the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations , and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds; country totals have not been released for FY2013). Among congressional actions, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ) forbade assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that Kazakhstan had significantly improved its human rights record during the preceding six-month period. The Secretary could, however, waive this prohibition on national security grounds. Reportedly responding to a U.S. appeal, the Kazakh legislature in May 2003 approved sending military engineers to Iraq. The 27 troops trained Iraqis in de-mining and water purification. Kazakh troops withdrew from Iraq in late 2008. The Senate explained its action as a response to widespread public opposition to sending military personnel to Afghanistan. | Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location, large territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth, but it faces ethnic, political, and other challenges to stability. Kazakhstan gained independence at the end of 1991 after the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstan's president at the time, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was one of the top leaders of the former Soviet Union and was instrumental in forming the successor Commonwealth of Independent States. He has been reelected president of Kazakhstan several times and in June 2010 was proclaimed the "Leader of the Nation" with lifetime ruling responsibilities and privileges. Kazakhstan's economy is the strongest in Central Asia, buoyed by oil exports. Its progress in democratization and respect for human rights has been halting, according to most observers. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan's pledges to reform convinced the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to select the country's leadership for its 2010 presidency.
According to the Obama Administration, the United States' strategic aim in Kazakhstan is to help the country develop into a stable, secure, and democratic country that embraces free market competition and rule of law, and is a respected regional leader. Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for Kazakhstan in fiscal years 1992 through 2010 was $2.05 billion (all program and agency funds), with Kazakhstan ranking fifth in aid among the 12 Soviet successor states. A large part of U.S. aid has supported Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR) programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Budgeted aid for FY2011 was $17.6 million and was $19.3 million for FY2012. Requested aid for FY2014 is $12.2 million (these latter amounts include foreign assistance listed in the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funding; country data for FY2013 are not yet available). Among congressional actions, foreign operations appropriations since FY2003 have barred assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Kazakhstan has significantly improved its human rights record. A waiver on national security grounds has been exercised in recent years.
Reportedly responding to a U.S. appeal, the Kazakh legislature in May 2003 approved sending military engineers to assist in coalition operations in Iraq. The 27 troops trained Iraqis in de-mining and water purification. They pulled out of Iraq in late 2008. Since 2009, Kazakhstan has permitted air and land transit for U.S. and NATO troops and equipment—as part of the Northern Distribution Network—to support stabilization operations in Afghanistan. In mid-May 2011, the Kazakh legislature demurred on sending some military officers to take part in noncombat missions in Afghanistan, citing popular opposition to sending such personnel to Afghanistan. In 2012, Kazakhstan agreed to facilitate the egress of troops and material from Afghanistan. |
crs_RL32666 | crs_RL32666_0 | Introduction
Technological improvements and investment commitments by the world's largest oil companies suggest that the gas to liquids industry (GTL) is likely to transform itself from a small, specialized producer to a large scale fuel producer over the next decade. As expansion of GTL proceeds, the industry may become a major consumer of natural gas, placing it in direct competition with the growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry for access to natural gas supply. If competition leads to tighter than expected natural gas supplies, the result is likely to be higher prices for natural gas consumers over the same time frame that the United States looks to world LNG markets to meet increasing domestic demand. Natural gas consumption in the United States is projected to increase by 18.6% to 26.1 trillion cubic feet per year in 2030, from a baseline of 22.0 trillion cubic feet per year in 2005, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (AEO). Almost all of the increased demand over that period is expected to be met through an expansion of LNG imports to the United States. While the GTL industry is likely to compete for natural gas supplies, its output, which is mainly liquid petroleum products, such as diesel fuel, will do little to satisfy natural gas demand in consuming nations. These factors may be considered additional impediments to the projected increased dependency on LNG. From the 1960s through the 1990s, several companies specializing in synthetic fuels, as well as joint ventures between major oil companies and synthetic fuels companies, explored and developed the basic FT technology as well as other technological approaches. Investment Activity
The GTL industry has been reported to be on the verge of a boom in investment for some time. High investment cost, technological problems, and natural gas price uncertainty had delayed the expansion of the industry in the past. For a viable GTL industry, oil prices must not collapse. The cost of natural gas to supply either a GTL or LNG facility is negotiated between the producing nation and the investors, and likely has little relationship to observed market prices, because the available alternative is not to sell the gas in consuming markets, but to leave it undeveloped or flare it off. The other two nations with GTL investment activity, Nigeria with 176 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and Australia with 90 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, are not likely to support an industry as large as that developing in Qatar, even though both have production capacity in excess of their domestic consumption needs. Some observers saw the potential for LNG to establish a price cap for natural gas in the U.S. market due to competition among suppliers. This competition, based on an over-supply of LNG, is less likely to materialize when GTL investments are available. Developing the industry is in the interest of producing nations with economically stranded natural gas resources, because it gives those nations the opportunity to choose the best use for their resources consistent with available rates of return and risk. No one source is likely to provide the supply and price stability that consumers desire. | Technological improvements and investment commitments from the world's largest oil companies suggest the gas to liquids (GTL) industry is likely to expand rapidly over the next decade. GTL uses large quantities of natural gas to produce liquid petroleum products like diesel fuel and home heating fuel. The GTL industry might become an important competitor to the liquefied natural gas industry (LNG) in the effort to secure natural gas supplies. As a result, LNG markets may be tighter, with higher prices, potentially altering LNG's projected role in the U.S. natural gas market.
The Energy Information Administration projects U.S. natural gas consumption increases of 18.6% by 2030, compared to 2005 levels. Much of this increased demand is expected to be met by importing LNG. LNG is natural gas that has been cooled to a liquid state to facilitate transportation. Although expanding LNG imports has drawbacks, the main positive factor is the belief that worldwide, there are large quantities of natural gas that have previously not had access to the market. Some believe that as the supply of imported LNG expands, it will provide a price cap for U.S. natural gas markets. An expanded GTL industry makes this result potentially less likely.
The GTL industry is poised for a major expansion based in Qatar, but also in Nigeria and Australia. The expansion is being funded by the major oil companies, in some cases in tandem with synthetic fuel companies and national oil companies. The projected expansion of the industry is based on favorable market conditions in addition to advances in technology. High oil and natural gas prices, declining capital investment costs, and improvements in technology that allow large scale production facilities are important factors in the industry's expansion.
The GTL industry offers an attractive choice to nations with economically stranded natural gas reserves because it allows those nations to diversify in the use of their resources. Diversification allows producing nations to gain higher rates of return than through a singular investment strategy. Consuming nations may find that dependence on one supply source, in this case LNG, does not offer the supply security and potential price stability of a diversified strategy.
For the United States, alternatives to increasing LNG imports include a pipeline to bring natural gas from Alaska, expanded exploration and development in areas, both on and off shore, that are currently restricted, and policies to enhance the development of current reserves. None of these alternatives alone is likely to close the projected gap between U.S. natural gas production and demand. The competition for natural gas resources between the LNG and the GTL industries may alter the parameters of the debate.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41779 | crs_R41779_0 | Introduction
The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which was approved by Congress in P.L. 112-41 and entered into force on March 15, 2012, follows current U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) practice in containing two types of dispute settlement: (1) State-State, applicable to disputes between the Parties to the KORUS FTA, and (2) investor-State, applicable to claims by an investor of one Party against the other Party for breach of a KORUS FTA investment obligation. The KORUS FTA also contains language relevant to dispute settlement stemming from a bipartisan understanding on trade policy between congressional leaders and the George W. Bush Administration finalized on May 10, 2007, setting out various provisions to be added to completed or substantially completed FTAs pending at the time. Aimed at, among other things, expanding and further integrating labor and environmental obligations into the FTA structure, the May 10 understanding provides that labor and environmental obligations in an FTA are to be subject to the same State-State dispute settlement provisions, enforcement mechanisms, and remedies for non-compliance as the agreement's commercial obligations. The same approach to labor and environmental disputes is also found in the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, which entered into force on February 1, 2009, and in U.S. FTAs with Colombia and Panama, approved by Congress in October 2011 along with the KORUS FTA. In general, resort to panels under FTA State-State dispute settlement has been uncommon and thus there has been relatively little experience with the operation of this mechanism over a range of agreements and issues. FTA investor-State claims have been the most prevalent under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with cases filed against all three NAFTA Parties, that is, the United States, Canada, and Mexico. One claim under the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, filed by the U.S. investor Renco Group, is currently pending. To date, investor-State claims have not been filed under other U.S. FTAs. As is the case with its NAFTA partners, however, the United States imports capital from South Korea to a greater degree than it does from parties to these other U.S. investment agreements and Korean investment in the United States may indeed grow over the course of the FTA. While this situation may thus create a greater potential for investor-State disputes than exists under most other U.S. investment agreements, the extent to which disputes involving Korean investors will in fact arise would seemingly depend upon a variety of factors and interests unique to an investor's individual situation and thus for now remains only a matter for conjecture. To date, the United States has prevailed in all investor-State cases brought against it. 20.9) of the agreement. Labor and Environmental Disputes
Due to its incorporation of principles set out in the inter-branch May 10, 2007, trade agreement understanding discussed earlier, the KORUS FTA differs from most earlier FTAs with labor and environment chapters in containing additional labor and environmental obligations; not restricting its general dispute settlement procedures to specified provisions of its labor and environmental chapters; and not limiting the remedy for non-compliance with an adverse panel report to the payment of an annual monetary assessment (i.e., a fine) by the defending party. Unlike most earlier FTAs with environment chapters, the prevailing Party in a dispute would not be initially limited to seeking the payment of a fine by the defending Party in the event the Party has not complied in the case. In the event the prevailing KORUS FTA Party does propose trade sanctions, the defending Party, as in labor disputes, would then have the option of paying an annual monetary assessment to the prevailing Party, or, if the Parties agree, to a fund that would distribute funds to the defending Party to facilitate compliance with its obligations in the case. This current most-favored-nation (MFN) rate for the covered items is 2.5% in the United States and 8% in South Korea. A tribunal may only make monetary awards and thus may not direct a Party to withdraw or modify a disputed measure. | The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which was approved by Congress in P.L. 112-41 and entered into force on March 15, 2012, follows current U.S. FTA practice in containing two types of formal dispute settlement: (1) State-State, applicable to disputes between the KORUS FTA Parties, and (2) investor-State, applicable to claims against one Party by an investor of the other Party for breach of an agreement investment obligation. An unsuccessful defendant in a State-State dispute would generally be expected to remove the complained-of measure; remedies for non-compliance include compensation and the suspension of KORUS FTA obligations (e.g., the imposition of a tariff surcharge on the defending Party's products) and, as an alternative, payment of a fine to the prevailing Party in the dispute or, in some cases, into a fund that may be used to assist the defending Party in complying with its obligations in the case. The agreement also contains special procedures for State-State disputes relating to motor vehicles that grant the prevailing Party an automatic right to increase tariffs on motor vehicles of the defending Party to most-favored-nation (MFN) rates. If the United States or South Korea were found to have violated an investment obligation in an investor-State dispute, the tribunal would be authorized only to make a monetary award to the investor and thus could not direct the State defendant to withdraw the challenged measure. If the State defendant did not comply with the award, the investor might seek to enforce it under one of the international arbitral conventions to which the United States and South Korea are party.
State-State dispute settlement in the KORUS FTA differs from that in most earlier U.S. FTAs in that it applies to all obligations in the agreement's labor and environmental chapters instead of only domestic labor or environmental law enforcement obligations. Also, in the event a Party is found to be in breach of one of these obligations and has not complied, the prevailing Party may impose trade sanctions instead of, as under earlier agreements, being limited to requesting that the non-complying Party pay a fine, with the proceeds to be expended for labor or environmental initiatives in that Party's territory. The changes stem from a bipartisan understanding on trade policy between congressional leaders and the George W. Bush Administration finalized on May 10, 2007, setting out provisions that were to be added to completed or substantially completed FTAs pending at the time. Among other aims, the understanding sought to expand and further integrate labor and environmental obligations into the U.S. FTA structure. The same approach to labor and environmental disputes is found in FTAs with Colombia and Panama, each approved by Congress in October 2011, and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, which entered into force in 2009.
Resort to panels under FTA State-State dispute settlement has been uncommon, and thus there has been relatively little experience with the operation of this mechanism over a range of agreements and issues. FTA investor-State claims have been filed under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. As is the case with its NAFTA partners, particularly Canada, the United States imports capital from South Korea to a greater degree than it does from parties to other U.S. investment agreements, and South Korean investment in the United States may indeed grow over time. While this situation may create a greater potential for investor-State disputes than exists under most other U.S. investment agreements, the extent to which disputes involving South Korean investors will in fact arise would seemingly depend upon a variety of factors and interests unique to an investor's individual situation and thus for now remains only a matter for conjecture. To date, the United States has prevailed in all investor-State cases brought against it. |
crs_R40078 | crs_R40078_0 | Introduction
On January 18, 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued an executive order directing the California Environmental Protection Agency to establish a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). The Executive Order requires the State of California to reduce the carbon intensity of fuels in the state by 10% by 2020. If finalized, the California LCFS would require fuel suppliers to reduce the expected lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from motor fuels, based on fuels' energy content. In this way, the greenhouse gas intensity of transportation fuels would decrease, regardless of the growth in transportation or fuel demand. Several bills were introduced in the 110 th Congress to establish a similar national LCFS. These bills varied based on their target dates and required reductions; some were stand-alone bills, while others were proposed as part of more comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation. None were adopted; one was discussed on the Senate floor. Conclusion
The establishment of a low carbon fuel standard could significantly affect fuel supplies and fuel prices. However, the details of any program are key to determining those effects. The stringency, scope, time frame, and flexibility of the program would determine its ultimate effects on both fuel markets and greenhouse gas emissions. California has not officially proposed regulations for its program, but instead has released drafts of possible regulations. The development of those rules could inform policymakers looking to establish a federal LCFS. However, the scope of a federal program—requiring compliance nationwide—would likely affect the fuel system in ways not comparable to California's experience. If more low-carbon fuel is needed in California, supply can be shifted from other parts of the country not under an LCFS. If more low-carbon fuel is needed nationwide, higher production and/or imports would be necessary. If the requirements of a low carbon fuel standard get ahead of the necessary supply, conventional fuel supply would need to be curtailed, or the program would need to be delayed. It is likely that the proposals with later time frames would be less disruptive to the fuel supply. | On January 18, 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger issued an executive order directing the California Environmental Protection Agency to establish a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). The California LCFS would require a 10% reduction in the carbon intensity of fuels in the State of California by 2020. It would require fuel suppliers to reduce the expected lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from motor fuels, based on fuels' energy content. In this way, the greenhouse gas intensity of transportation fuels would decrease, regardless of the growth in transportation or fuel demand. While California has not formally proposed regulations, the state Air Resources Board has released drafts of possible regulations.
Several bills were introduced in the 110th Congress to establish a similar national LCFS. These bills varied based on their target dates and required reductions; some were stand-alone bills, while others were proposed as part of more comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation. None were adopted; one was discussed on the Senate floor.
The establishment of a low carbon fuel standard could significantly affect fuel supplies and fuel prices. However, the details of any program are key to determining those effects. The stringency, scope, time frame, and flexibility of the program would determine its ultimate effects on both fuel markets and greenhouse gas emissions. The development of California's rules could inform policymakers looking to establish a federal LCFS. However, the scope of a federal program—requiring compliance nationwide—would likely affect the fuel system in ways not comparable to California's experience. If more low-carbon fuel is needed in California, supply can be shifted from other parts of the country not under an LCFS. If more low-carbon fuel is needed nationwide, higher production and/or imports would be necessary. If the requirements of a low carbon fuel standard get ahead of the necessary supply, conventional fuel supply would need to be curtailed, or the program would need to be delayed. It is likely that the proposals with later time frames would be less disruptive to the fuel supply. |
crs_RL32721 | crs_RL32721_0 | Some developing countries have no institutions for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and have never reported such emissions to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This report uses the data compiled by WRI to examine a pivotal and long-running issue surrounding U.S. climate change policy: the appropriate roles of developed and developing countries in addressing climate change. The crux of the Copenhagen Conference, to plot a post-Kyoto course for addressing climate change, was how to engage the two largest emitters, the United States and China—the former having rejected Kyoto in part because developing nations were not obligated to curtail emissions; and the latter having become the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases. No other country reached 6% of total emissions (although the collective 27-member EU accounted for 13.4%); overall, only eight countries emitted 2% or more. Land use changes and forestry practices in certain developing countries, notably Brazil and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially upping their relative emissions ranks. In terms of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and potentially the Copenhagen Accord, including land use in the equation for controlling emissions disadvantages certain countries whose exploitation of resources and development of agriculture are occurring at a particular moment in history, while for other countries the effects of past changes in land use and forestry practices are embedded in their baseline emissions. Implications of Focusing on Emissions Levels for International Actions
The data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both effectiveness and fairness in the effort to address global climate change. Differentiating responsibilities between Annex I and non-Annex I nations, as the UNFCCC has, does not focus efforts on all of the largest emitters. In all these cases, the time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and for taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential impacts on individual nations, as a result of their individual resource endowments and stage of economic development. Alternative metrics for taking into account greenhouse gas emissions and economic development include per capita emissions and economic intensity of emissions. Appendix A and Appendix B show that of the top 20 emitters in 2005, the highest ranked by per capita greenhouse gas emissions are developed countries (Australia, United States, and Canada, ranked 6, 9, and 10, respectively). These are both Annex I nations; non-Annex I nations have a narrower range, from the 136 tons/million international $GDP (Mexico) to 372 tons/million international $GDP (China). For greenhouse gas intensity, in 2005 the United States ranked number 122 in the world, making this a more favorable metric than absolute emissions (the United States ranked number 2 in the world) and per capita emissions (the United States ranked number 9). Indeed, the United States pulled completely out of the Kyoto process under the George W. Bush administration. Several major developing nations produce considerably higher greenhouse gas emissions per million dollars of GDP than some developed nations. The U.S. greenhouse gas intensity is declining, as is the case with most nations, but the decrease currently does not completely offset increased emissions resulting from the growth of population and of the economy. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a flexible strategy that permits each country to play to its strengths may make it easier for diverse countries like the United States and China to reach some acceptable agreement. | Using the World Resources Institute (WRI) database on greenhouse gas emissions and related data, this report examines two issues. The first issue is the separate treatment of developed and developing nations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Copenhagen Accord. This distinction has been a pivotal issue affecting U.S. climate change policy. The second issue is the difficulty of addressing climate change through limiting greenhouse gas emissions to a specified percentage of baseline emissions (typically 1990). The data permit examination of alternative approaches, such as focusing on per capita emissions or the greenhouse gas emission intensity (measured as emissions per unit of economic activity). Key findings include:
A few countries account for most greenhouse gas emissions: in 2005, China led by emitting 19% of the world total, followed closely by the United States with 18%; no other country reached 6%; the top eight emitters (those emitting 2% or more of total emissions) accounted for 58% of the 185 nations' emissions. Land-use effects (e.g., deforestation) on emissions are negligible for most nations, but they cause emissions to rise sharply for certain developing nations, most notably Brazil and Indonesia. While countries whose economies are dominated by oil and gas production have the highest per capita greenhouse gas emissions, in general developed nations rank high in per capita emissions (in 2005, Australia, the United States, and Canada ranked 6, 9, and 10, respectively, in the world), while developing nations tend to rank low (China, Brazil, Indonesia, and India ranked 81, 84, 117, and 148, respectively). The greenhouse intensity of the economy—the metric by which the George W. Bush Administration addressed climate change, and by which China has proposed to set its objectives under the Copenhagen Accord—varies substantially among developed countries (in 2005, not accounting for land use, Ukraine emitted 512 tons/million international $GDP, while France emitted 80 tons/million $GDP, with the United States at 153 tons/million $GDP; developing nations range from the 136 (Mexico) to 372 (China). The time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and for taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential impacts on individual nations, as a result of individual resource endowments (e.g., coal versus natural gas and hydropower) and stage of economic development (e.g., conversion of forest land to agriculture occurring before or after the baseline).
Differentiating responsibilities between developed and developing nations—as the UNFCCC does—has failed to engage some of the largest emitters effectively. Moreover, many developed countries have not achieved stabilization of their emissions despite the UNFCCC. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a flexible strategy that allows each country to play to its strengths may be necessary if diverse countries like the United States and China are ever to reach agreement. The difficulty in finding a common strategy was evidenced by the outcome of the Copenhagen meeting, which set a climate change objective of holding global warming to less than 2 degrees C but then left up to each country the choice of how to address emissions. |
crs_RL33351 | crs_RL33351_0 | Introduction
It is estimated that there are more than 11 million unauthorized aliens currently living in the United States, and the resident unauthorized alien population is estimated to increase by 500,000 people per year. In addition, each year approximately 1 million aliens are apprehended while trying to illegally enter the United States. Although most of these aliens are entering the United States for economic opportunities or fleeing civil strife and political unrest, some are criminals, and some may be terrorists. The report continues with a discussion of the role of state and local law enforcement in the enforcement of immigration laws. What is Immigration Enforcement? Immigration enforcement is the regulation of those who violate provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This includes violations of the civil provisions of the INA (e.g., aliens who enter without inspection or violate the conditions of their admittance), as well as U.S. citizens or aliens who violate the criminal provisions of the INA (e.g., marriage fraud or alien smuggling). However, increasing the immigration enforcement role of other federal agencies is controversial and could distract the agencies from their primary missions. In FY1992, 433 workyears were spent locating and arresting criminal aliens. In FY2003, the number of workyears devoted to criminal alien cases was 740, almost double the amount of hours spent on these cases in FY1992. In FY2003, 23% of all hours (435 workyears) were devoted to administrative and non-investigative tasks. Comparison
Figure 14 illustrates that many more resources (measured in staff hours) have been allotted to enforcement between the ports of entry than enforcement within the United States and at the ports of entry. Historically, Congress and INS devoted five times more resources (staff and funding) to border enforcement than to interior enforcement. CBP received the inspections functions and the border patrol. Conclusion
Many duties are incorporated under the banner of immigration enforcement. These include removing aliens who should not be in the United States, investigating alien smuggling and trafficking, patrolling between and at ports of entry, combating document and benefit fraud, and enforcing the prohibitions against employers hiring aliens without work authorization. However, others assert that the United States has not tried immigration enforcement, arguing that most of the resources have been devoted to border enforcement, and that the United States has not fully engaged in other types of immigration enforcement, most notably worksite enforcement. The majority of aliens come to the United States for economic opportunities and for family reunification. Thus, some argue that only a guest worker program, creating opportunities for a large number of immigrants to come to the United States to work, could significantly reduce the unauthorized migration. However, others argue that better worksite enforcement and enforcement document fraud would make it more difficult for unauthorized aliens to find work, resulting in a decrease in the unauthorized population. | An estimated 11 million unauthorized aliens reside in the United States, and this population is estimated to increase by 500,000 annually. Each year, approximately 1 million aliens are apprehended trying to enter the United States illegally. Although most of these aliens enter the United States for economic opportunities and family reunification, or to avoid civil strife and political unrest, some are criminals, and some may be terrorists. All are violating the United States' immigration laws.
Immigration enforcement is the regulation of those who violate provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This includes violations of the INA's civil provisions (e.g., violate the conditions of their admittance), as well as U.S. citizens or aliens who violate the criminal provisions (e.g., marriage fraud or alien smuggling). Many divergent tasks are incorporated under the banner of immigration enforcement. These include removing aliens who should not be in the United States, investigating alien smuggling and trafficking, patrolling between and at ports of entry, combating document and benefit fraud, and enforcing the prohibitions against employers hiring aliens without work authorization.
Historically, more resources (measured in staff hours) have been allotted to enforcement at the border than enforcement within the United States. While the amount of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) resources almost doubled between FY1997 and FY2003, time spent on other enforcement activities increased only slightly, while the number of inspection hours decreased. Furthermore, focusing on "interior" enforcement, in FY2003, the largest amount of staff time was devoted to locating and arresting criminal aliens (39%), followed by administrative and non-investigative duties (23%) and alien smuggling investigations (15%). Only 4% was devoted to worksite enforcement (i.e., locating and arresting aliens working without authorization, and punishing employers who hire such workers).
Congress has spent much time debating immigration enforcement and the unauthorized alien population. Congress could allocate more resources to immigration enforcement activities, raising the question of what is the most efficient allocation of resources among the different enforcement tasks. For example, some assert that the United States has not truly tried immigration enforcement, arguing that most of the resources have been devoted to border enforcement, instead of fully engaging in other types of immigration enforcement; others contend that only a legalization program can reduce the unauthorized population. In addition, Congress could expand the immigration enforcement role of other federal agencies and state and local law enforcement. Many fear, however, that this option will distract the agencies and local law enforcement from their primary missions. Since many of the unauthorized aliens come to the United States for economic opportunities, some argue that a guest worker program, creating opportunities for a large number of aliens to come to the United States to work, could significantly reduce unauthorized migration. Others argue that an increase in the enforcement of the prohibition against hiring illegal alien workers and the use and manufacturing of fraudulent documents would make it more difficult for unauthorized aliens to find work, resulting in a decrease in the unauthorized population. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43322 | crs_R43322_0 | Introduction
A National Security Letter (NSL) is roughly comparable to an administrative subpoena. The House passed such a bill, H.R. S. 2685 , however, failed to secure the three-fifths vote necessary for cloture. USA PATRIOT Act
Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act altered the FBI's NSL authority under Section 2709 (communications information), the Right to Financial Privacy Act (financial information), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (consumer credit information) in several ways:
it expanded issuing authority to include the heads of FBI field offices (special agents in charge (SACs)); it eliminated the requirement of specific and articulable facts demonstrating a nexus to a foreign power or its agents; it required instead that the information was sought for or relevant to various national security investigations; and It directed that no NSL related investigation of a "U.S. person" (American citizen or foreign resident alien) be predicated exclusively on First Amendment protected activities. More specifically, the report found that
a "significant number of NSL-related possible violations were not being identified or reported" as required; the only FBI data collection system produced "inaccurate" results; the FBI issued over 700 exigent letters acquiring information in a manner that "circumvented the ECPA NSL statute and violated the Attorney General's Guidelines ... and internal FBI policy"; the FBI's Counterterrorism Division initiated over 300 NSLs in a manner that precluded effective review prior to approval; 60% of the individual files examined showed violations of FBI internal control policies; the FBI did not retain signed copies of the NSLs it issued; the FBI had not provided clear guidance on the application of the Attorney General's least-intrusive-feasible-investigative-technique standard in the case of NSLs; the precise interpretation of toll billing information as it appears in the ECPA NSL statute is unclear; SAC supervision of the attorneys responsible for review of the legal adequacy of proposed NSLs made some of the attorneys reluctant to question the adequacy of the underlying investigation previously approved by the SAC; there was no indication that the FBI's misuse of NSL authority constituted criminal conduct; personnel both at FBI headquarters and in the field considered NSL use indispensable; and information generated by NSLs was fed into a number of FBI systems. The District Court for the Northern District of California agreed with the Second Circuit that the secrecy provisions as written violate the First Amendment and that the judicial review section as written violates both the First Amendment and separation of powers principles. Proposed Amendments in the 113th Congress
Bills in 113 th Congress that would have amended the NSL statutes and related provisions proposed adjustments in four areas: (1) the grounds for issuing an NSL; (2) confidentiality requirements, enforcement, and judicial review; (3) reports and audits; and (4) sunset and repeal. H.R. S. 1599 (Leahy) and S. 2685 (Leahy) would have amended the statutory provisions governing judicial review of NSLs nondisclosure orders. Several bills would have permitted public reporting by the recipients of NSLs and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) orders. Thus, S. 2685 (Leahy) and H.R. H.R. 3035 (Lofgren), S. 1551 (Wyden), and S. 1599 (Leahy) each would have allowed recipients to issue periodic reports on the number of NSL requests they received, organized according to the NSL statute under which the requests were received or by categories of the authorizing statutes. S. 1215 (Leahy) and S. 1599 (Leahy) would have called for a similar audit covering 2010 through 2013. In the case of S. 1215 , these intelligence assessments would have been required of the Inspectors General of the various agencies of the intelligence community. S. 1215 (Leahy) and S. 1599 (Leahy) would have changed that. Effective June 1, 2015, the bills would have returned NSL statutes to their pre-USA PATRIOT Act form. They would have established a transition provision under which the law prior to May 31, 2015, would have continued to apply with respect to investigations or offenses begun prior to June 1, 2015. 2709, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 802 of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 119 (text)
Audit of Use of National Security Letters. | A National Security Letter (NSL) is roughly comparable to an administrative subpoena. Various intelligence agencies use NSLs to demand certain customer information from communications providers, financial institutions, and consumer credit reporting agencies under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the National Security Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Congress weighed several NSL amendments during the 113th Congress. The House passed one, H.R. 3361. The Senate failed to provide the three-fifths vote necessary for cloture on another, S. 2685. Yet in the end, the 113th Congress adjourned without enacting any of the proposed NSL amendments.
The bills in the 113th Congress that would have amended the NSL statutes proposed adjustments in four areas: (1) the grounds for issuing an NSL; (2) confidentiality requirements and judicial review; (3) reports and audits; and (4) sunset and repeal. S. 1551 (Wyden), H.R. 3361 (House-passed), S. 1599 (Leahy), and S. 2685 (Leahy) would have defined more precisely the circumstances under which an NSL might be issued.
Initially, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and later the District Court for the Northern District of California concluded that the statutory secrecy and judicial review provisions relating to NSLs, read to their fullest, are inconsistent with the proscriptions of the First Amendment right to free speech and the principles of separation of powers. S. 1215 (Leahy), H.R. 3361 (House-passed), S. 1599 (Leahy), and S. 2685 (Leahy) would have amended the provisions in question roughly along lines suggested by the Second Circuit.
In the past, Congress has counterbalanced expanded NSL authority with increased oversight mechanisms. For example, it directed the Department of Justice's Inspector General to conduct an audit of NSL authority from 2001 to 2006, and instructed the Attorney General to report to Congress annually on the extent of NSL use. Several proposals in the 113th Congress would have supplemented the existing mechanisms. S. 1215, S. 1551, and S. 1599 would have called for greater detail in the Attorney General's annual reports. H.R. 3035 (Lofgren), S. 1551, and H.R. 3361 and S. 1599 would have authorized recipients to issue public reports on the NSLs they receive.
As an additional oversight tool, S. 1215 and S. 1599 would have returned all but two of the NSL statutes to their pre-USA PATRIOT Act form, effective June 1, 2015. The exceptions would have been the National Security Act NSL statute, which evokes few privacy concerns, and the sweeping, USA PATRIOT Act-born, Fair Credit Reporting Act NSL statute, which the bills would have repealed.
This report reprints the text of the five NSL statutes as they now appear and as they appeared prior to amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act (to which form they would have been returned under S. 1125 and H.R. 1805). Related reports include CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33320, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS20028 | crs_RS20028_0 | 92-532) has two basic aims: to regulate intentional ocean disposal of materials, and to authorize related research. This report presents a summary of the law, describing the essence of the statute. The MPRSA uses a comprehensive and uniform waste management system to regulate disposal or dumping of all materials into ocean waters. The basic provisions of the act have remained virtually unchanged since 1972, but many new authorities have been added. Four federal agencies have responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act: EPA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Coast Guard. EPA has primary authority for regulating ocean disposal of all substances except dredged spoils, which are under the authority of the Corps of Engineers. NOAA is responsible for long-range research on the effects of human-induced changes to the marine environment, while EPA is authorized to carry out research and demonstration activities related to phasing out sewage sludge and industrial waste dumping. The Coast Guard is charged with maintaining surveillance of ocean dumping. Regulating Ocean Dumping
Title I of the MPRSA prohibits all ocean dumping, except that allowed by permits, in any ocean waters under U.S. jurisdiction, by any U.S. vessel, or by any vessel sailing from a U.S. port. Certain materials, such as high-level radioactive waste, chemical and biological warfare agents, medical waste, sewage sludge, and industrial waste, may not be dumped in the ocean. Permits for dumping of other materials, except dredge spoils, can be issued by the EPA after notice and opportunity for public hearings where the Administrator determines that such dumping will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities. The law regulates ocean dumping within the area extending 12 nautical miles seaward from the U.S. baseline and regulates transport of material by U.S.-flagged vessels for dumping into ocean waters. EPA designates sites for ocean dumping and specifies in each permit where the material is to be disposed. Permits issued under the Ocean Dumping Act specify the type of material to be disposed, the amount to be transported for dumping, the location of the dumpsite, the length of time the permit is valid, and special provisions for surveillance. Research and Coastal Water Quality Monitoring
Title II of the MPRSA authorizes two types of research: general research on ocean resources, under the jurisdiction of NOAA; and EPA research related to phasing out ocean disposal activities. NOAA is directed to carry out a comprehensive, long-term research program on the effects not only of ocean dumping, but also of pollution, overfishing, and other human-induced changes on the marine ecosystem. EPA's research role includes "research, investigations, experiments, training, demonstrations, surveys, and studies" to minimize or end the dumping of sewage sludge and industrial wastes, along with research on alternatives to ocean disposal. Title IV of the MPRSA established nine regional marine research boards for the purpose of developing comprehensive marine research plans, considering water quality and ecosystem conditions and research and monitoring priorities and objectives in each region. Title V of the MPRSA established a national coastal water quality monitoring program. It directs EPA and NOAA jointly to implement a long-term program to collect and analyze scientific data on the environmental quality of coastal ecosystems, including ambient water quality, health and quality of living resources, sources of environmental degradation, and data on trends. | The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) has two basic aims: to regulate intentional ocean disposal of materials, and to authorize related research. Permit and enforcement provisions of the law are often referred to as the Ocean Dumping Act. The basic provisions of the act have remained virtually unchanged since 1972, when it was enacted to establish a comprehensive waste management system to regulate disposal or dumping of all materials into marine waters that are within U.S. jurisdiction, although a number of new authorities have been added. This report presents a summary of the law.
Four federal agencies have responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Coast Guard. EPA has primary authority for regulating ocean disposal of all substances except dredged spoils, which are under the authority of the Corps of Engineers. NOAA is responsible for long-range research on the effects of human-induced changes to the marine environment, while EPA is authorized to carry out research and demonstration activities related to phasing out sewage sludge and industrial waste dumping. The Coast Guard is charged with maintaining surveillance of ocean dumping.
Title I of the MPRSA prohibits all ocean dumping, except that allowed by permits, in any ocean waters under U.S. jurisdiction, by any U.S. vessel, or by any vessel sailing from a U.S. port. Certain materials, such as high-level radioactive waste, chemical and biological warfare agents, medical waste, sewage sludge, and industrial waste, may not be dumped in the ocean. Permits for dumping of other materials, except dredge spoils, can be issued by the EPA after notice and opportunity for public hearings where the Administrator determines that such dumping will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities. Permits specify the type of material to be disposed, the amount to be transported for dumping, the location of the dumpsite, the length of time the permit is valid, and special provisions for surveillance. The law regulates ocean dumping within the area extending 12 nautical miles seaward from the U.S. baseline and regulates transport of material by U.S.-flagged vessels for dumping into ocean waters. EPA designates sites for ocean dumping and specifies in each permit where the material is to be disposed.
Title II of the MPRSA authorizes two types of research: general research on ocean resources, under the jurisdiction of NOAA; and EPA research related to phasing out ocean disposal activities. NOAA is directed to carry out a comprehensive, long-term research program on the effects not only of ocean dumping, but also of pollution, overfishing, and other human-induced changes on the marine ecosystem. EPA's research role includes "research, investigations, experiments, training, demonstrations, surveys, and studies" to minimize or end the dumping of sewage sludge and industrial wastes, along with research on alternatives to ocean disposal. (Title III, concerning marine sanctuaries, is not discussed in this report.)
Title IV of the MPRSA established nine regional marine research boards for the purpose of developing comprehensive marine research plans, considering water quality and ecosystem conditions and research and monitoring priorities and objectives in each region.
Title V of the MPRSA established a national coastal water quality monitoring program. It directs EPA and NOAA jointly to implement a long-term program to collect and analyze scientific data on the environmental quality of coastal ecosystems, including ambient water quality, health and quality of living resources, sources of environmental degradation, and data on trends. |
crs_RS21416 | crs_RS21416_0 | Background on the Initiatives
In August 2001 the President ' s Management Agenda was announced, with the stated purpose of "improving the management and performance of the federal government." The Agenda consisted of five government-wide initiatives (described below), and several specific program activities. Strategic Management of Human Capital . The Administration also developed a new program assessment rating tool in 2002, known as PART, for evaluating program performance. | This report provides an overview of the President's Management Agenda, announced by former President George W. Bush in August 2001. The Agenda included five government-wide initiatives: strategic management of human capital, competitive sourcing, improved financial management, expanded electronic government, and performance improvement. Related developments, such as the introduction of a Management Scorecard for gauging agency achievement on the initiatives and development of a program assessment rating tool (PART) for evaluating program performance, are also discussed. This report will not be further updated. |
crs_R44710 | crs_R44710_0 | Introduction
The military missions of Department of Defense (DOD) units and organizations drive the need for facilities and the supporting infrastructure on any given military installation. When adding the time required for congressional authorization and appropriations, implementation of the federal contracting process, and the physical construction of the project, the end-to-end military construction process―beginning with the realization of the need for a facility to the opening of its doors for occupancy―may span seven years or more. Planning and Design . Military construction necessary to support the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. Once approved by the Assistant Secretary, the Army's proposed construction projects are ready to be sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for consolidation with those of the other services and defense agencies into a prioritized DOD master list. Execution: From Paper to Bricks and Mortar
With congressional authorization and an appropriation, the responsibility for managing military construction projects typically falls to either Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) for Navy and Marine Corps projects, or the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) for Army and Air Force projects. Appendix A. The final, consolidated list of projects for which appropriations and authorizations are enacted can be found in the conference reports submitted by the relevant conference committees. The FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 103-337 , Section 2856) as a sense of the Senate:
Appropriations for any military construction project not included in the DOD annual budget request should be considered for authorization only if the project is–
1.essential to the DOD's national security mission,
2. not inconsistent with past actions with the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC),
3. in the services' Future Years Defense Program,
4. executable in the year they are authorized and appropriated, and
5. offset by reductions in other defense accounts, through advice from the Secretary of Defense. What is the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)? During the programming and budgeting phase, the highest-priority construction projects that will fit within the budgetary guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will be included in the President's request. The center was created through the military construction process. | Congress appropriates several billion dollars annually to support and sustain a broad footprint of military bases, reflecting both a federal investment in local communities and a local investment in national defense. Specific military construction project authorizations―provided through the annual National Defense Authorization Act―enable the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to plan, program, design, and build the runways, piers, warehouses, barracks, schools, hospitals, child development centers, and other facilities needed to support U.S. military forces at home and overseas. This report describes and explains the end-to-end military construction process by which DOD and Congress act together to build that footprint, beginning with the requirement for a facility and ending with the opening of its doors for occupancy. The process encompasses several steps:
determination of need by the local installation commander and engineering office, vetting and prioritization of construction projects within the military chain of command and the military department, consolidation and budgeting within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to create the infrastructure construction portion of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), inclusion of the final budget year list of projects in the annual President's Budget Request to Congress, review and adjustment of the list by the congressional defense committees, consideration and passage of the necessary authorization and appropriation bills and their enactment by the President, and execution of the approved construction program by the military services' executive agents—Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) and Army Corps of Engineers (ACE). |
crs_R40572 | crs_R40572_0 | In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture and year-long recession that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has called the most severe since World War II, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). This report discusses ARRA's "general oversight provisions" and several related issues for Congress. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple programs, agencies, or appropriations accounts. Provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation (e.g., appropriations set-asides and reporting requirements) are excluded from the report's scope. The provisions provide for, among other things, establishment of a Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, numerous reporting and evaluation requirements, and increased resources for agency Inspectors General (IGs). The topic of subsequent implementation of the oversight provisions, including actions by executive agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is not included in the scope of this report. Nevertheless, even before considering experience with implementation, several broad issues related to ARRA oversight may be of interest to Congress. These include assessments of ARRA's role in achieving economic objectives. Typical objectives of a fiscal stimulus policy relate to increasing economic activity in the short term, compared to what would have happened without a stimulus. In addition, some stakeholders have emphasized that stimulating the economy in the short term alone is not a sufficient definition of "success." From this perspective, the manner in which spending, tax, and other public policies are implemented, and also the impacts of these policies, may be important. All of these perspectives appear to have been included among the law's explicit purposes and "general principles." Given ARRA's direction to "commenc[e] expenditures and activities as quickly as possible consistent with prudent management" ( P.L. 111-5 , Section 3), difficult trade-offs among goals may be inevitable. The experience with ARRA also may offer lessons learned for the "normal" systems of oversight that correspond to non-ARRA-related funding and operations. Beyond the immediate situation, additional oversight issues for Congress may relate to longer-term questions. These include how to build capacity within agencies to respond effectively to crises. Questions also may arise regarding how to build capacity in agencies and government overall to anticipate crises, mitigate their risks, and avoid preventable crises. This report analyzes these and other issues after reviewing how the oversight provisions were developed and providing an overview of the enacted provisions themselves, including related appropriations and reporting requirements. Over time, Congress may consider whether existing management and oversight mechanisms, in combination with ARRA's additional provisions, adequately support effective management and oversight of ARRA implementation. | In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture and year-long recession that the Congressional Budget Office has called the most severe since World War II, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). This report discusses ARRA's "general oversight provisions" and several related issues for Congress. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple programs, agencies, or appropriations accounts. Provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation (e.g., appropriations set-asides and reporting requirements) are excluded from the report's scope.
The report includes tabular presentations of ARRA's general oversight provisions. The provisions provide for, among other things, establishment of a Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, numerous reporting and evaluation requirements, and increased resources for agency Inspectors General (IGs) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Even before considering experience with implementation, several broad issues related to ARRA oversight may be of interest to Congress. These include assessments of ARRA's role in achieving economic objectives. Typical objectives of a fiscal stimulus policy relate to increasing economic activity in the short term, compared to what would have happened without a stimulus. In addition, some stakeholders have emphasized that stimulating the economy in the short term alone is not a sufficient definition of "success." From this perspective, the manner in which spending, tax, and other public policies are implemented, and also the impacts of these policies, may be important.
All of these perspectives appear to have been included among the law's explicit purposes and "general principles concerning use of funds." Given ARRA's direction to "commenc[e] expenditures and activities as quickly as possible consistent with prudent management," difficult trade-offs among goals may be inevitable. Over time, Congress may consider whether existing management and oversight mechanisms, in combination with ARRA's additional provisions, adequately support effective management and oversight of ARRA implementation. The experience with ARRA also may offer lessons learned for the "normal," non-ARRA systems of oversight.
Beyond the immediate situation, additional oversight issues for Congress may relate to longer-term questions. These include how to build and monitor capacity within agencies to respond effectively to crises. Questions also may arise regarding how to build and monitor capacity in agencies and government overall to anticipate crises, mitigate their risks, and avoid preventable crises. This report analyzes these and other issues after reviewing how the oversight provisions were developed and providing an overview of the enacted provisions themselves, including related appropriations and reporting requirements.
The topic of subsequent implementation of the oversight provisions, including actions by executive agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is not included in the scope of this report. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43195 | crs_R43195_0 | Introduction
While attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad are not infrequent, the severity of the September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, has caused a reexamination of measures in place to protect U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad. Members have also put forward a number of legislative proposals on issues ranging from the composition of Accountability Review Boards to procedures for awarding contracts for local security guards. Two of these measures have been considered and approved by committees. The Department of State undertook several measures in response to the attack, including immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board's recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years. The following summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department efforts to make U.S. embassies and personnel around the world more secure. It will be updated as necessary to reflect further developments and actions on ongoing policy proposals. Additional information about recent year funding requests and levels is available in CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues . Legislative Response to the Benghazi Attack
Congressional activity in the 112 th and 113 th Congresses on the issue of the protection of U.S. personnel and facilities abroad has included a number of legislative actions and proposals, as well as a variety of hearings and investigations into the Benghazi attack by a number of different committees. The House Select Committee on Benghazi, chaired by Representative Trey Gowdy, held its first hearing on September 17, 2014. S. 1386 , the Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013, introduced by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Menendez on July 30, 2013; adopted by voice vote and ordered reported favorably to the full Senate on August 1. Funding
H.R. 83 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, meets the Administration's $3.1 billion request for Worldwide Security Protection funds—growing the account by 12.7% over FY2014-enacted levels. While the Act exceeds the $1.47 billion request for Worldwide Security Upgrades by $23 million, this represents a reduction of 7.7% from FY2014 levels. The measure was repeated as Section 7006 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 4. 5. 8. | The September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, prompted sustained congressional attention on the specific circumstances of the events in question, as well as broader questions regarding how U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad are secured. Ensuring that the Department of State is better prepared for the possibility of similar attacks in the future has been a central congressional concern.
The Department of State undertook a number of measures in response to the attack, including immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board's recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years.
Congress has conducted oversight through investigations by a number of committees and through a number of hearings. The House of Representatives voted to create a select committee on the Benghazi attack on May 8, 2014; the committee held its first hearing on September 17, 2014.
Members have also put forward legislative proposals on issues ranging from the composition of Accountability Review Boards to procedures for awarding local security guard force contracts. In the 113th Congress, two wide-ranging bills incorporating many of these areas have been considered: H.R. 2848, the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2014, and S. 1386, the Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.
The 113th Congress, through the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, fully funded the Administration's FY2014 request for diplomatic security-related accounts, providing approximately $5.4 billion. H.R. 83, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, meets the Administration's $3.1 billion request for Worldwide Security Protection funds and exceeds the $1.47 billion request for Worldwide Security Upgrades by $23 million.
This report briefly summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department actions in response to the attack, and will be updated as necessary to reflect further developments and actions on ongoing policy proposals. Readers seeking background information on recent embassy attacks, State Department policies and procedures relevant to embassy security, or information on recent year embassy security funding trends should consult CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues. |
crs_RL30653 | crs_RL30653_0 | Learning whether public policy is on the right track is particularly important at the current time because of the positive relationship between age and disability. As
the incidence of disabling health conditions rises with age (e.g., hearing impairments, arthritis, and limitations on activities due to heart disease) and as the large baby-boom generation has been entering the mid-to-late working years,
disability is likely to become increasingly common and, potentially, increasingly costly to society (e.g., increased utilization of medical and rehabilitative services as well as decreased receipt of income and payroll taxes from forgone individual earnings). In 1938, the Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Section 14 of the act established a reduced wage for the employment of individuals, under special certificates issued by the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Administrator, whose earning capacity was impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA, P.L. In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA, P.L. 102-166 ) allows people bringing employment discrimination suits to seek compensatory and punitive damages under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ( P.L. Toward the close of the decade, the Congress turned its attention to the supply side of the labor market in the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. 106-170 is intended to encourage persons with severely limiting health conditions or impairments to increase their work effort by alleviating a dilemma of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries, namely, choosing between a job which may not have employer-provided health benefits and continuation of government-provided health care coverage through Medicare or Medicaid. The relatively recent implementation of these policies and programs makes it difficult to gauge how successful they have been at enhancing the employment prospects of persons with disabilities. The varying definitions of disability contained in programs and surveys compound the problem. Perhaps most importantly, so, too, does the lack of accurate statistics on individuals with disabilities derived from surveys that have asked consistent questions over time. 13078 recognized the data shortcomings related to the labor force status of persons with disabilities. It required the Presidential Task Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities to design and implement
a statistically reliable and accurate method to measure the employment rate of adults with disabilities as soon as possible, but no later than the date of termination of the Task Force [30 days after submitting its final report on July 26, 2002, the 10 th anniversary of initial implementation of the ADA's employment provisions]. In an effort to mitigate the data limitations, researchers sometimes have taken the approach of utilizing multiple surveys to determine whether they are telling the same story. An alternative employment rate of people with disabilities who report they are willing and able to work shows statistically significant increases during the 1990s expansion. Policy analysts have examined other explanations for the comparatively poor labor market performance of the population with disabilities during the 1990s. The results of this research have prompted some to suggest that improvement in the employment outcomes of persons with disabilities might be attained by, on the demand side, subsidizing the cost of employer accommodations and by, on the supply side, assisting already employed persons with disabilities retain their current jobs, among other things. | Congress has enacted major legislation related to the employment of individuals with disabilities. In 1938, the Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which, among other provisions, established a reduced wage for the employment of individuals whose earning capacity was impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury (Section 14). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 banned discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere on the basis of disability, and the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1991 allowed people bringing employment discrimination suits to seek compensatory and punitive damages under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In 1999, Congress turned its attention to the supply side of the labor market in the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act by encouraging people with severely limiting health conditions or impairments to increase their work effort without loss of government-provided health care coverage.
Learning whether public policy is on the right track is especially important today because of the direct relationship between age and disability. As the incidence of disabling health conditions rises with age and as the large baby-boom generation has been entering middle-age, disability is likely to become increasingly common and (potentially) costly to society. Changing economic conditions and the varying definitions of disability in programs and surveys make it difficult to gauge the success of the legislation in enhancing the employment prospects of people with disabilities. So, too, does the lack of accurate, consistent statistics over time on the labor force status of individuals with disabilities. Despite the charge of the Presidential Task Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities (1998-2002) to develop a valid, reliable measure of the employment rate of working-age adults with disabilities, progress toward that end has been very slow.
To mitigate the data shortcomings with regard to conducting trend analysis, researchers have utilized multiple databases to determine if they are telling the same story. In general, they are. Despite the strong state of the economy through 2000, full implementation of the ADA's employment provisions in the mid-1990s, and the employment rate of all working-age persons with disabilities failed to improve in recent decades. Analysts have examined a variety of explanations for the lagging employment opportunities of people with disabilities, including the seemingly increased share of adults with disabilities so severe that they report being unable to work; expansion of the Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income programs; and enactment and implementation of the ADA.
The results of this research have prompted some to suggest that enhancing the employment prospects of all members of the population with disabilities might involve subsidizing the cost of employer accommodations and helping those already employed retain their jobs, among other things. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R42809 | crs_R42809_0 | This report provides an overview of the mechanics of Coverdells, including a summary of the key parameters of Coverdells. The report also examines the specific tax advantages of these plans. Overview
A Coverdell education savings account (ESA)—often referred to simply as a Coverdell—is a tax-advantaged investment account that can be used to pay for both higher-education expenses and elementary and secondary school expenses. The specific tax advantage of a Coverdell is that distributions (i.e., withdrawals) from this account are tax-free, if they are used to pay for qualified education expenses. If the distribution is used to pay for nonqualified expenses, a portion of the distribution is taxable and may also be subject to a 10% penalty. Modifications of Coverdells Made Permanent by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012
Several parameters of Coverdells were temporarily modified by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ) and were initially scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. Subsequently, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. Two modifications which received recent attention include an increase in the annual contribution limits and an expansion of the definition of qualified expenses. Specifically, EGTRRA increased the annual contribution limit from $500 to $2,000 per beneficiary and allowed elementary and secondary expenses to be considered qualified education expenses. Upon enactment of ATRA, these and other changes were made permanent. | A Coverdell ESA—often referred to simply as a Coverdell—is a tax-advantaged investment account that can be used to pay for both higher-education expenses and elementary and secondary school expenses. The specific tax advantage of a Coverdell is that distributions (i.e., withdrawals) from this account are tax-free, if they are used to pay for qualified education expenses. If the distribution is used to pay for nonqualified expenses, a portion of the distribution is taxable and may also be subject to a 10% penalty.
Several parameters of Coverdells were temporarily modified by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) and were most recently scheduled to expire at the end of 2012. At the end of 2012, these modifications were made permanent by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240; ATRA).
Two of these EGTRRA modifications which have received recent attention include an increase in the annual contribution limits and an expansion of the definition of qualified expenses. Specifically, EGTRRA increased the annual contribution limit from $500 to $2,000 per beneficiary and allowed elementary and secondary expenses to be considered qualified education expenses. Under current law, these changes are now permanent.
This report describes the mechanics of Coverdells and examines the specific tax advantages of these plans. Specifically, this report reviews the major parameters of Coverdells and then examines the income and gift tax treatment of Coverdells, using a stylized example to illustrate key concepts. The report also examines the tax treatment of rollovers and the interaction of Coverdells with other education tax benefits. Finally, the report looks at how Coverdells affect a student's eligibility for federal need-based student aid. |
crs_R44031 | crs_R44031_0 | Hong Kong's current Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying (C.Y. 102-383 ) states, "Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong." The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures. However, Chinese and Hong Kong officials assert that the NPCSC August 2014 decision complies with China's international commitments and the laws governing the HKSAR, and is consistent with past statements regarding the adoption of universal suffrage in Hong Kong elections. All but one of the 43 pro-establishment Legco members announced they would vote in favor of the proposal. Step 4: Legco's Vote
After two days of debate, Legco defeated the proposed resolution on June 18, 2015, by a vote of 28 against and 8 for the motion. Finally, CY Leung could resubmit a report to the NPCSC on the conditions in Hong Kong, indicating that circumstances have changed since he submitted the previous report in July 2014. In addition, the 2016 Legco may have an opportunity to consider CE election reforms during their term in office, if the CE selected in 2017 chooses to restart the reform process, and the NPCSC amends or supersedes its August 2014 decision on CE election reforms. The Joint Declaration contains no direct reference to democracy or universal suffrage. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Hong Kong
The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 effectively continues U.S. relations with Hong Kong after China's resumption of authority over the city as it did during the time the city was a British colony, so long as China abides by its international obligations with respect to Hong Kong, including the Joint Declaration. 113-235 ) in December 2014. The report, released on April 10, 2015, contained a section on "electoral reforms," including the following statement:
The United States has called for the conduct of a multi-candidate competitive election for Chief Executive in 2017, which would enhance the legitimacy of Hong Kong's Chief Executive, would be a major step forward in Hong Kong's political development and would bolster Hong Kong's stability and prosperity
The Obama Administration's Policy
The White House and the State Department have been seemingly cautious about their statements with regards to the proposed CE election reforms and the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA; H.R. 5696 and S. 2922 ) was introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on November 13, 2014. The legislation reaffirmed "the principles and objectives set forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992," including "support for democratization" as a "fundamental principle of United States foreign policy." Legislation
On February 27, 2015, Representative Christopher Smith introduced the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act ( H.R. 1159 are very similar to the amended version of S. 2922 approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 113 th Congress. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. Motion
Motion concerning the Amendment to the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs to move the following motion:
Pursuant to Article 7 of Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China of 6 April 2004, and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 of 31 August 2014, the "(Draft) Amendment to Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" appended to this Motion is hereby endorsed by this Council by a two-thirds majority of all Members. | The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383) declares that, "Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong." China's law establishing the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR), commonly referred to as the "Basic Law," declares that "the ultimate aim" is the selection of Hong Kong's Chief Executive (CE) and Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage. The year 2015 may be a pivotal year for making progress toward the objectives of both of these laws. It could also be a year in which the democratic aspirations of many Hong Kong residents remain unfulfilled.
Hong Kong's current Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, initiated a six-step process in July 2014 whereby Hong Kong's Basic Law could be amended to allow the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017. On August 31, 2014, China's National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) completed the second step of the reform process when it issued a decision setting comparatively strict conditions on the adoption of universal suffrage for the 2017 CE elections that seemingly preclude the nomination of a pro-democracy candidate. The third step of the process, the CE submitting legislation to Legco to amend the Basic Law, came on June 17. On June 18, Legco defeated the proposed election reforms by a vote of 28 against and 8 in favor of the legislation, completing the fourth step and terminating one path to universal suffrage.
Public opinion in Hong Kong over the proposed CE election reforms is split, with opinion surveys showing a sharp division of opinion on accepting the NPCSC's conditions. In the autumn of 2014, anger in Hong Kong over the NPCSC's August 2014 decision precipitated the occupation of several major Hong Kong roads by thousands of Hong Kong residents. These occupations were ended in December 2014 by the deployment of thousands of police officers, but scattered protests continue.
The democratization of Hong Kong not only has implications for U.S. relations with Hong Kong, but also for U.S. relations with China and the political development of Taiwan and cross-Strait relations.
In response to the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, Members of the 113th Congress introduced the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (H.R. 5696 and S. 2922), to amend the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. The Senate version of the legislation was amended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on December 11, 2014, but did not receive consideration by the full Senate.
The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act has been reintroduced in the 114th Congress in the House of Representatives (H.R. 1159) with some changes, but not in the Senate. In addition, the 114th Congress may consider continuing appropriations for existing programs to promote the democratization of Hong Kong.
Because the process of possibly reforming Hong Kong's election laws is underway, this report will be updated as circumstances or conditions in Hong Kong significantly change. This update reflects Legco's defeat of the proposed resolution and possible next steps in election reforms. |
crs_R40665 | crs_R40665_0 | Introduction
Title III of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344 , 2 U.S.C. 601-661) ("the Budget Act"), as amended, provides for the adoption of an annual concurrent resolution on the budget by Congress. This report will outline the most significant provisions contained within the Budget Act that affect the consideration and amending of budget resolutions in the Senate. Section 301(a) of the Budget Act prescribes the content required for this the budget resolution, and is discussed below. In practice, the Senate also uses unanimous consent agreements to modify the Section 305(b)(2) time limits or further structure the amendment process. Vote-arama
Section 305(b)(1) of the Budget Act limits total Senate debate on the budget resolution to 50 hours, but the Senate has not always disposed of all amendments by the expiration of that time. This has been the most common point of order raised against budget resolution amendments. | Title III of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. 601-688) ("the Budget Act"), as amended, provides for the adoption of an annual concurrent resolution on the budget ("budget resolution") by Congress. The Budget Act includes provisions governing the consideration and amending process of the budget resolution, such as establishing points of order, setting time limits on certain motions, amendments, and the budget resolution itself, and restricting the content of amendments.
This report highlights some of the Budget Act's budget resolution provisions, and how they play out on the Senate floor during consideration and amending. One notable subject that this report addresses is the "vote-arama," or the period when the Senate disposes of amendments after the time for debate on the resolution has expired. In addition to Budget Act provisions, this report also includes examples of when the Senate has utilized unanimous consent agreements to further structure floor procedure. |
crs_R43107 | crs_R43107_0 | The renewed interest in litigation regarding the government surveillance programs comes on the heels of a recent Supreme Court ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty International . The litigants included a group of attorneys with clients with connections to terrorist-related cases, several journalists who have overseas sources in countries where terrorism may be ongoing, and human rights researchers who claimed to be seeking to talk to people subjected to torture in secret prisons overseas. The Court noted that the litigants' theory for how they would be injured in the future by Section 702 was based on a series of assumptions that all had to occur in order for them to have an injury that could be traced to the federal law and redressed by a favorable court ruling. Amongst the plaintiffs' assumptions, the Court noted that the Clapper litigants were assuming that (1) the government is thinking of imminently targeting the communication of the plaintiffs' foreign contacts; (2) the government would use Section 702, as opposed to other sources of authority, to engage in the surveillance; (3) the FISC would authorize such surveillance; (4) the government would actually succeed in eavesdropping on one of their contacts; and (5) the eavesdropping would actually capture the contents of the conversations of one of the litigants, injuring them. Future of Litigation Challenging the Foreign Surveillance Practices
Four months after the Supreme Court's ruling in Clapper came the avalanche of news stories alleging that the U.S. intelligence community was engaged in broad intelligence gathering measures, including the capturing of a broad universe of records from particular companies. On one hand, the ability of a plaintiff to muster enough evidence to establish standing has been arguably boosted by recent revelations about government surveillance efforts. As such, the arguments of the new litigants on how they have been injured are more specific and theoretically less speculative than the arguments made by the plaintiffs in Clapper . Nonetheless, while recent revelations in the press may have helped boost an argument for establishing standing, demonstrating Article III standing remains a difficult task, especially in light of Clapper . For example, the plaintiffs in these newly filed cases still have "no actual knowledge of the Government's ... targeting practices," and are assuming not only that the government has been successful in acquiring the data in question but also that the government is actually using or it is "certainly impending" that the government will use targeting techniques that cause the specific injury alleged, an erosion of the confidentiality of certain communications. As a consequence, the recent news accounts and disclosures by the government may not be enough to allow a federal court to reach the merits of the legality of certain government surveillance efforts. | Recent news accounts (and government responses to those news accounts) have indicated that the government is reportedly engaged in a surveillance program that gathers vast amounts of data, including records regarding the phone calls, emails, and Internet usage of millions of individuals. The disclosures to the media reportedly suggest that specific telecommunication companies have been required to disclose certain data to the government as part of the intelligence community's surveillance efforts.
The recent controversy over the reports of government targeting efforts comes months after the Supreme Court ruled in a case called Clapper v. Amnesty International. In Clapper, the Court dismissed a facial constitutional challenge to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act on constitutional standing grounds. Specifically, the Clapper court found that the litigants, a group of attorneys and human rights activists who argued that their communications with clients could be the target of foreign intelligence surveillance, could not demonstrate they would suffer a future injury that was "certainly impending," the requirement the majority of the Court found to be necessary to establish constitutional standing when asking a court to prevent a future injury.
Notwithstanding the Clapper decision, in light of the recent revelations about the government's intelligence gathering methods, several lawsuits have been filed by individuals who are customers of the companies allegedly subject to court orders requiring the disclosure of data to the government. The litigants in these newly filed lawsuits would appear to have a stronger argument for how they have been injured than the plaintiffs in Clapper did. Notably, unlike the Clapper plaintiffs, the litigants in these new lawsuits have evidence that the government is actually using its authority to gather data that is pertinent to the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs in these lawsuits may still have significant difficulties in establishing standing, as they have arguably not alleged that they have been specifically targeted by the government or injured in any concrete and particularized way by the government's conduct. Moreover, gathering evidence to prove an injury will be difficult because of evidentiary privileges protecting the government information. As a consequence, litigation challenging the government surveillance programs that are the topic of recent media accounts may have the same difficulties found in the Clapper litigation. |
crs_R41011 | crs_R41011_0 | Introduction
Habeas corpus is the procedure under which an individual held in custody may petition a federal court for his release on the grounds that his detention is contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States. This report is a brief overview of those recommendations and legislative proposals. Actually Innocent
Federal law imposes several bars to habeas relief in the interests of finality, federalism, and judicial efficiency. 3986 ) and the Justice for the Wrongfully Accused Act ( H.R. 3320 ). Representative Moore (Kansas) introduced H.R. Representative Johnson (Georgia) introduced H.R. H.R. The Johnson bill would also have carried state death row inmates, who claimed innocence, over another statutory habeas bar. H.R. Existing law requires federal courts to dismiss second or successive petitions unless they are based on retroactively applicable new law or are based on newly discovered facts that establish constitutional defect plus innocence. Boumediene and Guantanamo Detainees
The Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene stimulated several proposals in the 111 th Congress relating to the judicial review for the Guantanamo detainees. The proposals included the:
Military Commissions Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2009 ( H.R. The Smith and Graham bills would have established new habeas provisions applicable to detained enemy combatants, H.R. The 111 th Congress adjourned without further action on any of these proposals. Other Issues
Witnesses who submitted statements for the House Judiciary Committee's recent habeas hearings criticized other aspects of federal habeas law – issues which do not appear to have been the subject of legislative proposals in this Congress. | Federal habeas corpus is the process under which those in official detention may petition a federal court for their release based on an assertion that they are being held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Major habeas legislative activity in the 111th Congress fell within three areas: proposals to permit state death row inmates to seek habeas relief based on evidence that they are probably innocent (H.R. 3320 and H.R. 3986); proposals to amend federal law in response to the Supreme Court's determination that the level of judicial review afforded Guantanamo detainees failed to meet constitutional expectations (H.R. 64, H.R. 591, H.R. 630, H.R. 1315, H.R. 3728, and S. 3707); and recommendations for revision of several areas of federal habeas law from witnesses appearing before recent House Judiciary Committee hearings. The 111th Congress adjourned without further action on any of these proposals or recommendations.
Related CRS Reports include CRS Report R41010, Actual Innocence and Habeas Corpus: In re Troy Davis; CRS Report RL33391, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Brief Legal Overview (also available in abbreviated form as CRS Report RS22432, Federal Habeas Corpus: An Abridged Sketch); CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court; and CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress. |
crs_RL33975 | crs_RL33975_0 | Like all youth, vulnerable youth face a difficult transition to adulthood; however, their transition is further complicated by a number of challenges, including family conflict and obstacles to securing employment that provides adequate wages, health insurance, and potential for upward mobility. The federal government has not adopted a single overarching federal policy or legislative vehicle that addresses the challenges at-risk youth experience in adolescence or while making the transition to adulthood. Rather, federal youth policy today has evolved from multiple programs established in the early 20 th century and expanded through Great Society initiatives. These programs, concentrated in six areas—workforce development, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service—provide vulnerable youth with opportunities to develop skills that will assist them in adulthood. Despite the range of federal services and activities for vulnerable youth, many of the programs have not been developed into a coordinated system of support. Congress has passed legislation (the Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act, P.L. In the past three decades, Congress has also considered other legislation (the Youth Community Development Block Grant of 1995 and the Younger Americans Act of 2000) to improve the delivery of services to vulnerable youth and provide opportunities to these youth through policies with a "positive youth development" focus. Older youth, up to age 24, are in the process of transitioning to adulthood. The current move from adolescence to adulthood has become longer and more complex, particularly since the postwar period. During the period of transition, young adults cycle between attending school, living independently, and staying with their parents. A study of support to 19- to 22-year-olds, based on data from 2005 through 2009, found that just over 60% of these young adults receive some form of financial assistance from their parents, including help with paying bills (42.2%), tuition assistance (34.7%), providing personal vehicles (23.0%), and paying rent (21.5%). Defining the Vulnerable Youth Population
The majority of young people in the United States grow up healthy and safe in their communities. Those of primary and secondary school age live with parents who provide for their emotional and economic well-being and they attend schools that prepare them for continuing education or the workforce, and ultimately, self-sufficiency. This is due, in part, to their exposure to poverty, and crime, racism, and lack of access to systems of care, such as health care and vocational assistance. The federal Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs characterizes positive youth development as a process that engages young people in positive pursuits that help them acquire and practice the skills, attitudes, and behaviors that they will need to become effective and successful adults in their work, family, and civic lives. These programs include those enacted under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. 109-365 ). In 2008, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13459 to establish an Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs. This grant program was never funded. The final report was to include (1) a comprehensive list of recent research and statistical reporting by various federal agencies on the overall well-being of youth; (2) the assessment of the needs of youth and those who serve youth; (3) a summary of the plan in coordinating to achieve the goals and objectives for federal youth programs; (4) recommendations to coordinate and improve federal training and technical assistance, information sharing, and communication among federal programs and agencies; (5) recommendations to better integrate and coordinate policies across federal, state, and local levels of government, including any recommendations the chair determines appropriate for legislation and administrative actions; (6) a summary of the actions taken by the council at the request of federal agencies to facilitate collaboration and coordination on youth serving programs and the results of those collaborations, if available; (7) a summary of the action the council has taken at the request of states to provide technical assistance; and (8) a summary of the input and recommendations by disadvantaged youth, community-based organizations, among others. Without protective factors in place, vulnerable youth may have difficulty transitioning to adulthood. Detachment from the labor market and school—or disconnectedness—is perhaps the single strongest indicator that the transition has not been made adequately. | The majority of young people in the United States grow up healthy and safe in their communities. Most of those of school age live with parents who provide for their well-being, and they attend schools that prepare them for advanced education or vocational training and, ultimately, self-sufficiency. Many youth also receive assistance from their families during the transition to adulthood. During this period, young adults cycle between attending school, living independently, and staying with their families. A study from 2009 found that over 60% of young people ages 19 to 22 receive financial support from their parents, including help with paying bills (42%), tuition assistance (35%), providing personal vehicles (23%), and paying rent (21.5%). Even with this assistance, the current move from adolescence to adulthood has become longer and increasingly complex.
For vulnerable (or "at-risk") youth populations, the transition to adulthood is further complicated by a number of challenges, including family conflict or abandonment and obstacles to securing employment that provides adequate wages and health insurance. These youth may be prone to outcomes that have negative consequences for their future development as responsible, self-sufficient adults. Risk outcomes include teenage parenthood; homelessness; drug abuse; delinquency; physical and sexual abuse; and school dropout. Detachment from the labor market and school—or disconnectedness—may be the single strongest indicator that the transition to adulthood has not been made successfully.
The federal government has not adopted a single overarching federal policy or legislative vehicle that addresses the challenges vulnerable youth experience in adolescence or while making the transition to adulthood. Rather, federal youth policy today has evolved from multiple programs established in the early 20th century and expanded in the years following the 1964 announcement of the War on Poverty. These programs are concentrated in six areas: workforce development, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service. They are intended to provide vulnerable youth with opportunities to develop skills to assist them in adulthood.
Despite the range of federal services and activities to assist disadvantaged youth, many of these programs have not developed into a coherent system of support. This is due in part to the administration of programs within several agencies and the lack of mechanisms to coordinate their activities. In response to concerns about the complex federal structure developed to assist vulnerable youth, Congress passed the Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (P.L. 109-365) in 2006. Though activities under the act were never funded, the Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs was formed in 2008 under Executive Order 13459 to carry out coordinating activities across multiple agencies that oversee youth programs. Separately, Congress has considered other legislation to improve the delivery of services to vulnerable youth and provide opportunities to these youth through policies with a "positive youth development" focus. The Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs characterizes positive youth development as a process that engages young people in positive pursuits that help them acquire and practice the skills, attitudes, and behaviors that they will need to become successful adults.
In addition to the Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs, the executive branch has established working groups and initiatives to coordinate supports for youth. The Department of Justice has carried out the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention since the 1970s to coordinate federal policies on youth involved in the juvenile justice system. More recently, the Obama and Trump Administrations have carried out the Performance Partnership Pilots (P3) initiative to coordinate funding across selected agencies to support local communities in serving vulnerable youth. |
crs_R43113 | crs_R43113_0 | U.S. interests in the Kingdom of Cambodia include social, economic, and political development, trade and investment, regional security, civil society, and human rights. As China's economic and political influence has grown in Cambodia and the Lower Mekong Delta region, the Obama Administration has attempted to bolster U.S. ties with Cambodia and other countries in the region. A key challenge for U.S. policy toward Cambodia lies in combining and balancing efforts to engage the Kingdom on a range of fronts while promoting human rights and democracy. U.S. military engagement in Cambodia includes naval port visits, military assistance, and joint exercises related to international peacekeeping, civic action and humanitarian activities, and maritime security. Cambodia is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and served as the organization's rotating chair for the first time in 2012. Some observers contend that Cambodia's foreign policies are heavily influenced by China, as evidenced by the Kingdom's support of China's positions during the 2012 ASEAN meetings. Political Developments and Human Rights
During the past decade, Cambodia has made fitful progress in some areas of U.S. interest and concern, including the conduct of elections, the development of a vibrant civil society, the protection of labor rights, bringing some Khmer Rouge leaders to justice, and improving public health. During the past several years, the political system has become less democratic and civil liberties such as free speech and assembly have been encroached upon. Although political opposition groups may gain parliamentary seats in the national elections by forming a united front and tapping into voter discontent among urban voters, youth, and marginalized groups, the CPP's hold on power seems assured for now. Hun Sen has bolstered his political strength through a combination of electoral victories, influence over the broadcast media and judiciary, legal and extra-legal political maneuvers, intimidation of opponents, patronage, and economic threats. Many observers believe the July 2013 national elections will likely mark another milestone in Hun Sen's evolving political power in Cambodia. Among major concerns are the prohibition of opposition leader Sam Rainsy from running in the contest, the expulsion of opposition lawmakers from the National Assembly, inaccurate voter lists, and the perceived bias of the National Election Committee (NEC). The top foreign donors, in order of contributions, are Japan, Australia, the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. However, Prime Minister Hun Sen has opposed expanding the number of indictments, arguing that it would undermine "national reconciliation." China has been a major source of loans, infrastructure construction, investment, and development assistance to the Kingdom. Furthermore, many analysts argue that Chinese assistance has significantly reduced the effectiveness of other aid donors attempting to pressure Cambodia to make advances in the areas of rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Economic Conditions
Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in Asia. The United States is the largest overseas market for Cambodian goods, accounting for about half of the Kingdom's garment exports. Cambodia acceded to the WTO in October 2004. | The United States and the Kingdom of Cambodia have been expanding their once-limited ties for a number of years, although U.S. concerns about Cambodia's human rights record still limit the scope of the bilateral relationship. The Obama Administration has taken steps to broaden engagement with Cambodia, partly in response to China's growing diplomatic and economic influence in Cambodia and the Lower Mekong Delta region. U.S. interests in Cambodia include promoting development, trade and investment, regional security, civil society, democracy, and human rights. U.S. military engagement with Cambodia has increased as well. These include naval port visits, military assistance, and joint exercises related to international peacekeeping, humanitarian activities, and maritime security. A key challenge for U.S. policy toward Cambodia lies in balancing efforts to engage the Kingdom on many fronts while promoting democracy and human rights.
During the past decade, the Kingdom has made fitful progress in some areas of U.S. concern, including the conduct of elections, the development of civil society, labor rights, bringing some Khmer Rouge leaders to justice, public health, and counterterrorism measures. However, during the past several years, the political system has become less democratic and civil liberties have been curtailed. Although political opposition groups may gain parliamentary seats in the July 28, 2013 national elections by forming a united front and tapping into voter discontent among urban and marginalized groups, Prime Minister Hun Sen's continued hold on power seems assured.
Over the past decade and a half, Hun Sen has bolstered his political strength through a combination of electoral victories, influence over the broadcast media and judiciary, legal and extra-legal political maneuvers, intimidation of opponents and critics, patronage, and economic threats. Many observers believe that the fairness of the national elections were seriously undermined prior to election day. Among the major concerns were the prevention of opposition leader Sam Rainsy from participating in politics or running in the elections, the expulsion of opposition lawmakers from the National Assembly, inaccurate voter lists, and the alleged lack of neutrality of the National Election Commission.
The United States provides significant foreign aid to Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Asia, largely through non-governmental organizations. The Kingdom received $76 million in U.S. assistance in FY2012. Program areas include public health, agricultural development, environmental preservation, military training, maritime security, elections, civil society, and removal of explosive remnants of war. The United States is the largest foreign market for Cambodian goods, buying about half of the Kingdom's garment exports.
China has been a principal source of loans, infrastructure development, investment, and foreign aid to the Kingdom. Some experts maintain that Chinese assistance has significantly reduced the effectiveness of traditional aid donors in attempting to pressure Phnom Penh to make advances in the areas of rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Some groups have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of China's development projects on the local environment. Other observers also contend that Beijing has influenced Cambodian foreign policy. During its chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2012, Cambodia was seen as acceding to Beijing's desire to block attempts to raise the issue of maritime security in regional fora, to the consternation of the United States and other ASEAN nations. |
crs_RS22574 | crs_RS22574_0 | Introduction
The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States (37 million) is at the highest level in our history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population (12.4%) not seen since the early 20 th century. There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system, based upon the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. 110th Congress
Senate action on comprehensive immigration reform legislation stalled at the end of June 2007 after several weeks of intensive debate. | U.S. immigration policy is a highly contentious issue in the 110th Congress. The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population not seen since the early 20th century. There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. Senate action on comprehensive immigration reform legislation stalled at the end of June 2007 after several weeks of intensive debate. This report synthesizes the major elements of immigration reform in the 110th Congress and provides references to other CRS reports that fully analyze these legislative elements. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_R44421 | crs_R44421_0 | T he Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-13 ) made several changes to the tax treatment of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA, enacted in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, P.L. 96-499 ) as it relates to REITs. REITs are corporations that issue shares of stock, are largely invested in real property, and do not generally pay corporate tax. REITs distribute and deduct most of their earned income as dividends to shareholders. U.S. individual shareholders pay tax at ordinary individual income tax rates on those dividends, rather than the lower rates that normally apply to dividends on corporate stock. Also, FIRPTA imposes a capital gains tax on foreign investments for gains related to real estate, with an exception for a 5% or less ownership of a REIT. The Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted three types of changes to the rules regarding REITs: (1) provisions to prevent tax-free spin-offs of real property into tax-exempt REITs by currently taxable, operating corporations; (2) provisions to increase foreign investment in U.S. REITs by liberalizing FIRPTA rules; and (3) a series of technical revisions to REITs that had been under consideration for some time. Additional modifications to REIT provisions might still be considered in the future if general tax reform is considered. This report describes REITs and FIRPTA, provides historical developments, presents an overview of REIT size and activity, explains the provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, and discusses possible policy issues in the future. These and other changes expanded the scope of assets organized as REITs. Prior to the 2015 legislation and following a regulatory change in 2001, corporations have been able to spin off their real estate assets into a separate REIT through a tax-free reorganization. Today, most REITs are equity REITs. Foreign Shareholders, REITs, and FIRPTA
In general, a foreign person or corporation is not taxed on U.S. source capital gains income. The reasons given by legislators were the need for real estate financing due to economic conditions at that time and the creation of a vehicle to allow taxpayers of more modest means to invest in real estate. Expanding the Scope of REITs, Spin-offs, and Tax Rate Changes
During the past years, beginning in the late 1990s, REITs began to expand in scope and size, in part due to legislative and regulatory changes. The REIT provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. In addition, in 1999, taxable REIT subsidiaries were first allowed. These REITs own $1.8 trillion of real estate. From a tax perspective, tax-exempt investors have the largest benefit from REIT treatment compared with treatment as a regular corporation because they have a zero personal level tax and are not subject to the unrelated business income tax. There are some exceptions. Changes Relating to Foreign Shareholders, Including FIRPTA Provisions Relating to REITs
Five provisions affect the treatment of foreign shareholders of REITs and taken together cost $2,923 million in federal revenue forgone over 10 years. 5. Policy Options
The revisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act may lead to a period with no further REIT revisions. For example, some of the revenue-raising REIT provisions in former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Dave Camp's proposed Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. 1 , 113 th Congress) were not enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act and might be potential base broadening targets in a tax reform. | The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-13) made several changes to the tax treatment of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA, enacted in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, P.L. 96-499) as it relates to REITs. REITs are corporations that issue shares of stock, are largely invested in real property, and do not generally pay corporate tax. REITs distribute and deduct most income as dividends to shareholders. U.S. individual shareholders pay tax at ordinary individual income tax rates on those dividends (rather than the lower rates normally applied to dividends on corporate stock).
REITs were initially introduced, in part, to allow taxpayers of more modest means to invest in real estate. The size and scope of REITs has been increasing in past years, due in part to legislative and regulatory changes. REITs today are estimated to own $1.8 trillion in real estate. Legislative changes have meant REITs are increasingly not only owning and renting property as a passive investment, but also managing it through taxable subsidiaries. U.S. corporations have been spinning off (transferring to a separate corporation organized as a REIT) buildings (and other assets defined as real estate) in a tax-free reorganization. The expanding scope and size of REIT activities has raised issues as to whether the intent of the preferred treatment is still appropriate.
Another issue concerning REITs is that provisions in FIRPTA have been discouraging foreign investors from purchasing REIT shares by taxing investments that exceed 5% of the REIT's shares. Capital gains paid to foreign investors are generally exempt from U.S. tax. FIRPTA, however, imposes a capital gains tax on foreign investments for gains related to real estate, with an exception for a 5% or less ownership of a REIT. Investment in other types of securities is not subject to the U.S. capital gains tax.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act makes several changes in response to these issues. The act
disallows tax-free spin-offs of assets into a tax-exempt REIT by a regular corporation; increases from 5% to 10% the amount of ownership in a REIT by a foreign investor before the capital gains tax applies; and exempts foreign pension funds investing directly or indirectly in real estate from the FIRPTA capital gains tax.
These provisions, taken together, result in federal tax revenue losses. There are also some smaller (in revenue effect) provisions affecting foreign investors that gain revenue.
In addition to these rules, P.L. 114-13 includes some minor provisions, the most significant of these changes relating to the treatment of taxable REIT subsidiaries.
The changes in the Consolidated Appropriations Act may lead to a period with no further REIT revisions. If tax reform is considered, however, additional REIT base broadening provisions might be considered. For example, former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Dave Camp's proposed Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1, 113th Congress) contained more restrictive provisions relating to spin-offs as well as other provisions primarily focused on the definition of real estate. Changes in a tax reform, such as lowering the corporate rate or allowing a corporate dividend deduction, could also affect the relative tax benefit of REITs.
This report describes REITs and FIRPTA, provides historical developments, presents an overview of REIT size and activity, explains the provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, and discusses possible policy issues in the future. |
crs_R44848 | crs_R44848_0 | Although these bills contain numerous wide-ranging changes, most provisions can be grouped into five broad categories:
Fed g overnance. Some proposals would change the Fed's institutional structure—how officials are selected, how policy decisions are reached, and so on. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. P olicy rules ( e. g. , the Taylor Rule ) . Some proposals would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a policy rule such as the Taylor Rule and report those findings to Congress. T he Fed's emergency lending powers. Some proposals would reduce the Fed's discretion to provide emergency assistance under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed's balance sheet. This report analyzes these provisions and the policy debate surrounding them. 4753 ) and the FOMC Policy Responsibility Act ( H.R. 4755 , H.R. 6741 ). Monetary policy decisions, however, are made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which is composed of the seven governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four other regional bank presidents. P.L. H.R. 4759 and H.R. 4757 and H.R. 10 , H.R. Congressional Commission. H.R. Other bills that would reduce the Fed's surplus include H.R. Policy Proposals
GAO Audit. 10 , H.R. 10 would increase the frequency of the Fed's required monetary policy reports to Congress from semiannually to quarterly and would require the chair to testify on monetary policy before the committees of jurisdiction quarterly instead of semiannually. H.R. H.R. 10 , H.R. 10 would require FOMC transcripts to be made publicly available. 10 , H.R. 4755 , and H.R. 6741 would subject the nonmonetary policy functions of the Fed's Board of Governors and 12 privately owned regional banks to the congressional appropriations process. 3354 ), as passed by the House. H.R. Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements . H.R. 4791 , and H.R. GAO would report to Congress if the Fed was in compliance with the act's requirements, and if it was not, it would trigger a GAO audit that was not subject to the normal statutory restrictions (described " Oversight and Disclosure Proposals " section above) and the Fed chair's testimony before the committees of jurisdiction. 4270 and H.R. The Fed would be required to issue a report to the committees of jurisdiction semiannually on how the Fed's strategy or monetary policy decisions differ from the policy rules. The worsening of the financial crisis in 2008 led the Fed to revive this obscure provision to extend credit to nonbank financial firms for the first time since the 1930s. H.R. 10 , H.R. H.R. 10 , H.R. 10 , H.R. 4302 , and H.R. 10 , H.R. 4302 , and H.R. 4278 and H.R. 6741 would limit the types of securities that the Fed may acquire through open market operations to gold, Treasury currency (e.g., coins), or the direct obligations of the federal government, foreign central banks (e.g., foreign currency), or the International Monetary Fund (e.g., special drawing rights). The bills would require the Fed to swap any other assets (that it already holds or subsequently acquires) for federal debt of equal market value with the Department of the Treasury. The bills would also repeal the Fed's authority to make emergency loans to groups of banks, a power that has not been used because the Fed also has the authority to lend to individual banks. Concluding Thoughts
The proposals in this report are wide ranging and diverse but are united by the goals of increasing the Fed's accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Whereas some provisions make minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably reduce the Fed's independence from Congress somewhat. To some extent, a trade-off between independence and accountability is unavoidable. | The Federal Reserve (Fed) is the subject of legislation being considered in the 115th Congress. This report analyzes Fed bills that have seen committee or floor action and the policy debate surrounding them. The bills contain wide-ranging changes that can be grouped into five broad categories:
Fed governance. Some proposals, such as H.R. 4753, would change the Fed's institutional structure. H.R. 10, H.R. 4759, and H.R. 6741 would increase the voting weight of regional Fed presidents on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at the expense of the Fed's Board of Governors and the New York Fed. H.R. 4757 and H.R. 6741 would allow private banks to vote on the selection of Fed regional bank presidents. H.R. 10 would also create a congressional commission to recommend reforms to the Fed. P.L. 115-123 and P.L. 115-174 reduced the Fed's surplus account as a budgetary offset, as would multiple bills that passed the House.
Oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress or the public. H.R. 24 and H.R. 10 would require Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed that are not subject to current statutory restrictions that prevent GAO from performing policy evaluations of the Fed's monetary policy. H.R. 10 would subject the Fed's rulemakings to cost-benefit analysis requirements, require the FOMC to publicly release meeting transcripts, and increase requirements to periodically report to and testify before Congress. H.R. 10, H.R. 4791, and H.R. 6741 would require the Fed to publicly disclose the salaries and personal finances of certain officials and employees. H.R. 10, H.R. 4755, H.R. 3280, H.R. 6741, and H.R. 3354 would subject the Fed's nonmonetary policy functions to the congressional appropriations process and require the Fed to levy assessments to offset them.
Monetary policy rules (the Taylor Rule). H.R. 10, H.R. 4270 as reported, and H.R. 6741 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a policy rule (e.g., the Taylor Rule) and report those findings to Congress. Under H.R. 10, policy deviations from the rule would trigger GAO audits and congressional testimony.
The Fed's emergency lending powers. H.R. 10, H.R. 4302, and H.R. 6741 would reduce the Fed's discretion to make emergency loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed used this authority to extend credit to nonbank financial firms during the financial crisis.
The Fed's balance sheet. H.R. 4278 and H.R. 6741 would limit the types of securities that the Fed may acquire through open market operations to gold, coins, or the direct obligations of the federal government, foreign central banks, or the International Monetary Fund. It would require the Fed to swap any other assets (including its large holdings of mortgage-backed securities) for federal debt with the Department of the Treasury.
The proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed's accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Although some provisions make minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed's independence from Congress. The Fed is more independent than most other agencies, which has traditionally been justified by its monetary policy responsibilities. Most research has found a positive relationship between monetary policy independence and economic outcomes. (Research is more divided on whether there is a positive relationship between Fed discretion and economic outcomes.) To some extent, a trade-off between independence and accountability is unavoidable. For example, Congress can require the Fed to follow a policy rule to reduce discretion, but Congress can ensure compliance with the rule only if there are negative consequences for noncompliance that would reduce independence. |
crs_R44631 | crs_R44631_0 | Introduction
Representative Jeb Hensarling, chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, released a discussion draft titled the Financial CHOICE Act (FCA) on June 23, 2016. 5983 on September 9, 2016. The FCA is a wide-ranging proposal with 11 titles that would alter many parts of the financial regulatory system. Much of the FCA is in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), a broad package of regulatory reform legislation passed following the 2007-2009 financial crisis that initiated the largest change to the financial regulatory system since at least 1999. Many of the provisions of the bill would modify provisions from the Dodd-Frank Act, although others would address long-standing or more recent issues. This report highlights major policy proposals in the bill, but it is not a comprehensive summary of the bill. Regulatory relief provisions can be divided into the same categories discussed above: prudential regulation and consumer protection. Examples of relief from prudential regulation that would be provided by the FCA include the following:
Some provisions would modify or repeal prudential rules that regulators have issued. In exchange for choosing to be subject to the 10% leverage ratio, banks would be exempt from risk-weighted capital ratios; liquidity requirements; certain merger, acquisition, and consolidation restrictions; limitations on dividends; living will mandates; and other regulations. Provisions related to derivatives markets. 4894 as reported by the Financial Services Committee. Under the new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, there would be several resolution options. Financial regulators conduct rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement to implement law and supervise financial institutions. Thus, congressional control over an agency's funding reduces its independence from (and increases its accountability to) Congress. CFPB . Critics point to structural issues, such as the presence of a director rather than a board and funding that is outside the traditional congressional appropriations process. The APA contains rulemaking requirements and procedures for agency adjudications, and it provides for judicial review of rulemaking and agency actions. Three proposals in the FCA—requiring cost-benefit analysis (CBA), modifying the Congressional Review Act, and overturning the judicial Chevron Doctrine—would modify regulator discretion and accountability in the rulemaking process. H.R. Unlike the current CRA, the FCA would allow a court to review whether a financial agency has completed the necessary requirements for a final rule to take effect. For example, the FCA would increase the maximum civil penalties that could be assessed for violations of certain laws, such as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. | The Financial CHOICE Act (FCA; H.R. 5983), sponsored by Chairman Jeb Hensarling, was ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Financial Services on September 13, 2016. The bill is a wide-ranging proposal with 11 titles that would alter many parts of the financial regulatory system. Much of the FCA is in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), a broad package of regulatory reform legislation that initiated the largest change to the financial regulatory system since at least 1999. Many of the provisions of the bill would modify or repeal provisions from the Dodd-Frank Act, although others would address long-standing or more recent issues.
This report highlights major proposals included in the bill but is not a comprehensive summary. In general, the changes proposed by the FCA can be divided into two categories: (1) changes to financial policies and regulations and (2) changes to the regulatory structure and rulemaking process.
Major policy-related changes proposed by the FCA include the following:
Leverage Ratio—allowing a banking organization to choose to be subject to a higher, 10% leverage ratio in exchange for being exempt from risk-weighted capital ratios, liquidity requirements, and other regulations. Regulatory Relief—providing regulatory relief throughout the financial system to banks, consumers, and capital market participants, including by repealing the Volcker Rule, Durbin Amendment, and fiduciary rule. Too Big To Fail—repealing the designation of systemically important financial institutions and emergency assistance and replacing an option for winding down systemic institutions with a new chapter in the Bankruptcy Code that is tailored to financial firms.
The FCA also includes structural and procedural changes that affect the balance between regulator independence from and accountability to Congress and the judiciary, including
Leadership—modifying the leadership structure of agencies with a single head to be bipartisan, multimember commissions. Funding—subjecting regulators that currently set their own budgets to the traditional congressional appropriations process. Rulemaking—requiring regulators to perform more detailed cost-benefit analysis when issuing new rules and to use cost-benefit analysis to review existing rules, as well as requiring congressional approval for a major rule to come into effect. Judicial Review—requiring courts to apply a heightened judicial review standard for agency actions taken by financial regulators rather than applying varying levels of deference to the agencies' interpretations of the law. Enforcement—increasing the maximum civil penalties that could be assessed for violations of certain banking and securities laws and restraining certain agency enforcement powers. CFPB—renaming the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as the Consumer Financial Opportunity Commission and modifying its powers, leadership, mandate, and funding. |
crs_R44725 | crs_R44725_0 | Introduction
This report is designed to assist Congress as it considers how to proceed with the proposed nomination of General (Ret.) James Mattis to be Secretary of Defense. After exploring the history of the statutory restriction and its evolution over time (see " Preserving Civilian Control of the Military in the 1947 Act and Restricting the Position of Secretary of Defense "), it touches upon some of the broader questions that have recently been raised in the public debate on whether, and how, this proposed nomination might impact civilian-military relations and the principle of civilian control of the military. The challenge was how to do so while at the same time preventing the emergence of a national military that could threaten the new Republic . These included 10 U.S.C. P.L. President Truman submitted the nomination of General Marshall to be Secretary of Defense to the Senate on September 18, 1950. Statutory Changes to the Restriction on Secretary of Defense Eligibility in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 1585 contained a provision (Section 903) that would amend sections 113, 132, and 134 of Title 10, U.S.C., to reduce from 10 years to 5 years the period of time following active duty military service before a commissioned officer of a regular component could be appointed as Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The key contrast between the debates 66 years ago and today is that the public discussion surrounding the proposed nomination of General Mattis seems to be less about preserving the principle of civilian control of the military (although that is certainly being debated), and more about civilian-military relations more generally. Expedited Procedures Governing Senate Consideration of Legislation Waiving a Restriction Related to the Military Service of the Secretary of Defense66
Section 179 of the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 ), establishes special "fast track" procedures governing Senate consideration of a bill or joint resolution which would suspend the seven-year restriction contained in 113(a) of Title 10 of the U.S. Code . 114-254 who has been retired at least three years. Suspend the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to p osition of Secretary of Defense . Eliminate entirely or reduce the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to posit ion of Secretary of Defense . Related, should Congress choose not to pass relevant legislation, the Senate may choose to allow General Mattis's nomination to proceed, regardless. It is currently unclear what the legal implications of pursuing this option might be. 81-788 ("An act to authorize the President to appoint General of the Army George C. Marshall to the office of Secretary of Defense"), which authorized the suspension of certain statutory requirements otherwise prohibiting General of the Army George C. Marshall from serving as the Secretary of Defense. P.L. In 1939 just as World War II began in Europe, President Roosevelt appointed Marshall Army Chief of Staff. These requirements would have automatically made General Marshall ineligible for the position due to an insufficient period of time elapsing between his military service and appointment as Secretary of Defense (Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, which stipulated that a person who had, within 10 years, served on active duty as a commissioned officer in the regular armed services was ineligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense). Opposition to the bill in light of General Marshall's personal qualifications focused on questioning General Marshall's physical capability to assume the duties and responsibilities of the office of Secretary of Defense; challenging General Marshall's record of service as Special Representative of the President to China and as Secretary of State; and allegations that General Marshall would be unable to set aside any prior "special attachments" to the U.S. military establishment and effectively lead the combined military and civilian elements of the Department of Defense. | The proposed nomination of General (Ret.) James Mattis, United States Marine Corps (hereinafter referred to as "General Mattis"), who retired from the military in 2013, to be Secretary of Defense requires both houses of Congress to consider whether and how to suspend—or remove—a provision contained in Title 10 U.S.C. §113 that states,
A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.
This provision was originally contained in the 1947 National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), which mandated that 10 years pass between the time an officer is relieved from active duty and when he or she could be appointed to the office of the Secretary of Defense. Only one exception to this provision has been made. Enacted on September 18, 1950, at the special request of President Truman during a time of conflict, P.L. 81-788 authorized the suspension of statutory requirements otherwise prohibiting General of the Army George C. Marshall from serving as Secretary of Defense. In 2007, Section 903 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), Congress changed the period of time that must elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to the position of Secretary of Defense to seven years.
In response to the proposed nomination of General Mattis to the position of Secretary of Defense, Congress established special "fast track" procedures governing Senate consideration of a bill or joint resolution which would suspend the existing seven-year restriction (Section 179 of the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 [P.L. 114-254]). Accordingly, there are at least three basic options that Congress may pursue as it considers the issue of General Mattis's nomination:
suspending the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to position of Secretary of Defense; eliminating entirely or reducing the statutory requirement that seven years elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to position of Secretary of Defense; and choosing not to pass legislation that would suspend the provision in Title 10, U.S.C. that currently prohibits General Mattis to become Secretary of Defense.
Related to the latter, the Senate might also choose to consider General Mattis's nomination, regardless of whether or not Congress passes legislation designed to suspend or remove the relevant provision in Title 10, U.S.C. Should the Senate choose to pursue this option, it is not clear what the legal implications might be.
Historically, the restriction relating to the prior military service of the Secretary of Defense appears to be a product of congressional concern about preserving the principle of civilian control of the military, a fundamental tenet underpinning the design and operation of the American republic since its inception in 1776, if not before. At the conclusion of World War II, some observers believed that the operational experience during the war pointed to the need for better integration of the military services, and therefore argued for the establishment of what would become the Department of Defense. Others, however, voiced concern that this greater degree of integration might overly empower the military, and thus threaten civilian control of the military. Accordingly, as the 81st Congress considered whether, and how, it should create a National Military Establishment, it determined to enact several provisions to mitigate the risk that greater military integration would come at the expense of civilian control. These included restrictions on military service member eligibility for the position of Secretary of Defense, and limitations on the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nearly 67 years later, the proposed nomination of General Mattis has again generated a debate among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners regarding what civilian control of the military means in a contemporary context, and how to best uphold that principle. |
crs_RL31807 | crs_RL31807_0 | 2754 ) containingFY2004 appropriations of $27.08 billion, and the House passed the bill with the same funding onJuly 18. The Senate passed a $27.38 billion version of H.R. 2754 on September 16. The conference committee on the bill approved $27.33 billion on November 5, 2003 ( H.Rept.108-357 ), and both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report on November 18. The President signed the bill January 23 ( P.L. Status of Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations, FY2004
Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil worksprojects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau ofReclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number ofindependent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and theAppalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The Bush Administration's request was$26.946 billion for these programs for FY2004, compared with $26.198 billionappropriated for FY2003. The Administration asked for $891 million for FY2004 for the Department of the Interior programs included in the Energy and Water Development bill -- theBureau of Reclamation and the Central Utah Project. Key Policy Issues -- Corps of Engineers
Funding Level. Everglades. Science. Similarly, theSenate passed its version of H.R. 108-137 ) on December 1. Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). Nonproliferation and National Security Programs. The increased budget wasintended primarily to pay for preparing a construction permit application for anational nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack . | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation(BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. The BushAdministration requested $26.95 billion for these programs for FY2004 compared with $26.20billion appropriated for FY2003. On July 18 the House passed a bill, H.R. 2754 , containing appropriations of $27.08 billion. On September 16 the Senate passed its version of H.R.2754, funding energy and water development programs at $27.38 billion. The conferencecommittee on the bill approved $27.33 billion on November 5, 2003. Both the House and the Senateagreed to the conference report on November 18, and the President signed the bill December 1 ( P.L.108-137 ).
Key issues involving Energy and Water Development appropriations programs include:
funding and progress of Corps projects not considered priorities by the Administration;
funding for major water/ecosystem restoration initiatives such as Florida Everglades and California "Bay-Delta";
funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada;
funding for developing a new nuclear warhead, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator; and
DOE's "Nuclear Power 2010" initiative, to "identify the technical, institutional and regulatory barriers to the deployment of new nuclear power plants by2010."
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry; FDT= Foreign Affairs, Defense,and Trade. |
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