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57335b42d058e614000b58e5 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the fiscal crisis began to take hold in late 2008. Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary policy, and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast-growing world, leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-producing states. A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified. The destabilizing effects of this price variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the fiscal crisis. | Consumers tend to have less money to spend on other goods, when the price of which commodity is higher? | {
"text": [
"gasoline"
],
"answer_start": [
665
]
} |
57335c77d058e614000b5907 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter. | Who was the former director of the CFTC that testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008? | {
"text": [
"Michael Greenberger"
],
"answer_start": [
187
]
} |
57335c77d058e614000b5908 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter. | Who did Michael Greenberger erronesously name as a key player in speculative run-up of oil futures? | {
"text": [
"IntercontinentalExchange"
],
"answer_start": [
244
]
} |
57335c77d058e614000b5909 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter. | Who founded the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange? | {
"text": [
"Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP"
],
"answer_start": [
281
]
} |
57335c77d058e614000b590a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter. | Who purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001? | {
"text": [
"IntercontinentalExchange (ICE)"
],
"answer_start": [
464
]
} |
57335c77d058e614000b590b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008, former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the regulated futures exchanges in London and New York. However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter. | Where are regulated future exchanges located? | {
"text": [
"London and New York"
],
"answer_start": [
430
]
} |
57335ed14776f419006608d5 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet. | Who is one of the feminist economists that believe the financial crisis revealed a crisis of mainstream economics and call for a complete reshaping of the economy? | {
"text": [
"Ailsa McKay"
],
"answer_start": [
20
]
} |
57335ed14776f419006608d6 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet. | Feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjornhold believe that the financial crisis and response reveal a crisis of ideas in this? | {
"text": [
"mainstream economics"
],
"answer_start": [
139
]
} |
57335ed14776f419006608d7 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet. | According to feminist economists McKay and Bjornholt, would type economics should be included in a reshaping? | {
"text": [
"feminist economics"
],
"answer_start": [
357
]
} |
57335ed14776f419006608d8 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | feminist economists Ailsa McKay and Margunn Bjørnholt argue that the financial crisis and the response to it revealed a crisis of ideas in mainstream economics and within the economics profession, and call for a reshaping of both the economy, economic theory and the economics profession. They argue that such a reshaping should include new advances within feminist economics and ecological economics that take as their starting point the socially responsible, sensible and accountable subject in creating an economy and economic theories that fully acknowledge care for each other as well as the planet. | What do economists McKay and Bjornholt want to occur in the economy, economic theory, and economics profession? | {
"text": [
"a reshaping"
],
"answer_start": [
210
]
} |
573360014776f4190066090a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised." | Who was the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India that predicted the crisis in 2005? | {
"text": [
"Raghuram Rajan"
],
"answer_start": [
46
]
} |
573360014776f4190066090b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised." | When did Raghuram Rajan become chief economist the the International Monetary Fund? | {
"text": [
"2005"
],
"answer_start": [
89
]
} |
573360014776f4190066090c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised." | In 2005, where did Rajan deliver a controversial paper that was critical of the financial paper? | {
"text": [
"at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan"
],
"answer_start": [
169
]
} |
573360014776f4190066090d | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised." | What was the name of Raghuram Rajan's controversial paper delivered in 2005? | {
"text": [
"\"Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?\""
],
"answer_start": [
371
]
} |
573360014776f4190066090e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan had predicted the crisis in 2005 when he became chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.In 2005, at a celebration honouring Alan Greenspan, who was about to retire as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Rajan delivered a controversial paper that was critical of the financial sector. In that paper, "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?", Rajan "argued that disaster might loom." Rajan argued that financial sector managers were encouraged to "take risks that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous compensation the rest of the time. These risks are known as tail risks. But perhaps the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if the tail risk does materialise, financial positions can be unwound and losses allocated so that the consequences to the real economy are minimised." | What are risks called that generate severe adverse consequences with small probability but generous compensation the rest of the time? | {
"text": [
"tail risks"
],
"answer_start": [
696
]
} |
5733612b4776f41900660932 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The fiscal crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a fiscal crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to. | Who was one of the only mainstream economist to predict the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"Raghuram Rajan"
],
"answer_start": [
78
]
} |
5733612b4776f41900660933 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The fiscal crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a fiscal crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to. | What did Raghuram Rajan speak of? | {
"text": [
"Great Moderation"
],
"answer_start": [
119
]
} |
5733612b4776f41900660934 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The fiscal crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a fiscal crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to. | Who credit 12 heterodox economists with predicting the crisis in his research credits? | {
"text": [
"Dirk Bezemer"
],
"answer_start": [
216
]
} |
5733612b4776f41900660935 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The fiscal crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a fiscal crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to. | How did the Austrian economic school regard the crisis? | {
"text": [
"as a vindication"
],
"answer_start": [
768
]
} |
5733612b4776f41900660936 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The fiscal crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists except Raghuram Rajan, who instead spoke of the Great Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US). Examples of other experts who gave indications of a fiscal crisis have also been given. Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply, a perspective that even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to. | Which former Fed Chair confessed in Congressional testimony to being forced to return to lax monetary supply? | {
"text": [
"Alan Greenspan"
],
"answer_start": [
1005
]
} |
5733625f4776f41900660962 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to foretell the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to foretell a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to foretell the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom". | Which magazine ran a cover story claiming that most economists failed to the the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"BusinessWeek"
],
"answer_start": [
17
]
} |
5733625f4776f41900660963 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to foretell the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to foretell a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to foretell the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom". | The financial crisis of 2007 was the worst economic crisis since which crisis that occurred in the 1930s? | {
"text": [
"Great Depression"
],
"answer_start": [
137
]
} |
5733625f4776f41900660964 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to foretell the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to foretell a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to foretell the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom". | Which school at University of Pennsylvania examined in their online business journal why economists failed to predict the crisis? | {
"text": [
"The Wharton School"
],
"answer_start": [
168
]
} |
5733625f4776f41900660965 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to foretell the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to foretell a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to foretell the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom". | Which economist did the New York Times state warned of a crisis as early as September 2006? | {
"text": [
"Nouriel Roubini"
],
"answer_start": [
572
]
} |
5733625f4776f41900660966 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to foretell the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to foretell a major global financial crisis. Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to foretell the financial crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of economics is bad at predicting recessions. According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled him "Dr. Doom". | What was economist Roubini called by the New York Times for predicting a collapse of the housing market? | {
"text": [
"\"Dr. Doom\""
],
"answer_start": [
897
]
} |
573363724776f41900660995 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Stock trader and fiscal risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big fiscal bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming." | Who wrote the 2007 book The Black Swan? | {
"text": [
"Nassim Nicholas Taleb"
],
"answer_start": [
41
]
} |
573363724776f41900660996 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Stock trader and fiscal risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big fiscal bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming." | What journalist from the New York Times stated his believe in Nassim Nicholas Taleb? | {
"text": [
"David Brooks"
],
"answer_start": [
568
]
} |
573363724776f41900660997 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Stock trader and fiscal risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big fiscal bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming." | What did Nassim Nicholas Taleb warn about for years prior to the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"the breakdown of the banking system"
],
"answer_start": [
132
]
} |
573363724776f41900660998 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Stock trader and fiscal risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility". He also took action against the establishment view by making a big fiscal bet on banking stocks and making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money"). According to David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming." | What did Nassim Nicholas Taleb make a fortune on by making a big financial bet? | {
"text": [
"banking stocks"
],
"answer_start": [
456
]
} |
5733651b4776f419006609bf | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is alike to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however. | Who is the market strategist that believes distinctions exist between the current crisis and the Great Depression? | {
"text": [
"Phil Dow"
],
"answer_start": [
18
]
} |
5733651b4776f419006609c0 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is alike to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however. | How much did the Dow Jones average fall during a period of 17 months? | {
"text": [
"50%"
],
"answer_start": [
168
]
} |
5733651b4776f419006609c1 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is alike to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however. | What was the percentage the Dow Jones fell in the Great Depression? | {
"text": [
"54.7%"
],
"answer_start": [
215
]
} |
5733651b4776f419006609c2 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is alike to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16 months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow. Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past two years ranked third, however. | Who was the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times in March 2009? | {
"text": [
"Floyd Norris"
],
"answer_start": [
373
]
} |
573365f4d058e614000b5a14 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | One of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank. The highly leveraged nature of its business led the bank to bespeak security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to investor panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Treasury Spokesman Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions. | Which medium sized British bank was the first victim of the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"Northern Rock"
],
"answer_start": [
29
]
} |
573365f4d058e614000b5a15 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | One of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank. The highly leveraged nature of its business led the bank to bespeak security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to investor panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Treasury Spokesman Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions. | Who did Northern Rock request security from? | {
"text": [
"Bank of England"
],
"answer_start": [
159
]
} |
573365f4d058e614000b5a16 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | One of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank. The highly leveraged nature of its business led the bank to bespeak security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to investor panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Treasury Spokesman Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions. | When did Northern Rock investors panic and a bank run begin? | {
"text": [
"September 2007"
],
"answer_start": [
233
]
} |
573365f4d058e614000b5a17 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | One of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank. The highly leveraged nature of its business led the bank to bespeak security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to investor panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Treasury Spokesman Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions. | When was Northern Rock taken into public hands? | {
"text": [
"February 2008"
],
"answer_start": [
364
]
} |
573365f4d058e614000b5a18 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | One of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank. The highly leveraged nature of its business led the bank to bespeak security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to investor panic and a bank run in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Treasury Spokesman Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions. | Which bank early problems in 2007 were an indicator of the troubles that would soon befall other banks and financial institutions? | {
"text": [
"Northern Rock"
],
"answer_start": [
510
]
} |
573368994776f41900660a3f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | IndyMac often made loans without verification of the borrower’s income or assets, and to borrowers with poor credit histories. Appraisals obtained by IndyMac on underlying collateral were often questionable as well. As an Alt-A lender, IndyMac’s business model was to proffer loan products to fit the borrower’s needs, using an extensive array of risky option-adjustable-rate-mortgages (option ARMs), subprime loans, 80/20 loans, and other nontraditional products. Ultimately, loans were made to many borrowers who simply could not afford to make their payments. The thrift remained profitable only as long as it was able to sell those loans in the secondary mortgage market. IndyMac resisted efforts to regulate its involvement in those loans or tighten their issuing criteria: see the comment by Ruthann Melbourne, Chief Risk Officer, to the regulating agencies. | IndyMac often made loans without verifying what? | {
"text": [
"the borrower’s income"
],
"answer_start": [
49
]
} |
573368994776f41900660a40 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | IndyMac often made loans without verification of the borrower’s income or assets, and to borrowers with poor credit histories. Appraisals obtained by IndyMac on underlying collateral were often questionable as well. As an Alt-A lender, IndyMac’s business model was to proffer loan products to fit the borrower’s needs, using an extensive array of risky option-adjustable-rate-mortgages (option ARMs), subprime loans, 80/20 loans, and other nontraditional products. Ultimately, loans were made to many borrowers who simply could not afford to make their payments. The thrift remained profitable only as long as it was able to sell those loans in the secondary mortgage market. IndyMac resisted efforts to regulate its involvement in those loans or tighten their issuing criteria: see the comment by Ruthann Melbourne, Chief Risk Officer, to the regulating agencies. | What was questionable on IndyMac's underlying collateral? | {
"text": [
"Appraisals"
],
"answer_start": [
127
]
} |
573368994776f41900660a41 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | IndyMac often made loans without verification of the borrower’s income or assets, and to borrowers with poor credit histories. Appraisals obtained by IndyMac on underlying collateral were often questionable as well. As an Alt-A lender, IndyMac’s business model was to proffer loan products to fit the borrower’s needs, using an extensive array of risky option-adjustable-rate-mortgages (option ARMs), subprime loans, 80/20 loans, and other nontraditional products. Ultimately, loans were made to many borrowers who simply could not afford to make their payments. The thrift remained profitable only as long as it was able to sell those loans in the secondary mortgage market. IndyMac resisted efforts to regulate its involvement in those loans or tighten their issuing criteria: see the comment by Ruthann Melbourne, Chief Risk Officer, to the regulating agencies. | IndyMac gave loans to borrower's with what type credit histories? | {
"text": [
"poor"
],
"answer_start": [
104
]
} |
573368994776f41900660a42 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | IndyMac often made loans without verification of the borrower’s income or assets, and to borrowers with poor credit histories. Appraisals obtained by IndyMac on underlying collateral were often questionable as well. As an Alt-A lender, IndyMac’s business model was to proffer loan products to fit the borrower’s needs, using an extensive array of risky option-adjustable-rate-mortgages (option ARMs), subprime loans, 80/20 loans, and other nontraditional products. Ultimately, loans were made to many borrowers who simply could not afford to make their payments. The thrift remained profitable only as long as it was able to sell those loans in the secondary mortgage market. IndyMac resisted efforts to regulate its involvement in those loans or tighten their issuing criteria: see the comment by Ruthann Melbourne, Chief Risk Officer, to the regulating agencies. | IndyMac offered this type of questionable loans to borrowers? | {
"text": [
"risky"
],
"answer_start": [
345
]
} |
573368994776f41900660a43 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | IndyMac often made loans without verification of the borrower’s income or assets, and to borrowers with poor credit histories. Appraisals obtained by IndyMac on underlying collateral were often questionable as well. As an Alt-A lender, IndyMac’s business model was to proffer loan products to fit the borrower’s needs, using an extensive array of risky option-adjustable-rate-mortgages (option ARMs), subprime loans, 80/20 loans, and other nontraditional products. Ultimately, loans were made to many borrowers who simply could not afford to make their payments. The thrift remained profitable only as long as it was able to sell those loans in the secondary mortgage market. IndyMac resisted efforts to regulate its involvement in those loans or tighten their issuing criteria: see the comment by Ruthann Melbourne, Chief Risk Officer, to the regulating agencies. | IndyMac resisted efforts by regulators to tighten this criteria of their loans? | {
"text": [
"issuing criteria"
],
"answer_start": [
759
]
} |
57337fd34776f41900660bf9 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease. | How many of the poorest families did not have any wealth decline during the financial crisis? | {
"text": [
"half"
],
"answer_start": [
151
]
} |
57337fd34776f41900660bfa | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease. | In a Federal Reserve survey of 4,000 households, what percent reported wealth decline between 2007 and 2009? | {
"text": [
"63"
],
"answer_start": [
339
]
} |
57337fd34776f41900660bfb | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease. | How many of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth between 2007 and 2009? | {
"text": [
"77"
],
"answer_start": [
392
]
} |
57337fd34776f41900660bfc | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease. | How many families at the bottom of the pyramid had a decrease in total wealth between 2007 and 2009? | {
"text": [
"50"
],
"answer_start": [
470
]
} |
57337fd34776f41900660bfd | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and 2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77 percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease. | Which families experienced the least decline in wealth between 2007 and 2009? | {
"text": [
"poorest families"
],
"answer_start": [
163
]
} |
573381524776f41900660c15 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even disconfirming number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies. | On November 3, 2008, who predicted extremely weak GDP growth for the Eurozone in 2009? | {
"text": [
"European Commission at Brussels"
],
"answer_start": [
25
]
} |
573381524776f41900660c16 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even disconfirming number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies. | How much did the European Commission estimate the GDP growth for Eurozone countries would be in 2009? | {
"text": [
"0.1%"
],
"answer_start": [
112
]
} |
573381524776f41900660c17 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even disconfirming number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies. | How much did the European Commission estimate the GDP growth for the UK would be in 2009? | {
"text": [
"−1.0%"
],
"answer_start": [
228
]
} |
573381524776f41900660c18 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even disconfirming number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies. | On November 6, in Washington, D.C., who predicted a worldwide recession for 2009? | {
"text": [
"the IMF"
],
"answer_start": [
270
]
} |
573381524776f41900660c19 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even disconfirming number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C., launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies. | On November 5, 2008, the Bank of England reduced their interest rate from 4.5% to what? | {
"text": [
"3%"
],
"answer_start": [
536
]
} |
5733823bd058e614000b5c03 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to spread_out money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity. | What have central banks around the world done to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral? | {
"text": [
"expand money supplies"
],
"answer_start": [
80
]
} |
5733823bd058e614000b5c04 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to spread_out money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity. | What have governments done to offset the reduction in private sector demand? | {
"text": [
"enacted large fiscal stimulus packages"
],
"answer_start": [
279
]
} |
5733823bd058e614000b5c05 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to spread_out money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity. | What is the U.S. Federal Reserve's traditional role during a crisis? | {
"text": [
"lender-of-last-resort"
],
"answer_start": [
549
]
} |
5733823bd058e614000b5c06 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to spread_out money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity. | What did the U.S. Federal Reserve do to increase access to liquidity? | {
"text": [
"expanded liquidity facilities"
],
"answer_start": [
451
]
} |
5733823bd058e614000b5c07 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to spread_out money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused by the crisis. The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity. | What type decline does lower wages and higher unemployment lead to? | {
"text": [
"self-reinforcing decline"
],
"answer_start": [
201
]
} |
5733835e4776f41900660c4b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | This credit freeze brought the global fiscal system to the brink of collapse. The response of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. Following a model initiated by the United Kingdom bank rescue package, the governments of European nations and the USA guaranteed the debt issued by their banks and raised the capital of their national banking systems, ultimately purchasing $1.5 trillion newly issued preferred stock in their major banks. In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap. By creating $600 billion and inserting[clarification needed] this directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies, which Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings away from the United States. | What brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse? | {
"text": [
"credit freeze"
],
"answer_start": [
5
]
} |
5733835e4776f41900660c4c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | This credit freeze brought the global fiscal system to the brink of collapse. The response of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. Following a model initiated by the United Kingdom bank rescue package, the governments of European nations and the USA guaranteed the debt issued by their banks and raised the capital of their national banking systems, ultimately purchasing $1.5 trillion newly issued preferred stock in their major banks. In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap. By creating $600 billion and inserting[clarification needed] this directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies, which Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings away from the United States. | How much government debt and troubled private assets did central banks purchase during the last quarter of 2008? | {
"text": [
"US$2.5 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
280
]
} |
5733835e4776f41900660c4d | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | This credit freeze brought the global fiscal system to the brink of collapse. The response of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. Following a model initiated by the United Kingdom bank rescue package, the governments of European nations and the USA guaranteed the debt issued by their banks and raised the capital of their national banking systems, ultimately purchasing $1.5 trillion newly issued preferred stock in their major banks. In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap. By creating $600 billion and inserting[clarification needed] this directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies, which Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings away from the United States. | How much preferred stock did governments of European nations and the USA purchase in their major banks? | {
"text": [
"$1.5 trillion"
],
"answer_start": [
719
]
} |
5733835e4776f41900660c4e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | This credit freeze brought the global fiscal system to the brink of collapse. The response of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. Following a model initiated by the United Kingdom bank rescue package, the governments of European nations and the USA guaranteed the debt issued by their banks and raised the capital of their national banking systems, ultimately purchasing $1.5 trillion newly issued preferred stock in their major banks. In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap. By creating $600 billion and inserting[clarification needed] this directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies, which Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings away from the United States. | In October 2010, who was the Nobel laureate that explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was creating currency to combat the liquidity trap? | {
"text": [
"Joseph Stiglitz"
],
"answer_start": [
816
]
} |
5733835e4776f41900660c4f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | This credit freeze brought the global fiscal system to the brink of collapse. The response of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. Following a model initiated by the United Kingdom bank rescue package, the governments of European nations and the USA guaranteed the debt issued by their banks and raised the capital of their national banking systems, ultimately purchasing $1.5 trillion newly issued preferred stock in their major banks. In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap. By creating $600 billion and inserting[clarification needed] this directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies, which Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings away from the United States. | What did the banks chose to do with the money created by the Federal Reserve instead of financing more domestic loans and refinancing mortgages? | {
"text": [
"investing internationally in emerging markets"
],
"answer_start": [
1235
]
} |
57338497d058e614000b5c4c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank fiscal cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes. | What was introduced by President Barack Obama in June 2009? | {
"text": [
"a series of regulatory proposals"
],
"answer_start": [
65
]
} |
57338497d058e614000b5c4d | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank fiscal cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes. | What was one of the items important to consumers that was addressed by the new regulatory proposals introduced in June 2009? | {
"text": [
"consumer protection"
],
"answer_start": [
134
]
} |
57338497d058e614000b5c4e | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank fiscal cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes. | Regulations were proposed by Obama in January 2010 to limit the ability of banks to engage in which type trading? | {
"text": [
"proprietary"
],
"answer_start": [
501
]
} |
57338497d058e614000b5c4f | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank fiscal cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes. | Who were proposed new regulations called "The Volcker Rule" named after? | {
"text": [
"Paul Volcker"
],
"answer_start": [
586
]
} |
57338497d058e614000b5c50 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank fiscal cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others. In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes. | Who publicly argued for changes limiting the ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading? | {
"text": [
"Paul Volcker"
],
"answer_start": [
586
]
} |
5733857b4776f41900660c89 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now exist reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades. | When did the U.S. Senate first pass a financial reform bill? | {
"text": [
"May 2010"
],
"answer_start": [
40
]
} |
5733857b4776f41900660c8a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now exist reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades. | When did the U.S. House first pass a financial reform bill? | {
"text": [
"December 2009"
],
"answer_start": [
93
]
} |
5733857b4776f41900660c8b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now exist reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades. | What rule against proprietary trading was not part of legislation passed by either the Senate or House? | {
"text": [
"Volcker Rule"
],
"answer_start": [
333
]
} |
5733857b4776f41900660c8c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The U.S. Senate passed a reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill in December 2009. These bills must now exist reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by the Obama administration. For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to prohibit these trades. | Which bill gave regulators the discretion to prohibit proprietary trades? | {
"text": [
"Senate"
],
"answer_start": [
420
]
} |
573257950fdd8d15006c69eb | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | It threatened the collapse of big financial institutions, which was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments, but stock markets still dropped worldwide. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity". | What action in 2007 by national governments prevented the collapse of large financial institutions? | {
"text": [
"bailout of banks"
],
"answer_start": [
87
]
} |
573257950fdd8d15006c69ec | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | It threatened the collapse of big financial institutions, which was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments, but stock markets still dropped worldwide. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity". | How much estimated consumer wealth was lost as a result of the financial crisis of 2007? | {
"text": [
"trillions of U.S. dollars"
],
"answer_start": [
398
]
} |
573257950fdd8d15006c69ed | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | It threatened the collapse of big financial institutions, which was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments, but stock markets still dropped worldwide. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity". | What is the date the active phase of the financial crisis began as a liquidity crisis? | {
"text": [
"August 9, 2007"
],
"answer_start": [
649
]
} |
573257950fdd8d15006c69ee | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | It threatened the collapse of big financial institutions, which was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments, but stock markets still dropped worldwide. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity". | What year did the global recession that followed the financial crisis of 2007 end? | {
"text": [
"2012"
],
"answer_start": [
481
]
} |
573257950fdd8d15006c69ef | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | It threatened the collapse of big financial institutions, which was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments, but stock markets still dropped worldwide. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity". | What was the name of the company that terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds in 2007 citing a liquidity crisis? | {
"text": [
"BNP Paribas"
],
"answer_start": [
670
]
} |
57325b55e17f3d14004228e5 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The bursting of the U.S. (United States) housing bubble, which peaked in 2004, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. existent estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interplay of policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the financial commitments they were making. Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined. Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts. In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. | What year did the U.S. housing bubble peak? | {
"text": [
"2004"
],
"answer_start": [
73
]
} |
57325b55e17f3d14004228e6 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The bursting of the U.S. (United States) housing bubble, which peaked in 2004, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. existent estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interplay of policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the financial commitments they were making. Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined. Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts. In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. | What year did Congress pass the American Recover and Reinvestment Act? | {
"text": [
"2009"
],
"answer_start": [
1268
]
} |
57325b55e17f3d14004228e7 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The bursting of the U.S. (United States) housing bubble, which peaked in 2004, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. existent estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interplay of policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the financial commitments they were making. Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined. Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts. In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. | Overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages was based on the theory that housing prices would continue to do this? | {
"text": [
"escalate"
],
"answer_start": [
459
]
} |
57325b55e17f3d14004228e8 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The bursting of the U.S. (United States) housing bubble, which peaked in 2004, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. existent estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interplay of policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the financial commitments they were making. Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined. Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts. In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. | One of the causes of the financial crisis was easier access to loans by this type borrower? | {
"text": [
"subprime"
],
"answer_start": [
382
]
} |
57325b55e17f3d14004228e9 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | The bursting of the U.S. (United States) housing bubble, which peaked in 2004, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. existent estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interplay of policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled subprime mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading practices on behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the financial commitments they were making. Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined. Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts. In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. | In 2007, banks and insurance companies did not have adequate holdings of which type to back their financial commitments? | {
"text": [
"capital"
],
"answer_start": [
653
]
} |
57325ecbe99e3014001e6728 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | What is the name of the U.S. Senate report giving their conclusions for the cause of the crisis? | {
"text": [
"Levin–Coburn Report"
],
"answer_start": [
117
]
} |
57325ecbe99e3014001e6729 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | Which act was repealed in 1999 effectively removing the separation between investment and deposit banks? | {
"text": [
"Glass-Steagall Act"
],
"answer_start": [
1179
]
} |
57325ecbe99e3014001e672a | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | What is the name of the commission who concluded the financial crisis was avoidable? | {
"text": [
"Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission"
],
"answer_start": [
378
]
} |
57325ecbe99e3014001e672b | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | What agency failed to accurately price risk involved in mortgage-related financial products? | {
"text": [
"credit rating agencies"
],
"answer_start": [
1321
]
} |
57325ecbe99e3014001e672c | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts. The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street." The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by "widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision", "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions", "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency" by financial institutions, ill preparation and inconsistent action by government that "added to the uncertainty and panic", a "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics", "collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline", deregulation of over-the-counter derivatives, especially credit default swaps, and "the failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks in the United States. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets. Research into the causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads. | What practices should have been adjusted by governments to address 21st-century financial markets? | {
"text": [
"regulatory"
],
"answer_start": [
1487
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a65 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of fiscal agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such fiscal innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global fiscal institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | What are MBS as related to the housing and credit booms? | {
"text": [
"mortgage-backed securities"
],
"answer_start": [
83
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a66 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of fiscal agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such fiscal innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global fiscal institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | What are CDO as related to the housing and credit booms? | {
"text": [
"collateralized debt obligations"
],
"answer_start": [
120
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a67 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of fiscal agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such fiscal innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global fiscal institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | When housing prices declined, who reported significant losses from being heavily invested in subprime MBS? | {
"text": [
"major global financial institutions"
],
"answer_start": [
391
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a68 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of fiscal agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such fiscal innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global fiscal institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | Who could invest in the U.S. housing market through MBS and CDO? | {
"text": [
"institutions and investors around the world"
],
"answer_start": [
281
]
} |
573260db0fdd8d15006c6a69 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of fiscal agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such fiscal innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global fiscal institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. | MBS and CDO derive their value from? | {
"text": [
"mortgage payments and housing prices"
],
"answer_start": [
190
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadc | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a fiscal incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the fiscal strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | How much are total losses estimated to be from falling home prices? | {
"text": [
"trillions of U.S. dollars"
],
"answer_start": [
477
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadd | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a fiscal incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the fiscal strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What is the financial incentive when a home is worth less than the mortgage loan? | {
"text": [
"foreclosure"
],
"answer_start": [
114
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadb | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a fiscal incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the fiscal strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What year did the foreclosure epidemic begin? | {
"text": [
"late 2006"
],
"answer_start": [
174
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eade | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a fiscal incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the fiscal strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What other financial instruments had significant defaults and losses as a result of the crisis expanding from housing to other parts of the economy? | {
"text": [
"other loan types"
],
"answer_start": [
319
]
} |
573263d4b9d445190005eadf | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a fiscal incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the fiscal strength of banking institutions. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. | What continues to drain consumer wealth and erode the strength of banks? | {
"text": [
"foreclosure epidemic"
],
"answer_start": [
139
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab72 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the fiscal system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving fiscal institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by fiscal institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What institutions comprise the shadow banking system? | {
"text": [
"investment banks and hedge funds"
],
"answer_start": [
567
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab73 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the fiscal system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving fiscal institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by fiscal institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What institutions are not subject to the same regulations as commercial banks? | {
"text": [
"investment banks and hedge funds"
],
"answer_start": [
567
]
} |
57329eb1cc179a14009dab74 | Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 | While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the fiscal system to both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving fiscal institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the increasingly important role played by fiscal institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. | What process caused the financial system to both expand and become fragile? | {
"text": [
"financialization"
],
"answer_start": [
165
]
} |
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