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After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. | What kept the U.S. government from being able to stop Bin Laden's flow of money Didn't have enough funding | false | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. ||||| The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. | What kept the U.S. government from being able to stop Bin Laden's flow of money They did not find it important enough, instead focusing on money laundering for drug trafficking | true | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center Clarke and NSC staff were for it and Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center Congress | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center The Treasury | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center Treasury | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center The NSC | true | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center Governement | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center The President | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center Bank of New York | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center FBI | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center The CIA | false | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What US government agency was Clark a member of NSC | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What US government agency was Clark a member of Information not provided | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What US government agency was Clark a member of Treasury | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What US government agency was Clark a member of Clarke was a staff member of NSC agency | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What US government agency was Clark a member of The NSC staff | true | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What US government agency was Clark a member of The CIA | false | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Analysis | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Anti laundering | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Money laundering | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Anti-Terrorism Center | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Intelligence | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center | true | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Financing | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding Interrogation Center | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding An anti-money laundering center | false | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Where the money was coming from for Al Qaeda | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 US government agencies were trying to find financial funding for terrorism | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 To find bin laden | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Bin Laden's finances | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 The Saudi's understanding of finances | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Information regarding Bin Laden's finances | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Drug trafficking | false | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000 Get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances | true | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Iraq | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Afghanistan | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Russia | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Saudi Arabia | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Eastern Europe | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Sudan | false | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. ||||| A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. | Where did an interagency group travel to in 1999 and 2000 to find out about Bin Laden's finances Middle East | true | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for Analysis | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for Anti-Terrorism Center | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for Intelligence | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for Funding | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for A terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center | true | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for Terrorist | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What type of center did Clarke push funding for Interrogation Center | false | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Financing terrorism | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Congressional Fraud | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Money laundering | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Wall Street Fraud | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding International fraud | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficing, international fraud and Russian money laundering | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Terrorist organizations | false | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Drug trafficking | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding Russian Money Laundering | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. ||||| Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. ||||| Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. | What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding High international fraud | true | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. | Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising Congress | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. | Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising Treasury | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. | Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising The NSA | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. | Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising FBI | true | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. | Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising The CIA | false | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda FBI and NSC | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda CIA | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda Nsc and CIA | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NCS | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda Treasury | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda The FBI | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda NSC, CIA, and FBI were investigating financial ties to al Qaeda | true | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. ||||| The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | What government agencies were involved in tracking financial funding for al Qaeda The CIA | false | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To gather information regarding Al Qaeda's cash flows | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI was looking for financial funding of al Qaeda | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To find wealthy donors | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To gather information about Al Qaeda's fundraising | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI thought bin laden was in the USA | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To find organizations with Al Qaeda connections | true | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. ||||| The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. | Why was FBI conducting electronic surveillance and used informants in major US cities To gather information regarding money laundering in Russia | false | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Financial facilitators | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Bin Laden's personal fortune, charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Russia | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Politicians | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Wealthy Donors | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Charities | true | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Bin Laden | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered European Governments | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered Government | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. ||||| The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. | What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered The U.N | false | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Where al quaeda was funding its operations | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Clark was looking for terrorist financing sources | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center To distinguish Al Qaeda's transactions | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center To find people moving funds for Al Qaeda | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center How bin laden was moving his money | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Different organizations raising funds for Al Qaeda | true | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center Evidence of drug trafficking | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. ||||| Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. | What did Clarke try to find through creating an intelligence analysis center To disrupt Al Qaeda's money flows | false | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | true |
The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. ||||| Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. | Where were field offices opened to investigate al Qaeda funding Detroit | true | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt | false |
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