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Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | Who had overun most of Spain The christians | 0 | 4 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | false |
Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | Who had overun most of Spain Romans | 0 | 4 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | false |
Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | How did Nicia get fooled The potion | -1 | 4 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | false |
Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | What country did the Armies of North African nomads overrun after invading in a.d. Italy | 0 | 5 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | What country did the Armies of North African nomads overrun after invading in a.d. Spain | 1 | 5 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | What country did the Armies of North African nomads overrun after invading in a.d. Rome | 0 | 5 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. ||||| Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. | What was a result of the dead rising to their feet in Japan Guitar wolf plays a concert | -1 | 5 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | After what year did the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid 1308 | 1 | 6 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | After what year did the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid 1561 | 0 | 6 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | After what year did the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid 1477 | 0 | 6 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | How are index fossils used To observe lifestyle changes of humans | -1 | 6 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good hunting | 1 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Women | 0 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Because the air was invigorating and the hunting was excellent | 1 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Good air | 1 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid An early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town, the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent | 1 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | Why did kings of Spain visit Madrid Because of a formal meeting | 0 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. ||||| From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. | What studio did Durer train in Wolgemut's | -1 | 7 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. | Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history The romans left nothing of consequence in Madrid | 1 | 8 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. | Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history The kings did not visit | 0 | 8 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. | Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history No record of it remains | 1 | 8 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. | Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history History of raids | 1 | 8 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. | Why was Madrid's significance negligible in Spanish history Catholicism | 0 | 8 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. ||||| If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. | What two geographic formation can be created from flooding rivers Banks | -1 | 8 | History-Anthropology/oanc-HistoryMadrid-1.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Children, Gerd, or Dorian Popa | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Monetary rewards | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Asking Pakistan to help the USA | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Meeting with General Musharraf | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include President Clinton offered the moon in terms of better relations with the United States | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include A Presidential visit in March | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Paper checks | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Increasing trade with Pakistan | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What did the high-level effort to persuade Pakistan include Persuading Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban by dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Why does Bernardo despise the house It's gaudy, graceless, pretentious - | -1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Romanian police or secret service | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden President Cliton | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Karl Inderfurth | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Michael Sheehan | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden The department of counterterrorism | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Following his meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State and US State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, who did Musharraf intend to meet to discuss Bin Laden Mullah Omar | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | How was George W. Bush's war hero image used in his campaign Bush was protrayed as a war hero landing on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, however, he did not actually serve | -1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan Yes | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan Yes there was no disagreement between the two | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan No, the CIA felt it would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | How is the landscape in Southern Illinois different from that in central Illinois Southern Illinois is a plateau and Central Illinois is flat | -1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden 11.09.2020 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden March 25, 1999 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden March 15, 2000 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden 12.03.2019 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden January 2000 | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | On what date did President Clinton meet with Musharraf and others to discuss, among other things, Bin Laden March 25, 2000 | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | Which way do lines of latitude run and what do they divide They are parallel and perpendicular to equator, divide Earth | -1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan Direct pressure on Taliban had proved unsuccessful | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan The envoys reported that Pakistan was unlikely to do anything | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It was dangerous | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan It risked his life | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan The tensions between India and Pakistan | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan "Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit" and "visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life." | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why did one of the characters from the passages call Emil by his first name They lunched together | -1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 Barack Obama | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 President Clinton | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 George W. Bush | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 Bill Clinton | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969 George Bush | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Which products resulted in stock growth for Coleco in the 1980s Toys | -1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Direct pressure on Taliban had proved unsuccessful | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Due to the dangerous of nuclear activity | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The envoys reported that Pakistan was unlikely to do anything | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The president could die | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Tensions between Pakistan and India | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan The visit would put the President's life at risk and Pakistan had not done enough to merit the visit? | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan Risked his life | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan They would risk American service in Romania | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What did Bin Laden claim in an interview with ABC-TV He claimed it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels | -1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Due to the possibility of getting a presidential visit in march | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden For talks about the situation about how to fix computers in Romania | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden For talks against nuclear proliferation | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden To help the terrorists | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden To help the taliban | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden To show his government's legitimacy | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He promised he would put pressure on the Taliban | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Why did General Musharraf promise Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden He wanted the U.S.President to visit Pakistan | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who is a well-known figure in the Muslim community who worshipers at the Quds mosque describe as an outspoken, flamboyant Islamist Mohammed Haydar Zammar | -1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 South Asia | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 China | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 India | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 South Africa | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | Where was President Clinton's one day stop-over on March 25, 2000 Pakistan | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. ||||| His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. | What was the rate of apartments Penny Sweat had to move to 5 times more | -1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Money | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA On the president visiting India | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Counterterrorism | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Fixing Computers | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA On the president visiting Pakistan | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Visiting India | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
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