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The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA President Clinton's visit to Pakistan | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA Visiting Pakistan | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | What happened to Jerusalem after the Christians lost it the muslims left and went elsewhere | -1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The State Department | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The envoys were Mullah Omar and Musharraf | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The Secret Service | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The envoys were Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden The secret service and the CIA | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | How many families lived in the Mobile Park Plaza before getting notice to leave and how many decided to fight the eviction 2001, 25 | -1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who promised to meet Mullah Omar in order to discuss Bin Laden Michael Sheehan | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who promised to meet Mullah Omar in order to discuss Bin Laden Bill Clinton | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | Who promised to meet Mullah Omar in order to discuss Bin Laden General Musharraf | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. ||||| He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. | He proposed that the rocks formed side by side and then drifted where Apart | -1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan met with General Musharraf | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf Met with Michael Sheehan about Bill Clinto | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf State department official visit | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf The possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf Presidential visit | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | What visit was coveted by Musharraf Head of CIA visit | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Can you name two attorneys mentioned Rebecca Yee | -1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. CIA | 0 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth | 1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. President Clinton | 0 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan | 1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, as well as President Clinton | 1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Secret service | 0 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Michael Sheehan | 1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S. Assistant secretary of state and State department of counterterrorism coordinator | 1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | Why do the women switch houses They 're both looking for an escape from their problems | -1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan God and the president | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan CIA | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan Karl Inderfurth | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan The president | 1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan President Clinton | 1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan Secret service | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan Michael Sheehan | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Who did The State Department feel should visit both India and Pakistan Bin Laden | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. | Whose negative qualities was the result of jealousy of his rivals Spontini | -1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Direct pressure on Taliban had proved unsuccessful | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan The envoys reported that Pakistan was unlikely to do anything | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan They believed it would risk the President's life and also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan It was risky | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Pakistan did not earn merit of the presidential visit | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Because it is a beautiful country | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan Musharraf was unwilling to cooperate | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | Why was the CIA, counter terrorism officials, and secret service against the President visiting Pakistan There is no Bin Laden | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. ||||| Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. | What is the flood plain area of land good for if it floods often A flood plain area of land is good for growing crops | -1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 15, 2000 | 0 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf January 2000 | 0 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000 | 1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | When did President Clinton visit Pakistan and what was discussed between Clinton and Musharraf March 25, 2000 and they discussed the tension between Pakistan and India, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and Bin Laden | 1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. | What happened during the Sixth Crusade with the Christians They gained Jerusalem but lost it shortly after. | -1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it State department and CIA were against | 0 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it The State Department felt he should visit Pakistan and the Secret Service and the CIA were against it | 1 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it Musharraf | 1 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it The Secret Service and the CIA was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and the State Department were against it | 0 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it State department was for and CIA and Secret Service were against | 1 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it Secret service was for | 0 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it The State Department was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and the Secret Service and the CIA were against it | 1 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it Bin Laden | 0 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | After they traveled around Europe where did they go The United States of America | -1 | 17 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Why did Musharraf want the President to visit Pakistan Mullah Omar wanted to meet him | 0 | 18 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Why did Musharraf want the President to visit Pakistan It would be personally beneficial to him | 1 | 18 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Why did Musharraf want the President to visit Pakistan It would be "a reward for Pakistani cooperation" and be "a sign of his government's legitimacy." | 1 | 18 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Why did Musharraf want the President to visit Pakistan To show his government's legitimacy | 1 | 18 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Why did Musharraf want the President to visit Pakistan It would be a sign of his government's legitimacy | 1 | 18 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. ||||| Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. | Who delivered a short speech about playing to win in technology Gov. George E. Pataki | -1 | 18 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | false |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan A month | 0 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan 9 | 0 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan 6 months | 0 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan 1 month | 0 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan 3 months | 0 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan 14 | 0 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How many months passed after the meeting between Karl Inderfurth, Michael Sheehan and General Musharraf and the subsequent visit of President Clinton to Pakistan 2 months | 1 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What is the name of the boy who the archaeologists found his tomb and what unfortunately happens to him Kah-To-Bey is killed by Prem and then dragged to the desert | -1 | 19 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What day and time of year did the United States try to convince Pakistan to cooperate with them to influence the Taliban "In early 2000" specifically "January 2000" | 1 | 20 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What day and time of year did the United States try to convince Pakistan to cooperate with them to influence the Taliban March 2000 | 0 | 20 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What day and time of year did the United States try to convince Pakistan to cooperate with them to influence the Taliban January 2000 | 1 | 20 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What day and time of year did the United States try to convince Pakistan to cooperate with them to influence the Taliban March 25, 2000 | 0 | 20 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | What day and time of year did the United States try to convince Pakistan to cooperate with them to influence the Taliban Early in 2000. in : In January 2000, | 1 | 20 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. ||||| In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. | How long was it from the time Kilgore graduated to the time she started work at Administrative Law Unit and Resource Development 10 | -1 | 20 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include Discussing Bin Laden | 1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include Talking to the taliban | 0 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include A tour of Transilvania | 0 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include Tensions between Pakistan and India | 1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include Direct pressure on Taliban | 0 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include Golf and swimming | 1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include The US envoys talking to Mussharaf | 0 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden | 1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include The dangers of nuclear proliferation | 1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | What did President Clinton's visit with Pakistan include Meeting with Musharraf and others, concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden | 1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. ||||| President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." | Why Joe's father told him not to get near a tractor The tractor was broken | -1 | 21 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Did the State Department and the CIA agree in regards to President Clinton possibly visiting Pakistan No | 1 | 22 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Did the State Department and the CIA agree in regards to President Clinton possibly visiting Pakistan They didn't say | 0 | 22 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. ||||| The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. | Why did the high court raise the base fee for active attorneys to $180 from $140 To fund retired lawyers | -1 | 22 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-4.txt | true |
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