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After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Building up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin That he opposed their use | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Developing plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Keeping Pakistan in the dark as to the origin of the missile strikes | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What statement is no longer true "What goes up must come down." | -1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Where did Zinni say the Pakistani would think the missiles came from Pakistan | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Where did Zinni say the Pakistani would think the missiles came from India | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Where did Zinni say the Pakistani would think the missiles came from Uzbekistan | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What part of one's body can hold them up against the force of gravity Arms | -1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Use cruise missiles | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Use AC-130 gunships | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not use AC-130 gunships | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not allowing Pakistan access to weaponry | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missles | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missiles | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not deploying AC-130s | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Plans were developed to use AC-130s rather than cruise missle strikes | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Why does John accuse his father of leaving him again Because his father is not supportive of John's film | -1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan The Joint Staff | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Zinni | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Berger and Clarke | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Afghanistan | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton and officers in the Pentagon, Berger and Clarke, and John Maher- the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | What detail about the crash of American 11 did White House Senior Advisor Karl Rove not tell the president 11 minutes | -1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An attack on Bin Lan | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An attack on Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An attack on Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Pakistan | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What improved the soil in the garden Digging it up and adding a special mix improved the soil | -1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook A little over 2000 miles | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook 25 miles | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook A little over 2,000 miles | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook 130 miles | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook 105 miles | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | How can humans overcome gravity Magic | -1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Zinni | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military US president | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Osama Bin Laden | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military People of Afghanistan | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Many afghans | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Bin Laden | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What term describes the community garden in Mechanicsville Stopping a reawakening | -1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government USA | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Uzbekistan | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Afghanistan | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government A neighbor like Uzbekistan | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government India | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Israel | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Afghanistan's neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Pakistan | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Neighboring countries like Washington | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Neighboring countries to Pakistan | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which climate has dry summers and wet winters Temperate Climate | -1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Special Operations Command couldn't justify using them | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Special Operations Command gave approval | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed They did not have enough in supply | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Speical Operations Command didn't think the intelligence was good enough | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence was not good enough to justify it | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enoughto justify it | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The head of Special Operations didn't approve it | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence was good enough to deploy | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Special Operations Command though the intelligence was good enough to deploy | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed.Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enough | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why did Porky have to share a hotel room with Daffy Duck Plenty of room | -1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Zinni | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Berger and Clarke | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff John Maher | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Schoomaker | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff The Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Schoolmaker | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | What bodily fluids aide in digestion Saliva and acid in the stomach | -1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans.He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about That Bin Laden would locate himself in cities in the future and that Pakistani authorities would not get proper warning | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden would stay where he is | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden would locate himself in cities and that Pakastani authories would not get proper warning | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden locating himself in US cities in the future | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about That Pakistani authorities wouldn't get proper warning and that the AC-130 option was not feasible | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden would attack too early and the military would not act | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Pakistani authorities would get plenty of warning before attacks | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Pakistani authorities would respond to Al Qaeda assaults | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What was one cruel way in which the Bushido Code was enforced Branding the vassals | -1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using cruise missiles in an attack on Pakistan | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using the AC-130 in Kandahar | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Deployment of the AC-gunships | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Attacking Afghan civilians | 0 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using the AC-130 in an attack on Bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using AC-130s to attack al Qaeda | 1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | How many U.S members of Congress visited Iraq before Hall None | -1 | 11 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the option was feasible | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought it was feasible but that serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He wanted to block it | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the AC-130 option feasible | 1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He didn't care | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He worried the Pakistani authorities would not get adequate warning | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He opposed their use | 0 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | When did Gifford take the well-remembered fields path Late next Sunday afternoon | -1 | 12 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Did Schoomaker claim the AC-130 to be expensive or feasible Feasible | 1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
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