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Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Did Schoomaker claim the AC-130 to be expensive or feasible Expensive | 0 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What relationship does Akai's wife, Nozomi, have with Juzo His lover | -1 | 13 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations didn't support the option | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because Schoomaker opposed it | 0 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Bases in the middle east would be required for re-fueling | 1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little | 1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Zinni opposed their use but he doesn't remember it | 1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because their deployment would serious preparation for any such operations | 1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Where did Yonggary go after destroying the choppers Army base | -1 | 14 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | false |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Zinni | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Berger and Clarke | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar The president | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton in the Pentagon | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Officers in the Pentagon | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Schoomaker | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Al Qaeda | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton | 1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Bin Laden | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar The Halloween monsters | 0 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What are two examples of repair rather than replacing Fix your bike instead of replacing it | -1 | 15 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The AC-130 might cause more collateral damage than the cruise missiles | 0 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Zinni lied | 0 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles | 1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia | 1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The generals changed their minds | 0 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The AC-130's limited range would require building bases in the Middle East or South Asia | 1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why was Jean impressed with the time it took for the joke he pitched to be cut It was much slower to cut than normal | -1 | 16 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-9.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, Cheney and Bush | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation "Vice President" | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation Fleischer, Cheney and Bush | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, President, Fleischer | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation "President's press secretary" | 1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten and Fleischer | 0 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where is the earth's magnetic pull strongest Equator | -1 | 0 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed Joshua Bolten - The engage order | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted to confirm the President | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed Joshua Bolten - The take off time of Air Force One | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted the engage order confirmed | 1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed Joshua Bolten's secretary - The engage order | 0 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | How does the geography of central Illinois differ from southern Illinois Central Illinois is very flat, while southern Illinois has rolling hills | -1 | 1 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be With no intel about the aircraft, the take out order was issued, but it turned out to be a medivac chopper | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be No - a medevac helicopter | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be Yes - A commercial flight airplane | 0 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be Yes - a medevac helicopter | 1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | What practice is far more common in civil matters than in criminal cases Representation of litigants by legal assistance | -1 | 2 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 1 hour | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 13 minutes | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane "three seconds" | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 12 minutes | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane "at 10.33 hrs." | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 15 minutes | 0 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 10 minutes | 1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | What type of the film is being discussed and what is on of the key messages It is an animated history of the US and one of the key messages is to continue the racism of the KKK | -1 | 3 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about The order of succession | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about "engage order" | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about The hijacked plane | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about Who did the attacks | 0 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about VP talking to the President, | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about "Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order" | 1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | Was the gun fragment large or small Small | -1 | 4 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft "Until the Aricraft drops below the radar screen" | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft "Transmission of the Authorization" | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft 15 minutes | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft From 10:03 to 10:30 | 1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft 10 minutes | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft 30 minutes | 0 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | What is Seki's relationship with Juzo Bully from teenage years | -1 | 5 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Did the President order the aircraft to stop No | 0 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Did the President order the aircraft to stop Yes | 1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | What type of energy does wood have Solar energy | -1 | 6 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order "confirm the engage order" | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order "Bolten watched the exchange" | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order Oval Office | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order At the conference room table | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order Air Force One | 0 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order Conference Room | 1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The generals changed their minds | -1 | 7 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him "White House" | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him Air Force One | 1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him On vacation | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him The Oval Office | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him "NMCC" | 0 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | When will Daniel Castleman of Lubbock, Texas be sentenced In the next year | -1 | 8 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | false |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern Yes there was - he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern Since there had been no prior discussion with the President, He wanted the President to know that the Vice President had executed the order | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern No prior discussion - he wanted to make sure that the vice president knew everything that was going on | 0 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern No prior discussion - he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order | 1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What assassination plot caused the U.N. Security Council to sanction the Sudanese government Attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak | -1 | 9 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about Who was behind the attacks | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about "No direct conversation between them" | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about When he would return to Washington | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about What to do with the low-flying plane | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about An Order to Shoot Down the Plane | 1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about "President was told that the Vice President had executed the order" | 0 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | Why did the first words the writer's saviours said mean nothing to him He was still a stranded folk | -1 | 10 | Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-39.txt | true |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 12 | 0 | 0 | News/WSJ-masc-wsj_0120-1.txt | true |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 396 | 0 | 0 | News/WSJ-masc-wsj_0120-1.txt | true |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price Around 20 | 1 | 0 | News/WSJ-masc-wsj_0120-1.txt | true |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 35 | 0 | 0 | News/WSJ-masc-wsj_0120-1.txt | true |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 | 1 | 0 | News/WSJ-masc-wsj_0120-1.txt | true |
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