purplecat24/Russel · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 74

Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond
to private spaces, what can we know about it? We can know _only_ what is
required in order to secure the correspondence. That is to say, we can
know nothing of what it is like in itself, but we can know the sort
of arrangement of physical objects which results from their spatial
relations. We can know, for example, that the earth and moon and sun
are in one straight line during an eclipse, though we cannot know what
a physical straight line is in itself, as we know the look of a straight
line in our visual space. Thus we come to know much more about the
_relations_ of distances in physical space than about the distances
themselves; we may know that one distance is greater than another, or
that it is along the same straight line as the other, but we cannot have
that immediate acquaintance with physical distances that we have with
distances in our private spaces, or with colours or sounds or other
sense-data. We can know all those things about physical space which a
man born blind might know through other people about the space of sight;
but the kind of things which a man born blind could never know about the
space of sight we also cannot know about physical space. We can know the
properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence with
sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the
relations hold.

With regard to time, our _feeling_ of duration or of the lapse of time
is notoriously an unsafe guide as to the time that has elapsed by the
clock. Times when we are bored or suffering pain pass slowly, times when
we are agreeably occupied pass quickly, and times when we are sleeping
pass almost as if they did not exist. Thus, in so far as time is
constituted by duration, there is the same necessity for distinguishing
a public and a private time as there was in the case of space. But in so
far as time consists in an _order_ of before and after, there is no need
to make such a distinction; the time-order which events seem to have is,
so far as we can see, the same as the time-order which they do have. At
any rate no reason can be given for supposing that the two orders are
not the same. The same is usually true of space: if a regiment of men
are marching along a road, the shape of the regiment will look different
from different points of view, but the men will appear arranged in the
same order from all points of view. Hence we regard the order as true
also in physical space, whereas the shape is only supposed to correspond
to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the
order.

In saying that the time-order which events seem to have is the same as
the time-order which they really have, it is necessary to guard against
a possible misunderstanding. It must not be supposed that the various
states of different physical objects have the same time-order as the
sense-data which constitute the perceptions of those objects. Considered
as physical objects, the thunder and lightning are simultaneous; that is
to say, the lightning is simultaneous with the disturbance of the air in
the place where the disturbance begins, namely, where the lightning
is. But the sense-datum which we call hearing the thunder does not take
place until the disturbance of the air has travelled as far as to where
we are. Similarly, it takes about eight minutes for the sun's light
to reach us; thus, when we see the sun we are seeing the sun of eight
minutes ago. So far as our sense-data afford evidence as to the physical
sun they afford evidence as to the physical sun of eight minutes ago; if
the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last eight minutes, that
would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing
the sun'. This affords a fresh illustration of the necessity of
distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects.

What we have found as regards space is much the same as what we find
in relation to the correspondence of the sense-data with their
physical counterparts. If one object looks blue and another red, we may
reasonably presume that there is some corresponding difference between
the physical objects; if two objects both look blue, we may presume a
corresponding similarity. But we cannot hope to be acquainted directly
with the quality in the physical object which makes it look blue or red.
Science tells us that this quality is a certain sort of wave-motion, and
this sounds familiar, because we think of wave-motions in the space we
see. But the wave-motions must really be in physical space, with which
we have no direct acquaintance; thus the real wave-motions have not that
familiarity which we might have supposed them to have. And what holds
for colours is closely similar to what holds for other sense-data. Thus
we find that, although the _relations_ of physical objects have all
sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the
relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown
in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means
of the senses. The question remains whether there is any other method of
discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects.

The most natural, though not ultimately the most defensible, hypothesis
to adopt in the first instance, at any rate as regards visual
sense-data, would be that, though physical objects cannot, for the
reasons we have been considering, be _exactly_ like sense-data, yet they
may be more or less like. According to this view, physical objects will,
for example, really have colours, and we might, by good luck, see an
object as of the colour it really is. The colour which an object seems
to have at any given moment will in general be very similar, though
not quite the same, from many different points of view; we might thus
suppose the 'real' colour to be a sort of medium colour, intermediate
between the various shades which appear from the different points of
view.

Such a theory is perhaps not capable of being definitely refuted, but
it can be shown to be groundless. To begin with, it is plain that the
colour we see depends only upon the nature of the light-waves that
strike the eye, and is therefore modified by the medium intervening
between us and the object, as well as by the manner in which light is
reflected from the object in the direction of the eye. The intervening

Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond

to private spaces, what can we know about it? We can know _only_ what is

required in order to secure the correspondence. That is to say, we can

know nothing of what it is like in itself, but we can know the sort

of arrangement of physical objects which results from their spatial

relations. We can know, for example, that the earth and moon and sun

are in one straight line during an eclipse, though we cannot know what

a physical straight line is in itself, as we know the look of a straight

line in our visual space. Thus we come to know much more about the

_relations_ of distances in physical space than about the distances

themselves; we may know that one distance is greater than another, or

that it is along the same straight line as the other, but we cannot have

that immediate acquaintance with physical distances that we have with

distances in our private spaces, or with colours or sounds or other

sense-data. We can know all those things about physical space which a

man born blind might know through other people about the space of sight;

but the kind of things which a man born blind could never know about the

space of sight we also cannot know about physical space. We can know the

properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence with

sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the

relations hold.

With regard to time, our _feeling_ of duration or of the lapse of time

is notoriously an unsafe guide as to the time that has elapsed by the

clock. Times when we are bored or suffering pain pass slowly, times when

we are agreeably occupied pass quickly, and times when we are sleeping

pass almost as if they did not exist. Thus, in so far as time is

constituted by duration, there is the same necessity for distinguishing

a public and a private time as there was in the case of space. But in so

far as time consists in an _order_ of before and after, there is no need

to make such a distinction; the time-order which events seem to have is,

so far as we can see, the same as the time-order which they do have. At

any rate no reason can be given for supposing that the two orders are

not the same. The same is usually true of space: if a regiment of men

are marching along a road, the shape of the regiment will look different

from different points of view, but the men will appear arranged in the

same order from all points of view. Hence we regard the order as true

also in physical space, whereas the shape is only supposed to correspond

to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the

order.

In saying that the time-order which events seem to have is the same as

the time-order which they really have, it is necessary to guard against

a possible misunderstanding. It must not be supposed that the various

states of different physical objects have the same time-order as the

sense-data which constitute the perceptions of those objects. Considered

as physical objects, the thunder and lightning are simultaneous; that is

to say, the lightning is simultaneous with the disturbance of the air in

the place where the disturbance begins, namely, where the lightning

is. But the sense-datum which we call hearing the thunder does not take

place until the disturbance of the air has travelled as far as to where

we are. Similarly, it takes about eight minutes for the sun's light

to reach us; thus, when we see the sun we are seeing the sun of eight

minutes ago. So far as our sense-data afford evidence as to the physical

sun they afford evidence as to the physical sun of eight minutes ago; if

the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last eight minutes, that

would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing

the sun'. This affords a fresh illustration of the necessity of

distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects.

What we have found as regards space is much the same as what we find

in relation to the correspondence of the sense-data with their

physical counterparts. If one object looks blue and another red, we may

reasonably presume that there is some corresponding difference between

the physical objects; if two objects both look blue, we may presume a

corresponding similarity. But we cannot hope to be acquainted directly

with the quality in the physical object which makes it look blue or red.

Science tells us that this quality is a certain sort of wave-motion, and

this sounds familiar, because we think of wave-motions in the space we

see. But the wave-motions must really be in physical space, with which

we have no direct acquaintance; thus the real wave-motions have not that

familiarity which we might have supposed them to have. And what holds

for colours is closely similar to what holds for other sense-data. Thus

we find that, although the _relations_ of physical objects have all

sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the

relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown

in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means

of the senses. The question remains whether there is any other method of

discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects.

The most natural, though not ultimately the most defensible, hypothesis

to adopt in the first instance, at any rate as regards visual

sense-data, would be that, though physical objects cannot, for the

reasons we have been considering, be _exactly_ like sense-data, yet they

may be more or less like. According to this view, physical objects will,

for example, really have colours, and we might, by good luck, see an

object as of the colour it really is. The colour which an object seems

to have at any given moment will in general be very similar, though

not quite the same, from many different points of view; we might thus

suppose the 'real' colour to be a sort of medium colour, intermediate

between the various shades which appear from the different points of

view.

Such a theory is perhaps not capable of being definitely refuted, but

it can be shown to be groundless. To begin with, it is plain that the

colour we see depends only upon the nature of the light-waves that

strike the eye, and is therefore modified by the medium intervening

between us and the object, as well as by the manner in which light is

reflected from the object in the direction of the eye. The intervening