purplecat24/Russel · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 74

To this question physical science gives an answer, somewhat incomplete
it is true, and in part still very hypothetical, but yet deserving of
respect so far as it goes. Physical science, more or less unconsciously,
has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced
to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which
travel from the body emitting them to the person who sees light or feels
heat or hears sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or
'gross matter', but in either case is what the philosopher would call
matter. The only properties which science assigns to it are position in
space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion. Science
does not deny that it _may_ have other properties; but if so, such other
properties are not useful to the man of science, and in no way assist
him in explaining the phenomena.

It is sometimes said that 'light _is_ a form of wave-motion', but this
is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we know
directly by means of our senses, is _not_ a form of wave-motion, but
something quite different--something which we all know if we are not
blind, though we cannot describe it so as to convey our knowledge to a
man who is blind. A wave-motion, on the contrary, could quite well be
described to a blind man, since he can acquire a knowledge of space by
the sense of touch; and he can experience a wave-motion by a sea voyage
almost as well as we can. But this, which a blind man can understand, is
not what we mean by _light_: we mean by _light_ just that which a blind
man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him.

Now this something, which all of us who are not blind know, is not,
according to science, really to be found in the outer world: it is
something caused by the action of certain waves upon the eyes and nerves
and brain of the person who sees the light. When it is said that light
_is_ waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of
our sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people
experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form
any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses. And very
similar remarks would apply to other kinds of sensations.

It is not only colours and sounds and so on that are absent from the
scientific world of matter, but also _space_ as we get it through sight
or touch. It is essential to science that its matter should be in _a_
space, but the space in which it is cannot be exactly the space we see
or feel. To begin with, space as we see it is not the same as space as
we get it by the sense of touch; it is only by experience in infancy
that we learn how to touch things we see, or how to get a sight of
things which we feel touching us. But the space of science is neutral as
between touch and sight; thus it cannot be either the space of touch or
the space of sight.

Again, different people see the same object as of different shapes,
according to their point of view. A circular coin, for example, though
we should always _judge_ it to be circular, will _look_ oval unless we
are straight in front of it. When we judge that it _is_ circular, we are
judging that it has a real shape which is not its apparent shape, but
belongs to it intrinsically apart from its appearance. But this real
shape, which is what concerns science, must be in a real space, not
the same as anybody's _apparent_ space. The real space is public, the
apparent space is private to the percipient. In different people's
_private_ spaces the same object seems to have different shapes; thus
the real space, in which it has its real shape, must be different from
the private spaces. The space of science, therefore, though _connected_
with the spaces we see and feel, is not identical with them, and the
manner of its connexion requires investigation.

We agreed provisionally that physical objects cannot be quite like
our sense-data, but may be regarded as _causing_ our sensations.
These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call
'physical' space. It is important to notice that, if our sensations
are to be caused by physical objects, there must be a physical space
containing these objects and our sense-organs and nerves and brain. We
get a sensation of touch from an object when we are in contact with it;
that is to say, when some part of our body occupies a place in physical
space quite close to the space occupied by the object. We see an object
(roughly speaking) when no opaque body is between the object and our
eyes in physical space. Similarly, we only hear or smell or taste an
object when we are sufficiently near to it, or when it touches the
tongue, or has some suitable position in physical space relatively to
our body. We cannot begin to state what different sensations we shall
derive from a given object under different circumstances unless we
regard the object and our body as both in one physical space, for it is
mainly the relative positions of the object and our body that determine
what sensations we shall derive from the object.

Now our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space
of sight or the space of touch or such vaguer spaces as other senses
may give us. If, as science and common sense assume, there is one public
all-embracing physical space in which physical objects are, the relative
positions of physical objects in physical space must more or less
correspond to the relative positions of sense-data in our private
spaces. There is no difficulty in supposing this to be the case. If we
see on a road one house nearer to us than another, our other senses will
bear out the view that it is nearer; for example, it will be reached
sooner if we walk along the road. Other people will agree that the house
which looks nearer to us is nearer; the ordnance map will take the
same view; and thus everything points to a spatial relation between the
houses corresponding to the relation between the sense-data which we see
when we look at the houses. Thus we may assume that there is a physical
space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to
those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It
is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and assumed in
physics and astronomy.

To this question physical science gives an answer, somewhat incomplete

it is true, and in part still very hypothetical, but yet deserving of

respect so far as it goes. Physical science, more or less unconsciously,

has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced

to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which

travel from the body emitting them to the person who sees light or feels

heat or hears sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or

'gross matter', but in either case is what the philosopher would call

matter. The only properties which science assigns to it are position in

space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion. Science

does not deny that it _may_ have other properties; but if so, such other

properties are not useful to the man of science, and in no way assist

him in explaining the phenomena.

It is sometimes said that 'light _is_ a form of wave-motion', but this

is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we know

directly by means of our senses, is _not_ a form of wave-motion, but

something quite different--something which we all know if we are not

blind, though we cannot describe it so as to convey our knowledge to a

man who is blind. A wave-motion, on the contrary, could quite well be

described to a blind man, since he can acquire a knowledge of space by

the sense of touch; and he can experience a wave-motion by a sea voyage

almost as well as we can. But this, which a blind man can understand, is

not what we mean by _light_: we mean by _light_ just that which a blind

man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him.

Now this something, which all of us who are not blind know, is not,

according to science, really to be found in the outer world: it is

something caused by the action of certain waves upon the eyes and nerves

and brain of the person who sees the light. When it is said that light

_is_ waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of

our sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people

experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form

any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses. And very

similar remarks would apply to other kinds of sensations.

It is not only colours and sounds and so on that are absent from the

scientific world of matter, but also _space_ as we get it through sight

or touch. It is essential to science that its matter should be in _a_

space, but the space in which it is cannot be exactly the space we see

or feel. To begin with, space as we see it is not the same as space as

we get it by the sense of touch; it is only by experience in infancy

that we learn how to touch things we see, or how to get a sight of

things which we feel touching us. But the space of science is neutral as

between touch and sight; thus it cannot be either the space of touch or

the space of sight.

Again, different people see the same object as of different shapes,

according to their point of view. A circular coin, for example, though

we should always _judge_ it to be circular, will _look_ oval unless we

are straight in front of it. When we judge that it _is_ circular, we are

judging that it has a real shape which is not its apparent shape, but

belongs to it intrinsically apart from its appearance. But this real

shape, which is what concerns science, must be in a real space, not

the same as anybody's _apparent_ space. The real space is public, the

apparent space is private to the percipient. In different people's

_private_ spaces the same object seems to have different shapes; thus

the real space, in which it has its real shape, must be different from

the private spaces. The space of science, therefore, though _connected_

with the spaces we see and feel, is not identical with them, and the

manner of its connexion requires investigation.

We agreed provisionally that physical objects cannot be quite like

our sense-data, but may be regarded as _causing_ our sensations.

These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call

'physical' space. It is important to notice that, if our sensations

are to be caused by physical objects, there must be a physical space

containing these objects and our sense-organs and nerves and brain. We

get a sensation of touch from an object when we are in contact with it;

that is to say, when some part of our body occupies a place in physical

space quite close to the space occupied by the object. We see an object

(roughly speaking) when no opaque body is between the object and our

eyes in physical space. Similarly, we only hear or smell or taste an

object when we are sufficiently near to it, or when it touches the

tongue, or has some suitable position in physical space relatively to

our body. We cannot begin to state what different sensations we shall

derive from a given object under different circumstances unless we

regard the object and our body as both in one physical space, for it is

mainly the relative positions of the object and our body that determine

what sensations we shall derive from the object.

Now our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space

of sight or the space of touch or such vaguer spaces as other senses

may give us. If, as science and common sense assume, there is one public

all-embracing physical space in which physical objects are, the relative

positions of physical objects in physical space must more or less

correspond to the relative positions of sense-data in our private

spaces. There is no difficulty in supposing this to be the case. If we

see on a road one house nearer to us than another, our other senses will

bear out the view that it is nearer; for example, it will be reached

sooner if we walk along the road. Other people will agree that the house

which looks nearer to us is nearer; the ordnance map will take the

same view; and thus everything points to a spatial relation between the

houses corresponding to the relation between the sense-data which we see

when we look at the houses. Thus we may assume that there is a physical

space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to

those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It

is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and assumed in

physics and astronomy.