purplecat24/Russel · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 74
what it is worth, a solid basis from which to begin our pursuit of
knowledge.

The problem we have to consider is this: Granted that we are certain of
our own sense-data, have we any reason for regarding them as signs of
the existence of something else, which we can call the physical object?
When we have enumerated all the sense-data which we should naturally
regard as connected with the table, have we said all there is to say
about the table, or is there still something else--something not a
sense-datum, something which persists when we go out of the room? Common
sense unhesitatingly answers that there is. What can be bought and sold
and pushed about and have a cloth laid on it, and so on, cannot be
a _mere_ collection of sense-data. If the cloth completely hides the
table, we shall derive no sense-data from the table, and therefore, if
the table were merely sense-data, it would have ceased to exist, and
the cloth would be suspended in empty air, resting, by a miracle, in
the place where the table formerly was. This seems plainly absurd; but
whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened
by absurdities.

One great reason why it is felt that we must secure a physical object
in addition to the sense-data, is that we want the same object for
different people. When ten people are sitting round a dinner-table,
it seems preposterous to maintain that they are not seeing the same
tablecloth, the same knives and forks and spoons and glasses. But the
sense-data are private to each separate person; what is immediately
present to the sight of one is not immediately present to the sight of
another: they all see things from slightly different points of view, and
therefore see them slightly differently. Thus, if there are to be public
neutral objects, which can be in some sense known to many different
people, there must be something over and above the private and
particular sense-data which appear to various people. What reason, then,
have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects?

The first answer that naturally occurs to one is that, although
different people may see the table slightly differently, still they all
see more or less similar things when they look at the table, and
the variations in what they see follow the laws of perspective and
reflection of light, so that it is easy to arrive at a permanent object
underlying all the different people's sense-data. I bought my table from
the former occupant of my room; I could not buy _his_ sense-data,
which died when he went away, but I could and did buy the confident
expectation of more or less similar sense-data. Thus it is the fact that
different people have similar sense-data, and that one person in a given
place at different times has similar sense-data, which makes us suppose
that over and above the sense-data there is a permanent public object
which underlies or causes the sense-data of various people at various
times.

Now in so far as the above considerations depend upon supposing that
there are other people besides ourselves, they beg the very question at
issue. Other people are represented to me by certain sense-data, such as
the sight of them or the sound of their voices, and if I had no
reason to believe that there were physical objects independent of my
sense-data, I should have no reason to believe that other people exist
except as part of my dream. Thus, when we are trying to show that there
must be objects independent of our own sense-data, we cannot appeal to
the testimony of other people, since this testimony itself consists of
sense-data, and does not reveal other people's experiences unless our
own sense-data are signs of things existing independently of us. We must
therefore, if possible, find, in our own purely private experiences,
characteristics which show, or tend to show, that there are in the world
things other than ourselves and our private experiences.

In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence
of things other than ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity
results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my
thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere
fancy. In dreams a very complicated world may seem to be present, and
yet on waking we find it was a delusion; that is to say, we find that
the sense-data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such
physical objects as we should naturally infer from our sense-data. (It
is true that, when the physical world is assumed, it is possible to
find physical causes for the sense-data in dreams: a door banging, for
instance, may cause us to dream of a naval engagement. But although, in
this case, there is a physical cause for the sense-data, there is not a
physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an
actual naval battle would correspond.) There is no logical impossibility
in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we
ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this
is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that
it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a
means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense
hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action
on us causes our sensations.

The way in which simplicity comes in from supposing that there really
are physical objects is easily seen. If the cat appears at one moment in
one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural
to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over
a series of intermediate positions. But if it is merely a set of
sense-data, it cannot have ever been in any place where I did not see
it; thus we shall have to suppose that it did not exist at all while I
was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a new place. If
the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can understand from our own
experience how it gets hungry between one meal and the next; but if
it does not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd that appetite
should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the
cat consists only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no hunger
but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the

what it is worth, a solid basis from which to begin our pursuit of

knowledge.

The problem we have to consider is this: Granted that we are certain of

our own sense-data, have we any reason for regarding them as signs of

the existence of something else, which we can call the physical object?

When we have enumerated all the sense-data which we should naturally

regard as connected with the table, have we said all there is to say

about the table, or is there still something else--something not a

sense-datum, something which persists when we go out of the room? Common

sense unhesitatingly answers that there is. What can be bought and sold

and pushed about and have a cloth laid on it, and so on, cannot be

a _mere_ collection of sense-data. If the cloth completely hides the

table, we shall derive no sense-data from the table, and therefore, if

the table were merely sense-data, it would have ceased to exist, and

the cloth would be suspended in empty air, resting, by a miracle, in

the place where the table formerly was. This seems plainly absurd; but

whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened

by absurdities.

One great reason why it is felt that we must secure a physical object

in addition to the sense-data, is that we want the same object for

different people. When ten people are sitting round a dinner-table,

it seems preposterous to maintain that they are not seeing the same

tablecloth, the same knives and forks and spoons and glasses. But the

sense-data are private to each separate person; what is immediately

present to the sight of one is not immediately present to the sight of

another: they all see things from slightly different points of view, and

therefore see them slightly differently. Thus, if there are to be public

neutral objects, which can be in some sense known to many different

people, there must be something over and above the private and

particular sense-data which appear to various people. What reason, then,

have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects?

The first answer that naturally occurs to one is that, although

different people may see the table slightly differently, still they all

see more or less similar things when they look at the table, and

the variations in what they see follow the laws of perspective and

reflection of light, so that it is easy to arrive at a permanent object

underlying all the different people's sense-data. I bought my table from

the former occupant of my room; I could not buy _his_ sense-data,

which died when he went away, but I could and did buy the confident

expectation of more or less similar sense-data. Thus it is the fact that

different people have similar sense-data, and that one person in a given

place at different times has similar sense-data, which makes us suppose

that over and above the sense-data there is a permanent public object

which underlies or causes the sense-data of various people at various

times.

Now in so far as the above considerations depend upon supposing that

there are other people besides ourselves, they beg the very question at

issue. Other people are represented to me by certain sense-data, such as

the sight of them or the sound of their voices, and if I had no

reason to believe that there were physical objects independent of my

sense-data, I should have no reason to believe that other people exist

except as part of my dream. Thus, when we are trying to show that there

must be objects independent of our own sense-data, we cannot appeal to

the testimony of other people, since this testimony itself consists of

sense-data, and does not reveal other people's experiences unless our

own sense-data are signs of things existing independently of us. We must

therefore, if possible, find, in our own purely private experiences,

characteristics which show, or tend to show, that there are in the world

things other than ourselves and our private experiences.

In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence

of things other than ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity

results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my

thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere

fancy. In dreams a very complicated world may seem to be present, and

yet on waking we find it was a delusion; that is to say, we find that

the sense-data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such

physical objects as we should naturally infer from our sense-data. (It

is true that, when the physical world is assumed, it is possible to

find physical causes for the sense-data in dreams: a door banging, for

instance, may cause us to dream of a naval engagement. But although, in

this case, there is a physical cause for the sense-data, there is not a

physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an

actual naval battle would correspond.) There is no logical impossibility

in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we

ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this

is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that

it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a

means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense

hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action

on us causes our sensations.

The way in which simplicity comes in from supposing that there really

are physical objects is easily seen. If the cat appears at one moment in

one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural

to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over

a series of intermediate positions. But if it is merely a set of

sense-data, it cannot have ever been in any place where I did not see

it; thus we shall have to suppose that it did not exist at all while I

was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a new place. If

the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can understand from our own

experience how it gets hungry between one meal and the next; but if

it does not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd that appetite

should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the

cat consists only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no hunger

but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the