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Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | as to the State Senate was within the bounds of the discretion confided to it. Application of interim remedial techniques in voting rights cases has largely been left to the district courts. The courts are bound to apply equitable considerations and in Reynolds it was stated that "[i]n awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws" The court below was faced with severe time pressures. The reapportionment plans were first forwarded to the Attorney General on March 1, By April 7, these three cases had been filed and consolidated. The first hearing was scheduled for May 2, but on May 7, the Attorney General interposed his objections pursuant to the Voting Rights Act. As a result, the May 2 hearing was largely devoted to arguing about the effect of such objections and after that hearing, the court directed the cases to be continued until June 15. It also postponed the primary elections, which had been set for June 8, until September 1. The cases were finally heard on June 1, and the court's interlocutory order was entered on July 2, just two weeks prior to the revised July 1 filing deadline for primary candidates. Prior to the time the court acted, this Court had handed down recognizing that multimember districts were not per se *333 violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The court conscientiously considered both the legislative policy and this Court's admonition in that in fashioning apportionment remedies, the use of single-member districts is preferred. But it was confronted with plausible evidence of substantial malapportionment with respect to military personnel, the mandate of this Court that voting discrimination against military personnel is constitutionally impermissible, at 91-, and the fear that too much delay would have seriously disrupted the fall elections. Facing as it did this singular combination of unique factors, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in fashioning the interim remedy of combining the three districts into one multimember district.[13] We, therefore, affirm the order of that Court insofar as it dealt with the State Senate. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court in No. 71-373, City of Virginia Beach v. Howell, that the joinder by the District Court of three senatorial districts in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | District Court of three senatorial districts in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach area to create one multimember senatorial district for the election was permissible under the special circumstances *33 of this case. Cf. 17-179 ; see (195); (19). I dissent, however, in No. 71-3, v. Howell, from the Court's action in setting aside the District Court's finding that the apportionment of the State House of Delegates violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court approves a legislative apportionment plan that is conceded to produce a total deviation of at least 1.% from the constitutional ideal.[1] Of course, "the fact that a 10% or 15% variation from the norm is approved in one State has little bearing on the validity of a similar variation in another State." (197). "What is marginally permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case." Since every reapportionment case presents as its factual predicate a unique combination of circumstances, decisions upholding or invalidating a legislative plan cannot normally have great precedential significance. But language in the Court's opinion today suggests that more may be at stake than the application of well-established principles to a novel set of facts. In my view, the problem in the case before us is in no sense one of first impression, but is squarely controlled by our prior decisions. See ; ; It is appropriate, therefore, to call to mind again the controlling principles and to show that, properly applied to the facts of the case before us, they preclude a reversal of the District Court's decision. I Virginia's recently amended Constitution provides that "members of the Senate and of the House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be elected from electoral districts established by the General Assembly," and "[e]very electoral district shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory and shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is practicable, representation in proportion to the population of the district." Art. II, Pursuant to that requirement, the General Assembly in divided the Commonwealth into 52 legislative districts from which the 100 members of the House of Delegates were to be elected. On the basis of 1970 census figures, which set the population of the Commonwealth at8,9, each delegate should ideally represent85 persons. While the legislature's plan does not disregard constitutional requirements to the flagrant extent of many earlier cases,[2] it does, nevertheless, demonstrate a systematic pattern of substantial deviation from the constitutional ideal. Under the plan, more than 25% of the delegates would be elected from districts in which |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | of the delegates would be elected from districts in which the population deviates from the ideal by more than 5%. Almost 0% of the delegates would represent districts that deviate by more than 3%. Four legislators would be elected from districts that are overrepresented or underrepresented by more than 8%. And the maximum deviationthe *33 spread between the most overrepresented and the most underrepresented districtswould be at least 1.%, and might be as high as 23.%, depending on the method of calculation. Assuming a maximum deviation of 1.%, the legislature's plan is still significantly less representative than many plans previously struck down by state and lower federal courts.[3] Appellees maintain, however, that the total deviation, properly computed, is in fact 23.% a figure closely approximating the 25.5% deviation that led us to invalidate the Senate plan in the 2.8% deviation that led us to invalidate the House plan in 38 U.S. 120 (197), and the 2.78% deviation that led us to invalidate the House plan in 11-13 Appellees arrive at the figure of 23.% by taking into account the deviations in floterial districts, see App. 81-83, and appellants seem to concede that 23.% is an accurate indicator of the total deviation. See Brief for Appellant Commonwealth of Virginia 7.[] *337 The District Court pointed out that the "range of deviation may exceed 1.%," 1139 but it had no occasion to consider whether 23.% was the more accurate figure because of its finding that "[u]nder either mode of calculation the statewide range of deviation will not pass constitutional muster." Although conceding that the District Court did not reject or disparage appellees' assertion of a 23.% deviation, the Court nevertheless reaches the perplexing conclusion that we "confine our consideration to the figures actually found by the court and used to support its holding of unconstitutionality" 1.%. Ante, at 319, n. But if the legislature's plan does, in fact, "pass constitutional muster" on the assumption of a 1.% deviation, then it is surely fair to ask whether the plan would still be valid assuming a total deviation of 23.%. The Court refuses either to confront the question directly or to render it moot by determining that the figure of 23.% is irrelevant because improperly derived. Instead, it attempts to obscure the issue by contending that the Commonwealth and the city of Virginia Beach disputed appellees' assertion of a 23.% total deviation. That contention is wholly incorrect. Neither in the answers filed in the District Court, nor in the briefs, nor at oral argument did the Commonwealth or the city of Virginia Beach quarrel |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | did the Commonwealth or the city of Virginia Beach quarrel with appellee's method of calculating the deviation in floterial districts. See n. The Court's refusal to consider the question can only mean that appellees have the option of reopening this litigation in the District Court in an attempt to persuade that court that the true measure of the *338 deviation is 23.% and that a deviation of this order is fatal to the Commonwealth's plan. In my view, there is no need to prolong this litigation by resolution in the court below of an issue that this Court should, but inexplicably does not, decide. The District Court correctly held that deviations of the magnitude of even 1.% are sufficient to invalidate the legislature's plan. And that court addedagain correctly that "[i]n reapportionment cases the burden is on the State to justify deviations from parity by `legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.' ; see (197). The State has proved no governmental necessity for strictly adhering to political subdivision lines." 330 F. Supp., Accordingly, the District Court promulgated its own apportionment plan, which significantly reduced the extent of deviation. Under the District Court's plan, the maximum deviation would be 7.2%,[5] excluding one district which is geographically isolated from the mainland of the Commonwealth.[] And, even including that isolated district, the maximum total deviation would not exceed 10.2%. But the substantial reduction in the maximum deviation does not in itself make clear the full measure of the improvement achieved by the District Court's plan. The number of delegates whose districts deviate from the norm by 3% or more would be almost cut in *339 half, from 58 to 32. And of the 32 districts still exceeding the 3% mark, only onethe geographically isolated districtwould exceed the mean by more than 3.7%. In short, while the District Court did not achieve its stated goal of "perfect mathematical division" because of the "multiplicity of delegates, the geography of the State and the diversity of population concentrations," its plan would still produce measurably greater equality of representation. Appellants necessarily concede that the District Court's plan would reduce the inequality in population per district, but they defend the legislature's plan on the ground that "tolerance of political jurisdictional lines is justification for some deviation," Brief for Appellant Commonwealth of Virginia 2. They maintain that the legislature's plan achieved the highest degree of equality possible without fragmenting political subdivisions. The principal question presented for our decision is whether on the facts of this case an asserted state interest in preserving the integrity of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | case an asserted state interest in preserving the integrity of county lines can justify the resulting substantial deviations from population equality. II The holdings of our prior decisions can be restated in two unequivocal propositions. First, the paramount goal of reapportionment must be the drawing of district lines so as to achieve precise equality in the population of each district.[7] "[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of *30 equal population as is practicable." ; see also 39 U. S., The Constitution does not permit a State to relegate considerations of equality to secondary status and reserve as the primary goal of apportionment the service of some other state interest. Second, it is open to the State, in the event that it should fail to achieve the goal of population equality, to attempt to justify its failure by demonstrating that precise equality could not be achieved without jeopardizing some critical governmental interest. The Equal Protection Clause does not exalt the principle of equal representation to the point of nullifying every competing interest of the State. But we have held firmly to the view that variations in weight accorded each vote can be approved only where the State meets its burden of presenting cogent reasons in explanation of the variations, and even then only where the variations are small. See, e. g., ; The validity of these propositions and their applicability to the case before us are not at all diminished by the fact that and two of the many cases in which the propositions were refined and applied concerned the division of States into federal congressional districts rather than legislative reapportionment. Prior to today's decision, we have never held that different constitutional standards are applicable to the two situations. True, there are significant differences between congressional districting and legislative apportionment, and we have repeatedly recognized those differences. In for example, we termed "more than insubstantial" the argument that "a State can rationally consider according political subdivisions some independent representation in at least one body *31 of the state legislature, as long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts is maintained." See also ; But the recognition of these differences is hardly tantamount to the establishment of two distinct controlling standards. What our decisions have made clear is that certain state interests that are pertinent to legislative reapportionment can have no possible relevance to congressional districting. Thus, the need to preserve the integrity of political subdivisions as political subdivisions |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | to preserve the integrity of political subdivisions as political subdivisions may, in some instances, justify small variations in the population of districts from which state legislators are elected. But that interest can hardly be asserted in justification of malapportioned congressional districts. While the State may have a broader range of interests to which it can point in attempting to justify a failure to achieve precise equality in the context of legislative apportionment, it by no means follows that the State is subject to a lighter burden of proof or that the controlling constitutional standard is in any sense distinguishable. Our concern in was with the constitutional requirement that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." We rejected the State's argument that "there is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy without question the `as nearly as practicable' standard. Since `equal representation for equal numbers of people [is] the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives,' the `as nearly as practicable' standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. See" *32 Moreover, we held, that "[i]t was the burden of the State `to present acceptable reasons for the variations among the populations of the various districts' at 3-." The principles that undergirded our decision in are the very principles that supported our decision in a case involving the apportionment of a state legislature. The opinion in Kirkpatrick does not suggest that a different standard might be applicable to congressional districting. On the contrary, the "as nearly as practicable" standard with which we were concerned is identical to the standard that specifically made applicable to controversies over state legislative apportionment. See at See also 5 And the holding in Kirkpatrick that the State must bear the burden of justifying deviations from population equality not only rested squarely and exclusively on our holding in but even defined the test by quotation from Swann. See In we held that variations in the population of legislative districts must be justified by the State by presentation of "acceptable reasons for the variations." 385 U.S., at 3. And a comparison of the opinion for the Court in Swann with the views expressed by two Justices in dissent, see at decisively refutes any suggestion that unequal representation will be upheld so long as some rational basis for the discrimination can be found. A showing of necessity, not rationality, is what our decision in Swann requires. If Swann does not |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | what our decision in Swann requires. If Swann does not establish the point with sufficient clarity, then surely our decision in 38 *33 U. S. 120 (197), where we elucidated and applied the principles of Swann, removes all doubt. There, the District Court had sustained the state apportionment plan on two grounds, one of which we termed a "burden of proof" ruling. The lower court held that appellants "had the burden not only of demonstrating the degree of variance from the equality principle but also of `negat[ing] the existence of any state of facts which would sustain the constitutionality of the legislation.' 252 F. Supp. 0, 1." We squarely rejected that statement of the controlling legal standard, and held that under "it is quite clear that unless satisfactorily justified by the court or by the evidence of record, population variances of the size and significance evident here [a total deviation of 2.8%] are sufficient to invalidate an apportionment plan." We also rejected the District Court's second ground of decision: namely, that the deviations were amply justified by the State's attempt, wherever possible, to respect county boundaries. Significantly, the opinion stated that "[w]e are doubtful that the deviations evident here are the kind of `minor' variations which indicated might be justified by local policies counselling the maintenance of established political subdivisions in apportionment plans. -. But we need not reach that constitutional question, for we are not convinced that the announced policy of the State of Texas necessitated the range of deviations between legislative districts which is evident here." III I would affirm the District Court's decision because, on this record, the Commonwealth of Virginia failedjust as the State of Florida failed in and the State of Texas failed in to justify substantial *3 variations in the population of the districts from which members of the House of Delegates are elected. The panel that heard the case below consisted of four judges, all from Virginia, and I share their unanimous view that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the variations were justified by a need to insure representation of political subdivisions or a need to respect county boundaries in the drawing of district lines. If variations in the population of legislative districts are to be upheld, the Court must determine, before turning to the justifications that are asserted in defense of the variations, that they are "free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination." Ante, at 325, quoting from 377 U. S., at Appellees alleged before the District Court that the legislature's reapportionment plan did indeed discriminate against one region of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | legislature's reapportionment plan did indeed discriminate against one region of the Statethe Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, D. C. Each House seat in Northern Virginia would be underrepresented by an average of3% under the plan, and several would be underrepresented by as much as3%. In view of what it termed the "pervasive under-representation in districts in Northern Virginia," 330 F. Supp., at 11, the District Court ordered the transfer of one delegate out of the systematically overrepresented Tidewater region and into Northern Virginia. In 5-18, we pointed out that we have "never suggested that certain geographic areas or political interests are entitled to disproportionate representation. "Accordingly, we have underscored the danger of apportionment structures that contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular geographic areas or political interests or which necessarily will tend to favor, for example, less populous districts over their more *35 highly populated neighbors, see" The District Court found as a fact that the plan did include a "built-in bias tending to favor [a] particular geographic area." Conveniently, the Court discerns no need even to acknowledge this critical finding of fact, and sets it aside without explanation. We have no basis for concluding that the finding is clearly erroneous, and that finding requires an affirmance of the District Court's decision without regard to the Commonwealth's asserted justifications for the inequalities in district population. But even assuming that the Commonwealth's plan can be considered free of any "taint of arbitrariness or discrimination," appellants have failed to meet their burden of justifying the inequalities. They insist that the legislature has followed a consistent practice of drawing district lines in conformity with county boundaries. But a showing that a State has followed such a practice is still a long step from the necessary showing that the State must follow that practice. Neither in the Virginia Constitution nor in any Act of the Assembly has Virginia explicitly indicated any interest in preserving the integrity of county lines or in providing representation of political subdivisions as political subdivisions. Cf. On the contrary, the Constitution establishes a single standard for both legislative apportionment and congressional districting, and that standard requires only that lines be drawn so as to insure, "as nearly as is practicable," representation in proportion to population.[8]*3 And the origins of the constitutional provision make clear that equality in district population, not the representation of political subdivisions, is the Commonwealth's pre-eminent goal.[9] Moreover, in asserting its interest in preserving the integrity of county boundaries, the Commonwealth offers nothing more than vague references to "local legislation," without describing such legislation with precision, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | references to "local legislation," without describing such legislation with precision, without indicating whether such legislation amounts to a significant proportion of the legislature's business, and without demonstrating that the District Court's plan would materially affect the treatment of such legislation.[10] *37 The Court assumes that county representation is an important goal of Virginia's reapportionment plan, ante, at 32-328, and appellants suggest that the plan can be justified, at least in part, by the effort "to give an independent voice to the cities and counties [the legislature] daily governs." Brief for Appellant Commonwealth of Virginia 33. If county representation is indeed the Commonwealth's goal, then the apportionment plan adopted in itself falls far short of that objective. Appellants describe the problem in the following terms: "Under the Court's plan, a situation could arise where the 102 citizens of Wythe County, Virginia, who were placed in the Sixth Legislative District are opposed to local legislation pending in the General Assembly for their county. They must voice such opposition to the delegates representing 91,20 other persons in the Sixth Legislative District composed of the Counties of Carroll, Floyd and Montgomery *38 and the City of Radford, rather than oppose only their 20,537 fellow citizens of Wythe County." Brief for Appellant Commonwealth of Virginia 27. That argument assumes that some significant number of issues will have an impact squarely on Wythe County, while having no impact, or a differing impact, on the surrounding areas. For on issues affecting the entire region or the Commonwealth as a wholepresumably the vast majority of issuesthe critical concern is not that each vote in Wythe County be cast in a single district, but that each vote cast be precisely equal in weight to votes in every other part of the Commonwealth. And the argument also assumes that the issues affecting only one county are of predominant concern to the voters. Under a representative form of government, the voters participate indirectly through the election of delegates. It should be obvious that as a voter's concern with regional or statewide issues increases relative to his interest in county issues, the significance of voting outside the county will correspondingly diminish. But even if a substantial number of issues do have an impact primarily on a single county, and even if those issues are of deep concern to the voters, it still does not follow that the legislature's apportionment plan is a rational attempt to serve an important state interest. The plan would by no means provide, even in the legislature's own terms, effective representation for each county. Thus, the fourth legislative |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | terms, effective representation for each county. Thus, the fourth legislative district, which would elect one delegate under the plan, consists of Wythe, Grayson, and Bland Counties along with the city of Galax. Yet Wythe County alone, according to appellants' figures, comprises 22,139 of the 9,279 persons resident in the district. Since Wythe County makes up almost one-half of the population of the fourth district, the district's delegate is likely to champion Wythe County's cause should an issue arise that pits its interest *39 against the interests of Grayson or Bland County or the city of Galax. In short, the best that can be said of appellants' efforts to secure county representation is that the plan can be effective only with respect to some unspecified but in all likelihood small number of issues that affect a single county and that are overwhelmingly important to the voters of that county; and even then it provides effective representation only where the affected county represents a large enough percentage of the voters in the district to have a significant impact on the election of the delegate.[11] But even if county representation were, in fact, a strong and legitimate goal of the Commonwealth, and even if the plan did represent a rational effort to serve that goal, it is still not clear that the legislature's plan should be upheld. The plan prepared by the District Court would achieve a much higher degree of equality in district population, and it would accomplish that salutary goal with minimal disruption of the legislature's effort to avoid fragmenting counties. Of the 13 political subdivisions in the Commonwealth, only 12 would be divided by the District Court's plan. More significant, the number of persons resident in voting districts that would be cut out of one county or city and shifted to another is738, out of the total state population of8,9. Thus, even making each of the logical and empirical assumptions implicit in the view that violating county lines would effectively disenfranchise certain persons on certain local issues, the number *350 of persons affected would still be less than 1 1/2% of the total state population. IV On this recordwithout any showing of the specific need for county representation or a showing of how such representation can be meaningfully provided to small counties whose votes would be submerged in a multi-county districtI see no basis whatsoever for upholding the Assembly's plan and the resulting substantial variations in district population. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court holding the plan invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | dissenting | Rose v. Mitchell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110143/rose-v-mitchell/ | Although I agree with Parts I ad II of the Court's opiio, I believe that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimiatio was made out ad was ot rebutted by the State. I therefore disset from Parts III ad IV ad from the judgmet. O the basis of the evidece preseted at the evidetiary hearig i state court, the District Court cocluded that respodets "appear[ed]" to have made out a prima facie case of discrimiatio i the selectio of the forema of the grad *589 jury that idicted them. App. 99. However, upo the affidavits submitted by the State i respose, the court cocluded that i fact the forema had bee chose for other tha racial reasos, that he had ot voted o the idictmet, ad thus that there had ot bee a violatio of the Equal Protectio Clause. The Court of Appeals agreed that a prima facie case was show, iterpretig the record testimoy to the effect that the recollectios of those testifyig were that there had ever bee a black chose as forema of a grad jury i Tipto Couty, ad poitig out the potetial for discrimiatio i a system which leaves the selectio of the forema to the discretio of a sigle judge who has ot "really give ay thought to appoitig" a black, See The Court of Appeals disagreed, however, that this prima facie case had bee rebutted by the testimoy of the selectig judge that he had "o feelig agaist" appoitig a black to be forema, ad foud irrelevat that the forema did ot vote o respodets' idictmet. Because we do ot sit to redetermie the factfidigs of lower courts, ad because the Court of Appeals correctly euciated ad applied the law goverig proof of discrimiatio i the cotext of grad jury selectio, I disset. The oly differece betwee this case ad our previous cases voidig a covictio due to discrimiatory selectio of members of the grad jury is that i this case it has bee show oly that the grad jury forema, who did ot vote o the idictmet, was chose i a maer prohibited by the Equal Protectio Clause. I agree with the Court of Appeals that give the vital importace of the forema i the fuctioig of grad juries i Teessee,[1] a covictio based o a *590 idictmet where the forema was chose i a discrimiatory fashio is void just as would be a covictio where the etire grad jury is discrimiatorily selected, whether or ot there is a showig of actual prejudice, see ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | dissenting | Rose v. Mitchell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110143/rose-v-mitchell/ | prejudice, see ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; That this case ivolves oly the forema, rather tha the etire grad jury, does have implicatios for the maer i which respodets may meet their burde of provig discrimiatio. I the cotext of racial discrimiatio i the selectio of juries, "the systematic exclusio of Negroes is itself such a `uequal applicatio of the law as to show itetioal discrimiatio,'" a ecessary compoet of ay equal protectio violatio. Geerally, i those cases i which we have foud ucostitutioal discrimiatio i jury selectio, those allegig discrimiatio have relied upo a sigificat statistical discrepacy betwee the percetage of the uderrepreseted group i the populatio ad the percetage of this group called to serve as jurors, combied with a selectio procedure "that is susceptible of abuse or is ot racially eutral." See, e. g., ; Oce this *591 showig is made, the burde shifts to the State to rebut the iferece of discrimiatory purpose. This method of proof, sometimes called the "rule of exclusio," 430 U.S., may ot be well suited whe the focus of iquiry is a sigle officeholder whose term lasts two full years, as is true of the Tipto Couty grad jury forema. For istace, i we cosidered statistics relatig to a 11-year period showig that 39% of the 870 persos selected for grad jury duty were Hispaic, from a geeral populatio that was over 79% Hispaic. The likelihood that this statistical discrepacy could be explaied o the basis of chace aloe was less tha 1 i 10[140]. See -496, ad 17. The sample size ecessarily cosidered i a case of discrimiatio i the selectio of a forema simply does ot permit a statistical iferece as overwhelmig as that i Castaeda. Durig ay 11-year period, there would be oly five or six opportuities for selectig jury foreme i Tipto Couty, assumig that every forema selected serves at least the full 2-year term.[2] Despite the iheret difficulty of ay statistical presetatio with respect to discrimiatio i fillig a particular grad jury spot, respodets oetheless have made a strog showig of uderrepresetatio supportig a iferece of purposeful discrimiatio. This Court is ot i a positio to reject the fidig, explicitly made by the Court of Appeals ad implicitly made by the District Court,[3] that those who testified believed *592 there had ever bee a black forema durig the period 1951-1973. See ; Graver Mfg. Assumig that 11 forema selectios were made durig this period,[4] the expected umber of black foreme would be more tha 3ad the likelihood of o blacks beig chose would |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | dissenting | Rose v. Mitchell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110143/rose-v-mitchell/ | tha 3ad the likelihood of o blacks beig chose would be less tha 1 i 50if blacks, who costituted early a third of the couty's populatio, ad whites had a equal chace of beig selected. I do ot see how respodets could be expected to make a stroger statistical showig.[5] I ay evet, ay possible weakess i respodets' statistical presetatio was more tha overcome by the additioal evidece before the District Court. First, the selectio of a forema is left to the complete discretio of a sigle perso the circuit judge. The potetialities for abuse i such a system are obvious, cf. ; Heradez v. ("key ma" system). Moreover, the particular judge who chose the forema of respodets' grad jury had *593 ever chose a black i ay of the five couties for which he appoited foreme over a 6-year period, App. 113. Fially, the judge himself admitted that he had ever eve cosidered appoitig a black forema. Ibid.[6] Although these facts are ot ecessarily icosistet with a ultimate coclusio that respodets' forema was ot chose o racial grouds, they raise, i cojuctio with the previously described statistical presetatio, a strog iferece of itetioal racial discrimiatio, shiftig the burde to the State. Clearly the Court of Appeals is correct that the Circuit Judge's further self-servig statemet that he had "othig agaist" appoitig blacks is ot sufficiet rebuttal, see ; ; Heradez v. It ca hardly be said that the judge, as the official authorized by the State to appoit grad jury foreme, performed his "costitutioal duty ot to pursue a course of coduct i the admiistratio of [his] office which would operate to discrimiate i the selectio of jurors o racial grouds." MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissetig i part. MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opiio prompts me to explai that by joiig Part II of the Court's opiio I do ot ecessarily idicate that I would have rejected the argumets set forth i Mr. Justice Jackso's dissetig opiio i if I had bee a Member of the Court whe the issue was first addressed. But there is surely eough force to MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S reasoig to require adherece *594 to a course of decisio that has bee cosistetly followed by this Court sice 1880. The doctrie of stare decisis is ot a straitjacket that forecloses re-examiatio of outmoded rules. The doctrie does, however, provide busy judges with a valid reaso for refusig to remeasure a delicate balace that has tipped i the same directio every time the coflictig iterests have bee weighed. The stare decisis cosideratios that weigh heavily i my decisio to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | Petitioner Ansonia Board of Education has employed respondent Ronald Philbrook since 1962 to teach high school business and typing classes in Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook was baptized into the Worldwide Church of God. The tenets of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during designated holy days, a *63 practice that has caused respondent to miss approximately six schooldays each year. We are asked to determine whether the employer's efforts to adjust respondent's work schedule in light of his belief fulfill its obligation under 701 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e(j), to "reasonably accommodate to an employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."[1] Since the 1967-1968 school year, the school board's collective-bargaining agreements with the Ansonia Federation of Teachers have granted to each teacher 18 days of leave per year for illness, cumulative to 150 and later to 180 days. Accumulated leave may be used for purposes other than illness as specified in the agreement. A teacher may accordingly use five days' leave for a death in the immediate family, one day for attendance at a wedding, three days per year for attendance as an official delegate to a national veterans organization, and the like. See, e. g., App. 98-99. With the exception of the agreement covering the 1967-1968 school year, each contract has specifically provided three *64 days' annual leave for observance of mandatory religious holidays, as defined in the contract. Unlike other categories for which leave is permitted, absences for religious holidays are not charged against the teacher's annual or accumulated leave. The school board has also agreed that teachers may use up to three days of accumulated leave each school year for "necessary personal business." Recent contracts limited permissible personal leave to those uses not otherwise specified in the contract. This limitation dictated, for example, that an employee who wanted more than three leave days to attend the convention of a national veterans organization could not use personal leave to gain extra days for that purpose. Likewise, an employee already absent three days for mandatory religious observances could not later use personal leave for "[a]ny religious activity," or "[a]ny religious observance." Since the 1978-1979 school year, teachers have been allowed to take one of the three personal days without prior approval; use of the remaining two days requires advance approval by the school principal. The limitations on the use of personal business leave spawned this litigation. Until the 1976-1977 year, Philbrook observed mandatory holy days by using the three days |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | Philbrook observed mandatory holy days by using the three days granted in the contract and then taking unauthorized leave. His pay was reduced accordingly.[2] In 1976, however, respondent stopped taking unauthorized leave for religious reasons, and began scheduling required hospital visits on church holy days. He also worked on several holy days. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Philbrook repeatedly asked the school board to adopt one of two alternatives. His preferred alternative would allow use of personal business leave for religious observance, effectively giving him three additional * days of paid leave for that purpose. Short of this arrangement, respondent suggested that he pay the cost of a substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious observances.[3] Petitioner has consistently rejected both proposals. In 1973 Philbrook filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the school board and the Ansonia Federation of Teachers. After exhausting the available administrative avenues, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that the prohibition on the use of "necessary personal business" leave for religious observance violated 703(a)(1), (2) of Title VII, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (2), and seeking both damages and injunctive relief.[4] After a 2-day trial, the District Court concluded that Philbrook had failed to prove a case of religious discrimination because he had not been placed by the school board in a position of violating his religion or losing his job. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that a prima facie case of discrimination is established when an employee shows that " `(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment *66 requirement.' " quoting Philbrook established his case, the court held, by showing that he had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the employer's attendance requirements, that the employer was aware of the belief, and that he suffered a detriment namely, a loss of pay from the conflict.[5] The court then assumed that the employer's leave policy constituted a reasonable accommodation to Philbrook's belief. It held, however, that "[w]here the employer and the employee each propose a reasonable accommodation, Title VII requires the employer to accept the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer's conduct of his business." The Court |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | hardship on the employer's conduct of his business." The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the hardship that would result from Philbrook's suggestions. We granted certiorari to consider the important questions of federal law presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, we are asked to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Philbrook established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and in opining that an employer must accept the employee's preferred accommodation absent proof of undue hardship. We find little support in the statute for the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals, but we agree that the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved without further factual inquiry. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for additional findings. *67 As we noted in our only previous consideration of 701(j), its language was added to the 1972 amendments on the floor of the Senate with little discussion. Trans World Airlines, See 118 Cong. Rec. 705-706 (1972). In we determined that an accommodation causes "undue hardship" whenever that accommodation results in "more than a de minimis cost" to the employer. had been discharged because his religious beliefs would not allow him to work on Saturdays and claimed that this action violated the employer's duty to effect a reasonable accommodation of his beliefs. Because we concluded that each of the suggested accommodations would impose on the employer an undue hardship, we had no occasion to consider the bounds of a prima facie case in the religious accommodation context or whether an employer is required to choose from available accommodations the alternative preferred by the employee. The employer in simply argued that all conceivable accommodations would result in undue hardship, and we agreed. Petitioner asks us to establish for religious accommodation claims a proof scheme analogous to that developed in other Title VII contexts, delineating the plaintiff's prima facie case and shifting production burdens. See Texas Dept. of Community ; McDonnell Douglas But the present case raises no such issue. As in United States Postal Service Board of the defendant here failed to persuade the District Court to dismiss the action for want of a prima facie case, and the case was fully tried on the merits. We held in Aikens that these circumstances place the ultimate Title VII question of discrimination vel non directly before the court. "Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant." *68 We may therefore proceed to the question whether the employer's proposed accommodation of respondent's religious practices comports with the statutory mandate of 701(j). In addressing this question, the Court of Appeals assumed that the employer had offered a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook's religious beliefs. This alone, however, was insufficient in that court's view to allow resolution of the dispute. The court observed that the duty to accommodate "cannot be defined without reference to undue hardship." It accordingly determined that the accommodation obligation includes a duty to accept "the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer's conduct of his business." Cf. American Postal Because the District Court had not considered whether Philbrook's proposals would impose undue hardship, the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of those proposals. We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation. The employer violates the statute unless it "demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S. C. 2000e(j). Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee's alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship. As illustrates, the extent of *69 undue hardship on the employer's business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship. Once the Court of Appeals assumed that the school board had offered to Philbrook a reasonable alternative, it erred by requiring the Board to nonetheless demonstrate the hardship of Philbrook's alternatives. The legislative history of 701(j), as we noted in and n. 9, is of little help in defining the employer's accommodation obligation. To the extent it provides any indication of congressional intent, however, we think that the history supports our conclusion. Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the amendment that became 701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with "flexibility" and "a desire to achieve an adjustment." 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that "bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business." See also American Postal Under the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals, however, the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict. This approach, we think, conflicts with both the language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment. We accordingly hold that an employer has met its obligation under 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.[6] *70 The remaining issue in the case is whether the school board's leave policy constitutes a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook's religious beliefs. Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question. We think that there are insufficient factual findings as to the manner in which the collective-bargaining agreements have been interpreted in order for us to make that judgment initially. We think that the school board policy in this case, requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a reasonable one. In enacting 701(j), Congress was understandably motivated by a desire to assure the individual additional opportunity to observe religious practices, but it did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs. Trans World Airlines, The provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work. Generally speaking, "[t]he direct effect of [unpaid leave] is merely a loss of income for the period *71 the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status." Nashville Gas But unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. A provision for paid leave "that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free not to provide the benefit at all." Such an arrangement would display a discrimination against religious practices that is the antithesis of reasonableness. Whether the policy here violates this teaching turns on factual inquiry into past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. The school board contends that the necessary personal business category in the agreement, like other leave provisions, defines a limited purpose leave. Philbrook, on the other hand, asserts that the necessary personal leave category is not so limited, operating as an open-ended leave provision that may be used for a wide range of secular purposes in addition to those specifically provided for in the contract, but not for similar religious purposes. We do not think that the record is sufficiently clear on this point for us to make the necessary factual findings, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court. The latter court on remand should make the necessary findings as to past and existing practice in the administration of the collective-bargaining agreements. It is so ordered. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court's conclusion that, if the school board provides paid leave "for all purposes except religious ones," ante this page, its accommodation of Philbrook's religious needs would be unreasonable and thus violate Title VII. *72 But I do not find the specificity of the personal business leave, or the possibility that it may be used for activities similar to the religious activities Philbrook seeks leave to pursue, necessarily dispositive of whether the Board has satisfied its affirmative duty under 701(j), 42 U.S. C. 2000e(j), to reasonably accommodate Philbrook's religious needs. Even if the District Court should find that the personal leave is restricted to specific secular uses having no similarity with Philbrook's religious activities, Philbrook would still encounter a conflict between his religious needs and work requirements. In my view, the question would remain whether, without imposing an undue hardship on the conduct of its educational program, the school board could further reasonably accommodate Philbrook's need for additional religious leave. If, for example, the personal business leave were so limited that it allowed teachers paid leave for the sole purpose of meeting with their accountants to prepare their income tax returns (a purely secular activity), a proposal from Philbrook that he be allowed to prepare his tax return on his own time and use this paid leave for religious observance might be found imminently reasonable and lacking in undue hardship. The Board's prior determination that the conduct of its educational program can withstand the paid absence of its teachers for up to six days each year for religious and personal reasons tends to indicate that granting Philbrook's similar request |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | personal reasons tends to indicate that granting Philbrook's similar request in this case for a total of six days paid religious leave and no personal leave is reasonable, would cause the Board no undue hardship, and hence falls within the scope of the Board's affirmative obligation under Title VII. The Court suggests that requiring an employer to consider an employee's proposals would enable the employee to hold his employer hostage in exchange for a particular accommodation. Ante, at 69. If the employer has offered a reasonable accommodation that fully resolves the conflict between the employee's work and religious requirements, I agree that *73 no further consideration of the employee's proposals would normally be warranted. But if the accommodation offered by the employer does not completely resolve the employee's conflict, I would hold that the employer remains under an obligation to consider whatever reasonable proposals the employee may submit. I do not accept the Court's conclusion that the statute, "[b]y its very terms," relieves the Board from this continuing duty to accommodate the special religious practices of its employees where doing so is reasonable and causes no undue hardship. Ante, at 68. The statute simply creates an affirmative duty to accommodate; it does not specify who must respond to whom. Nor am I persuaded that the legislative history cited by the Court disposes of this issue. The statement of Senator Randolph, who sponsored the amendment, that he hoped the "accommodation would be made with `flexibility' and `a desire to achieve an adjustment,' " lends at least as much support to the concept of the employer's continuing duty as it does to the Court's reading of the statute. Ante, at 69 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972)). The EEOC's guidelines on religious discrimination support an interpretation of the statute placing this continuing duty to accommodate on the employer.[*] Just last Term, in * Meritor Savings we expressly relied on an EEOC guideline in holding that sexual harassment charges could provide the basis for a Title VII claim. The Court's reluctance to accord similar weight to the EEOC's interpretation here rests on nothing more than a selective reading of the express provisions of Title VII and the guidelines. Ante, at 69-70, n. 6. Title VII prohibits discrimination not only with respect to employment opportunities, 703(a)(2), 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2(a)(2), but also with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 703(a)(1), 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The EEOC guidelines consider compensation encompassed within the concept of "employment opportunities." 29 CFR 1605.2(c) A forced reduction in compensation based on an employee's religious |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | A forced reduction in compensation based on an employee's religious beliefs can be as much a violation of Title VII as a refusal to hire or grant a promotion. In this case, contrary to the Court's conclusion, ante, at 70-71, the school board's accommodation of Philbrook's religious needs by merely allowing unpaid leave does not eliminate the conflict. Rather, the offer forces Philbrook to choose between following his religious precepts with a partial forfeiture of salary and violating these precepts for work with full pay. It is precisely this loss of compensation that entitles Philbrook to further accommodation, if reasonably possible without undue hardship to the school board's educational program. It may be that unpaid leave will generally amount to a reasonable accommodation, but this does not mean that unpaid leave will always be the reasonable accommodation which best resolves the conflict between the needs of the employer and employee. In my view, then, an offer of unpaid leave does not end the inquiry: If an employee, in turn, offers another reasonable proposal that results in a more effective resolution without causing undue hardship, the employer should be required to implement it. * The Court's analysis in Trans World Airlines, is difficult to reconcile with its holding today. In the Court held that the employer's chosen work schedule was a reasonable accommodation but nonetheless went on to consider and reject each of the alternative suggested accommodations. The course followed in should have been adopted here as well. "Once it is determined that the duty to accommodate sometimes requires that an employee be exempted from an otherwise valid work requirement, the only remaining question is : Did [the employer] prove that it exhausted all reasonable accommodations, and that the only remaining alternatives would have caused undue hardship on [the employer's] business?" (emphasis added). Accordingly, I would remand this case for factual findings on both the intended scope of the school board's leave provision and the reasonableness and expected hardship of Philbrook's proposals. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I agree with the Court's rejection of the rationale of the Court of Appeals' opinion, I would simply reverse its judgment. Remanding for further proceedings in the District Court is both unnecessary and confusing. Whether respondent Philbrook's complaint is analyzed as an outright claim that he is entitled to six paid days of leave for religious observance or as an argument that petitioner's employment policies, while facially neutral, fail to accommodate his religious beliefs, the record before us plainly discloses that he cannot prevail. I The school board has |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | discloses that he cannot prevail. I The school board has a clear duty not to discriminate against Philbrook because of his religious faith. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 flatly prohibits an employer *76 from discriminating against any individual by basing employment and workplace decisions on the employee's or prospective employee's religion. This stricture against disparate treatment based on religion is simultaneously extended and qualified by 701, which defines religion for purposes of the Act. Congress defines religion to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 701(j). The statute therefore imposes a duty on the employer to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees. Trans World Airlines, The effect of 703(a) is to impose a special duty upon the employer when and only when a conflict arises between an individual's religious observance or practice and the employer's policy. The statute does not allow a plaintiff raising a claim under 701(j) to charge immediately onto the field of undue hardship. Folded within 701(j) are certain preliminary inquiries. First, the court must ask whether the employee's job obligations are in conflict with his religious obligations. "The accommodation issue by definition arises only when a neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious practices of a particular employee." Absent a conflict, it makes no sense to speak of a duty to accommodate; there is no competing claim on the employee for which the employer must make adjustments. If the duty does arise, the statute requires the employer to resolve the conflict if it can do so without undue hardship. As the Court correctly holds, the employer has no statutory duty to resolve the conflict in the way the employee requests as long as the solution that is adopted is reasonable. I find it equally clear that the employer *77 has no statutory duty to do anything more than strictly necessary to resolve the conflict. Because the existence and scope of the duty to accommodate depend solely on the nature of the conflict between the terms of the job and the requirements of the religion, it is essential to identify the alleged conflict as precisely as possible. In this case Philbrook's faith prevents him from working on certain schooldays. The school board does not require him to work on any of those days; on three |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | him to work on any of those days; on three of those days each year it pays him even though he does not work, and on the other days it declines to pay him for the time that he spends discharging his religious obligations. The existence of a conflict is thus not immediately apparent. Philbrook argues, however, that the contractual arrangement occasions two conflicts between his religious requirements and his employer's job requirements. First, he argues that the employer's practice of excluding religious observance as a permissible use of the three days of paid annual leave for "necessary personal business" is directly in conflict with his religious practice, because he needs to take those days as days of religious obligation. Second, during his unpaid absence from work on days of religious obligation, he is unable to do work and must later or earlier perform this work without separate compensation. In essence, he argues that the employer's practice of requiring him to complete this work, which is an integral part of his job duties as a salaried employee, conflicts with his religious obligation to be absent on the days when he would otherwise have performed this work and been paid for it. An examination of these claims discloses that neither has merit. II Philbrook has contended that the school board has discriminated on the basis of religion in the allocation of its paid annual leave, or more specifically, in the limitation it has placed on the use of three days of paid annual leave for necessary *78 personal business. Properly viewed, the conflict Philbrook alleges is one which is not cognizable under 703 and therefore entitles him to no relief. He points to the conflict, by no means specific to the practice of religion, between the Board's leave policy and the needs of an employee who wishes to use the three days of necessary personal business leave for any purpose not allowed by the contract. The Board allows all of its teachers three days of paid annual leave for "necessary personal business" but prohibits them from using any of those days for "[a]ny religious activity." On its face, this prohibition might appear to discriminate against employees who need to take a day off to attend church in favor of those who need a day off for secular reasons. The argument fails, however, because it does not fully describe either the scope of the separate provision for paid leave for religious purposes or the restricted scope of the provision for leave for necessary personal business. The collective-bargaining agreement between the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | leave for necessary personal business. The collective-bargaining agreement between the school board and the teachers' union contains generous provisions for paid leave for various specific purposes. After stating that 18 days of annual leave shall be granted "for personal illness and/or illness in the immediate family," the contract specifies 11 additional categories of personal leave, including 5 days for a death in the immediate family, 1 day each for attendance at funerals, weddings, graduations, and immediate family religious services, and 3 days each for "[m]andated religious observances" and "[n]ecessary personal business." The teacher is not required to identify the specific character of his personal business, but the contract limits the teacher's discretion by stating: "Necessary personal business shall not include (without limitations): "1. Marriage attendance or participation; "2. Day following marriage or wedding trip; "3. Attendance or participation in a sporting or recreational event; *79 "4. Any religious observance; "5. Travel associated with any provision of annual leave; "6. Purposes set forth under annual leave or another leave provision of this contract." App. 100. Philbrook does not contend that the leave policy is discriminatory because he is eligible for, or has actually received, fewer days of paid leave than members of other religious faiths or than teachers who have no religious obligations on schooldays. The basis of his principal discrimination argument is that the total of six days for mandated religious observances and necessary personal business is not adequate to enable him to take care of "the personal business that is most important and pressing to him: religious activity and observance,"[1] whereas this combination of six days of paid leave is adequate for some teachers who have different religious and ethical commitments. Quite clearly, however, this argument rests on the premise that Philbrook's special, that is, religious, needs entitle him to extraordinary treatment. His "discrimination" argument states a grievance against equal treatment rather than a claim that he has been the recipient of unequal treatment.[2] *80 This point comes into sharp focus when the contractual prohibition against using the three days of personal leave for "any religious observance" is seen for what it is, merely a part of the broader prohibition against using personal business leave for any of the purposes specifically authorized in the contract. The existing leave policy denies paid days to any teacher who proposes to take more paid days of personal business leave per year to fulfill his or her commitments than the contract allows. Philbrook's wish to use his secular leave for religious purposes is thwarted by the same policy that denies an avid official |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | thwarted by the same policy that denies an avid official delegate to a national veterans' organization use of secular leave days for that activity in excess of the days specifically allotted for it under the contract. In fact, since three days are expressly authorized for mandated religious observances events that recur each year whereas most other categories of paid leave cover relatively infrequent contingencies such as a death in the family or attendance at a family wedding, it is highly probable that the leave policy as a whole tends to favor, rather than to disfavor, persons who must observe religious days during the school year. For example, an atheist who attends a wedding, a funeral, and a graduation on schooldays receives a total of three days of paid personal leave, but a religious person who attends the same three events on paid days also receives pay for three religious days. III Philbrook's second claim is that the board has a duty of reasonable accommodation "to mitigate the burden of the Board's requirement that [he] work without pay in connection with his absence for religious observance." Brief for *81 Respondent Philbrook 24.[3] This claim founders because it discloses no conflict between Philbrook's religion and his employment. If he had been disciplined, or discharged, for taking too many days off for religious services, the result would be different, but the only inconvenience to which he is subjected is the necessity of doing work on paid days that he was unable to do during his days of religious observance. This inconvenience arises not because of any discrimination against religion, but because the employee's missed day of work is unpaid. Every employee who takes a day off from work for an unauthorized purpose suffers the same inconvenience as Philbrook; each loses a day of pay and must make up the work associated with that day. The obligation to perform the work carries over, not because the employee has exercised his religion in the one case or satisfied a secular business need in another, but for the generic and shared reason that the employee was not paid for a day on which he was hired to do work. Since no statutory conflict between Philbrook's religion and his work duties occurred, the duty to accommodate his religious practices never arose. IV The present state of the record enables me to conclude that Philbrook states no claim of religious discrimination under 703(a). In remanding the case, the Court apparently overlooks the plain fact that its rejection of the Court of Appeals' view of the duty |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,986 | 19 | majority | Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111773/ansonia-bd-of-ed-v-philbrook/ | rejection of the Court of Appeals' view of the duty of reasonable accommodation eliminates the necessity for further factual findings. Under the Court of *82 Appeals' theory that the employer has a duty to accept any reasonable accommodation proposal made by the employee as long as it does not result in "undue hardship," a remand to the District Court was appropriate to resolve the "undue hardship" issue. I do not understand why a remand is appropriate now. The Court of Appeals has already concluded that if no analysis of undue hardship is required, the Board's policy of granting three days of paid leave and additional days of unpaid leave for religious observances complies with the statute.[4] Neither that court nor the District Court saw any reason to make a special analysis of the "past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement." Ante, at 71. In view of the record, the factual analysis the Court calls for may satisfy the demands of the Court's curious holding in Icicle Seafoods, 4 U.S. 709, but it cannot affect the outcome of this case. Whether the Board has administered the provisions for paid leave for secular purposes strictly or permissively has no bearing on Philbrook's legally insufficient complaint that he *83 has some but not enough leave for religious purposes.[5] The employer has no duty to provide Philbrook with additional days of paid leave. Nor can the uses for which the board has historically allowed personal leave days possibly create a duty to pay Philbrook to perform the work he missed on days of religious obligation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the part of the Court's judgment that remands the case for further proceedings. |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | I respectfully dissent. The Court justifies today's sua sponte action on the ground that if reprocessing under the Secretary's new regulations "results in a determination of entitlement to disability benefits, there will be no need to consider the constitutional claim that claimants are entitled to an opportunity to make an oral presentation." (Emphasis by the Court.) Avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions is certainly a preferred practice when appropriate. But that course is inappropriate, indeed irresponsible, in this instance. We will not avoid the necessity of deciding the important constitutional question presented by claimants even should they prevail upon the Secretary's reconsideration. The question is being pressed all over the country. The Secretary's brief lists no less than seven cases presenting it with respect to disability benefits and 10 cases presenting it with respect to nondisability benefits.[1] *213 The Secretary's new regulations permit discontinuance of disability benefits without affording beneficiaries procedural due process either in the form mandated by or in the form mandated by the District Court, The regulations require only that the beneficiary be informed of the proposed suspension or termination and the information upon which it is based and be given an opportunity to submit a written response before benefits are cut off.[2] This procedure does not afford the beneficiary, as requires for welfare and old-age recipients, an evidentiary hearing at which he may personally appear to offer oral evidence and confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Nor does the procedure satisfy the requirements of due process as determined by the District Court. That court held that the beneficiary must be given not only notice but also, before he responds, a "reasonable opportunity to examine the documentary evidence" upon which the Secretary relies and, in case of conflict in the evidence, a decision by an impartial decisionmaker. The court said, however, that an evidentiary hearing and opportunity to confront adverse witnesses *214 were not necessary, although "a hearing could be held" if the beneficiary "submitted some evidence that contradicts that possessed by the Administration." Thus, under both and the District Court's decision, the omissions in the Secretary's new regulations are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. Because we may imminently be confronted with another case presenting the question, and because its resolution is vitally essential to the administration of an important Government program, today's action in avoiding decision of the constitutional question is not a responsible exercise of that practice. We gain a brief respite for ourselves while the Secretary, state agencies, and beneficiaries continue confused and uncertain. Moreover, the question has been thoroughly and ably argued |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | uncertain. Moreover, the question has been thoroughly and ably argued and briefed on both sides, and we have the benefit of thoughtful and well-considered majority and dissenting opinions in the District Court. Today's disposition results in an unjustified waste, not only of our own all too sparse time and energies, but also of the time and energies of the three judges of the District Court who must again suspend their own heavy calendars to assemble for what can only be an empty exercise. I cannot join in the Court's abdication of our responsibility to decide this case. Both the beneficiaries and the Secretary appeal from the District Court's judgment. The beneficiaries contend that the District Court erred in not holding that the procedure must afford an evidentiary hearing as in The Secretary contends that procedural due process requirements are satisfied by the "paper" hearing afforded by his new regulations. I agree with the beneficiaries and would therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand with direction to enter a new judgment requiring the procedures held in to be requisite with respect to discontinuance of welfare *215 and old-age benefits. See Section 225 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. 425, provides that "[i]f the Secretary, on the basis of information obtained by or submitted to him, believes that an individual entitled to benefits may have ceased to be under a disability, the Secretary may suspend the payment of benefits until it is determined whether or not such individual's disability has ceased or until the Secretary believes that such disability has not ceased." The District Court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that "[t]he ex-parte suspension power granted to the Secretary by section 225 is summary adjudication that is inconsistent with the requirements of due process." The Secretary does not challenge that holding in this Court as applied to his now-discarded procedures. Rather, the Secretary insists that the "hearing on paper" afforded to disability beneficiaries by his new regulations is constitutionally sufficient. The Secretary does not contend that disability beneficiaries differ from welfare and old-age recipients with respect to their entitlement to benefits or the drastic consequences that may befall them if their benefits are erroneously discontinued. The only distinctions urged are that the evidence ordinarily adduced to support suspension and termination of disability benefits differs markedly from that relied upon to cut off welfare benefits and that an undue monetary and administrative burden would result if prior hearings were required. Neither distinction withstands analysis. First. The Secretary points out that the decision to discontinue disability benefits |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | Secretary points out that the decision to discontinue disability benefits is generally made upon the basis of wage reports from employers and reports of medical examinations. This evidence, in the Secretary's view, "is highly reliable and not of a type that draws into issue veracity or credibility." Brief 10. *216 "The basis upon which disability benefits are suspended or terminated thus differs significantly from that upon which the terminations of welfare benefits involved in [] rested." Hence, the Secretary concludes, while procedural due process requires a pre-termination evidentiary hearing for welfare and old-age recipients, for disability beneficiaries a written presentation will suffice. The Secretary seriously misconstrues the holding in The Court there said that "the pre-termination hearing has one function only: to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits." The Secretary does not deny that due process safeguards fulfill the same function in disability cases. In the Court held that welfare recipients were entitled to hearings because decisions to discontinue benefits were challenged "as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases." The Court expressly put aside consideration of situations "where there are no factual issues in dispute or where the application of the rule of law is not intertwined with factual issues." n. 15. However reliable the evidence upon which a disability determination is normally based, and however rarely it involves questions of credibility and veracity, it is plain that, as with welfare and old-age determinations, the determination that an individual is or is not "disabled" will frequently depend upon the resolution of factual issues and the application of legal rules to the facts found. It is precisely for that reason that a hearing must be held. The Secretary, of course, recognizes that disability determinations often involve factual disputes. His new *217 procedures, as well as the post-termination procedures already available, presumably derive from that premise. The beneficiary may file a written response presenting rebuttal evidence before his benefits are suspended or terminated; after termination, he is entitled to reconsideration, based upon written submissions, and then a de novo evidentiary hearing, administrative appellate review of the hearing examiner's decision, and, finally, judicial review. Nevertheless, the Secretary insists that the decision to discontinue disability benefits differs from the decision to discontinue welfare benefits because the latter "may" be based upon "personal and social situations brought to the attention of the authorities by tips, rumor or gossip." |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | the attention of the authorities by tips, rumor or gossip." Brief 25. Yet it is irrelevant how the matter is "brought to the attention of the authorities," whether "by tips, rumor or gossip" or otherwise. The question in a welfare determination, as in a disability determination, is simply whether the recipient continues to be eligible for benefits. Nor does the Secretary make clear the relevance of "personal and social situations." The Secretary does say that "[o]ne of the recipients in [], for example, had been cut off because of her alleged failure to cooperate with welfare authorities in suing her estranged husband; payments to another were terminated because of alleged drug addiction." The second recipient, however, was cut off because "he refused to accept counseling and rehabilitation." 397 U.S., 6 n. 2. Consequently, both recipients lost their benefits for refusing to co-operate with the authorities. That, however, is no distinction from disability cases, for disability benefits will also be discontinued if the beneficiary refuses to cooperate. To support the assertion that pre-termination hearings are required in welfare cases because "credibility and veracity" are in issue, the Secretary focuses upon *218 certain language in He first quotes the statement that "[p]articularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." Apart from the obvious fact that that was not an absolute statement intended to limit hearings solely to those instances, it was but one of three reasons given to demonstrate that written submissions are insufficient. The Court also said that written submissions "are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance" and that they "do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decisionmaker appears to regard as important." Significantly, the Secretary does not deny that those reasons are as fully applicable to disability beneficiaries as to welfare recipients. The Secretary also relies upon the statement, quoted in from that: "[W]here governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination." *219 Again, however, the statement hardly indicates that confrontation and cross-examination are available to welfare recipients only because "credibility and veracity" are in issue. An individual has those rights because facts are in issue, as the statement makes clear. Moreover, the Court introduced its quotation of that statement in by pointing out that "[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." And, even assuming the validity of the novel doctrine that confrontation and cross-examination are available solely for the purpose of testing "credibility and veracity," that would not justify depriving the disability beneficiary of "an effective opportunity to defend by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally." Finally, I see no reason to suppose, nor does the Secretary suggest any, that the "credibility and veracity" of doctors and employers can never be in issue in a disability case. Indeed, the Secretary's new regulations indicate that they may. See Disability Ins. State Manual 353. The premise of the Secretary's entire argument is that disability benefits are discontinued "only on the basis of an objective considerationthat the previous disability has ceasedand that conclusion rests on reliable information." Brief 26. Whether or not the information is reliable, the premise is questionable. The Secretary himself emphasizes that disability determinations require "specialized medical and vocational evaluations" and not simply the acquisition of "medical and other relevant data." In any event, there are three grounds, pertinent here, upon which disability can be found to have ceased. None can fairly be characterized by the term "objective." *220 First, cessation of disability may be found if the beneficiary refuses to cooperate with the social security authorities. 20 CFR 404.1539 ; see Claims Manual 6706 (e). That judgment, of course, could be wholly subjective, as the Secretary points out with reference to welfare cases. Second, cessation may be found if the beneficiary "has regained his ability to engage in substantial gainful activity as demonstrated by work activity." 20 CFR 404.1539 (2); see Claims Manual 6706 That decision does not, as the Secretary appears to assert, rest solely "upon regular reports made by [the beneficiary's] employers to the government." Brief 25. Rather, "the work performed" by the beneficiary "may demonstrate" that he is no longer disabled, but only if it "is both substantial and gainful." "Substantial work activity involves the performance of significant physical |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | gainful." "Substantial work activity involves the performance of significant physical or mental duties, or a combination of both, productive in nature." A finding of "substantial gainful activity" depends upon the nature of the work performed, the adequacy of the performance, and the special conditions, if any, of the employment, as well as an evaluation of the time spent and the amount of money earned by the beneficiary. 20 CFR 404.1532-404.1534. Third, cessation of disability may be found if the evidence establishes medical recovery. 20 CFR 404.1539 (1); see Claims Manual 6706 That decision, of course, will be based upon medical examinations, but it does not follow that it is necessarily "objective." "The function of deciding whether or not an individual is under a disability is the responsibility of the Secretary," and a medical conclusion that the beneficiary is or is not disabled "shall not be determinative of the question." 20 CFR 404.1526. The Secretary's decision that a beneficiary's impairment "is no longer of such severity as to prevent him from engaging *221 in any substantial gainful activity," 20 CFR 404.1539 (1), obviously depends upon more than an "objective" medical report, for the application of the legal standard necessarily requires the exercise of judgment. And, of course, multiple conflicting medical reports are "not uncommon." The Secretary's claim for "objectivity" is even less persuasive in the situation where a beneficiary's benefits are suspended. "Benefits are suspended when information is received which indicates that the individual may no longer be under a disability." Claims Manual 6708. Here, by definition, there has been no determination that disability has ceased. Finally, the post-termination reversal rate for disability determinations makes the asserted "objectivity" even more doubtful. According to the Secretary's figures for 37% of the requests for reconsideration resulted in reversal of the determination that disability had ceased. Moreover, 55% of the beneficiaries who exercised their right to a hearing won reversal. While, as the Secretary says, these figures may attest to the fairness of the system, they also appear to confirm that the Court's reference in to "the welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility," n. 12, is fully applicable to the administration of the disability program. Second. The Secretary also contends that affording disability beneficiaries the opportunity to participate in evidentiary hearings before discontinuance of their benefits will result in great expense and a vast disruption of the administrative system. This justification for denial of pre-termination hearings was, of course, specifically rejected in -266, and *222 the Secretary offers no new considerations to support its acceptance here. In the Court pointed out |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | to support its acceptance here. In the Court pointed out "that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." That statement applies equally to eligible disability beneficiaries, for, as the District Court noted and the Secretary does not deny, "a disability beneficiary is by definition unable to engage in substantial gainful activity and he would, therefore, be liable to sustain grievous loss while awaiting the resolution of his claim." In view of that result, the District Court concluded that the "fiscal and administrative expenses to the government, whatever their magnitude, are insufficient justification considering the crippling blow that could be dealt to an individual in these circumstances." The Secretary's response is simply to stress the magnitude of the burden. Here, as in "[t]he requirement of a prior hearing doubtless involves some greater expense." The Secretary points out that current procedures include a two-step determination of disability: first by the state agency, after a district office of the Social Security Administration has conducted a disability investigation, and then, on review of the state agency's determination, by the Administration's Bureau of Disability Insurance, which is located in Baltimore, Maryland.[3] Thus, the Secretary says, a prior hearing "either would require the beneficiary to travel great distances or would necessitate that State or federal officials travel to the area in which the beneficiary resides, *223 neither of which is practical." Brief 28-29. "Nor could the decision-making function be turned over to the Administration's district offices, which are located conveniently to the beneficiaries, without staffing them with individuals qualified to make the necessary medical and vocational judgment." Hence, the Secretary concludes, prior hearings "would require massive restructuring of the existing administrative adjudicative process." Except for bald assertion, the Secretary offers nothing to indicate that any great burden upon the system would result if the state agencies conducted the hearings. Moreover, the Secretary omits even to mention the existence of the current post-termination hearing procedures. See 20 CFR 404.917-404.941. It is reasonable to assume that the only "restructuring" necessary would be a change in the timing of the hearings. That was apparently the method by which the Secretary required the States to comply with in the administration of various other social security programs, see 45 CFR 205.10, -3035, and it would seem to be an equally available response here. While the administration of the disability program to provide prior hearings may involve "some greater expense," as the Court noted in that expense should not be exaggerated in order |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | noted in that expense should not be exaggerated in order to deprive disability beneficiaries of their right to "rudimentary due process," The Secretary also claims that the requirement of prior hearings "would result in losses to the Social Security Trust Fund of nearly $16 million per year for disability cases and still greater sums when all Title II programs are considered." Brief 10. This conclusion does not follow from the facts the Secretary presents. As to the disability program, the Secretary says that in there were 38,000 determinations that disability *224 had ceased and that the average monthly benefit in those cases was $207. If, to provide prior hearings, terminations were delayed for two months, the Secretary says, the cost in benefits paid pending the hearings would approach $16 million. It is immediately apparent that this figure is grossly inflated. First, this figure depends upon the unwarranted assumption that all beneficiaries will demand a prior hearing. The Secretary suggests no reason to suppose that would happen. In fact, while there were 38,000 disability cessations in there were only 10,941 requests for reconsideration, and although 6,885 cessations were affirmed on reconsideration, there were only 2,330 requests for hearings. These post-termination procedures, of course, were utilized by beneficiaries who could not present their views before termination. Under the new regulations, affording notice and the opportunity to respond in writing before termination, it may well be that even fewer beneficiaries will demand hearings. In any event, experience in the welfare area has not demonstrated that recipients abuse their right to pre-termination hearings, and the Secretary does not claim that disability beneficiaries will do so. Second, the $16 million figure requires not only that all 38,000 beneficiaries request prior hearings, but also that they all lose. Yet, as noted above, 37% of the reconsiderations on written submissions and 55% of the post-termination hearings in resulted in reversal. The Secretary does not claim, nor is it conceivable, that in every case a prior hearing would uphold the initial determination that disability had ceased. Third, not only must every beneficiary request a prior hearing and every hearing affirm cessation of disability, it must also be true, to reach the $16 million figure, that the Secretary will be unable to recover any of the benefits paid to beneficiaries pending the hearings. That result *225 is unlikely. Section 204 (1) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 404 (1); see 20 CFR 404.501-404.502, directs the Secretary, if he finds that there has been an overpayment, to require a refund from the beneficiary or to decrease any future benefits to |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | from the beneficiary or to decrease any future benefits to which he may be entitled. Thus, if the beneficiary is not "disabled," he presumably can engage in "substantial gainful activity," and the Secretary may well secure a refund. If, on the other hand, the case is a close one and the beneficiary is later found to be "disabled" again, the Secretary may reduce his benefits. Furthermore, 204 (b), 42 U.S. C. 404 (b); see 20 CFR 404.506-404.509, directs the Secretary not to require a refund or decrease benefits if the beneficiary "is without fault" and a refund or decrease "would defeat the purpose of" the Act or "would be against equity and good conscience." The Secretary's duty to waive claims for excess payments may well apply in many termination cases, particularly where the beneficiary is judgment proof. See 20 CFR 404.508. Obviously, there is no loss to the social security fund if benefits paid to an ineligible beneficiary pending a hearing are subject to statutory waiver. Fourth, the $16 million figure depends upon the stated premise that the requirement of a hearing would cause a two-month delay in the termination of benefits. The Secretary does not explain why he chose that time period. Under the new regulations, a beneficiary receives notice of the proposed discontinuance, is informed of the information upon which it is based, and is given the opportunity to submit a written response presenting rebuttal evidence. Only then is the disability determination made. It is difficult to believe that it would require another two months just to provide a hearing. Finally, under 223 (1) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 423 (1); see Claims Manual 6707, benefits must be paid for two months after the month in which disability *226 ceases. The $16 million figure depends upon the unwarranted assumption that all terminations occur at least two months after disability is found to have ceased. In this case, for example, the state agency determined that plaintiff Atkins' disability ceased in January. The Bureau of Disability Insurance approved that determination and on February 3 informed Atkins that his benefits would be terminated at the end of March. Thus, even assuming a two-month delay for a hearing, there would be no cost whatever to the trust fund. Viewing Title II programs as a whole, the Secretary points out that there were nearly three million terminations of benefits in 1969. The vast majority of these terminations were for death, attainment of a certain age, and so forth, but the Secretary asserts that apart from those cases there were 515,189 terminations that |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Richardson v. Wright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108476/richardson-v-wright/ | that apart from those cases there were 515,189 terminations that would have been affected by the requirement of a prior hearing. That number, however, includes terminations based upon a student's leaving school, a change in a beneficiary's marital status, and the death or adoption of a child. Without those cases, the number drops to 186,035. Moreover, even this number includes disability terminations and the terminations of dependents based thereon. Putting aside those cases, the total appears to be somewhat closer to 100,000. While that is a substantial number of terminations, the Secretary does not indicate what issues are involved in making the decisions. As noted above, prior evidentiary hearings are necessary in disability cases because factual disputes exist. They may exist to a far lesser extent in other programs. Moreover, to whatever extent they do exist, the objections to the Secretary's inflated cost figure for disability terminations would seem to apply equally to nondisability terminations. In any event, the Secretary has simply provided the bare number of terminations, with no further information, and it *227 is inappropriate, if not impossible, to decide what effect requiring prior hearings in disability cases will have on nondisability cases. I do not deny that prior hearings will entail some additional administrative burdens and expense. Administrative fairness usually does. But the Secretary "is not without weapons to minimize these increased costs." Despite the Secretary's protestations to the contrary, I believe that in the disability, as in the welfare, area "[m]uch of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pre-termination hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities." The Court's conclusion on this point in is fully applicable here: "Indeed, the very provision for a post-termination evidentiary hearing is itself cogent evidence that the State recognizes the primacy of the public interest in correct eligibility determinations and therefore in the provision of procedural safeguards. Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens." My answers to the Secretary's contentions are also the reasons I disagree with the majority of the District Court and agree with the dissenting judge. I would therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand with direction to enter a new judgment requiring that disability benefits not be discontinued until the beneficiary has been afforded procedural due process in the form mandated by with respect to discontinuance of welfare and |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | The Court holds that the Government may burden pretrial detainees with almost any restriction, provided detention officials do not proclaim a punitive intent or impose conditions that are "arbitrary or purposeless." Ante, at 539. As if this standard were not sufficiently ineffectual, the Court dilutes it further by according virtually unlimited deference to detention officials' justifications for particular impositions. Conspicuously lacking from this analysis is any meaningful consideration of the most relevant factor, the impact that restrictions may have on inmates. Such an approach is unsupportable, given that all of these detainees are presumptively innocent and many are confined solely because they cannot afford bail.[1] *564 In my view, the Court's holding departs from the precedent it purports to follow and precludes effective judicial review of the conditions of pretrial confinement. More fundamentally, I believe the proper inquiry in this context is not whether a particular restraint can be labeled "punishment." Rather, as with other due process challenges, the inquiry should be whether the governmental interests served by any given restriction outweigh the individual deprivations suffered. I The premise of the Court's analysis is that detainees, unlike prisoners, may not be "punished." To determine when a particular disability imposed during pretrial detention is punishment, the Court invokes the factors enunciated in quoted ante, at 537-538 (footnotes omitted): "Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions." A number of the factors enunciated above focus on the nature and severity of the impositions at issue. Thus, if weight were given to all its elements, I believe the inquiry could be responsive to the impact of the * deprivations imposed on detainees. However, within a few lines after quoting the Court restates the standard as whether there is an expressed punitive intent on the part of detention officials, and, if not, whether the restriction is rationally related to some nonpunitive purpose or appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Ante, at 538-539 Absent from the reformulation is any appraisal of whether the sanction constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint and whether it has historically been regarded as punishment. Moreover, |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | and whether it has historically been regarded as punishment. Moreover, when the Court applies this standard, it loses interest in the inquiry concerning excessiveness, and, indeed, eschews consideration of less restrictive alternatives, practices in other detention facilities, and the recommendations of the Justice Department and professional organizations. See ante, at 542-543, n. 25, 543-544, n. 27, 554. By this process of elimination, the Court contracts a broad standard, sensitive to the deprivations imposed on detainees, into one that seeks merely to sanitize official motives and prohibit irrational behavior. As thus reformulated, the test lacks any real content. A To make detention officials' intent the critical factor in assessing the constitutionality of impositions on detainees is unrealistic in the extreme. The cases on which the Court relies to justify this narrow focus all involve legislative Acts, not day-to-day administrative decisions. See ; ; De In discerning the intent behind a statutory enactment, courts engage in a familiar judicial function, usually with the benefit of a legislative history that preceded passage of the statue. The motivation for policies in detention facilities, however, will frequently not be a matter of public *566 record. Detainees challenging these policies will therefore bear the substantial burden of establishing punitive intent on the basis of circumstantial evidence or retrospective explanations by detention officials, which frequently may be self-serving. Particularly since the Court seems unwilling to look behind any justification based on security,[2] that burden will usually prove insurmountable. In any event, it will often be the case that officials believe, erroneously but in good faith, that a specific restriction is necessary for institutional security. As the District Court noted, "zeal for security is among the most common varieties of official excess," United States ex rel. and the litigation in this area corroborates that conclusion.[3] A standard that focuses *567 on punitive intent cannot effectively eliminate this excess. Indeed, the Court does not even attempt to "detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention." Ante, at 540. Rather, it is content merely to recognize that "the effective management of the detention facility is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment." Moreover, even if the inquiry the Court pursues were more productive, it simply is not the one the Constitution mandates here. By its terms, the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of deprivations, not on the persons inflicting them. If this concern is to be vindicated, it is the |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | If this concern is to be vindicated, it is the effect of conditions of confinement, not the intent behind them, that must be the focal point of constitutional analysis. B Although the Court professes to go beyond the direct inquiry regarding intent and to determine whether a particular imposition is rationally related to a nonpunitive purposes, this exercise is at best a formality. Almost any restriction on detainees, including, as the Court concedes, chains and shackles, ante, at 539 n. 20, can be found to have some rational relation to institutional security, or more broadly, to "the effective management of the detention facility." Ante, at 540. See Yet this toothless standard applies irrespective of the excessiveness of the restraint or the nature of the rights infringed.[4] *568 Moreover, the Court has not in fact reviewed the rationality of detention officials' decisions, as requires Instead, the majority affords "wide-ranging" deference to those officials "in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Ante, at 547.[5] Reasoning that security considerations in jails are little different than in prisons, the Court concludes that cases requiring substantial deference to prison administrators' determinations on security-related issues are equally applicable in the present context. Ante, at 546-547, nn. 28, 29. Yet as the Court implicitly acknowledges, ante, at 545, the rights of detainees, who have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime, are necessarily more extensive than those of prisoners "who have been found to have violated one or more of the criminal laws established by society for its orderly governance." See Judicial tolerance of substantial impositions on detainees must be concomitantly less. However, by blindly deferring to administrative judgments on the rational basis for particular restrictions, the Court effectively delegates to detention officials the decision whether pretrial detainees have been punished. This, in my view, is an abdication of an unquestionably judicial function. II Even had the Court properly applied the punishment test, I could not agree to its use in this context. It simply does *569 not advance analysis to determine whether a given deprivation imposed on detainees constitutes "punishment." For in terms of the nature of the imposition and the impact on detainees, pretrial incarceration, although necessary to secure defendants' presence at trial, is essentially indistinguishable from punishment.[6] The detainee is involuntarily confined and deprived of the freedom "to be with his family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life," Indeed, this Court has previously recognized that incarceration is an "infamous |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | this Court has previously recognized that incarceration is an "infamous punishment." ; see also Wong ; And if the effect of incarceration itself is inevitably punitive, so too must be the cumulative impact of those restraints incident to that restraint.[7] A test that balances the deprivations involved against the state interests assertedly served[8] would be more consistent *570 with the import of the Due Process Clause. Such an approach would be sensitive to the tangible physical and psychological harm that a particular disability inflicts on detainees and to the nature of the less tangible, but significant, individual interests at stake. The greater the imposition on detainees, the heavier the burden of justification the Government would bear. See ; ; When assessing the restrictions on detainees, we must consider the cumulative impact of restraints imposed during confinement. Incarceration of itself clearly represents a profound infringement of liberty, and each additional imposition increases the severity of that initial deprivation. Since any restraint thus has a serious effect on detainees, I believe the Government must bear a more rigorous burden of justification than the rational-basis standard mandates. See At a minimum, I would require a showing that a restriction is substantially necessary to jail administration. Where the imposition is of particular gravity, that is, where it implicates interests of fundamental importance[9] or inflicts significant harms, the Government should demonstrate that the restriction serves a compelling necessity of jail administration.[10] In presenting its justifications, the Government could adduce evidence of the security and administrative needs of *571 the institution as well as the fiscal constraints under which it operates. And, of course, considerations of competence and comity require some measure of deference to the judgments of detention officials. Their estimation of institutional needs and the administrative consequences of particular acts is entitled to weight. But as the Court has repeatedly held in the prison context, judicial restraint "cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims." ; Even more so here, with the rights of presumptively innocent individuals at stake, we cannot abdicate our judicial responsibility to evaluate independently the Government's asserted justifications for particular deprivations. In undertaking this evaluation, courts should thus examine evidence of practices in other detention and penal facilities. To be sure, conditions of detention should not survive constitutional challenge merely because they are no worse than circumstances in prisons. But this evidence can assist courts in evaluating justifications based on security, administrative convenience, and fiscal constraints. Simply stated, the approach I advocate here weighs the detainees' interests implicated by a particular restriction against the governmental interests the |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | implicated by a particular restriction against the governmental interests the restriction serves. As the substantiality of the intrusion on detainees' rights increases, so must the significance of the countervailing governmental objectives. III A Applying this standard to the facts of this case, I believe a remand is necessary on the issue of double-bunking at the MCC. The courts below determined only whether double-bunking was justified by a compelling necessity, excluding fiscal and administrative considerations. Since it was readily ascertainable that the Government could not prevail under that test, detailed inquiry was unnecessary. Thus, the District *572 Court granted summary judgment, without a full record on the psychological and physical harms caused by overcrowding.[11] To conclude, as the Court does here, that double-bunking has not inflicted "genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time," ante, at 542, is inappropriate where respondents have not had an adequate opportunity to produce evidence suggesting otherwise. Moreover, that the District Court discerned no disputed issues of material fact, see ante, at 541 n. 24, is no justification for avoiding a remand, since what is material necessarily varies with the standard applied. Rather than pronouncing overbroad aphorisms about the principles "lurking in the Due Process Clause," ante, at 542, I would leave to the District Court in the first instance the sensitive balancing inquiry that the Due Process Clause dictates.[12] B Although the constitutionality of the MCC's rule limiting the sources of hardback books was also decided on summary judgment, I believe a remand is unnecessary.[13] That *573 individuals have a fundamental First Amendment right to receive information and ideas is beyond dispute. See 319 U.S. ; ; Red Lion Broadcasting ; see also Under the balancing test elaborated above, the Government must therefore demonstrate that its rule infringing on that interest serves a compelling necessity. As the courts below found, the Government failed to make such a showing.[14] In support of its restriction, the Government presented the affidavit of the MCC warden, who averred without elaboration that a proper and thorough search of incoming hardback books might require removal of the covers. Further, the warden asserted, "in the case of all books and magazines," it would *574 be necessary to leaf through every page to ascertain that there was no contraband. App. 24. The warden offered no reasons why the institution could not place reasonable limitations on the number of books inmates could receive or use electronic devices and fluoroscopes to detect contraband rather than requiring inmates to purchase hardback books directly from publishers or stores.[15] As the Court of Appeals noted, "other |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | publishers or stores.[15] As the Court of Appeals noted, "other institutions have not recorded untoward experiences with far less restrictive rules." The limitation on receipt of hardback books may well be one rational response to the legitimate security concerns of the institution, concerns which I in no way intend to deprecate. But our precedents, as the courts below apparently recognized, United States ex rel. ; 573 F.2d, at require some consideration of less restrictive alternatives, see, e. g., ; There is no basis for relaxing this requirement when the rights of presumptively innocent detainees are implicated. C The District Court did conduct a trial on the constitutionality of the MCC package rule and room-search practices. Although the courts below applied a different standard, the record is sufficient to permit resolution of these issues here. And since this Court decides the questions, I think it appropriate to suggest the results that would obtain on this record under my standard. Denial of the right to possess property is surely of heightened concern when viewed with the other indignities of detainment. See App. 73. As the District Court observed, it is a *575 severe discomfort to do without personal items such as a watch or cosmetics, and things to eat, smoke, or chew. Indeed, the court noted, "[t]he strong dependence upon material things gives rise to one of the deepest miseries of incarceration the deprivation of familiar possessions." Given this impact on detainees, the appropriate inquiry is whether the package restriction is substantially necessary to prison administration. The Government's justification for such a broad rule cannot meet this burden. The asserted interest in ameliorating sanitation and storage problems and avoiding thefts, gambling, and inmate conflicts over personal property is belied, as the Court seems to recognize, ante, at 553, by the policy of permitting inmate purchases of up to $15 a week from the prison commissary. Detention officials doubtless have a legitimate interest in preventing introduction of drugs or weapons into the facility. But as both the District Court and the Court of Appeals observed, other detention institutions have adopted much less restrictive regulations than the MCC's governing receipt of packages. See, e. g., aff'd, ; Inmates in New York state institutions, for example, may receive a 35-pound package each month, as well as clothing and magazines. See[16] To be sure, practices in other institutions do not necessarily demarcate the constitutional minimum. See ante, at 554. But such evidence does cast doubt upon the Government's justifications based on institutional security and administrative convenience. The District Court held that the Government was obligated to |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | The District Court held that the Government was obligated to dispel these doubts. The court thus *576 required a reasoned showing why "there must be deprivations at the MCC so much harsher than deemed necessary in other institutions." Absent such a showing, the court concluded that the MCC's rule swept too broadly and ordered detention officials to formulate a suitable alternative, at least with respect to items available from the commissary. This holding seems an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests and a minimal intrusion on administrative prerogatives. I would also affirm the ruling of the courts below that inmates must be permitted to observe searches of their cells. Routine searches such as those at issue here may be an unavoidable incident of incarceration. Nonetheless, the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not lapse at the jail-house door, ; United Detention officials must therefore conduct such searches in a reasonable manner, avoiding needless intrusions on inmates' privacy. Because unobserved searches may invite official disrespect for detainees' few possessions and generate fears that guards will steal personal property or plant contraband, see -149, the inmates' interests are significant. The Government argues that allowing detainees to observe official searches would lead to violent confrontations and enable inmates to remove or conceal contraband. However, the District Court found that the Government had not substantiated these security concerns and that there were less intrusive means available to accomplish the institution's objectives. Thus, this record does not establish that unobserved searches are substantially necessary to jail administration. D In my view, the body-cavity searches of MCC inmates represent one of the most grievous offenses against personal *577 dignity and common decency. After every contact visit with someone from outside the facility, including defense attorneys, an inmate must remove all of his or her clothing, bend over, spread the buttocks, and display the anal cavity for inspection by a correctional officer. Women inmates must assume a suitable posture for vaginal inspection, while men must raise their genitals. And, as the Court neglects to note, because of time pressures, this humiliating spectacle is frequently conducted in the presence of other inmates. App. 77. The District Court found that the stripping was "unpleasant, embarrassing, and humiliating." A psychiatrist testified that the practice placed inmates in the most degrading position possible, App. 48, a conclusion amply corroborated by the testimony of the inmates themselves.[17] There was evidence, moreover, that these searches engendered among detainees fears of sexual assault, were the occasion for actual threats of physical abuse by guards, and caused some inmates to forgo personal Not surprisingly, the |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Bell v. Wolfish | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110075/bell-v-wolfish/ | and caused some inmates to forgo personal Not surprisingly, the Government asserts a security justification for such inspections. These searches are necessary, it argues, to prevent inmates from smuggling contraband into the facility. In crediting this justification despite the contrary findings of the two courts below, the Court overlooks the critical facts. As respondents point out, inmates are required to wear one-piece jumpsuits with zippers in the front. To insert an object into the vaginal or anal cavity, an inmate would have to remove the jumpsuit, at least from the upper torso. App. 45; Joint App. in Nos. 77-2035, 77-2135 (CA2), *578 p. 925 (hereinafter Joint App.). Since contact visits occur in a glass-enclosed room and are continuously monitored by corrections officers, see 147; Joint App. 144, 1208-1209,[18] such a feat would seem extraordinarily difficult. There was medical testimony, moreover, that inserting an object into the rectum is painful and "would require time and opportunity which is not available in the visiting areas," App. 49-50, and that visual inspection would probably not detect an object once inserted. Additionally, before entering the visiting room, visitors and their packages are searched thoroughly by a metal detector, fluoroscope, and by hand. ; Joint App. 601, 1077. Correction officers may require that visitors leave packages or handbags with guards until the visit is over. Joint App. 1077-1078. Only by blinding itself to the facts presented on this record can the Court accept the Government's security rationale. Without question, these searches are an imposition of sufficient gravity to invoke the compelling-necessity standard. It is equally indisputable that they cannot meet that standard. Indeed, the procedure is so unnecessarily degrading that it "shocks the conscience." Even in Rochin, the police had reason to believe that the petitioner had swallowed contraband. Here, the searches are employed absent any suspicion of wrongdoing. It was this aspect of the MCC practice that the Court of Appeals redressed, requiring that searches be conducted only when there is probable cause to believe that the inmate is concealing contraband. The Due Process Clause, on any principled reading, dictates no less. *579 That the Court can uphold these indiscriminate searches highlights the bankruptcy of its basic analysis. Under the test adopted today, the rights of detainees apparently extend only so far as detention officials decide that cost and security will permit. Such unthinking deference to administrative convenience cannot be justified where the interests at stake are those of presumptively innocent individuals, many of whose only proven offense is the inability to afford bail. I dissent. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | dissenting | Larson v. Valente | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110697/larson-v-valente/ | I concur in the dissent of JUSTICE REHNQUIST with respect to standing. I also dissent on the merits. I It will be helpful first to indicate what occurred in the lower courts and what the Court now proposes to do. Based on two reports of a Magistrate, the District Court held unconstitutional the Minnesota limitation denying an exemption to religious organizations receiving less than 50 percent of their funding from their own members. The Magistrate recommended this action on the ground that the limitation could not pass muster under the second criterion set down in for identifying an unconstitutional establishment of religion that the principal or primary effect of the statute is one that neither enhances nor inhibits religion. The 50-percent limitation failed this test because it subjected some churches to far more rigorous requirements than others, the effect being to "severely inhibit plaintiff's religious activities." App. to Juris. Statement A-63. This created a preference offensive to the Establishment Clause. at A-33.[1] The Magistrate relied on the inhibiting effect of the 50-percent rule without reference *259 to whether or not it was the principal or primary effect of the limitation. In any event, the Magistrate recommended, and the District Court agreed, that the exemption from registration be extended to all religious organizations. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the 50-percent rule violated the Establishment Clause. Its ruling, however, was on the ground that the limitation failed to satisfy the first Lemon criterion that the statute have a secular rather than a religious purpose. The court conceded that the Act as a whole had the valid secular purpose of preventing fraudulent or deceptive practices in the solicitation of funds in the name of charity. The court also thought freeing certain organizations from regulation served a valid purpose because for those organizations public disclosure of funding would not significantly enhance the availability of information to contributors. Patriotic and fraternal societies that limit solicitation to voting members and certain charitable organizations that do not solicit in excess of $10,000 annually from the public fell into this category. But the court found no sound secular legislative purpose for the 50-percent limitation with respect to religious organizations because it "appears to be designed to shield favored sects, while continuing to burden other sects." The challenged provision, the Court of Appeals said, "expressly separates two classes of religious organizations and makes the separation for no valid secular purpose that has been suggested by defendants. Inexplicable disparate treatment will not generally be attributed to accident; it seems much more likely that |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | dissenting | Larson v. Valente | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110697/larson-v-valente/ | be attributed to accident; it seems much more likely that at some stage of the legislative process special solicitude for particular religious organizations affected the choice of statutory language. The resulting discrimination is constitutionally invidious." The Court of Appeals went on to say that if it were necessary to apply the second part of the Lemon test, the provision would also fail to survive that examination because it advantaged some organizations and disadvantaged others. *260 In this Court, the case is given still another treatment. The tests are put aside because they are applicable only to laws affording uniform benefit to all religions, not to provisions that discriminate among religions. Rather, in cases of denominational preference, the Court says that "our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." Ante, at 246. The Court then invalidates the challenged limitation. It does so by first declaring that the 50-percent rule makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations. The State's submission that the 50-percent limitation is a law based on secular criteria which happens not to have an identical effect on all religious organizations is rejected. The Court then holds that the challenged rule is not closely fitted to serve any compelling state interest and rejects each of the reasons submitted by the State to demonstrate that the distinction between contributions solicited from members and from nonmembers is a sensible one. Among others, the Court rejects the proposition that membership control is an adequate safeguard against deceptive solicitations of the public. The ultimate conclusion is that the exemption provision violates the Establishment Clause. II I have several difficulties with this disposition of the case. First, the Court employs a legal standard wholly different from that applied in the courts below. The premise for the Court's standard is that the challenged provision is a deliberate and explicit legislative preference for some religious denominations over others. But there was no such finding in the District Court. That court proceeded under the second Lemon test and then relied only on the disparate impact of the provision. There was no finding of a discriminatory or preferential legislative purpose. If this case is to be judged by a standard not employed by the courts below and if the *261 new standard involves factual issues or even mixed questions of law and fact that have not been addressed by the District Court, the Court should not itself purport to make these factual determinations. It should remand to the District Court. In this respect, it is |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | dissenting | Larson v. Valente | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110697/larson-v-valente/ | remand to the District Court. In this respect, it is no answer to say that the Court of Appeals appeared to find, although rather tentatively, that the state legislature had acted out of intentional denominational preferences. That court was no more entitled to supply the missing factual predicate for a different legal standard than is this Court. It is worth noting that none of the Court of Appeals' judges on the panel in this case is a resident of Minnesota. Second, apparently realizing its lack of competence to judge the purposes of the Minnesota Legislature other than by the words it used, the Court disposes in a footnote of the State's claim that the 50-percent rule is a neutral, secular criterion that has disparate impact among religious organizations. The limitation, it is said, "is not simply a facially neutral statute" but one that makes "explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations." Ante, at 247, n. 23. The rule itself, however, names no churches or denominations that are entitled to or denied the exemption. It neither qualifies nor disqualifies a church based on the kind or variety of its religious belief. Some religions will qualify and some will not, but this depends on the source of their contributions, not on their brand of religion. To say that the rule on its face represents an explicit and deliberate preference for some religious beliefs over others is not credible. The Court offers no support for this assertion other than to agree with the Court of Appeals that the limitation might burden the less well organized denominations. This conclusion, itself, is a product of assumption and speculation. It is contrary to what the State insists is readily evident from a list of those charitable organizations that have registered under the Act and of those that are exempt. It is claimed that both categories include not only well-established, *262 but also not so well-established, organizations. The Court appears to concede that the Minnesota law at issue does not constitute an establishment of religion merely because it has a disparate impact. An intentional preference must be expressed. To find that intention on the face of the provision at issue here seems to me to be patently wrong. Third, I cannot join the Court's easy rejection of the State's submission that a valid secular purpose justifies basing the exemption on the percentage of external funding. Like the Court of Appeals, the majority accepts the prevention of fraudulent solicitation as a valid, even compelling, secular interest. Hence, charities, including religious organizations, may be required to register if |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | dissenting | Larson v. Valente | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110697/larson-v-valente/ | charities, including religious organizations, may be required to register if the State chooses to insist. But here the State has excused those classes of charities it thought had adequate substitute safeguards or for some other reason had reduced the risk which is being guarded against. Among those exempted are various patriotic and fraternal organizations that depend only on their members for contributions. The Court of Appeals did not question the validity of this exemption because of the built-in safeguards of membership funding. The Court of Appeals, however, would not extend the same reasoning to permit the State to exempt religious organizations receiving more than half of their contributions from their members while denying exemption to those who rely on the public to a greater extent. This Court, preferring its own judgment of the realities of fundraising by religious organizations to that of the state legislature, also rejects the State's submission that organizations depending on their members for more than half of their funds do not pose the same degree of danger as other religious organizations. In the course of doing so, the Court expressly disagrees with the notion that members in general can be relied upon to control their organizations.[2] *263 I do not share the Court's view of our omniscience. The State has the same interest in requiring registration by organizations soliciting most of their funds from the public as it would have in requiring any charitable organization to register, including a religious organization, if it wants to solicit funds. And if the State determines that its interest in preventing fraud does not extend to those who do not raise a majority of their funds from the public, its interest in imposing the requirement on others is not thereby reduced in the least. Furthermore, as the State suggests, the legislature thought it made good sense, and the courts, including this one, should not so readily disagree. Fourth, and finally, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and the District Court that the exemption must be extended to all religious organizations. The Court of Appeals noted that the exemption provision, so construed, could be said to prefer religious organizations over nonreligious organizations and hence amount to an establishment of religion. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not further address the question, and the Court says nothing of it now. Arguably, however, there is a more evident secular reason for exempting religious organizations who rely on their members to a great extent than there is to exempt all religious organizations, including those who raise all or nearly all of their |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Barnhill v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112714/barnhill-v-johnson/ | Under the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance section, 11 U.S. C. 7, the trustee is permitted to recover, with certain exceptions, transfers of property made by the debtor within 90 days before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. We granted certiorari to decide whether, in determining if a transfer occurred within the 90-day preference period, a transfer made by check should be deemed to occur on the date the check is presented to the recipient or *395 on the date the drawee bank honors it. We hold that the latter date is determinative. The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. The debtor[1] made payment for a bona fide debt to petitioner Barnhill. The check was delivered to petitioner on November 18. The check was dated November 19, and the check was honored by the drawee bank on November 20. The debtor later filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. It is agreed by the parties that the 90th day before the bankruptcy filing was November 20. Respondent Johnson was appointed trustee for the bankruptcy estate. He filed an adversary proceeding against petitioner, claiming that the check payment was recoverable by the estate pursuant to 11 U.S. C. 7(b). That section generally permits the trustee to recover for benefit of the bankruptcy estate transfers of the debtor's property made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. Respondent asserted that the transfer occurred on November 20, the date the check was honored by the drawee bank, and therefore was within the 90-day period. Petitioner defended by claiming that the transfer occurred on November 18, the date he received the check (the so-called "date of delivery" rule), and that it therefore fell outside the 90-day period established by 7(b)(4)(A). The Bankruptcy Court concluded that a date of delivery rule should govern and therefore denied the trustee recovery. The trustee appealed, and the District Court affirmed. The trustee then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. *396 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that a date of honor rule should govern actions under 7(b). In re Antweil, It distinguished a prior decision, In re White River Corp., in which it held that, for purposes of 7(c), a date of delivery rule should govern when a transfer occurs.[2] The Tenth Circuit concluded that 7(b) and 7(c) have different purposes and functions, justifying different rules for each. It further concluded that a date of honor rule was appropriate because such a rule was consistent with provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U. C. C.), was capable of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Barnhill v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112714/barnhill-v-johnson/ | the Uniform Commercial Code (U. C. C.), was capable of easier proof, and was less subject to manipulation. We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split.[3] In relevant part, 7(b) provides: "(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property "(4) made "(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition" *397 Title 11 U.S. C. 101() (1988 ed., Supp. II)[4] defines "transfer" to mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." Section 7(e) provides further guidance on the meaning and dating of a transfer. For purposes of 7, it provides "[(e)(1)](B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee. "[(e)](2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made "(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time; "(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10 days" Our task, then, is to determine whether, under the definition of transfer provided by 101(), and supplemented by 7(e), the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid can be said to have occurred before November 20. "What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete" is a matter of federal law. This is unsurprising since, as noted above, the statute itself provides a definition of "transfer." But that definition in turn includes references to parting with "property" and "interest[s] in property." In the absence of any controlling federal law, "property" and "interests in property" are creatures of state law. ; Thus it is helpful to sketch briefly the rights and duties enjoyed under state law by each party to a check transaction.[5] A person with an account at a bank enjoys a claim against the bank for funds in an amount equal to the account balance. Under the U. C. C., a check is simply an order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated, signed by the maker and payable on demand. U. C. C. 3-104(1), (2)(b), 2 U. L. A. 224 Receipt of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Barnhill v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112714/barnhill-v-johnson/ | C. 3-104(1), (2)(b), 2 U. L. A. 224 Receipt of a check does not, however, give the recipient a right against the bank. The recipient may present the check, but, if the drawee bank refuses to honor it, the recipient has no recourse against the drawee. 3-409(1), 2A U. L. A. 189[6] That is not to say, however, that the recipient of a check is without any rights. Receipt of a check for an underlying obligation suspends the obligation "pro tan to until the instrument[`s] presentment[;] discharge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obligation." 3-802(1)(b), 2A U. L. A. 514 But should *399 the drawee bank refuse to honor a check, a cause of action against the drawer of the check accrues to the recipient of a check "upon demand following dishonor of the instrument." 3-122(3), 2 U. L. A. 407 ; see also 3-413(2), 2A U. L. A. 208 And the recipient of a dishonored check, received in payment on an underlying obligation, may maintain an action on either the check or the obligation. 3 802(1)(b), 2A U. L. A. 514 With this background we turn to the issue at hand. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the interest that passed from the debtor to the petitioner when the check was delivered on a date outside the 90-day preference period. We disagree. We begin by noting that there can be no assertion that an unconditional transfer of the debtor's interest in property had occurred before November 20. This is because, as just noted above, receipt of a check gives the recipient no right in the funds held by the bank on the drawer's account. Myriad events can intervene between delivery and presentment of the check that would result in the check being dishonored. The drawer could choose to close the account. A third party could obtain a lien against the account by garnishment or other proceedings. The bank might mistakenly refuse to honor the check.[7] The import of the preceding discussion for the instant case is that no transfer of any part of the debtor's claim against the bank occurred until the bank honored the check on November 20. The drawee bank honored the check by paying it. U. C. C. 1-201(21), 1 U. L. A. 65 (1989) (defining honor); 4-215(a), 2B U. L. A. 45 At that time, the bank had a right to "charge" the debtor's account, 4-401, 2B U. L. A. 307 i. e., the debtor's claim against the bank was reduced by the amount of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Barnhill v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112714/barnhill-v-johnson/ | claim against the bank was reduced by the amount of the checkand petitioner no longer *400 had a claim against the debtor. Honoring the check, in short, left the debtor in the position that it would have occupied if it had withdrawn cash from its account and handed it over to petitioner. We thus believe that when the debtor has directed the drawee bank to honor the check and the bank has done so, the debtor has implemented a "mode, direct or indirect of disposing of property or an interest in property." 11 U.S. C. 101() (1988 ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added). For the purposes of payment by ordinary check, therefore, a "transfer" as defined by 101() occurs on the date of honor, and not before. And since it is undisputed that honor occurred within the 90-day preference period, the trustee presumptively may avoid this transfer. In the face of this argument, petitioner retreats to the definition of "transfer" contained in 101(). Petitioner urges that rather than viewing the transaction as involving two distinct actionsdelivery of the check, with no interest in property thereby being transferred, and honoring of the check, with an interest being transferredthat we instead should view delivery of the check as a "conditional" transfer. We acknowledge that 101() adopts an expansive definition of transfer, one that includes "every mode absolute or conditional of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property." There is thus some force in petitioner's claim that he did, in fact, gain something when he received the check. But at most, what petitioner gained was a chose in action against the debtor.[8] Such a right, however, cannot fairly be characterized as a conditional right to *401 "property or an interest in property," 101(), where the property in this case is the account maintained with the drawee bank. For as noted above, until the moment of honor the debtor retains full control over disposition of the account and the account remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties. To treat petitioner's nebulous right to bring suit as a "conditional transfer" of the property would accomplish a near-limitless expansion of the term "conditional." In the absence of any right against the bank or the account, we think the fairer description is that petitioner had received no interest in debtor's property, not that his interest was "conditional." Finally, we note that our conclusion that no transfer of property occurs until the time of honor is consistent with 7(e)(2)(A). That section provides that a transfer occurs at the time the transfer |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Barnhill v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112714/barnhill-v-johnson/ | provides that a transfer occurs at the time the transfer "takes effect between the transferor and the transferee" For the reasons given above, and in particular because the debtor in this case retained the ability to stop payment on the check until the very last, we do not think that the transfer of funds in this case can be said to have "taken effect between the debtor and petitioner" until the moment of honor. Recognizing, perhaps, the difficulties in his position, petitioner places his heaviest reliance not on the statutory language but on accompanying legislative history. Specifically, he points to identical statements from Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini that "payment of a debt by means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored. Payment is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 7(c)(1) and (2)." 124 Cong. Rec. 32400 (1978); We think this appeal to legislative history unavailing. To begin, we note that appeals to statutory history are well taken only to resolve "statutory ambiguity." We do not think this is such a case. But even if it were, the statements on which *402 petitioner relies, by their own terms, apply only to 7(c), not to 7(b). Section 7(c), in turn, establishes various exceptions to 7(b)'s general rule permitting recovery of preferential transfers. Subsection (c)(1) provides an exception for transfers that are part of a contemporaneous exchange of new value between a debtor and creditor; subsection (c)(2) provides an exception for transfers made from debtor to creditor in the ordinary course of business. These sections are designed to encourage creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors on normal business terms by obviating any worry that a subsequent bankruptcy filing might require the creditor to disgorge as a preference an earlier received payment. But given this specialized purpose, we see no basis for concluding that the legislative history, particularly legislative history explicitly confined by its own terms to 7(c), should cause us to adopt a "date of delivery" rule for purposes of 7(b).[9] *403 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Rice v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145690/rice-v-collins/ | Concerned that, in this habeas corpus a federal court set aside reasonable state-court determinations of fact in favor of its own debatable interpretation of the record, we granted certiorari. Our review confirms that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred, misapplying settled rules that limit its role and authority. *336 I After a 4-day trial in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, a jury convicted Steven Martell Collins on one count of possessing cocaine. The conviction was all the more serious because it subjected him to California's three strikes rule for sentencing. The question at issue in this federal habeas corpus action, however, is the California courts' rejection of Collins' argument that the prosecutor struck a young, African-American woman, Juror 16, from the panel on account of her A second African-American juror was also the subject of a peremptory strike, and although Collins challenged that strike in the trial court, on appeal he objected only to the excusal of Juror 16. Even prior to this Court's decision in California courts barred peremptory challenges to jurors based on Although our recent decision in disapproved of the manner in which Wheeler and were implemented in some California s, the state courts in this used the correct analytical framework in considering and ruling upon the objection to the prosecutorial strike. As race-neutral explanations for striking Juror 16, the prosecutor said that Juror 16 had rolled her eyes in response to a question from the court; that Juror 16 was young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime; and that Juror 16 was single and lacked ties to the community. A further, more troubling part of the prosecutor's unorganized explanation was her reference to Juror 16's gender. The trial court, correctly, disallowed any reliance on that ground. The trial court, furthermore, which had the benefit of observing the prosecutor firsthand over the course of the proceedings, rejected Collins' challenge. "With regard to 016, the court, frankly, did not observe the demeanor of Ms. 016 that was complained of by *337 the District Attorney; however, Ms. 016 was a youthful person, as was [a white male juror the prosecutor also dismissed by peremptory challenge]. And one or more prospective jurors also. "The Court is prepared to give the District Attorney the benefit of the doubt as to Ms. 016." -15. The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the trial court's ruling on the peremptory challenge. People v. Collins, No. B106939 (Dec. 12, 1997), App. H to Pet. for Cert. 112-117. In its view, youth |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Rice v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145690/rice-v-collins/ | H to Pet. for Cert. 112-117. In its view, youth was a legitimate reason to exercise a peremptory challenge; and, even if it were not, Juror 16's demeanor also supported the strike. According to its review of the record, nothing suggested the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry of the prosecutor's reasons for striking Juror 16. -117. The appeals court thus upheld the trial court's ultimate conclusion to credit the prosecutor. Without comment, the Supreme Court of California denied Collins' petition for review. App. F, Collins sought collateral relief on this claim in federal court. The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed with prejudice Collins' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. App. D, A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition. amended and superseded by Noting that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governed Collins' petition, the panel majority concluded that it was an unreasonable factual determination to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 16. Judge Hall dissented, ; and later, over the dissent of five judges, the Court of Appeals declined to rehear the en banc, Though it recited the proper standard of review, the panel majority improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the state *338 trial court. We granted the petition for certiorari, and now reverse. II A defendant's challenge to a peremptory strike requires a three-step First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of 476 U.S., -97. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, "[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible"; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, but "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings a trial court makes in a inquiry are reviewed for clear error. (holding that evaluation of a prosecutor's credibility "lies `peculiarly within a trial judge's province'"). Under AEDPA, however, a federal habeas |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Rice v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145690/rice-v-collins/ | a trial judge's province'"). Under AEDPA, however, a federal habeas court must find the state-court conclusion "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." (d)(2). Thus, a federal habeas court can only grant Collins' petition if it was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for the challenge. State-court factual findings, moreover, *339 are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 2254(e)(1). See Although the Ninth Circuit assumed 2254(e)(1)'s presumption applied in this the parties disagree about whether and when it does. We need not address that question. Even assuming, arguendo, that only 2254(d)(2) applied in this proceeding, the state-court decision was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. Because the California Court of Appeal accepted the trial court's credibility finding, the panel majority inquired whether the appellate court made an unreasonable factual determination. See The panel majority's analysis and conclusions, however, depended entirely on its view of the trial court's credibility holding. The panel majority found no error in the trial court's proceedings or rulings in the first two steps of the -678. It disagreed, however, with the trial court's conclusions on the third step, holding that it was unreasonable to accept the prosecutor's explanation that Juror 16 was excused on account of her youth and her demeanor. We conclude the Ninth Circuit erred, for the trial court's credibility determination was not unreasonable. Noting that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16's purported eye rolling, the panel majority concluded that no reasonable factfinder could have accepted the prosecutor's rendition of the alleged incident because the prosecutor's conduct completely undermined her credibility. Having before it only the trial court record, the Court of Appeals majority drew this conclusion based on three considerations: first, the prosecutor's erroneous statement concerning another prospective African-American juror's age; second, the prosecutor's improper attempt to use gender as a basis for exclusion; and third, the majority's skepticism toward *340 the prosecutor's explanation that she struck Juror 16 in part because of her youth and lack of ties to the community. -684. The first reason the panel majority noted for rejecting the trial court's credibility finding pertained not to Juror 16, the subject of Collins' claim on appeal, but to another prospective African-American juror, Juror 19. The prosecutor referred to Juror 19 as "young" even though she was a grandmother. This reference to youth took place during a discussion about three prospective jurors, Jurors 6, 16, and 19. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Rice v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145690/rice-v-collins/ | discussion about three prospective jurors, Jurors 6, 16, and 19. Jurors 6 and 16 were both young. As Judge Hall observed, it is quite plausible that the prosecutor simply misspoke with respect to a juror's numerical designation, an error defense counsel may also have committed. ; It is a tenuous inference to say that an accidental reference with respect to one juror, Juror 19, undermines the prosecutor's credibility with respect to Juror 16. Seizing on what can plausibly be viewed as an innocent transposition makes little headway toward the conclusion that the prosecutor's explanation was clearly not credible. Second, the panel majority concluded that the trial court should have questioned the prosecutor's credibility because of her "attempt to use gender as a race-neutral basis for excluding Jurors 016 and 019." Respondent's trial occurred in August 1996, over two years after our decision in J. E. made clear that discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although the record contains a somewhat confusing colloquy on this point, it can be read as indicating that one of the prosecutor's aims in striking Juror 16 was achieving gender balance on the jury. Concerned about the constitutionality of such a strike, the trial court made clear that it would not accept gender as a race-neutral explanation. The panel majority assigned the gender justification more weight than it *341 can bear. The prosecutor provided a number of other permissible and plausible race-neutral reasons, and Collins provides no argument why this portion of the colloquy demonstrates that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor lied about the eye rolling and struck Juror 16 based on her Finally, the panel majority believed to be unsupportable the prosecutor's stated concern that Juror 16 might, as a young and single citizen with no ties to the community, be too tolerant of the crime with which respondent was -682, 684. This was so, the majority concluded, because during voir dire Juror 16 replied affirmatively when asked if she believed the crime with which respondent was charged should be illegal and disclaimed any other reason she could not be impartial. That the prosecutor claimed to hold such concerns despite Juror 16's voir dire averments does not establish that she offered a pretext. It is not unreasonable to believe the prosecutor remained worried that a young person with few ties to the community might be less willing than an older, more permanent resident to impose a lengthy sentence for possessing a small amount of a controlled substance. Accord, Even if the prosecutor was overly cautious |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Rice v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145690/rice-v-collins/ | controlled substance. Accord, Even if the prosecutor was overly cautious in this regard, her wariness of the young and the rootless could be seen as race neutral, for she used a peremptory strike on a white male juror, Juror 6, with the same characteristics. Viewing the panel majority's concerns together, the most generous reading would suggest only that the trial court had reason to question the prosecutor's credibility regarding Juror 16's alleged improper demeanor. That does not, however, compel the conclusion that the trial court had no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications and conclude Collins had shown a violation. Reasonable minds reviewing the record *342 might disagree about the prosecutor's credibility, but on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's credibility determination. The panel majority did not stop at the conclusion that the trial court rendered an unreasonable factual determination in light of the evidence presented. It further concluded that the state courts had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as determined by this 365 F.3d, ; (d)(1). The question whether a state court errs in determining the facts is a different question from whether it errs in applying the law. In this there is no demonstration that either the trial court or the California Court of Appeal acted contrary to clearly established federal law in recognizing and applying 's burden-framework. See -15; App. H to Pet. for Cert. 1-116. The only question, as we have noted, is whether the trial court's factual determination at 's third step was unreasonable. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude it was not. III The panel majority's attempt to use a set of debatable inferences to set aside the conclusion reached by the state court does not satisfy AEDPA's requirements for granting a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 1,990 | 16 | second_dissenting | Sullivan v. Stroop | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112460/sullivan-v-stroop/ | Although the answer to the question presented by this case is not quite as clear to me as it is to JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I believe he has the better of the argument. If one puts aside legal terminology and considers ordinary English usage, Social Security benefits paid to the surviving child of a deceased wage earner are reasonably characterized as a form of "child support payments" indeed, they are quite obviously payments made to support children. Moreover, respondents' interpretation of Title IV of the Social Security Act effectuates congressional intent: If a $50 portion of Social Security payments is disregarded when a family's eligibility for aid is determined, children with equal need will be more likely to receive equal aid. Finally, the interpretation achieves this parity in a way that serves the disregard provision's purpose fairly inferred from legislative history of mitigating the hardships imposed by the 1984 amendment that required families applying for aid to count child support payments as available income. Thus, Title II children's benefit payments are fairly encompassed by both the language and the purpose of the disregard provision. It may be that Congress did not sharply focus on the specific problem presented by this case; the statutory terminology suggests as much. Yet, this fact does not seem to me sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to Congress' more general intent, an intent that is expressed, albeit imperfectly, in the language Congress chose. For these *497 reasons, and others stated by JUSTICE BLACKMUN in his thorough opinion, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | This case presents again a dispute among church members over the control of a local church's property. Although the Court appears to accept established principles that I have thought would resolve this case, it superimposes on these principles a new structure of rules that will make the decision of these cases by civil courts more difficult. The new analysis also is more likely to invite intrusion into church polity forbidden by the First Amendment. I The Court begins by stating that "[t]his case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property," ante, at 597, suggesting that the concern is with legal or equitable ownership in the real property sense. But the ownership of the property of the Vineville church is not at issue. The deeds place title in the Vineville Presbyterian or in trustees of that church, and none of the parties has questioned the validity of those deeds. The question actually presented is which of the factions within the local congregation has the right to control the actions of the titleholder, and thereby to control the use of the property, as the Court later acknowledges. Ante, at 602. Since 1872, disputes over control of church property usually have been resolved under principles established by Under the new and complex, two-stage analysis approved today, a court instead first must apply newly defined "neutral principles of law" to determine *611 whether property titled to the local church is held in trust for the general church organization with which the local church is affiliated. If it is, then the court will grant control of the property to the councils of the general church. If not, then control by the local congregation will be recognized. In the latter situation, if there is a schism in the local congregation, as in this case, the second stage of the new analysis becomes applicable. Again, the Court fragments the analysis into two substeps for the purpose of determining which of the factions should control the property. As this new approach inevitably will increase the involvement of civil courts in church controversies, and as it departs from long-established precedents, I dissent. A The first stage in the "neutral principles of law" approach operates as a restrictive rule of evidence. A court is required to examine the deeds to the church property, the charter of the local church (if there is one), the book of order or discipline of the general church organization, and the state statutes governing the holding of church property. The object of the inquiry, where the title to the property is in the |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | inquiry, where the title to the property is in the local church, is "to determine whether there [is] any basis for a trust in favor of the general church." Ante, at 600. The court's investigation is to be "completely secular," "rel[ying] exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges." Ante, at 603. Thus, where religious documents such as church constitutions or books of order must be examined "for language of trust in favor of the general church," "a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust." Ante, at 604. It follows that the civil courts using this analysis may consider the form of religious government *612 adopted by the church members for the resolution of intrachurch disputes only if that polity has been stated, in express relation to church property, in the language of trust and property law.[1] One effect of the Court's evidentiary rule is to deny to the courts relevant evidence as to the religious politythat is, the form of governanceadopted by the church members. The constitutional documents of churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious precepts. Attempting to read them "in purely secular terms" is more likely to promote confusion than understanding. Moreover, whenever religious polity has not been expressed in specific statements referring to the property *613 of a church, there will be no evidence of that polity cognizable under the neutral-principles rule. Lacking such evidence, presumably a court will impose some rule of church government derived from state law. In the present case, for example, the general and unqualified authority of the Presbytery over the actions of the Vineville church had not been expressed in secular terms of control of its property. As a consequence, the Georgia courts could find no acceptable evidence of this authoritative relationship, and they imposed instead a congregational form of government determined from state law. This limiting of the evidence relative to religious government cannot be justified on the ground that it "free[s] civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." Ante, at 603. For unless the body identified as authoritative under state law resolves the underlying dispute in accord with the decision of the church's own authority, the state court effectively will have reversed the decisions of doctrine and practice made in accordance with church law. The schism in the Vineville church, for example, resulted from disagreements |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | schism in the Vineville church, for example, resulted from disagreements among the church members over questions of doctrine and practice. App. 233. Under the Book of Order, these questions were resolved authoritatively by the higher church courts, which then gave control of the local church to the faction loyal to that resolution. The Georgia courts, as a matter of state law, granted control to the schismatic faction, and thereby effectively reversed the doctrinal decision of the church courts. This indirect interference by the civil courts with the resolution of religious disputes within the church is no less proscribed by the First Amendment than is the direct decision of questions of doctrine and practice.[2] *614 When civil courts step in to resolve intrachurch disputes over control of church property, they will either support or overturn the authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church itself. The new analysis, under the attractive banner of "neutral principles," actually invites the civil courts to do the latter. The proper rule of decision, that I thought had been settled until today, requires a court to give effect in all cases to the decisions of the church government agreed upon by the members before the dispute arose. B The Court's basic neutral-principles approach, as a means of isolating decisions concerning church property from other decisions made within the church, relies on the concept of a trust of local church property in favor of the general church. Because of this central premise, the neutral-principles rule suffices to settle only disputes between the central councils of a church organization and a unanimous local congregation. Where, as here, the neutral-principles inquiry reveals no trust in favor of the general church, and the local congregation is split into factions, the basic question remains unresolved: which faction should have control of the local church? *615 The Court acknowledges that the church law of the Presbyterian in the United States (PCUS), of which the Vineville church is a part, provides for the authoritative resolution of this question by the Presbytery. Ante, at 608-609, and n. 7. Indeed, the Court indicates that Georgia, consistently with the First Amendment, may adopt the rule of adherence to the resolution of the dispute according to church lawa rule that would necessitate reversal of the judgment for the respondents. Ante, at 609. But instead of requiring the state courts to take this approach, the Court approves as well an alternative rule of state law: the Georgia courts are said to be free to "adop[t] a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other means." Ante, at 607. This showing may be made by proving that the church has "provid[ed], in the corporate charter or the constitution of the general church, that the identity of the local church is to be established in some other way." Ante, at 607-608. On its face, this rebuttable presumption also requires reversal of the state court's judgment in favor of the schismatic faction. The polity of the PCUS commits to the Presbytery the resolution of the dispute within the local church. Having shown this structure of church government for the determination of the identity of the local congregation, the petitioners have rebutted any presumption that this question has been left to a majority vote of the local congregation. The Court nevertheless declines to order reversal. Rather than decide the case here in accordance with established First Amendment principles, the Court leaves open the possibility that the state courts might adopt some restrictive evidentiary rule that would render the petitioners' evidence inadequate to overcome the presumption of majority control. Ante, at 608 n. 5. But, aside from a passing reference to the use of the neutral-principles approach developed earlier in its *616 opinion,[3] the Court affords no guidance as to the constitutional limitations on such an evidentiary rule; the state courts, it says, are free to adopt any rule that is constitutional. "Indeed, the state may adopt any method of overcoming the majoritarian presumption, so long as the use of that method does not impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy." Ante, at 608. In essence, the Court's instructions on remand therefore allow the state courts the choice of following the long-settled rule of or of adopting some other ruleunspecified by the Courtthat the state courts view as consistent with the First Amendment. Not only questions of state law but also important issues of federal constitutional law thus are left to the state courts for their decision, and, if they depart from they will travel a course left totally uncharted by this Court. II Disputes among church members over the control of church property arise almost invariably out of disagreements regarding doctrine and practice. Because of the religious nature of these disputes, civil courts should decide them according to principles that do not interfere with the free exercise of religion in accordance with church polity and doctrine. Serbian *617 Orthodox ; Presbyterian ; ; See also ; Maryland & Va. appeal dismissed |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | ; ; See also ; Maryland & Va. appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, The only course that achieves this constitutional requirement is acceptance by civil courts of the decisions reached within the polity chosen by the church members themselves. The classic statement of this view is found in -729:[4] "The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious *618 unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for." Accordingly, in each case involving an intrachurch dispute including disputes over church propertythe civil court must focus directly on ascertaining, and then following, the decision made within the structure of church governance. By doing so, the court avoids two equally unacceptable departures from the genuine neutrality mandated by the First Amendment. First, it refrains from direct review and revision of decisions of the church on matters of religious doctrine and practice that underlie the church's determination of intrachurch controversies, including those that relate to control of church property.[5] Equally important, by recognizing the authoritative resolution reached within the religious association, the civil court avoids interfering indirectly with the religious governance of those who have formed the association and submitted themselves to its authority. See ; ; at -110. III Until today, and under the foregoing authorities, the first question presented in a case involving an intrachurch dispute over church property was where within the religious association *619 the rules of polity, accepted by its members before the schism, had placed ultimate authority over the use of the church property.[6] The courts, in answering this question have recognized two broad categories of church government. One is congregational, in which authority over questions of church doctrine, practice, and administration rests entirely in the local congregation or some body within |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | rests entirely in the local congregation or some body within it. In disputes over the control and use of the property of such a church, the civil courts enforce the authoritative resolution of the controversy within the local church itself. The second is hierarchical, in which the local church is but an integral and subordinate part of a larger church and is under the authority of the general church. Since the decisions of the local congregation are subject to review by the tribunals of the church hierarchy, this Court has held that the civil courts must give effect to the duly made decisions of the highest body within the hierarchy that has considered the dispute. As we stated in Serbian Orthodox : "[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them." -725[7] A careful examination of the constitutions of the general *620 and local church, as well as other relevant documents, may be necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the members of the religious association. But there is no reason to restrict the courts to statements of polity related directly to church property. For the constitutionally necessary limitations are imposed not on the evidence to be considered but instead on the object of the inquiry, which is both limited and clear: the civil court must determine whether the local church remains autonomous, so that its members have unreviewable authority to withdraw it (and its property) from the general church, or whether the local church is inseparably integrated into and subordinate to the general church.[8] IV The principles developed in prior decisions thus afford clear guidance in the case before us. The Vineville church is presbyterian, a part of the PCUS. The presbyterian form of church government, adopted by the PCUS, is "a hierarchical structure of tribunals which consists of, in ascending order, (1) the Session, composed of the elders of the local church; (2) the Presbytery, composed of several churches in a geographical area; (3) the Synod, generally composed of all Presbyteries within a State; and (4) the General Assembly, the highest governing body." Presbyterian v. Hull *621 The Book of Order subjects the Session to "review and control" by the Presbytery in all matters, even authorizing the Presbytery to replace |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | dissenting | Jones v. Wolf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110144/jones-v-wolf/ | Presbytery in all matters, even authorizing the Presbytery to replace the leadership of the local congregation, to winnow its membership, and to take control of it. No provision of the Book of Order gives the Session the authority to withdraw the local church from the PCUS; similarly, no section exempts such a decision by the local church from review by the Presbytery. Thus, while many matters, including the management of the church property, are committed in the first instance to the Session and congregation of the local church, their actions are subject to review by the Presbytery. Here, the Presbytery exercised its authority over the local church, removing the dissidents from church office, asserting direct control over the government of the church, and recognizing the petitioners as the legitimate congregation and Session of the It is undisputed that under the established government of the Presbyterian accepted by the members of the church before the schismthe use and control of the church property have been determined authoritatively to be in the petitioners. Accordingly, under the principles I have thought were settled, there is no occasion for the further examination of the law of Georgia that the Court directs. On remand, the Georgia courts should be directed to enter judgment for the petitioners. |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | We granted certiorari[1] in this case in order to determine whether Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information 5 U.S. C. 552 (b) (3),[2] permits nondisclosure *257 to respondents of certain reports in the files of the Federal Aviation Administration. This exemption provides that material need not be disclosed if "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." The reports are known as Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) Reports.[3] They consist of analyses made by representatives of the FAA concerning the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. Over-sight and regulation of air travel safety is the responsibility of the FAA, 601 of the Federal Aviation of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S. C. 1421. The FAA claims the documents are protected from disclosure *258 by virtue of 1104 of the Federal Aviation of 1958, 49 U.S. C. 1504.[4] The facts of the case, in its present posture,[5] are quite simple. During the summer of 1970, in connection with a study of airline safety being conducted by them, the respondents, associated with the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, requested that the FAA make available certain SWAP Reports. The FAA declined to produce the documents. In accordance with established procedures adopted by the FAA, the respondents then filed timely notice of administrative appeal in August 1970. Several months later, while this administrative appeal was pending, the Air Transport Association, on behalf of its airline *259 members, requested that the FAA make no public disclosure of the SWAP Reports. The Association noted that, in a prior memorandum of its own staff, the FAA had pointed out that " `[t]he SWAP Program requires a cooperative effort on both the part of the company and FAA if it is to work effectively,' " and argued that "[t]he present practice of non-public submissions, which includes even tentative findings and opinions as well as certain factual material, encourages a spirit of openness on the part of airline management which is vital to the promotion of aviation safetythe paramount consideration of airlines and government alike in this area." In February 1971, the FAA formally denied respondents' request for the SWAP Reports. It took the position that the reports are exempt from public disclosure under 5 U.S. C. 552 (b) (3), the section at issue here. As previously noted, that section provides that such material need not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information when the material is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. The FAA noted that 1104 of the Federal Aviation of 1958 permits the Administrator to withhold information, public disclosure of which, in his judgment, would |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | withhold information, public disclosure of which, in his judgment, would adversely affect the interests of the objecting party and is not required to be disclosed in the interest of the public. The FAA also based its denial of these data on the exemption for intra-agency memoranda (5 U.S. C. 552 (b) (5)), the exemption for investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes ( 552 (b) (7)), and, finally, the exemption for documentation containing trade secrets and commercial or financial information of a privileged or confidential nature ( 552 (b) (4)). The FAA's answer also explained its view of the need for confidentiality in SWAP Reports: "The effectiveness of the in-depth analysis that is the essence of SWAP team investigation depends, to *260 a great extent, upon the full, frank and open cooperation of the operator himself during the inspection period. His assurance by the FAA that the resulting recommendations are in the interest of safety and operational efficiency and will not be disclosed to the public are the major incentives impelling the operator to hide nothing and to grant free access to procedures, system of operation, facilities, personnel, as well as management and operational records in order to exhibit his normal course of operations to the SWAP inspectors." Respondents then sued in the District Court, seeking, inter alia, the requested documents. The District Court held that "the documents sought by plaintiffs are, as a matter of law, public and non-exempt within the meaning of 5 United States Code [] 552, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court "insofar as appellants rely upon Exemption (3)," but remanded the case for consideration of other exemptions which the FAA might wish to assert. 162 U. S. App. D. C. 298, Examining first what it felt was the ordinary meaning of the language of Exemption 3, the Court of Appeals held that its language required the exempting statute relied on to specify or categorize the particular documents it authorizes to be withheld. Because 1104 delegated "broad discretionary authority" under a "public interest" standard, it was held not within the scope of Exemption 3. The Court of Appeals distinguished this Court's decision in on the ground that the exemption involved in that case was construed to be a specific reference by Congress to a definite class of documents, namely those that must be kept secret " `in the *261 interest of the national defense or foreign policy,' " 162 U. S. App. D. C., at The Court of Appeals |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | U. S. App. D. C., at The Court of Appeals read the as providing a comprehensive guide to congressional intent. One of the 's major purposes was seen as intending to eliminate what it characterized as vague phrases such as "in the public interest" or "for good cause" as a basis for withholding information. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that 1104 cannot be considered a specific exemption by statute within the meaning of Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information This case involves no constitutional claims, no issues regarding the nature or scope of "executive privilege," but simply the scope and meaning of one of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information 5 U.S. C. 552. The has two aspects. In one, it seeks to open public records to greater public access; in the other, it seeks to preserve the confidentiality undeniably essential in certain areas of Government operations. It is axiomatic that all parts of an "if at all possible, are to be given effect." Accord, We have construed the Freedom of Information recently in ; Renegotiation ; Renegotiation ; In the Court set out the general nature and purpose of the recognizing, as did the Senate committee report, that it is not " `an easy task to balance the opposing interests' " and " `provid[e] a workable formula which encompasses, balances, *262 and protects all interests' " quoting from S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). Nothing in the or its legislative history gives any intimation that all information in all agencies and in all circumstances is to be open to public inspection. Because it considered the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure 5 U.S. C. 1002 (1964 ed.), inadequate, Congress sought to permit access to certain kinds of official information which it thought had unnecessarily been withheld and, by the creation of nine explicitly exclusive exemptions, to provide a more workable and balanced formula that would make available information that ought to be public and, at the same time, protect certain information where confidentiality was necessary to protect legitimate governmental functions that would be impaired by disclosure. The exemptions provided by the one of which we deal with here, represent the congressional judgment as to certain kinds of "information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses," The language of Exemption 3 contains no "built-in" standard as in the case of some of the other exemptions. The variety of constructions given its language by the Courts of Appeals,[6] is ample evidence *263 that the relevant |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | Courts of Appeals,[6] is ample evidence *263 that the relevant portions of the exemption are unclear and ambiguous, compelling resort to the legislative history. See United Cf. United That history must be read in light of the legislation in existence when the was passed; that history reveals "clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws." Regional Rail Reorganization Congress was aware, as it undertook a painstaking review, during several sessions, of the right of the public to information concerning the public business; it was aware that it was acting not only against the backdrop of the 1946 Administrative Procedure but also on the basis of a significant number of earlier congressional decisions that confidentiality was essential in certain departments and agencies in order to protect the public interest. No distinction seems to have been made on *264 the basis of the standards articulated in the exempting statute or on the degree of discretion which it vested in a particular Government officer. When the continued vitality of these specialized exempting statutes was raised by the views of various agencies,[7] the members of the committee consistently expressed the clear intention that these statutes would remain unaffected by the new During the 1963 hearings, for example, Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee stated: "It should be made clear that this bill in no way limits statutes specifically written with the congressional intent of curtailing the flow of information as a supplement necessary to the proper functioning of certain agencies."[8] Indeed, some provisions[9] of bills which were not enacted could well have been construed as repealing all earlier legislation,[10] but such provisions were not included in the bill that was finally enacted. More specifically, when the Civil Aeronautics Board brought 1104 to the attention of both the House and Senate hearings of 1965, and expressed the agency interpretation that the provision was encompassed within Exemption 3,[11] no question was *265 raised or challenge made to the agency view of the impact of that exemption. When the House Committee on Government Operations focused on Exemption 3, it took note that there are "nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records. These would not be modified by the public records provisions of S. 1160." H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). (Emphasis added.) The respondents can prevail only if the is to be read as repealing by implication all existing statutes "which restrict public access to specific Government records." The term "specific" as there used cannot be |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | Government records." The term "specific" as there used cannot be read as meaning that the exemption applies only to documents specified, i. e., by naming them precisely or by describing the category in which they fall. To require this interpretation would be to ask of Congress a virtually impossible task. Such a construction would also imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation of authority to withhold information which it had made before the passage of this legislationa task which the legislative history shows it clearly did not undertake. Earlier this Term, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the Court in the Regional Rail Reorganization noted that "repeals by implication are disfavored," * and that, when courts are confronted with statutes " `capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.' " quoting As we have noted, here, as in the Regional Rail Reorganization there is "clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws," 419 U.S., at To spell out repeal by implication of a multitude of statutes enacted over a long period of time, each of which was separately weighed and considered by Congress to meet an identified need, would be a more unreasonable step by a court than to do so with respect to a single statute such as was involved in the Regional Rail Reorganization Congress' response was to permit the numerous laws then extant allowing confidentiality to stand; it is not for us to override that legislative choice. The discretion vested by Congress in the FAA, in both its nature and scope, is broad. There is not, however, any inevitable inconsistency between the general congressional intent to replace the broad standard of the former Administrative Procedure and its intent to preserve, for air transport regulation, a broad degree of discretion on what information is to be protected in the public interest in order to insure continuing access to the sources of sensitive information necessary to the regulation of air transport. Congress could not reasonably anticipate every situation in which the balance must tip in favor of nondisclosure as a means of insuring that the primary, or indeed sole, source of essential information would continue to volunteer information needed to develop and maintain safety standards. The public interest is served by assuring a free flow of relevant information to the regulatory *267 authorities from the airlines. Congress could appropriately conclude that the public interest was better served by guaranteeing confidentiality in order to secure the |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | better served by guaranteeing confidentiality in order to secure the maximum amount of information relevant to safety. The wisdom of the balance struck by Congress is not open to judicial scrutiny. It was inescapable that some regulatory authorities be vested with broad, flexible discretion, the exercise of which was made subject to continuing scrutiny by Congress. Following passage of the "[g]eneral oversight into the administration of the Freedom of Information [was] exercised by the [House] Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee and the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1419, pp. 3-4 (1972). It is not insignificant that this overall scrutiny of the in 1972 brought no change in Exemption 3. Indeed, when Congress amended the Freedom of Information in it reaffirmed the continued vitality of this particular exemption, covering statutes vesting in the agencies wide authority. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, p. 12 ; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, p. 12 Moreover, Congress amended the in to require that all agencies submit to each House, on an annual basis, "the number of determinations made by such agency not to comply with requests for records and the reasons for each such determination." 5 U.S. C. 552 (d) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In light of this continuing close scrutiny, we are bound to assume that Congress exercised an informed judgment as to the needs of the FAA and that it was persuaded as to the necessity, or at least of the practical compatibility, of both statutes. Reversed. *268 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN dissent for the reasons given in Judge Fahy's opinion for the Court of Appeals, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 298, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108424/sec-v-medical-comm-for-human-rights/ | The Medical Committee for Human Rights acquired by gift five shares of stock in Dow Chemical Co. In March 1968, the Committee's national chairman wrote a letter to the company expressing concern over its policy with respect to the production and sale of napalm. The letter also requested that there be included in the company's proxy statement for 1968 a proposal to amend Dow's Certificate of Incorporation to prohibit the sale of napalm unless the purchaser gives reasonable assurance that the napalm will not be used against human beings. Dow replied that the proposal was too late for inclusion in the 1968 proxy statement and for discussion at that year's annual meeting, but that it would be reconsidered the following year. In an exchange of letters with Dow in 1969, the Committee indicated its belief that it had a right under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Commission,14a-8 (1970) (promulgated pursuant to 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 78n (a)), to have its proposal included in the company's proxy statement for consideration by all shareholders. On February 7, 1969, Dow responded that it intended to omit the proposal (somewhat modified) from the 1969 statement under the authority of subsections of the SEC Rule relied on by the Committee that permitted omission of shareholder proposals under two sets of circumstances: 240.14a-8 (c) (2)"If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its management, or primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes"; or *405 240.14a-8 (c) (5)"If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer." The Committee requested that Dow's decision be reviewed by the staff of the SEC. On February 18, 1969, the Chief Counsel for the Division of Corporation Finance wrote both Dow and the Committee to inform them that "this Division will not recommend any action to the Commission if this proposal is omitted from the management's proxy material." App. 21. The SEC Commissioners granted a request by the Committee that they review the Division's decision and affirmed it. App. The Committee then sought and obtained review of the Commission's decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On July 8, 1970, the Court of Appeals held that the decision of the |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108424/sec-v-medical-comm-for-human-rights/ | the Court of Appeals held that the decision of the SEC was reviewable under 25 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. 78y (a); that while review of Dow's decision was clearly available in district court, review of the SEC's decision could also be obtained in a court of appeals; that the validity of the Commission's determination was extremely dubious, especially in light of its failure to state reasons supporting its conclusion; and that the case should be remanded to the Commission for reconsideration and a statement of reasons. 139 U. S. App. D. C. 226, The Commission petitioned for review here, and we granted certiorari on March 22, 1971. Events have taken place, subsequent to the decision by the court below, and some subsequent to our decision to grant certiorari, that require that we dismiss this case on the ground that it has now become moot. In January 1971, the Medical Committee again submitted *406 its napalm resolution for inclusion in Dow's 1971 proxy statement. This time Dow acquiesced in the Committee's request and included the proposal. At the annual stockholder's meeting in May 1971, Dow's shareholders voted on the Committee's proposal. Less than 3% of all voting shareholders supported it, and pursuant to Rule 14a-8 (c) (4) (i),14a-8 (c) (4) (i), Dow may exclude the same or substantially the same proposal from its proxy materials for the next three years. We find that this series of events has mooted the controversy. Respondent argues that it will continue to urge the adoption of the proposal and its inclusion in proxy statements, and that it is likely that Dow will reject inclusion in the future as it has in the past. It is true that in permitting the proposal to be included in the 1971 proxy statement Dow stated that it adhered to its opinion that the proposal might properly be omitted and that its inclusion was without prejudice to future exclusion. However, this does not create the controversy that is necessary for us to retain jurisdiction to decide the merits. Whether or not the Committee will actually resubmit its proposal or a similar one in 1974 is purely a matter of conjecture at this point, as is whether or not Dow will accept it. If Dow were likely to repeat its allegedly illegal conduct, the case would not be moot. See ; United However, in light of the meager support the proposal attracted, we can only speculate that Dow will continue to include the proposal when it again becomes eligible for inclusion, rather than to |
Justice Burger | 1,970 | 12 | majority | Dickey v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108148/dickey-v-florida/ | We granted the writ in this case to consider the petitioner's claim that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial: he was tried in on charges of alleged criminal acts committed in 1960. *31 Prior to the commencement of his jury trial in for armed robbery petitioner, Robert Dickey, moved to quash the information against him, alleging, inter alia, that if he were tried he would be denied his right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed by 11 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution[1] and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2] The motion was denied. Dickey was subsequently tried and convicted. He appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeal, First District, alleging error in the trial court's denial of his motion to quash. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a brief order. We granted Dickey leave to proceed in forma pauperis and granted his petition for a writ of certiorari. We reverse. I At about 2 o'clock in the morning of June 28, 1960, Clark's Motor Court in Quincy, Gadsden County, Florida, was robbed by a lone armed robber. The victim and only eyewitness was Mrs. Ralph Clark. She immediately reported the crime to Deputy County Sheriff Martin and gave a description of the robber to him; this description was routinely recorded for later reference. Shortly thereafter, Dickey was taken into custody on federal bank robbery charges and placed in the *32 Jackson County Jail, Marianna, Florida. Apparently the description Mrs. Clark had given Deputy Martin was sufficiently similar to Dickey that on July 1, 1960, he showed Mrs. Clark a picture of Dickey. Mrs. Clark and Deputy Martin then went to the Jackson County Jail where she identified Dickey as her assailant. Later that day Deputy Martin secured an arrest warrant charging Dickey with armed robbery.[3] From July 1, 1960, to September 2, 1960, Dickey remained in the Jackson County Jail. The Gadsden County Sheriff's Office knew of his whereabouts but made no effort to serve the warrant or gain custody for the purpose of trial. On September 2, 1960, Dickey, having been convicted on federal charges, was removed from Florida, first to Leavenworth and then Alcatraz. On the same day, the Gadsden County warrant was sent to the Chief United States Marshal, Atlanta, Georgia, and a formal detainer was lodged against Dickey. In 1962 Dickey filed in the Gadsden County Circuit Court a petition styled "writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum" naming the State Attorney for Gadsden County as respondent and asking that he be |
Justice Burger | 1,970 | 12 | majority | Dickey v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108148/dickey-v-florida/ | for Gadsden County as respondent and asking that he be required to show cause why he should not be ordered to either take the steps necessary to obtain Dickey's presence in Florida for trial or withdraw the detainer for failure to provide Dickey with a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The Circuit Court, in an order dated December 1, 1962, denied the petition on several grounds: first, that Dickey's unavailability for trial in Florida was the result of his voluntary commission of a federal crime, the natural consequence of which was incarceration in a federal penal institution; second, that *33 the speedy-trial issue was prematurely raised because only at the time of trial can a determination be made as to whether the delay has made a fair trial impossible; third, that even if the denial of an immediate trial was violative of Dickey's Sixth Amendment rights, it was a deprivation caused wholly by the federal officials having custody of his person, and any relief had to flow from those authorities. Dickey filed papers raising substantially the same contentions on two later occasions, April 1, 1963, and March 28, 1966. The Circuit Court denied both petitions, simply citing the prior denial dated December 1, 1962. Dickey next petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Circuit Court to either secure his return for trial or withdraw the detainer against him. The Circuit Court judge filed as a return the orders of December 1962, April 1963, and April 1966. Thereafter the Attorney General of Florida filed a brief in opposition arguing that Dickey should not be heard to complain that he had not received a speedy trial in Gadsden County because his unavailability was caused by the voluntary commission of criminal acts. Counsel was appointed for Dickey and the Florida Supreme Court heard argument on the petition for mandamus. The Florida Supreme Court rejected the State's claim that a person incarcerated for one crime has no right to demand his constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial on another charge. The court held that incarceration does not make the accused unavailable since there have long been means by which one jurisdiction, for the purpose of a criminal trial, can obtain custody of a prisoner held by another. That court also held that the prisoner's demand upon the accusing State gives rise *34 to an obligation to act affirmatively to secure his presence for trial; failure of the accusing State to promptly obtain the defendant from the detaining sovereign might invalidate any judgment ultimately |
Justice Burger | 1,970 | 12 | majority | Dickey v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108148/dickey-v-florida/ | defendant from the detaining sovereign might invalidate any judgment ultimately obtained, if the time lapse is sufficiently great and is not excused.[4] The Florida Supreme Court concluded that once the discretionary decision to charge a prisoner with a crime has been made, an obligation arises to act diligently toward procuring the accused for trial and that obligation is a ministerial duty subject to a writ of mandamus. However, since Dickey had named the Circuit Court as the respondent, rather than the appropriate State Attorney, the petition was dismissed without prejudice to his right to file another petition naming the appropriate respondent. On September 1, Dickey filed with the Circuit Court a motion to have the court order the Gadsden County State Attorney to dismiss the detainer warrant because he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The State Attorney then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to secure Dickey's return to Florida for trial. On December 15, the Circuit Court issued the writ, and on the same day the State Attorney filed an information charging Dickey with the armed robbery allegedly committed in 1960. Dickey was returned to Florida on January 23, On January 30, the day before the trial was to begin, Dickey's appointed counsel filed a motion for a continuance so that the whereabouts of two witnesses could *35 be determined, and a motion asking that the information be quashed on the ground that the delay of over seven years amounted to a denial of Dickey's right to a speedy trial. The motion alleged that the delay was sufficiently prejudicial to make a fair trial impossible.[5] The Circuit Court granted the continuance but took the motion to quash under advisement. The trial was set for February 13. Dickey's counsel filed another motion for a continuance, dated February 12, stating that one of the witnesses could not be located and that more time was needed.[6] The court denied the motion and, before the commencement of the trial on the next day, denied the motion to quash. At the trial Mrs. Clark testified from memory as to the description she had given the deputy after the crime, that she had identified Dickey in the Jackson County Jail, and that he was the robber. She stated that she could not recall having seen Dickey before the night of the crime. Deputy Martin also testified concerning the identification at the Jackson jail, noting that the jailer who had been present when Mrs. Clark viewed Dickey had since died. He further testified as to the description |
Justice Burger | 1,970 | 12 | majority | Dickey v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108148/dickey-v-florida/ | had since died. He further testified as to the description of the robber Mrs. Clark had given him, admitting that his memory was hazy and that the notes he *36 had made while investigating the crime had long since been destroyed. The record indicates that Dickey's defense consisted of his claim that he was in Waycross, Georgia, at the time of the crime and of testimony of another witness that he and Dickey had visited the victimized motel several times. From this latter evidence the defense argued the unlikelihood that Dickey would commit robbery at a place where he was known and would be recognized. Dickey was convicted and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in the State Penitentiary, the sentence to run consecutively with the federal term he was then serving. He then sought review in the Florida District Court of Appeal, alleging that the trial judge had erred in not granting his motion to quash. That court affirmed the conviction without opinion, saying only that "appellant. failed to demonstrate reversible error" II The record in this case shows that petitioner was available to the State at all times during the seven-year period before his trial. The State suggests no tenable reason for deferring the trial in the face of petitioner's diligent and repeated efforts by motions in the state court in 1962, 1963, and 1966 to secure a prompt trial. In the interval two witnesses died and another potential defense witness is alleged to have become unavailable. Police records of possible relevance have been lost or destroyed. Florida argues that the right of the petitioner under the Federal Constitution did not arise until this Court's decision in and that not until was there a constitutional requirement that the *37 State press for trial of a defendant in custody in another jurisdiction. As noted by the Court in the holding of the Klopfer case was that "the Fourteenth Amendment, [applying] the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is enforceable against the States as `one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.' " -375. From this the Court went on to hold that on demand a State had a duty to make a diligent and good-faith effort to secure the presence of the accused from the custodial jurisdiction and afford him a trial. In Smith we remanded the case to the state court without deciding whether the defendant, when available for trial in the state court, would be required to show prejudice arising from the delay. Here the State of Florida brought the petitioner back to Florida, tried, |
Justice Burger | 1,970 | 12 | majority | Dickey v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108148/dickey-v-florida/ | State of Florida brought the petitioner back to Florida, tried, and convicted him. Petitioner's challenge is directly to the power of the State to try him after the lapse of almost eight years during which he repeatedly demanded and was denied a trial. The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecution's case, as is the defendant's right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases.[7] Although a great many accused persons seek to put *38 off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.[8] This is brought sharply into focus when, as here, the accused presses for an early confrontation with his accusers and with the State. Crowded dockets, the lack of judges or lawyers, and other factors no doubt make some delays inevitable. Here, however, no valid reason for the delay existed; it was exclusively for the convenience of the State. On this record the delay with its consequent prejudice is intolerable as a matter of fact and impermissible as a matter of law. In addition to exerting every effort to require the State to try him, there is present in this record abundant evidence of actual prejudice to petitioner in the death of two potential witnesses, unavailability of another, and the loss of police records. This is sufficient to make a remand on that issue unnecessary.[9] We therefore reverse and remand to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, with directions to vacate the judgment appealed from and direct the dismissal of any proceedings arising out of the charges on which that judgment was based. MR. |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | The general rule that a witness must affirmatively claim the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination must in my *192 view admit of an exception in the case of a grand jury witness whom the prosecutor interrogates with the express purpose of getting evidence upon which to base a criminal charge against him. In such circumstances, even warnings, before interrogation, of his right to silence do not suffice. The privilege is emptied of substance unless the witness is further advised by the prosecutor that he is a potential defendant. Only if the witness then nevertheless intentionally and intelligently waives his right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination and submits to further interrogation should use of his grand jury testimony against him be sanctioned. As I stated in United : "I would hold that, in the absence of an intentional and intelligent waiver by the individual of his known right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination, the Government may not call before a grand jury one whom it has probable causeas measured by an objective standard to suspect of committing a crime, and by use of judicial compulsion compel him to testify with regard to that crime. In the absence of such a waiver, the Fifth Amendment requires that any testimony obtained in this fashion be unavailable to the Government for use at trial. Such a waiver could readily be demonstrated by proof that the individual was warned prior to questioning that he is currently subject to possible criminal prosecution for the commission of a stated crime" In this case, although respondent Washington was advised of his rights to silence and to talk to a lawyer before he appeared before the grand jury, he was "only told that he was needed as a witness in prosecuting the two who were occupants of the van at the time of its impoundment." He was never told that he was in danger of being indicted himself, even though "at the time of his grand jury appearance respondent was a potential defendant whose *193 indictment was considered likely by the prosecution." Ante, at 186 n. 4. The ancient privilege of a witness against being compelled to incriminate himself is precious to free men as a shield against high-handed and arrogant inquisitorial practices. It has survived centuries of controversies, periodically kindled by popular impatience that its protection sometimes allows the guilty to escape punishment. But it has endured as a wise and necessary protection of the individual against arbitrary power, and the price of occasional failures of justice is paid in the larger interest of general personal security. |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109659/united-states-v-washington/ | is paid in the larger interest of general personal security. I would hold that a failure to warn the witness that he is a potential defendant is fatal to an indictment of him when it is made unmistakably to appear, as here, that the grand jury inquiry became an investigation directed against the witness and was pursued with the purpose of compelling him to give self-incriminating testimony upon which to indict him. I would further hold that without such prior warning and the witness' subsequent voluntary waiver of his privilege, there is such gross encroachment upon the witness' privilege as to render worthless the values protected by it unless the self-incriminating testimony is unavailable to the Government for use at any trial brought pursuant to even a valid indictment. It should be remarked that, of course, today's decision applies only to application of the privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[*] The holding does not affect the authority of state courts to construe counterpart provisions of state constitutionseven identically phrased provisions"to give the individual greater protection than is provided" by the *194 federal provision. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, A number of state courts have recognized that a defendant or potential defendant called before a grand jury is privileged against the State's using his self-incriminating testimony to procure an indictment or using it to introduce against him at trial, even in the absence of an affirmative claim of his privilege against self-incrimination. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; See additional cases in Annot., Privilege Against Self-incrimination as to Testimony before Grand Jury, 38 A. L. R. 2d 225, 290-294 (1954). One court has specifically held that interrogating a potential defendant "under [the] guise of examining him as to the guilt of someone else" is a violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See also Newman, The Suspect and the Grand Jury: A Need for Constitutional Protection, ; Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, ; Meshbesher, Right to Counsel before Grand Jury, 41 F. R. D. 189, 191 (1966). The rationale of these decisionswhich I would find applicable to the case now before usis that where the grand jury investigation is in fact a proceeding against the witness, or even if begun as a general investigation it becomes a proceeding against the witness, the encroachment upon the witness' privilege requires that a court deny to the prosecution the use of the witness' self-incriminating testimony. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | We decide in this case whether an alien who has requested and been granted voluntary departure from the United States, a form of discretionary relief that avoids certain statutory penalties, must adhere to that election and depart within the time prescribed, even if doing so causes the alien to forgo a ruling on a pending, unresolved motion to reopen the removal proceedings. The case turns upon the interaction of relevant provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, -546 (IIRIRA or Act). The Act provides that every alien ordered removed from the United States has a right to file one motion to reopen his or her removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. 9a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The statute also provides, however, that if the alien's request for voluntary departure is granted after he or she is found removable, the alien is required to depart within the period prescribed by immigration officials, which cannot exceed 60 days. See 9c(b)(2) (2000 ed.). Failure to depart within the prescribed period renders the alien ineligible for certain forms of relief, including adjustment of status, for a period of 10 years. 9c(d)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Pursuant to regulation, however, departure has the effect of withdrawing the motion to reopen. See 8 CFR 1003.2(d) *2311 Without some means, consistent with the Act, to reconcile the two commands one directing voluntary departure and the other directing termination of the motion to reopen if an alien departs the United States an alien who seeks reopening has two poor choices: The alien can remain in the United States to ensure the motion to reopen remains pending, while incurring statutory penalties for overstaying the voluntary departure date; or the alien can avoid penalties by prompt departure but abandon the motion to reopen. The issue is whether Congress intended the statutory right to reopen to be qualified by the voluntary departure process. The alien, who is petitioner here, urges that filing a motion to reopen tolls the voluntary departure period pending the motion's disposition. We reject this interpretation because it would reconfigure the voluntary departure scheme in a manner inconsistent with the statutory design. We do not have the authority to interpret the statute as petitioner suggests. Still, the conflict between the right to file a motion to reopen and the provision requiring voluntary departure no later than 60 days remains untenable if these are the only two choices available to the alien. Absent a valid regulation resolving the dilemma in a different way, we conclude the alien must be permitted an opportunity to |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | we conclude the alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw the motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before the departure period expires. Petitioner attempted to avail himself of this opportunity below. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not disturb the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA or Board) denial of petitioner's request to withdraw the voluntary departure election. We now reverse its decision and remand the case. I Petitioner Samson Taiwo Dada, a native and citizen of Nigeria, came to the United States in April 1998 on a temporary nonimmigrant visa. He overstayed it. In 1999, petitioner alleges, he married an American citizen. Petitioner's wife filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf. The necessary documentary evidence was not provided, however, and the petition was denied in February 2003. In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged petitioner with being removable under 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, 8 U.S.C. 7(a)(1)(B) (2000 ed., Supp. V), for overstaying his visa. Petitioner's wife then filed a second I-130 petition. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner's request for a continuance pending adjudication of the newly filed I-130 petition and noted that those petitions take an average of about three years to process. The IJ found petitioner to be removable but granted the request for voluntary departure under 9c(b) (2000 ed.). The BIA affirmed on November 4, without a written opinion. It ordered petitioner to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties, including a civil fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 and ineligibility for relief under 240A, 240B, 245, 248, and 249 of the INA for a period of 10 years. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5-6. Two days before expiration of the 30-day period, on December 2, petitioner sought to withdraw his request for voluntary departure. At the same time he filed with the BIA a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 9a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). He contended that his motion recited new and material evidence demonstrating a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until the second I-130 petition was resolved. *2312 On February 8, more than two months after the voluntary departure period expired, the BIA denied the motion to reopen on the ground that petitioner had overstayed his voluntary departure period. Under 240B(d) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 9c(d) (2000 ed. and Supp. V), the BIA reasoned, an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but fails to depart in a timely fashion is statutorily |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | but fails to depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from applying for and receiving certain forms of discretionary relief, including adjustment of status. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-4. The BIA did not address petitioner's motion to withdraw his request for voluntary departure. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in the court held that the BIA's reading of the applicable statutes as rendering petitioner ineligible for relief was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit joined the First and Fourth Circuits in concluding that there is no automatic tolling of the voluntary departure period. See ; Four other Courts of Appeals have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., ; ; ; We granted certiorari, see to resolve the disagreement among the Court of Appeals. After oral argument we ordered supplemental briefing, see 552 U.S. to address whether an alien may withdraw his request for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. Also after oral argument, on January 10, petitioner's second I-130 application was denied by the IJ on the ground that his marriage is a sham, contracted solely to obtain immigration benefits. II Resolution of the questions presented turns on the interaction of two statutory schemes the statutory right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings; and the rules governing voluntary departure. A Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief that allows certain favored aliens either before the conclusion of removal proceedings or after being found deportable to leave the country willingly. Between 1927 to over 42 million aliens were granted voluntary departure; almost 13 million of those departures occurred between 1996 and alone. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Aliens Expelled: Fiscal Years 1892 to Table 38 online at http://www.dhs.gov/ ximgtn/statistics/ publications/YrBk05En.shtm (all Internet materials as visited June 13, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Voluntary departure was "originally developed by administrative officers, in the absence of a specific mandate in the statute." 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure 74.02[1], p. 74-15 (hereinafter Gordon). The practice was first codified in the Alien Registration Act of 0, 20, The Alien Registration Act amended 19 of the Immigration Act of Feb. 5, to provide that an alien "deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding *2313 five years" may be permitted by the Attorney General to "depart the United States to any country of his choice at his own expense, in lieu of deportation." 20(c), In 1996, perhaps in response |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | in lieu of deportation." 20(c), In 1996, perhaps in response to criticism of immigration officials who had expressed frustration that aliens granted voluntary departure were "permitted to continue their illegal presence in the United States for months, and even years," Letter from Benjamin G. Habberton, Acting Commissioner on Immigration and Naturalization, to the Executive Director of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, reprinted in Hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954 (Comm. Print 1952), Congress curtailed the period of time during which an alien may remain in the United States pending voluntary departure. The Act, as pertinent to voluntary departures requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, provides: "The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien's own expense if, at the conclusion of a proceeding under section 9a of this title, the immigration judge enters an order granting voluntary departure in lieu of removal and finds that "(A) the alien has been physically present in the United States for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date the notice to appear was served under section 9(a) of this title; "(B) the alien is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least 5 years immediately preceding the alien's application for voluntary departure; "(C) the alien is not deportable under section 7(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 7(a)(4) of this title; and "(D) the alien has established by clear and convincing evidence that the alien has the means to depart the United States and intends to do so." 8 U.S.C. 9c(b)(1). See also 9c(a)(1) ("The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien's own expense under this subsection" in lieu of being subject to removal proceedings or prior to the completion of those proceedings; the alien need not meet the requirements of 9c(b)(1) if removability is conceded). When voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, as it was in this case, the statute provides a voluntary departure period of not more than 60 days. See 9c(b)(2). The alien can receive up to 120 days if he or she concedes removability and requests voluntary departure before or during removal proceedings. See 9c(a)(2)(A). Appropriate immigration authorities may extend the time to depart but only if the voluntary departure period is less than the statutory maximum in the first instance. The voluntary departure period in no event may exceed 60 or 120 days for 9c(b) and 9c(a) departures, respectively. See 8 CFR 1240.26(f) |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | for 9c(b) and 9c(a) departures, respectively. See 8 CFR 1240.26(f) ("Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed 120 days or 60 days as set forth in section 240B of the Act"). *2314 The voluntary departure period typically does not begin to run until administrative appeals are concluded. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(47)(B) ; 9c(b)(1) (Attorney General may permit voluntary departure at conclusion of removal proceedings); see also 8 CFR 1003.6(a) In addition some Federal Courts of Appeals have found that they may stay voluntary departure pending consideration of a petition for review on the merits. See, e.g., ; But see This issue is not presented here, however, and we leave its resolution for another day. Voluntary departure, under the current structure, allows the Government and the alien to agree upon a quid pro quo. From the Government's standpoint, the alien's agreement to leave voluntarily expedites the departure process and avoids the expense of deportation including procuring necessary documents and detaining the alien pending deportation. The Government also eliminates some of the costs and burdens associated with litigation over the departure. With the apparent purpose of assuring that the Government attains the benefits it seeks, the Act imposes limits on the time for voluntary departure, see and prohibits judicial review of voluntary departure decisions, see 8 U.S.C. 9c(f) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Benefits to the alien from voluntary departure are evident as well. He or she avoids extended detention pending completion of travel arrangements; is allowed to choose when to depart (subject to certain constraints); and can select the country of destination. And, of great importance, by departing voluntarily the alien facilitates the possibility of readmission. The practice was first justified as involving "no warrant of deportation so that if [the alien reapplies] for readmission in the proper way he will not be barred." 2 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement: Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States 57, 102-103 (1931) (Report No. 5). The current statute likewise allows an alien who voluntarily departs to sidestep some of the penalties attendant to deportation. Under the current Act, an alien involuntarily removed from the United States is ineligible for readmission for a period of 5, 10, or 20 years, depending upon the circumstances of removal. See |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | or 20 years, depending upon the circumstances of removal. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) of this title or at the end of proceedings under section 9a of this title initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal) is inadmissible"); 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) ("Any alien not described in clause (i) who (I) has been ordered removed under section [240] or any other provision of law, or (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal is inadmissible"). An alien who makes a timely departure under a grant of voluntary departure, on the other hand, is not subject to these restrictions although he *2315 or she otherwise may be ineligible for readmission based, for instance, on an earlier unlawful presence in the United States, see 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). B A motion to reopen is a form of procedural relief that "asks the Board to change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing." 1 Gordon 3.05[8][c]. Like voluntary departure, reopening is a judicial creation later codified by federal statute. An early reference to the procedure was in when a Federal District Court addressed an alien's motion to reopen her case to provide evidence of her marriage to a United States citizen. See Ex parte Chan Shee, ; see also Chew Hoy "The reopening of a case by the immigration authorities for the introduction of further evidence" was treated then, as it is now, as "a matter for the exercise of their discretion"; where the alien was given a "full opportunity to testify and to present all witnesses and documentary evidence at the original hearing," judicial interference was deemed unwarranted. Wong Shong In 1958, when the BIA was established, the Attorney General promulgated a rule for the reopening and reconsideration of removal proceedings, 8 CFR 3.2, upon which the current regulatory provision is based. See 23 Fed.Reg. 9115, 9118-9119 (1958), final rule codified at 8 CFR 3.2 (1959) ; see also Board of Immigration Appeals: Powers; and Reopening or Reconsideration of Cases, 27 Fed.Reg. 96-97 (Jan. 5, 1962). Until 1996, there was no time limit for requesting the reopening of a case due to the availability of new evidence. Then, in "fear[ful] that deportable or excludable aliens [were] try[ing] to prolong their stays in the U.S. by filing one type of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | their stays in the U.S. by filing one type of discretionary relief after another in immigration proceedings," Justice Dept. Finds Aliens Not Abusing Requests for Relief, 68 No. 27 Interpreter 907 Congress ordered the Attorney General to "issue regulations with respect to the period of time in which motions to reopen may be offered in deportation proceedings," including "a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions," 545(d)(1), The Attorney General found little evidence of abuse, concluding that requirements for reopening are a disincentive to bad faith filings. See 68 Interpreter Because "Congress neither rescinded [n]or amended its mandate to limit the number and time frames of motions," however, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a regulation imposing new time limits and restrictions on filings. The new regulation allowed the alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 18901, 18905 (1996); see 8 CFR 3.2(c) (1996). With the 1996 enactment of the Act, Congress adopted the recommendations of the DOJ with respect to numerical and time limits. The current provision governing motions to reopen states: "(A) In general "An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section "(B) Contents *2316 "The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. "(C) Deadline (i) "In general "Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal." 8 U.S.C. 9a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp.V). To qualify as "new," 9a(c)(7)(B), the facts must be "material" and of the sort that "could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing," 8 CFR 1003.2(c)(1) ; 1 Gordon 3.05[8][c] ("Evidence is not previously unavailable merely because the movant chose not to testify or to present evidence earlier, or because the IJ refused to admit the evidence"). There are narrow exceptions to the 90-day filing period for asylum proceedings and claims of battered spouses, children, and parents, see 8 U.S.C. 9a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv) (2000 ed., Supp. V), which are not applicable here. The Act, to be sure, limits in significant ways the availability of the motion to reopen. It must be noted, though, that the Act transforms the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | to a statutory form of relief available to the alien. Nowhere in 9c(b) or 9a(c)(7) did Congress discuss the impact of the statutory right to file a motion to reopen on a voluntary departure agreement. And no legislative history indicates what some Members of Congress might have intended with respect to the motion's status once the voluntary departure period has elapsed. But the statutory text is plain insofar as it guarantees to each alien the right to file "one motion to reopen proceedings under this section." 9a(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. V). III The Government argues that, by requesting and obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, the alien knowingly surrenders the opportunity to seek reopening. See Brief for Respondent 29-30. Further, according to the Government, petitioner's proposed rule for tolling the voluntary departure period would undermine the "carefully crafted rules governing voluntary departure," including the statutory directive that these aliens leave promptly. To be sure, 8 U.S.C. 9c(b)(2) contains no ambiguity: The period within which the alien may depart voluntarily "shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days." See also 8 CFR 1240.26(f) ("In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed" the statutory periods prescribed by 8 U.S.C. 9c(a) and 9c(b)); 9c(d) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (imposing statutory penalties for failure to depart). Further, 9a(c)(7) does not forbid a scheme under which an alien knowingly relinquishes the right to seek reopening in exchange for other benefits, including those available to the alien under the voluntary departure statute. That does not describe this case, however. Nothing in the statutes or past usage with respect to voluntary departure or motions to reopen indicates they cannot coexist. Neither 9a(c)(7) nor 9c(b)(2) says anything about the filing of a motion to reopen by an alien who has requested and been granted the opportunity to voluntarily depart. And there is no other statutory language that would place the alien on notice of an inability to seek the case's reopening in the event of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances *2317 bearing upon eligibility for relief. In reading a statute we must not "look merely to a particular clause," but consider "in connection with it the whole statute." ; internal quotation marks omitted); see also ; United Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside the statutory right granted to the alien by 8 U.S.C. 9a(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. V) to pursue "one motion to reopen proceedings," the Government's position that the alien is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen if |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen if the alien agrees to voluntarily depart is unsustainable. It would render the statutory right to seek reopening a nullity in most cases of voluntary departure.) It is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the time allowed for voluntary departure will expire long before the BIA issues a decision on a timely filed motion to reopen. See Proposed Rules, DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion to Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition for Review, 72 Fed.Reg. 67674, 67677, and n. 2 ("As a practical matter, it is often the case that an immigration judge or the Board cannot reasonably be expected to adjudicate a motion to reopen or reconsider during the voluntary departure period"). These practical limitations must be taken into account. In the present case the BIA denied petitioner's motion to reopen 68 days after he filed the motion and 66 days after his voluntary departure period had expired. Although the record contains no statistics on the average disposition time for motions to reopen, the number of BIA proceedings has increased over the last two decades, doubling between and 2000 alone; and, as a result, the BIA's backlog has more than tripled, resulting in a total of 63,763 undecided cases in 2000. See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Study Conducted for: the American Bar Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono Re: Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management 13 (2003), online at http://www.dorsey. com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf. Since 2000, the BIA has adopted new procedures to reduce its backlog and shorten disposition times. In the DOJ introduced rules to improve case management, including an increase in the number of cases referred to a single Board member and use of summary disposition procedures for cases without basis in law or fact. See BIA: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.Reg. 54878 final rule codified at 8 CFR 1003 ; see also 1003.1(e)(4) (summary affirmance procedures). Nevertheless, on September 30, there were 33,063 cases pending before the BIA, 18% *2318 of which were more than a year old. See FY Statistical Year at U1. On September 30, approximately 20% of the cases pending had been filed during fiscal year See Whether an alien's motion will be adjudicated within the 60-day statutory period in all likelihood will depend on pure happenstance namely, the backlog of the particular Board member to whom the motion is assigned. Cf. United Absent tolling or some other remedial action by the Court, then, the alien who is granted |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | action by the Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: He or she can leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order; but, pursuant to regulation, the motion to reopen will be deemed withdrawn. See 8 CFR 1003.2(d); see also 23 Fed.Reg. 9115, 9118, final rule codified at 8 CFR 3.2 (1958). Alternatively, if the alien wishes to pursue reopening and remains in the United States to do so, he or she risks expiration of the statutory period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. See 8 U.S.C. 9c(d)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (failure to timely depart renders alien "ineligible, for a period of 10 years," for cancellation of removal under 240A, adjustment of status under 245, change of nonimmigrant status under 248, and registry under 249 of the INA); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-4 (treating petitioner's motion to reopen as forfeited for failure to depart). The purpose of a motion to reopen is to ensure a proper and lawful disposition. We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was designed to remove this important safeguard for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law. See 8 U.S.C. 9c(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (barring aliens who have committed, inter alia, aggravated felonies or terrorism offenses from receiving voluntary departure); 9c(b)(1)(B) (requiring an alien who obtains voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceedings to demonstrate "good moral character"). This is particularly so when the plain text of the statute reveals no such limitation. See ; see also ; IV A It is necessary, then, to read the Act to preserve the alien's right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government's interest in the quid pro quo of the voluntary departure arrangement. Some solutions, though, do not conform to the statutory design. Petitioner, as noted, proposes automatic tolling of the voluntary departure period during the pendency *2319 of the motion to reopen. We do not find statutory authority for this result. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. In return for anticipated benefits, including the possibility of readmission, an alien who requests voluntary departure represents that he or she "has the means to depart the United States and intends to do so" promptly. 8 U.S.C. 9c(b)(1)(D); 8 CFR 1240.26(c)(1)(2) ; cf. 1240.26(c)(3) (the judge may impose additional conditions to "ensure the alien's timely departure from the United States"). Included among the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | alien's timely departure from the United States"). Included among the substantive burdens imposed upon the alien when selecting voluntary departure is the obligation to arrange for departure, and actually depart, within the 60-day period. Cf. United If the alien is permitted to stay in the United States past the departure date to wait out the adjudication of the motion to reopen, he or she cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure; for the benefit to the Government a prompt and costless departure would be lost. Furthermore, it would invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are not likely to be reopened by immigration authorities. B Although a statute or regulation might be adopted to resolve the dilemma in a different manner, as matters now stand the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. The DOJ, which has authority to adopt regulations relevant to the issue at hand, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw an application for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. According to this proposal, there is nothing in the Act or the implementing regulations that makes the grant of voluntary departure irrevocable. See 72 Fed.Reg. 67679. Accordingly, the DOJ has proposed an amendment to 8 CFR 1240.26 that, prospectively, would "provide for the automatic termination of a grant of voluntary departure upon the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider, as long as the motion is filed prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period." Part IV-D; cf. Part VI ("The provisions of this proposed rule will be applied prospectively only, that is, only with respect to immigration judge orders issued on or after the effective date of the final rule that grant a period of voluntary departure"). Although not binding in the present case, the DOJ's proposed interpretation of the statutory and regulatory scheme as allowing an alien to withdraw from a voluntary departure agreement "warrants respectful consideration." Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family S. Ct. 962, and Thomas Jefferson ). We hold that, to safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before expiration of the departure period, without regard to the underlying merits of the motion to reopen. As a result, the alien has the option either to abide by the terms, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | alien has the option either to abide by the terms, and receive the agreed-upon benefits, of voluntary departure; or, alternatively, to forgo *2 those benefits and remain in the United States to pursue an administrative motion. If the alien selects the latter option, he or she gives up the possibility of readmission and becomes subject to the IJ's alternate order of removal. See 8 CFR 1240.26(d). The alien may be removed by the Department of Homeland Security within 90 days, even if the motion to reopen has yet to be adjudicated. See 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(1)(A). But the alien may request a stay of the order of removal, see BIA Practice Manual 6.3(a), online at http:// www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/ qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm; cf. 8 U.S.C. 9a(b)(5)(C) (providing that a removal order entered in absentia is stayed automatically pending a motion to reopen); and, though the BIA has discretion to deny the motion for a stay, it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to do so where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening. Though this interpretation still confronts the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the Government's proposal and the elimination of benefits to the Government that would follow from petitioner's tolling rule. Contrary to the Government's assertion, the rule we adopt does not alter the quid pro quo between the Government and the alien. If withdrawal is requested prior to expiration of the voluntary departure period, the alien has not received benefits without costs; the alien who withdraws from a voluntary departure arrangement is in the same position as an alien who was not granted voluntary departure in the first instance. Allowing aliens to withdraw from their voluntary departure agreements, moreover, establishes a greater probability that their motions to reopen will be considered. At the same time, it gives some incentive to limit filings to nonfrivolous motions to reopen; for aliens with changed circumstances of the type envisioned by Congress in drafting 9a(c)(7) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) are the ones most likely to forfeit their previous request for voluntary departure in return for the opportunity to adjudicate their motions. Cf. Supplemental Brief for Respondent 1-2 ("[I]t is extraordinarily rare for an alien who has requested and been granted voluntary departure by the BIA to seek to withdraw from that arrangement within the voluntary departure period"). A more expeditious solution to the untenable conflict between the voluntary departure scheme and the motion to reopen might be to permit an alien who has departed the United States to pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture, much as |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Dada v. Mukasey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145792/dada-v-mukasey/ | States to pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture, much as Congress has permitted with respect to judicial review of a removal order. See IIRIRA 306(b), -612 (repealing 8 U.S.C. 1105a(c) ( ed.), which prohibited an alien who "departed from the United States after the issuance of the order" to seek judicial review). As noted previously, 8 CFR 1003.2(d) provides that the alien's departure constitutes withdrawal of the motion to reopen. This regulation, however, has not been challenged in these proceedings, and we do not consider it here. * * * Petitioner requested withdrawal of his motion for voluntary departure prior to expiration of his 30-day departure period. The BIA should have granted this request, without regard to the merits of petitioner's I-130 petition, and permitted petitioner to pursue his motion to reopen. We find this same mistake implicit in the Court of Appeals' decision. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | majority | Campbell v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118196/campbell-v-louisiana/ | We must decide whether a white criminal defendant has standing to object to discrimination against black persons in the selection of grand jurors. Finding he has the requisite standing to raise equal protection and due process claims, we reverse and remand. I A grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana, indicted petitioner Terry Campbell on one count of second-degree *395 murder. Campbell, who is white, filed a timely pretrial motion to quash the indictment on the grounds the grand jury was constituted in violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and in violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement. Campbell alleged a longstanding practice of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in the parish. His sole piece of evidence is that, between January 1976 and August 1993, no black person served as a grand jury foreperson in the parish, even though more than 20 percent of the registered voters were black persons. See Brief for Petitioner 16. The State does not dispute this evidence. The trial judge refused to quash the indictment because "Campbell, being a white man accused of killing another white man," lacked standing to complain "where all of the forepersons were white." App. to Pet. for Cert. G-33. After Campbell's first trial resulted in a mistrial, he was retried, convicted of second-degree murder, and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Campbell renewed his challenge to the grand jury foreperson selection procedures in a motion for new trial, which was denied. See at I-2. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, because, under our decision in Campbell had standing to object to the alleged discrimination even though he is white. The Court of Appeal remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing because it found Campbell's evidence of discrimination inadequate. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. It distinguished as turning on the "considerable and substantial impact" that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges has on a defendant's trial as well as on the integrity of the judicial system. See The court declined to extend to a claim of discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreperson. It also found did not *396 afford Campbell standing to raise a due process objection. In this Court held no relief could be granted to a white defendant even if his due process rights were violated by discrimination in the selection of a federal grand jury foreperson. Noting that turned on the ministerial nature of the federal grand jury foreperson's duties, the Louisiana Supreme Court held "[t]he role of the grand jury |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | majority | Campbell v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118196/campbell-v-louisiana/ | Louisiana Supreme Court held "[t]he role of the grand jury foreman in Louisiana appears to be similarly ministerial" such that any discrimination "has little, if any, effect on the defendant's due process right of fundamental fairness." 661 So. 2d, at Because the Court of Appeal had not addressed Campbell's other asserted points of error, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case. After the Court of Appeal rejected Campbell's remaining claims, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to reconsider its ruling on the grand jury issue, We granted certiorari to address the narrow question of Campbell's standing to raise equal protection, due process, and fair-cross-section claims. II As an initial matter, we note Campbell complains about more than discrimination in the selection of his grand jury foreperson; he alleges that discrimination shaped the composition of the grand jury itself. In the federal system and in most States which use grand juries, the foreperson is selected from the ranks of the already seated grand jurors. See 1 S. W. Bryson, J. Felman, & M. Elston, Grand Jury Law and Practice 4:6, pp. 4-20 to 4-21 (either the judge selects the foreperson or fellow grand jurors elect him or her). Under those systems, the title "foreperson" is bestowed on one of the existing grand jurors without any change in the grand jury's composition. In Louisiana, by contrast, the judge selects the foreperson from the grand jury venire before the remaining members of the grand jury have been chosen by lot. La. Code Crim. Proc. *397 Ann., Art. 413(B) ; see also 1 In addition to his other duties, the foreperson of the Louisiana grand jury has the same full voting powers as other grand jury members. As a result, when the Louisiana judge selected the foreperson, he also selected one member of the grand jury outside of the drawing system used to compose the balance of that body. These considerations require us to treat the case as one alleging discriminatory selection of grand jurors. III Standing to litigate often turns on imprecise distinctions and requires difficult line-drawing. On occasion, however, we can ascertain standing with relative ease by applying rules established in prior cases. See Campbell's equal protection claim is such an instance. In we found a white defendant had standing to challenge racial discrimination against black persons in the use of peremptory challenges. We determined the defendant himself could raise the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors. Recognizing our general reluctance to permit a litigant to assert the rights of a third party, we found three preconditions had been satisfied: (1) the |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | majority | Campbell v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118196/campbell-v-louisiana/ | party, we found three preconditions had been satisfied: (1) the defendant suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) he had a "close relationship" to the excluded jurors; and (3) there was some hindrance to the excluded jurors asserting their own rights. ). We concluded a white defendant suffers a serious injury in fact because discrimination at the voir dire stage "`casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process'. and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." This cloud of doubt deprives the defendant of the certainty that a verdict in his case "is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair." *398 Second, the excluded juror and criminal defendant have a close relationship: They share a common interest in eliminating discrimination, and the criminal defendant has an incentive to serve as an effective advocate because a victory may result in overturning his conviction. -414. Third, given the economic burdens of litigation and the small financial reward available, "a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights." Upon consideration of these factors, we concluded a white defendant had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to racial discrimination against black persons in the petit jury selection process. Although Campbell challenges discriminatory selection of grand jurors, rather than petit jurors, ` reasoning applies to this case on the question of standing. Our prior cases have not decided whether a white defendant's own equal protection rights are violated when the composition of his grand jury is tainted by discrimination against black persons. We do not need to address this issue because Campbell seeks to assert the well-established equal protection rights of black persons not to be excluded from grand jury service on the basis of their race. See Tr. 9 (Dec. 2, 1993); see also Campbell satisfies the three preconditions for third-party standing outlined in Regardless of his or her skin color, the accused suffers a significant injury in fact when the composition of the grand jury is tainted by racial discrimination. "[D]iscrimination on the basis of race in the selection of members of a grand jury strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system" because the grand jury is a central component of the criminal justice process. The Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Government *399 to use a grand jury to initiate a prosecution, and 22 States adopt a similar rule as a matter of state law. See 1 1:2, at 1-3; see also The grand jury, like |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | majority | Campbell v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118196/campbell-v-louisiana/ | 1 1:2, at 1-3; see also The grand jury, like the petit jury, "acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors." It controls not only the initial decision to indict, but also significant decisions such as how many counts to charge and whether to charge a greater or lesser offense, including the important decision to charge a capital crime. See The integrity of these decisions depends on the integrity of the process used to select the grand jurors. If that process is infected with racial discrimination, doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions. See at 555- emphasized the harm inflicted when a prosecutor discriminates by striking racial minorities in open court and in front of the entire jury pool. The Court expressed concern that this tactic might encourage the jury to be lawless in its own actions. See -413. The State suggests this sort of harm is not inflicted when a single grand juror is selected based on racial prejudice because the discrimination is invisible to the grand jurors on that panel; it only becomes apparent when a pattern emerges over the course of years. See Brief for Respondent 16. This argument, however, underestimates the seriousness of the allegations. In even if the prosecutor had been motivated by racial prejudice, those responsible for the defendant's fate, the judge and the jury, had shown no actual bias. If, by contrast, the allegations here are true, the impartiality and discretion of the judge himself would be called into question. *400 The remaining two preconditions to establish third-party standing are satisfied with little trouble. We find no reason why a white defendant would be any less effective as an advocate for excluded grand jurors than for excluded petit jurors. See -414. The defendant and the excluded grand juror share a common interest in eradicating discrimination from the grand jury selection process, and the defendant has a vital interest in asserting the excluded juror's rights because his conviction may be overturned as a result. See ; ; The State contends Campbell's connection to "the excluded class of jurors who were not called to serve for the prior 16[1]20442 years is tenuous, at best." Brief for Respondent 22. This argument confuses Campbell's underlying claim with the evidence needed to prove it. To assert the rights of those venirepersons who were excluded from serving on the grand jury in his case, Campbell must prove their exclusion was on account of intentional discrimination. He seeks to do so based on past treatment of similarly situated |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | majority | Campbell v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118196/campbell-v-louisiana/ | to do so based on past treatment of similarly situated venirepersons in other cases, see but this does not mean he seeks to assert those venirepersons' rights. As a final matter, excluded grand jurors have the same economic disincentives to assert their own rights as do excluded petit jurors. See We find Campbell, like any other white defendant, has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to discrimination against black persons in the selection of his grand jury. IV It is axiomatic that one has standing to litigate his or her own due process rights. We need not explore the nature and extent of a defendant's due process rights when he alleges discriminatory selection of grand jurors, and confine our holding to his standing to raise the issue. Our decision in Peters v. Kiff addressed the due process question, although *401 a majority of Justices could not agree on a comprehensive statement of the rule or an appropriate remedy for any violation. See ("[W]hatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the system used to select his grand jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes members of any race, and thereby denies him due process of law"); ("[T]he strong statutory policy of [18 U.S. C.] 243, which reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment" permits a white defendant to challenge discrimination in grand jury selection). Our more recent decision in proceeded on the implied assumption that a white defendant had standing to raise a due process objection to discriminatory appointment of a federal grand jury foreperson and skipped ahead to the question whether a remedy was It is unnecessary here to discuss the nature and full extent of due process protection in the context of grand jury selection. That issue, to the extent it is still open based upon our earlier precedents, should be determined on the merits, assuming a court finds it necessary to reach the point in light of the concomitant equal protection The relevant assumption of and our holding here, is that a defendant has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process. The Louisiana Supreme Court erred in reading to foreclose Campbell's standing to bring a due process 661 So. 2d, at In we held discrimination in the selection of a federal grand jury foreperson did not infringe principles of fundamental fairness because the foreperson's duties were "ministerial." See In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided a Louisiana grand jury foreperson's duties were ministerial too, but then couched its decision in terms of |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | majority | Campbell v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118196/campbell-v-louisiana/ | ministerial too, but then couched its decision in terms of Campbell's *402 lack of standing to litigate a due process 661 So. 2d, at The Louisiana Supreme Court was wrong on both counts. Its interpretation of is inconsistent with the implicit assumption of standing we have just noted and with our explicit reasoning in that case. In a federal grand jury foreperson was selected from the existing grand jurors, so the decision to pick one grand juror over another, at least arguably, affected the defendant only if the foreperson was given some significant duties that he would not have had as a regular grand juror. See Against this background, the Court rejected the defendant's claim because the ministerial role of a federal grand jury foreperson "is not such a vital one that discrimination in the appointment of an individual to that post significantly invades" due process. Campbell's challenge is different in kind and degree because it implicates the impermissible appointment of a member of the grand jury. See -397. What concerns Campbell is not the foreperson's performance of his duty to preside, but performance as a grand juror, namely, voting to charge Campbell with second-degree murder. The significance of this distinction was acknowledged by `s discussion of a previous case, In we assumed relief could be granted for a constitutional challenge to discrimination in the appointment of a state grand jury foreperson. See at distinguished in part because it involved Tennessee's grand jury system. Under the Tennessee law then in effect, 12 members of the grand jury were selected at random, and then the judge appointed a 13th member who also served as foreperson. See As a result, pointed out discrimination in selection of the foreperson in Tennessee was much more serious than in the federal system because the former can affect the composition of the grand jury whereas the latter cannot: "So *403 long as the grand jury itself is properly constituted, there is no risk that the appointment of any one of its members as foreman will distort the overall composition of the array or otherwise taint the operation of the judicial process." By its own terms, then, does not address a claim like Campbell's. V One of the questions raised on certiorari is whether Campbell also has standing to raise a fair-cross-section It appears neither the Louisiana Supreme Court nor the Louisiana Court of Appeal discussed this contention. "With `very rare exceptions,' we will not consider a petitioner's federal claim unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision |
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