author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111902/fall-river-dyeing-finishing-corp-v-nlrb/ | a labor organization. 29 U.S. C. 18(a)(2). And, unlike the initial election situation, see n. 1, here the employer, not the Board, applies this rule. We conclude, however, that in this situation the successor is in the best position to follow a rule the criteria of which are straightforward.[17] The employer generally will know with tolerable certainty when all its job classifications have been filled or substantially filled, when it has hired a majority of the employees it intends to hire, and when it has begun normal production. Moreover, the "full complement" standard advocated by petitioner is not necessarily easier for a successor *1 to apply than is the "substantial and representative complement." In fact, given the expansionist dreams of many new entrepreneurs, it might well be more difficult for a successor to identify the moment when the "full complement" has been attained, which is when the business will reach the limits of the new employer's initial hopes, than it would be for this same employer to acknowledge the time when its business has begun normal production the moment identified by the "substantial and representative complement" rule.[18] *2 We therefore hold that the Board's "substantial and representative complement" rule is reasonable in the successorship context. Moreover, its application to the facts of this case is supported by substantial record evidence. The Court of observed that by mid-January petitioner "had hired employees in virtually all job classifications, had hired at least fifty percent of those it would ultimately employ in the majority of those classifications, and it employed a majority of the employees it would eventually employ when it reached full complement." 77 F.2d, -432. At that time petitioner had begun normal production. Although petitioner intended to expand to two shifts, and, in fact, reached this goal by mid-April, that expansion was contingent expressly upon the growth of the business. Accordingly, as found by the Board and approved by the Court of mid-January was the period when petitioner reached its "substantial and representative complement." Because at that time the majority of petitioner's employees were former Sterlingwale employees, petitioner had an obligation to bargain with the Union then. C We hold that the Board's "continuing demand" rule is reasonable in the successorship situation. The successor's duty to bargain at the "substantial and representative complement" date is triggered only when the union has made a bargaining demand. Under the "continuing demand" rule, when a union has made a premature demand that has been rejected by the employer, this demand remains in force until the moment when the employer attains the "substantial and |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111902/fall-river-dyeing-finishing-corp-v-nlrb/ | until the moment when the employer attains the "substantial and representative complement." See, e. g., Aircraft Magnesium, 26 N. L. R. B., at 134, n. 9; Spruce Up Corp., 209 N. L. R. B. 194, 197 enf'd, 29 F.2d 16 (CA4 197). Such a rule, particularly when considered along with the "substantial and representative complement" rule, places a minimal burden on the successor and makes sense in light of the union's position. Once the employer has concluded that *3 it has reached the appropriate complement, then, in order to determine whether its duty to bargain will be triggered, it has only to see whether the union already has made a demand for bargaining. Because the union has no established relationship with the successor and because it is unaware of the successor's plans for its operations and hiring, it is likely that, in many cases, a union's bargaining demand will be premature. It makes no sense to require the union repeatedly to renew its bargaining demand in the hope of having it correspond with the "substantial and representative complement" date, when, with little trouble, the employer can regard a previous demand as a continuing one.[19] The reasonableness of the "continuing demand" rule is demonstrated by the facts of this case. Although the Union had asked Ansin to inform it about his plans for Sterlingwale so that it could become involved in the employer transition, the Union learned about this transition only after it had become a fait accompli. Without having any established relationship with petitioner, it therefore is not surprising that the Union's October bargaining demand was premature. The Union, however, made clear after this demand that, in its view, petitioner had a bargaining obligation: the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge in November. Petitioner responded by denying that it had any duty to bargain. Rather than being a successor confused about when a bargaining obligation might arise, petitioner took an initial position *4 and stuck with it that it never would have any bargaining obligation with the Union.[20] The judgment of the Court of is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Carney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111423/california-v-carney/ | The character of "the place to be searched"[1] plays an important role in Fourth Amendment analysis. In this case, police officers searched a Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle as a "hybrid" which combines "the mobility attribute of an automobile with most of the privacy characteristics of a house."[2] The hybrid character of the motor home places it at the crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid warrantless invasions of the home, and the law enforcement interests that support the exception for warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause, United By choosing to follow the latter route, the Court errs in three respects: it has entered new *396 territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to an exception rather than to the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior cases. I In recent Terms, the Court has displayed little confidence in state and lower federal court decisions that purport to enforce the Fourth Amendment. Unless an order suppressing evidence is clearly correct, a petition for certiorari is likely to garner the four votes required for a grant of plenary review as the one in this case did. Much of the Court's "burdensome" workload is a product of its own aggressiveness in this area. By promoting the Supreme Court of the United States as the High Magistrate for every warrantless search and seizure, this practice has burdened the argument docket with cases presenting fact-bound errors of minimal significance.[3] It has also encouraged state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari in even the most frivolous search and seizure cases.[4] The Court's lack of trust in lower judicial authority has resulted in another improvident exercise of discretionary *397 jurisdiction.[5] In what is at most only a modest extension of our Fourth Amendment precedents, the California Supreme Court held that police officers may not conduct a nonexigent search of a motor home without a warrant supported by probable cause. The State of California filed a petition for certiorari contending that the decision below conflicted with the authority of other jurisdictions.[6] Even a cursory examination of the cases alleged to be in conflict revealed that they did not consider the question presented here.[7] *398 This is not a case "in which an American citizen has been deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Rather, a state court has upheld a citizen's assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal and state law." As an unusually perceptive study |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Carney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111423/california-v-carney/ | both federal and state law." As an unusually perceptive study of this Court's docket stated with reference to "this situation rarely presents a compelling reason for Court review in the absence of a fully percolated conflict."[8] The Court's decision to forge ahead *399 has established a rule for searching motor homes that is to be followed by the entire Nation. If the Court had merely allowed the decision below to stand, it would have only governed searches of those vehicles in a single State. The breadth of this Court's mandate counsels greater patience before we offer our binding judgment on the meaning of the Constitution. Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles. Despite the age of the automobile exception and the countless cases in which it has been applied, we have no prior cases defining the contours of a reasonable search in the context of hybrids such as motor homes, house trailers, houseboats, or yachts. In this case, the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with recreational vehicles and mobile living quarters.[9] The line or lines separating mobile homes from permanent structures might have been drawn in various ways, with consideration given to whether the home is moving or at rest, whether it rests on land or water, the form of the vehicle's attachment to its location, its potential speed of departure, its size and capacity to serve as a domicile, and its method of locomotion. Rational decisionmaking strongly counsels against divining the uses and abuses of these vehicles in the vacuum of the first case raising the question before us. Of course, we may not abdicate our responsibility to clarify the law in this filed. Some caution, however, is justified when every decision requires us to resolve a vexing "conflict. between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement." United "The certainty that is supposed to come from speedy resolution *400 may prove illusory if a premature decision raises more questions than it answers."[10] The only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication. Consideration of this matter by the lower courts in a series of litigated cases would surely have facilitated a reasoned accommodation of the conflicting interests. To identify rules that will endure, we must rely on the state and lower federal courts to debate and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and unresolved questions of constitutional law.[11] Deliberation on the question over time winnows out the unnecessary |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Carney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111423/california-v-carney/ | Deliberation on the question over time winnows out the unnecessary *401 and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves "whatever is pure and sound and fine."[12] II The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." We have interpreted this language to provide law enforcement officers with a bright-line standard: "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." ; In United the Court reaffirmed the primary importance of the general rule condemning warrantless searches, and emphasized that the exception permitting the search of automobiles without a warrant is a narrow -825. We expressly endorsed "the general rule," stated in that " `[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.' " Given this warning and the presumption of regularity that attaches to a warrant,[13] it is hardly unrealistic to expect experienced law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant when one can easily be secured. The ascendancy of the warrant requirement in our system of justice must not be bullied aside by extravagant claims of necessity: " `The warrant requirement is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part *402 of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers" who are a part of any system of law enforcement.'] ". By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search `be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime' we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority." 442 U. S., at -759. If the motor home were parked in the exact middle of the intersection between the general rule and the exception for automobiles, priority should be given to the rule rather than the exception. III The motor home, however, was not parked in the middle of that intersection. Our prior cases teach us that inherent mobility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened expectations of privacy in the location searched. Motor homes, by their common use and construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. When a |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Carney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111423/california-v-carney/ | legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. When a motor home is parked in a location that is removed from the public highway, I believe that society is prepared to recognize that the expectations of privacy within it are not unlike the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling. As a general rule, such places may only be searched with a warrant based upon probable cause. Warrantless searches of motor homes are only reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways, or when exigent circumstances otherwise require an immediate search without the expenditure of time necessary to obtain a warrant. *403 As we explained in the automobile exception is the product of a long history: "[S]ince its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods. It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable." -807[] The automobile exception has been developed to ameliorate the practical problems associated with the search of vehicles that have been stopped on the streets or public highways because there was probable cause to believe they were transporting contraband. Until today, however, the Court has never decided whether the practical justifications that apply to a vehicle that is stopped in transit on a public way apply with the same force to a vehicle parked in a lot near a courthouse where it could easily be detained while a warrant is issued.[15] *404 In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application.[16] The officers clearly had the element of surprise with them, and with curtains covering the windshield, the motor home offered no indication of any imminent departure. The officers plainly had probable cause to arrest the respondent and search the motor home, and on this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe harbor of a warrant.[17] In the absence of any evidence of exigency in the circumstances of this case, the Court relies on the inherent mobility of the motor home to create a conclusive presumption of exigency. This Court, however, has squarely held that mobility of the place to be |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Carney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111423/california-v-carney/ | has squarely held that mobility of the place to be searched is not a sufficient justification for abandoning the warrant requirement. In United the Court held that a warrantless search of a footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment even *405 though there was ample probable cause to believe it contained contraband. The Government had argued that the rationale of the automobile exception applied to movable containers in general, and that the warrant requirement should be limited to searches of homes and other "core" areas of privacy. See We categorically rejected the Government's argument, observing that there are greater privacy interests associated with containers than with automobiles,[18] and that there are less practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a container than with the detention of an automobile. See and n. 7. We again endorsed that analysis in : "The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument that the warrantless search was `reasonable' because a footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized that `a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile,' [433 U. S., ], and noted that the practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less than those associated with the detention of an automobile. n. 7." It is perfectly obvious that the citizen has a much greater expectation of privacy concerning the interior of a mobile home than of a piece of luggage such as a footlocker. If "inherent mobility" does not justify warrantless searches *406 of containers, it cannot rationally provide a sufficient justification for the search of a person's dwelling place. Unlike a brick bungalow or a frame Victorian, a motor home seldom serves as a permanent lifetime abode. The motor home in this case, however, was designed to accommodate a breadth of ordinary everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate that its height, length, and beam provided substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a table; cupboards provide room for storage of personal effects; bunk beds provide sleeping space; and a refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages.[19] Moreover, curtains and large opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the exterior of the vehicle. The interior configuration of the motor home establishes that the vehicle's size, shape, and mode of construction should have indicated to the officers that it was a vehicle containing mobile living quarters. The State contends that officers in the field will have an impossible task determining whether |
Justice Stevens | 1,985 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Carney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111423/california-v-carney/ | in the field will have an impossible task determining whether or not other vehicles contain mobile living quarters. It is not necessary for the Court to resolve every unanswered question in this area in a single case, but common English usage suggests that we already distinguish between a "motor home" which is "equipped as a self-contained traveling home," a "camper" which is only equipped for "casual travel and camping," and an automobile which is "designed for passenger transportation."[20] Surely the exteriors of these vehicles contain clues about their different functions which could alert officers in the field to the necessity of a warrant.[21] *407 The California Vehicle Code also refutes the State's argument that the exclusion of "motor homes" from the automobile exception would be impossible to apply in practice. In its definitional section, the Code distinguishes campers and house cars from station wagons, and suggests that they are special categories of the more general terms motor vehicles and passenger vehicles.[22] A "house car" is "a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been permanently attached."[23] Alcoholic beverages may not be opened or consumed in motor vehicles traveling on the highways, except in the "living quarters of a housecar or camper."[24] The same definitions might not necessarily apply in the context of the Fourth Amendment, but they do indicate that descriptive distinctions are humanly possible. They also reflect the California Legislature's judgment that "house cars" entertain different kinds of activities than the ordinary passenger vehicle. In my opinion, searches of places that regularly accommodate a wide range of private human activity are fundamentally different from searches of automobiles which primarily serve a public transportation function.[25] Although it may not be a castle, a motor home is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin. These places may be as Spartan *408 as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic ; ante, at 393, but the highest and most legitimate expectations of privacy associated with these temporary abodes should command the respect of this Court. ; ; United 7-715[26] In my opinion, a warrantless search of living quarters in a motor home is "presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." I respectfully dissent. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | This case presents the question whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 14 (ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 1001 et seq., pre-empts state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. I In March 15, in Gulfport, Mississippi, respondent Everate W. Dedeaux injured his back in an accident related to his employment for Entex, (Entex). Entex had at this time a long term disability employee benefit plan established by purchasing a group insurance policy from petitioner, Pilot Insurance Co. (Pilot ). Entex collected and matched its employees' contributions to the plan and forwarded those funds to Pilot ; the employer also provided forms to its employees for processing disability claims, and forwarded completed forms to Pilot Pilot bore the responsibility of determining who would receive disability benefits. Although Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following the 15 accident, Pilot terminated his benefits after two years. During the following three years Dedeaux's benefits were reinstated and terminated by Pilot several times. In 10, Dedeaux instituted a diversity action against Pilot in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Dedeaux's complaint contained three counts: "Tortious Breach of Contract"; "Breach of Fiduciary Duties"; and "Fraud in the Inducement." App. 18-. Dedeaux sought "[d]amages for failure to provide benefits under the insurance policy in a sum to be determined at the time of trial," "[g]eneral damages for mental and emotional distress and other incidental damages in the sum of $250,000.00," and "[p]unitive and exemplary damages in the *44 sum of $500,000.00." Dedeaux did not assert any of the several causes of action available to him under ERISA, see infra, at 53. At the close of discovery, Pilot moved for summary judgment, arguing that ERISA pre-empted Dedeaux's common law claim for failure to pay benefits on the group insurance policy. The District Court granted Pilot summary judgment, finding all Dedeaux's claims pre-empted. App. to Pet. Cert. 16a. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, primarily on the basis of this Court's decision in Metropolitan Ins. See We granted certiorari, and now reverse. II In ERISA, Congress set out to "protect participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." 2, as set forth in 29 U.S. C. 1001(b). ERISA comprehensively regulates, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | set forth in 29 U.S. C. 1001(b). ERISA comprehensively regulates, among other things, employee welfare benefit plans that, "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise," provide medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death. 3(1), 29 U.S. C. 1002(1). Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and *45 subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" 514(a), as set forth in 29 U.S. C. 1144(a) (pre-emption clause). "Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U.S. C. 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving clause). "Neither an employee benefit plan nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S. C. 1144(b) (2)(B) (deemer clause). To summarize the pure mechanics of the provisions quoted above: If a state law "relate[s] to employee benefit plan[s]," it is pre-empted. 514(a). The saving clause excepts from the pre-emption clause laws that "regulat[e] insurance." 514(b)(2)(A). The deemer clause makes clear that a state law that "purport[s] to regulate insurance" cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. 514(b)(2)(B). "[T]he question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent. ` "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." ' " Allis-Chalmers quoting quoting Retail We have observed in the past that the express pre-emption *46 provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to "establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern." 451 U.S. As we explained in : "The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA. The Conference Committee rejected those provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (14); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1090, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | No. 93-1280, p. 383 (14); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1090, p. 383 (14)." The House and Senate sponsors emphasized both the breadth and importance of the pre-emption provisions. Representative Dent described the "reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans" as ERISA's "crowning achievement." 120 Cong. Rec. 291 (14). Senator Williams said: "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law." See also In Metropolitan this Court, noting that the preemption and saving clauses "perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting," interpreted these clauses in relation to a statute that required minimum *47 mental health care benefits to be provided residents covered by general health insurance policies. The appellants in Metropolitan argued that the state statute, as applied to insurance policies purchased by employee health care plans regulated by ERISA, was pre-empted. The Court concluded, first, that the statute did "relate to employee benefit plan[s]," thus placing the state statute within the broad sweep of the pre-emption clause, 514(a). Metropolitan However, the Court held that, because the state statute was one that "regulate[d] insurance," the saving clause prevented the state law from being pre-empted. In determining whether the statute regulated insurance, the Court was guided by case law interpreting the phrase "business of insurance" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1011 et seq. Given the "statutory complexity" of ERISA's three pre-emption provisions, Metropolitan as well as the wide variety of state statutory and decisional law arguably affected by the federal pre-emption provisions, it is not surprising that we are again called on to interpret these provisions. III There is no dispute that the common law causes of action asserted in Dedeaux's complaint "relate to" an employee benefit plan and therefore fall under ERISA's express pre-emption clause, 514(a). In both Metropolitan and we noted the expansive sweep of the pre-emption clause. In both cases "[t]he phrase `relate to' was given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law `relate[s] to' a benefit plan `in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.' " Metropolitan quoting Shaw v. Delta Air In |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | a plan.' " Metropolitan quoting Shaw v. Delta Air In particular we have emphasized that the pre-emption clause is not limited to "state laws specifically designed *48 to affect employee benefit plans." Shaw v. Delta Air at The common law causes of action raised in Dedeaux's complaint, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, undoubtedly meet the criteria for pre-emption under 514(a). Unless these common law causes of action fall under an exception to 514(a), therefore, they are expressly pre-empted. Although Dedeaux's complaint pleaded several state common law causes of action, before this Court Dedeaux has described only one of the three counts called "tortious breach of contract" in the complaint, and "the Mississippi law of bad faith" in respondent's brief as protected from the pre-emptive effect of 514(a). The Mississippi law of bad faith, Dedeaux argues, is a law "which regulates insurance," and thus is saved from pre-emption by 514(b)(2)(A).[1] In Metropolitan we were guided by several considerations in determining whether a state law falls under the saving clause. First, we took what guidance was available from a "common-sense view" of the language of the saving clause 471 U.S., Second, we made use of the case law interpreting the phrase "business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S. C. 1011 et seq., in interpreting the saving clause.[2] Three criteria have been used to determine whether a practice falls under the "business of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: "[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship *49 between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry." Union Labor Ins. (12) In the present case, the considerations weighed in Metropolitan argue against the assertion that the Mississippi law of bad faith is a state law that "regulates insurance." As early as the Mississippi Supreme Court had recognized that punitive damages were available in a contract case when "the act or omission constituting the breach of the contract amounts also to the commission of a tort." See In American Railway Express a case involving a failure of a finance company to deliver to the plaintiff the correct amount of money cabled to the plaintiff through the finance company's offices, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained that punitive damages could be available when the breach of contract was "attended by some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or gross negligence, which amounts to an |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | wrong, insult, abuse, or gross negligence, which amounts to an independent tort." In Standard Insurance the Mississippi Supreme Court, citing D. L. Fair Lumber American Railway Express and upheld an award of punitive damages against a defendant insurance company for failure to pay on a credit life policy. Since Veal, the Mississippi Supreme Court has considered a large number of cases in which plaintiffs have sought punitive damages from insurance companies for failure to pay a claim under an insurance contract, and in a great many of these cases the court has used the identical formulation, first stated in of what must "attend" the breach of contract in order for punitive *50 damages to be recoverable. See, e. g., Employers Mutual Casualty ; State Farm Fire & Casualty ; Consolidated American Ins. (12); Gulf Guaranty Ins. (10); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. (10); New Hampshire Ins. ; Lincoln National Ins. 1 Recently the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "[w]e have come to term an insurance carrier which refuses to pay a claim when there is no reasonably arguable basis to deny it as acting in `bad faith,' and a lawsuit based upon such an arbitrary refusal as a `bad faith' cause of action." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mississippi, v. Campbell, (14). Certainly a common-sense understanding of the phrase "regulates insurance" does not support the argument that the Mississippi law of bad faith falls under the saving clause. A common-sense view of the word "regulates" would lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry. Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has identified its law of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law. Any breach of contract, and not merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages under Mississippi law. Neither do the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors support the assertion that the Mississippi law of bad faith "regulates insurance." Unlike the mandated-benefits law at issue in Metropolitan the Mississippi common law of bad faith does not effect a spreading of policyholder risk. The state common law of bad faith may be said to concern "the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured." The connection *51 to the insurer-insured relationship is attenuated at best, however. In contrast to the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan the common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the insured; it declares only that, whatever terms have been agreed upon in the insurance contract, a breach of that contract may in certain circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain punitive damages. The state common law of bad faith is therefore no more "integral" to the insurer-insured relationship than any State's general contract law is integral to a contract made in that State. Finally, as we have just noted, Mississippi's law of bad faith, even if associated with the insurance industry, has developed from general principles of tort and contract law available in any Mississippi breach of contract case. Cf. ; Hamilton Ins. Co. v. Republic National Ins. Co., Accordingly, the Mississippi common law of bad faith at most meets one of the three criteria used to identify the "business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and used in Metropolitan to identify laws that "regulat[e] insurance" under the saving clause. In the present case, moreover, we are obliged in interpreting the saving clause to consider not only the factors by which we were guided in Metropolitan but also the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole. On numerous occasions we have noted that " ` " `[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " ' " quoting Offshore Logistics, v. Tallentire, Because in this case, *52 the state cause of action seeks remedies for the improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our understanding of the saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA 502(a), 29 U.S. C. 1132(a). The Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, argues that Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. We agree. The conclusion that 502(a) was intended to be exclusive is supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil enforcement provisions, and second, by legislative history in which Congress declared that the pre-emptive force of 502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by 301 |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | 502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S. C. 185. The civil enforcement scheme of 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of ERISA.[3] The civil enforcement scheme is sandwiched between *53 two other ERISA provisions relevant to enforcement of ERISA and to the processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan. Section 501, 29 U.S. C. 1131, authorizes criminal penalties for violations of the reporting and disclosure provisions of ERISA. Section 503, 29 U.S. C. 1133, requires every employee benefit plan to comply with Department of Labor regulations on giving notice to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits has been denied, and affording a reasonable opportunity for review of the decision denying the claim. Under the civil enforcement provisions of 502(a), a plan participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator's improper refusal to pay benefits. A participant or beneficiary may also bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and under this cause of action may seek removal of the fiduciary. 502(a)(2), 409. In an action under these civil enforcement provisions, the court in its discretion may allow an award of attorney's fees to either party. 502(g). See Mutual Ins. In we concluded that ERISA's breach of fiduciary duty provision, 409(a), 29 U.S. C. *54 1109(a), provided no express authority for an award of punitive damages to a beneficiary. Moreover, we declined to find an implied cause of action for punitive damages in that section, noting that " `[t]he presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.' " at quoting Northwest Airlines, v. Transport Workers, Our examination of these provisions made us "reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA." at In sum, the detailed provisions of 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." The deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive. This conclusion is fully confirmed by the legislative history of the civil enforcement provision. The legislative history demonstrates that the pre-emptive force of 502(a) was modeled after 301 of the LMRA. *55 The Conference Report on ERISA describing the civil enforcement provisions of 502(a) says: "Under the conference agreement, civil actions may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due under the plan, to clarify rights to receive future benefits under the plan, and for relief from breach of fiduciary responsibility. [W]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan which do not involve application of the title I provisions, they may be brought not only in U. S. district courts but also in State courts of competent jurisdiction. All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (14) (emphasis added). Congress was well aware that the powerful pre-emptive force of 301 of the LMRA displaced all state actions for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization, even when the state action purported to authorize a remedy unavailable under the federal provision. Section 301 pre-empts any "state-law claim [whose resolution] is substantially dependent upon the analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." Allis-Chalmers As we observed in Allis-Chalmers, the broad pre-emptive effect of 301 was first analyzed in In Lucas Flour the Court found that "[t]he dimensions of 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute." at "[I]n enacting 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." Indeed, for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction, this Court has singled out |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111858/pilot-life-ins-co-v-dedeaux/ | purposes of determining federal jurisdiction, this Court has singled out 301 of the LMRA as having "pre-emptive *56 force so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action `for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law" Franchise Tax Board of referring to Avco Congress' specific reference to 301 of the LMRA to describe the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA makes clear its intention that all suits brought by beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal questions governed by 502(a). See also H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 12 (13), reprinted in 2 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of ERISA, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 59 (Comm. Print 16) ("The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws"); 120 Cong. Rec. 29933 (14) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (suits involving claims for benefits "will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act"); ("[i]t is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans"). The expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans would develop, indeed, the entire comparison of ERISA's 502(a) to 301 of the LMRA, would make little sense if the remedies available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under 502(a) could be supplemented or supplanted by varying state laws. In Metropolitan Ins. this Court rejected an interpretation of the saving clause of ERISA's express pre-emption provisions, 514(b) (2)(A), 29 U.S. C. 1144(b)(2)(A), that saved from pre-emption *57 "only state regulations unrelated to the substantive provisions of ERISA," finding that "[n]othing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act" supported this reading of the saving clause. Metropolitan however, did not involve a state law that conflicted with a substantive provision of ERISA. Therefore the Court's general observation that state laws related to ERISA may also fall under the saving clause was not focused on any particular relationship or conflict between a substantive provision of ERISA and a state law. In particular, the Court had no occasion to consider in Metropolitan the question raised in the present case: whether Congress might clearly express, through the structure |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,015 | 5 | concurring | M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2773182/mg-polymers-usa-llc-v-tackett/ | Today’s decision rightly holds that courts must apply ordinary contract principles, shorn of presumptions, to determine whether retiree health-care benefits survive the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement. Under the “cardinal principle” of contract interpretation, “the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the whole instrument, must prevail.” 11 R. Lord, Williston on Con- tracts p. 27 (4th ed. 2012) (Williston). To determine what the contracting parties intended, a court must exam- ine the entire agreement in light of relevant industry- specific “customs, practices, usages, and terminology.” at 55–58. When the intent of the parties is unam- biguously expressed in the contract, that expression con- trols, and the court’s inquiry should proceed no further. at 98–104. But when the contract is ambigu- ous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intentions of the parties. at 116–124. Contrary to M&G’s assertion, Brief for Petitioner 25, no rule requires “clear and express” language in order to show that parties intended health-care benefits to vest. “[C]onstraints upon the employer after the expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement,” we have observed, 2 M&G POLYMERS USA, LLC v. TACKETT GINSBURG, J., concurring may be derived from the agreement’s “explicit terms,” but they “may arise as well from implied terms of the expired agreement.” Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, (1991). On remand, the Court of Appeals should examine the entire agreement to determine whether the parties in- tended retiree health-care benefits to vest. 11 Williston at 55–57. Because the retirees have a vested, life- time right to a monthly pension, App. 366, a provision stating that retirees “will receive” health-care benefits if they are “receiving a monthly pension” is relevant to this examination. So is a “survivor benefits” clause instructing that if a retiree dies, her surviving spouse will “continue to receive [the retiree’s health-care] benefits until death or remarriage.” If, after consider- ing all relevant contractual language in light of industry practices, the Court of Appeals concludes that the contract is ambiguous, it may turn to extrinsic evidence—for ex- ample, the parties’ bargaining history. The Court of Ap- peals, however, must conduct the foregoing inspection without Yard-Man’s “thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits.” Ante, at 10; see International Union, United Auto, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Work- ers of Because I understand the Court’s opinion to be con- sistent with these basic rules of contract interpretation, I join it |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that over a long period of years those in charge of the Michigan public schools engaged in various practices calculated to effect the segregation of the Detroit school system. The Court does not question these findings, nor could it reasonably do so. Neither does it question the obligation of the federal courts to devise a feasible and effective remedy. But it promptly cripples the ability of the judiciary to perform this task, which is of fundamental importance to our constitutional system, by *763 fashioning a strict rule that remedies in school cases must stop at the school district line unless certain other conditions are met. As applied here, the remedy for unquestioned violations of the equal protection rights of Detroit's Negroes by the Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan must be totally confined to the limits of the school district and may not reach into adjoining or surrounding districts unless and until it is proved there has been some sort of "interdistrict violation"ÔÇö unless unconstitutional actions of the Detroit School Board have had a segregative impact on other districts, or unless the segregated condition of the Detroit schools has itself been influenced by segregative practices in those surrounding districts into which it is proposed to extend the remedy. Regretfully, and for several reasons, I can join neither the Court's judgment nor its opinion. The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local school districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case in most States. There are undoubted practical as well as legal limits to the remedial powers of federal courts in school desegregation cases. The Court has made it clear that the achievement of any particular degree of racial balance in the school system is not required by the Constitution; *764 nor may it be the primary focus of a court in devising an acceptable remedy for de jure segregation. A variety of procedures and techniques are available to a district court engrossed in fashioning remedies in a |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | to a district court engrossed in fashioning remedies in a case such as this; but the courts must keep in mind that they are dealing with the process of educating the young, including the very young. The task is not to devise a system of pains and penalties to punish constitutional violations brought to light. Rather, it is to desegregate an educational system in which the races have been kept apart, without, at the same time, losing sight of the central educational function of the schools. Viewed in this light, remedies calling for school zoning, pairing, and pupil assignments, become more and more suspect as they require that schoolchildren spend more and more time in buses going to and from school and that more and more educational dollars be diverted to transportation systems. Manifestly, these considerations are of immediate and urgent concern when the issue is the desegregation of a city school system where residential patterns are predominantly segregated and the respective areas occupied by blacks and whites are heavily populated and geographically extensive. Thus, if one postulates a metropolitan school system covering a sufficiently large area, with the population evenly divided between whites and Negroes and with the races occupying identifiable residential areas, there will be very real practical limits on the extent to which racially identifiable schools can be eliminated within the school district. It is also apparent that the larger the proportion of Negroes in the area, the more difficult it would be to avoid having a substantial number of all-black or nearly all-black schools. The Detroit school district is both large and heavily populated. It covers 139.6 square miles, encircles two *765 entirely separate cities and school districts, and surrounds a third city on three sides. Also, whites and Negroes live in identifiable areas in the city. The 1970 public school enrollment in the city school district totaled 9,763 and was 63.6% Negro and 34.8% white.[1] If "racial balance" were achieved in every school in the district, each school would be approximately 64% Negro. A remedy confined to the district could achieve no more desegregation. Furthermore, the proposed intracity remedies were beset with practical problems. None of the plans limited to the school district was satisfactory to the District Court. The most promising proposal, submitted by respondents, who were the plaintiffs in the District Court, would "leave many of its schools 75 to 90 percent Black."[2] Transportation on a "vast scale" would be required; 900 buses would have to be purchased for the transportation of pupils who are not now bused. The District Court also found |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | who are not now bused. The District Court also found that the plan "would change a school system which is now Black and White to one that would be perceived as Black, thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system, thereby increasing the Black student population." at For the District Court, "[t]he conclusion, under the evidence in this case, is inescapable that relief of segregation in the public schools of the *766 City of Detroit cannot be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of the city." The District Court therefore considered extending its remedy to the suburbs. After hearings, it concluded that a much more effective desegregation plan could be implemented if the suburban districts were included. In proceeding to design its plan on the basis that student bus rides to and from school should not exceed 40 minutes each way as a general matter, the court's express finding was that "[f]or all the reasons stated heretoforeÔÇö including time, distance, and transportation factorsÔÇö desegregation within the area described is physically easier and more practicable and feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate geographic limits of the city of Detroit." The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the remedy must extend beyond the city limits of Detroit. It concluded that "[i]n the instant case the only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan." (Emphasis added.) It also agreed that "any Detroit only desegregation plan will lead directly to a single segregated Detroit school district overwhelmingly black in all of its schools, surrounded by a ring of suburbs and suburban school districts overwhelmingly white in composition in a State in which the racial composition is 87 percent white and 13 percent black." There was "more than ample support for the District Judge's findings of unconstitutional segregation by race resulting in major part from action and inaction of public authorities, both local and State Under this record a remedial order of a court of equity which left the Detroit school system overwhelmingly black (for the foreseeable *767 future) surrounded by suburban school systems overwhelmingly white cannot correct the constitutional violations herein found." To conclude otherwise, the Court of Appeals announced, would call up "haunting memories of the now long overruled and discredited `separate but equal doctrine' of" and "would be opening a way to nullify Brown v. Board of which overruled Plessy" This Court now reverses the Court of Appeals. It |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | Plessy" This Court now reverses the Court of Appeals. It does not question the District Court's findings that any feasible Detroit-only plan would leave many schools 75 to 90 percent black and that the district would become progressively more black as whites left the city. Neither does the Court suggest that including the suburbs in a desegregation plan would be impractical or infeasible because of educational considerations, because of the number of children requiring transportation, or because of the length of their rides. Indeed, the Court leaves unchallenged the District Court's conclusion that a plan including the suburbs would be physically easier and more practical and feasible than a Detroit-only plan. Whereas the most promising Detroit-only plan, for example, would have entailed the purchase of 900 buses, the metropolitan plan would involve the acquisition of no more than 350 new vehicles. Despite the fact that a metropolitan remedy, if the findings of the District Court accepted by the Court of Appeals are to be credited, would more effectively desegregate the Detroit schools, would prevent resegregation,[3] and would be easier and more feasible from many *768 standpoints, the Court fashions out of whole cloth an arbitrary rule that remedies for constitutional violations occurring in a single Michigan school district must stop at the school district line. Apparently, no matter how much less burdensome or more effective and efficient in many respects, such as transportation, the metropolitan plan might be, the school district line may not be crossed. Otherwise, it seems, there would be too much disruption of the Michigan scheme for managing its educational system, too much confusion, and too much administrative burden. The District Court, on the scene and familiar with local conditions, had a wholly different view. The Court of Appeals also addressed itself at length to matters of local law and to the problems that interdistrict remedies might present to the State of Michigan. Its conclusion, flatly contrary to that of this Court, was that "the constitutional right to equality before the law [is not] hemmed in by the boundaries of a school district" and that an interdistrict remedy "is supported by the status of school districts under Michigan law and by the historical control exercised over local school districts by the legislature of Michigan and by State agencies and officials [I]t is well established under the Constitution and laws of Michigan that the public school system is a State function and that local school districts are instrumentalities of the State created for administrative convenience."[4] 484 F. 2d, at 245-246. *769 I am surprised that the Court, sitting |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | at 245-246. *769 I am surprised that the Court, sitting at this distance from the State of Michigan, claims better insight than the Court of Appeals and the District Court as to whether an interdistrict remedy for equal protection violations practiced by the State of Michigan would involve undue difficulties for the State in the management of its public schools. In the area of what constitutes an acceptable desegregation plan, "we must of necessity rely to a large extent, as this Court has for more than years, on the informed judgment of the district courts in the first instance and on courts of appeals." Obviously, whatever difficulties there might be, they are surmountable; for the Court itself concedes that, had there been sufficient evidence of an interdistrict violation, the District Court could have fashioned a single remedy for the districts implicated rather than a different remedy for each district *770 in which the violation had occurred or had an impact. I am even more mystified as to how the Court can ignore the legal reality that the constitutional violations, even if occurring locally, were committed by governmental entities for which the State is responsible and that it is the State that must respond to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment. An interdistrict remedy for the infringements that occurred in this case is well within the confines and powers of the State, which is the governmental entity ultimately responsible for desegregating its schools. The Michigan Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he school district is a State agency," Attorney General ex rel. 92 N.W. 9, and that " `[e]ducation in Michigan belongs to the State. It is no part of the local self-government inherent in the township or municipality, except so far as the legislature may choose to make it such. The Constitution has turned the whole subject over to the legislature' " Attorney General ex rel. It is unnecessary to catalogue at length the various public misdeeds found by the District Court and the Court of Appeals to have contributed to the present segregation of the Detroit public schools. The legislature contributed directly by enacting a statute overriding a partial high school desegregation plan voluntarily adopted by the Detroit Board of Indirectly, the trial court found the State was accountable for the thinly disguised, pervasive acts of segregation committed by the Detroit Board,[5] for Detroit's school construction *771 plans that would promote segregation, and for the Detroit school district's not having funds for pupil transportation within the district. The State was also chargeable with responsibility for the transportation of Negro high |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | also chargeable with responsibility for the transportation of Negro high school students in the late 1950's from the suburban Ferndale School District, past closer suburban and Detroit high schools with predominantly white student bodies, to a predominantly Negro high school within Detroit. and make abundantly clear that the tactics employed by the Detroit Board of a local instrumentality of the State, violated the constitutional rights of the Negro students in Detroit's public schools and required equitable relief sufficient to accomplish the maximum, practical desegregation within the power of the political body against which the Fourteenth Amendment directs its proscriptions. No "State" may deny any individual the equal protection of the laws; and if the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause are to have any substance at all, the courts must be free to devise workable remedies against the political entity with the effective power to determine local choice. It is also the case here that the State's legislative interdiction of Detroit's voluntary effort to desegregate its school system was unconstitutional. See North Carolina State Board of v. The Court draws the remedial line at the Detroit school district boundary, even though the Fourteenth Amendment is addressed to the State and even though *772 the State denies equal protection of the laws when its public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate. The State's default is "the condition that offends the Constitution," and state officials may therefore be ordered to take the necessary measures to completely eliminate from the Detroit public schools "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." I cannot understand, nor does the majority satisfactorily explain, why a federal court may not order an appropriate interdistrict remedy, if this is necessary or more effective to accomplish this constitutionally mandated task. As the Court unanimously observed in : "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." In this case, both the right and the State's Fourteenth Amendment violation have concededly been fully established, and there is no acceptable reason for permitting the party responsible for the constitutional violation to contain the remedial powers of the federal court within administrative boundaries over which the transgressor itself has plenary power. The unwavering decisions of this Court over the past years support the assumption of the Court of Appeals that the District Court's remedial power does not cease at the school district line. The Court's first formulation of the remedial principles to be followed in disestablishing racially discriminatory school systems recognized the |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | be followed in disestablishing racially discriminatory school systems recognized the variety of problems arising from different local school conditions and the necessity for that "practical flexibility" traditionally associated with courts of equity. Brown v. Board of Indeed, the district courts to which *773 the Brown cases were remanded for the formulation of remedial decrees were specifically instructed that they might consider, inter alia, "revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis" The malady addressed in Brown was the statewide policy of requiring or permitting school segregation on the basis of race, while the record here concerns segregated schools only in the city of Detroit. The obligation to rectify the unlawful condition nevertheless rests on the State. The permissible revision of school districts contemplated in Brown rested on the State's responsibility for desegregating its unlawfully segregated schools, not on any segregative effect which the condition of segregation in one school district might have had on the schools of a neighboring district. The same situation obtains here and the same remedial power is available to the District Court. Later cases reinforced the clearly essential rules that state officials are fully answerable for unlawfully caused conditions of school segregation which can effectively be controlled only by steps beyond the authority of local school districts to take, and that the equity power of the district courts includes the ability to order such measures implemented. When the highest officials of the State of Arkansas impeded a federal court order to desegregate the public schools under the immediate jurisdiction of the Little Rock School Board, this Court refused to accept the local board's assertion of its good faith as a legal excuse for delay in implementing the desegregation order. The Court emphasized that "from the point of view of the Fourteenth Amendment, they [the local school board members] stand in this litigation as the agents of the State." Perhaps *774 more importantly for present purposes, the Court went on to state: "The record before us clearly establishes that the growth of the Board's difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided power to control is the product of state action. Those difficulties can also be brought under control by state action." See also 2, 233-234 In the context of dual school systems, the Court subsequently made clear the "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch" and to come forward with a desegregation |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | root and branch" and to come forward with a desegregation plan that "promises realistically to work now." "Freedom of choice" plans were rejected as acceptable desegregation measures where "reasonably available other ways promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system " exist. Imperative insistence on immediate full desegregation of dual school systems "to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools" was reiterated in Alexander v. Holmes Board of and 396 U.S. The breadth of the equitable authority of the district courts to accomplish these comprehensive tasks was reaffirmed in much greater detail in and the companion case of where there was unanimous assent to the following propositions: "Having once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities should make every effort to *775 achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation. A district court may and should consider the use of all available techniques including restructuring of attendance zones and both contiguous and noncontiguous attendance zones The measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness." No suggestion was made that interdistrict relief was not an available technique. In itself, the Court, without dissent, recognized that the District Judge, in fulfilling his obligation to "make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation[,] will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." Nor was there any dispute that to break up the dual school system, it was within the District Court's "broad remedial powers" to employ a "frankÔÇöand sometimes drasticÔÇögerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones," as well as "pairing, `clustering,' or `grouping' of schools," to desegregate the "formerly all-Negro schools," despite the fact that these zones might not be compact or contiguous and might be "on opposite ends of the city." The school board in that case had jurisdiction over a 550-square-mile area encompassing the city of Charlotte and surrounding Mecklenburg North Carolina. The Mobile Alabama, board in embraced a 1,248-square-mile area, including the city of Mobile. Yet the Court approved the District Court's authority to award countywide relief in each case in order to accomplish desegregation of the dual school system. Even more recently, the Court specifically rejected the claim that a new school district, which admittedly would operate a unitary school system within its borders, was beyond the reach of a court-ordered desegregation plan *776 for other school districts, where the effectiveness of the plan as to the other districts depended upon the availability of the facilities and student population of the new district. In we held "that a new |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | of the new district. In we held "that a new school district may not be created where its effect would be to impede the process of dismantling a dual system." MR. JUSTICE STEWART's opinion for the Court made clear that if a proposal to erect new district boundary lines "would impede the dismantling of the [pre-existing] dual system, then a district court, in the exercise of its remedial discretion, may enjoin it from being carried out." In United States v. Scotland Neck Board of this same standard was applied to forbid North Carolina from creating a new city school district within a larger district which was in the process of dismantling a dual school system. The Court noted that if establishment of the new district were permitted, the "traditional racial identities of the schools in the area would be maintained," Until today, the permissible contours of the equitable authority of the district courts to remedy the unlawful establishment of a dual school system have been extensive, adaptable, and fully responsive to the ultimate goal of achieving "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." There are indeed limitations on the equity powers of the federal judiciary, but until now the Court has not accepted the proposition that effective enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment could be limited by political or administrative boundary lines demarcated by the very State responsible for the constitutional violation and for the disestablishment of the dual system. Until now the Court has instead looked to practical considerations in effectuating a desegregation *777 decree such as excessive distance, transportation time, and hazards to the safety of the schoolchildren involved in a proposed plan. That these broad principles have developed in the context of dual school systems compelled or authorized by state statute at the time of Brown v. Board of does not lessen their current applicability to dual systems found to exist in other contexts, like that in Detroit, where intentional school segregation does not stem from the compulsion of state law, but from deliberate individual actions of local and state school authorities directed at a particular school system. The majority properly does not suggest that the duty to eradicate completely the resulting dual system in the latter context is any less than in the former. But its reason for incapacitating the remedial authority of the federal judiciary in the presence of school district perimeters in the latter context is not readily apparent. The result reached by the Court certainly cannot be supported by the theory that the configuration of local governmental units is immune from alteration when necessary |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | of local governmental units is immune from alteration when necessary to redress constitutional violations. In addition to the well-established principles already noted, the Court has elsewhere required the public bodies of a State to restructure the State's political subdivisions to remedy infringements of the constitutional rights of certain members of its populace, notably in the reapportionment cases. In for example, which held that equal protection of the laws demands that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned on a population basis, thus necessitating wholesale revision of Alabama's voting districts, the Court remarked: "Political subdivisions of StatesÔÇöcounties, cities, or whateverÔÇönever were and never have been considered *778 as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions." And even more pointedly, the Court declared in that "[l]egislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution." Nor does the Court's conclusion follow from the talismanic invocation of the desirability of local control over education. Local autonomy over school affairs, in the sense of the community's participation in the decisions affecting the education of its children, is, of course, an important interest. But presently constituted school district lines do not delimit fixed and unchangeable areas of a local educational community. If restructuring is required to meet constitutional requirements, local authority may simply be redefined in terms of whatever configuration is adopted, with the parents of the children attending schools in the newly demarcated district or attendance zone continuing their participation in the policy management of the schools with which they are concerned most directly. The majority's suggestion that judges should not attempt to grapple with the administrative problems attendant on a reorganization of school attendance patterns is wholly without foundation. It is precisely this sort of task which the district courts have been properly exercising to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro students since Brown I and which the Court has never suggested they lack the capacity to perform. Intradistrict revisions of attendance zones, and pairing and grouping of schools, are techniques unanimously approved in v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg *779 Board of which entail the same sensitivity to the interest of parents in the education their children receive as would an interdistrict plan which is likely to employ the very same methods. There is no reason to suppose that the District Court, which has not yet adopted a final plan of desegregation, would not be as capable of giving |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | plan of desegregation, would not be as capable of giving or as likely to give sufficient weight to the interest in community participation in schools in an interdistrict setting, consistent with the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority's assumption that the District Court would act otherwise is a radical departure from the practical flexibility previously left to the equity powers of the federal judiciary. Finally, I remain wholly unpersuaded by the Court's assertion that "the remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." Ante, at 746. In the first place, under this premise the Court's judgment is itself infirm; for had the Detroit school system not followed an official policy of segregation throughout the 1950's and 's, Negroes and whites would have been going to school together. There would have been no, or at least not as many, recognizable Negro schools and no, or at least not as many, white schools, but "just schools," and neither Negroes nor whites would have suffered from the effects of segregated education, with all its shortcomings. Surely the Court's remedy will not restore to the Negro community, stigmatized as it was by the dual school system, what it would have enjoyed over all or most of this period if the remedy is confined to present-day Detroit; for the maximum remedy available within that area will leave many of the schools almost totally black, and the system itself will be predominantly black and will become increasingly so. Moreover, when a State has engaged in acts of official segregation over a lengthy *780 period of time, as in the case before us, it is unrealistic to suppose that the children who were victims of the State's unconstitutional conduct could now be provided the benefits of which they were wrongfully deprived. Nor can the benefits which accrue to school systems in which schoolchildren have not been officially segregated, and to the communities supporting such school systems, be fully and immediately restored after a substantial period of unlawful segregation. The education of children of different races in a desegregated environment has unhappily been lost, along with the social, economic, and political advantages which accompany a desegregated school system as compared with an unconstitutionally segregated system. It is for these reasons that the Court has consistently followed the course of requiring the effects of past official segregation to be eliminated "root and branch" by imposing, in the present, the duty to provide a remedy which will achieve "the |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | the duty to provide a remedy which will achieve "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." It is also for these reasons that once a constitutional violation has been found, the district judge obligated to provide such a remedy "will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." These concerns were properly taken into account by the District Judge in this case. Confining the remedy to the boundaries of the Detroit district is quite unrelated either to the goal of achieving maximum desegregation or to those intensely practical considerations, such as the extent and expense of transportation, that have imposed limits on remedies in cases such as this. The Court's remedy, in the end, is essentially arbitrary and will leave serious violations of the Constitution substantially unremedied. I agree with my Brother DOUGLAS that the Court of Appeals has acted responsibly in these cases. Regrettably, *781 the majority's arbitrary limitation on the equitable power of federal district courts, based on the invisible borders of local school districts, is unrelated to the State's responsibility for remedying the constitutional wrongs visited upon the Negro schoolchildren of Detroit. It is oblivious to the potential benefits of metropolitan relief, to the noneducational communities of interest among neighborhoods located in and sometimes bridging different school districts, and to the considerable interdistrict cooperation already existing in various educational areas. Ultimately, it is unresponsive to the goal of attaining the utmost actual desegregation consistent with restraints of practicability and thus augurs the frequent frustration of the remedial powers of the federal courts. Here the District Court will be forced to impose an intracity desegregation plan more expensive to the district, more burdensome for many of Detroit's Negro students, and surely more conducive to white flight than a metropolitan plan would beÔÇöall of this merely to avoid what the Detroit School Board, the District Court, and the en banc Court of Appeals considered to be the very manageable and quite surmountable difficulties that would be involved in extending the desegregation remedy to the suburban school districts. I am therefore constrained to record my disagreement and dissent. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting. In Brown v. Board of this Court held that segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race deprives minority group children of equal educational opportunities and therefore denies them the equal protection of the laws under the *782 Fourteenth Amendment. This Court recognized then that remedying decades of segregation in public education |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | recognized then that remedying decades of segregation in public education would not be an easy task. Subsequent events, unfortunately, have seen that prediction bear bitter fruit. But however imbedded old ways, however ingrained old prejudices, this Court has not been diverted from its appointed task of making "a living truth" of our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law. After years of small, often difficult steps toward that great end, the Court today takes a giant step backwards. Notwithstanding a record showing widespread and pervasive racial segregation in the educational system provided by the State of Michigan for children in Detroit, this Court holds that the District Court was powerless to require the State to remedy its constitutional violation in any meaningful fashion. Ironically purporting to base its result on the principle that the scope of the remedy in a desegregation case should be determined by the nature and the extent of the constitutional violation, the Court's answer is to provide no remedy at all for the violation proved in this case, thereby guaranteeing that Negro children in Detroit will receive the same separate and inherently unequal education in the future as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past. I cannot subscribe to this emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws and must respectfully dissent. Our precedents, in my view, firmly establish that where, as here, state-imposed segregation has been demonstrated, it becomes the duty of the State to eliminate root and branch all vestiges of racial discrimination and to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation. I agree with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that, under the facts of this case, this duty cannot be fulfilled unless the State *783 of Michigan involves outlying metropolitan area school districts in its desegregation remedy. Furthermore, I perceive no basis either in law or in the practicalities of the situation justifying the State's interposition of school district boundaries as absolute barriers to the implementation of an effective desegregation remedy. Under established and frequently used Michigan procedures, school district lines are both flexible and permeable for a wide variety of purposes, and there is no reason why they must now stand in the way of meaningful desegregation relief. The rights at issue in this case are too fundamental to be abridged on grounds as superficial as those relied on by the majority today. We deal here with the right of all of our children, whatever their race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach their full potential |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | and to an equal opportunity to reach their full potential as citizens. Those children who have been denied that right in the past deserve better than to see fences thrown up to deny them that right in the future. Our Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's refusal to remedy separate and unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. I The great irony of the Court's opinion and, in my view, its most serious analytical flaw may be gleaned from its concluding sentence, in which the Court remands for "prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970." Ante, at 753. The majority, however, seems to have forgotten the District Court's explicit finding that a Detroit-only decree, the only remedy permitted under today's decision, "would not accomplish desegregation." *784 Nowhere in the Court's opinion does the majority confront, let alone respond to, the District Court's conclusion that a remedy limited to the city of Detroit would not effectively desegregate the Detroit city schools. I, for one, find the District Court's conclusion well supported by the record and its analysis compelled by our prior cases. Before turning to these questions, however, it is best to begin by laying to rest some mischaracterizations in the Court's opinion with respect to the basis for the District Court's decision to impose a metropolitan remedy. The Court maintains that while the initial focus of this lawsuit was the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools, the District Court abruptly shifted focus in mid-course and altered its theory of the case. This new theory, in the majority's words, was "equating racial imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy." Ante, at 741 n. 19. As the following review of the District Court's handling of the case demonstrates, however, the majority's characterization is totally inaccurate. Nowhere did the District Court indicate that racial imbalance between school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area or within the Detroit School District constituted a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief. The focus of this case was from the beginning, and has remained, the segregated system of education in the Detroit city schools and the steps necessary to cure that condition which offends the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court's consideration of this case began with its finding, which the majority accepts, that the State of Michigan, through its instrumentality, the Detroit Board of engaged in |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | Michigan, through its instrumentality, the Detroit Board of engaged in widespread purposeful acts of racial segregation in the Detroit School District. Without belaboring the details, it is sufficient to *785 note that the various techniques used in Detroit were typical of methods employed to segregate students by race in areas where no statutory dual system of education has existed. See, e. g., Exacerbating the effects of extensive residential segregation between Negroes and whites, the school board consciously drew attendance zones along lines which maximized the segregation of the races in schools as well. Optional attendance zones were created for neighborhoods undergoing racial transition so as to allow whites in these areas to escape integration. Negro students in areas with overcrowded schools were transported past or away from closer white schools with available space to more distant Negro schools. Grade structures and feeder-school patterns were created and maintained in a manner which had the foreseeable and actual effect of keeping Negro and white pupils in separate schools. Schools were also constructed in locations and in sizes which ensured that they would open with predominantly one-race student bodies. In sum, the evidence adduced below showed that Negro children had been intentionally confined to an expanding core of virtually all-Negro schools immediately surrounded by a receding band of all-white schools. Contrary to the suggestions in the Court's opinion, the basis for affording a desegregation remedy in this case was not some perceived racial imbalance either between schools within a single school district or between independent school districts. What we confront here is "a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools and facilities within the school system" at 1. The constitutional violation found here was not some de facto racial imbalance, but rather the purposeful, intentional, massive, de jure segregation of the Detroit city schools, *786 which under our decision in forms "a predicate for a finding of the existence of a dual school system," ib and justifies "all-out desegregation." Having found a de jure segregated public school system in operation in the city of Detroit, the District Court turned next to consider which officials and agencies should be assigned the affirmative obligation to cure the constitutional violation. The court concluded that responsibility for the segregation in the Detroit city schools rested not only with the Detroit Board of but belonged to the State of Michigan itself and the state defendants in this caseÔÇöthat is, the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Board of and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. While the validity of this conclusion |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | Superintendent of Public Instruction. While the validity of this conclusion will merit more extensive analysis below, suffice it for now to say that it was based on three considerations. First, the evidence at trial showed that the State itself had taken actions contributing to the segregation within the Detroit schools. Second, since the Detroit Board of was an agency of the State of Michigan, its acts of racial discrimination were acts of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the District Court found that under Michigan law and practice, the system of education was in fact a state school system, characterized by relatively little local control and a large degree of centralized state regulation, with respect to both educational policy and the structure and operation of school districts. Having concluded, then, that the school system in the city of Detroit was a de jure segregated system and that the State of Michigan had the affirmative duty to remedy that condition of segregation, the District Court then turned to the difficult task of devising an effective remedy. It bears repeating that the District Court's focus at this stage of the litigation remained what it had *787 been at the beginningÔÇöthe condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools. As the District Court stated: "From the initial ruling [on segregation] to this day, the basis of the proceedings has been and remains the violation: de jure school segregation The task before this court, therefore, is now, and has always been, how to desegregate the Detroit public schools." The District Court first considered three desegregation plans limited to the geographical boundaries of the city of Detroit. All were rejected as ineffective to desegregate the Detroit city schools. Specifically, the District Court determined that the racial composition of the Detroit student body is such that implementation of any Detroit-only plan "would clearly make the entire Detroit public school system racially identifiable as Black" and would "leave many of its schools 75 to 90 per cent Black." The District Court also found that a Detroit-only plan "would change a school system which is now Black and White to one that would be perceived as Black, thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system, thereby increasing the Black student population." Based on these findings, the District Court reasoned that "relief of segregation in the public schools of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of the city" because a Detroit-only decree "would accentuate the racial identifiability of the district as a Black school system, and |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | identifiability of the district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation." The District Court therefore concluded that it "must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem of segregation in the Detroit public schools" In seeking to define the appropriate scope of that expanded desegregation area, however, the District Court continued to maintain as its sole focus the condition shown to violate the Constitution in this caseÔÇöthe segregation of the Detroit school system. As it stated, the *788 primary question "remains the determination of the area necessary and practicable effectively to eliminate `root and branch' the effects of state-imposed and supported segregation and to desegregate the Detroit public schools." There is simply no foundation in the record, then, for the majority's accusation that the only basis for the District Court's order was some desire to achieve a racial balance in the Detroit metropolitan area.[1] In fact, just the contrary is the case. In considering proposed desegregation areas, the District Court had occasion to criticize one of the State's proposals specifically because it had no basis other than its "particular racial ratio" and did not focus on "relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools [and] accomplishing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public schools." Similarly, in rejecting the Detroit School Board's proposed desegregation area, even though it included more all-white districts and therefore achieved a higher white-Negro ratio, the District Court commented: "There is nothing in the record which suggests that these districts need be included in the desegregation area in order to disestablish the racial *789 identifiability of the Detroit public schools. From the evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board's interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not racial desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters." The Court also misstates the basis for the District Court's order by suggesting that since the only segregation proved at trial was within the Detroit school system, any relief which extended beyond the jurisdiction of the Detroit Board of would be inappropriate because it would impose a remedy on outlying districts "not shown to have committed any constitutional violation." Ante, at 745.[2] The essential foundation of interdistrict relief in this case was not to correct conditions within outlying districts which themselves engaged in purposeful segregation. Instead, interdistrict relief was seen as a necessary part of any meaningful effort by the State of Michigan to remedy the state-caused segregation within the city of Detroit. Rather than consider the propriety |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | within the city of Detroit. Rather than consider the propriety of interdistrict relief on this basis, however, the Court has conjured up a largely fictional account of what the District Court was attempting to accomplish. With all due respect, the Court, in my view, does a great disservice to the District Judge who labored long and hard with this complex litigation by accusing him of changing horses in midstream and shifting the focus of this case from the pursuit of a remedy for the condition of segregation *790 within the Detroit school system to some unprincipled attempt to impose his own philosophy of racial balance on the entire Detroit metropolitan area. See ante, at 738-739. The focus of this case has always been the segregated system of education in the city of Detroit. The District Court determined that interdistrict relief was necessary and appropriate only because it found that the condition of segregation within the Detroit school system could not be cured with a Detroit-only remedy. It is on this theory that the interdistrict relief must stand or fall. Unlike the Court, I perceive my task to be to review the District Court's order for what it is, rather than to criticize it for what it manifestly is not. As the foregoing demonstrates, the District Court's decision to expand its desegregation decree beyond the geographical limits of the city of Detroit rested in large part on its conclusions (A) that the State of Michigan was ultimately responsible for curing the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools, and (B) that a Detroit-only remedy would not accomplish this task. In my view, both of these conclusions are well supported by the facts of this case and by this Court's precedents. A To begin with, the record amply supports the District Court's findings that the State of Michigan, through state officers and state agencies, had engaged in purposeful acts which created or aggravated segregation in the Detroit schools. The State Board of for example, prior to exercised its authority to supervise local schoolsite selection in a manner which contributed to segregation. Furthermore, the State's continuing authority, after *791 to approve school building construction plans[3] had intertwined the State with site-selection decisions of the Detroit Board of which had the purpose and effect of maintaining segregation. The State had also stood in the way of past efforts to desegregate the Detroit city schools. In 1970, for example, the Detroit School Board had begun implementation of its own desegregation plan for its high schools, despite considerable public and official resistance. The State Legislature |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | schools, despite considerable public and official resistance. The State Legislature intervened by enacting Act 48 of the Public Acts of 1970, specifically prohibiting implementation of the desegregation plan and thereby continuing the growing segregation of the Detroit school system. Adequate desegregation of the Detroit system was also hampered by discriminatory restrictions placed by the State on the use of transportation within Detroit. While state aid for transportation was provided by statute for suburban districts, many of which were highly urbanized, aid for intracity transportation was excepted. One of the effects of this restriction was to encourage the construction of small walk-in neighborhood schools in Detroit, thereby lending aid to the intentional policy of creating a school system which reflected, to the greatest extent feasible, extensive residential segregation. Indeed, that one of the purposes of the transportation restriction was to impede desegregation was evidenced when the Michigan Legislature amended the State Transportation Aid Act to cover intracity transportation but expressly prohibited the allocation of funds for cross-busing of students within a school district to achieve racial [4] Cf. North Carolina State Board of v. *792 Also significant was the State's involvement during the 1950's in the transportation of Negro high school students from the Carver School District past a closer white high school in the Oak Park District to a more distant Negro high school in the Detroit system. Certainly the District Court's finding that the State Board of had knowledge of this action and had given its tacit or express approval was not clearly erroneous. Given the comprehensive statutory powers of the State Board of over contractual arrangements between school districts in the enrollment of students on a nonresident tuition basis, including certification of the number of pupils involved in the transfer and the amount of tuition charged, over the review of transportation routes and distances, and over the disbursement of transportation funds,[5] the State Board inevitably knew and understood the significance of this discriminatory act. Aside from the acts of purposeful segregation committed by the State Legislature and the State Board of the District Court also concluded that the State was responsible for the many intentional acts of segregation committed by the Detroit Board of an agency of the State. The majority is only willing to accept this finding arguendo. See ante, at 748. I have no doubt, however, as to its validity under the Fourteenth Amendment. "The command of the Fourteenth Amendment," it should be recalled, "is that no `State' shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." While a State can |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | the equal protection of the laws." While a State can act only through "the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted," Ex parte Virginia, actions by an agent or officer of *793 the State are encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment for, "as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State." See also ; Under Michigan law a "school district is an agency of the State government." School District of the City of Lansing v. State Board of 1 N.W.2d 866, It is "a legal division of territory, created by the State for educational purposes, to which the State has granted such powers as are deemed necessary to permit the district to function as a State agency." Detroit Board of v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, Racial discrimination by the school district, an agency of the State, is therefore racial discrimination by the State itself, forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., We recognized only last Term in that it was the State itself which was ultimately responsible for de jure acts of segregation committed by a local school board. A deliberate policy of segregation by the local board, we held, amounted to "state-imposed segregation." 413 U.S., at 0. Wherever a dual school system exists, whether compelled by state statute or created by a local board's systematic program of segregation, "the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty `to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system' [and] to eliminate from the public schools within their school system `all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.' " Vesting responsibility with the State of Michigan for Detroit's segregated schools is particularly appropriate as *794 Michigan, unlike some other States, operates a single statewide system of education rather than several separate and independent local school systems. The majority's emphasis on local governmental control and local autonomy of school districts in Michigan will come as a surprise to those with any familiarity with that State's system of education. School districts are not separate and distinct sovereign entities under Michigan law, but rather are " `auxiliaries of the State,' " subject to its "absolute power." Attorney General of Michigan ex rel. The courts of the State have repeatedly emphasized that education in Michigan is not a local governmental concern, but a state function. "Unlike the delegation of other powers by the legislature to local governments, education is not inherently a part of the local self-government of a municipality Control of our public school system is a State matter delegated and lodged |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | public school system is a State matter delegated and lodged in the State legislature by the Constitution. The policy of the State has been to retain control of its school system, to be administered throughout the State under State laws by local State agencies organized with plenary powers to carry out the delegated functions given [them] by the legislature." School District of the City of Lansing v. State Board of 1 N.W.2d, at 868. The Supreme Court of Michigan has noted the deep roots of this policy: "It has been settled by the Ordinance of 1787, the several Constitutions adopted in this State, by its uniform course of legislation, and by the decisions of this court, that education in Michigan is a matter of State concern, that it is no part of the local self-government of a particular township or municipality *795 The legislature has always dictated the educational policy of the State." In re School District No. 6, 4 Mich. 132, 5-6, The State's control over education is reflected in the fact that, contrary to the Court's implication, there is little or no relationship between school districts and local political units. To take the 85 outlying local school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area as examples, 17 districts lie in two counties, two in three counties. One district serves five municipalities; other suburban municipalities are fragmented into as many as six school districts. Nor is there any apparent state policy with regard to the size of school districts, as they now range from 2,000 to 5,000 students. Centralized state control manifests itself in practice as well as in theory. The State controls the financing of education in several ways. The legislature contributes a substantial portion of most school districts' operating budgets with funds appropriated from the State's General Fund revenues raised through statewide taxation.[6] The State's power over the purse can be and is in fact used to enforce the State's powers over local districts.[7] In addition, although local districts obtain funds through local property taxation, the State has assumed the responsibility to ensure equalized property valuations throughout the State.[8] The State also establishes *796 standards for teacher certification and teacher tenure;[9] determines part of the required curriculum;[10] sets the minimum school term;[11] approves bus routes, equipment, and drivers;[12] approves textbooks;[13] and establishes procedures for student discipline.[] The State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of have the power to remove local school board members from office for neglect of their duties.[] Most significantly for present purposes, the State has wide-ranging powers to consolidate and merge school |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | the State has wide-ranging powers to consolidate and merge school districts, even without the consent of the districts themselves or of the local citizenry.[] See, e. g., Attorney General ex rel. 92 N.W. 9 aff'd, Indeed, recent years have witnessed an accelerated program of school district consolidations, mergers, and annexations, many of which were state imposed. Whereas the State had 7,362 local districts in 1912, the number had been reduced to 1,438 in 1964 and to 738 in 1968.[17] By June only 608 school districts remained. Furthermore, the State has broad powers to transfer property from one district to another, again without the consent of the local school districts affected by the transfer.[18] See, e. g., School District * of the City of Lansing v. State Board of Imlay Township District v. State Board of 102 N.W.2d 7 Whatever may be the history of public education in other parts of our Nation, it simply flies in the face of reality to say, as does the majority, that in Michigan, "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools" Ante, at 741. As the State's Supreme Court has said: "We have repeatedly held that education in this State is not a matter of local concern, but belongs to the State at large." 1 N.W. 905, See also 343 Mich. 9, ; Van Mich. 241, (19); Child Welfare Society of 2 Mich. Indeed, a study prepared for the 1961 Michigan Constitutional Convention noted that the Michigan Constitution's articles on education had resulted in "the establishment of a state system of education in contrast to a series of local school systems." Elementary and Secondary and the Michigan Constitution, Michigan Constitutional Convention Studies 1 (1961). In sum, several factors in this case coalesce to support the District Court's ruling that it was the State of Michigan itself, not simply the Detroit Board of which bore the obligation of curing the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools. The actions of the State itself directly contributed to Detroit's segregation. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the State is ultimately responsible for the actions of its local agencies. And, finally, given the structure of Michigan's educational system, Detroit's segregation cannot be *798 viewed as the problem of an independent and separate entity. Michigan operates a single statewide system of education, a substantial part of which was shown to be segregated in this case. B What action, then, could the District Court require the State to take in order to cure Detroit's condition of segregation? Our prior cases have |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | to cure Detroit's condition of segregation? Our prior cases have not minced words as to what steps responsible officials and agencies must take in order to remedy segregation in the public schools. Not only must distinctions on the basis of race be terminated for the future, but school officials are also "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." See also Lee v. Macon Board of (MD Ala.), aff'd sub nom. 389 U.S. Negro students are not only entitled to neutral nondiscriminatory treatment in the future. They must receive "what Brown promised them: a school system in which all vestiges of enforced racial segregation have been eliminated." See also These remedial standards are fully applicable not only to school districts where a dual system was compelled by statute, but also where, as here, a dual system was the product of purposeful and intentional state action. See 413 U. S., at 0-1. After examining three plans limited to the city of Detroit, the District Court correctly concluded that none would eliminate root and branch the vestiges of *799 unconstitutional segregation. The plans' effectiveness, of course, had to be evaluated in the context of the District Court's findings as to the extent of segregation in the Detroit city schools. As indicated earlier, the most essential finding was that Negro children in Detroit had been confined by intentional acts of segregation to a growing core of Negro schools surrounded by a receding ring of white schools.[19] Thus, in of Detroit's 251 *800 regular-attendance schools, 100 were 90% or more white and 71 were 90% or more Negro. In 1970, of Detroit's 2 regular-attendance schools, 69 were 90% or more white and 133 were 90% or more Negro. While in 68% of all schools were 90% or more one race, by 1970, 71.6% of the schools fell into that category. The growing core of all-Negro schools was further evidenced in total school district population figures. In the Detroit system had 46% Negro students and 54% white students, but by 1970, 64% of the students were Negro and only 36% were white. This increase in the proportion of Negro students was the highest of any major Northern city. It was with these figures in the background that the District Court evaluated the adequacy of the three Detroit-only plans submitted by the parties. Plan A, proposed by the Detroit Board of desegregated the high schools and about a fifth of the middle-level schools. It was |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | and about a fifth of the middle-level schools. It was deemed inadequate, however, because it did not desegregate elementary schools and left the middle-level schools not included in the plan more segregated than ever. Plan C, also proposed by the Detroit Board, was deemed inadequate because it too covered only some grade levels and would leave elementary schools segregated. Plan B, the plaintiffs' plan, though requiring the transportation of 82,000 pupils and the acquisition of 900 school buses, would make little *801 headway in rooting out the vestiges of segregation. To begin with, because of practical limitations, the District Court found that the plan would leave many of the Detroit city schools 75% to 90% Negro. More significantly, the District Court recognized that in the context of a community which historically had a school system marked by rigid de jure segregation, the likely effect of a Detroit-only plan would be to "change a school system which is now Black and White to one that would be perceived as Black" The result of this changed perception, the District Court found, would be to increase the flight of whites from the city to the outlying suburbs, compounding the effects of the present rate of increase in the proportion of Negro students in the Detroit system. Thus, even if a plan were adopted which, at its outset, provided in every school a 65% Negro-35% white racial mix in keeping with the Negro-white proportions of the total student population, such a system would, in short order, devolve into an all-Negro system. The net result would be a continuation of the all-Negro schools which were the hallmarks of Detroit's former dual system of one-race schools. Under our decisions, it was clearly proper for the District Court to take into account the so-called "white flight" from the city schools which would be forthcoming from any Detroit-only decree. The court's prediction of white flight was well supported by expert testimony based on past experience in other cities undergoing desegregation relief. We ourselves took the possibility of white flight into account in evaluating the effectiveness of a desegregation plan in where we relied on the District Court's finding that if the city of were allowed to withdraw from the existing system, leaving a system with a higher proportion of Negroes, it " `may be anticipated that the proportion *802 of whites in county schools may drop as those who can register in private academies'" One cannot ignore the white-flight problem, for where legally imposed segregation has been established, the District Court has the responsibility to see to it |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | the District Court has the responsibility to see to it not only that the dual system is terminated at once but also that future events do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish segregation. See See also n. 4; 391 U.S. 4 We held in that where de jure segregation is shown, school authorities must make "every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." This is the operative standard re-emphasized in If these words have any meaning at all, surely it is that school authorities must, to the extent possible, take all practicable steps to ensure that Negro and white children in fact go to school together. This is, in the final analysis, what desegregation of the public schools is all about. Because of the already high and rapidly increasing percentage of Negro students in the Detroit system, as well as the prospect of white flight, a Detroit-only plan simply has no hope of achieving actual desegregation. Under such a plan white and Negro students will not go to school together. Instead, Negro children will continue to attend all-Negro schools. The very evil that Brown I was aimed at will not be cured, but will be perpetuated for the future. Racially identifiable schools are one of the primary vestiges of state-imposed segregation which an effective desegregation decree must attempt to eliminate. In for example, we held that "[t]he district judge or school authorities will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." 402 *. There is "a presumption," we stated, "against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition." And in evaluating the effectiveness of desegregation plans in prior cases, we ourselves have considered the extent to which they discontinued racially identifiable schools. See, e. g., For a principal end of any desegregation remedy is to ensure that it is no longer "possible to identify a `white school' or a `Negro school.' " The evil to be remedied in the dismantling of a dual system is the "[r]acial identification of the system's schools." The goal is a system without white schools or Negro schoolsÔÇöa system with "just schools." A school authority's remedial plan or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its effectiveness in achieving this end. See ; ; We cautioned in of course, that the dismantling of a segregated school system does not mandate any particular racial We also concluded that a remedy under which there would remain a small number of racially identifiable schools was only presumptively inadequate and might be justified. But this is a totally different case. |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | might be justified. But this is a totally different case. The flaw of a Detroit-only decree is not that it does not reach some ideal degree of racial balance or mixing. It simply does not promise to achieve actual desegregation at all. It is one thing to have a system where a small number of students remain in racially identifiable schools. It is something else entirely to have a system where all students continue to attend such schools. The continued racial identifiability of the Detroit schools under a Detroit-only remedy is not simply a reflection of their high percentage of Negro students. *804 What is or is not a racially identifiable vestige of de jure segregation must necessarily depend on several factors. Cf. Foremost among these should be the relationship between the schools in question and the neighboring community. For these purposes the city of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs must be viewed as a single community. Detroit is closely connected to its suburbs in many ways, and the metropolitan area is viewed as a single cohesive unit by its residents. About 40% of the residents of the two suburban counties included in the desegregation plan work in Wayne in which Detroit is situated. Many residents of the city work in the suburbs. The three counties participate in a wide variety of cooperative governmental ventures on a metropolitan-wide basis, including a metropolitan transit system, park authority, water and sewer system, and council of governments. The Federal Government has classified the tri-county area as a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, indicating that it is an area of "economic and social integration." United States v. Connecticut National Bank, ante, at 670. Under a Detroit-only decree, Detroit's schools will clearly remain racially identifiable in comparison with neighboring schools in the metropolitan community. Schools with 65% and more Negro students will stand in sharp and obvious contrast to schools in neighboring districts with less than 2% Negro enrollment. Negro students will continue to perceive their schools as segregated educational facilities and this perception will only be increased when whites react to a Detroit-only decree by fleeing to the suburbs to avoid integration. School district lines, however innocently drawn, will surely be perceived as fences to separate the races when, under a Detroit-only decree, white parents withdraw their children *805 from the Detroit city schools and move to the suburbs in order to continue them in all-white schools. The message of this action will not escape the Negro children in the city of Detroit. See It will be of scant significance to Negro children who have |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | will be of scant significance to Negro children who have for years been confined by de jure acts of segregation to a growing core of all-Negro schools surrounded by a ring of all-white schools that the new dividing line between the races is the school district boundary. Nor can it be said that the State is free from any responsibility for the disparity between the racial makeup of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs. The State's creation, through de jure acts of segregation, of a growing core of all-Negro schools inevitably acted as a magnet to attract Negroes to the areas served by such schools and to deter them from settling either in other areas of the city or in the suburbs. By the same token, the growing core of all-Negro schools inevitably helped drive whites to other areas of the city or to the suburbs. As we recognized in : "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods [Action taken] to maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from the formal principles of `neighborhood zoning' does more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student body It may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with `neighborhood zoning,' further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a proper *806 showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy." 402 U.S., See also 413 U. S., at 2. The rippling effects on residential patterns caused by purposeful acts of segregation do not automatically subside at the school district border. With rare exceptions, these effects naturally spread through all the residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. See at 2-3. The State must also bear part of the blame for the white flight to the suburbs which would be forthcoming from a Detroit-only decree and would render such a remedy ineffective. Having created a system where whites and Negroes were intentionally kept apart so that they could not become accustomed to learning together, the State is responsible for the fact that many whites will react to the dismantling of that segregated system by attempting to flee to the suburbs. Indeed, by limiting the District Court to a Detroit-only remedy and allowing that flight to the suburbs to succeed, the Court today allows the State to profit from its own wrong and to perpetuate for years to |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | from its own wrong and to perpetuate for years to come the separation of the races it achieved in the past by purposeful state action. The majority asserts, however, that involvement of outlying districts would do violence to the accepted principle that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." See ante, at 744-745. Not only is the majority's attempt to find in this single phrase the answer to the complex and difficult questions presented in this case hopelessly simplistic, but more important, the Court reads these words in a manner which perverts their obvious meaning. The nature of a violation determines the scope of the remedy simply because the function of any remedy is to cure the violation to which it is addressed. In school segregation *807 cases, as in other equitable causes, a remedy which effectively cures the violation is what is required. See 391 U. S., ; 402 U. S., No more is necessary, but we can tolerate no less. To read this principle as barring a district court from imposing the only effective remedy for past segregation and remitting the court to a patently ineffective alternative is, in my view, to turn a simple commonsense rule into a cruel and meaningless paradox. Ironically, by ruling out an interdistrict remedy, the only relief which promises to cure segregation in the Detroit public schools, the majority flouts the very principle on which it purports to rely. Nor should it be of any significance that the suburban school districts were not shown to have themselves taken any direct action to promote segregation of the races. Given the State's broad powers over local school districts, it was well within the State's powers to require those districts surrounding the Detroit school district to participate in a metropolitan remedy. The State's duty should be no different here than in cases where it is shown that certain of a State's voting districts are malapportioned in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Overrepresented electoral districts are required to participate in reapportionment although their only "participation" in the violation was to do nothing about it. Similarly, electoral districts which themselves meet representation standards must frequently be redrawn as part of a remedy for other over- and under-inclusive districts. No finding of fault on the part of each electoral district and no finding of a discriminatory effect on each district is a prerequisite to its involvement in the constitutionally required remedy. By the same logic, no finding of fault on the part of the suburban school districts in this case *808 and no |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | the suburban school districts in this case *808 and no finding of a discriminatory effect on each district should be a prerequisite to their involvement in the constitutionally required remedy. It is the State, after all, which bears the responsibility under Brown of affording a nondiscriminatory system of education. The State, of course, is ordinarily free to choose any decentralized framework for education it wishes, so long as it fulfills that Fourteenth Amendment obligation. But the State should no more be allowed to hide behind its delegation and compartmentalization of school districts to avoid its constitutional obligations to its children than it could hide behind its political subdivisions to avoid its obligations to its voters. See also It is a hollow remedy indeed where "after supposed `desegregation' the schools remained segregated in fact." We must do better than " `substitute one segregated school system for another segregated school system.' " To suggest, as does the majority, that a Detroit-only plan somehow remedies the effects of de jure segregation of the races is, in my view, to make a solemn mockery of Brown I's holding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal and of 's unequivocal mandate that the answer to de jure segregation is the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation. I One final set of problems remains to be considered. We recognized in Brown and have re-emphasized ever since, that in fashioning relief in desegregation cases, "the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for *809 adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Brown 349 U. S., at See also Though not resting its holding on this point, the majority suggests that various equitable considerations militate against interdistrict relief. The Court, for example, refers to financing and administrative problems, the logistical problems attending large-scale transportation of students, and the prospect of the District Court's becoming a "de facto `legislative authority' " and " `school superintendent' for the entire area." Ante, at 743-744. The entangling web of problems woven by the Court, however, appears on further consideration to be constructed of the flimsiest of threads. I deal first with the last of the problems posed by the CourtÔÇöthe specter of the District Court qua "school superintendent" and "legislative authority"ÔÇöfor analysis of this problem helps put the other issues in proper perspective. Our cases, of course, make clear that the initial responsibility for devising an adequate desegregation plan belongs with school authorities, not with the District Court. The court's primary role is to review |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | the District Court. The court's primary role is to review the adequacy of the school authorities' efforts and to substitute its own plan only if and to the extent they default. See 402 U. S., ; 391 U. S., Contrary to the majority's suggestions, the District Judge in this case consistently adhered to these procedures and there is every indication that he would have continued to do so. After finding de jure segregation the court ordered the parties to submit proposed Detroit-only plans. The state defendants were also ordered to submit a proposed metropolitan plan extending beyond Detroit's boundaries. As the District Court stated, "the State defendants bear the initial burden of coming forward with a proposal that promises to work." The state defendants defaulted in this obligation, however. *810 Rather than submit a complete plan, the State Board of submitted six proposals, none of which was in fact a desegregation plan. It was only upon this default that the District Court began to take steps to develop its own plan. Even then the District Court maximized school authority participation by appointing a panel representing both plaintiffs and defendants to develop a plan. Pet. App. 99a-100a. Furthermore, the District Court still left the state defendants the initial responsibility for developing both interim and final financial and administrative arrangements to implement interdistrict relief. at 104a-105a. The Court of Appeals further protected the interests of local school authorities by ensuring that the outlying suburban districts could fully participate in the proceedings to develop a metropolitan remedy. These processes have not been allowed to run their course. No final desegregation plan has been proposed by the panel of experts, let alone approved by the District Court. We do not know in any detail how many students will be transported to effect a metropolitan remedy, and we do not know how long or how far they will have to travel. No recommendations have yet been submitted by the state defendants on financial and administrative arrangements. In sum, the practicality of a final metropolitan plan is simply not before us at the present time. Since the State and the panel of experts have not yet had an opportunity to come up with a workable remedy, there is no foundation for the majority's suggestion of the impracticality of interdistrict relief. Furthermore, there is no basis whatever for assuming that the District Court will inevitably be forced to assume the role of legislature or school superintendent.[]*811 Were we to hold that it was its constitutional duty to do so, there is every indication that the State of |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | do so, there is every indication that the State of Michigan would fulfill its obligation and develop a plan which is workable, administrable, financially sound, and, most important, in the best interest of quality education for all of the children in the Detroit metropolitan area. Since the Court chooses, however, to speculate on the feasibility of a metropolitan plan, I feel constrained to comment on the problem areas it has targeted. To begin with, the majority's questions concerning the practicality of consolidation of school districts need not give us pause. The State clearly has the power, under existing law, to effect a consolidation if it is ultimately determined that this offers the best prospect for a workable and stable desegregation plan. See at 796-. And given the 1,000 or so consolidations of school districts which have taken place in the past, it is hard to believe that the State has not already devised means of solving most, if not all, of the practical problems which the Court suggests consolidation would entail. Furthermore, the majority ignores long-established Michigan procedures under which school districts may enter into contractual agreements to educate their pupils in other districts using state or local funds to finance non-resident education.[21] Such agreements could form an *812 easily administrable framework for interdistrict relief short of outright consolidation of the school districts. The District Court found that interdistrict procedures like these were frequently used to provide special educational services for handicapped children, and extensive statutory provision is also made for their use in vocational education.[22] Surely if school districts are willing to engage in interdistrict programs to help those unfortunate children crippled by physical or mental handicaps, school districts can be required to participate in an interdistrict program to help those children in the city of Detroit whose educations and very futures have been crippled by purposeful state segregation. Although the majority gives this last matter only fleeting reference, it is plain that one of the basic emotional and legal issues underlying these cases concerns the propriety of transportation of students to achieve desegregation. While others may have retreated from its standards, see, e. g., I continue to adhere to the guidelines set forth in on this issue. See -31. And though no final desegregation plan is presently before us, to the extent the outline of such a plan is now visible, it is clear that the transportation it would entail will be fully consistent with these guidelines. First of all, the metropolitan plan would not involve the busing of substantially more students than already ride buses. The District |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | of substantially more students than already ride buses. The District Court found that, statewide, 35%-40% of all students already arrive at school on a bus. In those school districts in the tri-county Detroit metropolitan area eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs, 42%-52% of all students rode buses to school. In the tri-county areas as a whole, approximately *813000 pupils arrived at school on some type of bus, with about 60,000 of these apparently using regular public transit. In comparison, the desegregation plan, according to its present rough outline, would involve the transportation of 310,000 students, about 40% of the population within the desegregation area. With respect to distance and amount of time traveled, 17 of the outlying school districts involved in the plan are contiguous to the Detroit district. The rest are all within 8 miles of the Detroit city limits. The trial court, in defining the desegregation area, placed a ceiling of 40 minutes one way on the amount of travel time, and many students will obviously travel for far shorter periods. As to distance, the average statewide bus trip is 8 1/2 miles one way, and in some parts of the tri-county area, students already travel for one and a quarter hours or more each way. In sum, with regard to both the number of students transported and the time and distances involved, the outlined desegregation plan "compares favorably with the transportation plan previously operated" As far as economics are concerned, a metropolitan remedy would actually be more sensible than a Detroit-only remedy. Because of prior transportation aid restrictions, see Detroit largely relied on public transport, at student expense, for those students who lived too far away to walk to school. Since no inventory of school buses existed, a Detroit-only plan was estimated to require the purchase of 900 buses to effectuate the necessary transportation. The tri-county area, in contrast, already has an inventory of 1,800 buses, many of which are now under-utilized. Since increased utilization of the existing inventory can take up much of the increase in transportation involved in the interdistrict remedy, the District Court found that only 350 additional buses would *8 probably be needed, almost two-thirds fewer than a Detroit-only remedy. Other features of an interdistrict remedy bespeak its practicality, such as the possibility of pairing up Negro schools near Detroit's boundary with nearby white schools on the other side of the present school district line. Some disruption, of course, is the inevitable product of any desegregation decree, whether it operates within one district or on an interdistrict basis. As we said in |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | second_dissenting | Milliken v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109102/milliken-v-bradley/ | district or on an interdistrict basis. As we said in however: "Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided" 402 U.S., at Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task. Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years. But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the rights of others, so public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to divert this Court from the enforcement of the constitutional principles at issue in this case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles of law. In *8 the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two citiesÔÇöone white, the other blackÔÇöbut it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret. I dissent. |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | A federal court of appeals normally will not correct a legal error made in criminal trial court proceedings unless the defendant first brought the error to the trial court’s attention. See United (1993). But Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), creating an exception to the normal rule, says that “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be consid- ered even though it was not brought to the [trial] court’s attention.” (Emphasis added.) The Rule does not say explicitly, however, as of just what time the error must be “plain.” Must the lower court ruling be plainly erroneous as of the time the lower court made the error? Or can an error still count as “plain” if the erroneous nature of that ruling is not “plain” until the time of appellate review? The case before us concerns a District Court’s decision on a substantive legal question that was unsettled at the time the trial court acted, thus foreclosing the possibility that any error could have been “plain” then. Before the case was final and at the time of direct appellate review, however, the question had become settled in the defend- 2 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ant’s favor, making the trial court’s error “plain”—but not until that later time. In our view, as long as the error was plain as of that later time—the time of appellate review— the error is “plain” within the meaning of the Rule. And the Court of Appeals “may conside[r]” the error even though it was “not brought to the [trial] court’s attention.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). I In early 2010, Armarcion Henderson, the petitioner, pleaded guilty in Federal District Court to a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 224 The District Judge accepted the plea and, in June 2010, he sentenced Henderson to an above- Guidelines prison term of 60 months. The judge entered the longer sentence to “try to help” Henderson by qualifying him for an in-prison drug rehabilitation pro- gram, a program that would provide “the treatment and the counse[l]ing that this defendant needs right now.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a, 40a. Henderson’s counsel did not object. Indeed, the judge asked counsel if there was “any reason why that sentence as stated should not be imposed.” 1a. And counsel replied, “Procedurally, no.” Subsequently, Hender- son appealed, claiming, among other things, that the District Court had “plain[ly]” erred in sentencing him to an above-Guidelines prison term solely for rehabilitative In after Henderson was sentenced but before Henderson’s appeal was heard, this Court decided Tapia |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | but before Henderson’s appeal was heard, this Court decided Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. There, we held that it is error for a court to “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” at (slip op., at 15). Given Tapia, Henderson’s sentence was unlawful, and the District Court’s decision to impose that sentence Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court was erroneous. But, since Henderson’s counsel had not objected in the trial court, the Court of Appeals could not correct the error unless Rule 52(b) applied. The Rule, however, applies only if the error was “plain.” The error was not plain before Tapia; it was plain after Tapia. Thus, the Fifth Circuit had to determine the temporal scope of Rule 52(b)’s words “plain error.” The appeals court decided that Rule 52(b) did not give it the authority to correct the trial court’s error. 646 F. 3d, at 225. The appellate panel pointed out that, “[b]efore Tapia, there was a circuit split on whether a District Court can consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs to lengthen a sentence.” The panel added that the Fifth Circuit had “not pronounced on the question” before Henderson was sentenced. Thus, at the time when the District Court reached its decision, the law in that Circuit was unsettled. The Court of Appeals concluded that “Henderson cannot show that the error in his case was plain, because an error is plain only if it was clear under current law at the time of trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a divided vote. (7 to 10). Hender- son filed a petition for certiorari. And we granted the petition to resolve differences among the Circuits. Com- pare, e.g., United (time of review), with, e.g., United States v. II A Is the time for determining “plainness” the time when the error is committed, or can an error be “plain” if it is not plain until the time the error is reviewed? The ques- tion reflects a conflict between two important, here com- peting, legal principles. On the one hand, “ ‘[n]o procedural 4 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court principle is more familiar to this Court than that a consti- tutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be for- feited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal hav- ing jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” 507 U. S., at |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | ing jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” 507 U. S., at (quoting (1944)). This principle favors assessing plainness limited to the time the error was committed. On the other hand, “[t]he general rule is that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” See Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago: “It is in the general true that the province of an ap- pellate court is only to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subse- quent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. In such a case the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in viola- tion of law, the judgment must be set aside.” United This principle favors assessing plainness at the time of Rule 52(b) itself makes clear that the first principle is not absolute. Indeed, we have said that a “ ‘rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all circum- stances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of har- mony with the rules of fundamental justice.’ ” Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court (quoting 557 (1941); ellipsis in original). But neither is the second principle absolute. Even where a new rule of law is at issue, Rule 52(b) does not give a court of appeals authority to overlook a failure to object unless an error not only “affect[s] substantial rights” but also “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original). Because the two principles here point in different directions and neither is absolute, we cannot decide this conflict simply by looking to one rather than to the other. The text of Rule 52(b) does not resolve the problem. It does not say that a court of appeals may consider an “error that was plain”—language that would look to the past. Rather, it simply says that a court of appeals may consider “[a] plain error.” And that language leaves the temporal question open. But see infra, at 12. Neither does precedent answer the temporal question— at least not directly. is clearly relevant. There, we said that Rule 52(b) authorizes an appeals court to correct a forfeited error only if (1) |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | appeals court to correct a forfeited error only if (1) there is “an error,” (2) the error is “ plain,” and (3) the error “affect[s] substantial rights.” 507 U. S., Pointing out that Rule 52 “is permissive, not mandatory,” we added (4) that “the standard that should guide the exercise of remedial discretion under Rule 52(b)” is whether “the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, in- tegrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’ ” at 736 (quoting United 160 (1936); brackets in original). At the same time, we said that “[w]e need not consider the special case where the error was unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear on appeal because the applicable law has been clarified.” That is the case now before us. is also 6 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court relevant. We there considered a trial court’s decision that was clearly correct under Circuit law when made but which, by the time of review, had become plainly errone- ous due to an intervening authoritative legal decision. We concluded that, “where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of ap- peal[,] it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration.” As in however, we declined to decide whether that same rule should apply where the law is unsettled at the time of error but plain at the time of –468. As we have said, this is precisely the case now before us. B The text, precedents, and background principles do not directly dictate a result here. But prior precedent has helped to shape current And that precedent, read in light of those underlying principles, leads us to interpret Rule 52(b)’s phrase “plain error” as applying at the time of Given a “time of error” interpretation would prove highly, and unfairly, anomalous. Consider the lay of the post- legal land: No one doubts that an (un-objected to) error by a trial judge will ordinarily fall within Rule 52(b)’s word “plain” as long as the trial court’s decision was plainly incorrect at the time it was made. E.g., That much is common ground. then adds that, at least in one circumstance, an (un-objected to) error by a trial judge will also fall within Rule 52(b)’s word “plain” even if the judge was not plainly incorrect at the time it was made. That is the circumstance where an error is “plain” even if the trial judge’s decision was plainly correct at the time when it was made but subsequently becomes incorrect based |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | time when it was made but subsequently becomes incorrect based on a change in 520 U. S., And, since by definition the trial judge did not commit plain error at the time of the ruling, explicitly rejects applying the words Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court “plain error” as of the time when the trial judge acted. Instead, deems it “enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration” for that error to fall within Rule 52(b)’s category of “plain error.” But if the Rule’s words “plain error” cover both (1) trial court decisions that were plainly correct at the time when the judge made the decision and (2) trial court decisions that were plainly incorrect at the time when the judge made the decision, then why should they not also cover (3) cases in the middle—i.e., where the law at the time of the trial judge’s decision was neither clearly correct nor incorrect, but unsettled? To hold to the contrary would bring about unjustifi- ably different treatment of similarly situated individuals. Imagine three virtually identical defendants, each from a different circuit, each sentenced in January to identical long prison terms, and each given those long sentences for the same reason, namely to obtain rehabilitative treat- ment. Imagine that none of them raises an objection. In June, the Supreme Court holds this form of sentencing unlawful. And, in December, each of the three different circuits considers the claim that the trial judge’s January- imposed prison term constituted a legal error. Imagine further that in the first circuit the law in January made the trial court’s decision clearly lawful as of the time when the judge made it; in the second circuit, the law in Janu- ary made the trial court’s decision clearly unlawful as of the time when the judge made it; and in the third circuit, the law in January was unsettled. To apply Rule 52(b)’s words “plain error” as of the time of appellate review would treat all three defendants alike. It would permit all three to go on to argue to the appellate court that the trial court error affected their “substantial rights” and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” To interpret 8 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court “plain error” differently, however, would treat these three virtually identical defendants differently, allowing only the first two defendants, but not the third defendant, po- tentially to qualify for Rule 52(b) relief. All three defen- dants suffered from legal error; all three failed to |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | defen- dants suffered from legal error; all three failed to object; and all three would benefit from the new legal interpre- tation. What reason is there to give two of these three defendants the benefits of a new rule of law, but not the third? Cf. Schooner 1 Cranch, at There is no practical ground for making this distinction. To the contrary, to distinguish and treat more harshly cases where a circuit’s law was unclear would simply promote arguments about whether the law of the circuit initially was unclear (rather than clearly settled one way or the other). And these arguments are likely to be par- ticularly difficult to resolve where what is at issue is a matter of legal degree, not kind. To what extent, for ex- ample, did a prosecutor’s closing argument go too far down the road of prejudice? A “time of error” interpretation also would require courts of appeals to play a kind of temporal ping-pong, looking at the law that now is to decide whether “error” exists, looking at the law that then was to decide whether the error was “plain,” and looking at the circum- stances that now are to decide whether the defendant has satisfied ’s third and fourth criteria. Thus, the “time of error” interpretation would make the appellate process yet more complex and time consuming. We recognize, as the Solicitor General points out, that a “time of error” rule, even if confined to instances in which the law is uncertain, would in such cases provide an added incentive to counsel to call the lower court judge’s atten- tion to the matter at a time when that judge could quickly take remedial action. And, even if no remedy is offered, the lower court judge’s analysis may help the court of appeals to decide the legal question. See Brief for United States 30–32. See also 557 F. 3d, at We Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court disagree with the Solicitor General, however, in that we also believe that, in the present context, any added incen- tive has little, if any, practical importance. That is because counsel normally has other good reasons for calling a trial court’s attention to potential error—for example, it is normally to the advantage of counsel and his client to get the error speedily corrected. And, even where that is not so, counsel cannot rely upon the “plain error” rule to make up for a failure to object at trial. After all, that rule will help only if (1) the law changes in the de- |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | help only if (1) the law changes in the de- fendant’s favor, (2) the change comes after trial but before the appeal is decided, (3) the error affected the defendant’s “substantial rights,” and (4) the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial pro- ceedings.” 507 U. S., (internal quotation marks omitted). If there is a lawyer who would deliberately forgo objection now because he perceives some slightly expanded chance to argue for “plain error” later, we sus- pect that, like the unicorn, he finds his home in the imagi- nation, not the courtroom. The upshot is that a “time of review” interpretation furthers the basic Schooner principle that “an appel- late court must apply the law in effect at the time it ren- ders its decision.” 393 U. S., at It works little, if any, practical harm upon the competing adminis- trative principle that insists that counsel call a potential error to the trial court’s attention. And, it is consistent with the basic purpose of Rule 52(b), namely the creation of a fairness-based exception to the general requirement that an objection be made at trial. See At the same time, the competing “time of error” rule is out of step with our precedents, creates unfair and anoma- lous results, and works practical administrative harm. Thus, in the direct appeals of cases that are not yet final, we consider the “time of review” interpretation the better reading of Rule 52’s words “plain error.” 10 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court III The Solicitor General makes several other important arguments, but they fail to lead us to a different conclu- sion. First, the Government argues that the purpose of plain-error review is to ensure “the integrity of the [trial] proceedings.” Brief for United States 33–34. In turn, the argument goes, appellate courts should consider only (1) errors that counsel called to the court’s attention and (2) errors that the trial court should have known about regardless, namely those that then were plain. Expanding on this theme, one Court of Appeals described plain error as “error that is so clear-cut, so obvious, a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection. When the state of the law is unclear at trial and only becomes clear as a result of later authority, the Dis- trict Court’s error is perforce not plain; we expect district judges to be knowledgeable, not clairvoyant.” United (cita- tion omitted). This approach, however, overlooks the way in which the plain-error rule—Rule 52(b)—restricts the appellate court’s authority to correct an |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | plain-error rule—Rule 52(b)—restricts the appellate court’s authority to correct an error to those errors that would, in fact, seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Cf. United (consid- ering the issue from this perspective). And the approach runs headlong into The error in was not an error that the District Court should have known about at the time. It was the very opposite: The District Judge should have known that his ruling (at the time he made it) was not error; and perhaps not even clairvoyance could have led him to hold to the contrary. Cf. Khan v. State Oil Co., (regis- tering disagreement with this Court’s precedent while following it nonetheless); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (approving of that approach). Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court Rather, makes clear that plain-error review is not a grading system for trial judges. It has broader pur- poses, including in part allowing courts of appeals better to identify those instances in which the application of a new rule of law to cases on appeal will meet the demands of fairness and judicial integrity. See 520 U. S., 67–468; 507 U. S., Second, the Government fears that our holding will lead to too many claims of “plain error.” Brief for United States 26–28. After all, courts of appeals, not just the Supreme Court, clarify the law through their opinions. When a court of appeals does so, will not all defendants, including many who never objected in the court below, insist that the court of appeals now judge their cases according to the new rule? And will “plain error” in such cases not then disappear, leaving only simple “error” in its stead? The answer to this claim is that a new rule of law, set forth by an appellate court, cannot automatically lead that court to consider all contrary determinations by trial courts plainly erroneous. Many such new rules, as we have pointed out, concern matters of degree, not kind. And a lower court ruling about such matters (say, the nature of a closing argument), even if now wrong (in light of the new appellate holding), is not necessarily plainly wrong. The Rule’s requirement that an error be “plain” means that lower court decisions that are questionable but not plainly wrong (at time of trial or at time of appeal) fall outside the Rule’s scope. And there are other reasons for concluding that our holding will not open any “plain error” floodgates. As we have said, the Rule itself contains other |
Justice Breyer | 2,013 | 2 | majority | Henderson v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820903/henderson-v-united-states/ | floodgates. As we have said, the Rule itself contains other screening criteria. The error must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights and it must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. When courts apply these latter criteria, the fact that a defendant did not object, despite 12 HENDERSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court unsettled law, may well count against the grant of Rule 52(b) relief. Moreover, the problem here arises only when there is a new rule of law, when the law was previously unsettled, and when the District Court reached a decision contrary to the subsequent rule. These limitations may well explain the absence of any account before us of “plain error” inundation in those Circuits that already follow the interpretation we now adopt. See, e.g., at ; 656 F. 3d, at ; United ; United States v. Ross, Finally, the Government points out that Rule 52(b) is written mostly in the past tense. It says that a “plain error may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” (Emphasis added.) This use of the past tense, the Government argues, refers to a “plain error” that was not “brought to the court’s atten- tion” back then, when the error occurred. And that lin- guistic fact, in turn, means that the error must have been plain at that time. Brief for United States 18–22. Whatever the merits of this textual argument, however, forecloses it. The error at issue in that case was not even an error, let alone plain, at the time when the defendant might have “brought [it] to the court’s atten- tion.” Nonetheless, we found the error to be “plain error.” We cannot square the Government’s textual argument with our holding in that case. IV For these reasons, we conclude that whether a legal question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, “it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration” for “[t]he second part of the [four-part] test [to be] satisfied.” The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 1 SCALIA, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 11–9307 ARMARCION D. HENDERSON, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | Petitioner is the owner of real property in New York and is a Christian. But he is not a member of any of the religious organizations, "rejecting them as hostile." The New York statute exempts from taxation real property "owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for religious purposes" and used "exclusively for carrying out" such purposes.[1] Yet nonbelievers who own realty are taxed at the usual rate. The question in the case therefore is whether believers organized in church groupscan be made exempt from real estate taxes, merely because they are believers, while nonbelievers, whether organized or not, must pay the real estate taxes. My Brother HARLAN says he "would suppose" that the tax exemption extends to "groups whose avowed tenets may be antitheological, atheistic, or agnostic." Ante, at 697. If it does, then the line between believers and nonbelievers has not been drawn. But, with all respect, there is not even a suggestion in the present record that the statute covers property used exclusively by organizations for "antitheological purposes," "atheistic purposes," or "agnostic purposes." In we held that *701 a State could not bar an atheist from public office in light of the freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Neither the State nor the Federal Government, we said, "can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." That principle should govern this case. There is a line between what a State may do in encouraging "religious" activities, and what a State may not do by using its resources to promote "religious" activities, or bestowing benefits because of them. Yet that line may not always be clear. Closing public schools on Sunday is in the former category; subsidizing churches, in my view, is in the latter. Indeed I would suppose that in common understanding one of the best ways to "establish" one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax exemption does. The State may not do that any more than it may prefer "those who believe in no religion over those who do believe." In affirming this judgment the Court largely overlooks the revolution initiated by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. That revolution involved the imposition of new and far-reaching constitutional restraints on the States. Nationalization of many civil liberties has been the consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment, reversing the historic position that the foundations of those liberties rested largely |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | historic position that the foundations of those liberties rested largely in state law. The process of the "selective incorporation" of various provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, although often provoking lively disagreement *702 at large as well as among the members of this Court, has been a steady one. It started in 1897 with Chicago, B. & Q. R. in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded a State from taking private property for public use without payment of just compensation, as provided in the Fifth Amendment. The first direct holding as to the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth occurred in 1931 in a case involving the right of free speech, although that holding in Stromberg had been foreshadowed in 1925 by the Court's opinion in As regards the religious guarantees of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause was expressly deemed incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in 1940 in although that holding had been foreshadowed in 1923 and 1934 by the Court's dicta in and The Establishment Clause was not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment until was decided in 1947. Those developments in the last 30 years have had unsettling effects. It was, for example, not until 1962 that state-sponsored, sectarian prayers were held to violate the Establishment Clause. That decision brought many protests, for the habit of putting one sect's prayer in public schools had long been practiced. Yet if the Catholics, controlling one school board, could put their prayer into one group of public schools, the Mormons, Baptists, Moslems, Presbyterians, and others could do the same, once they got control. And so the seeds of Establishment would grow and a secular institution would be used to serve a sectarian end. *703 Engel was as disruptive of traditional state practices as was Stromberg. Prior to Stromberg, a State could arrest an unpopular person who made a rousing speech on the charge of disorderly conduct. Since Stromberg, that has been unconstitutional. And so the revolution occasioned by the Fourteenth Amendment has progressed as Article after Article in the Bill of Rights has been incorporated in it and made applicable to the States. Hence the question in the present case makes irrelevant the "two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation," referred to by the Court. Ante, at 678. If history be our guide, then tax exemption of church property in this country is indeed highly suspect, as it arose in the early days when the church was an agency of the state. See W. Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | state. See W. Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America 171 (1948). The question here, though, concerns the meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause made applicable to the States for only a few decades at best. With all due respect the governing principle is not controlled by Everson involved the use of public funds to bus children to parochial as well as to public schools. Parochial schools teach religion; yet they are also educational institutions offering courses competitive with public schools. They prepare students for the professions and for activities in all walks of life. in the secular sense was combined with religious indoctrination at the parochial schools involved in Everson. Even so, the Everson decision was five to four and, though one of the five, I have since had grave doubts about it, because I have become convinced that grants to institutions teaching a sectarian creed violate the Establishment Clause. See *704 This case, however, is quite different. is not involved. The financial support rendered here is to the church, the place of worship. A tax exemption is a subsidy. Is my Brother BRENNAN correct in saying that we would hold that state or federal grants to churches, say, to construct the edifice itself would be unconstitutional? What is the difference between that kind of subsidy and the present subsidy?[2] The problem takes us back where Madison was in 1784 and 1785 when he battled the Assessment Bill[3] in Virginia. That bill levied a tax for the support of Christian churches, leaving to each taxpayer the choice as to "what society of Christians" he wanted the tax paid; and absent such designation, the tax was to go for education. Even so, Madison was unrelenting in his opposition. As stated by Mr. Justice Rutledge: "The modified Assessment Bill passed second reading in December, 1784, and was all but enacted. *705 Madison and his followers, however, maneuvered deferment of final consideration until November, 1785. And before the Assembly reconvened in the fall he issued his historic Memorial and Remonstrance." The Remonstrance[4] stirred up such a storm of popular protest that the Assessment Bill was defeated.[5] The Remonstrance covers some aspects of the present subsidy, including Madison's protest in paragraph 3 to a requirement that any person be compelled to contribute even "three pence" to support a church. All men, he maintained in paragraph 4, enter society "on equal conditions," including the right to free exercise of religion: "Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to men, must an account of it be rendered. As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions." Madison's assault on the Assessment Bill was in fact an assault based on both the concepts of "free exercise" and "establishment" of religion later embodied in the First Amendment. Madison, whom we recently called "the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment," *706 was indeed their author and chief promoter.[6] As Mr. Justice Rutledge said: "All the great instruments of the Virginia struggle for religious liberty thus became warp and woof of our constitutional tradition, not simply by the course of history, but by the common unifying force of Madison's life, thought and sponsorship. He epitomized the whole of that tradition in the Amendment's compact, but nonetheless comprehensive, phrasing." The Court seeks to avoid this historic argument as to the meaning of "establishment" and "free exercise" by relying on the long practice of the States in granting the subsidies challenged here. Certainly government may not lay a tax on either worshiping or preaching. In we ruled on a state license tax levied on religious colporteurs as a condition to pursuit of their activities. In holding the tax unconstitutional we said: "The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano and cases cited. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of *707 the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation." Churches, like newspapers also enjoying First Amendment rights, have no constitutional immunity from all taxes. As we said in Murdock: "We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | the press are free from all financial burdens of government. See We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon." State aid to places of worship, whether in the form of direct grants or tax exemption, takes us back to the Assessment Bill and the Remonstrance. The church qua church would not be entitled to that support from believers and from nonbelievers alike. Yet the church qua nonprofit, charitable institution is one of many that receive a form of subsidy through tax exemption. To be sure, the New York statute[7] does not single out the church for grant or favor. It includes churches in a long list of nonprofit organizations: for the moral or mental improvement of men and women 420); for charitable, hospital, or educational purposes (ibid.); for playgrounds (ibid.); for scientific or literary objects (ibid.); for bar associations, medical societies, or libraries (ibid.); for patriotic and historical purposes (ibid.); for cemeteries (ibid.); for the enforcement of laws relating to children or animals (ibid.); for opera *708 houses 426); for fraternal organizations 428); for academies of music 434); for veterans' organizations 452); for pharmaceutical societies 472); and for dental societies 474). While the beneficiaries cover a wide range, "atheistic," "agnostic," or "antitheological" groups do not seem to be included. Churches perform some functions that a State would constitutionally be empowered to perform. I refer to nonsectarian social welfare operations such as the care of orphaned children and the destitute and people who are sick. A tax exemption to agencies performing those functions would therefore be as constitutionally proper as the grant of direct subsidies to them. Under the First Amendment a State may not, however, provide worship if private groups fail to do so. As Mr. Justice Jackson said: "[A State] may socialize utilities and economic enterprises and make taxpayers' business out of what conventionally had been private business. It may make public business of individual welfare, health, education, entertainment or security. But it cannot make public business of religious worship or instruction, or of attendance at religious institutions of any character. That is a difference which the Constitution sets up between religion and almost every other subject matter of legislation, a difference which goes to the very root of |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | legislation, a difference which goes to the very root of religious freedom and which the Court is overlooking today." That is a major difference between churches on the one hand and the rest of the nonprofit organizations on the other. Government could provide or finance operas, hospitals, historical societies, and all the rest because they represent social welfare programs within *709 the reach of the police power. In contrast, government may not provide or finance worship because of the Establishment Clause any more than it may single out "atheistic" or "agnostic" centers or groups and create or finance them. The Brookings Institution, writing in 1933, before the application of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the States, said about tax exemptions of religious groups:[8] "Tax exemption, no matter what its form, is essentially a government grant or subsidy. Such grants would seem to be justified only if the purpose for which they are made is one for which the legislative body would be equally willing to make a direct appropriation from public funds equal to the amount of the exemption. This test would not be met except in the case where the exemption is granted to encourage certain activities of private interests, which, if not thus performed, would have to be assumed by the government at an expenditure at least as great as the value of the exemption." (Emphasis added.) Since 1947, when the Establishment Clause was made applicable to the States, that report would have to state that the exemption would be justified only where "the legislative body could make" an appropriation for the cause. On the record of this case, the church qua nonprofit, charitable organization is intertwined with the church qua church. A church may use the same facilities, resources, and personnel in carrying out both its secular and its sectarian activities. The two are unitary and on the present record have not been separated one from *710 the other. The state has a public policy of encouraging private public welfare organizations, which it desires to encourage through tax exemption. Why may it not do so and include churches qua welfare organizations on a nondiscriminatory basis? That avoids, it is argued, a discrimination against churches and in a real sense maintains neutrality toward religion which the First Amendment was designed to foster. Welfare services, whether performed by churches or by nonreligious groups, may well serve the public welfare. Whether a particular church seeking an exemption for its welfare work could constitutionally pass muster would depend on the special facts. The assumption is that the church |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | on the special facts. The assumption is that the church is a purely private institution, promoting a sectarian cause. The creed, teaching, and beliefs of one may be undesirable or even repulsive to others. Its sectarian faith sets it apart from all others and makes it difficult to equate its constituency with the general public. The extent that its facilities are open to all may only indicate the nature of its proselytism. Yet though a church covers up its religious symbols in welfare work, its welfare activities may merely be a phase of sectarian activity. I have said enough to indicate the nature of this tax exemption problem. Direct financial aid to churches or tax exemptions to the church qua church is not, in my view, even arguably permitted. Sectarian causes are certainly not antipublic and many would rate their own church or perhaps all churches as the highest form of welfare. The difficulty is that sectarian causes must remain in the private domain not subject to public control or subsidy. That seems to me to be the requirement of the Establishment Clause. As Edmond Cahn said: "In America, Madison submitted most astutely, the rights of conscience must be kept not only free but equal as well. And in view of the endless variations *711 not only among the numerous sects, but also among the organized activities they pursued and the relative emotional values they attached to their activities how could any species of government assistance be considered genuinely equal from sect to sect? If, for example, a state should attempt to subsidize all sectarian schools without discrimination, it would necessarily violate the principle of equality because certain sects felt impelled to conduct a large number of such schools, others few, others none.[9] How could the officers of government begin to measure the intangible factors that a true equality of treatment would involve, i. e., the relative intensity of religious attachment to parochial education that the respective groups required of their lay and clerical members? It would be presumptuous even to inquire. Thus, just as in matters of race our belated recognition of intangible factors has finally led us to the maxim `separate therefore unequal,' so in matters of religion Madison's immediate recognition of intangible factors led us promptly to the maxim `equal therefore separate.' Equality was out of the question without total separation." Confronting Injustice 186-187 (1967). The exemptions provided here insofar as welfare projects are concerned may have the ring of neutrality. But subsidies either through direct grant or tax exemption for sectarian causes, whether carried on by |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | or tax exemption for sectarian causes, whether carried on by church qua church or by church qua welfare agency, must be treated differently, lest we in time allow the church qua church to be on the public payroll, which, I fear, is imminent. *712 As stated by my Brother BRENNAN in Abington School (concurring opinion), "It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government." Madison as President vetoed a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria, Virginia, as being a violation of the Establishment Clause. He said, inter alia:[10] "[T]he bill vests in the said incorporated church an authority to provide for the support of the poor and the education of poor children of the same, an authority which, being altogether superfluous if the provision is to be the result of pious charity, would be a precedent for giving to religious societies as such a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty." He also vetoed a bill that reserved a parcel of federal land "for the use" of the Baptist Church, as violating the Establishment Clause.[11] What Madison would have thought of the present state subsidy to churchesa tax exemption as distinguished from an outright grantno one can say with certainty. The fact that Virginia early granted church tax exemptions cannot be credited to Madison. Certainly he seems to have been opposed. In his paper Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments he wrote:[12] "Strongly guarded as is the separation between Religion & Govt in the Constitution of the United *713 States the danger of encroachment by Ecclesiastical Bodies, may be illustrated by precedents already furnished in their short history." And he referred, inter alia, to the "attempt in Kentucky for example, where it was proposed to exempt Houses of Worship from taxes." From these three statements, Madison, it seems, opposed all state subsidies to churches. Cf. D. Robertson, Should Churches Be Taxed? 60-61 (1968). We should adhere to what we said in 367 U. S., that neither a State nor the Federal Government "can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." (Emphasis added.) Unless we adhere to that principle, we do not give full support either to the Free |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | we do not give full support either to the Free Exercise Clause or to the Establishment Clause. If a church can be exempted from paying real estate taxes, why may not it be made exempt from paying special assessments? The benefits in the two cases differ only in degree; and the burden on nonbelievers is likewise no different in kind.[13] *714 The religiously used real estate of the churches today constitutes a vast domain. See M. Larson & C. Lowell, The Churches: Their Riches, Revenues, and Immunities (1969). Their assets total over $141 billion and their annual income at least $22 billion. And the extent to which they are feeding from the public trough in a variety of forms is alarming. c. 10. We are advised that since 1968 at least five States have undertaken to give subsidies to parochial and other private schools[14]Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. And it is reported that under two federal Acts, the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, and the Higher Act of 1965, billions of dollars have been granted to parochial and other private schools. The federal grants to elementary and secondary schools under were made to the States which in turn made advances to elementary and secondary schools. Those figures are not available. But the federal grants to private institutions of higher education are revealed in Department of Health, and Welfare (HEW), Digest of al Statistics 16 (1969). These show in billions of dollars the following:[15] 1965-66. $1.4 1966-67. $1.6 1967-68. $1.7 1968-69. $1.9 1969-70. $2.1 *715 It is an old, old problem. Madison adverted to it:[16] "Are there not already examples in the U. S. of ecclesiastical wealth equally beyond its object and the foresight of those who laid the foundation of it? In the U. S. there is a double motive for fixing limits in this case, because wealth may increase not only from additional gifts, but from exorbitant advances in the value of the primitive one. In grants of vacant lands, and of lands in the vicinity of growing towns & Cities the increase of value is often such as if foreseen, would essentially controul the liberality confirming them. The people of the U. S. owe their Independence & their liberty, to the wisdom of descrying in the minute tax of 3 pence on tea, the magnitude of the evil comprized in the precedent. Let them exert the same wisdom, in watching agst every evil lurking under plausible disguises, and growing up from small beginnings."[17] *716 If believers are entitled to public financial support, so are |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | If believers are entitled to public financial support, so are nonbelievers. A believer and nonbeliever under the present law are treated differently because of the articles of their faith. Believers are doubtless comforted that the cause of religion is being fostered by this legislation. Yet one of the mandates of the First Amendment is to promote a viable, pluralistic society and to keep government neutral, not only between sects, but also between believers and nonbelievers. The present involvement of government in religion may seem de minimis. But it is, I fear, a long step down the Establishment path. Perhaps I have been misinformed. But as I have read the Constitution and its philosophy, I gathered that independence was the price of liberty. I conclude that this tax exemption is unconstitutional. APPENDIX I TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING Assessment Bill. The December 24, 1784, print reproduced in the Supplemental Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in 72: "A BILL ESTABLISHING A PROVISION FOR TEACHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. "Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society; *717 which cannot be effected without a competent provision for learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to devote their time and attention to the duty of instructing such citizens, as from their circumstances and want of education, cannot otherwise attain such knowledge; and it is judged that such provision may be made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle heretofore adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all distinctions of pre-eminence amongst the different societies or communities of Christians; "Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That for the support of Christian teachers, per centum on the amount, or in the pound on the sum payable for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is hereby assessed, and shall be paid by every person chargeable with the said tax at the time the same shall become due; and the Sheriffs of the several Counties shall have power to levy and collect the same in the same manner and under the like restrictions and limitations, as are or may be prescribed by the laws for raising the Revenues of this State. "And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or Collector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to what society of Christians the person from whom he may receive the same shall direct the money to be paid, keeping a distinct account thereof in his books. The |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | paid, keeping a distinct account thereof in his books. The Sheriff of every County, shall, on or before the day of in every year, return to the Court, upon oath, two alphabetical lists of the payments to him made, distinguishing in columns opposite to the names of the persons who shall have paid the same, the society to which the money so paid was by them appropriated; and one column for the names where no appropriation shall be made. One of which lists, after being recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, shall be filed by the Clerk in his office; the other shall by the Sheriff *718 be fixed up in the Court-house, there to remain for the inspection of all concerned. And the Sheriff, after deducting five per centum for the collection, shall forthwith pay to such person or persons as shall be appointed to receive the same by the Vestry, Elders, or Directors, however denominated of each such society, the sum so stated to be due to that society; or in default thereof, upon the motion of such person or persons to the next or any succeeding Court, execution shall be awarded for the same against the Sheriff and his security, his and their executors or administrators; provided that ten days previous notice be given of such motion. And upon every such execution, the Officer serving the same shall proceed to immediate sale of the estate taken, and shall not accept of security for payment at the end of three months, nor to have the goods forthcoming at the day of sale; for his better direction wherein, the Clerk shall endorse upon every such execution that no security of any kind shall be taken. "And be it further enacted, That the money to be raised by virtue of this Act, shall be by the Vestries, Elders, or Directors of each religious society, appropriated to a provision for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel of their denomination, or the providing places of divine worship, and to none other use whatsoever; except in the denominations of Quakers and Menonists, who may receive what is collected from their members, and place it in their general fund, to be disposed of in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote their particular mode of worship. "And be it enacted, That all sums which at the time of payment to the Sheriff or Collector may not be appropriated by the person paying the same, shall be accounted for with the Court in manner as by this |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | accounted for with the Court in manner as by this Act is directed; and after deducting for his collection, the Sheriff shall pay the amount thereof (upon account certified *719 by the Court to the Auditors of Public Accounts, and by them to the Treasurer) into the public Treasury, to be disposed of under the direction of the General Assembly, for the encouragement of seminaries of learning within the Counties whence such sums shall arise, and to no other use or purpose whatsoever. "THIS Act shall commence, and be in force, from and after the day of in the year "A Copy from the Engrossed Bill. "JOHN BECKLEY, C. H. D." APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING[18] Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, as reproduced in the Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in ): "We, the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having taken into serious consideration, a Bill printed by order of the last Session of General Assembly, entitled `A Bill establishing a provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion,' and conceiving that the same, if finally armed with the sanctions of a law, will be a dangerous abuse of power, are bound as faithful members of a free State, to remonstrate against it, and to declare the reasons by which we are determined. We remonstrate against the said Bill, "1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, `that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every *720 man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no other rule exists, by which any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority; but it is also true, that the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority. "2. Because if religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is limited with regard to the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily is it limited with regard to the constituents. The preservation of a free government requires not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each department *721 of power may be invariably maintained; but more especially, that neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves, nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves. "3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever? "4. Because, the bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law, and which is more indispensible, in proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more liable to be impeached. If `all men are by nature equally free and independent,' all men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining an `equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates *722 of conscience.' Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to men, must an account of it be rendered. As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions. Are the Quakers and Menonists the only sects who think a compulsive support of their religions unnecessary and unwarantable? Can their piety alone be intrusted with the care of public worship? Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others, with extraordinary privileges, by which proselytes may be enticed from all others? We think too favorably of the justice and good sense of these denominations, to believe that they either covet pre-eminencies over their fellow citizens, or that they will be seduced by them, from the common opposition to the measure. "5. Because the bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: The second an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation. "6. Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself; for every page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without the support of |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | both existed and flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from them; and not only *723 during the period of miraculous aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence, and the ordinary care of Providence: Nay, it is a contradiction in terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must have pre-existed and been supported, before it was established by human policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excellence, and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies, to trust it to its own merits. "7. Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy. Propose a restoration of this primitive state in which its Teachers depended on the voluntary rewards of their flocks; many of them predict its downfall. On which side ought their testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when against their interest? "8. Because the establishment in question is not necessary for the support of Civil Government. If it be urged as necessary for the support of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting Religion, and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it cannot be necessary for the former. If Religion be not within [the] cognizance of Civil Government, how can its legal establishment be said to be necessary to civil Government? What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments *724 had on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have found an established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just government, instituted to secure & perpetuate it, needs them not. Such a government will be best |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | it, needs them not. Such a government will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another. "9. Because the proposed establishment is a departure from that generous policy, which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority. Distant as it may be, in its present form, from the Inquisition it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The magnanimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and philanthropy in their due extent may offer a more certain repose from his troubles. "10. Because, it will have a like tendency to banish our Citizens. The allurements presented by other situations are every day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive to emigration, by revoking the liberty *725 which they now enjoy, would be the same species of folly which has dishonored and depopulated flourishing kingdoms. "11. Because, it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects. Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinions. Time has at length revealed the true remedy. Every relaxation of narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assuage the disease. The American Theatre has exhibited proofs, that equal and compleat liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it, sufficiently destroys its malignant influence on the health and prosperity of the State. If with the salutary effects of this system under our own eyes, we begin to contract the bonds of Religious freedom, we know no name that will too severely reproach our folly. At least let warning be taken at the first fruits of the threatened innovation. |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | be taken at the first fruits of the threatened innovation. The very appearance of the Bill has transformed that `Christian forbearance, love and charity,' which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and jealousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not be dreaded should this enemy to the public quiet be armed with the force of a law? "12. Because, the policy of the bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity. The first wish of those who enjoy this precious gift, ought to be that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind. Compare the number of those who have as yet received it with the number still remaining under the dominion of false Religions; and how small is the former! Does the policy of the Bill tend to lessen the disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of [revelation] from coming into the Region *726 of it; and countenances, by example the nations who continue in darkness, in shutting out those who might convey it to them. Instead of levelling as far as possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of truth, the Bill with an ignoble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it, with a wall of defence, against the encroachments of error. "13. Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the case where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? and what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the Government, on its general authority. "14. Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy ought not to be imposed, without the clearest evidence that it is called for by a majority of citizens: and no satisfactory method is yet proposed by which the voice of the majority in this case may be determined, or its influence secured. `The people of the respective counties are indeed requested to signify their opinion respecting the adoption of the Bill to the next Session of Assembly.' But the representation must be made equal, before the voice either of the Representatives or of the Counties, will be that of the people. Our hope is that neither of the former will, after due consideration, espouse the dangerous principle of the Bill. Should the event disappoint us, it will still leave us in full |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | dissenting | Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108135/walz-v-tax-commn-of-city-of-new-york/ | event disappoint us, it will still leave us in full confidence, that a fair appeal to the latter will reverse the sentence against our liberties. "15. Because, finally, `the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience' is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it cannot *727 be less dear to us; if we consult the Declaration of those rights which pertain to the good people of Virginia, as the `basis and foundation of Government,' it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather studied emphasis. Either then, we must say, that the will of the Legislature is the only measure of their authority; and that in the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and sacred: Either we must say, that they may controul the freedom of the press, may abolish the trial by jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary Powers of the State; nay that they may despoil us of our very right to suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent and hereditary assembly: or we must say, that they have no authority to enact into law the Bill under consideration. We the subscribers say, that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such authority: And that no effort may be omitted on our part against so dangerous an usurpation, we oppose to it, this remonstrance; earnestly praying, as we are in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn their councils from every act which would affront his holy prerogative, or violate the trust committed to them: and on the other, guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing, may re]dound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the prosperity, and the Happiness of the Commonwealth." |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | dissenting | Sullivan v. Zebley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112359/sullivan-v-zebley/ | Only two Terms ago, when reviewing an aspect of the Secretary's methodology for evaluating disability applications *542 under this Act, we emphasized that "Congress has `conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority' " in this context, and we stated that the Secretary's regulations were therefore entitled to great deference. quoting Because the majority has failed to abide by this principle, I respectfully dissent. As this case involves a challenge to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency was entrusted to administer, Chevron U. S. A. provides the framework for our review. We should therefore first ask whether Congress has expressed a clear intent on the question at issue here; if so, we should enforce that intent. If not, as I think is the case, we should defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is permissible. Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982 ed.), provides that a person is disabled if he is unable by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment to engage in any substantial gainful employment; subsection (3)(B) further defines "disability" by providing that the impairment or impairments must be severe enough, considering the person's age, education, and work experience, to prevent him from engaging in any kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in the national economy. The Secretary has implemented the statute with respect to adults by regulations listing certain impairments that he will, without more, consider disabling because each of them would prevent an adult from engaging in any kind of gainful employment. 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 (1989). If not suffering from one of those impairments or its equivalent, an adult is then given further consideration as required by subsection (a)(3)(B) in order to determine whether in light of his impairment and the specified nonmedical factors he could perform any substantial gainful activities in the national labor market. *543 At the end of 42 U.S. C. 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982 ed.), with its definition of disability, is a parenthetical provision defining that term in the case of persons under 18: "or, in the case of a child under the age of 18, if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of comparable severity." There is no reference to nonmedical factors in this definition and no references to specific consequences that an impairment must or should produce. Furthermore, neither "comparable," "severity," nor the two words together are there or elsewhere defined in the Act, and their meaning is anything but clear. The severity of an impairment that disables an adult |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | dissenting | Sullivan v. Zebley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112359/sullivan-v-zebley/ | clear. The severity of an impairment that disables an adult is measured by its effects on the ability to engage in gainful employment. But that yardstick is not useful with respect to children, whose inability to work is not due to mental or physical impairment, but to the stage of their development and the labor market. Given this task of comparing apples and oranges, it is understandable that the Secretary implemented the statute with respect to children in a somewhat different manner than he did for adults, and surely there is no direction in the statute to employ the same methodology for both groups. Under the regulations applying to children, a person under 18 will be considered disabled if suffering from a Part A impairment listed for adults or its equivalent, as long as the disease's processes have a similar effect on adults and younger persons. Because vocational considerations are largely beside the point in dealing with children a fact that the Secretary submits Congress recognized in referring only to medical considerations in subsection (a)(3)(A)'s definition of what would disable a child the regulations do not provide for further consideration of the child in light of such factors. Instead, a child not suffering from a Part A impairment is evaluated under an additional listing of impairments in Part B of Appendix 1 to subpart P, any of which, or its equivalent, will be deemed sufficient to disable a child. The preamble to Part B, published in 1977, stated that in *544 identifying medical criteria that would establish disability for a child, the Secretary had placed primary emphasis on the effects of physical and mental impairments in children, and the restrictions on growth, learning, and development imposed on the child by the impairments. The impairments that were determined to affect the child's development to the same extent that the adult criteria have on an adult's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity were deemed to be of "comparable severity" to the disabling adult impairments. I do not find this approach to be an impermissible implementation of the rather ambiguous congressional directives with respect to children. Surely it cannot be said that the regulations, insofar as they use the Part A and Part B listings, singly or in combination, to identify disability in children, are inconsistent with the statute and void on their face. And as I understand it, no one claims that they are. What is submitted is, first, that the listings do not identify all of the specific medical impairments that should be considered disabling, and second, that |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | dissenting | Sullivan v. Zebley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112359/sullivan-v-zebley/ | medical impairments that should be considered disabling, and second, that each child not deemed disabled under Parts A and B must be evaluated in terms of both his or her medical impairments and nonmedical factors, as are adults. These alleged deficiencies are said to be sufficient to invalidate the regulations on their face. But surely these claims, if true, only would demonstrate that the regulations do not go far enough. Furthermore, the claims purport to be supported by descriptions of various unlisted impairments and anecdotal evidence, none of which, it seems to me, has been adjudged by a court to be sufficient to demonstrate that the Part B impairments, or their equivalents, fail to identify impairments that will have comparably severe effects on a child's development as the disabling impairments for an adult will have on an adult's ability to engage in substantial gainful employment. If there are medically determinable diseases or impairments that should be considered disabling because of comparable severity to those affecting adults, the children *545 suffering from them should claim disability, make their case before the Secretary, and take the case to court if their claims are rejected.[1] As for the more general attack on the regulation that they do not provide for individualized evaluation based on nonmedical factors the Secretary contends that it is a reasonable construction of section 3(A) to confine disabling criteria to medical factors where children are concerned. In any event, rather than declaring the regulations wholly or partly void on their face, the Court would be better advised to insist on children making out their claims in individual cases; only then can a court confidently say that the medically identifiable impairment, though neither a listed impairment nor its equivalent, is nevertheless of "comparable severity" and hence disabling when considered with nonmedical factors. I thus largely agree with District Judge Fullam's view of this case: "Plaintiff's argument may well be valid, in many cases; but errors in applying the regulations in some cases do not demonstrate invalidity of the regulations themselves. Part B of the Secretary's listings of impairments, 20 CFR 416.925, is not facially invalid or incomplete, *546 seems to provide the necessary flexibility, and, in my view, permits the award of benefits in conformity with the intent of Congress. If these criteria are being misapplied or misinterpreted, the remedy lies in the appeal process in individual cases, not in a class-action decree." The difference, furthermore, between the Secretary's regulatory approach toward adults and his approach toward children accords with the different purposes underlying the disability programs for the |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | dissenting | Sullivan v. Zebley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112359/sullivan-v-zebley/ | with the different purposes underlying the disability programs for the two groups. Congress provided disability benefits for adults in order to ensure "the basic means of replacing earnings that have been lost as a result of disability" for those who "are not able to support themselves through work" H. R. Rep. No. pp. 146-147 (1971). For this reason, insofar as adults are concerned, the Act defines disabilities in terms of the effect that the disabilities have on the claimant's ability to function in the workplace. In light of this purpose, it is appropriate for the Secretary to evaluate adults not only in terms of the severity of their impairment, but also in terms of their residual functional capacity to perform work. By contrast, Congress had a different set of considerations in mind when it provided for children's benefits. Recognizing that disabled children from low-income households are "among the most disadvantaged of all Americans," Congress provided special disability benefits for these persons "because their needs are often greater than those of nondisabled children." H. R. Rep. No. In other words, Congress' aim in providing benefits to these individuals was not to replace lost income, but rather to provide for their special health care expenses, such as the home health care costs arising out of the child's medical disability. It is consistent with this quite distinct purpose to focus consideration on the severity of the child's impairment from a medical perspective alone, without individualized consideration *547 of vocational or similar factors or the claimant's residual functional capacity. The nature and severity of a child's impairment, rather than the child's ability to contribute to his family's income, will necessarily determine the child's entitlement to benefits.[2] I also note that the majority faults the regulations on the grounds that they do not adequately provide for considering multiple impairments together. Ante, at 534. As 42 U.S. C. 1382c(a)(3)(F) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) requires, however, the regulations expressly provide that impairments in combination may add up to qualify for benefits. 20 CFR 416.923 (1989). The Court of Appeals recognized that the Secretary's regulations faithfully implement the statutory mandate "by providing generally that the combined effect of all of a claimant's impairments will be considered throughout the disability determination process." There is no cross-petition challenging this aspect of the judgment below, and the Court should therefore not expand the relief obtained in the Court of Appeals. In sum, because I cannot conclude that the Secretary's method for evaluating child-disability claims is an impermissible *548 construction of the Act, I dissent. The Social Security Administration processes over 100,000 |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | This case presents two intertwined questions concerning a civil litigant's right to obtain transcripts[1] of federal criminal grand jury proceedings. First, what justification for disclosure must a private party show in order to overcome the presumption of grand jury secrecy applicable to such transcripts? Second, what court should assess the strength of this showing the court where the civil action is pending, or the court that acts as custodian of the grand jury documents? I Respondent Petrol Stops Northwest is a gasoline retailer unaffiliated with any major oil company. In 1973, it operated 104 service stations located in Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, and several other On December 13, 1973, respondent filed an antitrust action in the District of Arizona against 12 large oil companies, including petitioners Douglas Oil Co. of California and Phillips Petroleum Co.[2] In its complaint, respondent alleged that on January 1, 1973, there had been a sharp reduction in the amount of gasoline offered for sale to it, and that this reduction had resulted form a conspiracy among the oil companies to restrain trade in gasoline, in violation of 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1,2. As a part of this conspiracy, respondent charged, petitioners and their codefendants had fixed the prices of gasoline at the retail and wholesale distribution levels in California, Oregon, and Washington.[3] *4 Respondents Gas-A-Tron of Arizona and Coinoco also independently sell gasoline through service stations they own or lease. Unlike respondent Petrol Stops Northwest, however, their operations are limited to the vicinity of Tucson, Ariz. On November 2, 1973, Gas-A-Tron and Coinoco filed an antitrust complaint in the District of Arizona naming as defendants nine large oil companies, including petitioner Phillips Petroleum Co.[4] Like respondent Petrol Stops Northwest, Gas-A-Tron and Coinoco alleged that as of January 1, 1973, their supply of gasoline had been sharply reduced, and attributed this reduction to a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The specific charges of illegal behavior asserted by the two retailers substantially paralleled those made by Petrol Stops Northwest in its complaint, and included an allegation that the defendants had fixed the price of gasoline at the wholesale and retail levels.[5] Although the issues and defendants in the two actions were substantially the same, the cases were assigned to two different judges in the District of Arizona. In February respondents served upon petitioners a set of interrogatories which included a request that petitioners state whether either of their companies at any time between January 1, and December 14, (sic), had had any communication with |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | 1, and December 14, (sic), had had any communication with any of their competitors concerning the wholesale price of gasoline to be sold to unaffiliated retailers. Petitioners also were asked to produce any documents they had concerning *5 such communications. Petitioners responded that they were aware of no such communications, and therefore could produce no documents pertinent to the request.[6] In the meantime, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice had been investigating since 1972 the pricing behavior on the west coast of several major oil companies, including petitioners. See App. 26. As part of this investigation, employees of petitioners were called to testify before a grand jury empaneled in the Central District of California. The Government's investigation culminated on March 19, 1975, when the grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioners and four other oil companies with having conspired to fix the price of "rebrand gasoline" in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, and Arizona.[7] The indictment alleged that the price-fixing conspiracy had begun in July 1970 and had continued at least until the end of 1971. *6 Although initially all six defendants charged in the criminal indictment pleaded not guilty, by December 1975, each had pleaded nolo contendere and was fined $50,000. Before changing their pleas, petitioners, acting pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (a) (1) (A), asked the District Court for the Central District of California to give them copies of the transcripts of testimony given by their employees before the grand jury. Their request was granted, and it appears that petitioners continue to possess copies of these transcripts. In October 1976, respondents served upon petitioners requests under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 34 for production of the grand jury transcripts in petitioners' possession. Petitioners objected to the requests for production, arguing that the transcripts were not relevant to the private antitrust actions and that they were not likely to lead to any admissible evidence. Respondents did not pursue their discovery requests by making a motion in the Arizona trial court under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37 to compel discovery. See n. 17, infra. Rather, they filed a petition in the District Court for the Central District of California asking that court, as guardian of the grand jury transcripts under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (e), to order them released to respondents. An attorney from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice appeared and indicated that the Government had no objection to respondents' receiving the transcripts already made available to petitioners under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (a) (1) (A). He suggested to the court, however, that |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | (a) (1) (A). He suggested to the court, however, that the real parties in interest were petitioners, and therefore that they should be given an opportunity to be heard. The California District Court accepted this suggestion, and petitioners participated in the proceedings as parties adverse to respondents. After briefing and oral argument, the court ordered the Chief of the Antitrust Division's Los Angeles Office "to produce for [respondents'] inspection and copying all grand jury transcripts previously disclosed to Phillips Petroleum Company or Douglas Oil Company of California or their attorneys *7 relating to the indictment in United v. Phillips, et al., Criminal Docket No. 75-377." App. 48-49. The production order was subject, however, to several protective conditions. The transcripts were to "be disclosed only to counsel for [respondents] in connection with the two civil actions" pending in Arizona. Furthermore, under the court's order the transcripts of grand jury testimony "may be used solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness or refreshing the recollection of a witness, either in deposition or at trial" in the Arizona actions. Finally, the court forbade any further reproduction of the matter turned over to respondents, and ordered that the material be returned to the Antitrust Division "upon completion of the purposes authorized by this Order." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the disclosure order. Petrol Stops The Court of Appeals noted that under United a party seeking access to grand jury transcripts must show a "particularized need." In evaluating the strength of the need shown in the present case, the Ninth Circuit considered two factors: the need for continued grand jury secrecy and respondents' need for the requested material. The court found the former need to be insubstantial, as the grand jury proceeding had concluded three years before and the transcripts already had been released to petitioners. As to respondents' claim, the court conceded that it knew little about the Arizona proceedings, but speculated that the transcripts would facilitate the prosecution of respondents' civil suits: Petitioners' answers to the interrogatories concerning price communications with competitors appeared to be at odds with their pleas of nolo contendere in the California criminal action. II Petitioners contend that the courts below erred in holding that, because the grand jury had dissolved and the requested material had been disclosed already to the defendants, respondents *8 had to show only a "slight need" for disclosure.[8] According to petitioners, this approach to disclosure under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (e) is contrary to prior decisions of this Court indicating that "a civil litigant must demonstrate a compelling necessity for specified |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | "a civil litigant must demonstrate a compelling necessity for specified grand jury materials before disclosure is proper." Brief for Petitioners 16. We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See, e. g., United supra.[9] In particular, we have noted several *9 distinct interests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.[10] For all of these reasons, courts have been reluctant to lift unnecessarily the veil of secrecy from the grand jury. At the same time, it has been recognized that in some situations justice may demand that discrete portions of transcripts be *220 made available for use in subsequent proceedings. See, e. g., United Indeed, recognition of the occasional need for litigants to have access to grand jury transcripts led to the provision in Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (e) (2) (C) (i) that disclosure of grand jury transcripts may be made "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."[11] *2 In United the Court sought to accommodate the competing needs for secrecy and disclosure by ruling that a private party seeking to obtain grand jury transcripts must demonstrate that "without the transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without reference to it an injustice would be done." Moreover, the Court required that the showing of need for the transcripts be made "with particularity" so that "the secrecy of the proceedings [may] be lifted discretely and limitedly." Accord, Pittsburgh Plate Glass In the Court considered a request for disclosure of grand jury records in quite different circumstances. It was there held to be an abuse of discretion for a District Court in a criminal trial to refuse to disclose to the defendants the grand jury testimony of four witnesses who some years earlier had appeared before a grand jury investigating activities of the |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | had appeared before a grand jury investigating activities of the defendants. The grand jury had completed its investigation, and the witnesses whose testimony was sought already had testified in public concerning the same matters. The Court noted that "[n]one of the reasons traditionally advanced to justify nondisclosure of grand jury minutes" was significant in those circumstances, at 872 n. 18, whereas the defendants had shown it to be likely that the witnesses' testimony at trial was inconsistent with their prior grand jury testimony. *222 From Procter & Gamble and Dennis emerges the standard for determining when the traditional secrecy of the grand jury may be broken: Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6 (e) must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed.[12] Such a showing must be made even when the grand jury whose transcripts are sought has concluded its operations, as it had in Dennis. For in considering the effects of disclosure on grand jury proceedings, the courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries. Persons called upon to testify will consider the likelihood that their testimony may one day be disclosed to outside parties. Fear of future retribution or social stigma may act as powerful deterrents to those who would come forward and aid the grand jury in the performance of its duties. Concern as to the future consequences of frank and full testimony is heightened where the witness is an employee of a company under investigation. Thus, the interests in grand jury secrecy, although reduced, are not eliminated merely because the grand jury has ended its activities.[13] *223 It is clear from Procter & Gamble and Dennis that disclosure is appropriate only in those cases where the need for it outweighs the public interest in secrecy, and that the burden of demonstrating this balance rests upon the private party seeking disclosure. It is equally clear that as the considerations justifying secrecy become less relevant, a party asserting a need for grand jury transcripts will have a lesser burden in showing justification. Accord, (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. J. L. Simmons ; U. S. Industries, (CA9), cert. denied, ; 1 C. Federal Practice & Procedure 106, p. 173 (1969). In sum, as so often is the situation in our jurisprudence, the court's duty in a |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | the situation in our jurisprudence, the court's duty in a case of this kind is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the relevant circumstances and the standards announced by this Court. And if disclosure is ordered, the court may include protective limitations on the use of the disclosed material, as did the District Court in this case. Moreover, we emphasize that a court called upon to determine whether grand jury transcripts should be released necessarily is infused with substantial discretion. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals erred in the standard by which it assessed the request for disclosure under Rule 6 (e). The District Court made clear that the question before it was whether a particularized need for disclosure outweighed the interest in continued grand jury secrecy. See App. 53-55. Similarly, the Court of Appeals correctly understood that the standard enunciated in Procter & Gamble requires a court to examine the extent of the need for continuing grand jury secrecy, the need for disclosure, and *224 the extent to which the request was limited to that material directly pertinent to the need for disclosure.[14] III Petitioners contend, irrespective of the legal standard applied, that the District Court for the Central District of California was not the proper court to rule on respondents' motion for disclosure. Petitioners note that the Court of Appeals and the District Court both purported to base their decisions in part upon the need for use of the requested material in the civil antitrust proceedings pending in Arizona.[15] This determination necessarily involved consideration of the nature and status of the Arizona proceedings, matters peculiarly within the competence of the Arizona District Court. Although the question is an important one, this Court heretofore has had no occasion to consider which court or courts may direct disclosure of grand jury minutes under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (e).[16] The federal courts that have addressed the *225 question generally have said that the request for disclosure of grand jury minutes under Rule 6 (e) must be directed toward the court under whose auspices the grand jury was empaneled. See ; Gibson v. United 131 U. S. App. D. C. 143, 144, ; Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., F. R. D. 233, 235 (DC 17); accord, 1 106, p. 174. But see United v. American Oil Co., Indeed, those who seek grand jury transcripts have little choice other than to file a request with the court that supervised |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | than to file a request with the court that supervised the grand jury, as it is the only court with control over the transcripts.[17] Quite apart from practical necessity, the policies underlying Rule 6 (e) dictate that the grand jury's supervisory court participate in reviewing such requests, as it is in the best position to determine the continuing need for grand jury secrecy. Ideally, the judge who supervised the grand jury should review the request for disclosure, as he will have firsthand knowledge of the grand jury's activities. But even other judges of the district where the grand jury sat may be able *226 to discover facts affecting the need for secrecy more easily than would judges from elsewhere around the country. The records are in the custody of the district court, and therefore are readily available for reference. Moreover, the personnel of that courtand particularly those of the United Attorney's office who worked with the grand juryare more likely to be informed about the grand jury proceedings than those in a district that had no prior experience with the subject of the request. We conclude, therefore, that, in general, requests for disclosure of grand jury transcripts should be directed to the court that supervised the grand jury's activities. It does not follow, however, that in every case the court in which the grand jury sat should make the final decision whether a request for disclosure under Rule 6 (e) should be granted. Where, as in this case, the request is made for use in a case pending in another district, the judges of the court having custody of the grand jury transcripts will have no firsthand knowledge of the litigation in which the transcripts allegedly are needed, and no practical means by which such knowledge can be obtained. In such a case, a judge in the district of the grand jury cannot weigh in an informed manner the need for disclosure against the need for maintaining grand jury secrecy. Thus, it may well be impossible for that court to apply the standard required by the decisions of this Court, reiterated above, for determining whether the veil of secrecy should be lifted. See at 2-224. In the Electrical Equipment Cases, a federal court contemplated a similar quandary. Following the convictions of 29 heavy electrical equipment manufacturers for price fixing, about 1,900 private damages suits were filed in 34 Federal Districts around the country. See Note, Release of Grand Jury Minutes in the National Deposition Program of the Electrical Equipment Cases, During one of these suits, plaintiffs asked the District Court |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | During one of these suits, plaintiffs asked the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to disclose portions *227 of a witness' grand jury testimony so that they could be used to refresh the witness' memory during a deposition. 0 F. Supp. 486 The request was directed to Judge Clary, who had supervised the grand jury and also was in charge of the deposition. He had no difficulty, therefore, setting forth in detail in his opinion both the need for secrecy and the need for disclosure. Recognizing, however, that the other District Courts in which related actions were pending might face similar requests for the grand jury minutes under his control, Judge Clary outlined a procedure by which parties in the future could put forward such requests. In the court's words: "[T]he Grand Jury transcript of any witness deposed in [these suits], either in this district or in any other district of the United in which these cases are pending, should be made available to the deposition Judge for use in his district. There may be and probably will be many instances during these national depositions when disclosure may be advisable. The refusal [to order disclosure in this case] cannot rule out production where in camera examination by a deposition Judge uncovers material discrepancy or significant facts which the witness concealed, or failed to remember, at his deposition. Such disclosure as is necessary to uncover full and complete facts must be allowed. If, at the completion of any deposition taken in the national program, a motion is made for the production of that witness' Grand Jury testimony, and if the deposition Judge requests it from this Court for examination in camera, the testimony will be immediately made available to him. The deposition Judge may then contrast the Grand Jury testimony with the deposition and determine, in his own discretion, whether in the interest of justice there is compelling need for disclosure." *228 Because Judge Clary in his opinion had discussed with care the various secrecy concerns as they applied to the transcripts before him, district courts called upon in the future to rule upon disclosure motions could weigh these concerns against the need for disclosure. In this way, the court provided precisely what was required by the situation: a coordinating of the informed views of both the civil trial court and the grand jury court concerning the propriety of disclosing portions of the grand jury minutes. Several other federal courts, recognizing the need for collaboration, have devised means by which both the court of the grand jury and the |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | which both the court of the grand jury and the court of the collateral civil proceeding may participate in the decision whether transcripts should be released under Rule 6 (e). See In re 1975-2 Grand Jury Investigation, ; 552 F. 2d, at 773 n. 5; Baker v. United Steel Corp., ; Gibson v. United 131 U. S. App. D. C., at 403 F.2d, at -168. In the present case, the District Court for the Central District of California was called upon to make an evaluation entirely beyond its expertise. The District Judge readily conceded that he had no knowledge of the civil proceedings pending several hundred miles away in Arizona. App. 58. Nonetheless, he was asked to rule whether there was a "particularized need" for disclosure of portions of the grand jury transcript and whether this need outweighed the need for continued grand jury secrecy. Generally we leave it to the considered discretion of the district court to determine the proper response to requests for disclosure under Rule 6 (e). See Pittsburgh Plate Glass 360 U. S., We have a duty, however, to guide the exercise of discretion by district courts, and when necessary to overturn discretionary decisions under Rule 6 (e). See, e. g., We find that the District Court here abused its discretion in releasing directly to respondents the grand jury minutes *229 they requested. Appreciating that it was largely ignorant of the Arizona civil suits, the court nonetheless made a judgment concerning the relative needs for secrecy and disclosure.[18] The court based its decision largely upon the unsupported assertions of counsel during oral argument before it, supplemented only by the criminal indictment returned by the grand jury, the civil complaints, and petitioners' response to a single interrogatory that appeared to be inconsistent with petitioners' nolo contendere plea in the criminal case. Even the court's comparison of the criminal indictment and the civil complaints did not indicate unambiguously what, if any, portions of the grand jury transcripts would be pertinent to the subject of the Arizona actions, as only some of the same parties were named and only some of the same territory was covered. The possibility of an unnecessary breach of grand jury secrecy in situations such as this is not insignificant. A court more familiar with the course of the antitrust litigation might have seen important differences between the allegations of the indictment and the contours of the conspiracy respondents sought to prove in their civil actionsdifferences indicating that disclosure would likely be of little value to respondents, save perhaps as a mechanism for general discovery. |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | majority | Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110060/douglas-oil-co-of-cal-v-petrol-stops-northwest/ | to respondents, save perhaps as a mechanism for general discovery. Alternatively, *230 the courts where the civil proceedings were pending might have considered disclosure at that point in the litigation to be premature; if there were to be conflicts between petitioners' statements and their actions in the criminal proceedings, the court might have preferred to wait until they ripened at depositions or even during testimony at trial. Under these circumstances, the better practice would have been for the District Court, after making a written evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy and a determination that the limited evidence before it showed that disclosure might be appropriate, to send the requested materials to the court where the civil cases were pending.[19] The Arizona court, armed with its special knowledge of the status of the civil actions, then could have considered the requests for disclosure in light of the California court's evaluation of the need *231 for continued grand jury secrecy. In this way, both the need for continued secrecy and the need for disclosure could have been evaluated by the courts in the best position to make the respective evaluations.[20] We do not suggest, of course, that such a procedure would be required in every case arising under Rule 6 (e). Circumstances that dictate the need for cooperative action between the courts of different districts will vary, and procedures to deal with the many variations are best left to the rulemaking procedures established by Congress. Undoubtedly there will be cases in which the court to whom the Rule 6 (e) request is directed will be able intelligently, on the basis of limited knowledge, to decide that disclosure plainly is inappropriate or that justice requires immediate disclosure to the requesting party, without reference of the matter to any other court. Our decision today therefore is restricted to situations, such as that presented by this case, in which the district court having custody of the grand jury records is unlikely to have dependable knowledge of the status of, and the needs of the parties in, the civil suit in which the desired transcripts are to be used. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | Acting pursuant to the mandate of its newly revised state constitution,[1] the Virginia General Assembly enacted statutes apportioning the State for the election of members of its House of Delegates[2] and Senate.[3] Two suits were brought challenging the constitutionality of the House redistricting statute on the grounds that there were impermissible population variances in the districts, that the multimember districts diluted representation,[] and that the use of multimember districts *318 constituted racial gerrymandering.[5] The Senate redistricting statute was attacked in a separate suit, which alleged that the city of Norfolk was unconstitutionally split into three districts, allocating Navy personnel "home-ported" in Norfolk to one district and isolating Negro voters in one district. Three three-judge district courts were convened to hear the suits pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2281 and 228. The suits were consolidated and heard by the four judges who variously made up the three three-judge panels. The consolidated District Court entered an interlocutory order that, inter alia, declared the legislative reapportionment statutes unconstitutional and enjoined the holding of elections in electoral districts other than those established by the court's opinion. Appellants, the Secretary of the State Board of Elections and its members and the city of Virginia Beach, have appealed directly to this Court from those portions of the court's order, invoking our jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1253. I The statute apportioning the House provided for a combination of 52 single-member, multimember, and floater delegate districts from which 100 delegates would *319 be elected. As found by the lower court, the ideal district in Virginia consisted of85 persons per delegate, and the maximum percentage variation from that ideal under the Act was 1.%the 12th district being over-represented by8% and the 1th district being under-represented by 9.%.[] The population ratio between these two districts was 1.18 to 1. The average percentage variance under the plan was ±3.89%, and the minimum population percentage necessary to elect a majority of the House was 9.29%. Of the 52 districts, 35 were within % of perfection and nine exceeded a % variance from the ideal. With one exception, the delegate districts followed political jurisdictional lines of the counties and cities. That exception, Fairfax County, was allotted 10 delegates but was divided into two five-member districts. Relying on and the District Court concluded that the 1.% variation was sufficient to condemn the House statute under the "one person, one vote" doctrine. While it noted that the variances were traceable to the desire of the General Assembly to maintain the integrity of traditional county and city boundaries, and that it was impossible to draft |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | and city boundaries, and that it was impossible to draft district lines to overcome unconstitutional disparities and still maintain *320 such integrity, it held that the State proved no governmental necessity for strictly adhering to political subdivision lines. Accordingly, it undertook its own re-districting and devised a plan having a percentage variation of slightly over 10% from the ideal district, a percentage it believed came "within passable constitutional limits as `a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality.'" -118. Appellants contend that the District Court's reliance on and in striking down the General Assembly's reapportionment plan was erroneous, and that proper application of the standards enunciated in would have resulted in a finding that the statute was constitutional. In and this Court invalidated state reapportionment statutes for federal congressional districts having maximum percentage deviations of 5.97% and 13.1% respectively. The express purpose of these cases was to elucidate the standard first announced in the holding of that "the command of Art. I, 2, that Representatives be chosen `by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." And it was concluded that that command "permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown." The principal question thus presented for review is whether or not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise permits only "the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith *321 effort to achieve absolute equality" in the context of state legislative reapportionment.[7] This Court first recognized that the Equal Protection Clause requires both houses of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned substantially on a population basis in In so doing, it suggested that in the implementation of the basic constitutional principleequality of population among the districts more flexibility was constitutionally permissible with respect to state legislative reapportionment than in congressional redistricting. Consideration was given to the fact that, almost invariably, there is a significantly larger number of seats in state legislative bodies to be distributed within a State than congressional seats, and that therefore it may be feasible for a State to use political subdivision lines to a greater extent in establishing state legislative districts than congressional districts while still affording adequate statewide representation. Another possible justification for deviation from population-based representation in state legislatures was stated to be: "[T]hat of insuring some voice to political subdivisions, as political subdivisions. Several factors make more than insubstantial claims that a State can |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | factors make more than insubstantial claims that a State can rationally consider according political subdivisions some independent representation in at least one body of the state legislature, as long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts is maintained. Local governmental entities are frequently charged with various responsibilities incident to the operation of state government. In many States much of the legislature's activity involves the enactment of so-called local legislation, directed only *322 to the concerns of particular political subdivisions. And a State may legitimately desire to construct districts along political subdivision lines to deter the possibilities of gerrymandering." The Court reiterated that the overriding objective in reapportionment must be "substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." By contrast, the Court in recognized no excuse for the failure to meet the objective of equal representation for equal numbers of people in congressional districting other than the practical impossibility of drawing equal districts with mathematical precision. Thus, whereas population alone has been the sole criterion of constitutionality in congressional redistricting under Art. I, 2, broader latitude has been afforded the States under the Equal Protection Clause in state legislative redistricting because of the considerations enumerated in The dichotomy between the two lines of cases has consistently been maintained. In for example, one asserted justification for population variances was that they were necessarily a result of the State's attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing congressional district lines along existing political subdivision boundaries. This argument was rejected in the congressional context. But in an apportionment for a county legislature having a maximum deviation from equality of 11.9% was upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge, in part because New York had a long history of maintaining the integrity of existing local government units within the county. *323 Application of the "absolute equality" test of Kirkpatrick and Wells to state legislative redistricting may impair the normal functioning of state and local governments. Such an effect is readily apparent from an analysis of the District Court's plan in this case. Under Art. VII, 2 and 3 of Virginia's Constitution, the General Assembly is given extensive power to enact special legislation regarding the organization of, and the exercise of governmental powers by, counties, cities, towns, and other political subdivisions. The statute redistricting the House of Delegates consistently sought to avoid the fragmentation of such subdivisions, assertedly to afford them a voice in Richmond to seek such local legislation. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | them a voice in Richmond to seek such local legislation. The court's reapportionment, based on its application of Kirkpatrick and Wells, resulted in a maximum deviation of slightly over 10%,[8] as compared with the roughly 1% maximum variation found in the plan adopted by the legislature. But to achieve even this limit of variation, the court's plan extended single and multimember districts across subdivision lines in 12 instances, substituting population equality for subdivision representation. Scott County, for example, under the Assembly's plan was placed in the first district and its population of 2,37 voted with the 7,3 persons in Dickinson, Lee, and Wise Counties for two delegates. The district thus established deviated by 8.3% from the ideal. The court transferred five of Scott County's enumeration districts, containing03 persons, to the contiguous second district composed of the city of Bristol, and Smith and Washington Counties, population 87,01. Scott County's representation was thereby substantially reduced in the first district, and all but nonexistent in the second district. *32 The opportunity of its voters to champion local legislation relating to Scott County is virtually nil. The countervailing benefit resulting from the court's readjustment is the fact that the first district's deviation from the ideal is now reduced to 1.8%. The city of Virginia Beach saw its position deteriorate in a similar manner under the court-imposed plan. Under the legislative plan, Virginia Beach constituted the 0th district and was allocated three delegates for its population of 172,10. The resulting underrepresentation was cured by providing a floterial district, the 2d, which also included portions of the cities of Chesapeake and Portsmouth. Under the court's plan, the 2d district was dissolved. Of its 32,51 persons that constituted the deviation from the ideal for the 0th district, 3,515 were placed in the 0th, and 29,13 were transferred to Norfolk's 39th district. The 39th district is a multimember district that includes the 307,951 persons who make up the population of the city of Norfolk. Thus, those Virginia Beach residents who cast their vote in the 39th district amount to only 8.% of that district's population. In terms of practical politics, Virginia Beach complains that such representation is no representation at all so far as local legislation is concerned, and that those 29,13 people transferred to the 39th district have in that respect been effectively disenfranchised. We conclude, therefore, that the constitutionality of Virginia's legislative redistricting plan was not to be judged by the more stringent standards that Kirkpatrick and Wells make applicable to congressional reapportionment, but instead by the equal protection test enunciated in We reaffirm its holding |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | the equal protection test enunciated in We reaffirm its holding that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal *325 population as is practicable." We likewise reaffirm its conclusion that "[s]o long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature." The asserted justification for the divergences in this casethe State's policy of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision linesis not a new one to this Court. In it was noted: "Because cities and counties have consistently not been split or divided for purposes of legislative representation, multimember districts have been utilized for cities and counties whose populations entitle them to more than a single representative And, because of a tradition of respecting the integrity of the boundaries of cities and counties in drawing district lines, districts have been constructed only of combinations of counties and cities and not by pieces of them." The then-existing substantial deviation in the apportionment of both Houses defeated the constitutionality of Virginia's districting statutes in that case, but the possibility of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines in districting was not precluded so long as there existed "such minor deviations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination." We are not prepared to say that the decision of the people of Virginia to grant the General Assembly the power to enact local legislation dealing with the political *32 subdivisions is irrational. And if that be so, the decision of the General Assembly to provide representation to subdivisions qua subdivisions in order to implement that constitutional power is likewise valid when measured against the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The inquiry then becomes whether it can reasonably be said that the state policy urged by Virginia to justify the divergences in the legislative reapportionment plan of the House is, indeed, furthered by the plan adopted by the legislature, and whether, if so justified, the divergences are also within tolerable limits. For a State's policy urged in justification of disparity in district population, however rational, cannot constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of substantial equality. There was uncontradicted evidence offered in the District Court to the effect that the legislature's |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | in the District Court to the effect that the legislature's plan, subject to minor qualifications, "produces the minimum deviation above and below the norm, keeping intact political boundaries." (Defendants' Exhibit 8.) That court itself recognized that equality was impossible if political boundaries were to be kept intact in the process of districting. But it went on to hold that since the State "proved no governmental necessity for strictly adhering to political subdivision lines," the legislative plan was constitutionally invalid. As we noted above, however, the proper equal protection test is not framed in terms of "governmental necessity," but instead in terms of a claim that a State may "rationally consider." The District Court intimated that one reason for rejecting the justification for divergences offered by the State was its conclusion that the legislature had not in fact implemented its asserted policy, "as witness the division of Fairfax County." *327 But while Fairfax County was divided, it was not fragmented. And had it not been divided, there would have been one ten-member district in Fairfax County, a result that this Court might well have been thought to disfavor as a result of its opinion in The State can scarcely be condemned for simultaneously attempting to move toward smaller districts and to maintain the integrity of its political subdivision lines. Appellees argue that the traditional adherence to such lines is no longer a justification since the Virginia constitutional provision regarding reapportionment, Art, II, neither specifically provides for apportionment along political subdivision lines nor draws a distinction between the standards for congressional and legislative districting. The standard in each case is described in the "as nearly as is practicable" language used in and But, as we have previously indicated, the latitude afforded to States in legislative redistricting is somewhat broader than that afforded to them in congressional redistricting. Virginia was free as a matter of federal constitutional law to construe the mandate of its Constitution more liberally in the case of legislative redistricting than in the case of congressional redistricting, and the plan adopted by the legislature indicates that it has done so. We also reject the argument that, because the State is not adhering to its tradition of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions in congressional and State Senate redistricting, it may not do so in the case of redistricting for the House of Delegates. Nothing in the fact that Virginia has followed the constitutional mandate of this Court in the case of congressional redistricting, or that it has chosen in some instances to ignore political subdivision lines in the case of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | instances to ignore political subdivision lines in the case of the State Senate, *328 detracts from the validity of its consistently applied policy to have at least one house of its bicameral legislature responsive to voters of political subdivisions as such.[9] We hold that the legislature's plan for apportionment of the House of Delegates may reasonably be said to advance the rational state policy of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions. The remaining inquiry is whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits. We conclude that they do not. The most stringent mathematical standard that has heretofore been imposed upon an apportionment plan for a state legislature by this Court was enunciated in (197), where a scheme having a maximum deviation of 2% was disapproved. In that case, the State of Florida offered no evidence at the trial level to support the challenged variations with respect to either the House or Senate. at The Court emphasized there that "the fact that a 10% or 15% variation from the norm is approved in one State has little bearing on the validity of a similar variation in another State." We, therefore, find the citations to numerous cases decided by state and lower *329 federal courts to be of limited use in determining the constitutionality of Virginia's statute. The relatively minor variations present in the Virginia plan contrast sharply with the larger variations in state legislative reapportionment plans that have been struck down by previous decisions of this Court. See, e. g., and 38 U.S. 120 (197). Neither courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that enable them to extract from the general language of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the mathematical formula that establishes what range of percentage deviations is permissible, and what is not. The 1-odd percent maximum deviation that the District Court found to exist in the legislative plan for the reapportionment of the House is substantially less than the percentage deviations that have been found invalid in the previous decisions of this Court. While this percentage may well approach tolerable limits, we do not believe it exceeds them. Virginia has not sacrificed substantial equality to justifiable deviations. The policy of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines in the process of reapportioning a state legislature, the policy consistently advanced by Virginia as a justification for disparities in population among districts that elect members to the House of Delegates, is a rational one. It can reasonably be said, upon examination of the legislative plan, that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Mahan v. Howell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108719/mahan-v-howell/ | reasonably be said, upon examination of the legislative plan, that it does in fact advance that policy. The population disparities that are permitted thereunder result in a maximum percentage deviation that we hold to be within tolerable constitutional limits. We, therefore, hold the General Assembly's plan for the reapportionment of the House of Delegates constitutional and reverse the District Court's conclusion *330 to the contrary. We also affirm Weinberg v. Prichard et al., No. 71-, held pending this disposition.[10] II The General Assembly divided the State into 0 single-member senatorial districts. Under the plan, a portion of the city of Virginia Beach was added to the city of Norfolk and the entire area was divided into three single-member districts, which the court below found conformed almost ideally, numerically, to the "one person, one vote" principle. But all naval personnel "home-ported" at the U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, about 3,700 persons, were assigned to the Fifth Senatorial District because that is where they were counted on official census tracts.[11] It was undisputed that only about 8,100 of such *331 personnel lived aboard vessels assigned to the census tract within the Fifth District. The court had before it evidence that about 18,000 lived outside the Fifth District but within the Norfolk and Virginia Beach areas that, if true, indicated a malapportionment with respect to such personnel.[12] Lacking survey data sufficiently precise to permit the creation of three single-member districts more closely representing the actual population, the court corrected the disparities by establishing one multimember district composed of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Districts, encompassing the city of Norfolk and a portion of Virginia Beach. Appellants charge that the District Court was not justified in overturning the districts established by the General Assembly since the Assembly validly used census tracts in apportioning the area and that the imposition by the court of a multimember district contravened the valid legislative policy in favor of single-member districts. We conclude that under the unusual, if not unique, circumstances in this case the District Court did not err in declining to accord conclusive weight to the legislative reliance on census figures. That court justifiably found *332 that with respect to the three single-member districts in question, the legislative plan resulted in both significant population disparities and the assignment of military personnel to vote in districts in which they admittedly did not reside. Since discriminatory treatment of military personnel in legislative reapportionment is constitutionally impermissible, at 91, we hold that the interim relief granted by the District Court as to the State Senate was within the bounds of |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.