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Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Blackledge v. Perry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109042/blackledge-v-perry/ | a guilty plea. I believe the Court's departure today from the principles of and the cases preceding it must be recognized as a potentially major breach in the wall of certainty surrounding guilty pleas for which we have found constitutional sanction in those cases. There is no indication in this record that respondent's guilty plea was the result of an agreement with the prosecutor. *37 But the Court's basis for distinguishing the and Brady cases seems so insubstantial as to permit the doctrine of this case to apply to guilty pleas which have been obtained as a result of "plea bargains." In that event it will be not merely the State which stands to lose, but the accused defendant in the position of the respondent as well. Since the great majority of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargaining, defendants as a class have at least as great an interest in the finality of voluntary guilty pleas as do prosecutors. If that finality may be swept aside with the ease exhibited by the Court's approach today, prosecutors will have a reduced incentive to bargain, to the detriment of the many defendants for whom plea bargaining offers the only hope for ameliorating the consequences to them of a serious criminal charge. III But if, as I believe, a proper analysis of respondent's constitutional claim produces at most a violation of the standards laid down in North I agree with the Court, though not for the reasons it gives, that respondent's claim was not merged in his guilty plea. Imposition of sentence in violation of is not an "antecedent constitutional violation," since sentence is customarily imposed after a plea of guilty, and is a separate legal event from the determination by the Court that the defendant is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged. If respondent's claim is properly analyzed in terms of I would think that a result quite different from that mandated in the Court's opinion would obtain. and the decisions following it have made it clear that the wrong lies in the increased sentence, not in the judgment of conviction, and that the remedy for a defect is a remand for sentencing consistent with due *38 process. North In Rice we concluded that the Court of Appeals had erred in ruling that authorized the expunging of Rice's conviction after his trial de novo in North Carolina: "It could not be clearer that does not invalidate the conviction that resulted from Rice's second trial in short, requires only resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Blackledge v. Perry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109042/blackledge-v-perry/ | requires only resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set aside and a new trial required. Even if the higher sentence imposed after Rice's trial de novo was vulnerable under Rice was entitled neither to have his conviction erased nor to avoid the collateral consequences flowing from that conviction and a proper sentence." Since Rice had completely served his sentence, rather than reaching the merits of Rice's claim, we remanded for a determination whether any collateral consequences flowed from his service of the longer sentence imposed after retrial, or whether the case was moot. Here, while respondent faced the prospect of a more severe sentence at the conclusion of his felony trial in the Superior Court of North Carolina, it was by no means self-evident that this would be the result. The maximum sentence which he could receive on the misdemeanor count was one and one-half years, but nothing in the record indicates that the Superior Court judge might not impose a lesser penalty than that, or even grant probation. Nor is there any indication in the habeas record, which contains only a fragment of the state court proceedings, that the Superior Court judge might not at the conclusion of the trial and after a verdict of guilty have before him for sentencing purposes information which would support an augmented sentence under In fact, the habeas court found that the sentence actually *39 imposed was more severe than that which could have been imposed under the misdemeanor charge. But the remedy for that violation should be a direction to the state court to resentence in accordance with rather than an order completely annulling the conviction. Respondent was originally convicted of assaulting a fellow inmate with a deadly weapon, and later pleaded guilty to a charge of assaulting the inmate with a deadly weapon with intent to kill him. But in spite of both a verdict of guilty on one charge and a plea of guilty to the other, the Court's decision may well, as a practical matter, assure that no penalty whatever will be imposed on him. MR. JUSTICE POWELL joins in Part II of this opinion. |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | second_dissenting | Patterson v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112127/patterson-v-illinois/ | The Court should not condone unethical forms of trial preparation by prosecutors or their investigators. In civil litigation it is improper for a lawyer to communicate with his or her adversary's client without either notice to opposing counsel or the permission of the court.[1] An attempt to obtain evidence for use at trial by going behind the back of one's adversary would be not only a serious breach of professional ethics but also a manifestly unfair form of trial practice. In the criminal context, the same ethical rules apply and, in my opinion, notions of fairness that are at least as demanding should also be enforced. After a jury has been empaneled and a criminal trial is in progress, it would obviously be improper for the prosecutor to conduct a private interview with the defendant for the purpose *302 of obtaining evidence to be used against him at trial. By "private interview" I mean, of course, an interview initiated by the prosecutor, or his or her agents, without notice to the defendant's lawyer and without the permission of the court. Even if such an interview were to be commenced by giving the defendant the five items of legal advice that are mandated by Miranda, see ante, at 288, n. 1, I have no doubt that this Court would promptly and unanimously condemn such a shabby practice. As our holding in suggests, such a practice would not simply constitute a serious ethical violation, but would rise to the level of an impairment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.[2] *303 The question that this case raises, therefore, is at what point in the adversary process does it become impermissible for the prosecutor, or his or her agents, to conduct such private interviews with the opposing party? Several alternatives are conceivable: when the trial commences, when the defendant has actually met and accepted representation by his or her appointed counsel, when counsel is appointed, or when the adversary process commences. In my opinion, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel demands that a firm and unequivocal line be drawn at the point at which adversary proceedings commence. In prior cases this Court has used strong language to emphasize the significance of the formal commencement of adversary proceedings. Such language has been employed to explain decisions denying the defendant the benefit of the protection of the Sixth Amendment in preindictment settings, but an evenhanded interpretation of the Amendment would support the view that additional protection should automatically attach the moment the formal proceedings *304 begin. One such example is in which the Court concluded |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | second_dissenting | Patterson v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112127/patterson-v-illinois/ | begin. One such example is in which the Court concluded that the general rule requiring the presence of counsel at pretrial, lineup identifications, see United ; should not extend to protect custodial defendants not yet formally charged. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion explained the significance of the formal charge: "The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the `criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. See Powell v. -71; ; (Douglas, J., concurring)." -690 Similarly, in United we relied upon the significance of the absence of a formal charge in concluding that the Sixth Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent prison inmates confined in administrative detention while authorities investigate their possible involvement in criminal activity. Again the Court noted that "given the plain language of the Amendment and its purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial *305 criminal proceedings `is far from a mere formalism.'" Most recently, in the Court upheld a waiver of the right to counsel in a pretrial context even though the waiver "would not be valid" if the same situation had arisen after indictment, see ante, at 296-297, n. 9. In the Moran opinion, the Court explained: "It is clear, of course, that, absent a valid waiver, the defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation occurring after the first formal charging proceeding, the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel initially attaches. United ; See Brewer v. -401. And we readily agree that once the right has attached, it follows that the police may not interfere with the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a `"medium" between [the suspect] and the State' during the interrogation. ; see Brewer v. The difficulty for respondent is that the interrogation sessions that yielded the inculpatory statements took place before the initiation of `adversary judicial proceedings.' United" Today, however, in reaching a decision similarly favorable to the interest in law enforcement |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | second_dissenting | Patterson v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112127/patterson-v-illinois/ | a decision similarly favorable to the interest in law enforcement unfettered by process concerns, the Court backs away from the significance previously attributed to the initiation of formal proceedings. In the majority's view, the purported waiver of counsel in this case is properly equated with that of an unindicted suspect. Yet, as recognized in Kirby, and Moran, important differences *306 separate the two.[3] The return of an indictment, or like instrument, substantially alters the relationship between the state and the accused. Only after a formal accusation has "the government committed itself to prosecute, and only then [have] the adverse positions of government and defendant. solidified." Kirby, Moreover, the return of an indictment also presumably signals the government's conclusion that it has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. As a result, any further interrogation can only be designed to buttress the government's case; authorities are no longer simply attempting " `to solve a crime.' " United ; see also Given the significance of the initiation of formal proceedings and the concomitant shift in the relationship between the state and the accused, I think it quite wrong to suggest that Miranda warnings or for that *307 matter, any warnings offered by an adverse party provide a sufficient basis for permitting the undoubtedly prejudicial and, in my view, unfair practice of permitting trained law enforcement personnel and prosecuting attorneys to communicate with as-of-yet unrepresented criminal defendants. It is well settled that there is a strong presumption against waiver of Sixth Amendment protections, see ; Von ; and that a waiver may only be accepted if made with full awareness of "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation," ; see also Warnings offered by an opposing party, whether detailed or cursory, simply cannot satisfy this high standard. The majority premises its conclusion that Miranda warnings lay a sufficient basis for accepting a waiver of the right to counsel on the assumption that those warnings make clear to an accused "what a lawyer could `do for him' during the postindictment questioning: namely, advise [him] to refrain from making any [incriminating] statements." Ante, at 294[4] Yet, this is surely a gross understatement of the disadvantage of proceeding without a lawyer and *308 an understatement of what a defendant must understand to make a knowing waiver.[5] The Miranda warnings do not, for example, inform the accused that a lawyer might examine the indictment for legal sufficiency before submitting his or her client to interrogation or that a lawyer is likely to be considerably more skillful at negotiating a plea bargain and that |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | second_dissenting | Patterson v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112127/patterson-v-illinois/ | considerably more skillful at negotiating a plea bargain and that such negotiations may be most fruitful if initiated prior to any interrogation. Rather, the warnings do not even go so far as to explain to the accused the nature of the charges pending against him advice that a court would insist upon before allowing a defendant to enter a guilty plea with or without the presence of an attorney, see Without defining precisely the nature of the inquiry required to establish a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it must be conceded that at least minimal advice is necessary the accused must be told of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Yet, once it is conceded that certain advice is required and that after indictment the adversary relationship between the state and the accused has solidified, it inescapably follows *309 that a prosecutor may not conduct private interviews with a charged defendant. As at least one Court of Appeals has recognized, there are ethical constraints that prevent a prosecutor from giving legal advice to an uncounseled adversary.[6] Thus, neither the prosecutor nor his or her agents can ethically provide the unrepresented defendant with the kind of advice that should precede an evidence-gathering interview after formal proceedings have been commenced. Indeed, in my opinion even the Miranda warnings themselves are a species of legal advice that is improper when given by the prosecutor after indictment. Moreover, there are good reasons why such advice is deemed unethical, reasons that extend to the custodial, postindictment setting with unequaled strength. First, the offering of legal advice may lead an accused to underestimate the prosecuting authorities' true adversary posture. For an incarcerated defendant in this case, a 17-year-old who had been in custody for 44 hours at the time he was told of the *310 indictment the assistance of someone to explain why he is being held, the nature of the charges against him, and the extent of his legal rights, may be of such importance as to overcome what is perhaps obvious to most, that the prosecutor is a foe and not a friend. Second, the adversary posture of the parties, which is not fully solidified until formal charges are brought, will inevitably tend to color the advice offered. As hard as a prosecutor might try, I doubt that it is possible for one to wear the hat of an effective adviser to a criminal defendant while at the same time wearing the hat of a law enforcement authority. Finally, regardless of whether or not the accused |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | second_dissenting | Patterson v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112127/patterson-v-illinois/ | enforcement authority. Finally, regardless of whether or not the accused actually understands the legal and factual issues involved and the state's role as an adversary party, advice offered by a lawyer (or his or her agents) with such an evident conflict of interest cannot help but create a public perception of unfairness and unethical conduct. And as we held earlier this Term, "courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." This interest is a factor that may be considered in deciding whether to override a defendant's waiver of his or her Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation, see ibid., and likewise, should be considered in determining whether a waiver based on advice offered by the criminal defendant's adversary is ever appropriate.[7] In sum, without a careful discussion of the pitfalls of proceeding without counsel, the Sixth Amendment right cannot properly be waived. An adversary party, moreover, cannot adequately provide such advice. As a result, once the right to counsel attaches and the adversary relationship between *311 the state and the accused solidifies, a prosecutor cannot conduct a private interview with an accused party without "dilut[ing] the protection afforded by the right to counsel," Although this ground alone is reason enough to never permit such private interviews, the rule also presents the added virtue of drawing a clear and easily identifiable line at the point between the investigatory and adversary stages of a criminal proceeding. Such clarity in definition of constitutional rules that govern criminal proceedings is important to the law enforcement profession as well as to the private citizen. See It is true, of course, that the interest in effective law enforcement would benefit from an opportunity to engage in incommunicado questioning of defendants who, for reasons beyond their control, have not been able to receive the legal advice from counsel to which they are constitutionally entitled. But the Court's singleminded concentration on that interest might also lead to the toleration of similar practices at any stage of the trial. I think it clear that such private communications are intolerable not simply during trial, but at any point after adversary proceedings have commenced. I therefore respectfully dissent. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | dissenting | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118183/lewis-v-united-states/ | As the majority recognizes, the touchstone for interpreting the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) is the intent of Congress. Ante, at 166. One of Congress' purposes in enacting the ACA was to fill gaps in federal criminal law. Ante, at 160. The majority fails to weigh, however, a second, countervailing policy behind the ACA: the value of federalism. The intent of Congress was to preserve state law *181 except where it is "displaced by specific laws enacted by Congress." In other words, the ACA embodies Congress' "policy of general conformity to local law." United The majority quotes these passages with approval, ante, at 160, yet ignores the principles of federalism upon which they rest. A central tenet of federalism is concurrent jurisdiction over many subjects. See One result of concurrent jurisdiction is that, outside federal enclaves, citizens can be subject to the criminal laws of both state and federal sovereigns for the same act or course of conduct. See The ACA seeks to mirror the results of concurrent jurisdiction in enclaves where, but for its provisions, state laws would be suspended in their entirety. Congress chose this means to recognize and respect the power of both sovereigns. We should implement this principle by assimilating state law except where Congress has manifested a contrary intention in "specific [federal] laws." Franklin, at But see ante, at 163 (suggesting that persons within federal enclaves should not be "randomly subject" to state as well as federal law, even though both sovereigns regulate those outside enclaves). The majority recognizes that assimilation is not barred simply because the conduct at issue could be punished under a federal statute. It is correct, then, to assume that assimilation depends on whether Congress has proscribed the same offense. Ante, at 161-162. Yet in trying to define the same offense, the majority asks whether assimilation would interfere with a federal policy, rewrite a federal offense, or intrude upon a field occupied by the Federal Government. Ante, at 164-165. The majority's standards are a roundabout way to ask whether specific federal laws conflict with state laws. The standards take too little note of the value of federalism and the concomitant presumption in favor of *182 assimilation. And for many concrete cases, they are too vague to be of help. A more serious problem with the majority's approach, however, is that it undervalues the best indicia of congressional intent: the words of the criminal statutes in question and the factual elements they define. There is a methodology at hand for this purpose, and it is the Blockburger test we use in double jeopardy |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | dissenting | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118183/lewis-v-united-states/ | it is the Blockburger test we use in double jeopardy law. See ; see also Under Blockburger, we examine whether "[e]ach of the offenses created requires proof of a different element." In other words, does "each provision requir[e] proof of a fact which the other does not"? The same-elements test turns on the texts of the statutes in question, the clearest and most certain indicators of the will of Congress. The test is straightforward, and courts and Congress are already familiar with its dynamic. Following Blockburger, a same-elements approach under the ACA would respect federalism by allowing a broad scope for assimilation of state law. The majority rejects this approach, however, because federal and state statutes may have trivial differences in wording or may differ in jurisdictional elements. Ante, at 163, 165. It would be simpler and more faithful to federalism to use a same-elements inquiry as the starting point for the ACA analysis. Courts could use this standard and still accommodate the majority's concerns. Under this view, we would look beyond slight differences in wording and jurisdictional elements to discern whether, as a practical matter, the elements of the two crimes are the same. The majority frets that a small difference in the definitions of purses in federal and state purse-snatching laws would by itself permit assimilation. Ante, at 163. But a slight difference in definition need not by itself allow assimilation. See Amar & Marcus, *183 Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, The majority also wonders whether one could assimilate state laws forbidding robbery of state-chartered banks because a federal bank-robbery law did not require a state charter. Ante, at 163. But again, a jurisdictional element need not by itself allow assimilation, if all substantive elements of the offenses are identical. Because the purposes of the ACA and double jeopardy law differ, some other adjustments to Blockburger may be necessary. For instance, Blockburger treats greater and lesser included offenses as the same to protect the finality of a single prosecution, but finality is not the purpose of the ACA. Congress chooses to allow greater and lesser included offenses to coexist at the federal level, though a particular offender cannot be convicted of both. So too the existence of a lesser included federal offense does not prevent the assimilation of a greater state offense under the ACA, or vice versa. See ante, at 171 (citing cases finding federal assault statute does not prevent assimilation of state child-abuse laws). Another way in which the ACA differs from double jeopardy law is compelled by our own precedent interpreting the ACA. See |
Justice Kennedy | 1,998 | 4 | dissenting | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118183/lewis-v-united-states/ | is compelled by our own precedent interpreting the ACA. See Congress sometimes adverts to a specific element of an offense and sets it at a level different from the level set by state law. When the federal and state offenses have otherwise identical elements, assimilation is not proper. In the Williams case, for example, a state statutory-rape law set the age of majority at 18. Congress had enacted a federal carnal-knowledge statute, setting the age of majority at 16. Once Congress had adverted to and set the age of majority, state law could not be used to rewrite and broaden this particular element. See Because Congress had manifested *184 a clear intent to the contrary, assimilation was improper. The same would be true if a state grand-larceny law required a theft of at least $200, while a federal grand-larceny law required a theft of $250 or more. Congress could have defined first-degree murder to include the killing of children younger than 3, even though state law set the requisite age at 12. Had Congress done so, Williams would apply and assimilation of state law would be improper if all other elements were the same. Here, on the other hand, Congress has not taken a victim's age into account at all in defining first-degree murder. The state offense includes a substantive age element missing from the federal statute, so the two do not share the same elements and assimilation is proper. The majority's analysis is more obscure and leads it to an incorrect conclusion. For these reasons, and with all respect, I dissent. |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | I join the opinion of the Court, but write separately to make a few additional points. I In Food this Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state court from relying on its law of trespass to enjoin the peaceful picketing of a business enterprise located within a shopping center. The Court concluded that because the shopping center "serves as the community business block" and is open to the general public, "the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises." The Court rejected the suggestion that such an abrogation of the state law of trespass would intrude on the constitutionally protected property rights of shopping center owners. And it emphasized that the shopping center was open to the public and that reasonable restrictions on the exercise of communicative activity would be permitted. "[N]o meaningful claim to protection of a right of privacy can be advanced by respondents here. Nor on the facts of the case can any significant claim to protection of the normal business operation of the property be raised. Naked title is essentially all that is at issue." The Court in Logan Valley emphasized that if the property rights of shopping center owners were permitted to overcome the First Amendment rights of prospective petitioners, a significant intrusion on communicative activity would result. Because "[t]he large-scale movement of this country's population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied *90 by the advent of the suburban shopping center," a contrary decision would have "substantial consequences for workers seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies." In light of these realities, we concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the State from using its trespass laws to prevent the exercise of expressive activities on privately owned shopping centers, at least when those activities were related to the operations of the store at which they were directed. In Lloyd the Court confined Logan Valley to its facts, holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated when a State prohibited petitioning that was not designed to convey information with respect to the operation of the store that was being picketed. The Court indicated that a contrary result would constitute "an unwarranted infringement of property rights." And in the Court concluded that Lloyd had in fact overruled Logan Valley. I continue to believe that Logan Valley was rightly decided, and that both |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | believe that Logan Valley was rightly decided, and that both Lloyd and Hudgens were incorrect interpretations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. State action was present in all three cases. In all of them the shopping center owners had opened their centers to the public at large, effectively replacing the State with respect to such traditional First Amendment forums as streets, sidewalks, and parks. The State had in turn made its laws of trespass available to shopping center owners, enabling them to exclude those who wished to engage in expressive activity on their premises.[1]*91 Rights of free expression become illusory when a State has operated in such a way as to shut off effective channels of communication. I continue to believe, then, that "the Court's rejection of any role for the First Amendment in the privately owned shopping center complex stems from an overly formalistic view of the relationship between the institution of private ownership of property and the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech." II In the litigation now before the Court, the Supreme Court of California construed the California Constitution to protect precisely those rights of communication and expression that were at stake in Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens. The California court concluded that its State "[C]onstitution broadly proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping centers to which the public is invited can provide an essential and invaluable forum for exercising those rights." Like the Court in Logan Valley, the California court found that access to shopping centers was crucial to the exercise of rights of free expression. And like the Court in Logan Valley, the California court rejected the suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment barred the intrusion on the property rights of the shopping center owners. I applaud the court's decision, which is a part of a very healthy trend of affording state constitutional provision a more expansive interpretation than this Court has given to the Federal Constitution. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, Appellants, of course, take a different view. They contend that the decision below amounts to a constitutional "taking" or a deprivation of their property without due process of law. Lloyd, they claim, did not merely overrule Logan *92 Valley's First Amendment holding; it overruled its due process ruling as well, recognizing a federally protected right on the part of shopping center owners to enforce the pre-existing state law of trespass by excluding those who engage in communicative activity on their property. In my view, the issue appellants present is largely a restatement of the question of whether and to |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | largely a restatement of the question of whether and to what extent a State may abrogate or modify common-law rights. Although the cases in this Court do not definitively resolve the question, they demonstrate that appellants' claim has no merit. Earlier this Term, in the Court was also confronted with a claim that the abolition of a cause of action previously conferred by state law was an impermissible taking of "property." We responded that even if a pre-existing state-law remedy "is a species of `property' protected by the Due Process Clause it would remain true that the State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational." Similarly, in the context of a claim that a guest statute impermissibly abrogated common-law rights of tort, the Court observed that the Due Process Clause does not forbid the "creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." And in the Court upheld a statute limiting the permissible rate for the warehousing of grain. "A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the *93 common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances." See also Second Employers' Liability Cases, ; Appellants' claim in this case amounts to no less than a suggestion that the common law of trespass is not subject to revision by the State, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court's finding that state-created rights of expressive activity would be severely hindered if shopping centers were closed to expressive activities by members of the public. If accepted, that claim would represent a return to the era of when common-law rights were also found immune from revision by State or Federal Government. Such an approach would freeze the common law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-century state of development. It would allow no room for change in response to changes in circumstance. The Due Process Clause does not require such a result. On the other hand, I do not understand the Court to suggest |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | other hand, I do not understand the Court to suggest that rights of property are to be defined solely by state law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a state government. The constitutional terms "life, liberty, and property" do not derive their meaning solely from the provisions of positive law. They have a normative dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to respect.[2] Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain *94 categories of common-law rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental authority to abolish "core" common-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy.[3] That "core" has not been approached in this case. The California Supreme Court's decision is limited to shopping centers, which are already open to the general public. The owners are permitted to impose reasonable restrictions on expressive activity. There has been no showing of interference with appellants' normal business operations. The California court has not permitted an invasion of any personal sanctuary. Cf. No rights of privacy are implicated. In these circumstances *95 there is no basis for strictly scrutinizing the intrusion authorized by the California Supreme Court. I join the opinion of the Court. I join MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S concurring opinion but with these additional remarks. The question here is whether the Federal Constitution forbids a State to implement its own free-speech guarantee by requiring owners of shopping centers to permit entry on their property for the purpose of communicating with the public about subjects having no connection with the shopping centers' business. The Supreme Court of California held that in the circumstances of this case the federally protected property rights of appellants were not infringed. The state court recognized, however, that reasonable time and place limitations could be imposed and that it was dealing with the public or common areas in large shopping center and not with an individual retail establishment within or without the shopping center or with the property or privacy rights of a homeowner. On the facts before it, "[a] handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights." -348 I agree that on the record before us there was not an unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights. But it bears pointing out that the Federal Constitution does not require that a shopping center permit distributions or solicitations |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | not require that a shopping center permit distributions or solicitations on its property. Indeed, and Lloyd hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not prevent the property owner from excluding those who would demonstrate or communicate on his property. Insofar as the Federal Constitution is concerned, therefore, a State may *96 decline to construe its own constitution so as to limit the property rights of the shopping center owner. The Court also affirms the California Supreme Court's implicit holding that appellants' own free-speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not infringed by requiring them to provide a forum for appellees to communicate with the public on shopping center property. I concur in this judgment, but I agree with MR. JUSTICE POWELL that there are other circumstances that would present a far different First Amendment issue. May a State require the owner of a shopping center to subsidize any and all political, religious, or social-action groups by furnishing a convenient place for them to urge their views on the public and to solicit funds from likely prospects? Surely there are some limits on state authority to impose such requirements; and in this respect, I am not in entire accord with Part V of the Court's opinion. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring in part and in the judgment. Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all of the reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different questions would be presented if a State authorized strangers to picket or distribute leaflets in privately owned, freestanding stores and commercial premises. Nor does our decision today apply to all "shopping centers." This generic term may include retail establishments that vary widely in size, location, and other relevant characteristics. Even large establishments may be able to show that the number or type of persons wishing to speak on their premises would create a substantial annoyance to customers that could be eliminated only by elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, and manner restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to regulate private property is limited to the adoption of reasonable restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without *97 just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision." Ante, at 81. I Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, are invalid if they infringe the freedom of expression and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' contention that "a private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 85. I agree that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case. But some of the language in the Court's opinion is unnecessarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action that transforms privately owned property into a forum for the expression of the public's views could raise serious First Amendment questions. The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he does not hold. See ; West Virginia State Board of Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do not believe that the result in would have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we said that "[a] system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." This principle on its face protects a person who refuses to allow use of his property as a marketplace for the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal use." Ante, at 87. A person who has merely invited the public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be *98 an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable."[1] As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created right of limited access to a specialized type of property. Ante, at 87, 87-88. But even when no particular message is mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state action that forces a property owner to admit third-party speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For example, a law requiring that a newspaper permit others to use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First Amendment right to select material for publication. Miami Herald Publishing 8 U.S. 2 See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 2 U.S. 94, Such a right of access burdens the newspaper's "fundamental right to decide what to print or omit." ; |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | "fundamental right to decide what to print or omit." ; see Miami Herald Publishing As such, it is tantamount to compelled affirmation and, thus, presumptively unconstitutional.[2] *99 The selection of material for publication is not generally a concern of shopping centers. But similar speech interests are affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed by members of the public on commercial property as the views of the owner. If a state law mandated public access to the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, office, or small shopping center, customers might well conclude that the messages reflect the view of the proprietor. The same would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or distribute pamphlets in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of a private building. The property owner or proprietor would be faced with a choice: he either could permit his customers to receive a mistaken impression or he could disavow the messages. Should he take the first course, he effectively has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should he choose the second, he has been forced to speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself from the views expressed on his property, see ante, at 87, cannot restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." A property owner also may be faced with speakers who wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A minority-owned business confronted with leaflet distributers from the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, or a union compelled to supply a forum to right-to-work advocates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law requires it to make its private property available to anyone who wishes to speak. The strong emotions evoked by speech *100 in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to respond. The pressure to respond is particularly apparent when the owner has taken a position opposed to the view being expressed on his property. But an owner who strongly objects to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of access would extend may oppose ideological activities "of any sort" that are not related to the purposes for which he has invited the public onto his property. See 213, 2 To require the owner to specify |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | concurring | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110292/pruneyard-shopping-center-v-robins/ | property. See 213, 2 To require the owner to specify the particular ideas he finds objectionable enough to compel a response would force him to relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure." [3] Thus, the right to control one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners will not assume that the messages expressed on private property are those of the owner.[4] II One easily can identify other circumstances in which a right of access to commercial property would burden the owner's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from *101 speaking. But appellants have identified no such circumstance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that would support a holding in their favor under either of the legal theories outlined above. On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' limited speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Yard or of its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. Interspersed among these establishments are common walkways and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 77, 83. Appellees are high school students who set up their card table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the "Grand Plaza." App. to Juris. Statement B-2. They showed passersby several petitions and solicited signatures. Persons solicited could not reasonably have believed that the petitions embodied the views of the shopping center merely because it owned the ground on which they stood. Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that some groups who reasonably might be expected to speak at the PruneYard will express views that are so objectionable as to require a response even when listeners will not mistake their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the numbers or types of interest groups that may seek access to this shopping center, and no testimony showing that the appellants strongly disagree with any of them. Because appellants have not shown that the limited right of access held to be afforded by the California Constitution burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval for state efforts to transform privately owned commercial property into public forums. Any such state action would raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present in this case. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | This case presents the issue whether 18 U.S. C. 922 (6),[1] declaring that it is unlawful knowingly to make a false statement "in connection with the acquisition of any firearm from a licensed dealer," covers the redemption of a firearm from a pawnshop. I On October 6, petitioner, William C. Huddleston, Jr., pawned his wife's Winchester 30-30-caliber rifle for $25 at a pawnshop in Oxnard, California. On the following October 15 and on December 28, he pawned at *816 the same shop two other firearms, a Russian 7.62-caliber rifle and a Remington22-caliber rifle, belonging to his wife. For these he received loans of $10 and $15, respectively. The owner of the pawnshop was a federally licensed firearms dealer. Some weeks later, on February 1, and on March 10, Huddleston redeemed the weapons. In connection with each of the redemptions, the pawnbroker required petitioner to complete Treasury Form 4473, entitled "Firearms Transaction Record." This is a form used in the enforcement of the gun control provision of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Stat. 225, as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, Stat. 1213, of which the above-cited 18 U.S. C. 922 (6) is a part. Question 8b of the form is: "Have you been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year? (Note: The actual sentence given by the judge does not mattera yes answer is necessary if the judge could have given a sentence of more than one year.)" The question is derived from the statutory prohibition against a dealer's selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm to any person who "has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S. C. 922 (d) (1).[2] Petitioner answered "no" to Question 8b on each of the three *817 Forms 4473. He then affixed his signature to each form's certification that the answers were true and correct, that he understood that a person who answers any of the questions in the affirmative is prohibited by federal law from "purchasing and/or possessing a firearm," and that he also understood that the making of any false statement with respect to the transaction is a crime punishable as a felony. In fact, Huddleston, six years earlier, had been convicted in a California state court for writing checks without sufficient funds, an offense punishable under California law by a maximum term of 14 years.[3] This fact, if revealed to the pawnshop proprietor, would have precluded the proprietor from |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | to the pawnshop proprietor, would have precluded the proprietor from selling or otherwise disposing of any of the rifles to the petitioner because of the proscription in 18 U.S. C. 922 (d) (1). Huddleston was charged in a three-count indictment with violating 18 U.S. C. 922 (6) and 924[4] He moved to dismiss the indictment, in part on the ground that 922 (6) was never intended to apply, and should not apply, to a pawnor's redemption of a weapon he had pawned. This motion was denied. Petitioner then pleaded not guilty and waived a jury trial. *818 The Government's evidence consisted primarily of the three Treasury Forms 4473 Huddleston had signed; the record of his earlier California felony conviction; and the pawnbroker's federal license. A Government agent also testified that petitioner, after being arrested and advised of his rights, made statements admitting that he had known, when filling out the forms, that he was a felon and that he had lied each time when he answered Question 8b in the negative. Huddleston testified in his own defense. He stated that he did not knowingly make a false statement; that he did not read the form and simply answered "no" upon prompting from the pawnbroker; and that he was unaware that his California conviction was punishable by a term exceeding one year.[5] The District Judge found the petitioner guilty on all counts. He sentenced Huddleston to three concurrent three-year terms. The sentences were suspended, however, except for 20 days to be served on weekends. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed the conviction. The dissenting judge agreed that the statute was constitutional as applied, but concluded that what Huddleston did was to "reacquire" the rifles, and that "reacquire" is not necessarily included within the statute's term "acquire." We granted certiorari, to resolve an existing conflict among the circuits on the issue whether the *819 prohibition against making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm covers a firearm's redemption from a pawnshop.[6] II Petitioner's assault on the statute under which he was convicted is two pronged. First, it is argued that both the statute's language and its legislative history indicate that Congress did not intend a pawnshop redemption of a firearm to be an "acquisition" covered by the statute. Second, it is said that even if Congress did intend a pawnshop redemption to be a covered "acquisition," the statute is so ambiguous that its construction is controlled by the maxim that ambiguity in a criminal statute is to be resolved in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | ambiguity in a criminal statute is to be resolved in favor of the defendant. We turn first to the language and structure of the Act. Reduced to a minimum, 922 (6) relates to any false statement made "in connection with the acquisition of any firearm" from a licensed dealer and intended or likely to deceive the dealer "with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm." Petitioner attaches great significance to the word "acquisition." He urges that it suggests only a sale-like transaction. Since Congress in 922 (6) did not use words of transfer or delivery, as it did in other sections of the Act, he argues that "acquisition" must have a narrower meaning than those terms. Moreover, since a pawn transaction is only a temporary bailment of personal property, with the pawnshop having merely a security interest in the pledged property, title or ownership is constant in the pawnor, and the pawnplus-redemption *820 transaction is no more than an interruption in the pawnor's possession. The pawnor simply repossesses his own property, and he does not "acquire" any new title or interest in the object pawned. At most, he "reacquires" the object, and reacquisition, as the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals noted, is not necessarily included in the statutory term "acquisition." On its face, this argument might be said to have some force. A careful look at the statutory language and at complementary provisions of the Act, however, convinces us that the asserted ambiguity is contrived. Petitioner is mistaken in focusing solely on the term "acquisition" and in enshrouding it with an extra-statutory "legal title" or "ownership" analysis. The word "acquire" is defined to mean simply "to come into possession, control, or power of disposal of." Webster's New International Dictionary (3d ed., 1966, unabridged); United There is no intimation here that title or ownership would be necessary for possession, or control, or disposal power, and there is nothing else in the statute that justifies the imposition of that gloss. Moreover, a full reading of 922 (6) clearly demonstrates that the false statements that are prohibited are those made with respect to the lawfulness of the sale "or other disposition" of a firearm by a licensed dealer. The word "acquisition," therefore, cannot be considered apart from the phrase "sale or other disposition." As the Government suggests, and indeed as the petitioner implicitly reasoned at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, if the pawnbroker "sells" or "disposes" under 922 (6), the transferee necessarily "acquires." These words, as used in the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | the transferee necessarily "acquires." These words, as used in the statute, are correlatives. The focus of our inquiry, therefore, should be to determine whether a "sale or other disposition" of a firearm by a pawnbroker encompasses the redemption of the firearm by a pawnor. *821 Clearly, a redemption is not a "sale" for the simple reason that a sale has definite connotations of ownership and title. Some "other disposition" of a firearm, however, could easily encompass a pawnshop redemption. We believe that it does. It is the dealer who sells or disposes of the firearm. The statute defines the dealer to be: "(A) any person engaged in the business of selling firearms or ammunition at wholesale or retail, (B) any person engaged in the business of repairing firearms or of making or fitting special barrels, stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms, or (C) any person who is a pawnbroker." 18 U.S. C. 921 (11) (emphasis supplied). It defines a "pawnbroker" as "any person whose business or occupation includes the taking or receiving, by way of pledge or pawn, of any firearm or ammunition as security for the payment or repayment of money." 18 U.S. C. 921 (12) (emphasis supplied). These definitions surely suggest that a "sale or other disposition" of a firearm in a pawnshop is covered by the statute. This, of course, does not of itself resolve the question as to exactly what "other disposition" by a pawnbroker is included. It should be apparent, however, that if Congress had intended to include only a pawnbroker's default sales of pledged or pawned goods, or his wholesale and retail sales of nonpawned goods, and to exclude the redemption of pawned articles, then the explicit inclusion of the pawnbroker in the definition of "dealer" would serve no purpose, since part (A) of the definition, covering wholesale and retail sales, would otherwise reach all such sales. United At oral argument counsel suggested that the specific reference to a pawnbroker might have been intended to include "disposition" *822 by barter, swap, trade, or gift. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7. This interpretation strains belief. Trades or gifts are not peculiar to pawnbrokers. Wholesalers and retailers may indulge in such dispositions. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that this interpretation prompted the specific mention of a pawnbroker in part (C) of the definition. To the contrary, the committee reports indicate that part (C) "specifically provides that a pawnbroker dealing in firearms shall be considered a dealer." H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1968) (emphasis supplied). See also S. Rep. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | 2d Sess., 11 (1968) (emphasis supplied). See also S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1968). We also cannot ignore the explicit reference to a firearm transaction "by way of pledge or pawn" in the statutory definition of "pawnbroker" in 921 (12). Had Congress' desire been to exempt a transaction of this kind, it would have artfully worded the definition so as to exclude it. We are equally impressed by Congress' failure to exempt redemptive transactions from the prohibitions of the Act when it so carefully carved out exceptions for a dealer "returning a firearm" and for an individual mailing a firearm to a dealer "for the sole purpose of repair or customizing." 922 (2) (A). Petitioner contends that a redemptive transaction is no different from the return of a gun left for repair. His argument is that the pawned weapon is simply "returned" to the individual who left it and represents a mere restoration to its original status. We believe, however, that it was not unreasonable for Congress to choose to view the pawn transaction as something more than the mere interruption in possession typical of repair. The fact that Congress thought it necessary specifically to exempt the repair transaction indicates that it otherwise would have been covered and, if this were so, clearly a pawn transaction likewise would be covered. *823 Other provisions of the Act also make it clear that the statute generally covers all transfers of firearms by dealers to recipients. Section 922 (1) makes it unlawful for any person, except a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer, to engage in the business of "dealing" in firearms, or in the course of such business "to ship, transport, or receive any firearm." Section 922 (b) (1) makes it unlawful for a dealer "to sell or deliver" firearms of specified types to persons under 18 or 21 years of age. Section 922 (b) (2) makes it unlawful for a dealer to "sell or deliver" a weapon to a person in any State where "at the place of sale, delivery or other disposition," the transfer would violate local law. Section 922 (d) makes it unlawful for a dealer "to sell or otherwise dispose of" a firearm to a person under a felony indictment, a felon, a fugitive, a narcotic addict, or a mental defective. Section 923 (g) requires that each licensed dealer maintain "records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition, of firearms." In sum, the word "acquisition," as used in 922 (6), is not ambiguous, but clearly includes any person, by definition, who "come[s] into |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | but clearly includes any person, by definition, who "come[s] into possession, control, or power of disposal" of a firearm. As noted above, "acquisition" and "sale or other disposition" are correlatives. It is reasonable to conclude that a pawnbroker might "dispose" of a firearm through a redemptive transaction. And because Congress explicitly included pawnbrokers in the Act, explicitly mentioned pledge and pawn transactions involving firearms, and clearly failed to include them among the statutory exceptions, we are not at liberty to tamper with the obvious reach of the statute in proscribing the conduct in which the petitioner engaged. *824 III The legislative history, too, supports this reading of the statute. This is apparent from the aims and purposes of the Act and from the method Congress adopted to achieve those objectives. When Congress enacted the provisions under which petitioner was convicted, it was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest. Pub. L. 90-351, 1201, as amended by Pub. L. 90-618, 301 (1), 18 U.S. C. App. 1201. Congress determined that the ease with which firearms could be obtained contributed significantly to the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 (1968). The principal purpose of the federal gun control legislation, therefore, was to curb crime by keeping "firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency." S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1968). Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968 are thus aimed at restricting public access to firearms. Commerce in firearms is channeled through federally licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers in an attempt to halt mail-order and interstate consumer traffic in these weapons. The principal agent of federal enforcement is the dealer. He is licensed, 922 (1) and 923 ; he is required to keep records of "sale or other disposition," 923 (g); and he is subject to a criminal penalty for disposing of a weapon contrary to the provisions of the Act, 924. Section 922 (6), the provision under which petitioner *825 was convicted, was enacted as a means of providing adequate and truthful information about firearms transactions. Information drawn from records kept by dealers was a prime guarantee of the Act's effectiveness in keeping "these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose possession |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow." 114 Cong. Rec. 13219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings). Thus, any false statement with respect to the eligibility of a person to obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer was made subject to a criminal penalty. From this outline of the Act, it is apparent that the focus of the federal scheme is the federally licensed firearms dealer, at least insofar as the Act directly controls access to weapons by users. Firearms are channeled through dealers to eliminate the mail order and the generally widespread commerce in them, and to insure that, in the course of sales or other dispositions by these dealers, weapons could not be obtained by individuals whose possession of them would be contrary to the public interest. Thus, the conclusion we reached above with respect to the language and structure of the Act, that firearms redemptions in pawnshops are covered, is entirely consonant with the achievement of this congressional objective and method of enforcing the Act. Moreover, as was said in United "There is no indication in either the committee reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statute was to be in any way restricted" (footnotes omitted). Indeed, the committee reports indicate that the proscription under 922 (d) on the sale or other disposition of a firearm to a felon "goes to all types of sales or dispositions *826 over-the-counter as well as mail order."[7] S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1968). See S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 34 (1968). As far as the parties have informed us, and as far as our independent research has revealed, there is no discussion of the actual meaning of "acquisition" or of "sale or other disposition" in the legislative history. Previous legislation relating to the particular term "other disposition" sheds some light, however, and prudence calls on us to look to it in ascertaining the legislative purpose. United The term apparently had its origin in 1 (k) of the National Firearms Act, Pub. L. 474, (1934). That Act set certain conditions on the "transfer" of machine guns and other dangerous weapons. As defined by the Act, "transfer" meant "to sell, assign, pledge, lease, loan, give away, or otherwise dispose of." The term "otherwise dispose of" in that context was aimed at providing *827 maximum coverage. The interpretation we adopt here accomplishes the same objective.[8] There also can be no doubt of Congress' intention to deprive |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | also can be no doubt of Congress' intention to deprive the juvenile, the mentally incompetent, the criminal, and the fugitive of the use of firearms. Senator Tydings stated: "Title IV, the concealed weapons amendment, is a very limited, stripped-down, bare-minimum gun-traffic control bill, primarily designed to reduce access to handguns for criminals, juveniles, and fugitives I can fairly say that this concealed weapons amendment does not significantly inconvenience hunters and sportsmen in any way. The people it does frustrate are the juveniles, felons, and fugitives who today can, with total anonymity and impunity, obtain guns by mail or by crossing into neighboring States with lax or no gun laws at all, regardless of the law of their own State." 114 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1968). *828 Congressman Celler, the House Manager, stated: "Mr. Chairman, none of us who support Federal firearms controls believe that any bill or any system of control can guarantee that society will be safe from firearms misuse. But we are convinced that a strengthened system can significantly contribute to reducing the danger of crime in the United States. No one can dispute the need to prevent drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a history of mental disturbances, and persons convicted of certain offenses, from buying, owning, or possessing firearms. This bill seeks to maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of such persons." Congressman McCulloch, a senior member of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in referring specifically to 922 (6), stated, "[The bill] makes it unlawful [f]or any person, in connection with obtaining a firearm or ammunition from a licensee, to make a false representation material to such acquisition."[9] Given these statements of congressional purpose, it would be unwarranted to except pawnshop redemptions *829 when, by virtue of the statutory language itself, such redemptions would be covered. Otherwise every evil Congress hoped to cure would continue unabated.[10] *830 IV Petitioner urges that the intention to include pawn redemptions is so ambiguous and uncertain that the statute should be narrowly construed in his favor. Reliance is placed upon the maxim that an "ambiguity *831 concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." ; United This rule of narrow construction is rooted in the concern of the law for individual rights, and in the belief that fair warning should be accorded as to what conduct is criminal and punishable by deprivation of liberty or property. United ; United The rule is also the product of an awareness that legislators and not the courts should define criminal activity. Zeal in forwarding |
Justice Blackmun | 1,974 | 11 | majority | Huddleston v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108996/huddleston-v-united-states/ | not the courts should define criminal activity. Zeal in forwarding these laudable policies, however, must not be permitted to shadow the understanding that "[s]ound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will." United States ex rel. Although penal laws are to be construed strictly, they "ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature." American Fur ; United United ; United ; United ; United We perceive no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act. The statute in question clearly proscribes petitioner's conduct and accorded him fair warning of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct. Huddleston was not short of notice that his actions were unlawful. The question he answered untruthfully was preceded by a warning in boldface type that "an untruthful answer may subject you to criminal prosecution." The question itself was forthright and direct, stating that it was concerned with conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a *832 term exceeding one year and that this meant the term which could have been imposed and not the sentence actually given. Finally, petitioner was required to certify by his signature that his answers were true and correct and that he understood that "the making of any false oral or written statement with respect to this transaction is a crime punishable as a felony." This warning also was in boldface type. Clearly, petitioner had adequate notice and warning of the consequences of his action. Our reading of the statute cannot be viewed as judicial usurpation of the legislative function. The statute's language reveals an unmistakable attempt to include pawnshop transactions, by pledge or pawn, among the transactions covered by the Act. And Congress unquestionably made it unlawful for dealers, including pawnbrokers, "to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm" to a convicted felon, a juvenile, a drug addict, or a mental defective. 922 (d). Under these circumstances we will not blindly incant the rule of lenity to "destroy the spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to [and did] enact." American Tobacco ; United 271 U. S., at[11] *833 V The petitioner suggests, lastly, that the application of 922 (6) to a pawn redemption would raise constitutional questions of some moment, and that these would not arise if the statute were narrowly construed. We fail to see the presence of issues of that import. There was no taking of Huddleston's property without just compensation. The rifles, in fact, were not his but his wife's. Moreover, Congress |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117932/city-of-edmonds-v-oxford-house-inc/ | The Fair Housing Act (FHA or Act) prohibits discrimination in housing against, inter alios, persons with handicaps.[1] Section 807(b)(1) of the Act entirely exempts from the FHA's compass "any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." 42 U.S. C. 3607(b)(1). This case presents the question whether a provision in petitioner City of Edmonds' zoning code qualifies for 3607(b)(1)'s complete exemption from FHA scrutiny. The provision, governing areas zoned for single-family dwelling units, defines "family" as "persons [without regard to number] related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Edmonds Community Development Code (ECDC) 21.30.010 (11). The defining provision at issue describes who may compose a family unit; it does not prescribe "the maximum number of occupants" a dwelling unit may house. We hold that 3607(b)(1) does not exempt prescriptions of the familydefining kind, i. e., provisions designed to foster the family character of a neighborhood. Instead, 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption removes from the FHA's scope only total occupancy limits, i. e., numerical ceilings that serve to prevent overcrowding in living quarters. I In the summer of 10, respondent Oxford House opened a group home in the City of Edmonds, Washington (City), for *72 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction. The group home, called Oxford House-Edmonds, is located in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences. Upon learning that Oxford House had leased and was operating a home in Edmonds, the City issued criminal citations to the owner and a resident of the house. The citations charged violation of the zoning code rule that defines who may live in single-family dwelling units. The occupants of such units must compose a "family," and family, under the City's defining rule, "means an individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage." ECDC 21.30.010. Oxford House-Edmonds houses more than five unrelated persons, and therefore does not conform to the code. Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S. C. 3601 et seq., which declares it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter." 3604(f)(1)(A). The parties have stipulated, for purposes of this litigation, that the residents of Oxford House-Edmonds "are recovering alcoholics and drug addicts and are handicapped persons within the meaning" of the Act. App. 106. Discrimination covered |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117932/city-of-edmonds-v-oxford-house-inc/ | within the meaning" of the Act. App. 106. Discrimination covered by the FHA includes "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 3604(f)(3)(B). Oxford House asked Edmonds to make a "reasonable accommodation" by allowing it to remain in the single-family dwelling it had leased. Group homes for recovering substance abusers, Oxford urged, need 8 to 12 residents to be financially and therapeutically viable. Edmonds declined to permit Oxford House to stay in a single-family residential zone, but passed an ordinance *730 listing group homes as permitted uses in multifamily and general commercial zones. Edmonds sued Oxford House in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City with failure to make a "reasonable accommodation" permitting maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. The United States filed a separate action on the same FHA "reasonable accommodation" ground, and the two cases were consolidated. Edmonds suspended its criminal enforcement actions pending resolution of the federal litigation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that ECDC 21.30.010, defining "family," is exempt from the FHA under 3607(b)(1) as a "reasonable restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed; holding 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption inapplicable, the Court of Appeals remanded the cases for further consideration of the claims asserted by Oxford House and the United States. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an Eleventh Circuit decision declaring exempt under 3607(b)(1) a family definition provision similar to the Edmonds prescription. See[2] We granted *731 certiorari to resolve the conflict, and we now affirm the Ninth Circuit's judgment.[3] II The sole question before the Court is whether Edmonds' family composition rule qualifies as a "restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" within the meaning of the FHA's absolute exemption. 42 U.S. C. 3607(b)(1).[4] In answering this question, we are mindful of the Act's stated policy "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 3601. We also note precedent recognizing the FHA's "broad and inclusive" compass, and therefore according a "generous construction" to the Act's complaintfiling provision. Accordingly, we regard this case as an instance in which an exception to "a general statement *732 of policy" |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117932/city-of-edmonds-v-oxford-house-inc/ | which an exception to "a general statement *732 of policy" is sensibly read "narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy]."[5] A Congress enacted 3607(b)(1) against the backdrop of an evident distinction between municipal land-use restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions. Land-use restrictions designate "districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded." D. Mandelker, Land Use Law 4.16, pp. 113-114 (3d ed. 13) (hereinafter Mandelker). These restrictions typically categorize uses as single-family residential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or industrial. See, e. g., 1 E. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning 8.01, pp. 8-2 to 8-3 (4th ed. 15); Mandelker 1.03, p. 4; 1 E. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice 7-2, p. 252 (4th ed. 178). Land-use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused by the "pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of In particular, reserving land for single-family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods, securing "zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet *733 seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Village of Belle ; see also 431 U.S. 44, (177) (purpose of East Cleveland's single-family zoning ordinance "is the traditional one of preserving certain areas as family residential communities"). To limit land use to single-family residences, a municipality must define the term "family"; thus family composition rules are an essential component of single-family residential use restrictions. Maximum occupancy restrictions, in contradistinction, cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in relation to available floor space or the number and type of rooms. See, e. g., International Conference of Building Officials, Uniform Housing Code 503(b) (188); Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., BOCA National Property Maintenance Code PM-405.3, PM-405.5 (13) (hereinafter BOCA Code); Southern Building Code Congress, International, Inc., Standard Housing Code 306.1, 306.2 (11); E. Mood, APHACDC Recommended Minimum Housing Standards02, p. 37 (186) (hereinafter APHA CDC Standards).[6] These restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling units. Their purpose is to protect health and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding. See, e. g., BOCA Code PM-101.3, PM-405.3, PM-405.5 and commentary; Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B. U. L. Rev. 1, 41-45 (176). We recognized this distinction between maximum occupancy restrictions and land-use restrictions in 431 U.S. 44 (177). In Moore, the Court held unconstitutional the constricted definition of "family" contained *734 in East Cleveland's housing ordinance. East Cleveland's ordinance "select[ed] certain categories of relatives who may live together and declare[d] that others may not"; in particular, East Cleveland's definition of "family" made |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117932/city-of-edmonds-v-oxford-house-inc/ | may not"; in particular, East Cleveland's definition of "family" made "a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson." at 48-4 In response to East Cleveland's argument that its aim was to prevent overcrowded dwellings, streets, and schools, we observed that the municipality's restrictive definition of family served the asserted, and undeniably legitimate, goals "marginally, at best." Another East Cleveland ordinance, we noted, "specifically addressed the problem of overcrowding"; that ordinance tied "the maximum permissible occupancy of a dwelling to the habitable floor area." n. 7; accord, Justice Stewart, in dissent, also distinguished restrictions designed to "preserv[e] the character of a residential area," from prescription of "a minimum habitable floor area per person," at 53, n. in the interest of community health and safety.[7] Section 3607(b)(1)'s language"restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling"surely encompasses maximum occupancy restrictions.[8]*735 But the formulation does not fit family composition rules typically tied to land-use restrictions. In sum, rules that cap the total number of occupants in order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling "plainly and unmistakably," see A. H. Phillips, 324 U.S. 40, 43 (145), fall within 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption from the FHA's governance; rules designed to preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain, do not.[] B Turning specifically to the City's Community Development Code, we note that the provisions Edmonds invoked against Oxford House, ECDC 16.20.010 and 21.30.010, are classic examples of a use restriction and complementing family composition rule. These provisions do not cap the number of people who may live in a dwelling. In plain terms, they direct *736 that dwellings be used only to house families. Captioned "USES," ECDC 16.20.010 provides that the sole "Permitted Primary Us[e]" in a single-family residential zone is "[s]ingle-family dwelling units." Edmonds itself recognizes that this provision simply "defines those uses permitted in a single family residential zone." Pet. for Cert. 3. A separate provision caps the number of occupants a dwelling may house, based on floor area: "Floor Area. Every dwelling unit shall have at least one room which shall have not less than 120 square feet of floor area. Other habitable rooms, except kitchens, shall have an area of not less than 70 square feet. Where more than two persons occupy a room used for sleeping purposes, the required floor area shall be increased at the rate of 50 square feet for each occupant in excess of two." ECDC 1.10.000 (adopting Uniform Housing Code 503(b) (188)).[10] This space |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117932/city-of-edmonds-v-oxford-house-inc/ | ECDC 1.10.000 (adopting Uniform Housing Code 503(b) (188)).[10] This space and occupancy standard is a prototypical maximum occupancy restriction. Edmonds nevertheless argues that its family composition rule, ECDC 21.30.010, falls within 3607(b)(1), the FHA exemption for maximum occupancy restrictions, because the rule caps at five the number of unrelated persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling. But Edmonds' family composition rule surely does not answer the question: "What is the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a house?" So long as they are related "by genetics, adoption, or marriage," any number of people can live in a house. Ten siblings, their parents and grandparents, for example, could dwell in a house in Edmonds' single-family residential zone without offending Edmonds' family composition rule. *737 Family living, not living space per occupant, is what ECDC 21.30.010 describes. Defining family primarily by biological and legal relationships, the provision also accommodates another group association: Five or fewer unrelated people are allowed to live together as though they were family. This accommodation is the peg on which Edmonds rests its plea for 3607(b)(1) exemption. Had the City defined a family solely by biological and legal links, 3607(b)(1) would not have been the ground on which Edmonds staked its case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 16. It is curious reasoning indeed that converts a family values preserver into a maximum occupancy restriction once a town adds to a related persons prescription "and also two unrelated persons."[11] Edmonds additionally contends that subjecting singlefamily zoning to FHA scrutiny will "overturn Euclidian zoning" and "destroy the effectiveness and purpose of singlefamily zoning." Brief for Petitioner 11, 25. This contention both ignores the limited scope of the issue before us and exaggerates the force of the FHA's antidiscrimination provisions. We address only whether Edmonds' family composition rule qualifies for 3607(b)(1) exemption. Moreover, the FHA antidiscrimination provisions, when applicable, require only "reasonable" accommodations to afford persons with handicaps "equal opportunity to use and enjoy" housing. 3604(f)(1)(A) and (f)(3)(B). *738 * * * The parties have presented, and we have decided, only a threshold question: Edmonds' zoning code provision describing who may compose a "family" is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA under 3607(b)(1). It remains for the lower courts to decide whether Edmonds' actions against Oxford House violate the FHA's prohibitions against discrimination set out in 3604(f)(1)(A) and (f)(3)(B). For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Affirmed. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | dissenting | Department of Agriculture v. Moreno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108856/department-of-agriculture-v-moreno/ | For much the same reasons as those stated in my dissenting opinion in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, ante, p. 522, I am unable to agree with the Court's disposition of this case. Here appellees challenged a provision in the Federal Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S. C. 2011 et seq., which limited food stamps to related people living in one "household." The result of this provision is that unrelated persons who live under the same roof and pool their resources may not obtain food stamps even though otherwise eligible. The Court's opinion would make a very persuasive congressional committee report arguing against the adoption of the limitation in question. Undoubtedly, Congress attacked the problem with a rather blunt instrument and, just as undoubtedly, persuasive arguments may be made that what we conceive to be its purpose will not be significantly advanced by the enactment of the limitation. But questions such as this are for Congress, rather than for this Court; our role is limited to the *546 determination of whether there is any rational basis on which Congress could decide that public funds made available under the food stamp program should not go to a household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household. I do not believe that asserted congressional concern with the fraudulent use of food stamps is, when interpreted in the light most favorable to sustaining the limitation, quite as irrational as the Court seems to believe. A basic unit which Congress has chosen for determination of availability for food stamps is the "household," a determination which is not criticized by the Court. By the limitation here challenged, it has singled out households which contain unrelated persons and made such households ineligible. I do not think it is unreasonable for Congress to conclude that the basic unit which it was willing to support with federal funding through food stamps is some variation on the family as we know it a household consisting of related individuals. This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by households containing unrelated individuals that the household exists for some purpose other than to collect federal food stamps. Admittedly, as the Court points out, the limitation will make ineligible many households which have not been formed for the purpose of collecting federal food stamps, and will at the same time not wholly deny food stamps to those households which may have been formed in large part to take advantage of the program. But, as the Court concedes, "[t]raditional equal protection analysis does not require that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | dissenting | Department of Agriculture v. Moreno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108856/department-of-agriculture-v-moreno/ | Court concedes, "[t]raditional equal protection analysis does not require that every classification be drawn with precise `mathematical nicety,'" ante, at 538. And earlier this Term, the constitutionality of a similarly "imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act was challenged *547 on grounds such as those urged by appellees here. In the imposition of the rule on all members of a defined class was sustained because it served to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class of disclosure mechanisms chosen by Congress for consumer protection. The limitation which Congress enacted could, in the judgment of reasonable men, conceivably deny food stamps to members of households which have been formed solely for the purpose of taking advantage of the food stamp program. Since the food stamp program is not intended to be a subsidy for every individual who desires low-cost food, this was a permissible congressional decision quite consistent with the underlying policy of the Act. The fact that the limitation will have unfortunate and perhaps unintended consequences beyond this does not make it unconstitutional. |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | majority | Holywell Corp. v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112695/holywell-corp-v-smith/ | These cases require us to decide whether a trustee appointed to liquidate and distribute property as part of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan must file income tax returns and pay income tax under the Internal Revenue Code. I Miami Center Limited Partnership borrowed money from the Bank of New York (Bank) to develop "Miami Center," a hotel and office building complex in Miami, Florida. In August 1984, after it defaulted on the loan, MCLP and four affiliated debtorsHolywell Corporation, Chopin Associates, Miami Center Corporation, and Theodore B. Gouldeach filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. The Bankruptcy Court consolidated the five cases. Prior to confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, the debtors represented their own bankruptcy estates as debtors in possession. See 11 U.S. C. 1101(1). The estates of Gould and Holywell contained two principal assets: equity in Miami Center and cash proceeds from the postbankruptcy sale of certain real estate in Washington, D. C., known as the Washington Properties. In August the Bank and other creditors approved a "Consolidated Plan of Reorganization." The plan required the debtors to give up their interests in Miami Center and the proceeds from the sale of the Washington Properties, but otherwise permitted them to remain in business. Part V of the plan provided: "1. A Trust is hereby declared and established on behalf of the Debtors and an individual to be appointed by the Court is designated as Trustee of all property of the estates of the Debtors including but not limited to, Miami Center [and] the Washington Proceeds. to hold, liquidate, and distribute such Trust Property according to the terms of this Plan. The Trust shall be known as the `Miami Center Liquidating Trust.' *51 "2. [A]ll right,title and interest of the Debtors in and to the Trust Property, including Miami Center, shall vest in the Trustee, without further act or deed by the Debtors"App. 41. The plan required the trustee to liquidate and distribute all of the trust property to the creditors of the various bankruptcy estates. It empowered the trustee to "[m]anage, operate, improve, and protect the Trust Property"; to "[r]elease, convey, or assign any right, title or interest in or about the Trust Property"; and to perform other, similar actions. The plan said nothing about whether the trustee had to file income tax returns or pay any income tax due. The United States did not object to its confirmation. The plan took effect on October 10, The trustee appointed by the court, respondent Fred Stanton Smith, immediately sold Miami Center to the Bank in consideration for cash and cancellation of the |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | majority | Holywell Corp. v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112695/holywell-corp-v-smith/ | the Bank in consideration for cash and cancellation of the Bank's claim. The trustee then distributed these and other assets to third-party creditors. Holywell Corporation filed a tax return for the fiscal year ending July 31, The income for this fiscal year included capital gains earned in the sale of the Washington Properties. Holywell asked the trustee to pay the taxes owed. Neither the corporate debtors nor the trustee filed federal income tax returns for any fiscal year ending after July 31, The income for these years included the capital gains earned in the sale of Miami Center and interest earned by reinvesting the proceeds. In December 1987, the trustee sought a declaratory judgment from the Bankruptcy Court that he had no duty to file income tax returns or pay income tax under the federal income tax laws. The United States and the debtors opposed the action. The Bankruptcy Court declared that the trustee did not have to make any federal tax returns or pay any taxes. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, and the Court of Appeals, both affirmed. The United States, in No. *52 90-1484, and the debtors, in No. 90-1361, each petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted review. II The Internal Revenue Code ties the duty to pay federal income taxes to the duty to make an income tax return. See 26 U.S. C. 6151(a) ("[W]hen a return of a tax is required. the person required to make such return shall pay such tax"). We conclude in this case that the trustee must pay the tax due on the income attributable to the corporate debtors' property because 6012(b)(3) requires him to make a return as the "assignee" of the "property of a corporation." We further hold that the trustee must pay the tax due on the income attributable to the individual debtor's property because 6012(b)(4) requires him to make a return as the "fiduciary" of a "trust." Finally, we decide that the United States did not excuse the trustee from these duties by failing to object to the plan. A We first consider the trustee's duties with respect to the corporate debtors. Section 6012(b)(3) provides: "(3) Receivers, trustees and assignees for corporations "In a case where a receiver, trustee in a case under title 11 of the United States Code, or assignee, by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, by operation of law or otherwise, has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the property or business of a corporation, whether or not such property or business is |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | majority | Holywell Corp. v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112695/holywell-corp-v-smith/ | a corporation, whether or not such property or business is being operated, such receiver, trustee, or assignee shall make the return of income for such corporation in the same manner and form as corporations are required to make such returns." The parties disagree about whether the trustee in this case is a "receiver," a "trustee in a case under title 11 of *53 the United States Code [i. e., the Bankruptcy Code]," or an "assignee." We hold that the trustee is an "assignee" of the corporate debtors under 6012(b)(3). Because the parties do not argue that the trustee's duties would differ under another characterization, we decline to consider whether the trustee would qualify as a receiver or bankruptcy trustee. The plan, as noted above, transferred the corporate debtors' estates to respondent Smith as trustee for the Miami Center Liquidating Trust. The respondents do not dispute that the trustee meets the usual definition of the word "assignee" in both ordinary and legal usage. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 132 (1986) (defining an "assignee" as "one to whom a right or property is legally transferred"); Black's Law Dictionary 118-119 (defining an "assignee" as "[a] person to whom an assignment is made" and an "assignment" as "[t]he act of transferring to another all or part of one's property, interest, or rights"); cf. 26 CFR 301.6036-1(a)(3) They argue, however, that courts have applied 6012(b)(3) only in situations in which a person winds up the business of a dissolving corporation, see, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Greeley, or a person stands in the place of management in operating the day-to-day business of a distressed corporation, see, e. g., Louisville Property They conclude that 6012(b)(3) cannot apply to the trustee in this case because he did neither. We find this argument unpersuasive. Nothing in 6012(b)(3) suggests that the word "assignee" is limited in the manner proposed by the respondents. The statute does not make dissolution necessary; it applies whether the corporation transfers "all" or "substantially all" of its property. It does not require the assignee to manage the corporation's business after the transfer of property; it *54 expressly requires the assignee to make a return "whether or not [the assigned] property or business is being operated." We therefore conclude that 6012(b)(3) applies to the trustee in this case. As the assignee of "all" or "substantially all" of the property of the corporate debtors, the trustee must file the returns that the corporate debtors would have filed had the plan not assigned their property to the trustee. B We next consider the trustee's duties with |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | majority | Holywell Corp. v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112695/holywell-corp-v-smith/ | the trustee. B We next consider the trustee's duties with respect to the individual debtor, Theodore B. Gould. The parties agree that 6012(b)(3) does not require the trustee to file a return as the "assignee" of Gould's estate because the section applies only to the assignee of the property of a corporation. Section 6012(b)(4), however, provides: "(4) Returns of estates and trusts "Returns of an estate, a trust, or an estate of an individual under chapter 7 or 11 of title 11 of the United States Code shall be made by the fiduciary thereof." The United States argues that the trustee must file under 6012(b)(4) as the fiduciary of Gould's Chapter 11 "estate." The debtors join the United States' argument and also contend in the alternative that the trustee must file under the section as the fiduciary of a "trust." The respondents insist that the trustee is not acting as the fiduciary of either a bankruptcy estate or a trust within the meaning of 6012(b)(4). Accordingly, they assert, the section does not require the trustee to file a return on behalf of Gould. We agree with the debtors that the trustee must file a return because he is the fiduciary of a trust of an individual. The parties agree that Gould originally served as the fiduciary of his own bankruptcy estate when he became debtor in possession. See 11 U.S. C. 1107(a). At confirmation, according to the United States, the bankruptcy plan substituted the trustee for Gould but did not alter the bankruptcy *55 estate. In other words, the United States argues, the trustee took Gould's place as the fiduciary of "an estate of an individual under chapter 11." The United States points out that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly provides that a fiduciary may hold and administer property of the estate after confirmation of the plan, see 11 U.S. C. 1123(b)(3), and that nothing prohibits the substitution of a third-party trustee for the debtor in possession. The United States, therefore, maintains that the trustee must file a return under 6012(b)(4). Whether or not the Bankruptcy Code permits a plan to place a new fiduciary in charge of an estate after confirmation, as the United States contends, we do not believe that a mere substitution occurred in this case. The plan, as quoted above, "declared and established" the new Miami Center Liquidating Trust. It then vested all of the assets of Gould's estate to respondent Smith as trustee. The plan did not simply substitute the trustee for Gould as the fiduciary of the estate. Rather, it created a separate and distinct |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | majority | Holywell Corp. v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112695/holywell-corp-v-smith/ | of the estate. Rather, it created a separate and distinct trust holding the property of the estate and gave the trustee control of this property. The Bankruptcy Code expressly permits this arrangement. See 1123(a)(5)(B) (authorizing a plan to transfer "all or any part of the property of the estate to one or more entities, whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan"). The trustee, therefore, is not acting as the fiduciary of Gould's bankruptcy estate. The trustee, nonetheless, must make a return. Section 6012(b)(4), as the debtors assert, applies to the fiduciary of a trust as well as the fiduciary of a bankruptcy estate. We see no way for the respondents to deny that the Miami Center Liquidating Trust is a "trust" and that respondent Smith is its "fiduciary." A Treasury Regulation states: "Certain organizations which are commonly known as liquidating trusts are treated as trusts for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. An organization will be considered a liquidating trust if it is organized for the *56 primary purpose of liquidating and distributing the assets transferred to it, and if its activities are all reasonably necessary to, and consistent with, the accomplishment of that purpose." 26 CFR 301.7701-4(d) The Miami Center Liquidating Trust clearly fits this description. The plan not only describes the entity as a trust, but also created it for the express purpose of liquidating Gould's estate and distributing it to creditors. Respondent Smith, moreover, acted as the fiduciary of this trust. The Internal Revenue Code defines "fiduciary" as a "guardian, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, conservator, or any person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any person." 26 U.S. C. 7701(a)(6). A Treasury Regulation further specifies: "`Fiduciary' is a term which applies to persons who occupy positions of peculiar confidence toward others, such as trustees, executors, and administrators. A fiduciary is a person who holds in trust an estate to which another has the beneficial title or in which another has a beneficial interest, or receives and controls income of another, as in the case of receivers." 26 CFR 301.7701-6 The bankruptcy plan, as noted above, assigned the property of Gould's estate to the trustee and gave him powers consistent with this definition. Smith therefore acted as the fiduciary of a trust within the meaning of 6012(b)(4). The respondents raise two principal objections to this conclusion. First, they argue that Gould must pay the Miami Center Liquidating Trust's income taxes under the so-called "grantor trust" rules in the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S. C. 671-677. They note, in particular, that Treasury Regulation 1.677(a)1(d) specifies |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | majority | Holywell Corp. v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112695/holywell-corp-v-smith/ | 671-677. They note, in particular, that Treasury Regulation 1.677(a)1(d) specifies that "a grantor is, in general, treated as the owner of a portion of a trust whose income *57 isapplied in discharge of a legal obligation of the grantor." 26 CFR 1.667(a)1(d) They assert that Gould is the grantor of the liquidating trust and that, under this regulation, he owns the trust's income and must pay taxes on it. To support this position, the respondents cite In re which applied the grantor trust provisions to a postconfirmation liquidating trust. While we express no opinion on the results in the facts are distinguishable. In the property of the bankruptcy estate by the terms of the plan appears to have revested in the debtor upon confirmation. The debtor pursuant to a plan then placed some of this property in a trust created to pay his creditors. Under these circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court concluded, the debtor had created a grantor trust under Treasury Regulation 1.677(a)1(d). See In this case, however, the property of Gould's bankruptcy estate did not revest in Gould. The plan, instead, placed all of the estate's property directly in the Miami Center Liquidating Trust. Gould himself did not contribute anything to the trust, and we thus fail to see how the respondents can characterize him as the grantor. Second, the respondents argue that the trustee did not act as a fiduciary because he had almost no discretion in performing his duties under the plan. They assert that the trustee merely acted as a "disbursing agent" who distributed liquidated funds to the creditors. As the dissenting judge noted below, labels and characterizations cannot alter the trustee's status for the purpose of the tax law. Because the liquidating trust is a trust under the Internal Revenue Code and because respondent Smith's duties under the plan satisfy the description of a fiduciary in *58 the regulations, the restrictions on the trustee's discretion do not remove him from coverage under 6012(b)(4).[*] C The respondents finally assert that the trustee may ignore the duties imposed by 6012 and 6151 because the Chapter 11 plan does not require him to pay taxes. They note that 1141(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that "the provisions of a confirmed plan bind any creditor" whether or not the creditor has accepted the plan. They conclude that 1141(a) precludes the United States, as a creditor, from seeking payment of any taxes. They add that the United States should have objected to the plan if it had wanted a different result. We disagree. The United States is not seeking from the |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | The term "concerted action" encompasses unlawful conspiracies and constitutionally protected assemblies. The "looseness and pliability" of legal doctrine applicable to concerted action led Justice Jackson to note that certain joint activities have a "chameleon-like" character.[1] The boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County, Miss., that gave rise to this litigation had such a character; it included elements of criminality and elements of majesty. Evidence that fear of reprisals caused some black citizens to withhold their patronage from respondents' businesses convinced the Supreme Court of Mississippi that the entire boycott was unlawful and that each of the 92 petitioners was liable for all of its economic consequences. Evidence that persuasive rhetoric, determination to remedy past injustices, and a host of voluntary decisions by free citizens were the critical *889 factors in the boycott's success presents us with the question whether the state court's judgment is consistent with the Constitution of the United s. I In March 1966, black citizens of Port Gibson, Miss., and other areas of Claiborne County presented white elected officials with a list of particularized demands for racial equality and integration.[2] The complainants did not receive a satisfactory response and, at a local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) meeting at the First Baptist Church, several hundred black persons voted to place a boycott on white merchants in the area. On October 31, 1969, several of the merchants filed suit in state court to recover losses caused by the boycott and to enjoin future boycott activity. We recount first the course of that litigation and then consider in more detail the events that gave rise to the merchants' claim for damages. A The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Hinds County by 17 white merchants.[3] The merchants named two corporations and 146 individuals as defendants: the NAACP, a New York membership corporation; Mississippi Action for Progress (MAP), a Mississippi corporation that implemented *890 the federal "Head Start" program; Aaron Henry, the President of the Mississippi Conference of the NAACP; Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP in Mississippi; and 144 other individuals who had participated in the boycott.[4] The complaint sought injunctive relief and an attachment of property, as well as damages. Although it alleged that the plaintiffs were suffering irreparable injury from an ongoing conspiracy, no preliminary relief was sought. Trial began before a chancellor in equity on June 11, 1973.[5] The court heard the testimony of 144 witnesses during an 8-month trial. In August 1976, the chancellor issued an opinion and decree finding that "an overwhelming preponderance of the evidence" |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | and decree finding that "an overwhelming preponderance of the evidence" established the joint and several liability of *891 130 of the defendants on three separate conspiracy theories.[6] First, the court held that the defendants were liable for the tort of malicious interference with the plaintiffs' businesses, which did not necessarily require the presence of a conspiracy.[7] Second, the chancellor found a violation of a state *892 statutory prohibition against secondary boycotts, on the theory that the defendants' primary dispute was with the governing authorities of Port Gibson and Claiborne County and not with the white merchants at whom the boycott was directed.[8] Third, the court found a violation of Mississippi's antitrust statute, on the ground that the boycott had diverted black patronage from the white merchants to black merchants and to other merchants located out of Claiborne County and thus had unreasonably limited competition between black and white merchants that had traditionally existed.[9] The chancellor specifically rejected the defendants' claim that their conduct was protected by the First Amendment.[10] *893 Five of the merchants offered no evidence of business losses. The chancellor found that the remaining 12 had suffered lost business earnings and lost goodwill during a 7-year period from 1966 to 1972 amounting to $944,699. That amount, plus statutory antitrust penalties of $6,000 and a $300,000 award of attorney's fees, produced a final judgment of $1,250,699, plus interest from the date of judgment and costs. As noted, the chancellor found all but 18 of the original 148 defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment. The court justified imposing full liability on the national organization of the NAACP on the ground that it had failed to "repudiate" the actions of Charles Evers, its Field Secretary in Mississippi. In addition to imposing damages liability, the chancellor entered a broad permanent injunction. He permanently enjoined petitioners from stationing "store watchers" at the respondents' business premises; from "persuading" any person to withhold his patronage from respondents; from "using demeaning and obscene language to or about any person" because that person continued to patronize the respondents; from "picketing or patroling" the premises of any of the respondents; and from using violence against any person or inflicting damage to any real or personal property.[11] *894 In December 1980, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed significant portions of the trial court's judgment. It held that the secondary boycott statute was inapplicable because it had not been enacted until "the boycott had been in operation for upward of two years."[12] The court declined to rely on the restraint of trade statute, noting that the "United s |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | the restraint of trade statute, noting that the "United s Supreme Court has seen fit to hold boycotts to achieve political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. 1 (1970), after which our statute is patterned."[13] Thus, the court rejected two theories of liability that were consistent with a totally voluntary and nonviolent withholding of patronage from the white merchants. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of liability, however, on the basis of the chancellor's common-law tort theory. After reviewing the chancellor's recitation of the facts, the court quoted the following finding made by the trial court: "In carrying out the agreement and design, certain of the defendants, acting for all others, engaged in acts of physical force and violence against the persons and property of certain customers and prospective customers. Intimidation, threats, social ostracism, vilification, and traduction were some of the devices used by the defendants to achieve the desired results. Most effective, also, was the stationing of guards (`enforcers,' `deacons,' or `black hats') in the vicinity of white-owned businesses. Unquestionably, the evidence shows that the volition of many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear, and they were forced and compelled against their personal wills to withhold their trade and business intercourse *895 from the complainants." App. to Pet. for Cert. (quoted ). On the basis of this finding, the court concluded that the entire boycott was unlawful. "If any of these factorsforce, violence, or threatsis present, then the boycott is illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, political, social or other."[14] In a brief passage, the court rejected petitioners' reliance on the First Amendment: "The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats against the peace to achieve a goal makes the present state of facts a conspiracy. We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to no decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment includes in its protection the right to commit crime." The theory of the Mississippi Supreme Court, then, was that petitioners had agreed to use force, violence, and "threats" to effectuate the boycott.[15] To the trial court, such a finding had not been necessary.[16] Although the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's basic finding of liability, the court held that respondents *896 "did not establish their case" with respect to 38 of the defendants.[17] The court found that MAP was a victim, rather than a willing participant, in the conspiracy and dismissed without further explanation 37 individual defendants for lack of proof. Finally, |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | explanation 37 individual defendants for lack of proof. Finally, the court ruled that certain damages had been improperly awarded and that other damages had been inadequately proved. The court remanded for further proceedings on the computation of damages.[18] We granted a petition for certiorari. At oral argument, a question arose concerning the factual basis for the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court. As noted, that court affirmed petitioners' liability for damages on the ground that each of the petitioners had agreed to effectuate the boycott through force, violence, and threats. Such a finding was not necessary to the trial court's imposition of liability and neither state court had identified the evidence actually linking the petitioners to such an agreement. In response to a request from this Court, respondents filed a supplemental brief "specifying the acts committed by each of the petitioners giving rise to liability for damages." Supplemental Brief for Respondents 1. That brief helpfully places the petitioners in different categories; we accept respondents' framework for analysis and identify these classes as a preface to our review of the relevant incidents that occurred during the 7-year period for which damages were assessed.[19] *897 First, respondents contend that liability is justified by evidence of participation in the "management" of the boycott.[20] Respondents identify two groups of persons who may be found liable as "managers": 79 individuals who regularly attended Tuesday night meetings of the NAACP at the First Baptist Church; and 11 persons who took "leadership roles" at those meetings.[21] Second, respondents contend that liability is justified by evidence that an individual acted as a boycott "enforcer."[22] In this category, respondents identify 22 persons as members of the "Black Hats" a special group organized during the boycottand 19 individuals who were simply "store watchers." Third, respondents argue that those petitioners "who themselves engaged in violent acts or who threatened violence have provided the best possible evidence that they wanted the boycott to succeed by coercion whenever it could not succeed by persuasion." They identify 16 individuals *898 for whom there is direct evidence of participation in what respondents characterize as violent acts or threats of violence. Fourth, respondents contend that Charles Evers may be held liable because he "threatened violence on a number of occasions against boycott breakers." Like the chancellor, respondents would impose liability on the national NAACP because Evers "was acting in his capacity as Field Secretary of the NAACP when he committed these tortious and constitutionally unprotected acts." Finally, respondents state that they are "unable to determine on what record evidence the state courts relied in |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | determine on what record evidence the state courts relied in finding liability on the part of seven of the petitioners." With these allegations of wrongdoing in mind, we turn to consider the factual events that gave rise to this controversy. B The chancellor held petitioners liable for all of respondents' lost earnings during a 7-year period from 1966 to December 31, 1972. We first review chronologically the principal events that occurred during that period, describe some features of the boycott that are not in dispute, and then identify the most significant evidence of violent activity. In late 1965 or early 1966, Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP, helped organize the Claiborne County Branch of the NAACP. The pastor of the First Baptist Church, James Dorsey, was elected president of the Branch; regular meetings were conducted each Tuesday evening at the church. At about the same time, a group of black citizens formed a Human Relations Committee and presented a petition for redress of grievances to civic and business leaders of the white community. In response, a biracial committeeincluding five of the petitioners and several of the respondentswas organized and held a series of unproductive meetings. The black members of the committee then prepared a further petition entitled "Demands for Racial Justice." This petition *899 was presented for approval at the local NAACP meeting conducted on the first Tuesday evening in March. As described by the chancellor, "the approximately 500 people present voted their approval unanimously."[23] On March 14, 1966, the petition was presented to public officials of Port Gibson and Claiborne County. The petition included 19 specific demands. It called for the desegregation of all public schools and public facilities, the hiring of black policemen, public improvements in black residential areas, selection of blacks for jury duty, integration of bus stations so that blacks could use all facilities, and an end to verbal abuse by law enforcement officers. It stated that "Negroes are not to be addressed by terms as `boy,' `girl,' `shine,' `uncle,' or any other offensive term, but as `Mr.,' `Mrs.,' or `Miss,' as is the case with other citizens."[24] As described by the chancellor, the purpose of the demands "was to gain equal rights and opportunities for Negro citizens."[25] The petition further provided that black leaders hoped it would not be necessary to resort to the "selective buying campaigns" that had been used in other communities.[26] On March 23, two demands that had been omitted *900 from the original petition were added, one of which provided: "All stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers."[27] This |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | provided: "All stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers."[27] This supplemental petition stated that a response was expected by April 1. A favorable response was not received. On April 1, 1966, the Claiborne County NAACP conducted another meeting at the First Baptist Church. As described by the chancellor: "Several hundred black people attended the meeting, and the purpose was to decide what action should be taken relative to the twenty-one demands. Speeches were made by Evers and others, and a vote was taken. It was the unanimous vote of those present, without dissent, to place a boycott on the white merchants of Port Gibson and Claiborne County." App. to Pet. for Cert. 15b. The boycott was underway.[] In September 1966, Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. (MAP), was organized to develop community action programs in 20 counties of Mississippi. One of MAP's programs known as Head Startinvolved the use of federal funds to provide food for young children. Originally, food purchases in Claiborne County were made alternately from white-owned and black-owned stores, but in February 1967 the directors *901 of MAP authorized their Claiborne County representatives to purchase food only from black-owned stores. Since MAP bought substantial quantities of food, the consequences of this decision were significant. A large portion of the trial was devoted to the question whether MAP participated in the boycott voluntarily andunder the chancellor's theories of liabilitycould be held liable for the resulting damages. The chancellor found MAP a willing participant, noting that "during the course of the trial, the only Head Start cooks called to the witness stand testified that they refused to go into white-owned stores to purchase groceries for the children in the program for the reason that they were in favor of the boycott and wanted to honor it."[29] Several events occurred during the boycott that had a strong effect on boycott activity. On February 1, 1967, Port Gibson employed its first black policeman. During that month, the boycott was lifted on a number of merchants. On April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis. The chancellor found that this tragic event had a depressing effect on the black community and, as a result, the boycott "tightened."[30] *902 One event that occurred during the boycott is of particular significance. On April 18, 1969, a young black man named Roosevelt Jackson was shot and killed during an encounter with two Port Gibson police officers.[31] Large crowds immediately gathered, first at the hospital and later at the church. Tension in the community neared a breaking point. The local police requested reinforcements |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | community neared a breaking point. The local police requested reinforcements from the Highway Patrol and sporadic acts of violence ensued. The Mayor and Board of Aldermen placed a dawn-to-dusk curfew into effect. On April 19, Charles Evers spoke to a group assembled at the First Baptist Church and led a march to the courthouse where he demanded the discharge of the entire Port Gibson Police Force. When this demand was refused, the boycott was reimposed on all white merchants. One of Evers' speeches on this date was recorded by the police. In that speechsignificant portions of which are reproduced in an Appendix to this opinionEvers stated that boycott violators would be "disciplined" by their own people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night. On April 20, Aaron Henry came to Port Gibson, spoke to a large gathering, urged moderation, and joined local leaders in a protest march and a telegram sent to the Attorney General of the United s. On April 21, Evers gave another speech to several hundred people, in which he again called for a discharge of the police force and for a total boycott of all white-owned businesses in Claiborne County. Although this speech was not recorded, the chancellor found that Evers stated: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."[32] As noted, this lawsuit was filed in October 1969. No significant events concerning the boycott occurred after that *903 time. The chancellor identified no incident of violence that occurred after the suit was brought. He did identify, however, several significant incidents of boycott-related violence that occurred some years earlier. Before describing that evidence, it is appropriate to note that certain practices generally used to encourage support for the boycott were uniformly peaceful and orderly. The few marches associated with the boycott were carefully controlled by black leaders. Pickets used to advertise the boycott were often small children. The police made no arrestsand no complaints are recordedin connection with the picketing and occasional demonstrations supporting the boycott. Such activity was fairly irregular, occurred primarily on weekends, and apparently was largely discontinued around the time the lawsuit was filed.[33] One form of "discipline" of black persons who violated the boycott appears to have been employed with some regularity. Individuals stood outside of boycotted stores and identified those who traded with the merchants. Some of these "store watchers" were members of a group known as the "Black Hats" or the "Deacons."[34] The names of persons who violated *904 the boycott were read |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | names of persons who violated *904 the boycott were read at meetings of the Claiborne County NAACP and published in a mimeographed paper entitled the "Black Times." As stated by the chancellor, those persons "were branded as traitors to the black cause, called demeaning names, and socially ostracized for merely trading with whites."[35] The chancellor also concluded that a quite different form of discipline had been used against certain violators of the boycott. He specifically identified 10 incidents that "strikingly" revealed the "atmosphere of fear that prevailed among blacks from 1966 until 1970."[36] The testimony concerning four incidents convincingly demonstrates that they occurred because the victims were ignoring the boycott. In two cases, shots were fired at a house; in a third, a brick was thrown through a windshield; in the fourth, a flower garden was damaged. None of these four victims, however, ceased trading with white merchants.[37] *905 The evidence concerning four other incidents is less clear, but again it indicates that an unlawful form of discipline was applied to certain boycott violators. In April 1966, a black couple named Cox asked for a police escort to go into a white-owned dry cleaner and, a week later, shots were fired into their home. In another incident, an NAACP member took a bottle of whiskey from a black man who had purchased it in a white-owned store. The third incident involved a fight between a commercial fisherman who did not observe the boycott and four men who "grabbed me and beat me up and took a gun off me."[38] In a fourth incident, described only in hearsay testimony, a group of young blacks apparently pulled down the overalls of an elderly brick mason known as "Preacher White" and spanked him for not observing the boycott.[39] Two other incidents discussed by the chancellor are of less certain siguificance. Jasper Coleman testified that he participated *906 in an all-night poker game at a friend's house on Christmas Eve 1966. The following morning he discovered that all four tires of his pickup truck had been slashed with a knife. Coleman testified that he did not participate in the boycott but was never threatened for refusing to do so. Record 13791. Finally, Willie Myles testified that he and his wife received a threatening phone call and that a boy on a barge told him that he would be whipped for buying his gas at the wrong place. Five of these incidents occurred in 1966. The other five are not dated. The chancellor thus did not find that any act of violence occurred after 1966.[40] |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | not find that any act of violence occurred after 1966.[40] In particular, he made no reference to any act of violence or threat of violencewith the exception, of course, of Charles Evers' speechesafter the shootings of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968 or Roosevelt Jackson in 1969. The chancellor did not find that any of the incidents of violence was discussed at the Tuesday evening meetings of the NAACP.[41] II This Court's jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is, of course, limited to the federal *907 questions necessarily decided by that court.[42] We consider first whether petitioners' activities are protected in any respect by the Federal Constitution and, if they are, what effect such protection has on a lawsuit of this nature. A The boycott of white merchants at issue in this case took many forms. The boycott was launched at a meeting of a local branch of the NAACP attended by several hundred persons. Its acknowledged purpose was to secure compliance by both civic and business leaders with a lengthy list of demands for equality and racial justice. The boycott was supported by speeches and nonviolent picketing. Participants repeatedly encouraged others to join in its cause. Each of these elements of the boycott is a form of speech or conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.[43] The black citizens named as defendants in this action banded together and collectively expressed their dissatisfaction with a social structure that had denied them rights to equal treatment and respect. As we so recently acknowledged in Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair "the practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process." We recognized that "by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint *908 or lost." In emphasizing "the importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard on public issues," we noted the words of Justice Harlan, writing for the Court in 460: "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated for the Court in Citizens Against Rent Control: "There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with others, but political expression is not one of them." The right |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | but political expression is not one of them." The right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected. In De the Court unanimously held that an individual could not be penalized simply for assisting in the conduct of an otherwise lawful meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party, an organization that advocated "criminal syndicalism." After reviewing the rights of citizens "to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances," Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, stated: "It follows from these considerations that, consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices *909 under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge." Of course, the petitioners in this case did more than assemble peaceably and discuss among themselves their grievances against governmental and business policy. Other elements of the boycott, however, also involved activities ordinarily safeguarded by the First Amendment. In the Court held that peaceful picketing was entitled to constitutional protection, even though, in that case, the purpose of the picketing "was concededly to advise customers and prospective customers of the relationship existing between the employer and its employees and thereby to induce such customers not to patronize the employer." Cf. In we held that a peaceful march and demonstration was protected by the rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for a redress of grievances. Speech itself also was used to further the aims of the boycott. Nonparticipants repeatedly were urged to join the common cause, both through public address and |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | to join the common cause, both through public address and through personal solicitation. These elements of the boycott involve speech in its most direct form. In addition, names of boycott violators were read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist Church and published in a local black newspaper. Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott *910 through social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. Speech does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action. As Justice Rutledge, in describing the protection afforded by the First Amendment, explained: "It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to action. The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution of learning. `Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts." In Organization for a Better the Court considered the validity of a prior restraint on speech that invaded the "privacy" of the respondent. Petitioner, a racially integrated community organization, charged that respondent, a real estate broker, had engaged in tactics known as "blockbusting" or "panic peddling."[44] Petitioner asked respondent to sign an agreement that he would not solicit property in their community. When he refused, petitioner distributed leaflets near respondent's home that were critical of his business practices.[45] A state court enjoined petitioner from distributing the leaflets; an appellate court affirmed on the ground that the alleged activities were coercive and intimidating, rather than informative, and therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection. This Court reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained: "This Court has often recognized that the activity of peaceful pamphleteering is a form of communication protected *911 by the First Amendment. E. g., ; ; In sustaining the injunction, however, the Appellate Court was apparently of the view that petitioners' purpose in distributing their literature was not to inform the public, but to `force' respondent to sign a no-solicitation agreement. The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper. See Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the public aware of respondent's real estate practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the views and practices of petitioners are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability." In dissolving the prior restraint, the Court recognized |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | of acceptability." In dissolving the prior restraint, the Court recognized that "offensive" and "coercive" speech was nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.[46] In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The established elements of speech, assembly, association, and petition, "though not identical, are inseparable." Through exercise of these First Amendment rights, petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change. *912 Through speech, assembly, and petitionrather than through riot or revolutionpetitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second-class citizens. The presence of protected activity, however, does not end the relevant constitutional inquiry. Governmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances. See United s v. O'Brien,[47] A nonviolent and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association. See ; The right of business entities to "associate" to suppress competition may be curtailed. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United s, Unfair trade practices may be restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part of "Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife." See and n. 20. *913 While s have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in the boycott in this case. This Court has recognized that expression on public issues "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values." "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." There is a "profound national commitment" to the principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times In Eastern Railroad Presidents the Court considered whether the Sherman Act prohibited a publicity campaign waged by railroads against the trucking industry that was designed to foster the adoption of laws destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for truckers among the general public, and to impair the relationships existing between truckers and their customers. Noting that the "right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms," the Court held that |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | an intent to invade these freedoms," the Court held that the Sherman Act did not proscribe the publicity campaign. 7-138. The Court stated that it could not see how an intent to influence legislation to destroy the truckers as competitors "could transform conduct otherwise lawful into a violation of the Sherman Act." 8-139. Noting that the right of the people to petition their representatives in government "cannot properly be made to depend on their intent in doing so," the Court held that "at least insofar as the railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had." 9-140. This conclusion was not changed by the fact that the railroads' anticompetitive purpose produced an anticompetitive *914 effect; the Court rejected the truckers' Sherman Act claim despite the fact that "the truckers sustained some direct injury as an incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influence governmental action." It is not disputed that a major purpose of the boycott in this case was to influence governmental action. Like the railroads in Noerr, the petitioners certainly foresawand directly intendedthat the merchants would sustain economic injury as a result of their campaign. Unlike the railroads in that case, however, the purpose of petitioners' campaign was not to destroy legitimate competition. Petitioners sought to vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The right of the s to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.[48] In upholding an injunction against the state supersedeas bonding requirement in this case, Judge Ainsworth of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cogently stated: "At the heart of the Chancery Court's opinion lies the belief that the mere organization of the boycott and every activity undertaken in support thereof could be subject to judicial prohibition under state law. This *915 view accords insufficient weight to the First Amendment's protection of political speech and association. There is no suggestion that the NAACP, MAP or the individual defendants were in competition with the white businesses or that the boycott arose from parochial economic interests. On the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial dispute with the white merchants and city government of Port Gibson and all of the picketing, speeches, and other communication associated with the boycott were directed to the elimination of racial discrimination in the town. This differentiates this case from |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | racial discrimination in the town. This differentiates this case from a boycott organized for economic ends, for speech to protest racial discrimination is essential political speech lying at the core of the First Amendment." We hold that the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.[49] B The Mississippi Supreme Court did not sustain the chancellor's imposition of liability on a theory that state law prohibited a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott. The fact that such activity is constitutionally protected, however, imposes a special obligation on this Court to examine critically the basis on which liability was imposed.[50] In particular, we *916 consider here the effect of our holding that much of petitioners' conduct was constitutionally protected on the ability of the to impose liability for elements of the boycott that were not so protected.[51] The First Amendment does not protect violence. "Certainly violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the guise of `advocacy.'" (Douglas, J., concurring). Although the extent and significance of the violence in this case are vigorously disputed by the parties, there is no question that acts of violence occurred. No federal rule of law restricts a from imposing tort liability for business losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence. When such conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity, however, "precision of regulation" is demanded.[52] Specifically, the presence of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to *917 damages liability and on the persons who may be held accountable for those damages. In Mine the Court considered a case in many respects similar to the one before us. The case grew out of the rivalry between the United Mine Workers (UMW) and the Southern Labor Union (SLU) over representation of workers in the southern Appalachian coal fields. A coal company laid off 100 miners of UMW's Local 5881 when it closed one of its mines. That same year, a subsidiary of the coal company hired Gibbs as mine superintendent to attempt to open a new mine on nearby property through use of members of the SLU. Gibbs also received a contract to haul the mine's coal to the nearest railroad loading point. When he attempted to open the mine, however, he was met by armed members of Local 5881 who threatened Gibbs and beat an SLU organizer. These incidents occurred on August 15 and 16. Thereafter, there was no further violence at the mine |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | 16. Thereafter, there was no further violence at the mine site and UMW members maintained a peaceful picket line for nine months. No attempts to open the mine were made during that period. Gibbs lost his job as superintendent and never began performance of the haulage contract. Claiming to have suffered losses as a result of the union's concerted plan against him, Gibbs filed suit in federal court against the international UMW. He alleged an unlawful secondary boycott under the federal labor laws and, as a pendent state-law claim, "an unlawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott aimed at him to maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with his contract of employment and with his contract of haulage." The federal claim was dismissed on the ground that the dispute was "primary" and therefore not cognizable under the federal prohibition of secondary labor boycotts. Damages were awarded against the UMW, however, on the state claim of interference with an employment relationship. This Court reversed. The Court found that the pleadings, arguments of counsel, and jury instructions had not adequately *918 defined the compass within which damages could be awarded under state law. The Court noted that it had "consistently recognized the right of s to deal with violence and threats of violence appearing in labor disputes" and had sustained "a variety of remedial measures against the contention that state law was pre-empted by the passage of federal labor legislation." To accommodate federal labor policy, however, the Court in Gibbs held: "the permissible scope of state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct consequences of such [violent] conduct, and does not include consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing or other union activity." The Court noted that in Construction damages were restricted to those directly and proximately caused by wrongful conduct chargeable to the defendants. "`Thus there [was] nothing in the measure of damages to indicate that state power was exerted to compensate for anything more than the direct consequences of the violent conduct.'" (quoting San Diego Building Trades ). The careful limitation on damages liability imposed in Gibbs resulted from the need to accommodate state law with federal labor policy. That limitation is no less applicable, however, to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this case. Petitioners withheld their patronage from the white establishment of Claiborne County to challenge a political and economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country had fought a Civil War to secure. While the legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered. The First Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the to impose liability on an individual solely because of his *919 association with another. In Scales v. United s, the Court noted that a "blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims" would present "a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired." The Court suggested that to punish association with such a group, there must be "clear proof that a defendant `specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence.'" (quoting Noto v. United s, ).[53] Moreover, in Noto v. United s the Court emphasized that this intent must be judged "according to the strictest law,"[54] for "otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share." at -300. In the Court applied these principles in a noncriminal context. In that case the Court held that a student group could not be denied recognition at a state-supported college merely because of its affiliation with a national organization associated with disruptive and violent campus activity. It noted that "the Court has consistently disapproved governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's association with an unpopular organization." The Court stated that "it has been established that `guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the Goverument,' is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights." (quoting United s v. Robel, ). "The government has the burden *920 of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims." 408 U.S.,[55] The principles announced in Scales, Noto, and Healy are relevant to this case. Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.[56] "In this sensitive field, the may not employ `means that |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | "In this sensitive field, the may not employ `means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.'" 393 U.S. 1, III The chancellor awarded respondents damages for all business losses that were sustained during a 7-year period beginning in 1966 and ending December 31, 1972.[57] With the exception *921 of Aaron Henry, all defendants were held jointly and severally liable for these losses. The chancellor's findings were consistent with his view that voluntary participation in the boycott was a sufficient basis on which to impose liability. The Mississippi Supreme Court properly rejected that theory; it nevertheless held that petitioners were liable for all damages "resulting from the boycott."[58] In light of the principles set forth above, it is evident that such a damages award may not be sustained in this case. The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court itself demonstrates that all business losses were not proximately caused by the violence and threats of violence found to be present. The court stated that "coercion, intimidation, and threats" formed "part of the boycott activity" and "contributed to its almost complete success."[59] The court broadly assertedwithout differentiationthat "`[i]ntimidation, threats, social ostracism, vilification, and traduction'" were devices used by the defendants to effectuate the boycott.[60] The court repeated the chancellor's finding that "the volition of many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear."[61] These findings are inconsistent with the court's imposition of all damages "resulting from the boycott." To the extent that the court's judgment rests on the ground that "many" black citizens were "intimidated" by "threats" of "social ostracism, vilification, and traduction," it is flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment. The ambiguous findings of the Mississippi Supreme Court are inadequate to assure the "precision of regulation" demanded by that constitutional provision. *922 The record in this case demonstrates that all of respondents' losses were not proximately caused by violence or threats of violence. As respondents themselves stated at page 12 of their brief in the Mississippi Supreme Court: "Most of the witnesses testified that they voluntarily went along with the NAACP and their fellow black citizens in honoring and observing the boycott because they wanted the boycott." This assessment is amply supported by the record.[62] It is indeed inconceivable that a boycott launched by the unanimous vote of several hundred persons succeeded solely through fear and intimidation. Moreover, the fact that the boycott "intensified" following the shootings of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Roosevelt Jackson demonstrates that factors other than force and violence (by the petitioners) figured *923 prominently in the boycott's success. The chancellor |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | petitioners) figured *923 prominently in the boycott's success. The chancellor made no finding that any act of violence occurred after 1966. While the timing of the acts of violence was not important to the chancellor's imposition of liability, it is a critical factor under the narrower rationale of the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court has completely failed to demonstrate that business losses suffered in 1972three years after this lawsuit was filedwere proximately caused by the isolated acts of violence found in 1966.[63] It is impossible to conclude that state power has not been exerted to compensate respondents for the direct consequences of nonviolent, constitutionally protected activity. This case is not like Milk Wagon in which the Court held that the presence of violence justified an injunction against both violent and nonviolent activity.[64] The violent conduct present in that case was pervasive.[65] The Court in Meadownoor stated that "utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force." The Court emphasized, however: *924 "Still it is of prime importance that no constitutional freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening reality. That is why this Court has the ultimate power to search the records in the state courts where a claim of constitutionality is effectively made. And so the right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of force." Such "insubstantial findings" were not present in Meadowmoor. But in this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court has relied on isolated acts of violence during a limited period to uphold respondents' recovery of all business losses sustained over a 7-year span. No losses are attributed to the voluntary participation of individuals determined to secure "justice and equal opportunity."[66] The court's judgment "screens reality" and cannot stand.[67] Respondents' supplemental brief also demonstrates that on the present record no judgment may be sustained against most of the petitioners. Regular attendance and participation at the Tuesday meetings of the Claiborne County Branch of the NAACP is an insufficient predicate on which to impose liability. The chancellor's findings do not suggest that any illegal conduct was authorized, ratified, or even discussed at any of the meetings. The Sheriff testified that he was kept *925 informed of what transpired at the meetings; he made no reference to any discussion of unlawful activity.[68] To impose liability for presence at weekly meetings of the NAACP |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | impose liability for presence at weekly meetings of the NAACP wouldironicallynot even constitute "guilt by association," since there is no evidence that the association possessed unlawful aims. Rather, liability could only be imposed on a "guilt for association" theory. Neither is permissible under the First Amendment.[69] Respondents also argue that liability may be imposed on individuals who were either "store watchers" or members of the "Black Hats." There is nothing unlawful in standing outside a store and recording names. Similarly, there is nothing unlawful in wearing black hats, although such apparel may cause apprehension in others. As established above, mere association with either groupabsent a specific intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by that groupis *926 an insufficient predicate for liability. At the same time, the evidence does support the conclusion that some members of each of these groups engaged in violence or threats of violence. Unquestionably, these individuals may be held responsible for the injuries that they caused; a judgment tailored to the consequences of their unlawful conduct may be sustained. Respondents have sought separately to justify the judgment entered against Charles Evers and the national NAACP, As set forth by the chancellor, Evers was specially connected with the boycott in four respects. First, Evers signed the March 23 supplemental demand letter and unquestionably played the primary leadership role in the organization of the boycott. Second, Evers participated in negotiations with MAP and successfully convinced MAP to abandon its practice of purchasing food alternately from white-owned and black-owned stores. Third, he apparently presided at the April 1, 1966, meeting at which the vote to begin the boycott was taken; he delivered a speech to the large audience that was gathered on that occasion. See n. Fourth, Evers delivered the speeches on April 19 and 21, 1969, which we have discussed previously. See ; Appendix to this opinion. For the reasons set forth above, liability may not be imposed on Evers for his presence at NAACP meetings or his active participation in the boycott itself. To the extent that Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through his organization of the boycott, his emotional and persuasive appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his "threats" of vilification or social ostracism, Evers' conduct is constitutionally protected and beyond the reach of a damages award. Respondents point to Evers' speeches, however, as justification for the chancellor's damages award. Since respondents would impose liability on the basis of a public addresswhich predominantly contained highly charged political rhetoric *927 lying at the core of the First Amendmentwe approach this suggested basis of |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | core of the First Amendmentwe approach this suggested basis of liability with extreme care. There are three separate theories that might justify holding Evers liable for the unlawful conduct of others. First, a finding that he authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity would justify holding him responsible for the consequences of that activity. Second, a finding that his public speeches were likely to incite lawless action could justify holding him liable for unlawful conduct that in fact followed within a reasonable period. Third, the speeches might be taken as evidence that Evers gave other specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats. While many of the comments in Evers' speeches might have contemplated "discipline" in the permissible form of social ostracism, it cannot be denied that references to the possibility that necks would be broken and to the fact that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night implicitly conveyed a sterner message. In the passionate atmosphere in which the speeches were delivered, they might have been understood as inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence whether or not improper discipline was specifically intended. It is clear that "fighting words"those that provoke immediate violenceare not protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, words that create an immediate panic are not entitled to constitutional protection. Schenck v. United s,[70] This Court has made clear, however, that mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment. In we reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for threatening "revengeance" if the "suppression" of the white race continued; we relied on *9 "the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." See Noto v. United s, -298 See also (Brandeis, J., concurring). The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers' speeches did not transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg. The lengthy addresses generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and economic power available to them. In the course of those pleas, strong language was used. If that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this case, howeverwith the possible exception of the Cox incident the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred weeks or months after the April 1, 1966, speech; the chancellor made no finding of any violence after the challenged 1969 speech. Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech. To rule otherwise would ignore the "profound national commitment" that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times 376 U. S., at[71] *929 For these reasons, we conclude that Evers' addresses did not exceed the bounds of protected speech. If there were other evidence of his authorization of wrongful conduct, the references to discipline in the speeches could be used to corroborate that evidence. But any such theory fails for the simple reason that there is no evidenceapart from the speeches themselvesthat Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence.[72] The chancellor's findings are not sufficient to establish that Evers had a duty to "repudiate" the acts of violence that occurred.[73] The findings are constitutionally inadequate to support the damages judgment against him. The liability of the NAACP derived solely from the liability of Charles Evers.[74] The chancellor found: "The national NAACP was well-advised of Evers' actions, and it had the option of repudiating his acts or ratifying them. It never repudiated those acts, and therefore, it is deemed by this Court to have affirmed them." App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b-43b. *930 Of course, to the extent that Charles Evers' acts are insufficient to impose liability upon him, they may not be used to impose liability on his principal. On the present record, however, the judgment against the NAACP could not stand in any event. The associational rights of the NAACP and its members have been recognized repeatedly by this Court.[] The NAACPlike any other organizationof course may be held responsible for the acts of its agents throughout the country that are undertaken within the scope of their actual or apparent authority.[76] Cf. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Moreover, the NAACP may be found liable for other conduct of which it had knowledge and specifically ratified. The chancellor made no finding that Charles Evers or any other NAACP member had either actual or apparent authority to |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | other NAACP member had either actual or apparent authority to commit acts of violence or to threaten violent conduct. The evidence in the record suggests the contrary. Aaron Henry, President of the Mississippi Conference of the NAACP and a member of the Board of Directors of the national organization, testified that the statements attributed to Evers were directly contrary to NAACP policy. Record 4930.[77] Similarly, there is no evidence that the NAACP ratifiedor *931 even had specific knowledge ofany of the acts of violence or threats of discipline associated with the boycott. Henry testified that the NAACP never authorized, and never considered taking, any official action with respect to the boycott. The NAACP supplied no financial aid to the boycott. The chancellor made no finding that the national organization was involved in any way in the boycott.[78] To impose liability without a finding that the NAACP authorizedeither actually or apparentlyor ratified unlawful conduct would impermissibly burden the rights of political association that are protected by the First Amendment. As Justice Douglas noted in dissenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari found to have been improvidently granted: "To equate the liability of the national organization with that of the Branch in the absence of any proof that the national authorized or ratified the misconduct in question could ultimately destroy it. The rights of political association are fragile enough without adding the *932 additional threat of destruction by lawsuit. We have not been slow to recognize that the protection of the First Amendment bars subtle as well as obvious devices by which political association might be stifled. See Thus we have held that forced disclosure of one's political associations is, at least in the absence of a compelling state interest, inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of associational privacy. E. g., ; U.S. 539, ; ; N. A. A. C. Recognizing that guilt by association is a philosophy alien to the traditions of a free society (see and the First Amendment itself, we have held that civil or criminal disabilities may not be imposed on one who joins an organization which has among its purposes the violent overthrow of the Government, unless the individual joins knowing of the organization's illegal purposes ) and with the specific intention to further those purposes. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, [384 U. S., at] 11; Aptheker v. Secretary of" The chancellor's findings are not adequate to support the judgment against the NAACP. IV In litigation of this kind the stakes are high. Concerted action is a powerful weapon. History teaches that special dangers are associated |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | a powerful weapon. History teaches that special dangers are associated with conspiratorial activity.[79] And *933 yet one of the foundations of our society is the right of individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by lawful means.[80] At times the difference between lawful and unlawful collective action may be identified easily by reference to its purpose. In this case, however, petitioners' ultimate objectives were unquestionably legitimate. The charge of illegality like the claim of constitutional protectionderives from the means employed by the participants to achieve those goals. The use of speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism cannot provide the basis for a damages award. But violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional protection. The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the petitioners. They, of course, may be held liable for the consequences of their violent deeds. The burden of demonstrating that it colored the entire collective effort, however, is not satisfied by evidence that violence occurred or even that violence contributed to the success of the boycott. A massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and economic structure of a local environment cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of relatively few violent acts. Such a characterization must be supported by findings that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use unlawful means, that carefully *934 identify the impact of such unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity. The burden of demonstrating that fear rather than protected conduct was the dominant force in the movement is heavy. A court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless freestanding trees. The findings of the chancellor, framed largely in the light of two legal theories rejected by the Mississippi Supreme Court, are constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment that all petitioners are liable for all losses resulting from the boycott. The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concurs in the result. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Portions of speech delivered by Charles Evers on April 19, 1969 (Record 1092-1108): "Thank you very much. We want our white friends here to know what we tell them happens to be so. |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | to know what we tell them happens to be so. Thank you for having the courage to walk down those streets with us. We thank you for letting our white brethren know that guns and bullets ain't gonna stop us. (No) (No) We thank you for letting our white brothers know that Port Gibson ain't none of their town. (Amen) (Applause) That Port Gibson is all of our town. (Applause) That black folks, red folks, Chinese and Japanese alike (Yeah) (That's right.), that we are going to have our share. (Yeah, we are.) *935 "We are going to beat you because we know you can't trick us no more. (yea) You are not going to be able to fool us by getting somebody to give us a drink of whiskey no more. (Applause) You ain't gonna be able to fool us by somebody giving us a few dollars no more. (Applause) We are gonna take your money and drink with you and then we're gonna (Applause) vote against you. Then we are going to elect a sheriff in this county and a sheriff that is responsible, that won't have to run and grab the telephone and call up the blood-thirsty highway patrol when he gets ready (Yeah) to come in and beat innocent folks down to the ground for no cause. (That's right) (Applause) (Boo) We are going to elect a sheriff that can call his deputies and represent black leaders in the community and stop whatever problem there is. (Yeah) (That's right.) "Then we are going to do more than that. The white merchants of this town are so wrapped up in the power structure here, since you love your Police Department so well, since you support them so well (Yeah), we are going to let them buy your dirty clothes and your filthy, rotten groceries. "Oh, no, white folks, we ain't going to shoot you with no bullet. (That's right.) We are going to shoot you with our ballots and with our bucks. (Yea) (That's right.) We are going to take away from you the thing that you have had over us all these years. (Yeah) Political power and economic power. While you kill our brothers and our sisters and rape our wives and our friends. (Yeah) You're guilty. You're guilty because you don't care a thing about anybody. (Yes.) And when you go and let a big, black burly nigger like you get on the police force (Yea) go down and grab another black brother's arm and hold it while a white racist stole him from us, |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | hold it while a white racist stole him from us, and he's a liar if he says he didn't hold him. "We mean what we are saying. We are not playing. (Right) We better not even think one of us is black. You better not even be caught near one of these stores. (Applause) *936 "We don't want you caught in Piggly-Wiggly. You remember how he grinned at us four years ago? (Yeah) You know how when he took office he grinned at us? (Yeah) He ain't hired nobody yet. (That's right) (No) And you know old Jitney Jungle down there with those funny letters down on the end? (That's right) (Applause) He haven't hired nobody in there yet. (No) Do you know poor ole M & M or whatever it stands for, mud and mush, I guess. (Applause) They're out here on the highway and they haven't hired none of us yet. "Do you know Ellis who had a part-time boy all his life? He ain't hired nobody, is he, yet? (No) Then we got ole Stampley, and ninety-nine and three-fourths of his sales are black folks business. He got the nerve to tell me he ain't gonna put no nigger ringing his cash register. I got news for you, Brother Stampley. You can ring it your damn self. (Extra loud applause.) I want some of you fat cats after this meeting who wants three of our young boys who ain't a'scar'd of white folks (Applause) (Me) and we want you that's willing to follow the rules now to go down by Brother Stampley's and serve notice on him with our placards that we ain't coming no more. "Then we are going to tell all the young men that drive Piggly-Wiggly trucks now (Yeah) (Be careful, Son.) because the soul brothers and the spirit is watching you. (Extra loud applause.) "All right, Brother Wolf, you're next. (Applause) We got a couple of 'em to come down by Brother Wolf's. We mean business, white folks. We ain't gonna shoot you all, we are going to hit you where it hurts most. (In the pocket-book) (Applause) In the pocketbook and in the ballot box. (Applause) We may as well tell our friends at Alcorn to stay away from up here. (Yea) Now, you say, `What's wrong with you niggers?' I'll tell you what is wrong with us niggers; We are tired of you white folks, you racists and you bigots mistreating us. (Yeah) We are tired of paying you to *937 deny us the right to even exist. (Tell 'em about |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | deny us the right to even exist. (Tell 'em about it.) And we ain't coming back, white folks. (We ain't.) "You all put a curfew on us at eight o'clock tonight. We are going to do you better than that. We are going to leave at one-thirty. (Loud applause) We are going to leave at one-thirty and we ain't coming back, white folks. "We are going to have Brother McCay; we are going to have our newly elected mayor who we elected, we are going to have him around here, too. Come on back, my dear friend. He say, `Naw, brother, we ain't coming.' `Have you got rid of all those bigots you got on your police force?' `No.' `Have you hired Negroes in all them stores?' `No.' `Well, we ain't coming back.' (Right) That's all we gonna do. You know, what they don't realize is you put on this curfew, that is all we needed. Let me just give them some instructions. We are going to buy gas only from the Negro-owned service stations. We agreed on it, remember? Now, don't back upon your agreement. (Yea) I don't care how many Negroes working on it, that's too bad. We are going only to Negro-owned service stations. And we are going onlythe only time you will see us around on this street, now listen good, you are going to Lee's Grocery and other stores on this end. Is that clear? (Yeah) (Applause) "We don't want to go to none of them drugstores. They get us confused. Now, who am I going to get my medicine from? Let us know in time and we will be glad to furnish a car free to carry you anywhere you have to go to get a prescription filled. You can't beat this. (No) It won't cost you a dime. You go to any of the local black businessmen and tell them you have got to go to Vicksburg to get your stuff. And then if they don't carry you, let us know. We'll take care of them later. (Applause) Now, you know, we have got a little song that says, `This is your thing, do what you want to do.' (Applause) This is our thing, let's do what we want to do with it. Let's make sure nowif you be disobedient *938 now you are going to be in trouble. Remember that, now, listen. Listen good. They are going to start saying, `You know what, Evers is down there with his goon squad,' Now, we know Claiborne County,`with his goon squad harassing poor ole |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | we know Claiborne County,`with his goon squad harassing poor ole niggers.' "Well, good white folks you have been harassing us all our lives. (Applause) And if we decided to harass you that's our business. (That's right) They are our children and we are going to discipline them the way we want to. Now, be sure you get all this right on all these tape recorders. Whatever I say on this trip I will say it in Jackson. (Amen) (Glory) And I will say it in Washington and New York. White folks ain't gonna never control us no more. (Applause) "Now, my dear friends, the white folks have got the message. I hope you have got the message and tell every one of our black brothers until all these people are gone, you voted on this in the church, don't let me down, and don't let yourself down. We agreed in the church that we would vacate this town until they have met those requests, the white folks don't demand nothing out of us. All right, white folks, we are just saying until you decide when you want to do these little things we beg of you, we are not coming back. (No way) "None of us better not be caught up here. (Yea) I don't care how old you are, I don't care how sick you are, I don't care how crazy you are, you better not be caught on these streets shopping in these stores until these demands are met. (Applause) "Now, let's get together. Are you for this or against it? (Applause) (For it.) Remember you voted this. We intend to enforce it. You needn't go calling the chief of police, he can't help you none. You needn't go calling the sheriff, he can't help you none. (That's right.) He ain't going to offer *939 to sleep with none of us men, I can tell you that. (Applause) Let's don't break our little rules that you agreed upon here. "Let's go to the funeral of our young son whenever the funeral is. I don't want you to come with hate because that is not going to solve our problems. (No hate.) We don't want you to hate the white folks here in Port Gibson. That is not going to solve it. If you hate what they have done, I hate to get personal, I hate what they did so much to Medgar, (I know.) I ain't going to ever stop hating them for that. But I am going to chase them in the way what I know is |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110798/naacp-v-claiborne-hardware-co/ | to chase them in the way what I know is right and just. I am not going to lay out in the bushes and shoot no white folks. That's wrong. I am not gonna go out here and bomb none of them's home. (No) That's not right. But I am going to do everything in my power to take away all the power, political power, legal power that they possess anywhere I live. We are going to compete against them. When we blacks learn to support and respect each other, then and not until then, will white folks respect us. (Applause) "Now, you know I trust white folks and I mean every word I say. But it comes a time when we got to make up in our mind individually, are we going to make those persons worthwhile. We done talked and raised all kind of sand all day here, now, what is really going to prove it, are we going to live up to what we have said? (Applause) Now if there is any one of us breaks what we agreed upon, you are just as guilty as that little trigger-happy, blood-thirsty rascal. (Tell 'em about it.) "I go all over this country, and I ought not to tell you white folks this, and I tell other white folks that some day we are going to get together in Mississippi, black and white, and work out our problems. And we are ready to start whenever you are. If you are ready to start, we are. We ain't *940 going to let you push us, not one inch. (That's right.) If you come on beating us, we are going to fight back. (Right) We got our understanding. We are all God's children. The same man that brought you all here brought us. You could have been black just like we are. We could have been white and baldheaded just like you are. (Laughter) (Inaudible) We are going to work hard at this, Dan. We are going to be organized this time. We ain't going to be bought off and talked off. We are going to elect the county sheriff here this next time that don't need the highway patrol. Now, you see, Dan had a good chance to set himself up right, but he goofed it. He goofed. (Yeah) He blew it. (Laughter) Don't forget that, heah. (Right) It brings back memories like you know you remember things we do. "Now, if you don't think it is necessary, we don't have to go back to the church. If you want |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | In this case, which arises under our original jurisdiction, U. S. Const., Art. III, cl. 2; 28 U.S. C. we consider nine exceptions submitted by the parties to two reports filed by the Special Master. I In 1986, Congress granted its consent under the Com pact Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 3, to seven inter state compacts providing for the creation of regional facili ties to dispose of low-level radioactive waste. Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, One of those compacts was the South east Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (Compact), entered into by Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. at 71–80. That Com pact established an “instrument and framework for a cooperative effort” to develop new facilities for the long 2 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court term disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the region. Art. 1, The Compact was to be administered by a Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission (Commis sion), composed of two voting members from each party State. Art. 4(A), A pre-existing facility in Barnwell, South Carolina was to serve as the initial facility for regional generators to dispose of their low-level radioactive waste. Art. 2(10), at 73. That facility was scheduled to close as the re gional-disposal facility for the Compact by the end of 1992, ib and so the Compact required the Commission to develop “procedures and criteria for identifying a host [S]tate for the development of a second regional disposal facility,” and to “seek to ensure that such facility is li censed and ready to operate as soon as required but in no event later than 1991,” Art. 4(E)(6), The Compact authorized the Commission to “designate” a party State as a host State for the facility. Art. 4(E)(7), In September 1986, the Commission designated North Carolina as the host for the second facility. North Caro lina therefore became obligated to “take appropriate steps to ensure that an application for a license to construct and operate a [low-level radioactive waste storage facility] is filed with and issued by the appropriate authority.” Art. 5(C), In 1987, North Carolina’s General Assembly created the North Carolina Low-Level Radioac tive Waste Management Authority (Authority) to fulfill the State’s obligation. N. C. Gen. Stat. (1987), 1987 N. C. Sess. Laws ch. 850. Although “[t]he Commission is not responsible for any costs associated with,” among other things, “the creation of any facility,” Art. 4(K)(1), North Carolina asked the Commission for financial assistance with build ing and licensing costs. The Commission responded by Cite as: |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | ing and licensing costs. The Commission responded by Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court adopting a resolution, which declared it was both “appro priate and necessary” for the Commission “to provide financial assistance” to North Carolina. App. 63. To that end, the Commission created a “Host States Assistance Fund” to help North Carolina with the “financial costs and burdens” of “preliminary planning, the administrative preparation, and other pre-operational” activities. at 64. The estimate in 1989 was that it would cost approxi mately $21 million and take two years to obtain a license for North Carolina’s regional-disposal facility. That proved to be wildly optimistic. By 1990, the cost estimate had ballooned to $45.8 million, and the estimated date for obtaining a license now extended far into 1993. At the beginning of 1994 there still was no license, and the esti mated cost had grown to $87.1 million. By end of 1994 the estimate was $112.5 million, and issuance of a license was not anticipated until 1997. And by December 1996 the estimated cost had increased by another $27 million and the projected date to receive a license had become August 2000. North Carolina’s own appropriations—approximately $27 million from Fiscal Year 1988 through Fiscal Year (FY) 1995—did not cover the costs of the licensing phase. But during the same time period, the Commission pro vided North Carolina with approximately $67 million. The funds came from surcharges and access fees collected for that purpose from generators disposing of low-level radioactive waste at the pre-existing Barnwell facility. at 71–74, 145. In July 1995, however, South Carolina withdrew from the Compact, thereby depriving the Commission of contin ued revenues from the Barnwell facility. In 1996, the Commission accordingly informed North Carolina that it would no longer be able to provide financial support for licensing activities. The Governor of North Carolina 4 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court responded that the State was not prepared to assume a greater portion of the project’s costs, and would not be able to proceed without continued Commission funding. Shortly thereafter the Commission adopted a resolution declaring that it was willing and able to provide additional funds, but calling on North Carolina to work with it to develop long-term funding sources for the facility. From FY 1996 through FY 1998, the Commission provided North Carolina approximately an additional $12.27 mil lion in financial assistance. North Carolina, for its part, continued to provide its own funds toward licensing activi ties—another $6 million during the same time period. In August 1997, the Commission notified North |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | same time period. In August 1997, the Commission notified North Caro lina that absent a plan for funding the remaining steps of the licensing phase, it would not disburse additional funds to North Carolina after November 30, 1997. North Caro lina responded that it would not be able to continue with out additional guarantees of external funding. On Decem ber 1, 1997, the parties having failed to agree upon a long term financing plan, the Commission ceased financial assistance to North Carolina. By then it had provided almost $80 million. On December 19, 1997, North Carolina informed the Commission it would commence an orderly shutdown of its licensing project, and since that date has taken no further steps toward obtaining a license for the facility. But it did continue to fund the Authority for several more years, in the hope that the project would resume upon the restora tion of external financial assistance. North Carolina maintained the proposed facility site, preserved the work it had completed to date, and retained the Authority’s books and records. It also participated in discussions with the Commission, generators of low-level radioactive waste, and other stakeholders regarding options to resolve the financing shortfall. From FY 1988 through FY 2000, North Carolina had expended almost $34 million toward Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court obtaining a license. In June 1999, after attempts to resolve the funding impasse had failed, Florida and Tennessee filed with the Commission a complaint for sanctions against North Carolina. It alleged that North Carolina had failed to fulfill its obligations under the Compact, and requested (among other things) return of the almost $80 million paid to North Carolina by the Commission, plus interest, as well as damages and attorney’s fees. The next month, North Carolina withdrew from the Compact by enacting a law repealing its status as a party State, see 1999 N. C. Sess. Laws ch. 357, as required by Article 7(G) of the Compact. More than four months later, in December 1999, the Commission held a sanctions hearing. North Carolina did not participate. After the hearing, the Commission con cluded that North Carolina had failed to fulfill its obliga tions under the Compact. It adopted a resolution demand ing that North Carolina repay approximately $80 million, plus interest, to the Commission; pay an additional $10 million penalty to compensate the Commission for the loss of future revenue (surcharges and access fees) it would have received had a facility been completed in North Carolina; and pay the Commission’s attorney’s fees. North Carolina did not comply. In |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | the Commission’s attorney’s fees. North Carolina did not comply. In July 2000, seeking to enforce its sanctions resolution, the Commission moved for leave to file a bill of complaint under our original jurisdiction. Southeast Interstate Low- Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission v. North Carolina, No. 131, Orig. North Carolina opposed the motion on the grounds that the Commission could not invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, and we invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. The Solicitor General filed a brief urging denial of the Commission’s motion on the grounds that the Commission’s bill of complaint did not 6 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court fall within our exclusive original jurisdiction over “contro versies between two or more States.” We denied the Commission’s motion. In June 2002, the States of Alabama, Florida, Tennes see, and Virginia, joined by the Commission (collectively Plaintiffs), moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against North Carolina. North Carolina opposed the motion, and we again sought the views of the Solicitor General. The United States urged that we grant Plaintiffs’ motion, which we did. 539 U.S. 925 (2003). The bill of complaint contains five counts: violation of the party States’ rights under the Compact (Count I); breach of contract (Count II); unjust enrichment (Count III), promissory estoppel (Count IV); and money had and received (Count V). Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief requests a declaration that North Carolina is subject to sanctions and that the Commission’s sanctions resolution is valid and enforceable, as well as the award of damages, costs, and other relief. We assigned the case to a Special Master, 540 U.S. 1014 (2003), who has conducted proceedings and now has filed two reports. The Master’s Preliminary Report ad dressed three motions filed by the parties. He recom mended denying without prejudice North Carolina’s mo tion to dismiss the Commission’s claims against North Carolina on the grounds of sovereign immunity. Prelimi nary Report 4–14. He recommended denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Count I, which sought enforcement of the Commission’s sanctions resolution. at 14–33. He recommended granting North Carolina’s cross-motion to dismiss Count I and other portions of the bill of complaint that sought enforcement of the sanctions resolution. at 33–34. And he recommended denying North Carolina’s motion to dismiss the claims in Counts II–V. at 34–43. After the Special Master issued his Preliminary Report, Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court the parties engaged in partial discovery and subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Special Master’s Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs’ |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | summary judgment. The Special Master’s Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Count II, Second Report 8–35, and granting North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on Count II, at 35–40. Finally, he recom mended denying North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims in Counts III–V. at 41–45. II Plaintiffs present a total of seven exceptions to the Special Master’s two reports. We address them in turn. A Their first exception challenges the Special Master’s conclusion that the Commission lacked authority to im pose monetary sanctions upon North Carolina. The terms of the Compact determine that question. Article 4(E) of the Compact sets forth the Commission’s “duties and powers.” Among its powers are the authority “[t]o revoke the membership of a party [S]tate that will fully creates barriers to the siting of a needed regional facility,” Art. 4(E)(7), and the authority “[t]o revoke the membership of a party [S]tate in accordance with Article 7(f),” Art. 4(E)(11), Conspicuously ab sent from Article 4, however, is any mention of the author ity to impose monetary sanctions. Plaintiffs contend that authority may be found elsewhere—in the first paragraph of Article 7(F), which provides in relevant part: “Any party [S]tate which fails to comply with the provisions of this compact or to fulfill the obligations incurred by becoming a party [S]tate to this compact may be subject to sanctions by the Commission, in cluding suspension of its rights under this compact and revocation of its status as a party [S]tate.” at 8 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court 79. The sanctions expressly identified in Article 7(F)— “suspension” of rights and “revocation” of party-state status—flow directly from the Commission’s power in Articles 4(E)(7) and (11) to revoke a party State’s member ship. That can fairly be understood to include the lesser power to suspend a party State’s rights. There is no simi lar grounding in Article 4(E) of authority to impose mone tary sanctions, and the absence is significant. According to Plaintiffs, however, the word “sanctions” in Article 7(F) naturally “includ[es]” monetary sanctions. Since the Compact contains no definition of “sanctions,” we give the word its ordinary meaning. A “sanction” (in the sense the word is used here) is “[t]he detriment loss of reward, or other coercive intervention, annexed to a viola tion of a law as a means of enforcing the law.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2211 (2d ed. 1957) (herein after Webster’s Second); see Black’s Law Dictionary 1458 (9th ed. 2009) (“A penalty or coercive measure that results from failure to comply with a law, rule, |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | that results from failure to comply with a law, rule, or order”). A monetary penalty is assuredly one kind of “sanction.” See generally Department of 621 (1992). But there are many others, ranging from the withholding of benefits, or the imposition of a nonmone tary obligation, to capital punishment. The Compact surely does not authorize the Commission to impose all of them. Ultimately, context dictates precisely which “sanctions” are authorized under Article 7(F), and nothing in the Compact suggests that these include monetary measures. The only two “sanctions” specifically identified as being included within Article 7(F) are “suspension” of a State’s rights under the Compact and “revocation” of its status as a party State. These are arguably merely examples, and may not exhaust the universe of sanctions the Commission Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 9 Opinion of the Court can impose. But they do establish “illustrative applica tion[s] of the general principle,” Federal Land Bank of St. which underlies the kinds of sanctions the Commission can impose. It is significant that both these specifically authorized sanctions are prospective and nonmonetary in nature. Moreover, Article 3 of the Compact provides: “The rights granted to the party [S]tates by this compact are addi tional to the rights enjoyed by sovereign states, and noth ing in this compact shall be construed to infringe upon, limit, or abridge those rights.” Construing Article 7(F) to authorize monetary sanctions would violate this provision, since the primeval sovereign right is im munity from levies against the government fisc. See, e.g., Finally, a comparison of the Compact’s terms with those of “[o]ther interstate compacts, approved by Congress contemporaneously,” 565 confirms that Article 7(F) does not authorize monetary sanctions. At the same time Congress consented to this Compact, it consented to three other interstate compacts that expressly authorize their commissions to impose monetary sanctions against the parties to the compacts. See Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioac tive Waste Management Compact, Art. IV(i)(14), 99 Stat. 1915 (hereinafter Northeast Compact); Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Art. VIII(f), (hereinafter Central Midwest Com pact); Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Art. VII(e), (hereinafter Central Compact). The Compact “clearly lacks the features of these other compacts, and we are not free to rewrite it” to empower the Commission to impose monetary sanctions. 10 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court B Because the Compact does not authorize the Commis sion to impose monetary sanctions, Plaintiffs’ second exception—that North Carolina could not avoid monetary sanctions by withdrawing from the Compact—is moot. The third exception also pertains to the Commission’s sanctions resolution: that |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | third exception also pertains to the Commission’s sanctions resolution: that North Carolina forfeited its right to object to a monetary penalty by failing to partici pate at the sanctions hearing. Plaintiffs have failed to argue this exception. They have merely noted that North Carolina refused to participate at the sanctions hearing, and have cited no law in support of the proposition that this was a forfeit. We deem the exception abandoned. It was wisely abandoned, because it is meritless. North Carolina opposed the sanctions resolution and denied that the Commission had jurisdiction to impose sanctions against it. C Plaintiffs next take exception to the Special Master’s recommendation that no binding effect or even deference be accorded to the Commission’s conclusion that North Carolina violated Article 5(C) of the Compact. We are bound by the Commission’s conclusion of breach only if there is “an explicit provision or other clear indicatio[n]” in the Compact making the Commission the “sole arbiter of disputes” regarding a party State’s compliance with the Compact. at 569–570. Plaintiffs assert there is such a provision, the second sentence of Article 7(C), which states: “The Commission is the judge of the qualifications of the party [S]tates and of its members and of their com pliance with the conditions and requirements of this com pact and the laws of the party [S]tates relating to the enactment of this compact.” Plaintiffs greatly overread this provision. The limited nature of the authority to “judge” that it confers upon the Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 11 Opinion of the Court Commission is clear from its context. The first sentence of Article 7(C) states that an eligible State “shall be de clared” a party State “upon enactment of this compact into law by the [S]tate and upon [the] payment of” a $25,000 fee, as “required by Article 4(H)(1).” The second sentence makes the Commission the “judge” of four mat ters, all of which concern status as a party State or Com mission member. First, the Commission is the judge of the “qualifications” of a State to become a party State (the qualifications set forth in Article 7(A) for the initial party States and in Article 7(B) for States that subsequently petition to join). Second, the Commission is the judge of the qualifications of the members of the Commission, which are specified in Article 4(A). Third, the Commission is the judge of a party State’s compliance with the “condi tions” and “requirements” of the Compact. The former term is an obvious reference to Article 7(B): “The Commis sion may establish such conditions as it |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | 7(B): “The Commis sion may establish such conditions as it deems necessary and appropriate to be met by a [S]tate wishing to become a party [S]tate to this [C]ompact.” The accompanying term “requirements” also refers to Article 7’s prescriptions for prospective party States, such as paying the “fees required” under Article 7(C), at 79, and obtaining, as Article 7(B) requires, a two-thirds vote of the Commission in favor of admission. Finally, the Commission is the judge of the “laws of the party [S]tates relating to the enactment of this compact.” Art. 7(C), Again, that concerns status as a party State, which re quires that the State “enac[t] this compact into law,” The Commission is the “judge” of only these specific matters. This is not to say the Commission lacks authority to interpret the Compact or to say whether a party State has violated its terms. That is of course implicit in its power to sanction under Article 7(F). But because “the express terms of the [Southeast] Compact do not constitute the 12 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court Commission as the sole arbiter” regarding North Caro lina’s compliance with its obligations under the Compact, we are not bound to follow the Commission’s findings. Plaintiffs argue that we nonetheless owe deference to the Commission’s conclusion. But unless the text of an interstate compact directs otherwise, we do not review the actions of a compact commission “on the deferential model of judicial review of administrative action by a federal agency.” at 566–567. The terms of this Compact do not establish that “this suit may be maintained only as one for judicial review of the Commission’s” determination of breach. Accordingly, we do not apply ad ministrative-law standards of review, but exercise our independent judgment as to both fact and law in executing our role as the “exclusive” arbiter of controversies between the States, D Plaintiffs’ next two exceptions are to the Special Mas ter’s recommendations to deny their motion for summary judgment on their breach-of-contract claims, and to grant North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on those claims. In resolving motions for summary judgment in cases within our original jurisdiction, we are not techni cally bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but we use Rule 56 as a guide. This Court’s Rule 17.2; Ne Hence, summary judgment is appropriate where there “is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 13 Opinion of the Court 1 Plaintiffs claim North Carolina breached the Compact in December 1997, when (as it admits) it ceased all efforts toward obtaining a license. At that point, in their view, North Carolina was no longer “tak[ing] appropriate steps to ensure that an application for a license to construct and operate a [low-level radioactive waste storage facility] is filed with and issued by the appropriate authority,” Art. 5(C), North Carolina says that once the Commission ceased providing financial assistance on December 1, and once it became clear there was insuffi cient funding to complete the licensing phase, there were no more “appropriate” steps to take. The Special Master concluded that the phrase “appropriate steps” in Article 5(C) was ambiguous, and that the parties’ course of per formance established that North Carolina was not re quired to take steps toward obtaining a license once it was made to bear the remaining financial burden of the licens ing phase. Second Report 10–24, 35–36. Plaintiffs take exception to that conclusion. Article 5(C) does not require North Carolina to take any and all steps to license a regional-disposal facility; only those that are “appropriate.” Plaintiffs contend that this requires North Carolina to take the steps set forth in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission govern ing the filing and disposition of applications for licenses to operate radioactive waste disposal facilities, 10 CFR pt. 61 Those regulations set forth some, but certainly not all, of the “steps” the State would have to take to obtain a license. But Article 5(C) does not incorporate the regula tions by reference, much less describe them as the appro priate steps. We could accept Plaintiffs’ contention if “appropriate” meant “necessary” (the steps set forth in the regulation are assuredly necessary to obtaining a license). But it does not. Whether a particular step is “appropriate”— 14 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court “[s]pecially suitable; fit; proper,” Webster’s Second 133— could depend upon many factors other than its mere in dispensability to obtaining a license. It would not be appropriate, for example, to take a step whose cost greatly exceeded whatever benefits the license would confer, or if it was highly uncertain the license would ever issue. In determining whether, in terminating its efforts to obtain a license, North Carolina failed to take what the parties considered “appropriate” steps, the parties’ course of performance under the Compact is highly |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | the parties’ course of performance under the Compact is highly significant. See, e.g., New 830–831 (1998) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 203 (1979) (hereinafter Restatement). That firmly establishes that North Carolina was not ex pected to go it alone—to proceed with the very expensive licensing process without any external financial assis tance. The history of the Compact consists entirely of shared financial burdens. From the beginning, North Carolina made clear that it required financial assistance to do the extensive work required for obtaining a license. The Commission promptly declared it was “appropriate and necessary” to assist North Carolina with the costs. App. 63. It provided the vast majority of funding for li censing-related activities—$80 million, compared to North Carolina’s $34 million. The Commission repeatedly noted the necessity (and propriety) of providing financial assis tance to North Carolina, and reiterated its dedication to sharing the substantial financial burdens of the licensing phase. See, e.g., There is nothing to support the proposition that the other States had an obli gation under the Compact to share the licensing costs through the Commission; but we doubt that they did so out of love for the Tarheel State. They did it, we think, because that was their understanding of how the Compact was supposed to work. One must take the Commission at its word, that it was “appropriate” to share the cost— Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 15 Opinion of the Court which suggests that it would not have been appropriate to make North Carolina proceed on its own. Nor was North Carolina required after December 19, 1997, to continue to expend its own funds at the same level it had previously (which Plaintiffs concede had satis fied North Carolina’s obligation to take “appropriate steps”). Once the Commission refused to provide any further financial assistance, North Carolina would have had to assume an unlimited financial commitment to cover all remaining licensing costs. Even if it maintained its prior rate of appropriations going forward, it would not have come close to covering the at least $34 million needed for the last steps of the licensing phase. And since the income from the South Carolina facility had been termi nated, there was no apparent prospect of funding for the construction phase (expected to cost at least $75 million). In connection with its August 1997 refusal to provide further assistance, the Commission itself had said, “[I]t will be imprudent to continue to deplete Commission resources for this purpose if a source of funds is not estab lished soon for the ultimate completion of the project.” |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | estab lished soon for the ultimate completion of the project.” at 306, 307; Joint Supp. Fact Brief App. 36, 37. And in March 1998, the Commission “strongly” reiterated that “it would be imprudent to spend additional funds for licens ing activities if funds will not be available to complete the project.” What was imprudent for the Commis sion would surely have been imprudent (and hence inap propriate) for North Carolina as well. The State would have wasted millions of its taxpayers’ dollars on what seemed to be a futile effort. JUSTICE BREYER would uphold Plaintiffs’ challenge on this point. He believes that the Compact obligated North Carolina to fund and complete the licensing and construc tion of a nuclear waste facility. Post, at 2, 4–6 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact, how ever, North Carolina was not even contractually required 16 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court to “secur[e] a license,” post, at 2, but only to take “appro priate steps” to obtain one, Art. 5(C), And nothing in the terms of the Compact required North Caro lina either to provide “adequate funding” for or to “beg[i]n construction” on a regional facility, post, at 2. Other con temporaneously enacted interstate compacts expressly provide that the host State is “responsible for the timely development” of a regional facility, Central Midwest Com pact, Art. VI(f), ; Midwest Compact, Art. VI(e), or “shall [c]ause a regional facility to be developed on a timely basis,” Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Art. III(d)(i), at 1903–1904. But the compact here before us has no such provision, and the contrast is telling.1 Texas v. New Mex Moreover, the Commission’s state ments described in the preceding paragraph, that it would be imprudent to commit additional resources “ ‘if a source of funds is not established soon for the ultimate comple tion of the project,’ ” or “ ‘if funds will not be available to complete the project,’ ” surely suggest that North Carolina is not committed to the funding by contract. JUSTICE BREYER asserts, post, at 4–5, that the rotating —————— 1 The Compact provides only that the host State is “responsible for the availability of their regional facilities in accordance with” Article 5(B). Art. 3(C), –74. The latter section makes clear that responsibility for “availability” does not mean that the host State will fund construction of the facility, but that it will keep it open and not impose unreasonable restrictions on its use. JUSTICE BREYER is correct that the Compact says the Commission is not “responsible” for the costs of |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | says the Commission is not “responsible” for the costs of “the creation” of a regional facility. Art. 4(K)(1), at 76. But what is important here is that it does not say that the host State is responsible—which (if it were true) would almost certainly have been joined with saying who was not responsible. What JUSTICE BREYER overlooks is the possibility that no one is responsible, and the licensing and construction of the facility is meant to depend upon voluntary funding by interested parties, such as the party States, the Commission, and low-level radioactive waste generators. Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 17 Opinion of the Court host requirement in the Compact, see Art. 5(A), 99 Stat. 73, necessarily implies that North Carolina is solely responsible for the licensing and construction costs of its facility. But all that requirement entails is that a party State “shall not be designated” as a host State for a second time before “each [other] party [S]tate” has taken a turn. It can perfectly well envision that the States will take turns in bearing the lead responsibility for getting the facility licensed, supervising its construction, and operating the facility on its soil. In fact, that is just what its text suggests, since it describes the responsibility that is to be rotated as the host State’s “obligation to have a regional facility operated within its borders.” Not to construct it, or pay for its construction, but to “have [it] operated within its borders.” As noted above, other con temporaneously enacted compacts do spell out the obliga tion of the host State to construct the facility. Still others at least provide that the host State will recoup its costs through disposal fees—which arguably suggests that the host State is to bear the costs. See, e.g., Central Compact, Art. III(d), ; Northeast Compact, Art. III(c)(2), The compact before us here does not even contain that arguable suggestion. What it comes down to, then, is JUSTICE BREYER’s intui tion that the whole point of the Compact was that each designated host State would bear the up-front costs of licensing and construction, but would eventually recoup those costs through its regional monopoly on the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. Post, at 5–6. He can cite no provision in the Compact which reflects such an under standing, and the behavior of the parties contradicts it.2 It —————— 2 The course-of-dealing evidence that JUSTICE BREYER identifies, post, at 6–7, is not probative. The Commission’s statements that it is not legally responsible for costs and that at some point Commission funds will no longer |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | and that at some point Commission funds will no longer be available, and North Carolina’s assurances that it will keep its commitments and honor its obligations, are perfectly compati ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court would, moreover, have been a foolish understanding, since the regional monopoly to recoup construction costs would not be a monopoly if South Carolina withdrew and contin ued to operate its facility—which is exactly what hap pened in 1995.3 Even leaving aside the principle, dis cussed infra, at 21, that implied obligations are not to be read into interstate compacts, JUSTICE BREYER’s intuition fails to reflect the reality of what was implied. 2 Plaintiffs take exception to the Special Master’s rejec tion of their alternative argument that North Carolina repudiated the Compact when it announced it would not take further steps toward obtaining a license. They argue that North Carolina’s announcement that it was shutting down the project constituted a refusal to tender any fur ther performance under the contract. Plaintiffs’ repudiation theory fails for the same reasons their breach theory fails. A repudiation occurs when an obligor either informs an obligee “that the obligor will —————— ble with the proposition that North Carolina did not have to provide all funding for licensing the facility, and that it would be “inappropriate” to proceed toward obtaining a license for a facility that would never be needed or built. 3 South Carolina’s withdrawal from the Compact not only “could” affect North Carolina’s ability to recoup its facility costs, as JUSTICE BREYER grudgingly concedes, post, at 5; it unquestionably would. With a regional competitor in the Barnwell facility and declining demand for waste disposal facilities due to technological and other factors, App. 261, 263–264, North Carolina would receive significantly lower reve nues from its facility, at 261–262, 265. The document attached to a 1996 letter from North Carolina to the Commission trumpeting “$600 million in cost savings” that would come from a new facility, post, at 5, proves precisely the opposite of what JUSTICE BREYER thinks. The cost savings were to accrue “to all generators” of waste, App. 266 (emphasis added)—that is, those who would use North Carolina’s facility. Those savings would come, of course, from lower costs for waste disposal, which means that North Carolina would be charging lower rates than the Barnwell facility (and thus receiving lower revenues). Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 19 Opinion of the Court commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach,” Restatement or performs “a voluntary affirmative act which renders |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | breach,” Restatement or performs “a voluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform without such a breach,” Neither event occurred here. North Carolina never informed the Commission (or any party State) that it would not fulfill its Article 5(C) obliga tion to take appropriate steps toward obtaining a license. Rather, it refused to take further steps that were not appropriate. Nor did North Carolina take an affirmative act that rendered it unable to perform. To the contrary, it continued to fund the Authority for almost two years; it maintained the records of the Authority; and it preserved the work completed to date while waiting for alternative funding sources that would enable resumption of the project. Plaintiffs further argue that a repudiation was effected by North Carolina’s refusal to take further steps toward licensing “except on conditions which go beyond” the terms of the Compact, Restatement Comment b (internal quotation marks omitted)—i.e., the provision of external-financial assistance. But, as we have discussed, external-financial assistance was contemplated by the Compact. E Plaintiffs’ final exception is to the Special Master’s recommendation to deny their motion for summary judg ment, and to grant North Carolina’s cross-motion for summary judgment, on their claim that North Carolina violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when it withdrew from the Compact in July 1999. Plain tiffs concede that North Carolina could withdraw from the Compact, but contend it could not do so in “bad faith.” And, they assert, its withdrawal after accepting $80 mil lion from the Commission, and with monetary sanctions pending against it, was the epitome of bad faith. 20 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court We have never held that an interstate compact approved by Congress includes an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Of course “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.” Restatement But an interstate compact is not just a contract; it is a federal statute enacted by Congress. If courts were authorized to add a fairness requirement to the implementation of federal statutes, judges would be potent lawmakers in deed. We do not—we cannot—add provisions to a federal statute. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). And in that regard a statute which is a valid interstate compact is no different. Texas v. New 565. We are especially reluctant to read absent terms into an interstate compact given the federalism and separation-of-powers concerns that would arise were we to rewrite an agreement |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | concerns that would arise were we to rewrite an agreement among sovereign States, to which the political branches consented. As we have said before, we will not “ ‘order relief inconsistent with [the] express terms’ ” of a compact, “no matter what the equities of the circumstances might otherwise invite.” New (quoting Texas v. New ). The Compact imposes no limitation on North Carolina’s exercise of its statutory right to withdraw. Under Article 7(G), which governed North Carolina’s withdrawal,4 “any party [S]tate may withdraw from the compact by enacting a law repealing the compact.” There is no restriction upon a party State’s enactment of such a law, —————— 4 After North Carolina was designated as a host State, the Compact was amended to add Article 7(H), which restricted the ability of a party State to withdraw to within 30 days after a second regional-disposal facility opened. Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Amendments Consent Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101–171, 103 Stat. 1289. That provision did not apply when North Carolina with drew, because its facility had not been opened. Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 21 Opinion of the Court and nothing in the Compact suggests the parties under stood there were “certain purposes for which the expressly conferred power could not be employed.” Tymshare, (opinion for the court by Scalia, J.). Moreover, Article 3 ensures that no such restrictions may be implied, since it provides that the Compact shall not be “construed to infringe upon, limit or abridge” the sovereign rights of a party State. A comparison of the Compact with other, contemporane ously enacted, compacts confirms there is no such limita tion on North Carolina’s right to withdraw. See Texas v. New In contrast to the Compact, several other compacts concerning the creation of regional facilities for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste contain express good-faith limitations upon a State’s exercise of its rights. See, e.g., Central Compact, Art. III(f), ; Central Midwest Compact, Art. V(a), ; Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact, Art. V(a), at 97. III North Carolina submits two exceptions—one to the Special Master’s Second Report and one to his Preliminary Report. A North Carolina takes exception to the recommendation of the Second Report to deny without prejudice its motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ equita ble claims in Counts III–V. North Carolina’s motion was based on the ground that, as a matter of law, its obliga tions are governed entirely by the Compact. The Special Master recommended denying the motion without preju dice, because the claims in Counts III–V |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | motion without preju dice, because the claims in Counts III–V “requir[e] further briefing and argument, and possibly further discovery.” 22 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court Second Report 41. A threshold question for all claims in those Counts, for example, is whether they “belong to the Commission, the Plaintiff States, or both.” Perhaps the States can bring them in their capacity as parens patriae, but as the Special Master noted “the parties have not adequately briefed this issue, and its resolution in this case is unclear.” at 42–43. We think it was reasonable for the Special Master to defer ruling. We granted the Special Master discretion to “direct subsequent proceedings” and “to submit such re ports as he may deem appropriate.” He could have deferred filing any report until full factual discovery had been completed and all of the legal issues, many of which are novel and challenging, had been fully briefed, considered, and decided. Instead, he concluded that our immediate resolution of Counts I and II would facilitate the efficient disposition of the case; and in agree ing to hear exceptions to his Preliminary Report and Second Report we implicitly agreed. His deferral of ruling on the merits of Counts III–V is part and parcel of the same case management, and we find no reason to upset it. B North Carolina takes exception to the Special Master’s recommendation in his Preliminary Report to deny with out prejudice its motion to dismiss the Commission’s claims on the ground that they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution and by structural princi ples of state sovereign immunity. The Special Master assumed for the sake of argument that a State possesses sovereign immunity against a claim brought by an entity, like the Commission, created by an interstate compact,5 —————— 5 We have held that an entity created through a valid exercise of the Interstate Compact Clause is not entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, see but we have not decided whether such Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 23 Opinion of the Court Preliminary Report 5. But he recommended denying North Carolina’s motion to dismiss “at this point in the proceedings.” The Special Master relied upon our decision in Arizona v. which held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the participation of several Indian Tribes in an original action concerning the allocation of rights to the waters of the Colorado River. The United States had already intervened, in its capacity as trustee for several Indian Tribes; but the Tribes moved to intervene as well, |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | Indian Tribes; but the Tribes moved to intervene as well, and the States opposed. We granted the Tribes’ motion, stating that the States do not enjoy sovereign immunity against the United States, and “[t]he Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or issues against the States, but only ask leave to participate in an adjudi cation of their vital water rights that was commenced by the United States.” Thus, “our judicial power over the controversy is not enlarged by granting leave to intervene, and the States’ sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment is not compromised.” Relying on this holding, the Special Master held that sovereign immunity does not bar the Commission’s suit, so long as the Commission asserts the same claims and seeks the same relief as the other plaintiffs. Whether that is so, he said, “cannot be resolved without further factual and legal development[s],” Preliminary Report 6, and so North Carolina is free to renew its motion at a later point, at 13–14. See Second Report 45–48. Assuming (as the Special Master did) that the Commis sion’s claims against North Carolina implicate sovereign immunity, we agree with his disposition. North Carolina contends that making application of the Constitution’s waiver of sovereign immunity turn upon whether a nonsovereign party seeks to expand the relief sought is —————— an entity’s suit against a State is barred by sovereign immunity. 24 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court inconsistent with our decisions construing state sovereign immunity as a “personal privilege.” College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also But nothing in those cases suggests that has been implic itly overruled.6 See Neither of them arose under our original jurisdiction, and neither cited or discussed—at all—the sovereign immunity issue that case addressed. That sovereign immunity is a personal privilege of the States says noth ing about whether that privilege “is not compromised,” by an additional, nonsovereign plaintiff’s bringing an entirely overlapping claim for relief that burdens the State with no additional defense or liability.7 North Carolina contends that cannot apply to the Commission’s claims, because the Commission does not—indeed, cannot—assert the same claims or seek the same relief as the plaintiff States. We disagree. In the bill of complaint, the States and the Commission assert the same claims and request the same relief. Bill of Complaint ¶¶62–86 and Prayer for Relief. Their claim for restitution of $80 million cannot, given the —————— 6 North Carolina has not asked us to overrule We decline to do so on our |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | us to overrule We decline to do so on our own motion and without argument. We therefore do not address the merits of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent. 7 North Carolina also asserts that our decisions in State School and and County of under mine They do not. In neither case were there entirely overlapping claims for relief between sovereign and nonsovereign plaintiffs. See Indeed, in County of Oneida there was no sovereign plaintiff. Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 25 Opinion of the Court other allegations of the complaint, be thought to be $80 million payable to each of the four plaintiff States and the Commission. North Carolina argues, however, that summary judg ment in its favor is appropriate because it is clear that the Commission, and not the plaintiff States, provided $80 million to North Carolina—wherefore, as a matter of law, only the Commission can claim entitlement to $80 million, either as a measure of damages for breach of the Compact under Counts I and II of the bill of complaint, see Re statement Comment a, and or under the un just enrichment, promissory estoppel, and money-had-and received theories of recovery in Counts III, IV, and V, see, e.g., Restatement of Restitution Comment a (1936). And, it contends, a stand-alone suit by the Commission is barred by sovereign immunity. With regard to Counts I and II, at least, we disagree. The Commission’s claims under those Compact-related Counts are wholly derivative of the States’ claims. See The Commission is “a legal entity separate and distinct from” the States that are parties to the Compact. Art. 4(M)(1), Since it is not a party it has neither a contractual right to performance by the party States nor enforceable statutory rights under Article 5 of the Compact, see Bennett v. Spear, The Compact does, however, authorize the Commission to “act or appear on behalf of any party [S]tate or [S]tates as an intervenor or party in interest before any court of law,” Art. 4(E)(10), and it is obviously in this capacity that the Commission seeks to vindicate the plaintiff States’ statutory and contractual rights in Counts I and II. Its Count I and Count II claims therefore rise or fall with the claims of the States. While the Commission may not bring them in a stand-alone action under this Court’s original jurisdiction, see it may assert them in 26 ALABAMA v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court this Court alongside the plaintiff States, see Arizona v. 460 U.S., The summary judgment disallowing the underlying claims on their merits renders the sovereign immunity question |
Justice Scalia | 2,010 | 9 | majority | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147530/alabama-v-north-carolina/ | underlying claims on their merits renders the sovereign immunity question with regard to any relief the Commission alone might have on those claims moot. Counts III–V, which do not rely upon the Compact, stand on a different footing. As to them, while the Com mission again seemingly makes the same claims and seeks the same relief as the States, it is conceivable that as a matter of law the Commission’s claims are not identical. The Commission can claim restitution as the party that paid the money to North Carolina; the other plaintiffs cannot claim it on that basis. Whether this means that the claims are not identical for pur poses, and that the Commission’s Counts III–V claims must be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, is a question that the Special Master declined to resolve until the merits issues were further clarified. We have ap proved his deferral of those issues, and we likewise ap prove his deferral of the related sovereign immunity issue. * * * We overrule the exceptions of Plaintiffs and North Carolina to the Special Master’s Reports, and we adopt the recommendations of the Special Master. We grant North Carolina’s motion to dismiss Count I. We grant North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on Count II. We deny Plaintiffs’ motions for judgment on Counts I and II. And we deny without prejudice North Carolina’s motion to dismiss the Commission’s claims on the grounds of sover eign immunity and its motion for summary judgment on Counts III–V. It is so ordered. Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 1 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 132, Orig. STATE OF ALABAMA, STATE OF FLORIDA, STATE OF TENNESSEE, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, AND SOUTHEAST INTERSTATE LOW-LEVEL RADIO- ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, PLAINTIFFS v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ON EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRELIMINARY AND SECOND REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL MASTER [June 1, 2010] JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | second_dissenting | Maggio v. Fulford | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110954/maggio-v-fulford/ | I dissent. The Court is simply wrong in assuming that 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) applies to the question whether there is "a sufficient doubt of [the defendant's] competence to stand trial to require further inquiry on the question." Our decisions clearly establish that whether a competence hearing should have been held is a mixed question of law and fact which is subject to full federal review. ; Even if the Court were correct in assuming that 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)(8) applies, there would be no justification for the Court's summary disposition of this case. This Court's Rules *121 governing petitions for certiorari were designed to help elicit the information necessary to decide whether review by certiorari is warranted. They were not designed to permit a decision on the merits on the basis of the certiorari papers. In particular, Rule 22.2 states that "a brief in opposition shall be as short as possible." In compliance with this Rule the indigent respondent filed a mimeographed brief in opposition of seven pages, a substantial portion of which is devoted to the argument that the petition presents no question worthy of review by this Court an argument that might well have been expected to prevail given the traditional learning that this Court "is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions."[1] Only a few paragraphs of the brief in opposition discuss the record.[2] If the Court is to decide whether the record supports the trial court's conclusion that no competence hearing was necessary, it should at least afford the parties a chance to brief that issue. This could be done by merely issuing an order (1) noting that the case will be disposed of without oral argument and (2) permitting both sides to file briefs on the merits. I do not think this is asking too much. |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | These cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 77 (Surface Mining Act or Act), 30 U.S. C. 1201 et seq. (76 ed., Supp. III). The United District Court for the Western District of Virginia declared several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. In these appeals, we consider whether Congress, in adopting the Act, exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,[1] or transgressed affirmative limitations on the exercise of that power contained in the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. We conclude that in the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Mining Act does not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects, and we uphold the Act as constitutional. I A The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute designed to "establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations." 102 (a), 30 U.S. C. 1202 (a) (76 ed., Supp. III). Title II of the Act, 30 U.S. C. 1 (76 ed., Supp. III), creates the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), within the Department of the Interior, and the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged with primary responsibility for administering *269 and implementing the Act by promulgating regulations and enforcing its provisions. 201 (c), 30 U.S. C. 1 (c) (76 ed., Supp. III). The principal regulatory and enforcement provisions are contained in Title V of the Act, -, 30 U.S. C. 1251-1279 (76 ed., Supp. III). Section 501, 30 U.S. C. 1251 (76 ed., Supp. III), establishes a two-stage program for the regulation of surface coal mining: an initial, or interim regulatory phase, and a subsequent, permanent phase. The interim program mandates immediate promulgation and federal enforcement of some of the Act's environmental protection performance standards, complemented by continuing state regulation. Under the permanent phase, a regulatory program is to be adopted for each State, mandating compliance with the full panoply of federal performance standards, with enforcement responsibility lying with either the State or Federal Government. Section 501 (a) directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing an interim regulatory program during which mine operators will be required to comply with some of the Act's performance standards, as specified by 502 (c), 30 U.S. C. 1252 (c) (76 ed., Supp. III). Included among those selected standards are requirements governing: (a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined areas; and (g) spoil disposal. 515 (b), 30 U.S. C. 1265 (b) (76 ed., Supp. III).[2] The interim *270 regulations were published on December 13, 77, see[3] and they are currently in effect in most including Virginia.[4] The Secretary is responsible for enforcing the interim regulatory program. 502 (e), 30 U.S. C. 1252 (e) (76 ed., Supp. III). A federal enforcement and inspection program is to be established for each State, and is to remain in effect until a permanent regulatory program is implemented in the State. may issue permits for surface mining operations during the interim phase, but operations authorized by such permits must comply with the federal interim performance standards. 502 (b), 30 U.S. C. 1252 (b) (76 ed., Supp. III). may also pursue their own regulatory and inspection programs during the interim phase, and they may *271 assist the Secretary in enforcing the interim standards.[5] The are not, however, required to enforce the interim regulatory standards and, until the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary may not cede the Federal Government's independent enforcement role to that wish to conduct their own regulatory programs. Section 501 (b), 30 U.S. C. 1251 (b) (76 ed., Supp. III), directs the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing a permanent regulatory program incorporating all the Act's performance standards. The Secretary published the permanent regulations on March 13, 79, see but these regulations do not become effective in a particular State until either a permanent state program, submitted and approved in accordance with 503 of the Act, or a permanent federal program for the State, adopted in accordance with 504, is implemented. Under 503, any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority over the surface coal mining operations on "non-Federal lands"[6] within its borders must submit a proposed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval. The proposed program must demonstrate that the state legislature has enacted laws implementing the environmental protection standards established by the Act and accompanying regulations, and that the State has the administrative and technical ability to enforce these standards. 30 U.S. C. 1253 (76 ed., Supp. III). The Secretary must approve or disapprove each such proposed program in accordance with time schedules and procedures established by 503 (b), (c), *272 30 U.S. C. 1253 (b), (c) (76 ed., Supp. III).[7] In addition, the Secretary must develop and implement a federal permanent program for each State |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | develop and implement a federal permanent program for each State that fails to submit or enforce a satisfactory state program. 504, 30 U.S. C. 1254 (76 ed., Supp. III). In such situations, the Secretary constitutes the regulatory authority administering the Act within that State and continues as such unless and until a "state program" is approved. No later than eight months after adoption of either a state-run or federally administered permanent regulatory program for a State, all surface coal mining and reclamation operations on "non-Federal lands" within that State must obtain a new permit issued in accordance with the applicable regulatory program. 506 (a), 30 U.S. C. 1256 (a) (76 ed., Supp. III). *273 B On October 23, 78, the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, an association of coal producers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia, 63 of its member coal companies, and 4 individual landowners filed suit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Act. The Commonwealth of Virginia and the town of Wise, Va., intervened as plaintiffs.[8] Plaintiffs' challenge was primarily directed at Title V's performance standards.[9] Because the permanent regulatory program was not scheduled to become effective until June 3, plaintiffs' challenge was directed at the sections of the Act establishing the interim regulatory program. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,[10] the Tenth Amendment,[11] and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[12] The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The court subsequently *274 issued an order and opinion declaring several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional. The court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges to the Act. The court held, however, that the Act "operates to `displace the ' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions,'. and, therefore, is in contravention of the Tenth Amendment." quoting National League of The court also ruled that various provisions of the Act effect an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the court agreed with plaintiffs' due process challenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions. The court permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing various provisions of the Act.[13] In No. 79-1538, the Secretary appeals from that portion of the District Court's judgment declaring various sections of the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement. In No. 79-1596, plaintiffs cross-appeal from the District Court's rejection |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | In No. 79-1596, plaintiffs cross-appeal from the District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge to the Act.[14] Because of the importance of the issues raised, we noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals,[15] 449 U. S. *275 817 and consolidated the two cases.[16] For convenience, we shall usually refer to plaintiffs as "appellees." II On cross-appeal, appellees argue that the District Court erred in rejecting their challenge to the Act as beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. They insist that the Act's principal goal is regulating the use of private lands within the borders of the and not, as the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining. Consequently, appellees contend that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as such is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, i. e. whether land can be regarded as `in commerce.'" Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, et al. 12 (emphasis in original). In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees emphasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regulation is within the inherent police powers of the and their political subdivisions,[17] and *276 argue that Congress may regulate land use only insofar as the Property Clause[18] grants it control over federal lands. We do not accept either appellees' framing of the question or the answer they would have us supply. The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. Heart of Atlanta Motel, ; This established, the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta Motel, See United v. ; The judicial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme. Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the fact that the Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress. See National League of ; Cleveland v. United ; (). This power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." 6 Moreover, this Court has made clear that the commerce power extends not only to "the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and *277 to "protection of |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | of interstate or foreign commerce" and *277 to "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in commerce," but also to "activities affecting commerce." Perez v. United (71). As we explained in Fry v. United 421, U. S. 542, 547 (75), "[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the or with foreign nations." See National League of 426 U. S., ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, ; (42); United v. Wrightwood Dairy 1 (42); United v. at 120-. Thus, when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is rational. Here, the District Court properly deferred to Congress' express findings, set out in the Act itself, about the effects of surface coal mining on interstate commerce. Section 101 (c), 30 U.S. C. 1201 (c) (76 ed., Supp. III), recites the congressional finding that "many surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and property by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural resources." The legislative record provides ample support for these statutory findings. The Surface Mining Act became law *278 only after six years of the most thorough legislative consideration.[] Committees of both Houses of Congress held extended hearings during which vast amounts of testimony and *279 documentary evidence about the effects of surface mining on our Nation's environment and economy were brought to Congress' attention. Both Committees made detailed findings about these effects and the urgent need for federal legislation to address the problem. The Senate Report explained that "[s]urface coal mining activities have imposed large social costs on the public in many areas of the country in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife resources, and a decline in natural beauty." S. Rep. No. 95-128, p. 50 (77). See Similarly, the House Committee documented the adverse effects of surface coal mining on interstate commerce as including: "`Acid drainage which has ruined an estimated 11,000 miles of streams; the loss of |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | ruined an estimated 11,000 miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip mining; the degrading of productive farmland; recurrent *280 landslides; siltation and sedimentation of river systems.'" H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, p. 58 (77), quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1445, p. And in discussing how surface coal mining affects water resources and in turn interstate commerce, the House Committee explained: "The most widespread damages are environmental in nature. Water users and developers incur significant economic and financial losses as well. "Reduced recreational values, fishkills, reductions in normal waste assimilation capacity, impaired water supplies, metals and masonry corrosion and deterioration, increased flood frequencies and flood damages, reductions in designed water storage capacities at impoundments, and higher operating costs for commercial waterway users are some of the most obvious economic effects that stem from mining-related pollution and sedimentation." H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 59. See The Committees also explained that inadequacies in existing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal regulations imperative. See S. Rep. No. 95-128, at 49; H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 58. In light of the evidence available to Congress and the detailed consideration that the legislation received, we cannot say that Congress did not have a rational basis for concluding that surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstate commerce. Appellees do not, in general, dispute the validity of the congressional findings.[20] Rather, appellees' contention is that *281 the "rational basis" test should not apply in this case because the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate commerce. But even assuming that appellees correctly characterize the land use regulated by the Act as a "local" activity, their argument is unpersuasive. The denomination of an activity as a "local" or "intrastate" activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously noted, the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce." United v. Wrightwood Dairy 315 U. S., at 1. See Fry v. United ; 301 U. S., at This Court has long held that Congress may regulate the conditions under which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced where the "local" activity of producing these goods itself affects interstate commerce. See, e. g., United v. ; (42); Kirschbaum v. Walling, (42). |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | e. g., United v. ; (42); Kirschbaum v. Walling, (42). Cf. Appellees do not dispute that coal is a commodity that moves in interstate commerce. Here, Congress rationally determined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may result from that activity. This congressional finding is sufficient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the Act responds to a congressional finding that nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different will not be used to undermine the ability of the several *282 to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders." 30 U.S. C. 1201 (g) (76 ed., Supp. III). The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause. In United v. the Court used a similar rationale to sustain the imposition of federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations on a manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce. The Court explained that the statute implemented Congress' view that "interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows." The same rationale applies here to support the conclusion that the Surface Mining Act is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.[21] Appellees do not dispute that the environmental and other problems that the Act attempts to control can properly be addressed through Commerce Clause legislation. In these circumstances, it is difficult to find any remaining foundation *283 for appellees' argument that, because it regulates a particular land use, the Surface Mining Act is beyond congressional Commerce Clause authority. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the means selected by Congress were reasonable and appropriate. Appellees' essential challenge to the means selected by the Act is that they are redundant or unnecessary. Appellees contend that a variety of federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S. C. 7401 et seq. (76 ed., Supp. III), the Flood Control Acts, 33 U.S. C. 701 et seq. (76 |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | Flood Control Acts, 33 U.S. C. 701 et seq. (76 ed., Supp. III), and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S. C. 1251 et seq. (76 ed., Supp. III), adequately address the federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of surface coal mining without need to resort to the land-use regulation scheme of the Surface Mining Act. The short answer to this argument is that the effectiveness of existing laws in dealing with a problem identified by Congress is ordinarily a matter committed to legislative judgment. Congress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and concluded that additional measures were necessary to deal with the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 58-60; S. Rep. No. 95-128, at 59-63. And we agree with the court below that the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably related to the goals Congress sought to accomplish. The Act's restrictions on the practices of mine operators all serve to control the environmental and other adverse effects of surface coal mining. In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly rejected appellees' Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. We therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exercise of the commerce power. III The District Court invalidated 515 (d) and (e) of the Act, which prescribe performance standards for surface coal *284 mining on "steep slopes,"[22] on the ground that they violate a constitutional limitation on the commerce power imposed by the Tenth Amendment. These provisions require "steep-slope" operators: (i) to reclaim the mined area by completely covering the highwall and returning the site to its "approximate original contour";[23] (ii) to refrain from dumping spoil material on the downslope below the bench or mining cut; and (iii) to refrain from disturbing land above the highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory authority. 515 (d), 30 U.S. C. 1265 (d) (76 ed., Supp. III). Under 515 (e), a "steep-slope" operator may obtain a variance from the approximate-original-contour requirement by showing that it will allow a postreclamation use that is "deemed to constitute an equal or better economic or public use" than would otherwise be possible. 30 U.S. C. 1265 (e) (3) (A) (76 ed., Supp. III).[24] The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision in National League of The District Court viewed the central issue as whether the Act governs the activities of private individuals, or whether it instead regulates the governmental decisions of the And although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately affects the coal mine operator." it concluded that the |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | "ultimately affects the coal mine operator." it concluded that the Act contravenes the Tenth Amendment *285 because it interferes with the ' "traditional governmental function" of regulating land use. The court held that, as applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope provisions impermissibly constrict the State's ability to make "essential decisions."[25] The court found the Act accomplishes this result "through forced relinquishment of state control of land use planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, cities, and towns."[26] The court therefore permanently enjoined enforcement of 515 (d) and (e).[27] *286 The District Court's reliance on National League of Cities requires a careful review of the actual basis and import of our decision in that case. There, we considered a constitutional challenge to the 74 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which had extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to most state and local government employees. Because it was conceded that the challenged regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause," the only question presented was whether that particular exercise of the commerce power "encounter[ed] a constitutional barrier because [the regulations] applied directly to the and subdivisions of as employers." We began by drawing a sharp distinction between congressional regulation of private persons and businesses "necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside," and federal regulation "directed, not to private citizens, but to the as" As to the former, we found no Tenth Amendment impediment to congressional action. Instead, we reaffirmed our consistent rule: "Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result that has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the requirement that `the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' Heart of Atlanta Motel," The Court noted, however, that "the as stand on a quite different footing from an individual or corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce." It indicated that when Congress attempts to directly regulate the as the Tenth *287 Amendment requires recognition that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." The Court held that the power to set the wages and work hours of state employees was "an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." And because it further found that the challenged regulations would "displace the ' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," at the Court concluded that Congress could not, consistently with the Tenth Amendment, "abrogate the ' otherwise plenary authority to make [these decisions]."[28] It should be apparent from this discussion that in order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the " as" Second, the federal regulation *288 must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the ' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." at[29] When the Surface Mining Act is examined in light of these principles, it is clear that appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge must fail because the first of the three requirements is not satisfied. The District Court's holding to the contrary rests on an unwarranted extension of the decision in National League of Cities. As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and businesses. Moreover, the are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government. Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. Cf. (CA4 75), vacated and remanded sub nom. (77); District of (75), vacated and remanded sub nom. (77); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. *289 2d 827, 8-842 (CA9 75), vacated and remanded, (77). The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows the within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 9 |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | needs. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 9 U. S. App. D. C. 225, 226, In this respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal statutes that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower federal courts.[30] Appellees argue, however, that the threat of federal usurpation of their regulatory roles coerces the into enforcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that the Act directly regulates the as because it establishes mandatory minimum federal standards. In essence, appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond the activities actually regulated by the Act to its conceivable effects on the ' freedom to make decisions in areas of "integral governmental functions." And appellees emphasize, as did the court below, that the Act interferes with the ' ability to exercise their police powers by regulating land use. Appellees' claims accurately characterize the Act insofar as it prescribes federal minimum standards governing surface coal mining, which a State may either implement itself or else yield to a federally administered regulatory program. To object to this scheme, however, appellees must assume that the Tenth Amendment limits congressional power to *290 pre-empt or displace state regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce. This assumption is incorrect. A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal law. See, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing 430 U.S. 5, (77); 402 U.S. 6, (71); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 3 U.S. 132, (63); Bethlehem Steel v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., (47); Moreover, it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to prohibit alland not just inconsistentstate regulation of such activities. See, e. g., City of (73); (61); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator (47); Transit Comm'n v. United 289 U.S. (33). Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the ' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result. See & North Western Transp. v. Kalo Brick & Tile 317-3 (81); Sanitary District v. United (25); The Minnesota Rate Cases, (13); As the Court long ago stated: "It is elementary and well settled that there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and that the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive." Missouri Pacific R. v. Stroud, (25). Thus, Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining. We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110516/hodel-v-virginia-surface-mining-reclamation-assn-inc/ | Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the a regulatory role. Contrary to the assumption by both the District Court and appellees, nothing in *291 National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce. To the contrary, National League of Cities explicitly reaffirmed the teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in regulating private activities pursuant to the commerce power, "pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result which has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress." 426 U.S., The only limitation on congressional authority in this regard is the requirement that the means selected be reasonably related to the goal of regulating interstate commerce. We have already indicated that the Act satisfies this test.[31] This conclusion applies regardless of whether the federal legislation displaces laws enacted under the ' "police powers." The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the ' exercise of their police powers. See Hoke v. United (13); Athanasaw v. United (13); Cleveland v. United 329 U. S., at ; United v. -114; United v. Wrightwood Dairy 315 U. S., at 1. Cf. United v. Carolene Products (38) ;[32] accord, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline 315 *, (42); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse (); Seven Cases v. United (16). This Court has upheld as constitutional any number of federal statutes enacted under the commerce power that pre-empt particular exercises of state police power. See, e. g., United v. Walsh, (47) (upholding Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S. C. 301-392); () (upholding National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. 151-168); United v. (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 201-2). It would therefore be a radical departure from long-established precedent for this Court to hold that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from displacing state police power laws regulating private activity. Nothing in National League of Cities compels or even hints at such a departure.[33] *293 In sum, appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Act must fail because here, in contrast to the situation in National League of Cities, the statute at issue regulates only "individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and the State in which they reside." National League of 426 U. S.,[34] Accordingly, we turn to the District Court's ruling that the Act contravenes other constitutional limits on |
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