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Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | State for modification of its order. See infra, at 45–48. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court Master in Coleman filed a report stating that, after years of slow improvement, the state of mental health care in California’s prisons was deteriorating. App. 489. The Special Master ascribed this change to increased over crowding. The rise in population had led to greater demand for care, and existing programming space and staffing levels were inadequate to keep pace. Prisons had retained more mental health staff, but the “growth of the resource [had] not matched the rise in demand.” at 482. At the very time the need for space was rising, the need to house the expanding population had caused a “reduction of programming space now occupied by inmate bunks.” The State was “facing a four to five year gap in the availability of sufficient beds to meet the treatment needs of many inmates/patients.” “[I]ncreasing numbers of truly psychotic inmate/patients are trapped in [lower levels of treatment] that cannot meet their needs.” The Special Master concluded that many early “achievements have succumbed to the inexo rably rising tide of population, leaving behind growing frustration and despair.” C The second action, Plata v. Brown, involves the class of state prisoners with serious medical conditions. After this action commenced in 2001, the State conceded that defi ciencies in prison medical care violated prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights. The State stipulated to a remedial injunc The State failed to comply with that injunc tion, and in 2005 the court appointed a Receiver to oversee remedial efforts. The court found that “the California prison medical care system is broken beyond repair,” resulting in an “unconscionable degree of suffering and death.” App. 917. The court found: “[I]t is an uncontested fact that, on average, an inmate in one of California’s prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days due to 10 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court constitutional deficiencies in the [California prisons’] medical delivery system.” And the court made findings regarding specific instances of neglect, including the following: “[A] San Quentin prisoner with hypertension, diabetes and renal failure was prescribed two different medica tions that actually served to exacerbate his renal fail ure. An optometrist noted the patient’s retinal bleed ing due to very high blood pressure and referred him for immediate evaluation, but this evaluation never took place. It was not until a year later that the pa tient’s renal failure was recognized, at which point he was referred to a nephrologist on an urgent basis; he should have been seen by |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | on an urgent basis; he should have been seen by the specialist within 14 days but the consultation never happened and the pa tient died three months later.” (citations omitted). Prisons were unable to retain sufficient numbers of com petent medical staff, and would “hire any doctor who had ‘a license, a pulse and a pair of shoes,’ ” at 926. Medical facilities lacked “necessary medical equip ment” and did “not meet basic sanitation standards.” at 944. “Exam tables and counter tops, where prisoners with communicable diseases are treated, [were] not routinely disinfected.” In 2008, three years after the District Court’s decision, the Receiver described continuing deficiencies in the health care provided by California prisons: “Timely access is not assured. The number of medical personnel has been inadequate, and competence has not been assured. Adequate housing for the dis abled and aged does not exist. The medical facilities, when they exist at all, are in an abysmal state of dis repair. Basic medical equipment is often not available or used. Medications and other treatment options are Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion of the Court too often not available when needed. Indeed, it is a misnomer to call the existing chaos a ‘medical deliv ery system’—it is more an act of desperation than a system.” Record in No. 3:01–CV–01351–TEH (ND Cal.), Doc. 1136, p. 5. A report by the Receiver detailed the impact of overcrowd ing on efforts to remedy the viola The Receiver ex plained that “overcrowding, combined with staffing short ages, has created a culture of cynicism, fear, and despair which makes hiring and retaining competent clinicians extremely difficult.” App. 1. “[O]vercrowding, and the resulting day to day operational chaos of the [prison sys tem], creates regular ‘crisis’ situations which take time [and] energy away from important remedial pro grams.” Overcrowding had increased the incidence of infectious disease, –8, and had led to rising prison violence and greater reliance by custo dial staff on lockdowns, which “inhibit the delivery of medical care and increase the staffing necessary for such care.” “Every day,” the Receiver reported, “California prison wardens and health care managers make the difficult decision as to which of the class actions, Coleman or Plata they will fail to comply with because of staff shortages and patient loads.” D The Coleman and Plata plaintiffs, believing that a rem edy for unconstitutional medical and mental health care could not be achieved without reducing overcrowding, moved their respective District Courts to convene a three judge court empowered under the PLRA to order reduc tions in the prison |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | under the PLRA to order reduc tions in the prison popula The judges in both actions granted the request, and the cases were consolidated before a single three-judge court. The State has not chal lenged the validity of the consolidation in proceedings before this Court, so its propriety is not presented by this 12 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court appeal. The three-judge court heard 14 days of testimony and issued a 4-page opinion, making extensive findings of fact. The court ordered California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of the prisons’ design capacity within two years. Assuming the State does not increase capacity through new construction, the order requires a population reduction of 38,000 to 46,000 persons. Because it appears all but certain that the State cannot complete sufficient construction to comply fully with the order, the prison population will have to be reduced to at least some extent. The court did not order the State to achieve this reduction in any particular manner. Instead, the court ordered the State to formulate a plan for compliance and submit its plan for approval by the court. The State appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. and the Court postponed consideration of the ques tion of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. Schwar zenegger v. Plata, 560 U. S. (2010). II As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of human dig nity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. “ ‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.’ ” (plurality opinion)). To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison’s failure to provide sustenance for inmates “may Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 13 Opinion of the Court actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death.’ ” ); see generally A. Elsner, Gates of Injustice: The Crisis in America’s Prisons (2004). Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, includ ing adequate medical care, is incompatible with the con cept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society. If government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | society. If government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment viola See 687, n. 9 (1978). Courts must be sensitive to the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and danger ous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals. See Courts nevertheless must not shrink from their obligation to “en force the constitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ including prisoners.” (per curiam). Courts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administra Courts faced with the sensitive task of remedying un constitutional prison conditions must consider a range of available options, including appointment of special mas ters or receivers and the possibility of consent decrees. When necessary to ensure compliance with a constitu tional mandate, courts may enter orders placing limits on a prison’s popula By its terms, the PLRA restricts the circumstances in which a court may enter an order “that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison popula” U.S. C. The order in this case does not necessarily require the State to release any prisoners. The State may comply by raising the design 14 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court capacity of its prisons or by transferring prisoners to county facilities or facilities in other States. Because the order limits the prison population as a percentage of de sign capacity, it nonetheless has the “effect of reducing or limiting the prison popula” Under the PLRA, only a three-judge court may enter an order limiting a prison popula Before a three-judge court may be convened, a district court first must have entered an order for less intrusive relief that failed to remedy the constitutional violation and must have given the defendant a reasonable time to comply with its prior orders. The party request ing a three-judge court must then submit “materials suffi cient to demonstrate that [these requirements] have been met.” If the district court concludes that the materials are, in fact, sufficient, a three-judge court may be convened. ; see 28 U.S. C. (stating that a three-judge court may not be convened if the district court “determines that three judges are not required”); 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & V. Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2007). The three-judge court must then find by clear and con vincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right” and |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | primary cause of the violation of a Federal right” and that “no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.” U.S. C. As with any award of prospective relief under the PLRA, the relief “shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” The three-judge court must therefore find that the relief is “narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” In making this de termination, the three-judge court must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the op eration of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) Opinion of the Court Applying these standards, the three-judge court found a population limit appropriate, necessary, and authorized in this case. This Court’s review of the three-judge court’s legal determinations is de novo, but factual findings are re viewed for clear error. See v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–574 (1985). Deference to trial court fact finding reflects an understanding that “[t]he trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experi ence in fulfilling that role comes expertise.” The three-judge court oversaw two weeks of trial and heard at considerable length from California prison offi cials, as well as experts in the field of correctional admini stra The judges had the opportunity to ask relevant questions of those witnesses. Two of the judges had over seen the ongoing remedial efforts of the Receiver and Special Master. The three-judge court was well situated to make the difficult factual judgments necessary to fash ion a remedy for this complex and intractable constitu tional viola The three-judge court’s findings of fact may be reversed only if this Court is left with a “ ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” ). A The State contends that it was error to convene the three-judge court without affording it more time to comply with the prior orders in Coleman and Plata. 1 The parties dispute this Court’s jurisdiction to review the determinations of the Coleman and Plata District Courts that a three-judge court should be convened. Plaintiffs claim the State was required to raise this issue first in the Court of Appeals by appealing the orders of the 16 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court District Courts. When exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. however, this Court “has not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction ‘to determine the authority of the court below,’ |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | exercise jurisdiction ‘to determine the authority of the court below,’ ” including whether the three-judge court was properly constituted. ); see (19) (“The case is analogous to those in which this Court, finding that the court below has acted without jurisdiction, exercises its appellate jurisdiction to correct the improper action”). The merits of the decision to con vene the three-judge court, therefore, are properly before this Court. 2 Before a three-judge court may be convened to consider whether to enter a population limit, the PLRA requires that the court have “previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied.” U.S. C. This provision refers to “an order.” It is satisfied if the court has entered one order, and this sin gle order has “failed to remedy” the constitutional viola The defendant must have had “a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders.” This provision refers to the court’s “orders.” It requires that the defendant have been given a reasonable time to comply with all of the court’s orders. Together, these requirements ensure that the “ ‘last resort remedy’ ” of a population limit is not imposed “ ‘as a first step.’ ” Inmates of (CADC 1988). The first of these conditions, the previous order re quirement of was satisfied in Coleman by appointment of a Special Master in 1995, and it was Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 17 Opinion of the Court satisfied in Plata by approval of a consent decree and stipulated injunction in 2002. Both orders were intended to remedy the constitutional violations. Both were given ample time to succeed. When the three-judge court was convened, 12 years had passed since the appointment of the Coleman Special Master, and 5 years had passed since the approval of the Plata consent decree. The State does not claim that either order achieved a remedy. Although the PLRA entitles a State to terminate remedial orders such as these after two years unless the district court finds that the relief “remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right,” California has not attempted to obtain relief on this basis. The State claims instead that the second condition, the reasonable time requirement of was not met because other, later remedial efforts should have been given more time to succeed. In 2006, the Coleman District Judge approved a revised plan of action calling for con struction of new facilities, hiring of new staff, and im plementation of new procedures. That same |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | new staff, and im plementation of new procedures. That same year, the Plata District Judge selected and appointed a Receiver to oversee the State’s ongoing remedial efforts. When the three-judge court was convened, the Receiver had filed a preliminary plan of action calling for new construction, hiring of additional staff, and other procedural reforms. Although both the revised plan of action in Coleman and the appointment of the Receiver in Plata were new devel opments in the courts’ remedial efforts, the basic plan to solve the crisis through construction, hiring, and proce dural reforms remained unchanged. These efforts had been ongoing for years; the failed consent decree in Plata had called for implementation of new procedures and hiring of additional staff; and the Coleman Special Master had issued over 70 orders directed at achieving a remedy through construction, hiring, and procedural reforms. The BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver were unable to provide assurance that further, substantially similar efforts would yield success absent a population reduc Instead, the Coleman Special Master explained that “many of the clinical advances painfully accomplished over the past decade are slip-sliding away” as a result of overcrowding. App. 481–482. And the Plata Receiver indicated that, absent a reduction in overcrowding, a successful remedial effort could “all but bankrupt” the State of California. App. 1053. Having engaged in remedial efforts for 5 years in Plata and 12 in Coleman, the District Courts were not required to wait to see whether their more recent efforts would yield equal disappointment. When a court attempts to remedy an entrenched constitutional violation through reform of a complex institution, such as this statewide prison system, it may be necessary in the ordinary course to issue multiple orders directing and adjusting ongoing remedial efforts. Each new order must be given a reason able time to succeed, but reasonableness must be assessed in light of the entire history of the court’s remedial efforts. A contrary reading of the reasonable time requirement would in effect require district courts to impose a morato rium on new remedial orders before issuing a population limit. This unnecessary period of inaction would delay an eventual remedy and would prolong the courts’ involve ment, serving neither the State nor the prisoners. Con gress did not require this unreasonable result when it used the term “reasonable.” The Coleman and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt that additional efforts to build new facilities and hire new staff would achieve a remedy. Indeed, although 5 years have now passed since the appointment of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | although 5 years have now passed since the appointment of the Plata Receiver and approval of the revised plan of action in Coleman, there is no indication that the constitutional violations have been cured. A report filed by the Coleman Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 19 Opinion of the Court Special Master in July 2009 describes ongoing violations, including an “absence of timely access to appropriate levels of care at every point in the system.” App. 807. A report filed by the Plata Receiver in October 2010 likewise describes ongoing deficiencies in the provision of medical care and concludes that there are simply “too many pris oners for the healthcare infrastructure.” The Coleman and Plata courts acted reasonably when they convened a three-judge court without further delay. B Once a three-judge court has been convened, the court must find additional requirements satisfied before it may impose a population limit. The first of these requirements is that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right.” U.S. C. 1 The three-judge court found the primary cause require ment satisfied by the evidence at trial. The court found that overcrowding strains inadequate medical and mental health facilities; overburdens limited clinical and custodial staff; and creates violent, unsanitary, and chaotic condi tions that contribute to the constitutional violations and frustrate efforts to fashion a remedy. The three-judge court found that “until the problem of overcrowding is overcome it will be impossible to provide constitutionally compliant care to California’s prison popula” Juris. App. 141a. The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to this determina With respect to the three-judge court’s factual findings, this Court’s review is necessarily deferen tial. It is not this Court’s place to “duplicate the role” of the trial court. 470 U.S., The ultimate issue of primary cause presents a mixed question of law and fact; but there, too, “the mix weighs heavily on the 20 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court ‘fact’ side.” (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment). Because the “district court is ‘better positioned’ to decide the issue,” our review of the three-judge court’s primary cause deter mination is deferential. Salve Regina The record documents the severe impact of burgeoning demand on the provision of care. At the time of trial, vacancy rates for medical and mental health staff ranged as high as 20% for surgeons, 25% for physicians, 39% for nurse practitioners, and 54.1% for psychiatrists. Juris. App. 105a, 108a. These percentages are based on the number of positions budgeted by the State. Dr. Ronald Shansky, former medical director of the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | the State. Dr. Ronald Shansky, former medical director of the Illinois prison system, concluded that these numbers understate the se verity of the crisis because the State has not budgeted sufficient staff to meet demand.5 According to Dr. Shansky, “even if the prisons were able to fill all of their vacant health care positions, which they have not been able to do to date, the prisons would still be unable to handle the level of need given the current overcrowding.” Record in No. 2:90–CV–00520–LKK–JFM (ED Cal.), Doc. 3231–13, p. 16 (hereinafter Doc. 3231–13). Dr. Craig Haney, a professor of psychology, reported that mental health staff are “managing far larger caseloads than is appropriate or effective.” App. 596. A prison psychiatrist told Dr. Haney that “ ‘we are doing about 50% of what we should be doing.’ ” In the context of physical care Dr. Shansky agreed that “demand for care, particularly for the high priority cases, continues to overwhelm the resources —————— 5 Dr. Craig Haney likewise testified that the State had “significantly underestimated the staffing needed to implement critical portions of the Coleman Program Guide requirements,” that “key tasks were omitted when determining staffing workloads,” and that estimates were based on “key assumptions” that caused the State to underestimate demand for mental health care. App. 596–597. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 21 Opinion of the Court available.” Even on the assumption that vacant positions could be filled, the evidence suggested there would be insufficient space for the necessary additional staff to perform their jobs. The Plata Receiver, in his report on overcrowding, concluded that even the “newest and most modern pris ons” had been “designed with clinic space which is only one-half that necessary for the real-life capacity of the prisons.” App. 1023 (emphasis deleted). Dr. Haney re ported that “[e]ach one of the facilities I toured was short of significant amounts of space needed to perform other wise critical tasks and responsibilities.” at 597–598. In one facility, staff cared for 7,525 prisoners in space designed for one-third as many. Juris. App. 93a. Staff operate out of converted storage rooms, closets, bath rooms, shower rooms, and visiting centers. These make shift facilities impede the effective delivery of care and place the safety of medical professionals in jeopardy, compounding the difficulty of hiring additional staff. This shortfall of resources relative to demand contrib utes to significant delays in treatment. Mentally ill pris oners are housed in administrative segregation while awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment beds for appropriate care. One correctional officer indicated that he had kept mentally |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | care. One correctional officer indicated that he had kept mentally ill prisoners in segregation for “ ‘6 months or more.’ ” App. 594. Other prisoners awaiting care are held in tiny, phone-booth sized cages. The record documents instances of prisoners committing suicide while awaiting treatment.6 Delays are no less severe in the context of physical care. —————— 6 For instance, Dr. Pablo Stewart reported that one prisoner was referred to a crisis bed but, “[a]fter learning that the restraint room was not available and that there were no crisis beds open, staff moved [the prisoner] back to his administrative segregation cell without any prescribed observa” App. 736. The prisoner “hanged himself that night in his cell.” ; see Juris. App. 99a. 22 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court Prisons have backlogs of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor. Doc. 3231–13, at A review of referrals for urgent specialty care at one prison revealed that only 105 of 316 pending referrals had a scheduled appointment, and only 2 had an appointment scheduled to occur within 14 days. at 22–23. Urgent specialty referrals at one prison had been pending for six months to a year. at 27. Crowding creates unsafe and unsanitary living conditions that hamper effective delivery of medical and mental health care. A medical expert described living quarters in converted gymnasiums or dayrooms, where large numbers of prisoners may share just a few toilets and showers, as “ ‘breeding grounds for disease.’ ”7 Juris. App. 102a. Cramped conditions promote unrest and vio lence, making it difficult for prison officials to monitor and control the prison popula On any given day, prisoners in the general prison population may become ill, thus entering the plaintiff class; and overcrowding may prevent immediate medical attention necessary to avoid suffering, death, or spread of disease. After one prisoner was as saulted in a crowded gymnasium, prison staff did not even learn of the injury until the prisoner had been dead for several hours. Tr. 382. Living in crowded, unsafe, and unsanitary conditions can cause prisoners with latent mental illnesses to worsen and develop overt symptoms. Crowding may impede efforts to improve delivery of —————— 7 Correctional officials at trial described several outbreaks of disease. One officer testified that antibiotic-resistant staph infections spread widely among the prison population and described prisoners “bleeding, oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes when they come in to get the wound covered and treated.” Tr. 601, 604–605. Another witness testified that inmates with influenza were sent back from the infirmary due to a lack |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | were sent back from the infirmary due to a lack of beds and that the disease quickly spread to “more than half ” the 0 prisoners in the housing unit, with the result that the unit was placed on lockdown for a week. at 720–721. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 23 Opinion of the Court care. Two prisoners committed suicide by hanging after being placed in cells that had been identified as requiring a simple fix to remove attachment points that could sup port a noose. The repair was not made because doing so would involve removing prisoners from the cells, and there was no place to put them. at 769–777. More gen erally, Jeanne Woodford, the former acting secretary of California’s prisons, testified that there “ ‘are simply too many issues that arise from such a large number of pris oners,’ ” and that, as a result, “ ‘management spends virtu ally all of its time fighting fires instead of engaging in thoughtful decision-making and planning’ ” of the sort needed to fashion an effective remedy for these constitu tional violations. Juris. App. 82a. Increased violence requires increased reliance on lockdowns to keep order, and lockdowns further impede the effective delivery of care. In 2006, prison officials instituted 449 lockdowns. at 116a. The average lock down lasted 12 days, and 20 lockdowns lasted 60 days or longer. During lockdowns, staff must either escort prisoners to medical facilities or bring medical staff to the prisoners. Either procedure puts additional strain on already overburdened medical and custodial staff. Some programming for the mentally ill even may be canceled altogether during lockdowns, and staff may be unable to supervise the delivery of psychotropic medications. The effects of overcrowding are particularly acute in the prisons’ reception centers, intake areas that process 140,000 new or returning prisoners every year. at 85a. Crowding in these areas runs as high as 300% of design capacity. at 86a. Living conditions are “ ‘toxic,’ ” and a lack of treatment space impedes efforts to identify inmate medical or mental health needs and pro vide even rudimentary care. at 92a. The former warden of San Quentin reported that doctors in that prison’s reception center “ ‘were unable to keep up with 24 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court physicals or provid[e] any kind of chronic care follow-up.’ ” at 90a. Inmates spend long periods of time in these areas awaiting transfer to the general popula Some prisoners are held in the reception centers for their entire period of incarcera Numerous experts testified that crowding is the primary |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | of incarcera Numerous experts testified that crowding is the primary cause of the constitutional violations. The former warden of San Quentin and former acting secretary of the Califor nia prisons concluded that crowding “makes it ‘virtually impossible for the organization to develop, much less implement, a plan to provide prisoners with adequate care.’ ” at 83a. The former executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice testified that “ ‘[e]verything revolves around overcrowding” and that “ ‘overcrowding is the primary cause of the medical and mental health care violations.’ ” 7a. The former head of corrections in Pennsylvania, Washington, and Maine testified that overcrowding is “ ‘overwhelming the system both in terms of sheer numbers, in terms of the space available, in terms of providing healthcare.’ ” And the current secretary of the Pennsylvania Depart ment of Corrections testified that “ ‘‘the biggest inhibiting factor right now in California being able to deliver appro priate mental health and medical care is the severe over crowding.’ ” at 82a. 2 The State attempts to undermine the substantial evi dence presented at trial, and the three-judge court’s find ings of fact, by complaining that the three-judge court did not allow it to present evidence of current prison condi tions. This suggestion lacks a factual basis. The three-judge court properly admitted evidence of current conditions as relevant to the issues before it. The three-judge court allowed discovery until a few months before trial; expert witnesses based their conclusions on Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 25 Opinion of the Court recent observations of prison conditions; the court ad mitted recent reports on prison conditions by the Plata Receiver and Coleman Special Master; and both parties presented testimony related to current conditions, includ ing understaffing, inadequate facilities, and unsanitary and unsafe living conditions. See at 4–8, 19–24. Dr. Craig Haney, for example, based his expert report on tours of eight California prisons. App. 539. These tours occurred as late as August 2008, two weeks before Dr. Haney submitted his report and less than four months before the first day of trial. ; see 565, 580 (July tours). Other experts submitted reports based on similar observations. See, e.g., Doc. 3231–13, at 6 (Dr. Shansky); App. 646 (Dr. Stewart); 45 (Austin); The three-judge court’s opinion cited and relied on this evidence of current conditions. The court relied exten sively on the expert witness reports. See generally Juris. App. 85a–143a. The court cited the most current data available on suicides and preventable deaths in the Cali fornia prisons. 3a, 125a. The court relied on statistics on |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | fornia prisons. 3a, 125a. The court relied on statistics on staff vacancies that dated to three months before trial, at 105a, 108a, and statistics on shortages of treatment beds for the same period, at 97a. These are just examples of the extensive evidence of current conditions that informed every aspect of the judgment of the three-judge court. The three-judge court did not abuse its discretion when it cited findings made in earlier decisions of the Plata and Coleman District Courts. Those findings remained relevant to establish the nature of these longstanding, continuing constitutional violations. It is true that the three-judge court established a cutoff date for discovery a few months before trial. The order stated that site inspections of prisons would be allowed until that date, and that evidence of “changed prison conditions” after that date would not be admitted. App. 26 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court 1190. The court excluded evidence not pertinent to the issue whether a population limit is appropriate under the PLRA, including evidence relevant solely to the exis tence of an ongoing constitutional viola The court reasoned that its decision was limited to the issue of rem edy and that the merits of the constitutional violation had already been determined. The three-judge court made clear that all such evidence would be considered “[t]o the extent that it illuminates questions that are properly before the court.” App. 9. Both rulings were within the sound discretion of the three-judge court. Orderly trial management may require discovery deadlines and a clean distinction between litiga tion of the merits and the remedy. The State in fact represented to the three-judge court that it would be “ap propriate” to cut off discovery before trial because “like plaintiffs, we, too, are really gearing up and going into a pretrial mode.” And if the State truly be lieved there was no longer a violation, it could have argued to the Coleman and Plata District Courts that a three judge court should not be convened because the District Courts’ prior orders had not “failed to remedy the dep rivation” of prisoners’ constitutional rights. U.S. C. see at 16–17. Once the three judge court was convened, that court was not required to reconsider the merits. Its role was solely to consider the propriety and necessity of a population limit. The State does not point to any significant evidence that it was unable to present and that would have changed the outcome of the proceedings. To the contrary, the record and opinion make clear that the decision of the three judge court was |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | clear that the decision of the three judge court was based on current evidence pertaining to ongoing constitutional violations. 3 The three-judge court acknowledged that the violations Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 27 Opinion of the Court were caused by factors in addition to overcrowding and that reducing crowding in the prisons would not entirely cure the violations. This is consistent with the reports of the Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver, both of whom concluded that even a significant reduction in the prison population would not remedy the violations absent continued efforts to train staff, improve facilities, and reform procedures. App. 487, 1054.8 The three-judge court nevertheless found that overcrowding was the pri mary cause in the sense of being the foremost cause of the viola This understanding of the primary cause requirement is consistent with the text of the PLRA. The State in fact concedes that it proposed this very definition of primary cause to the three-judge court. “Primary” is defined as “[f]irst or highest in rank, quality, or importance; princi pal.” American Heritage Dictionary 1393 (4th ed. 2000); see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 00 (defining “primary” as “first in rank or impor tance”); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 472 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “primary” as “[o]f the first or highest rank or importance; that claims the first consideration; principal, chief ”). Overcrowding need only be the foremost, chief, or principal cause of the viola If Congress had intended —————— 8 The Plata Receiver concluded that those who believed a population reduction would be a panacea were “simply wrong.” App. 1054–1055. The Receiver nevertheless made clear that “the time this process will take, and the cost and the scope of intrusion by the Federal Court cannot help but increase, and increase in a very significant manner, if the scope and characteristics of [California prison] overcrowding continue.” The Coleman Special Master likewise found that a large release of prisoners, without other relief, would leave the violation “largely unmitigated” even though deficiencies in care “are unquestionably exacerbated by overcrowding” and “defendants’ ability to provide required mental health services would be enhanced consid erably by a reduction in the overall census” of the prisons. App. 486– 487. 28 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court to require that crowding be the only cause, it would have said so, assuming in its judgment that definition would be consistent with constitutional limitations. As this case illustrates, constitutional violations in conditions of confinement are rarely susceptible of simple or straightforward solutions. In addition to overcrowding the failure of California’s prisons to provide adequate |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | to overcrowding the failure of California’s prisons to provide adequate medical and mental health care may be ascribed to chronic and worsening budget shortfalls, a lack of political will in favor of reform, inadequate facilities, and systemic admin istrative failures. The Plata District Judge, in his order appointing the Receiver, compared the problem to “ ‘a spider web, in which the tension of the various strands is determined by the relationship among all the parts of the web, so that if one pulls on a single strand, the tension of the entire web is redistributed in a new and complex pattern.’ ” App. 966–967 (quoting Fletcher, The Discre tionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L. J. 635, 645 (1982)); see (noting “the interdependence of the con ditions producing the violation,” including overcrowd ing). Only a multifaceted approach aimed at many causes, including overcrowding, will yield a solu The PLRA should not be interpreted to place undue restrictions on the authority of federal courts to fashion practical remedies when confronted with complex and intractable constitutional violations. Congress limited the availability of limits on prison populations, but it did not forbid these measures altogether. See U.S. C. The House Report accompanying the PLRA explained: “While prison caps must be the remedy of last re sort, a court still retains the power to order this remedy despite its intrusive nature and harmful con sequences to the public if, but only if, it is truly necessary to prevent an actual violation of a prisoner’s Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 29 Opinion of the Court federal rights.” H. R. Rep. No. 104–21, p. 25 (1995). Courts should presume that Congress was sensitive to the real-world problems faced by those who would remedy constitutional violations in the prisons and that Congress did not leave prisoners without a remedy for violations of their constitutional rights. A reading of the PLRA that would render population limits unavailable in practice would raise serious constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681, n. 12 (1986). A finding that overcrowding is the “primary cause” of a violation is therefore permissi ble, despite the fact that additional steps will be required to remedy the viola C The three-judge court was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that “no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.” The State argues that the violation could have been remedied through a combination of new construction, transfers of prisoners out of State, hiring of medical per sonnel, and continued efforts by |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | State, hiring of medical per sonnel, and continued efforts by the Plata Receiver and Coleman Special Master. The order in fact permits the State to comply with the population limit by transferring prisoners to county facilities or facilities in other States, or by constructing new facilities to raise the prisons’ design capacity. And the three-judge court’s order does not bar the State from undertaking any other remedial efforts. If the State does find an adequate remedy other than a population limit, it may seek modification or termination of the three-judge court’s order on that basis. The evi dence at trial, however, supports the three-judge court’s conclusion that an order limited to other remedies would not provide effective relief. The State’s argument that out-of-state transfers provide a less restrictive alternative to a population limit must fail 30 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court because requiring out-of-state transfers itself qualifies as a population limit under the PLRA.9 Such an order “has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.” The same is true of transfers to county facilities. Transfers provide a means to reduce the prison population in compliance with the three-judge court’s order. They are not a less restrictive alternative to that order. Even if out-of-state transfers could be regarded as a less restrictive alternative, the three-judge court found no evidence of plans for transfers in numbers sufficient to relieve overcrowding. The State complains that the Cole man District Court slowed the rate of transfer by requir ing inspections to assure that the receiving institutions were in compliance with the Eighth Amendment, but the State has made no effort to show that it has the resources and the capacity to transfer significantly larger numbers of prisoners absent that condi Construction of new facilities, in theory, could alleviate overcrowding, but the three-judge court found no realistic possibility that California would be able to build itself out of this crisis. At the time of the court’s decision the State had plans to build new medical and housing facilities, but funding for some plans had not been secured and funding for other plans had been delayed by the legislature for years. Particularly in light of California’s ongoing fiscal crisis, the three-judge court deemed “chimerical” any “remedy that requires significant additional spending by the state.” Juris. App. 1a. Events subsequent to the —————— 9 A program of voluntary transfers by the State would, of course, be less restrictive than an order mandating a reduction in the prison popula In |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | an order mandating a reduction in the prison popula In light of the State’s longstanding failure to remedy these serious constitutional violations, the three-judge court was under no obligation to consider voluntary population-reduction measures by the State as a workable alternative to injunctive relief. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 31 Opinion of the Court three-judge court’s decision have confirmed this conclu sion. In October 2010, the State notified the Coleman District Court that a substantial component of its con struction plans had been delayed indefinitely by the legis lature. And even if planned construction were to be completed, the Plata Receiver found that many so-called “expansion” plans called for cramming more prisoners into existing prisons without expanding administrative and support facilities. Juris. App. 1a–2a. The former acting secretary of the California prisons explained that these plans would “ ‘compound the burdens imposed on prison administrators and line staff’’ ” by adding to the already overwhelming prison population, creating new barriers to achievement of a remedy. at 2a. The three-judge court rejected additional hiring as a realistic means to achieve a remedy. The State for years had been unable to fill positions necessary for the ade quate provision of medical and mental health care, and the three-judge court found no reason to expect a change. Although the State points to limited gains in staffing between 2007 and 2008, the record shows that the prison system remained chronically understaffed through trial in 2008. See The three-judge court found that violence and other negative conditions caused by crowding made it difficult to hire and retain needed staff. The court concluded that there would be insufficient space for additional staff to work even if adequate personnel could somehow be retained. Additional staff cannot help to remedy the violation if they have no space in which to see and treat patients. The three-judge court did not err, much less commit clear error, when it concluded that, absent a population reduction, continued efforts by the Receiver and Special Master would not achieve a remedy. Both the Receiver and the Special Master filed reports stating that over crowding posed a significant barrier to their efforts. The 32 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court Plata Receiver stated that he was determined to achieve a remedy even without a population reduction, but he warned that such an effort would “all but bankrupt” the State. App. 1053. The Coleman Special Master noted even more serious concerns, stating that previous reme dial efforts had “succumbed to the inexorably rising tide of popula” App. 489. Both reports are persuasive evi |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | tide of popula” App. 489. Both reports are persuasive evi dence that, absent a reduction in overcrowding, any rem edy might prove unattainable and would at the very least require vast expenditures of resources by the State. Noth ing in the long history of the Coleman and Plata actions demonstrates any real possibility that the necessary re sources would be made available. The State claims that, even if each of these measures were unlikely to remedy the violation, they would succeed in doing so if combined together. Aside from asserting this proposition, the State offers no reason to believe it is so. Attempts to remedy the violations in Plata have been ongoing for 9 years. In Coleman, remedial efforts have been ongoing for 16. At one time, it may have been possi ble to hope that these violations would be cured without a reduction in overcrowding. A long history of failed reme dial orders, together with substantial evidence of over crowding’s deleterious effects on the provision of care, compels a different conclusion today. The common thread connecting the State’s proposed remedial efforts is that they would require the State to expend large amounts of money absent a reduction in overcrowding. The Court cannot ignore the political and fiscal reality behind this case. California’s Legislature has not been willing or able to allocate the resources necessary to meet this crisis absent a reduction in overcrowding. There is no reason to believe it will begin to do so now, when the State of California is facing an unprecedented budgetary shortfall. As noted above, the legislature re cently failed to allocate funds for planned new construc Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 33 Opinion of the Court at 30–31. Without a reduction in overcrowd ing, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconsti tutional care of the sick and mentally ill in California’s prisons. D The PLRA states that no prospective relief shall issue with respect to prison conditions unless it is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the viola U.S. C. When determining whether these requirements are met, courts must “give substantial weight to any ad verse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.” 1 The three-judge court acknowledged that its order “is likely to affect inmates without medical conditions or serious mental illness.” Juris. App. 172a. This is because reducing California’s prison population will require reduc ing the number of prisoners outside the class through steps such |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | the number of prisoners outside the class through steps such as parole reform, sentencing reform, use of good-time credits, or other means to be determined by the State. Reducing overcrowding will have positive effects beyond facilitating timely and adequate access to medical care, including reducing the incidence of prison violence and ameliorating unsafe living conditions. Ac cording to the State, these collateral consequences are evidence that the order sweeps more broadly than necessary. The population limit imposed by the three-judge court does not fail narrow tailoring simply because it will have positive effects beyond the plaintiff class. Narrow tailor ing requires a “ ‘ “fit” between the [remedy’s] ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.’ ” Board of Trus BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court tees of State Univ. of N. (1989). The scope of the remedy must be proportional to the scope of the violation, and the order must extend no further than necessary to remedy the viola This Court has rejected remedial orders that unnecessarily reach out to improve prison conditions other than those that violate the Constitu Lewis v. Casey, 5 U.S. 3, 357 (1996). But the precedents do not suggest that a narrow and otherwise proper remedy for a constitutional violation is invalid simply because it will have collateral effects. Nor does anything in the text of the PLRA require that result. The PLRA states that a remedy shall extend no further than necessary to remedy the violation of the rights of a “particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” U.S. C. This means only that the scope of the order must be determined with reference to the consti tutional violations established by the specific plaintiffs before the court. This case is unlike cases where courts have impermis sibly reached out to control the treatment of persons or institutions beyond the scope of the viola See Dayton Bd. of Even prisoners with no present physical or mental illness may become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are at risk so long as the State continues to provide inadequate care. Prisoners in the general population will become sick, and will become members of the plaintiff classes, with rou- tine frequency; and overcrowding may prevent the timely diagnosis and care necessary to provide effective treat ment and to prevent further spread of disease. Relief targeted only at present members of the plaintiff classes may therefore fail to adequately protect future class mem bers who will develop serious physical or mental illness. Prisoners who are not sick or mentally ill do not yet have a claim that they have |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | ill do not yet have a claim that they have been subjected to care that violates Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 35 Opinion of the Court the Eighth Amendment, but in no sense are they remote bystanders in California’s medical care system. They are that system’s next potential victims. A release order limited to prisoners within the plaintiff classes would, if anything, unduly limit the ability of State officials to determine which prisoners should be released. As the State acknowledges in its brief, “release of seriously mentally ill inmates [would be] likely to create special dangers because of their recidivism rates.” Consolidated Reply Brief for Appellants The order of the three judge court gives the State substantial flexibility to determine who should be released. If the State truly be lieves that a release order limited to sick and mentally ill inmates would be preferable to the order entered by the three-judge court, the State can move the three-judge court for modification of the order on that basis. The State has not requested this relief from this Court. The order is not overbroad because it encompasses the entire prison system, rather than separately assessing the need for a population limit at every institu The Coleman court found a systemwide violation when it first afforded relief, and in Plata the State stipulated to sys temwide relief when it conceded the existence of a viola Both the Coleman Special Master and the Plata Receiver have filed numerous reports detailing system wide deficiencies in medical and mental health care. California’s medical care program is run at a systemwide level, and resources are shared among the correctional facilities. Although the three-judge court’s order addresses the entire California prison system, it affords the State flexi bility to accommodate differences between institutions. There is no requirement that every facility comply with the 137.5% limit. Assuming no constitutional violation results, some facilities may retain populations in excess of the limit provided other facilities fall sufficiently below it 36 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court so the system as a whole remains in compliance with the order. This will allow prison officials to shift prisoners to facilities that are better able to accommodate over crowding, or out of facilities where retaining sufficient medical staff has been difficult. The alternative—a series of institution-specific population limits—would require federal judges to make these choices. Leaving this discre tion to state officials does not make the order overbroad. Nor is the order overbroad because it limits the State’s authority to run its prisons, as the State urges in its brief. While |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | its prisons, as the State urges in its brief. While the order does in some respects shape or control the State’s authority in the realm of prison administration, it does so in a manner that leaves much to the State’s discre The State may choose how to allocate prisoners between institutions; it may choose whether to increase the prisons’ capacity through construction or reduce the population; and, if it does reduce the population, it may decide what steps to take to achieve the necessary reduc The order’s limited scope is necessary to remedy a constitutional viola As the State implements the order of the three-judge court, time and experience may reveal targeted and effec tive remedies that will end the constitutional violations even without a significant decrease in the general prison popula The State will be free to move the three-judge court for modification of its order on that basis, and these motions would be entitled to serious considera See infra, at 45–48. At this time, the State has not proposed any realistic alternative to the order. The State’s desire to avoid a population limit, justified as according respect to state authority, creates a certain and unacceptable risk of continuing violations of the rights of sick and mentally ill prisoners, with the result that many more will die or needlessly suffer. The Constitution does not permit this wrong. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 37 Opinion of the Court 2 In reaching its decision, the three-judge court gave “substantial weight” to any potential adverse impact on public safety from its order. The court devoted nearly 10 days of trial to the issue of public safety, and it gave the question extensive attention in its opinion. Ultimately, the court concluded that it would be possible to reduce the prison population “in a manner that preserves public safety and the operation of the criminal justice system.” Juris. App. 247a–248a. The PLRA’s requirement that a court give “substantial weight” to public safety does not require the court to cer tify that its order has no possible adverse impact on the public. A contrary reading would depart from the statute’s text by replacing the word “substantial” with “conclusive.” Whenever a court issues an order requiring the State to adjust its incarceration and criminal justice policy, there is a risk that the order will have some adverse impact on public safety in some sectors. This is particularly true when the order requires release of prisoners before their sentence has been served. Persons incarcerated for even one offense may have committed many other crimes prior to |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | one offense may have committed many other crimes prior to arrest and conviction, and some number can be ex pected to commit further crimes upon release. Yet the PLRA contemplates that courts will retain authority to issue orders necessary to remedy constitutional violations, including authority to issue population limits when neces sary. See at 28–29. A court is required to consider the public safety consequences of its order and to struc ture, and monitor, its ruling in a way that mitigates those consequences while still achieving an effective remedy of the constitutional viola This inquiry necessarily involves difficult predictive judgments regarding the likely effects of court orders. Although these judgments are normally made by state officials, they necessarily must be made by courts when 38 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court those courts fashion injunctive relief to remedy serious constitutional violations in the prisons. These questions are difficult and sensitive, but they are factual questions and should be treated as such. Courts can, and should, rely on relevant and informed expert testimony when making factual findings. It was proper for the three-judge court to rely on the testimony of prison officials from California and other States. Those experts testified on the basis of empirical evidence and extensive experience in the field of prison administra The three-judge court credited substantial evidence that prison populations can be reduced in a manner that does not increase crime to a significant degree. Some evidence indicated that reducing overcrowding in California’s pris ons could even improve public safety. Then-Governor Schwarzenegger, in his emergency proclamation on over crowding, acknowledged that “ ‘overcrowding causes harm to people and property, leads to inmate unrest and mis conduct, and increases recidivism as shown within this state and in others.’ ” Juris. App. 191a–192a. The former warden of San Quentin and acting secretary of the Cali fornia prison system testified that she “ ‘absolutely be lieve[s] that we make people worse, and that we are not meeting public safety by the way we treat people.’ ”10 9a. And the head of Pennsylvania’s correctional system testified that measures to reduce prison population —————— 10 The former head of correctional systems in Washington, Maine, and Pennsylvania, likewise referred to California’s prisons as “ ‘crimino genic.’ ” Juris. App. 191a. The Yolo County chief probation officer testified that “ ‘it seems like [the prisons] produce additional criminal behavior.’ ” at 190a. A former professor of sociology at George Washington University, reported that California’s present recidivism rate is among the highest in the Na App. 1246. And the three judge court noted the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | Na App. 1246. And the three judge court noted the report of California’s Little Hoover Commission, which stated that “ ‘[e]ach year, California communities are burdened with absorbing 123,000 offenders returning from prison, often more dangerous than when they left.’ ” Juris. App. 191a. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 39 Opinion of the Court may “actually improve on public safety because they ad dress the problems that brought people to jail.” Tr. 52– 53. Expert witnesses produced statistical evidence that prison populations had been lowered without adversely affecting public safety in a number of jurisdictions, includ ing certain counties in California, as well as Wisconsin, Illinois, Texas, Colorado, Montana, Michigan, Florida, and Canada. Juris. App. 245a.11 Washington’s former secretary of corrections testified that his State had implemented population reduction methods, including parole reform and expansion of good time credits, without any “deleteri ous effect on crime.” Tr. 2008–2009. In light of this evi dence, the three-judge court concluded that any negative impact on public safety would be “substantially offset, and perhaps entirely eliminated, by the public safety benefits” —————— 11 Philadelphia’s experience in the early 1990’s with a federal court order mandating reductions in the prison population was less positive, and that history illustrates the undoubted need for caution in this area. One congressional witness testified that released prisoners committed 79 murders and multiple other offenses. See Hearing on S. 3 et al. before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 45 (1995) (statement of Lynne Abraham, District Attorney of Philadel phia). Lead counsel for the plaintiff class in that case responded that “[t]his inflammatory assertion has never been documented.” at 212 (statement of David Richman). The Philadelphia decree was different from the order entered in this case. Among other things, it “prohibited the City from admitting to its prisons any additional inmates, except for persons charged with, or convicted of, murder, forcible rape, or a crime involving the use of a gun or knife in the commission of an aggravated assault or robbery.” Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. 382, 384–385 ; see Crime and Justice Research Institute, J. Goldkamp & M. White, Restoring Accountability in Pretrial Release: The Philadelphia Pretrial Release Supervision Experiments 6–8 (1998). The difficulty of determining the precise relevance of Philadelphia’s experience illustrates why appellate courts defer to the trier of fact. The three-judge court had the opportunity to hear testimony on population reduction measures in other jurisdictions and to ask relevant questions of informed expert witnesses. 40 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court of a reduction in overcrowding. Juris. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | Opinion of the Court of a reduction in overcrowding. Juris. App. 248a. The court found that various available methods of re ducing overcrowding would have little or no impact on public safety. Expansion of good-time credits would allow the State to give early release to only those prisoners who pose the least risk of reoffending. Diverting low-risk offenders to community programs such as drug treatment, day reporting centers, and electronic monitoring would likewise lower the prison population without releasing violent convicts.12 The State now sends large numbers of persons to prison for violating a technical term or condi tion of their parole, and it could reduce the prison popula tion by punishing technical parole violations through community-based programs. This last measure would be particularly beneficial as it would reduce crowding in the reception centers, which are especially hard hit by over crowding. See at 23–24. The court’s order took account of public safety concerns by giving the State sub stantial flexibility to select among these and other means of reducing overcrowding. The State submitted a plan to reduce its prison popula tion in accordance with the three-judge court’s order, and it complains that the three-judge court approved that plan without considering whether the specific measures contained within it would substantially threaten public safety. The three-judge court, however, left the choice of how best to comply with its population limit to state —————— 12 Expanding such community-based measures may require an ex penditure of resources by the State to fund new programs or expand existing ones. The State complains that the order therefore requires it to “divert” savings that will be achieved by reducing the prison popula tion and that setting budgetary priorities in this manner is a “severe, unlawful intrusion on the State authority.” Brief for Appellants 55. This argument is not convincing. The order does not require the State to use any particular approach to reduce its prison population or allocate its resources. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 41 Opinion of the Court prison officials. The court was not required to second guess the exercise of that discre Courts should pre sume that state officials are in a better position to gauge how best to preserve public safety and balance competing correctional and law enforcement concerns. The decision to leave details of implementation to the State’s discretion protected public safety by leaving sensitive policy deci sions to responsible and competent state officials. During the pendency of this appeal, the State in fact began to implement measures to reduce the prison popula See Supp. Brief for Appellants 1. These |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | the prison popula See Supp. Brief for Appellants 1. These measures will shift “thousands” of prisoners from the state prisons to the county jails by “mak[ing] certain felonies punishable by imprisonment in county jail” and “requir[ing] that individuals returned to custody for violating their condi tions of parole ‘serve any custody term in county jail.’ ” These developments support the three-judge court’s conclusion that the prison population can be reduced in a manner calculated to avoid an undue negative effect on public safety. III Establishing the population at which the State could begin to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care, and the appropriate time frame within which to achieve the necessary reduction, requires a de gree of judgment. The inquiry involves uncertain predic tions regarding the effects of population reductions, as well as difficult determinations regarding the capacity of prison officials to provide adequate care at various popu lation levels. Courts have substantial flexibility when making these judgments. “ ‘Once invoked, “the scope of a district court’s equitable powers is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” ’ ” n. 9 in turn quoting Swann v. 42 ). Nevertheless, the PLRA requires a court to adopt a remedy that is “narrowly tailored” to the constitutional violation and that gives “substantial weight” to public safety. U.S. C. When a court is imposing a population limit, this means the court must set the limit at the highest population consistent with an efficacious remedy. The court must order the population reduc tion achieved in the shortest period of time reasonably consistent with public safety. A The three-judge court concluded that the population of California’s prisons should be capped at 137.5% of design capacity. This conclusion is supported by the record. Indeed, some evidence supported a limit as low as % of design capacity. The chief deputy secretary of Correc tional Healthcare Services for the California prisons tes tified that California’s prisons “ ‘were not designed and made no provision for any expansion of medical care space beyond the initial % of capacity.’ ” Juris. App. 176a. Other evidence supported a limit as low as 130%. The head of the State’s Facilities Strike Team recommended reducing the population to 130% of design capacity as a long-term goal. at 179a–0a. A former head of cor rectional systems in Washington State, Maine, and Penn sylvania testified that a 130% limit would “ ‘give prison officials and staff the ability to provide the necessary programs and services for California’s prisoners.’ ” at 0a. A former executive director of the Texas prisons testified |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | 0a. A former executive director of the Texas prisons testified that a limit of 130% was “ ‘realistic and appro priate’ ” and would “ ‘ensure that [California’s] prisons are safe and provide legally required services.’ ” And a former acting secretary of the California prisons agreed with a 130% limit with the caveat that a 130% limit might prove inadequate in some older facilities. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 43 Opinion of the Court According to the State, this testimony expressed the witnesses’ policy preferences, rather than their views as to what would cure the constitutional viola Of course, courts must not confuse professional standards with con stitutional requirements. Rhodes v. 452 U.S. 337, 8, n. 13 (1981). But expert opinion may be relevant when determining what is obtainable and what is accept able in corrections philosophy. See at 37–38. Nothing in the record indicates that the experts in this case imposed their own policy views or lost sight of the underlying violations. To the contrary, the witnesses testified that a 130% population limit would allow the State to remedy the constitutionally inadequate provision of medical and mental health care. When expert opinion is addressed to the question of how to remedy the relevant constitutional violations, as it was here, federal judges can give it considerable weight. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has set 130% as a long-term goal for population levels in the federal prison system. Brief for Appellants 43–44. The State suggests the expert witnesses impermissibly adopted this profes sional standard in their testimony. But courts are not required to disregard expert opinion solely because it adopts or accords with professional standards. Profes sional standards may be “helpful and relevant with re spect to some questions.” at 8, n. 13. The witnesses testified that a limit of 130% was necessary to remedy the constitutional violations, not that it should be adopted because it is a BOP standard. If anything, the fact that the BOP views 130% as a manageable population density bolsters the three-judge court’s conclusion that a population limit of 130% would alleviate the pressures associated with overcrowding and allow the State to begin to provide constitutionally adequate care. Although the three-judge court concluded that the “evi dence in support of a 130% limit is strong,” it found that 44 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court some upward adjustment was warranted in light of “the caution and restraint required by the PLRA.” Juris. App. 3a, 4a. The three-judge court noted evidence support ing a higher limit. In particular, the State’s Corrections Independent Review |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | a higher limit. In particular, the State’s Corrections Independent Review Panel had found that 145% was the maximum “operable capacity” of California’s prisons, at 1a–2a, although the relevance of that determina tion was undermined by the fact that the panel had not considered the need to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care, as the State itself con cedes. Brief for Coleman Appellees 45. After considering, but discounting, this evidence, the three-judge court con cluded that the evidence supported a limit lower than 145%, but higher than 130%. It therefore imposed a limit of 137.5%. This weighing of the evidence was not clearly erroneous. The adversary system afforded the court an opportunity to weigh and evaluate evidence presented by the parties. The plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing was intended to justify a limit of 130%, and the State made no attempt to show that any other number would allow for a remedy. There are no scientific tools available to determine the precise population reduction necessary to remedy a consti tutional violation of this sort. The three-judge court made the most precise determination it could in light of the record before it. The PLRA’s narrow tailoring require ment is satisfied so long as these equitable, remedial judgments are made with the objective of releasing the fewest possible prisoners consistent with an efficacious remedy. In light of substantial evidence supporting an even more drastic remedy, the three-judge court complied with the requirement of the PLRA in this case. B The three-judge court ordered the State to achieve this reduction within two years. At trial and closing argument Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 45 Opinion of the Court before the three-judge court, the State did not argue that reductions should occur over a longer period of time. The State later submitted a plan for court approval that would achieve the required reduction within five years, and that would reduce the prison population to 1% of design capacity in two years. The State represented that this plan would “safely reach a population level of 137.5% over time.” App. to Juris. Statement 32a. The three-judge court rejected this plan because it did not comply with the deadline set by its order. The State first had notice that it would be required to reduce its prison population in February 2009, when the three-judge court gave notice of its tentative ruling after trial. The 2-year deadline, however, will not begin to run until this Court issues its judgment. When that happens, the State will have already had over two years to begin complying with the order of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | over two years to begin complying with the order of the three-judge court. The State has used the time productively. At oral argument, the State indicated it had reduced its prison population by approximately 9,000 persons since the decision of the three-judge court. After oral argument, the State filed a supplemental brief indicating that it had begun to imple ment measures to shift “thousands” of additional prisoners to county facilities. Supp. Brief for Appellants at 1. Particularly in light of the State’s failure to contest the issue at trial, the three-judge court did not err when it established a 2-year deadline for relief. Plaintiffs pro posed a 2-year deadline, and the evidence at trial was intended to demonstrate the feasibility of a 2-year dead line. See Tr. 2979. Notably, the State has not asked this Court to extend the 2-year deadline at this time. The three-judge court, however, retains the authority, and the responsibility, to make further amendments to the existing order or any modified decree it may enter as warranted by the exercise of its sound discre “The power of a court of equity to modify a decree of injunctive 46 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.” New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (CA2 1983) (Friendly, J.). A court that invokes equity’s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order. at 969–971. Experience may teach the necessity for modification or amendment of an earlier decree. To that end, the three judge court must remain open to a showing or demonstra tion by either party that the injunction should be altered to ensure that the rights and interests of the parties are given all due and necessary protec Proper respect for the State and for its governmental processes require that the three-judge court exercise its jurisdiction to accord the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make plans to correct the violations in a prompt and effective way consistent with public safety. In order to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety,” U.S. C. the three-judge court must give due deference to informed opinions as to what public safety requires, including the considered determinations of state officials regarding the time in which a reduction in the prison population can be achieved consistent with public safety. An extension of time may allow the State to consider changing political, economic, and other |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | allow the State to consider changing political, economic, and other circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities for more effective remedies that arise as the Special Master, the Receiver, the prison system, and the three-judge court itself evaluate the progress being made to correct unconstitutional conditions. At the same time, both the three-judge court and state officials must bear in mind the need for a timely and efficacious remedy for the ongoing violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights. The State may wish to move for modification of the three-judge court’s order to extend the deadline for the Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 47 Opinion of the Court required reduction to five years from the entry of the judgment of this Court, the deadline proposed in the State’s first population reduction plan. The three-judge court may grant such a request provided that the State satisfies necessary and appropriate preconditions designed to ensure that measures are taken to implement the plan without undue delay. Appropriate preconditions may include a requirement that the State demonstrate that it has the authority and the resources necessary to achieve the required reduction within a 5-year period and to meet reasonable interim directives for population reduc The three-judge court may condition an extension of time on the State’s ability to meet interim benchmarks for improvement in provision of medical and mental health care. The three-judge court, in its discretion, may con sider whether it is appropriate to order the State to begin without delay to develop a system to identify prisoners who are unlikely to reoffend or who might otherwise be candidates for early release. Even with an extension of time to construct new facilities and implement other reforms, it may become necessary to release prisoners to comply with the court’s order. To do so safely, the State should devise systems to select those prisoners least likely to jeopardize public safety. An extension of time may provide the State a greater opportunity to refine and elab orate those systems. The State has already made significant progress toward reducing its prison population, including reforms that will result in shifting “thousands” of prisoners to county jails. See Supp. Brief for Appellants at 1. As the State makes further progress, the three-judge court should evaluate whether its order remains appropriate. If significant progress is made toward remedying the underlying consti tutional violations, that progress may demonstrate that further population reductions are not necessary or are less 48 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court urgent than previously believed. Were the State to make this showing, the three-judge court in the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | State to make this showing, the three-judge court in the exercise of its discretion could consider whether it is appropriate to ex tend or modify this timeline. Experience with the three-judge court’s order may lead the State to suggest other modifications. The three judge court should give any such requests serious consid era The three-judge court should formulate its orders to allow the State and its officials the authority necessary to address contingencies that may arise during the remedial process. These observations reflect the fact that the three-judge court’s order, like all continuing equitable decrees, must remain open to appropriate modifica They are not intended to cast doubt on the validity of the basic premise of the existing order. The medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment. This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding. The relief ordered by the three-judge court is required by the Constitution and was authorized by Congress in the PLRA. The State shall implement the order without further delay. The judgment of the three-judge court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 49 Opinion of the Court APPENDIXES A U.S. C. “(a) REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIEF. “(1) PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.—(A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. “(3) PRISONER RELEASE ORDER.—(A) In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, no court shall enter a prisoner release order unless— “(i) a court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner release order; and “(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders. “(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court in accordance with section |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | entered only by a three-judge court in accordance with section 2284 of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E) have been met. “(C) A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal court shall file with any request for such relief, a request 50 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to demon strate that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have been met. “(D) If the requirements under subparagraph (A) have been met, a Federal judge before whom a civil action with respect to prison conditions is pending who believes that a prison release order should be considered may sua sponte request the convening of a three-judge court to determine whether a prisoner release order should be entered. “(E) The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evi dence that— “(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and “(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Fed eral right. “(F) Any State or local official including a legislator or unit of government whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of prison facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not ad mitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order shall have standing to oppose the imposition or continua tion in effect of such relief and to seek termination of such relief, and shall have the right to intervene in any pro ceeding relating to such relief. (g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section “(4) the term “prisoner release order” includes any order, including a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the re lease from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison” Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 51 Opinion of the Court B Mule Creek State Prison Aug. 1, 2008 California Institution for Men Aug. 7, 2006 52 BROWN v. PLATA Opinion of the Court C Salinas Valley State Prison July 29, 2008 Correctional Treatment Center (dry cages/holding cells for people wait ing for mental health crisis bed) Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 1 SCALIA, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09–1 EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF CAL- IFORNIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MARCIANO PLATA ET AL. |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118223/dooley-v-korean-air-lines-co/ | In a case of death on the high seas, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S. C. App. 76 et seq., allows certain relatives of the decedent to sue for their pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. This case presents the question whether those relatives may nevertheless recover such damages through a survival action under general maritime law. We hold that they may not. I On September 983, Korean Air Lines Flight KE007, en route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea, strayed into the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down over the Sea of Japan. All 269 people on board were killed. Petitioners, the personal representatives of three of the passengers, brought lawsuits against respondent Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. (KAL), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. These cases were consolidated in that court, along with the other federal actions arising out of the crash. After trial, a jury found that KAL had committed "willful misconduct," thus removing the Warsaw Convention's $75,000 cap on damages, and in a subsequent verdict awarded $50 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the finding of willful misconduct, but vacated the punitive damages award on the ground that the Warsaw Convention does not permit the recovery of punitive damages. In re Korean Air Lines of Sept. 983, The Judicial Panel on Multi district Litigation thereafter remanded, for damages trials, all of the individual cases to the District Courts in which they had been filed. In petitioners' cases, KAL moved for a pretrial determination that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA or Act), 46 U.S. C. *9 App. 76 et seq., provides the exclusive source of recoverable damages. DOHSA provides, in relevant part: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative" 76. "The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought" 762. KAL argued that, in a case of death on the high seas, DOHSA |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118223/dooley-v-korean-air-lines-co/ | in a case of death on the high seas, DOHSA provides the exclusive cause of action and does not permit damages for loss of society, survivors' grief, and decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. The District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed, holding that because petitioners' claims were brought pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, DOHSA could not limit the recoverable damages. The court determined that Article 7 of the Warsaw Convention "allows for the recovery of all `damages sustained,' " meaning any "actual harm" that any party "experienced" as a result of the crash. App. 59. While petitioners' cases were awaiting damages trials, we reached a different conclusion in another case arising out of the downing of Flight KE007. In Zicherman, we held that the Warsaw Convention "permit[s] compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leave[s] the specification of what harm is legally cognizable to the domestic law applicable under the forum's choice-of-law rules," and that where "an *20 airplane crash occurs on the high seas, DOHSA supplies the substantive United States law." Accordingly, the petitioners could not recover damages for loss of society: "[W]here DOHSA applies, neither state law, see Offshore Logistics, nor general maritime law, see Mobil Oil can provide a basis for recovery of loss-of-society damages." We did not decide, however, whether the petitioners in Zicherman could recover for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering, as KAL had not raised this issue in its petition for certiorari. See n. 4. After the Zicherman decision, KAL again moved to dismiss all of petitioners' claims for nonpecuniary damages. The District Court granted this motion, holding that United States law (not South Korean law) governed these cases; that DOHSA provides the applicable United States law; and that DOHSA does not permit the recovery of nonpecuniary damagesincluding petitioners' claims for their decedents' predeath pain and suffering. In re Korean Air Lines of Sept. 983, On appeal, petitioners argued that, although DOHSA does not itself permit recovery for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, general maritime law provides a survival action that allows a decedent's estate to recover for injuries (including pre-death pain and suffering) suffered by the decedent. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed. In re Korean Air Lines of Sept. 983, Assuming, arguendo, that there is a survival cause of action under general maritime law, the court held that such an action is unavailable when the death is on the high seas: "For deaths on the high seas, Congress decided who may sue and for what. Judge-made general maritime law may not override such congressional judgments, however |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118223/dooley-v-korean-air-lines-co/ | general maritime law may not override such congressional judgments, however ancient those judgments may happen to be. Congress *2 made the law and it is up to Congress to change it." We granted certiorari, to resolve a Circuit split concerning the availability of a general maritime survival action in cases of death on the high seas. Compare, e. g., In re Korean Air Lines 7 F. 3d, with II Before Congress enacted DOHSA in 920, the general law of admiralty permitted a person injured by tortious conduct to sue for damages, but did not permit an action to be brought when the person was killed by that conduct. See generally R. Hughes, Handbook of Admiralty Law 222-223 (2d ed. 920). This rule stemmed from the theory that a right of action was personal to the victim and thus expired when the victim died. Accordingly, in the absence of an Act of Congress or state statute providing a right of action, a suit in admiralty could not be maintained in the courts of the United States to recover damages for a person's death. See The Harrisburg, ; The Alaska,[] Congress passed such a statute, and thus authorized recovery for deaths on the high seas, with its enactment of DOHSA. DOHSA provides a cause of action for "the death of a person caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas," 76; this action must be brought by the decedent's personal representative "for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, *22 child, or dependent relative," The Act limits recovery in such a suit to "a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is sought." 762. DOHSA also includes a limited survival provision: In situations in which a person injured on the high seas sues for his injuries and then dies prior to completion of the suit, "the personal representative of the decedent may be substituted as a party and the suit may proceed as a suit under this chapter for the recovery of the compensation provided in section 762." 765. Other sections establish a limitations period, 763a, govern actions under foreign law, 764, bar contributory negligence as a complete defense, 766, exempt the Great Lakes, navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone, and state territorial waters from the Act's coverage, 767, and preserve certain state-law remedies and state-court jurisdiction, DOHSA does not authorize recovery for the decedent's own losses, nor does it allow damages for nonpecuniary losses. In Mobil Oil we considered whether, in a case of |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118223/dooley-v-korean-air-lines-co/ | In Mobil Oil we considered whether, in a case of death on the high seas, a decedent's survivors could recover damages under general maritime law for their loss of society. We held that they could not, and thus limited to territorial waters those cases in which we had permitted loss of society damages under general maritime law. ; see n. For deaths on the high seas, DOHSA "announces Congress' considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and damages." We thus noted that while we could "fil[l] a gap left by Congress' silence," we were not free to "rewrit[e] rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." Because "Congress ha[d] struck the balance for us" in DOHSA by limiting the available recovery to pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives, we had "no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress," Hig- *23 ginbotham, however, involved only the scope of the remedies available in a wrongful-death action, and thus did not address the availability of other causes of action. Conceding that DOHSA does not authorize recovery for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, petitioners seek to recover such damages through a general maritime survival action. Petitioners argue that general maritime law recognizes a survival action, which permits a decedent's estate to recover damages that the decedent would have been able to recover but for his death, including pre-death pain and suffering. And, they contend, because DOHSA is a wrongful-death statutegiving surviving relatives a cause of action for losses they suffered as a result of the decedent's deathit has no bearing on the availability of a survival action. We disagree. DOHSA expresses Congress' judgment that there should be no such cause of action in cases of death on the high seas. By authorizing only certain surviving relatives to recover damages, and by limiting damages to the pecuniary losses sustained by those relatives, Congress provided the exclusive recovery for deaths that occur on the high seas. Petitioners concede that their proposed survival action would necessarily expand the class of beneficiaries in cases of death on the high seas by permitting decedents' estates (and their various beneficiaries) to recover compensation. They further concede that their cause of action would expand the recoverable damages for deaths on the high seas by permitting the recovery of nonpecuniary losses, such as pre-death pain and suffering. Because Congress has already decided these issues, it has precluded the judiciary from enlarging either the class of beneficiaries or the recoverable damages. As we noted in "Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to |
Justice Thomas | 1,998 | 1 | majority | Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118223/dooley-v-korean-air-lines-co/ | we noted in "Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to encourage the creation of nonpecuniary supplements." *24 The comprehensive scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, see at 22, which limits the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress' "considered judgment," Mobil Oil on the availability and contours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions; rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision. Indeed, Congress did so in the same year that it incorporated into the Jones Act, which permits seamen injured in the course of their employment to recover damages for their injuries, a survival action similar to the one petitioners seek here. See Act of June 5, 920, 33, 4 Stat. 007 (incorporating survival action of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S. C. 59). Even in the exercise of our admiralty jurisdiction, we will not upset the balance struck by Congress by authorizing a cause of action with which Congress was certainly familiar but nonetheless declined to adopt. In sum, Congress has spoken on the availability of a survival action, the losses to be recovered, and the beneficiaries, in cases of death on the high seas. Because Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages.[2] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | Reeves, Inc. v. Stake | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110308/reeves-inc-v-stake/ | The South Dakota Cement Commission has ordered that in times of shortage the state cement plant must turn away out-of-state customers until all orders from South Dakotans are filled. This policy represents precisely the kind of economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent.[1] The Court, however, finds no violation of the Commerce Clause, solely because the State produces the cement. I agree with the Court that the State of South Dakota may provide cement for its public needs without violating the Commerce Clause. But I cannot agree that South Dakota may withhold its cement from interstate commerce in order to benefit private citizens and business within the State. I The need to ensure unrestricted trade among the States created a major impetus for the drafting of the Constitution. "The power over commerce was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government." Indeed, the Constitutional Convention was called after an earlier convention on trade and commercial problems proved inconclusive. C. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the *448 Constitution 61-63 (1935); S. Bloom, History of the Formation of the Union Under the Constitution 14-15 In the subsequent debate over ratification, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the importance of unrestricted interstate commerce: "An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each, by an interchange of their respective productions. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple of one fails it can call to its aid the staple of another." The Federalist, No. 11, p. 71 (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (A. Hamilton); see No. 42, p. 283 (J. Madison). The Commerce Clause has proved an effective weapon against protectionism. The Court has used it to strike down limitations on access to local goods, be they animal, ; vegetable, ; or mineral, Only this Term, the Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute designed to exclude out-of-state investment advisers. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., ante, p. 27. As we observed in "this Nation is a common market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand." This case presents a novel constitutional question. The Commerce Clause would bar legislation imposing on private parties the type of restraint on commerce adopted by South Dakota. See cf. Great A&P Tea ; Foster-Fountain Packing[2] Conversely, *449 a private business constitutionally could adopt a marketing policy that excluded customers who come from another State. This case falls |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | Reeves, Inc. v. Stake | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110308/reeves-inc-v-stake/ | excluded customers who come from another State. This case falls between those polar situations. The State, through its Commission, engages in a commercial enterprise and restricts its own interstate distribution. The question is whether the Commission's policy should be treated like state regulation of private parties or like the marketing policy of a private business. The application of the Commerce Clause to this case should turn on the nature of the governmental activity involved. If a public enterprise undertakes an "integral operatio[n] in areas of traditional governmental functions," National League of the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant. If, however, the State enters *450 the private market and operates a commercial enterprise for the advantage of its private citizens, it may not evade the constitutional policy against economic Balkanization. This distinction derives from the power of governments to supply their own needs, see ; (3), and from the purpose of the Commerce Clause itself, which is designed to protect "the natural functioning of the interstate market," In procuring goods and services for the operation of government, a State may act without regard to the private marketplace and remove itself from the reach of the Commerce Clause. See American Yearbook (MD Fla.), summarily aff'd, But when a State itself becomes a participant in the private market for other purposes, the Constitution forbids actions that would impede the flow of interstate commerce. These categories recognize no more than the "constitutional line between the State as government and the State as trader." New ; see United ; ; South (5). The Court holds that South Dakota, like a private business, should not be governed by the Commerce Clause when it enters the private market. But precisely because South Dakota is a State, it cannot be presumed to behave like an enterprise " `engaged in an entirely private business.'" See ante, at 439, quoting United A State frequently will respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic concerns. To use the Court's terms, a State may attempt to act as a "market regulator" rather than a "market participant." See ante, at 436. In that situation, it is a pretense to equate the State with a private economic actor. State action burdening interstate trade is no less state action because it is *451 accomplished by a public agency authorized to participate in the private market. II The threshold issue is whether South Dakota has undertaken integral government operations in an area of traditional governmental functions, or whether it has participated in the marketplace as a private firm. If the latter characterization |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | Reeves, Inc. v. Stake | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110308/reeves-inc-v-stake/ | the marketplace as a private firm. If the latter characterization applies, we also must determine whether the State Commission's marketing policy burdens the flow of interstate trade. This analysis highlights the differences between the state action here and that before the Court in A In Alexandria a scrap processor challenged a Maryland program to pay bounties for every junk car registered in Maryland that was converted into scrap. The program imposed more onerous documentation standards on non-Maryland processors, thereby diverting Maryland "hulks" to in-state processors. The plaintiff argued that this diversion burdened interstate commerce. As the Court today notes, Alexandria determined that Maryland's bounty program constituted direct state participation in the market for automobile hulks. Ante, at 435. But the critical questionthe second step in the opinion's analysiswas whether the bounty program constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Recognizing that the case did not fit neatly into conventional Commerce Clause theory, we found no burden on commerce. The Court first observed: "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price. There has been an impact upon the interstate flow of hulks only because Maryland effectively *452 has made it more lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to dispose of their hulks in Maryland" We further stated "that the novelty of this case is not its presentation of a new form of 'burden' upon commerce, but that appellee should characterize Maryland's action as a burden which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect." The opinion then emphasized that "no trade barrier of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and involved in previous cases, impedes th[e] movement [of hulks] out of State." Rather, the hulks "remain within Maryland in response to market forces, including that exerted by money from the State." The Court concluded that the subsidies provided under the Maryland program erected no barriers to trade. Consequently, the Commerce Clause did not forbid the Maryland program. B Unlike the market subsidies at issue in Alexandria the marketing policy of the South Dakota Cement Commission has cut off interstate trade.[3] The State can raise such a bar when it enters the market to supply its own needs. In order to ensure an adequate supply of cement for public uses, the State can withhold from interstate commerce the cement needed for public projects. Cf. National League of The State, however, has no parallel justification for favoring private, in-state customers over out-of-state customers.[4]*453 In response to political concerns that |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | Reeves, Inc. v. Stake | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110308/reeves-inc-v-stake/ | customers over out-of-state customers.[4]*453 In response to political concerns that likely would be inconsequential to a private cement producer, South Dakota has shut off its cement sales to customers beyond its borders. That discrimination constitutes a direct barrier to trade "of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and involved in previous cases." Alexandria 426 U. S., The effect on interstate trade is the same as if the state legislature had imposed the policy on private cement producers. The Commerce Clause prohibits this severe restraint on commerce. III I share the Court's desire to preserve state sovereignty. But the Commerce Clause long has been recognized as a limitation on that sovereignty, consciously designed to maintain a national market and defeat economic provincialism. The Court today approves protectionist state policies. In the absence of contrary congressional action,[5] those policies now can be implemented as long as the State itself directly participates in the market.[6] By enforcing the Commerce Clause in this case, the Court would work no unfairness on the people of South Dakota. They still could reserve cement for public projects and share in whatever return the plant generated. They could not, however, *454 use the power of the State to furnish themselves with cement forbidden to the people of neighboring States. The creation of a free national economy was a major goal of the States when they resolved to unite under the Federal Constitution. The decision today cannot be reconciled with that purpose. |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | The District Court the Court of Appeals approved certification of a class of more than 2 million current former Comcast subscribers who seek damages for al- leged violations of the federal antitrust laws. We consider whether certification was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). I Comcast Corporation its subsidiaries, petitioners here, provide cable-television services to residential commercial customers. From 1998 to 2007, petitioners engaged in a series of transactions that the parties have described as “clustering,” a strategy of concentrating op- erations within a particular region. The region at issue here, which the parties have referred to as the Philadel- phia “cluster” or the Philadelphia “Designated Market Area” (DMA), includes 16 counties located in Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey.1 Petitioners pursued their —————— 1 A “Designated Market Area” is a term used by Nielsen Media Re search to define a broadcast-television market. Strictly speaking, the 2 COMCAST CORP. v. BEHREND Opinion of the Court clustering strategy by acquiring competitor cable provid ers in the region swapping their own systems outside the region for competitor systems located in the region. For instance, in 2001, petitioners obtained Adelphia Com- munications’ cable systems in the Philadelphia DMA, along with its 464,000 subscribers; in exchange, petition ers sold to Adelphia their systems in Palm Beach, Florida, Los Angeles, California. As a result of nine cluster- ing transactions, petitioners’ share of subscribers in the re- gion allegedly increased from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007. See 264 F. R. D. 150, 156, n. 8, 160 (ED Pa. 2010). The named plaintiffs, respondents here, are subscribers to Comcast’s cable-television services. They filed a class action antitrust suit against petitioners, claiming that petitioners entered into unlawful swap agreements, in violation of of the Sherman Act, monopolized or at- tempted to monopolize services in the cluster, in viola tion of Ch. 647, as amended, 15 U.S. C. §, 2. Petitioners’ clustering scheme, respondents con tended, harmed subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster by eliminating competition holding prices for cable ser vices above competitive levels. Respondents sought to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). That provision permits certification only if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The District Court held, it is uncontested here, that to meet the predominance requirement respondents had to show (1) that the existence of individual injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation (referred to as “anti trust impact”) was “capable of proof at trial through evidence that [was] common to the |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | proof at trial through evidence that [was] common to the class rather than indi —————— Philadelphia DMA comprises 18 counties, not 16. Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court vidual to its members”; (2) that the damages resulting from that injury were measurable “on a class-wide basis” through use of a “common methodology.” 264 F. R. D., at 154.2 Respondents proposed four theories of antitrust impact: First, Comcast’s clustering made it profitable for Comcast to withhold local sports programming from its competi tors, resulting in decreased market penetration by direct broadcast satellite providers. Second, Comcast’s activities reduced the level of competition from “overbuilders,” com panies that build competing cable networks in areas where an incumbent cable company already operates. Third, Comcast reduced the level of “benchmark” competi tion on which cable customers rely to compare prices. Fourth, clustering increased Comcast’s bargaining power relative to content providers. Each of these forms of im pact, respondents alleged, increased cable subscription rates throughout the Philadelphia DMA. The District Court accepted the overbuilder theory of antitrust impact as capable of classwide proof rejected the rest. Accordingly, in its certification order, the District Court limited respondents’ “proof of antitrust impact” to “the theory that Comcast engaged in anticompetitive clustering conduct, the effect of which was to deter the entry of overbuilders in the Phila delphia DMA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 192a–193a.3 —————— 2 Respondents sought certification for the following class: “All cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any times since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidi aries or affiliates in Comcast’s Philadelphia cluster.” App. 35a. 3 The District Court did not hold that the three alternative theories of liability failed to establish antitrust impact, but merely that those theories could not be determined in a manner common to all the class plaintiffs. The other theories of liability may well be available for the plaintiffs to pursue as individual actions. Any contention that the plaintiffs should be allowed to recover damages attributable to all four 4 COMCAST CORP. v. BEHREND Opinion of the Court The District Court further found that the damages resulting from overbuilder-deterrence impact could be calculated on a classwide basis. To establish such dam- ages, respondents had relied solely on the testimony of Dr. James McClave. Dr. McClave designed a regression model comparing actual cable prices in the Philadelphia DMA with hypothetical prices that would have prevailed but for petitioners’ allegedly anticompetitive activities. The model calculated damages of |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | for petitioners’ allegedly anticompetitive activities. The model calculated damages of $875,576,662 for the entire class. App. 1388a (sealed). As Dr. McClave acknowledged, however, the model did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact. at 189a– 190a. The District Court nevertheless certified the class. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, petitioners contended the class was improperly certified because the model, among other shortcomings, failed to attribute damages resulting from overbuilder deterrence, the only theory of injury remaining in the case. The court refused to consider the argument because, in its view, such an “attac[k] on the merits of the methodology [had] no place in the class certification inquiry.” 655 F.3d 182, 207 (CA3 2011). The court emphasized that, “[a]t the class certification stage,” respondents were not required to “tie each theory of antitrust impact to an exact calcula tion of ” According to the court, it had “not reached the stage of determining on the merits whether the methodology is a just reasonable infer ence or speculative.” Rather, the court said, re spondents must “assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages are capable of measure ment will not require labyrinthine individual calcula —————— theories in this class action would erroneously suggest one of two things—either that the plaintiffs may also recover such damages in individual actions or that they are precluded from asserting those theories in individual actions. Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court tions.” In the court’s view, that burden was met because respondents’ model calculated “supra-competitive prices regardless of the type of anticompetitive conduct.” We granted certiorari. 567 U. S. (2012).4 II The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by on behalf of the individual named parties only.” 700–701 (1979). To come within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class action “must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance” with Rule 23. Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. (2011) (slip op., at 10). The Rule “does not set forth a mere pleading st ard.” Rather, a party must not only “be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact,” typicality of claims or defenses, adequacy of representation, as required by Rule 23(a). The party must also satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule —————— 4 The question presented reads: “Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class had intro duced admissible evidence, including |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | whether the plaintiff class had intro duced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” 567 U. S., at Respondents contend that petitioners forfeited their ability to answer this question in the negative because they did not make an objection to the admission of Dr. McClave’s testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Such a forfeit would make it impossible for petitioners to argue that Dr. McClave’s testimony was not “admissible evidence” under the Rules; but it does not make it impossible for them to argue that the evidence failed “to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” Peti tioners argued below, continue to argue here, that certification was improper because respondents had failed to establish that damages could be measured on a classwide basis. That is the question we address here. 6 COMCAST CORP. v. BEHREND Opinion of the Court 23(b). The provision at issue here is Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a court to find that “the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Repeatedly, we have emphasized that it “ ‘may be neces sary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,’ that certification is proper only if ‘the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.’ ” (quoting General Tele- phone Co. of 160–161 (1982)). Such an analysis will frequently entail “overlap with the merits of the plaintiff ’s underlying claim.” 564 U. S., at (slip op., at 10). That is so because the “ ‘class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual legal issues comprising the plaintiff ’s cause of action.’ ” (quoting at 160). The same analytical principles govern Rule 23(b). If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more deming than Rule 23(a). Products, Inc. v. Windsor, Rule 23(b)(3), as an “ ‘adventuresome innovation,’ ” is designed for situa tions “ ‘in which “class-action treatment is not as clearly called for.” ’ ” at (slip op., at 22) (quoting –615). That explains Congress’s addition of procedural safeguards for (b)(3) class members beyond those provided for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members (e.g., an opportunity to opt out), the court’s duty to take a “ ‘close look’ ” at whether common questions predominate over individual ones. III Respondents’ class action was improperly certified un der Rule 23(b)(3). By refusing to entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | refusing to entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on the Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court propriety of class certification, simply because those ar guments would also be pertinent to the merits determina tion, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry. And it is clear that, under the proper stard for evaluating certification, respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class. This case thus turns on the straightforward application of class-certification prin ciples; it provides no occasion for the dissent’s extended discussion, post, at 5–11 (GINSBURG BREYER, JJ., dissenting), of substantive antitrust law. A We start with an unremarkable premise. If respondents prevail on their claims, they would be entitled only to damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition, since that is the only theory of antitrust impact accepted for class-action treatment by the District Court. It follows that a model purporting to serve as evidence of damages in this class action must measure only those damages at tributable to that theory. If the model does not even at tempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish that damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3). Calculations need not be exact, see Story Parchment but at the class-certification stage (as at trial), any model supporting a “plaintiff ’s damages case must be consistent with its liability case, particularly with respect to the alleged anticompetitive effect of the violation.” ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal Economic Issues 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010); see, e.g., Image Tech. Servs. v. East- 8 COMCAST And for purposes of Rule 23, courts must conduct a “ ‘rigorous analysis’ ” to determine whether that is so. at (slip op., at 10). The District Court the Court of Appeals saw no need for respondents to “tie each theory of antitrust im pact” to a calculation of 655 F. 3d, That, they said, would involve consideration of the “merits” having “no place in the class certification inquiry.” –207. That reasoning flatly contradicts our cases requiring a determination that Rule 23 is satisfied, even when that requires inquiry into the merits of the claim. at n. 6 (slip op., at 10–11, n. 6). The Court of Appeals simply concluded that re spondents “provided a method to measure quantify damages on a classwide basis,” finding it unnecessary |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | measure quantify damages on a classwide basis,” finding it unnecessary to decide “whether the methodology [was] a just reason able inference or speculative.” 655 F. 3d, Under that logic, at the class-certification stage any method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be. Such a proposition would reduce Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nullity. B There is no question that the model failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability in this action is premised.5 —————— 5 The dissent is of the view that what an econometric model proves is a “question of fact” on which we will not “undertake to review concur rent findings by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious exceptional showing of error.” Post, at 9 (inter nal quotation marks omitted)). To begin with, neither of the courts below found that the model established damages attributable to over building alone. Second, while the data contained within an econometric model may well be “questions of fact” in the relevant sense, what those Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court The scheme devised by respondents’ expert, Dr. McClave, sought to establish a “but for” baseline—a figure that would show what the competitive prices would have been if there had been no antitrust violations. Damages would then be determined by comparing to that baseline what the actual prices were during the charged period. The “but for” figure was calculated, however, by assuming a market that contained none of the four distortions that respondents attributed to petitioners’ actions. In other words, the model assumed the validity of all four theories of antitrust impact initially advanced by respondents: decreased penetration by satellite providers, overbuilder deterrence, lack of benchmark competition, increased bargaining power. At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. McClave expressly admitted that the model calculated damages resulting from “the alleged anticompetitive conduct as a whole” did not attribute damages to any one particular theory of anticompetitive impact. App. 189a–190a, 208a. This methodology might have been sound, might have produced commonality of damages, if all four of those alleged distortions remained in the case. But as Judge Jordan’s partial dissent pointed out: “[B]ecause the only surviving theory of antitrust im pact is that clustering reduced overbuilding, for Dr. McClave’s comparison to be relevant, his benchmark counties must reflect the conditions that would have prevailed in the Philadelphia DMA but for the alleged reduction in overbuilding. In all respects unrelated to reduced overbuilding, the benchmark counties should —————— |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Comcast Corp. v. Behrend | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/856346/comcast-corp-v-behrend/ | respects unrelated to reduced overbuilding, the benchmark counties should —————— data prove is no more a question of fact than what our opinions hold. And finally, even if it were a question of fact, concluding that the model here established damages attributable to overbuilding alone would be “obvious[ly] exceptional[ly]” erroneous. 10 COMCAST CORP. v. BEHREND Opinion of the Court reflect the actual conditions in the Philadelphia DMA, or else the model will identify ‘damages’ that are not the result of reduced overbuilding, or, in other words, that are not the certain result of the wrong.” 655 F. 3d, at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority’s only response to this was that “[a]t the class certification stage we do not require that Plaintiffs tie each theory of antitrust impact to an exact calculation of damages, but instead that they assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages are capable of measurement will not require labyrinthine individual calculations.” But such assurance is not provided by a methodology that identifies damages that are not the result of the wrong. For all we know, cable subscribers in Gloucester County may have been overcharged because of petitioners’ alleged elimination of satellite competition (a theory of liability that is not ca- pable of classwide proof ); while subscribers in Camden County may have paid elevated prices because of petitioners’ increased bargaining power vis-à-vis content providers (another theory that is not capable of classwide proof ); while yet other subscribers in Montgomery County may have paid rates produced by the combined effects of multi ple forms of alleged antitrust harm; so on. The per mutations involving four theories of liability 2 million subscribers located in 16 counties are nearly endless. In light of the model’s inability to bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general competitive prices attributable to the deterrence of over building, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscrib ers within the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class.6 Prices whose level above what an expert deems —————— 6 We might add that even if the model had identified subscribers who paid more solely because of the deterrence of overbuilding, it still would not have established the requisite commonality of damages unless it Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court “competitive” has been caused by factors unrelated to an accepted theory of antitrust harm are not “anticompeti tive” in any sense relevant here. “The first step in a dam ages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | Regulation 25 of the Mississippi State Tax Commission requires out-of-state liquor distillers and suppliers to collect from military installations within Mississippi, and remit to the Commission, a tax in the form of a wholesale markup of 17% to 20% on liquor sold to the installations.[1] The United States has four military installations *601 in the State. Exclusive federal jurisdiction is exercised over two of the installations, Keesler Air Force Base and the Naval Construction Battalion Center.[2] The United States and Mississippi exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the other two installations, Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian Naval Air Station. The issue presented on this appeal is whether Regulation 25 imposes an unconstitutional state tax upon these federal instrumentalities. I The controversy between the United States and the Tax Commission over Regulation 25 is here for the second *602 time. Shortly after adoption of the Regulation, the United States asserted before the Commission that the markup was unconstitutional as a tax upon federal instrumentalities, and proposed an escrow account for the amount of the tax pending a judicial determination of its legality. The Commission refused and advised out-of-state distillers by letter that the markup "must be invoiced to the Military and collected directly from the Military" or the distillers would face criminal prosecution and delistment of their authority to sell liquor in Mississippi. The United States thereupon paid the markup under protest and brought this action in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Regulation 25 imposed an unconstitutional tax on federal instrumentalities, an injunction against its enforcement, and a refund of the sums paid under protest.[3] The Tax Commission moved for summary judgment. A three-judge District Court granted the Commission's motion. The District Court concluded that despite Art. I, 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution,[4] the Twenty-first Amendment permitted the Tax Commission to apply the markup to out-of-state purchases destined for nonappropriated fund activities on the two installations, Keesler and the Naval Construction Battalion Center, over which the United States exercises *603 exclusive jurisdiction, and that therefore, a fortiori, the liquor sales made on the two bases over which the United States and Mississippi exercise concurrent jurisdiction, Meridian and Columbus, are similarly subject to the Mississippi tax. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We held that the court erred in ruling that the Twenty-first Amendment empowered the Tax Commission to apply the markup to transactions between out-of-state distillers and nonappropriated fund activities on the two exclusively federal enclaves, and held that this conclusion also eliminated the essential premise of the District |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | this conclusion also eliminated the essential premise of the District Court's decision concerning the two concurrent jurisdiction bases. There were, however, other issues addressed to Regulation 25 that had not been reached by the District Court. We therefore remanded the case for that court's initial consideration and determination of the issues. In respect to the two exclusively federal enclaves, the Tax Commission argued that the markup might properly be viewed as a sales tax, and that the United States had consented to the imposition of such a "tax" under the Buck Act of 1940, now 4 U.S. C. 105-110. Section 105 (a) provides that no person may be relieved of any sales or use tax levied by a State on the ground that the sale or use occurred in whole or part within a federal area. But 107 (a) provides that 105 (a) "shall not be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from the United States or any instrumentality thereof" We directed that, upon remand, the District Court address and determine the questions whether the markup should be treated as a tax on sales occurring within a federal area within the meaning of 105 (a), and, if so, whether the exception contained in 107 (a) nevertheless preserves the federal immunity with respect to transactions with nonappropriated fund activities on the two exclusively federal -379. *604 The Buck Act questions are irrelevant to the markup as applied to the two concurrent jurisdiction bases, and, therefore, the United States argued that the markup is a tax upon instrumentalities of the United States that is unconstitutional under We directed that the District Court also address and decide the instrumentality argument on -381.[5] II On the remand the District Court held, as to the exclusively federal enclaves, that the markup constituted a "sales or use tax" within the meaning of 105 (a) of the Buck Act, and that the exception in 107 (a) for taxes upon federal instrumentalities was inapplicable because Regulation 25 imposes the legal incidence of the tax upon the distillers, and not upon any federal instrumentality, For the same reason, the District Court held that the tax upon the sales to the two concurrent jurisdiction bases was not an unconstitutional tax upon instrumentalities of the United States. We again noted probable jurisdiction, We reverse. III The exception in 107 (a) is plainly a congressional preservation of federal immunity from any state tax that *605 would violate the principle of prohibiting state taxation of instrumentalities of the United States. If Regulation 25 is invalid under that |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | the United States. If Regulation 25 is invalid under that principle, it is invalid in its imposition of the markup upon all out-of-state purchases, both those destined for the nonappropriated fund activities on the exclusive jurisdiction bases, and those destined for those activities on the concurrent jurisdiction bases. We therefore turn to our reasons for concluding that Regulation 25 is an unconstitutional tax upon instrumentalities of the United States. Before 1966, Mississippi prohibited the sale or possession of alcoholic beverages within its borders. In that year, however, the state legislature enacted the "Local Option Alcoholic Beverage Control Law," Miss. Code Ann. 67-1-1 et seq., which created the State Tax Commission as the sole importer and wholesaler of alcoholic beverages, not including malt liquor, in the State, Miss. Code Ann. 67-1-41. The statute authorized the Tax Commission to purchase intoxicating liquors and sell them "to authorized retailers within the state including, at the discretion of the commission, any retail distributors operating within any military post within the boundaries of the state, exercising such control over the distribution of alcoholic beverages as seem[s] right and proper in keeping with the provisions and purposes of this chapter." The legislature also directed the Commission to add to the cost of all alcoholic beverages a price markup designed to cover the cost of operation of the wholesale liquor business, yield a reasonable profit, and keep Mississippi's liquor prices competitive with those of neighboring States, Miss. Code Ann. 27-71-11. Generally, the wholesale markup was 17% on distilled spirits and 20% on wine. Pursuant to its statutory authority the Commission *606 promulgated Regulation 25 which gave post exchanges, officers' clubs, ship's stores, and other nonappropriated fund activities operating on military installations within Mississippi the option of purchasing alcoholic beverages directly from out-of-state distillers or from the Commission. The Regulation requires that orders from distillers bear the usual price markup as charged by the Commission on its sales, which the distiller in turn must remit to the Commission or face a fine, imprisonment, or delisting, i. e., withdrawal of the privilege of distributing alcoholic beverages to the Commission for resale in Mississippi. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. 27-71-23. The various nonappropriated fund activities at the four military installations in Mississippi all chose to purchase their alcoholic beverages directly from out-of-state distillers, and thereby continued the practice begun when Mississippi was a "dry" State. The District Court correctly determined that post exchanges and similar facilities are instrumentalities of the United States: "it is clear that the ship's stores, officers' clubs and post exchanges `as now operated are arms |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | officers' clubs and post exchanges `as now operated are arms of the government deemed by it essential for the performance of governmental functions and partake of whatever immunities it may have under the constitution and federal statutes.' " -563. See also Standard Oil ; cf. The District Court also correctly held that the markup constitutes a tax on the purchases made by the nonappropriated fund activities from out-of-state suppliers. The markup can only be understood as an "enforced contribution to provide for the support of government," the standard definition of a tax. United The District Court held, however, that federal immunity from state taxation extends only to "a *607 state tax whose legal, as opposed to purely economic, incidence falls upon the federal government, its property or its instruments" In determining that the legal incidence of the Mississippi wholesale markup fell not upon the Federal Government but upon the out-of-state distillers, the District Court defined legal incidence as "the legally enforceable, unavoidable liability for nonpayment of the tax." That was error. The Tax Commission, of course, has not attempted to collect the markup directly from the nonappropriated fund activities, but has instead compelled out-of-state suppliers to collect the markup for it. But that fact alone is not determinative that the markup is a tax on the suppliers rather than on the instrumentalities of the United States. In First Agricultural Nat. we squarely rejected the proposition that the legal incidence of a tax falls always upon the person legally liable for its payment. Massachusetts imposed a sales and use tax on purchases of tangible personal property, including purchases by national banks for their own use. The statute directed that " `each vendor in this commonwealth shall add to the sales price and shall collect from the purchaser the full amount of the tax imposed' " Like the District Court here, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated: "The legal incidence of a tax [is] determined by `who is responsible for payment to the state of the exaction.' " Accordingly, the state court held that the legal incidence of the tax was on the vendor. We reversed, stating: "It would appear to be indisputable that a sales tax which by its terms must be passed on to the purchaser imposes the legal incidence of the tax upon the purchaser. There can be no doubt from the clear wording of the *608 statute that the Massachusetts Legislature intended that this sales tax be passed on to the purchaser. For our purposes, at least, that intent is controlling." 392 U.S., -348. See also Gurley |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | that intent is controlling." 392 U.S., -348. See also Gurley v. Rhoden, ante, p. 200. We see no difference between this markup and a sales tax which must be collected by the seller and remitted to the State. The Tax Commission would distinguish First Agricultural Nat. Bank on the ground that because the immunity of the national bank from state taxation in all but a few closely defined areas was conferred by statute, c. 267, as amended, 12 U.S. C. 548, the Court did not decide "the constitutional question of whether today national banks should be considered nontaxable as federal instrumentalities." But the controlling significance of First Agricultural Nat. Bank for our purposes is the test formulated by that decision for the determination where the legal incidence of the tax falls, namely, that where a State requires that its sales tax be passed on to the purchaser and be collected by the vendor from him, this establishes as a matter of law that the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the purchaser.[6] That is plainly the requirement of Regulation 25. Regulation 25 provides that all direct orders by military facilities of alcoholic beverages from distillers "shall bear the usual wholesale *609 markup in price," that the "price of such alcoholic beverages shall be paid by such organizations directly to the distiller," and that the distiller "shall in turn remit the wholesale markup" to the Tax Commission.[7] The Tax Commission clearly intendedindeed, the scheme unavoidably requiresthat the out-of-state distillers and suppliers pass on the markup to the military purchasers. And to underscore this conclusion, the Director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the Tax Commission informed the distillers by letter that the wholesale markup "must be invoiced to the Military and collected directly from the Military (Club) or other authorized organization located on the Military base," warning that any distiller who sells alcoholic beverages to the military without "collecting said fee directly from said Military organization shall be in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control laws and regulations issued pursuant thereto," and subject to the penalties provided, including delisting. Plainly that ruling explicitly imposes the legal incidence of the tax upon the military.[8] *610 Kern-Limerick, ; and buttress our conclusion. Kern-Limerick held unconstitutional, as regards sales to the United States, a state sales tax statute which purported to tax the seller, but provided that the seller " `shall collect the tax levied hereby from the purchaser.' " Similarly, the Alabama statute in King & Boozer required the seller to pay the sales tax, but also required him " `to |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | pay the sales tax, but also required him " `to add to the sales price and collect from the purchaser the amount due by the taxpayer on account of said tax.' " We held that the statute, by requiring the passing on of the tax and its collection from the purchaser, placed the legal incidence of the tax on the purchaser. We hold, therefore, that viewing the markup as a sales tax, the legal incidence of that tax was intended to rest upon instrumentalities of the United States.[9] We turn therefore to consideration of the question *611 whether the Buck Act is of assistance to the Tax Commission in its attempt to enforce Regulation 25. IV The Buck Act was enacted in 1940[10] to bar the United States, among other things, from asserting immunity from state sales and use taxes on the ground that "the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the area where the transaction occurred." S. Rep. No. 1625, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1940). Section 105 (a) of the Buck Act provides: "No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area." The District Court concluded that under this section "Congress has legislatively acceded to Mississippi's markup on wholesale liquor transactions." Section 107 (a) of the Buck Act, however, contains a limitation upon the application of 105 (a). It provides that 105 (a) "shall not be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from the United *612 States or any instrumentality thereof"[11] Although the District Court recognized that 107 (a) "limits" 105 (a), the court held that 107 (a) was inapplicable in light of its holding that the legal incidence of the tax was on the distillers. Our reversal of the District Court in that respect and our holding that the legal incidence of the tax is upon the United States plainly brings 107 (a) into play. The section can only be read as an explicit congressional preservation of federal immunity from state |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109261/united-states-v-tax-commn-of-miss/ | as an explicit congressional preservation of federal immunity from state sales taxes unconstitutional under the immunity doctrine announced by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in "[U]nshaken, rarely questioned, is the principle that possessions, institutions, and activities of the Federal Government itself in the absence of express congressional consent are not subject to any form of state taxation." United *613 See also Kern-Limerick, -118.[12] Regulation 25 is therefore outside the coverage of 105 (a) and the markup is unconstitutional as a tax imposed upon the United States and its instrumentalities. Nor does the Twenty-first Amendment require a different result. When the case was last here we held that "the Twenty-first Amendment confers no power on a State to regulatewhether by licensing, taxation, or otherwisethe importation of distilled spirits into territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction [pursuant to Art. I, 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution]." ; see Cf. We reach the same conclusion as to the concurrent jurisdiction bases to which Art. I, 8, cl. 17, does not apply: "Nothing in the language of the [Twenty-first] Amendment nor in its history leads to [the] extraordinary conclusion" that the Amendment abolished federal immunity with respect to taxes on sales of liquor to the military on bases where the United States and Mississippi exercise *614 concurrent jurisdiction. Department of ; James Beam involved a Kentucky tax upon the importation into that State of whiskey produced in Scotland and transported through the United States directly to bonded warehouses in Kentucky. The Court held that the tax was prohibited by the Export-Import Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, 10, cl. 2, and that the Amendment had not repealed that clause: "To sustain the tax which Kentucky has imposed in this case would require nothing short of squarely holding that the Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned. Nothing in the language of the Amendment nor in its history leads to such an extraordinary conclusion. This Court has never intimated such a view, and now that the claim for the first time is squarely presented, we expressly reject it." 377 U.S., at Hostetter held that the Twenty-first Amendment did not supersede the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 3, so as to permit the State of New York to prohibit the sale of liquor, under the supervision of United States Customs, to departing international airline passengers. We said that "[s]uch a conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect." Similarly, it is a "patently bizarre" and "extraordinary conclusion" to suggest that the Twenty-first Amendment abolished federal |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | dissenting | Fisher v. Berkeley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/ | Since the Court has wrestled with the question of the degree to which federal antitrust laws prohibit state and local governments from imposing anticompetitive restraints on trade. Laws which impose such restraints have been held to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny if they constitute action of the State itself in its sovereign capacity, or state-authorized municipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. See Community Today, the Court holds that a municipality's price-fixing scheme is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws whether or not the scheme is state-authorized, or furthers or implements a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. Because today's decision discards over 40 years of carefully considered precedent, I respectfully dissent. I A Berkeley's Rent Stabilization Ordinance (hereafter Ordinance) effectively fixes prices for rental units in the city of Berkeley. In we held that a state statute "may be condemned under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute. Such condemnation will follow under 1 of the Sherman Act when the conduct contemplated by the statute is in all cases a per se violation." *275 In this case, by declaring maximum prices landlords may charge, Berkeley's Ordinance irresistibly pressures landlords to fix prices for their rental units. Thus, the Ordinance "facially conflict[s] with the Sherman Act because it mandate[s] [price fixing], an activity that has long been regarded as a per se violation of the Sherman Act." The Court recognizes that the Ordinance imposes anticompetitive restraints on trade, and that it has the same effect on the housing market as would a conspiracy by landlords to fix rental prices. Ante, at 266. Despite this, the Court holds that the Ordinance is not pre-empted by the Sherman Act because prices are fixed "unilaterally" by the city, rather than by "contract, combination, or conspiracy." I do not read our decisions necessarily to require proof of such concerted action as a prerequisite to a finding of pre-emption. Certainly, nothing we said in Rice supports such a narrow view of pre-emption.[1] Our other decisions have found statutes in conflict with the Sherman Act because they eliminated price competition in the relevant market. In California Retail Liquor Dealers a wine wholesaler sought to enjoin enforcement of a California statute which effectively *276 required it to sell wines at prices set by producers. The Court focused on the fact that |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | dissenting | Fisher v. Berkeley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/ | set by producers. The Court focused on the fact that the statute eliminated price competition, and held that the wine-pricing system constituted resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. The Midcal decision squarely controls the result here. Just as the statute challenged in Midcal compelled wine wholesalers to charge prices set by wine producers, Berkeley's Ordinance compels landlords to charge prices set by the city. The city "holds the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged" by landlords. "[S]uch vertical control destroys horizontal competition as effectively as if [landlords] `formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions by agreement with each other.' " ). Schwegmann is also directly on point. In Schwegmann, a Louisiana statute authorized liquor distributors to enforce agreements fixing minimum retail prices on their products against retailers who had not agreed to the price restrictions. The Court held that the statutory scheme amounted to resale price maintenance, in violation of the Sherman Act. To paraphrase the Court in Schwegmann, "when [the city] compels [landlords] to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." "[W]hen [landlords] are forced to abandon price competition, they are driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of the proviso which forbids `horizontal' price fixing." B Even if I accepted the Court's analysis of the antitrust pre-emption issue, I would find a functional "combination" in this case between the city of Berkeley and its officials, on the one hand, and the landlords on the other a combination that operates to fix prices for rental units in Berkeley. To reach a contrary result, the Court simply states a conclusion that *277 "[a] restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not become concerted action within the meaning of the statute simply because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the law." Ante, at 267. The Court doesn't explain why this is so it simply baldly asserts that "[t]he ordinary relationship between the government and those who must obey its regulatory commands whether they wish to or not is not enough to establish a conspiracy." The best I can make of this is that the Court apparently would interpret the Sherman Act to forbid only privately arranged price-fixing schemes. See ante, at 267-269. That interpretation would be plainly misguided. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal restraints of trade resulting from any "contract, combination or conspiracy." 15 U.S. C. 1. Understandably, that wording has led the Court to draw a "basic distinction" between concerted and independent |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | dissenting | Fisher v. Berkeley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/ | Court to draw a "basic distinction" between concerted and independent action, and to hold that "[i]ndependent action is not proscribed" by 1. Monsanto 465 U.S. 7, However, until today we have not held, or indeed even suggested, that government-imposed restraints on economic actions cannot constitute concerted action. Rather, both Schwegmann and Midcal held that state statutes which "had a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the law" violated 1.[2] *278 If the Ordinance allowed the individual landlords ultimately to set their own rental prices, I might understand the Court's conclusion that any resulting price restraints did not necessarily result from collective action. Cf. Monsanto at However, because the Ordinance has the force of law, the city can compel landlords to do what the Sherman Act plainly forbids to fix prices for rental units in Berkeley. Regardless of whether the landlords "agree" to the prices charged, the circumstances here clearly "exclude the possibility that the [city and the landlords] were acting independently." The Ordinance eliminates price competition more effectively than any private "agreement" ever could, and is therefore pre-empted by the Sherman Act. The Court's contrary conclusion does not further, as it argues, but rather distorts "traditional antitrust analysis." Ante, at 264. II Ultimately, the Court is holding that a municipality's authority to protect the public welfare should not be constrained by the Sherman Act. That holding excludes a broad range of local government anticompetitive activities from the reach of the antitrust laws. This flies in the face of the fact that Congress has not enacted such a broad antitrust exemption for municipalities. See Community ; ; cf. 15 U.S. C. 35(a) (1982 ed., Supp. II) (immunizing local governments *279 only from liability for damages for violations of the antitrust laws). "In light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we [have been] especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from their reach." Lafayette, "The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress' intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limitation: Ours is a `dual system of government,' Parker, which has no place for sovereign cities." Community Of course, our decisions do not foreclose municipalities from enacting anticompetitive measures in the public interest, but only require that such actions be state-authorized and be implemented pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | dissenting | Fisher v. Berkeley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111607/fisher-v-berkeley/ | to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly service. See 455 U.S., at Berkeley's Ordinance plainly is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under this standard. Appellees suggest that three considerations support their argument that the Ordinance implements a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy authorizing municipalities to enact rent control measures: (1) the state legislature's 1972 ratification of a city rent control charter amendment; (2) the California Supreme Court's decision in which ultimately invalidated that amendment; and (3) the city's state-law obligation to provide affordable housing. None of these considerations support appellees' position. First, in 1972, Berkeley adopted a rent control charter amendment, which was approved by concurrent resolution of *280 both houses of the state legislature.[3] There are serious doubts that this purely pro forma approval would qualify the amendment for the Parker exemption. See In any event, that amendment was subsequently invalidated by the California Supreme Court, and the legislature's actions respecting its passage afford no support for the claimed exemption of the current Ordinance from antitrust scrutiny. Second, the Birkenfeld decision, while invalidating Berkeley's rent control amendment, found state authority for such measures in constitutional provisions conferring upon cities the power to "make and enforce all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." 550 P. 2d, at 1009-1010. But we have made clear that such general grants of authority do not constitute the required mandate to engage in conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws. See Community "Acceptance of such a proposition would wholly eviscerate the concepts of `clear articulation and affirmative expression' that our precedents require." Third, state law requires cities to "make adequate provision for the housing needs of all economic segments of the community." Cal. Govt. Code Ann. 65580(d) (West 1983). But, although appellees argue that rent control measures are a "foreseeable result" of these statutory obligations, see those laws are expressly neutral with respect to a city's authority to impose rent controls. California Govt. Code Ann. 65589(b) (West 1983) expressly provides that "nothing in this article shall be construed to be a grant of authority or a repeal of any authority which may exist of a local government to impose rent controls." *281 See also Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. 50202 (West Supp. 1986) ("[N]othing in this division shall authorize the imposition of rent regulations or controls"). The requirement of " `clear articulation and affirmative expression' is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | This case is a sequel to in which we held that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe (Tribe) has the power to impose a severance tax on the production of oil and gas by non-Indian lessees of wells located on the Tribe's reservation. We must now decide whether the State of New Mexico can continue to impose its severance taxes on the same production of oil and gas. I All 742,13 acres of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation are located in northwestern New Mexico. In 87, President Cleveland issued an Executive Order setting aside this tract of public land "as a reservation for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 87 (1904). The only qualification contained in the order was a proviso protecting bona fide settlers from defeasance of previously acquired federal rights.[1]*17 The land is still owned by the United States and is held in trust for the Tribe. The Tribe, which consists of approximately 2,00 enrolled members, is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act. 2 U.S. C. 41 et seq. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (1938 Act) grants the Tribe authority, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary), to execute mineral leases. 2 U.S. C. 39a et seq. Since at least as early as 193, the Tribe has been leasing reservation lands to nonmembers for the production of oil and gas. See Mineral leases now encompass a substantial portion of the reservation and constitute the primary source of the Tribe's general operating revenues. In 199, the Secretary approved an amendment to the Tribe's Constitution authorizing it to enact ordinances, subject to his approval, imposing taxes on non-members doing business in the reservation. See Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. XI, 1(e) (Equity). The Tribe enacted such an ordinance in 197, imposing a severance tax on "any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands." Oil and Gas Severance Tax, Ordinance No. 77-0-02, Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code (hereinafter J. A. T. C.), Tit. 11, ch. 1 (Equity); see also -13. The Secretary approved the ordinance later that year, and in 1982 this Court upheld the Tribe's power to impose a severance tax on pre-existing as well as future leases. See Subsequently, the Tribe enacted a privilege tax, which the * Secretary also approved. See Oil and Gas Privilege Tax, Ordinance No. 8-0-434, J. A. T. C., Tit. 11, ch. 2[2] In 197, Cotton Petroleum Corporation (Cotton), a non-Indian company in the business of extracting and marketing oil and gas, acquired five |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | business of extracting and marketing oil and gas, acquired five leases covering approximately 1,000 acres of the reservation. There were then 1 operating wells on the leased acreage and Cotton has since drilled another 0 wells. The leases were issued by the Tribe and the United States under the authority of the 1938 Act. Pursuant to the terms of the leases, Cotton pays the Tribe a rent of $12 per acre, plus a royalty of 12 1/2 percent of the value of its production.[3] In addition, Cotton pays the Tribe's oil and gas severance and privilege taxes, which amount to approximately percent of the value of its production. Thus, Cotton's aggregate payment to the Tribe includes an acreage rent in excess of $1 million, plus royalties and taxes amounting to about 1/2 percent of its production. Prior to 1982, Cotton paid, without objection, five different oil and gas production taxes to the State of New Mexico.[4] The state taxes amount to about 8 percent of the value of Cotton's production. The same 8 percent is collected from producers throughout the State. Thus, on wells outside the *19 reservation, the total tax burden is only 8 percent, while Cotton's reservation wells are taxed at a total rate of 14 percent (8 percent by the State and percent by the Tribe). No state tax is imposed on the royalties received by the Tribe. At the end of our opinion in -19, n. 2, we added a rejecting the taxpayer's argument that the tribal tax was invalid as a "multiple tax burden on interstate commerce" because imposed on the same activity already taxed by the State. One of the reasons the argument failed was that the taxpayer had made no attempt to show that the Tribe was "seek[ing] to seize more tax revenues than would be fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe." After making that point, the suggested that the state tax might be invalid under the Commerce Clause if in excess of what "the State's contact with the activity would justify."[] (emphasis in original). *170 In 1982, Cotton paid its state taxes under protest and then brought an action in the District Court for Santa Fe County challenging the taxes under the Indian Commerce, Interstate Commerce, Due Process, and Supremacy Clauses of the Federal Constitution. App. 2-1. Relying on the Cotton contended that state taxes imposed on reservation activity are only valid if related to actual expenditures by the State in relation to the activity being taxed. Record 421. In support of this theory, Cotton presented evidence at trial |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | In support of this theory, Cotton presented evidence at trial tending to prove that the amount of tax it paid to the State far exceeded the value of services that the State provided to it and that the taxes paid by all nonmember oil producers far exceeded the value of services provided to the reservation as a whole.[] Cotton did not, however, attempt to prove that the state taxes imposed any burden on the Tribe. After trial, the Tribe sought, and was granted, leave to file a brief amicus curiae. The Tribe argued that a decision upholding the state taxes would substantially interfere with the Tribe's ability to raise its own tax rates and would diminish the desirability of on-reservation oil and gas leases. The Tribe expressed a particular concern about what it characterized as a failure of the State "to provide services commensurate with the taxes collected." *171 After the Tribe filed its brief, the New Mexico District Court issued a decision upholding the state taxes. App. to Juris. Statement 14. The District Court found that "New Mexico provides substantial services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton,"[7] and concluded that the State had a valid interest in imposing taxes on non-Indians on the reservation.[8] Squarely rejecting Cotton's theory of the case, the court stated that "[t]he theory of public finance does not require expenditures equal to revenues." Turning to the question whether the state taxes were inconsistent with the federal interest in fostering the economic development of Indian tribes, the District Court found that the "economic and legal burden of paying the state taxes falls on Cotton or its buyers" and that "[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe by virtue of the state taxes." More specifically, it found that the state taxes had not affected the Tribe's ability to collect its taxes or to impose a higher * tax, and had "not in any way deterred production of oil and gas" on the reservation. It concluded that the taxes had no adverse impact on tribal interests and that they were not pre-empted by federal law. -. Finally, the District Court held that the taxes were fully consistent with the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed. 10 N. M. 17, Like the District Court, it was left unpersuaded by Cotton's contention that the New Mexico taxes are invalid because the State's expenditures on reservation activity do not equal the revenues collected. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the 4 U.S., 9, n. 2, "intimate[s] no opinion on |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | the 4 U.S., 9, n. 2, "intimate[s] no opinion on the possibility of such a challenge," but simply suggests that a state tax "might" be invalid if greater than the State's "contact with the [on-reservation] activity would justify." 10 N. M., at Finding no support for Cotton's position in the Court of Appeals looked instead to our opinion in Commonwealth Edison and concluded that a State's power to tax an activity connected to interstate commerce is not limited to the value of the services provided in support of that activity. 10 N. M., at Agreeing with the trial court that the New Mexico taxes were fairly related to the services provided to Cotton, the Court of Appeals rejected Cotton's Commerce Clause challenge. The Tribe, again participating as an amicus curiae, urged a different approach to the case. Unlike Cotton, the Tribe argued that the state taxes could not withstand traditional pre-emption analysis. The Tribe conceded that state laws, to the extent they do not interfere with tribal self-government, may control the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation. It maintained, however, that the taxes at issue interfered with its ability to raise taxes and thus with its right to self-government. The Court of Appeals rejected *173 this argument because the record contained no evidence of any adverse impact on the Tribe and, indeed, indicated that the Tribe could impose even higher taxes than it had without adverse effect.[9] The New Mexico Supreme Court granted, but then quashed, a writ of certiorari. 10 N. M. 11, We then noted probable jurisdiction and invited the parties to brief and argue the following additional question: "Does the Commerce Clause require that an Indian Tribe be treated as a State for purposes of determining whether a state tax on nontribal activities conducted on an Indian Reservation must be apportioned to account for taxes imposed on those same activities by the Indian Tribe?" We now affirm the judgment of the New Mexico Court of Appeals. II This Court's approach to the question whether a State may tax on-reservation oil production by non-Indian lessees has varied over the course of the past century. At one time, such a tax was held invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress; more recently, such taxes have been upheld unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress. The changed approach to these taxes is one aspect of the evolution of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity that we recently discussed in detail in South During the first third of this century, this Court frequently invalidated state taxes that arguably imposed an indirect economic |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | frequently invalidated state taxes that arguably imposed an indirect economic *174 burden on the Federal Government or its instrumentalities by application of the "intergovernmental immunity" doctrine. That doctrine "was based on the rationale that any tax on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax on the contract and thus a tax `on' the government because it burdened the government's power to enter into the contract." In a case decided in 1922, the Court applied the intergovernmental immunity doctrine to invalidate a state tax on income derived by a non-Indian lessee from the sale of his interest in oil produced on Indian land. See Consistently with the view of intergovernmental immunity that then prevailed, the Court stated that "a tax upon such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that it can for its wards." at 0 ). The same reasoning was used to invalidate a variety of other state taxes imposed on non-Indian lessees at that time.[10] Shortly after reaching its zenith in the decision, the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity started a long path in decline and has now been "thoroughly repudiated" by modern case law. South at In 1932, four Members of this Court argued that was unsound and should be overruled. See (Stone, J., dissenting); Five years later, the Court took a substantial step in that direction, rejecting the view that a nondiscriminatory state tax on a *17 private party contracting with the Government is invalid because the economic burden of the tax may fall on the Government. See "With the rationale for conferring a tax immunity on parties dealing with another government rejected, the government contract immunities recognized under prior doctrine were, one by one, eliminated." South Specifically, in the Court squarely overruled Thus, after Mountain Producers was decided, oil and gas lessees operating on Indian reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation as long as Congress did not act affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes. See See also Oklahoma Tax In sum, it is well settled that, absent express congressional authorization, a State cannot tax the United States directly. See It is also clear that the tax immunity of the United States is shared by the Indian tribes for whose benefit the United States holds reservation lands in trust. See Under current doctrine, however, a State can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with whom the United States or an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the United States |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | burden of the tax may fall on the United States or tribe. See ; South Although a lessee's oil production on Indian lands is therefore not "automatically exempt from state taxation," Congress does, of course, retain the power to grant such immunity. Mescalero Apache Whether such immunity shall be granted is thus a question that "is essentially legislative in character." Texas The question for us to decide is whether Congress has acted to grant the Tribe such immunity, either expressly or *17 by plain implication.[11] In addition, we must consider Cotton's argument that the "multiple burden" imposed by the state and tribal taxes is unconstitutional. III Although determining whether federal legislation has pre-empted state taxation of lessees of Indian land is primarily an exercise in examining congressional intent, the history of tribal sovereignty serves as a necessary "backdrop" to that process. Cf. ). As a result, questions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference to standards of pre-emption that have developed in other areas of the law, and are not controlled by "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty." White Mountain Apache Instead, we have applied a flexible pre-emption analysis sensitive to the particular facts and legislation involved. Each case "requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests." Ramah Navajo School Moreover, in examining the pre-emptive force of the relevant federal legislation, we are cognizant of both the broad policies that underlie the legislation and the history of tribal independence in the field at issue. See It bears emphasis that although congressional silence no longer entails a broad-based immunity from taxation for private parties doing business with Indian tribes, federal pre-emption is not limited to cases in which Congress has expressly as compared to *177 impliedly pre-empted the state activity. Finally, we note that although state interests must be given weight and courts should be careful not to make legislative decisions in the absence of congressional action, ambiguities in federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal independence. See Against this background, Cotton argues that the New Mexico taxes are pre-empted by the "federal laws and policies which protect tribal self-government and strengthen impoverished reservation economies." Brief for Appellants 1. Most significantly, Cotton contends that the 1938 Act exhibits a strong federal interest in guaranteeing Indian tribes the maximum return on their oil and gas leases. Moreover, Cotton maintains that the Federal and Tribal Governments, acting pursuant to the 1938 Act, its accompanying regulations, and the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code, exercise comprehensive regulatory control over Cotton's |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code, exercise comprehensive regulatory control over Cotton's on-reservation activity. Cotton describes New Mexico's responsibilities, in contrast, as "significantly limited." Brief for Appellants 21. Thus, weighing the respective state, federal, and tribal interests, Cotton concludes that the New Mexico taxes unduly interfere with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency and are not justified by an adequate state interest. We disagree. The 1938 Act neither expressly permits state taxation nor expressly precludes it, but rather simply provides that "unallotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any tribe may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council for terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities." 2 U.S. C. 39a. The Senate and House Reports that accompanied the Act, moreover even when considered in their broadest possible terms shed little light on congressional intent concerning state taxation of oil and gas produced on leased lands. See S. Rep. No. 7th Cong., 1st Sess. ; H. R. Rep. No. 7th Cong., *178 3d Sess. Both Reports reflect that the proposed legislation was suggested by the Secretary and considered by the appropriate committees, which recommended that it pass without amendment. Beyond this procedural summary, the Reports simply rely on the Secretary's letter of transmittal to describe the purpose of the Act. That letter provides that the legislation was intended, in light of the disarray of federal law in the area, "to obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes," and, in particular, was designed to "bring all mineral leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act." ; S. Rep. No. In addition, the letter contains the following passage: "It is not believed that the present law is adequate to give the Indians the greatest return from their property. As stated, present law provides for locating and taking mineral leases in the same manner as mining locations are made on the public lands of the United States; but there are disadvantages in following this procedure on Indian lands that are not present in applying for a claim on the public domain. For instance, on the public domain the discoverer of a mineral deposit gets extralateral rights and can follow the ore beyond the side lines indefinitely, while on the Indian lands under the act of June 30, 1919, he is limited to the confines of the survey markers not to exceed 00 feet |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | confines of the survey markers not to exceed 00 feet by 1,00 feet in any one claim. The draft of the bill herewith would permit the obtaining of sufficient acreage to remove the necessity for extralateral rights with all of its attending controversies." ; H. R. Rep. No. Relying on the first sentence in this paragraph, Cotton argues that the 1938 Act embodies a broad congressional policy of maximizing revenues for Indian tribes. Cotton finds support for this proposition in That case raised the question *179 whether the 1938 Act authorizes state taxation of a tribe's royalty interests under oil and gas leases issued to nonmembers. Applying the settled rule that a tribe may only be directly taxed by a State if "Congress has made its intention to [lift the tribe's exemption] unmistakably clear," we concluded that "the State may not tax Indian royalty income from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act," In a we added the observation that direct state taxation of Indian revenues would frustrate the 1938 Act's purpose of "ensur[ing] that Indians receive `the greatest return from their property,' [S. Rep. No. at] 2; H. R. Rep. No." To the extent Cotton seeks to give the Secretary's reference to "the greatest return from their property" talismanic effect, arguing that these words demonstrate that Congress intended to guarantee Indian tribes the maximum profit available without regard to competing state interests, it overstates its case. There is nothing remarkable in the proposition that, in authorizing mineral leases, Congress sought to provide Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue. It is however quite remarkable, indeed unfathomable in our view, to suggest that Congress intended to remove all state-imposed obstacles to profitability by attaching to the Senate and House Reports a letter from the Secretary that happened to include the phrase "the greatest return from their property." Read in the broadest terms possible, the relevant paragraph suggests that Congress sought to remove "disadvantages in [leasing mineral rights] on Indian lands that are not present in applying for a claim on the public domain." S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. By 1938, however, it was established that oil and gas lessees of public lands were subject to state taxation. See Mid-Northern Oil v. Walker, It is thus apparent that Congress was not concerned with state taxation, but with matters such as the unavailability of extralateral mineral rights on Indian land. Nor do we *0 read the Blackfeet 471 U.S., to give the Secretary's words greater effect. We think it clear that the simply stands for the proposition that |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | it clear that the simply stands for the proposition that the Act's purpose of creating a source of revenue for Indian tribes provides evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize direct state taxation of Indian royalties. We thus agree that a purpose of the 1938 Act is to provide Indian tribes with badly needed revenue, but find no evidence for the further supposition that Congress intended to remove all barriers to profit maximization. The Secretary's letter of transmittal, even when read permissively for broad policy goals and even when read to resolve ambiguities in favor of tribal independence, supports no more. Our review of the legislation that preceded the 1938 Act provides no additional support for Cotton's expansive view of the Act's purpose. This history is relevant in that it supplies both the legislative background against which Congress enacted the 1938 Act and the relevant "backdrop" of tribal independence. Congress first authorized mineral leasing on Indian lands in 91. See Act of Feb. 28, 91, 3, 2 U.S. C. 397 (91 Act). That legislation, which empowered tribes to enter into grazing and mining leases, only applied to lands "occupied by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," and was thus interpreted to be inapplicable to Executive Order reservations. See British-American Oil Producing v. Board of of Mineral leasing on reservations created by Executive Order like the Jicarilla Apache Reservation was not authorized until almost four decades later. After years of debate concerning whether Indians had any right to share in royalties derived from oil and gas leases in Executive Order reservations,[12]*1 Congress finally enacted legislation in 1927 that authorized such leases. See Indian Oil Act of 1927, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1347, 2 U.S. C. 398a (1927 Act). While both the 91 and 1927 Acts were in effect, was the prevailing law and, under its expansive view of inter-governmental tax immunity, States were powerless to impose severance taxes on oil produced on Indian reservations unless Congress expressly waived that immunity. Just two years after was decided, Congress took such express action and authorized state taxation of oil and gas production in treaty reservations. See Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, (1924 Act), current version U.S. C. 398. See also British-American Oil Producing v. Board of More significantly for purposes of this case, when Congress first authorized oil and gas leasing on Executive Order reservations in the 1927 Act, it expressly waived immunity from state taxation of oil and gas lessees operating in those reservations. See 44 Stat. (part 2) 1347, 2 U.S. C. 398c. Thus, |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | 44 Stat. (part 2) 1347, 2 U.S. C. 398c. Thus, at least as to Executive Order reservations, state taxation of nonmember oil and gas lessees was the norm from the very start. There is, accordingly, simply no history of tribal independence from state taxation of these lessees to form a "backdrop" against which the 1938 Act must be read. We are also unconvinced that the contrast between the 1927 Act's express waiver of immunity and the 1938 Act's silence on the subject suggests that Congress intended to repeal the waiver in the 1938 Act and thus to diametrically change course by implicitly barring state taxation. The general repealer clause contained in the 1938 Act provides that "[a]ll Act[s] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." Although one might infer from this clause that all preceding, nonconflicting legislation in the area, like the 1927 Act's waiver provision, is implicitly incorporated, we need not go so far to simply conclude that the 1938 Act's omission demonstrates no congressional purpose to close the door to state taxation. Moreover, the contrast between the 1927 and 1938 Acts is easily explained by the contemporaneous history of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. In 1927, prevailed, and States were only permitted to tax lessees of Indian lands if Congress expressly so provided. By the time the 1938 Act was enacted, however, had been overruled and replaced by the modern rule permitting such taxes absent congressional disapproval.[13] Thus, Congress' approaches to both the *3 1927 and 1938 Acts were fully consistent with an intent to permit state taxation of nonmember lessees.[14] Cotton nonetheless maintains that our decisions in White Mountain Apache and Ramah Navajo School compel the conclusion that the New Mexico taxes are pre-empted by federal law. In pressing this argument, Cotton ignores the admonition included in both of those decisions that the relevant pre-emption test is a flexible one sensitive to the particular state, federal, and tribal interests involved. See at ; at In we addressed the question whether Arizona could impose its motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on a nonmember logging company's use of roads located solely within an Indian reservation. Significantly, the roads at issue were "built, maintained, and policed exclusively by the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors," 448 U.S., 0, and the State was "unable to identify any regulatory function or service [it] performed that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation," See also 4 ("The State has no interest in raising revenues from the use of |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | has no interest in raising revenues from the use of Indian roads that cost it nothing and over which it exercises no control"). Moreover, it was undisputed in that the economic burden of the taxes ultimately fell on the Tribe. 1. Based on these facts and on our conclusion that collection of the taxes would undermine federal policy "in a context in which the Federal Government has undertaken to regulate the most minute details" of the Tribe's timber operations, we held that the taxes were pre-empted. Ramah Navajo School involved a similar factual scenario. In the late 190's, New Mexico closed the only public high school that served the Ramah Navajo children. The State then sought to tax two nonmember construction firms hired by the Tribe to build a school in the reservation. As in the State asserted no legitimate regulatory interest that might justify the tax. Ramah Navajo School Also as in the economic burden of the tax ultimately fell on the Tribe. And finally, again * as in we noted that federal law imposed a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Ramah Navajo School -842. We concluded: "Having declined to take any responsibility for the education of these Indian children, the State is precluded from imposing an additional burden on the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide this education a scheme which has `left the State with no duties or responsibilities.' " ). The factual findings of the New Mexico District Court clearly distinguish this case from both and Ramah Navajo School After conducting a trial, that court found that "New Mexico provides substantial services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton," costing the State approximately $3 million per year. App. to Juris. Statement 1. Indeed, Cotton concedes that from 1981 through 1 New Mexico provided its operations with services costing $89,384, but argues that the cost of these services is disproportionate to the $2,293,93 in taxes the State collected from Cotton. Brief for Appellants 13-14. Neither nor Ramah Navajo School however, imposes such a proportionality requirement on the States.[1] Rather, both cases involved complete abdication or noninvolvement of the State in the on-reservation activity. The present case is also unlike and Ramah Navajo School in that the District Court found that "[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe by virtue of the state taxes," App. to Juris. Statement 1, and that the Tribe could, in fact, increase its taxes without adversely affecting on-reservation oil and gas development, Finally, the District Court found that the * State regulates the spacing and mechanical integrity of wells located on the reservation. Thus, |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | and mechanical integrity of wells located on the reservation. Thus, although the federal and tribal regulations in this case are extensive,[1] they are not exclusive, as were the regulations in and Ramah Navajo School We thus conclude that federal law, even when given the most generous construction, does not pre-empt New Mexico's oil and gas severance taxes. This is not a case in which the State has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it. Nor is this a case in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.[17] It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the New *7 Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect on the demand for on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the Tribe to increase its tax rate. Any impairment to the federal policy favoring the exploitation of on-reservation oil and gas resources by Indian tribes that might be caused by these effects, however, is simply too indirect and too insubstantial to support Cotton's claim of pre-emption. To find pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens on this broad congressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those present in and Ramah Navajo School would be to return to the pre-1937 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.[] Any adverse effect on the Tribe's finances caused by the taxation of a private party contracting with the Tribe would be ground to strike the state tax. Absent more explicit guidance from Congress, we decline to return to this long-discarded and thoroughly repudiated doctrine. IV Cotton also argues that New Mexico's severance taxes "insofar as they are imposed without allocation or apportionment on top of Jicarilla Apache tribal taxes" impose "an unlawful *8 multiple tax burden on interstate commerce." Brief for Appellants 33. In support of this argument, Cotton relies on three facts: (1) that the State and the Tribe tax the same activity; (2) that the total tax burden on Cotton is higher than the burden on its off-reservation competitors who pay no tribal tax; and (3) that the state taxes generate revenues that far exceed the value of the services it provides on the reservation. As we pointed out in the see n. a multiple taxation issue may arise when more than one State attempts to tax the same activity. If a unitary business derives income from several States, each State may only tax the portion of that income that is attributable to activity within its borders.[19] See, e. g., Exxon v. Wisconsin Department of |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | its borders.[19] See, e. g., Exxon v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Thus, in such a case, an apportionment formula is necessary in order to identify the scope of the taxpayer's business that is within the taxing jurisdiction of each State. In this case, however, all of Cotton's leases are located entirely within the borders of the State of New Mexico and also within the borders of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. Indeed, they are also within the borders of the United States. There are, therefore, three different governmental entities, each of which has taxing jurisdiction over all of the non-Indian wells. Cf. *9 The federal sovereign has the undoubted power to prohibit taxation of the Tribe's lessees by the Tribe, by the State, or by both, but since it has not exercised that power, concurrent taxing jurisdiction over all of Cotton's on-reservation leases exists. Cf. Commonwealth Edison 43 U. S., at 17 Unless and until Congress provides otherwise, each of the other two sovereigns has taxing jurisdiction over all of Cotton's leases. It is, of course, true that the total taxes paid by Cotton are higher than those paid by off-reservation producers. But neither the State nor the Tribe imposes a discriminatory tax. The burdensome consequence is entirely attributable to the fact that the leases are located in an area where two governmental entities share jurisdiction. As we noted in the tribal tax does "not treat minerals transported away from the reservation differently than it treats minerals that might be sold on the reservation." 4 U.S., 7-. Similarly, the New Mexico taxes are administered in an evenhanded manner and are imposed at a uniform rate throughout the State both on and off the reservation. See 10 N. M., at Cotton's most persuasive argument is based on the evidence that tax payments by reservation lessees far exceed the value of services provided by the State to the lessees, or more generally, to the reservation as a whole. See n. There are, however, two sufficient reasons for rejecting this argument. First, the relevant services provided by the State include those that are available to the lessees and the members of the Tribe off the reservation as well as on it. The intangible value of citizenship in an organized society is not easily measured in dollars and cents; moreover, the District Court found that the actual per capita state expenditures for Jicarilla members are equal to or greater than *190 the per capita expenditures for non-Indian citizens. See App. to Juris. Statement 1. Second, there is no constitutional requirement that the benefits received |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | Second, there is no constitutional requirement that the benefits received from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer or by those living in the community where the taxpayer is located must equal the amount of its tax obligations. See Keystone Bituminous Coal As we recently explained: "[T]here is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the activity. Instead, our consistent rule has been: " `Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied. " `A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have said, a means of distributing the burden of the cost of government. The only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burden on those who pay them, and would involve abandonment of the most fundamental principle of government that it exists primarily to provide for the common good.' Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 301 U.S. 49, -23 (citations and omitted). "There is no reason to suppose that this latitude afforded the States under the Due Process Clause is somehow divested by the Commerce Clause merely because the taxed activity has some connection to interstate commerce; *191 particularly when the tax is levied on an activity conducted within the State." Commonwealth Edison at 22-23. Cotton, in effect, asks us to divest New Mexico of its normal latitude because its taxes have "some connection" to commerce with the Tribe. The connection, however, is by no means close enough. There is simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an adverse effect on the Tribe's ability to attract oil and gas lessees. It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the existence of the state tax imposes some limit on the profitability of Indian oil and gas leases just as it no doubt imposes a limit on the profitability of off-reservation leasing arrangements but that is precisely the same indirect burden that we rejected as a basis for granting non-Indian contractors an immunity from state taxation in ; Oklahoma |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | non-Indian contractors an immunity from state taxation in ; Oklahoma Tax 319 U.S. 98 ; Oklahoma Tax ; 42 U.S. 43 (197); and V In our order noting probable jurisdiction we invited the parties to address the question whether the Tribe should be treated as a State for the purpose of determining whether New Mexico's taxes must be apportioned. All of the Indian tribes that have filed amicus curiae briefs addressing this question including the Jicarilla Apache Tribe have uniformly taken the position that Indian tribes are not States within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. This position is supported by the text of the Clause itself. Article I, 8, cl. 3, provides that the "Congress shall have Power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Thus, the Commerce Clause draws a clear distinction between "States" and "Indian *192 Tribes." As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Cherokee Pet. 1, : "The objects to which the power of regulating commerce might be directed, are divided into three distinct classes foreign nations, the several states, and Indian Tribes. When forming this article, the convention considered them as entirely distinct." In fact, the language of the Clause no more admits of treating Indian tribes as States than of treating foreign nations as States. See It is also well established that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applications. In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation, see McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth ; the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs, see 417 U.S. 3, 1-2 ; F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 207-208, and nn. 2, 3 and 9-11 The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause, moreover, is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause. Most notably, as our discussion of Cotton's "multiple taxation" argument demonstrates, the fact that States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the context of commerce "among" States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction to trade "with" Indian tribes. Accordingly, we have no occasion to modify our comment on this question in the case: "Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109692/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison/ | One of the most intractable problems arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., has been whether an employer is guilty of religious discrimination when he discharges an employee (or refuses to hire a job applicant) because of the employee's religious practices. Particularly troublesome has been the plight of adherents to minority faiths who do not observe the holy days on which most businesses are closedSundays, Christmas, and Easter but who need time off for their own days of religious observance. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has grappled with this problem in two sets of regulations, and in a long line of decisions. Initially the Commission concluded that an employer was "free under Title VII to establish a normal workweek generally applicable to all employees," and that an employee could not "demand any alteration in [his work schedule] to accommodate his religious needs." 29 CFR 1605.1 (3), (3) (1967). Eventually, however, the Commission changed its view and decided that employers must reasonably accommodate such requested schedule changes except where "undue hardship" would resultfor example, "where the employee's needed work cannot be performed *86 by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence." 29 CFR 1605.1[1] In amending Title VII in Congress confronted the same problem, and adopted the second position of the EEOC. Pub. L. 92-261, 2(7), codified at 42 U.S. C. 2000e (j) ( ed., Supp. V). Both before and after the amendment the lower courts have considered at length the circumstances in which employers must accommodate the religious practices of employees, reaching what the Court correctly describes as conflicting results, ante, at 75 n. 10. And on two occasions this Court has attempted to provide guidance to the lower courts, only to find ourselves evenly divided. Parker Seal ; Today's decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious practices. The Court holds, in essence, that although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an employer must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take account of religious observances, the regulation and Act do not *87 really mean what they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow their faith. As a question of social policy, this result is deeply troubling, for a society that truly values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their job. And as a matter |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109692/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison/ | surrendering their religion or their job. And as a matter of law today's result is intolerable, for the Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly rejected in as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that a majority of this Court thinks unwise. I therefore dissent. I With respect to each of the proposed accommodations to respondent Hardison's religious observances that the Court discusses, it ultimately notes that the accommodation would have required "unequal treatment," ante, at 81, 84-85, in favor of the religious observer. That is quite true. But if an accommodation can be rejected simply because it involves preferential treatment, then the regulation and the statute, while brimming with "sound and fury," ultimately "signif[y] nothing." The accommodation issue by definition arises only when a neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious practices of a particular employee. In some of the reported cases, the rule in question has governed work attire; in other cases it has required attendance at some religious function; in still other instances, it has compelled membership in a union; and in the largest class of cases, it has concerned work schedules.[2] What all these cases have in common is an employee who could comply with the rule only by violating what the employee views as a religious commandment. In each *88 instance, the question is whether the employee is to be exempt from the rule's demands. To do so will always result in a privilege being "allocated according to religious beliefs," ante, at 85, unless the employer gratuitously decides to repeal the rule in toto. What the statute says, in plain words, is that such allocations are required unless "undue hardship" would result. The point is perhaps best made by considering a not altogether hypothetical example. See CCH EEOC Decisions (1973) ¶ 6180. Assume that an employer requires all employees to wear a particular type of hat at work in order to make the employees readily identifiable to customers. Such a rule obviously does not, on its face, violate Title VII, and an employee who altered the uniform for reasons of taste could be discharged. But a very different question would be posed by the discharge of an employee who, for religious reasons, insisted on wearing over her hair a tightly fitted scarf which was visible through the hat. In such a case the employer could accommodate this religious practice without undue hardshipor any hardship at all. Yet as I understand the Court's analysisand nothing in the Court's response, ante, at 83 n. 14, 84 n. 15, is to the contrarythe |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109692/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison/ | 83 n. 14, 84 n. 15, is to the contrarythe accommodation would not be required because it would afford the privilege of wearing scarfs to a select few based on their religious beliefs. The employee thus would have to give up either the religious practice or the job. This, I submit, makes a mockery of the statute. In reaching this result, the Court seems almost oblivious of the legislative history of the amendments to Title VII which is briefly recounted in the Court's opinion, ante, at 73-75 That history is far more instructive than the Court allows. After the EEOC promulgated its second set of guidelines requiring reasonable accommodations unless undue hardship would result, at least two courts issued decisions questioning, whether the guidelines were consistent with Title VII. *89 aff'd by equally divided Court, ; rev'd, These courts reasoned, in language strikingly similar to today's decision, that to excuse religious observers from neutral work rules would "discriminate against other employees" and "constitute unequal administration of the collective-bargaining agreement." They therefore refused to equate "religious discrimination with failure to accommodate." When Congress was reviewing Title VII in Senator Jennings Randolph informed the Congress of these decisions which, he said, had "clouded" the meaning of religious discrimination. 118 Cong. Rec. 706 He introduced an amendment, tracking the language of the EEOC regulation, to make clear that Title VII requires religious accommodation, even though unequal treatment would result. The primary purpose of the amendment, he explained, was to protect Saturday Sabbatarians like himself from employers who refuse "to hire or to continue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to abstain from work in the nature of hire on particular days." His amendment was unanimously approved by the Senate on a roll-call vote, and was accepted by the Conference Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 92-899, p. 15 ; S. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 15 whose report was approved by both Houses, 118 Cong. Rec. 7169, 7573 Yet the Court today, in rejecting any accommodation that involves preferential treatment, follows the Dewey decision in direct contravention of congressional intent. The Court's interpretation of the statute, by effectively nullifying it, has the singular advantage of making consideration of petitioners' constitutional challenge unnecessary. The Court does not even rationalize its construction on this ground, however, nor could it, since "resort to an alternative construction to avoid deciding a constitutional question is appropriate *90 only when such a course is `fairly possible' or when the statute provides a `fair alternative' construction." Moreover, while important constitutional questions would be posed by interpreting the law to |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109692/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison/ | constitutional questions would be posed by interpreting the law to compel employers (or fellow employees) to incur substantial costs to aid the religious observer,[3] not all accommodations are costly, and the constitutionality of the statute is not placed in serious doubt simply because it sometimes requires an exemption from a work rule. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly found no Establishment Clause problems in exempting religious observers from state-imposed duties, e. g., ; ; even when the exemption was in no way compelled by the Free Exercise Clause, e. g., ; ; ; ;[4] If the State does not establish *91 religion over nonreligion by excusing religious practitioners from obligations owed the State, I do not see how the State can be said to establish religion by requiring employers to do the same with respect to obligations owed the employer. Thus, I think it beyond dispute that the Act doesand, consistently with the First Amendment, canrequire employers to grant privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation process. II Once it is determined that the duty to accommodate sometimes requires that an employee be exempted from an otherwise valid work requirement, the only remaining question is whether this is such a case: Did TWA prove that it exhausted all reasonable accommodations, and that the only remaining alternatives would have caused undue hardship on TWA's business? To pose the question is to answer it, for all that the District Court found TWA had done to accommodate respondent's Sabbath observance was that it "held several meetings with [respondent] [and] authorized the union steward to search for someone who would swap shifts." To conclude that TWA, one of the largest air carriers in the Nation, would have suffered undue hardship had it done anything more defies both reason and common sense. The Court implicitly assumes that the only means of accommodation open to TWA were to compel an unwilling employee to replace Hardison; to pay premium wages to a voluntary substitute; or to employ one less person during *92 respondent's Sabbath shift.[5] Based on this assumption, the Court seemingly finds that each alternative would have involved undue hardship not only because Hardison would have been given a special privilege, but also because either another employee would have been deprived of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement, ante, at 80-81, or because "more than a de minimis cost," ante, at 84, would have been imposed on TWA. But the Court's myopic view of the available options is not supported by either the District Court's findings or the evidence adduced at trial. Thus, the Court's conclusion |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109692/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison/ | or the evidence adduced at trial. Thus, the Court's conclusion cannot withstand analysis, even assuming that its rejection of the alternatives it does discuss is justifiable.[6] *93 To begin with, the record simply does not support the Court's assertion, made without accompanying citations, that "[t]here were no volunteers to relieve Hardison on Saturdays," ante, at 81. Everett Kussman, the manager of the department in which respondent worked, testified that he had made no effort to find volunteers, App. 136,[7] and the union stipulated that its steward had not done so either,[8] Thus, contrary to the Court's assumption, there may have been one or more employees who, for reasons of either sympathy or personal convenience, willingly would have substituted *94 for respondent on Saturdays until respondent could either regain the non-Saturday shift he had held for the three preceding months[9] or transfer back to his old department where he had sufficient seniority to avoid Saturday work. Alternatively, there may have been an employee who preferred respondent's Thursday-Monday daytime shift to his own; in fact, respondent testified that he had informed Kussman and the union steward that the clerk on the Sunday-Thursday night shift (the "graveyard" shift) was dissatisfied with his hours. Thus, respondent's religious observance might have been accommodated by a simple trade of days or shifts without necessarily depriving any employee of his or her contractual rights[10] and without *95 imposing significant costs on TWA. Of course, it is also possible that no tradeor none consistent with the seniority systemcould have been arranged. But the burden under the EEOC regulation is on TWA to establish that a reasonable accommodation was not possible. 29 CFR 1605.1 Because it failed either to explore the possibility of a voluntary trade or to assure that its delegate, the union steward, did so, TWA was unable to meet its burden. Nor was a voluntary trade the only option open to TWA that the Court ignores; to the contrary, at least two other options are apparent from the record. First, TWA could have paid overtime to a voluntary replacement for respondent assuming that someone would have been willing to work Saturdays for premium payand passed on the cost to respondent. In fact, one accommodation Hardison suggested would have done just that by requiring Hardison to work overtime when needed at regular pay. Under this plan, the total overtime cost to the employerand the total number of overtime hours available for other employeeswould not have reflected Hardison's Sabbath absences. Alternatively, TWA could have transferred respondent back to his previous department where he had accumulated substantial seniority, as |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109692/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-hardison/ | his previous department where he had accumulated substantial seniority, as respondent also suggested.[11] Admittedly, both options would have violated the collective-bargaining agreement; the former because the agreement required that employees working over 40 hours per week receive premium pay, and the latter because the agreement prohibited employees from transferring *96 departments more than once every six months. But neither accommodation would have deprived any other employee of rights under the contract or violated the seniority system in any way.[12] Plainly an employer cannot avoid his duty to accommodate by signing a contract that precludes all reasonable accommodations; even the Court appears to concede as much, ante, at 79. Thus I do not believe it can be even seriously argued that TWA would have suffered "undue hardship" to its business had it required respondent to pay the extra costs of his replacement, or had it transferred respondent to his former department.[13] What makes today's decision most tragic, however, is not that respondent Hardison has been needlessly deprived of his livelihood simply because he chose to follow the dictates of his conscience. Nor is the tragedy exhausted by the impact it will have on thousands of Americans like Hardison who could be forced to live on welfare as the price they must pay for *97 worshiping their God.[14] The ultimate tragedy is that despite Congress' best efforts, one of this Nation's pillars of strength our hospitality to religious diversityhas been seriously eroded. All Americans will be a little poorer until today's decision is erased. I respectfully dissent. |
per_curiam | 1,978 | 200 | per_curiam | Califano v. Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109805/califano-v-torres/ | Certain benefits under the Social Security Act, as amended in 1972, are payable only to residents of the United States, defined as the 50 States and the District of Columbia. The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held in these *2 cases that this geographic limitation is unconstitutional as applied to persons who upon moving to Puerto Rico lost the benefits to which they were entitled while residing in the United States. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, responsible for the administration of the Social Security Act, has appealed.[1] I One of the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act created a uniform program, known as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, for aid to qualified aged, blind, and disabled persons. 42 U.S. C. 1381 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). This federally administered program replaced the federal-state programs of Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S. C. 301 et seq.; Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S. C. 1201 et seq.; Aid to the Disabled, 42 U.S. C. 1351 et seq.; and Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 42 U.S. C. 1381 et seq. The exclusion of Puerto Rico in the amended program is apparent in the definitional section. Section 1611 (f) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U.S. C. 1382 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. V), states that no individual is eligible for benefits during any month in which he or she is outside the United States. The Act defines "the United States" as "the 50 States and the District of Columbia." 1614 (e), as set forth in 42 U.S. C. 1382c (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The repeal of the pre-existing programs did not apply to Puerto Rico. Thus persons in Puerto Rico are not eligible to receive SSI benefits, but are eligible to receive benefits under the pre-existing programs.[2] Appellee Torres received SSI benefits while residing in Connecticut; the benefits were discontinued when he moved *3 to Puerto Rico. Similarly, appellees Colon and Vega received benefits as residents of Massachusetts and New Jersey, respectively, but lost them on moving to Puerto Rico.[3] Torres filed a complaint in the District Court of Puerto Rico claiming that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program was unconstitutional, and a three-judge court was convened to adjudicate the suit. Viewing the geographic limitations in the law as an interference with the constitutional right of residents of the 50 States and the District of Columbia to travel, the court searched for a compelling governmental interest to justify such interference. Finding none, the court held 1611 (f) and 1614 |
per_curiam | 1,978 | 200 | per_curiam | Califano v. Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109805/califano-v-torres/ | interference. Finding none, the court held 1611 (f) and 1614 (e) unconstitutional as applied to Torres.[4] Soon after that decision appellees Colon and Vega also sued in the Puerto Rico District Court. Relying on the Torres decision, a single judge enjoined the Social Security Administration from discontinuing their SSI benefits on the basis of their change of residency to Puerto Rico.[5] *4 II In and Memorial this Court held that laws prohibiting newly arrived residents in a State or county from receiving the same vital benefits as other residents unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate travel. As the Court said in Memorial Hospital, "the right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital governmental benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents." In the present cases the District Court altogether transposed that proposition. It held that the Constitution requires that a person who travels to Puerto Rico must be given benefits superior to those enjoyed by other residents of Puerto Rico if the newcomer enjoyed those benefits in the State from which he came. This Court has never held that the constitutional right to travel embraces any such doctrine, and we decline to do so now.[6] Such a doctrine would apply with equal force to any benefits a State might provide for its residents, and would require a State to continue to pay those benefits indefinitely to any persons who had once resided there. And the broader implications of such a doctrine in other areas of substantive law would bid fair to destroy the independent power of each *5 State under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its residents. If there ever could be a case where a person who has moved from one State to another might be entitled to invoke the law of the State from which he came as a corollary of his constitutional right to travel, this is surely not it. For we deal here with a constitutional attack upon a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits. Such a statute "is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality." "So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket." See also ;[7] The judgments are reversed. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would affirm. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL would note probable jurisdiction and set these cases for oral argument. |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | This case asks us to decide whether a court in Nevada may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis that he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Geor- gia would delay the return of funds to plaintiffs with connections to Nevada. Because the defendant had no other contacts with Nevada, and because a plaintiff ’s con- tacts with the forum State cannot be “decisive in deter- mining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated,” we hold that the court in Nevada may not exercise personal jurisdiction under these circumstances. I Petitioner Anthony Walden serves as a police officer for the city of Covington, Georgia. In August 2006, petitioner was working at the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport as a deputized agent of the Drug Enforcement Administra- tion (DEA). As part of a task force, petitioner conducted investigative stops and other law enforcement functions in support of the DEA’s airport drug interdiction program. On August 8, 2006, Transportation Security Admin- 2 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court istration agents searched respondents Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson and their carry-on bags at the San Juan airport in Puerto Rico. They found almost $97,000 in cash. Fiore explained to DEA agents in San Juan that she and Gipson had been gambling at a casino known as the El San Juan, and that they had residences in both Cali- fornia and Nevada (though they provided only California identification). After respondents were cleared for depar- ture, a law enforcement official at the San Juan airport notified petitioner’s task force in Atlanta that respondents had boarded a plane for Atlanta, where they planned to catch a connecting flight to Las Vegas, Nevada. When respondents arrived in Atlanta, petitioner and another DEA agent approached them at the departure gate for their flight to Las Vegas. In response to petition- er’s questioning, Fiore explained that she and Gipson were professional gamblers. Respondents maintained that the cash they were carrying was their gambling “ ‘bank’ ” and winnings. App. 15, 24. After using a drug-sniffing dog to perform a sniff test, petitioner seized the cash.1 Petitioner advised respondents that their funds would be returned if they later proved a legitimate source for the cash. Re- spondents then boarded their plane. After respondents departed, petitioner moved the cash to a secure location and the matter was forwarded to DEA headquarters. The next day, petitioner received a phone call from respondents’ attorney in Nevada seeking return of the funds. On two occasions over the next month, peti- tioner also received documentation from the attorney regarding the legitimacy of the |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | received documentation from the attorney regarding the legitimacy of the funds. At some point after petitioner seized the cash, he helped draft an affidavit to show probable cause for forfeiture of —————— 1 Respondents allege that the sniff test was “at best, inconclusive,” and there is no indication in the pleadings that drugs or drug residue were ever found on or with the cash. App. 21. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 3 Opinion of the Court the funds and forwarded that affidavit to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia.2 According to respondents, the affidavit was false and misleading because petitioner misrepresented the encounter at the airport and omitted exculpatory information regarding the lack of drug evi- dence and the legitimate source of the funds. In the end, no forfeiture complaint was filed, and the DEA returned the funds to respondents in March 2007. Respondents filed suit against petitioner in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking money damages under Respondents alleged that petitioner violated their Fourth Amendment rights by (1) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping the money after concluding it did not come from drug- related activity; (3) drafting and forwarding a probable cause affidavit to support a forfeiture action while know- ing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory informa- tion; and (5) withholding that exculpatory information from the United States Attorney’s Office. The District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dis- miss. Relying on this Court’s decision in the court determined that petition- er’s search of respondents and his seizure of the cash in Georgia did not establish a basis to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The court concluded that even if petitioner caused harm to respondents in Nevada while knowing they lived in Nevada, that fact alone did not confer jurisdiction. Because the court dismissed the com- plaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, it did not determine —————— 2 The alleged affidavit is not in the record. Because this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we take respondents’ factual allega- tions as true, including their allegations regarding the existence and content of the affidavit. 4 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court whether venue was proper. On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals assumed the District Court had correctly deter- mined that petitioner’s search and seizure in Georgia could not support exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada. The court held, however, that the District Court could properly exercise jurisdiction |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | held, however, that the District Court could properly exercise jurisdiction over “the false probable cause affida- vit aspect of the case.” Accord- ing to the Court of Appeals, petitioner “expressly aimed” his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a “significant connection” to Nevada.3 After determining that the delay in returning the funds to respondents caused them “foreseeable harm” in Nevada and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over petitioner was otherwise reasonable, the court found the District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to be proper.4 The Ninth Circuit denied re- hearing en banc, with eight judges, in two separate opin- ions, dissenting. We granted certiorari to decide whether due process permits a Nevada court to exercise jurisdiction over peti- tioner. 568 U. S. (2013). We hold that it does not and —————— 3 The allegations in the complaint suggested to the Court of Appeals that petitioner “definitely knew, at some point after the seizure but before providing the alleged false probable cause affidavit, that [re- spondents] had a significant connection to Nevada.” 4 Judge Ikuta dissented. In her view, the “false affidavit/forfeiture proceeding aspect” over which the majority found jurisdiction proper was not raised as a separate claim in the complaint, and she found it “doubtful that such a constitutional tort even exists.” After the court denied rehearing en banc, the majority explained in a post- script that it viewed the filing of the false affidavit, which effected a “continued seizure” of the funds, as a separate Fourth Amendment violation. at 588–589. Petitioner does not dispute that reading here. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 5 Opinion of the Court therefore reverse.5 II A “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determin- ing the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 6). This is because a federal district court’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of process on a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A). Here, Nevada has authorized its courts to exercise juris- diction over persons “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States.” Nev. Rev. Stat. Thus, in order to determine whether the Federal District Court in this case was authorized to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner, we ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction “comports with the limits imposed by federal due process” |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | jurisdiction “comports with the limits imposed by federal due process” on the State of Nevada. Daimler, at (slip op., at 6). B 1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts. World-Wide Volkswagen Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have “certain minimum con- tacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not —————— 5 We also granted certiorari on the question whether Nevada is a proper venue for the suit under 28 U.S. C. Because we resolve the case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not decide whether venue was proper in Nevada. 6 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 463 (1940)). This case addresses the “minimum contacts” necessary to create specific jurisdiction.6 The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonres- ident defendant “focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” ). For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum Two related aspects of this necessary relationship are relevant in this case. First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the “defendant himself ” creates with the forum Burger Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defend- ant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties. See World-Wide Volkswagen at –292. We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant- focused “minimum contacts” inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. (“[The] unilateral —————— 6 “Specific” or “case-linked” jurisdiction “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy’ ” (i.e., an “activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation”). Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. (slip op., at 2). This is in contrast to “general” or “all purpose” jurisdiction, which permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit (e.g., domicile). Respondents rely on specific jurisdiction only. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 7 Opinion of the Court activity of another party or a third person is not an appro- priate consideration when determining whether a defend- ant has sufficient |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | priate consideration when determining whether a defend- ant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction”). We have thus rejected a plain- tiff ’s argument that a Florida court could exercise per- sonal jurisdiction over a trustee in Delaware based solely on the contacts of the trust’s settlor, who was domiciled in Florida and had executed powers of appointment there. We have likewise held that Oklahoma courts could not exer- cise personal jurisdiction over an automobile distributor that supplies New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut dealers based only on an automobile purchaser’s act of driving it on Oklahoma highways. World-Wide Volks- wagen Put simply, however sig- nificant the plaintiff ’s contacts with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be “decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated.” 444 U.S., at Second, our “minimum contacts” analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. See, e.g., International (Due process “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judg- ment in personam against an individual with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations”); (“However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him”). Accordingly, we have upheld the assertion of juris- diction over defendants who have purposefully “reach[ed] out beyond” their State and into another by, for example, entering a contractual relationship that “envisioned con- tinuing and wide-reaching contacts” in the forum State, Burger at 479–480, or by circulating maga- 8 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court zines to “deliberately exploi[t]” a market in the forum State, And although physical pres- ence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, Burger physical entry into the State— either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant contact. See, e.g., at 773–774. But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him. See Burger (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot”); (declining to “find personal jurisdiction in a State merely because |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | (declining to “find personal jurisdiction in a State merely because [the plaintiff in a child support action] was residing there”). To be sure, a defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction. See at (“Naturally, the parties’ relation- ships with each other may be significant in evaluating their ties to the forum. The requirements of International however, must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction”). Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the Burger 471 U.S., at (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 9 Opinion of the Court 2 These same principles apply when intentional torts are involved. In that context, it is likewise insufficient to rely on a defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated con- tacts” or on the “unilateral activity” of a plaintiff. (same). A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on inten- tional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the forum. illustrates the applica- tion of these principles. In a California actress brought a libel suit in California state court against a reporter and an editor, both of whom worked for the Na- tional Enquirer at its headquarters in Florida. The plain- tiff ’s libel claims were based on an article written and edited by the defendants in Florida for publication in the National Enquirer, a national weekly newspaper with a California circulation of roughly 600,000. We held that California’s assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants was consistent with due process. Although we recognized that the defendants’ activities “focus[ed]” on the plaintiff, our jurisdictional inquiry “focuse[d] on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” (quoting 433 U.S., at ). Specifically, we examined the various contacts the defend- ants had created with California (and not just with the plaintiff) by writing the allegedly libelous story. We found those forum contacts to be ample: The defend- ants relied on phone calls to “California sources” for the information in their article; they wrote the story about the plaintiff ’s activities in California; they caused reputa- tional injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous article that was widely circulated in the State; |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | allegedly libelous article that was widely circulated in the State; and the “brunt” of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that 465 U.S., –789. “In sum, California [wa]s the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.” 10 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court Jurisdiction over the defendants was “there- fore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” The crux of was that the reputation-based “ef- fects” of the alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the plaintiff. The strength of that connection was largely a function of the nature of the libel tort. However scandalous a newspaper article might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to (and read and understood by) third persons. See Restate- ment (Second) of Torts §, Comment b (1976); see also (“[R]eputation is the estimation in which one’s char- acter is held by his neighbors or associates”). Accordingly, the reputational injury caused by the defendants’ story would not have occurred but for the fact that the defend- ants wrote an article for publication in California that was read by a large number of California citizens. Indeed, because publication to third persons is a necessary ele- ment of libel, see the defendants’ intentional tort actually occurred in California. (“The tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the offending material is circulated”). In this way, the “ef- fects” caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to the plaintiff ’s reputation in the estimation of the Califor- nia public—connected the defendants’ conduct to Califor- nia, not just to a plaintiff who lived there. That connec- tion, combined with the various facts that gave the article a California focus, sufficed to authorize the California court’s exercise of jurisdiction.7 —————— 7 The defendants in argued that no contacts they had with California were sufficiently purposeful because their employer was responsible for circulation of the article. See 465 U.S. 783, 789 We rejected that argument. Even though the defend- ants did not circulate the article themselves, they “expressly aimed” “their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions” at California be- cause they knew the National Enquirer “ha[d] its largest circulation” in Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 11 Opinion of the Court III Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. 357 U.S., It is undisputed that no part of petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada. Peti- tioner approached, questioned, and searched |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | conduct occurred in Nevada. Peti- tioner approached, questioned, and searched respondents, and seized the cash at issue, in the Atlanta airport. It is alleged that petitioner later helped draft a “false probable cause affidavit” in Georgia and forwarded that affidavit to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to support a potential action for forfeiture of the seized funds. 688 F.3d, at 563. Petitioner never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper lens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally rele- vant contacts with Nevada. The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion by shifting the analytical focus from petitioner’s contacts with the forum to his contacts with respondents. See 444 U.S., at Rather than assessing petitioner’s own contacts with Nevada, the Court of Appeals looked to petitioner’s knowledge of respondents’ “strong forum connections.” 688 F.3d, at –579, 581. In the court’s view, that knowledge, combined with its conclusion that respondents suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada, satis- fied the “minimum contacts” inquiry.8 This approach to the “minimum contacts” analysis —————— California, and that the article would “have a potentially devastating impact” there. –790. 8 Respondents propose a substantially similar analysis. They suggest that “a defendant creates sufficient minimum contacts with a forum when he (1) intentionally targets (2) a known resident of the forum (3) for imposition of an injury (4) to be suffered by the plaintiff while she is residing in the forum state.” Brief for Respondents 26–27. 12 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court impermissibly allows a plaintiff ’s contacts with the de- fendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis. Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada con- nections. Such reasoning improperly attributes a plain- tiff ’s forum connections to the defendant and makes those connections “decisive” in the jurisdictional analysis. See at It also obscures the reality that none of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself. Relying on respondents emphasize that they suffered the “injury” caused by petitioner’s allegedly tor- tious conduct (i.e., the delayed return of their gambling funds) while they were residing in the forum. Brief for Respondents 14. This emphasis is likewise misplaced. As previously noted, made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way. Respondents’ claimed injury does not evince a connec- tion between petitioner and Nevada. Even if we consider the continuation of the seizure in Georgia to be a distinct injury, it is not the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada in any meaningful way. Respondents (and only respond- ents) lacked access to their funds in Nevada not because anything independently occurred there, but because Ne- vada is where respondents chose to be at a time when they desired to use the funds seized by petitioner. Respondents would have experienced this same lack of access in Cali- fornia, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled and found themselves wanting more money than Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 13 Opinion of the Court they had. Unlike the broad publication of the forum- focused story in the effects of petitioner’s con- duct on respondents are not connected to the forum State in a way that makes those effects a proper basis for jurisdiction.9 The Court of Appeals pointed to other possible contacts with Nevada, each ultimately unavailing. Respondents’ Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, but that is precisely the sort of “unilateral activity” of a third party that “cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum ” Respondents allege that some of the cash seized in Georgia “originated” in Nevada, but that attenuated connection was not created by petitioner, and the cash was in Georgia, not Nevada, when petitioner seized it. Finally, the funds were eventu- ally returned to respondents in Nevada, but petitioner had nothing to do with that return (indeed, it seems likely that it was respondents’ unilateral decision to have their funds sent to Nevada). * * * Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction are sufficient to decide this case. The proper focus of the —————— 9 Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks minimum con- tacts in this case, it will bring about unfairness in cases where inten- tional torts are committed via the Internet or other electronic means (e.g., fraudulent access of financial accounts or “phishing” schemes). As an initial matter, we reiterate that the “minimum contacts” inquiry principally protects the liberty of the nonresident defendant, not the interests of the plaintiff. World-Wide Volkswagen –292 In any event, this case does not present the very different |
Justice Thomas | 2,014 | 1 | majority | Walden v. Fiore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2654532/walden-v-fiore/ | any event, this case does not present the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual “presence” and conduct translate into “contacts” with a particular To the contrary, there is no question where the conduct giving rise to this litigation took place: Petitioner seized physical cash from respondents in the Atlanta airport, and he later drafted and forwarded an affidavit in Georgia. We leave questions about virtual contacts for another day. 14 WALDEN v. FIORE Opinion of the Court “minimum contacts” inquiry in intentional-tort cases is “ ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” 465 U.S., And it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the forum In this case, the application of those principles is clear: Petitioner’s rele- vant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia, and the mere fact that his conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does not suffice to authorize jurisdic- tion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | The Internal Revenue Code and the Social Security Act direct the Secretary of the Treasury to "intercept" certain *853 tax refunds payable to persons who have failed to meet child-support obligations. In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that payments involving earned-income credits could be intercepted. We granted certiorari, because this ruling was in conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits. See ; (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. I A Stanley Sorenson, the husband of petitioner Marie Sorenson, was legally obligated to make child-support payments for a child of his previous marriage who was in the custody of his former wife. Mr. Sorenson was unemployed because of a disability and fell behind on those support payments. His former wife applied for welfare benefits from the State of Washington. Since 1975, the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) has required, as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for welfare assign to the State concerned any right to child-support payments that has accrued at the time of assignment. (c)(5)(C), 2 U.S. C. 602(a)(26)(A).[1] Thus, Stanley Sorenson's former wife turned over to the State her right to collect the payments Mr. Sorenson had failed to make. Stanley and Marie Sorenson also had their own dependent child living with them. They thus were potentially eligible *85 to receive an earned-income credit. For the calendar year 1981, the time relevant to this lawsuit, 3 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195, as amended, provided that an individual responsible for the support of a child living with him was allowed "as a credit against the tax imposed for the taxable year an amount equal to 10 percent of so much of the earned income for the taxable year as does not exceed $5,000." As the amount of the taxpayer's earned income increased, the amount of the credit decreased, reaching zero when the taxpayer's adjusted gross income reached $10,000.[2] Unlike certain other credits, which can be used only to offset tax that would otherwise be owed, the earned-income credit is "refundable." Thus, if an individual's earned-income credit exceeds his tax liability, the excess amount is "considered an overpayment" of tax under 601(b), as it then read, of the 195 Code.[3] Subject to specified setoffs, *855 602(a) directs the Secretary to credit or refund "any overpayment" to the person who made it.[] An individual who is entitled to an earned-income credit that exceeds the amount of tax he owes thereby receives the difference as if he had overpaid his tax in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | the difference as if he had overpaid his tax in that amount. B In February petitioner and her husband timely filed a joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1981. Petitioner had worked during part of that year, and all the Sorenson family income for the year was attributable to her wages and unemployment compensation benefits. By the return so filed, the Sorensons anticipated a refund of $108.90, consisting in part of excess withholding on petitioner's wages and in part of an earned-income credit. The Internal Revenue Service, however, notified the Sorensons that $1,132 of the anticipated refund was being retained, under the authority granted it by the tax-intercept law, and *856 would be paid over to the State of Washington because that State had been assigned the right to collect Mr. Sorenson's unpaid child-support obligations. See Second Declaration of Peter Greenfield, Exh. B, Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, No. C82-1C (WD Wash.). The tax-intercept law essentially directs the Secretary to give priority to a State's claim for recoupment of welfare payments made to a family who failed to receive child support, see 02(a)(26)(A) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 2 U.S. C. 602(a)(26)(A), over an individual's claim for refund of tax overpayment. See 602(a), as amended, of the 195 Code. The intercept law originally was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. 97-35, 2331, First, OBRA 2331(a) added 6 to the Social Security Act, 2 U.S. C. 66. That section directs the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Health and Human Services to establish a scheme by which a State is to notify the Secretary of the Treasury of persons who owe past-due child-support payments that have been assigned to it, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to intercept tax-refund payments that would otherwise be paid to those persons: "Upon receiving notice from a State agency administering [an AFDC plan] that a named individual owes past-due support which has been assigned to such State pursuant to section 02(a)(26), the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine whether any amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid, are payable to such individual (regardless of whether such individual filed a tax return as a married or unmarried individual). If the Secretary of the Treasury finds that any such amount is payable, he shall withhold from such refunds an amount equal to the past-due support, and pay such amount to the State agency (together with notice of the individual's *857 home address) for distribution in accordance with section 57(b)(3)." 6(a), 2 U.S. C. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | distribution in accordance with section 57(b)(3)." 6(a), 2 U.S. C. 66(a).[5] Section 2331(c) of OBRA amended the Internal Revenue Code. It added a new subsection to the provision governing the Secretary of the Treasury's authority to refund overpayments to taxpayers. The new subsection, 602(c), requires the Secretary to withhold from the refund otherwise due the taxpayer the amount owed the State in past-due child support and to remit the amount withheld to the State: "The amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support (as defined in section 6(c) of the Social Security Act) owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 6 of the Social Security Act. The Secretary shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State to which such support has been assigned and notify the person making the overpayment that so much of the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support has been paid to the State. This subsection shall be applied to an overpayment prior to its being credited to a person's future liability for an internal revenue tax." C After negotiations concerning the status of tax refunds in community property States such as Washington issues that are not germane to the question now presented to this Court the Secretary ultimately withheld only half of the refund increment the Sorensons claimed. Petitioner then filed *858 a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking, among other things, a declaration that 6 of the Social Security Act did not reach a refund attributable to an excess earned-income credit. The District Court rejected the Secretary's jurisdictional arguments, which were renewed on appeal to the Court of Appeals but which are not pressed in this Court. See Brief for Respondents 5, n. 1. But it agreed with the Secretary's arguments on the merits and granted summary judgment for the Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. It rejected petitioner's statutory construction arguments, and held that, since the Code expressly defined excess earned-income credits as "overpayments," and disbursed those excess credits to recipients through the income tax refund process, the credits were "payable `as' refunds of federal taxes paid" and therefore could be intercepted. Congress used the broad terms "any amounts" and "any overpayment" in the tax-intercept law and gave no indication that it intended to exclude earned-income credit payments from these terms. The Court of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | exclude earned-income credit payments from these terms. The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner's argument that the Secretary's position conflicted with Congress' intention to provide benefits to the poor through the earned-income credit. First, the legislative history of 3 did not suggest that the earned-income credit was intended primarily as a type of welfare grant; rather, it was meant to negate the disincentive to work caused by Social Security taxes. Since the earned-income credit was payable as a lump sum, it was more like excess withholding, which was clearly reachable by the intercept program, than it was like wages, a portion of which Congress exempted from the assessment and collection process. See n. 1. Second, had Congress intended to exempt earned-income credit payments from the intercept program, it could have done so expressly. Instead, it provided that any amount payable *859 through the federal tax-refund process might be intercepted. "In the face of this rather clear statutory mandate," said the Court of Appeals, "we conclude that we are not free to speculate that Congress intended otherwise." II Petitioner advances two arguments to support her claim that an excess earned-income credit cannot be intercepted. First, she claims that the language and structure of the interlocking statutory provisions that make up the intercept law exclude an earned-income credit from its reach: excess earned-income credits are neither "overpayments" nor "refunds of Federal taxes paid," and only those items are subject to interception. Second, she claims that permitting interception of an earned-income credit would frustrate Congress' aims in providing the credit, and thus that Congress could not have intended the intercept law to reach earned-income credits. We find neither argument persuasive. A The Internal Revenue Code's treatment of earned-income credits supports the Government's position. An individual can receive the amount by which his entitlement to an earned-income credit exceeds his tax liability only because 601(b) of the Code defines that amount as an "overpayment," and 602 provides a mechanism for disbursing overpayments, namely, the income tax refund process. The refundability of the earned-income credit is thus inseparable from its classification as an overpayment of tax. Petitioner therefore acknowledges that the excess earned-income credit is an "overpayment" for purposes of 602(a), the general provision that authorizes all tax refunds. See n. If it were not, the Secretary would lack authorization for refunding it to her. She claims, however, that while an excess earned-income credit is an "overpayment" for purposes of 602(a), it is not an "overpayment" for purposes of 602(c), which requires that the "amount of any overpayment *860 shall be reduced by the amount |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | of any overpayment *860 shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support" assigned to the State. The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that " `identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.' " 293 U.S. 8, (193), quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. 27, 33 That the Internal Revenue Code includes an explicit definition of "overpayment" in the same subchapter strengthens the presumption. And that both subsections concern the tax-refund treatment of "overpayment[s]" is especially damaging to any claim that "the words, though in the same act, are found in such dissimilar connections as to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent." Stockholms Enskilda 293 U. S., at Petitioner and the two Courts of Appeals that have excluded excess earned-income credits from the definition of "overpayment" used in 602(c) offer two bases for their position. First, they believe that 602(c) limits 601(b)'s broad definition "by [using] the phrase `overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment.' " 731 F. 2d, at 111; see 751 F. 2d, at 356. Not all overpayments, they suggest, are refunded to persons who "made" them, since some those consisting of earned-income credits may be refunded to persons who actually have not paid any tax. We disagree. All refunds made by the Secretary under 602(a) are paid to "the person who made the overpayment." The phrase merely identifies the person entitled to the refund; it does not restrict the nature of the refund itself. Petitioner must characterize herself as a person who has "made" an overpayment; otherwise, she cannot claim her excess earned-income credit. The phrase in 602(c) on which petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits relied is virtually identical to the phrase used in 602(a). Since the words cannot have *861 the limiting effect petitioner proposes when used in 602(a), no justification exists for giving them such a construction in 602(c). Second, petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits perceive a tension between 602(b)'s and 602(a)'s treatment of excess earned-income credits and 6(a)'s treatment of interceptable amounts. As used in those Code sections, "overpayment" includes more than "refunds of Federal taxes paid," the phrase used in the Social Security Act. Since 6 and 602(c) were enacted simultaneously as part of OBRA, petitioner and the two Circuits believe that 602(c) should be harmonized with 6 rather than with 601(b) and 602(a). See 751 F. 2d, at 357; 731 F. 2d., at 111. This second argument, it seems to |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | F. 2d., at 111. This second argument, it seems to us, misperceives the structure of the tax-intercept law, and manufactures a tension that need not exist. OBRA's placement of provisions regarding interception in both Acts reflects a division of functions. The tax-intercept program lies at the intersection of the Social Security Act's concern in Subchapter IV, Part D, with child support, and the Internal Revenue Code's concern in Chapter 65, Subchapter A, with the treatment of credits in the tax-refund process. Section 6 addresses the concerns of the States that have received AFDC-related grants. It defines past-due child support, authorizes procedures by which the States can notify the Secretary of the Treasury of their entitlement to recover such past-due support, and directs the Secretary to aid the States, through his control over the tax-refund process, in recouping that support. Sections 601 and 602 address the operation of the tax-refund process under the Internal Revenue Code. They define the status of certain tax credits, set up a mechanism for disbursing refunds, and direct the Secretary to divert certain amounts from the refund process. To the extent that the tax-intercept law regulates the relationship of the Secretary of the Treasury to refund claimants, it does so through *862 602, and not through a provision that governs the Secretary's relationship to state agencies. Petitioner, however, views 602(c)'s reference to 6 as indicating that 6(a) is meant to be read into 602(c) as a limitation on the Secretary's intercept powers. This argument depends on a somewhat strained construction of 602(c)'s statement that "[t]he amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 6 of the Social Security Act." Petitioner claims that "[t]he words `in accordance with section 6 of the Social Security Act' do not modify `has been notified by a State,' as one might initially assume. Rather they belatedly modify the words `shall be reduced.' " Brief for Petitioner 18. In petitioner's view, her construction would lead to the conclusion that a refund can be reduced only to the extent that the refund represents a refund of tax actually paid, since that is all 6(a) permits. We disagree with both petitioner's construction of 602(c) and her reading of 6(a). First, it seems far more plausible that the words modify the nearest verb. If they are given this more natural reading, then 602(c) directs the Secretary to intercept only that amount which |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | 602(c) directs the Secretary to intercept only that amount which properly is classified as past-due support and of which he properly has been notified. But even if the reference in 602(c) to 6 were read to refer solely to 6(a),[6] nothing in that subsection exempts excess earned-income credits from interception. Petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits recast their *863 argument regarding the meaning of "overpayment" by contending that the amount of a refund that is attributable to an excess earned-income credit is not a "refun[d] of Federal taxes paid," and that 6(a) permits interception of only "amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid": "A refund of federal taxes is a repayment of money paid by a taxpayer in excess of that taxpayer's liability. Although the earned income credit is given effect through the income tax return, the credit is not a tax refund because eligibility for the credit is not contingent upon payment of any federal income tax." 751 F. 2d, at 356. But just as eligibility for an earned-income credit does not depend upon an individual's actually having paid any tax, the Code's classification of the credit as an "overpayment" to be refunded is similarly independent of the individual's actually having made any payment. Cf. 601(c). The Ninth Circuit correctly held that, to the extent an excess earned-income credit is "payable" to an individual, it is payable as if it were a refund of tax 752 F.2d, Section 6(a)'s reference to the tax-refund process is best understood as a directive to the Secretary that he follow the procedures established by the Internal Revenue Code for calculating and disbursing refunds, rather than as an attempt implicitly to redefine terms given special meaning by the Code. B Nor do we agree with petitioner's claim that Congress did not intend the intercept program to reach excess earned-income credits. Petitioner and the Government agree that Congress never mentioned the earned-income credit in enacting OBRA. See Brief for Petitioner 2; Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. But it defies belief that Congress was unaware, when it provided in 602(c) that "any overpayment to be refunded shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support" (emphasis *86 added), that this would include refunds attributable to excess earned-income credits. Congress had previously expressly defined an excess earned-income credit as an "overpayment," in 601(b) of the Internal Revenue Code the section immediately preceding the section to which Congress added the intercept provision.[7] What petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits are really claiming is that the intercept law should be read narrowly to avoid frustrating |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | majority | Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111634/sorenson-v-secretary-of-treasury/ | the intercept law should be read narrowly to avoid frustrating the goals of the earned-income credit program. The earned-income credit was enacted to reduce the disincentive to work caused by the imposition of Social Security taxes on earned income (welfare payments are not similarly taxed), to stimulate the economy by funneling funds to persons likely to spend the money immediately, and to provide relief for low-income families hurt by rising food and energy prices.[8] Each is an undeniably important objective. It is impossible, however, for us to say that these goals outweigh the goals served by the subsequently enacted tax-intercept program securing child support from absent *865 parents whenever possible and reducing the number of families on welfare.[9] Congress of course could conclude that families eligible for earned-income credits have a more compelling claim to the funds involved than do either the States or non-AFDC families. But it is equally clear that Congress could have decided that the more pressing need was to alleviate the "devastating consequences for children and the taxpayers" of the epidemic of nonsupport. See Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance on Spending Reduction Proposals, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 3 (1981) (statement of Secretary Schweiker).[10] The ordering of competing social policies is a quintessentially legislative function. In light of Congress' decision to direct the interception of any overpayment otherwise refundable to a taxpayer, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to "speculate that Congress intended otherwise." Its judgment, accordingly, is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the court's instructions in a trial for mailing obscene materials prior to 3, and therefore tried under the -Memoirs standards, could properly include children and sensitive persons within the definition of the community by whose standards obscenity is to be judged. We are also asked to determine whether the evidence supported a charge that members of deviant sexual groups may be considered in determining whether the materials appealed to prurient interest in sex; whether a charge of pandering was proper in light of the evidence; and whether comparison evidence proffered by petitioner should have been admitted on the issue of contemporary community standards. *295 Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in United District Court on 11 counts, charging that he had mailed obscene materials and advertising brochures for obscene materials in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1 (6 ed.).[1] On appeal, his conviction was reversed on the grounds that the instructions to the jury defining obscenity had been cast under the standards established in although the offenses charged occurred in 1 when the standards announced in and particularized in were applicable. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the District Court for a new trial under the standards controlling in 1. No. 73-2900 (CA9 Feb. 5, 5, rehearing denied May 13, 5); see On retrial in 6, petitioner was again convicted on the same 11 counts. He was sentenced to terms of four years' imprisonment on each count, the terms to be served concurrently, and fined $500 on each count, for a total fine of $5,500. The Court of Appeals affirmed. I The evidence presented by the Government in its case in chief consisted of materials mailed by the petitioner accompanied by a stipulation of facts which, among other things, recited that petitioner, knowing the contents of the mailings,[2] had "voluntarily and intentionally" used the mails on 11 occasions to deliver brochures illustrating sex books, magazines, *296 and films, and to deliver a sex magazine (one count) and a sex film (one count), with the intention that these were for the personal use of the recipients. From the stipulation and the record, it appears undisputed that the recipients were adults who resided both within and without the State of Because of the basis of our disposition of this case, it is unnecessary for us to review the contents of the exhibits in detail. The defense consisted of expert testimony and surveys offered to demonstrate that the materials did not appeal to prurient interest, were not in conflict with community standards, and |
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