author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | prurient interest, were not in conflict with community standards, and had redeeming social value. Two films were proffered by the defense for the stated purpose of demonstrating that comparable material had received wide box office acceptance, thus demonstrating that the materials covered by the indictment were not obscene and complied with community standards. As a rebuttal witness, the Government presented an expert who testified as to what some of the exhibits depicted and that in his opinion they appealed to the prurient interest of the average person and to that of members of particular deviant groups. II In this Court, as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges four parts of the jury instructions and the trial court's rejection of the comparison films. A. Instruction as to Children Petitioner challenges that part of the jury instruction which read: "In determining community standards, you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and the irreligious, men, women and children, from all walks of life." (Emphasis added.) *297 The Court of Appeals concluded that the inclusion of children was "unnecessary" and that it would "prefer that children be excluded from the court's [jury] instruction until the Supreme Court clearly indicates that inclusion is proper." It correctly noted that this Court had been ambivalent on this point, having sustained the conviction in where the instruction included children, and having intimated later in that it did not necessarily approve the inclusion of "children" as part of the community instruction.[3] Reviewing the charge as a whole under the traditional standard of review, cogent arguments can be made that the inclusion of children was harmless error, see ; however, the courts, the bar, and the public are entitled to greater clarity than is offered by the ambiguous comment in Ginzburg on this score. Since this is a federal prosecution under an Act of Congress, we elect to take this occasion to make clear that children are not to be included for these purposes as part of the "community" as that term relates to the "obscene materials" proscribed by 18 U.S. C. 1 (6 ed.). Cf. Earlier in the same Term in which was decided, the Court had reversed a conviction under a state statute which *298 made criminal the dissemination of a book "found to have a potentially deleterious influence on youth." The statute was invalidated because its "incidence is to reduce the adult population to reading only what is fit for children." The instruction given here, when read as a whole, did not have an effect so |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | read as a whole, did not have an effect so drastic as the Butler statute. But it may well be that a jury conscientiously striving to define the relevant community of persons, the "average person," by whose standards obscenity is to be judged, would reach a much lower "average" when children are part of the equation than it would if it restricted its consideration to the effect of allegedly obscene materials on adults. Cf. There was no evidence that children were the intended recipients of the materials at issue here, or that petitioner had reason to know children were likely to receive the materials. Indeed, an affirmative representation was made that children were not involved in this case.[4] We therefore conclude it was error to instruct the jury that they were a part of the relevant community, and accordingly the conviction cannot stand. B. Instruction as to Sensitive Persons It does not follow, however, as petitioner contends, that the inclusion of "sensitive persons" in the charge advising the jury of whom the community consists was error. The District Court's charge was: "Thus the brochures, magazines and film are not to be *299 judged on the basis of your personal opinion. Nor are they to be judged by their effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group in the community. You are to judge these materials by the standard of the hypothetical average person in the community, but in determining this average standard you must include the sensitive and the insensitive, in other words, you must include everyone in the community." (Emphasis added.) Petitioner's reliance on passages from and at for the proposition that inclusion of sensitive persons in the relevant community was error is misplaced. In we said, "[T]he primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of `the average person, applying contemporary community standards' is to be certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive personor indeed a totally insensitive one. See" This statement was essentially repeated in : "[T]he Court has held that 1 embodies a requirement that local rather than national standards should be applied. Similarly, obscenity is to be judged according to the average person in the community, rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant. Both of these substantive limitations are passed on to the jury in the form of instructions." (Footnote omitted.) The point of these passages was to emphasize what was an issue central to |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | passages was to emphasize what was an issue central to that "judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well *300 encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press." 354 U.S.,[5] But nothing in those opinions suggests that "sensitive" and "insensitive" persons, however defined, are to be excluded from the community as a whole for the purpose of deciding if materials are obscene. In the narrow and limited context of this case, the community includes all adults who constitute it, and a jury can consider them all in determining relevant community standards. The vice is in focusing upon the most susceptible or sensitive members when judging the obscenity of materials, not in including them along with all others in the community. See U.S. 502, Petitioner relies also on to support his argument. Like and though, Hamling merely restated the by now familiar rule that jurors are not to base their decision about the materials on their "personal opinion, nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group." 418 U.S., at It is clear the trial court did not instruct the jury to focus on sensitive persons or groups. It explicitly said the jury should not use sensitive persons as a standard, and emphasized that in determining the "average person" standard the jury "must include the sensitive and the insensitive, in other words everyone in the community." The difficulty of framing charges in this area is well recognized. But the term "average person" as used in this charge means what it usually means, and is no less clear than "reasonable person" used for generations in other contexts. Cf. Cautionary instructions to avoid subjective personal and private views in determining community standards can do no more than tell the individual juror that in evaluating the hypothetical "average *301 person" he is to determine the collective view of the community, as best as it can be done. Simon E. Sobeloff, then Solicitor General, later Chief Judge of the United Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, very aptly stated the dilemma: "Is the so-called definition of negligence really a definition? What could be fuzzier than the instruction to the jury that negligence is a failure to observe that care which would be observed by a `reasonable man'a chimerical creature conjured up to give an aura of definiteness where definiteness is not possible. "Every man is likely to think of himself as the happy exemplification of `the reasonable man'; and |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | himself as the happy exemplification of `the reasonable man'; and so the standard he adopts in order to fulfill the law's prescription will resemble himself, or what he thinks he is, or what he thinks he should be, even if he is not. All these shifts and variations of his personal norm will find reflection in the verdict. The whole business is necessarily equivocal. This we recognize, but we are reconciled to the impossibility of discovering any form of words that will ring with perfect clarity and be automatically self-executing. Alas, there is no magic push-button in this or in other branches of the law." (Emphasis added.)[6] However one defines "sensitive" or "insensitive" persons, they are part of the community. The contention that the instruction was erroneous because it included sensitive persons is therefore without merit. C. Instruction as to Deviant Groups Challenge is made to the inclusion of "members of a deviant sexual group" in the charge which recited: "The first test to be applied, in determining whether a given picture is obscene, is whether the predominant *302 theme or purpose of the picture, when viewed as a whole and not part by part, and when considered in relation to the intended and probable recipients, is an appeal to the prurient interest of the average person of the community as a whole or the prurient interest of members of a deviant sexual group at the time of mailing. "In applying this test, the question involved is not how the picture now impresses the individual juror, but rather, considering the intended and probable recipients, how the picture would have impressed the average person, or a member of a deviant sexual group at the time they received the picture." Examination of some of the materials could lead to the reasonable conclusion that their prurient appeal would be more acute to persons of deviant persuasions, but it is equally clear they were intended to arouse the prurient interest of any reader or observer. Nothing prevents a court from giving an instruction on prurient appeal to deviant sexual groups as part of an instruction pertaining to appeal to the average person when the evidence, as here, would support such a charge. See Many of the exhibits depicted aberrant sexual activities. These depictions were generally provided along with or as a part of the materials which apparently were thought likely to appeal to the prurient interest in sex of nondeviant persons. One of the mailings even provided a list of deviant sexual groups which the recipient was asked to mark to indicate interest in |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | the recipient was asked to mark to indicate interest in receiving the type of materials thought appealing to that particular group. Whether materials are obscene generally can be decided by viewing them; expert testimony is not necessary. U. S., at 465; ; see But petitioner claims that to support *303 an instruction on appeal to the prurient interest of deviants, the prosecution must come forward with evidence to guide the jury in its deliberations, since jurors cannot be presumed to know the reaction of such groups to stimuli as they would that of the average person. Concededly, in the past we have "reserve[d] judgment on the extreme case where contested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the [particular] prurient interest." Paris Adult Theatre But here we are not presented with that "extreme" case because the Government did in fact present expert testimony on rebuttal which, when combined with the exhibits themselves, sufficiently guided the jury. This instruction, therefore, was acceptable. D. Instruction as to Pandering Pandering is "the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers." citing -496 We have held, and reaffirmed, that to aid a jury in its determination of whether materials are obscene, the methods of their creation, promotion, or dissemination are relevant. Splawn v. ; In essence, the Court has considered motivation relevant to the ultimate evaluation if the prosecution offers evidence of motivation. In this case the trial judge gave a pandering instruction to which the jury could advert if it found "this to be a close case" under the three part -Memoirs test. This was not a so-called finding instruction which removed the jury's discretion; rather it permitted the jury to consider the touting descriptions along with the materials themselves to determine whether they were intended to appeal to the recipient's * prurient interest in sex, whether they were "commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal," Ginzburg, if indeed the evidence admitted of any other purpose. And while it is true the Government offered no extensive evidence of the methods of production, editorial goals, if any, methods of operation, or means of delivery other than the mailings and the names, locations, and occupations of the recipients, the evidence was sufficient to trigger the Ginzburg pandering instruction. E. Exclusion of Comparison Evidence At trial petitioner proffered, and the trial judge rejected, two films which were said to have |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | majority | Pinkus v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109865/pinkus-v-united-states/ | trial judge rejected, two films which were said to have had considerable popular and commercial success when displayed in Los Angeles and elsewhere around the country. He proffered this assertedly comparable material as evidence that materials as explicit as his had secured community tolerance. Apparently the theory was that display of such movies had altered the level of community tolerance. On appeal the Court of Appeals began an inquiry into whether the comparison evidence should have been admitted. It held that exclusion of the evidence was proper as to the printed materials; but it abandoned the inquiry when, in reliance on the so-called concurrent-sentence doctrine, it concluded that even if the comparison evidence had been improperly excluded as to the count involving petitioner's film, the sentence would not be affected. It therefore exercised its discretion not to pass on the admissibility of the comparison evidence and hence did not review the conviction on the film count.[7] However, the sentences on the 11 counts were not in fact fully concurrent; petitioner's 11 prison terms of four years each were concurrent but the $500 fines on each of the counts *305 were cumulative, totaling $5,500, so that a separate fine of $500 was imposed on the film count. Petitioner thus had at least a pecuniary interest in securing review of his conviction on each of the counts. In light of our disposition of the case the issue of admissibility of the comparison evidence is not before us, and we leave it to the Court of Appeals to decide whether or to what extent such evidence is relevant to a jury's evaluation of community standards. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | The principal issue in this case is whether a federal district court lawfully may enjoin a plaintiff who has prevailed in a trial in state court from executing the judgment in its favor pending appeal of that judgment to a state appellate court. *4 I Getty Oil Co. and appellant Pennzoil Co. negotiated an agreement under which Pennzoil was to purchase about three-sevenths of Getty's outstanding shares for $0 a share. Appellee Texaco Inc. eventually purchased the shares for $128 a share. On February 8, 1984, Pennzoil filed a complaint against Texaco in the County District Court, a state court located in Houston, Texas, the site of Pennzoil's corporate headquarters. The complaint alleged that Texaco tortiously had induced Getty to breach a contract to sell its shares to Pennzoil; Pennzoil sought actual damages of $7.3 billion and punitive damages in the same amount. On November 19, 198, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Pennzoil, finding actual damages of $7.3 billion and punitive damages of $3 billion. The parties anticipated that the judgment, including prejudgment interest, would exceed $ billion. Although the parties disagree about the details, it was clear that the expected judgment would give Pennzoil significant right under Texas law. By recording an abstract of a judgment in the real property records of any of the 24 counties in Texas, a judgment creditor can secure a lien on all of a judgment debtor's real property located in that county. See If a judgment creditor wishes to have the judgment enforced by state officials so that it can take possession of any of the debtor's assets, it may secure a writ of execution from the clerk of the court that issued the judgment. See Tex. Rule Civ. Proc. 627.[1] Rule 627 provides that such a writ usually can be obtained "after the expiration of thirty days from the time a * final judgment is signed."[2] But the judgment debtor "may suspend the execution of the judgment by filing a good and sufficient bond to be approved by the clerk." Rule 364(a). See Rule 368.[3] For a money judgment, "the amount of the bond shall be at least the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs." Rule 364(b).[4] Even before the trial court entered judgment, the jury's verdict cast a serious cloud on Texaco's financial situation. The amount of the bond required by Rule 364(b) would have been more than $13 billion. It is clear that Texaco would not have been able to post such a bond. Accordingly, "the business and financial community concluded that Pennzoil would be able, |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | business and financial community concluded that Pennzoil would be able, under the lien and bond provisions of Texas law, to commence enforcement of any judgment entered on the verdict before Texaco's appeals had been resolved." App. to Juris. Statement A87 The effects on Texaco were substantial: the price of its stock dropped markedly; it had difficulty obtaining credit; the rating of its bonds was lowered; and its trade creditors refused to sell it crude oil on customary terms. at A90-A98 (District Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact 49-70). *6 Texaco did not argue to the trial court that the judgment, or execution of the judgment, conflicted with federal law. Rather, on December 10, 198 before the Texas court entered judgment[] Texaco filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in White Plains, New York, the site of Texaco's corporate headquarters. Texaco alleged that the Texas proceedings violated rights secured to Texaco by the Constitution and various federal statutes.[6] It asked the District Court to enjoin Pennzoil from taking any action to enforce the judgment. Pennzoil's response, and basic position, was that the District Court could not hear the case. First, it argued that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S. C. 2283, barred issuance of an injunction. It further contended that the court should abstain *7 under the doctrine of Third, it argued that the suit was in effect an appeal from the Texas trial court and that the District Court had no jurisdiction under the principles of and District of Columbia Court of The District Court rejected all of these arguments. It found the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable because Texaco's complaint rested on 42 U.S. C. See (holding that 1983 falls within the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act). It found Younger abstention unwarranted because it did not believe issuance of an injunction would "interfere with a state official's pursuit of a fundamental state interest." As to the Rooker- doctrine, the court noted only that it was not "attempting to sit as a final or intermediate appellate state court as to the merits of the Texas action. Our only intention is to assure Texaco its constitutional right to raise claims that we view as having a good chance of success." The District Court justified its decision to grant injunctive relief by evaluating the prospects of Texaco's succeeding in its appeal in the Texas state courts. It considered the merits of the various challenges Texaco had made before the Texas Court of Appeals and concluded that these challenges "present generally fair grounds for litigation." It |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | that these challenges "present generally fair grounds for litigation." It then evaluated the constitutionality of the Texas lien and bond requirements by applying the test articulated in It concluded that application of the lien and bond provisions effectively would deny Texaco a right to appeal. It thought that the private interests and the State's interests favored protecting Texaco's right to appeal. Relying on its view of the merits of the state-court appeal, the court found the risk of erroneous deprivation "quite severe." Finally, *8 it viewed the administrative burden on the State as "slight." In light of these factors, the District Court concluded that Texaco's constitutional claims had "a very clear probability of success." Accordingly, the court issued a preliminary injunction.[7] On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It first addressed the Rooker- doctrine and rejected the portion of the District Court's opinion that evaluated the merits of the state-court judgment. It held, however, that the doctrine did not completely bar the District Court's jurisdiction. It concluded that the due process and equal protection claims, not presented by Texaco to the Texas courts, were within the District Court's jurisdiction because they were not " `inextricably intertwined' " with the state-court action. (quoting District of Columbia Court of ). Next, the court considered whether Texaco had stated a claim under The question was whether Texaco's complaint sought to redress action taken "under color of" state law, 42 U.S. C. The court noted that "Pennzoil *9 would have to act jointly with state agents by calling on state officials to attach and seize Texaco's assets." Relying on its reading of the court concluded that the enjoined action would have been taken under color of state law, and thus that Texaco had stated a claim under -47. Because 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, see the court also found that the Anti-Injunction Act did not prevent the District Court from granting the relief sought by Texaco. Finally, the court held that abstention was unnecessary. First, it addressed Pullman abstention, see Railroad Comm'n of It rejected that ground of abstention, holding that "the mere possibility that the Texas courts would find Rule 364 [concerning the supersedeas bond requirements] unconstitutional as applied does not call for Pullman abstention." Next, it rejected Younger abstention. It thought that "[t]he state interests at stake in this proceeding differ in both kind and degree from those present in the six cases in which the Supreme Court held that Younger applied." Moreover, it thought that Texas had failed to "provide adequate procedures for adjudication |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | that Texas had failed to "provide adequate procedures for adjudication of Texaco's federal claims." Turning to the merits, it agreed with the District Court that Texaco had established a likelihood of success on its constitutional claims and that the balance of hardships favored Texaco. Accordingly, it affirmed the grant of injunctive relief.[8] Pennzoil filed a jurisdictional statement in this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 124(2). We reverse. *10 II The courts below should have abstained under the principles of federalism enunciated in Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the significant interests harmed by their unprecedented intrusion into the Texas judicial system. Similarly, neither of those courts applied the appropriate standard in determining whether adequate relief was available in the Texas courts. A The first ground for the Younger decision was "the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law." The Court also offered a second explanation for its decision: "This underlying reason is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of `comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. The concept does not mean blind deference to `States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." * This concern mandates application of Younger abstention not only when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government. E. g., Another important reason for abstention is to avoid unwarranted determination of federal constitutional questions. When federal courts interpret state statutes in a |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | constitutional questions. When federal courts interpret state statutes in a way that raises federal constitutional questions, "a constitutional determination is predicated on a reading of the statute that is not binding on state courts and may be discredited at any time thus essentially rendering the federal-court decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaningless." See[9] This concern has special significance in this case. Because Texaco chose not to present to the Texas courts the constitutional claims asserted in this case, it is impossible to be certain that the governing Texas statutes and procedural rules actually raise these claims. Moreover, the Texas Constitution contains an *12 "open courts" provision, Art. I, 13,[10] that appears to address Texaco's claims more specifically than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, when this case was filed in federal court, it was entirely possible that the Texas courts would have resolved this case on state statutory or constitutional grounds, without reaching the federal constitutional questions Texaco raises in this case.[] As we have noted, Younger abstention in situations like this "offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional problem and intelligently mediate federal constitutional concerns and state interests." Texaco's principal argument against Younger abstention is that exercise of the District Court's power did not implicate a "vital" or "important" state interest. Brief for Appellee 24-32. This argument reflects a misreading of our precedents. This Court repeatedly has recognized that the States have important interests in administering certain aspects of *13 their judicial systems. E. g., 1; Middlesex County Ethics In we held that a federal court should have abstained from adjudicating a challenge to a State's contempt process. The Court's reasoning in that case informs our decision today: "A State's interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long as that system itself affords the opportunity to pursue federal claims within it, is surely an important interest. Perhaps it is not quite as important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws, Younger, or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as was involved in But we think it is of sufficiently great import to require application of the principles of those cases." Our comments on why the contempt power was sufficiently important to justify abstention also are illuminating: "Contempt in these cases, serves, of course, to vindicate and preserve the private interests of competing litigants, but its purpose is by no means spent upon purely private concerns. It stands in aid |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | means spent upon purely private concerns. It stands in aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory." The reasoning of Juidice controls here. That case rests on the importance to the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts. There is little difference between the State's interest in forcing persons to transfer property in response to a court's judgment and in forcing persons to respond to the court's process on pain of contempt. Both Juidice and this case involve challenges to the processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its *14 courts.[12] Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which those judgments were obtained. So long as those challenges relate to pending state proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its hand.[13] B Texaco also argues that Younger abstention was inappropriate because no Texas court could have heard Texaco's constitutional claims within the limited time available to Texaco. But the burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff to show "that state procedural law barred presentation of [its] claims." 442 U. S., 2. See ). Moreover, denigrations of the procedural protections afforded by Texas law hardly come from Texaco with good grace, as it apparently made no effort under Texas law to secure the relief sought in this case. Cf. Middlesex County Ethics Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that "the Judges in every State shall be bound" by the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. We cannot assume that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state procedural law to bar presentation of federal claims. Cf. Ohio Civil Rights Accordingly, when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary. The "open courts" provision of the Texas Constitution, Article I, 13, see nn. 10, has considerable relevance here. This provision has appeared in each of Texas' six Constitutions, dating back to the Constitution of the Republic of Texas in 1836. See According to the Texas Supreme Court, the provision "guarantees all litigants the right to their day in court." "The common thread of [the Texas Supreme Court's] decisions construing the open courts provision is that the legislature has |
Justice Powell | 1,987 | 17 | majority | Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111856/pennzoil-co-v-texaco-inc/ | construing the open courts provision is that the legislature has no power to make a remedy by due course of law contingent on an impossible condition." In light of this demonstrable and longstanding commitment of the Texas Supreme Court to provide * access to the state courts, we are reluctant to conclude that Texas courts would have construed state procedural rules to deny Texaco an effective opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. Against this background, Texaco's submission that the Texas courts were incapable of hearing its constitutional claims is plainly insufficient. Both of the courts below found that the Texas trial court had the power to consider constitutional challenges to the enforcement provisions.[14] The Texas Attorney General filed a brief in the proceedings below, arguing that such relief was available in the Texas courts. See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant in Nos. 86-7046, 86-702 (CA2), pp. 32-33. Texaco has cited no statute or case clearly indicating that Texas courts lack such power.[1] Accordingly, Texaco has failed to meet its burden on this point.[] *17 In sum, the lower courts should have deferred on principles of comity to the pending state proceedings. They erred in accepting Texaco's assertions as to the inadequacies of Texas procedure to provide effective relief. It is true that this case presents an unusual fact situation, never before addressed by the Texas courts, and that Texaco urgently desired prompt relief. But we cannot say that those courts, when this suit was filed, would have been any less inclined than a federal court to address and decide the federal constitutional claims. Because Texaco apparently did not give the Texas courts an opportunity to adjudicate its constitutional claims, and because Texaco cannot demonstrate that the Texas courts were not then open to adjudicate its claims, there is no basis for concluding that the Texas law and procedures were so deficient that Younger abstention is inappropriate. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court should have abstained. III In this opinion, we have addressed the situation that existed on the morning of December 10, 198, when this case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. We recognize that much has transpired in the Texas courts since then. Later that day, the Texas trial court entered judgment. See n. On February 12 of this year, the Texas Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the judgment. See We are not unmindful of the unique importance to Texaco of having its challenges to that judgment authoritatively considered and resolved. We of course express no opinion on the merits of |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | dissenting | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | I dissent from the Court’s immoderate reading of 28 U.S. C. and would affirm the Federal Circuit’s judgment. According to the Court, the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Tohono O’odham Nation’s (Nation) claim because the Tribe was simultaneously pursuing in the D. C. District Court an action with “a common factual basis.” Ante, at 1. It mat ters not, the Court holds, that to gain complete relief, the Nation had to launch two suits, for neither of the two courts whose jurisdiction the Tribe invoked could alone provide full redress. See ante, at 8–9. The Court concludes that “claim” or “cause of action,” terms the Court considers synonymous as used in* —————— * “ ‘Cause of action,’ ” the Court simultaneously states, “is the more technical term.” Ante, at 5. If “more technical” means more precise, clear or certain, the Court is incorrect. See United (“A ‘cause of action’ may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another.”). In its discourse on the term, the Court has fallen into an old error; the drafters of the Federal Rules endeavored to “eliminate the unfortunate rigidity and confusion surrounding the words ‘cause of action.’ ” 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure p. 207 (3d ed. 2004). Today’s invocation of a supposed particular or exact meaning for the phrase risks reviving that confusion. 2 UNITED STATES v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION GINSBURG, J., dissenting see ante, at 5, refers to “operative facts,” and not to the remedies a plaintiff seeks. See ante, at 4. Section 1500 speaks of “the time when the cause of action arose,” a time antedating the commencement of suit. The Court infers, therefore, that a “claim” or “cause of action” is discrete from a pleading’s request for relief. See ante, at 4. In fact, however, entitlement to relief is essential to the existence of a claim or cause of action, which arises when a person suffers a harm capable of judicial redress. See 2 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence p. 741 (8th ed. 1861) (“[T]he cause of action arises when the party has a right to apply to a court for relief.”). A plaintiff may not, instructs, petition both the CFC and a district court, invoking in each a distinct legal theory appropriate to the forum, but seeking redress for a single injury. When Congress bars a plaintiff from obtain ing complete relief in one suit, however, and does not call for an election of remedies, Congress is most sensibly read to have comprehended that the operative facts give |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | dissenting | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | sensibly read to have comprehended that the operative facts give rise to two discrete claims. Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956), as JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR spells out, see ante, at 5, is the paradigm case. There, a discharged federal em ployee, complaining of wrongful termination, sought rein statement in a district-court action and backpay in the Court of Claims. Section 1500 does not stand in the way, the Court of Claims held in Casman, when the plaintiff suffered two distinct injuries, for which she seeks discrete forms of relief within the exclusive competence of different courts. See –650 (claim for backpay “entirely different” from claim for reinstatement). The Federal Circuit, in my view, rightly adhered to Casman in Loveladies Harbor, (1994) (en banc), and rightly did so in this case. While I agree with much of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s opin ion concurring in the judgment, I do not agree with her conclusion that bars the Nation’s CFC action. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 GINSBURG, J., dissenting JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins the Court’s judgment (although not the Court’s reasoning) because the “Tohono O’odham Nation seeks in the [CFC] some of the same relief on the same facts as it does in its pending District Court action.” Ante, at 1 (emphasis added). But to the extent that “the Nation’s two actions seek overlapping relief,” ibid., a disposition less harsh would be in order. Ordinar ily, when a plaintiff’s allegations and demands for relief are excessive, her complaint is not instantly dismissed on that account. Instead, she may seek leave to trim her pleading, permission a court “should freely give when justice so requires.” Rule 15(a)(2) (CFC 2010). Cf. Rule 54(c) (CFC 2010) (judgment, other than default, need not conform to demand for relief, but “should grant the relief to which each party is entitled”). As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and the Nation recognize, to avoid both duplication and the running of the statute of limitations, the CFC suit could be stayed while the com panion District Court action proceeds. See ante, at 11; Brief for Respondent 35. That is a common practice when a prior action is pending. See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, (instructing Court of Claims to stay pending proceedings to enable litigant to obtain District Court review of relevant agency order); (CA Fed. 1994) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims may stay a takings action pending completion of a related action in a district court.”). Why is this Court not positioned to direct the CFC to disregard requests for relief simultaneously sought in a district-court action, or at least |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | This concerns the legitimacy under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a class-action certification sought to achieve global settlement of current and future asbestos-related claims. The class proposed for certification potentially encompasses hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals tied together by this commonality: Each was, or some day may be, adversely affected by past exposure to asbestos products manufactured by one or more of 20 companies. Those companies, defendants in the lower courts, are petitioners here. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class for settlement only, finding that the proposed settlement was fair and that representation and notice had been adequate. That court enjoined class members from separately pursuing asbestos-related personal-injury suits in any court, federal or state, pending the issuance of a final order. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's orders, holding that the class certification failed to satisfy Rule 23's requirements in several critical respects. We affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment. I A The settlement-class certification we confront evolved in response to an asbestos-litigation crisis. See A United States Judicial Conference *598 Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos appointed by The Chief Justice in September 1990, described facets of the problem in a report: "[This] is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s. On the basis of past and current filing data, and because of a latency period that may last as long as 40 years for some asbestos related diseases, a continuing stream of claims can be expected. The final toll of asbestos related injuries is unknown. Predictions have been made of 200,000 asbestos disease deaths before the year 2000 and as many as 265,000 by the year 2015. "The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose altogether." Report of The Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos 2-3 Real reform, the report concluded, required federal legislation creating a national asbestos dispute-resolution scheme. See ; see (agreeing that "a national solution is the only answer" and suggesting "passage by Congress of an administrative claims procedure |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | and suggesting "passage by Congress of an administrative claims procedure similar to the Black Lung legislation"). As recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee, the Judicial Conference of the United States urged Congress to act. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 33 To this date, no congressional response has emerged. *599 In the face of legislative inaction, the federal courtslacking authority to replace state tort systems with a national toxic tort compensation regimeendeavored to work with the procedural tools available to improve management of federal asbestos litigation. Eight federal judges, experienced in the superintendence of asbestos s, urged the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict (MDL Panel), to consolidate in a single district allasbestos complaints then pending in federal courts. Accepting the recommendation, the MDL Panel transferred all asbestos s then filed, but not yet on trial in federal courts to a single district, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; pursuant to the transfer order, the collected s were consolidated for pretrial proceedings before Judge Weiner. See In re Asbestos Products Liability (No. VI),[1] The order aggregated pending s only; no authority resides in the MDL Panel to license for consolidated proceedings claims not yet filed. B After the consolidation, attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants formed separate steering committees and began settlement negotiations. Ronald L. Motley and Gene Lockslater appointed, along with Motley's law partner Joseph F. Rice, to represent the plaintiff class in this action cochaired the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee. Counsel for the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), the consortium of *600 20 former asbestos manufacturers now before us as petitioners, participated in the Defendants' Steering Committee.[2] Although the MDL Panel order collected, transferred, and consolidated only s already commenced in federal courts, settlement negotiations included efforts to find a "means of resolving future s." Record, Doc. 3, p. 2 (Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Conditional Class Certification); see 157 F. R. D. 246, 266 ("primary purpose of the settlement talks in the consolidated MDL litigation was to craft a national settlement that would provide an alternative resolution mechanism for asbestos claims," including claims that might be filed in the future). In November the Defendants' Steering Committee made an offer designed to settle all pending and future asbestos s by providing a fund for distribution by plaintiffs' counsel among asbestos-exposed individuals. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee rejected this offer, and negotiations fell apart. CCR, however, continued to pursue "a workable administrative system for the handling of future claims." To that end, CCR counsel approached the lawyers who had headed |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | that end, CCR counsel approached the lawyers who had headed the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee in the unsuccessful negotiations, and a new round of negotiations began; that round yielded the mass settlement agreement now in controversy. At the time, the former heads of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee represented thousands of plaintiffs with then-pending asbestos-related claimsclaimants the parties *601 to this suit call "inventory" plaintiffs. CCR indicated in these discussions that it would resist settlement of inventory s absent "some kind of protection for the future." ; see at 295 (CCR communicated to the inventory plaintiffs' attorneys that once the CCR defendants saw a rational way to deal with claims expected to be filed in the future, those defendants would be prepared to address the settlement of pending s). Settlement talks thus concentrated on devising an administrative scheme for disposition of asbestos claims not yet in litigation. In these negotiations, counsel for masses of inventory plaintiffs endeavored to represent the interests of the anticipated future claimants, although those lawyers then had no attorney-client relationship with such claimants. Once negotiations seemed likely to produce an agreement purporting to bind potential plaintiffs, CCR agreed to settle, through separate agreements, the claims of plaintiffs who had already filed asbestos-related lawsuits. In one such agreement, CCR defendants promised to pay more than $200 million to gain release of the claims of numerous inventory plaintiffs. After settling the inventory claims, CCR, together with the plaintiffs' lawyers CCR had approached, launched this exclusively involving persons outside the MDL Panel's provinceplaintiffs without already pending lawsuits.[3] C The class action thus instituted was not intended to be Rather, within the space of a single day, January 15, the settling partiesCCR defendants and the representatives of the plaintiff class described belowpresented to the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed *602 settlement agreement, and a joint motion for conditional class certification.[4] The complaint identified nine lead plaintiffs, designating them and members of their families as representatives of a class comprising all persons who had not filed an asbestosrelated lawsuit against a CCR defendant as of the date the class action commenced, but who (1) had been exposed occupationally or through the occupational exposure of a spouse or household memberto asbestos or products containing asbestos attributable to a CCR defendant, or (2) whose spouse or family member had been so exposed.[5] Untold numbers of individuals may fall within this description. All named plaintiffs alleged that they or a member of their family had been exposed to asbestos-containing products of *603 CCR defendants. More than half of the named plaintiffs alleged that |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | defendants. More than half of the named plaintiffs alleged that they or their family members had already suffered various physical injuries as a result of the exposure. The others alleged that they had not yet manifested any asbestos-related condition. The complaint delineated no subclasses; all named plaintiffs were designated as representatives of the class as a whole. The complaint invoked the District Court's diversity jurisdiction and asserted various state-law claims for relief, including (1) negligent failure to warn, (2) strict liability, (3) breach of express and implied warranty, (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (5) enhanced risk of disease, (6) medical monitoring, and (7) civil conspiracy. Each plaintiff requested unspecified damages in excess of $100,000. CCR defendants' answer denied the principal allegations of the complaint and asserted 11 affirmative defenses. A stipulation of settlement accompanied the pleadings; it proposed to settle, and to preclude nearly all class members from litigating against CCR companies, all claims not filed before January 15, involving compensation for present and future asbestos-related personal injury or death. An exhaustive document exceeding 100 pages, the stipulation presents in detail an administrative mechanism and a schedule of payments to compensate class members who meet defined asbestos-exposure and medical requirements. The stipulation describes four categories of compensable disease: mesothelioma; lung cancer; certain "other cancers" (colonrectal, laryngeal, esophageal, and stomach cancer); and "non-malignant conditions" (asbestosis and bilateral pleural thickening). Persons with "exceptional" medical claims claims that do not fall within the four described diagnostic categoriesmay in some instances qualify for compensation, but the settlement caps the number of "exceptional" claims CCR must cover. For each qualifying disease category, the stipulation specifies the range of damages CCR will pay to qualifying claimants. *604 Payments under the settlement are not adjustable for inflation. Mesothelioma claimantsthe most highly compensated categoryare scheduled to receive between $20,000 and $200,000. The stipulation provides that CCR is to propose the level of compensation within the prescribed ranges; it establishes procedures to resolve disputes over medical diagnoses and levels of compensation. Compensation above the fixed ranges may be obtained for "extraordinary" claims. But the settlement places both numerical caps and dollar limits on such claims.[6] The settlement imposes " flow maximums," which cap the number of claims payable for each disease in a given year. Class members are to receive no compensation for certain kinds of claims, even if otherwise applicable state law recognizes such claims. Claims that garner no compensation under the settlement include claims by family members of asbestos-exposed individuals for loss of consortium, and claims by so-called "exposure-only" plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, fear |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | by so-called "exposure-only" plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, fear of future asbestos-related injury, and medical monitoring. "Pleural" claims, which might be asserted by persons with asbestos-related plaques on their lungs but no accompanying physical impairment, are excluded. Although not entitled to present compensation, exposure-only claimants and pleural claimants may qualify for benefits when and if they develop a compensable disease and meet the relevant exposure and medical criteria. Defendants forgo defenses to liability, including statute of limitations pleas. Class members, in the main, are bound by the settlement in perpetuity, while CCR defendants may choose to withdraw *605 from the settlement after ten years. A small number of class membersonly a few per yearmay reject the settlement and pursue their claims in court. Those permitted to exercise this option, however, may not assert any punitive damages claim or any claim for increased risk of cancer. Aspects of the administration of the settlement are to be monitored by the AFLCIO and class counsel. Class counsel are to receive attorneys' fees in an amount to be approved by the District Court. D On January 29, as requested by the settling parties, the District Court conditionally certified, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), an encompassing opt-out class. The certified class included persons occupationally exposed to defendants' asbestos products, and members of their families, who had not filed suit as of January 15. Judge Weiner appointed Locks, Motley, and Rice as class counsel, noting that "[t]he Court may in the future appoint additional counsel if it is deemed necessary and advisable." Record, Doc. 11, p. 3 (Class Certification Order). At no stage of the proceedings, however, were additional counsel in fact appointed. Nor was the class ever divided into subclasses. In a separate order, Judge Weiner assigned to Judge Reed, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, "the task of conducting fairness proceedings and of determining whether the proposed settlement is fair to the class." See 157 F. R. D., at 258. Various class members raised objections to the settlement stipulation, and Judge Weiner granted the objectors full rights to participate in the subsequent proceedings. Ib[7] *606 In preliminary rulings, Judge Reed held that the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction, see and he approved the settling parties' elaborate plan for giving notice to the class, see 158 F. R. D. 314, 336 The courtapproved notice informed recipients that they could exclude themselves from the class, if they so chose, within a threemonth opt-out period. Objectors raised numerous challenges to the settlement. They urged that the settlement unfairly disadvantaged those without currently compensable conditions |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | that the settlement unfairly disadvantaged those without currently compensable conditions in that it failed to adjust for inflation or to account for changes, over time, in medical understanding. They maintained that compensation levels were intolerably low in comparison to awards available in tort litigation or payments received by the inventory plaintiffs. And they objected to the absence of any compensation for certain claims, for example, medical monitoring, compensable under the tort law of several States. Rejecting these and all other objections, Judge Reed concluded that the settlement terms were fair and had been negotiated without collusion. See 157 F. R. D., at 325, -332. He found that adequate notice had been given to class members, see and that final class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was appropriate, see As to the specific prerequisites to certification, the District Court observed that the class satisfied Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement,[8] see ib a matter no one debates. The *607 Rule 23(a)(2) and (b)(3) requirements of commonality[9] and preponderance[10] were satisfied, the District Court held, in that "[t]he members of the class have all been exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendants and all share an interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims, while minimizing the risks and transaction costs inherent in the asbestos litigation process as it occurs presently in the tort system. Whether the proposed settlement satisfies this interest and is otherwise a fair, reasonable and adequate compromise of the claims of the class is a predominant issue for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)." The District Court held next that the claims of the class representatives were "typical" of the class as a whole, a requirement of Rule 23(a)(3),[11] and that, as Rule 23(b)(3) demands,[12] the class settlement was "superior" to other methods of adjudication. See ib Strenuous objections had been asserted regarding the adequacy of representation, a Rule 23(a)(4) requirement.[13] Objectors maintained that class counsel and class representatives had disqualifying conflicts of interests. In particular, objectors urged, claimants whose injuries had become manifest and claimants without manifest injuries should not have common counsel and should not be aggregated in a single *608 class. Furthermore, objectors argued, lawyers representing inventory plaintiffs should not represent the newly formed class. Satisfied that class counsel had ably negotiated the settlement in the best interests of all concerned, and that the named parties served as adequate representatives, the District Court rejected these objections. See Subclasses were unnecessary, the District Court held, bearing in mind the added cost and confusion they would entail and the ability of class members to exclude themselves from the class |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | ability of class members to exclude themselves from the class during the three-month opt-out period. See Reasoning that the representative plaintiffs "have a strong interest that recovery for all of the medical categories be maximized because they may have claims in any, or several categories," the District Court found "no antagonism of interest between class members with various medical conditions, or between persons with and without currently manifest asbestos impairment." at 318. Declaring class certification appropriate and the settlement fair, the District Court preliminarily enjoined all class members from commencing any asbestos-related suit against the CCR defendants in any state or federal court. See The objectors appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the certification, holding that the requirements of Rule 23 had not been satisfied. See E The Court of Appeals, in a long, heavily detailed opinion by Judge Becker, first noted several challenges by objectors to justiciability, subject-matter jurisdiction, and adequacy of notice. These challenges, the court said, raised "serious concerns." However, the court observed, "the jurisdictional issues in this would not exist but for the [class-action] certification." Ib Turning to the classcertification *609 issues and finding them dispositive, the Third Circuit declined to decide other questions. On class-action prerequisites, the Court of Appeals referred to an earlier Third Circuit decision, In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability which held that although a class action may be certified for settlement purposes only, Rule 23(a)'s requirements must be satisfied as if the were going to be -800. The same rule should apply, the Third Circuit said, to class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). See But cf.In re Asbestos cert. pending, Nos. 96-1379, 96-1394. While stating that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) must be met "without taking into account the settlement," the Court of Appeals in fact closely considered the terms of the settlement as it examined aspects of the under Rule 23 criteria. See The Third Circuit recognized that Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement is subsumed under, or superseded by, the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class "predominate over" other questions. The court therefore trained its attention on the "predominance" inquiry. See The harmfulness of asbestos exposure was indeed a prime factor common to the class, the Third Circuit observed. See But uncommon questions abounded. In contrast to mass torts involving a single accident, class members in this were exposed to different asbestoscontaining products, in different ways, over different periods, and for different amounts of time; some suffered no physical injury, others suffered disabling or |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | time; some suffered no physical injury, others suffered disabling or deadly diseases. See "These factual differences," the Third Circuit explained, "translate[d] into significant legal differences." State law governed and varied widely *610 on such critical issues as "viability of [exposure-only] claims [and] availability of causes of action for medical monitoring, increased risk of cancer, and fear of future injury." Ib[14] "[T]he number of uncommon issues in this humongous class action," the Third Circuit concluded, ib barred a determination, under existing tort law, that common questions predominated, see The Court of Appeals next found that "serious intra-class conflicts preclude[d] th[e] class from meeting the adequacy of representation requirement" of Rule 23(a)(4). Ib Adverting to, but not resolving charges of attorney conflict of interests, the Third Circuit addressed the question whether the named plaintiffs could adequately advance the interests of all class members. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the District Court was certainly correct to this extent: "`[T]he members of the class are united in seeking the maximum possible recovery for their asbestos-related claims.' " Ib "But the settlement does more than simply provide a general recovery fund," the Court of Appeals immediately added; "[r]ather, it makes important judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different kinds of plaintiffs, decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over others." 83 F.3d, In the Third Circuit's view, the "most salient" divergence of interests separated plaintiffs already afflicted with an asbestos-related disease from plaintiffs without manifest injury (exposure-only plaintiffs). The latter would rationally want protection against inflation for distant recoveries. See ib They would seek sturdy back-end opt-out rights and "causation provisions that can keep pace with changing *611 science and medicine, rather than freezing in place the science of" -631. Already injured parties, in contrast, would care little about such provisions and would rationally trade them for higher current payouts. See These and other adverse interests, the Court of Appeals carefully explained, strongly suggested that an undivided set of representatives could not adequately protect the discrete interests of both currently afflicted and exposureonly claimants. The Third Circuit next rejected the District Court's determination that the named plaintiffs were "typical" of the class, noting that this Rule 23(a)(3) inquiry overlaps the adequacy of representation question: "both look to the potential for conflicts in the class." Evident conflict problems, the court said, led it to hold that "no set of representatives can be `typical' of this class." Ib The Court of Appeals similarly rejected the District Court's assessment of the superiority of the class action. The Third Circuit initially noted that a class action |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | action. The Third Circuit initially noted that a class action so large and complex "could not be tried." Ib The court elaborated most particularly, however, on the unfairness of binding exposure-only plaintiffs who might be unaware of the class action or lack sufficient information about their exposure to make a reasoned decision whether to stay in or opt out. See "A series of statewide or more narrowly defined adjudications, either through consolidation under Rule 42(a) or as class actions under Rule 23, would seem preferable," the Court of Appeals sa The Third Circuit, after intensive review, ultimately ordered decertification of the class and vacation of the District Court's antisuit injunction. Judge Wellford concurred, "fully subscrib[ing] to the decision of Judge Becker that the plaintiffs in this ha[d] not met the requirements of Rule 23." Ib He added that in his view, named exposure-only plaintiffs had no standing to pursue the *612 suit in federal court, for their depositions showed that "[t]hey claimed no damages and no present injury." We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II Objectors assert in this Court, as they did in the District Court and Court of Appeals, an array of jurisdictional barriers. Most fundamentally, they maintain that the settlement proceeding instituted by class counsel and CCR is not a justiciable or controversy within the confines of Article III of the Federal Constitution. In the main, they say, the proceeding is a nonadversarial endeavor to impose on countless individuals without currently ripe claims an administrative compensation regime binding on those individuals if and when they manifest injuries. Furthermore, objectors urge that exposure-only claimants lack standing to sue: Either they have not yet sustained any cognizable injury or, to the extent the complaint states claims and demands relief for emotional distress, enhanced risk of disease, and medical monitoring, the settlement provides no redress. Objectors argue that exposureonly claimants did not meet the then-current amount-incontroversy requirement (in excess of $50,000) specified for federal-court jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S. C. 1332(a). As earlier recounted, see the Third Circuit declined to reach these issues because they "would not exist but for the [class-action] certification." 83 F.3d, We agree that "[t]he class certification issues are dispositive," ib; because their resolution here is logically antecedent to the existence of any Article III issues, it is appropriate to reach them first, cf. Arizonans for Official We therefore follow the path taken by the Court of Appeals, mindful that *613 Rule 23's requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," 28 U.S. C. 2072(b). See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 82 ("rules shall not be construed to extend the [subject-matter] jurisdiction of the United States district courts").[15] III To place this controversy in context, we briefly describe the characteristics of class actions for which the Federal Rules provide. Rule 23, governing federal-court class actions, stems from equity practice and gained its current shape in an innovative 1966 revision. See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), Rule 23(a) states four threshold requirements applicable to all class actions: (1) numerosity (a "class [so large] that joinder of all members is impracticable"); (2) commonality ("questions of law or fact common to the class"); (3) typicality (named parties' claims or defenses "are typical of the class"); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"). *614 In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites, parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). Rule 23(b)(1) covers s in which separate actions by or against individual class members would risk establishing "incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(1)(A), or would "as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests" of nonparty class members "or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests," Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Rule 23(b)(1)(A) "takes in s where the party is obliged by law to treat the members of the class alike (a utility acting toward customers; a government imposing a tax), or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity (a riparian owner using water as against downriver owners)." Kaplan, Continuing Work 388 (footnotes omitted). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) includes, for example, "limited fund" s, instances in which numerous persons make claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. See Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp. 696-697 (hereinafter Adv. Comm. Notes). Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class." Civil rights s against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples. Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 697; see Kaplan, Continuing Work 389 (subdivision (b)(2) "build[s] on experience mainly, but not exclusively, in the civil rights field"). In the |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | but not exclusively, in the civil rights field"). In the 1966 class-action amendments, Rule 23(b)(3), the category at issue here, was "the most adventuresome" innovation. See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 Barb. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 497 (1969) (hereinafter Kaplan, Prefatory Note). Rule 23(b)(3) added to the complex-litigation arsenal class actions for damages designed to secure judgments binding all class members save those who affirmatively elected to be *615 excluded. See 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1777, p. 517 (hereinafter Wright, Miller, & Kane); see generally Kaplan, Continuing Work 379-400. Rule 23(b)(3) "opt-out" class actions superseded the former "spurious" class action, so characterized because it generally functioned as a permissive joinder ("opt-in") device. See 7A Wright, Miller, & Kane 1753, at 28-31, 42-44; see Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 695. Framed for situations in which "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for" as it is in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where class suit "may nevertheless be convenient and desirable." Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 697. To qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), a class must meet two requirements beyond the Rule 23(a) prerequisites: Common questions must "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"; and class resolution must be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." In adding "predominance" and "superiority" to the qualification-for-certification list, the Advisory Committee sought to cover s "in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." Ib Sensitive to the competing tugs of individual autonomy for those who might prefer to go it alone or in a smaller unit, on the one hand, and systemic efficiency on the other, the Reporter for the 1966 amendments cautioned: "The new provision invites a close look at the before it is accepted as a class action." Kaplan, Continuing Work 390. Rule 23(b)(3) includes a nonexhaustive list of factors pertinent to a court's "close look" at the predominance and superiority criteria: *616 "(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action." In setting out these factors, the Advisory Committee for the 1966 reform anticipated that in each courts would "consider the interests of individual members of the class in controlling their own litigations and carrying them on as they see fit." Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 698. They elaborated: "The interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to callfor denial of a class action. On the other hand, these interests may be theoretic rather than practical; the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable." Ib See Kaplan, Continuing Work 391 ("Th[e] interest [in individual control] can be high where the stake of each member bulks large and his will and ability to take care of himself are strong; the interest may be no more than theoretic where the individual stake is so small as to make a separate action impracticable." (footnote omitted)). As the Third Circuit observed in the instant : "Each plaintiff [in an action involving claims for personal injury and death] has a significant interest in individually controlling the prosecution of [his ]"; each "ha[s] a substantial stake in making individual decisions on whether and when to settle." 83 F.3d, *617 While the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not exclude from certification s in which individual damages run high, the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of "the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all." Kaplan, Prefatory Note 497. As concisely recalled in a recent Seventh Circuit opinion: "The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." To alert class members to their right to "opt out" of a (b)(3) class, Rule 23 instructs the court to "direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(2); see No class action may be "dismissed or compromised without [court] approval," preceded by notice to |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | "dismissed or compromised without [court] approval," preceded by notice to class members. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e). The Advisory Committee's sole comment on this terse final provision of Rule 23 restates the Rule's instruction without elaboration: "Subdivision (e) requires approval of the court, after notice, for the dismissal or compromise of any class action." Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 699. In the decades since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, classaction practice has become ever more "adventuresome" as a means of coping with claims too numerous to secure their * "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" one by one. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. The development reflects concerns about the efficient use of court resources and the conservation of funds to compensate claimants who do not line up early in a litigation queue. See generally J. Individual Justice in Mass Tort : The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and Other Multiparty Devices ; Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the "settlement only" class has become a stock device. See, e. g., T. Willging, L. Hooper, & R. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 61-62 (noting large number of such s in districts studied). Although all Federal Circuits recognize the utility of Rule 23(b)(3) settlement classes, courts have divided on the extent to which a proffered settlement affects court surveillance under Rule 23's certification criteria. In GM -800, and in the instant -, the Third Circuit held that a class cannot be certified for settlement when certification for trial would be unwarranted. Other courts have held that settlement obviates or reduces the need to measure a proposed class against the enumerated Rule 23 requirements. See, e. g., In re Asbestos ("in settlement class context, common issues arise from the settlement itself") ); cert. denied, ; In re A. H. Robins Co., (CA4) ("[i]f not a ground for certification per se, certainly settlement should be a factor, and an important factor, to be considered when determining certification"), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson ; cert. denied, A proposed amendment to Rule 23 would expressly authorize settlement class certification, in conjunction with a motion by the settling parties for Rule 23(b)(3) certification, "even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes of trial." Proposed Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b), 117 S. Ct. No. 1 CXIX, CLIV to CLV (Request for Comment). In response to the publication of this proposal, voluminous |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | Comment). In response to the publication of this proposal, voluminous public commentsmany of them opposed to, or skeptical of, the amendmentwere received by the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. See, e. g., Letter from Steering Committee to Oppose Proposed Rule 23, signed by 129 law professors ; Letter from Paul D. Carrington The Committee has not yet acted on the matter. We consider the certification at issue under the Rule as it is currently framed. IV We granted review to decide the role settlement may play, under existing Rule 23, in determining the propriety of class certification. The Third Circuit's opinion stated that each of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) "must be satisfied without taking into account the settlement." (quoting GM ). That statement, petitioners urge, is incorrect. We agree with petitioners to this limited extent: Settlement is relevant to a class certification. The Third Circuit's opinion bears modification in that respect. But, as we earlier observed, see the Court of Appeals in fact did not ignore the settlement; instead, that court homed in on settlement terms in explaining why it found the absentees' *620 interests inadequately represented. See 83 F.3d, 631. The Third Circuit's close inspection of the settlement in that regard was altogether proper. Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial. But other specifications of the Rule those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitionsdemand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold. See Rule 23(c), (d).[16] And, of overriding importance, courts must be mindful that the Rule as now composed sets the requirements they are bound to enforce. Federal Rules take effect after an extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a Rules Advisory Committee, public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this Court, the Congress. See 28 U.S. C. 2073, 2074. The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered, a process properly tuned to the instruction that rules of procedure "shall not abridge any substantive right." 2072(b). Rule 23(e), on settlement of class actions, reads in its entirety: "A class action shall not be |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | reads in its entirety: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised *621 without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." This prescription was designed to function as an additional requirement, not a superseding direction, for the "class action" to which Rule 23(e) refers is one qualified for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b). Cf. -177 Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed. The safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) classqualifying criteria, we emphasize, are not impractical impedimentschecks shorn of utilityin the settlement-class context. First, the standards set for the protection of absent class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the chancellor's foot kindclass certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment or overarching impression of the settlement's fairness. Second, if a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer, see Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, and the court would face a bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial investigation, see, e. g., (parties "may even put one over on the court, in a staged performance"), cert. denied, *622 Federal courts, in any lack authority to substitute for Rule 23's certification criteria a standard never adopted that if a settlement is "fair," then certification is proper. Applying to this criteria the rulemakers set, we conclude that the Third Circuit's appraisal is essentially correct. Although that court should have acknowledged that settlement is a factor in the calculus, a remand is not warranted on that account. The Court of Appeals' opinion amply demonstrates whywith or without a settlement on the table the sprawling class the District Court certified does not satisfy Rule 23's requirements.[17] A We address first the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that "[common] questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." The District Court concluded that predominance was satisfied based on two factors: class members' shared experience of asbestos exposure and their common "interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims, while minimizing the risks and transaction costs |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | for their claims, while minimizing the risks and transaction costs inherent in the asbestos litigation process as it occurs presently in the tort system." 157 F. R. D., The settling parties contend that the settlement's fairness is a common question, predominating over disparate legal issues that might be pivotal in litigation but become irrelevant under the settlement. The predominance requirement stated in Rule 23(b)(3), we hold, is not met by the factors on which the District Court relied. The benefits asbestos-exposed persons might gain from the establishment of a grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative consideration, see *623 at 598, but it is not pertinent to the predominance inquiry. That inquiry trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's as a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement.[18] The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. See 7A Wright, Miller, & Kane 518 519.[19] The inquiry appropriate under Rule 23(e), on the other hand, protects unnamed class members "from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise." See 7B Wright, Miller, & Kane 1797, at 340-341. But it is not the mission of Rule 23(e) to assure the class cohesion that legitimizes representative action in the first place. If a common interest in a fair compromise could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), that vital prescription would be stripped of any meaning in the settlement context. The District Court relied upon this commonality: "The members of the class have all been exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendants" 157 F. R. D., Even if Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement may be satisfied *624 by that shared experience, the predominance criterion is far more demanding. See -627. Given the greater number of questions peculiar to the several categories of class members, and to individuals within each category, and the significance of those uncommon questions, any overarching dispute about the health consequences of asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard. The Third Circuit highlighted the disparate questions undermining class cohesion in this : "Class members were exposed to different asbestoscontaining products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have only a symptomatic plural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestos is, or from mesothelioma Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry. "The [exposure-only] plaintiffs especially share little in common, either with each other or with the presently injured class members. It is unclear whether they will contract asbestos-related disease and, if so, what disease each will suffer. They will incur different medical expenses because their monitoring and treatment will depend on singular circumstances and individual medical histories." Differences in state law, the Court of Appeals observed, compound these disparities. See ). No settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this one. Cf. In re Asbestos n. 8 ("We would likely agree with the Third Circuit that a class action requesting individual damages for members of a global class of asbestos claimants would not satisfy [Rule 23] requirements due to the huge number of individuals and *625 their varying medical expenses, smoking histories, and family situations."). Predominance is a test readily met in certain s alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws. See Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 697; see Even mass tort s arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement. The Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that "mass accident" s are likely to present "significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, affecting the individuals in different ways." Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 697. And the Committee advised that such s are "ordinarily not appropriate" for class treatment. Ib But the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort s from class certification, and District Courts, since the late 1970's, have been certifying such s in increasing number. See Resnik, From "Cases" to "," 54 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, 17-19 (describing trend). The Committee's warning, however, continues to call for caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among class members great. As the Third Circuit's opinion makes plain, the certification in this does not follow the counsel of caution. That certification cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception of Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement irreconcilable with the Rule's design. B Nor can the class approved by the District Court satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement that the named parties "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. See General Telephone Co. of "[A] class representative must |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | represent. See General Telephone Co. of "[A] class representative must be part of the class and `possess * the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members." East Tex. Motor Freight System, ).[20] As the Third Circuit pointed out, named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future. Cf. General Telephone Co. of ("In employment discrimination litigation, conflicts might arise, for example, between employees and applicants who were denied employment and who will, if granted relief, compete with employees for fringe benefits or seniority. Under Rule 23, the same plaintiff could not represent these classes."). The disparity between the currently injured and exposure-only categories of plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category are not made insignificant by the District Court's finding that petitioners' assets suffice to pay claims under the settlement. See 157 F. R. D., at 291. Although *627 this is not a "limited fund" certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit defendants' liability. For example, as earlier described, see the settlement includes no adjustment for inflation; only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and loss-of-consortium claims are extinguished with no compensation. The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected. Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as representative for the whole, not for a separate constituency. In another asbestos class action, the Second Circuit spoke precisely to this point: "[W]here differences among members of a class are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a unitary class, some of whom happen to be members of the distinct subgroups. The class representatives may well have thought that the Settlement serves the aggregate interests of the entire class. But the adversity among subgroups requires that the members of each subgroup cannot be bound to a settlement except by consents given by those who understand that their role is to represent solely the members of |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | that their role is to represent solely the members of their respective subgroups." In re Joint Eastern and South- ern Dist. Asbestos modified on reh'g sub nom. In re Findley, The Third Circuit found no assurance hereeither in the terms of the settlement or in the structure of the negotiationsthat the named plaintiffs operated under a proper understanding of their representational responsibilities. See * 83 F. 3d, -631. That assessment, we conclude, is on the mark. C Impediments to the provision of adequate notice, the Third Circuit emphasized, rendered highly problematic any endeavor to tie to a settlement class persons with no perceptible asbestos-related disease at the time of the settlement. ; cf. In re Asbestos - Many persons in the exposure-only category, the Court of Appeals stressed, may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent of the harm they may incur. Even if they fully appreciate the significance of class notice, those without current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out. Family members of asbestos-exposed individuals may themselves fall prey to disease or may ultimately have ripe claims for loss of consortium. Yet large numbers of people in this categoryfuture spouses and children of asbestos victimscould not be alerted to their class membership. And current spouses and children of the occupationally exposed may know nothing of that exposure. Because we have concluded that the class in this cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation, we need not rule, definitively, on the notice given here. In accord with the Third Circuit, however, see 83 F.3d, -634, we recognize the gravity of the question whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous. V The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos *629 exposure.[21] Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it. As this exemplifies, the rulemakers' prescriptions for class actions may be endangered by "those who embrace [Rule 23] too enthusiastically just as [they are by] those who approach [the Rule] with distaste." C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 508 ; cf.83 F. 3d, * * * For the |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | 508 ; cf.83 F. 3d, * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is Affirmed. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although I agree with the Court's basic holding that "[s]ettlement is relevant to a class certification," ante, at 619, I find several problems in its approach that lead me to a different conclusion. First, I believe that the need for settlement in this mass tort with hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the Court's opinion suggests. Second, I would give more weight than would the majority to settlement-related issues for purposes of determining whether common issues predominate. Third, I am uncertain about the Court's determination of adequacy of representation, *630 and do not believe it appropriate for this Court to second-guess the District Court on the matter without first having the Court of Appeals consider it. Fourth, I am uncertain about the tenor of an opinion that seems to suggest the settlement is unfair. And fifth, in the absence of further review by the Court of Appeals, I cannot accept the majority's suggestions that "notice" is inadequate. These difficulties flow from the majority's review of what are highly fact-based, complex, and difficult matters, matters that are inappropriate for initial review before this Court. The law gives broad leeway to district courts in making class certification decisions, and their judgments are to be reviewed by the court of appeals only for abuse of discretion. See Indeed, the District Court's certification decision rests upon more than 300 findings of fact reached after five weeks of comprehensive hearings. Accordingly, I do not believe that we should in effect set aside the findings of the District Court. That court is far more familiar with the issues and litigants than is a court of appeals or are we, and therefore has "broad power and discretion with respect to matters involving the certification" of class actions. ; cf. Cooter & I do not believe that we can rely upon the Court of Appeals' review of the District Court record, for that review, and its ultimate conclusions, are infected by a legal error. E. g., There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals at any point considered the settlement as something that would help the class meet Rule 23. I find, moreover, the fact-related issues presented here sufficiently *631 close to warrant further detailed appellate court review under the correct legal standard. Cf. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | detailed appellate court review under the correct legal standard. Cf. And I shall briefly explain why this is so. I First, I believe the majority understates the importance of settlement in this Between 13 and 21 million workers have been exposed to asbestos in the workplaceover the past 40 or 50 yearsbut the most severe instances of such exposure probably occurred three or four decades ago. See Report of The Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos pp. 6-7 (Judicial Conference Report); App. 781-782, 801; B. Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects 787-788 This exposure has led to several hundred thousand lawsuits, about 15% of which involved claims for cancer and about 30% for asbestos is. See In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos About half of the suits have involved claims for plural thickening and plaquesthe harmfulness of which is apparently controversial. (One expert below testified that they "don't transform into cancer" and are not "predictor[s] of future disease," App. 781.) Some of those who suffer from the most serious injuries, however, have received little or no compensation. In re School Asbestos ; see Edley & Asbestos: A MultiBillion-Dollar Crisis, 30 Harv. J. Legis. 383, 384, 393 ("[U]p to one-half of asbestos claims are now being filed by people who have little or no physical impairment. Many of these claims produce substantial payments (and substantial costs) even though the individual litigants will never become impaired"). These lawsuits have taken up more than 6% of all federal civil filings in one recent year, and are subject to a delay that is twice that of other civil suits. Judicial Conference Report 7, 10-11. *632 Delays, high costs, and a random pattern of noncompensation led the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos to transfer all federal asbestos personalinjury s to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in an effort to bring about a fair and comprehensive settlement. It is worth considering a few of the Committee's comments. See Judicial Conference Report 2 ("`Decisions concerning thousands of deaths, millions of injuries, and billions of dollars are entangled in a litigation system whose strengths have increasingly been overshadowed by its weaknesses.' The ensuing five years have seen the picture worsen: increased filings, larger backlogs, higher costs, more bankruptcies and poorer prospects that judgmentsif ever obtainedcan be collected" (quoting Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice)); ("The transaction costs associated with asbestos litigation are an unconscionable burden on the victims of asbestos disease." "[O]f each asbestos litigation dollar, 61 cents is consumed in transaction costs Only 39 cents were paid to the asbestos victims" (citing |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | Only 39 cents were paid to the asbestos victims" (citing Rand finding)); ("Delays can increase transaction costs, especially the attorneys' fees paid by defendants at hourly rates. These costs reduce either the insurance fund or the company's assets, thereby reducing the funds available to pay pending and future claimants. By the end of the trial phase in [one ], at least seven defendants had declared bankruptcy (as a result of asbestos claims generally")); see J. Individual Justice in Mass Tort 155 ; Edley & Although the transfer of the federal asbestos s did not produce a general settlement, it was intertwined with and led to a lengthy year-long negotiation between the cochairs of the Plaintiff's Multi-District Steering Committee (elected by the Plaintiff's Committee Members and approved by the District Court) and the 20 asbestos defendants who are before us here. 157 F. R. D. 246, 266-267 ; App. 660-662. *633 These "protracted and vigorous" negotiations led to the present partial settlement, which will pay an estimated $1.3 billion and compensate perhaps 100,000 class members in the first 10 years. 157 F. R. D., at 268, 287. "The negotiations included a substantial exchange of information" between class counsel and the 20 defendant companies, including "confidential data" showing the defendants' historical settlement averages, numbers of claims filed and settled, and insurance resources. "Virtually no provision" of the settlement "was not the subject of significant negotiation," and the settlement terms "changed substantially" during the negotiations. Ib In the end, the negotiations produced a settlement that, the District Court determined based on its detailed review of the process, was "the result of armslength adversarial negotiations by extraordinarily competent and experienced attorneys." The District Court, when approving the settlement, concluded that it improved the plaintiffs' chances of compensation and reduced total legal fees and other transaction costs by a significant amount. Under the previous system, according to the court, "[t]he sickest of victims often go uncompensated for years while valuable funds go to others who remain unimpaired by their mild asbestos disease." Ib The court believed the settlement would create a compensation system that would make more money available for plaintiffs who later develop serious illnesses. I mention this matter because it suggests that the settlement before us is unusual in terms of its importance, both to many potential plaintiffs and to defendants, and with respect to the time, effort, and expenditure that it reflects. All of which leads me to be reluctant to set aside the District Court's findings without more assurance than I have that they are wrong. I cannot obtain that assurance |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | have that they are wrong. I cannot obtain that assurance through comprehensive review of the record because that is properly the job of the Court of Appeals and that court, understandably, but as we now hold, mistakenly, believed that settlement *634 was not a relevant (and, as I would say, important) consideration. Second, the majority, in reviewing the District Court's determination that common "issues of fact and law predominate," says that the predominance "inquiry trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's as a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement." Ante, (footnote omitted). I find it difficult to interpret this sentence in a way that could lead me to the majority's conclusion. If the majority means that these presettlement questions are what matters, then how does it reconcile its statement with its basic conclusion that "settlement is relevant" to class certification, or with the numerous lower court authority that says that settlement is not only relevant, but important? See, e. g., In re A. H. Robins Co., (CA4), cert. denied sub nom. ; In re Beef Industry Antitrust cert. denied sub nom. Iowa Beef Processors, ; 2 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Newberg on Class Actions 11.27, pp. 11-54 to 11-55 Nor do I understand how one could decide whether common questions "predominate" in the abstractwithout looking at what is likely to be at issue in the proceedings that will ensue, namely, the settlement. Every group of human beings, after all, has some features in common, and some that differ. How can a court make a contextual judgment of the sort that Rule 23 requires without looking to what proceedings will follow? Such guideposts help it decide whether, in light of common concerns and differences, certification will achieve Rule 23's basic objective"economies of time, effort, and expense." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3), 28 U.S. C. App., p. 697. As this Court has previously observed, "sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to *635 rest on the certification question." General Telephone Co. of ; see 7B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1785, p. 107, and n. 34 I am not saying that the "settlement counts only one way." Ante, at 620, n. 16. Rather, the settlement may simply "add a great deal of information to the court's inquiry and will often expose diverging interests or common issues that were not evident or clear from the complaint" and courts "can and should" look to it to enhance the "ability |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | "can and should" look to it to enhance the "ability to make informed certification decisions." In re Asbestos The majority may mean that the District Court gave too much weight to the settlement. But I am not certain how it can reach that conclusion. It cannot rely upon the Court of Appeals, for that court gave no positive weight at all to the settlement. Nor can it say that the District Court relied solely on "a common interest in a fair compromise," ante, for the District Court did not do so. Rather, it found the settlement relevant because it explained the importance of the class plaintiffs' common features and common interests. The court found predominance in part because: "The members of the class have all been exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendants and all share an interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims, while minimizing the risks and transaction costs inherent in the asbestos litigation process as it occurs presently in the tort system." 157 F. R. D., The settlement is relevant because it means that these common features and interests are likely to be important in the proceeding that would ensuea proceeding that would focus primarily upon whether or not the proposed settlement fairly and properly satisfied the interests class members had in common. That is to say, the settlement underscored the importance *636 of (a) the common fact of exposure, (b) the common interest in receiving some compensation for certain rather than running a strong risk of no compensation, and (c) the common interest in avoiding large legal fees, other transaction costs, and delays. Ib Of course, as the majority points out, there are important differences among class members. Different plaintiffs were exposed to different products for different times; each has a distinct medical history and a different history of smoking; and many s arise under the laws of different States. The relevant question, however, is how much these differences matter in respect to the legal proceedings that lie ahead. Many, if not all, toxic tort class actions involve plaintiffs with such differences. And the differences in state law are of diminished importance in respect to a proposed settlement in which the defendants have waived all defenses and agreed to compensate all those who were injured. These differences might warrant subclasses, though subclasses can have problems of their own. "There can be a cost in creating more distinct subgroups, each with its own representation. [T]he more subclasses created, the more severe conflicts bubble to the surface and inhibit settlement. The resources of defendants |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | to the surface and inhibit settlement. The resources of defendants and, ultimately, the community must not be exhausted by protracted litigation." Individual Justice in Mass Tort at 66. Or these differences may be too serious to permit an effort at group settlement. This kind of determination, as I have said, is one that the law commits to the discretion of the district courtreviewable for abuse of discretion by a court of appeals. I believe that we are far too distant from the litigation itself to reweigh the fact-specific Rule 23 determinations and to find them erroneous without the benefit of the Court of Appeals first having restudied the matter with today's legal standard in mind. *637 Third, the majority concludes that the "representative parties" will not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Rule 23(a)(4). It finds a serious conflict between plaintiffs who are now injured and those who may be injured in the future because "for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments," a goal that "tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future." Ante, I agree that there is a serious problem, but it is a problem that often exists in toxic tort s. See (noting that conflict "between present and future claimants" "is almost always present in some form in mass tort s because long latency periods are needed to discover injuries"); see Judicial Conference Report 34-35 ("Because many of the defendants in these s have limited assets that may be called upon to satisfy the judgments obtained under current common tort rules and remedies, there is a `real and present danger that the available assets will be exhausted before those later victims can seek compensation to which they are entitled' " (citation omitted)). And it is a problem that potentially exists whenever a single defendant injures several plaintiffs, for a settling plaintiff leaves fewer assets available for the others. With class actions, at least, plaintiffs have the consolation that a district court, thoroughly familiar with the facts, is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the interests of no class members are sacrificed. But this Court cannot easily safeguard such interests through review of a cold record. "What constitutes adequate representation is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of each" 7A Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1765, at 271. That is particularly so when, as here, there is an unusual baseline, namely, the "`real and present danger' " described by the Judicial Conference Report above. The majority's |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | " described by the Judicial Conference Report above. The majority's use of the *638 lack of an inflation adjustment as evidence of inadequacy of representation for future plaintiffs, ante, -627, is one example of this difficulty. An inflation adjustment might not be as valuable as the majority assumes if most plaintiffs are old and not worried about receiving compensation decades from now. There are, of course, strong arguments as to its value. But that disagreement is one that this Court is poorly situated to resolve. Further, certain details of the settlement that are not discussed in the majority opinion suggest that the settlement may be of greater benefit to future plaintiffs than the majority suggests. The District Court concluded that future plaintiffs receive a "significant value" from the settlement due to a variety of its items that benefit future plaintiffs, such as: (1) tolling the statute of limitations so that class members "will no longer be forced to file premature lawsuits or risk their claims being time-barred"; (2) waiver of defenses to liability; (3) payment of claims, if and when members become sick, pursuant to the settlement's compensation standards, which avoids "the uncertainties, long delays and high transaction costs [including attorney's fees] of the tort system"; (4) "some assurance that there will be funds available if and when they get sick," based on the finding that each defendant "has shown an ability to fund the payment of all qualifying claims" under the settlement; and (5) the right to additional compensation if cancer develops (many settlements for plaintiffs with noncancerous conditions bar such additional claims). 157 F. R. D., For these reasons, and others, the District Court found that the distinction between present and future plaintiffs was "illusory." I do not know whether or not the benefits are more or less valuable than an inflation adjustment. But I can certainly recognize an argument that they are. (To choose one more brief illustration, the majority chastises the settlement for extinguishing loss-of-consortium claims, ante, but *639 does not note that, as the District Court found, the "defendants' historical [settlement] averages, upon which the compensation values are based, include payments for loss of consortium claims, and, accordingly, the Compensation Schedule is not unfair for this ascribed reason," 157 F. R. D., at 278.) The difficulties inherent in both knowing and understanding the vast number of relevant individual fact-based determinations here counsel heavily in favor of deference to district court decisionmaking in Rule 23 decisions. Or, at the least, making certain that appellate court review has taken place with the correct standard in mind. Fourth, |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | has taken place with the correct standard in mind. Fourth, I am more agnostic than is the majority about the basic fairness of the settlement. Ante, at 625-. The District Court's conclusions rested upon complicated factual findings that are not easily cast aside. It is helpful to consider some of them, such as its determination that the settlement provided "fair compensation while reducing the delays and transaction costs endemic to the asbestos litigation process" and that "the proposed class action settlement is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient resolution of the asbestos-related personal injury claims of class members." 157 F. R. D., (citation omitted); see ("The inadequate tort system has demonstrated that the lawyers are well paid for their services but the victims are not receiving speedy and reasonably inexpensive resolution of their claims. Rather, the victims' recoveries are delayed, excessively reduced by transaction costs and relegated to the impersonal group trials and mass consolidations. The sickest of victims often go uncompensated for years while valuable funds go to others who remain unimpaired by their mild asbestos disease. Indeed, these unimpaired victims have, in many states, been forced to assert their claims prematurely or risk giving up all rights to future compensation for any future lung cancer or mesothelioma. The plan which this Court approves today will correct that unfair result for the class members and the defendants"); *640 ; ; Edley & 30 Harv. J. Legis., at 405, 407 (finding that "[t]here are several reasons to believe that this settlement secures important gains for both sides" and that they "firmly endorse the fairness and adequacy of this settlement"). Indeed, the settlement has been endorsed as fair and reasonable by the AFLCIO (and its Building and Construction Trades Department), which represents a "`substantial percentage' " of class members, 157 F. R. D., at 325, and which has a role in monitoring implementation of the settlement, I do not intend to pass judgment upon the settlement's fairness, but I do believe that these matters would have to be explored in far greater depth before I could reach a conclusion about fairness. And that task, as I have said, is one for the Court of Appeals. Finally, I believe it is up to the District Court, rather than this Court, to review the legal sufficiency of notice to members of the class. The District Court found that the plan to provide notice was implemented at a cost of millions of dollars and included hundreds of thousands of individual notices, a wide-ranging television and print campaign, and significant additional |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,997 | 5 | majority | Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118142/amchem-products-inc-v-windsor/ | notices, a wide-ranging television and print campaign, and significant additional efforts by 35 international and national unions to notify their members. Every notice emphasized that an individual did not currently have to be sick to be a class member. And in the end, the District Court was "confident" that Rule 23 and due process requirements were satisfied because, as a result of this "extensive and expensive notice procedure," "over six million" individuals "received actual notice materials," and "millions more" were reached by the media campaign. Although the majority, in principle, is reviewing a Court of Appeals' conclusion, it seems to me that its opinion might call into question the fact-related determinations of the District *641 Court. Ante, at To the extent that it does so, I disagree, for such findings cannot be so quickly disregarded. And I do not think that our precedents permit this Court to do so. See 442 U. S., at ; 442 U. S., at II The issues in this are complicated and difficult. The District Court might have been correct. Or not. Subclasses might be appropriate. Or not. I cannot tell. And I do not believe that this Court should be in the business of trying to make these fact-based determinations. That is a job suited to the district courts in the first instance, and the courts of appeals on review. But there is no reason in this to believe that the Court of Appeals conducted its prior review with an understanding that the settlement could have constituted a reasonably strong factor in favor of class certification. For this reason, I would provide the courts below with an opportunity to analyze the factual questions involved in certification by vacating the judgment, and remanding the for further proceedings. |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | This case presents the question whether administrative payment orders issued by the Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) for the purpose of assessing royalty underpayments on oil and gas leases fall within (a), which sets out a 6-year statute of limitations for Government contract actions. We hold that this provision does not apply to these administrative payment orders, and we therefore affirm. I A The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920(MLA) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease public-domain lands to private parties for the production of oil and gas. as amended, et seq. MLA lessees are obligated to pay a royalty of at least "12.5 percent in amount or value of the production removed or sold from the lease." 226(b)(1)(A). In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA), as amended, 30 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., to address the concern that the "system of accounting with respect to royalties and other payments due and owing on oil and gas produced from such lease sites [was] archaic and inadequate." 1701(a)(2). FOGRMA ordered the Secretary of the Interior to "audit and reconcile, to the extent practicable, all current and past lease accounts for leases of oil or gas and take appropriate actions to make additional collections or *6 refunds as warranted." 1711(c)(1). The Secretary, in turn, has assigned these duties to MMS. 30 CFR 201.100 Under FOGRMA, lessees are responsible in the first instance for the accurate calculation and payment of royalties. 30 U.S.C. 1712(a). MMS, in turn, is authorized to audit those payments to determine whether a royalty has been overpaid or underpaid. 1711(a) and (c); 30 CFR 206.150(c), 206.170(d). In the event that an audit suggests an underpayment, it is MMS'[1] practice to send the lessee a letter inquiring about the perceived deficiency. If, after reviewing the lessee's response, MMS concludes that the lessee owes additional royalties, MMS issues an order requiring payment of the amount due. Failure to comply with such an order carries a stiff penalty: "Any person who (1) knowingly or willfully fails to make any royalty payment by the date as specified by [an] order shall be liable for a penalty of up to $10,000 per violation for each day such violation continues." 30 U.S.C. 1719(c). The Attorney General may enforce these orders in federal court. 1722(a). An MMS payment order may be appealed, first to the Director of MMS and then to the Interior Board of Land Appeals or to an Assistant Secretary. 30 CFR 290.105, 290.108. While filing an appeal does not generally stay the payment order, |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | filing an appeal does not generally stay the payment order, 8.50(c), MMS will usually suspend the order's effect after the lessee complies with applicable bonding or financial solvency requirements, 243.8. Congress supplemented this scheme by enacting the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996 (FOGRSFA), as amended, 30 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. FOGRSFA adopted a prospective 7-year statute of limitations for any "judicial proceeding or demand" for royalties arising under a federal oil or gas lease. 1724(b)(1). The parties agree that this provision applies both to judicial actions ("judicial proceeding]") and to MMS' administrative payment orders ("demand[s]") arising on or after September 1, 1996. This provision does not, however, apply to judicial proceedings or demands arising from leases of Indian land or underpayments of royalties on pre-September 1, 1996, production. FOGRSFA 9, 11, notes following 30 U.S.C. 1701. There is no dispute that a lawsuit in court to recover royalties owed to the Government on pre-September 1, 1996, production is covered by (a), which sets out a general 6-year statute of limitations for Government contract actions. That section, which was enacted in 19, provides in relevant part: "Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later." (Emphasis added.) Whether this general 6-year statute of limitations also governs MMS administrative payment orders concerning pre-September 1, 1996, production is the question that we must decide in this case. *643 B Petitioner BP America Production holds gas leases from the Federal Government for lands in New Mexico's San Juan Basin. BP's predecessor, Amoco Production first entered into these leases nearly 50 years ago, and these leases require the payment of the minimum 12.5 percent royalty prescribed by 30 U.S.C. 226(b)(1)(A). For years, Amoco calculated the royalty as a percentage of the value of the gas as of the moment it was produced at the well. In 1996, MMS sent lessees a letter directing that royalties should be calculated based not on the value of the gas at the well, but on the value of the gas after it was treated to meet the quality requirements for introduction into the Nation's mainline pipelines.[2] |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | the quality requirements for introduction into the Nation's mainline pipelines.[2] Consistent with this guidance, MMS in 1997 ordered Amoco to pay additional royalties for the period from January 1989 through December 1996 in order to cover the difference between the value of the treated gas and its lesser value at the well. Amoco appealed the order, disputing MMS' interpretation of its royalty obligations and arguing that the payment order was in any event barred in part by the 6-year statute of limitations in (a). The Assistant Secretary of the Interior denied the appeal and ruled that the statute of limitations was inapplicable. Amoco, together with petitioner Atlantic Richfield sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which agreed with the Assistant Secretary that 2415(a) did not govern the administrative order. Amoco Production The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, Amoco Production and we granted certiorari, in order to resolve the conflict between that decision and the contrary holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in OXY USA, We now affirm. II A We start, of course, with the statutory text. Central Bank of Denver, Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Read in this way, the text of 2415(a) is quite clear. The statute of limitations imposed by 2415(a) applies when the Government commences any "action for money damages" by filing a "complaint" to enforce a contract, and the statute runs from the point when "the right of action accrues." The key terms in this provision"action" and "complaint"are ordinarily used in connection with judicial, not administrative, proceedings. In 19, when 2415(a) was enacted, a commonly used legal dictionary defined the term "right of action" as "[t]he right to bring suit; a legal right to maintain an action," with "suit" meaning "any proceeding in a court of justice." Black's Law Dictionary 1488, 1603 (4th ed.1951) (hereinafter Black's). Likewise, "complaint" was defined as "the first or initiatory pleading on the part of the plaintiff *644 in a civil action."[3] 56. See also Unexcelled Chemical 97 L. Ed. 8 (holding that filing a complaint, in the ordinary sense of the term, means filing a suit in court, not initiating an administrative proceeding: "Commencement of an action by the filing of a complaint has too familiar a history for us to assume that Congress did not mean to use the words in their ordinary sense"). The phrase "action for money damages" reinforces this reading because the term "damages" is generally used to mean |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | reading because the term "damages" is generally used to mean "pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts." Black's 4 Nothing in the language of 2415(a) suggests that Congress intended these terms to apply more broadly to administrative proceedings. On the contrary, 2415(a) distinguishes between judicial and administrative proceedings. Section 2415(a) provides that an "action" must commence "within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings." Thus, Congress knew how to identify administrative proceedings and manifestly had two separate concepts in mind when it enacted 2415(a).[4] B In an effort to show that the term "action" is commonly used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings, petitioners have cited numerous statutes and regulations that, petitioners claim, document this usage.[5] These examples, however, actually undermine petitioners' argument, since none of them uses the term "action" standing alone to refer to administrative proceedings. Rather, each example includes a modifier of some sort, referring to an "administrative action," a "civil or administrative action," or "administrative enforcement actions." This pattern of usage buttresses the point that the term "action," standing alone, ordinarily refers to a judicial proceeding. Petitioners contend that their broader interpretation of the statutory term "action" is supported by the reference to "every action for money damages" founded *645 upon "any contract." (a) But the broad terms "every" and "any" do not assist petitioners, as they do not broaden the ordinary meaning of the key term "action." Petitioners argue that their interpretation is supported by and 527 U.S. 2, but this reliance is misplaced. In Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, we construed the attorney's fee provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes a "court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, [to] award costs of litigation to any party." U.S.C. 7604(d). We permitted the recovery of fees both for work done in court and in subsequent administrative proceedings. But the pertinent statutory provision in that case did not employ the key terms that appear in the statute at issue here. Specifically, the CWA provision referred to "litigation," not to an "action" commenced by the filing of a "complaint." Moreover, "the work done by counsel [in the administrative phase of the case] was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief. as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom obtaining the consent decree." And we expressly reserved judgment on the question "whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate when there is no connected court action in which fees are recoverable." West |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | no connected court action in which fees are recoverable." West helps petitioners even less. There, we considered whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could order a federal agency to pay compensatory damages in an administrative proceeding. Section 717(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S.C. e-16(b), authorized the EEOC to employ "appropriate remedies," but did not specifically authorize damages, and 717(c) authorized a subsequent court action against an employer agency, U.S.C. e-16(c). In 1991, Congress added Rev. Stat. 1977A(a)(1), U.S.C. 1981a(a)(1), which provided that "[i]n an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 the complaining party may recover compensatory " In West, the respondent employee argued that the enactment of 1981a(a)(1) showed that Congress did not consider compensatory damages to be "appropriate remedies" in an EEOC proceeding, as opposed to an action brought by an aggrieved employee. If Congress had wished to authorize the award of compensatory damages in an EEOC proceeding, the respondent employee reasoned, Congress would have so provided in 1981a(a)(l), by expressly cross-referencing 717(c). We rejected this argument, but in doing so we did not hold that an EEOC proceeding is an "action" under 1981a(a)(1). Rather, we simply concluded that the EEOC's authorization under 717(b) to award "appropriate remedies" was broad enough to encompass compensatory -2, For these reasons, we are not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the term "action" in 2415(a) applies to the administrative proceedings that follow the issuance of an MMS payment order. C We similarly reject petitioners' suggestion that an MMS letter or payment order constitutes a "complaint" within the meaning of 2415(a). Petitioners point to examples of statutes and regulations that employ the term "complaint" in the administrative context. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. *646 45(b) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission to serve a "complaint" on a party suspected of engaging in an unfair method of competition); 29 CFR 102.15 But the occasional use of the term to describe certain administrative filings does not alter its primary meaning, which concerns the initiation of "a civil action." Black's 356. Moreover, even if the distinction between administrative and judicial proceedings is put aside, an MMS payment order lacks the essential attributes of a complaint. While a complaint is a filing that commences a proceeding that may in the end result in a legally binding order providing relief, an MMS payment order in and of itself imposes a legal obligation on the party to which it is issued. As noted, the failure to comply with such an order can result in fines of up to $10,000 a |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | order can result in fines of up to $10,000 a day. An MMS payment order, therefore, plays an entirely different role from that of a "complaint."[6] D To the extent that any doubts remain regarding the meaning of 2415(a), they are erased by the rule that statutes of limitations are construed narrowly against the government. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & This canon is rooted in the traditional rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi time does not run against the King. Guaranty Trust A corollary of this rule is that when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt if the scope of the statute is ambiguous. cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary. There, as here, the issue was the scope of a statute of limitations. The provision in that case, however, provided that "`[n]o suit or proceeding for the collection of any such taxes'" shall commence more than five years after the filing of the return. The Government argued that the terms "proceeding" and "suit" were coterminous, and urged further that any ambiguity should be resolved in its favor. The Court recognized the canon, restating it much as we have above. But the Court concluded that the canon had no application in that case because the text of the relevant statute, unlike 2415(a), applied clearly and separately to "suits" and "proceedings," and the Court saw no reason to give these different terms the same meaning. -350, E We come now to petitioners' argument that interpreting 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would render subsection (i) of the same statute superfluous. Subsection (i) provides as follows: "The provisions of this section shall not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset, in accordance *647 with section 3716 of title" (i). An administrative offset is a mechanism by which the Government withholds payment of a debt that it owes another party in order to recoup a payment that this party owes the Government. U.S.C. 3701(a)(1). Thus, under subsection (i), the Government may recover a debt via an administrative offset even if the Government would be time barred under subsection (a) from pursuing the debt in court. Petitioners argue that, if 2415(a) applies only to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings, there is no need for 2415(i)'s rule protecting a particular administrative mechanism (i.e., an administrative offset) from the statute of limitations set out in subsection (a). Invoking the canon against |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | limitations set out in subsection (a). Invoking the canon against reading a statute in a way that makes part of the statute redundant, see, e.g., TRW petitioners contend that subsection (i) shows that subsection (a) was meant to apply to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings. We disagree. As the Court of Appeals noted, subsection (i) was not enacted at the same time as subsection (a) but rather was added 16 years later by the Debt Collection Act of 1982. This enactment followed a dispute between the Office of the Comptroller General of the United States, head of the agency then named the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) over whether an administrative offset could be used to recoup a debt where a judicial recoupment action was already time barred. In 1978, in response to a question from the United States Civil Service Commission, OLC opined that an administrative offset could not be used to recoup a debt as to which a judicial action was already time barred. OLC reached this conclusion not because it believed that 2415(a) reached administrative proceedings generally,[7] but rather because of the particular purpose of an administrative offset. "Where [a] debt has not been reduced to judgment," OLC stated, "an administrative offset is merely a pre-judgment attachment device." Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to Alan K. Campbell, Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission Re: Effect of Statute of Limitations on Administrative Collection of United States Claims 3 (Sept. 29, 1978), Joint Lodging. OLC opined that a prejudgment attachment device such as this exists only to preserve funds to satisfy any judgment the creditor subsequently obtains. at 4 (citing cases). OLC therefore concluded that, where a lawsuit is already foreclosed by 2415(a), an administrative offset that is the functional equivalent of a pretrial attachment is also unavailable. GAO disagreed. See In re Collection of DebtsStatute of Limitations on Administrative Setoff, WL 14962 In its view, the question was answered by "[t]he general rule that statutes of limitations applicable to suits for debts or money demands bar or run only against the remedy (the right to bring suit) to which they apply and do not discharge the debt or extinguish, or even impair, the right or obligation, either in law or in fact, and the creditor may avail himself of every other lawful means of realizing on the debt or obligation. See Mascot Oil F.2d 309 affirmed ; and 33 Comp. Gen. WL 526 See also Ready-Mix Concrete 1 Ct. Cl. 204," That Congress had time |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | Ready-Mix Concrete 1 Ct. Cl. 204," That Congress had time barred the judicial remedy, GAO reasoned, imposed no limit on the administrative remedy. The OLC-GAO dispute reveals that, even under the interpretation of subsection (a)the one we are adoptingthat considers it applicable only to court proceedings, subsection (i) is not mere surplusage. It clarifies that administrative offsets are not covered by subsection (a) even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action. To accept petitioners' argument, on the other hand, we would have to hold either that 2415(a) applied to administrative actions when it was enacted in 19 or that it was extended to reach administrative actions when subsection (i) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of the text of 2415(a), which has not been amended, refutes the first of these propositions, and accepting the latter would require us to conclude that in 1982 Congress elected to enlarge 2415 to cover administrative proceedings by inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative vehicle from the statute's reach. It is entirely unrealistic to suggest that Congress would proceed by such an oblique and cryptic route. III Petitioners contend that interpreting 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions results in a statutory scheme with peculiarities that Congress could not have intended. For example, petitioners note that while they are required by statute to preserve their records regarding royalty obligations for only seven years, 30 U.S.C. 1724(f), the interpretation of 2415(a) adopted by the Court of Appeals permits MMS to issue payment orders that reach back much further. We are mindful of the fact that a statute should be read where possible as effecting a "`symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,'" 146 L. Ed. 2d 1 but here petitioners' alternative interpretation of 2415(a) would itself result in disharmony. For instance, under FOGRSFA, MMS payment orders regarding oil and gas leases are now prospectively subject to a 7-year statute of limitations except with respect to obligations arising out of leases of Indian land. Consequently, if we agreed with petitioners that 2415(a) applies generally to administrative proceedings, payment orders relating to oil and gas royalties owed under leases of Indian land would be subject to a shorter (i.e., 6-year) statute of limitations than similar payment orders relating to leases of other public-domain lands (which would be governed by FOGRSFA's new 7-year statute). Particularly in light of Congress' exhortation that the Secretary of the Interior "aggressively carry out his trust responsibility in the administration of Indian oil and gas," 30 U.S.C. 1701(a)(4), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to impose a shorter statute of |
Justice Alito | 2,006 | 8 | majority | BP America Production Co. v. Burton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145769/bp-america-production-co-v-burton/ | unlikely that Congress intended to impose a shorter statute of limitations for payment orders regarding Indian lands. Petitioners contend, finally, that interpreting 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would frustrate the statute's purposes of providing repose, ensuring that actions are brought while evidence is fresh, lightening recordkeeping burdens, and pressuring federal agencies to assert federal rights promptly. These are certainly cogent policy arguments, but they must be viewed in perspective. For one thing, petitioners overstate the scope of the problem, since Congress of *649 course can enact and has enacted specific statutes of limitations to govern specific administrative actions. See, e.g., U.S.C. 5205(a)(1) Indeed, in 1996, FOGRSFA imposed just such a limitation prospectively on all non-Indian land, oil, and gas lease claims. Second, and more fundamentally, the consequences of interpreting 2415(a) as limited to court actions must be considered in light of the traditional rule exempting proceedings brought by the sovereign from any time bar. There are always policy arguments against affording the sovereign this special treatment, and therefore in a case like this, where the issue is how far Congress meant to go when it enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the Government, arguing that an expansive interpretation would serve the general purposes of statutes of limitations is somewhat beside the point. The relevant inquiry, instead, is simply how far Congress meant to go when it enacted the statute of limitations in question. Here prior to the enactment of 2415(a) in 19, contract actions brought by the Government were not subject to any statute of limitations. See Guaranty Trust 304 U.S., at Absent congressional action changing this rule, it remains the law, and the text of 2415(a) betrays no intent to change this rule as it applies to administrative proceedings. In the final analysis, while we appreciate petitioners' arguments, they are insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the statutory text. We therefore hold that the 6-year statute of limitations in 2415(a) applies only to court actions and not to the administrative proceedings involved in this case. * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. The CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | This case presents the issue as to whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary. This Court's decisions in and are particularly implicated. I Jimmy D. Glover, a full-time trooper of the Connecticut State Police, in 1970 was assigned to the Narcotics Division in an undercover capacity. On May 5 of that year, about *100 7:45 p. m., e. d. t., and while there was still daylight, Glover and Henry Alton Brown, an informant, went to an apartment building Westland, in Hartford, for the purpose of purchasing narcotics from "Dickie Boy" Cicero, a known narcotics dealer. Cicero, it was thought, lived on the third floor of that apartment building. Tr. 45-46, 68.[1] Glover and Brown entered the building, observed by backup Officers D'Onofrio and Gaffey, and proceeded by stairs to the third floor. Glover knocked at the door of one of the two apartments served by the stairway.[2] The area was illuminated by natural light from a window in the third floor hallway. The door was opened 12 to 18 inches in response to the knock. Glover observed a man standing at the door and, behind him, a woman. Brown identified himself. Glover then asked for "two things" of narcotics. The man at the door held out his hand, and Glover gave him two $10 bills. The door closed. Soon the man returned and handed Glover two glassine bags.[3] While the door was open, Glover stood within two feet of the person from whom he made the purchase and observed his face. Five to seven minutes elapsed from the *101 time the door first opened until it closed the second time. Glover and Brown then left the building. This was about eight minutes after their arrival. Glover drove to headquarters where he described the seller to D'Onofrio and Gaffey. Glover at that time did not know the identity of the seller. He described him as being "a colored man, approximately five feet eleven inches tall, dark complexion, black hair, short Afro style, and having high cheekbones, and of heavy build. He was wearing at the time blue pants and a plaid shirt." -37. D'Onofrio, suspecting from this description that respondent might be the seller, obtained a photograph of respondent from the Records Division of the Hartford Police Department. He left it at Glover's office. D'Onofrio was not acquainted with respondent personally, but did know him by sight and had seen |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | personally, but did know him by sight and had seen him "[s]everal times" prior to May 5. Glover, when alone, viewed the photograph for the first time upon his return to headquarters on May 7; he identified the person shown as the one from whom he had purchased the narcotics. -38. The toxicological report on the contents of the glassine bags revealed the presence of heroin. The report was dated July 16, 1970. Respondent was arrested on July 27 while visiting at the apartment of a Mrs. Ramsey on the third floor of 201 Westland. This was the apartment at which the narcotics sale had taken place on May 5.[4] Respondent was charged, in a two-count information, with possession and sale of heroin, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 19-481a and 19-480a *102[5] At his trial in January 1971, the photograph from which Glover had identified respondent was received in evidence without objection on the part of the defense. Tr. 38. Glover also testified that, although he had not seen respondent in the eight months that had elapsed since the sale, "there [was] no doubt whatsoever" in his mind that the person shown on the photograph was respondent. Glover also made a positive in-court identification without objection. No explanation was offered by the prosecution for the failure to utilize a photographic array or to conduct a lineup. Respondent, who took the stand in his own defense, testified that on May 5, the day in question, he had been ill at his Albany Avenue apartment ("a lot of back pains, muscle spasms a bad heart high blood pressure neuralgia in my face, and sinus," ), and that at no time on that particular day had he been Westland. 113-114. His wife testified that she recalled, after her husband had refreshed her memory, that he was home all day on May 5. Doctor Wesley M. Vietzke, an internist and assistant professor of medicine at the University of Connecticut, testified that respondent had consulted him on April 15, 1970, and that he took a medical history from him, heard his complaints about his back and facial pain, and discovered that he had high blood pressure. The physician found respondent, subjectively, "in great discomfort." Respondent in fact underwent surgery for a herniated disc at L5 and S1 on August 17. The jury found respondent guilty on both counts of the information. He received a sentence of not less than six nor *103 more than nine years. His conviction was affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. That court noted the absence of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | Supreme Court of Connecticut. That court noted the absence of an objection to Glover's in-court identification and concluded that respondent "has not shown that substantial injustice resulted from the admission of this evidence." Under Connecticut law, substantial injustice must be shown before a claim of error not made or passed on by the trial court will be considered on appeal. Fourteen months later, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United District Court for the District of Connecticut. He alleged that the admission of the identification testimony at his state trial deprived him of due process of law to which he was entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, by an unreported written opinion based on the court's review of the state trial transcript,[6] dismissed respondent's petition. On appeal, the United Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, with instructions to issue the writ unless the State gave notice of a desire to retry respondent and the new trial occurred within a reasonable time to be fixed by the District Judge.[7] In brief summary, the court felt that evidence as to the photograph should have been excluded, regardless of reliability, *104 because the examination of the single photograph was unnecessary and suggestive. And, in the court's view, the evidence was unreliable in any event. We granted certiorari. II decided in 1967, concerned a petitioner who had been convicted in a New York court of murder. He was arrested the day following the crime and was taken by the police to a hospital where the victim's wife, also wounded in the assault, was a patient. After observing Stovall and hearing him speak, she identified him as the murderer. She later made an in-court identification. On federal habeas, Stovall claimed the identification testimony violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the petition, and the Court of Appeals, en banc, affirmed. This Court also affirmed. On the identification issue, the Court reviewed the practice of showing a suspect singly for purposes of identification, and the claim that this was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that it constituted a denial of due process of law. The Court noted that the practice "has been widely condemned," but it concluded that "a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the of the circumstances surrounding it." In that case, showing Stovall to the victim's spouse "was imperative." The Court then quoted the observations of the Court of Appeals, to the effect that the spouse was the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | of Appeals, to the effect that the spouse was the only person who could possibly exonerate the accused; that the hospital was not far from the courthouse and jail; that no one knew how long she might live; that she was not able to visit the jail; and that taking Stovall to the hospital room was the only feasible procedure, and, under the circumstances, "`the usual police station line-up was out of the question.'" *105 decided in 1972, concerned a respondent who had been convicted in a Tennessee court of rape, on evidence consisting in part of the victim's visual and voice identification of at a station-house showup seven months after the crime. The victim had been in her assailant's presence for some time and had directly observed him indoors and under a full moon outdoors. She testified that she had "no doubt" that was her assailant. She previously had given the police a description of the assailant. She had made no identification of others presented at previous showups, lineups, or through photographs. On federal habeas, the District Court held that the confrontation was so suggestive as to violate due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court reversed on that issue, and held that the evidence properly had been allowed to go to the jury. The Court reviewed Stovall and certain later cases where it had considered the scope of due process protection against the admission of evidence derived from suggestive identification procedures, namely, ; ; and[8] The Court concluded that *106 general guidelines emerged from these cases "as to the relationship between suggestiveness and misidentification." The "admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process." The Court expressed concern about the lapse of seven months between the crime and the confrontation and observed that this "would be a seriously negative factor in most cases." The "central question," however, was "whether under the ` of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive." Applying that test, the Court found "no substantial likelihood of misidentification. The evidence was properly allowed to go to the jury." well might be seen to provide an unambiguous answer to the question before us: The admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.[9] In one passage, *107 however, the Court observed that the challenged procedure occurred pre-Stovall and that a strict rule would make little sense with regard to a confrontation that preceded the Court's first indication that a |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | a confrontation that preceded the Court's first indication that a suggestive procedure might lead to the exclusion of evidence. One perhaps might argue that, by implication, the Court suggested that a different rule could apply post-Stovall. The question before us, then, is simply whether the analysis applies to post-Stovall confrontations as well to those pre-Stovall. III In the present case the District Court observed that the "sole evidence tying Brathwaite to the possession and sale of the heroin consisted in his identifications by the police undercover agent, Jimmy Glover." App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. On the constitutional issue, the court stated that the first inquiry was whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. If so, the second inquiry is whether, under all the circumstances, that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. at 9a. and Simmons were cited. The court noted that in the Second Circuit, its controlling court, it was clear that "this type of identification procedure [display of a single photograph] is impermissibly *108 suggestive," and turned to the second inquiry. App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. The factors specified for consideration were recited and applied. The court concluded that there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. It referred to the facts: Glover was within two feet of the seller. The duration of the confrontation was at least a "couple of minutes." There was natural light from a window or skylight and there was adequate light to see clearly in the hall. Glover "certainly was paying attention to identify the seller." at 10a. He was a trained police officer who realized that later he would have to find and arrest the person with whom he was dealing. He gave a detailed description to D'Onofrio. The reliability of this description was supported by the fact that it enabled D'Onofrio to pick out a single photograph that was thereafter positively identified by Glover. Only two days elapsed between the crime and the photographic identification. Despite the fact that another eight months passed before the in-court identification, Glover had "no doubt" that Brathwaite was the person who had sold him heroin. The Court of Appeals confirmed that the exhibition of the single photograph to Glover was "impermissibly suggestive," 527 F.2d, 6, and felt that, in addition, "it was unnecessarily so." 7. There was no emergency and little urgency. The court said that prior to the decision in except in cases of harmless error, "a conviction secured as the result of admitting an identification obtained by impermissibly suggestive and unnecessary |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | of admitting an identification obtained by impermissibly suggestive and unnecessary measures could not stand." It noted what it felt might be opposing inferences to be drawn from passages in but concluded that the case preserved the principle "requiring the exclusion of identifications resulting from `unnecessarily suggestive confrontation'" in post-Stovall 527 F.2d, 8. The court also concluded that for post-Stovall identifications, had not changed the existing rule. Thus: "Evidence of an identification unnecessarily obtained by impermissibly *109 suggestive means must be excluded under Stovall No rules less stringent than these can force police administrators and prosecutors to adopt procedures that will give fair assurance against the awful risks of misidentification." Finally, the court said, even if this conclusion were wrong, the writ, nevertheless, should issue. It took judicial notice that on May 5, 1970, sunset at Hartford was at 7:53 p. m. It characterized Glover's duty as an undercover agent as one "to cause arrests to be made," and his description of the suspect as one that "could have applied to hundreds of Hartford black males." The in-court identification had "little meaning," for Brathwaite was at the counsel table. The fact that respondent was arrested in the very apartment where the sale was made was subject to a "not implausible" explanation from the respondent, "although evidently not credited by the jury." And the court was troubled by "the long and unexplained delay" in the arrest. It was too great a danger that the respondent was convicted because he was a man D'Onofrio had previously observed near the scene, was thought to be a likely offender, and was arrested when he was known to be in Mrs. Ramsey's apartment, rather than because Glover "really remembered him as the seller." IV Petitioner at the outset acknowledges that "the procedure in the instant case was suggestive [because only one photograph was used] and unnecessary" [because there was no emergency or exigent circumstance]. Brief for Petitioner 10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. The respondent, in agreement with the Court of Appeals, proposes a per se rule of exclusion that he claims is dictated by the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. He rightly observes that this is the first case in which this Court has had occasion to rule upon strictly post-Stovall out-of-court identification evidence of the challenged kind. *110 Since the decision in the Courts of Appeals appear to have developed at least two approaches to such evidence. See Pulaski, : The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, The first, or per se approach, employed by the Second |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | The first, or per se approach, employed by the Second Circuit in the present case, focuses on the procedures employed and requires exclusion of the out-of-court identification evidence, without regard to reliability, whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily suggested confrontation procedures.[10] The justifications advanced are the elimination of evidence of uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and prosecutors, and the stated "fair assurance against the awful risks of misidentification." See (CA4), cert. denied sub nom. The second, or more lenient, approach is one that continues to rely on the of the circumstances. It permits the admission of the confrontation evidence if, despite the suggestive aspect, the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability. Its adherents feel that the per se approach is not mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This second approach, in contrast to the other, is ad hoc and serves to limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of fact. See United ex rel. (CA7) (opinion by Judge, now MR. JUSTICE, STEVENS), cert. denied, ; cert. denied sub nom.[11] MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, in writing for the Seventh Circuit in observed: "There is surprising unanimity among scholars in regarding such a rule [the per se approach] as essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage of justice." He pointed out that well-known federal judges have taken the position that "evidence of, or derived from, a showup identification should be inadmissible unless the prosecutor can justify his failure to use a more reliable identification procedure." Indeed, the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 160.1 and 160.2 (hereafter Model Code) frowns upon the use of a showup or the display of only a single photograph. The respondent here stresses the same theme and the need for deterrence of improper identification practice, a factor he regards as pre-eminent. Photographic identification, it is said, continues to be needlessly employed. He notes that the legislative regulation "the Court had hoped [United v.] Wade[,] would engender," Brief for Respondent 15, has not been forthcoming. He argues that a rule cannot be expected to have a significant deterrent impact; only a strict rule of exclusion will have direct and immediate impact on law enforcement agents. Identification evidence is so convincing to the jury that sweeping exclusionary rules are required. Fairness of the trial is threatened by suggestive confrontation evidence, and thus, it is said, an exclusionary rule has an established constitutional predicate. There are, of course, several interests to be considered and taken into account. The driving force behind United |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | considered and taken into account. The driving force behind United and Stovall, all decided on the same day, was the Court's concern with the problems of eyewitness identification. Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness' recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police. Thus, Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability. It must be observed that both approaches before us are responsive to this concern. The per se rule, however, goes too far since its application automatically and peremptorily, and without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant. The second factor is deterrence. Although the per se approach has the more significant deterrent effect, the approach also has an influence on police behavior. The police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures under the rule, as well as the per se one, for fear that their actions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable.[12] The third factor is the effect on the administration of justice. Here the per se approach suffers serious drawbacks. Since it denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on occasion, in the guilty going free. Also, because of its rigidity, the per se approach may make error by the trial judge more likely than the approach. And in those cases in which the admission of identification evidence is error under the per se approach but not under the approach *113 cases in which the identification is reliable despite an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedurereversal is a Draconian sanction.[13] Certainly, inflexible rules of exclusion that may frustrate rather than promote justice have not been viewed recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm. See, for example, the several opinions in See also United It is true, as has been noted, that the Court in referred to the pre-Stovall character of the confrontation in that 409 U.S., But that observation was only one factor in the judgmental process. It does not translate into a holding that post-Stovall confrontation evidence automatically is to be excluded. The standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United ; Stovall, with its reference to "the of the circumstances," and with its continuing stress on the same 409 U.S., did not, singly or together, establish a strict exclusionary rule or new standard of due process. Judge |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | strict exclusionary rule or new standard of due process. Judge Leventhal, although speaking pre- and of a pre-Wade situation, correctly has described Stovall as protecting an evidentiary interest and, at the same time, as recognizing the limited extent of that interest in our adversary system.[14] *114 We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall confrontations. The factors to be considered are set out in 409 U. S., -200. These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. V We turn, then, to the facts of this case and apply the analysis: 1. The opportunity to view. Glover testified that for two to three minutes he stood at the apartment door, within two feet of the respondent. The door opened twice, and each time the man stood at the door. The moments passed, the conversation took place, and payment was made. Glover looked directly at his vendor. It was near sunset, to be sure, but the sun had not yet set, so it was not dark or even dusk or twilight. Natural light from outside entered the hallway through a window. There was natural light, as well, from inside the apartment. *115 2. The degree of attention. Glover was not a casual or passing observer, as is so often the case with eyewitness identification. Trooper Glover was a trained police officer on dutyand specialized and dangerous dutywhen he called at the third floor of 201 Westland in Hartford on May 5, 1970. Glover himself was a Negro and unlikely to perceive only general features of "hundreds of Hartford black males," as the Court of Appeals stated. It is true that Glover's duty was that of ferreting out narcotics offenders and that he would be expected in his work to produce results. But it is also true that, as a specially trained, assigned, and experienced officer, he could be expected to pay scrupulous attention to detail, for he knew that subsequently he would have to find and arrest his vendor. In addition, he knew that his claimed observations would be subject later to close scrutiny and examination at any trial. 3. The accuracy of the description. Glover's description was given to D'Onofrio within minutes after the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | Glover's description was given to D'Onofrio within minutes after the transaction. It included the vendor's race, his height, his build, the color and style of his hair, and the high cheekbone facial feature. It also included clothing the vendor wore. No claim has been made that respondent did not possess the physical characteristics so described. D'Onofrio reacted positively at once. Two days later, when Glover was alone, he viewed the photograph D'Onofrio produced and identified its subject as the narcotics seller. 4. The witness' level of certainty. There is no dispute that the photograph in question was that of respondent. Glover, in response to a question whether the photograph was that of the person from whom he made the purchase, testified: "There is no question whatsoever." Tr. 38. This positive assurance was repeated. 5. The time between the crime and the confrontation. Glover's description of his vendor was given to D'Onofrio *116 within minutes of the crime. The photographic identification took place only two days later. We do not have here the passage of weeks or months between the crime and the viewing of the photograph. These indicators of Glover's ability to make an accurate identification are hardly outweighed by the corrupting effect of the challenged identification itself. Although identifications arising from single-photograph displays may be viewed in general with suspicion, see we find in the instant case little pressure on the witness to acquiesce in the suggestion that such a display entails. D'Onofrio had left the photograph at Glover's office and was not present when Glover first viewed it two days after the event. There thus was little urgency and Glover could view the photograph at his leisure. And since Glover examined the photograph alone, there was no coercive pressure to make an identification arising from the presence of another. The identification was made in circumstances allowing care and reflection. Although it plays no part in our analysis, all this assurance as to the reliability of the identification is hardly undermined by the facts that respondent was arrested in the very apartment where the sale had taken place, and that he acknowledged his frequent visits to that apartment.[15] Surely, we cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | majority | Manson v. Brathwaite | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109693/manson-v-brathwaite/ | Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature. *117 Of course, it would have been better had D'Onofrio presented Glover with a photographic array including "so far as practicable a reasonable number of persons similar to any person then suspected whose likeness is included in the array." Model Code 160.2 (2). The use of that procedure would have enhanced the force of the identification at trial and would have avoided the risk that the evidence would be excluded as unreliable. But we are not disposed to view D'Onofrio's failure as one of constitutional dimension to be enforced by a rigorous and unbending exclusionary rule. The defect, if there be one, goes to weight and not to substance.[16] We conclude that the criteria laid down in are to be applied in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning a post-Stovall identification, and that those criteria are satisfactorily met and complied with here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | This case concerns the scope of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (Hague Service Convention), 20 U. S. T. 361, T. I. A. S. No. 6638. The purpose of that multilateral treaty is to simplify, standardize, and generally improve the process of serving documents abroad. Preamble, ; see Volkswagenwerk To that end, the Hague Service Convention specifies cer tain approved methods of service and “pre-empts incon sistent methods of service” wherever it applies. at 699. Today we address a question that has divided the lower courts: whether the Convention prohibits service by mail. We hold that it does not. I A Petitioner Water Splash is a corporation that produces aquatic playground systems. Respondent Menon is a former employee of Water Splash. In 2013, Water Splash sued Menon in state court in Texas, alleging that she had begun working for a competitor while still employed by 2 WATER SPLASH, Water Splash asserted several causes of action, including unfair competition, conversion, and tortious interference with business relations. Because Menon resided in Can ada, Water Splash sought and obtained permission to effect service by mail. After Menon declined to answer or otherwise enter an appearance, the trial court issued a default judgment in favor of Water Splash. Menon moved to set aside the judgment on the ground that she had not been properly served, but the trial court denied the mo tion. Menon appealed, arguing that service by mail does not “comport with the requirements of the Hague Service Convention.” The Texas Court of Appeals majority sided with Menon and held that the Convention prohibits service of process by mail. Justice Christopher dissented. The Court of Appeals declined to review the matter en banc, App. 95–96, and the Texas Supreme Court denied discretionary review, at 97–98. The disagreement between the panel majority and Justice Christopher tracks a broader conflict among courts as to whether the Convention permits service through postal channels. Compare, e.g., (holding that the Convention prohibits service by mail), and Nuovo Pignone, (CA5 2002) (same), with, e.g., 383 F.3d 798, (CA9 2004) (holding that the Convention allows service by mail), and Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 8, 838–840 (CA2 1986) (same). We granted certio rari to resolve that conflict. 580 U. S. (2016). B The “primary innovation” of the Hague Service Conven tion—set out in Articles 2–7—is that it “requires each state to establish a central authority to receive requests Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court for service of documents from other countries.” |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | of the Court for service of documents from other countries.” at When a central authority receives an ap propriate request, it must serve the documents or arrange for their service, Art. 5, and then provide a certificate of service, Art. 6. Submitting a request to a central authority is not, how ever, the only method of service approved by the Conven tion. For example, Article 8 permits service through diplomatic and consular agents; Article 11 provides that any two states can agree to methods of service not other wise specified in the Convention; and Article 19 clarifies that the Convention does not preempt any internal laws of its signatories that permit service from abroad via meth ods not otherwise allowed by the Convention. At issue in this case is Article 10 of the Convention, the English text of which reads as follows: “Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with— “(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, “(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect ser vice of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination, “(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judi cial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.” 20 U. S. T., at 363. Articles 10(b) and 10(c), by their plain terms, address additional methods of service that are permitted by the Convention (unless the receiving state objects). By con trast, Article 10(a) does not expressly refer to “service.” The question in this case is whether, despite this textual 4 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON Opinion of the Court difference, the Article 10(a) phrase “send judicial docu ments” encompasses sending documents for the purposes of service. II A In interpreting treaties, “we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used.” (internal quotation marks omitted). For present purposes, the key word in Article 10(a) is “send.” This is a broad term,1 and there is no apparent reason why it would exclude the transmission of documents for a particular purpose (namely, service). Moreover, the structure of the Hague Service Convention strongly counsels against such a reading. The key structural point is that the scope of the Conven tion is limited to service of documents. Several elements of the Convention indicate as much. First, the preamble states that the Convention |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | indicate as much. First, the preamble states that the Convention is intended “to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time.” (Emphasis added.) And Article 1 defines the Con vention’s scope by stating that the Convention “shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” (Emphasis added.) Even the Conven tion’s full title reflects that the Convention concerns “Ser vice Abroad.” We have also held as much. (stating that the Convention “applies only to documents transmitted for service abroad”). As we explained, a pre liminary draft of Article 1 was criticized “because it sug gested that the Convention could apply to transmissions —————— 1 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1568 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “send,” in part, as “[t]o cause to be moved or conveyed from a present location to another place; esp., to deposit (a writing or notice) in the mail”). Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 5 Opinion of the Court abroad that do not culminate in service.” The final version of Article 1, however, “eliminates this possibility.” The wording of Article 1 makes clear that the Con vention “applies only when there is both transmission of a document from the requesting state to the receiving state, and service upon the person for whom it is intended.” In short, the text of the Convention reveals, and we have explicitly held, that the scope of the Convention is limited to service of documents. In light of that, it would be quite strange if Article 10(a)—apparently alone among the Convention’s provisions—concerned something other than service of documents. Indeed, under that reading, Article 10(a) would be su perfluous. The function of Article 10 is to ensure that, absent objection from the receiving state, the Convention “shall not interfere” with the activities described in 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c). But Article 1 already “eliminates [the] possibility” that the Convention would apply to any com munications that “do not culminate in service,” so it is hard to imagine how the Convention could interfere with any non-service communications. Accordingly, in order for Article 10(a) to do any work, it must pertain to sending documents for the purposes of service. Menon attempts to avoid this superfluity problem by suggesting that Article 10(a) does refer to serving docu ments—but only some documents. Specifically, she makes a distinction between two categories of service. According to Menon, Article 10(a) does not apply to service of process (which we have defined as |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | apply to service of process (which we have defined as “a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action,” )). But Article 10(a) does apply, Menon suggests, to the service of “post-answer judicial documents” (that is, any additional documents which may have to be served later in the litigation). Brief for Respondent –31. The problem with this argument is 6 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON Opinion of the Court that it lacks any plausible textual footing in Article 10.2 If the drafters wished to limit Article 10(a) to a particu lar subset of documents, they presumably would have said so—as they did, for example, in Article 15, which refers to “a writ of summons or an equivalent document.” Instead, Article 10(a) uses the term “judicial documents”—the same term that is featured in 10(b) and 10(c). Accord- ingly, the notion that Article 10(a) governs a different set of documents than 10(b) or 10(c) is hard to fathom. And it certainly derives no support from the use of the word “send,” whose ordinary meaning is broad enough to cover the transmission of any judicial documents (including litigation-initiating documents). Nothing about the word “send” suggests that Article 10(a) is narrower than 10(b) and 10(c), let alone that Article 10(a) is somehow limited to “post-answer” documents. Ultimately, Menon wishes to read the phrase “send judicial documents” as “serve a subset of judicial docu ments.” That is an entirely atextual reading, and Menon offers no sustained argument in support of it. Therefore, the only way to escape the conclusion that Article 10(a) includes service of process is to assert that it does not cover service of documents at all—and, as shown above, that reading is structurally implausible and renders Arti cle 10(a) superfluous. —————— 2 The argument also assumes that the scope of the Convention is not limited to service of process (otherwise, Article 10(a) would be superflu ous even under Menon’s reading). can be read to suggest that this assumption is 486 U.S., –701; see 1 B. Ristau, International Judicial Assistance p. 112 (1990 rev. ed.) (Ristau) (stating that the English term “service” in the Convention “means the formal delivery of a legal document to the addressee in such a manner as to legally charge him with notice of the institution of a legal proceeding”). For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume, arguendo, that Menon’s assumption is correct. Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 7 Opinion of the Court B The text and structure of the Hague Service Convention, then, strongly suggest |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | and structure of the Hague Service Convention, then, strongly suggest that Article 10(a) pertains to ser vice of documents. The only significant counterargument is that, unlike many other provisions in the Convention, Article 10(a) does not include the word “service” or any of its variants. The Article 10(a) phrase “send judicial docu ments,” the argument goes, should mean something differ ent than the phrase “effect service of judicial documents” in the other two subparts of Article 10. This argument does not win the day for several reasons. First, it must contend with the compelling structural considerations discussed above. See Air (treaty interpretation must take account of the “context in which the written words are used”); cf. University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 13) (“Just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices”). Second, the argument fails on its own terms. Assume for a second that the word “send” must mean something other than “serve.” That would not imply that Article 10(a) must exclude service. Instead, “send[ing]” could be a broader concept that includes service but is not limited to it. That reading of the word “send” is probably more plau sible than interpreting it to exclude service, and it does not create the same superfluity problem.3 Third, it must be remembered that the French version of —————— 3 Another plausible explanation for the distinct terminology of Article 10(a) is that it is the only provision in the Convention that specifically contemplates direct service, without the use of an intermediary. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (“[I]n contrast to Article 10(a), all other methods of service identified in the Convention require the affirmative engagement of an intermediary to effect ‘service’ ”). The use of the word “send” may simply have been intended to reflect that distinction. 8 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON Opinion of the Court the Convention is “equally authentic” to the English ver sion. Menon does not seri- ously engage with the Convention’s French text. But the word “adresser”—the French counterpart to the word “send” in Article 10(a)—“has been consistently interpreted as meaning service or notice.” Hague Conference on Pri vate Int’l Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention ¶279, p. 91 (4th ed. 2016). In short, the most that could possibly be said for this argument is that it creates an ambiguity as to Article 10(a)’s meaning. And when a treaty provision is ambigu ous, the Court “may look beyond the written words to the |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | the Court “may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, these traditional tools of treaty interpretation comfortably resolve any lingering ambiguity in Water Splash’s favor. III Three extratextual sources are especially helpful in ascertaining Article 10(a)’s meaning: the Convention’s drafting history, the views of the Executive, and the views of other signatories. Drafting history has often been used in treaty interpre tation. See ; ; see also (ana lyzing the negotiating history of the Hague Service Con vention). Here, the Convention’s drafting history strongly suggests that Article 10(a) allows service through postal channels. Philip W. Amram was the member of the United States delegation who was most closely involved in the drafting of the Convention. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (App.) (1967) (S. Exec. Rep.) (statement of State Department Deputy Legal Adviser Richard D. Kearney). Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 9 Opinion of the Court A few months before the Convention was signed, he pub lished an article describing and summarizing it. In that article, he stated that “Article 10 permits direct service by mail unless [the receiving] state objects to such ser vice.” The Proposed International Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A. B. A. J. 650, 653 (1965).4 Along similar lines, the Rapporteur’s report on a draft version of Article 10—which did not materially differ from the final version—stated that the “provision of paragraph 1 also permits service by telegram” and that the draft ers “did not accept the proposal that postal channels be limited to registered mail.” 1 Ristau at 149. In other words, it was clearly understood that service by postal channels was permissible, and the only question was whether it should be limited to registered mail. The Court also gives “great weight” to “the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the half century since the Convention was adopted, the Executive has consistently maintained that the Hague Service Convention allows service by mail. When President Johnson transmitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent, he included a report by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. That report stated that “Article 10 permits direct service by mail unless [the receiving] state objects to such service.” Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu ments in Civil or Commercial Matters: Message From the President of the United States, S. |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | Matters: Message From the President of the United States, S. Exec. Doc. C, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967). —————— 4 Two years later, Amram testified to the same effect before the Sen ate Foreign Relations Committee. S. Exec. Rep., at 13 (stating that service by central authority “is not obligatory,” and that other available techniques included “direct service by mail”). 10 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON Opinion of the Court In the Eighth Circuit issued Bankston, the first Federal Court of Appeals decision holding that the Hague Service Convention prohibits service by mail. 889 F.2d, at 174. The State Department expressed its disagreement with Bankston in a letter addressed to the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts and the National Center for State Courts. See Notice of Other Documents (1), United States Department of State Opinion Regarding the Bank ston Case and Service by Mail to Japan Under the Hague Service Convention, I. L. M. 260, 260–261 (1991) (ex cerpts of Mar. 14, 1990, letter). The letter stated that “Bankston is incorrect to the extent that it suggests that the Hague Convention does not permit as a method of service of process the sending of a copy of a summons and complaint by registered mail to a defendant in a foreign country.” The State Department takes the same position on its website.5 Finally, this Court has given “considerable weight” to the views of other parties to a treaty. Abbott, 560 U.S., at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 9) (noting the importance of “read[ing] the treaty in a man ner consistent with the shared expectations of the con tracting parties” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And other signatories to the Convention have consistently adopted Water Splash’s view. Multiple foreign courts have held that the Hague Ser —————— 5 Dept. of State, Legal Considerations: International Judicial Assis tance: Service of Process (stating that “[s]ervice by registered mail is an option in many countries in the world,” but that it “should not be used in the countries party to the Hague Service Conven- tion that objected to the method described in Article 10(a) (postal channels)”), online at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal considerations/judicial/service-of-process.html (all Internet materials as last visited May 19, 2017). Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 11 Opinion of the Court vice Convention allows for service by mail.6 In addition, several of the Convention’s signatories have either objected, or declined to object, to service by mail under Article 10, thereby acknowledging that Article 10 encompasses service by mail.7 Finally, several Special Commissions— |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | Article 10 encompasses service by mail.7 Finally, several Special Commissions— comprising numerous contracting States—have expressly stated that the Convention does not prohibit service by mail.8 By contrast, Menon identifies no evidence that any —————— 6 See, e.g., Wang v. Lin, [2016] 132 O. R. 3d 48, 61 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Crystal Decisions (U. K.), (High Court, Eng.); ; Case C– 412/97, ED Srl v. Italo Fenocchio, 1999 E. C. R. I–3845, 3877–3878, ¶6 [] 3 Cow. M. L. R. 855; see also (CA9 2004) (noting that foreign courts are “essentially unanimous” in the view “that the meaning of ‘send’ in Article 10(a) includes ‘serve’ ”). 7 Canada, for example, has stated that it “does not object to service by postal channels.” By contrast, the Czech Republic has adopted Czecho slovakia’s position that “judicial documents may not be served through postal channels.” Dutch Govt. Treaty Database: Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters: Parties With Reservations, Declarations and Objections, (entries for Canada and the Czech Republic) on- line at https://treatydatabase.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/004235_b; see also, e.g., In addition, some states have objected to all of the channels of transmis sion listed in Article 10, referring to them collectively with the term “service.” See, e.g., (entries for Bulgaria, Hungary, Kuwait, and Turkey). 8 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence and Service Conventions ¶55, p. 11 (Oct. 28–Nov. 4, 2003) (“reaffirm[ing]” the Special Commis sion’s “clear understanding that the term ‘send’ in Article 10(a) is to be understood as meaning ‘service’ through postal channels”), online at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_concl_e.pdf; Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report on the Work of the Special Commission of April on the Operation of the Hague Conventions of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudi cial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters ¶16, 12 WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON Opinion of the Court signatory has ever rejected Water Splash’s view. * * * In short, the traditional tools of treaty interpretation unmistakably demonstrate that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail. To be clear, this does not mean that the Convention affirmatively authorizes service by mail. Article 10(a) simply provides that, as long as the receiving state does not object, the Convention does not “interfere with the freedom” to serve documents through postal channels. In other words, in cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by |
Justice Alito | 2,017 | 8 | majority | Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4393430/water-splash-inc-v-menon/ | in cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by mail is permissible if two conditions are met: first, the receiving state has not ob jected to service by mail; and second, service by mail is authorized under otherwise-applicable law. See Brock –804. Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the Con vention prohibited service by mail outright, it had no occasion to consider whether Texas law authorizes the methods of service used by Water Splash. We leave that question, and any other remaining issues, to be considered on remand to the extent they are properly preserved. For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceed ings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. —————— p. 5 (criticizing “certain courts in the United States” which “had concluded that service of process abroad by mail was not permit ted under the Convention”), online at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/ scrpt89e_20.pdf; Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 21– 25 1977, 17 I. L. M. 312, 326 (1978) (observing that “most of the States made no objection to the service of judicial documents coming from abroad directly by mail in their territory” (emphasis added)) |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention (Convention)[1] imposes liability on an air carrier for a passenger's or bodily injury caused by an "accident" that occurred in connection with an international flight. In Air the Court explained that the term "accident" in the Convention refers to an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger," and not to "the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft." The issue we must decide is whether the "accident" condition precedent to air carrier liability under Article 17 is satisfied when the carrier's unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a passenger is a link in a chain of causation resulting in a passenger's pre-existing medical condition being aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft cabin. We conclude that it is. I The following facts are taken from the District Court's findings, which, being unchallenged by either party, we accept as true. In December 1997, Dr. Abid Hanson and his wife, Rubina Husain (hereinafter respondent), traveled with their children and another family from San Francisco to Athens and Cairo for a family vacation. During a stopover in New York, Dr. Hanson learned for the first time that petitioner allowed its passengers to smoke on international *647 flights. Because Dr. Hanson had suffered from asthma and was sensitive to secondhand smoke, respondent requested and obtained seats away from the smoking section. Dr. Hanson experienced no problems on the flights to Cairo. For the return flights, Dr. Hanson and respondent arrived early at the Cairo airport in order to request nonsmoking seats. Respondent showed the check-in agent a physician's letter explaining that Dr. Hanson "has [a] history of recurrent anaphylactic reactions," App. 81, and asked the agent to ensure that their seats were in the nonsmoking section. The flight to Athens was uneventful. After boarding the plane for the flight to San Francisco, Dr. Hanson and respondent discovered that their seats were located only three rows in front of the economy-class smoking section. Respondent advised Maria Leptourgou, a flight attendant for petitioner, that Dr. Hanson could not sit in a smoking area, and said, "`You have to move him.'" The flight attendant told her to "`have a seat.'" After all the passengers had boarded but prior to takeoff, respondent again asked Ms. Leptourgou to move Dr. Hanson, explaining that he was "`allergic to smoke.'" Ms. Leptourgou replied that she could not reseat Dr. Hanson because the plane was "`totally full'" and she was "too busy" to help. Shortly after takeoff, passengers in the smoking |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | busy" to help. Shortly after takeoff, passengers in the smoking section began to smoke, and Dr. Hanson was soon surrounded by ambient cigarette smoke. Respondent spoke with Ms. Leptourgou a third time, stating, "`You have to move my husband from here.'" Ms. Leptourgou again refused, stating that the plane was full. Ms. Leptourgou told respondent that Dr. Hanson could switch seats with another passenger, but that respondent would have to ask other passengers herself, without the flight crew's assistance. Respondent told Ms. Leptourgou that Dr. Hanson had to move even if the only available seat was in the cockpit or in *648 business class, but Ms. Leptourgou refused to provide any assistance.[2] About two hours into the flight, the smoking noticeably increased in the rows behind Dr. Hanson. Dr. Hanson asked respondent for a new inhaler because the one he had been using was empty. Dr. Hanson then moved toward the front of the plane to get some fresher air. While he was leaning against a chair near the galley area, Dr. Hanson gestured to respondent to get his emergency kit. Respondent returned with it and gave him a shot of epinephrine. She then awoke Dr. Umesh Sabharwal, an allergist, with whom Dr. Hanson and respondent had been traveling. Dr. Sabharwal gave Dr. Hanson another shot of epinephrine and began to administer CPR and oxygen. Dr. Hanson died shortly thereafter.[3] at 1128. Respondents filed a wrongful- suit in California state court. Petitioner removed the case to federal court, and the District Court found petitioner liable for Dr. Hanson's The District Court held that Ms. Leptourgou's refusal to reseat Dr. Hanson constituted an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17. Applying Saks' definition of that term, the court reasoned that the flight attendant's conduct was external to Dr. Hanson and, because it was in "blatant disregard of industry standards and airline policies," was not expected or usual. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Applying Saks' definition of "accident," the Ninth Circuit agreed that the flight attendant's refusal to reseat Dr. Hanson "was clearly external to *649 Dr. Hanson, and it was unexpected and unusual in light of industry standards, Olympic policy, and the simple nature of Dr. Hanson's requested accommodation." We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II A We begin with the language of Article 17 of the Convention, which provides:[4] "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."[5] In Saks, the Court recognized that the text of the Convention does not define the term "accident" and that the context in which it is used is not "illuminating." *650 The Court nevertheless discerned the meaning of the term "accident" from the Convention's text, structure, and history as well as from the subsequent conduct of the parties to the Convention. Neither party here contests Saks' definition of the term "accident" under Article 17 of the Convention. Rather, the parties differ as to which event should be the focus of the "accident" inquiry. The Court's reasoning in Saks sheds light on whether the flight attendant's refusal to assist a passenger in a medical crisis is the proper focus of the "accident" inquiry. In Saks, the Court addressed whether a passenger's "`loss of hearing proximately caused by normal operation of the aircraft's pressurization system'" was an "`accident.'" The Court concluded that it was not, because the injury was her "own internal reaction" to the normal pressurization of the aircraft's cabin. The Court noted two textual clues to the meaning of the term "accident." First, the Convention distinguishes between liability under Article 17 for or injuries to passengers caused by an "accident" and liability under Article 18 for destruction or loss of baggage caused by an "occurrence." The difference in these provisions implies that the meaning of the term "accident" is different from that of "occurrence." Second, the Court found significant the fact that Article 17 focuses on the "accident which caused" the passenger's injury and not an accident that is the passenger's injury. The Court explained that it is the cause of the injury rather than the occurrence of the injury that must satisfy the definition of "accident." And recognizing the Court's responsibility to read the treaty in a manner "consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties," ibid., the Court also looked to the French legal meaning of the term "accident," which when used to describe the cause of an injury, is usually defined as a "fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event." *651 Accordingly, the Court held in Saks that an "accident" under Article 17 is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger," and not "the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft."[6] The Court emphasized that the definition of "accident" "should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries." The Court further contemplated that intentional conduct could fall within the "accident" definition under Article 17,[7] an interpretation that comports with another provision of the Convention.[8] As such, Saks correctly characterized the *652 term "accident" as encompassing more than unintentional conduct. The Court focused its analysis on determining "what causes can be considered accidents," and observed that Article 17 "embraces causes of injuries" that are "unexpected or unusual." The Court did not suggest that only one event could constitute the "accident," recognizing that "[a]ny injury is the product of a chain of causes." Thus, for purposes of the "accident" inquiry, the Court stated that a plaintiff need only be able to prove that "some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger." B Petitioner argues that the "accident" inquiry should focus on the "injury producing event," Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, which, according to petitioner, was the presence of ambient cigarette smoke in the aircraft's cabin. Because petitioner's policies permitted smoking on international flights, petitioner contends that Dr. Hanson's resulted from his own internal reaction namely, an asthma attack to the normal operation of the aircraft. Petitioner also argues that the flight attendant's failure to move Dr. Hanson was inaction, whereas Article 17 requires an action that causes the injury. We disagree. As an initial matter, we note that petitioner did not challenge in the Court of Appeals the District Court's finding that the flight attendant's conduct in three times refusing to move Dr. Hanson was unusual or unexpected in light of the relevant industry standard or petitioner's own company policy. Petitioner instead argued that the flight attendant's conduct was irrelevant for purposes of the "accident" inquiry and that the only relevant event was the presence of the ambient cigarette *653 smoke in the aircraft's cabin. Consequently, we need not dispositively determine whether the flight attendant's conduct qualified as "unusual or unexpected" under Saks, but may assume that it was for purposes of this opinion. Petitioner's focus on the ambient cigarette smoke as the injury producing event is misplaced. We do not doubt that the presence of ambient cigarette smoke in the aircraft's cabin during an international flight might have been "normal" at the time of the flight in question. But petitioner's "injury producing event" inquiry which looks to "the precise factual `event' that caused the injury" neglects the reality that there are often multiple interrelated factual events that combine to cause any given injury. Brief for |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | events that combine to cause any given injury. Brief for Petitioner 14. In Saks, the Court recognized that any one of these factual events or happenings may be a link in the chain of causes and so long as it is unusual or unexpected could constitute an "accident" under Article 17. 470 U.S., Indeed, the very fact that multiple events will necessarily combine and interrelate to cause any particular injury makes it difficult to define, in any coherent or non-question-begging way, any single event as the "injury producing event." Petitioner's only claim to the contrary here is to say: "Looking to the purely factual description of relevant events, the aggravating event was Dr. Hanson remaining in his assigned non-smoking seat and being exposed to ambient smoke, which allegedly aggravated his pre-existing asthmatic condition leading to his" Brief for Petitioner 24, and that the "injury producing event" was "not the flight attendant's failure to act or violation of industry standards," Reply Brief for Petitioner 9-10. Petitioner ignores the fact that the flight attendant's refusal on three separate occasions to move Dr. Hanson was also a "factual `event,'" Brief for Petitioner 14, that the District Court correctly found to be a "`link in the chain'" of causes that led to Dr. Hanson's Petitioner's statement that the flight attendant's failure to reseat Dr. Hanson was not the *654 "injury producing event" is nothing more than a bald assertion, unsupported by any law or argument. An example illustrates why petitioner's emphasis on the ambient cigarette smoke as the "injury producing event" is misplaced. Suppose that petitioner mistakenly assigns respondent and her husband to seats in the middle of the smoking section, and that respondent and her husband do not notice that they are in the smoking section until after the flight has departed. Suppose further that, as here, the flight attendant refused to assist respondent and her husband despite repeated requests to move. In this hypothetical case, it would appear that, "[l]ooking to the purely factual description of relevant events, the aggravating event was [the passenger] remaining in his assigned seat and being exposed to ambient smoke, which allegedly aggravated his pre-existing asthmatic condition leading to his" Brief for Petitioner 24. To argue otherwise, petitioner would have to suggest that the misassignment to the smoking section was the "injury producing event," but this would simply beg the question. The fact is, the exposure to smoke, the misassignment to the smoking section, and the refusal to move the passenger would all be factual events contributing to the of the passenger. In the instant |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | events contributing to the of the passenger. In the instant case, the same can be said: The exposure to the smoke and the refusal to assist the passenger are happenings that both contributed to the passenger's And petitioner's argument that the flight attendant's failure to act cannot constitute an "accident" because only affirmative acts are "event[s] or happening[s]" under Saks is 470 U.S., The distinction between action and inaction, as petitioner uses these terms, would perhaps be relevant were this a tort law negligence case. But respondents do not advocate, and petitioner vigorously rejects, that a negligence regime applies under Article 17 of the Convention. The relevant "accident" inquiry under *655 Saks is whether there is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening." The rejection of an explicit request for assistance would be an "event" or "happening" under the ordinary and usual definitions of these terms. See American Heritage Dictionary 635 (3d ed. 1992) ("event": "[s]omething that takes place; an occurrence"); Black's Law Dictionary 554-555 (6th ed. 1990) ("event": "Something that happens"); Webster's New International Dictionary 885 (2d ed. 1949) ("event": "The fact of taking place or occurring; occurrence" or "[t]hat which comes, arrives, or happens").[9] *656 Moreover, the fallacy of petitioner's position that an "accident" cannot take the form of inaction is illustrated by the following example. Suppose that a passenger on a flight inexplicably collapses and stops breathing and that a medical doctor informs the flight crew that the passenger's life could be saved only if the plane lands within one hour. Suppose further that it is industry standard and airline policy to divert a flight to the nearest airport when a passenger otherwise faces imminent If the plane is within 30 minutes of a suitable airport, but the crew chooses to continue its cross-country flight, "[t]he notion that this is not an unusual event is staggering."[10] Confirming this interpretation, other provisions of the Convention suggest that there is often no distinction between action and inaction on the issue of ultimate liability. For example, Article 25 provides that Article 22's liability cap does not apply in the event of "wilful misconduct or such default on [the carrier's] part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct."[11] Because liability can be imposed for *657 or bodily injury only in the case of an Article 17 "accident" and Article 25 only lifts the caps once liability has been found, these provisions read together tend to show that inaction can give rise to liability. Moreover, Article |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | majority | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | show that inaction can give rise to liability. Moreover, Article 20(1) makes clear that the "due care" defense is unavailable when a carrier has failed to take "all necessary measures to avoid the damage." These provisions suggest that an air carrier's inaction can be the basis for liability. Finally, petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit improperly created a negligence-based "accident" standard under Article 17 by focusing on the flight crew's negligence as the "accident." The Ninth Circuit stated: "The failure to act in the face of a known, serious risk satisfies the meaning of `accident' within Article 17 so long as reasonable alternatives exist that would substantially minimize the risk and implementing these alternatives would not unreasonably interfere with the normal, expected operation of the airplane." 316 F.3d, at Admittedly, this language does seem to approve of a negligence-based approach. However, no party disputes the Ninth Circuit's holding that the flight attendant's conduct was "unexpected and unusual," ibid., which is the operative language under Saks and the correct Article 17 analysis. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the conduct here constitutes an "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | dissenting | 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111786/324-liquor-corp-v-duffy/ | Immediately after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, this Court recognized that the broad language of 2 of the Amendment conferred plenary power on the States to regulate the liquor trade within their boundaries. Ziffrin, ; Finch & ; Indianapolis Brewing ; State Board of As JUSTICE STEVENS recently observed, however, the Court has, over the years, so "completely distorted the Twenty-first *353 Amendment" that "[i]t now has a barely discernible effect in Commerce Clause cases." Newport v. Iacobucci, ante, at 98 Because I believe that the Twenty-first Amendment clearly authorized the State of New York to regulate the liquor trade within its borders free of federal interference, I dissent from Part III of the Court's opinion, and would affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals. I In this Court took a first step toward eviscerating the authority of States to regulate the commerce of liquor. The Court held that the State of New York could not regulate the importation of liquor into that State when the liquor was sold in duty-free shops at the Kennedy Airport. The basis for this decision was the fact that the United States Customs Service already supervised the liquor sold at the airport. Justice Black, who as a Senator was present at the creation of the Twenty-first Amendment, wrote a thoughtful and powerful dissent. After reviewing the legislative history of the Twenty-first Amendment, Justice Black concluded that the Senators who approved the Twenty-first Amendment thought they were returning absolute control over the liquor industry to the States, and "were seeing to it that the Federal Government could not interfere with or restrict the State's exercise of the power conferred by the Amendment." Because the Court has seen fit in recent years to dismiss this legislative history without analysis as "obscure," Bacchus Imports, ; ante, at 346-347, n. 10, a fresh examination of the origins of the Twenty-first Amendment is in order and long overdue. Although neither the House of Representives nor the state ratifying conventions deliberated long on the powers conferred on the States by 2, but see 76 Cong. Rec. 2776 (1933) (statement of Rep. Lea of California that the section was "the *354 extreme of State rights" because it obligated the Federal Government to assist the enforcement of state laws "however unwise or improvident"), the Senate considered the section in great detail. Those Senate discussions clearly demonstrate an intent to confer on States complete and exclusive control over the commerce of liquor. When the Senate began its deliberations on the Twenty-first Amendment, the proposed Amendment included a 3 not |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | dissenting | 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111786/324-liquor-corp-v-duffy/ | the Twenty-first Amendment, the proposed Amendment included a 3 not present in the adopted Amendment. This section granted the Federal Government concurrent authority over some limited aspects of the commerce of liquor. It provided that "Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold." As Justice Black observed, the proposal "to leave even this remnant of federal control over liquor traffic gave rise to the only real controversy over the language of the proposed Amendment." Even Senator Blaine, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee that had held hearings on the proposed Amendment, opposed the limited grant of authority to the Federal Government in 3. According to Senator Blaine, when the Federal Government was organized by the Constitution the States had "surrendered control over and regulation of interstate commerce." 76 Cong. Rec. 4141 (1933). He viewed 2 of the Amendment as a restoration of the power surrendered by the States when they joined the Union. Section 2 "restor[ed] to the States, in effect, the right to regulate commerce respecting a single commodity namely, intoxicating liquor." In his view, the grant of authority to Congress in 3 undercut the import of 2: "Mr. President, my own personal viewpoint upon section 3 is that it is contrary to section 2 of the resolution. I am now endeavoring to give my personal views. The purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by constitutional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which *355 enter the confines of the States. The State under section 2 may enact certain laws on intoxicating liquors, and section 2 at once gives such laws effect. Thus the States are granted larger power in effect and are given greater protection, while under section 3 the proposal is to take away from the States the powers that the States would have in the absence of the eighteenth amendment." Senator Wagner was an especially vigorous opponent of the proposed 3. In his view, it failed to "correct the central error of national prohibition. It does not restore to the States responsibility for their local liquor problems. It does not withdraw the Federal Government from the field of local police regulation into which it has trespassed." In Senator Wagner's view, the danger of 3 was that even this limited grant of authority to the Federal Government would result in federal control of the liquor trade: "If Congress may regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors where they are to be drunk on premises where |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | dissenting | 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111786/324-liquor-corp-v-duffy/ | liquors where they are to be drunk on premises where sold, then we shall probably see Congress attempt to declare during what hours such premises may be open, where they shall be located, how they shall be operated, the sex and age of the purchasers, the price at which the beverages are to be sold. "It is entirely conceivable that in order to protect such a prohibition the courts might sustain the prohibition or regulation of all sales of beverages whether intended to be drunk on the premises or not. And if sales may be regulated, so may transportation and manufacture. If that is to be the history of the proposed amendment and there is every reason to expect it then obviously we have expelled the system of national control through the front door of section 1 and readmitted it forthwith through the back door of section 3." *356 Other Senators also expressed the fear that "any grant of power to the Federal Government, even a seemingly narrow one, could be used to whittle away the exclusive control over liquor traffic given the States by Section 2." ; see 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (Sen. Blaine); Still others emphasized the plenary power granted the States by 2. Senator Walsh, a member of the Subcommittee that had held hearings on the Amendment, said: "The purpose of the provision in the resolution reported by the committee was to make the intoxicating liquor subject to the laws of the State once it passed the State line and before it gets into the hands of the consignee as well as thereafter." In response to a question from Senator Swanson, Senator Robinson of Arkansas affirmed that "it is left entirely to the States to determine in what manner intoxicating liquors shall be sold or used and to what places such liquors may be transported." Thus, upon the motion of Senator Robinson, the Senate voted to strike 3 from the proposed Amendment. By emphasizing the importance of the plenary powers granted the States in 2, and more importantly by removing even the limited grant of authority to Congress contained in 3, the Senate made manifest its intent to prevent any federal interference with state attempts to regulate the liquor trade. It is difficult to believe that the Senators would have anticipated that a federal statute enacted under the commerce power could ever override the State's power to regulate the liquor trade. II The history of the Amendment strongly supports Justice Black's view that the Twenty-first Amendment was intended to return absolute control of the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | dissenting | 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111786/324-liquor-corp-v-duffy/ | Twenty-first Amendment was intended to return absolute control of the liquor trade to the States, and that the Federal Government could not use its Commerce Clause powers to interfere in any manner with the States' exercise of the power conferred by the Amendment. *357 Given its desire to confer broad freedom on the States to regulate commerce in intoxicating liquors without federal interference, Congress certainly intended that the States have the power to enact economic regulations governing the pricing of liquor free of federal antitrust policy. The behavior of the States upon the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment also supports this view. Contemporaneously with the enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment, a report sponsored by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., recommended that those States that could not muster the political support for state monopolies in the liquor industry should adopt the equivalent solution of price-control laws designed to keep the price of liquor at high levels. R. Fosdick & A. Scott, Toward Liquor Control 52 (1933). According to this report, the "profit motive is the core of the problem." This profit motive encouraged low prices that stimulated liquor consumption. Retail prices had a "direct bearing on the amount of consumption," and thus a State could use price-fixing powers "as one of its most effective instruments of control." The ideas expressed by the Rockefeller Report "were the dominant ideas which took flesh in the post-repeal legislation of the states." Dunsford, State Monopoly and Price-Fixing in Retail Liquor Distribution, It is not surprising, therefore, that even before the enactment of the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937, States exercised their Twenty-first Amendment powers to adopt "bold and drastic experiments in price control," including price posting, regulation by private associations, and mandatory resale price maintenance contracts. De Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage Industry, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 665, 680 (1940). Thus, the States that ratified the Twenty-first Amendment immediately exercised the authority granted them by 2 of that Amendment to enact the very type of statute that this Court strikes down today. *358 With the clear legislative intent to free state regulation of liquor from federal interference, and the immediate enactment of price-control laws by the ratifying States, the better view of the proper resolution of any apparent conflict between the Sherman Act and a state regulation of the liquor trade was expressed by Justice Frankfurter in United In Justice Frankfurter's view, the Twenty-first Amendment accorded States the power to control the liquor traffic "according to their notions of policy freed from the restrictions upon state power which the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | dissenting | 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111786/324-liquor-corp-v-duffy/ | policy freed from the restrictions upon state power which the Commerce Clause implies as to ordinary articles of commerce." Because Congress enacted the Sherman Act pursuant to its authority in the Commerce Clause, the Sherman Act must yield to state power drawn from the Twenty-first Amendment. Thus, Justice Frankfurter concluded: "If a State for its own sufficient reasons deems it a desirable policy to standardize the price of liquor within its borders either by a direct price-fixing statute or by permissive sanction of such price-fixing in order to discourage the temptations of cheap liquor due to cutthroat competition, the Twenty-first Amendment gives it that power and the Commerce Clause does not gainsay it. Such state policy can not offend the Sherman Law even though distillers or middlemen agree with local dealers to respect this policy." Justice Frankfurter believed that in the absence of a conflict between the state regulatory scheme and the federal antitrust laws, federal antitrust policy was fully applicable even to the intrastate liquor trade. In Frankfort Distilleries itself, the State had not authorized the anticompetitive conduct of the respondents. Once a State has exercised its 2 power, however, "the Sherman Law could not override such exercise of state power." *359 Justice Frankfurter was not alone in this view. In repealing the Miller-Tydings Act which had authorized States to enact fair trade laws the Senate believed that the States could continue to impose retail price maintenance on liquor retailers. The Report from the Senate Judiciary Committee on the proposal to repeal the Miller-Tydings Act explicitly assured the Senate that the repeal would not change the power of States to impose retail price maintenance on liquor retailers pursuant to the authority granted the States by the Twenty-first Amendment: "Liquor will not be affected by the repeal of the fair trade laws in the same manner as other products because the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution gives the States broad powers over the sale of alcoholic beverages. Thus, while repeal of the fair trade laws generally will prohibit manufacturers from enforcing resale prices, alcohol manufacturers may do such in States which pass price fixing statutes pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment." S. Rep. No. 94-466, p. 2 (1975). The history and purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment are a compelling indication of an intent to confer on States the power to regulate trade in liquor. Despite this clear intent, the Court in recent years has used a balancing test to resolve conflicts between federal statutes and state laws enacted pursuant to 2. In California Retail Liquor Dealers and once again |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | dissenting | 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111786/324-liquor-corp-v-duffy/ | to 2. In California Retail Liquor Dealers and once again today, the Court ventured still further from the intent of the Twenty-first Amendment by adopting an unprecedented test that focuses on the wisdom of the State's exercise of its 2 powers. For the Court today does not invalidate the ABC Law because it involves an exercise of power outside the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment indeed, the Court could not do so given the long history of the use of price controls by state liquor authorities. Instead, in a manner reminiscent of the long-repudiated the Court strikes down the ABC Law because *360 it concludes that the law was not "effective" in preserving small retail establishments or in decreasing alcohol consumption. The proper inquiry, however, is not whether the State of New York chose wisely in enacting a retail price maintenance law, nor whether the State of New York's motivation in doing so was linked to a "central purpos[e]" of the Twenty-first Amendment. The sole "question is whether the provision in this case is an exercise of a power expressly conferred upon the States by the Constitution." Bacchus Imports, Because the State of New York was plainly exercising its 2 power to regulate liquor trade, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Trammel v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110212/trammel-v-united-states/ | We granted certiorari to consider whether an accused may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony so as *42 to exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife. This calls for a re-examination of I On March 10, 1976, petitioner Otis Trammel was indicted with two others, Edwin Lee Roberts and Joseph Freeman, for importing heroin into the United from Thailand and the Philippine Islands and for conspiracy to import heroin in violation of 21 U.S. C. 92 (a), 962 (a), and 963. The indictment also named six unindicted co-conspirators, including petitioner's wife Elizabeth Ann Trammel. According to the indictment, petitioner and his wife flew from the Philippines to California in August 197, carrying with them a quantity of heroin. Freeman and Roberts assisted them in its distribution. Elizabeth Trammel then traveled to Thailand where she purchased another supply of the drug. On November 3, 197, with four ounces of heroin on her person, she boarded a plane for the United During a routine customs search in Hawaii, she was searched, the heroin was discovered, and she was arrested. After discussions with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, she agreed to cooperate with the Government. Prior to trial on this indictment, petitioner moved to sever his case from that of Roberts and Freeman. He advised the court that the Government intended to call his wife as an adverse witness and asserted his claim to a privilege to prevent her from testifying against him. At a hearing on the motion, Mrs. Trammel was called as a Government witness under a grant of use immunity. She testified that she and petitioner were married in May 197 and that they remained married.[1] She explained that her cooperation with the Government was based on assurances that she would be given *43 lenient treatment.[2] She then described, in considerable detail, her role and that of her husband in the heroin distribution conspiracy. After hearing this testimony, the District Court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify in support of the Government's case to any act she observed during the marriage and to any communication "made in the presence of a third person"; however, confidential communications between petitioner and his wife were held to be privileged and inadmissible. The motion to sever was denied. At trial, Elizabeth Trammel testified within the limits of the court's pretrial ruling; her testimony, as the Government concedes, constituted virtually its entire case against petitioner. He was found guilty on both the substantive and conspiracy charges and sentenced to an indeterminate term of years pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S. C. 010 |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Trammel v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110212/trammel-v-united-states/ | to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S. C. 010 (b).[3] In the Court of Appeals petitioner's only claim of error was that the admission of the adverse testimony of his wife, over his objection, contravened this Court's teaching in and therefore constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. It concluded that Hawkins did not prohibit "the voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity from the Government in return for her " II The privilege claimed by petitioner has ancient roots. Writing in 1628, Lord Coke observed that "it hath beene resolved *44 by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband." 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b (1628). See, generally, 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961). This spousal disqualification sprang from two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one. From those two now long-abandoned doctrines, it followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of the defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife. Despite its medieval origins, this rule of spousal disqualification remained intact in most common-law jurisdictions well into the 19th century. See 2333. It was applied by this Court in in Graves v. United and again in Jin Fuey Moy v. United where it was deemed so well established a proposition as to "hardly require[e] mention." Indeed, it was not until 1933, in Funk v. United that this Court abolished the testimonial disqualification in the federal courts, so as to permit the spouse of a defendant to testify in the defendant's behalf. Funk, however, left undisturbed the rule that either spouse could prevent the other from giving adverse The rule thus evolved into one of privilege rather than one of absolute disqualification. See J. Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law 78-92 (1947). The modern justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship. Notwithstanding this benign purpose, the rule was sharply criticized.[4]*4 Professor Wigmore termed it "the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice." 8 Wigmore 2228, at 221. The Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the American Bar Association called for its abolition. 63 American Bar Association Reports |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Trammel v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110212/trammel-v-united-states/ | Association called for its abolition. 63 American Bar Association Reports 94-9 (1938). In its place, Wigmore and others suggested a privilege protecting only private marital communications, modeled on the privilege between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient. See 8 Wigmore 2332 et seq.[] These criticisms influenced the American Law Institute, which, in its 1942 Model Code of Evidence, advocated a privilege for marital confidences, but expressly rejected a rule vesting in the defendant the right to exclude all adverse testimony of his spouse. See American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence, Rule 21 (1942). In 3 the Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, followed a similar course; it limited the privilege to confidential communications and "abolishe[d] the rule, still existing in some states, and largely a sentimental relic, of not requiring one spouse to testify against the other in a criminal action." See Rule 23 (2) and comments. Several state legislatures enacted similarly patterned provisions into law.[6] *46 In this Court considered the continued vitality of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in the federal courts. There the District Court had permitted petitioner's wife, over his objection, to testify against him. With one questioning concurring opinion, the Court held the wife's testimony inadmissible; it took note of the critical comments that the common-law rule had engendered, and n. 4, but chose not to abandon it. Also rejected was the Government's suggestion that the Court modify the privilege by vesting it in the witness-spouse, with freedom to testify or not independent of the defendant's control. The Court viewed this proposed modification as antithetical to the widespread belief, evidenced in the rules then in effect in a majority of the and in England, "that the law should not force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences." Hawkins, then, left the federal privilege for adverse spousal testimony where it found it, continuing "a rule which bars the testimony of one spouse against the other unless both consent." Accord, Wyatt v. United[7] However, in so doing, the Court made clear that its decision was not meant to "foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be dictated by `reason and experience.'" 38 U.S., *47 III A The Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials "governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted in the light of reason and experience." Fed. Rule Evid. |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Trammel v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110212/trammel-v-united-states/ | in the light of reason and experience." Fed. Rule Evid. 01. Cf. Wolfie v. United The general mandate of Rule 01 was substituted by the Congress for a set of privilege rules drafted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and approved by the Judicial Conference of the United and by this Court. That proposal defined nine specific privileges, including a husband-wife privilege which would have codified the Hawkins rule and eliminated the privilege for confidential marital communications. See proposed Fed. Rule Evid. 0. In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 01, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather was to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis," 0 Cong. Rec. 40891 (statement of Rep. Hungate), and to leave the door open to change. See also S. Rep. No. 93-77, p. 11 ; H. R. Rep. No. 93-60, p. 8 (1973).[8] Although Rule 01 confirms the authority of the federal courts to reconsider the continued validity of the Hawkins *48 rule, the long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to be casually cast aside. That the privilege is one affecting marriage, home, and family relationships already subject to much erosion in our dayalso counsels caution. At the same time, we cannot escape the reality that the law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave them birth have disappeared and after experience suggests the need for change. This was recognized in Funk where the Court "decline[d] to enforce ancient rule[s] of the common law under conditions as they now exist." For, as Mr. Justice Black admonished in another setting, "[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it." B Since 8, when Hawkins was decided, support for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony has been eroded further. Thirty-one jurisdictions, including Alaska and Hawaii, then allowed an accused a privilege to prevent adverse spousal n. 3 The number has now declined to 24.[9] In 1974, the National *49 Conference on Uniform State Laws revised its Uniform Rules of Evidence, but again rejected the Hawkins rule in favor of a limited privilege for confidential communications. See Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 04. That proposed rule has been enacted in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Oklahoma each of which in 8 permitted an accused to exclude adverse spousal [10] The trend in state law toward *0 divesting the |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Trammel v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110212/trammel-v-united-states/ | [10] The trend in state law toward *0 divesting the accused of the privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony has special relevance because the laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally reserved to the states. See Scholarly criticism of the Hawkins rule has also continued unabated.[11] C Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "`the public has a right to every man's evidence.'" United v. Bryan, (0). As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Elkins v. United Accord, United v. Nixon, Here we must decide whether the privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice. It is essential to remember that the Hawkins privilege is not needed to protect information privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship once described by this Court as "the best solace of human existence." Those confidences are privileged under the independent rule protecting confidential marital communications. Blau v. United (1); see n. The Hawkins privilege is invoked, not to exclude private marital communications, but rather to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in the presence of third persons. No other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly. The privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient limit protection to private communications. These privileges are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust. The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return. The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out. Similarly, the physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to treat disease; barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment. The Hawkins rule stands in marked contrast to these three privileges. Its protection is not limited to confidential communications; rather it permits an accused to exclude all adverse spousal As Jeremy Bentham observed more than a century and a half ago, such a privilege goes far beyond making "every man's house his castle," and permits a person *2 to convert |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Trammel v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110212/trammel-v-united-states/ | house his castle," and permits a person *2 to convert his house into "a den of thieves." Rationale of Judicial Evidence 340 (1827). It "secures, to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable crime." The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world indeed in any modern societyis a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being. Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have been cast aside so that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." 14-1 The contemporary justification for affording an accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive. When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding whatever the motivationtheir relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In these circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.[] Indeed, there is reason to believe that vesting the privilege in the accused could actually undermine the marital relationship. For example, in a case such as this, the Government is unlikely to offer a wife immunity and lenient treatment if it knows that her husband can prevent her from giving adverse If the Government is dissuaded from making such an offer, the privilege can have the untoward effect of permitting one *3 spouse to escape justice at the expense of the other. It hardly seems conducive to the preservation of the marital relation to place a wife in jeopardy solely by virtue of her husband's control over her IV Our consideration of the foundations for the privilege and its history satisfy us that "reason and experience" no longer justify so sweeping a rule as that found acceptable by the Court in Hawkins. Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modificationvesting the privilege in the witness-spouse furthers the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs. Here, petitioner's spouse chose to testify against him. That she did so after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | second_dissenting | Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3177215/campbell-ewald-v-gomez/ | I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent. I agree that a de- fendant may extinguish a plaintiff ’s personal stake in pursuing a claim by offering complete relief on the claim, even if the plaintiff spurns the offer. Our Article III prec- edents make clear that, for mootness purposes, there is nothing talismanic about the plaintiff ’s acceptance. E.g., LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. (2013) (holding that Nike’s unilateral covenant not to sue mooted Al- ready’s trademark invalidity claim). I write separately to emphasize what I see as the linchpin for finding mootness in this case: There is no real dispute that Campbell would “make good on [its] promise” to pay Gomez the money it offered him if the case were dismissed. Ante, at 5 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Absent this fact, I would be compelled to find that the case is not moot. Our “voluntary cessation” cases provide useful guidance. Those cases hold that, when a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a defendant’s conduct, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resump- tion of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dis- missed.” v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. – (2012) (slip op., at 6–7). To obtain dismissal in such circumstances, the defendant must “ ‘bea[r] the formidable 2 CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. v. GOMEZ ALITO, J., dissenting burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” at (slip op., at 4) (quoting Friends of the Earth, ). We have typically applied that rule in cases involving claims for prospective relief, see at (slip op., at 7), but the basic principle easily translates to cases, like this one, involving claims for damages: When a defendant offers a plaintiff complete relief on a damages claim, the case will be dismissed as moot if—but only if—it is “abso- lutely clear” that the plaintiff will be able to receive the offered relief. at (slip op., at 8).1 Consider an offer of complete relief from a defendant that has no intention of actually paying the promised sums, or from a defendant whose finances are so shaky that it cannot produce the necessary funds. In both in- stances, there is a question whether the defendant will back up its offer to pay with an actual payment. If those cases were dismissed as moot, the defendant’s failure to follow through on its promise to pay would leave the plain- tiff forever emptyhanded. In the language of our mootness |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | second_dissenting | Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3177215/campbell-ewald-v-gomez/ | plain- tiff forever emptyhanded. In the language of our mootness cases, those cases would not be moot because a court could still grant the plaintiff “effectual relief,” at (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted)— namely, the relief sought in the first place. The plaintiff retains a “personal stake” in continuing the litigation. Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). An offer of complete relief thus will not always warrant dismissal. —————— 1 I say it must be clear that the plaintiff “will be able to receive” the relief, rather than that the plaintiff “will receive” the relief, to account for the possibility of an obstinate plaintiff who refuses to take any relief even if the case is dismissed. A plaintiff cannot thwart mootness by refusing complete relief presented on a silver platter. Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 3 ALITO, J., dissenting Campbell urges that a plaintiff could simply move to reopen a dismissed case if a defendant fails to make good on its offer. Reply Brief 10. I assume that is true. But the prospect of having to reopen litigation is precisely why our voluntary cessation cases require defendants to prove, before dismissal, that the plaintiff ’s injury cannot reason- ably be expected to recur. I see no reason not to impose a similar burden when a defendant asserts that it has ren- dered a damages claim moot. How, then, can a defendant make “absolutely clear” that it will pay the relief it has offered? The most straightfor- ward way is simply to pay over the money. The defendant might hand the plaintiff a certified check or deposit the requisite funds in a bank account in the plaintiff ’s name. See California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 313–314 (1893). Alternatively, a defendant might deposit the money with the district court (or another trusted intermediary) on the condition that the money be released to the plaintiff when the court dismisses the case as moot. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 67; 28 U.S. C. 2042. In these situations, there will rarely be any serious doubt that the plaintiff can obtain the offered money.2 —————— 2 Depositing funds with the district court or another intermediary may be particularly attractive to defendants because it would ensure that the plaintiff can obtain the money, yet allow the defendant to reclaim the funds if the court refuses to dismiss the case (for example, because it determines the offer is for less than full relief ). Contrary to the |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | second_dissenting | Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3177215/campbell-ewald-v-gomez/ | is for less than full relief ). Contrary to the views of Gomez’s amicus, there is no reason to force a defendant to effect an “ ‘irrevocable transfer of title’ ” to the funds without regard to whether doing so succeeds in mooting the case. Brief for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 10. Likewise, because I believe our precedents “provide sufficiently specific principles to resolve this case,” I would not apply the “rigid formalities” of common-law tender in this context. Ante, at 1, 2 (THOMAS, J., concur- ring in judgment). Article III demands that a plaintiff always have a personal stake in continuing the litigation, and that stake is extin- guished if the plaintiff is freely able to obtain full relief in the event the case is dismissed as moot. 4 CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. v. GOMEZ ALITO, J., dissenting While outright payment is the surest way for a defend- ant to make the requisite mootness showing, I would not foreclose other means of doing so. The question is whether it is certain the defendant will pay, not whether the de- fendant has already paid. I believe Campbell clears the mark in this case. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE observes, there is no dispute Campbell has the means to pay the few thousand dollars it offered Gomez, and there is no basis “to argue that Campbell might not make good on that promise” if the case were dismissed. Ante, at 5. Thus, in the circumstances of this case, Campbell’s offer of com- plete relief should have rendered Gomez’s damages claim moot. But the same would not necessarily be true for other defendants, particularly those that face more sub- stantial claims, possess less secure finances, or extend offers of questionable sincerity. Cf. 568 U. S., at – (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3–4) (em- phasizing the “formidable burden on the party asserting mootness” and noting possible “doubts that Nike’s showing [of mootness] would suffice in other circumstances”). The Court does not dispute Campbell’s ability or will- ingness to pay, but nonetheless concludes that its unac- cepted offer did not moot Gomez’s claim. While I disagree with that result on these facts, I am heartened that the Court appears to endorse the proposition that a plaintiff ’s claim is moot once he has “received full redress” from the defendant for the injuries he has asserted. Ante, at 10, n. 5 (discussing and Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009)). Today’s decision thus does not prevent a defendant who actually pays complete relief—either di- rectly to the plaintiff or to a |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Texas v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109482/texas-v-louisiana/ | We have already decided that the relevant boundary between the States of Texas and Louisiana is the geographic *466 middle of Sabine Pass, Sabine Lake, and Sabine River from the mouth of the Sabine in the Gulf of Mexico to the thirty-second degree of north latitude. We have also held that all islands in the east half of the Sabine River when Louisiana was admitted as a State in 1812, or thereafter formed, belong to Louisiana. Delimitation of the boundary and decision as to ownership of the islands in the west half of the Sabine were deferred pending further proceedings before the Special Master in which the United States was invited to participate. The litigation subsequently was enlarged upon the motion of Louisiana to include a determination of the lateral seaward boundary between Texas and Louisiana, and Texas and the United States extending into the Gulf of Mexico.[1] Pleadings relating to the lateral boundary were filed by the States and by the United States. The United States also claimed title to six of the islands in the western half of the Sabine, ; it subsequently amended its complaint, however, to withdraw its claim to all islands except one identified as "Sam." The city of Port Arthur, Tex., was permitted to intervene for purposes of protecting its interests in the island claims of the United States. *467 After hearings on referral, the Special Master has concluded and recommends: "1) That the boundary between the States of Texas and Louisiana from 32° to 30° north latitude be established as shown upon Texas Exhibit AAA 1-12, pursuant to agreement of the parties. "2) That the boundary line from 30° north latitude to the Gulf of Mexico and to the terminus of the jetties be established as being the median line marked on Louisiana Exhibits DDD and III and hereinabove described specifically, with the right to the States of Texas and Louisiana to alter such boundary within Sabine Lake by agreement within the time proposed. "3) That the claim of the United States of America to an island named `Sam' be denied. "4) That the lateral boundary in the Gulf of Mexico between the States of Texas and Louisiana and between the State of Texas and the United States of America be established as the line shown on your Special Master's Exhibit and marked `U. S.' "5) That the cost be taxed to the parties in accordance with their contribution to the fund established by your Special Master and deposited in the First National Bank & Trust Company, Lincoln, Nebraska; that no costs be |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Texas v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109482/texas-v-louisiana/ | Bank & Trust Company, Lincoln, Nebraska; that no costs be taxed for the services of your Special Master herein; that upon the order of termination of this your Special Master file a report setting forth the amount of money received by him from the parties for the payment of costs and expenses pursuant to his requests and of the disbursement thereof for approval by the Court unless prior thereto the parties in writing have approved your Special Master's report as to the disbursement of said moneys." *468 Exceptions to the recommendations of the Special Master have been filed by Louisiana and Texas. At approximately 30° north latitude, the Sabine River enters into Sabine Lake through three channels. Louisiana excepts to that portion of the Special Master's report which marks the boundary line between the States through the passage more recently known as "middle pass," instead of in the geographic middle of the "west pass." Louisiana contends that the Special Master acted contrary to our rejection of the thalweg doctrine earlier in this by considering navigation as the criterion to locate the boundary in the middle channel. We think it clear, however, that the Special Master makes reference to the volume of water flowing through these passes solely in an analytic context reflecting the history and geography of the region. We are persuaded that the Special Master made his determination consistent with our earlier holding. Texas has filed exceptions to the Special Master's delimitation of the lateral seaward boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. Texas argues that the Special Master erred in concluding that Texas and Louisiana did not have a historic boundary in the Gulf; we think that misreads the findings of the Special Master. The Special Master does not reject Texas' contention that there was a historic "inchoate" boundary; what he concludes is that there has never been an established offshore boundary between the States. We find the Special Master correct in his conclusion and conclude that he properly considered how such a boundary should be now constructed. All parties agree that the lateral seaward boundary is to be constructed by reference to the median line, or equidistant principle, recognized in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2) 1606. T. I. A. S. No. *469 5639.[2] Texas, however, excepts to the Special Master's determination that the equidistant principle is to be applied to the coastlines of the States as affected by jetties at the mouth of the Sabine River.[3] Texas urges that the relevant coastline is the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Texas v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109482/texas-v-louisiana/ | Sabine River.[3] Texas urges that the relevant coastline is the coastline that existed in 1845 when it was admitted to the Union. Texas argues that this is a domestic dispute involving historical precedents and that the States' offshore boundary should be constructed as Congress would have done in 1845 had it considered the matter. The short answer to Texas' argument is that no line was drawn by Congress and that the boundary is being described in this litigation for the first time. The Court *470 should not be called upon to speculate as to what Congress might have done. We hold that the Special Master correctly applied the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to this suit. As we previously have recognized, "the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome." United When read together, Arts. 12 and 8 of the Convention clearly require that the median line be measured with reference to the jetties.[4] Accordingly, the exceptions of Louisiana and Texas are overruled. The parties are directed within 90 days to submit a proposed decree which has the approval of the Special Master. If the States cannot agree, the Special Master is requested, after appropriate hearings, to prepare and submit a recommended decree. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Blackledge v. Perry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109042/blackledge-v-perry/ | I would find it more difficult than the Court apparently does in Part I of its opinion to conclude that the very bringing of more serious charges against respondent following his request for a trial de novo violated due process as defined in North Still more importantly, I believe the Court's conclusion that respondent may assert the Court's new-found claim in this federal habeas action, despite his plea of guilty to the charges brought after his invocation of his statutory right to a trial de novo, marks an unwarranted departure from the principles we have recently enunciated in and the Brady trilogy, ; ; and I As the Court notes, in addition to his claim based on respondent contends that his felony indictment in the Superior Court violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Presumably because we have earlier held that "the jeopardy incident to" a trial does "not extend to an offense beyond [the trial court's] jurisdiction," the Court rests its decision instead on the Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine of In so doing, I think the Court too readily equates the role of the prosecutor, who is a natural adversary of the defendant and who, we observed in *33 "often request[s] more than [he] can reasonably expect to get," with that of the sentencing judge in I also think the Court passes too lightly over the reasoning of in which we held that imposition of the prophylactic rule of was not necessary in Kentucky's two-tier system for de novo appeals from justice court convictions, even though the judge at retrial might impose a more severe sentence than had been imposed by the justice court after the original trial. The concurring opinion in and specifically rejected such an approach to the case. The Court went on to hold "that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction." The Court concluded by holding that due process "requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." To make certain that those requirements of due process were met, the Court laid |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Blackledge v. Perry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109042/blackledge-v-perry/ | those requirements of due process were met, the Court laid down the rule that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after *34 a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear." at Thus the avowed purpose of the remedy fashioned in was to prevent judicial vindictiveness from resulting in longer sentences after a retrial following successful appeal. Since in theory if not in practice the second sentence in the situation might be expected to be the same as the first unless influenced by vindictiveness or by intervening conduct of the defendant, in theory at least the remedy mandated there reached no further than the identified wrong. The same cannot be said here. For while indictment on more serious charges after a successful appeal would present a problem closely analogous to that in in this respect, the bringing of more serious charges after a defendant's exercise of his absolute right to a trial de novo in North Carolina's two-tier system does not. The prosecutor here elected to proceed initially in the State District Court where felony charges could not be prosecuted, for reasons which may well have been unrelated to whether he believed respondent was guilty of and could be convicted of the felony with which he was later charged. Both prosecutor and defendant stand to benefit from an initial prosecution in the District Court, the prosecutor at least from its less burdensome procedures and the defendant from the opportunity for an initial acquittal and the limited penalties. With the countervailing reasons for proceeding only on the misdemeanor charge in the District Court no longer applicable once the defendant has invoked his statutory right to a trial de novo, a prosecutor need not be vindictive to seek to indict and convict a defendant of the more serious of the two crimes of which he believes him guilty. Thus even if one accepts the Court's equation of prosecutorial vindictiveness with judicial vindictiveness, here, unlike the Court's remedy reaches far beyond the wrong it identifies. *35 Indeed, it is not a little puzzling that the Court's remedy is the same that would follow upon a conclusion that the bringing of the new charges violated respondent's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. And the Court's conclusion that "[t]he very initiation of the proceedings against [respondent] in the Superior Court thus operated to deny him due process of law" surely sounds in the language of double jeopardy, however it may be dressed in due process garb. II If the Court is correct in stating the consequences of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Blackledge v. Perry | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109042/blackledge-v-perry/ | If the Court is correct in stating the consequences of upholding respondent's constitutional claim here, and indeed the State lacked the very power to bring him to trial, I believe this case is governed by cases culminating in In that case the State no doubt lacked "power" to bring to trial without a valid grand jury indictment; yet that constitutional disability was held by us to be merged in the guilty plea. I do not see why a constitutional claim the consequences of which make it the identical twin of double jeopardy may not, like double jeopardy, be waived by the person for whose benefit it is accorded. ; ; In we held that "just as the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy were found to foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of claimed antecedent constitutional violations there, respondent's guilty plea here alike forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury." Surely the due process violation found by the Court today is no less "antecedent" than the constitutional violations claimed to make the *36 grand jury indictment invalid in the confession inadmissible in McMann, or the exercise of the right to a jury trial impermissibly burdened in Brady and Parker. As the Court notes, we reaffirmed in the principle of the Brady trilogy that "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process." We went on to say there: "When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann." The assertion by the Court that this reasoning is somehow inapplicable here because the claim goes "to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him" is little other than a conclusion. Any difference between the issue resolved the other way in and the issue before us today is at most semantic. But the Court's "test" not only fails to distinguish ; it also fails to provide any reasoned basis on which to approach such questions as whether a speedy trial claim is merged in a guilty plea. I believe the Court's departure today from |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.