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Justice Scalia | 1,996 | 9 | majority | Behrens v. Pelletier | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117996/behrens-v-pelletier/ | case at hand, would violate the principle discussed above, that appealability determinations are made for classes of decisions, not individual orders in specific cases. Apart from these objections in principle, the practical effect of respondent's proposal would be intolerable. If the district court rules erroneously, the qualified-immunity right not to be subjected to pretrial proceedings will be eliminated, so long as the plaintiff has alleged (with or without evidence to back it up) violation of one "clearly established" right; and both that and the further right not to be subjected to trial itself will be eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive relief (for which no "clearly established" right need be alleged). Second, respondent asserts that appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available because the denial rested on the ground that "[m]aterial issues of fact remain." This, he contends, renders the denial unappealable under last Term's decision in -318. That is a misreading of the case. Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that there are controverted issues of material fact, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. *313 56, and surely does not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable. held, simply, that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to arise in a qualified-immunity case; if what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly "separable" from the plaintiff's claim, and hence there is no "final decision" under Cohen and See -318. reaffirmed that summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute concerning an "abstract issu[e] of law" relating to qualified immunity, at 317typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was "clearly established," see, e. g., -535; U.S. 183, Here the District Court's denial of petitioner's summary judgment motion necessarily determined that certain conduct attributed to petitioner (which was controverted) constituted a violation of clearly established law. permits petitioner to claim on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the standard of "objective legal reasonableness." This argument was presented by petitioner in the trial court, and there is no apparent impediment to its being raised on appeal. And while the District Court, in denying petitioner's summary judgment motion, did not identify the particular charged conduct that it deemed adequately supported, recognizes that under such circumstances "a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | dissenting | Wash. State Grange v. WASH. STATE REP. PARTY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145824/wash-state-grange-v-wash-state-rep-party/ | The electorate's perception of a political party's beliefs is colored by its perception of those who support the party; and a *1198 party's defining act is the selection of a candidate and advocacy of that candidate's election by conferring upon him the party's endorsement. When the state-printed ballot for the general election causes a party to be associated with candidates who may not fully (if at all) represent its views, it undermines both these vital aspects of political association. The views of the self-identified party supporter color perception of the party's message, and that self-identification on the ballot, with no space for party repudiation or party identification of its own candidate, impairs the party's advocacy of its standard bearer. Because Washington has not demonstrated that this severe burden upon parties' associational rights is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interestindeed, because it seems to me Washington's only plausible interest is precisely to reduce the effectiveness of political partiesI would find the law unconstitutional. I I begin with the principles on which the Court and I agree. States may not use election regulations to undercut political parties' freedoms of speech or association. See U.S. Term Limits, Thus, when a State regulates political parties as a part of its election process, we consider "the `character and magnitude'" of the burden imposed on the party's associational rights and "the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary." Regulations imposing severe burdens must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. Among the First Amendment rights that political parties possess is the right to associate with the persons whom they choose and to refrain from associating with persons whom they reject. Democratic Party of United Also included is the freedom to choose and promote the "`standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences.'" When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose views the group does not accept, the organization's message is undermined; the organization is understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with them. We therefore held, for example, that a State severely burdened the right of expressive association when it required the Boy Scouts to accept an openly gay scoutmaster. The scoutmaster's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." Boy Scouts of A political party's expressive mission is not simply, or even primarily, to persuade voters of the party's |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | dissenting | Wash. State Grange v. WASH. STATE REP. PARTY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145824/wash-state-grange-v-wash-state-rep-party/ | simply, or even primarily, to persuade voters of the party's views. Parties seek principally to promote the election of candidates who will implement those views. See, e.g., ; ; M. Hershey & P. Beck, Party Politics in America 13 That is achieved in large part by marking candidates with the party's seal of approval. Parties devote substantial resources to making their names trusted symbols of certain approaches to governance. See, *1199 e.g., App. 239 (Declaration of Democratic Committee Chair Paul J. Berendt); J. Aldrich, Why Parties? 48-49 They then encourage voters to cast their votes for the candidates that carry the party name. Parties' efforts to support candidates by marking them with the party trademark, so to speak, have been successful enough to make the party name, in the words of one commentator, "the most important resource that the party possesses." Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. Pa. L.Rev. 793, 804 And all evidence suggests party labels are indeed a central consideration for most voters. See, e.g., ; Rahn, The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing About Political Candidates, 37 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 472 (1993); Klein & Baum, Ballot Information and Voting Decisions in Judicial Elections, 54 Pol. Research Q. 709 II A The State of Washington need not like, and need not favor, political parties. It is entirely free to decline running primaries for the selection of party nominees and to hold nonpartisan general elections in which party labels have no place on the ballot. See California Democratic Parties would then be left to their own devices in both selecting and publicizing their candidates. But Washington has done more than merely decline to make its electoral machinery available for party building. Recognizing that parties draw support for their candidates by giving them the party imprimatur, Washington seeks to reduce the effectiveness of that endorsement by allowing any candidate to use the ballot for drawing upon the goodwill that a party has developed, while preventing the party from using the ballot to reject the claimed association or to identify the genuine candidate of its choice. This does not merely place the ballot off limits for party building; it makes the ballot an instrument by which party building is impeded, permitting unrebutted associations that the party itself does not approve. These cases cannot be decided without taking account of the special role that a state-printed ballot plays in elections. The ballot comes into play "at the most crucial stage in the electoral processthe instant before the vote is cast." It is the only document that all |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | dissenting | Wash. State Grange v. WASH. STATE REP. PARTY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145824/wash-state-grange-v-wash-state-rep-party/ | vote is cast." It is the only document that all voters are guaranteed to see, and it is "the last thing the voter sees before he makes his choice," Thus, we have held that a State cannot elevate a particular issue to prominence by making it the only issue for which the ballot sets forth the candidates' positions. (opinion of the Court). And we held unconstitutional California's election system, which listed as the party's candidate on the general election ballot the candidate selected in a state-run "blanket primary" in which all citizens could determine who would be the party's nominee. It was not enough to sustain the law that the party remained free to select its preferred candidate through another process, and could denounce or campaign against the candidate carrying the party's name on the general election ballot. Forced association with the party on the general election ballot was fatal. The Court makes much of the fact that the party names shown on the Washington ballot may be billed as mere statements of *1200 candidate "preference." See ante, at 1193-1195. To be sure, the party is not itself forced to display favor for someone it does not wish to associate with, as the Boy Scouts were arguably forced to do by employing the homosexual scoutmaster in and as the political parties were arguably forced to do by lending their ballot-endorsement as party nominee in But thrusting an unwelcome, self-proclaimed association upon the party on the election ballot itself is amply destructive of the party's associational rights. An individual's endorsement of a party shapes the voter's view of what the party stands for, no less than the party's endorsement of an individual shapes the voter's view of what the individual stands for. That is why party nominees are often asked (and regularly agree) to repudiate the support of persons regarded as racial extremists. On Washington's ballot, such repudiation is impossible. And because the ballot is the only document voters are guaranteed to see, and the last thing they see before casting their vote, there is "no means of replying" that "would be equally effective with the voter." at Not only is the party's message distorted, but its goodwill is hijacked. There can be no dispute that candidate acquisition of party labels on Washington's balloteven if billed as self-identificationis a means of garnering the support of those who trust and agree with the party. The "I prefer the D's" and "I prefer the R's" will not be on the ballot for esthetic reasons; they are designed to link candidates to unwilling parties |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | dissenting | Wash. State Grange v. WASH. STATE REP. PARTY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145824/wash-state-grange-v-wash-state-rep-party/ | reasons; they are designed to link candidates to unwilling parties (or at least parties who are unable to express their revulsion) and to encourage voters to cast their ballots based in part on the trust they place in the party's name and the party's philosophy. These harms will be present no matter how Washington's law is implemented. There is therefore "no set of circumstances" under which Washington's law would not severely burden political parties, see United and no good reason to wait until Washington has undermined its political parties to declare that it is forbidden to do so. B THE CHIEF JUSTICE would wait to see if the law is implemented in a manner that no more harms political parties than allowing a person to state that he "`like[s] Campbell's soup'" would harm the Campbell Soup Company. See ante, at 1188 (concurring opinion). It is hard to know how to respond. First and most fundamentally, there is simply no comparison between statements of "preference" for an expressive association and statements of "preference" for soup. The robust First Amendment freedom to associate belongs only to groups "engage[d] in `expressive association,'" Second, I assuredly do not share THE CHIEF JUSICE's view that the First Amendment will be satisfied so long as the ballot "is designed in such a manner that no reasonable voter would believe that the candidates listed there are nominees or members of, or otherwise associated with, the parties the candidates claimed to `prefer.'" Ante, at 1188. To begin with, it seems to me quite impossible for the ballot to satisfy a reasonable voter that the candidate is not "associated with" the party for which he has expressed a preference. *1201 He has associated himself with the party by his very expression of a preference and that indeed is the whole purpose of allowing the preference to be expressed. If all The Chief Justice means by "associated with" is that the candidate "does not speak on the party's behalf or with the party's approval," ib none of my analysis in this opinion relies upon that misperception, nor upon the misperception that the candidate is a member or the nominee of the party. Avoiding those misperceptions is far from enough. Is it enough to say on the ballot that a notorious and despised racist who says that the party is his choice does not speak with the party's approval? Surely not. His unrebutted association of that party with his views distorts the image of the party nonetheless. And the fact that the candidate who expresses a "preference" for one or another |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | dissenting | Wash. State Grange v. WASH. STATE REP. PARTY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145824/wash-state-grange-v-wash-state-rep-party/ | the candidate who expresses a "preference" for one or another party is shown not to be the nominee of that party does not deprive him of the boost from the party's reputation which the party wishes to confer only on its nominee. The Chief Justice claims that "the content of the ballots in the pertinent respect is yet to be determined," I disagree. We know all we need to know about the form of ballot. When pressed, Washington's Attorney General assured us at oral argument that the ballot will not say whether the party for whom the candidate expresses a preference claims or disavows him. (Of course it will not, for that would enable the party expression that it is the very object of this legislation to impair.) And finally, while THE CHIEF JUSTICE earlier expresses his awareness that the special character of the ballot is what makes these cases different, ante, at 1188, his Campbell's Soup example seems to forget that. If we must speak in terms of soup, Washington's law is like a law that encourages Oscar the Grouch (Sesame Street's famed bad-taste resident of a garbage can) to state a "preference" for Campbell's at every point of sale, while barring the soup company from disavowing his endorsement, or indeed using its name at all, in those same crucial locations. Reserving the most critical communications forum for statements of "preference" by a potentially distasteful speaker alters public perceptions of the entity that is "preferred"; and when this privileged connection undermines not a company's ability to identify and promote soup but an expressive association's ability to identify and promote its message and its standard bearer, the State treads on the constitutionally protected freedom of association. The majority opinion and THE CHIEF JUSTICE's concurrence also endorse a wait-and-see approach on the grounds that it is not yet evident how the law will affect voter perception of the political parties. But contrary to the Court's suggestion, it is not incumbent on the political parties to adduce "evidence," ante, at 1195, that forced association affects their ability to advocate for their candidates and their causes. We have never put expressive groups to this perhaps-impossible task. Rather, we accept their own assessments of the matter. The very cases on which THE CHIEF JUSTICE relies for a wait-and-see approach, ante, at 1187-1188, establish as much. In for example, we did not require the Boy Scouts to prove that forced acceptance of the openly homosexual scoutmaster would distort their message. See 530 U.S., at It falls far, far short of establishing the compelling state interest |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | dissenting | Wash. State Grange v. WASH. STATE REP. PARTY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145824/wash-state-grange-v-wash-state-rep-party/ | falls far, far short of establishing the compelling state interest that the First Amendment requires. And to tell the truth, here even the existence of a rational basis is questionable. Allowing candidates to identify themselves with particular parties on the ballot displays the State's view that adherence to party philosophy is "an importantperhaps paramountconsideration in the citizen's choice." 375 U.S., at If that is so, however, it seems to me irrational not to allow the party to disclaim that self-association, or to identify its own endorsed candidate. It is no mystery what is going on here. There is no state interest behind this law except the Washington Legislature's dislike for bright-colors partisanship, and its desire to blunt the ability of political parties with noncentrist views to endorse and advocate their own candidates. That was the purpose of the Washington system that this enactment was adopted to replacea system indistinguishable from the one we invalidated in which required parties to allow nonmembers to join in the selection of the candidates shown as their nominees on the election ballot.) And it is the obvious purpose of Washington legislation enacted after this law, which requires political parties to repeat a candidate's self-declared party "preference" in electioneering communications concerning the candidateeven if the purpose of the communication is to criticize the candidate and to disavow any connection between him and the party. Wash. Rev.Code 42.17.510(1) (2006); see also Wash. Admin. Code 390-18-020 (2007). Even if I were to assume, however, that Washington has a legitimate interest in telling voters on the ballot (above all other things) that a candidate says he favors a particular political party; and even if I were further to assume (per impossibile) that that interest was a compelling one; Washington would still have to "narrowly tailor" its law to protect that interest with minimal intrusion upon the parties' associational *1203 rights. There has been no attempt to do that here. Washington could, for example, have permitted parties to disclaim on the general-election ballot the asserted association or to designate on the ballot their true nominees. The course the State has chosen makes sense only as an effort to use its monopoly power over the ballot to undermine the expressive activities of the political parties. * * * The right to associate for the election of candidates is fundamental to the operation of our political system, and state action impairing that association bears a heavy burden of justification. Washington's electoral system permits individuals to appropriate the parties' trademarks, so to speak, at the most crucial stage of election, thereby distorting the |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | concurring | McCormick v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/ | I agree with the Court's conclusion and, given the assumption on which this case was briefed and argued, with the reasons the Court assigns. If the prohibition of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S. C. 1951, against receipt of money "under color of official right" includes receipt of money from a private source for the performance of official duties, that ambiguously described crime assuredly need not, and for the reasons the Court discusses should not, be interpreted to cover campaign contributions with anticipation of favorable future action, as opposed to campaign contributions in exchange for an explicit promise of favorable future action. *277 I find it unusual and unsettling, however, to make such a distinction without any hint of a justification in the statutory text: 1951 contains not even a colorable allusion to campaign contributions or quid pro quos. I find it doubly unsettling because there is another interpretation of 1951, contrary to the one that has been the assumption of argument here, that would render the distinction unnecessary. While I do not feel justified in adopting that interpretation without briefing and argument, neither do I feel comfortable giving tacit approval to the assumption that contradicts it. I write, therefore, a few words concerning the text of this statute and the history that has produced the unexamined assumption underlying our opinion. Section 1951(a) provides: "Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion. shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." Section 1951(b)(2) defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." The relevant provisions were enacted as part of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, and were carried forward without change in the Hobbs Act of 1948. For more than 30 years after enactment, there is no indication that they were applied to the sort of conduct alleged here. When, in the 's, it first occurred to federal prosecutors to use the Hobbs Act to reach what was essentially the soliciting of bribes by state officials, courts were unimpressed with the notion. They thought that public officials were not guilty of extortion when they accepted, or even when they requested, voluntary payments designed to influence or procure their official action. United ; United ; United Not until 19 did any court apply the Hobbs Act to bribery. See United (CA3 19) That holding was soon followed |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | concurring | McCormick v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/ | bribery. See United (CA3 19) That holding was soon followed by the Seventh Circuit in United which said that "[s]o long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of 18 U.S. C. 1951." While Kenny, Braasch, and subsequent cases were debated in academic writing, compare Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 Geo. L. J. 1171 (criticizing Kenny), with The Elusive Distinction between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, the Courts of Appeals accepted the expansion with little disagreement, see, e. g., United ; United ; United ; but see United and this Court has never had occasion to consider the matter. It is acceptance of the assumption that "under color of official right" means "on account of one's office" that brings bribery cases within the statute's reach, and that creates the necessity for the reasonable but textually inexplicable distinction the Court makes today. That assumption is questionable. "The obtaining of property under color of official right" more naturally connotes some false assertion of official entitlement to the property. This interpretation *279 might have the effect of making the 1951 definition of extortion comport with the definition of "extortion" at common law. One treatise writer, describing "extortion by a public officer," states: "At common law it was essential that the money or property be obtained under color of office, that is, under the pretense that the officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his office. The money or thing received must have been claimed or accepted in right of office, and the person paying must have yielded to official authority." 3 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure 790-791 (1957). It also appears to be the case that under New York law, which has long contained identical "under color of official right" language and upon which the Hobbs Act is said to have been based, see bribery and extortion were separate offenses. An official charged with extortion could defend on the ground that the payment was voluntary and thus he was guilty only of bribery. People v. Feld, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 796, 797 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see I am aware of only one pre-Hobbs Act New York prosecution involving extortion "under color of official right," and there the defendant, a justice of the peace, had extracted a payment from a litigant on the false ground that it was due him as a court fee. Finally, where the United States Code explicitly criminalizes conduct such |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | concurring | McCormick v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/ | Finally, where the United States Code explicitly criminalizes conduct such as that alleged in the present case, it calls the crime bribery, not extortionand like all bribery laws I am aware of (but unlike 1951 and all other extortion laws I am aware of) it punishes not only the person receiving the payment but the person making it. See 18 U.S. C. 201(b) (criminalizing bribery of and by federal officials).[*]*280 Cf. 18 U.S. C. 8 (criminalizing extortion by federal officials, making no provision for punishment of person extorted). McCormick, though not a federal official, is subject to federal prosecution for bribery under the Travel Act, 18 U.S. C. 1952, which criminalizes the use of interstate commerce for purposes of briberyand reaches, of course, both the person giving and the person receiving the bribe. I mean only to raise this argument, not to decide it, for it has not been advanced and there may be persuasive responses. See, e. g., But unexamined assumptions have a way of becoming, by force of usage, unsound law. Before we are asked to go further down the road of making reasonable but textually unapparent distinctions in a federal "payment for official action" statuteas we unquestionably will be asked, see ante, at 267, n. 5I think it well to bear in mind that the statute may not exist. |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | Indigent and incarcerated, appellant T. McCoy fights an uphill battle to overturn his conviction. Standing alone, he is hardly a match the formidable resources the State has committed to keeping him behind bars. Appellant's most crucial ally in this fight is the court-appointed appellate counsel that the State is constitutionally obligated to furnish him. Because the very State that is resolved to deprive appellant of liberty pays his defense counsel, he might understandably suspect his defender's allegiance. Sensitive to that natural distrust, we have always assured indigent defendants such as appellant that our Constitution's guarantee that "the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense," U. S. Const., Amdt. 6, "contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client." Von (citation omitted). We have counseled them not to fear that they will receive no more justice than they can afford, because the "constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process" means that the rich and poor alike deserve "the same rights and opportunities on appeal" The Court today reneges on these longstanding assurances by permitting a State to force its appointed defender of the indigent to advocate his client upon unilaterally concluding that the client's appeal lacks merit. I dissent. I "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." See also Accordingly, our Constitution imposes on defense counsel an "overarching duty," *446 to "advanc[e] `the undivided interests of his client,' " Polk and on the State a concomitant "constitutional obligation to respect the professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages," -322 Once "the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated." United Our commitment to the adversarial process, we have repeatedly recognized, is every bit as crucial on appeal of a criminal conviction as it is at trial. See, e. g., ; ; On appeal, as at trial, our Constitution guarantees the accused "an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court assisting in a detached evaluation of the appellant's claim." See also Naturally, the defense counsel's duty to advocate, whether on appeal or at trial, is tempered by ethical rules. For example, counsel may not in his or her zeal to advocate a client's case fabricate law or facts or suborn perjury, and must at times disclose law contrary to the client's position. See ante, at 440-441, and n. 14. |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | the client's position. See ante, at 440-441, and n. 14. Similarly, defense counsel have an ethical duty not to press appeals they believe to be frivolous, even though other lawyers might see an issue of arguable merit. See Polk For retained counsel, who may decline to represent a paying client in what counsel believes to be a frivolous appeal, the latter duty does not interfere with the duty of unwavering allegiance to the client. Since, however, court-appointed counsel may withdraw only with court approval, the indigent client who insists on pursuing an appeal that counsel finds frivolous presents a *447 unique dilemma: Appointed counsel, cast ostensibly in the role of defender, must announce to the court that will rule on a client's appeal that he or she believes the client has no case. We have struck a delicate balance permitting an appointed counsel to satisfy his or her ethical duty to the court in the manner that least compromises the constitutional duty to advocate the client's case and that thereby minimizes the disadvantage to the indigent. Our cases make abundantly clear that an appointed counsel's constitutional duty to advocate zealously on the client's behalf does not end abruptly upon his or her conclusion that the client has no case. We have, for example, flatly disapproved of a regime that permits appointed defense counsel or anyone other than the appellate tribunal itself to adjudge finally the worthiness of an indigent defendant's appeal. See ; Similarly, our Constitution strictly limits the appointed counsel's latitude to depart from the role of defender either by declining to advocate at all or, worse yet, by opposing the client when that counsel believes his or her client's appeal lacks merit. In we held that a court may not permit appointed counsel to withdraw from a criminal appeal on the basis of the bald assertion that " `there is no merit to the appeal.' " Instead, appointed counsel's "role as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability" and that any request to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous "must be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." Central to our analysis was the constitutional imperative to "assure penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal as nearly as is practicable as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel." This "constitutional *448 requirement of substantial equality and |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | private counsel." This "constitutional *448 requirement of substantial equality and fair process," we held, "can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae." We took pains to emphasize that the -brief requirement "would not force appointed counsel to brief his case his client but would merely afford the latter that advocacy which a nonindigent defendant is able to obtain." ' injunction casting appointed counsel in the role of an amicus who might "brief his case his client" is best understood in light of on which relied, where we concluded that defense counsel abdicated their role as advocates by arguing to the court that their client's appeal was meritless. After identifying a single " `possible' area of error," 101 U. S. App. D. C. as presumably would require counsel to do, the "defense" memorandum proceeded to prove (not merely to announce) that "there was not such merit even in this aspect of the appeal as to warrant further prosecution of the appeal," and that therefore "no substantial question existed in this case." The Court of Appeals commended the defense counsel's conduct as faithful to their duty "to advise the court in this matter." See also ; 249 F.2d, at We summarily vacated the judgment and remanded, roundly criticizing the role that the Court of Appeals encouraged counsel to play: "In this case, it appears that the two attorneys appointed by the Court of Appeals, performed essentially the role of amici curiae. But representation *449 in the role of an advocate is required."[1] and together carefully prescribe the contours of appointed counsel's constitutional duty upon concluding that an appeal lacks merit. Appointed counsel must advocate anything in the record arguably supporting the client's position. When counsel has nothing further to say in the client's defense, he or she should say no more. At that point, an unadorned statement that counsel believes the appeal to be frivolous satisfies the appointed counsel's constitutional duty to the client and ethical duty to the court, see Polk and any further discussion of the merits impermissibly casts defense counsel in the role of amicus. II Wisconsin's Rule 809.32(1) forces appointed counsel to do exactly what we denounced in and The Rule begins with the requirement, consistent with that appointed counsel"shall file with the court of appeals a brief in which is stated anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal," but in the next breath it departs from ' prescription by requiring also "a discussion of why the |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | ' prescription by requiring also "a discussion of why the issue lacks merit." Wis. Rule App. Proc. 809.32(1). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in language reminiscent of the Court of Appeals' opinion in extolled the discussion requirement "as a significant administrative aid to the reviewing court [which] serves an informational function and, equally important, enables the court to operate in a more efficient, expeditious and cost-saving manner." Wisconsin ex *450 rel. As in the foregoing functions, however expedient they might be, describe a role ordinarily filled not by defense counsel, but by amici and the State's attorney. Under the Rule, then, a court-appointed counsel no longer "acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client." U. S., Far from providing the accused "Assistance of Counsel for his defense," as the Sixth Amendment mandates, the Rule explicitly "force[s] appointed counsel to brief his case his client," No less than the no-merit briefs we disapproved in the no-merit discussion undermines the "very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice," 422 U. S., at The Court's curious conclusion that counsel nevertheless does not act as an amicus curiae when he or she files the requisite no-merit discussion is rooted in a single observation: that the requirement poses little danger that counsel, in deciding whether "to pursue the appeal," will improperly "weig[h] the probability of success the time burdens on the court and the attorney." Ante, at 443 (citation omitted). But declining to burden the court with another case or another brief is not the only, nor even the most common, sense in which counsel act as amici, and is assuredly not the meaning that and ascribed to the term. The most common definition of "amicus curiae" is "[a] person with a strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action [who] petition[s] the court for permission to file a brief. to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views." Black's Law Dictionary 75 And as the numerous passages quoted above from and make clear, the Court's reference to amici focused more on the concern that counsel might advocate their client than on the concern that they might not advocate at all (a possibility that itself prohibits). Thus, the Wisconsin Rule falls *451 squarely within our flat prohibition casting defense counsel in the role of amici. Not only does Wisconsin's Rule impinge upon the right to counsel, but contrary to our admonition that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man enjoys `depends on the amount of money he has,' " |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | enjoys `depends on the amount of money he has,' " ) it does so in manner that ensures the poor will not have "the same rights and opportunities on appeal" as the rich. Central to the Court's contrary position is its repeated observation that neither rich nor poor are entitled to pursue a frivolous appeal. See ante, at 436, 438-439. At issue here, however, is not the indigent's right " `to pester a court with frivolous arguments. that cannot conceivably persuade the court,' " ante, at 436 (citation omitted), nor the right to a state-funded "unscrupulous attorney" to do so, ante, at 439, n. 12, but the indigent's right to the usual adversary appellate process to test the validity of a conviction even though a single attorney unilaterally concludes that the appeal lacks merit. Legal issues do not come prepackaged with the labels "frivolous" or "arguably meritorious." If such characterizations were typically unanimous or uncontroversial, we could freely permit defense counsel to decide finally whether an appeal should proceed, but see or to advise the court without any advocacy on their clients' behalf that an appeal is frivolous, but see It by no means impugns the legal profession's integrity to acknowledge that reasonable attorneys can differ as to whether a particular issue is arguably meritorious. Therein lies the Wisconsin Rule's inequity. When retained counsel in Wisconsin declines to appeal a case on the ground that he or she believes the appeal to be frivolous, the wealthy client can always seek a second opinion and might well find a lawyer who in good conscience believes it to have arguable merit. In no event, however, will any lawyer file in the *452 wealthy client's name a brief that undercuts his or her position. In contrast, when appointed counsel harbors the same belief, the indigent client has no recourse to a second opinion, and (unless he or she withdraws the appeal) must respond in court to the arguments of his or her own defender. An indigent defendant who accepts the State's offer of counsel must submit to the state-imposed risk that counsel will advocate him or her upon unilaterally concluding that the appeal is frivolous, but the defendant with means to purchase a defender whose allegiance is undivided need never fear such treachery. When retained counsel "actively represent conflicting interests" we deride them as "ineffective," (80); see Wheat v. United States, ante, p. 153, but when appointed counsel actively brief both sides of an appeal we congratulate them for achieving "substantial equality and fair procedure," ante, at 435. The Court is left, |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | and fair procedure," ante, at 435. The Court is left, then, to justify the inequality on the basis of an imagined distinction between the "typical advocate's brief in a criminal appeal" and the brief. Ante, at 442.[2] It is true that the question presented to the court in an brief (whether the appeal has arguable merit) differs from that presented in a brief on the merits (whether the accused should prevail). Any substantive difference between the two questions, however, does not in itself suggest, as the Court maintains, that counsel's advocacy on behalf of a client should be any less forceful in the one context than in the other. itself makes clear that the role of counsel writing an brief, like his or her role in a "typical advocate's brief," is to advocate. The no-merit letter filed by ' lawyer was flawed because it "did not furnish [] *453 with counsel acting in the role of an advocate nor did it provide that full consideration and resolution of the matter as is obtained when counsel is acting in that capacity," U. S., at 743 The brief is supposed to aid the reviewing court, but not in the sense that an amicus does. Rather the brief was designed to spare the reviewing court from having to sift through "only the cold record without the help of an advocate," To be sure, the brief, unlike the typical brief on the merits, concludes with an assertion "This appeal is frivolous" that is contrary to the client's interest. It does not, however, follow that "no constitutional deprivation occurs when the attorney explains the basis for that conclusion." Ante, at 443. Such a conclusion, the Court seems to agree, is no different in type from other statements that defense attorneys are obligated to make their clients' best interests, such as an admission that the weight of authority is the client's position or that certain facts belie the client's case. See ante, at 440-441, and n. 14. No one would suppose that the limited obligation to cite contrary law and facts translates into a general obligation to expose all the weaknesses in a client's case, or even to explain why the particular law or facts cited disfavor the defense. Merely because counsel constitutionally may take slight deviations from the role of advancing the client's undivided interests does not mean that counsel constitutionally may entirely abandon that role, nor even that counsel may depart from that role any more than is absolutely necessary to satisfy the ethical obligation.[3] *454 Neither the Court nor the State |
Justice Brennan | 1,988 | 13 | dissenting | McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112088/mccoy-v-court-of-appeals-of-wis-dist-1/ | the ethical obligation.[3] *454 Neither the Court nor the State identifies any interest that demands so drastic a departure from defense counsel's "over-arching duty," 466 U. S., at to advocate "the undivided interests of his client," 444 U. S., at No doubt, a counsel's refutation of the argument that he or she deems frivolous lightens the court's load, and in some circumstances might even expose an analytical flaw that is not apparent from counsel's bare conclusion. But an issue that is so clearly without merit as to be frivolous should reveal itself to the court as such with minimal research and no guidance. One might perhaps hypothesize an issue whose frivolity is so elusive as to require refutation. In such an event, as in every other stage of a criminal prosecution, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was surely correct that "[t]he court will be better equipped to make the correct decision about the potential merits of the appeal if it has before it not only the authorities which might favor an appeal, but also the authorities which might militate it." Never before, however, have we permitted a court to further the interest in having "powerful statements on both sides of [a] question" by compelling a single advocate to take both sides. There is no more reason to command defense counsel to refute defense arguments they deem frivolous than there is to force them to refute their own arguments on the merits of nonfrivolous appeals. In either situation, the State has a corps of lawyers ready and able to perform that task. * III The Court purports to leave unscathed the constitutional axiom that appellate counsel "must play the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court," 469 U. S., Our disagreement boils down to whether defense counsel who details for a court why he or she believes a client's appeal is frivolous befriends the client or the court. The Court looks at Wisconsin's regime and sees a friend of the client who "assur[es] that the constitutional rights of indigent defendants are scrupulously honored." Ante, at 444. I look at the same regime and see a friend of the court whose advocacy is so damning that the prosecutor never responds. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14, 30. Either way, with friends like that, the indigent criminal appellant is truly alone. |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Skipper v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111657/skipper-v-south-carolina/ | Petitioner Ronald Skipper was convicted in a South Carolina trial court of capital murder and rape. The State sought the death penalty, and a separate sentencing hearing was held before the trial jury under S. C. Code 16-3-20 which provides for a bifurcated trial and jury sentencing in capital cases. Following introduction by the State of evidence in aggravation of the offense (principally evidence of petitioner's history of sexually assaultive behavior), petitioner presented as mitigating evidence his own testimony and that of his former wife, his mother, his sister, and his grandmother. This testimony, for the most part, concerned *3 the difficult circumstances of his upbringing. Petitioner and his former wife, however, both testified briefly that petitioner had conducted himself well during the 7 1/2 months he spent in jail between his arrest and trial. Petitioner also testified that during a prior period of incarceration he had earned the equivalent of a high school diploma and that, if sentenced to life imprisonment rather than to death, he would behave himself in prison and would attempt to work so that he could contribute money to the support of his family. Petitioner also sought to introduce testimony of two jailers and one "regular visitor" to the jail to the effect that petitioner had "made a good adjustment" during his time spent in jail. The trial court, however, ruled that under the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in such evidence would be irrelevant and hence inadmissible. The decision in the judge stated, stood for the rule that "whether [petitioner] can adjust or not adjust" was "not an issue in this case." App. 11. After hearing closing arguments during the course of which the prosecutor contended that petitioner would pose disciplinary problems if sentenced to prison and would likely rape other prisoners, at 13-14 the jury sentenced petitioner to death. On appeal, petitioner contended that the trial court had committed constitutional error in excluding the testimony of the jailers and the visitor: the testimony of these witnesses, petitioner argued, would have constituted relevant mitigating evidence, and exclusion of such evidence was improper under this Court's decisions in and The Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected petitioner's contention, stating: "The trial judge properly refused to admit evidence of [petitioner's] future adaptability to prison life. State v. However, evidence of his past adaptability was admitted through testimony of his former wife, *4 his mother and his own testimony. This contention is without merit." 285 S. C. 42, 48, We granted certiorari, to consider petitioner's claim that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision is inconsistent |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Skipper v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111657/skipper-v-south-carolina/ | claim that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision is inconsistent with this Court's decisions in and and we now reverse. There is no disputing that this Court's decision in requires that in capital cases " `the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' " (quoting ) (emphasis in original). Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering "any relevant mitigating evidence." These rules are now well established, and the State does not question them. Accordingly, the only question before us is whether the exclusion from the sentencing hearing of the testimony petitioner proffered regarding his good behavior during the over seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial deprived petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment. t can hardly be disputed that it did. The State does not contest that the witnesses petitioner attempted to place on the stand would have testified that petitioner had been a well-behaved and well-adjusted prisoner, nor does the State dispute that the jury could have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony regarding petitioner's character and his probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison. Although it is true that any such inferences would not relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed, see there is no question but that such inferences would be "mitigating" in the sense that *5 they might serve "as a basis for a sentence less than death." Consideration of a defendant's past conduct as indicative of his probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal sentencing: "any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose." The Court has therefore held that evidence that a defendant would in the future pose a danger to the community if he were not executed may be treated as establishing an "aggravating factor" for purposes of capital sentencing, see also Likewise, evidence that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating.[1] Under such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer's consideration. The State advances several arguments as to why the exclusion of petitioner's proffered evidence was, nonetheless, not erroneous. First, the State contends that the trial court ruled only that petitioner's witnesses could not |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Skipper v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111657/skipper-v-south-carolina/ | the trial court ruled only that petitioner's witnesses could not offer incompetent lay opinion testimony regarding petitioner's ability to adjust to prison life in the future. the State argues, does not displace reasonable state-law rules regarding the competency of testimony. The record does not, however, support the State's contention that the trial court's *6 ruling was no more than an evenhanded application of rules restricting the use of opinion testimony. t is true that petitioner's request for a ruling on the admissibility of the testimony of the two jailers and the "regular visitor" was immediately preceded by an attempt to introduce his former wife's opinion (ruled inadmissible by the trial judge, App. 10) regarding his prospects for adjustment to prison life. n seeking a ruling on the testimony of the three witnesses at issue here, however, petitioner made it clear that he expected them "to testify that [petitioner] has made a good adjustment" to jail. d., Defense counsel was not offering opinion testimony regarding future events. Under these circumstances, any ruling premised on the assumption that petitioner planned to present incompetent opinion testimony would have been as the State conceded at oral argument a "mistake." Such a misunderstanding could by no means justify the exclusion of nonopinion evidence bearing on the defendant's ability to adjust to prison life. Second, the State echoes the South Carolina Supreme Court in arguing that the trial court's ruling was not improper because it did not prevent petitioner from introducing evidence of past good conduct in jail for purposes of establishing his good character, but only foreclosed the introduction of "irrelevant" evidence of his future adaptability to prison life. There is no clear support for this contention in the record of this case, as the trial court did not explicitly rely on any such distinction and appears to have excluded petitioner's evidence of good conduct for any purpose whatsoever. The State's proposed distinction between use of evidence of past good conduct to prove good character and use of the same evidence to establish future good conduct in prison seems to be drawn from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in another case altogether, State v. 285 S. C. 1, ( ), cert. denied, There, the court stated that although "future *7 adaptability to prison [is] irrelevant evidence because it does not bear on a defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense[,] [p]ast behavior in prison does bear on a defendant's character and, therefore, is relevant." 285 S. C., at 3, This distinction is elusive. As we have explained |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Skipper v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111657/skipper-v-south-carolina/ | at 3, This distinction is elusive. As we have explained above, a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination.[2] Accordingly, the precise meaning and practical significance of the decision in and of the State's argument is difficult to assess. Assuming, however, that the rule would in any case have the effect of precluding the defendant from introducing otherwise admissible evidence for the explicit purpose of convincing the jury that he should be spared the death penalty because he would pose no undue danger to his jailers or fellow prisoners and could lead a useful life behind bars if sentenced to life imprisonment, the rule would not pass muster under Since the trial court's ruling in this case whether or not it can credibly be said to be consistent with at least had this effect, it cannot stand under Finally, the State seems to suggest that exclusion of the proffered testimony was proper because the testimony was merely cumulative of the testimony of petitioner and his former *8 wife that petitioner's behavior in jail awaiting trial was satisfactory, and of petitioner's testimony that, if sentenced to prison rather than to death, he would attempt to use his time productively and would not cause trouble. We think, however, that characterizing the excluded evidence as cumulative and its exclusion as harmless is implausible on the facts before us. The evidence petitioner was allowed to present on the issue of his conduct in jail was the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving. The testimony of more disinterested witnesses and, in particular, of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their charges would quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury. Nor can we confidently conclude that credible evidence that petitioner was a good prisoner would have had no effect upon the jury's deliberations. The prosecutor himself, in closing argument, made much of the dangers petitioner would pose if sentenced to prison, and went so far as to assert that petitioner could be expected to rape other inmates. Under these circumstances, it appears reasonably likely that the exclusion of evidence bearing upon petitioner's behavior in jail (and hence, upon his likely future behavior in prison) may have affected the jury's decision to impose the death sentence. Thus, under any standard, the exclusion of the evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | These appeals present constitutional challenges to the key provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 11 (Act), and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, all as amended in 14.[1] *7 The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the legislation in large part against various constitutional challenges,[2] viewed it as "by far the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress." 171 U. S. App. D. C. 172, 182, The statutes at issue summarized in broad terms, contain the following provisions: (a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for various federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are subject to prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of Presidential campaign activities is established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code;[3] and (d) a Federal Election Commission is established to administer and enforce the legislation. This suit was originally filed by appellants in the United District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs included a candidate for the Presidency of the United a United Senator who is a candidate for re-election, a potential contributor, the *8 Committee for a Constitutional PresidencyMcCarthy '76, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc. The defendants included the Secretary of the United Senate and the Clerk of the United House of Representatives, both in their official capacities and as ex officio members of the Federal Election Commission. The Commission itself was named as a defendant. Also named were the Attorney of the United and the Comptroller of the United Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S. C. 1331, 21, and 22, and 315 (a) of the Act, 2 U.S. C. 437h (a) (10 ed., Supp. IV).[4] The complaint sought both a *9 declaratory judgment that the major provisions of the Act were unconstitutional and an injunction against enforcement of those provisions. Appellants requested the convocation of a three-judge District Court as to all matters and also requested certification of constitutional questions to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the terms of 315 (a). The District Judge denied the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | the terms of 315 (a). The District Judge denied the application for a three-judge court and directed that the case be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. That court entered an order stating that the case was "preliminarily deemed" to be properly certified under 315 (a). Leave to intervene was granted to various groups and individuals.[5] After considering matters regarding factfinding procedures, the Court of Appeals entered an order en banc remanding the case to the District Court to (1) identify the constitutional issues in the complaint; (2) take whatever evidence was found necessary in addition to the submissions suitably dealt with by way of judicial notice; (3) make findings of fact with reference to those issues; and (4) certify the constitutional questions arising from the foregoing steps to the Court of Appeals.[6] On remand, the District *10 Judge entered a memorandum order adopting extensive findings of fact and transmitting the augmented record back to the Court of Appeals. On plenary review, a majority of the Court of Appeals rejected, for the most part, appellants' constitutional attacks. The court found "a clear and compelling interest," 171 U. S. App. D. C., at in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. On that basis, the court upheld, with one exception,[7] the substantive provisions of the Act with respect to contributions, expenditures, and disclosure. It also sustained the constitutionality of the newly established Federal Election Commission. The court concluded that, notwithstanding the manner of selection of its members and the breadth of its powers, which included nonlegislative functions, the Commission is a constitutionally authorized agency created to perform primarily legislative functions.[8]*11 The provisions for public funding of the three stages of the Presidential selection process were upheld as a valid exercise of congressional power under the Welfare Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, 8. In this Court, appellants argue that the Court of Appeals failed to give this legislation the critical scrutiny demanded under accepted First Amendment and equal protection principles. In appellants' view, limiting the use of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money. Further, they argue that the reporting and disclosure provisions of the Act unconstitutionally impinge on their right to freedom of association. Appellants also view the federal subsidy provisions of Subtitle H as violative of the Welfare Clause, and as inconsistent with the First and Fifth Amendments. Finally, appellants renew their attack on the Commission's composition and powers. At the outset we must determine whether the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | and powers. At the outset we must determine whether the case before us presents a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution. Congress may not, of course, require this Court to render opinions in matters which are not "cases or controversies." Aetna Life Ins. We must therefore decide whether appellants have the "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" necessary to meet the requirements of Art. III. It is clear that Congress, in enacting *12 2 U.S. C. 437h (10 ed., Supp. IV),[9] intended to provide judicial review to the extent permitted by Art. III. In our view, the complaint in this case demonstrates that at least some of the appellants have a sufficient "personal stake"[10] in a determination of the constitutional validity of each of the challenged provisions to present "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins.[11] I. CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS The intricate statutory scheme adopted by Congress to regulate federal election campaigns includes restrictions *13 on political contributions and expenditures that apply broadly to all phases of and all participants in the election process. The major contribution and expenditure limitations in the Act prohibit individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign[12] and from spending more than $1,000 a year "relative to a clearly identified candidate."[13] Other provisions restrict a candidate's use of personal and family resources in his campaign[14] and limit the overall amount that can be spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office.[15] The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in this case.[16] Thus, the critical constitutional *14 questions presented here go not to the basic power of Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously discriminates against nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. A. Principles The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Although First Amendment protections are not confined to "the exposition of ideas," "there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates." This no more than reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates *15 for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot "it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in stemmed from the Court's recognition that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee " `freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,' " a freedom that encompasses " `[t]he right to associate with the political party of one's choice.' " quoted in It is with these principles in mind that we consider the primary contentions of the parties with respect to the Act's limitations upon the giving and spending of money in political campaigns. Those conflicting contentions could not more sharply define the basic issues before us. Appellees contend that what the Act regulates is conduct, and that its effect on speech and association is incidental at most. Appellants respond that contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the Act's limitations thus constitute restraints on First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct. In upholding the constitutional validity of the Act's contribution and expenditure provisions on the ground *16 that those provisions should be viewed as regulating conduct, not speech, the Court of Appeals relied upon United See 171 U. S. App. D. C., at The O'Brien case involved a defendant's claim that the First Amendment prohibited his prosecution for burning his draft card because his act was " `symbolic speech' " engaged in as a " `demonstration against the war and against the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | as a " `demonstration against the war and against the draft.' " On the assumption that "the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct [was] sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment," the Court sustained the conviction because it found "a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element" that was "unrelated to the suppression of free expression" and that had an "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms no greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of that interest." The Court expressly emphasized that O'Brien was not a case "where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. See ; New York Times For example, in the Court contrasted picketing and parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citizen to a public official. The parading and picketing activities were said to constitute conduct "intertwined with expression and association," whereas the newspaper comment and the telegram were described as a "pure form of expression" involving "free speech alone" rather than "expression mixed with particular conduct." Even if the categorization of the expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O'Brien test because the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve "suppressing communication." The interests served by the Act include restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the overall scope of federal election campaigns. Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations, it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and groups. Unlike O'Brien, where the Selective Service System's administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged "conduct" of giving or spending money "arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." 391 U.S., Nor can the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations be sustained, as some of the parties suggest, by reference to the constitutional principles reflected in such *18 decisions as ; and Those cases stand for the proposition that the government may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas, in order to further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of communication. See In contrast to O'Brien, where the method of expression was held to be subject to prohibition, Cox, Adderley, and Kovacs involved place or manner restrictions on legitimate modes of expressionpicketing, parading, demonstrating, and using a soundtruck. The critical difference between this case and those time, place, and manner cases is that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any reasonable time, place, and manner regulations otherwise imposed.[17] *19 A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.[18] This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech. The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. The $1,000 ceiling on spending "relative to a clearly identified candidate," 18 U.S. C. 608 (e) (1) (10 ed., Supp. IV), would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press[19] from any significant use of the most * effective modes of communication.[] Although the Act's limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations and political parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns[21] and would operate |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns[21] and would operate to constrain campaigning by candidates who raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling. By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. *21 A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.[22] A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor. Given the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. There is no indication, however, that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political associations.[23] The overall effect of the Act's contribution *22 ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression. The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act's contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a candidate or committee, but leave the contributor free to become a member of any |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates. And the Act's contribution limitations permit associations and candidates to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy. By contrast, the Act's $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" precludes most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association. See 357 U. S., at The Act's constraints on the ability of independent associations and candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political expression "is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of [their] adherents," See Cousins v. *23 9 U. S., at -488; In sum, although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions. B. Contribution Limitations 1. The $1,000 Limitation on Contributions by Individuals and Groups to Candidates and Authorized Campaign Committees Section 608 (b) provides, with certain limited exceptions, that "no person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000." The statute defines "person" broadly to include "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other organization or group of persons." 591 (g). The limitation reaches a gift, subscription, loan, advance, deposit of anything of value, or promise to give a contribution, made for the purpose of influencing a primary election, a Presidential preference primary, or a general election for any federal office.[24] 591 (e) (1), (2). The *24 $1,000 ceiling applies regardless of whether the contribution is given to the candidate, to a committee authorized in writing by the candidate to accept contributions on his behalf, or indirectly via earmarked gifts passed through an intermediary to the candidate. 608 (b) (4), (6).[25] The restriction applies to aggregate amounts contributed to the candidate for each electionwith primaries, runoff elections, and general elections counted separately, and all Presidential primaries held in any calendar year treated together as a single election campaign. 608 (b) (5). Appellants contend that the $1,000 contribution ceiling unjustifiably burdens First Amendment freedoms, employs overbroad dollar limits, and discriminates against candidates opposing incumbent officeholders and against minor-party candidates in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We address each of these claims of invalidity in turn. (a) As the general discussion in Part indicated, the primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. *25 The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a "basic constitutional freedom," that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." See, e. g., ; at -461; In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental "action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." at -461. Yet, it is clear that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute." Even a " `significant interference' with protected rights of political association" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. ; ; Appellees argue that the Act's restrictions on large campaign contributions are justified by three governmental interests. According to the parties and amici, the primary interest served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. Two "ancillary" interests underlying the Act are also allegedly furthered by the $1,000 limits on contributions. First, the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election *26 process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections.[26] Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some extent act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political system more widely to candidates without access to sources of large amounts of money.[27] It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purposeto limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions are given |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of *27 representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 12 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.[28] Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. In the Court found that the danger to "fair and effective government" posed by partisan political conduct on the part of federal employees charged with administering the law was a sufficiently important concern to justify broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan political association. Here, as there, Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence "is also critical if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."[29] Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with "proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." But laws making criminal *28 the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action. And while disclosure requirements serve the many salutary purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion,[30] Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed. The Act's $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.[31] Significantly, the *29 Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties. We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. (b) Appellants' first overbreadth challenge to the contribution ceilings rests on the proposition that most large contributors do not seek improper influence over a candidate's position or an officeholder's action. Although the truth of that proposition may be assumed, it does not *30 undercut the validity of the $1,000 contribution limitation. Not only is it difficult to isolate suspect contributions but, more importantly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated. A second, related overbreadth claim is that the $1,000 restriction is unrealistically low because much more than that amount would still not be enough to enable an unscrupulous contributor to exercise improper influence over a candidate or officeholder, especially in campaigns for statewide or national office. While the contribution limitation provisions might well have been structured to take account of the graduated expenditure limitations for congressional and Presidential campaigns,[] Congress' failure to engage in such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation. As the Court of Appeals observed, "[i]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." 171 U. S. App. D. C., at Such distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind. Compare with (c) Apart from these First Amendment concerns, appellants argue that the contribution limitations work such an invidious discrimination between incumbents *31 and challengers that the statutory provisions must be declared unconstitutional on their face.[33] In considering this contention, it is important at the outset to note that the Act applies the same limitations on contributions to all candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations. Absent record evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a court should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded restrictions. Cf. * There is no such evidence to support the claim that the contribution limitations in themselves discriminate against major-party challengers to incumbents. Challengers can and often do defeat incumbents in federal elections.[34] Major-party challengers in federal elections are usually men and women who are well known and influential in their community or State. |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | are well known and influential in their community or State. Often such challengers are themselves incumbents in important local, state, or federal offices. Statistics in the record indicate that major-party challengers as well as incumbents are capable of raising large sums for campaigning.[35] Indeed, a small but nonetheless significant number of challengers have in recent elections outspent their incumbent rivals.[36] And, to the extent that incumbents generally are more likely than challengers to attract very large contributions, the Act's $1,000 ceiling has the practical effect of benefiting challengers as a class.[37] Contrary to the broad generalization *33 drawn by the appellants, the practical impact of the contribution ceilings in any given election will clearly depend upon the amounts in excess of the ceilings that, for various reasons, the candidates in that election would otherwise have received and the utility of these additional amounts to the candidates. To be sure, the limitations may have a significant effect on particular challengers or incumbents, but the record provides no basis for predicting that such adventitious factors will invariably and invidiously benefit incumbents as a class.[38] Since the danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption apply with equal force to challengers and to incumbents, Congress had ample justification for imposing the same fundraising constraints upon both. The charge of discrimination against minor-party and independent candidates is more troubling, but the record provides no basis for concluding that the Act invidiously disadvantages such candidates. As noted above, the Act on its face treats all candidates equally with regard to contribution limitations. And the restriction would appear to benefit minor-party and independent candidates relative to their major-party opponents because major-party candidates receive far more money in large contributions.[39] Although there is some *34 force to appellants' response that minor-party candidates are primarily concerned with their ability to amass the resources necessary to reach the electorate rather than with their funding position relative to their major-party opponents, the record is virtually devoid of support for the claim that the $1,000 contribution limitation will have a serious effect on the initiation and scope of minor-party and independent candidacies.[40] Moreover, any attempt *35 to exclude minor parties and independents en masse from the Act's contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor-party candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election.[] In view of these considerations, we conclude that the impact of the Act's $1,000 contribution limitation on major-party challengers and on minor-party candidates does not render the provision unconstitutional on its face. 2. The $5,000 Limitation on Contributions by Political Committees |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | face. 2. The $5,000 Limitation on Contributions by Political Committees Section 608 (b) (2) permits certain committees, designated as "political committees," to contribute up to $5,000 to any candidate with respect to any election for federal office. In order to qualify for the higher contribution ceiling, a group must have been registered with the Commission as a political committee under 2 U.S. C. 433 (10 ed., Supp. IV) for not less than six months, have received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for state political party organizations, have contributed to five or more candidates for federal office. Appellants argue that these qualifications unconstitutionally discriminate against ad hoc organizations in favor of established interest groups and impermissibly burden free association. The argument is without merit. Rather than undermining freedom of association, the basic provision enhances the opportunity of bona fide groups to participate in the election process, and the registration, contribution, and candidate conditions serve the permissible purpose of preventing individuals *36 from evading the applicable contribution limitations by labeling themselves committees. 3. Limitations on Volunteers' Incidental Expenses The Act excludes from the definition of contribution "the value of services provided without compensation by individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate or political committee." 591 (e) (5) (A). Certain expenses incurred by persons in providing volunteer services to a candidate are exempt from the $1,000 ceiling only to the extent that they do not exceed $500. These expenses are expressly limited to (1) "the use of real or personal property and the cost of invitations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related activities." 591 (e) (5) (B); (2) "the sale of any food or beverage by a vendor for use in a candidate's campaign at a charge [at least equal to cost but] less than the normal comparable charge," 591 (e) (5) (C); and (3) "any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services to a candidate," 591 (e) (5) (D). If, as we have held, the basic contribution limitations are constitutionally valid, then surely these provisions are a constitutionally acceptable accommodation of Congress' valid interest in encouraging citizen participation in political campaigns while continuing to guard against the corrupting potential of large financial contributions to candidates. The expenditure of resources at the candidate's direction for a fundraising event at a volunteer's residence or the provision of in-kind assistance in the form of food or |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | provision of in-kind assistance in the form of food or beverages to be resold to raise funds or consumed by the participants in such an event provides material financial assistance to a candidate. The ultimate *37 effect is the same as if the person had contributed the dollar amount to the candidate and the candidate had then used the contribution to pay for the fundraising event or the food. Similarly, travel undertaken as a volunteer at the direction of the candidate or his staff is an expense of the campaign and may properly be viewed as a contribution if the volunteer absorbs the fare. Treating these expenses as contributions when made to the candidate's campaign or at the direction of the candidate or his staff forecloses an avenue of abuse[42] without limiting actions voluntarily undertaken by citizens independently of a candidate's campaign.[43] *38 4. The $25,000 Limitation on Total Contributions During any Calendar Year In addition to the $1,000 limitation on the nonexempt contributions that an individual may make to a particular candidate for any single election, the Act contains an overall $25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual during any calendar year. 608 (b) (3). A contribution made in connection with an election is considered, for purposes of this subsection, to be made in the year the election is held. Although the constitutionality of this provision was drawn into question by appellants, it has not been separately addressed at length by the parties. The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid. *39 C. Expenditure Limitations The Act's expenditure ceilings impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech. The most drastic of the limitations restricts individuals and groups, including political parties that fail to place a candidate on the[44] to an expenditure of $1,000 "relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year." 608 (e) (1). Other expenditure ceilings limit spending by candidates, 608 (a), their |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | Other expenditure ceilings limit spending by candidates, 608 (a), their campaigns, 608 (c), and political parties in connection with election campaigns, 608 (f). It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas expressed, limit political expression "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms." 1. The $1,000 Limitation on Expenditures "Relative to a Clearly Identified Candidate" Section 608 (e) (1) provides that "[n]o person may make any expenditure relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000."[45] The plain effect of 608 (e) (1) is to *40 prohibit all individuals, who are neither candidates nor owners of institutional press facilities, and all groups, except political parties and campaign organizations, from voicing their views "relative to a clearly identified candidate" through means that entail aggregate expenditures of more than $1,000 during a calendar year. The provision, for example, would make it a federal criminal offense for a person or association to place a single one-quarter page advertisement "relative to a clearly identified candidate" in a major metropolitan newspaper.[46] Before examining the interests advanced in support of 608 (e) (1)'s expenditure ceiling, consideration must be given to appellants' contention that the provision is unconstitutionally vague.[47] Close examination of the * specificity of the statutory limitation is required where, as here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First Amendment interests. See ; ;[48] The test is whether the language of 608 (e) (1) affords the "[p]recision of regulation [that] must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." 371 U. S., The key operative language of the provision limits "any expenditure relative to a clearly identified candidate." Although "expenditure," "clearly identified," and "candidate" are defined in the Act, there is no definition clarifying what expenditures are "relative to" a candidate. The use of so indefinite a phrase as "relative to" a candidate fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech, unless other portions of 608 (e) (1) make sufficiently explicit the range of expenditures *42 covered by the limitation. The section prohibits "any expenditure relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000." (Emphasis added.) This context clearly permits, if |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | candidate, exceeds $1,000." (Emphasis added.) This context clearly permits, if indeed it does not require, the phrase "relative to" a candidate to be read to mean "advocating the election or defeat of" a candidate.[49] But while such a construction of 608 (e) (1) refocuses the vagueness question, the Court of Appeals was mistaken in thinking that this construction eliminates the problem of unconstitutional vagueness altogether. 171 U. S. App. D. C., at For the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest.[50] In an analogous *43 context, this Court in 3 U.S. 516 observed: "[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short of invitation would miss that mark is a question both of intent and of effect. No speaker, in such circumstances, safely could assume that anything he might say upon the general subject would not be understood by some as an invitation. In short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and meaning. "Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to hedge and trim." See also United 352 U.S. ; (5) The constitutional deficiencies described in can be avoided only by reading 608 (e) (1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate, much as the definition of "clearly identified" in 608 (e) (2) requires that an explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate appear as part of the communication.[51] This *44 is the reading of the provision suggested by the non-governmental appellees in arguing that "[f]unds spent to propagate one's views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate's election or defeat are thus not covered." We agree that in order to preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds, 608 (e) (1) must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.[52] We turn then to the basic First Amendment question whether 608 (e) (1), even as thus narrowly and |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | question whether 608 (e) (1), even as thus narrowly and explicitly construed, impermissibly burdens the constitutional right of free expression. The Court of Appeals summarily held the provision constitutionally valid on the ground that "section 608 (e) is a loophole-closing provision only" that is necessary to prevent circumvention of the contribution limitations. 171 U. S. App. D. C., at We cannot agree. The discussion in Part explains why the Act's expenditure limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association than do its contribution limitations. The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by 608 (e) (1) thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of 608 (e) (1) turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations *45 on core First Amendment rights of political expression. We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify 608 (e) (1)'s ceiling on independent expenditures. First, assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions, 608 (e) (1) does not provide an answer that sufficiently relates to the elimination of those dangers. Unlike the contribution limitations' total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to candidates, 608 (e) (1) prevents only some large expenditures. So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views. The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or office-holder. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective office. Cf. Second, quite apart from the shortcomings of 608 (e) *46 (1) in preventing any abuses generated by large independent expenditures, the independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions. The parties defending 608 (e) (1) contend that it is necessary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations by the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for other portions of the candidate's campaign activities. They argue that expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might well have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would pose similar dangers of abuse. Yet such controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions rather than expenditures under the Act.[53] Section 608 (b)'s *47 contribution ceilings rather than 608 (e) (1)'s independent expenditure limitation prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions. By contrast, 608 (e) (1) limits expenditures for express advocacy of candidates made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign. Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. Rather than preventing circumvention of the contribution limitations, 608 (e) (1) severely restricts all independent advocacy despite its substantially diminished potential for abuse. While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming *48 the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression. For the First Amendment right to " `speak one's mind on all public institutions' " includes the right to engage in " `vigorous advocacy' no less than `abstract discussion.' " New York Times quoting and Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.[54] It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates imposed by 608 (e) (1)'s expenditure ceiling. But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in *49 order to enhance the relative voice of others |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | in *49 order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed "to secure `the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,' " and " `to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' " New York Times 269, quoting Associated 6 U.S. 1, and 354 U. S., at The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion. Cf. Eastern R.[55] *50 The Court's decisions in and Miami Herald Publishing held that legislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment. In Mills, the Court addressed the question whether "a State, consistently with the United Constitution, can make it a crime for the editor of a daily newspaper to write and publish an editorial on election day urging people to vote a certain way on issues submitted to them." We held that "no test of reasonableness can save [such] a state law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment." at 2. Yet the prohibition of election-day editorials invalidated in Mills is clearly a lesser intrusion on constitutional freedom than a $1,000 limitation on the amount of money any person or association can spend during an entire election year in advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for public office. More recently in Tornillo, the Court held that Florida could not constitutionally require a newspaper *51 to make space available for a political candidate to reply to its criticism. Yet under the Florida statute, every newspaper was free to criticize any candidate as much as it pleased so long as it undertook the modest burden of printing his reply. See -. The legislative restraint involved in Tornillo thus also pales in comparison to the limitations imposed by 608 (e) (1).[56] For the reasons stated, we conclude that 608 (e) (1)'s independent expenditure limitation is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 2. Limitation on Expenditures by Candidates from Personal or Family Resources The Act also sets limits on expenditures by a candidate "from his personal funds, or the personal funds of his immediate family, in connection with his campaigns during any calendar year." 608 (a) (1). These ceilings vary from $50,000 for Presidential or Vice Presidential candidates to $35,000 for senatorial candidates, and $25,000 for most candidates for the House of Representatives.[57] *52 The ceiling on personal expenditures |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | the House of Representatives.[57] *52 The ceiling on personal expenditures by candidates on their own behalf, like the limitations on independent expenditures contained in 608 (e) (1), imposes a substantial restraint on the ability of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression.[58] The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered *53 opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day. Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation that in our country "public discussion is a political duty," (7) applies with special force to candidates for public office. Section 608 (a)'s ceiling on personal expenditures by a candidate in furtherance of his own candidacy thus clearly and directly interferes with constitutionally protected freedoms. The primary governmental interest served by the Act the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political processdoes not support the limitation on the candidate's expenditure of his own personal funds. As the Court of Appeals concluded: "Manifestly, the core problem of avoiding undisclosed and undue influence on candidates from outside interests has lesser application when the monies involved come from the candidate himself or from his immediate family." 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 6, Indeed, the use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which the Act's contribution limitations are directed.[59] *54 The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective office, therefore, provides the sole relevant rationale for 608 (a)'s expenditure ceiling. That interest is clearly not sufficient to justify the provision's infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights. First, the limitation may fail to promote financial equality among candidates. A candidate who spends less of his personal resources on his campaign may nonetheless outspend his rival as a result of more successful fundraising efforts. Indeed, a candidate's personal wealth may impede his efforts to persuade others that he needs their financial contributions or volunteer efforts to conduct an effective campaign. Second, and more fundamentally, the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate 608 (a)'s restriction upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy. We therefore hold that 608 (a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional. |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | 608 (a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional. 3. Limitations on Campaign Expenditures Section 608 (c) places limitations on overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking nomination for election and election to federal office.[60] Presidential candidates may spend $10,000,000 in seeking nomination for office and an additional $,000,000 in the general election campaign. 608 (c) (1) (A), (B).[61]*55 The ceiling on senatorial campaigns is pegged to the size of the voting-age population of the State with minimum dollar amounts applicable to campaigns in with small populations. In senatorial primary elections, the limit is the greater of eight cents multiplied by the voting-age population or $100,000, and in the general election the limit is increased to 12 cents multiplied by the voting-age population or $150,000. 608 (c) (1) (C), (D). The Act imposes blanket $70,000 limitations on both primary campaigns and general election campaigns for the House of Representatives with the exception that the senatorial ceiling applies to campaigns in entitled to only one Representative. 608 (c) (1) (C)-(E). These ceilings are to be adjusted upwards at the beginning of each calendar year by the average percentage rise in the consumer price index for the 12 preceding months. 608 (d).[62] No governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by 608 (c)'s campaign expenditure limitations. The major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is the danger of candidate dependence on large contributions. The interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by the Act's contribution limitations and disclosure provisions rather than by 608 (c)'s campaign expenditure ceilings. The Court of Appeals' assertion that the expenditure restrictions are necessary to reduce the incentive to circumvent direct contribution limits is not persuasive. See 171 U. S. *56 App. D. C., at There is no indication that the substantial criminal penalties for violating the contribution ceilings combined with the political repercussion of such violations will be insufficient to police the contribution provisions. Extensive reporting, auditing, and disclosure requirements applicable to both contributions and expenditures by political campaigns are designed to facilitate the detection of illegal contributions. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, the Act permits an officeholder or successful candidate to retain contributions in excess of the expenditure ceiling and to use these funds for "any other lawful purpose." 2 U.S. C. 439a (10 ed., Supp. IV). This provision undercuts whatever marginal role the expenditure limitations might otherwise play in enforcing the contribution ceilings. The interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates competing for federal office |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | equalizing the financial resources of candidates competing for federal office is no more convincing a justification for restricting the scope of federal election campaigns. Given the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial resources available to a candidate's campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size and intensity of the candidate's support.[63] There is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate's message to the electorate.[64] Moreover, the equalization of permissible campaign expenditures *57 might serve not to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign. The campaign expenditure ceilings appear to be designed primarily to serve the governmental interests in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns. Appellees and the Court of Appeals stressed statistics indicating that spending for federal election campaigns increased almost 300% between 1952 and 12 in comparison with a 57.6% rise in the consumer price index during the same period. Appellants respond that during these years the rise in campaign spending lagged behind the percentage increase in total expenditures for commercial advertising and the size of the gross national product. In any event, the mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in and of itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of federal campaigns. The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the peopleindividually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committeeswho must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.[65] *58 For these reasons we hold that 608 (c) is constitutionally invalid.[] In sum, the provisions of the Act that impose a $1,000 limitation on contributions to a single candidate, 608 (b) (1), a $5,000 limitation on contributions by a political committee to a single candidate, 608 (b) (2), and a $25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual during any calendar year, 608 (b) (3), are constitutionally valid. These limitations, along with the disclosure provisions, constitute the Act's primary weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions. The contribution ceilings thus serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion. By contrast, the First Amendment requires the invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling, 608 (e) (1), its limitation on a candidate's expenditures from his own personal funds, 608 (a), and its ceilings on overall campaign expenditures, 608 (c). These provisions place substantial and direct restrictions *59 on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.[67] *60 II. REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS Unlike the limitations on contributions and expenditures imposed by 18 U.S. C. 608 (10 ed., Supp. IV), the disclosure requirements of the Act, 2 U.S. C. et seq. (10 ed., Supp. IV),[68] are not challenged by appellants as per se unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.[69] Indeed, appellants argue that "narrowly drawn disclosure requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils Congress sought to remedy." Brief for Appellants 171. The particular requirements *61 embodied in the Act are attacked as overbroadboth in their application to minor-party and independent candidates and in their extension to contributions as small as $11 or $101. Appellants also challenge the provision for disclosure by those who make independent contributions and expenditures, 434 (e). The Court of Appeals found no constitutional infirmities in the provisions challenged here.[70] We affirm the determination on overbreadth and hold that 434 (e), if narrowly construed, also is within constitutional bounds. The first federal disclosure law was enacted in 0. Act of June 25, 0, c. 392, It required political committees, defined as national committees and national congressional campaign committees of parties, and organizations operating to influence congressional elections in two or more to disclose names of all contributors of $100 or more; identification of recipients of expenditures of $10 or more was also required. 1, 5-6, 824. Annual expenditures of $50 or more "for the purpose of influencing or controlling, in two or more the result of" a congressional election had to be reported independently if they were not made through a political committee. 7, In 1 the Act was revised to include prenomination transactions such as those involved in conventions and primary campaigns. Act of Aug. 19, 1, 2, See United -576. Disclosure requirements were broadened in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 5 (Title III of the Act of Feb. 28, 5), That Act required political committees, defined as organizations that accept contributions or make expenditures |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | committees, defined as organizations that accept contributions or make expenditures "for the purpose of *62 influencing or attempting to influence" the Presidential or Vice Presidential elections (a) in two or more or (b) as a subsidiary of a national committee, 302 (c), to report total contributions and expenditures, including the names and addresses of contributors of $100 or more and recipients of $10 or more in a calendar year. 305 (a), The Act was upheld against a challenge that it infringed upon the prerogatives of the in Burroughs v. United (4). The Court held that it was within the power of Congress "to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard [a Presidential] election from the improper use of money to influence the result." Although the disclosure requirements were widely circumvented,[71] no further attempts were made to tighten them until 10, when the Senate passed a bill that would have closed some existing loopholes. S. 2436, 106 Cong. Rec. 1. The attempt aborted because no similar effort was made in the House. The Act presently under review replaced all prior disclosure laws. Its primary disclosure provisions impose reporting obligations on "political committees" and candidates. "Political committee" is defined in (d) as a group of persons that receives "contributions" or makes "expenditures" of over $1,000 in a calendar year. "Contributions" and "expenditures" are defined in lengthy parallel provisions similar to those in Title 18, discussed *63 above.[72] Both definitions focus on the use of money or other objects of value "for the purpose of influencing" the nomination or election of any person to federal office. (e) (1), (f) (1). Each political committee is required to register with the Commission, 433, and to keep detailed records of both contributions and expenditures, 4 (c), (d). These records must include the name and address of everyone making a contribution in excess of $10, along with the date and amount of the contribution. If a person's contributions aggregate more than $100, his occupation and principal place of business are also to be included. 4 (c) (2). These files are subject to periodic audits and field investigations by the Commission. (a) (8). Each committee and each candidate also is required to file quarterly reports. 434 (a). The reports are to contain detailed financial information, including the full name, mailing address, occupation, and principal place of business of each person who has contributed over $100 in a calendar year, as well as the amount and date of the contributions. 434 (b). They are to be made available by the Commission "for public inspection and copying." (a) (4). Every candidate for |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | "for public inspection and copying." (a) (4). Every candidate for federal office is required to designate a "principal campaign committee," which is to receive reports of contributions and expenditures made on the candidate's behalf from other political committees and to compile and file these reports, together with its own statements, with the Commission. 4 (f). Every individual or group, other than a political committee or candidate, who makes "contributions" or "expenditures" of over $100 in a calendar year "other than *64 by contribution to a political committee or candidate" is required to file a statement with the Commission. 434 (e). Any violation of these recordkeeping and reporting provisions is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or a prison term of not more than a year, or both. 4 (a). A. Principles Unlike the overall limitations on contributions and expenditures, the disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities. But we have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment. E. g., ; ; ; ; We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest. Since we have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny.[73] We also have insisted that there be a "relevant correlation"[74] or "substantial relation"[75] between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed. See (ED Ark.) (three-judge court), aff'd, *65 (per curiam). This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure. Cf. -58. Appellees argue that the disclosure requirements of the Act differ significantly from those at issue in and its progeny because the Act only requires disclosure of the names of contributors and does not compel political organizations to submit the names of their members.[76] As we have seen, group association is protected because it enhances "[e]ffective advocacy." at The right to join together "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas," ib is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if "advocacy" is * to be truly or optimally "effective." Moreover, the invasion of privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought concerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the joining of organizations, for |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | money as when it concerns the joining of organizations, for "[f]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Our past decisions have not drawn fine lines between contributors and members but have treated them interchangeably. In Bates, for example, we applied the principles of and reversed convictions for failure to comply with a city ordinance that required the disclosure of "dues, assessments, and contributions paid, by whom and when paid." See also United v. The strict test established by is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights. But we have acknowledged that there are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly when the "free functioning of our national institutions" is involved. Communist The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements are of this magnitude. They fall into three categories. First, disclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate"[77] in order to aid the voters in evaluating those *67 who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office. Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.[78] This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return.[79] And, as we recognized in Burroughs v. United Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure during an election campaign tends "to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections." In enacting these requirements it may have been mindful of Mr. Justice Brandeis' advice: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."[80] Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, *68 and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations described above. The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these interests are sufficient to justify the requirements we must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights. It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has sought to promote by this legislation. In this process, we note and agree with appellants' concession[81] that disclosure requirementscertainly in most applicationsappear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.[82] Appellants argue, however, that the balance tips against disclosure when it is required of contributors to certain parties and candidates. We turn now to this contention. B. Application to Minor Parties and Independents Appellants contend that the Act's requirements are overbroad insofar as they apply to contributions to minor *69 parties and independent candidates because the governmental interest in this information is minimal and the danger of significant infringement on First Amendment rights is greatly increased. 1. Requisite Factual Showing In the organization had "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members [had] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility," and the State was unable to show that the disclosure it sought had a "substantial bearing" on the issues it sought to clarify, Under those circumstances, the Court held that "whatever interest the State may have in [disclosure] has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections." The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' suggestion that this case fits into the mold. It concluded that substantial governmental interests in "informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process" were furthered by requiring disclosure of minor parties and independent candidates, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at and therefore found no "tenable rationale for assuming that the public interest in minority party disclosure of contributions above a reasonable cutoff point is uniformly outweighed by potential contributors' associational rights," The court left open the question of the application of the disclosure requirements to candidates (and parties) who could demonstrate injury of the sort at stake in No record of harassment on a similar scale was found in this case.[83] We agree with *70 the Court of Appeals' conclusion that |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | We agree with *70 the Court of Appeals' conclusion that is inapposite where, as here, any serious infringement on First Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of contributors is highly speculative. It is true that the governmental interest in disclosure is diminished when the contribution in question is made to a minor party with little chance of winning an election. As minor parties usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the interests that specific candidates represent. Major parties encompass candidates of greater diversity. In many situations the label "Republican" or "Democrat" tells a voter little. The candidate who bears it may be supported by funds from the far right, the far left, or any place in between on the political spectrum. It is less likely that a candidate of, say, the Socialist Labor Party will represent interests that cannot be discerned from the party's ideological position. The Government's interest in deterring the "buying" of elections and the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders also may be reduced where contributions to a minor party or an independent candidate are concerned, for it is less likely that the candidate will be victorious. But a minor party sometimes can play a significant role in an election. Even when a minor-party candidate has little or no chance of winning, he may be encouraged by major-party interests in order to divert votes from other major-party contenders.[84] *71 We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within[85] and without[86] the political arena. There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in and Bates, where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.[87] But no appellant in this case has tendered record evidence of the sort proffered in Instead, appellants primarily rely on "the clearly articulated fears of individuals, well experienced in the political process." Brief for Appellants 173. At *72 best they offer the testimony of several |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | 173. At *72 best they offer the testimony of several minor-party officials that one or two persons refused to make contributions because of the possibility of disclosure.[88] On this record, the substantial public interest in disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm generally alleged. 2. Blanket Exemption Appellants agree that "the record here does not reflect the kind of focused and insistent harassment of contributors and members that existed in the NAACP cases." They argue, however, that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary lest irreparable injury be done before the required evidence can be gathered. Those parties that would be sufficiently "minor" to be exempted from the requirements of 434 could be defined, appellants suggest, along the lines used for public-financing purposes, see Part II, infra, as those who received less than 25% of the vote in past elections. Appellants do not argue that this line is constitutionally required. They suggest as an alternative defining "minor parties" as those that do not qualify for automatic access under state law. Presumably, other criteria, such as current political strength (measured by polls or petition), age, or degree of organization, could also be used.[89] The difficulty with these suggestions is that they reflect only a party's past or present political strength and *73 that is only one of the factors that must be considered. Some of the criteria are not precisely indicative of even that factor. Age,[90] or past political success, for instance, may typically be associated with parties that have a high probability of success. But not all long-established parties are winnerssome are consistent losersand a new party may garner a great deal of support if it can associate itself with an issue that has captured the public's imagination. None of the criteria suggested is precisely related to the other critical factor that must be considered, the possibility that disclosure will impinge upon protected associational activity. An opinion dissenting in part from the Court of Appeals' decision concedes that no one line is "constitutionally required."[91] It argues, however, that a flat exemption for minor parties must be carved out, even along arbitrary lines, if groups that would suffer impermissibly from disclosure are to be given any real protection. An approach that requires minor parties to submit evidence that the disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally be applied to them offers only an illusory safeguard, the argument goes, because the "evils" of "chill and harassment are largely incapable of formal proof."[92] This dissent expressed its concern that a minor party, particularly a *74 new party, may never be |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | minor party, particularly a *74 new party, may never be able to prove a substantial threat of harassment, however real that threat may be, because it would be required to come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear. A strict requirement that chill and harassment be directly attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is sought would make the task even more difficult. We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties. The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views. Where it exists the type of chill and harassment identified in can be shown. We cannot assume that courts will be insensitive to similar showings when made in future cases. We therefore conclude that a blanket exemption is not required. C. Section 434 (e) Section 434 (e) requires "[e]very person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes contributions *75 or expenditures" aggregating over $100 in a calendar year "other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate" to file a statement with the Commission.[93] Unlike the other disclosure provisions, this section does not seek the contribution list of any association. Instead, it requires direct disclosure of what an individual or group contributes or spends. In considering this provision we must apply the same strict standard of scrutiny, for the right of associational privacy developed in derives from the rights of the organization's members to advocate their personal points of view in the most effective See also -; 354 U. S., at Appellants attack 434 (e) as a direct intrusion on privacy of belief, in violation of and as imposing "very real, practical burdens certain to deter individuals from making expenditures for their independent political speech" analogous to those held to be impermissible |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | independent political speech" analogous to those held to be impermissible in 3 U.S. 516 1. The Role of 434 (e) The Court of Appeals upheld 434 (e) as necessary to enforce the independent-expenditure ceiling imposed by 18 U.S. C. 608 (e) (1) (10 ed., Supp. IV). It said: "If Congress has both the authority and a compelling interest to regulate independent expenditures under section 608 (e), surely it can require that there be disclosure to prevent misuse of the spending channel." 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 2 We have found that 608 (e) (1) unconstitutionally infringes *76 upon First Amendment rights.[94] If the sole function of 434 (e) were to aid in the enforcement of that provision, it would no longer serve any governmental purpose. But the two provisions are not so intimately tied. The legislative history on the function of 434 (e) is bare, but it was clearly intended to stand independently of 608 (e) (1). It was enacted with the general disclosure provisions in 11 as part of the original Act,[95] while 608 (e) (1) was part of the 14 amendments.[] Like the other disclosure provisions, 434 (e) could play a role in the enforcement of the expanded contribution and expenditure limitations included in the 14 amendments, but it also has independent functions. Section 434 (e) is part of Congress' effort to achieve "total disclosure" by reaching "every kind of political activity"[] in order to insure that the voters are fully informed and to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible. The provision is responsive to the legitimate fear that efforts would be made, as they had been in the past,[98] to avoid the disclosure requirements by routing financial support of candidates through avenues not explicitly covered by the general provisions of the Act. 2. Vagueness Problems In its effort to be all-inclusive, however, the provision raises serious problems of vagueness, particularly treacherous where, as here, the violation of its terms carries criminal penalties[99] and fear of incurring these sanctions *77 may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights. Section 434 (e) applies to "[e]very person who makes contributions or expenditures." "Contributions" and "expenditures" are defined in parallel provisions in terms of the use of money or other valuable assets "for the purpose of influencing" the nomination or election of candidates for federal office.[100] It is the ambiguity of this phrase that poses constitutional problems. Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for "no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United v. See also (12). Where First Amendment rights are involved, an even "greater degree of specificity" is required. 5 U. S., at See (12); There is no legislative history to guide us in determining the scope of the critical phrase "for the purpose of influencing." It appears to have been adopted without comment from earlier disclosure Acts.[101] Congress "has voiced its wishes in [most] muted strains," leaving us to draw upon "those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining direction without a compass." 3 U.S. 3, (10). Where the constitutional requirement of definiteness is at stake, we have the further obligation to construe the statute, *78 if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness. United v. ; United v. In enacting the legislation under review Congress addressed broadly the problem of political campaign financing. It wished to promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process.[102] Our task is to construe "for the purpose of influencing," incorporated in 434 (e) through the definitions of "contributions" and "expenditures," in a manner that precisely furthers this goal. In Part I we discussed what constituted a "contribution" for purposes of the contribution limitations set forth in 18 U.S. C. 608 (b) (10 ed., Supp. IV).[103] We construed that term to include not only contributions made directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee, and contributions made to other organizations or individuals but earmarked for political purposes, but also all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. The definition of "contribution" in (e) for disclosure purposes parallels the definition in Title 18 almost word for word, and we construe the former provision as we have the latter. So defined, "contributions" have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act, for they are connected with a candidate or his campaign. When we attempt to define "expenditure" in a similarly narrow way we encounter line-drawing problems *79 of the sort we faced in 18 U.S. C. 608 (e) (1) (10 ed., Supp. IV). Although the phrase, "for the purpose of influencing" an election or nomination, differs from the language used in 608 (e) (1), it shares the same potential for encompassing both issue discussion |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | it shares the same potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.[104] The general requirement that "political committees" and candidates disclose their expenditures could raise similar vagueness problems, for "political committee" is defined only in terms of amount of annual "contributions" and "expenditures,"[105] and could be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion. The lower courts have construed the words "political committee" more narrowly.[106] To fulfill the purposes of the Act they need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of "political committees" so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related. But when the maker of the expenditure is not within these categorieswhen it is an individual other than a candidate or a group other than a "political committee"[107]*80 the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the Act may be too remote. To insure that the reach of 434 (e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe "expenditure" for purposes of that section in the same way we construed the terms of 608 (e)to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate[108] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. This reading is directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate. In summary, 434 (e), as construed, imposes independent reporting requirements on individuals and groups that are not candidates or political committees only in the following circumstances: (1) when they make contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee, and (2) when they make expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Unlike 18 U.S. C. 608 (e) (1) (10 ed., Supp. IV), 434 (e), as construed, bears a sufficient relationship to a substantial governmental interest. As narrowed, 434 (e), like 608 (e) (1), does not reach all partisan discussion for it only requires disclosure of those expenditures that expressly advocate a particular election result. This might have been fatal if the only purpose of 434 (e) *81 were to stem corruption or its appearance by closing a loophole in the general disclosure requirements. But the disclosure provisions, including 434 (e), serve another, informational interest, and even as construed 434 (e) increases the fund of information concerning those who support |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | (e) increases the fund of information concerning those who support the candidates. It goes beyond the general disclosure requirements to shed the light of publicity on spending that is unambiguously campaign related but would not otherwise be reported because it takes the form of independent expenditures or of contributions to an individual or group not itself required to report the names of its contributors. By the same token, it is not fatal that 434 (e) encompasses purely independent expenditures uncoordinated with a particular candidate or his agent. The corruption potential of these expenditures may be significantly different, but the informational interest can be as strong as it is in coordinated spending, for disclosure helps voters to define more of the candidates' constituencies. Section 434 (e), as we have construed it, does not contain the infirmities of the provisions before the Court in and 3 U.S. 516 The ordinance found wanting in Talley forbade all distribution of handbills that did not contain the name of the printer, author, or manufacturer, and the name of the distributor. The city urged that the ordinance was aimed at identifying those responsible for fraud, false advertising, and libel, but the Court found that it was "in no manner so limited." Here, as we have seen, the disclosure requirement is narrowly limited to those situations where the information sought has a substantial connection with the governmental interests sought to be advanced. Thomas held unconstitutional a prior restraint in the form of a registration requirement for labor organizers. *82 The Court found the State's interest insufficient to justify the restrictive effect of the statute. The burden imposed by 434 (e) is no prior restraint, but a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view.[] D. Thresholds Appellants' third contention, based on alleged overbreadth, is that the monetary thresholds in the recordkeeping and reporting provisions lack a substantial nexus with the claimed governmental interests, for the amounts involved are too low even to attract the attention of the candidate, much less have a corrupting influence. The provisions contain two thresholds. Records are to be kept by political committees of the names and addresses of those who make contributions in excess of $10, 4 (c) (2), and these records are subject to Commission audit, (a) (8). If a person's contributions to a committee or candidate aggregate more than $100, his name and address, as well as his occupation and principal place of business, are to be included in reports filed by committees and candidates |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | to be included in reports filed by committees and candidates with the Commission, 434 (b) (2), and made available for public inspection, (a) (4). The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' contention that these thresholds are unconstitutional. It found the challenge on First Amendment grounds to the $10 threshold to be premature, for it could "discern no basis in the statute for authorizing disclosure outside the Commission *83. and hence no substantial `inhibitory effect' operating upon" appellants. 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 216, The $100 threshold was found to be within the "reasonable latitude" given the legislature "as to where to draw the line." We agree. The $10 and $100 thresholds are indeed low. Contributors of relatively small amounts are likely to be especially sensitive to recording or disclosure of their political preferences. These strict requirements may well discourage participation by some citizens in the political process, a result that Congress hardly could have intended. Indeed, there is little in the legislative history to indicate that Congress focused carefully on the appropriate level at which to require recording and disclosure. Rather, it seems merely to have adopted the thresholds existing in similar disclosure laws since 0.[110] But we cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold. The line is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left in the context of this complex legislation to congressional discretion. We cannot say, on this bare record, that the limits designated are wholly without rationality.[] We are mindful that disclosure serves informational functions, as well as the prevention of corruption and the enforcement of the contribution limitations. Congress is not required to set a threshold that is tailored only to the latter goals. In addition, the enforcement *84 goal can never be well served if the threshold is so high that disclosure becomes equivalent to admitting violation of the contribution limitations. The $10 recordkeeping threshold, in a somewhat similar fashion, facilitates the enforcement of the disclosure provisions by making it relatively difficult to aggregate secret contributions in amounts that surpass the $100 limit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no warrant for assuming that public disclosure of contributions between $10 and $100 is authorized by the Act. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether information concerning gifts of this size can be made available to the public without trespassing impermissibly on First Amendment rights. Cf. California Bankers -57.[112] In summary, we find no constitutional infirmities in the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure provisions of the Act.[113] *85 III. PUBLIC FINANCING OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS A |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | Act.[113] *85 III. PUBLIC FINANCING OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS A series of statutes[114] for the public financing of Presidential election campaigns produced the scheme now found in 60 and Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue *86 Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. 60, 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (10 ed., Supp. IV).[115] Both the District Court, and the Court of Appeals, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at -887, sustained Subtitle H against a constitutional attack.[116] Appellants renew their challenge here, contending that the legislation violates the First and Fifth Amendments. We find no merit in their claims and affirm. A. Summary of Subtitle H Section 9006 establishes a Presidential Election Campaign Fund (Fund), financed from general revenues in the aggregate amount designated by individual taxpayers, under 60, who on their income tax returns may authorize payment to the Fund of one dollar of their tax liability in the case of an individual return or two dollars in the case of a joint return. The Fund consists of three separate accounts to finance (1) party nominating conventions, 9008 (a), (2) general election campaigns, 9006 (a), and (3) primary campaigns, 9037 (a).[117] *87 Chapter 95 of Title 26, which concerns financing of party nominating conventions and general election campaigns, distinguishes among "major," "minor," and "new" parties. A major party is defined as a party whose candidate for President in the most recent election received 25% or more of the popular vote. 9002 (6). A minor party is defined as a party whose candidate received at least 5% but less than 25% of the vote at the most recent election. 9002 (7). All other parties are new parties, 9002 (8), including both newly created parties and those receiving less than 5% of the vote in the last election.[118] Major parties are entitled to $2,000,000 to defray their national committee Presidential nominating convention expenses, must limit total expenditures to that amount, 9008 (d),[119] and may not use any of this money to benefit a particular candidate or delegate, 9008 (c). *88 A minor party receives a portion of the major-party entitlement determined by the ratio of the votes received by the party's candidate in the last election to the average of the votes received by the major parties' candidates. 9008 (b) (2). The amounts given to the parties and the expenditure limit are adjusted for inflation, using 14 as the base year. 9008 (b) (5). No financing is provided for new parties, nor is there any express provision for financing independent candidates or parties not holding a convention. For expenses in the general election campaign, 9004 |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | a convention. For expenses in the general election campaign, 9004 (a) (1) entitles each major-party candidate to $,000,000.[1] This amount is also adjusted for inflation. See 9004 (a) (1). To be eligible for funds the candidate[121] must pledge not to incur expenses in excess of the entitlement under 9004 (a) (1) and not to accept private contributions except to the extent that the fund is insufficient to provide the full entitlement. 9003 (b) Minor-party candidates are also entitled to funding, again based on the ratio of the vote received by the party's candidate in the preceding election to the average of the major-party candidates. 9004 (a) (2) (A). Minor-party candidates must certify that they will not incur campaign expenses in excess of the major-party entitlement and *89 that they will accept private contributions only to the extent needed to make up the difference between that amount and the public funding grant. 9003 (c). New-party candidates receive no money prior to the general election, but any candidate receiving 5% or more of the popular vote in the election is entitled to post-election payments according to the formula applicable to minor-party candidates. 9004 (a) (3). Similarly, minor-party candidates are entitled to post-election funds if they receive a greater percentage of the average major-party vote than their party's candidate did in the preceding election; the amount of such payments is the difference between the entitlement based on the preceding election and that based on the actual vote in the current election. 9004 (a) (3). A further eligibility requirement for minor-and new-party candidates is that the candidate's name must appear on the or electors pledged to the candidate must be on the in at least 10 9002 (2) (B). Chapter establishes a third account in the Fund, the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account. 9037 (a). This funding is intended to aid campaigns by candidates seeking Presidential nomination "by a political party," 9033 (b) (2), in "primary elections," 90 (7).[122] The threshold eligibility requirement is that the candidate raise at least $5,000 in each of counting only the first $ from each person contributing to the candidate. 9033 (b) (3), (4). In addition, the candidate must agree to abide by the spending limits in 9035. See 9033 (b) (1).[123] Funding is *90 provided according to a matching formula: each qualified candidate is entitled to a sum equal to the total private contributions received, disregarding contributions from any person to the extent that total contributions to the candidate by that person exceed $. 9034 (a). Payments to any candidate under Chapter may not exceed 50% of |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | to any candidate under Chapter may not exceed 50% of the overall expenditure ceiling accepted by the candidate. 9034 (b). B. Constitutionality of Subtitle H Appellants argue that Subtitle H is invalid (1) as "contrary to the `general welfare,' " Art. I, 8, (2) because any scheme of public financing of election campaigns is inconsistent with the First Amendment, and (3) because Subtitle H invidiously discriminates against certain interests in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We find no merit in these contentions. Appellants' "general welfare" contention erroneously treats the Welfare Clause as a limitation upon congressional power. It is rather a grant of power, the scope of which is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of power by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 4 Congress has power to regulate Presidential elections and primaries, United v. Classic, ; Burroughs v. United (4); and public financing of Presidential elections as a means to reform the electoral process was clearly a choice within the granted power. It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will promote the general welfare: "[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not *91 limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." United v. Butler, 2 U.S. 1, (6). See Any limitations upon the exercise of that granted power must be found elsewhere in the Constitution. In this case, Congress was legislating for the "general welfare"to reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our political process, to facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising. See S. Rep. No. Pp. 1-10 Whether the chosen means appear "bad," "unwise," or "unworkable" to us is irrelevant; Congress has concluded that the means are "necessary and proper" to promote the general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without the grant of power in Art. I, 8. Appellants' challenge to the dollar check-off provision ( 60) fails for the same reason. They maintain that Congress is required to permit taxpayers to designate particular candidates or parties as recipients of their money. But the appropriation to the Fund in 9006 is like any other appropriation from the general revenue except that its amount is determined by reference to the aggregate of the one-and two-dollar authorization on taxpayers' income tax returns. This detail does not constitute the appropriation any less an appropriation by Congress.[124] The fallacy of appellants' argument is therefore apparent; *92 every appropriation made by Congress uses public money in a manner to |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | made by Congress uses public money in a manner to which some taxpayers object.[125] Appellants next argue that "by analogy" to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment public financing of election campaigns, however meritorious, violates the First Amendment. We have, of course, held that the Religion Clauses"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"require Congress, and the through the Fourteenth Amendment, to remain neutral in matters of religion. E. g., Abington School 374 U.S. 3, The government may not aid one religion to the detriment of others or impose a burden on one religion that is not imposed on others, and may not even aid all religions. E. g., See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, But the analogy is patently inapplicable to our issue here. Although "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or the press," Subtitle H is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public *93 discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.[126] Thus, Subtitle H furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values.[127] Appellants argue, however, that as constructed public financing invidiously discriminates in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We turn therefore to that argument. Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 U.S. 636, and cases cited. In several situations concerning the electoral process, the principle has been *94 developed that restrictions on access to the electoral process must survive exacting scrutiny. The restriction can be sustained only if it furthers a "vital" governmental interest, American Party of that is "achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity." See American Party of ; These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear on the These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates is not restrictive of voters' rights and less restrictive of candidates'.[] Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the or any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, if any, of minor-party candidates |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | of his choice; the inability, if any, of minor-party candidates to wage effective campaigns will derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to *95 raise private contributions. Any disadvantage suffered by operation of the eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate that the formulae afford eligible candidates. But eligible candidates suffer a countervailing denial. As we more fully develop later, acceptance of public financing entails voluntary acceptance of an expenditure ceiling. Non-eligible candidates are not subject to that limitation.[129] Accordingly, we conclude that public financing is generally less restrictive of access to the electoral process than the -access regulations dealt with in prior cases.[130] In any event, Congress enacted Subtitle H in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental interests and has * not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the political opportunity of any party or candidate. It cannot be gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest. S. Rep. No. pp. 4-5 In addition, the limits on contributions necessarily increase the burden of fundraising, and Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions. See The have also been held to have important interests in limiting places on the to those candidates who demonstrate substantial popular support. E. g., ; ; 403 U.S. ; -33. Congress' interest in not funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public money, S. Rep. No. necessarily justifies the withholding of public assistance from candidates without significant public support. Thus, Congress may legitimately require "some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support," at as an eligibility requirement for public funds. This requirement also serves the important public interest against providing artificial incentives to "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism." ; S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. p. 13 Cf. (12). At the same time Congress recognized the constitutional restraints against inhibition of the present opportunity of minor parties to become major political entities if they obtain widespread support. S. Rep. No. -10; H. R. Rep. No. As * the Court of Appeals said, "provisions for public funding of Presidential campaigns could operate to give an unfair advantage to established parties, thus reducing, to the nation's detriment. the `potential fluidity of American political life.' " 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 519 F.2d, 80, quoting from 1. Election Campaign Financing Appellants insist that Chapter 95 falls short of the constitutional requirement |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | insist that Chapter 95 falls short of the constitutional requirement in that its provisions supply larger, and equal, sums to candidates of major parties, use prior vote levels as the sole criterion for pre-election funding, limit new-party candidates to post-election funds, and deny any funds to candidates of parties receiving less than 5% of the vote. These provisions, it is argued, are fatal to the validity of the scheme, because they work invidious discrimination against minor and new parties in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We disagree.[131] As conceded by appellants, the Constitution does not require Congress to treat all declared candidates the same for public financing purposes. As we said in "there are obvious differences in kind between the needs and potentials of a political party with historically established broad support, on the one hand, and a new or small political organization on the other. Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating *98 things that are different as though they were exactly alike, a truism well illustrated in -. Since the Presidential elections of 1856 and 1860, when the Whigs were replaced as a major party by the Republicans, no third party has posed a credible threat to the two major parties in Presidential elections.[1] Third parties have been completely incapable of matching the major parties' ability to raise money and win elections. Congress was, of course, aware of this fact of American life, and thus was justified in providing both major parties full funding and all other parties only a percentage of the major-party entitlement.[133] Identical treatment of all parties, on the other hand, "would not only make it easy to raid the United Treasury, it would also artificially foster the proliferation of splinter parties." 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 519 F.2d, 81. The Constitution does not require the Government to "finance the efforts of every nascent political group," American Party of 5 U. S., 94, merely because Congress chose to finance the efforts of the major parties. Furthermore, appellants have made no showing that *99 the election funding plan disadvantages nonmajor parties by operating to reduce their strength below that attained without any public financing. First, such parties are free to raise money from private sources,[134] and by our holding today new parties are freed from any expenditure limits, although admittedly those limits may be a largely academic matter to them. But since any major-party candidate accepting public financing of a campaign voluntarily assents to a spending ceiling, other candidates will be able to spend more in relation to the major-party candidates. The relative |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | spend more in relation to the major-party candidates. The relative position of minor parties that do qualify to receive some public funds because they received 5% of the vote in the previous Presidential election is also enhanced. Public funding for candidates of major parties is intended as a substitute for private contributions; but for minor-party candidates[135] such assistance may be viewed as a supplement to private contributions since these candidates may continue to solicit private funds up to the applicable spending limit. Thus, we conclude that the general election funding system does not work an invidious discrimination against candidates of nonmajor parties. Appellants challenge reliance on the vote in past elections as the basis for determining eligibility. That challenge is foreclosed, however, by our holding in 403 U. S., -440, that popular vote totals in the last election are a proper measure of public support. *100 And Congress was not obliged to select instead from among appellants' suggested alternatives. Congress could properly regard the means chosen as preferable, since the alternative of petition drives presents cost and administrative problems in validating signatures, and the alternative of opinion polls might be thought inappropriate since it would involve a Government agency in the business of certifying polls or conducting its own investigation of support for various candidates, in addition to serious problems with reliability.[136] Appellants next argue, relying on the -access decisions of this Court, that the absence of any alternative means of obtaining pre-election funding renders the scheme unjustifiably restrictive of minority political interests. Appellants' reliance on the -access decisions is misplaced. To be sure, the regulation sustained in for example, incorporated alternative means of qualifying for the and the lack of an alternative was a defect in the scheme struck down in 5 U. S., 18. To *101 suggest, however, that the constitutionality of Subtitle H therefore hinges solely on whether some alternative is afforded overlooks the rationale of the operative constitutional principles. Our decisions finding a need for an alternative means turn on the nature and extent of the burden imposed in the absence of available alternatives. We have earlier stated our view that Chapter 95 is far less burdensome upon and restrictive of constitutional rights than the regulations involved in the -access cases. See Moreover, expenditure limits for major parties and candidates may well improve the chances of nonmajor parties and their candidates to receive funds and increase their spending. Any risk of harm to minority interests is speculative due to our present lack of knowledge of the practical effects of public financing and cannot overcome the force |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | practical effects of public financing and cannot overcome the force of the governmental interests against use of public money to foster frivolous candidacies, create a system of splintered parties, and encourage unrestrained factionalism. Appellants' reliance on the alternative-means analyses of the -access cases generally fails to recognize a significant distinction from the instant case. The primary goal of all candidates is to carry on a successful campaign by communicating to the voters persuasive reasons for electing them. In some of the -access cases the afforded candidates alternative means for qualifying for the a step in any campaign that, with rare exceptions, is essential to successful effort. Chapter 95 concededly provides only one method of obtaining pre-election financing; such funding is, however, not as necessary as being on the See n. Plainly, campaigns can be successfully carried out by means other than public financing; they have been up to this date, and this avenue is still open to all candidates. And, after all, the important achievements of minority *102 political groups in furthering the development of American democracy[137] were accomplished without the help of public funds. Thus, the limited participation or nonparticipation of nonmajor parties or candidates in public funding does not unconstitutionally disadvantage them. Of course, nonmajor parties and their candidates may qualify for post-election participation in public funding and in that sense the claimed discrimination is not total. Appellants contend, however, that the benefit of any such participation is illusory due to 9004 (c), which bars the use of the money for any purpose other than paying campaign expenses or repaying loans that had been used to defray such expenses. The only meaningful use for post-election funds is thus to repay loans; but loans, except from national banks, are "contributions" subject to the general limitations on contributions, 18 U.S. C. 591 (e) (10 ed., Supp. IV). Further, they argue, loans are not readily available to nonmajor parties or candidates before elections to finance their campaigns. Availability of post-election funds therefore assertedly gives them nothing. But in the nature of things the willingness of lenders to make loans will depend upon the pre-election probability that the candidate and his party will attract 5% or more of the voters. When a reasonable prospect of such support appears, the party and candidate may be an acceptable loan risk since the prospect of post-election participation in public funding will be good.[138] *103 Finally, appellants challenge the validity of the 5% threshold requirement for general election funding. They argue that, since most state regulations governing access have threshold requirements well below 5%, and because |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | governing access have threshold requirements well below 5%, and because in their view the 5% requirement here is actually stricter than that upheld in 403 U.S.[] the requirement is unreasonable. We have already concluded that the restriction under Chapter 95 is generally less burdensome than -access Further, the Georgia provision sustained in Jenness required the candidate to obtain the signatures of 5% of all eligible voters, without regard to party. To be sure, the public funding formula does not permit anyone who voted for another party in the last election to be part of a candidate's 5%. But under Chapter 95 a Presidential candidate needs only 5% or more of the actual vote, not the larger universe of eligible voters. As a result, we cannot say that Chapter 95 is numerically more, or less, restrictive than the regulation in Jenness. In any event, the choice of the percentage requirement that best accommodates the competing interests involved was for Congress to make. See Louisville Gas 277 U.S. (8) ; n. Without any doubt a range of formulations would sufficiently protect the public fisc and not foster factionalism, and would also recognize the public interest in the fluidity of our political *104 affairs. We cannot say that Congress' choice falls without the permissible range.[] 2. Nominating Convention Financing The foregoing analysis and reasoning sustaining general election funding apply in large part to convention funding under Chapter 95 and suffice to support our rejection of appellants' challenge to these provisions. Funding of party conventions has increasingly been derived from large private contributions, see H. R. Rep. No. p. 14 and the governmental interest in eliminating this reliance is as vital as in the case of private contributions to individual candidates. The expenditure limitations on major parties participating in public financing enhance the ability of nonmajor parties to increase their spending relative to the major parties; further, in soliciting private contributions to finance conventions, parties are not subject to the $1,000 contribution limit pertaining to candidates.[1] We therefore conclude that appellants' constitutional challenge to the *105 provisions for funding nominating conventions must also be rejected. 3. Primary Election Campaign Financing Appellants' final challenge is to the constitutionality of Chapter which provides funding of primary campaigns. They contend that these provisions are constitutionally invalid (1) because they do not provide funds for candidates not running in party primaries[142] and (2) because the eligibility formula actually increases the influence of money on the electoral process. In not providing assistance to candidates who do not enter party primaries, Congress has merely chosen to limit at this time |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | primaries, Congress has merely chosen to limit at this time the reach of the reforms encompassed in Chapter This Congress could do without constituting the reforms a constitutionally invidious discrimination. The governing principle was stated in 384 U.S. 6, : "[I]n deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a `statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,' that a legislature need not `strike at all evils at the same time,' and that `reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,'"[143] *106 The choice to limit matching funds to candidates running in primaries may reflect that concern about large private contributions to candidates centered on primary races and that there is no historical evidence of similar abuses involving contributions to candidates who engage in petition drives to qualify for state s. Moreover, assistance to candidates and nonmajor parties forced to resort to petition drives to gain access implicates the policies against fostering frivolous candidacies, creating a system of splintered parties, and encouraging unrestrained factionalism. The eligibility requirements in Chapter are surely not an unreasonable way to measure popular support for a candidate, accomplishing the objective of limiting subsidization to those candidates with a substantial chance of being nominated. Counting only the first $ of each contribution for eligibility purposes requires candidates to solicit smaller contributions from numerous people. Requiring the money to come from citizens of a minimum number of eliminates candidates whose appeal is limited geographically; a President is elected not by popular vote, but by winning the popular vote in enough to have a majority in the Electoral College.[144] *107 We also reject as without merit appellants' argument that the matching formula favors wealthy voters and candidates. The thrust of the legislation is to reduce financial barriers[] and to enhance the importance of smaller contributions.[146] Some candidates undoubtedly could raise large sums of money and thus have little need for public funds, but candidates with lesser fundraising capabilities will gain substantial benefits from matching funds. In addition, one eligibility requirement for *108 matching funds is acceptance of an expenditure ceiling, and candidates with little fundraising ability will be able to increase their spending relative to candidates capable of raising large amounts in private funds. For the reasons stated, we reject appellants' claims that Subtitle H is facially unconstitutional.[147] C. Severability The only remaining issue is whether our holdings invalidating 18 U.S. C. |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | remaining issue is whether our holdings invalidating 18 U.S. C. 608 (a), (c), and (e) (1) (10 ed., Supp. IV) require the conclusion that Subtitle H is unconstitutional. There is, of course, a relationship between the spending limits in 608 (c) and the public financing provisions; the expenditure limits accepted by a candidate to be eligible for public funding are identical to the limits in 608 (c). But we have no difficulty in concluding that Subtitle H is severable. "Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Champlin * Refining 286 U.S. (2). Our discussion of "what is left" leaves no doubt that the value of public financing is not dependent on the existence of a generally applicable expenditure limit. We therefore hold Subtitle H severable from those portions of the legislation today held constitutionally infirm. IV. THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION The 14 amendments to the Act create an eight-member Federal Election Commission (Commission) and vest in it primary and substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act. The question that we address in this portion of the opinion is whether, in view of the manner in which a majority of its members are appointed, the Commission may under the Constitution exercise the powers conferred upon it. We find it unnecessary to parse the complex statutory provisions in order to sketch the full sweep of the Commission's authority. It will suffice for present purposes to describe what appear to be representative examples of its various powers. Chapter 14 of Title 2[148] makes the Commission the principal repository of the numerous reports and statements which are required by that chapter to be filed by those engaging in the regulated political activities. Its duties under (a) with respect to these reports and statements include filing and indexing, making them available for public inspection, preservation, and auditing and field investigations. It is directed to "serve as a national clearinghouse for information in respect to the administration of elections." (b). *110 Beyond these recordkeeping, disclosure, and investigative functions, however, the Commission is given extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers. Its duty under (a) (10) is "to prescribe suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of chapter [14]." Under 437d (a) (8) the Commission is empowered to make such rules "as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."[149] Section 437d (a) (9) authorizes it to "formulate general policy with |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | 437d (a) (9) authorizes it to "formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act" and enumerated sections of Title 18's Criminal Code,[150] as to all of which provisions the Commission "has primary jurisdiction with respect to [their] civil enforcement." 437c (b).[] The Commission is authorized under 437f (a) to render advisory opinions with respect to activities possibly violating the Act, the Title 18 sections, or the campaign funding provisions of Title 26,[152] the effect of which is that "[n]otwithstanding * any other provision of law, any person with respect to whom an advisory opinion is rendered who acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions and findings [thereof] shall be presumed to be in compliance with the [statutory provision] with respect to which such advisory opinion is rendered." 437f (b). In the course of administering the provisions for Presidential campaign financing, the Commission may authorize convention expenditures which exceed the statutory limits. 26 U.S. C. 9008 (d) (3) (10 ed., Supp. IV). The Commission's enforcement power is both direct and wide ranging. It may institute a civil action for (i) injunctive or other relief against "any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of this Act," 437g (a) (5); (ii) declaratory or injunctive relief "as may be appropriate to implement or con[s]true any provisions" of Chapter 95 of Title 26, governing administration of funds for Presidential election campaigns and national party conventions, 26 U.S. C. 9011 (b) (1) (10 ed., Supp. IV); and (iii) "such injunctive relief as is appropriate to implement any provision" of Chapter of Title 26, governing the payment of matching funds for Presidential primary campaigns, 26 U.S. C. 9040 (c) (10 ed., Supp. IV). If after the Commission's post-disbursement audit of candidates receiving payments under Chapter 95 or it finds an overpayment, it is empowered to seek repayment of all funds due the Secretary of the Treasury. 26 U.S. C. 9010 (b), 9040 (b) (10 ed., Supp. IV). In no respect do the foregoing civil actions require the concurrence of or participation by the Attorney ; conversely, the decision not to seek judicial relief in the above respects would appear to rest solely with the Commission.[153] With respect to the *112 referenced Title 18 sections, 437g (a) (7) provides that if, after notice and opportunity for a hearing before it, the Commission finds an actual or threatened criminal violation, the Attorney "upon request by the Commission. shall institute a civil action for relief." Finally, as "[a]dditional enforcement authority," 456 (a) authorizes the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | (a) authorizes the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, to make "a finding that a person while a candidate for Federal office, failed to file" a required report of contributions or expenditures. If that finding is made within the applicable limitations period *113 for prosecutions, the candidate is thereby "disqualified from becoming a candidate in any future election for Federal office for a period of time beginning on the date of such finding and ending one year after the expiration of the term of the Federal office for which such person was a candidate."[154] The body in which this authority is reposed consists of eight members.[155] The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives are ex officio members of the Commission without the right to vote. Two members are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate "upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the Senate."[156] Two more are to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, likewise upon the recommendations of its respective majority and minority leaders. The remaining two members are appointed by the President. Each of the six voting members of the Commission must be confirmed by the majority of both Houses of Congress, and each of the three appointing authorities is forbidden to choose both of their appointees from the same political party. A. Ripeness Appellants argue that given the Commission's extensive powers the method of choosing its members under 437c (a) (1) runs afoul of the separation of powers embedded in the Constitution, and urge that as presently constituted the Commission's "existence be held unconstitutional by this Court." Before embarking on this or any *114 related inquiry, however, we must decide whether these issues are properly before us. Because of the Court of Appeals' emphasis on lack of "ripeness" of the issue relating to the method of appointment of the members of the Commission, we find it necessary to focus particularly on that consideration in this section of our opinion. We have recently recognized the distinction between jurisdictional limitations imposed by Art. III and "[p]roblems of prematurity and abstractness" that may prevent adjudication in all but the exceptional case. Socialist Labor (12). In Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 9 U.S. 102, we stated that "ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing," and therefore the passage of months between the time of the decision of the Court of Appeals and our present ruling is of itself significant. We likewise observed in the Reorganization Act Cases: "Thus, occurrence of |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | likewise observed in the Reorganization Act Cases: "Thus, occurrence of the conveyance allegedly violative of Fifth Amendment rights is in no way hypothetical or speculative. Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect." The Court of Appeals held that of the five specific certified questions directed at the Commission's authority, only its powers to render advisory opinions and to authorize excessive convention expenditures were ripe for adjudication. The court held that the remaining aspects of the Commission's authority could not be adjudicated because "[in] its present stance, this litigation does not present the court with the concrete facts that are necessary *115 to an informed decision."[157] 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 244, 519 F.2d, 93. Since the entry of judgment by the Court of Appeals, *116 the Commission has undertaken to issue rules and regulations under the authority of (a) (10). While many of its other functions remain as yet unexercised, the date of their all but certain exercise is now closer *117 by several months than it was at the time the Court of Appeals ruled. Congress was understandably most concerned with obtaining a final adjudication of as many issues as possible litigated pursuant to the provisions of 437h. Thus, in order to decide the basic question whether the Act's provision for appointment of the members of the Commission violates the Constitution, we believe we are warranted in considering all of those aspects of the Commission's authority which have been presented by the certified questions.[158] Party litigants with sufficient concrete interests at stake may have standing to raise constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights. Palmore v. United 1 U.S. 389 ; Glidden ; (9). In Glidden, of course, the challenged adjudication had already taken place, whereas in this case appellants' claim is of impending future rulings and determinations by the Commission. But this is a question of ripeness, rather than lack of case or controversy under Art. III, and for the reasons to which we have previously *118 adverted we hold that appellants' claims as they bear upon the method of appointment of the Commission's members may be presently adjudicated. B. The Merits Appellants urge that since Congress has given the Commission wide-ranging rulemaking and enforcement powers with respect to the substantive provisions of the Act, Congress is precluded under the principle of separation of powers |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | Congress is precluded under the principle of separation of powers from vesting in itself the authority to appoint those who will exercise such authority. Their argument is based on the language of Art. II, 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which provides in pertinent part as follows: "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint. all other Officers of the United whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Appellants' argument is that this provision is the exclusive method by which those charged with executing the laws of the United may be chosen. Congress, they assert, cannot have it both ways. If the Legislature wishes the Commission to exercise all of the conferred powers, then its members are in fact "Officers of the United " and must be appointed under the Appointments Clause. But if Congress insists upon retaining the power to appoint, then the members of the Commission may not discharge those many functions of the Commission which can be performed only by "Officers of *119 the United" as that term must be construed within the doctrine of separation of powers. Appellee Commission and amici in support of the Commission urge that the Framers of the Constitution, while mindful of the need for checks and balances among the three branches of the National Government, had no intention of denying to the Legislative Branch authority to appoint its own officers. Congress, either under the Appointments Clause or under its grants of substantive legislative authority and the Necessary and Proper Clause in Art. I, is in their view empowered to provide for the appointment to the Commission in the manner which it did because the Commission is performing "appropriate legislative functions." The majority of the Court of Appeals recognized the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers which is at the heart of our Constitution, and also recognized the principle enunciated in (8), that the Legislative Branch may not exercise executive authority by retaining the power to appoint those who will execute its laws. But it described appellants' argument based upon Art. II, 2, cl. 2, as "strikingly syllogistic," and concluded that Congress had sufficient authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I of the Constitution not only to establish the Commission but to appoint the Commission's members. As we |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | the Commission but to appoint the Commission's members. As we have earlier noted, it upheld the constitutional validity of congressional vesting of certain authority in the Commission, and concluded that the question of the constitutional validity of the vesting of its remaining functions was not yet ripe for review. The three dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals concluded that the method of appointment for the Commission did violate the doctrine of separation of powers. *1 1. Separation of Powers We do not think appellants' arguments based upon Art. II, 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution may be so easily dismissed as did the majority of the Court of Appeals. Our inquiry of necessity touches upon the fundamental principles of the Government established by the Framers of the Constitution, and all litigants and all of the courts which have addressed themselves to the matter start on common ground in the recognition of the intent of the Framers that the powers of the three great branches of the National Government be largely separate from one another. James Madison, writing in the Federalist No. 47,[159] defended the work of the Framers against the charge that these three governmental powers were not entirely separate from one another in the proposed Constitution. He asserted that while there was some admixture, the Constitution was nonetheless true to Montesquieu's well-known maxim that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct: "The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. `When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,' says he, `there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.' Again: `Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.' Some of these reasons *121 are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author."[160] Yet it is also clear from the provisions of the Constitution itself, and from the Federalist Papers, that the Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of these three essential branches of Government. The President is a participant in the lawmaking process by virtue of his authority to |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | in the lawmaking process by virtue of his authority to veto bills enacted by Congress. The Senate is a participant in the appointive process by virtue of its authority to refuse to confirm persons nominated to office by the President. The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court in Hampton & Co. v. United (8), after stating the general principle of separation of powers found in the United Constitution, went on to observe: "[T]he rule is that in the actual administration of the government Congress or the Legislature should exercise the legislative power, the President or the State executive, the Governor, the executive power, and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power, and in carrying out that constitutional division into three branches it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power *122 and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power. This is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each in the field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." More recently, Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the opinion and the judgment of the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube succinctly characterized this understanding: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other. As Madison put it in Federalist No. 51: "This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | No. 51: "This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the *123 several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the otherthat the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State."[161] This Court has not hesitated to enforce the principle of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution when its application has proved necessary for the decisions of cases or controversies properly before it. The Court has held that executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution. United v. Ferreira, ; Hayburn's Case, The Court has held that the President may not execute and exercise legislative authority belonging only to Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube In the course of its opinion in that case, the Court said: "In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a law-maker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that `All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United' " 343 U.S., 87-. *124 More closely in point to the facts of the present case is this Court's decision in (8), where the Court held that the legislature of the Philippine could not provide for legislative appointment to executive agencies. 2. The Appointments Clause The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. Article I, 1, declares: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United" Article II, 1, vests the executive power "in a President of the United of America," and Art. III, 1, declares that "The judicial Power of the United shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The further concern of the Framers of the Constitution with maintenance of the separation of powers is found in the so-called "Ineligibility" and "Incompatibility" Clauses contained in Art. I, 6: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." It is in the context of these cognate provisions of the document that we must examine the language of Art. II. 2, cl. 2, which appellants contend provides the only authorization for appointment of those to whom substantial executive or administrative authority is given *125 by statute. Because of the importance of its language, we again set out the provision: "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." The Appointments Clause could, of course, be read as merely dealing with etiquette or protocol in describing "Officers of the United" but the drafters had a less frivolous purpose in mind. This conclusion is supported by language from United v. 509- : "The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes. The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But foreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment there can be but little doubt." (Emphasis supplied.) We think that the term "Officers of |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | doubt." (Emphasis supplied.) We think that the term "Officers of the United " *126 as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United v. is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United is an "Officer of the United" and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by 2, cl. 2, of that Article. If "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment," United v. it is difficult to see how the members of the Commission may escape inclusion. If a postmaster first class, Myers v. United U.S. 52 (6), and the clerk of a district court, Ex parte Hennen, are inferior officers of the United within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, as they are, surely the Commissioners before us are at the very least such "inferior Officers" within the meaning of that Clause.[162] Although two members of the Commission are initially selected by the President, his nominations are subject to confirmation not merely by the Senate, but by the House of Representatives as well. The remaining four voting members of the Commission are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and by the Speaker of the House. While the second part of the Clause *127 authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of the officers described in that part in "the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments," neither the Speaker of the House nor the President pro tempore of the Senate comes within this language. The phrase "Heads of Departments," used as it is in conjunction with the phrase "Courts of Law," suggests that the Departments referred to are themselves in the Executive Branch or at least have some connection with that branch. While the Clause expressly authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of certain officers in the "Courts of Law," the absence of similar language to include Congress must mean that neither Congress nor its officers were included within the language "Heads of Departments" in this part of cl. 2. Thus with respect to four of the six voting members of the Commission, neither the President, the head of any department, nor the Judiciary has any voice in their selection. The Appointments Clause specifies the method of appointment only for "Officers of the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | specifies the method of appointment only for "Officers of the United " whose appointment is not "otherwise provided for" in the Constitution. But there is no provision of the Constitution remotely providing any alternative means for the selection of the members of the Commission or for anybody like them. Appellee Commission has argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Appointments Clause of Art. II should not be read to exclude the "inherent power of Congress" to appoint its own officers to perform functions necessary to that body as an institution. But there is no need to read the Appointments Clause contrary to its plain language in order to reach the result sought by the Court of Appeals. Article I, 3, cl. 5, expressly authorizes the selection of the President pro tempore of the Senate, and 2, cl. 5, of that Article provides * for the selection of the Speaker of the House. Ranking nonmembers, such as the Clerk of the House of Representatives, are elected under the internal rules of each House[163] and are designated by statute as "officers of the Congress."[164] There is no occasion for us to decide whether any of these member officers are "Officers of the United " whose "appointment" is otherwise provided for within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, since even if they were such officers their appointees would not be. Contrary to the fears expressed by the majority of the Court of Appeals, nothing in our holding with respect to Art. II, 2, cl. 2, will deny to Congress "all power to appoint its own inferior officers to carry out appropriate legislative functions."[165] Appellee Commission and amici contend somewhat obliquely that because the Framers had no intention of relegating Congress to a position below that of the co-equal Judicial and Executive Branches of the National Government, the Appointments Clause must somehow be read to include Congress or its officers as among those *129 in whom the appointment power may be vested. But the debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.[1] The debates during the Convention, and the evolution of the draft version of the Constitution, seem to us to lend considerable support to our reading of the language of the Appointments Clause itself. An interim version of the draft Constitution had vested in the Senate the authority to appoint Ambassadors, public Ministers, and Judges of the Supreme Court, and the language of Art. II |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | of the Supreme Court, and the language of Art. II as finally adopted is a distinct change in this regard. We believe that it was a deliberate change made by the Framers with the intent to deny Congress any authority itself to appoint those who were "Officers of the United" The debates on the floor of the Convention reflect at least in part the way the change came about. On Monday, August 6, 1787, the Committee on Detail to which had been referred the entire draft of the Constitution reported its draft to the Convention, including the following two articles that bear on the question before us:[167] Article IX, 1: "The Senate of the United shall have power to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court." Article X, 2: "[The President] shall commission all *130 the officers of the United ; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution." It will be seen from a comparison of these two articles that the appointment of Ambassadors and Judges of the Supreme Court was confided to the Senate, and that the authority to appointnot merely nominate, but to actually appointall other officers was reposed in the President. During a discussion of a provision in the same draft from the Committee on Detail which provided that the "Treasurer" of the United should be chosen by both Houses of Congress, Mr. Read moved to strike out that clause, "leaving the appointment of the Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive."[168] Opposition to Read's motion was based, not on objection to the principle of executive appointment, but on the particular nature of the office of the "Treasurer."[169] On Thursday, August 23, the Convention voted to insert after the word "Ambassadors" in the text of draft Art. IX the words "and other public Ministers." Immediately afterwards, the section as amended was referred to the "Committee of Five."[170] The following day the Convention took up Art. X. Roger Sherman objected to the draft language of 2 because it conferred too much power on the President, and proposed to insert after the words "not otherwise provided for by this Constitution" the words "or by law." This motion was defeated by a vote of nine to one.[171] On September *131 3 the Convention debated the Ineligibility and Incompatibility Clauses which now appear in Art. I, and made the Ineligibility Clause somewhat less stringent.[172] Meanwhile, on Friday, August 31, a motion had been carried without opposition to refer such parts of the Constitution as had been postponed or not acted upon to |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | Constitution as had been postponed or not acted upon to a Committee of Eleven. Such reference carried with it both Arts. IX and X. The following week the Committee of Eleven made its report to the Convention, in which the present language of Art. II, 2, cl. 2, dealing with the authority of the President to nominate is found, virtually word for word, as 4 of Art. X.[173] The same Committee also reported a revised article concerning the Legislative Branch to the Convention. The changes are obvious. In the final version, the Senate is shorn of its power to appoint Ambassadors and Judges of the Supreme Court. The President is given, not the power to appoint public officers of the United but only the right to nominate them, and a provision is inserted by virtue of which Congress may require Senate confirmation of his nominees. It would seem a fair surmise that a compromise had been made. But no change was made in the concept of the term "Officers of the United" which since it had first appeared in Art. X had been taken by all concerned to embrace all appointed officials exercising responsibility under the public laws of the Nation. Appellee Commission and amici urge that because of what they conceive to be the extraordinary authority reposed in Congress to regulate elections, this case stands on a different footing than if Congress had exercised its legislative authority in another field. There is, of course, no doubt that Congress has express authority to regulate *1 congressional elections, by virtue of the power conferred in Art. I, 4.[174] This Court has also held that it has very broad authority to prevent corruption in national Presidential elections. Burroughs v. United (4). But Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction. We see no reason to believe that the authority of Congress over federal election practices is of such a wholly different nature from the other grants of authority to Congress that it may be employed in such a manner as to offend well-established constitutional restrictions stemming from the separation of powers. The position that because Congress has been given explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it must therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause. Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all officers of the United are to |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | elsewhere provided for, all officers of the United are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause. Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions. The President appoints judicial as well as executive officers. Neither has it been disputedand apparently *133 it is not now disputedthat the Clause controls the appointment of the members of a typical administrative agency even though its functions, as this Court recognized in Humphrey's Executor v. United (5), may be "predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative" rather than executive. The Court in that case carefully emphasized that although the members of such agencies were to be independent of the Executive in their day-to-day operations, the Executive was not excluded from selecting them. Appellees argue that the legislative authority conferred upon the Congress in Art. I, 4, to regulate "the Times, places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives" is augmented by the provision in 5 that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." Section 5 confers, however, not a general legislative power upon the Congress, but rather a power "judicial in character" upon each House of the Congress. Barry v. United ex rel. 279 U.S. 5, (9). The power of each House to judge whether one claiming election as Senator or Representative has met the requisite qualifications, 395 U.S. (19), cannot reasonably be translated into a power granted to the Congress itself to impose substantive qualifications on the right to so hold such office. Whatever power Congress may have to legislate, such qualifications must derive from 4, rather than 5, of Art. I. Appellees also rely on the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution insofar as the authority of the Commission to regulate practices in connection with the Presidential election is concerned. This Amendment provides that certificates of the votes of the electors be "sealed [and] *134 directed to the President of the Senate," and that the "President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted." The method by which Congress resolved the celebrated disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, reflected in supports the conclusion that Congress viewed this Amendment as conferring upon its two Houses the same sort of power "judicial in character," Barry v. United ex rel. at |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | power "judicial in character," Barry v. United ex rel. at as was conferred upon each House by Art. I, 5, with respect to elections of its own members. We are also told by appellees and amici that Congress had good reason for not vesting in a Commission composed wholly of Presidential appointees the authority to administer the Act, since the administration of the Act would undoubtedly have a bearing on any incumbent President's campaign for re-election. While one cannot dispute the basis for this sentiment as a practical matter, it would seem that those who sought to challenge incumbent Congressmen might have equally good reason to fear a Commission which was unduly responsive to members of Congress whom they were seeking to unseat. But such fears, however rational, do not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work. Appellee Commission and amici finally contend, and the majority of the Court of Appeals agreed with them, that whatever shortcomings the provisions for the appointment of members of the Commission might have under Art. II, Congress had ample authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I to effectuate this result. We do not agree. The proper inquiry when considering the Necessary and Proper Clause is not the authority of Congress to create an office or a commission, which is broad indeed, but rather its authority to provide *135 that its own officers may make appointments to such office or commission. So framed, the claim that Congress may provide for this manner of appointment under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I stands on no better footing than the claim that it may provide for such manner of appointment because of its substantive authority to regulate federal elections. Congress could not, merely because it concluded that such a measure was "necessary and proper" to the discharge of its substantive legislative authority, pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto law contrary to the prohibitions contained in 9 of Art. I. No more may it vest in itself, or in its officers, the authority to appoint officers of the United when the Appointments Clause by clear implication prohibits it from doing so. The trilogy of cases from this Court dealing with the constitutional authority of Congress to circumscribe the President's power to remove officers of the United is entirely consistent with this conclusion. In Myers v. United U.S. 52 (6), the Court held that Congress could not by statute divest the President of the power to remove an officer in the Executive Branch whom he was initially authorized to |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | in the Executive Branch whom he was initially authorized to appoint. In explaining its reasoning in that case, the Court said: "The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his executive power he should select those who were *136 to act for him under his direction in the execution of the laws. "Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before stated, is that Article II grants to the President the executive power of the Government, i. e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officersa conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed" In the later case of Humphrey's Executor, where it was held that Congress could circumscribe the President's power to remove members of independent regulatory agencies, the Court was careful to note that it was dealing with an agency intended to be independent of executive authority "except in its selection." Wiener v. United which applied the holding in Humphrey's Executor to a member of the War Claims Commission, did not question in any respect that members of independent agencies are not independent of the Executive with respect to their appointments. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Mr. Justice Sutherland, the author of the Court's opinion in Humphrey's Executor, likewise wrote the opinion for the Court in (8), in which it was said: "Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection; though the case might be different if the additional duties *137 were devolved upon an appointee of the executive." at 2. 3. The Commission's Powers Thus, on the assumption that all of the powers granted in the statute may be exercised by an agency whose members have been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause,[175] the ultimate question is which, if any, of those powers may be exercised by the present voting Commissioners, none of whom was appointed as provided by that Clause. Our previous description of the statutory provisions, see at -113, disclosed that the Commission's powers fall |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | provisions, see at -113, disclosed that the Commission's powers fall generally into three categories: functions relating to the flow of necessary information receipt, dissemination, and investigation; functions with respect to the Commission's task of fleshing out the statuterulemaking and advisory opinions; and functions necessary to ensure compliance with the statute and rulesinformal procedures, administrative determinations and hearings, and civil suits. Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially of an investigative and informative nature, falling in the same general category as those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its own committees, there can be no question that the Commission as presently constituted may exercise them. ; (7); Eastland v. United Servicemen's Fund, As this Court stated in at 175: "A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite informationwhich not infrequently is truerecourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of inquirywith enforcing processwas regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislateindeed, was treated as inhering in it." But when we go beyond this type of authority to the more substantial powers exercised by the Commission, we reach a different result. The Commission's enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary power to seek judicial relief, is authority that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress. A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, 3. Congress may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Clause create "offices" in the generic sense and provide such method of appointment to those "offices" as it chooses. But Congress' power under that Clause * is inevitably bounded by the express language of Art. II, 2, cl. 2, and unless the method it provides comports with the latter, the holders of those offices will not be "Officers of the United" They may, therefore, properly perform duties only in aid of those functions that Congress may |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | duties only in aid of those functions that Congress may carry out by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not "Officers of the United" This Court observed more than a century ago with respect to litigation conducted in the courts of the United : "Whether tested, therefore, by the requirements of the Judiciary Act, or by the usage of the government, or by the decisions of this court, it is clear that all such suits, so far as the interests of the United are concerned, are subject to the direction, and within the control of, the Attorney-." Confiscation Cases, The Court echoed similar sentiments 59 years later in 277 U. S., at 2, saying: "Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. It is unnecessary to enlarge further upon the general subject, since it has so recently received the full consideration of this Court. Myers v. United U.S. 52. "Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection; though the * case might be different if the additional duties were devolved upon an appointee of the executive." We hold that these provisions of the Act, vesting in the Commission primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the United for vindicating public rights, violate Art. II, 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Such functions may be discharged only by persons who are "Officers of the United " within the language of that section. All aspects of the Act are brought within the Commission's broad administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory opinions, and determinations of eligibility for funds and even for federal elective office itself. These functions, exercised free from day-to-day supervision of either Congress[176] or the Executive Branch, are more legislative and judicial in nature than are the Commission's *1 enforcement powers, and are of kinds usually performed by independent regulatory agencies or by some department in the Executive Branch under the direction of an Act of Congress. Congress viewed these broad powers as essential to effective and impartial administration of the entire substantive framework of the Act. Yet each of these functions also represents the performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law. While |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law. While the President may not insist that such functions be delegated to an appointee of his removable at will, Humphrey's Executor v. United (5), none of them operates merely in aid of congressional authority to legislate or is sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of public law to allow it to be performed by the present Commission. These administrative functions may therefore be exercised only by persons who are "Officers of the United"[177] *142 It is also our view that the Commission's inability to exercise certain powers because of the method by which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of the Commission's administrative actions and determinations to this date, including its administration of those provisions, upheld today, authorizing the public financing of federal elections. The past acts of the Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity, just as we have recognized should be the case with respect to legislative acts performed by legislators held to have been elected in accordance with an unconstitutional apportionment plan. (12). See -4 ; aff'd sub nom. Cf. City of Richmond v. United We also draw on the Court's practice in *143 the apportionment and voting rights cases and stay, for a period not to exceed 30 days, the Court's judgment insofar as it affects the authority of the Commission to exercise the duties and powers granted it under the Act. This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the Court sustains, allowing the present Commission in the interim to function de facto in accordance with the substantive provisions of the Act. Cf. Georgia v. United 1 U.S. 526, 5 ; v. Morris, 385 U.S. ; Maryland CONCLUSION In summary,[178] we sustain the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme. We conclude, however, that the limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds are constitutionally infirm. Finally, we hold that most of the powers conferred by the Act upon the Federal Election Commission can be exercised only by "Officers of the United" appointed in conformity with Art. II, 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, and therefore cannot be exercised by the Commission as presently constituted. In No. 75-436, the judgment of the Court of Appeals *144 is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the District Court in No. 75-437 |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | part. The judgment of the District Court in No. 75-437 is affirmed. The mandate shall issue forthwith, except that our judgment is stayed, for a period not to exceed 30 days, insofar as it affects the authority of the Commission to exercise the duties and powers granted it under the Act. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. APPENDIX TO PER CURIAM OPINION[*] TITLE 2. THE CONGRESS CHAPTER 14FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS SUBCHAPTER I.DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS Definitions. When used in this subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter (a) "election" means (1) a general, special, primary, or runoff election; (2) a convention or caucus of a political party held to nominate a candidate; (3) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party; and (4) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for election to the office of President; * (b) "candidate" means an individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office, whether or not such individual is elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or election, if he has (1) taken the action necessary under the law of a State to qualify himself for nomination for election, or election, to Federal office; or (2) received contributions or made expenditures, or has given his consent for any other person to receive contributions or make expenditures, with a view to bringing about his nomination for election, or election, to such office; (c) "Federal office" means the office of President or Vice President of the United ; or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the United ; (d) "political committee" means any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000; (e) "contribution" (1) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made for the purpose of (A) influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal office or for the purpose of influencing the results of a primary held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party; or (B) influencing the result of an election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for election to the office of President of the United ; *146 (2) means a contract, |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | President of the United ; *146 (2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, expressed or implied, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution for such purposes; (3) means funds received by a political committee which are transferred to such committee from another political committee or other source; (4) means the payment, by any person other than a candidate or a political committee, of compensation for the personal services of another person which are rendered to such candidate or political committee without charge for any such purpose; but (5) does not include (A) the value of services provided without compensation by individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate or political committee; (B) the use of real or personal property and the cost of invitations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related activities; (C) the sale of any food or beverage by a vendor for use in a candidate's campaign at a charge less than the normal comparable charge, if such charge for use in a candidate's campaign is at least equal to the cost of such food or beverage to the vendor; (D) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services to a candidate; (E) the payment by a State or local committee of a political party of the costs of preparation, *147 display, or mailing or other distribution incurred by such committee with respect to a printed slate card or sample or other printed listing, of three or more candidates for any public office for which an election is held in the State in which such committee is organized, except that this clause shall not apply in the case of costs incurred by such committee with respect to a display of any such listing made on broadcasting stations, or in newspapers, magazines, or other similar types of general public political advertising; or (F) any payment made or obligation incurred by a corporation or a labor organization which, under the provisions of the last paragraph of section of Title 18, would not constitute an expenditure by such corporation or labor organization; to the extent that the cumulative value of activities by any individual on behalf of any candidate under each of clauses (B), (C), and (D) does not exceed $500 with respect to any election; (f) "expenditure" (1) means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made for the purpose of (A) influencing the nomination for election, or the election, of any person to Federal office, or to the office of presidential and vice presidential elector; or (B) influencing the results of a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a political party or for the expression of a preference for *148 the nomination of persons for election to the office of President of the United ; (2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, express or implied, whether or not legally enforceable, to make any expenditure; (3) means the transfer of funds by a political committee to another political committee; but (4) does not include (A) any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate; (B) nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals to register to vote or to vote; (C) any communication by any membership organization or corporation to its members or stockholders, if such membership organization or corporation is not organized primarily for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal office; (D) the use of real or personal property and the cost of invitations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related activities if the cumulative value of such activities by such individual on behalf of any candidate do [sic] not exceed $500 with respect to any election; (E) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services to a candidate if the cumulative amount for such individual incurred with respect to such candidate *149 does not exceed $500 with respect to any election; (F) any communication by any person which is not made for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Federal office; or (G) the payment by a State or local committee of a political party of the costs of preparation, display, or mailing or other distribution incurred by such committee with respect to a printed slate card or sample or other printed listing, of three or more candidates for any public office for which an election is held in the State in which such committee is organized, except that this clause shall not apply in the case of costs |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | this clause shall not apply in the case of costs incurred by such committee with respect to a display of any such listing made on broadcasting stations, or in newspapers, magazines or other similar types of general public political advertising; or (H) any payment made or obligation incurred by a corporation or a labor organization which, under the provisions of the last paragraph of section of Title 18, would not constitute an expenditure by such corporation or labor organization; (g) "Commission" means the Federal Election Commission; (h) "person" means an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, and any other organization or group of persons; (i) "State" means each State of the United the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United ; *150 (j) "identification" means (1) in the case of an individual, his full name and the full address of his principal place of residence; and (2) in the case of any other person, the full name and address of such person; (k) "national committee" means the organization which, by virtue of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level, as determined by the Commission; (l) "State committee" means the organization which, by virtue of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the State level, as determined by the Commission; (m) "political party" means an association, committee, or organization which nominates a candidate for election to any Federal office, whose name appears on the election as the candidate of such association, committee, or organization; and (n) "principal campaign committee" means the principal campaign committee designated by a candidate under section 4 (f) (1) of this title. 4. Organization of political committees. (a) Chairman; treasurer; vacancies; official authorizations. Every political committee shall have a chairman and a treasurer. No contribution and no expenditure shall be accepted or made by or on behalf of a political committee at a time when there is a vacancy in the office of chairman or treasurer thereof. No expenditure shall be made for or on behalf of a political committee without the authorization of its chairman or treasurer, or their designated agents. (b) Account of contributions; segregated funds. * Every person who receives a contribution in excess of $10 for a political committee shall, on demand of the treasurer, and in any event within 5 days after receipt of such contribution, render to the treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the amount of the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the amount of the contribution and the identification of the person making such contribution, and the date on which received. All funds of a political committee shall be segregated from, and may not be commingled with, any personal funds of officers, members, or associates of such committee. (c) Recordkeeping. It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a political committee to keep a detailed and exact account of (1) all contributions made to or for such committee; (2) the identification of every person making a contribution in excess of $10, and the date and amount thereof and, if a person's contributions aggregate more than $100, the account shall include occupation, and the principal place of business (if any); (3) all expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee; and (4) the identification of every person to whom any expenditure is made, the date and amount thereof and the name and address of, and office sought by, each candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made. (d) Receipts; preservation. It shall be the duty of the treasurer to obtain and keep a receipted bill, stating the particulars, for every expenditure made by or on behalf of a political committee in excess of $100 in amount, and for any such expenditure in a lesser amount, if the aggregate amount of such expenditures to the same person during a calendar year exceeds $100. The treasurer *152 shall preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to be kept by this section for periods of time to be determined by the Commission. (e) Unauthorized activities; notice. Any political committee which solicits or receives contributions or makes expenditures on behalf of any candidate that is not authorized in writing by such candidate to do so shall include a notice on the face or front page of all literature and advertisements published in connection with such candidate's campaign by such committee or on its behalf stating that the committee is not authorized by such candidate and that such candidate is not responsible for the activities of such committee. (f) Principal campaign committees; one candidate limitation; office of President: national committee for candidate; duties. (1) Each individual who is a candidate for Federal office (other than the office of Vice President of the United ) shall designate a political committee to serve as his principal campaign committee. No political committee may be designated as the principal campaign committee of more than one candidate, except that the candidate for the office of President of the United nominated by a political party |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | of President of the United nominated by a political party may designate the national committee of such political party as his principal campaign committee. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, no political committee which supports more than one candidate may be designated as a principal campaign committee. (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, each report or statement of contributions received or expenditures made by a political committee (other than a principal campaign committee) which is required to be filed with the Commission under this subchapter shall be filed instead with the principal campaign *153 committee for the candidate on whose behalf such contributions are accepted or such expenditures are made. (3) It shall be the duty of each principal campaign committee to receive all reports and statements required to be filed with it under paragraph (2) of this subsection and to compile and file such reports and statements, together with its own reports and statements, with the Commission in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter. 433. Registration of political committees. (a) Statements of organization. Each political committee which anticipates receiving contributions or making expenditures during the calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 shall file with the Commission a statement of organization, within 10 days after its organization or, if later, 10 days after the date on which it has information which causes the committee to anticipate it will receive contributions or make expenditures in excess of $1,000. Each such committee in existence at the date of enactment of this Act shall file a statement of organization with the Commission at such time as it prescribes. (b) Contents of statements. The statement of organization shall include (1) the name and address of the committee; (2) the names, addresses, and relationships of affiliated or connected organizations; (3) the area, scope, or jurisdiction of the committee; (4) the name, address, and position of the custodian of books and accounts; (5) the name, address, and position of other principal officers, including officers and members of the finance committee, if any; *154 (6) the name, address, office sought, and party affiliation of (A) each candidate whom the committee is supporting; and (B) any other individual, if any, whom the committee is supporting for nomination for election, or election, to any public office whatever; or, if the committee is supporting the entire ticket of any party, the name of the party; (7) a statement whether the committee is a continuing one; (8) the disposition of residual funds which will be made in the event of dissolution; (9) a listing of |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | made in the event of dissolution; (9) a listing of all banks, safety deposit boxes, or other repositories used; (10) a statement of the reports required to be filed by the committee with State or local officers, and, if so, the names, addresses, and positions of such persons; and (11) such other information as shall be required by the Commission. (c) Information changes; report. Any change in information previously submitted in a statement of organization shall be reported to the Commission within a 10-day period following the change. (d) Disbanding of political committees or contributions and expenditures below prescribed ceiling; notice. Any committee which, after having filed one or more statements of organization, disbands or determines it will no longer receive contributions or make expenditures during the calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000 shall so notify the Commission. (e) Filing reports and notifications with appropriate principal campaign committees. In the case of a political *155 committee which is not a principal campaign committee, reports and notifications required under this section to be filed with the Commission shall be filed instead with the appropriate principal campaign committee. 434. Reports by political committees and candidates. (a) Receipts and expenditures; completion date, exception. (1) Except as provided by paragraph (2), each treasurer of a political committee supporting a candidate or candidates for election to Federal office, and each candidate for election to such office, shall file with the Commission reports of receipts and expenditures on forms to be prescribed or approved by it. The reports referred to in the preceding sentence shall be filed as follows: (A) (i) In any calendar year in which an individual is a candidate for Federal office and an election for such Federal office is held in such year, such reports shall be filed not later than the 10th day before the date on which such election is held and shall be complete as of the 15th day before the date of such election; except that any such report filed by registered or certified mail must be postmarked not later than the close of the 12th day before the date of such election. (ii) such reports shall be filed not later than the 30th day after the day of such election and shall be complete as of the th day after the date of such election. (B) In any other calendar year in which an individual is a candidate for Federal office, such reports shall be filed after December 31 of such calendar year, but not later than January 31 of the following calendar year and |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | later than January 31 of the following calendar year and shall be complete as of the close of the calendar year with respect to which the report is filed. *156 (C) Such reports shall be filed not later than the 10th day following the close of any calendar quarter in which the candidate or political committee concerned received contributions in excess of $1,000, or made expenditures in excess of $1,000, and shall be complete as of the close of such calendar quarter; except that any such report required to be filed after December 31 of any calendar year with respect to which a report is required to be filed under subparagraph (B) shall be filed as provided in such subparagraph. (D) When the last day for filing any quarterly report required by subparagraph (C) occurs within 10 days of an election, the filing of such quarterly report shall be waived and superseded by the report required by subparagraph (A) (i). Any contribution of $1,000 or more received after the 15th day, but more than 48 hours, before any election shall be reported within 48 hours after its receipt. (2) Each treasurer of a political committee which is not a principal campaign committee shall file the reports required under this section with the appropriate principal campaign committee. (3) Upon a request made by a presidential candidate or a political committee which operates in more than one State, or upon its own motion, the Commission may waive the reporting dates set forth in paragraph (1) (other than the reporting date set forth in paragraph (1) (B)), and require instead that such candidate or political committee file reports not less frequently than monthly. The Commission may not require a presidential candidate or a political committee operating in more than one State to file more than 12 reports (not counting any report referred to in paragraph (1) (B)) during any calendar year. If the Commission acts on its own motion *157 under this paragraph with respect to a candidate or a political committee, such candidate or committee may obtain judicial review in accordance with the provisions of chapter 7 of Title 5. (b) Contents of reports. Each report under this section shall disclose (1) the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of the reporting period; (2) the full name and mailing address (occupation and the principal place of business, if any) of each person who has made one or more contributions to or for such committee or candidate (including the purchase of tickets for events such as dinners, luncheons, rallies, and similar |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | tickets for events such as dinners, luncheons, rallies, and similar fundraising events) within the calendar year in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $100, together with the amount and date of such contributions; (3) the total sum of individual contributions made to or for such committee or candidate during the reporting period and not reported under paragraph (2); (4) the name and address of each political committee or candidate from which the reporting committee or the candidate received, or to which that committee or candidate made, any transfer of funds, together with the amounts and dates of all transfers; (5) each loan to or from any person within the calendar year in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $100, together with the full names and mailing addresses (occupations and the principal places of business, if any) of the lender, endorsers, and guarantors, if any, and the date and amount of such loans; (6) the total amount of proceeds from *158 (A) the sale of tickets to each dinner, luncheon, rally, and other fundraising event; (B) mass collections made at such events; and (C) sales of items such as political campaign pins, buttons, badges, flags, emblems, hats, banners, literature, and similar materials; (7) each contribution, rebate, refund, or other receipt in excess of $100 not otherwise listed under paragraphs (2) through (6); (8) the total sum of all receipts by or for such committee or candidate during the reporting period, together with total expenditures less transfers between political committees which support the same candidate and which do not support more than one candidate; (9) the identification of each person to whom expenditures have been made by such committee or on behalf of such committee or candidate within the calendar year in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $100, the amount, date, and purpose of each such expenditure and the name and address of, and office sought by, each candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made; (10) the identification of each person to whom an expenditure for personal services, salaries, and reimbursed expenses in excess of $100 has been made, and which is not otherwise reported, including the amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure; (11) the total sum of expenditures made by such committee or candidate during the calendar year, together with total receipts less transfers between political committees which support the same candidate and which do not support more than one candidate; *159 (12) the amount and nature of debts and obligations owed by or to the committee, in such form as the |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | by or to the committee, in such form as the supervisory officer may prescribe and a continuous reporting of their debts and obligations after the election at such periods as the Commission may require until such debts and obligations are extinguished, together with a statement as to the circumstances and conditions under which any such debt or obligation is extinguished and the consideration therefor; and (13) such other information as shall be required by the Commission. (c) Cumulative reports for calendar year; amounts for unchanged items carried forward; statement of inactive status. The reports required to be filed by subsection (a) of this section shall be cumulative during the calendar year to which they relate, but where there has been no change in an item reported in a previous report during such year, only the amount need be carried forward. If no contributions or expenditures have been accepted or expended during a calendar year, the treasurer of the political committee or candidate shall file a statement to that effect. (d) Members of Congress; reporting exemption. This section does not require a Member of the Congress to report, as contributions received or as expenditures made, the value of photographic, matting, or recording services furnished to him by the Senate Recording Studio, the House Recording Studio, or by an individual whose pay is disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives and who furnishes such services as his primary duty as an employee of the Senate or House of Representatives, or if such services were paid for by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the Democratic National Congressional *160 Committee, or the National Republican Congressional Committee. This subsection does not apply to such recording services furnished during the calendar year before the year in which the Member's term expires. (e) Reports by other than political committees. Every person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes contributions or expenditures, other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess of $100 within a calendar year shall file with the Commission a statement containing the information required by this section. Statements required by this subsection shall be filed on the dates on which reports by political committees are filed but need not be cumulative. 437a. Reports by certain persons; exemptions. Any person (other than an individual) who expends any funds or commits any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | or who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material referring to a candidate (by name, description, or other reference) advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, setting forth the candidate's position on any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts (in the case of a candidate who holds or has held Federal office), or otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidate or to withhold their votes from such candidate shall file reports with the Commission as if such person were a political committee. The reports filed by such person shall set forth the source of the funds used in carrying out any activity described in the preceding sentence in the same detail as if the funds were contributions within the meaning of section (e) of this title, and payments of such funds in the same detail as if they were expenditures within the meaning of section (f) of this title. The provisions *161 of this section do not apply to any publication or broadcast of the United Government or to any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of a broadcasting station or a bona fide newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication. A news story, commentary, or editorial is not considered to be distributed through a bona fide newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication if (1) such publication is primarily for distribution to individuals affiliated by membership or stock ownership with the person (other than an individual) distributing it or causing it to be distributed, and not primarily for purchase by the public at newsstands or paid by subscription; or (2) the news story, commentary, or editorial is distributed by a person (other than an individual) who devotes a substantial part of his activities to attempting to influence the outcome of elections, or to influence public opinion with respect to matters of national or State policy or concern. 437c. Federal Election Commission. (a) Establishment; membership; term of office; vacancies; qualifications; compensation; chairman and vice chairman. (1) There is established a commission to be known as the Federal Election Commission. The Commission is composed of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, ex officio and without the right to vote, and six members appointed as follows: (A) two shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both Houses of the Congress, by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the Senate; *162 (B) two shall |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | the minority leader of the Senate; *162 (B) two shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both Houses of the Congress, by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the House and the minority leader of the House; and (C) two shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both Houses of the Congress, by the President of the United A member appointed under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) shall not be affiliated with the same political party as the other member appointed under such paragraph. (2) Members of the Commission shall serve for terms of 6 years, except that of the members first appointed (A) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (A) shall be appointed for a term ending on the April 30 first occurring more than 6 months after the date on which he is appointed; (B) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (B) shall be appointed for a term ending 1 year after the April 30 on which the term of the member referred to in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph ends; (C) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (C) shall be appointed for a term ending 2 years thereafter; (D) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (A) shall be appointed for a term ending 3 years thereafter; (E) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1) (B) shall be appointed for a term ending 4 years thereafter; and (F) one of the members appointed under paragraph *163 (1) (C) shall be appointed for a term ending 5 years thereafter. An individual appointed to fill a vacancy occurring other than by the expiration of a term of office shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member he succeeds. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original appointment. (3) Members shall be chosen on the basis of their maturity, experience, integrity, impartiality, and good judgment and shall be chosen from among individuals who, at the time of their appointment, are not elected or appointed officers or employees in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United (4) Members of the Commission (other than the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives) shall receive compensation equivalent to the compensation paid at level IV of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S. C. 5315). (5) The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | (5) The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members (other than the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives) for a term of one year. No member may serve as chairman more often than once during any term of office to which he is appointed. The chairman and the vice chairman shall not be affiliated with the same political party. The vice chairman shall act as chairman in the absence or disability of the chairman, or in the event of a vacancy in such office. (b) Administration, enforcement, and formulation of policy; primary jurisdiction of civil enforcement. The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to this Act and sections 608, 611, 614, 615, 616, *164 and of Title 18. The Commission has primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions. (c) Voting requirement; nondelegation of function. All decisions of the Commission with respect to the exercise of its duties and powers under the provisions of this subchapter shall be made by a majority vote of the members of the Commission. A member of the Commission may not delegate to any person his vote or any decisionmaking authority or duty vested in the Commission by the provisions of this subchapter. (d) Meetings. The Commission shall meet at least once each month and also at the call of any member. (e) Rules for conduct of activities; seal, judicial notice; principal office. The Commission shall prepare written rules for the conduct of its activities, shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed, and shall have its principal office in or near the District of Columbia (but it may meet or exercise any of its powers anywhere in the United ). (f) Staff director and general counsel: appointment and compensation; appointment and compensation of personnel and procurement of intermittent services by staff director; use of assistance, personnel, and facilities of Federal agencies and departments. (1) The Commission shall have a staff director and a general counsel who shall be appointed by the Commission. The staff director shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay in effect for level IV of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S. C. 5315). The general counsel shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay in effect for level V of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S. C. 5316). With the approval of the *165 Commission, the staff director may appoint and fix the pay of such |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | staff director may appoint and fix the pay of such additional personnel as he considers desirable. (2) With the approval of the Commission, the staff director may procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized by section 3 (b) of Title 5, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-15 of the general schedule (5 U.S. C. 53). (3) In carrying out its responsibilities under this Act, the Commission shall, to the fullest extent practicable, avail itself of the assistance, including personnel and facilities, of other agencies and departments of the United Government. The heads of such agencies and departments may make available to the Commission such personnel, facilities, and other assistance, with or without reimbursement, as the Commission may request. 437d. Powers of Commission. (a) Specific enumeration. The Commission has the power (1) to require, by special or general orders, any person to submit in writing such reports and answers to questions as the Commission may prescribe; and such submission shall be made within such a reasonable period of time and under oath or otherwise as the Commission may determine; (2) to administer oaths or affirmations; (3) to require by subpena, signed by the chairman or the vice chairman, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all documentary evidence relating to the execution of its duties; (4) in any proceeding or investigation, to order testimony to be taken by deposition before any person who is designated by the Commission and has *1 the power to administer oaths and, in such instances, to compel testimony and the production of evidence in the same manner as authorized under paragraph (3) of this subsection; (5) to pay witnesses the same fees and mileage as are paid in like circumstances in the courts of the United ; (6) to initiate (through civil proceedings for injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief), defend, or appeal any civil action in the name of the Commission for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Act, through its general counsel; (7) to render advisory opinions under section 437 of this title; (8) to make, amend, and repeal such rules, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 5 of Title 5, as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act; (9) to formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act and sections 608, 611, 614, 615, 616, and of Title 18; (10) to develop prescribed forms under subsection (a) (1) of this |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Buckley v. Valeo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109380/buckley-v-valeo/ | to develop prescribed forms under subsection (a) (1) of this section; and (11) to conduct investigations and hearings expeditiously, to encourage voluntary compliance, and to report apparent violations to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. (b) Judicial orders for compliance with subpenas and orders of Commission; contempt of court. Any United district court within the jurisdiction of which any inquiry is carried on, may, upon petition by the Commission, in case of refusal to obey a subpena or order of the Commission issued under subsection (a) of this section, issue an order requiring compliance therewith. Any failure to obey the order of the *167 court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof. (c) Civil liability for disclosure of information. No person shall be subject to civil liability to any person (other than the Commission or the United ) for disclosing information at the request of the Commission. (d) Transmittal to Congress: Budget estimates or requests and legislative recommendations; prior transmittal to Congress: legislative recommendations. (1) Whenever the Commission submits any budget estimate or request to the President of the United or the Office of Management and Budget, it shall concurrently transmit a copy of such estimate or request to the Congress. (2) Whenever the Commission submits any legislative recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation, requested by the Congress or by any Member of the Congress, to the President of the United or the Office of Management and Budget, it shall concurrently transmit a copy thereof to the Congress or to the Member requesting the same. No officer or agency of the United shall have any authority to require the Commission to submit its legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments on legislation, to any office or agency of the United for approval, comments, or review, prior to the submission of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress. 437e. Reports to President and Congress. The Commission shall transmit reports to the President of the United and to each House of the Congress no later than March 31 of each year. Each such report shall contain a detailed statement with respect to the activities of the Commission in carrying out its duties under this subchapter, together with recommendations *168 for such legislative or other action as the Commission considers appropriate. 437f. Advisory opinions. (a) Written requests; written opinions within reasonable time; specific transactions or activities constituting violations of provisions. Upon written request to the Commission by any individual holding Federal office, any candidate for Federal office, or any political committee, the Commission shall render an advisory opinion, in writing, within |
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