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Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | are not forbidden to sellers in other sections of the Act For we are not dealing simply with a `discrimination in price'; the `discrimination in price' in 2 (f) must be one `which is prohibited by this section.' Even if any price differential were to be comprehended within the term `discrimination in price,' 2 (f), which speaks of prohibited discriminations, cannot be read as declaring out of bounds price differentials within one or more of the `defenses' available to sellers, such as that the price differentials *78 reflect cost differences, fluctuating market conditions, or bona fide attempts to meet competition, as those defenses are set out in the provisos of 2 (a) and 2 (b)." -71 The Court thus explicitly recognized that a buyer cannot be held liable under 2 (f) if the lower prices received are justified by reason of one of the seller's affirmative defenses. III The petitioner, relying on this plain meaning of 2 (f) and the teaching of the Automatic Canteen case, argues that it cannot be liable under 2 (f) if Borden had a valid meeting-competition defense. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner may be liable even assuming that Borden had such a defense. The meeting-competition defense, the respondent contends, must in these circumstances be judged from the point of view of the buyer. Since A&P knew for a fact that the final Borden bid beat the Bowman bid, it was not entitled to assert the meeting-competition defense even though Borden may have honestly believed that it was simply meeting competition. Recognition of a meeting-competition defense for the buyer in this situation, the respondent argues, would be contrary to the basic purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act to curtail abuses by large buyers. A The short answer to these contentions of the respondent is that Congress did not provide in 2 (f) that a buyer can be liable even if the seller has a valid defense. The clear language of 2 (f) states that a buyer can be liable only if he receives a price discrimination "prohibited by this section." If a seller has a valid meeting-competition defense, there is simply no prohibited price discrimination. A similar attempt to amend the Robinson-Patman Act judicially was rejected by this Court in There the Federal Trade Commission had found that a manufacturer of dress patterns had violated 2 (e) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, by providing its larger customers services and facilities not offered its smaller customers.[11] The manufacturer attempted to defend against this charge by asserting that there |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | attempted to defend against this charge by asserting that there had been no injury to competition and that its discriminations in services were cost justified. Since liability under 2 (e), unlike 2 (a), does not depend upon competitive injury or the absence of a cost-justification defense, the manufacturer's primary argument was that "it would be `bad law and bad economics' to make discriminations unlawful even where they may be accounted for by cost differentials or where there is no competitive injury." The Court rejected this argument. Recognizing that "this Court is not in a position to review the economic wisdom of Congress," the Court stated that "[w]e cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted." The respondent's attempt in the present case to rewrite 2 (f) to hold a buyer liable even though there is no discrimination in price "prohibited by this section" must be rejected for the same reason.[12] *80 B In the Automatic Canteen case, the Court warned against interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act which "extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in so doing, help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation." Imposition of 2 (f) liability on the petitioner in this case would lead to just such price uniformity and rigidity.[13] In a competitive market, uncertainty among sellers will cause them to compete for business by offering buyers lower prices. Because of the evils of collusive action, the Court has held that the exchange of price information by competitors violates the Sherman Act. United Under the view advanced by the respondent, however, a buyer, to avoid liability, must either refuse a seller's bid or at least inform him that his bid has beaten competition. Such a duty of affirmative disclosure would almost inevitably frustrate competitive bidding and, by reducing uncertainty, lead to price matching and anticompetitive cooperation among sellers.[14] Ironically, the Commission itself, in dismissing the charge under 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in this case, recognized the dangers inherent in a duty of affirmative disclosure: "The imposition of a duty of affirmative disclosure, applicable to a buyer whenever a seller states that his offer is *81 intended to meet competition, is contrary to normal business practice and, we think, contrary to the public interest. "We fear a scenario where the seller automatically attaches a meeting competition caveat to every bid. The buyer would then state whether such bid meets, beats, or loses to another bid. The seller would then submit a second, a third, and perhaps a fourth bid until finally he |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | a third, and perhaps a fourth bid until finally he is able to ascertain his competitor's bid." 87 F. T. C. 1047, 1050-1051. The effect of the finding that the same conduct of the petitioner violated 2 (f), however, is to impose the same duty of affirmative disclosure which the Commission condemned as anticompetitive, "contrary to the public interest," and "contrary to normal business practice," in dismissing the charge under 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Neither the Commission nor the Court of Appeals offered any explanation for this apparent anomaly. As in the Automatic Canteen case, we decline to adopt a construction of 2 (f) that is contrary to its plain meaning and would lead to anticompetitive results. Accordingly, we hold that a buyer who has done no more than accept the lower of two prices competitively offered does not violate 2 (f) provided the seller has a meeting-competition defense.[15] *82 IV Because both the Commission and the Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that a buyer who accepts the lower of two competitive bids can be liable under 2 (f) even if the seller has a meeting-competition defense, there was not a specific finding that Borden did in fact have such a defense. But it quite clearly did. A The test for determining when a seller has a valid meeting-competition defense is whether a seller can "show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor." "A good-faith belief, rather than absolute certainty, that a price concession is being offered to meet an equally low price offered by a competitor is sufficient to satisfy the 2 (b) defense." United *83[1] Since good faith, rather than absolute certainty, is the touchstone of the meeting-competition defense, a seller can assert the defense even if it has unknowingly made a bid that in fact not only met but beat his competition. B Under the circumstances of this case, Borden did act reasonably and in good faith when it made its second bid. The petitioner, despite its longstanding relationship with Borden, was dissatisfied with Borden's first bid and solicited offers from other dairies. The subsequent events are aptly described in the opinion of the Commission: "Thereafter, on August 31, 195, A&P received an offer from Bowman Dairy that was lower than Borden's August 13 offer. On or about September 1, 195, Elmer Schmidt, A&P's Chicago unit buyer, telephoned Gordon Tarr, Borden's Chicago chain store sales manager, and |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | telephoned Gordon Tarr, Borden's Chicago chain store sales manager, and stated, `I have a bid in my pocket. You [Borden] people are so far out of line it is not even funny. You are not even in the ball park.' Although Tarr asked Schmidt for some details, Schmidt said that he could not tell Tarr anything except that a $50,000 improvement in Borden's bid `would not be a drop in the [bucket].' Contrary to its usual practice, A&P then offered Borden the opportunity *84 to submit another bid." 87 F. T. C., at 1048 (Footnotes and record citations omitted.) Thus, Borden was informed by the petitioner that it was in danger of losing its A&P business in the Chicago area unless it came up with a better offer. It was told that its first offer was "not even in the ball park" and that a $50,000 improvement "would not be a drop in the bucket." In light of Borden's established business relationship with the petitioner, Borden could justifiably conclude that A&P's statements were reliable and that it was necessary to make another bid offering substantial concessions to avoid losing its account with the petitioner. Borden was unable to ascertain the details of the Bowman bid. It requested more information about the bid from the petitioner, but this request was refused. It could not then attempt to verify the existence and terms of the competing offer from Bowman without risking Sherman Act liability. United Faced with a substantial loss of business and unable to find out the precise details of the competing bid, Borden made another offer stating that it was doing so in order to meet competition. Under these circumstances, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that in making that offer Borden acted in a reasonable and good-faith effort to meet its competition, and therefore was entitled to a meeting-competition defense.[17] *85 Since Borden had a meeting-competition defense and thus could not be liable under 2 (b), the petitioner who did no more than accept that offer cannot be liable under 2 (f).[18] Accordingly, the judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion, but dissent from Part IV. Because it was thought the issue was irrelevant where the buyer knows that the price offered is lower than necessary to meet competition, neither the Commission nor the Court of Appeals decided whether Borden itself would have had |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | Court of Appeals decided whether Borden itself would have had a valid meeting-competition defense. The Court should not decide this question here, but should remand to the Commission, whose job it is initially to consider such matters. For the reason stated by the Commission and the Court of Appeals, I am also convinced that the United States made a sufficient, unrebutted showing that Borden would not have a cost-justification defense to a Robinson-Patman Act charge. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting in part. I agree with the Court that the Federal Trade Commission and the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard in *8 assessing A&P's liability under the Robinson-Patman Act. However, I cannot join the Court's interpretation of 2 (f) as precluding buyer liability under this Act unless the seller could also be found liable for price discrimination. Neither the language nor the sparse legislative history of 2 (f) justifies this enervating standard for the determination of buyer liability. To the contrary, the Court's construction disregards the congressional purpose to curtail the coercive practices of chainstores and other large buyers. Having formulated a new legal standard, the Court then applies it here in the first instance rather than remanding the case to the Commission. Given the numerous ambiguities in the record, I believe the Court thereby improperly arrogates to itself the role of the trier of fact. I Section 2 (f) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." (Emphasis added.) The Court interprets the italicized language as "plainly meaning" that a buyer can be found liable for knowingly inducing price discrimination only if his seller is first proved liable under 2 (a) and 2 (b). Ante, at 7, 81. Under this construction, proceedings involving only the Commission and a buyer will turn upon proof of a seller's liability, and whenever a seller could successfully claim the meeting-competition defense, the buyer must be exonerated. In my view, the language of 2 (f) does not compel this circuitous method of establishing buyer liability. Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the Act define the elements of price discrimination and the affirmative defenses available to sellers. When Congress extended liability to buyers who encourage price discrimination, a ready means of defining the prohibition was to rely on the elements and defenses already delineated in 2 (a) and 2 (b). Thus, the phrase "which is prohibited by this section" in 2 (f) incorporates these elements and *87 defenses by reference, making them applicable to buyers. So construed, |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | defenses by reference, making them applicable to buyers. So construed, 2 (f) simply means that the same elements of a prima facie case must be established and the same basic affirmative defenses available, whether buyer or seller liability is in issue. The section does not require that another party actually satisfy all of the conditions of 2 (a) and 2 (b) before buyer liability can even be considered. Determining buyer and seller liability independently, I believe, places less strain on the "plain meaning" of the language of 2 (f) than does the absolutely derivative standard the majority announces today. In construing 2 (f), the Court relies on Congress' delay in adding the section to the final bill and on a remark by Representative Utterback during the legislative debates. Ante, at 75-77, and n. 10. The delay provides little logical justification for the Court's interpretation; rather, it more likely reflects Congress' late realization that halting the abusive practices of buyers[1] could not be accomplished solely through imposition of liability on sellers. Representative Utterback's statement, 80 Cong. Rec. 9419 (193), amounts to a slight paraphrase of 2 (f) and in no way supports the Court's derivative standard. I agree with the Court's suggestion, ante, at 80, that we must resolve the dilemma confronting a buyer who properly invites a seller to meet a competitor's price and then fortuitously *88 obtains a lower bid. Congress could not have expected the buyer to choose between asking the seller to increase the bid to a specific price or accepting the lower bid and facing liability under 2 (f). Rather, it must have intended some accommodation for buyers who act in good faith yet receive bids that beat competition. This does not mean, however, that a buyer should be liable under 2 (f) only if his seller also would be liable. That solution to the buyer's dilemma would enable him to manufacture his own defense by misrepresenting to a seller the response needed to meet a competitor's bid and then allowing the seller to rely in good faith on incorrect information. The Court purports to reserve this "lying buyer" issue, ante, at 81-82, n. 15, but the derivative standard it adopts today belies the reservation. If "prohibited by this section" means that a buyer's liability depends on that of the seller, then absent seller liability, the buyer's conduct and bad faith are necessarily irrelevant. I would hold that under 2 (f), the Robinson-Patman Act defenses must be available to buyers on the same basic terms as they are to sellers. To be sure, some differences in |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | they are to sellers. To be sure, some differences in the nature of the defenses would obtain because of the different bargaining positions of sellers and buyers. With respect to the meeting-competition defense at issue here, a seller can justify a price discrimination by showing that his lower price was offered in "good faith" to meet that of a competitor. Ante, at 82-83; United In my view, a buyer should be able to claim that defenseindependently of the sellerif he acted in good faith to induce the seller to meet a competitor's price, regardless of whether the seller's price happens to beat the competitor's. But a buyer who induces the lower bid by misrepresentation should not escape Robinson-Patman Act liability. See Kroger v. FTC, (CA) (Clark, J.), cert. denied, This definition of the meeting-competition defense both extricates buyers from an impossible dilemma and respects the congressional *89 intent to prevent buyers from abusing their market power to gain competitive advantage.[2] Automatic Canteen of is entirely consistent with this interpretation of 2 (f). The issue there concerned the allocation of "the burden of coming forward with evidence under 2 (f) of the Act," not the precise contours of the elements and defenses that determine the scope of buyer liability. Automatic Canteen's general discussion of 2 (f)'s substantive requirements, quoted ante, at 77-78, merely explains that the affirmative defenses "available to sellers" must also be available to buyers. Far from pronouncing that buyer liability is derivative, Automatic Canteen began with the observation that 2 (f) is "roughly the counterpart, as to buyers, of sections of the Act dealing with discrimination by sellers."[3] *90 II In my judgment, the numerous ambiguities in the record dictate that this case be remanded to the Commission. The Court, however, avoids a remand by concluding in the first instance that A&P's seller necessarily had a meeting-competition defense.[4] In so doing, the Court usurps the factfinding function best performed by the Commission.[5] Neither the Administrative Law Judge, the Commission, nor the Court of Appeals determined that Borden would have been entitled to claim the meeting-competition defense. Indeed, the Administrative Law Judge suggested the opposite, 87 F. T. C. 92, 1021 (197), and the Commission stated: "We believe that it is very probable that Borden did not have such a defense. To have a meeting competition *91 defense, the record must demonstrate the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the lower price would, in fact, meet the competitor's price. As noted, Borden had serious doubts concerning whether the competing bid was |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110019/great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-v-ftc/ | Borden had serious doubts concerning whether the competing bid was legal. Specifically, it believed that the other bid only considered direct costs. It should have asked A&P for more information about the competing bid. By not making the request, it was not acting prudently. As the record clearly indicates, A&P had knowledge of Borden's belief that other dairies might submit bids that did not include all costs." 87 F. T. C. 1047, 1057 n. 19 (197) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Furthermore, if the Court truly intends to avoid deciding the "lying buyer" issue, then it should remand the case for determination of whether the exception applies here. Testimony before the Administrative Law Judge directly raised the possibility that A&P misled Borden to believe a still lower price was necessary than Borden had offered when it first responded to the Bowman bid. App. 117a-118a, 123a-124a, 141a-142a.[] Both the Administrative Law Judge and the *92 Commission credited that testimony, see 87 F. T. C., at 979, 1021-1022; 87 F. T. C., at 1049 n. 3, but since evidence of misrepresentation was not material under the standard they applied, there were no clear findings of fact on the point. Under these circumstances, this Court should not attempt to elide such testimony by the unsubstantiated conclusion that Borden's final bid was unaffected by any misrepresentation. Ante, at 81-82, n. 15; see n. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court's adoption of a derivative standard for determining buyer liability and its resolution of disputed factual issues without a remand. |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | majority | United States v. Generix Drug Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110888/united-states-v-generix-drug-corp/ | The question presented is whether the statutory prohibition against the marketing of a "new drug" without the prior approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires respondent Generix Drug Corp to have approved new drug applications (NDA's) before it may market its generic drug products In statutory terms, we are required to determine whether the term "drug" as used in the relevant sections of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act), as amended, 21 US C 301 et seq (1976 ed and Supp V), refers only to the active ingredient in a drug product or to the entire product We hold that Congress intended the word to have the broader meaning I The active ingredients in most prescription drugs constitute less than 10% of the product; inactive "excipients" (such as coatings, binders, and capsules) constitute the rest The term "generic drug" is used to describe a product that contains the same active ingredients but not necessarily the same excipients as a so-called "pioneer drug" that is marketed *455 under a brand name[1] Respondent Generix is a distributor of generic drugs manufactured by other firms The Government initiated this action to enjoin Generix from distributing in interstate commerce a number of generic drug products that contain eight specified active ingredients[2] It alleged that the FDA had never approved new drug applications with respect to any of those products[3] The District Court held that a generic drug product containing the same active ingredients as a previously approved pioneer drug is a "new drug," requiring an NDA, only if there is a reasonable possibility that the differences in excipients between the generic product and the pioneer will make the generic product less safe and effective The court found clear evidence in support of the general proposition that differences in excipients may affect the safety and effectiveness of drug products Excipients may affect the rate at which the active ingredient is delivered to a diseased organ If delivery is too fast, the patient may be harmed just as if he received an overdose; if delivery is too slow, the treatment of the disease may be ineffective *456 In this case, the District Court found that the Government had established a reasonable possibility that the safety and effectiveness of six of respondent's generic drug products might be affected by differences between their excipients and those found in approved products[4] Accordingly, it enjoined the defendants from further distribution of products containing the designated active ingredients The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, vacated the District Court's injunction and remanded |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | majority | United States v. Generix Drug Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110888/united-states-v-generix-drug-corp/ | the Eleventh Circuit, vacated the District Court's injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint It held that the statutory prohibition against the sale of a "new drug" without prior approval does not apply to a drug product having the same active ingredients as a previously approved drug product, regardless of any differences in excipients It based that conclusion on its view that the statutory requirement of evaluating the safety and effectiveness of new drugs must normally relate to active ingredients, because the precise technique of formulating the finished drug is not part of the information generally known to the medical or scientific community Moreover, it believed that the legislative history suggested that Congress had not intended to create a product-by-product licensing system Since the active ingredients at issue had all received the necessary approval, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government was entitled to no relief at all Because the question is obviously important and because it has been decided differently in other Circuits,[5] we granted certiorari [6] *457 II In resolving the narrow issue presented, the Court of Appeals misread the statutory text Section 201(p) of the Act defines a "new drug" to be "any drug [which] is not generally recognized as safe and effective or which has not, otherwise than in [safety and effectiveness] investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time "[7] The Court of Appeals did not rest its decision on a finding that Generix's products are generally recognized as safe and effective; rather, its conclusion rested on the proposition that the statutory phrase "any drug" does not include a complete drug product, but only an active ingredient That proposition is simply untenable The original Federal Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, prohibited the sale of adulterated or misbranded *458 foods or drugs The definition of the term "drug" in that statute was plainly broad enough to describe a completed drug product It provided: "That the term `drug,' as used in this Act, shall include all medicines and preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary for internal or external use, and any substance or mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease of either man or other animals" In 1938, Congress passed the new statute, which requires that an application be submitted to the FDA before any "new drug" may be introduced into interstate commerce Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 US C 301 et seq (1976 ed and Supp V) The new Act's |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | majority | United States v. Generix Drug Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110888/united-states-v-generix-drug-corp/ | et seq (1976 ed and Supp V) The new Act's definition of the term "drug" is even broader than the old one: "[201](g)(1) The term `drug' means (A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph; but does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories" as amended, and as set forth in 21 US C 321(g)(1) In examining this statutory definition, the Court of Appeals was persuaded that only active ingredients come within the terms of subsection (A) [8] Unfortunately, *459 the court did not analyze the entire definition If it had done so, it would have noted both that the terms of subsections (A), (B), and (C) are plainly broad enough to include more than just active ingredients, and that they must do so unless subsection (D) is to be superfluous Because the definition is disjunctive, generic drug products are quite plainly drugs within the meaning of the Act The natural reading of this definition is corroborated by other sections of the Act Section 501(a) provides that a "drug" is deemed adulterated "if [it is a drug which] bears or contains, for purposes of coloring only, a color additive which is unsafe" 52 Stat 1049, as amended, 21 US C 351(a)(4) Section 502(e) provides that a "drug fabricated from two or more ingredients" shall be deemed to be misbranded unless its label includes, "whether active or not, the established name and quantity or proportion of any bromides, ether, chloroform, [etc]" 52 Stat 1050-1051, as amended, 21 US C 352(e)(1) And 505(b) requires that an application for new drug approval contain "a full list of the articles used as components of such drug [and] a full statement of the composition of such drug" 52 Stat 1052, 21 US C 355(b) The term "drug" is plainly intended throughout the Act to include entire drug products, complete with active and inactive ingredients[9] Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondents have pointed to anything in the text of the Act that is inconsistent *460 with our reading of its plain language[10] The respondents make a number of arguments |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | majority | United States v. Generix Drug Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110888/united-states-v-generix-drug-corp/ | its plain language[10] The respondents make a number of arguments based upon legislative history and administrative practice regarding the marketing of generic prescription and over-the-counter drugs that lend support to the proposition that two products need not have precisely the same molecular structure in order to be the same "drug"[11] None of those arguments, however, warrants the conclusion that the term "drug" means only the active ingredient in a product In this case we are not required to determine what types of differences between drugs would be significant or insignificant under the statute Respondent Generix argues only *461 that its products are not new drugs under the theory that "drug" means "active ingredient"; it does not argue that its complete products active ingredients and excipients together are the same as previously approved products The latter argument would, of course, have been unavailing on the facts before us; for the respondent has not questioned the District Court's finding of a reasonable possibility that its products are not bioequivalent to any previously approved products[12] We thus do not reach the issue of whether two demonstrably bioequivalent products, containing the same active ingredients but different excipients, might under some circumstances be the same "drug" In summary, a generic drug product is a "drug" within the meaning of 201(g)(1) of the Act Such a product is therefore a "new drug," subject to the requirements of 505, until the product (and not merely its active ingredient) no longer falls within the terms of 201(p) The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | concurring | Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195550/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc/ | I write separately to clarify my understanding of the pre-emption principles that should guide this Court’s analysis of the Federal Power Act and that underpin its conclusion in these cases. The process through which consumers obtain energy stretches across state and federal regulatory domains. The Federal Power Act authorizes the States to regulate energy production. 16 U.S. C. It then instructs the Federal Government to step in and regulate wholesale purchases and energy transportation. Finally, it allows the States to assume control over the ultimate sale of energy to consumers. In short, the Federal Power Act, like all collaborative federalism stat- utes, envisions a federal-state relationship marked by interdependence. 2 HUGHES v. TALEN ENERGY MARKETING, LLC SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring Pre-emption inquiries related to such collaborative programs are particularly delicate. This Court has said that where “coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre- emption becomes a less persuasive one.” New York State Dept. of Social (1973). That is not to say that pre-emption has no role in such programs, but courts must be careful not to confuse the “congressionally designed interplay between state and federal regulation,” Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation, Comm’n of Kan., (1989), for impermissible tension that requires pre- emption under the Supremacy Clause. In this context, therefore, our general exhortation not to rely on a talismanic pre-emption vocabulary applies with special force. See (1941) (“This Court has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick” (footnote omitted)). I understand today’s opinion to reflect these principles. Using the purpose of the Federal Power Act as the “ulti- mate touchstone” of its pre-emption inquiry, Altria Group, rather than resting on generic pre-emption frameworks unrelated to the Fed- eral Power Act, the Court holds that Maryland has im- permissibly impeded the performance of one of FERC’s core regulatory duties. Ensuring “just and reasonable” wholesale rates is a central purpose of the Act. See 16 Pursuant to its mandate to set such rates, FERC has approved the PJM Interconnection capacity auction as the proper mechanism to determine the “just and reasonable” rate for the sale of petitioner CPV Mary- Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring land, LLC’s energy at wholesale. Ante, at 12. Maryland, however, has acted to guarantee CPV a rate different from FERC’s “just and reasonable” rate and has thus contra- |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | concurring | Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195550/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc/ | from FERC’s “just and reasonable” rate and has thus contra- vened the goals of the Federal Power Act. Such actions must be preempted. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, (“States may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable wholesale rates”). The Court, however, also rightly recognizes the importance of protecting the States’ ability to contribute, within their regulatory domain, to the Federal Power Act’s goal of ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient and price-effective energy. Ante, at 15. Endorsing those conclusions, I join the Court’s opinion in full. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 1 Opinion of THOMAS, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 14–614 and 14–623 W. KEVIN HUGHES, CHAIRMAN, MARYLAND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–614 v. TALEN ENERGY MARKETING, LLC, FKA PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC, ET AL. CPV MARYLAND, LLC, PETITIONER 14–623 v. TALEN ENERGY MARKETING, LLC, FKA PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC, ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [April 19, 2016] JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The Court concludes that Maryland’s regulatory pro- gram invades the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis- sion’s (FERC) exclusive jurisdiction over interstate whole- sale sales of electric energy. Ante, at 12. I agree that the statutory text and framework compel that conclusion, and that Maryland’s program therefore cannot stand. Because the statute provides a sufficient basis for resolving these cases, I would not also rest today’s holding on principles of implied pre-emption. See, e.g., ante, at 11–12. For that reason, I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent that it rests on the text and structure of the Federal Power Act (FPA), as amended, 16 U.S. C. et seq. The FPA divides federal and state jurisdiction over the regulation of electricity sales. As relevant here, the FPA 2 HUGHES v. TALEN ENERGY MARKETING, LLC Opinion of THOMAS, J. grants FERC the authority to regulate “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” That federal authority over interstate wholesale sales is exclusive. See, e.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 4 U.S. 953, (recognizing that Congress “vested” in FERC “exclusive jurisdiction” and “plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates”); Mis- sissippi Power & Light 487 U.S. 354, 377 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is common ground that if FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, the States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject”). To resolve these cases, it is enough to conclude that Maryland’s program invades FERC’s exclusive jurisdic- tion. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | concurring | Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3195550/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc/ | to conclude that Maryland’s program invades FERC’s exclusive jurisdic- tion. Maryland has partially displaced the FERC- endorsed market mechanism for determining wholesale capacity rates. Under Maryland’s program, CPV Mary- land, LLC, is entitled to receive, for its wholesale sales into the capacity auction, something other than what FERC has decided that generators should receive. That is a regulation of wholesale sales: By “fiddling with the effective price” that CPV receives for its wholesale sales, Maryland has “regulate[d]” wholesale sales “no less than does direct ratesetting.” FERC v. Electric Power Supply Assn., 577 U. S. (2016) (Scalia, J., dissent- ing) (slip op., at 6) (emphasis deleted) (addressing analo- gous situation involving retail sales). Maryland’s program therefore intrudes on the exclusive federal jurisdiction over wholesale electricity rates. Although the Court applies the FPA’s framework in reaching that conclusion, see ante, at 12, it also relies on principles of implied pre-emption, see, e.g., ante, at 11–12. Because we can resolve these cases based on the statute alone, I would affirm based solely on the FPA. Accord- ingly, I concur in the judgment and I join the Court’s opinion to the extent that it holds that Maryland’s pro- gram invades FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Florida v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111280/florida-v-rodriguez/ | With increasing frequency this Court seems prone to disregard important differences between cases that come to us from state tribunals and those that arise in the federal system. See Secretary of State of As the Court of last resort in the federal system, we have supervisory authority and therefore must occasionally perform a pure error-correcting function in federal litigation. We do not have comparable supervisory responsibility to correct mistakes that are bound to occur in the thousands of state tribunals throughout the land. The unusual action the Court takes today illustrates how far the Court may depart from its principal mission when it becomes transfixed by the specter of a drug courier escaping the punishment that in his due. I Some five years ago a Florida trial judge conducted the suppression hearing in this case and a county narcotics officer testified at some length. The transcript contains a somewhat improbable account of the respondent either running in place or frantically running in circles in the presence of the *8 agent,[1] and the agent identifying himself to the respondent as a police officer in order to be sure he would not be mistaken for a member of the Hare Krishna.[2] *9 After hearing all of the officer's testimony, the trial judge stated: "Counsel, I am going to rule as a matter of fact that they did nothing wrong, that there was no reason to stop these men for contact or for any other reason at that point in time. The whole case hinges on whether or not there was consent given subsequent to that time. Let me hear your argument to that." Tr. 104. After hearing argument, the judge ruled that respondent had not voluntarily consented to a search of his luggage. In making that ruling, the judge relied, in part, on the fact that the narcotics agent had not advised the respondent that he had a right to refuse to consent to the search. Today this Court holds (1) that the officer did have an "articulable suspicion" that justified a temporary seizure of respondent's person; and (2) that the trial judge did not articulate a legally sufficient basis for his conclusion that respondent did not voluntarily consent to the search of his bag. Accordingly, the Court remands the case to the Florida District Court of Appeal for further proceedings. To understand the unusual nature of this disposition, it is necessary to comment on some of the events that have transpired in this litigation during the past five years. II On September 23, 1980, after full argument, the District Court of |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Florida v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111280/florida-v-rodriguez/ | September 23, 1980, after full argument, the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third District filed an opinion which reads in its entirety as follows: "PER CURIAM. "Affirmed on the authority of" The Florida Attorney General did not ask the Florida Supreme Court to review that decision. He did not do so because the Florida appellate system has been carefully structured to enable the State's highest court to concentrate *10 on matters of greater public importance than the possibility that a trial judge's error might not have been corrected by the intermediate court of appeal. As the Florida Supreme Court explained in a 1958 opinion: "We have heretofore pointed out that under the constitutional plan the powers of this Court to review decisions of the district courts of appeal are limited and strictly prescribed. The revision and modernization of the Florida judicial system at the appellate level was prompted by the great volume of cases reaching the Supreme Court and the consequent delay in the administration of justice. The new article embodies throughout its terms the idea of a Supreme Court which functions as a supervisory body in the judicial system for the State, exercising appellate power in certain specified areas essential to the settlement of issues of public importance and the preservation of uniformity of principle and practice, with review by the district courts in most instances being final and absolute." Recognizing that the Florida Supreme Court does not provide a forum for error-correcting review of lower court judgments in that State's judicial system, the Florida Attorney General instead filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. Because the petition did not present any question of general significance, on May 26, 1981, this Court wisely denied certiorari. Presumably because they were convinced that error had been committed, three Members of the Court dissented from that disposition and stated that they "would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment." Ibid.[3] The Attorney General of Florida then filed a timely petition for rehearing. *11 III Rule 51.2 of this Court's Rules requires that the grounds set forth in a petition for rehearing "must be limited to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not previously presented." The principal ground advanced by Florida in its petition for rehearing was that a succession of clearly erroneous per curiam decisions of the State District Court of Appeal was having a devastating effect on its prosecutions. As an "intervening circumstance," it noted that the State had filed a petition for certiorari in In my opinion neither of |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Florida v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111280/florida-v-rodriguez/ | a petition for certiorari in In my opinion neither of these grounds satisfied the terms of our Rule. In any event, the petition for a rehearing remained on the Court's docket for the next two years. Rule 51.3 provides that no petition for a rehearing will be granted without an opportunity to submit a response. In 1983, when respondent was at long last asked to respond to the State's petition, we learned that he was a fugitive from justice and no longer was represented by counsel. On May 23, 1983, the Court entered an order granting the petition for rehearing, vacating the judgment of the District Court of Appeal and remanding the case to that court for reconsideration in the light of our opinions in IV On November 15, 1983, the District Court of Appeal of Florida filed an order which reads, in its entirety, as follows: "PER CURIAM. Affirmed." The Attorney General thereafter filed another petition for certiorari in this Court,[4] and today the Court rewards him *12 for this effort. I continue to believe, however, that this case does not present any legal issue warranting review in this Court. At the time the District Court of Appeal's opinion was filed, every decision cited in the Court's opinion today had already been decided. Presumably, the petitioner called all of those cases to the attention of the Florida District Court of Appeal. Since the Court does not purport to announce any new principle of law, it is also fair to presume that the Florida District Court of Appeal was already familiar with the legal principles discussed by the Court today. Thus, the Court performs the error-correcting function that the Florida Supreme Court has refused to perform, and reverses the state court's judgment by applying settled principles to the facts of this case. V The Court's opinion today is flawed in at least two respects. It is highly unusual for this Court to undertake de novo review of the factual findings of a state court on the "articulable suspicion" issue. My colleagues did not hear the witness testify; they have insufficient time to study the transcript with the care that is appropriate to credibility determinations; and, indeed, collectively they have only minimal experience in the factfinding profession. Moreover, the Court's disposition of the consent issue implicitly assumes that the Florida District Court of Appeal has a duty to explain its reasons for affirming the trial court's judgment. If that court, upon remand, simply enters another one-word order affirming the trial court's judgment, I would suppose that this Court would have to |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Florida v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111280/florida-v-rodriguez/ | judgment, I would suppose that this Court would have to interpret the ruling as a determination on the existing record that the respondent did not voluntarily consent to the search of his luggage. A petition for certiorari on that question would present "a fact-bound issue of little importance." If we presume, as I think we should, that the judges of that court *13 were already familiar with the cases discussed in this Court's opinion, I do not understand why we should not make the same assumption on the record as it presently exists. VI There is a certain irony in the fact that respondent is a fugitive from justice. If he is apprehended, he probably will be punished for his flight from justice even if the suppression order is ultimately upheld. Perhaps this Court's tireless efforts to bring this one man to justice will result in convictions on both counts. In either event, I believe this Court should abandon its error-correcting role in cases on direct review from state courts. Instead, the Court ought to take a lesson from the Supreme Court of Florida and focus its attention on issues of overriding importance to the administration of justice. The single-minded achievement of results in individual cases is not a virtue that should characterize the work of this Court. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | I agree with most of what JUSTICE MARSHALL has said in his dissenting opinion. I, too, dissent, but I base my conclusion also on evidentiary factors that the Court rejects with some emphasis. The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two times out of three. The Court reaches this result even in a capital case because, it is said, the testimony is subject to cross-examination and impeachment. In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at stake no matter how heinous his offense a requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself. I To obtain a death sentence in the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Tex. *917 Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b)() As a practical matter, this prediction of future dangerousness was the only issue to be decided by Barefoot's sentencing jury.[1] At the sentencing hearing, the State established that Barefoot had two prior convictions for drug offenses and two prior convictions for unlawful possession of firearms. None of these convictions involved acts of violence. At the guilt stage of the trial, for the limited purpose of establishing that the crime was committed in order to evade police custody, see cert. denied, the State had presented evidence that Barefoot had escaped from jail in New Mexico where he was being held on charges of statutory rape and unlawful restraint of a minor child with intent to commit sexual penetration against the child's will. The prosecution also called several character witnesses at the sentencing hearing, from towns in five States. Without mentioning particular examples of Barefoot's conduct, these witnesses testified that Barefoot's reputation for being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was bad in their respective communities. Last, the prosecution called Doctors Holbrook and Grigson, whose testimony extended over more than half the hearing. Neither had examined Barefoot or requested the opportunity to examine him. In the presence of the jury, and over defense counsel's objection, each was qualified as an expert psychiatrist witness. Doctor Holbrook detailed at length his training and experience as a psychiatrist, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | detailed at length his training and experience as a psychiatrist, which included a position as chief of psychiatric services at the *91 Department of Corrections. He explained that he had previously performed many "criminal evaluations," Trial Tr. 069, and that he subsequently took the post at the Department of Corrections to observe the subjects of these evaluations so that he could "be certain those opinions that [he] had were accurate at the time of trial and pretrial." He then informed the jury that it was "within [his] capacity as a doctor of psychiatry to predict the future dangerousness of an individual within a reasonable medical certainty," and that he could give "an expert medical opinion that would be within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to whether or not that individual would be dangerous to the degree that there would be a probability that that person would commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing threat to society," Doctor Grigson also detailed his training and medical experience, which, he said, included examination of "between thirty and forty thousand individuals," including000 charged with felonies, and at least 300 charged with murder. He testified that with enough information he would be able to "give a medical opinion within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to the psychological or psychiatric makeup of an individual," and that this skill was "particular to the field of psychiatry and not to the average layman." Each psychiatrist then was given an extended hypothetical question asking him to assume as true about Barefoot the four prior convictions for nonviolent offenses, the bad reputation for being law-abiding in various communities, the New Mexico escape, the events surrounding the murder for which he was on trial and, in Doctor Grigson's case, the New Mexico arrest. On the basis of the hypothetical question, Doctor Holbrook diagnosed Barefoot "within a reasonable psychiatr[ic] certainty," as a "criminal sociopath." He testified that he knew of no treatment that could change *919 this condition, and that the condition would not change for the better but "may become accelerated" in the next few years. Finally, Doctor Holbrook testified that, "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," there was "a probability that the Thomas A. Barefoot in that hypothetical will commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing threat to society," and that his opinion would not change if the "society" at issue was that within prisons rather than society outside prison. -101. Doctor Grigson then testified that, on the basis of the hypothetical question, he could diagnose Barefoot "within reasonable psychiatric certainty" as |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | question, he could diagnose Barefoot "within reasonable psychiatric certainty" as an individual with "a fairly classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder." He placed Barefoot in the "most severe category" of sociopaths (on a scale of one to ten, Barefoot was "above ten"), and stated that there was no known cure for the condition. Finally, Doctor Grigson testified that whether Barefoot was in society at large or in a prison society there was a "one hundred percent and absolute" chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the psychiatrists about studies demonstrating that psychiatrists' predictions of future dangerousness are inherently unreliable. Doctor Holbrook indicated his familiarity with many of these studies but stated that he disagreed with their conclusions. Doctor Grigson stated that he was not familiar with most of these studies, and that their conclusions were accepted by only a "small minority group" of psychiatrists "[i]t's not the American Psychiatric Association that believes that." After an hour of deliberation, the jury answered "yes" to the two statutory questions, and Thomas Barefoot was sentenced to death. *90 II A The American Psychiatric Association (APA), participating in this case as amicus curiae, informs us that "[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession." Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae 1 (APA Brief). The APA's best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists are wrong. The Court does not dispute this proposition, see ante, at 99-901, n. 7, and indeed it could not do so; the evidence is overwhelming. For example, the APA's Draft Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process (Draft Report) states that "[c]onsiderable evidence has been accumulated by now to demonstrate that long-term prediction by psychiatrists of future violence is an extremely inaccurate process." John Monahan, recognized as "the leading thinker on this issue" even by the State's expert witness at Barefoot's federal habeas corpus hearing, Hearing Tr. 195, concludes that "the `best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior," even among populations of individuals who are mentally ill and have committed violence in the past. J. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 47-49 (emphasis deleted) (J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction); see also Another study has found it impossible to identify any subclass of offenders "whose members have a greater-than-even chance |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | any subclass of offenders "whose members have a greater-than-even chance of engaging again in an assaultive act." Wenk, Robison, & Can Violence Be Predicted?, 1 Crime & Delinquency 393, 394 (1). Yet another commentator observes: "In general, mental health professionals are more likely to be wrong than right when they predict legally relevant behavior. When predicting violence, dangerousness, and suicide, they are far more *91 likely to be wrong than right." Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Neither the Court nor the State of has cited a single reputable scientific source contradicting the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong more often than they are right.[] The APA also concludes, see APA Brief 9-16, as do researchers that have studied the issue,[3] that psychiatrists simply have no expertise in predicting long-term future dangerousness. *9 A layman with access to relevant statistics can do at least as well and possibly better; psychiatric training is not relevant to the factors that validly can be employed to make such predictions, and psychiatrists consistently err on the side of overpredicting violence.[4] Thus, while Doctors Grigson and Holbrook were presented by the State and by self-proclamation as experts at predicting future dangerousness, the scientific literature makes crystal clear that they had no expertise whatever. Despite their claims that they were able to predict Barefoot's future behavior "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," or to a "one hundred percent and absolute" certainty, there was in fact no more than a one in three chance that they were correct.[5] *93 B It is impossible to square admission of this purportedly scientific but actually baseless testimony with the Constitution's paramount concern for reliability in capital sentencing.[6]*94 Death is a permissible punishment in only if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability the defendant will commit future acts of criminal violence. The admission of unreliable psychiatric predictions of future violence, offered with unabashed claims of "reasonable medical certainty" or "absolute" professional reliability, creates an intolerable danger that death sentences will be imposed erroneously. The plurality in stated: "Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." The Court does not see fit to mention this principle today, yet it is as firmly established as any in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | as firmly established as any in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Only two weeks ago, in the Court described the need for reliability in the application of the death penalty as one of the *95 basic "themes reiterated in our opinions discussing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital sentencing determinations." See ; ; ; ; ; (17) ; State evidence rules notwithstanding, it is well established that, because the truth-seeking process may be unfairly skewed, due process may be violated even in a noncapital criminal case by the exclusion of evidence probative of innocence, see (13), or by the admission of certain categories of unreliable and prejudicial evidence, see ;[7] The reliability and admissibility of evidence considered by a capital sentencing factfinder is obviously of still greater constitutional concern. Cf. ; (17). The danger of an unreliable death sentence created by this testimony cannot be brushed aside on the ground that the " `jury [must] have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.' " Ante, at quoting Although committed to allowing a "wide scope of evidence" at presentence hearings, *96 the Court has recognized that "consideration must be given to the quality, as well as the quantity, of the information on which the sentencing [authority] may rely." 430 U. S., at Thus, very recently, this Court reaffirmed a crucial limitation on the permissible scope of evidence: " `[s]o long as the evidence introduced do[es] not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions.' " quoting The Court all but admits the obviously prejudicial impact of the testimony of Doctors Grigson and Holbrook; granting that their absolute claims were more likely to be wrong than right, ante, at 99, n. 7, 901, the Court states that "[t]here is no doubt that the psychiatric testimony increased the likelihood that petitioner would be sentenced to death," ante, at 905. Indeed, unreliable scientific evidence is widely acknowledged to be prejudicial. The reasons for this are manifest. "The major danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury; an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny." Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific : Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 0 Colum. L. Rev. 11,[] Where the public holds an exaggerated opinion of *97 the accuracy of scientific testimony, the prejudice is likely to be indelible. See United (CA4), cert. denied, (15). There is little question that psychiatrists are perceived by the public as having a special expertise to predict |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | by the public as having a special expertise to predict dangerousness, a perception based on psychiatrists' study of mental disease. See J. Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry 17-1 ; & 5 Soc. Probs., at 73; Morse, Analysis of Mental Health -536. It is this perception that the State in Barefoot's case sought to exploit. Yet mental disease is not correlated with violence, see J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 77-; & and the stark fact is that no such expertise exists. Moreover, psychiatrists, it is said, sometimes attempt to perpetuate this illusion of expertise, & 5 Soc. Probs., at 74, and Doctors Grigson and Holbrook who purported to be able to predict future dangerousness "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," or absolutely present extremely disturbing examples *9 of this tendency. The problem is not uncommon. See Giannelli, Scientific 0 Colum. L. Rev., at 13. Furthermore, as is only reasonable, the Court's concern in encouraging the introduction of a wide scope of evidence has been to ensure that accurate information is provided to the sentencing authority without restriction. The joint opinion announcing the judgment in Gregg explained the jury's need for relevant evidence in these terms: "If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing decision." 4 U.S., at 190 See California v. Ramos, post, at 1004 (Court holds jury instruction permissible at sentencing hearing on ground that it "gives the jury accurate information") So far as I am aware, the Court never has suggested that there is any interest in providing deceptive and inaccurate testimony to the jury. Psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are not accurate; wrong two times out of three, their probative value, and therefore any possible contribution they might make to the ascertainment of truth, is virtually nonexistent. See & 9 Rutgers L. Rev., at 1101 Indeed, given a psychiatrist's prediction that an individual will be dangerous, it is more likely than not that the defendant will not commit further violence. It is difficult to understand how the admission of such predictions can be justified as advancing the search for truth, particularly in light of their clearly prejudicial effect. *99 Thus, the Court's remarkable observation that "[n]either petitioner nor the [APA] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time," ante, at 901 misses the point completely, and its claim that this testimony was no more problematic than "other relevant evidence against any defendant in a criminal case," ante, at 905-906, is simply incredible. Surely, this Court's commitment to ensuring that death sentences are imposed reliably and reasonably requires that nonprobative and highly prejudicial testimony on the ultimate question of life or death be excluded from a capital sentencing hearing. III A Despite its recognition that the testimony at issue was probably wrong and certainly prejudicial, the Court holds this testimony admissible because the Court is "unconvinced. that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness." Ante, at 901; see ante, at 99-901, n. 7. One can only wonder how juries are to separate valid from invalid expert opinions when the "experts" themselves are so obviously unable to do so. Indeed, the evidence suggests that juries are not effective at assessing the validity of scientific evidence. Giannelli, Scientific 0 Colum. L. Rev., at 139-140, and n. 319. There can be no question that psychiatric predictions of future violence will have an undue effect on the ultimate verdict. Even judges tend to accept psychiatrists' recommendations about a defendant's dangerousness with little regard for cross-examination or other testimony. & 5 Soc. Probs., at 71 (in making involuntary commitment decisions, psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness accepted in 6.7% of cases); see Morse, Analysis of Mental Health n. 16, 603. There is every reason to believe that inexperienced *930 jurors will be still less capable of "separat[ing] the wheat from the chaff," despite the Court's blithe assumption to the contrary, ante, at 901, n. 7. The American Bar Association has warned repeatedly that sentencing juries are particularly incapable of dealing with information relating to "the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes," and similar predictive judgments. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 1.1(b), Commentary, pp. 46-47 (App. Draft 196); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 1-1.1, Commentary, pp. 1.16, 1.4 to 1.5 Relying on the ABA's conclusion, the joint opinion announcing the judgment in 4 U. S., at 19, recognized that "[s]ince the members of a jury will have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given." But the Court in this case, in its haste to praise the jury's ability to find the truth, apparently forgets |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | praise the jury's ability to find the truth, apparently forgets this well-known and worrisome shortcoming. As if to suggest that petitioner's position that unreliable expert testimony should be excluded is unheard of in the law, the Court relies on the proposition that the rules of evidence generally "anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party." Ante, at 9. But the Court simply ignores hornbook law that, despite the availability of cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, "opinion evidence is not admissible if the court believes that the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted." E. Cleary, McCormick on 13, p. 31 (d ed. 1). Because it is feared that the jury will overestimate its probative value, polygraph evidence, for example, almost invariably is excluded from trials despite the fact that, at a conservative estimate, an experienced polygraph examiner can detect truth or deception correctly about 0 to 90 percent of the time. Ennis & *931 at 736.[9] In no area is purportedly "expert" testimony admitted for the jury's consideration where it cannot be demonstrated that it is correct more often than not. "It is inconceivable that a judgment could be considered an `expert' judgment when it is less accurate than the flip of a coin." The risk that a jury will be incapable of separating "scientific" myth from reality is deemed unacceptably high.[10] B The Constitution's mandate of reliability, with the stakes at life or death, precludes reliance on cross-examination and the opportunity to present rebuttal witnesses as an antidote for this distortion of the truth-finding process. Cross-examination is unlikely to reveal the fatuousness of psychiatric *93 predictions because such predictions often rest, as was the case here, on psychiatric categories and intuitive clinical judgments not susceptible to cross-examination and rebuttal. at 44. Psychiatric categories have little or no demonstrated relationship to violence, and their use often obscures the unimpressive statistical or intuitive bases for prediction. J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 31; & 5 Soc. Probs., at 74.[11] The APA particularly condemns the use of the diagnosis employed by Doctors Grigson and Holbrook in this case, that of sociopathy: "In this area confusion reigns. The psychiatrist who is not careful can mislead the judge or jury into believing that a person has a major mental disease simply on the basis of a description of prior criminal behavior. Or a psychiatrist can mislead the court into believing that an individual is devoid of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | the court into believing that an individual is devoid of conscience on the basis of a description of criminal acts alone. The profession of psychiatry has a responsibility to avoid inflicting this confusion upon the courts and to spare the defendant the harm that may result. Given our uncertainty about the implications of the finding, the diagnosis of sociopathy. should not be used to justify or to support predictions of future conduct. There is no certainty in this area." Draft Report 30. It is extremely unlikely that the adversary process will cut through the facade of superior knowledge. THE CHIEF JUSTICE long ago observed: *933 "The very nature of the adversary system complicates the use of scientific opinion evidence, particularly in the field of psychiatry. This system of partisan contention, of attack and counterattack, at its best is not ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait or profile of the human personality, especially in the area of abnormal behavior. Although under ideal conditions the adversary system can develop for a jury most of the necessary fact material for an adequate decision, such conditions are rarely achieved in the courtrooms in this country. These ideal conditions would include a highly skilled and experienced trial judge and highly skilled lawyers on both sides of the case, all of whom in addition to being well-trained in the law and in the techniques of advocacy would be sophisticated in matters of medicine, psychiatry, and psychology. It is far too rare that all three of the legal actors in the cast meet these standards." Burger, Psychiatrists, yers, and the Courts, Fed. Prob. 3, 6 (June 1964). Another commentator has noted: "Competent cross-examination and jury instructions may be partial antidotes but they cannot be complete. Many of the cases are not truly adversarial; too few attorneys are skilled at cross-examining psychiatrists, laypersons overweigh the testimony of experts, and, in any case, unrestricted use of experts promotes the incorrect view that the questions are primarily scientific. There is, however, no antidote for the major difficulty with mental health `experts' that they simply are not experts In realms beyond their true expertise, the law has little special to learn from them; too often their testimony is prejudicial." Morse, Analysis of Mental Health 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 66. *934 See See also at 44-45; Ennis & at 745; -100; J. Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry 0-03 Nor is the presentation of psychiatric witnesses on behalf of the defense likely to remove the prejudicial taint of misleading testimony by prosecution psychiatrists.[1] No reputable expert would be able |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | testimony by prosecution psychiatrists.[1] No reputable expert would be able to predict with confidence that the defendant will not be violent; at best, the witness will be able to give his opinion that all predictions of dangerousness are unreliable. Consequently, the jury will not be presented with the traditional battle of experts with opposing views on the ultimate question. Given a choice between an expert who says that he can predict with certainty that the defendant, whether confined in prison or free in society, will kill again, and an expert who says merely that no such prediction can be made, members of the jury charged by law with making the prediction surely will be tempted to opt for the expert who claims he can help them in performing their duty, and who predicts dire consequences if the defendant is not put to death.[13] Moreover, even at best, the presentation of defense psychiatrists will convert the death sentence hearing into a battle of *935 experts, with the Eighth Amendment's well-established requirement of individually focused sentencing a certain loser. The jury's attention inevitably will turn from an assessment of the propriety of sentencing to death the defendant before it to resolving a scientific dispute about the capabilities of psychiatrists to predict future violence. In such an atmosphere, there is every reason to believe that the jury may be distracted from its constitutional responsibility to consider "particularized mitigating factors," see 4 U. S., at 7, in passing on the defendant's future dangerousness. See n. 1, at 310. One searches the Court's opinion in vain for a plausible justification for tolerating the State's creation of this risk of an erroneous death verdict. As one Court of Appeals has observed: "A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defendant should not hang on his ability to successfully rebut scientific evidence which bears an `aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,' although, in reality the witness is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypothesis which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field." United 557 F.d 541, (CA6 17). Ultimately, when the Court knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be no excuse for imposing on the defendant, on pain of his *936 life, the heavy burden of convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud.[14] IV The Court is simply wrong in claiming that psychiatric testimony respecting future dangerousness is necessarily admissible in light of or As the Court recognizes, Jurek involved "only lay testimony." Ante, at Thus, it is not surprising that "there was no |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | second_dissenting | Barefoot v. Estelle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111017/barefoot-v-estelle/ | at Thus, it is not surprising that "there was no suggestion by the Court that the testimony of doctors would be inadmissible," ib and it is simply irrelevant that the Jurek Court did not "disapprov[e]" the use of such testimony, see *937 In the psychiatric testimony at issue was given by the same Doctor Grigson who confronts us in this case, and his conclusions were disturbingly similar to those he rendered here. See The APA, appearing as amicus curiae, argued that all psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness should be excluded from capital sentencing proceedings. The Court did not reach this issue, because it found 's death sentence invalid on narrower grounds: Doctor Grigson's testimony had violated 's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Contrary to the Court's inexplicable assertion in this case, ante, at 99, certainly did not reject the APA's position. Rather, the Court made clear that "the holding in Jurek was guided by recognition that the inquiry [into dangerousness] mandated by law does not require resort to medical experts." 451 U.S., If Jurek and held that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding as the Court claims, this guiding recognition would have been irrelevant. The Court also errs in suggesting that the exclusion of psychiatrists' predictions of future dangerousness would be contrary to the logic of Jurek. Jurek merely upheld ' substantive decision to condition the death sentence upon proof of a probability that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence in the future. Whether the evidence offered by the prosecution to prove that probability is so unreliable as to violate a capital defendant's rights to due process is an entirely different matter, one raising only questions of fair procedure.[15]Jurek's conclusion that may impose the *93 death penalty on capital defendants who probably will commit criminal acts of violence in no way establishes that the prosecution may convince a jury that this is so by misleading or patently unreliable evidence. Moreover, Jurek's holding that the death statute is not impermissibly vague does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that psychiatric testimony is admissible. It makes sense to exclude psychiatric predictions of future violence while admitting lay testimony, see ante, at 96-, because psychiatric predictions appear to come from trained mental health professionals, who purport to have special expertise. In view of the total scientific groundlessness of these predictions, psychiatric testimony is fatally misleading. See White v. 554 F. Supp., at 5. Lay testimony, frankly based on statistical factors with demonstrated correlations to violent behavior, would not raise this substantial threat of unreliable and |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | majority | Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112345/hoffmann-la-roche-inc-v-sperling/ | The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 621 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), provides that an employee may bring an action on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated. To resolve disagreement among the Courts of Appeals,[1] we granted certiorari on the question whether a district court conducting a suit of this type may authorize and facilitate notice of the pending action. I Age discrimination in employment is forbidden by 4 of the ADEA. 29 U.S. C. 623 (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Section 7(b) of the ADEA incorporates enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 201 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), and provides that the ADEA shall be enforced using certain of the powers, remedies, and procedures of the FLSA. This controversy centers around one of the provisions the ADEA incorporates, which states, in pertinent part, that an action "may be maintained against any employer in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or *168 themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S. C. 216(b) (1982 ed.). In 1985, petitioner Hoffman-La Roche Inc. ordered a reduction in work force and discharged or demoted some 1,200 workers. Richard Sperling, a discharged employee and one of the respondents, filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for himself and all employees similarly situated. With the assistance of counsel, Sperling and some other employees formed a group known as Roche Age Discriminatees Asking Redress (R.A.D.A.R.). The group mailed a letter, on R.A.D.A.R. letterhead, to some 600 employees whom it had identified as potential members of the protected class. The letter advised that an action would be brought against petitioner under the ADEA and invited the addressees to join the suit by filling out and returning an enclosed consent form, thus fulfilling the statutory requirement of joinder by "consent in writing." Respondents filed this ADEA action in Federal District Court and, through R.A.D.A.R.'s letters and informal contacts, received and filed with the court over 400 consents. To ensure that all potential plaintiffs would receive notice of the suit, respondents moved for discovery of the names and addresses of all similarly situated employees. They also requested that the court send |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | majority | Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112345/hoffmann-la-roche-inc-v-sperling/ | similarly situated employees. They also requested that the court send notice to all potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed consents. Petitioner opposed both motions and filed a cross-motion asking the court to invalidate the consents already filed on the ground that the solicitation had been misleading. In addition, petitioner requested that the court send out a "corrective notice" to the individuals who had filed consents. To resolve these matters the District Court ordered petitioner to produce the names and addresses of the discharged employees. The District Court held that it was "permissible *169 for a court to facilitate notice of an ADEA suit to absent class members in appropriate cases, so long as the court avoids communicating to absent class members any encouragement to join the suit or any approval of the suit on its merits." 118 F. R. D. 392, 402 The court also authorized respondents to send to all employees who had not yet joined the suit a notice and a consent document, with a text and form approved by the court. The court attached the authorized notice to its interlocutory order. At the end of the approved notice was a statement that the notice had been authorized by the District Court, but that the court had taken no position on the merits of the case. Finally, the District Court refused to invalidate the consents already filed. The District Court found that its orders regarding discovery and further notice met the requirements for immediate appeal, 28 U.S. C. 1292(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V), and the Court of Appeals permitted an appeal from that portion of the ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the discovery order and the order for further notice, ruling that "there is no legal impediment to court-authorized notice in an appropriate case." The Court of Appeals declined to review the form and contents of the notice to potential plaintiffs and, in particular, it declined to pass upon the concluding statement of the notice stating that it had been authorized by the District Court. II As it comes before us, this case presents the narrow question whether, in an ADEA action, district courts may play any role in prescribing the terms and conditions of communication from the named plaintiffs to the potential members of the class on whose behalf the collective action has been brought. We hold that district courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement 29 U.S. C. 216(b) (1982 ed.), as incorporated by 29 U.S. C. 626(b) (1982 ed.), in ADEA actions by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs. *170 The facts and |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | majority | Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112345/hoffmann-la-roche-inc-v-sperling/ | by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs. *170 The facts and circumstances of this case illustrate the propriety, if not the necessity, for court intervention in the notice process. As did the Court of Appeals, we decline to examine the terms of the notice used here, or its concluding statement indicating court authorization. We confirm the existence of the trial court's discretion, not the details of its exercise. The District Court was correct to permit discovery of the names and addresses of the discharged employees. Without pausing to explore alternative bases for the discovery, for instance that the employees might have knowledge of other discoverable matter, we find it suffices to say that the discovery was relevant to the subject matter of the action and that there were no grounds to limit the discovery under the facts and circumstances of this case. The ADEA, through incorporation of 216(b), expressly authorizes employees to bring collective age discrimination actions "in behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S. C. 216(b) (1982 ed.). Congress has stated its policy that ADEA plaintiffs should have the opportunity to proceed collectively. A collective action allows age discrimination plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity. These benefits, however, depend on employees receiving accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can make informed decisions about whether to participate. Section 216(b)'s affirmative permission for employees to proceed on behalf of those similarly situated must grant the court the requisite procedural authority to manage the process of joining multiple parties in a manner that is orderly, sensible, and not otherwise contrary to statutory commands or the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 83. It follows that, once an ADEA action is filed, the court has a *171 managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties to assure that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper way. We have recognized that a trial court has a substantial interest in communications that are mailed for single actions involving multiple parties. In Gulf Oil we held that a District Court erred by entering an order that in effect prohibited communications between the named plaintiffs and others in a Rule 23 class action. Observing that class actions serve important goals but also present opportunities for abuse, we noted that "[b]ecause of the potential for |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | majority | Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112345/hoffmann-la-roche-inc-v-sperling/ | for abuse, we noted that "[b]ecause of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and the parties." The same justifications apply in the context of an ADEA action. Although the collective form of action is designed to serve the important function of preventing age discrimination, the potential for misuse of the class device, as by misleading communications, may be countered by court-authorized notice.[2] Because trial court involvement in the notice process is inevitable in cases with numerous plaintiffs where written consent is required by statute, it lies within the discretion of a district court to begin its involvement early, at the point of the initial notice, rather than at some later time. One of the most significant insights that skilled trial judges have gained in recent years is the wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention in the management of litigation. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, ; Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 Judicature 400 (1978). A trial court can *172 better manage a major ADEA action if it ascertains the contours of the action at the outset. The court is not limited to waiting passively for objections about the manner in which the consents were obtained. By monitoring preparation and distribution of the notice, a court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative. Both the parties and the court benefit from settling disputes about the content of the notice before it is distributed. This procedure may avoid the need to cancel consents obtained in an improper manner. The instant case is illustrative. Petitioner objected to the form of the notice first sent by respondents' counsel, alleging that it was so inaccurate that any consents based on it should be found invalid by the court, and at the same time petitioner resisted discovery of the names and addresses of the discharged employees. Questions of notice, proper discovery, and the validity of consents were intertwined. Court authorization of notice serves the legitimate goal of avoiding a multiplicity of duplicative suits and setting cutoff dates to expedite disposition of the action. In this case, the trial court, as part of its order, set a cutoff date for the filing of consents, as it was bound to do if the action was to proceed in diligent fashion. By approving the form of notice sent, the trial court could be |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | majority | Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112345/hoffmann-la-roche-inc-v-sperling/ | the form of notice sent, the trial court could be assured that its cutoff date was reasonable, rather than having to set a cutoff date based on a series of unauthorized communications or even gossip that might have been misleading. In the context of the explicit statutory direction of a single ADEA action for multiple ADEA plaintiffs, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide further support for the trial court's authority to facilitate notice. Under the terms of Rule 83, courts, in any case "not provided for by rule," may "regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with" federal or local rules. Rule 83 endorses measures to regulate the actions of the parties to a multiparty suit. See Gulf Oil This authority is well settled, as courts traditionally have exercised considerable authority *173 "to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R. The interest of courts in managing collective actions in an orderly fashion is reinforced by Rule 16(b), requiring entry of a scheduling order limiting time for various pretrial steps such as joinder of additional parties. At pretrial conferences, courts are encouraged to address "the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, [or] multiple parties" Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(c)(10). We reject petitioner's contention that court involvement in the notice process would thwart Congress' intention to relieve employers from the burden of multiparty actions, as expressed in the 1947 amendments to the FLSA. In 1938, Congress gave employees and their "representatives" the right to bring actions to recover amounts due under the FLSA. No written consent requirement of joinder was specified by the statute. In enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Congress made certain changes in these procedures. In part responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal interest in the outcome, the representative action by plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims was abolished, and the requirement that an employee file a written consent was added. See 93 Cong. Rec. 538, 2182 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Donnell). The relevant amendment was for the purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted claims in their own right and freeing employers of the burden of representative actions. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 5(a), 6, 7, -88. Congress left intact the "similarly situated" language providing for collective actions, such as this one. The broad remedial goal of the statute should be enforced to the full extent of its terms. *174 Our decision does not imply that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correction, appellants prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join appellee, the North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. (Union), barred all meetings of the Union, and refused to deliver packets of Union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. The Union instituted this action, based on 42 U.S. C. 1983, to challenge these policies. It alleged that appellants' efforts to prevent the operation of a prisoners' union violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of it and its members and that the refusal to grant the Union those privileges accorded several other organizations operating within the prison system deprived the Union of equal protection of the laws. A three-judge court was convened. After a hearing, the court found merit in the Union's free speech, association, and equal protection arguments, and enjoined appellants from preventing inmates from soliciting other prisoners to join the Union and from "refus[ing] receipt of the Union's publications on the ground that they are calculated to encourage membership in the organization or solicit joining." The court also held that the Union "shall be accorded the privilege of holding meetings under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate organizations" We noted probable jurisdiction to consider whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments extend prisoner labor unions such protection. We have decided that they do not, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the District Court. *122 I Appellee, an organization self-denominated as a Prisoners' Labor Union, was incorporated in late 1974, with a stated goal of "the promotion of charitable labor union purposes" and the formation of a "prisoners' labor union at every prison and jail in North Carolina to seek through collective bargaining to improve working conditions."[1] It also proposed to work toward the alteration or elimination of practices and policies of the Department of Correction which it did not approve of, and to serve as a vehicle for the presentation and resolution of inmate grievances. By early 1975, the Union had attracted some 2,000 inmate "members" in 40 different prison units throughout North Carolina. The State of North Carolina, unhappy with these developments, set out to prevent inmates from forming or operating a "union." While the State tolerated individual "membership," or belief, in the Union, it sought to prohibit inmate solicitation of other inmates, meetings between members of the Union, and bulk mailings concerning the Union from outside sources. Pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Department of Correction on March 26, 1975, such solicitation |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | the Department of Correction on March 26, 1975, such solicitation and group activity were proscribed. Suit was filed by the Union in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on March 18, 1975, approximately a week before the date upon which the regulation was to take effect. The Union claimed that its rights, and the rights of its members, to engage in protected free speech, association, and assembly activities were being infringed by the no-solicitation and no-meeting rules. It also alleged a deprivation of equal protection of the laws in that *123 the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous were permitted to have meetings and other organizational rights, such as the distribution of bulk mailing material, that the Union was being denied. A declaratory judgment and injunction against continuation of these restrictive policies were sought, as were substantial damages.[2] A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2281 and 2284, while dismissing the Union's prayers for damages and attorney's fees, granted it substantial injunctive relief. The court found that appellants "permitted" inmates to join the Union, but "oppose[d] the solicitation of other inmates to join," either by inmate-to-inmate solicitation or by The court noted, at 942: "[Appellants] sincerely believe that the very existence of the Union will increase the burdens of administration and constitute a threat of essential discipline and control. They are apprehensive that inmates may use the Union to establish a power bloc within the inmate population which could be utilized to cause work slowdowns or stoppages or other undesirable concerted activity." The District Court concluded, however, that there was "no consensus" among experts on these matters, and that it was "left with no firm conviction that an association of inmates is necessarily good or bad." The court felt that since appellants countenanced the bare fact of Union membership, it had to allow solicitation activity, whether by inmates or by outsiders: "We are unable to perceive why it is necessary or essential to security and order in the to forbid *124 solicitation of membership in a union permitted by the authorities. This is not a case of riot. There is not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions." The other questions, respecting the bulk mailing by the Union of literature into the for distribution and the question of meetings of inmate members, the District Court resolved against appellants "by application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." Finding that such meetings and bulk mailing privileges had been permitted |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | that such meetings and bulk mailing privileges had been permitted the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and, in one institution, the Boy Scouts, the District Court concluded that appellants "may not pick and choose depending on [their] approval or disapproval of the message or purpose of the group" unless "the activity proscribed is shown to be detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful." The court concluded that appellants had failed to meet this burden. Appropriate injunctive relief was thereupon ordered.[3] *125 II A The District Court, we believe, got off on the wrong foot in this case by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement. While litigation by prison inmates concerning conditions of confinement, challenged other than under the Eighth Amendment, is of recent vintage, this Court has long recognized that "[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." ; see also ; The fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration. We noted in at : "[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law." Perhaps the most obvious of the First Amendment rights that are necessarily curtailed by confinement are those associational rights that the First Amendment protects outside of prison *126 walls. The concept of incarceration itself entails a restriction on the freedom of inmates to associate with those outside of the penal institution. Equally as obvious, the inmate's "status as a prisoner" and the operational realities of a prison dictate restrictions on the associational rights among inmates. Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators. We noted in v. : "[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities." (Footnote omitted.) See also U.S. 319, It is in this context that the claims of the Union must be examined. B State correctional officials uniformly testified that the concept of a prisoners' labor union was itself fraught with potential dangers, whether or not such a union intended, illegally, to press for collective-bargaining recognition.[4] Appellant *127 Ralph Edwards, the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, stated in his affidavit: "The creation of an inmate union will naturally result in increasing the existing friction between inmates and prison personnel. It can also create friction between union inmates and non-union inmates." Appellant David Jones, the Secretary of the Department of Correction, stated: "The existence of a union of inmates can create a divisive element within the inmate population. In a time when the units are already seriously over-crowded, such an element could aggravate already tense conditions. The purpose of the union may well be worthwhile projects. But it is evident that the inmate organizers could, if recognized as spokesman for all inmates, make themselves to be power figures among the inmates. If the union is successful, these inmates would be in a position to misuse their influence. After the inmate union has become established, there would probably be nothing this Department could do to terminate its existence, even if its activities became overtly subversive to the functioning of the Department. Work stoppages and mutinies are easily foreseeable. Riots and chaos would almost inevitably result. Thus, even if the purposes of the union are as stated in the complaint, the potential for a dangerous situation exists, a situation which could not be brought under control." The District Court did not reject these beliefs as fanciful or erroneous. It, instead, noted that they were held "sincerely," and were arguably correct.[5] 409 F. Supp., Without *128 a showing that these beliefs were unreasonable, it was error for the District Court to conclude that appellants needed to show more. In particular, the burden was not on appellants to show affirmatively that the Union would be "detrimental to proper penological objectives" or would constitute a "present danger to security and order." -945. Rather, "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters." The necessary and correct result of our deference to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | matters." The necessary and correct result of our deference to the informed discretion of prison administrators permits them, and not the courts, to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations in situations such as this. The District Court, however, gave particular emphasis to what it viewed as appellants' tolerance of membership by inmates in the Union as undermining appellants' position. It viewed a system which permitted inmate "membership" but prohibited inmate-to-inmate solicitation (as well, it should be noted, as meetings, or other group activities) as bordering "on the irrational," and felt that "[t]he defendants' own hypothesis in this case is that the existence of the Union and membership in it are not dangerous, for otherwise they would surely have undertaken to forbid membership." 409 F. Supp., This, however, considerably overstates what appellants' concession as to pure membership entails. Appellants permitted membership because of the reasonable assumption that each individual prisoner could believe what he chose to believe, and that outside individuals should be able to communicate ideas and beliefs to individual inmates. Since a *129 member qua member incurs no dues or obligationsa prisoner apparently may become a member simply by considering himself a memberthis position simply reflects the concept that thought control, by means of prohibiting beliefs, would not only be undesirable but impossible. But appellants never acquiesced in, or permitted, group activity of the Union in the nature of a functioning organization of the inmates within the prison, nor did the District Court find that they had. It is clearly not irrational to conclude that individuals may believe what they want, but that concerted group activity, or solicitation therefor, would pose additional and unwarranted problems and frictions in the operation of the State's penal institutions. The ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings, therefore, was rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration. Cf. at C The invocation of the First Amendment, whether the asserted rights are speech or associational, does not change this analysis. In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights that are "inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." at Prisons, it is obvious, differ in numerous respects from free society. They, to begin with, are populated, involuntarily, by people who have been found to have violated one or more of the criminal laws established by society for its orderly governance. In seeking a "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives [of ] and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application," this |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | provisions of the Constitution that are of general application," this Court has repeatedly recognized the need for major restrictions on a prisoner's rights. See, e. g., ; These restrictions have applied as well *130 where First Amendment values were implicated. See, e. g., v. ; An examination of the potential restrictions on speech or association that have been imposed by the regulations under challenge, demonstrates that the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and are consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners and with the legitimate operational considerations of the institution. To begin with, First Amendment speech rights are barely implicated in this case.[6] Mail rights are not themselves implicated; the only question respecting the mail is that of bulk mailings.[7] The advantages of bulk mailings to inmates by the Union are those of cheaper rates and convenience. While the District Court relied on the cheaper bulk mailing rates in finding an equal protection violation, infra, at 133, it is clear that losing these cost advantages does not *131 fundamentally implicate free speech values. Since other avenues of outside informational flow by the Union remain available, the prohibition on bulk mailing, reasonable in the absence of First Amendment considerations, remains reasonable.[8] Cf. Nor does the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate solicitation of membership trench untowardly on the inmates' First Amendment speech rights. Solicitation of membership itself involves a good deal more than the simple expression of *132 individual views as to the advantages or disadvantages of a union or its views; it is an invitation to collectively engage in a legitimately prohibited activity. If the prison officials are otherwise entitled to control organized union activity within the prison walls, the prohibition on solicitation for such activity is not then made impermissible on account of First Amendment considerations, for such a prohibition is then not only reasonable but necessary. 417 U. S., at First Amendment associational rights, while perhaps more directly implicated by the regulatory prohibitions, likewise must give way to the reasonable considerations of penal management. As already noted, numerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the realities of confinement. They may be curtailed whenever the institution's officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations, whether through group meetings or otherwise, possess the likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment. As we noted in "central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves." Appellant prison officials concluded that the presence, perhaps even the objectives, of a prisoners' |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | that the presence, perhaps even the objectives, of a prisoners' labor union would be detrimental to order and security in the It is enough to say that they have not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view. The interest in preserving order and authority in the is self-evident. Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration. 418 U. S., Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to forestall such a threat, and they must be permitted to act before the *133 time when they can compile a dossier on the eve of a riot.[9] The case of a prisoners' union, where the focus is on the presentation of grievances to, and encouragement of adversary relations with, institution officials surely would rank high on anyone's list of potential trouble spots. If the appellants' views as to the possible detrimental effects of the organizational activities of the Union are reasonable, as we conclude they are, then the regulations are drafted no more broadly than they need be to meet the perceived threatwhich stems directly from group meetings and group organizational activities of the Union. Cf. v. -416. When weighed against the First Amendment rights asserted, these institutional reasons are sufficiently weighty to prevail. D The District Court rested on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down appellants' prohibition against the receipt and distribution of bulk mail from the Union as well as the prohibition of Union meetings among the inmates. It felt that this was a denial of equal protection because bulk mailing and meeting rights had been extended to the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Boy Scouts. The court felt that just as outside the prison, a "government may not pick and choose depending upon its approval or disapproval of the message or purpose of the group," 409 F. Supp., so, too, appellants could not choose among groups without first demonstrating that the activity proscribed is "detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful." This analysis is faulty for two reasons. The District Court *134 erroneously treated this case as if the prison environment were essentially a "public forum." We observed last Term in upholding a ban on political meetings at Fort Dix that a Government enclave such as a military base was not a public forum. We stated, at 838 n. 10: "The fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | majority | Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109718/jones-v-north-carolina-prisoners-labor-union-inc/ | entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dix into a public forum or to confer upon political candidates a First or Fifth Amendment right to conduct their campaigns there. The decision of the military authorities that a civilian lecture on drug abuse, a religious service by a visiting preacher at the base chapel, or a rock musical concert would be supportive of the military mission of Fort Dix surely did not leave the authorities powerless thereafter to prevent any civilian from entering Fort Dix to speak on any subject whatever." A prison may be no more easily converted into a public forum than a military base. Thus appellants need only demonstrate a rational basis for their distinctions between organizational groups. Cf. City of Here, appellants' affidavits indicate exactly why Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jaycees have been allowed to operate within the prison. Both were seen as serving a rehabilitative purpose, working in harmony with the goals and desires of the prison administrators, and both had been determined not to pose any threat to the order or security of the institution.[10] The affidavits indicate that the administrators' *135 view of the Union differed critically in both these respects.[11] Those conclusions are not unreasonable. Prison administrators may surely conclude that the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous differ in fundamental respects from appellee Union, a group with no past to speak of, and with the avowed intent to pursue an adversary relationship with the prison officials. Indeed, it would be enough to distinguish the Union from Alcoholics Anonymous to note that the chartered purpose of *136 the Union, apparently pursued in the prison, was illegal under North Carolina law.[12] Since a prison is most emphatically not a "public forum," these reasonable beliefs of appellants are sufficient, cf. City of The District Court's further requirement of a demonstrable showing that the Union was in fact harmful is inconsistent with the deference federal courts should pay to the informed discretion of prison officials. v. 416 U. S., at It is precisely in matters such as this, the decision as to which of many groups should be allowed to operate within the prison walls, where, confronted with claims based on the Equal Protection Clause, the courts should allow the prison administrators the full latitude of discretion, unless it can be firmly stated that the two groups are so similar that discretion has been abused. That is surely not the case here. There is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | We are asked in this case to decide whether which requires appointment of counsel for indigent state defendants on their first appeal as of right, should be extended to require counsel for discretionary state appeals and for applications *603 for review in this Court. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that such appointment was required by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.[1] I The case now before us has resulted from consolidation of two separate cases, North Carolina criminal prosecutions brought in the respective Superior Courts for the counties of Mecklenburg and Guilford. In both cases respondent pleaded not guilty to charges of forgery and uttering a forged instrument, and because of his indigency was represented at trial by court-appointed counsel. He was convicted and then took separate appeals to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, where he was again represented by court-appointed counsel, and his convictions were affirmed.[2] At this point the procedural histories of the two cases diverge. Following affirmance of his Mecklenburg Country conviction, respondent sought to invoke the discretionary review procedures of the North Carolina Supreme Court. His court-appointed counsel approached the Mecklenburg County Superior Court about possible appointment to represent respondent on this appeal, but counsel was informed that the State was not required to furnish counsel for that petition. Respondent sought collateral relief in both the state and federal courts, first raising his right-to-counsel contention in a habeas corpus petition filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina in February 1971. Relief was denied at that time, and respondent's appeal to the Court *604 of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was dismissed by stipulation in order to allow respondent to first exhaust state remedies on this issue. After exhausting state remedies, he reapplied for habeas relief, which was again denied. Respondent appealed that denial to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Following affirmance of his conviction on the Guilford County charges, respondent also sought discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court. On this appeal, however, respondent was not denied counsel but rather was represented by the public defender who had been appointed for the trial and respondent's first appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari.[3] Respondent then unsuccessfully petitioned the Superior Court for Guilford County for court-appointed counsel to prepare a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, and also sought post-conviction relief throughout the state courts. After these motions were denied, respondent again sought federal habeas relief, this time in the United States |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | sought federal habeas relief, this time in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. That court denied relief, and respondent took an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court of Appeals reversed the two District Court judgments, holding that respondent was entitled to the assistance of counsel at state expense both on his petition for review in the North Carolina Supreme Court and on his petition for certiorari to this Court. Reviewing the procedures of the North Carolina appellate system and the possible benefits that counsel would provide for indigents seeking review in that system, the court stated: "As long as the state provides such procedures and allows other convicted felons to seek access to the *605 higher court with the help of retained counsel, there is a marked absence of fairness in denying an indigent the assistance of counsel as he seeks access to the same court."[4] This principle was held equally applicable to petitions for certiorari to this Court. For, said the Court of Appeals, "[t]he same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals."[5] We granted certiorari, to consider the Court of Appeals' decision in light of and apparently conflicting decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits.[6] For the reasons hereafter stated we reverse the Court of Appeals. II This Court, in the past 20 years, has given extensive consideration to the rights of indigent persons on appeal. In the first of the pertinent cases, the Court had before it an rule allowing a convicted criminal defendant to present claims of trial error to the Supreme Court of only if he procured a transcript of the testimony adduced at his trial.[7] No exception was made for the indigent *606 defendant, and thus one who was unable to pay the cost of obtaining such a transcript was precluded from obtaining appellate review of asserted trial error. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who cast the deciding vote, said in his concurring opinion: ". has decreed that only defendants who can afford to pay for the stenographic minutes of a trial may have trial errors reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court." The Court in Griffin held that this discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Succeeding cases invalidated similar financial barriers to the appellate process, at the same time reaffirming the traditional principle that a State is not obliged to provide any appeal at all for criminal defendants. The cases encompassed a variety of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | all for criminal defendants. The cases encompassed a variety of circumstances but all had a common theme. For example, involved an Indiana provision declaring that only a public defender could obtain a free transcript of a hearing on a coram nobis application. If the public defender declined to request one, the indigent prisoner seeking to appeal had no recourse. In the State permitted an indigent to obtain a free transcript of the trial at which he was convicted only if he satisfied the trial judge that his contentions on appeal would not be frivolous. The appealing defendant was in effect bound by the trial court's conclusions in seeking to review the determination of frivolousness, since no transcript or its equivalent was made available to him. In Iowa had required a filing fee in order to process a state habeas corpus application by a convicted defendant, and in the State of Ohio required a $20 filing fee in *607 order to move the Supreme Court of Ohio for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals affirming a criminal conviction. Each of these state-imposed financial barriers to the adjudication of a criminal defendant's appeal was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The decisions discussed above stand for the proposition that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons. In however, a case decided the same day as and the Court departed somewhat from the limited doctrine of the transcript and fee cases and undertook an examination of whether an indigent's access to the appellate system was adequate. The Court in Douglas concluded that a State does not fulfill its responsibility toward indigent defendants merely by waiving its own requirements that a convicted defendant procure a transcript or pay a fee in order to appeal, and held that the State must go further and provide counsel for the indigent on his first appeal as of right. It is this decision we are asked to extend today. Petitioners in Douglas, each of whom had been convicted by a jury on 13 felony counts, took appeals as of right to the District Court of Appeal. No filing fee was exacted of them, no transcript was required in order to present their arguments to the Court of Appeal, and the appellate process was therefore open to them. Petitioners, however, claimed that they not only had the right to make use of the appellate process, but were also entitled to court-appointed and state-compensated counsel because they were indigent. The appellate |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | court-appointed and state-compensated counsel because they were indigent. The appellate court examined the trial record on its own initiative, following the then-existing rule in and concluded that " `no good whatever could be *608 served by appointment of counsel.' " It therefore denied petitioners' request for the appointment of counsel. This Court held unconstitutional 's requirement that counsel on appeal would be appointed for an indigent only if the appellate court determined that such appointment would be helpful to the defendant or to the court itself. The Court noted that under this system an indigent's case was initially reviewed on the merits without the benefit of any organization or argument by counsel. By contrast, persons of greater means were not faced with the preliminary "ex parte examination of the record," but had their arguments presented to the court in fully briefed form. The Court noted, however, that its decision extended only to initial appeals as of right, and went on to say: "We need not now decide whether would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from the Supreme Court after the District Court of Appeal had sustained his conviction or whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate affirmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certiorari which lies within the Court's discretion. But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an `invidious discrimination.' ; Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them." -357. The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support *609 being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.[8] Neither Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached, each depending on a different inquiry which emphasizes different factors. "Due process" emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. "Equal protection," on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable. We will address these issues separately in the succeeding sections. III Recognition of the due process rationale in Douglas is found both in the Court's opinion and in the dissenting opinion |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | both in the Court's opinion and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. The Court in Douglas stated that "[w]hen an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure." Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the due process issue in Douglas was the only one worthy of extended *610 consideration, remarking: "The real question in this case, I submit, and the only one that permits of satisfactory analysis, is whether or not the state rule, as applied in this case, is consistent with the requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due Process Clause." We do not believe that the Due Process Clause requires North Carolina to provide respondent with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State Supreme Court. At the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the right of an indigent defendant to counsel is fundamental and binding upon the States by virtue of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. But there are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To accomplish this purpose, the State employs a prosecuting attorney who presents evidence to the court, challenges any witnesses offered by the defendant, argues rulings of the court, and makes direct arguments to the court and jury seeking to persuade them of the defendant's guilt. Under these circumstances "reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury below. The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being "haled into court" *611 by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a word to upset the prior determination of guilt. This difference is significant for, while no one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant's consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all. The fact that an appeal has |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | any appeal at all. The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way. Unfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. That question is more profitably considered under an equal protection analysis. IV Language invoking equal protection notions is prominent both in Douglas and in other cases treating the rights of indigents on appeal. The Court in Douglas, for example, stated: "[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor." (Emphasis in original.) The Court in stated the issue in the following terms: "[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Despite the tendency of all rights "to declare themselves *612 absolute to their logical extreme,"[9] there are obviously limits beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be pressed without doing violence to principles recognized in other decisions of this Court. The Fourteenth Amendment "does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages," San Antonio Independent School nor does it require the State to "equalize economic conditions." It does require that the state appellate system be "free of unreasoned distinctions," and that indigents have an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system. The State cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent defendant "entirely cut off from any appeal at all," by virtue of his indigency, or extend to such indigent defendants merely a "meaningless ritual" while others in better economic circumstances have a "meaningful appeal." The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees. In this case we do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause, when interpreted in the context of these cases, requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file petitions for certiorari in this Court. A. The North Carolina appellate system, as are the appellate systems of almost half the States,[10] is multitiered, providing for both an intermediate Court of Appeals and a Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals was *613 created effective January 1, 1967, and, like other intermediate state appellate courts, was intended to absorb a substantial share of the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | courts, was intended to absorb a substantial share of the caseload previously burdening the Supreme Court. In criminal cases, an appeal as of right lies directly to the Supreme Court in all cases which involve a sentence of death or life imprisonment, while an appeal of right in all other criminal cases lies to the Court of Appeals. N. C. Gen. Stat. 7A-27 A second appeal of right lies to the Supreme Court in any criminal case "(1) [w]hich directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State, or (2) [i]n which there is a dissent." N. C. Gen. Stat. 7A-30 (1969). All other decisions of the Court of Appeals on direct review of criminal cases may be further reviewed in the Supreme Court on a discretionary basis. The statute governing discretionary appeals to the Supreme Court is N. C. Gen. Stat. 7A-31 (1969). This statute provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n any cause in which appeal has been taken to the Court of Appeals the Supreme Court may in its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the Court of Appeals." The statute further provides that "[i]f the cause is certified for transfer to the Supreme Court after its determination by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals." The choice of cases to be reviewed is not left entirely within the discretion of the Supreme Court but is regulated by statutory standards. Subsection (c) of this provision states: "In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court after determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the *614 Supreme Court (1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." Appointment of counsel for indigents in North Carolina is governed by N. C. Gen. Stat. 7A-450 et seq. These provisions, although perhaps on their face broad enough to cover appointments such as those respondent sought here,[11] have generally been construed to limit the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases to direct appeals taken as of right. Thus North Carolina has followed the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | taken as of right. Thus North Carolina has followed the mandate of and authorized appointment of counsel for a convicted defendant appealing to the intermediate Court of Appeals, but has not gone beyond Douglas to provide for appointment of counsel for a defendant who seeks either discretionary review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina or a writ of certiorari here. B. The facts show that respondent, in connection with his Mecklenburg County conviction, received the benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his behalf for the state Court of Appeals. Thus, prior to his seeking discretionary review in the State Supreme Court, his claims had "once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court." 372 U. S., *615 We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court. At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review. We are fortified in this conclusion by our understanding of the function served by discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court. The critical issue in that court, as we perceive it, is not whether there has been "a correct adjudication of guilt" in every individual case, see but rather whether "the subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest," whether "the cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State," or whether the decision below is in probable conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may deny certiorari even though it believes that the decision of the Court of Appeals was incorrect, see since a decision which appears incorrect may nevertheless fail to satisfy any of the criteria discussed above. Once a defendant's claims of error are organized and presented in a lawyerlike fashion to the Court of Appeals, the justices of the Supreme Court of North Carolina who make the decision to grant or deny discretionary review should be able to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | to grant or deny discretionary review should be able to ascertain whether his case satisfies the standards established by the legislature for such review. *616 This is not to say, of course, that a skilled lawyer, particularly one trained in the somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review, would not prove helpful to any litigant able to employ him. An indigent defendant seeking review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina is therefore somewhat handicapped in comparison with a wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting him in every conceivable manner at every stage in the proceeding. But both the opportunity to have counsel prepare an initial brief in the Court of Appeals and the nature of discretionary review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina make this relative handicap far less than the handicap borne by the indigent defendant denied counsel on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas. And the fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required. The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. We think respondent was given that opportunity under the existing North Carolina system. V Much of the discussion in the preceding section is equally relevant to the question of whether a State must provide counsel for a defendant seeking review of his conviction in this Court. North Carolina will have provided counsel for a convicted defendant's only appeal as of right, and the brief prepared by that counsel together with one and perhaps two North Carolina appellate opinions will be available to this Court in order that it may decide whether or not to grant certiorari. This *617 Court's review, much like that of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, is discretionary and depends on numerous factors other than the perceived correctness of the judgment we are asked to review. There is also a significant difference between the source of the right to seek discretionary review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the source of the right to seek discretionary review in this Court. The former is conferred by the statutes of the State of North Carolina, but the latter is granted by statute enacted by Congress. Thus the argument relied upon in the Griffin and Douglas |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Ross v. Moffitt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109070/ross-v-moffitt/ | Thus the argument relied upon in the Griffin and Douglas cases, that the State having once created a right of appeal must give all persons an equal opportunity to enjoy the right, is by its terms inapplicable. The right to seek certiorari in this Court is not granted by any State, and exists by virtue of federal statute with or without the consent of the State whose judgment is sought to be reviewed. The suggestion that a State is responsible for providing counsel to one petitioning this Court simply because it initiated the prosecution which led to the judgment sought to be reviewed is unsupported by either reason or authority. It would be quite as logical under the rationale of Douglas and Griffin, and indeed perhaps more so, to require that the Federal Government or this Court furnish and compensate counsel for petitioners who seek certiorari here to review state judgments of conviction. Yet this Court has followed a consistent policy of denying applications for appointment of counsel by persons seeking to file jurisdictional statements or petitions for certiorari in this Court. See, e. g., Drumm v. ; ; Oppenheimer v. In the light of these authorities, it would be odd, indeed, to read the Fourteenth Amendment to *618 impose such a requirement on the States, and we decline to do so. VI We do not mean by this opinion to in any way discourage those States which have, as a matter of legislative choice, made counsel available to convicted defendants at all stages of judicial review. Some States which might well choose to do so as a matter of legislative policy may conceivably find that other claims for public funds within or without the criminal justice system preclude the implementation of such a policy at the present time. North Carolina, for example, while it does not provide counsel to indigent defendants seeking discretionary review on appeal, does provide counsel for indigent prisoners in several situations where such appointments are not required by any constitutional decision of this Court.[12] Our reading *619 of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves these choices to the State, and respondent was denied no right secured by the Federal Constitution when North Carolina refused to provide counsel to aid him in obtaining discretionary appellate review. The judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | Petitioner Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in January 182. He unsuccessfully challenged the conviction on direct appeal and state collateral proceedings in the Texas state courts, and in a federal habeas petition. In February -10 years after his conviction he urged in a second federal habeas petition that he was "actually innocent" of the murder for which he was sentenced to death, and that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law therefore forbid his execution. He supported this claim with affidavits tending to show that his now-dead brother, rather than he, had been the perpetrator of the crime. Petitioner urges us to hold that this showing of innocence entitles him to relief in this federal habeas proceeding. We hold that it does not. Shortly before 11 p.m. on an evening in late September 181, the body of Texas Department of Public Safety Officer David Rucker was found by a passer-by on a stretch of highway about six miles east of Los Fresnos, Texas, a few miles north of Brownsville in the Rio Grande Valley. Rucker's body was lying beside his patrol car. He had been shot in the head. At about the same time, Los Fresnos Police Officer Enrique Carrisalez observed a speeding vehicle traveling west towards Los Fresnos, away from the place where Rucker's body had been found, along the same road. Carrisalez, who was accompanied in his patrol car by Enrique Hernandez, turned on his flashing red lights and pursued the speeding *34 vehicle. After the car had stopped briefly at a red light, it signaled that it would pull over and did so. The patrol car pulled up behind it. Carrisalez took a flashlight and walked toward the car of the speeder. The driver opened his door and exchanged a few words with Carrisalez before firing at least one shot at Carrisalez' chest. The officer died nine days later. Petitioner Herrera was arrested a few days after the shootings and charged with the capital murder of both Carrisalez and Rucker. He was tried and found guilty of the capital murder of Carrisalez in January 182, and sentenced to death. In July 182, petitioner pleaded guilty to the murder of Rucker. At petitioner's trial for the murder of Carrisalez, Hernandez, who had witnessed Carrisalez' slaying from the officer's patrol car, identified petitioner as the person who had wielded the gun. A declaration by Officer Carrisalez to the same effect, made while he was in the hospital, was also |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | effect, made while he was in the hospital, was also admitted. Through a license plate check, it was shown that the speeding car involved in Carrisalez' murder was registered to petitioner's "live-in" girlfriend. Petitioner was known to drive this car, and he had a set of keys to the car in his pants pocket when he was arrested. Hernandez identified the car as the vehicle from which the murderer had emerged to fire the fatal shot. He also testified that there had been only one person in the car that night. The evidence showed that Herrera's Social Security card had been found alongside Rucker's patrol car on the night he was killed. Splatters of blood on the car identified as the vehicle involved in the shootings, and on petitioner's blue jeans and wallet were identified as type A bloodthe same type which Rucker had. (Herrera has type O blood.) Similar evidence with respect to strands of hair found in the car indicated that the hair was Rucker's and not Herrera's. A handwritten letter was also found on the person of petitioner *35 when he was arrested, which strongly implied that he had killed Rucker.[1] Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing, among other things, that Hernandez' and Carrisalez' identifications were unreliable and improperly admitted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and we denied certiorari, Petitioner's application for state habeas relief was denied. Ex parte Herrera, No. 12,8-02 Petitioner then filed a federal habeas *36 petition, again challenging the identifications offered against him at trial. This petition was denied, see (CA5), and we again denied certiorari, Petitioner next returned to state court and filed a second habeas petition, raising, among other things, a claim of "actual innocence" based on newly discovered evidence. In support of this claim petitioner presented the affidavits of Hector Villarreal, an attorney who had represented petitioner's brother, Raul Herrera, Sr., and of Juan Franco Palacious, one of Raul, Senior's former cellmates. Both individuals claimed that Raul, Senior, who died in had told them that he and not petitioner had killed Officers Rucker and Carrisalez.[2] The State District Court denied this application, finding that "no evidence at trial remotely suggest[ed] that anyone other than [petitioner] committed the offense." Ex parte Herrera, No. 81CR-2C ¶ 35. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, Ex parte Herrera, and we denied certiorari, In February petitioner lodged the instant habeas petition his second in federal court, alleging, among other things, that he is innocent of the murders of Rucker and Carrisalez, and that his execution would thus violate |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | Rucker and Carrisalez, and that his execution would thus violate the Eighth *37 and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition to proffering the above affidavits, petitioner presented the affidavits of Raul Herrera, Jr., Raul, Senior's son, and Jose Ybarra, Jr., a schoolmate of the Herrera brothers. Raul, Junior, averred that he had witnessed his father shoot Officers Rucker and Carrisalez and petitioner was not present. Raul, Junior, was nine years old at the time of the killings. Ybarra alleged that Raul, Senior, told him one summer night in 183 that he had shot the two police officers.[3] Petitioner alleged that law enforcement officials were aware of this evidence, and had withheld it in violation of The District Court dismissed most of petitioner's claims as an abuse of the writ. No. M-2-30 However, "in order to ensure that Petitioner can assert his constitutional claims and out of a sense of fairness and due process," the District Court granted petitioner's request for a stay of execution so that he could present his claim of actual innocence, along with the Raul, Junior, and Ybarra affidavits, in state court. App. 38-3. Although it initially dismissed petitioner's Brady claim on the ground that petitioner had failed to present "any evidence of withholding exculpatory material by the prosecution," App. 37, the District Court also granted an evidentiary hearing on this claim after reconsideration, The Court of Appeals vacated the stay of execution. It agreed with the District Court's initial conclusion that there was no evidentiary basis for petitioner's Brady claim, and found disingenuous petitioner's attempt to couch his claim of actual innocence in Brady Absent an accompanying constitutional violation, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's claim *38 of actual innocence was not cognizable because, under "the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus." See[4] We granted certiorari, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stayed petitioner's execution. We now affirm. Petitioner asserts that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the execution of a person who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. This proposition has an elemental appeal, as would the similar proposition that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment of one who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. After all, the central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent. See United But the evidence upon which petitioner's claim of innocence rests was not produced at his trial, but rather |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | innocence rests was not produced at his trial, but rather eight years later. In any system of criminal justice, "innocence" or "guilt" must be determined in some sort of a judicial proceeding. Petitioner's showing of innocence, and indeed his constitutional claim for relief based upon that showing, must be evaluated in the light of the previous proceedings in this case, which have stretched over a span of 10 years. A person when first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Other constitutional provisions also have the effect of ensuring against the risk of convicting an innocent *3 person. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; ; ; ; In re Murchison, In capital cases, we have required additional protections because of the nature of the penalty at stake. See, e. g., All of these constitutional safeguards, of course, make it more difficult for the State to rebut and finally overturn the presumption of innocence which attaches to every criminal defendant. But we have also observed that "[d]ue process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person." To conclude otherwise would all but paralyze our system for enforcement of the criminal law. Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears. Cf. Here, it is not disputed that the State met its burden of proving at trial that petitioner was guilty of the capital murder of Officer Carrisalez beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in the eyes of the law, petitioner does not come before the Court as one who is "innocent," but, on the *400 contrary, as one who has been convicted by due process of law of two brutal murders. Based on affidavits here filed, petitioner claims that evidence never presented to the trial court proves him innocent notwithstanding the verdict reached at his trial. Such a claim is not cognizable in the state courts of Texas. For to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must file a motion within 30 days after imposition or suspension of sentence. Tex. Rule App. Proc. 31(a)(1) The Texas courts have construed this 30-day time limit as jurisdictional. See ; Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. Chief Justice Warren made this clear in at : "Where newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application, evidence which could not reasonably have been presented to the state trier of facts, the federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. Of course, such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant's detention; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal ha- beas corpus. " This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution not to correct errors of fact. See, e. g., ("[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved"); *401 (emphasis in original); Ex parte Terry, (emphasis in original). More recent authority construing federal habeas statutes speaks in a similar vein. "Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials." The guilt or innocence determination in state criminal trials is "a decisive and portentous event." U.S. 72, "Society's resources have been concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens." Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of free standing claims of actual innocence. Our decision in comes as close to authorizing evidentiary review of a statecourt conviction on federal habeas as any of our cases. There, we held that a federal habeas court may review a claim that the evidence adduced at a state trial was not sufficient to convict a criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. But in so holding, we emphasized: "[T]his inquiry does not require a court to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable *402 inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." We specifically noted that "the standard announced does not permit a court to make its |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | standard announced does not permit a court to make its own subjective determination of guilt or innocence." The type of federal habeas review sought by petitioner here is different in critical respects than that authorized by Jackson. First, the Jackson inquiry is aimed at determining whether there has been an independent constitutional violationi. e., a conviction based on evidence that fails to meet the standard. Thus, federal habeas courts act in their historic capacity to assure that the habeas petitioner is not being held in violation of his or her federal constitutional rights. Second, the sufficiency of the evidence review authorized by Jackson is limited to "record evidence." Jackson does not extend to nonrecord evidence, including newly discovered evidence. Finally, the Jackson inquiry does not focus on whether the trier of fact made the correct guilt or innocence determination, but rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or acquit. Petitioner is understandably imprecise in describing the sort of federal relief to which a suitable showing of actual innocence would entitle him. In his brief he states that the federal habeas court should have "an important initial opportunity to hear the evidence and resolve the merits of Petitioner's claim." Brief for Petitioner 42. Acceptance of this view would presumably require the habeas court to hear testimony from the witnesses who testified at trial as well as those who made the statements in the affidavits which petitioner has presented, and to determine anew whether or not petitioner is guilty of the murder of Officer Carrisalez. Indeed, the dissent's approach differs little from that hypothesized here. The dissent would place the burden on petitioner to show that he is "probably" innocent. Post, at 442. Although *403 petitioner would not be entitled to discovery "as a matter of right," the District Court would retain its "discretion to order discovery when it would help the court make a reliable determination with respect to the prisoner's claim." Post, at 444. And although the District Court would not be required to hear testimony from the witnesses who testified at trial or the affiants upon whom petitioner relies, the dissent would allow the District Court to do so "if the petition warrants a hearing." At the end of the day, the dissent would have the District Court "make a case-by-case determination about the reliability of the newly discovered evidence under the circumstances," and then "weigh the evidence in favor of the prisoner against the evidence of his guilt." Post, at 443. The dissent fails to articulate the relief that would be available if petitioner were |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | articulate the relief that would be available if petitioner were to meets its "probable innocence" standard. Would it be commutation of petitioner's death sentence, new trial, or unconditional release from imprisonment? The typical relief granted in federal habeas corpus is a conditional order of release unless the State elects to retry the successful habeas petitioner, or in a capital case a similar conditional order vacating the death sentence. Were petitioner to satisfy the dissent's "probable innocence" standard, therefore, the District Court would presumably be required to grant a conditional order of relief, which would in effect require the State to retry petitioner 10 years after his first trial, not because of any constitutional violation which had occurred at the first trial, but simply because of a belief that in light of petitioner's new-found evidence a jury might find him not guilty at a second trial. Yet there is no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination would be any more exact. To the contrary, the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications. See (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted)); United Under the dissent's approach, the District Court would be placed in the even more difficult position of having to weigh the probative value of "hot" and "cold" evidence on petitioner's guilt or innocence. This is not to say that our habeas jurisprudence casts a blind eye toward innocence. In a series of cases culminating with decided last Term, we have held that a petitioner otherwise subject to defenses of abusive or successive use of the writ may have his federal constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper showing of actual innocence. This rule, or fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, is grounded in the "equitable discretion" of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. See But this body of our habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of "actual innocence" is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. Petitioner in this case is simply not entitled to habeas relief based on the reasoning of this line of cases. For he does not seek excusal of a procedural error so that he may bring an independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or sentence, but rather argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because newly discovered evidence shows that his conviction is factually incorrect. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available "only where the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available "only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence." Kuhlmann, We have never held that it extends to *405 free standing claims of actual innocence. Therefore, the exception is inapplicable here. Petitioner asserts that this case is different because he has been sentenced to death. But we have "refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has been imposed requires a different standard of review on federal habeas corpus." We have, of course, held that the Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be imposed. See, e. g., 44 U.S. ; (182) ; (178) (same). But petitioner's claim does not fit well into the doctrine of these cases, since, as we have pointed out, it is far from clear that a second trial 10 years after the first trial would produce a more reliable result. Perhaps mindful of this, petitioner urges not that he necessarily receive a new trial, but that his death sentence simply be vacated if a federal habeas court deems that a satisfactory showing of "actual innocence" has been made. Tr. of Oral Arg. 1-20. But such a result is scarcely logical; petitioner's claim is not that some error was made in imposing a capital sentence upon him, but that a fundamental error was made in finding him guilty of the underlying murder in the first place. It would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances, which held that under our Constitution he could not be executed, but that he could spend the rest of his life in prison. Petitioner argues that our decision in 477 U.S. 3 supports his position. The plurality in Ford held that, because the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of insane persons, certain procedural protections inhere in the sanity determination. "[I]f the Constitution *406 renders the fact or timing of his execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact," Justice Marshall wrote, "then that fact must be determined with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being." Because the Florida scheme for determining the sanity of persons sentenced to death failed "to achieve even the minimal degree of reliability," the plurality concluded that Ford was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his sanity before the District Court. Unlike petitioner here, Ford did not challenge the validity of his conviction. Rather, he challenged the constitutionality of his death sentence in view of his claim of insanity. Because Ford's claim went to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | of his claim of insanity. Because Ford's claim went to a matter of punishment not guilt it was properly examined within the purview of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, unlike the question of guilt or innocence, which becomes more uncertain with time for evidentiary reasons, the issue of sanity is properly considered in proximity to the execution. Finally, unlike the sanity determination under the Florida scheme at issue in Ford, the guilt or innocence determination in our system of criminal justice is made "with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being." Petitioner also relies on where we held that the Eighth Amendment requires reexamination of a death sentence based in part on a prior felony conviction which was set aside in the rendering State after the capital sentence was imposed. There, the State insisted that it was too late in the day to raise this point. But we pointed out that the Mississippi Supreme Court had previously considered similar claims by writ of error coram nobis. Thus, there was no need to override state law relating to newly discovered evidence in order to consider Johnson's claim on the merits. Here, there is no doubt that petitioner seeks additional process an evidentiary hearing on his claim of "actual innocence" based on *407 newly discovered evidence which is not available under Texas law more than 30 days after imposition or suspension of sentence. Tex. Rule App. Proc. 31(a)(1)[5] Alternatively, petitioner invokes the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law in support of his claim that his showing of actual innocence entitles him to a new trial, or at least to a vacation of his death sentence.[6] "[B]ecause the States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition," we have "exercis[ed] substantial deference to legislative judgments in this area." Thus, we have found criminal process lacking only where it "`offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and *408 conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' " ). "Historical practice is probative of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as fundamental." The Constitution itself, of course, makes no mention of new trials. New trials in criminal cases were not granted in England until the end of the 17th century. And even then, they were available only in misdemeanor cases, though the writ of error coram nobis was available for some errors of fact in felony cases. New Trial in Federal Criminal |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | of fact in felony cases. New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 23, (157). The First Congress provided for new trials for "reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in courts of law." Act of Sept. 24, 178, ch. 20, 17, This rule was early held to extend to criminal cases. See (185) (citing cases). One of the grounds upon which new trials were granted was newly discovered evidence. See F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice 854-874, pp. 5-52 (8th ed. 1880). The early federal cases adhere to the common-law rule that a new trial may be granted only during the term of court in which the final judgment was entered. See, e. g., United (114); United (No. 16,28) (CC EDNY 1878). Otherwise, "the court at a subsequent term has power to correct inaccuracies in mere matters of form, or clerical errors." 235 U.S., at In 134, this Court departed from the common-law rule and adopted a time limit60 days after final judgment for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence. Rule II(3), Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure, 22 U.S. 65, Four years later, we amended Rule II(3) to allow such motions in capital cases "at any time" before the execution took place. U.S. 52 (138) (codified at 18 U.S. C. 688 (140)). *40 There ensued a debate as to whether this Court should abolish the time limit for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice, or retain a time limit even in capital cases to promote finality. See at 2-. In 146, we set a 2-year time limit for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence and abolished the exception for capital cases. Rule 33, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, ("A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment").[7] We have strictly construed the Rule 33 time limits. Cf. United And the Rule's treatment of new trials based on newly discovered evidence has not changed since its adoption. The American Colonies adopted the English common law on new trials. Riddell, New Trial in Present Practice, 27 Yale L. J. 353, 360 (117). Thus, where new trials were available, motions for such relief typically had to be filed before the expiration of the term during which the trial was held. H. Underhill, Criminal Evidence 57, n. 1 (188); J. Bassett, Criminal Pleading and Practice 313 (1885). Over time, many States enacted statutes providing for |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | 313 (1885). Over time, many States enacted statutes providing for new trials *410 in all types of cases. Some States also extended the time period for filing new trial motions beyond the term of court, but most States required that such motions be made within a few days after the verdict was rendered or before the judgment was entered. See American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure 1040-1042 (Official Draft 131) (reviewing contemporary new trials rules). The practice in the States today, while of limited relevance to our historical inquiry, is divergent. Texas is one of 17 States that requires a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence to be made within 60 days of judgment.[8] One State adheres to the common-law rule and requires that such a motion be filed during the term in which judgment was rendered.[] Eighteen jurisdictions have time limits ranging between one and three years, with 10 States and the District of Columbia following the 2-year federal time limit.[10]*411 Only 15 States allow a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence to be filed more than three years after conviction. Of these States, four have waivable time limits of less than 120 days, two have waivable time limits of more than 120 days, and nine States have no time limits.[11] In light of the historical availability of new trials, our own amendments to Rule 33, and the contemporary practice in the States, we cannot say that Texas' refusal to entertain petitioner's newly discovered evidence eight years after his conviction transgresses a principle of fundamental fairness "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people." 432 U. S., at This is not to say, however, that petitioner is left without a forum to raise his actual innocence claim. For under Texas law, petitioner may file a request for executive clemency. See Tex. Const., Art. IV, 11; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 48.01 Clemency[12] is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition *412 of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted.[13] In England, the clemency power was vested in the Crown and can be traced back to the 700's. W. Humbert, The Pardoning Power of the President (141). Blackstone thought this "one of the great advantages of monarchy in general, above any other form of government; that there is a magistrate, who has it in his power to extend mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved: holding a court of equity in his own breast, to soften the rigour of the general law, in such |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | to soften the rigour of the general law, in such criminal cases as merit an exemption from punishment." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *37. Clemency provided the principal avenue of relief for individuals convicted of criminal offenses most of which were capital because there was no right of appeal until 17. 1 L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law 122 (148). It was the only means by which one could challenge his conviction on the ground of innocence. United States Dept. of Justice, 3 Attorney General's Survey of Release 73 (13). Our Constitution adopts the British model and gives to the President the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States." Art. II, 2, cl. 1. In *413 United Chief Justice Marshall expounded on the President's pardon power: "As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. "A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. It is a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case, of which he is not informed judicially. A private deed, not communicated to him, whatever may be its character, whether a pardon or release, is totally unknown and cannot be acted on. The looseness which would be introduced into judicial proceedings, would prove fatal to the great principles of justice, if the judge might notice and act upon facts not brought regularly into the cause. Such a proceeding, in ordinary cases, would subvert the best established principles, and overturn those rules which have been settled by the wisdom of ages." See also Ex parte Garland, (18); The Federalist No. 74, pp. 447-44 (C. Rossiter ed. 161) (A. Hamilton) ("The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity that without an easy access to exceptions *414 in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | exceptions *414 in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel"). Of course, although the Constitution vests in the President a pardon power, it does not require the States to enact a clemency mechanism. Yet since the British Colonies were founded, clemency has been available in America. C. Jensen, The Pardoning Power in the American States 3-4 (122). The original States were reluctant to vest the clemency power in the executive. And although this power has gravitated toward the executive over time, several States have split the clemency power between the Governor and an advisory board selected by the legislature. See Survey of Release at 1-8. Today, all 36 States that authorize capital punishment have constitutional or statutory provisions for clemency.[14] *415 Executive clemency has provided the "fail safe" in our criminal justice system. K. Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest 131 It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible. But history is replete with examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in the wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence. In his classic work, Professor Edwin Borchard compiled 65 cases in which it was later determined that individuals had been wrongfully convicted of crimes. Clemency provided the relief mechanism in 47 of these cases; the remaining cases ended in judgments of acquittals after new trials. E. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (132). Recent authority confirms that over the past century clemency has been exercised frequently in capital cases in which demonstrations of "actual innocence" have been made. See M. Radelet, H. Bedau, & C. Putnam, In Spite of Innocence 282-356[15] *416 In Texas, the Governor has the power, upon the recommendation of a majority of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, to grant clemency. Tex. Const., Art. IV, 11; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 48.01 The board's consideration is triggered upon request of the individual sentenced to death, his or her representative, or the Governor herself. In capital cases, a request may be made for a full pardon, Tex. Admin. Code, Tit. 37, 143.1 a commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment or appropriate maximum penalty, 143.57, or a reprieve of execution, 143.43. The Governor has the sole authority to grant one reprieve in any capital case not exceeding 30 days. 143.41(a). The Texas clemency procedures contain specific guidelines for pardons on the ground of innocence. The board will entertain applications for a recommendation of full pardon because of innocence upon receipt of the following: "(1) a written unanimous recommendation |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | upon receipt of the following: "(1) a written unanimous recommendation of the current trial officials of the court of conviction; and/or (2) a certified order or judgment of a court having jurisdiction accompanied by certified copy of the findings of fact (if any); and (3) affidavits of witnesses upon which the finding of innocence is based." 143.2. In this case, petitioner has apparently sought a 30day reprieve from the Governor, but has yet to apply for a pardon, or even a commutation, on the ground of innocence or otherwise. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 34. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, in state criminal proceedings the trial is the paramount event for determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Federal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal proceedings. Our federal habeas cases have treated claims of "actual innocence," not as an independent constitutional claim, but as a basis upon which a habeas petitioner may have an independent constitutional claim considered on the merits, even though his habeas *417 petition would otherwise be regarded as successive or abusive. History shows that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency. We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold. Petitioner's newly discovered evidence consists of affidavits. In the new trial context, motions based solely upon affidavits are disfavored because the affiants' statements are obtained without the benefit of cross-examination and an opportunity to make credibility determinations. See Petitioner's affidavits are particularly suspect in this regard because, with the exception of Raul Herrera, Jr.'s affidavit, they consist of hearsay. Likewise, in reviewing petitioner's new evidence, we are mindful that defendants often abuse new trial motions "as a method of delaying enforcement of just sentences." United |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,993 | 19 | majority | Herrera v. Collins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112808/herrera-v-collins/ | "as a method of delaying enforcement of just sentences." United (146). Although we are not presented with a new trial motion per se, we believe the likelihood of abuse is as great or greater here. The affidavits filed in this habeas proceeding were given over eight years after petitioner's trial. No satisfactory explanation has been given as to why the affiants waited until the 11th hourand, indeed, until after the alleged perpetrator *418 of the murders himself was dead to make their statements. Cf. 4 U. S., at 414 Equally troubling, no explanation has been offered as to why petitioner, by hypothesis an innocent man, pleaded guilty to the murder of Rucker. Moreover, the affidavits themselves contain inconsistencies, and therefore fail to provide a convincing account of what took place on the night Officers Rucker and Carrisalez were killed. For instance, the affidavit of Raul, Junior, who was nine years old at the time, indicates that there were three people in the speeding car from which the murderer emerged, whereas Hector Villarreal attested that Raul, Senior, told him that there were two people in the car that night. Of course, Hernandez testified at petitioner's trial that the murderer was the only occupant of the car. The affidavits also conflict as to the direction in which the vehicle was heading when the murders took place and petitioner's whereabouts on the night of the killings. Finally, the affidavits must be considered in light of the proof of petitioner's guilt at trial proof which included two eyewitness identifications, numerous pieces of circumstantial evidence, and a handwritten letter in which petitioner apologized for killing the officers and offered to turn himself in under certain conditions. See at 33-35, and n. 1. That proof, even when considered alongside petitioner's belated affidavits, points strongly to petitioner's guilt. This is not to say that petitioner's affidavits are without probative value. Had this sort of testimony been offered at trial, it could have been weighed by the jury, along with the evidence offered by the State and petitioner, in deliberating upon its verdict. Since the statements in the affidavits contradict the evidence received at trial, the jury would have had to decide important issues of credibility. But coming 10 years after petitioner's trial, this showing of innocence falls *41 far short of that which would have to be made in order to trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118091/united-states-v-gonzales/ | This case arose out of a criminal enterprise that violated both New Mexico law and federal law and gave rise to both state and federal prosecutions. It raises a narrow but important question concerning the scope of the prohibition against concurrent sentences contained in 18 U.S. C. 924(c)(1). As the Government reads that provision, it prohibits the 924(c) sentence from running concurrently with a state sentence that has already been imposed, but permits concurrent state and federal sentences when the federal prosecution precedes the state prosecution.[1] Thus, the length of the total term of imprisonmentincluding both the state sentence and the federal sentenceis determined, in part, by the happenstance of which case is tried first. Read literally, however, the text of 924(c)(1) would avoid this anomalous result. Because the text broadly prohibits the 924(c) sentence from running "concurrently with any other term of imprisonment" regardless of whether that other term is imposed before or after the federal sentence, if the statute is read literally, it would require state judges to make any state term of imprisonment run consecutively to the 924(c) sentence. Alternatively, if the state trial follows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concurrent sentence (because she does not read 924(c) as having any applicability to state sentences), the literal text would require the federal authorities to suspend the 924(c) sentence until the state sentence has been served. By relying so heavily on pure textual analysis, the Court's opinion would appear to dictate this result. Like the Government, however, I do not think the statute can reasonably be interpreted as containing any command to state sentencing judges or as requiring the suspension of any federal sentences when concurrent state sentences are later imposed. *13 Thus, common sense requires us to reject a purely literal reading of the text. The question that then arises is which is the better of two plausible nonliteral readings. Should the term "any other term of imprisonment" be narrowed by reading it to cover only "any other term of imprisonment that has already been imposed, " as the Government argues, or "any other federal term of imprisonment," as respondents contend? For three reasons, I think it more likely that Congress intended the latter interpretation. First, it borders on the irrational to assume that Congress would actually intend the severity of the defendant's punishment in a case of this kind to turn on the happenstance of whether the state or the federal prosecution was concluded first. Respondents' reading of the statute avoids that anomaly. Second, when 924(c) was amended in 1970 to prohibit |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118091/united-states-v-gonzales/ | anomaly. Second, when 924(c) was amended in 1970 to prohibit concurrent sentences, see Title II, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, this prohibition applied only to the federal sentence imposed for the underlying offense. When Congress amended the statute in 1984 to broaden the prohibition beyond the underlying offense, it said nothing about state sentences; if Congress had intended the amendment to apply to state as well as federal sentences, I think there would have been some mention of this important change in the legislative history.[2] Furthermore, the 1984 amendment was part of a general revision of sentencing laws that sought to achieve more uniformity and predictability in federal sentencing. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S. C. 3551 et seq. The anomaly that the Government's reading of 924(c) authorizes is inconsistent with the basic uniformity theme of the 1984 legislation. Finally, the context *14 in which the relevant language appears is concerned entirely with federal sentencing. Indeed, the word "any" as used earlier in the section unquestionably has the meaning "any federal."[3] Given the Government's recognition of the fact that a completely literal reading of 924(c)(1) is untenable, and the further fact that the Court offers nothing more than the dictionary definition of the word "any" to support its result, I think the wiser course is to interpret that word in the prohibition against concurrent sentences as having the same meaning as when the same word is first used in the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Rawson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112426/steelworkers-v-rawson/ | The Idaho Supreme Court held that summary judgment was improper and that Tharon Rawson and the other respondents could proceed to trial against the United Steelworkers of America (Union) on a state-law tort theory. Although the respondents have not yet established liability under Idaho law, the Union argues that federal law must govern and bar their suit. To support this position, the Union relies on both 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. 185(a), and the duty of fair representation *377 implicit in 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 159(a). The Court accepts the Union's contentions with respect to 301 and does not reach the issue of pre-emption by the duty of fair representation. With all respect, I dissent. Neither of the Union's arguments for displacing Idaho law without any trial on the merits has validity. I The Union bases its 301 argument on our decisions in ; Electrical ; and These cases hold that 301 pre-empts state-law causes of action that require interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. In my view, they have no application here. The Idaho Supreme Court, whose determination of state law supersedes that of the trial court, has declared that the respondents' case rests on allegations of the Union's active negligence in a voluntary undertaking, not its contractual obligations. Adopting verbatim a standard from the Restatement (Second) of Torts 323 (1965), the Idaho Court expressed the law governing the respondents' claims as follows: " `One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if " `(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm, [or] " `(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.' " *378 According to the Idaho Supreme Court's second opinion, the respondents can prove the elements of the tort described in 323 without relying on the Union's collective-bargaining agreement. The Court states: "In the instant case, we are not faced with looking at the Collective Bargaining Agreement to determine whether it imposes some new duty upon the union rather it is conceded the union undertook to inspect and, thus, the issue is solely whether that inspection was negligently performed under traditional Idaho tort law." Placing this analysis of state law in the context of our precedents, the Idaho court explains: "[T]he instant case |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Rawson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112426/steelworkers-v-rawson/ | of our precedents, the Idaho court explains: "[T]he instant case is clearly distinguishable from Hechler in that here the state tort basis of the action was not abandoned, but has been pursued consistently both at the trial and appellate levels and the tort exists without reference to the collective bargaining agreement." at -, 770 P.2d, at -797. The court states further: "[As in no interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement is required to determine whether the union member of the inspection team committed a tort when he committed various acts and omissions such as failure to note the self-rescuers were stored in boxes with padlocks or that the activating valves of the oxygen-breathing-apparatuses were corroded shut. Rather, such alleged acts of negligence are measured by state tort law." These statements reveal that the Idaho Supreme Court understood the federal pre-emption standards and interpreted state law not to implicate them. Because we have no basis for disputing the construction of state law by a state supreme court, see I submit that, at this stage of the proceedings, we must conclude that 301 does not govern the respondents' claims. The Court reaches a different conclusion because it doubts that the Idaho Supreme Court means what it seems to have said. The Court bases its view, to a large extent, on the Idaho court's expressed intention to "adhere to [its first] opinion as written." 115 Idaho, The first opinion says: "Because the union, pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, had contracted to inspect and in fact, inspected the mine, it owed the (minimal) duty to its members to exercise due care in inspecting and in reporting the findings of its inspection." The Court construes the remark to negate the unequivocal statements quoted above. I cannot accept this labored interpretation. The Idaho Supreme Court's adherence to the first opinion does not implicate 301 because it does not require interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. The first opinion suggests that the respondents may refer to the collective-bargaining agreement. It does not eliminate the possibility, identified three times in the second opinion, that the respondents may prove the elements of 323 without relying on the collective-bargaining agreement. Even the Union concedes: "After Hechler, as we understand matters, both plaintiffs and the Idaho court would locate the source of the union's duty to inspect [in a non-negligent manner] in the union's action of accompanying company and state inspectors on inspections of the mine, and not in any contractual agreement by the union to inspect." Brief for Petitioner 27-28. The Court, thus, reads too much into the |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Rawson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112426/steelworkers-v-rawson/ | Petitioner 27-28. The Court, thus, reads too much into the last sentence of the Idaho Supreme Court's second opinion. I see no reason not to allow this case to go forward with a simple mandate: The respondents may press their state claims so long as they do not rest upon the collective-bargaining *380 agreement. To the extent that any misunderstanding might exist, this approach would preserve all federal interests. If the Idaho Supreme Court, after a trial on the merits, were to uphold a verdict resting on the Union's obligations under the collective-bargaining agreement, we could reverse its decision. But for now we must take the case as the Idaho Supreme Court has given it to us. According to the second opinion, the respondents may prove the elements of 323 without relying on the Union's contractual duties. The Court also rules against the respondents because it surmises that 323 has no general applicability. The Court assumes that only union members could recover from the Union for its negligence in inspecting the mine and that union members could not recover from anyone else for comparable negligence. See ante, at 370-371. I agree that a State cannot circumvent our decisions in Lingle, Hechler, and by the mere "relabeling" as a tort claim an action that in law is based upon the collective-bargaining process. 471 U. S., at We must have the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether a state law depends on a collective-bargaining agreement for the purposes of 301. In this case, however, I see no indication that the tort theory pressed by the respondents has the limited application presumed by the Court. The Idaho Supreme Court did not invent, for the purposes of this case, the theory underlying the respondents' claims. As Cardozo put it: "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Restatement 323, upon which the Idaho Court relies, embodies this principle and long has guided the interpretation of Idaho tort law. See, e. g., Steiner 106 Idaho ; S. H. Kress & ; *381 ; (machinery accident). The Court has identified no basis for its assumption that 323 has a narrower scope than its plain language and these cases indicate. I thus would not find pre-emption on the mere supposition that the Union's duty runs only to the union members. II The Union also argues that the duty of fair representation immunizes it from liability under 323. Allowing the States to impose tort liability on labor organization, it |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Rawson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112426/steelworkers-v-rawson/ | the States to impose tort liability on labor organization, it contends, would upset the balance of rights and duties that federal law has struck between unions and their members. I disagree because nothing in the NLRA supports the Union's position. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S. C. 159(a), grants a duly elected union the exclusive authority to represent all employees in a collective-bargaining unit. We have reasoned: "The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization chosen to represent a craft is chosen to represent all its members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against those whom it represents. It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those from whom it is exercised unless so expressed." (interpretation of 2(a) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S. C. 152 ( ed.), adopted for 9(a) of the NLRA in Ford Motor ). *382 As a result, we have read 9(a) to establish a duty of fair representation requiring a union "to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Although we have inferred that Congress intended to impose a duty of fair representation in 9(a), I see no justification for the further conclusion that Congress desired to grant unions an immunity from all state tort law. Nothing about a union's status as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit creates a need to exempt it from general duties to exercise due care to avoid injuring others. At least to some extent, therefore, I would conclude that Congress "by silence indicate[d] a purpose to let state regulation be imposed." Retail Our decision in confirms this view. Farmer held that the NLRA did not pre-empt a union member's action against his union for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See The union member complained that his union ridiculed him in public and refused to refer jobs to him in accordance with hiring hall rules. See In analyzing this claim, we ruled that the NLRA's pre-emption of state tort law depends on two factors: "the state interests in regulating the conduct in question and the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme." Both of these factors militated against |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Rawson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112426/steelworkers-v-rawson/ | the federal regulatory scheme." Both of these factors militated against pre-emption in Farmer. Noting that "our cases consistently have recognized the historic state interest in `such traditionally local matters as public safety and order,' " ), we ruled that the tort law addressed proper matters of state concern. We further observed that, although the tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress might interfere with the federal prohibition against discrimination by a *383 union, that "potential for interference is insufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial interest of the State in protecting its citizens." The Farmer analysis reveals that Idaho may hold the union liable for negligence in inspecting the mine. The strength and legitimacy of the State's interests in mine safety stand beyond question; the Union's failure to exercise due care, according to the allegations, caused or contributed to the deaths of 91 Idaho miners. Allowing this case to proceed to trial, moreover, would pose little threat to the federal regulatory scheme. State courts long have held unions liable for personal injuries under state law. See, e. g., ; (personal injuries); ; ; The Union presents no argument that this longstanding practice has interfered with federal labor regulation. Indeed, as the Court itself holds, nothing in the federal statutory scheme addresses the Union's conduct or provides redress for the injuries that it may have produced. See ante, at 373-375. The Union's position also deviates from the well-established position of the Courts of Appeals. These courts have found pre-emption by the duty of fair representation in two situations. First, the courts have said that the duty of fair fair representation pre-empts state duties that depend on a collective-bargaining agreement or on the union's status as the exclusive collective bargaining agent. See, e. g., ; As noted above, however, the Union's duties in this case do not stem from a contract or from its status as a union. Second, other courts have found the federal duty of fair representation to supplant equivalent state-law duties. See, e. g., ; ; In this case, state law differs from federal law in that the duty of fair representation does not address the conduct in question. The Union, as a result, has shown no support for its contention that the duty of fair representation pre-empts the Idaho tort law. For these reasons, I dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | The United States District Courts have jurisdiction over civil actions claiming a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States or by Acts of Congress providing *603 for equal rights or for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.[1] The question presented by these cases is whether that jurisdiction encompasses a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act. We conclude that it does not. In the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress authorized partial federal funding of approved state programs providing emergency assistance for certain needy persons.[2] In February 1976, Julia Gonzalez, the petitioner in No. 77-5324, requested the Hudson County, N. J., Welfare Board to pay her $163 in emergency assistance funds to cover her rent and utility bills.[3] The Board denied her request because *604 petitioner and her children were not "in a state of homelessness" as required by the relevant New Jersey regulations.[4] Petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that the emergency payment was "necessary to avoid destitution" within the meaning of 406 (e) (1) of the federal Social Security Act,[5] and she was therefore entitled to the payment notwithstanding the more stringent New Jersey regulation. In her federal complaint she sought damages of $163 and an injunction *605 commanding the New Jersey Welfare Director to conform his administration of the State's emergency assistance program to federal statutory standards. In essence, petitioner claimed that the New Jersey officials had deprived her of a right to emergency assistance protected by 406 (e) (1) of the Social Security Act. The District Court held that the complaint stated a claim under 42 U.S. C. 1983.[6] Without deciding whether the "secured by the Constitution" language in 1343 (3) should be construed to include Supremacy Clause claims,[7] the District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction under both subparagraphs (3) and (4) of 1343. But in doing so, the court did not explain whether it was 1983 or 406 (e) (1) of the Social Security Act that it viewed as the Act of Congress securing "equal rights" or "civil rights". On the merits, the District Court found no conflict between the state regulation and the federal statute and entered summary judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not address the merits because it concluded that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction.[8] In *606 reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first noted that 1983 "is not a |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | Court of Appeals first noted that 1983 "is not a jurisdictional statute; it only fashions a remedy." Nor could jurisdiction be founded on 28 U.S. C. 1331,[9] the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, since the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000. The court recognized that when a constitutional claim is of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction, a district court has power to consider other claims which might not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.[10] But it concluded that the constitutional claim must involve more than a contention that the Supremacy Clause requires that a federal statute be given effect over conflicting state law. It then went on to hold that the Social Security Act is not an Act of Congress securing either "equal rights" or "civil rights" as those terms are used in 1343. And those terms, the court concluded, limit the grant of federal jurisdiction conferred by 1343 even if 1983 creates a remedy for a broader category of statutory claims. The petitioners in No. 77-719 are Commissioners of the Texas Department of Human Resources, which administers the State's program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Respondents represent a class of AFDC recipients who share living quarters with a nondependent relative. Under the Texas regulations, the presence in the household of a nondependent person results in a reduction in the level of payments to the beneficiaries even if their level of actual need is unchanged. In a suit brought in the United *607 States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, respondents claimed that the Texas regulations violate 402 (a) (7) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. 602 (a) (7), and the federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.[11] The District Court upheld the Texas regulations.[12] While respondents' appeal was pending, this Court decided Van On the authority of that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.[13] Following earlier Fifth Circuit cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that federal jurisdiction was conferred by the language in 28 U.S. C. 1343 (4) describing actions seeking relief "under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights" The Court reasoned that statutory rights concerning food and shelter are "`rights of an essentially personal nature,'" Houston Welfare Rights ; that 42 U.S. C. 1983 provides a remedy which may be invoked to protect such rights; and that 1983 is an Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights within the meaning of that jurisdictional grant.[14] We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between that conclusion and the holding of the |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | the conflict between that conclusion and the holding of the Third Circuit in No. 77-5324. We have previously reserved the jurisdictional question we decide today, see We preface our decision with a review of the history of the governing statutes. I Our decision turns on the construction of the two jurisdictional provisions, 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3) and (4), and their *608 interrelationship with 42 U.S. C. 1983 and the Social Security Act. As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is the source of both the jurisdictional grant now codified in 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3) and the remedy now authorized by 42 U.S. C. 1983.[15] Section 1 authorized individual suits in federal court to vindicate the deprivation, under color of state law, "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States." No authorization was given for suits based on any federal statute. In 1874, Congress enacted the Revised Statutes of the United States. At that time, the remedial and jurisdictional provisions of 1 were modified and placed in separate sections. The words "and laws," as now found in 1983, were included in the remedial provision of Rev. Stat. 1979,[16] and two quite *609 different formulations of the jurisdictional grant were included in Rev. Stat. 563 and 629. The former granted the district courts jurisdiction of all actions to redress a deprivation under color of state law of any right secured by the Constitution or "by any law of the United States."[17] The latter defined the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and included the limiting phrase"by any law providing for equal rights"which is now found in 1343 (3).[18] In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress abolished circuit courts and transferred their authority to the district courts.[19] The Code's definition of the jurisdiction of the district courts to redress the deprivation of civil rights omitted the broad language referring to "any law of the United States" which had defined district court jurisdiction under 563, and provided instead for jurisdiction over claims arising under federal laws "providing for equal rights"the language which had been used to describe circuit court jurisdiction under 629, *610 and which is now a part of 1343 (3).[20] No significant change in either the remedial or jurisdictional language has been made since 1911.[21] Subsection 4 of 1343, providing jurisdiction for claims "under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote," is of more recent origin. Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as proposed, authorized the Attorney General to institute suits for injunctive relief against conspiracies to deprive citizens of the civil rights specified in 42 U.S. C. 1985, which includes voting rights.[22] Part III conferred jurisdiction on the United States district courts to entertain proceedings instituted pursuant to this section of the Act.[23] While the substantive authorization of suits by the Attorney General was defeated, the amendment of 1343, which had been termed a technical amendment to comply with the authority conferred by Part III,[24] was enacted into law. With the exception of this most recent enactment, the legislative history of the provisions at issue in these cases ultimately provides us with little guidance as to the proper resolution of the question presented here. Section 1 of the 1871 Act was the least controversial provision of that Act;[25]*611 and what little debate did take place as to 1 centered largely on the question of what protections the Constitution in fact afforded.[26] The relevant changes in the Revised Statutes were adopted virtually without comment, as was the definition of civil rights jurisdiction in the 1911 Code. The latter provision was described as simply merging the existing jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts,[27] a statement which may be read either as reflecting a view that the broader "and laws" language was intended to be preserved in the more limited "equal rights" language or as suggesting that "and laws" was itself originally enacted with reference to laws providing for equal rights, and was never thought to be any broader. Similar ambiguity is found in discussions of the basic policy of the legislation. While there is weight to the claim that Congress, from 1874 onward, intended to create a broad right of action in federal court for deprivations by a State of any federally secured right, it is also clear that the prime focus of Congress in all of the relevant legislation was ensuring a right of action to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal laws enacted pursuant thereto. We cannot say that any of these arguments is ultimately *612 right or wrong, or that one policy is more persuasive than others in reflecting the intent of Congress. It may well be that, at least as to 1343 (3), the Congresses that enacted the 1871 Act and its subsequent amendments never considered the question of federal jurisdiction of claims arising under the broad |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | question of federal jurisdiction of claims arising under the broad scope of federal substantive authority that emerged many years later. This does not mean that jurisdiction cannot be found to encompass claims nonexistent in 1871 or 1874, but it cautions us to be hesitant in finding jurisdiction for new claims which do not clearly fit within the terms of the statute.[28] II The statutory language suggests three different approaches to the jurisdictional issue. The first involves a consideration of the words "secured by the Constitution of the United States" as used in 1343. The second focuses on the remedy authorized by 1983 and raises the question whether that section is a statute that secures "equal rights" or "civil rights" within the meaning of 1343. The third approach makes the jurisdictional issue turn on whether the Social Security Act is a statute that secures "equal rights" or "civil rights." We consider these approaches in turn. 1. The Supremacy Clause Under 1343 (3), Congress has created federal jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to redress the deprivation under color of state law "of any right, privilege or immunity secured [1] by the Constitution of the United States or [2] by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United *613 States." Claimants correctly point out that the first prepositional phrase can be fairly read to describe rights secured by the Supremacy Clause. For even though that Clause is not a source of any federal rights, it does "secure" federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law.[29] In that sense all federal rights, whether created by treaty, by statute, or by regulation, are "secured" by the Supremacy Clause. In Swift & the Court was confronted with an analogous choice between two interpretations of the statute defining the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts.[30] The comprehensive language of that statute, 28 U.S. C. 2281 (1970 ed.),[31] could have been broadly read to *614 encompass statutory claims secured by the Supremacy Clause or narrowly read to exclude claims that involve no federal constitutional provision except that Clause. After acknowledging that the broader reading was consistent not only with the statutory language but also with the policy of the statute, the Court accepted the more restrictive reading. Its reasoning is persuasive and applicable to the problems confronting us in this case. "This restrictive view of the application of 2281 is more consistent with a discriminating reading of the statute itself than is the first and more embracing interpretation. |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | statute itself than is the first and more embracing interpretation. The statute requires a three-judge court in order to restrain the enforcement of a state statute `upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute.' Since all federal actions to enjoin a state enactment rest ultimately on the Supremacy Clause, the words `upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute' would appear to be superfluous unless they are read to exclude some types of such injunctive suits. For a simple provision prohibiting the restraint of the enforcement of any state statute except by a three-judge court would manifestly have sufficed to embrace every such suit whatever its particular constitutional ground. It is thus quite permissible to read the phrase in question as one of limitation, signifying a congressional purpose to confine the three-judge court requirement to injunction suits depending directly upon a substantive provision of the Constitution, leaving cases of conflict with a federal statute (or treaty) to follow their normal course in a single-judge court." Swift & Just as the phrase in 2281"upon the ground of the *615 unconstitutionality of such statute"would have been superfluous unless read as a limitation on three-judge-court jurisdiction, so is it equally clear that the entire reference in 1343 (3) to rights secured by an Act of Congress would be unnecessary if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced those resting solely on the Supremacy Clause. More importantly, the additional language which describes a limited category of Acts of Congressthose "providing for equal rights of citizens"plainly negates the notion that jurisdiction over all statutory claims had already been conferred by the preceding reference to constitutional claims. Thus, while we recognize that there is force to claimants' argument that the remedial purpose of the civil rights legislation supports an expansive interpretation of the phrase "secured by the Constitution," it would make little sense for Congress to have drafted the statute as it did if it had intended to confer jurisdiction over every conceivable federal claim against a state agent. In order to give meaning to the entire statute as written by Congress, we must conclude that an allegation of incompatibility between federal and state statutes and regulations does not, in itself, give rise to a claim "secured by the Constitution" within the meaning of 1343 (3). 2. Section 1983 Claimants next argue that the "equal rights" language of 1343 (3) should not be read literally or, if it is, that 1983, the source of their asserted cause of action, should be considered an Act of Congress "providing for equal rights" within the meaning of |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | of Congress "providing for equal rights" within the meaning of 1343 (3) or "providing for the protection of civil rights" within 1343 (4). In support of this position, they point to the common origin of 1983 and 1343 (3) in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and this Court's recognition that the latter is the jurisdictional counterpart of the former.[32]*616 Since broad language describing statutory claims was used in both provisions during the period between 1874 and 1911 and has been retained in 1983, and since Congress in the Judicial Code of 1911 purported to be making no changes in the existing law as to jurisdiction in this area, the "equal rights" language of 1343 (3) must be construed to encompass all statutory claims arising under the broader language of 1983. Moreover, in view of its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and its function in modern litigation, 1983 does "provid[e] for the protection of civil rights" within the meaning of 1343 (4). In practical effect, this argument leads to the same result as claimants' Supremacy Clause argument: jurisdiction over all challenges to state action based on any federal ground. Although the legislative history does not forbid this result, the words and structure of the statute, as well as portions of the legislative history, support a more limited construction. The common origin of 1983 and 1343 (3) unquestionably implies that their coverage is, or at least originally was, coextensive. It is not, however, necessary in this case to decide whether the two provisions have the same scope. For even if they do, there would still be the question whether the "and laws" language in 1983 should be narrowly read to conform with the "equal rights" language in 1343 (3), or, conversely, the latter phrase should be broadly read to parallel the former. And, in all events, whether or not we assume that there is a difference between "any law of the United States" on the one hand and "any Act of Congress providing for equal rights" on the other, the fact is that the more limited language was used when Congress last amended the jurisdictional provision. In order to construe the broad language of 1983 to cover any statutory claim, and at the same time to construe the language of 1343 (3) as coextensive with such a cause of action, it would be necessary to ignore entirely Congress' most recent limiting amendment and the words of the provision as currently in force. *617 We cannot accept claimants' argument that we should reach this result by holding that 1983 |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | that we should reach this result by holding that 1983 is an Act of Congress "providing for equal rights" within the meaning of 1343 (3). Unlike the 1866 and 1870 Acts,[33] 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not provide for any substantive rightsequal or otherwise. As introduced and enacted, it served only to ensure that an individual had a cause of action for violations of the Constitution, which in the Fourteenth Amendment embodied and extended to all individuals as against state action the substantive protections afforded by 1 of the 1866 Act.[34] No matter how broad the 1 cause of action may be, the breadth of its coverage does not alter its procedural character. Even if claimants are correct in asserting that 1983 provides a cause of action for all federal statutory claims, it remains true that one cannot go into court and claim a "violation of 1983"for 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything. As Senator Edmunds recognized in the 1871 debate: "All civil suits, as every lawyer understands, which this act authorizes, are not based upon it; *618 they are based upon the right of the citizen. The act only gives a remedy."[35] Under 1343 (3), a civil action must be both "authorized by law" and brought to redress the deprivation of rights "secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights." Section 1983, when properly invoked, satisfies the first requirement: It ensures that the suit will not be dismissed because not "authorized by law." But it cannot satisfy the second, since by its terms, as well as its history, it does not provide any rights at all. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the argument that 1983 is a statute "providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." Standing alone, 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil rights since, as we have just concluded, 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all. To be sure, it may be argued that 1983 does in some sense "provid[e] for the protection of civil rights" when it authorizes a cause of action based on the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other Acts of Congress. But in such cases, there is no question as to jurisdiction, and no need to invoke 1983 to meet the "civil rights" requirement of 1343 (4); the Act of Congress which is the actual substantive basis of the suit clearly suffices to meet the requisite test.[36] It is only when the underlying statute is |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | requisite test.[36] It is only when the underlying statute is not a civil rights Act that 1983 need be invoked by those in claimants' position to support jurisdiction. And in such cases, by hypothesis, 1983 does not "provid[e] for the protection of civil rights." To construe 1343 (4), moreover, as encompassing all federal statutory suits, as claimants here propose, would seem plainly inconsistent with the congressional intent in passing that statute. As noted earlier, the provision's primary purpose *619 was to ensure federal-court jurisdiction over suits which the bill authorized the Attorney General to bring against conspiracies to deprive individuals of the civil rights enumerated in 42 U.S. C. 1985.[37] The statute, of course, is broader than that: It encompasses suits brought by private individuals as well, and thus retained some significance even after the provisions authorizing suit by the Attorney General were defeated. But to the extent that 1343 (4) was thought to expand existing federal jurisdiction, it was only because it does not require that the claimed deprivation be "under color of any State law."[38] One would expect that if Congress sought *620 not only to eliminate any state-action requirement but also to allow jurisdiction without respect to the amount in controversy for claims which in fact have nothing to do with "civil rights," there would be some indication of such an intent. But there is none, either in the legislative history or in the words of the statute itself. 3. The Social Security Act It follows from what we have said thus far that 1343 does not confer federal jurisdiction over the claims based on the Social Security Act unless that Act may fairly be characterized as a statute securing "equal rights" within 1343 (3) or "civil rights" within 1343 (4). The Social Security Act provisions at issue here authorize federal assistance to participating States in the provision of a wide range of monetary benefits to needy individuals, including emergency assistance and payments necessary to provide food and shelter. Arguably, a statute that is intended to provide at least a minimum level of subsistence for all individuals could be regarded as securing either "equal rights" or "civil rights."[39] We are persuaded, *621 however, that both of these terms have a more restrictive meaning as used in the jurisdictional statute. The Social Security Act does not deal with the concept of "equality" or with the guarantee of "civil rights," as those terms are commonly understood. The Congress that enacted 1343 (3) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for cases dealing with racial equality; the Congress that enacted 1343 |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110076/chapman-v-houston-welfare-rights-organization/ | cases dealing with racial equality; the Congress that enacted 1343 (4) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for actions dealing with the civil rights enumerated in 42 U.S. C. 1985, and most notably the right to vote. While the words of these statutes are not limited to the precise claims which motivated their passage,[40] it is inappropriate to read the jurisdictional provisions to encompass new claims which fall well outside the common understanding of their terms. Our conclusion that the Social Security Act does not fall within the terms of either 1343 (3) or (4) is supported by this Court's construction of similar phrases in the removal statute, 28 U.S. C. 1443. The removal statute makes reference to "any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens" and "any law providing for equal rights." In construing these phrases in this Court concluded: "The present language `any law providing for equal civil rights' first appeared in 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. When the Revised Statutes were compiled, the substantive and removal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were carried forward in separate sections. Hence, Congress could no longer identify the rights for which removal was available by using the language of the original Civil Rights Act`rights secured to them by the first section of this act.' The new *622 language it chose, however, does not suggest that it intended to limit the scope of removal to rights recognized in statutes existing in 1874. On the contrary, Congress' choice of the open-ended phrase `any law providing for equal civil rights' was clearly appropriate to permit removal in cases involving `a right under' both existing and future statutes that provided for equal civil rights. "There is no substantial indication, however, that the general language of 641 of the Revised Statutes was intended to expand the kinds of `law' to which the removal section referred. In spite of the potential breadth of the phrase `any law providing for equal civil rights,' it seems clear that in enacting 641, Congress intended in that phrase only to include laws comparable in nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. ". As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded, 1443 `applies only to rights that are granted in terms of equality and not to the whole gamut of constitutional rights' `When the removal statute speaks of "any law providing for equal rights," it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of equality, such as the historic and the recent equal rights statutes, as distinguished from laws, of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | The Tohono O’odham Nation is an Indian Tribe with federal recognition. The Nation’s main reservation is in the Sonoran desert of southern Arizona. Counting this and other reservation lands, the Nation’s landholdings are approximately 3 million acres. The Nation brought two actions based on the same alleged violations of fiduciary duty with respect to the Nation’s lands and other assets. One action was filed against federal officials in district court and the other against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the CFC suit was not barred by the rule that the CFC lacks jurisdiction over an action “for or in respect to” a claim that is also the subject of an action pending in an other court. 28 U.S. C. The question presented is whether a common factual basis like the one apparent in the Nation’s suits suffices to bar jurisdiction under I The case turns on the relationship between the two suits the Nation filed. The first suit was filed in the United 2 UNITED STATES v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION Opinion of the Court States District Court for the District of Columbia against federal officials responsible for managing tribal assets held in trust by the Federal Government. The complaint alleged various violations of fiduciary duty with respect to those assets. The Nation claimed, for example, that the officials failed to provide an accurate accounting of trust property; to refrain from self-dealing; or to use reasonable skill in investing trust assets. The complaint requested equitable relief, including an accounting. The next day the Nation filed the instant action against the United States in the CFC. The CFC complaint de scribed the same trust assets and the same fiduciary duties that were the subject of the District Court com plaint. And it alleged almost identical violations of fiduci ary duty, for which it requested money damages. The CFC case was dismissed under for want of jurisdiction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. Two suits are for or in respect to the same claim, it reasoned, only if they share operative facts and also seek overlapping relief. Finding no overlap in the relief requested, the court held that the two suits at issue were not for or in respect to the same claim. This Court granted certiorari. 559 U. S. (2010). II Since 1868, Congress has restricted the jurisdiction of the CFC and its predecessors when related actions are pending elsewhere. Section 1500, identical in most re spects to the original |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | Section 1500, identical in most re spects to the original statute, provides: “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 Opinion of the Court of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United States.” The rule is more straightforward than its complex wording suggests. The CFC has no jurisdiction over a claim if the plaintiff has another suit for or in respect to that claim pending against the United States or its agents. The question to be resolved is what it means for two suits to be “for or in respect to” the same claim. provided a partial answer. It held that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are “based on substantially the same operative facts at least if there [is] some overlap in the relief requested.” The case did not decide whether the jurisdictional bar also operates if the suits are based on the same operative facts but do not seek overlapping relief. Still, narrows the permissible constructions of “for or in respect to” a claim to one of two interpretations. Either it requires substantial factual and some remedial overlap, or it re quires substantial factual overlap without more. Congress first enacted the jurisdictional bar now codi fied in to curb duplicate lawsuits brought by resi dents of the Confederacy following the Civil War. The so-called “cotton claimants”—named for their suits to recover for cotton taken by the Federal Government—sued the United States in the Court of Claims under the Aban doned Property Collection Act, while at the same time suing federal officials in other courts, seeking relief under tort law for the same alleged actions. See –207; Schwartz, Section 1500 of the Judicial Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Govern ment and Its Agents, 55 Geo. L. J. 573, 574–580 (1967). Although the rule embodied in originated long ago, Congress reenacted the statute at various times, most 4 UNITED STATES v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION Opinion of the Court recently in 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948, ; –207. The text of reflects a robust response to the prob lem first presented by the cotton claimants. It bars juris diction in the CFC not only |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | claimants. It bars juris diction in the CFC not only if the plaintiff sues on an identical claim elsewhere—a suit “for” the same claim— but also if the plaintiff’s other action is related although not identical—a suit “in respect to” the same claim. The phrase “in respect to” does not resolve all doubt as to the scope of the jurisdictional bar, but “it does make it clear that Congress did not intend the statute to be rendered useless by a narrow concept of identity.” It suggests a broad prohibition, regardless of whether “claim” carries a special or limited meaning. Cf. United (“claim” in the Little Tucker Act refers only to requests for money). Of the two constructions of “for or in respect to” the same claim that permits—one based on facts alone and the other on factual plus remedial overlap—the for mer is the more reasonable interpretation in light of the statute’s use of a similar phrase in a way consistent only with factual overlap. The CFC bar applies even where the other action is not against the Government but instead against a “person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United States.” The statute refers to a person who acts under color of federal law in respect to a cause of action at the time it arose. But at that time, the person could not act in respect to the relief requested, for no complaint was yet filed. This use of the phrase “in respect to a cause of action” must refer to op erative facts and not whatever remedies an aggrieved party might later request. A person acts under color of federal law in respect to a cause of action by claiming or wielding federal authority in the relevant factual context. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 Opinion of the Court Although the two phrases are not identical—one is in respect to a claim, the other a cause of action—they are almost so, and there is reason to think that both phrases refer to facts alone and not to relief. As the Court explained, “the term ‘claim’ is used here synonymously with ‘cause of action.’ ” And if either of the two phrases were to include both operative facts and a specific remedy, it would be the one that uses the term “cause of action” rather than “claim.” “Cause of action” is the more technical term, while “claim” is often used |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | is the more technical term, while “claim” is often used in a commonsense way to mean a right or demand. Here, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, “in respect to a cause of action” refers simply to facts without regard to judicial remedies. So, if the phrase with the more tech nical of the two terms does not embrace the concept of remedy, it is reasonable to conclude that neither phrase does. Even if the terms “claim” or “cause of action” include the request for relief, the phrase “for or in respect to” gives the statutory bar a broader scope. Reading the statute to require only factual and not also remedial overlap makes sense in light of the unique reme dial powers of the CFC. The CFC is the only judicial forum for most non-tort requests for significant monetary relief against the United States. See 28 U.S. C. (2006 ed. and Supp. III); (2006 ed.). Unlike the district courts, however, the CFC has no general power to provide equitable relief against the Government or its officers. Compare United 2–3 (1969), with 5 U.S. C. see also United States v. Alire, (“[T]he only judgments which the Court of Claims are authorized to render against the government are judgments for money found due from the government to the petitioner”). The distinct jurisdiction of the CFC makes overlapping relief the exception and distinct relief the norm. For that rea son, a statute aimed at precluding suits in the CFC that 6 UNITED STATES v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION Opinion of the Court duplicate suits elsewhere would be unlikely to require remedial overlap. Remedial overlap between CFC actions and those in other courts was even more unusual when ’s rule was first enacted in 1868. At that time the CFC had a more limited jurisdiction than it does now, for the Tucker Act’s general waiver of sovereign immunity for non-tort claims for monetary relief had not yet been enacted. See And while the district courts can today adjudicate suits against the United States for money damages under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. and the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1868 the United States could only be sued in the Court of Claims. United 212–214 (1983); G. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government (4th ed. 2006). Because the kinds of suits and forms of relief available against the United States were few and constrained, remedial overlap between CFC suits and those in other courts was even less common then than now. If the statute were to require remedial as well as factual |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | the statute were to require remedial as well as factual overlap, it would have had very limited application in 1868 despite its broad language that bars not only identical but also related claims. The rule in effects a significant jurisdictional limitation, and Congress reen acted it even as changes in the structure of the courts made suits on the same facts more likely to arise. Doing so reaffirmed the force of the bar and thus the commit ment to curtailing redundant litigation. The panel of the Court of Appeals could not identify “any purpose that serves today,” in large part because it was bound by Circuit precedent that left the statute without meaningful force. For exam ple, the panel cited Tecon Engineers, which held that does not prohibit two identical suits from proceed ing so long as the action in the CFC, or at that time the Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 7 Opinion of the Court Court of Claims, is filed first. The Tecon holding is not presented in this case because the CFC action here was filed after the District Court suit. Still, the Court of Appeals was wrong to allow its prece dent to suppress the statute’s aims. Courts should not render statutes nugatory through construction. In fact the statute’s purpose is clear from its origins with the cotton claimants—the need to save the Government from bur dens of redundant litigation—and that purpose is no less significant today. The conclusion that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on sub stantially the same operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim. Developing a fac tual record is responsible for much of the cost of litigation. Discovery is a conspicuous example, and the preparation and examination of witnesses at trial is another. The form of relief requested matters less, except insofar as it affects what facts parties must prove. An interpretation of focused on the facts rather than the relief a party seeks preserves the provision as it was meant to function, and it keeps the provision from becoming a mere pleading rule, to be circumvented by carving up a single transaction into overlapping pieces seeking different relief. Cf. Casman v. United States, (CFC had jurisdiction notwithstanding common facts in district court suit be cause the plaintiff sought different relief in each forum). Concentrating on operative facts is also consistent with the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, which bars “repetitious suits involving the same cause of action” once “a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | action” once “a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits.” Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). The jurisdictional bar in was enacted in part to address the problem that judgments in suits against officers were not preclusive in suits against the United States. Matson Nav. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 355–356 (1932). So it is no surprise that the 8 UNITED STATES v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION Opinion of the Court statute would operate in similar fashion. The now accepted test in preclusion law for determining whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action de pends on factual overlap, barring “claims arising from the same transaction.” Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482, n. 22 (1982); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980). The transactional test is of course much younger than the rule embodied in but even in the 19th century it was not uncommon to identify a claim for preclusion purposes based on facts rather than relief. See J. Wells, Res Adjudicata and Stare Decisis 1, p. 208 (1878) (“The true distinction between de mands or rights of action which are single and entire, and those which are several and distinct, is, that the former immediately arise out of one and the same act or contract, and the latter out of different acts or contracts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 2 H. Black, Law of Judgments p. 866 (1891) (The test for identity is: “Would the same evidence support and establish both the present and the former cause of action?”). Reading to depend on the underlying facts and not also on the relief requested gives effect to the principles of preclusion law embodied in the statute. There is no merit to the Nation’s assertion that the interpretation adopted here cannot prevail because it is unjust, forcing plaintiffs to choose between partial reme dies available in different courts. The hardship in this case is far from clear. The Nation could have filed in the CFC alone and if successful obtained monetary relief to compensate for any losses caused by the Government’s breach of duty. It also seems likely that Indian tribes in the Nation’s position could go to district court first without losing the chance to later file in the CFC, for Congress has provided in every appropriations Act for the Department of Interior since 1990 that the statute of limitations on Indian trust mismanagement claims shall not run until Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court the affected tribe has been given |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | Opinion of the Court the affected tribe has been given an appropriate account ing. See, e.g., ; Even were some hardship to be shown, considerations of policy divorced from the statute’s text and purpose could not override its meaning. Although Congress has permit ted claims against the United States for monetary relief in the CFC, that relief is available by grace and not by right. See (“[A]s this permission is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the man ner in which the suit shall be conducted”). If indeed the statute leads to incomplete relief, and if plaintiffs like the Nation are dissatisfied, they are free to direct their com plaints to Congress. This Court “enjoy[s] no ‘liberty to add an exception to remove apparent hardship.’ ” –218 ). reserved the question whether common facts are sufficient to bar a CFC action where a similar case is pending elsewhere. To continue to reserve the question would force the CFC to engage in an unnecessary and complicated remedial inquiry, and it would increase the expense and duration of litigation. The question thus demands an answer, and the answer is yes. Two suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the CFC, if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit. III The remaining question is whether the Nation’s two suits have sufficient factual overlap to trigger the jurisdic tional bar. The CFC dismissed the action here in part because it concluded that the facts in the Nation’s two suits were, “for all practical purposes, identical.” 79 Fed. Cl. 645, 656 (2007). It was correct to do so. 10 UNITED STATES v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION Opinion of the Court The two actions both allege that the United States holds the same assets in trust for the Nation’s benefit. They describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duty—that the United States engaged in self-dealing and imprudent investment, and failed to provide an accurate accounting of the assets held in trust, for example. Indeed, it appears that the Nation could have filed two identical complaints, save the caption and prayer for relief, without changing either suit in any significant respect. Under the substantial overlap in operative facts between the Nation’s District Court and CFC suits pre cludes jurisdiction in the CFC. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded otherwise. IV The holding here precludes the CFC from exercising jurisdiction over the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,011 | 4 | majority | United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215412/united-states-v-tohono-oodham-nation/ | holding here precludes the CFC from exercising jurisdiction over the Nation’s suit while the District Court case is pending. Should the Nation choose to dismiss the latter action, or upon that action’s completion, the Nation is free to file suit again in the CFC if the statute of limita tions is no bar. In the meantime, and in light of the sub stantial overlap in operative facts between them, the two suits are “for or in respect to” the same claim under and the CFC case must be dismissed. The contrary judg ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09–846 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT [April 26, 2011] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | concurring | Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205203/bruesewitz-v-wyeth-llc/ | I join the Court’s judgment and opinion. In my view, the Court has the better of the purely textual argument. But the textual question considered alone is a close one. Hence, like the dissent, I would look to other sources, including legislative history, statutory purpose, and the views of the federal administrative agency, here supported by expert medical opinion. Unlike the dissent, however, I believe these other sources reinforce the Court’s conclusion. I House Committee Report 99–908 contains an “authori tative” account of Congress’ intent in drafting the pre emption clause of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act). See (“[T]he authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill”). That Report says that, “if” vaccine injured persons “cannot demonstrate under applicable law either that a vaccine was improperly prepared or that it was ac companied by improper directions or inadequate warnings [they] should pursue recompense in the 2 BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC BREYER, J., concurring compensation system, not the tort system.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, p. 24 (1986) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). The Report lists two specific kinds of tort suits that the clause does not pre-empt (suits based on improper manu facturing and improper labeling), while going on to state that compensation for other tort claims, e.g., design-defect claims, lies in “the [NCVIA’s no-fault] compensation sys tem, not the tort system.” The strongest contrary argument rests upon the Re port’s earlier description of the statute as “set[ting] forth the principle contained in Comment k” (of the Restate ment Second of Torts’ strict liability section, 402A) that “a vaccine manufacturer should not be liable for injuries or deaths resulting from unavoidable side effects.” (emphasis added). But the appearance of the word “un avoidable” in this last-mentioned sentence cannot provide petitioners with much help. That is because nothing in the Report suggests that the statute means the word “unavoidable” to summon up an otherwise unmentioned third exception encompassing suits based on design de fects. Nor can the Report’s reference to comment k fill the gap. The Report itself refers, not to comment k’s details, but only to its “principle,” namely, that vaccine manufac turers should not be held liable for unavoidable injuries. It says nothing at all about who—judge, jury, or federal safety agency—should decide whether a safer vaccine could have been designed. Indeed, at the time Congress wrote this Report, different state courts had come to very different conclusions about that matter. See Cupp, Re thinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | concurring | Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205203/bruesewitz-v-wyeth-llc/ | Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negli gence Approach, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (1994–1995) (“[C]ourts [had] adopted a broad range of conflicting inter pretations” of comment k). Neither the word “unavoid Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 3 BREYER, J., concurring able” nor the phrase “the principle of Comment k” tells us which courts’ view Congress intended to adopt. Silence cannot tell us to follow those States where juries decided the design-defect question. II The legislative history describes the statute more gen erally as trying to protect the lives of children, in part by ending “the instability and unpredictability of the childhood vaccine market.” H. R. Rep., at 7; see ante, at 2–3. As the Committee Report makes clear, routine vacci nation is “one of the most spectacularly effective public health initiatives this country has ever undertaken.” H. R. Rep., at 4. Before the development of routine whoop ing cough vaccination, for example, “nearly all children” in the United States caught the disease and more than 4,000 people died annually, most of them infants. U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, What Would Happen if We Stopped Vaccinations? http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/ whatifstop.htm (all Internet materials as visited Feb. 17, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); Prevent ing Tetanus, Diphtheria, and Pertussis Among Adoles cents: Use of Tetanus Toxoid, Reduced Diptheria Toxoid and Acellular Pertussis Vaccines, 55 Morbidity and Mor tality Weekly Report, No. RR–3, p. 2 (Mar. 24, 2006) (here inafter Preventing Tetanus) (statistics for 1934–1943), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5503.pdf; U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Con trol and Prevention, Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 200 (11th ed. rev. May 2009). After vaccination became common, the number of annual cases of whooping cough declined from over 200,000 to about 2,300, and the number of deaths from about 4,000 to about 12. Preventing Tetanus 2; Childhood Immunizations, House Committee on Energy and Com 4 BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC BREYER, J., concurring merce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (Comm. Print 1986) (here inafter Childhood Immunizations). But these gains are fragile; “[t]he causative agents for these preventable childhood illnesses are ever present in the environment, waiting for the opportunity to attack the unprotected individual.” Hearing on S. 827 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 20–21 (1985) (hereinafter Hear ings) (testimony of the American Academy of Pediatrics); see California Dept. of Public Health, Pertussis Re- port (Jan. 7, 2011), www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/immunize/ Documents/PertussisReport2011–01–07.pdf (In 2010, 8,383 people in |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | concurring | Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205203/bruesewitz-v-wyeth-llc/ | (Jan. 7, 2011), www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/immunize/ Documents/PertussisReport2011–01–07.pdf (In 2010, 8,383 people in California caught whooping cough, and 10 infants died). Even a brief period when vaccination pro grams are disrupted can lead to children’s deaths. Hear ings 20–21; see Gangarosa et al., Impact of Anti-Vaccine Movements on Pertussis Control: The Untold Story, 351 Lancet 356–361 (Jan. 31, 1998) (when vaccination pro grams are disrupted, the number of cases of whooping cough skyrockets, increasing by orders of magnitude). In considering the NCVIA, Congress found that a sharp increase in tort suits brought against whooping cough and other vaccine manufacturers between 1980 and 1985 had “prompted manufacturers to question their continued participation in the vaccine market.” H. R. Rep., at 4; Childhood Immunizations 85–86. Indeed, two whooping cough vaccine manufacturers withdrew from the market, and other vaccine manufacturers, “fac[ing] great difficulty in obtaining [product liability] insurance,” told Congress that they were considering “a similar course of action.” H. R. Rep., at 4; Childhood Immunizations 68–70. The Committee Report explains that, since there were only one or two manufacturers of many childhood vaccines, “[t]he loss of any of the existing manufacturers of childhood vaccines could create a genuine public health hazard”; it “would present the very real possibility of vaccine short Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 5 BREYER, J., concurring ages, and, in turn, increasing numbers of unimmunized children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable dis eases.” H. R. Rep., at 5. At the same time, Congress sought to provide generous compensation to those whom vaccines injured—as determined by an expert compensa tion program. Given these broad general purposes, to read the pre emption clause as preserving design-defect suits seems anomalous. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) decides when a vaccine is safe enough to be licensed and which licensed vaccines, with which associated injuries, should be placed on the Vaccine In- jury Table. 42 U.S. C. ante, at 3–4; A Comprehensive Review of Federal Vaccine Safety Pro grams and Public Health Activities 13–15, 32–34 (Dec. 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/documents/ vaccine-safety-review.pdf. A special master in the Act’s compensation program determines whether someone has suffered an injury listed on the Injury Table and, if not, whether the vaccine nonetheless caused the injury. Ante, at 3–4; To allow a jury in effect to second guess those determinations is to substitute less expert for more expert judgment, thereby threatening manufacturers with liability (indeed, strict liability) in instances where any conflict between experts and nonexperts is likely to be particularly severe—instances where Congress intended the contrary. That is because potential tort plaintiffs are unlikely to bring suit unless |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | concurring | Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205203/bruesewitz-v-wyeth-llc/ | because potential tort plaintiffs are unlikely to bring suit unless the specialized compensation program has determined that they are not entitled to compensation (say, because it concludes that the vaccine did not cause the injury). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (“99.8% of successful Compensation Program claimants have accepted their awards, foregoing any tort remedies against vaccine manufacturers”). It is difficult to reconcile these potential conflicts and the re sulting tort liabilities with a statute that seeks to diminish 6 BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC BREYER, J., concurring manufacturers’ product liability while simultaneously augmenting the role of experts in making compensation decisions. III The United States, reflecting the views of HHS, urges the Court to read the Act as I and the majority would do. It notes that the compensation program’s listed vaccines have survived rigorous administrative safety review. It says that to read the Act as permitting design-defect lawsuits could lead to a recurrence of “exactly the crisis that precipitated the Act,” namely withdrawals of vaccines or vaccine manufacturers from the market, “disserv[ing] the Act’s central purposes,” and hampering the ability of the agency’s “expert regulators, in conjunction with the medical community, [to] control the availability and with drawal of a given vaccine.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, 31. The United States is supported in this claim by leading public health organizations, including the American Acad emy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Family Phy sicians, the American College of Preventive Medicine, the American Public Health Association, the American Medi cal Association, the March of Dimes Foundation, the Pedi atric Infectious Diseases Society, and 15 other similar organizations. Brief for American Academy of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae (hereinafter AAP Brief). The Ameri can Academy of Pediatrics has also supported the reten tion of vaccine manufacturer tort liability (provided that federal law structured state-law liability conditions in ways that would take proper account of federal agency views about safety). Hearings 14–15. But it nonetheless tells us here, in respect to the specific question before us, that the petitioners’ interpretation of the Act would un dermine its basic purposes by threatening to “halt the future production and development of childhood vaccines Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 7 BREYER, J., concurring in this country,” i.e., by “threaten[ing] a resurgence of the very problems which caused Congress to intervene” by enacting this statute. AAP Brief 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). I would give significant weight to the views of HHS. The law charges HHS with responsibility for overseeing vaccine production and safety. It is “likely to |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | concurring | Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205203/bruesewitz-v-wyeth-llc/ | for overseeing vaccine production and safety. It is “likely to have a thor ough understanding” of the complicated and technical subject matter of immunization policy, and it is compara tively more “qualified to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.” (internal quotation marks omitted); see Medtronic, (1996) (BREYER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (the agency is in the best position to determine “whether (or the extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives”). HHS’s position is par ticularly persuasive here because expert public health organizations support its views and the matter concerns a medical and scientific question of great importance: how best to save the lives of children. See In sum, congressional reports and history, the statute’s basic purpose as revealed by that history, and the views of the expert agency along with those of relevant medical and scientific associations, all support the Court’s conclusions. I consequently agree with the Court. Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09–152 RUSSELL BRUESEWITZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WYETH LLC, FKA WYETH, INC., FKA WYETH LABORATORIES, ET AL. |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | concurring | Aguilar v. Felton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111506/aguilar-v-felton/ | I concur in the Court's opinions and judgments today in this case and in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, ante, p. 373, holding that the aid to parochial schools involved in those cases violates the Establishment Clause of the First *415 Amendment. I write to emphasize additional reasons why precedents of this Court require us to invalidate these two educational programs that concededly have "done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm." The Court has previously recognized the important role of parochial schools: " `Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools.' " "The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them." 433 U.S., at Regrettably, however, the Title I and Grand Rapids programs do not survive the scrutiny required by our Establishment Clause cases. I agree with the Court that in this case the Establishment Clause is violated because there is too great a risk of government entanglement in the administration of the religious schools; the same is true in Ball, ante, p. 373. As beneficial as the Title I program appears to be in accomplishing its secular goal of supplementing the education of deprived children, its elaborate structure, the participation of public school teachers, and the government surveillance required to ensure that public funds are used for secular purposes inevitably present a serious risk of excessive entanglement. Our cases have noted that " `[t]he State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.' " ). This is true whether the subsidized teachers are religious school teachers, as in Lemon, or public school teachers teaching secular subjects to parochial school children at the parochial schools. Judge Friendly, writing for the unanimous Court of Appeals, agreed with this assessment of our cases. He correctly observed that the structure of the Title I program required the active and extensive surveillance that the City has provided, and, "under Meek, this very surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement even if it has succeeded in preventing the fostering of religion." 739 F. 2d, at 66. This risk of entanglement is compounded by the additional risk of political divisiveness stemming from the aid to religion at issue here. I do not suggest that at this point in our history the Title I |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | concurring | Aguilar v. Felton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111506/aguilar-v-felton/ | that at this point in our history the Title I program or similar parochial aid plans could result in the establishment of a state religion. There likewise is small chance that these programs would result in significant religious or denominational control over our democratic processes. See Nonetheless, there remains a considerable risk of continuing political strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation of limited governmental resources. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct governmental aid is extended to some groups that there will be competition and strife among them and others to gain, maintain, or increase the financial support of government. E. g., Committee for Public Education & Religious ; Lemon v. In States such as New York that have large and varied sectarian populations, one can be assured that politics will enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing financial pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus, any proposal to extend direct governmental *417 aid to parochial schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from nonrecipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to parochial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point." Although the Court's opinion does not discuss it at length, see ante, at 413, the potential for such divisiveness is a strong additional reason for holding that the Title I and Grand Rapids programs are invalid on entanglement grounds. The Title I program at issue in this case also would be invalid under the "effects" prong of the test adopted in Lemon v. As has been discussed thoroughly in Ball, ante, at 392-397, with respect to the Grand Rapids programs, the type of aid provided in New York by the Title I program amounts to a state subsidy of the parochial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide the remedial and supplemental education their children require. This is not the type of "indirect and incidental effect beneficial to [the] religious institutions" that we suggested in Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. Rather, by directly assuming part of the parochial schools' education function, the effect of the Title I aid is "inevitably to subsidize and advance the |
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