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Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | concurring | Aguilar v. Felton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111506/aguilar-v-felton/ | Title I aid is "inevitably to subsidize and advance the religious mission of [the] sectarian schools," even though the program provides that only secular subjects will *418 be taught. As in the secular education these schools provide goes " `hand in hand' " with the religious mission that is the reason for the schools' (quoting Lemon v. ). Because of the predominantly religious nature of the schools, the substantial aid provided by the Title I program "inescapably results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity." I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are placed by the interaction of the "effects" and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions require governments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an extremely narrow line between being certain that the "principal or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion, Lemon v. and avoiding excessive entanglement. Nonetheless, the Court has never foreclosed the possibility that some types of aid to parochial schools could be valid under the Establishment Clause. Our cases have upheld evenhanded secular assistance to both parochial and public school children in some areas. E. g., ; Board of Education v. ; I do not read the Court's opinion as precluding these types of indirect aid to parochial schools. In the cases cited, the assistance programs made funds available equally to public and nonpublic schools without entanglement. The constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be administered in significant part by public school teachers within parochial schools resulting in both the advancement of religion and forbidden entanglement. If, for example, Congress could fashion a program of evenhanded financial assistance to both public and private schools that could *419 be administered, without governmental supervision in the private schools, so as to prevent the diversion of the aid from secular purposes, we would be presented with a different question. I join the opinions and judgments of the Court. |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Shalala v. Schaefer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112895/shalala-v-schaefer/ | This case concerns the proper timing of an application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in a Social Security case. Under 4 U.S. C. 405(g), a claimant has the right to seek judicial review of a final *94 decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying Social Security benefits. One possible outcome of such a suit is that the district court, pursuant to sentence four of 405(g), will enter "a judgment reversing the decision of the Secretary [and] remanding the cause for a rehearing." The issue here is whether the 30-day period for filing an application for EAJA fees begins immediately upon expiration of the time for appeal of such a "sentencefour remand order," or sometime after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete. I In 1986, respondent Richard Schaefer filed an application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended, 4 U.S. C. 401 et seq. ( ed. and Supp. III). He was denied benefits at the administrative level, and sought judicial review by filing suit against the Secretary as authorized by 405(g). Schaefer and the Secretary filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 4, 1989, the District Court held that the Secretary had committed three errors in ruling on Schaefer's case and entered an order stating that "the Secretary's decision denying disability insurance benefits to [Schaefer] is reversed, that the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are denied, and that the case is remanded to the Secretary for further consideration in light of this Order." App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a. In accordance with this order, Schaefer's application for benefits was reconsidered at the administrative level, and was granted. On July 18, 1990, Schaefer returned to the District Court and filed an application for attorney's fees pursuant to EAJA. In response, the Secretary noted that Schaefer was required to file any application for EAJA fees "within thirty days of final judgment in the action," 8 U.S. C. 41(d)(1)(B), and argued that the relevant "final judgment" in the case was the administrative decision on *95 remand, which had become final on April 1990. The District Court stayed action on Schaefer's EAJA application pending this Court's imminent ruling in was announced shortly thereafter, holding that a final administrative decision could not constitute a "final judgment" for purposes of 41(d)(1)(B). In light of the Secretary changed positions to argue that EAJA's 30-day clock began running when the District Court's April 4, 1989 order (not the administrative ruling on remand) became final, which would have occurred at the end of the |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Shalala v. Schaefer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112895/shalala-v-schaefer/ | final, which would have occurred at the end of the 60 days for appeal provided under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Thus, the Secretary concluded, Schaefer's time to file his EAJA application expired on July 3, 1989, over a year before the application was filed. The District Court, however, found Schaefer's EAJA application timely under the controlling Circuit precedent of which held that a sentence-four remand order is not a final judgment where "the district court retain[s] jurisdiction and plan[s] to enter dispositive sentence four judgmen[t]" after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete. The District Court went on to rule that Schaefer was entitled to $1,37.50 in attorney's fees. The Secretary fared no better on appeal. The Eighth Circuit declined the Secretary's suggestion for en banc reconsideration of Welter, and affirmed the District Court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Judgt. order reported 0 F.d 1053 The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari, urging us to reverse the Court of Appeals summarily. We granted certiorari, and set the case for oral argument. II The first sentence of 8 U.S. C. 41(d)(1)(B) provides: "A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, *96 submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed." (Emphasis added.) In we held that the term "final judgment" in the highlighted phrase above "refers to judgments entered by a court of law, and does not encompass decisions rendered by an administrative agency." See 501 U.S., Thus, the only order in this case that could have resulted in the starting of EAJA's 30-day clock was the District Court's April 4, 1989, order, which reversed the Secretary's decision denying disability benefits and remanded the case to the Secretary for further proceedings. In cases reviewing final agency decisions on Social Security benefits, the exclusive methods by which district courts may remand to the Secretary are set forth in sentence four and sentence six of 405(g), which are set forth in the margin.[1] See Schaefer correctly *97 concedes that the District Court's remand order in this case was entered pursuant to sentence four.[] He argues, however, that a district court proceeding under that provision need not enter a judgment |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Shalala v. Schaefer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112895/shalala-v-schaefer/ | court proceeding under that provision need not enter a judgment at the time of remand, but may postpone it and retain jurisdiction pending completion of the administrative proceedings. That argument, however, is inconsistent with the plain language of sentence four, which authorizes a district court to enter a judgment "with or without" a remand order, not a remand order "with or without" a judgment. See Immediate entry of judgment (as opposed to entry of judgment after post remand agency proceedings have been completed and their results filed with the court) is in fact the principal feature that distinguishes a sentence-four remand from a sentence-six remand. See Nor is it possible to argue that the judgment authorized by sentence four, if it includes a remand, does not become a "final judgment"as required by 41(d)upon expiration of the time for appeal. If that were true, there would never be any final judgment in cases reversed and remanded for further agency proceedings (including those which suffer that fate after the Secretary has filed the results of a sentence-six remand). Sentence eight of 405(g) states that "[t]he judgment of the court"which must be a reference to a sentence-four judgment, since that is the only judgment authorized by 405(g)"shall be final except that it shall be *98 subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions." Thus, when the time for seeking appellate review has run, the sentence-four judgment fits squarely within the term "final judgment" as used in 41(d), which is defined to mean "a judgment that is final and not appealable." 8 U.S. C. 41(d)()(G). We described the law with complete accuracy in when we said: "In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment (`affirming, modifying, or reversing') is entered by the court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable. In sentence six cases, the filing period does not begin until after the post remand proceedings are completed, the Secretary returns to court, the court enters a final judgment, and the appeal period runs." Schaefer raises two arguments that merit further discussion. The first is based on our decision in which held that fees incurred during administrative proceedings held pursuant to a district court's remand order could be recovered under EAJA. In order "to effectuate Hudson, " Schaefer contends, a district court entering a sentence-four remand order may properly hold its judgment in abeyance (and thereby delay the start of EAJA's 30-day clock) until post remand administrative proceedings are complete; otherwise, as far as fees incurred during |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Shalala v. Schaefer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112895/shalala-v-schaefer/ | proceedings are complete; otherwise, as far as fees incurred during the yet-to-be-held administrative proceedings are concerned, the claimant would be unable to comply with the requirement of 41(d)(1)(B) that the fee application include "the amount sought" and "an itemized statement [of] the actual time expended" by attorneys and experts. In response, the Secretary argues that Hudson applies only to cases remanded pursuant to sentence six of 405(g), where there is no final judgment and the clock does not begin to run. The difficulty with that, Schaefer contends, is that Hudson itself clearly involved a sentence-four remand. *99 On the last point, Schaefer is right. Given the facts recited by the Court in Hudson, the remand order there could have been authorized only under sentence four. See -881; cf. n. However, the facts in Hudson also show that the District Court had not terminated the case, but had retained jurisdiction during the remand. And that was a central element in our decision, as the penultimate sentence of the opinion shows: "We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation and retains contin- uing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine the claimant's enti- tlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand are an integral part of the `civil action' for judicial review, and thus attorney's fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations in the EAJA." 490 U.S., at We have since made clear, in that that retention of jurisdiction, that failure to terminate the case, was error: Under 405(g), "each final decision of the Secretary [is]reviewable by a separate piece of litigation," and a sentencefour remand order "terminate[s] the civil action" seeking judicial review of the Secretary's final 496 U.S., at 64-65 What we adjudicated in Hudson, in other words, was a hybrid: a sentence-four remand that the District Court had improperly (but without objection) treated like a sentence-six remand.[3] We specifically *300 noted in that Hudson was limited to a "narrow class of qualifying administrative proceedings" where "the district court retains jurisdiction of the civil action" pending the completion of the administrative proceedings. We therefore do not consider the holding of Hudson binding as to sentence-four remands that are ordered (as they should be) without retention of jurisdiction, or that are ordered with retention of jurisdiction that is challenged.[4] Schaefer's second argument is that a sentence-four remand order cannot be considered a "final judgment" for purposes of 41(d)(1)(B) because that provision requires the party seeking fees to submit an application "show[ing] that [he] |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Shalala v. Schaefer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112895/shalala-v-schaefer/ | party seeking fees to submit an application "show[ing] that [he] is a prevailing party." That showing, Schaefer contends, cannot be made until the proceedings on remand are complete, since a Social Security claimant does not "prevail" until he is awarded Social Security benefits. The premise of this argument is wrong. No holding of this Court has ever denied prevailing-party status (under 41(d)(1)(B)) to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four of 405(g). Dicta in Hudson stated that "a Social Security *301 claimant would not, as a general matter, be a prevailing party within the meaning of the EAJA merely because a court had remanded the action to the agency for further proceedings." But that statement (like the holding of the case) simply failed to recognize the distinction between a sentence-four remand, which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff, and a sentence-six remand, which does not. The sharp distinction between the two types of remand had not been made in the lower court opinions in Hudson, see 839 F.d 1453 ; App. to Pet. for Cert. in O. T. No. 616, pp. 17a0a (setting forth unpublished District Court opinion), was not included in the question presented for decision,[5] and was mentioned for the first time in the closing pages of the Secretary's reply brief, see Reply Brief for Petitioner in O. T. No. 616, pp. 14-17. It is only decisions after Hudson specifically and which establish that the sentence-four, sentence-six distinction is crucial to the structure of judicial review established under 405(g). See 496 U. S., at 66; -98. Hudson `s dicta that remand does not generally confer prevailing-party status relied on three cases, none of which supports that proposition as applied to sentence-four remands. rejected an assertion of prevailing-party status, not by virtue of having secured a remand, but by virtue of having obtained a favorable procedural ruling (the reversal on appeal of a directed verdict) during the course of the judicial proceedings. 48 U.S. 755 held *30 that a plaintiff does not become a prevailing party merely by obtaining "a favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff, " (A sentence-four remand, of course, is a judgment for the plaintiff.) And the third case cited in Hudson, Texas State Teachers 489 U.S. 78 affirmatively supports the proposition that a party who wins a sentencefour remand order is a prevailing party. Garland held that status to have been obtained "[i]f the plaintiff has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of |
Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | majority | Shalala v. Schaefer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112895/shalala-v-schaefer/ | on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit sought in bringing suit." at 791-79 Obtaining a sentence-four judgment reversing the Secretary's denial of benefits certainly meets this description. See also III Finally, Schaefer argues that, even if the District Court should have entered judgment in connection with its April 4, 1989 order remanding the case to the Secretary, the fact remains that it did not. And since no judgment was entered, he contends, the 30-day time period for filing an application for EAJA fees cannot have run. We agree. An EAJA application may be filed until 30 days after a judgment becomes "not appealable"i. e., 30 days after the time for appeal has ended. See 41(d)(1)(B), (d)()(G); see also 501 U. S., at 10. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes that, in a civil case to which a federal officer is a party, the time for appeal does not end until 60 days after "entry of judgment," and that a judgment is considered entered for purposes of the Rule only if it has been "entered in compliance with Rul[e] 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Fed. Rules App. Proc. 4(a)(1), (7). Rule 58, in turn, requires a district court to set forth every judgment "on a separate document" and provides that "[a] judgment is effective only when so set *303 forth." See United 411 U.S. 16, 0 Since the District Court's April 4 remand order was a final judgment, see at 99, a "separate document" of judgment should have been entered. It is clear from the record that this was not done. The Secretary does not dispute that, but argues that a formal "separate document" of judgment is not needed for an order of a district court to become appealable. That is quite true, see 8 U.S. C. 191; Bankers Trust ; at 68, n. 7, but also quite irrelevant. EAJA's 30-day time limit runs from the end of the period for appeal, not the beginning. Absent a formal judgment, the District Court's April 4 order remained "appealable" at the time that Schaefer filed his application for EAJA fees, and thus the application was timely under 41(d)(1).[6] * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Fankell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118124/johnson-v-fankell/ | The question presented is whether defendants in an action brought under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 1983, in state court have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. We hold that they do not. I Petitioners are officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary. Respondent, a former liquor store clerk, brought this action for damages under 1983 in the District Court for the County of Bonner, Idaho. She alleged that petitioners deprived her of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution when they terminated her employment. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. They contended that, at the time of respondent's dismissal, they reasonably believed that she was a probationary employee who had no property interest in her job. Accordingly, petitioners argued, her termination did not violate clearly established law. The trial court *914 denied the motion,[1] and petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. The State Supreme Court entered an order dismissing the appeal. The court explained that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) "for the reason it is not from a final order or Judgment." App. 67. It also rejected petitioners' arguments that the order was appealable under 42 U.S. C. 1983 and Petitioners sought rehearing, again arguing that the order was final within the meaning of the Idaho Appellate Rule, and, in the alternative, that they had a right to appeal as a matter of federal law. The court denied rehearing and dismissed the appeal. Petitioners then filed a petition in this Court seeking either a writ of certiorari or a writ of mandamus. They pointed out that some state courts, unlike the Idaho Supreme Court, allow interlocutory appeals of orders denying qualified immunity on the theory that such review is necessary to protect a substantial federal right, see ; We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, and now affirm. II We have recognized a qualified immunity defense for both federal officials sued under the implied cause of action asserted in and state officials sued under 42 U.S. C. 1983. In both situations, "officials performing discretionary function[s] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable *915 person would have known." This "qualified immunity" defense is valuable to officials asserting it for two reasons. First, if it is |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Fankell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118124/johnson-v-fankell/ | officials asserting it for two reasons. First, if it is found applicable at any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from damages liability. Second, when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly established law or when discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue whether the defendant committed such a violation, it provides the defendant with an immunity from the burdens of trial as well as a defense to liability.[2] Indeed, one reason for adopting the objective test announced in Harlow was to "permit the resolution of many in substantial claims on summary judgment." Consistent with that purpose, we held in that a Federal District Court order rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the defendant's actionsif provedwould have violated clearly established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision" within the meaning of the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S. C. 1291.[3] If this action had been brought in a federal court, therefore, petitioners would have had a right to take an appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for summary judgment. Relying on the facts (a) that respondent has asserted a federal claim under a federal statute, and (b) that they are *916 asserting a defense provided by federal law, petitioners submit that the Idaho courts must protect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the same interlocutory appeal that would be available in a federal court. They support this submission with two different arguments: First, that when the Idaho courts construe their own rules allowing appeals from final judgments, they must accept the federal definition of finality in cases brought under 1983; and second, that if those rules do not authorize the appeal, they are pre-empted by federal law. We find neither argument persuasive. III We can easily dispense with petitioners' first contention that Idaho must follow the federal construction of a "final decision." Even if the Idaho and federal statutes contained identical languageand they do not[4]the interpretation of the Idaho statute by the Idaho Supreme Court would be binding on federal courts. Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State. See, e. g., New ; Exxon ; This proposition, fundamental to our system of federalism, is applicable to procedural as well as substantive rules. See The definition of the term "final decision" that we adopted in was an application of |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Fankell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118124/johnson-v-fankell/ | "final decision" that we adopted in was an application of the "collateral order" doctrine first recognized in In that case, as in all of our cases following it, we were construing the federal statutory language of 28 U.S. C. 1291.[5] While some States have adopted a similar "collateral order" exception when construing their jurisdictional statutes,[6] we have never suggested that federal law compelled them to do so. Indeed, a number of States employ collateral order doctrines that reject the limitations this Court has placed on 1291.[7] Idaho could, of *918 course, place the same construction on its Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) as we have placed on 1291. But that is clearly a choice for that court to make, not one that we have any authority to command. IV Petitioners also contend that, to the extent that Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) does not allow an interlocutory appeal, it is pre-empted by 1983. Relying heavily on petitioners first assert that preemption is necessary to avoid "different outcomes in 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court," Second, they argue that the state procedure "impermissibly burden[s]" the federal immunity from suit because it does not adequately protect their right to prevail on the immunity question in advance of trial.[8] For two reasons, petitioners have a heavy burden of persuasion in making this argument. First, our normal presumption against pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state Rule regarding the administration of the state courts.[9] As we explained in : *919 "When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts, we must act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim. See Missouri ex rel. Southern R. ; Georgia Rail Road & Banking ; ; The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented. The general rule, `bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.' Hart, [The Relations Between State and Federal Law], 54 Colum. L. Rev. [489, 508 (1954)]; see also Southland U.S. 1, ; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. [742, 774 ] (opinion of Powell, J.). The States thus have great latitude to establish the |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Fankell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118124/johnson-v-fankell/ | J.). The States thus have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts." A second barrier to petitioners' argument arises from the nature of the interest protected by the defense of qualified immunity. Petitioners' argument for pre-emption is bottomed on their claims that the Idaho rules are interfering with their federal rights. While it is true that the defense has its source in a federal statute ( 1983), the ultimate purpose of qualified immunity is to protect the State and its officials from overenforcement of federal rights. The Idaho Supreme Court's application of the State's procedural rules in this context is thus less an interference with federal interests than a judgment about how best to balance the competing state interests of limiting interlocutory appeals and providing *920 state officials with immediate review of the merits of their defense.[10] Petitioners' arguments for pre-emption are not strong enough to overcome these considerable hurdles. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, Idaho's decision not to provide appellate review for the vast majority of interlocutory orders including denials of qualified immunity in 1983 casesis not "outcome determinative" in the sense that we used that term when we held that Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute could not be applied to defeat a federal civil rights action brought in state courts under 1983. The failure to comply with the Wisconsin statute in resulted in a judgment dismissing a complaint that would not have been dismissedat least not without a judicial determination of the merits of the claimif the case had been filed in a federal court. One of the primary grounds for our decision was that, because the notice-of-claim requirement would "frequently and predictably produce different outcomes" depending on whether 1983 claims were brought in state or federal court, it was inconsistent with the federal interest in uniformity.[11] *921 Petitioners' reliance on is misplaced because "outcome," as we used the term there, referred to the ultimate disposition of the case. If petitioners' claim to qualified immunity is meritorious, there is no suggestion that the application of the Idaho rules of procedure will produce a final result different from what a federal ruling would produce. Petitioners were able to argue their immunity from suit claim to the trial court, just as they would to a federal court. And the claim will be reviewable by the Idaho Supreme Court after the trial court enters a final judgment, thus providing petitioners with a further chance to urge their immunity. Consequently, the postponement of the appeal until after final judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of the case. Petitioners' second |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Johnson v. Fankell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118124/johnson-v-fankell/ | not affect the ultimate outcome of the case. Petitioners' second argument for pre-emption of the state procedural Rule is that the Rule does not adequately protect their right to prevail in advance of trial. In evaluating this contention, it is important to focus on the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue. The right to have the trial court rule on the merits of the qualified immunity defense presumably has its source in 1983, but the right to immediate appellate review of that ruling in a federal case has its source in 1291. The former right is fully protected by Idaho. The latter right, however, is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum.[12] The locus of the right to interlocutory appeal in 1291, rather than in 1983 itself, is demonstrated by our holding *922 in In that case, government officials asserting qualified immunity claimed entitlement to an interlocutory appeal of a District Court order denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground that the record showed a genuine issue of material fact whether the officials actually engaged in the conduct that constituted a clear violation of constitutional law. We concluded that this circumstance was different from that presented in in which the subject of the interlocutory appeal was whether a given set of facts showed a violation of clearly established law, and held that although 1291 did allow an interlocutory appeal in the latter circumstance, such an appeal was not allowed in the former. In so holding, we acknowledged that "whether a district court's denial of summary judgment amounts to (a) a determination about pre-existing `clearly established' law, or (b) a determination about `genuine' issues of fact for trial, it still forces public officials to trial." But we concluded that the strong "countervailing considerations" surrounding appropriate interpretation of 1291 were of sufficient importance to outweigh the officials' interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation. The "countervailing considerations" at issue here are even stronger than those presented in Johnson. When preemption of state law is at issue, we must respect the "principles [that] are fundamental to a system of federalism in which the state courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law." Howlett, 496 U. S., at -373. This respect is at its apex when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its courts.[13] We therefore cannot agree with petitioners that *923 1983's recognition of the defense of qualified immunity preempts a State's consistent application |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act), Stat. 1214, 5 U.S. C. 7131(a) ( ed.), requires federal agencies to grant "official time" to employees *91 representing their union in collective bargaining with the agencies. The grant of official time allows the employee negotiators to be paid as if they were at work, whenever they bargain during hours when they would otherwise be on duty. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) concluded that the grant of official time also entitles employee union representatives to a per diem allowance and reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in connection with collective bargaining. 2 F. L. R. A. 265 In this case, the Court of for the Ninth Circuit enforced an FLRA order requiring an agency to pay a union negotiator travel expenses and a per diem, finding the Authority's interpretation of the statute "reasonably defensible." Three other Courts of have rejected the FLRA's construction of the Act.[1] We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, and now reverse. I A Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act, part of a comprehensive revision of the laws governing the rights and obligations of civil servants, contains the first statutory scheme governing labor relations between federal agencies and their employees. Prior to enactment of Title VII, labor-management relations in the federal sector were governed by a program established in a 12 Executive Order.[2] The Executive Order regime, under which federal employees had *92 limited rights to engage in concerted activity, was most recently administered by the Federal Labor Relations Council, a body composed of three Executive Branch management officials whose decisions were not subject to judicial review.[3] The new Act, declaring that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest," 5 U.S. C. 7101(a) ( ed.), significantly strengthened the position of public employee unions while carefully preserving the ability of federal managers to maintain "an effective and efficient Government," 7101(b).[4] Title VII expressly protects the rights of federal employees "to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity," 7102, and imposes on federal agencies and labor organizations a duty to bargain collectively in good faith, 76(a)(5) and (b)(5). The Act excludes certain management prerogatives from the scope of negotiations, although an agency must bargain over the procedures by which these management rights are exercised. See 7106. In general, unions and federal agencies must negotiate over terms and conditions of employment, unless a bargaining proposal is inconsistent with existing federal law, rule, or regulation. See 7103(a), 74, 76, and 77(a). |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | law, rule, or regulation. See 7103(a), 74, 76, and 77(a). Strikes and certain other forms of concerted activities by federal employees are illegal and constitute unfair labor practices under the Act, 76(b)(7)(A). The Act replaced the management-controlled Federal Labor Relations Council with the FLRA, a three-member independent and bipartisan body within the Executive Branch with responsibility for supervising the collective-bargaining process and administering other aspects of federal labor relations established by Title VII. 7104. The Authority, the role of which in the public sector is analogous *93 to that of the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector, see H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 41 adjudicates negotiability disputes, unfair labor practice complaints, bargaining unit issues, arbitration exceptions, and conflicts over the conduct of representational elections. See 7105(a)(2) (A)-(I). In addition to its adjudicatory functions, the Authority may engage in formal rulemaking, 7134, and is specifically required to "provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters" arising under the Act, 7105(a)(1). The FLRA may seek enforcement of its adjudicatory orders in the United States courts of appeals, 7123(b), and persons, including federal agencies, aggrieved by any final FLRA decision may also seek judicial review in those courts, 7123(a). B Petitioner, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF or Bureau), an agency within the Department of the Treasury, maintained a regional office in Lodi, California. Respondent National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU or Union) was the exclusive representative of BATF employees stationed in the Lodi office. In November 1978, the Bureau notified NTEU that it intended to move the Lodi office to Sacramento and to establish a reduced duty post at a new location in Lodi. The Union informed BATF that it wished to negotiate aspects of the move's impact on employees in the bargaining unit. As its agent for these negotiations, the Union designated Donald Pruett, a BATF employee and NTEU steward who lived in Madera, California, and was stationed in Fresno. Bureau officials agreed to meet with Pruett at the new offices and discuss the planned move. Pruett asked that his participation in the discussions be classified as "official time" so that he could receive his regular salary while attending the meetings. The Bureau denied the request and directed Pruett to take either annual leave or leave without pay for the day of the meeting. On February 23, 1979, Bureau officials met with Pruett at the proposed new Sacramento offices and inspected the physical *94 amenities, including the restrooms, dining facilities, and parking areas. Pruett and the BATF officials then drove to Lodi where they conducted |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | the BATF officials then drove to Lodi where they conducted a similar inspection of the new reduced duty post. Finally, the group repaired to the existing Lodi office where they discussed the planned move. After Pruett expressed his general satisfaction with the new facilities, he negotiated with the agency officials about such matters as parking arrangements, employee assignments, and the possibility of excusing employee tardiness for the first week of operations in the Sacramento office. Once the parties reached an agreement on the move, Pruett drove back to his home in Madera. Pruett had spent 1/2 hours traveling to and attending the meetings, and had driven more than 300 miles in his own car. When he renewed his request to have his participation at the meetings classified as official time, the Bureau informed him that it did not reimburse employees for expenses incurred in negotiations and that it granted official time only for quarterly collective-bargaining sessions and not for midterm discussions like those involved here. In June 1979, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA, claiming that BATF had improperly compelled Pruett to take annual leave for the February 23 sessions. While the charge was pending, the FLRA issued an "Interpretation and Guidance" of general applicability which required federal agencies to pay salaries, travel expenses, and per diem allowances to union representatives engaged in collective bargaining with the agencies.[5] 2 F. L. R. A. 265 The Interpretation relied on 5 U.S. C. 7131(a) *95 ( ed.), which provides that "[a]ny employee representing an exclusive representative in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement shall be authorized official time for such purposes" The Authority concluded that an employee's entitlement to official time under this provision extends to "all negotiations between an exclusive representative and an agency, regardless of whether such negotiations pertain to the negotiation or renegotiation of a basic collective bargaining agreement." 2 F. L. R. A., at 268. The Authority further determined that 7131(a) requires agencies to pay a per diem allowance and travel expenses to employees representing their union in such negotiations. Based on the NTEU's pending charge against the Bureau, the General Counsel of the Authority issued a complaint and notice of hearing, alleging that the BATF had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to grant Pruett official time for the February 23 meetings.[6] During the course of a subsequent hearing on the charge before an Administrative Law Judge, the complaint was amended to add a claim that, in addition to paying Pruett's salary for the day of the meetings, the BATF |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | Pruett's salary for the day of the meetings, the BATF should have paid his travel expenses and a per diem allowance. Following the hearing, the ALJ determined * that negotiations had in fact taken place between Pruett and BATF officials at the February 23 meetings. Bound to follow the recent FLRA Interpretation and Guidance, the ALJ concluded that the Bureau had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to comply with 7131(a). Accordingly, he ordered the Bureau to pay Pruett his regular salary for the day in question, as well as his travel costs and a per diem allowance. The ALJ also required the BATF to post a notice stating that the agency would do the same for all employee union representatives in future negotiations. The Bureau filed exceptions to the decision with the Authority, which, in September 1980, affirmed the decision of the ALJ, adopting his findings, conclusions, and recommended relief. 4 F. L. R. A. 288 (1980). The Bureau sought review in the United States Court of for the Ninth Circuit, and the Union intervened as a party in that appeal. The Bureau challenged both the FLRA's conclusion that 7131(a) applies to midterm negotiations and its determination that the section requires payment of travel expenses and a per diem allowance. After deciding that the Authority's construction of its enabling Act was entitled to deference if it was "reasoned and supportable," -736, the Court of enforced the Authority's order on both issues. On certiorari to this Court, petitioner does not seek review of the holding with respect to midterm negotiations. Only that aspect of the Court of ' decision regarding travel expenses and per diem allowances is at issue here. II The FLRA order enforced by the Court of in this case was, as noted, premised on the Authority's earlier construction of 7131(a) in its Interpretation and Guidance. Although we have not previously had occasion to consider an interpretation of the Civil Service Reform Act by the FLRA, we have often described the appropriate standard of judicial *97 review in similar contexts.[7] Like the National Labor Relations Board, see, e. g., the FLRA was intended to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the Act. See 7105; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 41 Consequently, the Authority is entitled to considerable deference when it exercises its "special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities" of federal labor relations. Cf. at See also Ford Motor ; ; |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | labor relations. Cf. at See also Ford Motor ; ; On the other hand, the "deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." American Ship Building (15). Accordingly, while reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency's enabling Act, at they must not "rubber-stamp administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute." (15). See Chemical & Alkali v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,[8] Guided by these principles, we turn to a consideration of the FLRA's construction of 7131(a). III Title 5 U.S. C. 7131(a) ( ed.) provides in full: "Any employee representing an exclusive representative in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement *99 under this chapter shall be authorized official time for such purposes, including attendance at impasse proceeding, during the time the employee otherwise would be in a duty status. The number of employees for whom official time is authorized under this subsection shall not exceed the number of individuals designated as representing the agency for such purposes." According to the House Committee that reported the bill containing 7131, Congress used the term "official time" to mean "paid time." See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 58 In light of this clear expression of congressional intent, the parties agree that employee union negotiators are entitled to their usual pay during collective-bargaining sessions that occur when the employee "otherwise would be in a duty status." Both the Authority, 2 F. L. R. A., at 269, and the Court of recognized that there is no corresponding expression, either in the statute or the extensive legislative history, of a congressional intent to pay employee negotiators travel expenses and per diem allowances as well. Despite this congressional silence, respondents advance several reasons why the FLRA's determination that such payments are required is consistent with the policies underlying the Act. Each of these arguments proceeds from the assumption that, by providing employee negotiators with official time for bargaining, Congress rejected the model of federal labor relations that had shaped prior administrative practice. In its place, according to respondents, Congress substituted a new vision of collective bargaining under which employee negotiators, like management representatives, are considered "on the job" while bargaining and are therefore entitled to all customary forms of compensation, including travel expenses and per diem allowances.[9] In order to evaluate this claim, it is necessary briefly to review the rights of *100 employee negotiators to |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | briefly to review the rights of *100 employee negotiators to compensation prior to adoption of the Act. A Under the 12 Executive Order establishing the first federal labor relations program, the decision whether to pay union representatives for the time spent in collective bargaining was left within the discretion of their employing agency,[10] apparently on the ground that, without some control by management, the length of such sessions could impose too great a burden on Government business. See Report of the President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Service, reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, pp. 77, 1203 (hereinafter Leg. Hist.). Under this early scheme, employee negotiators were not entitled to per diem allowances and travel expenses, on the view that they were engaged, not in official business of the Government, but rather in activities "primarily in the interest of the employee organization." (15).[] *101 Executive Order No. 491, which became effective in 1970, cut back on the previous Order by providing that employees engaged in negotiations with their agencies could not receive official time, even at the agencies' discretion. See 3 CFR 861-862, 873-874 (16-1970 Comp.). Again, the prohibition was based on the view that employee representatives work for their union, not for the Government, when negotiating an agreement with their employers. See Leg. Hist., at 67. In 1971, however, at the recommendation of the Federal Labor Relations Council, an amending Executive Order allowed unions to negotiate with agencies to obtain official time for employee representatives, up to a maximum of either 40 hours, or 50% of the total time spent in bargaining. Exec. Order No. 616, 3 CFR 605 (1971-1975 Comp.). The Council made clear that this limited authorization, which was intended "to maintain a reasonable policy with respect to union self-support and an incentive to economical and businesslike bargaining practices," Leg. Hist., at 69, did not permit "[o]vertime, premium pay, or travel expenditures." The Senate version of the bill that became the Civil Service Reform Act would have retained the last Executive Order's restrictions on the authorization of official time. S. Rep. *102 No. 95-9, p. 2 Congress instead adopted the section in its present form, concluding, in the words of one Congressman, that union negotiators "should be allowed official time to carry out their statutory representational activities just as management uses official time to carry out its responsibilities." 124 Cong. Rec. 29188 (remarks of Rep. Clay). See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, p. 1 B Respondents suggest that, |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, p. 1 B Respondents suggest that, by rejecting earlier limitations on official time, Congress repudiated the view that employee negotiators work only for their union and not for the Government. Under the new vision of federal labor relations postulated by respondents, civil servants on both sides of the bargaining table are engaged in official business of the Government and must be compensated equally. Because federal employees representing the views of management receive travel expenses and per diem allowances, federal employees representing the views of labor are entitled to such payments as well. In support of this view, respondents rely on the Act's declaration that public sector collective bargaining is in "the public interest" and "contributes to the effective conduct of public business," 7101(a), as well as on a number of specific provisions in the Act intended to equalize the position of management and labor. For instance, the Act requires agencies to deduct union dues from employees' paychecks and to transfer the funds to the union at no cost, 75(a);[12] in addition, agencies must furnish a variety of date useful to unions in the collective-bargaining process, 74(b)(4). Respondents also contend that Congress employed the term "official time" in 7131 specifically to indicate that employee negotiators are engaged in Government business and therefore entitled to all of their usual forms of compensation. *103 Although Congress certainly could have adopted the model of collective bargaining advanced by respondents, we find no indications in the Act or its legislative history that it intended to do so. The Act's declaration that collective bargaining contributes to efficient government and therefore serves the public interest does not reflect a dramatic departure from the principles of the Executive Order regime under which employee negotiators had not been regarded as working for the Government. To the contrary, the declaration constitutes a strong congressional endorsement of the policy on which the federal labor relations program had been based since its creation in 12. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 CFR 521 (1959-13 Comp.) ("participation of employees in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies affecting them contributes to effective conduct of public business"); Exec. Order No. 491, 3 CFR 861 (16-1970 Comp.) ("public interest requires modern and progressive work practices to facilitate improved employee performance and efficiency" and efficient government is "benefited by providing employees an opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of their employment"). See also S. Rep. No. 95-9, p. 12 ; 124 Cong. Rec. 29182 (remarks of Rep. Udall) ("What we |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | 124 Cong. Rec. 29182 (remarks of Rep. Udall) ("What we really do is to codify the 12 action of President Kennedy in setting up a basic framework of collective bargaining for Federal employees").[13] *104 Nor do the specific provisions of the Act aimed at equalizing the positions of management and labor suggest that Congress intended employee representatives to be treated as though they were "on the job" for all purposes. Indeed, the Act's provision of a number of specific subsidies for union activities supports precisely the opposite conclusion. As noted above, Congress expressly considered and ultimately rejected the approach to paid time that had prevailed under the Executive Order regime. See In contrast, there is no reference in the statute or the legislative history to travel expenses and per diem allowances, despite the fact that these kinds of payments had also received administrative attention prior to passage of the Act, see and n. There is, of course, nothing inconsistent in paying the salaries, but not the expenses, of union negotiators. Congress might well have concluded that, although union representatives should not be penalized by a loss in salary while engaged in collective bargaining, they need not be further subsidized with travel and per diem allowances. The provisions of the Act intended to facilitate the collection of union dues, see 75, certainly suggest that Congress contemplated that unions would ordinarily pay their own expenses. Respondents also find their understanding of the role of union representatives supported by Congress' use of the phrase "official time" in 7131(a). For respondents, the use of this term indicates an intent to treat employee negotiators "as doing the government's work for all the usual purposes," and therefore entitled to "all attributes of employment," including travel expenses and a per diem allowance. Brief for Respondent NTEU 24-28. They suggest that, if Congress intended to maintain only the employees' salaries, it would have granted them "leave without loss of pay," a term it has used in other statutes. See, e. g., 5 U.S. C. 6321 (absence of veterans to attend funeral services), 6322(a) (jury or witness duty), and 6323 (military reserve duty) ( ed.). In contrast, Congress uses the terms "official *105 capacity" and "duty status" to indicate that an employee is "on the job" and entitled to all the usual liabilities and privileges of employment. See, e. g., 5751, 6322(b) (employee summoned to testify in "official capacity" entitled to travel expenses).[14] The difficulty with respondents' argument is that Congress did not provide that employees engaged in collective bargaining are acting in their "official capacity," "on the job," |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | bargaining are acting in their "official capacity," "on the job," or in a "duty status." Instead, the right to a salary conferred by 7131(a) obtains only when "the employee otherwise would be in a duty status" (emphasis supplied). This qualifying language strongly suggests that union negotiators engaged in collective bargaining are not considered in a duty status and thereby entitled to all of their normal forms of compensation. Nor does the phrase "official time," borrowed from prior administrative practice, have the same meaning as "official capacity."[15] As noted above, employees on "official time" under the Executive Order regime were not generally entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance. See -101. Moreover, as respondents' own examples demonstrate, Congress does not rely on the mere use of the word "official" when it intends to allow travel expenses and per diems. Even as to those employees acting in an "official capacity," Congress generally provides explicit authorization for such payments. See, e. g., 5702, 5751(b), 6322(b). In the Civil Service Reform Act itself, for instance, Congress expressly provided that members of the Federal Service *106 Impasses Panel are entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance, in addition to a salary. See 5703, 79(c)(4).[16] Perhaps recognizing that authority for travel expenses and per diem allowances cannot be found within the four corners of 7131(a), respondents alternatively contend that the Authority's decision is supported by the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S. C. 5702(a) ( ed.), which provides that a federal employee "traveling on official business away from his designated post of duty is entitled to a per diem allowance." The Travel Expense Act is administered by the Comptroller General who has concluded that agencies may authorize per diem allowances for travel that is "sufficiently in the interest of the United States so as to be regarded as official business." (14). Under the Executive Order regime, the Comptroller General authorized per diem payments to employee negotiators pursuant to this statute upon a certification that the employees' travel served the convenience of the employing agency. See n. Based on its view that employee negotiators are "on the job," the Authority determined that union representatives engaged in collective bargaining are on "official business" and therefore entitled to a per diem allowance under the Travel Expense Act. 2 F. L. R. A., at 269. In support of this reasoning, the Authority notes that 5702(a) has been construed broadly to authorize reimbursement in connection with a variety *107 of "quasi-official" activities, such as employees' attendance at their own personnel hearings and at privately sponsored conferences. See, e. |
Justice Brennan | 1,983 | 13 | majority | Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111049/bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-flra/ | own personnel hearings and at privately sponsored conferences. See, e. g., Comptroller General of the United States, Travel in the Management and Operation of Federal Programs 1, App. I, p. 5 (Rpt. No. FPCD-77-, Mar. 17, 1977); In each of these instances, however, the travel in question was presumably for the convenience of the agency and therefore clearly constituted "official business" of the Government. As we have explained, neither Congress' declaration that collective bargaining is in the public interest nor its use of the term of art "official time" warrants the conclusion that employee negotiators are on "official business" of the Government.[17] IV In passing the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal unions and to make the collective-bargaining process a more effective instrument of the public interest than it had been under the Executive Order regime. See There is no evidence, however, that the Act departed from the basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public *108 and the private sector that the parties "proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest." (10), quoted in General Building Contractors Assn., Nor did the Act confer on the FLRA an unconstrained authority to equalize the economic positions of union and management. See American Ship Building -. We conclude, therefore, that the FLRA's interpretation of 7131(a) constitutes an "unauthorized assumption by [the] agency of [a] major policy decisio[n] properly made by Congress." at The judgment of the Court of is Reversed. |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | United States v. Mendoza-Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111894/united-states-v-mendoza-lopez/ | In this case, we must determine whether an alien who is prosecuted under 8 U.S. C. 1326 for illegal entry following deportation may assert in that criminal proceeding the invalidity of the underlying deportation order. I Respondents, Jose Mendoza-Lopez and Angel Landeros-Quinones, were arrested at separate locations in Lincoln, Nebraska, on October 23, 1984, by agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. On October 30, 1984, they were transported to Denver, Colorado, where a group deportation hearing was held for respondents along with 11 other persons, all of whom were, like respondents, Mexican nationals.[1] After the hearing, respondents were ordered deported and were bused to El Paso, Texas. They were deported from El Paso on November 1, 1984. Each received, at the time of his deportation, a copy of Form I-294, which advised, in both Spanish and English, that a return to the United States without permission following deportation would constitute a felony. On December 12, 1984, both respondents were once again separately arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska. They were subsequently indicted by a grand jury in the District of Nebraska on charges of violating 8 U.S. C. 1326, which provides: "Any alien who "(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and thereafter "(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States *831 "shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both."[2] Respondents moved in the District Court to dismiss their indictments, on the ground that they were denied fundamentally fair deportation hearings. They contended that the Immigration Law Judge inadequately informed them of their right to counsel at the hearing, and accepted their unknowing waivers of the right to apply for suspension of deportation.[3] The District Court ruled that respondents could collaterally attack their previous deportation orders. United States v. Landeros-Quinones, CR 85-L-06 It rejected their claims that they were not adequately informed of their right to counsel. It found, however, that respondents had apparently failed to understand the Immigration Judge's explanation of suspension of deportation.[4] The District *832 Court concluded that respondents had not made knowing and intelligent waivers of their rights to apply for suspension of deportation or their rights to appeal, finding it "inconceivable that they would so lightly waive their rights to appeal, and thus to the relief they now claim entitlement, [sic] if they had been fully apprised of the ramifications of such a choice." App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. Holding that |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | United States v. Mendoza-Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111894/united-states-v-mendoza-lopez/ | a choice." App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. Holding that the "failure to overcome these defendants' lack of understanding about the proceedings, which is apparent from listening to the tape recording, totally undermined the reliability of the proceedings" and that "substantial justice was not done," the District Court dismissed the indictments in both cases. at 26a. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Noting a conflict among the Circuits regarding whether a defendant prosecuted under 1326 may collaterally attack a deportation order, the court agreed with those Courts of Appeals that had concluded that a material element of the offense prohibited by 1326 was a "lawful" deportation. It went on to state that principles of fundamental fairness required a pretrial review of the underlying deportation to examine whether the alien received due process of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's conclusion that there was a due process violation in this case, holding that, "[b]ecause the defendants did not fully understand the proceedings, the hearing was fundamentally unfair, and the deportation order was obtained unlawfully. Thus, it cannot stand as a material element forming the basis of the charges against the defendants."[5] *833 To resolve the conflict among the Circuits,[6] we granted certiorari. We affirm. II In United we left open whether the validity of an underlying order of deportation may be challenged in a criminal prosecution in which that prior deportation is an element of the crime.[7] Today, we *834 squarely confront this question in the context of 1326, which imposes a criminal penalty on any alien who has been deported and subsequently enters, attempts to enter, or is found in, the United States. The issue before us is whether a federal court must always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order, even if the deportation proceeding was not conducted in conformity with due process.[8] The first question we must address is whether the statute itself provides for a challenge to the validity of the deportation order in a proceeding under 1326. Some of the Courts of Appeals considering the question have held that a deportation is an element of the offense defined by 1326 only if it is "lawful,"[9] and that 1326 therefore permits collateral *835 challenge to the legality of an underlying deportation order. The language of the statute, however, suggests no such limitation, stating simply that "[a]ny alien who has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported," 8 U.S. C. 1326 (1), will be guilty of a felony if the alien thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | United States v. Mendoza-Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111894/united-states-v-mendoza-lopez/ | the alien thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, 8 U.S. C. 1326(2). Nor does the sparse legislative history contain any evidence that Congress intended to permit challenge to the validity of the deportation in the 1326 proceeding. Before 1326 was enacted, three statutory sections imposed criminal penalties upon aliens who reentered the country after deportation: 8 U.S. C. 180(a) (1946 ed.) which provided that any alien who had been "deported in pursuance of law" and subsequently entered the United States would be guilty of a felony; 8 U.S. C. 138 (1946 ed.) which provided that an alien deported for prostitution, procuring, or similar immoral activity, and who thereafter reentered the United States, would be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a different penalty; and 8 U.S. C. 137-7(b) (1946 ed., Supp. V) which stated that any alien who reentered the country after being deported for subversive activity would be guilty of a felony and subject to yet a third, more severe penalty.[10] See H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 219-220 *836 Congress thus had available to it in at least one of the predecessor sections 180(a) express language that would have permitted collateral challenges to the validity of deportation proceedings in a criminal prosecution for reentry after deportation.[11] It nonetheless failed to include in 1326 the "in pursuance of law" language of 180(a). And while there was, at the time of the enactment of 1326, some case law suggesting that a collateral attack on a deportation proceeding might under certain circumstances be permitted, that principle was not so unequivocally established as to persuade us that Congress must have intended to incorporate that prior law into 1326.[12] The Immigration and Nationality Act does include sections that limit judicial review of deportation orders. 8 U.S. C. 1105a provides that, outside of enumerated exceptions, the procedures prescribed by Title 28 of the United States Code for review of federal agency orders "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation." The enumerated exceptions permit an alien to challenge a deportation order, the validity of which has not previously been judicially determined, in a criminal proceeding against the alien for violation of 8 U.S. C. 1252(d) or (e), 8 U.S. C. 1105a(a)(6), and any alien held in custody *837 pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review of that order in a habeas corpus proceeding, 8 U.S. C. 1105a(a)(9). These sections are not directly applicable to this case, since |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | United States v. Mendoza-Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111894/united-states-v-mendoza-lopez/ | These sections are not directly applicable to this case, since respondents did not ask the District Court to vacate their deportation orders and the court did not do so. It ruled only that the orders could not properly be used as the predicate for a 1326 conviction. Yet the text of 1105a indicates that Congress considered and addressed some of the various circumstances in which challenges to deportation orders might arise and did not mention 1326. See also 8 U.S. C. 1101(g) ("For the purposes of this chapter any alien ordered deported who has left the United States, shall be considered to have been deported in pursuance of law"); but see[13] The text and background of 1326 thus indicate no congressional intent to sanction challenges to deportation orders in proceedings under 1326. III A That Congress did not intend the validity of the deportation order to be contestable in a 1326 prosecution does not end our inquiry. If the statute envisions that a court may impose a criminal penalty for reentry after any deportation, regardless of how violative of the rights of the alien the deportation proceeding may have been, the statute does not comport with the constitutional requirement of due process.[14] Our cases establish that where a determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent *838 imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding. See ; ; cf.[15] This principle means at the very least that where the defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense.[16] The result of those proceedings may subsequently be used to convert the misdemeanor of unlawful entry into *839 the felony of unlawful entry after a deportation. Depriving an alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be made available in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used to establish an element of a criminal offense.[17] B Having established that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review, the question remains whether that occurred in this case. The United States did not seek this Court's review of the determination of the courts |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | United States v. Mendoza-Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111894/united-states-v-mendoza-lopez/ | seek this Court's review of the determination of the courts below that respondents' rights to due process were violated by the failure of the Immigration Judge to explain adequately their right to suspension of deportation or their right to appeal. Pet. for Cert. 7. The United States has asked this Court to assume that respondents' deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair in considering whether collateral attack on the hearing may be *840 permitted. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. We consequently accept the legal conclusions of the court below that the deportation hearing violated due process. If the violation of respondents' rights that took place in this case amounted to a complete deprivation of judicial review of the determination, that determination may not be used to enhance the penalty for an unlawful entry under 1326. We think that it did. The Immigration Judge permitted waivers of the right to appeal that were not the result of considered judgments by respondents, and failed to advise respondents properly of their eligibility to apply for suspension of deportation. Because the waivers of their rights to appeal were not considered or intelligent, respondents were deprived of judicial review of their deportation proceeding. The Government may not, therefore, rely on those orders as reliable proof of an element of a criminal offense. C The United States asserts that our decision in answered any constitutional objections to the scheme employed in 1326. In Lewis, the Court held that a state-court conviction, even though it was uncounseled and therefore obtained in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant under could be used as a predicate for a subsequent conviction under 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S. C. App. 1202(a)(1), which forbade any person convicted of a felony from receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm. We do not consider Lewis to control the issues raised by this case. The question in Lewis was whether Congress could define that "class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms," by reference to prior state felony convictions, even if those convictions had resulted from procedures, such as the denial of *841 counsel, subsequently condemned as unconstitutional.[18] The Court there rejected Lewis' statutory challenge, holding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon the prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings, and further held that this use of uncounseled prior convictions did not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In rejecting the |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | United States v. Mendoza-Lopez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111894/united-states-v-mendoza-lopez/ | Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In rejecting the notion that the statute permitted, or the Constitution required, this "new form of collateral attack" on prior convictions, the Court pointed to the availability of alternative means to secure judicial review of the conviction: "[I]t is important to note that a convicted felon may challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm." It is precisely the unavailability of effective judicial review of the administrative determination at issue here that sets this case apart from Lewis. The fundamental procedural defects of the deportation hearing in this case rendered direct review of the Immigration Judge's determination unavailable to respondents. What was assumed in Lewis, namely the opportunity to challenge the predicate conviction in a judicial forum, was precisely that which was denied to respondents here. Persons charged with crime are entitled to have the factual and legal determinations upon which convictions are based subjected to the scrutiny of an impartial judicial officer. *842 Lewis does not reject that basic principle, and our decision today merely reaffirms it. Because respondents were deprived of their rights to appeal, and of any basis to appeal since the only relief for which they would have been eligible was not adequately explained to them, the deportation proceeding in which these events occurred may not be used to support a criminal conviction, and the dismissal of the indictments against them was therefore proper. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | This case arises under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), as amended, et seq. When an employee files "a charge alleging unlawful [age] discrimination" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the charge sets the Act's enforcement mechanisms in motion, commencing a waiting period during which the employee cannot file suit. The phrase, "a charge alleging unlawful discrimination," is used in the statute, 626(d), and "charge" appears in the agency's implementing regulations; but it has no statutory definition. In deciding what constitutes a charge under the Act the Courts of Appeals have adopted different definitions. As a result, difficulties have arisen in determining when employees *1153 may seek relief under the ADEA in courts of competent jurisdiction. As a cautionary preface, we note that the EEOC enforcement mechanisms and statutory waiting periods for ADEA claims differ in some respects from those pertaining to other statutes the EEOC enforces, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 10, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. While there may be areas of common definition, employees and their counsel must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination. Cf. General Dynamics Land Systems, This is so even if the EEOC forms and the same definition of charge apply in more than one type of discrimination case. I Petitioner, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx), provides mail pickup and delivery services to customers worldwide. In 14 and 15, FedEx initiated two programs, designed, it says, to make its 45,000-strong courier network more productive. The programs, "Best Practice Pays" (BPP) and "Minimum Acceptable Performance Standards" (MAPS), tied the couriers' compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, for instance the number of stops a courier makes per day. Respondents are 14 current and former FedEx couriers over the age of 40. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on April 30, claiming, inter alia, that BPP and MAPS violate the ADEA. Asserting that their claims were typical of many couriers nationwide, respondents sought to represent a plaintiffs' class of all couriers over the age of 40 who were subject to alleged acts of age discrimination by FedEx. The suit maintains that BPP and MAPS were veiled attempts to force older workers out of the company before they would be entitled to receive retirement benefits. FedEx, it is alleged, used the initiatives as a pretext for |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | it is alleged, used the initiatives as a pretext for harassing and discriminating against older couriers in favor of younger ones. The immediate question before us is the timeliness of the suit filed by one of the plaintiffs below, Patricia Kennedy, referred to here as "respondent." Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's action, contending respondent had not filed her charge with the EEOC at least 60 days before filing suit, as required by 29 U.S.C. 626(d). Respondent countered that she filed a valid charge on December 11, by submitting EEOC Form 283. The agency labels Form 283 an "Intake Questionnaire." Respondent attached to the questionnaire a signed affidavit describing the alleged discriminatory employment practices in greater detail. The District Court determined these documents were not a charge and granted the motion to dismiss. No. 02 Civ. 3355(LMM) App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. An appeal followed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. See We granted certiorari to consider whether respondent's filing was a charge, 551 U.S. and we now affirm. II This case presents two distinct questions: What is a charge as the ADEA uses that term? And were the documents respondent filed in December a charge? *1154 A The relevant statutory provision states: "No civil action may be commenced by an individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. "Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." 29 U.S.C. 626(d). The Act does not define charge. While EEOC regulations give some content to the term, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. The agency has statutory authority to issue regulations, see 628; and when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations. See U.S.A. The regulations the agency has adoptedso far as they goare reasonable constructions of the term charge. There is little dispute about this. The issue is the guidance the regulations give. One of the regulations, 29 CFR 1626.3 is entitled "Other definitions." It says: "charge shall mean a statement filed with the Commission by or on behalf of an aggrieved person which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in actions in violation of the Act." Section 1626.8(a) identifies five pieces of information a "charge should contain": |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | 1626.8(a) identifies five pieces of information a "charge should contain": (1)-(2) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the person making the charge and the charged entity; (3) a statement of facts describing the alleged discriminatory act; (4) the number of employees of the charged employer; and (5) a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. The next subsection, 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is "sufficient" if it meets the requirements of 1626.6i.e., if it is "in writing and name[s] the prospective respondent and generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s)." Even with the aid of the regulations the meaning of charge remains unclear, as is evident from the differing positions of the parties now before us and in the Courts of Appeals. Petitioner contends an Intake Questionnaire cannot be a charge unless the EEOC acts upon it. On the other hand some Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, take a position similar to the Government's in this case, that an Intake Questionnaire can constitute a charge if it expresses the filer's intent to activate the EEOC's enforcement processes. See, e.g., A third view, which seems to accord with respondent's position, is that all completed Intake Questionnaires are charges. See, e.g., B In support of her position that the Intake Questionnaire she filed, taken together with the attached six-page affidavit, meets the regulatory definition of a charge, respondent places considerable emphasis on what might be described as the regulations' catchall or savings provision, 29 CFR 1626.8(b). This seems to *1155 require only a written document with a general allegation of discriminatory conduct by a named employer. Respondent points out that, when read together, 1626.8(b) and 1626.6 say that a "charge is sufficient when the Commission receives. a written statement" that "name[s] the [employer] and generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s)." Respondent views this language as unequivocal and sees no basis for requiring that a charge contain any additional information. The EEOC's view, as expressed in the Government's amicus brief, however, is that the regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. As such, not all documents that meet the minimal requirements of 1626.6 are charges. The question, then, becomes how to interpret the scope of the regulations. Just as we defer to an agency's reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the first instance, see the agency is entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force. See Under Auer, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | of regulations it has put in force. See Under Auer, we accept the agency's position unless it is "`"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'" ). In accord with this standard we accept the agency's position that the regulations do not identify all necessary components of a charge; and it follows that a document meeting the requirements of 1626.6 is not a charge in every instance. The language in 1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. True, the structure of the regulations is less than clear. But the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, "ProceduresAge Discrimination in Employment Act." A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents a charge document must contain. This is the agency's position, and we defer to it under Auer. C This does not resolve the case. While we agree with the Government that the regulations do not state all the elements a charge must contain, the question of what additional elements are required remains. On this point the regulations are silent. The EEOC submits that the proper test for determining whether a filing is a charge is whether the filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the agency to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15. The EEOC has adopted this position in the Government's amicus brief and in various internal directives it has issued to its field offices over the years. See 1 EEOC Compliance Manual 2.2(b), p. 2:0001 ; randum from Elizabeth M. Thornton, Director, Office of Field Programs, EEOC, to All District, Area, and Local Office Directors et al. on line at http://www.eeoc. gov/charge/memo-2-21-02.html (hereinafter Thornton ) (all Internet materials as visited Feb. 21, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court's case file); randum from Nicholas M. Inzeo, Director, Office of Field Programs, EEOC, to All District, Field, Area, and Local Office Directors et al. on line at http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/memo-8-13-07.html. The Government asserts that this request-to-act requirement is a reasonable extrapolation of the agency's regulations *1156 and that, as a result, the agency's position is dispositive under Auer. The Government acknowledges the regulations do not, on their face, speak to the filer's intent. To the extent the request-to-act requirement can be derived from the text of the regulations, it must spring from the term charge. But, in this context, the term charge is not a construct of the agency's regulations. It is a term |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | a construct of the agency's regulations. It is a term Congress used in the underlying statute that has been incorporated in the regulations by the agency. Thus, insofar as they speak to the filer's intent, the regulations do so by repeating language from the underlying statute. It could be argued, then, that this case can be distinguished from Auer. See ; It is not necessary to hold that Auer deference applies to the agency's construction of the term charge as it is used in the regulations, however. For even if Auer deference is inapplicable, we would accept the agency's proposed construction of the statutory term, and we turn next to the reasons for this conclusion. D In our view the agency's policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only the regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full deference, they do reflect "`a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'" As such, they are entitled to a "measure of respect" under the less deferential Skidmore standard. Alaska Dept. of Environmental ; United Under Skidmore, we consider whether the agency has applied its position with consistency. Mead Here, the relevant interpretive statement, embodied in the compliance manual and memoranda, has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. See Thornton True, as the Government concedes, the agency's implementation of this policy has been uneven. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. In the very case before us the EEOC's Tampa field office did not treat respondent's filing as a charge, as the Government now maintains it should have done. And, as a result, respondent filed suit before the agency could initiate a conciliation process with the employer. These undoubted deficiencies in the agency's administration of the statute and its regulatory scheme are not enough, however, to deprive the agency of all judicial deference. Some degree of inconsistent treatment is unavoidable when the agency processes over 175,000 inquiries a year. And although one of the policy memoranda the Government relies upon was circulated after we granted certiorari, the position the document takes is consistent with the EEOC's previous directives. We see no reason to assume the agency's positionthat a charge *1157 is filed when the employee requests some actionwas framed for the specific purpose of aiding a party in this litigation. Cf. The EEOC, moreover, has drawn our attention to the need to define charge in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws and disseminating information about those laws to the public. Cf. The agency's duty to initiate informal dispute resolution processes upon receipt of a charge is mandatory in the ADEA context. See 29 U.S.C. 626(d) ; Cf. Yet, at the same time, Congress intended the agency to serve an "educational" function. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 705(i), ; 705(g)(3) (noting that the Commission shall have the power to "furnish to persons subject to this title such technical assistance as they may request"). Providing answers to the public's questions is a critical part of the EEOC's mission; and it accounts for a substantial part of the agency's work. Of about 175,000 inquiries the agency receives each year, it dockets around 76,000 of these as charges. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 10. Even allowing for errors in the classification of charges and noncharges, it is evident that many filings come from individuals who have questions about their rights and simply want information. For efficient operations, and to effect congressional intent, the agency requires some mechanism to separate information requests from enforcement requests. Respondent's proposed standard, that a charge need contain only an allegation of discrimination and the name of the employer, falls short in this regard. Were that stripped-down standard to prevail, individuals who approach the agency with questions could end up divulging enough information to create a charge. This likely would be the case for anyone who completes an Intake Questionnairewhich provides space to indicate the name and address of the offending employer and asks the individual to answer the question, "What action was taken against you that you believe to be discrimination?" App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a. If an individual knows that reporting this minimal information to the agency will mandate the agency to notify her employer, she may be discouraged from consulting the agency or wait until her employment situation has become so untenable that conciliation efforts would be futile. The result would be contrary to Congress' expressed desire that the EEOC act as an information provider and try to settle employment disputes through informal means. For these reasons, the definition of charge respondent advocatesi.e., that it need conform only to 29 CFR 1626.6is in considerable tension with the structure and purposes of the ADEA. The agency's interpretive positionthe request-to-act requirementprovides a reasonable alternative that is consistent with the statutory framework. No clearer alternatives are within our authority or expertise to adopt; and so deference to the agency is |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | expertise to adopt; and so deference to the agency is appropriate under Skidmore. We conclude as follows: In addition to the information required *1158 by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Some Courts of Appeals have referred to a "`manifest intent'" test, under which, in order to be deemed a charge, the filing must demonstrate "an individual's intent to have the agency initiate its investigatory and conciliatory processes." ; see also Wilkerson v. Grinnell ; ; If this formulation suggests the filer's state of mind is somehow determinative, it misses the point. If, however, it means the filing must be examined from the standpoint of an objective observer to determine whether, by a reasonable construction of its terms, the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes, that would be in accord with our conclusion. It is true that under this permissive standard a wide range of documents might be classified as charges. But this result is consistent with the design and purpose of the ADEA. Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties. See In the administrative context now before us it appears pro se filings may be the rule, not the exception. The ADEA, like Title VII, sets up a "remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process." ; see also Oscar Mayer & S. Ct. 2066, The system must be accessible to individuals who have no detailed knowledge of the relevant statutory mechanisms and agency processes. It thus is consistent with the purposes of the Act that a charge can be a form, easy to complete, or an informal document, easy to draft. The agency's proposed test implements these purposes. Reasonable arguments can be made that the agency should adopt a standard giving more guidance to filers, making it clear that the request to act must be stated in quite explicit terms. A rule of that sort might yield more consistent results. This, however, is a matter for the agency to decide in light of its experience and expertise in protecting the rights of those who are covered by the Act. For its decisions in this regard the agency is subject to the oversight of the political branches. Cf. National Cable |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | to the oversight of the political branches. Cf. National Cable & Telecommunications We find no reason in this case to depart from our usual rule: Where ambiguities in statutory analysis and application are presented, the agency may choose among reasonable alternatives. E Asserting its interest as an employer, petitioner urges us to condition the definition of charge, and hence an employee's ability to sue, upon the EEOC's fulfilling its mandatory duty to notify the charged party and initiate a conciliation process. In petitioner's view, because the *1159 Commission must act "[u]pon receiving such a charge," 29 U.S.C. 626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge. The agency rejects this view, as do we. As a textual matter, the proposal is too artificial a reading of the statute to accept. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual's right to sue upon the agency taking any action. ; Cf. 535 U.S. The filing of a charge, moreover, determines when the Act's time limits and procedural mechanisms commence. It would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. III Having determined that the agency acted within its authority in formulating the rule that a filing is deemed a charge if the document reasonably can be construed to request agency action and appropriate relief on the employee's behalf, the question is whether the filing here meets this test. The agency says it does, and we agree. The agency's determination is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces. Respondent's completed intake form contained all of the information outlined in 29 CFR 1626.8, including: the employee's name, address, and telephone number, as well as those of her employer; an allegation that she and other employees had been the victims of "age discrimination"; the number of employees who worked at the Dunedin, Florida, facility where she was stationed; and a statement indicating she had not sought the assistance of any government agency regarding this matter. See App. 265. Petitioner maintains the filing was still deficient because it contained no request for the agency to act. Were the Intake Questionnaire the only document before us we might agree its handwritten statements do not request action. The design of the form in use in moreover, does not give rise to the inference that the employee requests action against |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | rise to the inference that the employee requests action against the employer. Unlike EEOC Form 5, the Intake Questionnaire is not labeled a "Charge of Discrimination," see In fact the wording of the questionnaire suggests the opposite: that the form's purpose is to facilitate "pre-charge filing counseling" and to enable the agency to determine whether it has jurisdiction over "potential charges." There might be instances where the indicated discrimination is so clear or pervasive that the agency could infer from the allegations themselves that action is requested and required, but the agency is not required to treat every completed Intake Questionnaire as a charge. In this case, however, the completed questionnaire filed in December was supplemented with a detailed six-page affidavit. At the end of the last page, respondent asked the agency to "[p]lease force Federal Express to end their age discrimination *1160 plan so we can finish out our careers absent the unfairness and hostile work environment created within their application of Best Practice/High-Velocity Culture Change." This is properly construed as a request for the agency to act. Petitioner says that, in context, the statement is ambiguous. It points to respondent's accompanying statement that "I have been given assurances by an Agent of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that this Affidavit will be considered confidential by the United States Government and will not be disclosed as long as the case remains open unless it becomes necessary for the Government to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding." Petitioner argues that if respondent intended the affidavit to be kept confidential, she could not have expected the agency to treat it as a charge. This reads too much into the assurance of nondisclosure. Respondent did not request the agency to avoid contacting her employer. She stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential. Even then, she gave consent for the agency to disclose the affidavit in a "formal proceeding." Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Intake Questionnaire giving consent for the agency to disclose her identity to the employer. Here the combination of the waiver and respondent's request in the affidavit that the agency "force" the employer to stop discriminating against her were enough to bring the entire filing within the definition of charge we adopt here. Petitioner notes that respondent did file a Form 5 (a formal charge) with the EEOC but only after she filed her complaint in the District Court. This shows, petitioner argues, that respondent did not intend the earlier December filing to be a charge; otherwise, there would have been |
Justice Kennedy | 2,008 | 4 | majority | Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145827/federal-exp-corp-v-holowecki/ | filing to be a charge; otherwise, there would have been no reason for the later filing. What matters, however, is whether the documents filed in December should be interpreted as a request for the agency to act. Postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge. Documents filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee's rights and statutory remedies. Construing ambiguities against the drafter may be the more efficient rule to encourage precise expression in other contexts; here, however, the rule would undermine the remedial scheme Congress adopted. It would encourage individuals to avoid filing errors by retaining counsel, increasing both the cost and likelihood of litigation. IV The Federal Government interacts with individual citizens through all but countless forms, schedules, manuals, and worksheets. Congress, in most cases, delegates the format and design of these instruments to the agencies that administer the relevant laws and processes. An assumption underlying the congressional decision to delegate rulemaking and enforcement authority to the agency, and the consequent judicial rule of deference to the agency's determinations, is that the agency will take all efforts to ensure that affected parties will receive the full benefits and protections of the law. Here, because the agency failed to treat respondent's filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA's informal dispute resolution process. The employer's interests, in particular, were given short shrift, for it was not notified of respondent's complaint until she filed suit. The court that hears the merits of this litigation can attempt to remedy *1161 this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. True, that remedy would be imperfect. Once the adversary process has begun a dispute may be in a more rigid cast than if conciliation had been attempted at the outset. This result is unfortunate, but, at least in this case, unavoidable. While courts will use their powers to fashion the best relief possible in situations like this one, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the agency. The agency already has made some changes to the charge-filing process. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3, n. 2 (noting that the Intake Questionnaire form respondent filed has been replaced with a reworded form). To reduce the risk of further misunderstandings by those who seek its assistance, the agency should determine, in the first instance, what additional revisions in its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate. The |
Justice Breyer | 1,995 | 2 | majority | Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117933/reynoldsville-casket-co-v-hyde/ | In Autolite this Court held unconstitutional (as impermissibly burdening interstate commerce) an Ohio "tolling" provision that, in effect, gave Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state) defendants. Subsequently, in the case before us, the Supreme Court of *751 Ohio held that, despite Ohio's tolling law continues to apply to tort claims that accrued before that decision. This holding, in our view, violates the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. We therefore reverse the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment. The accident that led to this case, a collision between a car and a truck, occurred in Ashtabula County, Ohio, on March 5, 1984. More than three years later, on August 11, Carol Hyde (respondent here) sued the truck's driver, John Blosh, and its owner, Reynoldsville Casket Company (petitioners). All parties concede that, had Blosh and Reynoldsville made their home in Ohio, Ohio law would have given Hyde only two years to bring her lawsuit. See But, because petitioners were from Pennsylvania, a special provision of Ohio law tolled the running of the statute of limitations, making the lawsuit timely. See 2305.15(A) (tolling the statute of limitations while a person against whom "a cause of action accrues" is "out of" or "departs from" the State). Ten months after Hyde brought her suit, this Court, in held that the tolling provision on which she relied, 2305.15(A), places an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. Soon thereafter, the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, finding this case indistinguishable from held that the tolling provision could not constitutionally be applied to the case, and dismissed the lawsuit as untimely. The intermediate appellate state court affirmed the dismissal. However, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the suit. Its syllabus, which under Ohio law sets forth the authoritative basis for its decision, see Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions Rule 1(B) (-1995); simply says, " Autolite may not be retroactively applied to bar claims in state courts which had accrued prior to the announcement of that decision. *752 (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution, applied.)" We granted certiorari to decide whether the Federal Constitution permits Ohio to continue to apply its tolling statute to pre- torts. And, as we have said, we conclude that it does not. Hyde acknowledges that this Court, in held that, when (1) the Court decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule of that case to the parties before it, then (2) it and other courts must treat that same (new) legal rule as "retroactive," applying it, for example, to all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve pre |
Justice Breyer | 1,995 | 2 | majority | Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117933/reynoldsville-casket-co-v-hyde/ | all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve pre decision events. She thereby concedes that, the Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus to the contrary notwithstanding, applies to her case. And, she says, as "a result of there is no question that retroactively invalidated" the tolling provision that makes her suit timely. Brief for Respondent 8. Although one might think that is the end of the matter, Hyde ingeniously argues that it is not. She asks us to look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done, not through the lens of "retroactivity," but through that of "remedy." States, she says, have a degree of legal leeway in fashioning remedies for constitutional ills. She points to Chevron Oil 404 U.S. (11), in which this Court applied prospectively only its ruling that a 1-year statute of limitations governed certain tort casesprimarily because that ruling had "effectively overruled a long line of decisions" applying a more generous limitations principle (that of laches), upon which plaintiffs had reasonably relied. at 107. She concedes that overruled Chevron Oil insofar as the case (selectively) permitted the prospective-only application of a new rule of law. But, she notes the possibility of recharacterizing Chevron Oil as a case in which the Court simply took reliance interests into account in tailoring an appropriate remedy for a violation of federal law. See *753 ; American Trucking Assns., And she quotes Justice Harlan, who, before Chevron Oil, pointed out that "equitable considerations" such as "`reliance' " might prove relevant to "relief." United 3 U.S. 286, 296-2 (10) Thus, Hyde asks, why not look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done in this case as if it were simply an effort to fashion a remedy that takes into consideration her reliance on pre- law? Here, the remedy would actually consist of providing no remedy for the constitutional violation or, to put the matter more precisely, of continuing to toll the 2-year statute of limitations in pre- cases, such as hers, as a state law "equitable" device for reasons of reliance and fairness. She claims that use of this device violates no federal constitutional provision (such as the Due Process Clause) and is therefore permissible. One serious problem with Hyde's argument lies in the Ohio Supreme Court's legal description of why, in fact, it refused to dismiss Hyde's case. As we have pointed out, the Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus (the legally authoritative statement of its holding) speaks, not about remedy, but about retroactivity. Regardless, we do not see how, in the circumstances before us, the Ohio Supreme Court could change a legal |
Justice Breyer | 1,995 | 2 | majority | Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117933/reynoldsville-casket-co-v-hyde/ | before us, the Ohio Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that federal law, applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate simply by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a remedy. The Ohio Supreme Court's justification for refusing to dismiss Hyde's suit is that she, and others like her, may have reasonably relied upon pre- lawa reliance of the same kind and degree as that involved in Chevron Oil. But, this type of justificationoften present when prior law is overruledis the very sort that this Court, in found insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule (that had been applied in the case that first announced *754 it). If has anything more than symbolic significance, how could virtually identical reliance, without more, prove sufficient to permit a virtually identical denial simply because it is characterized as a denial based on "remedy" rather than "nonretroactivity"? Hyde tries to answer this question by pointing to other cases in which, she claims, this Court has allowed state courts effectively to avoid retroactive application of federal law by denying a particular remedy for violation of that law or by refusing to provide any remedy at all. She argues that these cases are similar enough to her own to permit a "remedial" exception to the retroactive application of We have examined the cases to which Hyde looks for support, and conclude that they all involve very different circumstances. First, Hyde points to a statement in the opinion announcing the Court's judgment in James B. Distilling that once "a rule is found to apply `backward,' there may then be a further issue of remedies, i. e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one." at 535 (opinion of Souter, J.); ; American Trucking Assns., (speaking of the need to "distinguish the question of retroactivity from the distinct remedial question"); at 210 (distinguishing "between retroactivity as a choice-of-law rule and retroactivity as a remedial principle"). This language, however, read both literally and in context, makes clear that the ordinary application of a new rule of law "backwards," say, to pending cases, may or may not, involve a further matter of remedies. Whether it does so, and, if so, what kind of remedy the state court may fashion, dependlike almost all legal issues *755 upon the kind of case, matter, and circumstances involved. Not all cases concerning retroactivity and remedies are of the same sort. Second, Hyde points to tax cases |
Justice Breyer | 1,995 | 2 | majority | Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117933/reynoldsville-casket-co-v-hyde/ | of the same sort. Second, Hyde points to tax cases in which the Court applied retroactively new rules holding certain state tax laws unconstitutional, but nonetheless permitted the state courts a degree of leeway in designing a remedy, including a remedy that would deny state taxpayers, with pending refund cases, the refund that they sought. See ; If state courts may at the same time apply new law (invalidating tax statutes) and withhold relief (tax refunds) from tax plaintiffs, asks Hyde, why can they not at the same time apply new law (invalidating tolling statutes) and withhold relief (dismissal) from tort defendants? The answer to this question lies in the special circumstances of the tax cases. The Court has suggested that some of them involve a particular kind of constitutional violationa kind that the State could cure without repaying back taxes. See McKesson Where the violation depends, in critical part, upon differential treatment of two similar classes of individuals, then one might cure the problem either by similarly burdening, or by similarly unburdening, both groups. Where the violation stemmed from, say, taxing the retirement funds of one group (retired Federal Government employees) but not those of another (retired state government employees), see then the State might cure the problem either (1) by taxing both (imposing, say, back taxes on the previously advantaged group, to the extent constitutionally permissible), or (2) by taxing neither (and refunding back taxes). Cf. McKesson at and n. 23. And, if the State chooses the first, then the taxpayers need receive no refund. But, that result flows not from some general "remedial" *756 exception to "retroactivity" law, but simply from the fact that the state law that the taxpayer had attacked now satisfies the Constitution. One can imagine a roughly comparable situation in the statute of limitations context. Suppose that Ohio violated the Constitution by treating two similar classes of tort defendants differently, say, by applying a 2-year statute of limitations to the first (in-state defendants) but a 4-year statute to the second (out-of-state defendants). Ohio might have cured this (imaginary) constitutional problem either (1) by applying a 4-year statute to both groups, or (2) by applying a 2-year statute to both groups. Had it chosen the first of these remedies, then Hyde's case could continue because the 4-year statute would no longer violate the Federal Constitution. This imaginary case, however, is not the case at hand, for the Ohio Supreme Court's "remedy" here (allowing Hyde to proceed) does not cure the tolling statute's problem of unconstitutionality. And, her tort claim critically depends upon Ohio tolling |
Justice Breyer | 1,995 | 2 | majority | Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117933/reynoldsville-casket-co-v-hyde/ | unconstitutionality. And, her tort claim critically depends upon Ohio tolling law that continues to violate the Commerce Clause. Other tax examples present different, remedial problems. Suppose a State collects taxes under a taxing statute that this Court later holds unconstitutional. Taxpayers then sue for a refund of the unconstitutionally collected taxes. Retroactive application of the Court's holding would seem to entitle the taxpayers to a refund of taxes. But what if a preexisting, separate, independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivitya rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund suitnonetheless barred the taxpayers' refund suit? See McKesson ; Depending upon whether or not this independent rule satisfied other provisions of the Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers' refund claim. See McKesson *757 This tax scenario simply reflects the legal commonplace that, when two different rules of law each independently bar recovery, then a decision, the retroactive application of which invalidates one rule, will make no difference to the result. The other, constitutionally adequate rule remains in place. Hyde cannot bring her case within the protection of this principle, for the Ohio Supreme Court did not rest its holding upon a pre-existing, separate rule of state law (having nothing to do with retroactivity) that independently permitted her to proceed. Rather, the maintenance of her action critically depends upon the continued application of the Ohio statute's "tolling" principlea principle that this Court has held unconstitutional. Third, Hyde points to the law of qualified immunity, which, she says, imposes a "remedial" limitation upon the "retroactive" application of a new rule to pending cases. To understand her argument, consider the following scenario: (1) sues a police officer claiming injury because of an unconstitutional arrest; (2) the police officer asserts that the arrest was constitutional; (3) this Court then holds, in a different case, that an identical arrest is not constitutional; (4) the holding of this different case applies retroactively to 's case; but (5) the police officer still wins on grounds of qualified immunity because the new rule of law was not "clearly established" at the time of the arrest. See generally In one sense, lost for a reason similar to the tax plaintiffs mentioned above, namely, that a previously existing, separate, constitutional legal ground (that of the law not being "clearly established") bars her claim. We acknowledge, however, that this separate legal ground does reflect certain remedial considerations. In particular, it permits government officials to rely upon old law. But, it does so lest threat of liability "`dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the |
Justice Breyer | 1,995 | 2 | majority | Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117933/reynoldsville-casket-co-v-hyde/ | the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching *758 discharge of their duties.' " at 814 ). And, it reflects the concern that "society as a whole," without that immunity, would have to bear "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office." These very factsthat a set of special federal policy considerations have led to the creation of a well-established, independent rule of lawdistinguish the qualified immunity cases from the case before us, where a concern about reliance alone has led the Ohio court to create what amounts to an ad hoc exemption from retroactivity. Finally, Hyde points to the line of cases starting with in which, she says, this Court has held that a habeas corpus petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy where doing so would require the habeas court to apply retroactively a new rule of criminal law. The Teague doctrine, however, does not involve a special "remedial" limitation on the principle of "retroactivity" as much as it reflects a limitation inherent in the principle itself. New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed. Cf. United 3 U. S., at 296 (at some point, "the rights of the parties should be considered frozen" and a "conviction final"). And, much as the qualified immunity doctrine embodies special federal policy concerns related to the imposition of damages liability upon persons holding public office, the Teague doctrine embodies certain special concernsrelated to collateral review of state criminal convictionsthat affect which cases are closed, for which retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances. No such special finality-related concerns are present here. The upshot is that Hyde shows, through her examples, the unsurprising fact that, as courts apply "retroactively" a new rule of law to pending cases, they will find instances where *759 that new rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case. Thus, a court may find (1) an alternative way of curing the constitutional violation, or (2) a previously existing, independent legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief, or (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a well-established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy justifications, or (4) a principle of law, such as that of "finality" present in the Teague context, that limits the principle of retroactivity itself. But, this case involves no such instance; |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | dissenting | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | To rebut mitigating character evidence introduced by petitioner Dawson at his capital sentencing hearing, the State of Delaware proved that Dawson belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood *170 prison gang. The Court holds that the gang membership evidence "ha[d] no relevance to the issues being decided in the proceeding" and that admission of the evidence violated the First Amendment. Ante, at 160. I respectfully dissent. I Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang had relevance at sentencing. Under Delaware law, after a jury finds a statutory aggravating factor, it may consider "all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation" relating to either the crime or the "character and propensities" of the defendant. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 209(d)(1) Under this provision, Dawson's character became an issue in determining whether he should receive the death penalty. To prove his good character, as the Court observes, Dawson introduced evidence that he had acted kindly toward his family and that he had earned good time credits while in prison. Ante, at 162. Dawson introduced evidence of his membership and participation in various respectable organizations, including the Green Tree Program (described only as a "drug and alcohol program"), Alcoholics Anonymous (not described at all), and certain therapy and counseling groups ( not described at all). App. 79. Dawson did not call any expert witnesses to clarify the nature of these organizations or their activities. The State attempted to rebut Dawson's mitigating character evidence in part by showing that Dawson belonged to a prison gang called the Aryan Brotherhood. A stipulation read to the jury explained: "The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware." *171 I do not consider the evidence of Dawson's gang membership irrelevant to his character. A The Court asserts that the gang membership evidence had no relevance because it did nothing more than indicate Dawson's "abstract" racist "beliefs." Ante, at 167. The Court suggests that Dawson's membership in a prison gang would be relevant if the gang had endorsed or committed "unlawful or violent acts" such as drug use, escape, or the murder of other inmates. Ante, at 165, 166. Yet, because the State failed to prove the Aryan Brotherhood's activities, the Court reasons, the jury could do no more than infer that Dawson shared the gang's racist beliefs. I disagree. In my judgment, a jury reasonably could conclude from Dawson's membership in a prison gang that he had engaged |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | dissenting | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | Dawson's membership in a prison gang that he had engaged in some sort of forbidden activities while in prison. The evidence tended to establish future dangerousness and to rebut Dawson's attempt to show that he was kind to others. Jurors do not leave their knowledge of the world behind when they enter a courtroom and they do not need to have the obvious spelled out in painstaking detail. Just as defense counsel may assume when introducing mitigating evidence that a jury understands the nature of a church choir, a softball team, or the Boy Scouts, so too may a prosecutor assume when rebutting this evidence that a jury knows the nature of a prison gang. The concept of a prison gang is not so mysterious that it requires an encyclopedic definition or a greater explanation than any of the other organizations to which Dawson belonged, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or the Green Tree Program. Cf. ; United States Dept. of Justice, Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons 10 (discussing the "extensive" media coverage of prison gangs). *172 In stating that Dawson belonged to a prison gang, the stipulation implied much more than that he shared the gang's abstract racist creed; it indicated that Dawson had engaged in prison gang activities, and that he had the character of a person who engages in these activities. "One of the distinguishing characteristics of the prison gang is the virtual absence of any non-criminal, nondeviant activities. Gang members engage in some institutional pastimes, weight lifting being one of the more notable, but in general their activities are criminal or deviant in nature. The gang member is completely immersed in being a career prison gangster, leaving little time and less inclination for other than asocial behavior." U. S. Dept. of Justice, at x-xi. Denying that Dawson's gang membership told the jury anything about his activities, tendencies, and traitshis "character"ignores reality. What Judge Easterbrook remarked when others attempted to distinguish gang membership from gang activities, someone reading the Court's opinion might say today: "Who do they think they are fooling? What elements of `membership'as opposed to `activity'take place [in the prison]? What are prison gangs for, except to engage in forbidden `activity'? Surely [they] do not believe that prison gangs meet every month to discuss The Critique of Pure Reason and debate how Stanley Tigerman's buildings differ from those of the Bauhaus school. Gangs affiliate for mutual support, but not the kind contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act." David In my view, the stipulation was relevant to Dawson's character because it explained |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | dissenting | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | the stipulation was relevant to Dawson's character because it explained that the Aryan Brotherhood was a prison gang and that Dawson was a member. That evidence, I submit, supports an inference that while in prison, *173 Dawson engaged in the kind of unlawful activity mentioned by the Court.[1] The description of the Aryan Brotherhood as a "racist" prison gang conveyed additional information about Dawson's character. In the plurality found it relevant that a black gang conspired not merely to commit crimes, but to commit them against white persons out of racial hatred. See Even if Dawson's white racist prison gang does not advocate "the murder of fellow inmates," ante, at 165, a jury reasonably could infer that its members in one way or another act upon their racial prejudice. The stipulation itself makes clear that the Aryan Brotherhood does not exist merely to facilitate formulation of abstract racist thoughts, but to "respon[d]" to gangs of racial minorities. The evidence thus tends to establish that Dawson has not been "a well-behaved and well-adjusted prisoner," which *17 itself is an indication of future dangerousness, see 87 U.S. 16, ; The stipulation tends to rebut Dawson's evidence of good character. In capital cases, we have held that the sentence imposed should reflect a "`reasoned moral response' " not only to the crime, but to the "`background' " and "`character' " of the defendant himself. See 92 U.S. 302, In determining Dawson's "personal culpability," the jury surely would want to know about the various activities, traits, and tendencies that distinguish him as a "uniquely individual human bein[g]," 28 U.S. 280, 30 Dawson introduced mitigating character evidence that he had acted kindly towards his family. The stipulation tended to undercut this showing by suggesting that Dawson's kindness did not extend to members of other racial groups. Although we do not sit in judgment of the morality of particular creeds, we cannot bend traditional concepts of relevance to exempt the antisocial. B The Court's opinion suggests that the Constitution now imposes a double standard for determining relevance: a standard easy for defendants to satisfy, but difficult for prosecutors. Under 55 U.S. 10 and 38 U.S. 586 a capital defendant has a right to introduce all relevant mitigating evidence. Capital defendants, as a result, regularly introduce character evidence that allows juries to consider their abstract beliefs and associational rights. Dawson, for example, introduced evidence that he associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and other groups. Other defendants have introduced comparable evidence regarding their religious practice and fraternal organizations. See, e. g., Jordan ; ; ; 5 Cal. 3d 7, |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | dissenting | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | e. g., Jordan ; ; ; 5 Cal. 3d 7, 30 ; 122, ; State v.Beuke, 3, 526 N.E.2d 27, I see no way to hold that this evidence has relevance, but that Dawson's gang membership does not. A double standard for determining relevance may distort the picture presented to the jury. In this case, Dawson himself chose to introduce evidence of certain good character traits. Unless the State had responded with evidence of other, bad traits, the jury could not possibly have made a fair and balanced determination. Membership in Alcoholics Anonymous might suggest a good character, but membership in the Aryan Brotherhood just as surely suggests a bad one. The jury could not have assessed Dawson's overall character without both. Just last Term, in the Court condemned a similar distortion. Overruling 82 U.S. 96 and South 90 U.S. 805 we held that the Eighth Amendment does not generally prohibit the introduction of victim impact evidence. See We reasoned that allowing the jury to consider the defendant, but not the victim, would create an unbalanced picture. Quoting a dissenting opinion in we stated: "`[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.' " (quoting 82 U. S., at 517 ); see 82 U.S., at 520 *176 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Many citizens have found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pressures beyond normal human experience that drove the defendant to commit his crime Perhaps these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with mercy, but that is a question to be decided through the democratic processes of a free people, and not by the decrees of this Court"). Whatever distortion was produced in requiring an exclusive focus on the defendant's character, at least nothing in prevented the juryas does today's decisionfrom fairly and fully assessing that character. II The Court acknowledges that Delaware could have avoided any First Amendment problem simply by presenting evidence that proved something more than Dawson's abstract beliefs. Ante, at 167. For the reasons that I have stated, I believe that Delaware has made such a showing. I therefore see no First Amendment violation under the Court's analysis. The Court, however, goes on to make several further assertions about the First Amendment that I find troubling and unnecessary |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | dissenting | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | about the First Amendment that I find troubling and unnecessary in this case. A Both Dawson and the State, as noted above, had a right to develop the issue of "character" at the sentencing proceeding. See Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 209(d)(1) ; at 113-11. In applying the First Amendment, however, the Court declines to decide whether abstract beliefs may constitute a portion of character. "Whatever label is given to the evidence," the Court asserts, "we conclude that Dawson's First Amendment rights were violated in this case" Ante, at 167. As a consequence, to the extent that abstract beliefs make up part of a person's character, the decision today limits the aspects of character that sentencing authorities may consider. *177 We long have held that the Constitution permits courts and juries to consider character evidence in sentencing proceedings. See 337 U.S. 21, 27 (199). Until today, we have never hinted that the First Amendment limits the aspects of a defendant's character that they may consider. To the contrary, we have emphasized that the sentencing authority "may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come." United 0 U.S. 3, 6 In Williams, for example, we upheld a New York law that encouraged the sentencing judge to consider evidence about the defendant's "past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities," 337 U.S., at 25, a phrase easily broad enough to encompass a substantial amount of First Amendment activity. Writing for the Court, Justice Black specifically identified religion and interests as sentencing considerations that may "give the sentencing judge a composite picture of the defendant." More recently, in all five Members of the Court who addressed the issue agreed that religious activity may bear upon a defendant's character. See 87 U.S., ("Evidence of religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits"); ("Evidence of regular church attendance" is relevant to character).[2] Although the opinions in Franklin endorsed * consideration of religious activity as a mitigating factor, the endorsement necessarily disfavors abstention from religious activity, which the First Amendment protects. The Court nowhere explains why courts and juries may consider some First Amendment protected activities when assessing character, but they cannot consider others. Today's decision, moreover, does not define the boundaries of permissible inquiry into character. If the Court means that no First Amendment protected activity "ca[n] be viewed as relevant `bad' character evidence in its own right," ante, at 168, then today's decision represents a dramatic shift in our sentencing jurisprudence. B Once the |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | dissenting | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | a dramatic shift in our sentencing jurisprudence. B Once the Court concludes that the gang membership evidence "has no relevance to the issues being decided in the [sentencing] proceeding," ante, at 160, I have difficulty seeing what the First Amendment adds to the analysis. If the Court considers the evidence irrelevant, the problem is not that Delaware law bases the sentencing decision on impermissible issues, but rather that Dawson may not have received a fair trial on the permissible issues in the proceeding. The Due Process Clause, not the First Amendment, traditionally has regulated questions about the improper admission of evidence. As we stated in (190), the requirement of due process always has protected "the weak, or helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed" by ensuring that "no man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of [the] law until there ha[s] been a charge fairly made *179 and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power." at -237. We have made clear, in particular, that when a state court admits evidence that is "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." 501 U. S., ; see 77 U.S. 168, Our decision in which the Court incorrectly cites, illustrates the point. In Schware, the New Mexico Supreme Court denied an applicant admission to the bar on grounds that he lacked good moral character. Evidence showed that the applicant had belonged to the Communist Party 15 years earlier. The Court erroneously states that Schware held that admitting proof of the applicant's membership in the Communist Party violated the First Amendment. Ante, at 168. Schware, in fact, did not decide that admitting the Communist Party evidence abridged any right of free political association. See 353 U.S., at 23, n. 13. It held, instead, that the state court erred in admitting the Communist Party evidence because it had no relevance to the applicant's moral character after so many years. See at 26. Due process, the Court concluded, prohibited the state court to find the applicant morally unfit to practice law without any relevant evidence. See at 27. Applying familiar evidentiary standards in Dawson's case, the trial judge recognized that the "real issue" in admitting the gang membership evidence was whether its "probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." App. 52. The Delaware Supreme Court, likewise, examined the record to determine whether the gang membership evidence "improperly appeal[ed] to the juror's passions and |
per_curiam | 1,980 | 200 | per_curiam | Harris v. Rosario | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110270/harris-v-rosario/ | The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), as amended, 42 U.S. C. 601 et seq., provides federal financial assistance to States and Territories to aid families with needy dependent children. Puerto Rico receives less assistance than do the States, 42 U.S. C. 1308 (a) (1), 1396d (b) (1976 ed. and Supp. II). Appellees, AFDC recipients residing in Puerto Rico, filed this class action against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Secretary of Health and Human Services) in March 1977 in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico; they challenged the constitutionality of 42 U.S. C. 1308 and 1396d (b), claiming successfully that the lower level of AFDC reimbursement provided to Puerto Rico violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. We disagree. Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, U. S. Const., Art. IV, 3, cl. 2, to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the United States," may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a *652 rational basis for its actions. In we concluded that a similar statutory classification was rationally grounded on three factors: Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the federal treasury; the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy. These same considerations are forwarded here in support of 1308 and 1396d (b), Juris. Statement 12-14,[*] and we see no reason to depart from our conclusion in Torres that they suffice to form a rational basis for the challenged statutory classification. We reverse. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, not now being persuaded that the Court's summary disposition in so clearly controls this case, would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | We are called upon to determine the effect of Rule 12 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on a post-conviction motion for relief which raises for the first time a claim of unconstitutional discrimination in the composition of a grand jury. An indictment was returned in the District Court charging petitioner Davis, a Negro, and two white men with entry into a federally insured bank with intent to commit larceny in violation of 18 U.S. C. 2 and 2113 (a). Represented by appointed counsel,[1] petitioner entered a not-guilty plea at his arraignment and was given 30 days within which to file pretrial motions. He timely moved to quash his indictment on the ground that it was the result of an illegal arrest, but made no other pretrial motions relating to the indictment. On the opening day of the trial, following voir dire of the jury, the District Judge ruled on petitioner's pretrial motions in chambers and ordered that the motion to quash on the illegal arrest ground be carried with the case. He then asked twice if there were anything else before commencing trial. Petitioner was convicted and *235 sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Post-conviction motions were thereafter filed and denied, but none dealt with the issue presented in this case. Almost three years after his conviction, petitioner filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment, pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2255, alleging that the District Court had acquiesced in the systematic exclusion of qualified Negro jurymen by reason of the use of a "key man" system of selection,[2] an asserted violation of the "mandatory requirement of the statute laws set forth in title 28, U. S. C. A. Section 1861, 1863, 1864, and the 5th amendment of the United Constitution."[3] His challenge only went to the composition of the grand jury and did not include the petit jury which found him guilty. The District Court, though it took no evidence on the motion, invited additional briefs on the issue of waiver. It then denied the motion. In its memorandum opinion it relied on Mfg. and concluded that petitioner had waived his right to object to the composition of the grand jury because such a contention is waived under Rule 12 (b) (2) unless raised by motion prior to trial. Also, since the "key man" method of selecting grand jurors had been openly followed for many years prior to petitioner's indictment; since the same grand jury that indicted petitioner indicted his two white accomplices; and since the *236 case against petitioner |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | two white accomplices; and since the *236 case against petitioner was "a strong one," the court determined that there was nothing in the facts of the case or in the nature of the claim justifying the exercise of the power to grant relief under Rule 12 (b) (2) for "cause shown." The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of and Rule 12 (b) (2). Because its decision is contrary to decisions of the Ninth Circuit in and we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. Petitioner contends that because his 2255 motion alleged deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, one which has been recognized since his case is controlled by this Court's dispositions of and rather than Mfg. and Rule 12 (b) (2). Accordingly, he urges that his collateral attack on his conviction may be precluded only after a hearing in which it is established that he "deliberately bypassed" or "understandingly and knowingly" waived his claim of unconstitutional grand jury composition. See and I Rule 12 (b) (2) provides in pertinent part that "[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment may be raised only by motion before trial," and that failure to present such defenses or objections "constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver." By its terms, it applies to both procedural and constitutional defects in the institution of prosecutions which do not affect the jurisdiction of the *2 trial court. According to the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, the waiver provision was designed to continue existing law, which as exemplified by this Court's decision in United v. Gale, was, inter alia, that defendants who pleaded to an indictment and went to trial without making any non-jurisdictional objection to the grand jury, even one unconstitutionally composed, waived any right of subsequent complaint on account thereof. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Advisory Committee's Notes expressly indicate that claims such as petitioner's are meant to be within the Rule's purview: "These two paragraphs [12 (b) (1) and (2)] classify into two groups all objections and defenses to be interposed by motion prescribed by Rule 12 (a). In one group are defenses and objections which must be raised by motion, failure to do so constituting a waiver. ". Among the defenses and objections in this group are the following: Illegal selection or organization of the grand jury" Notes of Advisory Committee following Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12, 18 U.S. C. App. This Court had occasion to consider the Rule's application in Mfg. a case |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | occasion to consider the Rule's application in Mfg. a case involving tax-evasion convictions. In a motion filed more than four years after their trial, but before the conclusion of direct review, petitioners alleged that both the grand and petit jury arrays were illegally constituted because, inter alia, "the Clerk of the District Court failed to employ a selection method designed to secure a cross-section of the population."[4] -362. *238 Deeming the case controlled by Rule 12 (b) (2), the District Court held a hearing to determine whether there was "cause" warranting relief from the waiver provision and it found that "the facts concerning the selection of the grand and petit juries were notorious and available to petitioners in the exercise of due diligence before the trial." It concluded that their failure to exercise due diligence combined with the absence of prejudice from the alleged illegalities precluded the raising of the issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In this Court, petitioners conceded that Rule 12 (b) (2) applied to their objection to the grand jury array, but they denied that it applied to the petit jury. Both objections were held foreclosed by the petitioners' years of inaction, and the lower courts' application of the Rule was affirmed. thus confirms that Rule 12 (b) (2) precludes untimely challenges to grand jury arrays, even when such challenges are on constitutional grounds.[5] Despite the strong analogy between the effect of the Rule as construed in and petitioner's 2255 allegations, he nonetheless contends that establishes that he is not precluded from raising *239 his constitutional challenge in a 2255 proceeding.[6] See We disagree. In Kaufman, the defendant in a bank robbery conviction sought collateral relief under 2255 alleging that illegally seized evidence had been admitted against him at trial, over a timely objection, and that this evidence resulted in the rejection of his only defense to the charge. The application was denied in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals on the ground that it had not been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction and "that a motion under 2255 cannot be used in lieu of an appeal." This Court reversed, however, holding that when constitutional claims are asserted, post-conviction relief cannot be denied solely on the ground that relief should have been sought by appeal. But the Court in Kaufman was not dealing with the sort of express waiver provision contained in Rule 12 (b) (2) which specifically provides for the waiver of a particular *240 kind of constitutional claim if it be not timely asserted. The claim in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | claim if it be not timely asserted. The claim in Kaufman was that the applicable provisions of 2255 by implication forbade the assertion of a constitutional claim of unlawful search and seizure where the defendant failed to assert the claim on appeal from the judgment of conviction.[7] See, e. g., The Court held that the statute did not preclude the granting of relief on such a claim simply because it had not been asserted on appeal, where there was no indication of a knowing and deliberate bypass of the appeal procedure. But here the Government's claim is not that 2255 itself limits or precludes the assertion of petitioner's claim, but that the separate provisions of Rule 12 (b) (2) do so. Kaufman, therefore, is dispositive only if the absence of a statutory provision for waiver in 2255 and the federal habeas statute by implication precludes the application to post-conviction proceedings of the express waiver provision found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. held that a claim of unconstitutional grand jury composition raised four years after conviction, but while the appeal proceedings were still alive, was governed by Rule 12 (b) (2). Both the reasons for the Rule and the normal rules of statutory construction clearly indicate that no more lenient standard of waiver should *241 apply to a claim raised three years after conviction simply because the claim is asserted by way of collateral attack rather than in the criminal proceeding itself. The waiver provisions of Rule 12 (b) (2) are operative only with respect to claims of defects in the institution of criminal proceedings. If its time limits are followed, inquiry into an alleged defect may be concluded and, if necessary, cured before the court, the witnesses, and the parties have gone to the burden and expense of a trial. If defendants were allowed to flout its time limitations, on the other hand, there would be little incentive to comply with its terms when a successful attack might simply result in a new indictment prior to trial. Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult. Rule 12 (b) (2) promulgated by this Court and, pursuant to 18 U.S. C. 71, "adopted" by Congress, governs by its terms the manner in which the claims of defects in the institution of criminal proceedings may be waived. See Singer v. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | institution of criminal proceedings may be waived. See Singer v. United Were we confronted with an express conflict between the Rule and a prior statute, the force of 71, providing that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect," is such that the prior inconsistent statute would be deemed to have been repealed. Cf. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not ex proprio vigore govern post-conviction proceedings, and had Congress in enacting the statutes governing federal collateral relief specifically there dealt with the issue of waiver, we would be faced with a difficult question of repeal by implication of such a provision by the later *242 enacted rules of criminal procedure. But Congress did not deal with the question of waiver in the federal collateral relief statutes, and in Kaufman this Court held that, since 2255 had not spoken on the subject of waiver with respect to claims of unlawful search and seizure, a particular doctrine of waiver would be applied by this Court in interpreting the statute. We think it inconceivable that Congress, having in the criminal proceeding foreclosed the raising of a claim such as this after the commencement of trial in the absence of a showing of "cause" for relief from waiver, nonetheless intended to perversely negate the Rule's purpose by permitting an entirely different but much more liberal requirement of waiver in federal habeas proceedings. We believe that the necessary effect of the congressional adoption of Rule 12 (b) (2) is to provide that a claim once waived pursuant to that Rule may not later be resurrected, either in the criminal proceedings or in federal habeas, in the absence of the showing of "cause" which that Rule requires. We therefore hold that the waiver standard expressed in Rule 12 (b) (2) governs an untimely claim of grand jury discrimination, not only during the criminal proceeding, but also later on collateral review. Our conclusion in this regard is further buttressed by the Court's observation in decided the year after Kaufman, that "[w]hether the question of racial exclusion in the selection of the grand jury is open in a federal habeas corpus action we need not decide." The context of the Court's language makes it apparent that the question was framed in terms of waiver and timely assertion of such a claim in state criminal proceedings. But if the question were left open with respect to state proceedings, it must have been at least patently open with respect to *243 federal habeas review of federal convictions, where Congress is the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | federal habeas review of federal convictions, where Congress is the lawgiver both as to the procedural rules governing the criminal trial and the principles governing collateral review. II The principles of Rule 12 (b) (2), as construed in are not difficult to apply to the facts of this case. Petitioner alleged the deprivation of a substantial constitutional right, recognized by this Court as applicable to state criminal proceedings from 7 U.S. 1 through But he failed to assert the claim until long after his trial, verdict, sentence, and appeal had run their course. In findings challenged only half-heartedly here, the District Court determined that no motion, oral or otherwise, raised the issue of discrimination in the selection of the grand jurors prior to trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and on petition for rehearing conducted its own search of the record in a vain effort to see whether the files or docket entries in the case supported petitioner's contention that he had made such a motion. We will not disturb the coordinate findings of these two courts on a question such as this. The waiver provision of the Rule therefore coming into play, the District Court held that there had been no "cause shown" which would justify relief. It said: "Petitioner offers no plausible explanation of his failure to timely make his objection to the composition of the grand jury. The method of selecting grand jurors then in use was the same system employed by this court for years. No reason has been suggested why petitioner or his attorney could not have ascertained all of the facts necessary to present the objection to the court prior to trial. The same *244 grand jury that indicted petitioner also indicted his two white accomplices. The case had no racial overtones. The government's case against petitioner was, although largely circumstantial, a strong one. There was certainly sufficient evidence against petitioner to justify a grand jury in determining that he should stand trial for the offense with which he was charged. Petitioner has shown no cause why the court should grant him relief from his waiver of the objection to the composition of the grand jury" In denying the relief, the court took into consideration the question of prejudice to petitioner. This approach was approved in where the Court stated: "[W]here, as here, objection to the jury selection has not been timely raised under Rule 12 (b) (2), it is entirely proper to take absence of prejudice into account in determining whether a sufficient showing has been made to warrant relief from the effect |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | Davis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108761/davis-v-united-states/ | showing has been made to warrant relief from the effect of that Rule." 1 U.S., Petitioner seeks to avoid this aspect of by asserting that there both lower courts had found that petitioners were not prejudiced in any way by the alleged illegalities whereas under prejudice is presumed in cases where there is an allegation of racial discrimination in grand jury composition. But Peters dealt with whether or not a white man had a substantive constitutional right to set aside his conviction upon proof that Negroes had been systematically excluded from the state grand and petit juries which indicted and tried him. Three Justices dissented from the Court's upholding of such a substantive right on the ground that no prejudice had been shown, and three concurred separately in the *245 judgment. But the three opinions delivered in Peters, all indicate a focus on the existence of the constitutional right, rather than its possible loss through delay in asserting it. The presumption of prejudice which supports the existence of the right is not inconsistent with a holding that actual prejudice must be shown in order to obtain relief from a statutorily provided waiver for failure to assert it in a timely manner. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner relief from the application of the waiver provision of Rule 12 (b) (2), and that having concluded he was not entitled to such relief, it properly dismissed his motion under 2255. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | United States v. Flores-Montano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134729/united-states-v-flores-montano/ | Customs officials seized 37 kilograms a little more than 81 pounds of marijuana from respondent Manuel Flores-Montano's gas tank at the international border. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on an earlier decision by a divided panel of that court, United held that the Fourth Amendment forbade the fuel tank search absent reasonable suspicion. No. 02-50306, We hold that the search in question did not require reasonable suspicion. Respondent, driving a 1987 Ford Taurus station wagon, attempted to enter the United States at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in southern California. A customs inspector conducted an inspection of the station wagon, and requested respondent to leave the vehicle. The vehicle was then taken to a secondary inspection station. *151 At the secondary station, a second customs inspector inspected the gas tank by tapping it, and noted that the tank sounded solid. Subsequently, the inspector requested a mechanic under contract with Customs to come to the border station to remove the tank. Within 20 to 30 minutes, the mechanic arrived. He raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and then disconnected some hoses and electrical connections. After the gas tank was removed, the inspector hammered off bondo (a putty-like hardening substance that is used to seal openings) from the top of the gas tank. The inspector opened an access plate underneath the bondo and found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks. The process took 15 to 25 minutes. A grand jury for the Southern District of California indicted respondent on one count of unlawfully importing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S. C. 952, and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 841(a)(1). Relying on Molina-Tarazon, respondent filed a motion to suppress the marijuana recovered from the gas tank. In Molina-Tarazon, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that removal of a gas tank requires reasonable suspicion in order to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Government advised the District Court that it was not relying on reasonable suspicion as a basis for denying respondent's suppression motion, but that it believed Molina-Tarazon was wrongly decided. The District Court, relying on Molina-Tarazon, held that reasonable suspicion was required to justify the search and, accordingly, granted respondent's motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals, citing Molina-Tarazon, summarily affirmed the District Court's judgment. No. 02-50306, We granted certiorari, and now reverse. *152 In Molina-Tarazon, the Court of Appeals decided a case presenting |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | United States v. Flores-Montano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134729/united-states-v-flores-montano/ | In Molina-Tarazon, the Court of Appeals decided a case presenting similar facts to the one at bar. It asked "whether [the removal and dismantling of the defendant's fuel tank] is a `routine' border search for which no suspicion whatsoever is required." The Court of Appeals stated that "[i]n order to conduct a search that goes beyond the routine, an inspector must have reasonable suspicion," and the "critical factor" in determining whether a search is "routine" is the "degree of intrusiveness." The Court of Appeals seized on language from our opinion in United in which we used the word "routine" as a descriptive term in discussing border searches. ; The Court of Appeals took the term "routine," fashioned a new balancing test, and extended it to searches of vehicles. But the reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to determine what is a "routine" search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more "intrusive" search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles. The Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. Time and again, we have stated that "searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the *153 border." United Congress, since the beginning of our Government, "has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country." Montoya de at 537 (citing at -617 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, )). The modern statute that authorized the search in this case, 19 U.S. C. 1581(a),[1] derived from a statute passed by the First Congress, the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 31, see United and reflects the "impressive historical pedigree" of the Government's power and interest, It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity. That interest in protecting the borders is illustrated in this case by the evidence that smugglers frequently attempt to penetrate our borders with contraband secreted in their automobiles' |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,004 | 19 | majority | United States v. Flores-Montano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134729/united-states-v-flores-montano/ | to penetrate our borders with contraband secreted in their automobiles' fuel tank. Over the past 5½ fiscal years, there have been 18,788 vehicle drug seizures at the southern California ports of entry. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. Of those 18,788, gas tank drug seizures have accounted for 4,619 of the vehicle drug seizures, or approximately 25%. In addition, instances of persons smuggled in and around gas tank compartments are discovered at the ports of entry of * San Ysidro and Otay Mesa at a rate averaging 1 approximately every 10 days. at 16a. Respondent asserts two main arguments with respect to his Fourth Amendment interests. First, he urges that he has a privacy interest in his fuel tank, and that the suspicionless disassembly of his tank is an invasion of his privacy. But on many occasions, we have noted that the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior. Montoya de We have long recognized that automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched. See It is difficult to imagine how the search of a gas tank, which should be solely a repository for fuel, could be more of an invasion of privacy than the search of the automobile's passenger compartment. Second, respondent argues that the Fourth Amendment "protects property as well as privacy," and that the disassembly and reassembly of his gas tank is a significant deprivation of his property interest because it may damage the vehicle. He does not, and on the record cannot, truly contend that the procedure of removal, disassembly, and reassembly of the fuel tank in this case or any other has resulted in serious damage to, or destruction of, the property.[2] According to *155 the Government, for example, in fiscal year 348 gas tank searches conducted along the southern border were negative (i. e., no contraband was found), the gas tanks were reassembled, and the vehicles continued their entry into the United States without incident. Brief for United States 31. Respondent cites not a single accident involving the vehicle or motorist in the many thousands of gas tank disassemblies that have occurred at the border. A gas tank search involves a brief procedure that can be reversed without damaging the safety or operation of the vehicle. If damage to a vehicle were to occur, the motorist might be entitled to recovery. See, e. g., 31 U.S. C. 3723; 19 U.S. C. 1630. While the interference with a motorist's possessory interest is not insignificant when the Government removes, disassembles, and reassembles his gas tank, it nevertheless is |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as ordinary citizens. This conclusion is firmly supported by the text of the Constitution, the early history of the Nation, decisions of this Court, and a correct understanding of the basic structure of the Federal Government. These cases do not implicate the more difficult questions associated with congressional coercion of state legislatures addressed in New Nor need we consider the wisdom of relying on local officials rather than federal agents to carry out aspects of a federal program, or even the question whether such officials may be required to perform a federal function on a permanent basis. The question is whether Congress, acting on behalf of the people of the entire Nation, may require local law enforcement officers to perform certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a federal gun control program. It is remarkably similar to the question, heavily debated by the Framers of the Constitution, whether Congress could require state agents to collect federal taxes. Or the question *940 whether Congress could impress state judges into federal service to entertain and decide cases that they would prefer to ignore. Indeed, since the ultimate issue is one of power, we must consider its implications in times of national emergency. Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national response before federal personnel can be made available to respond. If the Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make an appropriate response, is there anything in the Tenth Amendment, "in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, [or] in the jurisprudence of this Court," ante, at 905, that forbids the enlistment of state officers to make that response effective? More narrowly, what basis is there in any of those sources for concluding that it is the Members of this Court, rather than the elected representatives of the people, who should determine whether the Constitution contains the unwritten rule that the Court announces today? Perhaps today's majority would suggest that no such emergency is presented by the facts of these cases. But such a suggestion is itself an expression of a policy judgment. And Congress' view of the matter is quite different from that implied by the Court today. The Brady Act was passed in response to what Congress described |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | Brady Act was passed in response to what Congress described as an "epidemic of gun violence." H. R. Rep. No. 103-344, p. 8 (1993). The Act's legislative history notes that 15,377 Americans were murdered with firearms in 1992, and that 12,489 of these deaths were caused by handguns. Congress expressed special concern that "[t]he level of firearm violence in this country is, by far, the highest among developed nations." The partial solution contained in the Brady Act, a mandatory background check before a *941 handgun may be purchased, has met with remarkable success. Between 1994 and 1996, approximately 6,600 firearm sales each month to potentially dangerous persons were prevented by Brady Act checks; over 70% of the rejected purchasers were convicted or indicted felons. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, A National Estimate: Presale Firearm Checks 1 (Feb. 1997). Whether or not the evaluation reflected in the enactment of the Brady Act is correct as to the extent of the danger and the efficacy of the legislation, the congressional decision surely warrants more respect than it is accorded in today's unprecedented decision. I The text of the Constitution provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of these cases. Article I, 8, grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the Putting to one side the revisionist views expressed by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in United there can be no question that that provision adequately supports the regulation of commerce in handguns effected by the Brady Act. Moreover, the additional grant of authority in that section of the Constitution "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers" is surely adequate to support the temporary enlistment of local police officers in the process of identifying persons who should not be entrusted with the possession of handguns. In short, the affirmative delegation of power in Article I provides ample authority for the congressional enactment. Unlike the First Amendment, which prohibits the enactment of a category of laws that would otherwise be authorized by Article I, the Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated powers. Using language *942 that plainly refers only to powers that are "not " delegated to Congress, it provides: "The powers not delegated to the United by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the are reserved to the respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amdt. 10. The Amendment confirms the principle that the powers of the Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively granted by the Constitution, |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | Government are limited to those affirmatively granted by the Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the scope or the effectiveness of the exercise of powers that are delegated to Congress.[1] See New Thus, the Amendment provides no support for a rule that immunizes local officials from obligations that might be imposed on ordinary citizens.[2] Indeed, it would be more reasonable to infer *943 that federal law may impose greater duties on state officials than on private citizens because another provision of the Constitution requires that "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United and of the several shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." Art. VI, cl. 3. It is appropriate for state officials to make an oath or affirmation to support the Federal Constitution because, as explained in The Federalist, they "have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution." The Federalist No. 44, p. 312 (J. Madison).[3] There can be no conflict between their duties to the State and those owed to the Federal Government because Article VI unambiguously provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," binding in every State. U. S. Const., Art. *944 VI, cl. 2. Thus, not only the Constitution, but every law enacted by Congress as well, establishes policy for the just as firmly as do laws enacted by state legislatures. The reasoning in our unanimous opinion explaining why state tribunals with ordinary jurisdiction over tort litigation can be required to hear cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act applies equally to local law enforcement officers whose ordinary duties parallel the modest obligations imposed by the Brady Act: "The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State. As was said by this court in 137: "`The laws of the United are laws in the several and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The United is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | United is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty.' " Second Employers' Liabil- ity Cases, See also There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the United that supports the proposition that a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in Article I. *945 II Under the Articles of Confederation the National Government had the power to issue commands to the several sovereign but it had no authority to govern individuals directly. Thus, it raised an army and financed its operations by issuing requisitions to the constituent members of the Confederacy, rather than by creating federal agencies to draft soldiers or to impose taxes. That method of governing proved to be unacceptable, not because it demeaned the sovereign character of the several but rather because it was cumbersome and inefficient. Indeed, a confederation that allows each of its members to determine the ways and means of complying with an overriding requisition is obviously more deferential to state sovereignty concerns than a national government that uses its own agents to impose its will directly on the citizenry. The basic change in the character of the government that the Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of the National Government, not to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for state officers. Because indirect control over individual citizens ("the only proper objects of government") was ineffective under the Articles of Confederation, Alexander Hamilton explained that "we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens." The Federalist No. 15, at 101 Indeed, the historical materials strongly suggest that the founders intended to enhance the capacity of the Federal Government by empowering itas a part of the new authority to make demands directly on individual citizensto act through local officials. Hamilton made clear that the new Constitution, "by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its laws." The Federalist No. 27, at 180. Hamilton's meaning was unambiguous; the Federal Government was to have the power to demand that local officials *946 implement national policy programs. As he went on to explain: "It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which [the State and Federal Governments] might proceed; and will give the |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | State and Federal Governments] might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State." [4] More specifically, during the debates concerning the ratification of the Constitution, it was assumed that state agents would act as tax collectors for the Federal Government. Opponents of the Constitution had repeatedly expressed fears that the new Federal Government's ability to impose taxes directly on the citizenry would result in an overbearing presence of federal tax collectors in the[5] Federalists rejoined that this problem would not arise because, as Hamilton explained, "the United will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting" certain *947 taxes. No. 36, at 235. Similarly, Madison made clear that the new central Government's power to raise taxes directly from the citizenry would "not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers appointed by the several" No. 45, at 318.[6] The Court's response to this powerful historical evidence is weak. The majority suggests that "none of these statements necessarily implies Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent of the" Ante, at 910-911 (emphasis deleted). No fair reading of these materials can justify such an interpretation. As Hamilton explained, the power of the Government to act on "individual citizens"including "employ[ing] the ordinary magistracy" of the was an answer to the problems faced by a central Government that could act only directly "upon the in their political or collective capacities." The Federalist, No. 27, at 179-180. The new Constitution would avoid this problem, resulting in "a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union." This point is made especially clear in Hamilton's statement that "the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. " It is hard to imagine a more unequivocal statement that state *948 judicial and executive branch officials may be required to implement federal law where the National Government acts within the scope of its affirmative powers.[7] The Court makes two unpersuasive attempts to discount the force of this statement. First, according to the majority, because Hamilton mentioned the Supremacy Clause without specifically referring to any "congressional directive," the statement does not mean what it plainly says. Ante, at 912. But the mere fact that the |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | says. Ante, at 912. But the mere fact that the Supremacy Clause is the source of the obligation of state officials to implement congressional directives does not remotely suggest that they might be "`incorporat[ed] into the operations of the national government,' " The Federalist No. 27, (A. Hamilton), before their obligations have been defined by Congress. Federal law establishes policy for the just as firmly as laws enacted by state legislatures, but that does not mean that state or federal officials must implement directives that have not been specified in any law.[8] Second, the majority suggests that interpreting this passage to mean what it says would conflict with our decision in New Ante, at 912. But since the New opinion did not mention The Federalist No. 27, it does not affect either the relevance or the weight of the historical evidence provided by No. 27 insofar as it relates to state courts and magistrates. Bereft of support in the history of the founding, the Court rests its conclusion on the claim that there is little evidence the National Government actually exercised such a power in *949 the early years of the Republic. See ante, at 907-908. This reasoning is misguided in principle and in fact. While we have indicated that the express consideration and resolution of difficult constitutional issues by the First Congress in particular "provides `contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the Constitution's meaning since many of [its] Members `had taken part in framing that instrument,' " we have never suggested that the failure of the early Congresses to address the scope of federal power in a particular area or to exercise a particular authority was an argument against its existence. That position, if correct, would undermine most of our post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As Justice O'Connor quite properly noted in New "[t]he Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers." 505 U.S., at 1. More importantly, the fact that Congress did elect to rely on state judges and the clerks of state courts to perform a variety of executive functions, see ante, at 905-909, is surely evidence of a contemporary understanding that their status as state officials did not immunize them from federal service. The majority's description of these early statutes is both incomplete and at times misleading. For example, statutes of the early Congresses required in mandatory terms that state judges and their clerks perform various executive duties with respect to applications for citizenship. The First Congress enacted a statute requiring that the state courts consider such applications, specifying that the state |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | the state courts consider such applications, specifying that the state courts "shall administer" an oath of loyalty to the United and that "the clerk of such court shall record such application." Act of Mar. 26, 1, ch. 3, 1, Early legislation passed by the Fifth Congress also imposed reporting requirements relating to naturalization on court clerks, specifying that failure to perform those duties would result in a fine. Act of June 18, *950 1798, ch. 54, 2, (specifying that these obligations "shall be the duty of the clerk" ). Not long thereafter, the Seventh Congress mandated that state courts maintain a registry of aliens seeking naturalization. Court clerks were required to receive certain information from aliens, record those data, and provide certificates to the aliens; the statute specified fees to be received by local officials in compensation. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2, 155 (specifying that these burdens "shall be the duty of such clerk" including clerks "of a state" ).[9] Similarly, the First Congress enacted legislation requiring state courts to serve, functionally, like contemporary regulatory *951 agencies in certifying the seaworthiness of vessels. Act of July 20, 1, ch. 29, 3, -133. The majority casts this as an adjudicative duty, ante, at 907, but that characterization is misleading. The law provided that upon a complaint raised by a ship's crew members, the state courts were (if no federal court was proximately located) to appoint an investigative committee of three persons "most skilful in maritime affairs" to report back. On this basis, the judge was to determine whether the ship was fit for its intended voyage. The statute sets forth, in essence, procedures for an expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise more characteristic of executive activity.[10] The Court assumes that the imposition of such essentially executive duties on state judges and their clerks sheds no light on the question whether executive officials might have an immunity from federal obligations. Even assuming that the enlistment of state judges in their judicial role for federal purposes is irrelevant to the question whether executive officials may be asked to perform the same functiona claim disputed below, see infra, at 968-970the majority's analysis is badly mistaken. We are far truer to the historical record by applying a functional approach in assessing the role played by these early state officials. The use of state judges and their clerks to perform executive functions was, in historical context, hardly unusual. As one scholar has noted, "two centuries ago, state and local judges and associated judicial personnel *952 performed many of the |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | judges and associated judicial personnel *952 performed many of the functions today performed by executive officers, including such varied tasks as laying city streets and ensuring the seaworthiness of vessels." Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, And, of course, judges today continue to perform a variety of functions that may more properly be described as executive. See, e. g., The majority's insistence that this evidence of federal enlistment of state officials to serve executive functions is irrelevant simply because the assistance of "judges" was at issue rests on empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order.[11] The Court's evaluation of the historical evidence, furthermore, fails to acknowledge the important difference between *953 policy decisions that may have been influenced by respect for state sovereignty concerns, and decisions that are compelled by the Constitution.[12] Thus, for example, the decision by Congress to give President Wilson the authority to utilize the services of state officers in implementing the World War I draft, see Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 6, -81, surely indicates that the National Legislature saw no constitutional impediment to the enlistment of state assistance during a federal emergency. The fact that the President was able to implement the program by respectfully "request[ing]" state action, rather than bluntly commanding it, is evidence that he was an effective statesman, but surely does not indicate that he doubted either his or Congress' power to use mandatory language if necessary.[13] If there were merit to the Court's appraisal of this incident, one would assume that there would have been some contemporary comment on the supposed constitutional concern that hypothetically might have motivated the President's choice of language.[14] *954 The Court concludes its review of the historical materials with a reference to the fact that our decision in invalidated a large number of statutes enacted in the 1970's, implying that recent enactments by Congress that are similar to the Brady Act are not entitled to any presumption of validity. But in Chadha, unlike these cases, our decision rested on the Constitution's express bicameralism and presentment requirements, not on judicial inferences drawn from a silent text and a historical record that surely favors the congressional understanding. Indeed, the majority's opinion consists almost entirely of arguments against the substantial evidence weighing in opposition to its view; the Court's ruling is strikingly lacking in affirmative support. Absent even a modicum of textual foundation for its judicially crafted constitutional rule, there should be a presumption that if the Framers had actually intended such a rule, at least one of them |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | actually intended such a rule, at least one of them would have mentioned it.[15] *955 III The Court's "structural" arguments are not sufficient to rebut that presumption. The fact that the Framers intended to preserve the sovereignty of the several simply does not speak to the question whether individual state employees may be required to perform federal obligations, such as registering young adults for the draft, -81, creating state emergency response commissions designed to manage the release of hazardous substances, 42 U.S. C. 11001, 11003, collecting and reporting data on underground storage tanks that may pose an environmental hazard, 6991a, and reporting traffic fatalities, 23 U.S. C. 402(a), and missing children, 42 U.S. C. 79(a), to a federal agency.[] *956 As we explained in : "[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the from overreaching by Congress." Given the fact that the Members of Congress are elected by the people of the several with each State receiving an equivalent number of Senators in order to ensure that even the smallest have a powerful voice in the Legislature, it is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of their constituents. It is far more reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose modest burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment that the people in each of the will benefit therefrom. Indeed, the presumption of validity that supports all congressional enactments[17] has added force with respect to policy *9 judgments concerning the impact of a federal statute upon the respective The majority points to nothing suggesting that the political safeguards of federalism identified in Garcia need be supplemented by a rule, grounded in neither constitutional history nor text, flatly prohibiting the National Government from enlisting state and local officials in the implementation of federal law. Recent developments demonstrate that the political safeguards protecting Our Federalism are effective. The majority expresses special concern that were its rule not adopted the Federal Government would be able to avail itself of the services of state government officials "at no cost to itself." Ante, at 922; see also ante, at 930 (arguing that "Members of Congress can take credit for `solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes"). But this specific problem of federal actions that have the effect |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | this specific problem of federal actions that have the effect of imposing so-called "unfunded mandates" on the has been identified and meaningfully addressed by Congress in recent legislation.[18] See Unfunded *958 Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Stat. 48. The statute was designed "to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal mandates on State governments without adequate Federal funding, in a manner that may displace other essential State. governmental priorities." 2 U.S. C. 1(2) (1994 ed., Supp. II). It functions, inter alia, by permitting Members of Congress to raise an objection by point of order to a pending bill that contains an "unfunded mandate," as defined by the statute, of over $50 million.[19] The mandate may not then be enacted unless the Members make an explicit decision to proceed anyway. See Recent Legislation, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Whatever the ultimate impact of the new legislation, its passage demonstrates that *959 unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.[20] Perversely, the majority's rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State's rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies. This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised would not occur, in part as a result of the National Government's ability to rely on the magistracy of the See, e. g., The Federalist No. 36, at 234-235 (A. Hamilton); No. 45, at 318 (J. Madison).[21] With colorful hyperbole, the Court suggests that the unity in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government "would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject *960 to reduction, if Congress could requir[e] state officers to execute its laws." Ante, at 923. Putting to one side the obvious tension between the majority's claim that impressing state police officers will unduly tip the balance of power in favor of the federal sovereign and this suggestion that it will emasculate the Presidency, the Court's reasoning contradicts New[22] That decision squarely approved of cooperative federalism programs, designed at the national level but implemented principally by state governments. New disapproved of a particular method of putting such programs into place, not the existence of federal programs implemented locally. See Indeed, |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | not the existence of federal programs implemented locally. See Indeed, nothing in the majority's holding calls into question the three mechanisms for constructing such programs that New expressly approved. Congress may require the to implement its programs as a condition of federal spending,[23] in order to avoid the threat of unilateral federal action in the area,[] or as a part of a program that affects and private parties alike.[25] The majority's suggestion in response to this dissent that Congress' ability to create such programs is limited, ante, at 923, n. 12, is belied by the importance and sweep of the federal statutes that meet this description, some of which we described in New See * -8 Nor is there force to the assumption under girding the Court's entire opinion that if this trivial burden on state sovereignty is permissible, the entire structure of federalism will soon collapse. These cases do not involve any mandate to state legislatures to enact new rules. When legislative action, or even administrative rule making, is at issue, it may be appropriate for Congress either to pre-empt the State's lawmaking power and fashion the federal rule itself, or to respect the State's power to fashion its own rules. But these cases, unlike any precedent in which the Court has held that Congress exceeded its powers, merely involve the imposition of modest duties on individual officers. The Court seems to accept the fact that Congress could require private persons, such as hospital executives or school administrators, to provide arms merchants with relevant information about a prospective purchaser's fitness to own a weapon; indeed, the Court does not disturb the conclusion that flows directly from our prior holdings that the burden on police officers would be permissible if a similar burden were also imposed on private parties with access to relevant data. See New ; A structural problem that vanishes when the statute affects private individuals as well as public officials is not much of a structural problem. Far more important than the concerns that the Court musters in support of its new rule is the fact that the Framers entrusted Congress with the task of creating a working structure of inter governmental relationships around the framework that the Constitution authorized. Neither explicitly nor implicitly did the Framers issue any command that forbids Congress from imposing federal duties on private citizens or on local officials. As a general matter, Congress *962 has followed the sound policy of authorizing federal agencies and federal agents to administer federal programs. That general practice, however, does not negate the existence of power |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | general practice, however, does not negate the existence of power to rely on state officials in occasional situations in which such reliance is in the national interest. Rather, the occasional exceptions confirm the wisdom of Justice Holmes' reminder that "the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints." Bain Peanut Co. of IV Finally, the Court advises us that the "prior jurisprudence of this Court" is the most conclusive support for its position. Ante, at 925. That "prior jurisprudence" is New[26] The case involved the validity of a federal statute that provided the with three types of incentives to encourage them to dispose of radioactive wastes generated within their borders. The Court held that the first two sets of incentives were authorized by affirmative grants of power to Congress, and therefore "not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment." 174. That holding, of course, sheds no doubt on the validity of the Brady Act. The third so-called "incentive" gave the the option either of adopting regulations dictated by Congress or of taking title to and possession of the low level radioactive waste. The Court concluded that, because Congress had no power to compel the state governments to take title to the *963 waste, the "option" really amounted to a simple command to the to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. The Court explained: "A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. Either way, `the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., an outcome that has never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution." After noting that the "take title provision appears to be unique" because no other federal statute had offered "a state government no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress," the Court concluded that the provision was "inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution." Our statements, taken in context, clearly did not decide the question presented here, whether state executive officialsas opposed to state legislatorsmay in appropriate circumstances be enlisted to implement federal policy. The "take title" provision at issue in New was beyond Congress' authority to enact because it was "in principle no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers," almost certainly a legislative Act. The majority relies upon dictum in New to the effect that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the to |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | effect that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." ; see ante, at 933. But that language was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case. It is,of course, beyond dispute that we are not bound by the dicta of our prior opinions. See, e. g., U. S. Bancorp Mortgage ("invoking our customary refusal to be bound by dicta"). To *964 the extent that it has any substance at all, New `s administration language may have referred to the possibility that the State might have been able to take title to and devise an elaborate scheme for the management of the radioactive waste through purely executive policy making. But despite the majority's effort to suggest that similar activities are required by the Brady Act, see ante, at 927-928, it is hard to characterize the minimal requirement that CLEO's perform background checks as one involving the exercise of substantial policy making discretion on that essentially legislative scale.[27] Indeed, Justice Kennedy's recent comment about another case that was distinguishable from New applies to these cases as well: "This is not a case where the etiquette of federalism has been violated by a formal command from the National *965 Government directing the State to enact a certain policy, cf. New or to organize its governmental functions in a certain way, cf. v. (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)." In response to this dissent, the majority asserts that the difference between a federal command addressed to individuals and one addressed to the State itself "cannot be a constitutionally significant one." Ante, at 930. But as I have already noted, n. there is abundant authority in our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence recognizing a constitutional distinction between local government officials, such as the CLEO's who brought this action, and state entities that are entitled to sovereign immunity. To my knowledge, no one has previously thought that the distinction "disembowels," ante, at 931, the Eleventh Amendment.[28] Importantly, the majority either misconstrues or ignores three cases that are more directly on point. In v. we upheld a federal statute requiring state utilities commissions, inter alia, to take the affirmative step of considering federal energy standards in a manner complying with federally specified notice and comment procedures, and to report back to Congress periodically. The state commissions could avoid this obligation *966 only by ceasing regulation in the field, a "choice" that we recognized was realistically foreclosed, since Congress had put forward no alternative regulatory scheme to govern this very important area. The burden on state officials |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | govern this very important area. The burden on state officials that we approved in was far more extensive than the minimal, temporary imposition posed by the Brady Act.[29] Similarly, in Puerto we overruled our earlier decision in How. 66 and held that the Extradition Act of 1793 permitted the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to seek extradition of a fugitive from its laws without constitutional barrier. The Extradition Act, as the majority properly concedes, plainly imposes duties on state executive officers. See ante, at 908-909. The majority suggests that this statute is nevertheless of little importance because it simply constitutes an implementation of the authority granted the National Government by the Constitution's Extradition Clause, Art. IV, 2. But in Branstad we noted ambiguity as to whether Puerto Rico benefits from that Clause, which applies on its face only to "." Avoiding the question of the Clause's applicability, we held simply that under the Extradition Act Puerto Rico had the power to request that the State of Iowa deliver up the fugitive the Commonwealth -230. Although Branstad relied on the authority of the Act alone, without the benefit of the *967 Extradition Clause, we noted no barrier to our decision in the principles of federalismdespite the fact that one Member of the Court brought the issue to our attention, see[30] Finally, the majority provides an incomplete explanation of our decision in and demeans its importance. In that case the Court unanimously held that state courts of appropriate jurisdiction must occupy themselves adjudicating claims brought by private litigants under the federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, regardless of how otherwise crowded their dockets might be with state-law matters. That is a much greater imposition on state sovereignty than the Court's characterization of the case as merely holding that "state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law," ante, at 928. That characterization describes only the narrower duty to apply federal law in cases that the state courts have consented to entertain. *968 The language drawn from the Supremacy Clause upon which the majority relies ("the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law], any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding"), expressly embraces that narrower conflict of laws principle. Art. VI, cl. 2. But the Supremacy Clause means far more. As Testa held, because the "Laws of the United [are] the supreme Law of the Land," state courts of appropriate jurisdiction must hear federal claims whenever a federal statute, such as the Emergency Price Control Act, requires them to do so. Art. VI, cl. 2. |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Printz v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118148/printz-v-united-states/ | Act, requires them to do so. Art. VI, cl. 2. Hence, the Court's textual argument is quite misguided. The majority focuses on the Clause's specific attention to the point that "Judges in every State shall be bound." That language commands state judges to "apply federal law" in cases that they entertain, but it is not the source of their duty to accept jurisdiction of federal claims that they would prefer to ignore. Our opinions in Testa, and earlier the Second Employers' Liability Cases, rested generally on the language of the Supremacy Clause, without any specific focus on the reference to judges.[31] *969 The majority's reinterpretation of Testa also contradicts our decision in In addition to the holding mentioned earlier, see we also approved in that case provisions of federal law requiring a state utilities commission to "adjudicate disputes arising under [a federal] statute." Because the state commission had "jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those" put before it under the federal statute, ib we held that Testa required it to adjudicate the federal claims. Although the commission was serving an adjudicative function, the commissioners were unquestionably not "judges" within the meaning of Art. VI, cl. 2. It is impossible to reconcile the Court's present view that Testa rested entirely on the specific reference to state judges in the Supremacy Clause with our extension of that early case in[32] Even if the Court were correct in its suggestion that it was the reference to judges in the Supremacy Clause, rather than the central message of the entire Clause, that dictated the result in Testa, the Court's implied expressio unius argument that the Framers therefore did not intend to permit the enlistment of other state officials is implausible. Throughout our history judges, state as well as federal, have merited as much respect as executive agents. The notion that the Framers would have had no reluctance to "press *970 state judges into federal service" against their will but would have regarded the imposition of a similarindeed, far lesser burden on town constables as an intolerable affront to principles of state sovereignty can only be considered perverse. If such a distinction had been contemplated by the learned and articulate men who fashioned the basic structure of our government, surely some of them would have said so.[33] * * * The provision of the Brady Act that crosses the Court's newly defined constitutional threshold is more comparable to a statute requiring local police officers to report the identity of missing children to the Crime Control Center of the Department of Justice than to an offensive |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | JW Bateson Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Bd. of Trustees of Nat. Automatic Sprinkler Industry Pension Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109778/jw-bateson-co-v-united-states-ex-rel-bd-of-trustees-of-nat-automatic/ | Under the Miller Act, as amended, 40 U.S. C. 270a et seq., a prime contractor on a federal construction project involving over $2,000 must post a payment bond to protect those who have a direct contractual relationship with either the prime contractor or a "subcontractor." The issue in this case is whether the term "subcontractor," as used in the Act, encompasses a firm that is technically a "sub-subcontractor." The material facts are not in dispute. Petitioner J. W. Bateson entered into a contract with the United States for construction of an addition to a hospital and provided a payment bond signed by Bateson's president and by representatives of petitioner sureties. Bateson, the prime contractor, subcontracted with Pierce Associates for a portion of the original work, and Pierce in turn subcontracted with Colquitt Sprinkler for the installation of a sprinkler system, one of the items specified in the contract between Bateson and the United States. Under a collective-bargaining agreement with respondent Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, Colquitt was obligated to pay over amounts withheld from employees' wages for union dues and vacation savings, and to contribute to the union's welfare, pension, and educational trust funds. When Colquitt failed to make any of these payments *588 by the end of the union members' employment with the firm, the union and respondent trustees notified Bateson of the amount that they claimed was due them under the payment bond and then filed suit against Bateson in the name of the United States. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 325, The appellate court recognized that Colquitt, which had a contractual relationship with Pierce but not with Bateson, was "technically a sub-subcontractor," but it concluded nevertheless that Colquitt should be considered a "subcontractor" for purposes of payment bond recovery by its employees or their representatives.[1] Applying a functional test based on the "substantial[ity] and importan[ce]" of the relationship between Bateson and Colquitt, the court noted that Colquitt was performing on the jobsite "an integral and significant part of [Bateson's] contract" with the Government, that the work "was performed over a substantial period of time," that Bateson had access to Colquitt's payroll records, and that Bateson could have protected itself "through bond or otherwise" against Colquitt's default. Ib 551 F. 2d, at 1286. We granted certiorari, to resolve a conflict between the decision below and the holdings of at least three other Circuits.[2] We now reverse. *589 Like the predecessor Heard Act, Act of Aug. |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | JW Bateson Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Bd. of Trustees of Nat. Automatic Sprinkler Industry Pension Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109778/jw-bateson-co-v-united-states-ex-rel-bd-of-trustees-of-nat-automatic/ | reverse. *589 Like the predecessor Heard Act, Act of Aug. 13, 1894, ch. 280, as amended, Act of Feb. 24, 1905, the Miller Act was designed to provide an alternative remedy to the mechanics' liens ordinarily available on private construction projects. F. D. Because "a lien cannot attach to Government property," persons supplying labor or materials on a federal construction project were to be protected by a payment bond. at 121-. The scope of the Miller Act's protection is limited, however, by a proviso in 2 (a) of the Act that "had no counterpart in the Heard Act." Clifford F. This proviso has the effect of requiring that persons who lack a "contractual relationship express or implied with the [prime] contractor" show a "direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor" in order to recover on the bond. 40 U.S. C. 270b (a);[3] see F. D. v. United States ex rel. *590 Industrial Lumber at ; Clifford F. at -108. In the instant case it is conceded that Colquitt's employees enjoyed no contractual relationship, "express or implied," with Bateson, and that they did have a "direct contractual relationship" with Colquitt. The question before us, then, is whether Colquitt can be considered a "subcontractor." As we observed in Clifford F. Congress used the word "subcontractor" in the Miller Act in accordance with "usage in the building trades." -109; see In the building trades, "a subcontractor is one who performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract" It thus appears that a contract with a prime contractor is a prerequisite to being a "subcontractor."[4] *591 This interpretation of the Act's language is confirmed by the legislative history, which leaves no room for doubt about Congress' intent. While relatively brief, the authoritative Committee Reports of both the House of Representatives and the Senate squarely focus on the question at issue here: "A sub-subcontractor may avail himself of the protection of the bond by giving written notice to the contractor, but that is as far as the bill goes. It is not felt that more remote relationships ought to come within the purview of the bond." H. R. Rep. No. 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); S. Rep. No. 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1935). This passage indicates both that Congress understood the difference between "sub-subcontractors" like Colquitt and "subcontractors" like Pierce, and that it intended the scope of protection of a payment bond to extend no further than to sub-subcontractors. See 322 U. S., at -108, and n. 5. There is nothing |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | JW Bateson Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Bd. of Trustees of Nat. Automatic Sprinkler Industry Pension Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109778/jw-bateson-co-v-united-states-ex-rel-bd-of-trustees-of-nat-automatic/ | U. S., at -108, and n. 5. There is nothing to the contrary anywhere in the legislative history. Thus, while Colquitt could have claimed *592 against the payment bond had Pierce defaulted in its obligations, the employees of Colquitt were not similarly protected against Colquitt's default, because they did not have a contractual relationship with Pierce or any other "subcontractor."[5] This view of what was intended in the Miller Act is reinforced by the fact that all reported decisions that have considered the question, except that of the court below and one early District Court decision, have reached the same conclusion.[6] Presumably aware of this well-settled body of law *593 dating back almost 20 years, Congress has never moved to modify the Act's coverage. As a result, all of those concerned with Government projectsprime contractors, sureties, various levels of subcontractors and their employeeshave been led to assume that the employees of a sub-subcontractor would not be protected by the Miller Act payment bond and to order their affairs accordingly.[7] In the absence of some clear indication to the contrary, we should not defeat these reasonable expectations, particularly in view of the importance of certainty with regard to bonding practices on Government construction projects. See generally -111. In reaching a result contrary to that of other Courts of Appeals, the court below did not address itself either to the legislative history quoted above or to the conflict among the Circuits that its ruling created. Instead, it focused primarily on the substantiality and importance of the relationship between Colquitt and Bateson, see relying for this approach on our decisions in and F. D. While those cases did involve the scope of the term "subcontractor" in the 2 (a) proviso, they arose in situations in which the *594 firm at issue, unlike Colquitt, had a direct contractual relationship with the prime contractor. The question in both cases was whether a supplier of materials to the prime contractor could be considered a "subcontractor,"[8] and on this question an absence of dispositive statutory language and legislative history led the Court ultimately to look to "functional" considerations. -124; see 322 U.S., -111. In the instant case, by contrast, the traditional tools of statutory construction provide a definitive answer to the question before us, and hence it would be inappropriate to utilize the approach relied on by the Court of Appeals. In concluding that the word "subcontractor" must be limited in meaning to one who contracts with a prime contractor, we are not unmindful of our obligation to construe the "highly remedial" Miller Act "liberal[ly] in order |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | dissenting | Time, Inc. v. Firestone | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109388/time-inc-v-firestone/ | In my view, the question presented by this case is the degree of protection commanded by the First Amendment's free expression guarantee where it is sought to hold a publisher liable under state defamation laws for erroneously reporting the results of a public judicial proceeding. I In a series of cases beginning with New York this Court has held that the laws of libel and defamation, no less than other legal modes of restraint on the freedoms of speech and press, are subject to constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Court has emphasized that the central meaning of the free expression guarantee is that the body politic of this Nation shall be entitled to the communications necessary for self-governance, and that to place restraints on the exercise of expression is to deny the instrumental means required in order that the citizenry exercise that ultimate sovereignty reposed in its collective judgment by the Constitution.[1] Accordingly, we have held that laws governing harm incurred by individuals through defamation or invasion of privacy, although directed to the worthy objective of ensuring the "essential dignity and worth of every human being" necessary to a civilized society, must be measured and limited by constitutional constraints *472 assuring the maintenance and well-being of the system of free expression. Although "calculated false-hood" is no part of the expression protected by the central meaning of the First Amendment, error and misstatement is recognized as inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. New York Therefore, in order to avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict or simple fault liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin for errorprotecting some misstatements so that the "freedoms of expression have the `breathing space' that they `need to survive.' " "[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones." St. For this reason, New York held that liability for defamation of a public official may not be imposed in the absence of proof of actual malice on the part of the person making the erroneous -280.[2] *473 Identical considerations led the Court last Term in Cox Broadcasting (19), to hold that the First Amendment commands an absolute privilege to truthfully report the contents of public records reflecting the subject matter of judicial proceedings. Recognizing the possibility of injury to legitimate privacy interests of persons affected by such proceedings, the Court was nevertheless constrained in light of the strong First |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | dissenting | Time, Inc. v. Firestone | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109388/time-inc-v-firestone/ | Court was nevertheless constrained in light of the strong First Amendment values involved to conclude that no liability whatever could be imposed by the State for reports damaging to those concerns. Following the reasoning of New York and its progeny, the Court in Cox Broadcasting noted: "[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations. Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government *474 generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice. ". Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business." -4, 495. Crucial to the holding in Cox Broadcasting was the determination that a "reasonable man" standard for imposing liability for invasion of privacy interests is simply inadequate to the task of safeguarding against "timidity and self-censorship" in reporting judicial proceedings. Clearly, the inadequacy of any such standard is no less in the related area of liability for defamation resulting from inadvertent error in reporting such proceedings. II It is true, of course, that the Court in cut back on the scope of application of the New York privilege as it had evolved through the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom had held the New York privilege applicable to "all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." But in light of the Court's perception *4 of an altered balance between the conflicting values at stake where the person defamed is in some sense a "private individual," held First Amendment interests adequately protected in such |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | dissenting | Time, Inc. v. Firestone | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109388/time-inc-v-firestone/ | "private individual," held First Amendment interests adequately protected in such circumstances so long as defamation liability is restricted to a requirement of "fault" and proof of "actual injury" resulting from the claimed defamation.[3] 418 U. S., *476 at 349-. However, the extension of the relaxed standard of to news reporting of events transpiring in and decisions arising out of public judicial proceedings is unwarranted by the terms of itself, is contrary to other well-established precedents of this Court and, most importantly, savages the cherished values encased in the First Amendment. There is no indication in of any intention to overrule the Rosenbloom decision on its facts. Confined to those facts, Rosenbloom holds that in instances of erroneous reporting of the public actions of public officials, the New York actual-malice standard must be met before liability for defamation may be imposed in favor of persons affected by those actions. Although clearly altered the broader rationale of Rosenbloom, until the Court's decision today it could not have been supposed that Rosenbloom did not remain the law roughly to the extent of my Brother WHITE'S concurring statement therein: "[I]n defamation actions, absent actual malice as defined in New York the First Amendment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege to report and comment upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy of an individual involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public view."[4] At stake in the present case is the ability of the press to report to the citizenry the events transpiring in the Nation's judicial systems. There is simply no meaningful *477 or constitutionally adequate way to report such events without reference to those persons and transactions that form the subject matter in controversy.[5] This Court has long held: "A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity. There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it."[6] The Court has recognized that with regard to the judiciary, no less than other areas of government, the press performs an indispensable role by "subjecting the judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." And it is critical that the judicial processes be open to such scrutiny and criticism, for, as the Court has noted in the specific context of labor disputes, the more acute public controversies |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | dissenting | Time, Inc. v. Firestone | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109388/time-inc-v-firestone/ | specific context of labor disputes, the more acute public controversies are, "the more likely it is that in some aspect they will get into court."[7] Indeed, slight *478 reflection is needed to observe the insistent and complex interaction between controversial judicial proceedings and popular impressions thereof and fundamental legal and political changes in the Nation throughout the 200 years of evolution of our political system. With the judiciary as with all other aspects of government, the First Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they shall retain the necessary means of control over their institutions that might in the alternative grow remote, insensitive, and finally acquisitive of those attributes of sovereignty not delegated by the Constitution.[8] Also no less true than in other areas of government, error in reporting and debate concerning the judicial process is inevitable. Indeed, in view of the complexities of that process and its unfamiliarity to the laymen *479 who report it, the probability of inadvertent error may be substantially greater.[9] "There is perhaps no area of news more inaccurately reported factually, on the whole, though with some notable exceptions, than legal news. *480 "Some part of this is due to carelessness But a great deal of it must be attributed, in candor, to ignorance which frequently is not at all blame-worthy. For newspapers are conducted by men who are laymen to the law. With too rare exceptions their capacity for misunderstanding the significance of legal events and procedures, not to speak of opinions, is great. But this is neither remarkable nor peculiar to newsmen. For the law, as lawyers best know, is full of perplexities. "In view of these facts any standard which would require strict accuracy in reporting legal events factually or in commenting upon them in the press would be an impossible one. Unless the courts and judges are to be put above criticism, no such rule *481 can obtain. There must be some room for misstatement of fact, as well as for misjudgment, if the press and others are to function as critical agencies in our democracy concerning courts as for all other instruments of government."[10] For precisely such reasons, we have held that the contempt power may not be used to punish the reporting of judicial proceedings merely because a reporter "missed the essential point in a trial or failed to summarize the issues to accord with the views of the judge who sat on the case." 331 U. S., at 3. See also And "[w]hat a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | This case under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is before us a second time, now raising the question whether the Act bars nominal compensation to a worker who is presently able to earn at least as much as before he was injured. We hold nominal compensation proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker's wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his preinjury wages sometime in the future. *124 Respondent John Rambo injured his back and leg in 1980 while doing longshore work for petitioner Metropolitan Stevedore Company. Rambo claimed against Metropolitan for compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), as amended, 33 U.S. C. 901 et seq., and the parties stipulated that Rambo had sustained a 22[1]20442% permanent partial disability, which would normally reflect a $120.24 decline in his preinjury $534.38 weekly wage. This, in turn, was reduced to an award of $80.16 per week under 8(c)(21) of the Act, 33 U.S. C. 908(c)(21), providing for compensation at the rate of 66[2]20443% of the difference between an employee's preinjury wages and postinjury wage-earning An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) entered an order incorporating this stipulated award. App. 51; Metropolitan Stevedore Rambo was later trained as a longshore crane operator and got full-time work with his new skills, with occasional stints as a heavy-truck operator to earn extra pay. His resulting annual earnings between 1985 and were about three times what he had made before his injury. As a consequence, Metropolitan moved in 1989 to modify Rambo's earlier disability award, see 22, 33 U.S. C. 922, and a hearing was held before an ALJ. While there was no evidence that Rambo's physical condition had improved, the ALJ ordered the disability payments discontinued based on the tripling of Rambo's preinjury earnings: "After taking into consideration the increase in wages due to the rate of inflation and any increase in salary for the particular job, it is evident that [Rambo] no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss. Although [Rambo] testified that he might lose his job at some future time, the evidence shows that [Rambo] would not be at any *125 greater risk of losing his job than anyone else. Moreover, no evidence has been offered to show that [Rambo's] age, education, and vocational training are such that he would be at greater risk of losing his present job or in seeking new employment in the event that he should be required to do so. Likewise, the evidence does not show that [Rambo's] employer is a beneficent one. On the contrary, the evidence |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | employer is a beneficent one. On the contrary, the evidence shows that [Rambo] is not only able to work full time as a crane operator, but that he is able to work as a heavy lift truck operator when the time is available within which to do so." App. 55. See also Rambo at -294. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the modification order, App. 57, 61, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that 22 authorizes modification of an award only for changed physical conditions, We in turn reversed in Rambo holding that "[t]he fundamental purpose of the Act is to compensate employees (or their beneficiaries) for wage-earning capacity lost because of injury; where that wage-earning capacity has been reduced, restored, or improved, the basis for compensation changes and the statutory scheme allows for modification." Since the essence of wage-earning capacity is economic, not physical, that capacity may be affected "even without any change in the employee's physical condition," On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the order discontinuing compensation payments. t recognized that when a worker suffers a significant physical impairment without experiencing a present loss of earnings, there may be serious tension between the statutory mandate to account for future effects of disability in determining a claimant's wage-earning capacity (and thus entitlement to compensation), *126 see 8(h), 33 U.S. C. 908(h), and the statutory prohibition against issuing any new order to pay benefits more than one year after compensation ends or an order is entered denying an award, see 22, 33 U.S. C. 922. The Court of Appeals reconciled the two provisions by reading the statute to authorize a present nominal award subject to later modification if conditions should change. The court reversed the order ending Rambo's benefits as unsupported by substantial evidence, due to "overemphasi[s on] Rambo's current status and fail[ure] to consider the effect of Rambo's permanent partial disability on his future earnings," ib and it remanded for entry of a nominal award reflecting Rambo's permanent partial disability,[1] We granted certiorari. While we agree that nominal compensation may be awarded under certain circumstances despite the worker's present ability to earn more than his preinjury wage, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals directing entry of such an award and remand for factfinding by the ALJ. The LHWCA authorizes compensation not for physical injury as such, but for economic harm to the injured worker from decreased ability to earn wages. See Rambo The Act speaks of this economic harm as "disability," defined as the "incapacity because of injury |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | harm as "disability," defined as the "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment," 2(10), 33 U.S. C. 902(10). Such incapacity is conclusively presumed for certain enumerated or "scheduled" injuries, which are compensated at 66[2]20443% of the worker's preinjury wages over specified periods of time. See 8(c)(1)8(c)(20), 8(c)(22), 33 U.S. C. 908(c)(1)908(c)(20), 908(c)(22); Potomac Elec. For other, so-called "unscheduled" injuries resulting in less than total disability, the Act sets compensation at "66[2]20443 per centum of the difference between the average weekly [preinjury] wages of the employee and the employee's wage-earning capacity thereafter." 8(c)(21), 33 U.S. C. 908(c)(21) (permanent partial disability); see also 8(e), 33 U.S. C. 908(e) (temporary partial disability). For figuring this difference, 8(h) explains that the claimant's postinjury "wage-earning capacity" is to be determined "by his actual earnings if such actual earnings fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity: Pro- vided, however, That if the employee has no actual earnings or his actual earnings do not fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity, the deputy commissioner may, in the interest of justice, fix such wageearning capacity as shall be reasonable, having due regard to the nature of his injury, the degree of physical impairment, his usual employment, and any other factors or circumstances in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future." 8(h), 33 U.S. C. 908(h). See also 10, 33 U.S. C. 910 (method for determining preinjury wages). See generally Rambo 515 U. S., We may summarize these provisions and their implications this way. Disability is a measure of earning capacity lost as a result of work-related injury. By distinguishing between the diminished capacity and the injury itself, and by defining capacity in relation both to the injured worker's old job and to other employment, the statute makes it clear that disability is the product of injury and opportunities in the job market. Capacity, and thus disability, is not necessarily reflected in actual wages earned after injury, see ; Potomac Elec. and when *128 it is not, the factfinder under the Act must make a determination of disability that is "reasonable" and "in the interest of justice," and one that takes account of the disability's future effects, 8(h). n some cases a disparity between the worker's actual postinjury wages and his job-market capacity will be obvious, along with the reasons for it. f a disabled worker with some present capacity chooses |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | it. f a disabled worker with some present capacity chooses not to work at all, or to work at less than his capacity, a windfall is avoided by determining present disability and awarding a benefit accordingly. See, e. g., Penrod Drilling At the other extreme, a worker with some present disability may nonetheless be fortunate enough to receive not merely the market wages appropriate for his diminished capacity, but full preinjury wages (say, because an employer is generous, for whatever reason). See, e. g., Travelers ns. ; see also Once again, the present disability may still be calculated and a corresponding award made. A problem in applying the provisions applicable when there is a disparity between current wages and wageearning capacity arises in a case like this one, however. The worker now receives appropriate market wages as high or higher than those before his injury, thus experiencing no decline in present And yet (we assume for now) there is some particular likelihood that in the future the combination of injury and market conditions may leave him with a lower The question is whether such a person is presently disabled within the meaning of the statute, and if so, what provision should be made for the potential effects of disability in the future. There are two reasons to treat such a person as presently disabled under the statute. The first follows from the provision *129 of law that on its face bars an injured worker from waiting for adverse economic effects to occur in the future before bringing his disability claim, which generally must be filed within a year of injury. 13(a), 33 U.S. C. 913(a); He is also barred from seeking a new, modified award after one year from the date of any denial or termination of benefits. 22, 33 U.S. C. 922. Because an injured worker who has a basis to anticipate wage loss in the future resulting from a combination of his injury and job-market opportunities must nonetheless claim promptly, it is likely that Congress intended "disability" to include the injury-related potential for future wage loss.[2] And because a losing claimant loses for all time after one year from the denial or termination of benefits, it is equally likely that Congress intended such a claimant to obtain some award of benefits in anticipation of the future potential loss. *130 This conclusion is confirmed by the provision of 8(h) that in cases of disparity between actual wages and earning capacity, the natural effects of disability that will occur in the future must be given "due regard" as one of |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | the future must be given "due regard" as one of the "factors or circumstances in the case which may affect [a claimant's] capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition." Although this mandate is phrased in general terms, its practical effect is limited to the class of cases at issue here, where the worker is presently able to earn at least as much as before his injury. n all other cases, when injury depresses the claimant's wage-earning capacity under the conditions prevailing at the time of an award, so that the present effects of his disability are unquestionably compensable immediately, the Act already makes provision for the future effects of disability by means of 22, which liberally permits modification of awards in response to changed conditions that occur within one year of the last payment of compensation (or a denial or termination of benefits). 33 U.S. C. 922. Rambo held that this provision allows modification whenever a changed combination of training and economic (let alone physical) circumstances reduces, restores, or improves wage-earning -297.[3] Since ongoing awards may be modified if future possibilities become present realities, there is no need to account for such possibilities in calculating a worker's immediately compensable disability; the Act plainly takes a wait-and-see approach to future contingencies here.[4] The first award in this case was *131 a standard illustration of the proper practice of basing capacity determinations and compensation awards on present reality. f Rambo's initial award had already been discounted to reflect the odds of his obtaining less strenuous but higher paying work in the future, Rambo could hardly have held that the Act permitted reduction of that initial award again when Rambo actually received training as a crane operator and found work using his new skills. The first award simply reflected the degree of diminished capacity operative at the time it was made, and it was proper to revise it when conditions changed. Thus, if 8(h)'s admonition to consider future effects when calculating capacity has any practical application, it must be because it may apply in a case such as this one, in which there is no present wage loss and would thus be no present award if compensation were to be based solely on present employment conditions. f the future were ignored and compensation altogether denied whenever present earning capacity had not (yet) declined, 22 would bar modification in response to future changes in condition after one year. *132 To implement the mandate of 8(h) in this class of cases, then, "disability" must be read broadly enough to cover loss of capacity not |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | be read broadly enough to cover loss of capacity not just as a product of the worker's injury and present market conditions, but as a potential product of injury and market opportunities in the future. There must, in other words, be a cognizable category of disability that is potentially substantial, but presently nominal in character. There being, then, a need to account for potential future effects in a present determination of wage-earning capacity (and thus disability) when capacity does not immediately decline, the question is which of two basic methods to choose to do this. The first would be to make a one-time calculation of a periodic benefit following the approach of the common law of torts, which bases lump-sum awards for loss of future earnings on an estimate of "the difference between the value of the plaintiff's services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have been had there been no harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts 924, Comment d, p. 525 (1977). This predictive approach ordinarily requires consideration of every possible variable that could have an impact on ability to earn, including "[e]nvironmental factors such as the condition of the labor market, the chance of advancement or of being laid off, and the like." 4 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts 25.8, pp. 550-551 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted). Prediction of future employment may well be the most troublesome step in this wide-ranging enquiry. As the tripling of Rambo's own earnings shows, a claimant's future ability to earn wages will vary as greatly as opportunity varies, and any estimate of wage-earning potential turns in part on the probabilities over time that suitable jobs within certain ranges of pay will actually be open. n these calculations, there is room for error.[5] Cf. 25.8, at 553 *133 (to determine lost wage-earning capacity, juries must often "use their judgment (in effect, speculate)"). That juries in tort cases must routinely engage in such difficult predictions (compounded further by discounting for present value) is the price paid by the common-law approach for the finality of a one-time lump-sum judgment. The second possible way to account for future developments would be to do in this situation just what the Act already does through the modification provision in the run of cases: to wait and see, that is, to base calculation of diminished wage-earning capacity, and thus compensation, on current realities and to permit modifications reflecting the actual effects of an employee's disability as manifested over time. This way, finality is exchanged for accuracy, both in |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | time. This way, finality is exchanged for accuracy, both in compensating a worker for the actual economic effects of his injury, and in charging the employer and his insurer for that amount alone. Metropolitan denies that the second, wait-and-see alternative is even open, arguing that 8(h) gives the factfinder only two choices: either deny compensation altogether because a claimant's actual wages have not diminished, or, if the ALJ concludes that the worker's current income does not fairly represent his present wage-earning capacity, calculate the *134 extent of the worker's disability (and his consequent entitlement to compensation) in toto based on all relevant factors, including the future effects of the disability. See Brief for Petitioner 9. What we have already said, however, shows the unsoundness of Metropolitan's two options. The practical effect of denying any compensation to a disabled claimant on the ground that he is presently able to earn as much as (or more than) before his injury would run afoul of the Act's mandate to account for the future effects of disability in fashioning an award, since those effects would not be reflected in the current award and the 1-year statute of limitations for modification after denial of compensation would foreclose responding to such effects on a wait-andsee basis as they might arise.[6] On the other hand, trying to honor that mandate by basing a present award on a comprehensive prediction of an inherently uncertain future would, as we have seen, almost always result in present overcompensation or under compensation. And it would be passing strange to credit Congress with the intent to guarantee fairness to employers and employees by a wait-and-see approach in most cases where future effects are imperfectly foreseeable, but to find no such intent in one class of cases, those in which wage-earning ability does not immediately decline.[7] *135 There is moreover an even more fundamental objection to Metropolitan's proposed options. They implicitly reject the very conclusion required to make sense of the combined provisions limiting claims and mandating consideration of future effects: that a disability whose substantial effects are only potential is nonetheless a present disability, albeit a presently nominal one. t is, indeed, this realization that points toward a way to employ the wait-and-see approach to provide for the future effects of disability when capacity does not immediately decline. t is simply "reasonable" and "in the interest of justice" (to use the language of 8(h)) to reflect merely nominal current disability with a correspondingly nominal award. Ordering nominal compensation holds open the possibility of a modified award if a future conjunction of injury, |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | of a modified award if a future conjunction of injury, training, and employment opportunity should later depress the worker's ability to earn wages below the preinjury level, turning the potential disability into an actual one. t allows full scope to the mandate to consider the future effects of disability, it promotes accuracy, it preserves administrative simplicity by obviating cumbersome enquiries relating to the entire range of possible future states of affairs,[8] and it avoids imputing to Congress the unlikely intent *136 to join a wait-and-see rule for most cases with a predict-thefuture method when the disability results in no current decline in what the worker can earn. Our view, as it turns out, coincides on this point with the position taken by the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), who is charged with the administration of the Act, and who also construes the Act as permitting nominal compensation as a mechanism for taking future effects of disability into account when present wageearning ability remains undiminished. See Brief for Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 12-21, 24-31. The Secretary of Labor has delegated the bulk of her statutory authority to administer and enforce the Act, including rulemaking power, to the Director, see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation ; ngalls Shipbuilding, nc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and the Director's reasonable interpretation of the Act brings at least some added persuasive force to our conclusion, see, e. g., ; There is, of course, the question of how high the potential for disability need be to be recognized as nominal, but that is an issue not addressed by the parties, and it would be imprudent of us to address it now with any pretense of settling it for all time. Here it is enough to recall that in those cases where an injury immediately depresses ability to earn wages under present conditions, the payment of actual compensation holds open the option of modification under 22 even for future changes in condition whose probability of occurrence may well be remote at the time of the original award. Consistent application of the Act's wait-and-see approach thus suggests that nominal compensation permitting *137 future modification should not be limited to instances where a decline in capacity can be shown to a high degree of statistical likelihood. Those courts to have dealt with the matter explicitly have required a showing that there is a significant possibility that a worker's wage-earning capacity will at some future point fall below his preinjury wages, see ; Randall v. Comfort Control, nc., and, in the absence |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | ; Randall v. Comfort Control, nc., and, in the absence of rulemaking by the agency specifying how substantial the possibility of future decline in capacity must be to justify a nominal award, we adopt this standard.[9] *138 We therefore hold that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation when his work-related injury has not diminished his present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but there is a significant potential that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. The application of this legal standard to the case before us depends in part on how the burden of persuasion is allocated. Section 7(c) of the APA, 5 U.S. C. 556(d), which applies to adjudications under the Act, see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation places the burden of persuasion on the proponent of an order, ; when the evidence is evenly *139 balanced, the proponent loses, see On the initial claim for nominal compensation under the Act, then, the employee has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been injured and that the odds are significant that his wage-earning capacity will fall below his preinjury wages at some point in the future. But when an employer seeks modification of previously awarded compensation, the employer is the proponent of the order with the burden of establishing a change in conditions justifying modification. n a case like this, where the prior award was based on a finding of economic harm resulting from an actual decline in wage-earning capacity at the time the award was entered, the employer satisfies this burden by showing that as a result of a change in capacity the employee's wages have risen to a level at or above his preinjury earnings. Once the employer makes this showing, 8(h) gives rise to the presumption that the employee's wage-earning capacity is equal to his current, higher wage and, in the face of this presumption, the burden shifts back to the claimant to show that the likelihood of a future decline in capacity is sufficient for an award of nominal compensation. We emphasize that the probability of a future decline is a matter of proof; it is not to be assumed pro forma as an administrative convenience in the run of cases. n this case, the first award of compensation was based on the parties' stipulation that Rambo suffered 22 12% permanent partial disability as a result of his injury, whereby Rambo established that the injury impaired his ability to undertake at least some types of previously available gainful labor and thus prevented him from earning as |
Justice Souter | 1,997 | 20 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118130/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | available gainful labor and thus prevented him from earning as much as he had before his accident. Metropolitan sought termination of the award based solely on evidence, which the ALJ found persuasive, that Rambo is now able to earn market wages as a crane operator significantly greater than his preinjury earnings. There is therefore substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's decision to terminate actual (as * opposed to nominal) benefits, since under present conditions Rambo's capacity to earn wages is no longer depressed. But the ALJ failed to consider whether there is a significant possibility that Rambo's wage-earning capacity will decline again in the future.[10] Because there is no evidence in the record of the modification proceedings showing that Rambo's physical condition has improved to the point of full recovery, the parties' earlier stipulation of permanent partial disability at least raises the possibility that Rambo's ability to earn will decline in the event he loses his current employment as a crane operator. The ALJ's order altogether terminating benefits must therefore be vacated for failure to consider whether a future decline in Rambo's earning capacity is sufficiently likely to justify nominal compensation. Since the ALJ is the factfinder under the Act, see 21(b)(3), (c), 33 U.S. C. 921(b)(3), (c), however, the Court of Appeals should have remanded to the agency for further findings of fact, see, e. g., Randall v. Comfort Control, nc., 725 F. 2d, at 799- (remanding for consideration of nominal award), instead of directing entry of a nominal award based on its own appraisal of the evidence. We therefore vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment insofar as it directs entry of an *141 award of nominal compensation, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. t is so ordered. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | concurring | United States v. Hohri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111903/united-states-v-hohri/ | I join the Court's opinion and its judgment. I do so, however, with less than full assurance and satisfaction. There are three reasons for my concern. The first is the consequent element of further delay in the decision on the merits in a case that has roots already more than four decades old. The issue on the merits probably will be back in this Court once again months or years hence. The second is that the statute the Court is forced to construe in this case is not a model of legislative craftsmanship. Surely, Congress is able to make its intent more evident than in the language it has utilized here. It is to be hoped that Congress will look at the problem it has created and will set forth in precise terms its conclusion as to jurisdiction of federal appellate courts in mixed-claims cases of this kind. My third reason is an administrative one. I am somewhat surprised and concerned over the fact that the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit was designated to sit on this appeal. The jurisdictional issue, on which the case presently goes off, involves the jurisdiction of his own court as against that of the District of Columbia Circuit. In concluding to dissent, as he had every right to do and as the Court today vindicates the Chief Judge was forced to take a position favoring his own court's jurisdiction. The "appearance" is troubling. I wonder why what must have been a measure of embarrassment *77 for the Chief Judge was not avoided by refraining to assign him, or any other judge from the "opposite" court, to sit on this case. Unless the designation was purposeful (in order to have a panel with views of judges of both courts), one must observe that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had a complement of other judges from which to fill the third seat on the three-judge panel. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118256/department-of-army-v-blue-fox-inc/ | An insolvent prime contractor failed to pay a subcontractor for work the latter completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. The Department of the Army having required no Miller Act bond from the prime *257 contractor, the subcontractor sought to collect directly from the Army by asserting an equitable lien on certain funds held by the Army. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S. C. 702, waived the Government's immunity for the subcontractor's claim. We hold that 702 did not nullify the long settled rule that sovereign immunity bars creditors from enforcing liens on Government property. Participating in a business development program for socially and economically disadvantaged firms run by the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Department of the Army contracted with Verdan Technology, Inc., in September 1993, to install a telephone switching system at an Army depot in Umatilla, Oregon. Verdan, in turn, employed respondent Blue Fox, Inc., as a subcontractor on the project to construct a concrete block building to house the telephone system and to install certain safety and support systems. Under the Miller Act, 40 U.S. C. 270a270d, a contractor that performs "construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States" generally must post two types of bonds. 270a(a). First, the contractor must post a "performance bond for the protection of the United States" against defaults by the contractor. 270a(a)(1). Second, the contractor must post a "payment bond for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material." 270a(a)(2). The Miller Act gives the subcontractors and other suppliers "the right to sue on such payment bond for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of institution of such suit and to prosecute said action to final execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due him." 270b(a). Although the Army's original solicitation in this case required the contractor to furnish payment and performance bonds if the contract price exceeded $25,000, the Army later amended the solicitation, treated the contract as a "services contract," and deleted *258 the bond requirements. Verdan therefore did not post any Miller Act bonds. Blue Fox performed its obligations, but Verdan failed to pay it the $46,586.14 that remained due on the subcontract. After receiving notices from Blue Fox that it had not been fully paid, the Army nonetheless disbursed a total of $86,132.33 to Verdan as payment for all work that Verdan had completed. In January 1995, the Army terminated its contract with Verdan for |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118256/department-of-army-v-blue-fox-inc/ | January 1995, the Army terminated its contract with Verdan for various defaults and another contractor completed the Umatilla project. Blue Fox obtained a default judgment in tribal court against Verdan. Seeing that it could not collect from Verdan or its officers, it sued the Army for the balance due on its contract with Verdan in Federal District Court.[1] Predicating jurisdiction on 28 U.S. C. 1331 and the APA, Blue Fox sought an "equitable lien" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for completion of the Umatilla project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. Blue Fox also sought an injunction preventing the Army from paying any more money on the Verdan contract or on the follow-on contract until Blue Fox was paid. By the time of the suit, however, the Army had paid all amounts due on the Verdan contract, Blue Fox failed to obtain any preliminary relief, and the Army subsequently paid the replacement contractor the funds remaining on the Verdan contract plus additional funds.[2] *259 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the APA did not apply to respondent's claim against the Army. The District Court thus concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over respondent's claim and accordingly granted the Army's motion for summary judgment. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. See Blue Fox The majority held that under this Court's decision in the APA waives immunity for equitable actions. Based in part on its analysis of several of our cases examining a surety's right of subrogation, the majority held that the APA had waived the Army's immunity from Blue Fox's suit to recover the amount withheld by the Army. The majority concluded that the lien attached to funds retained by the Army but owed to Verdan at the time the Army received Blue Fox's notice that Verdan had failed to pay. The majority stated that "[t]he Army cannot escape Blue Fox's equitable lien by wrongly paying out funds to the prime contractor when it had notice of Blue Fox's unpaid claims." The dissenting judge stated that "no matter how you slice Blue Fox's claim, it seeks funds from the treasury to compensate for the Army's failure to require Verdan to post a bond." In her view, Congress chose to protect subcontractors like Blue Fox through the bond requirements of the Miller Act, not by waiving immunity in the APA to permit subcontractors to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118256/department-of-army-v-blue-fox-inc/ | by waiving immunity in the APA to permit subcontractors to sue the United States directly for amounts owed to them by the prime contractor. Because this rule has been "conventional wisdom for at least fifty years," she did not agree that Congress had waived the Army's sovereign immunity from Blue Fox's suit. The Government petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari to decide whether the APA has *260 waived the Government's immunity from suits to enforce an equitable lien. "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." Congress, of course, has waived its immunity for a wide range of suits, including those that seek traditional money damages. Examples are the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. 2671 et seq., and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. 1491.[3] They are not involved here. Respondent sued the Army under 10(a) of the APA, which provides in relevant part: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party." 5 U.S. C. 702 (emphasis added). Respondent asks us to hold, as did the court below, that this provision, which waives the Government's immunity from *261 actions seeking relief "other than money damages," allows subcontractors to place liens on funds held by the United States Government for work completed on a prime contract. We have frequently held, however, that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. See, e. g., ; Library of Such a waiver must also be "unequivocally expressed" in the statutory text. See at Respondent's claim must therefore meet this high standard. Respondent argues, and the court below held, that our analysis of 702 in Bowen compels the allowance of respondent's lien. We disagree. In Bowen, we examined the text and legislative history of 702 to determine whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could sue the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enforce a provision of the Medicaid Act that required the payment of certain amounts to the State for Medicaid |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118256/department-of-army-v-blue-fox-inc/ | the payment of certain amounts to the State for Medicaid services. We held that the State's complaint in Bowen was not barred by the APA's prohibition on suits for money damages. The Court of Appeals below read our decision in Bowen as interpreting 702's reference to "other than money damages" as waiving immunity from all actions that are equitable in nature. See Bowen `s analysis of 702, however, did not turn on distinctions between "equitable" actions and other actions, nor could such a distinction have driven the Court's analysis in light of 702's language. As Bowen recognized, the crucial question under 702 is not whether a particular claim for relief is "equitable" (a term found nowhere in 702), but rather what Congress meant by "other than money damages" (the precise terms of 702). Bowen held that Congress employed this language to distinguish between specific relief and compensatory, or substitute, relief. The Court stated: *262 "`We begin with the ordinary meaning of the words Congress employed. The term "money damages," 5 U.S. C. 702, we think, normally refers to a sum of money used as compensatory relief. Damages are given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies "are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled."` " ). Bowen also concluded from its analysis of relevant legislative history that "the drafters had in mind the time-honored distinction between damages and specific relief." Bowen `s interpretation of 702 thus hinged on the distinction between specific relief and substitute relief, not between equitable and nonequitable categories of remedies. We accordingly applied this interpretation of 702 to the State's suit to overturn a decision by the Secretary disallowing reimbursement under the Medicaid Act. We held that the State's suit was not one "seeking money in compensation for the damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay as mandated; rather, it [was] a suit seeking to enforce the statutory mandate itself, which happens to be one for the payment of money." The Court therefore concluded that the substance of the State's suit was one for specific relief, not money damages, and hence the suit fell within 702's waiver of immunity. It is clear from Bowen that the equitable nature of the lien sought by respondent here does not mean that its ultimate claim was not one for "money damages" within the meaning of 702. Liens, whether equitable or legal, are merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money. Indeed, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118256/department-of-army-v-blue-fox-inc/ | of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money. Indeed, equitable liens by their nature constitute substitute or compensatory relief rather than specific relief. An equitable lien does not "give the plaintiff the very thing *263 to which he was entitled," ; instead, it merely grants a plaintiff "a security interest in the property, which [the plaintiff] can then use to satisfy a money claim," usually a claim for unjust enrichment, 1 D. Law of Remedies 4.3(3), p. 601 (2d ed. 1993); see also Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 Texas L. Rev. 1277, 1290 (1989) ("The equitable lien is a hybrid, granting a money judgment and securing its collection with a lien on the specific thing"). Commentators have warned not to view equitable liens as anything more than substitute relief: "[T]he form of the remedy requires that [a] lien or charge should be established, and then enforced, and the amount due obtained by a sale total or partial of the fund, or by a sequestration of its rents, profits, and proceeds. These preliminary steps may, on a casual view, be misleading as to the nature of the remedy, and may cause it to appear to be something more than compensatory; but a closer view shows that all these steps are merely auxiliary, and that the real remedy, the final object of the proceeding, is the pecuniary recovery." 1 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 112, p. 148 (5th ed. 1941). See also We accordingly hold that the sort of equitable lien sought by respondent here constitutes a claim for "money damages"; its goal is to seize or attach money in the hands of the Government as compensation for the loss resulting from the default of the prime contractor. As a form of substitute and not specific relief, respondent's action to enforce an equitable lien falls outside of 702's waiver of sovereign immunity. *264 Our holding today is in accord with our precedent establishing that sovereign immunity bars creditors from attaching or garnishing funds in the Treasury, see or enforcing liens against property owned by the United States, see United ; United States ex rel. Respondent points to nothing in the text or history of 702 that suggests that Congress intended to overrule this precedent, let alone anything that "`unequivocally express[es]' " such an intent. 518 U. S., at Instead, recognizing that sovereign immunity left subcontractors and suppliers without a remedy against the Government when the general contractor became insolvent, Congress enacted the Miller Act (and its predecessor the Heard Act) to protect these workers. See United ; Ansonia Brass |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118256/department-of-army-v-blue-fox-inc/ | Act) to protect these workers. See United ; Ansonia Brass & Copper at But the Miller Act by its terms only gives subcontractors the right to sue on the surety bond posted by the prime contractor, not the right to recover their losses directly from the Government. Respondent contends that in several cases examining a surety's right of equitable subrogation, this Court suggested that subcontractors and suppliers can seek compensation directly against the Government. See, e. g., Prairie State ; Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty of Baltimore, ; Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. ; but see Munsey Trust at *265 None of the cases relied upon by respondent involved a question of sovereign immunity, and, in fact, none involved a subcontractor directly asserting a claim against the Government. Instead, these cases dealt with disputes between private parties over priority to funds which had been transferred out of the Treasury and as to which the Government had disclaimed any ownership. They do not in any way disturb the established rule that, unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on Government property or funds to recoup their losses. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
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