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Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | ex plained in the main text, that finding rests upon the Court’s misappli cation of the presumption. 10 The Government submits that a “transnational securities fraud violates Section 10(b) if significant conduct material to the fraud’s success occurs in the United States.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6. I understand the Government’s submission to be largely a repackaging of the “conduct” prong of the Second Circuit’s test. The Government expresses no view on that test’s “effects” prong, as the decision below considered only respondents’ conduct. See n. 2; 10 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment shared by most scholars that Congress, in passing the Exchange Act, “expected U. S. securities laws to apply to certain international transactions or conduct.” Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 14, 1 ; see also Data Process ing Equip. (Friendly, J.) (detailing evidence that Congress “meant to protect against fraud in the sale or pur chase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized United States markets”). It is also consistent with the traditional understanding, regnant in the 0’s as it is now, that the presumption against extraterritorial ity does not apply “when the conduct [at issue] occurs within the United States,” and has lesser force when “the failure to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign set ting will result in adverse effects within the United States.” Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 86 F.2d 528, 531 ; accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (164– 165); cf. (THOMAS, J., joined by SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent ing) (presumption against extraterritoriality “lend[s] no support” to a “rule restricting a federal statute from reach ing conduct within U. S. borders”); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., (presumption against extraterritoriality not controlling “[s]ince the activities of the defendants had an impact within the United States and upon its foreign trade”). And it strikes a reasonable balance between the goals of “preventing the export of fraud from America,” protecting shareholders, enhancing investor confidence, and deter ring corporate misconduct, on the one hand, and conserv ing United States resources and limiting conflict with Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 11 STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment foreign law, on the Thus, while may not give any “clear indication” on its face as to how it should apply to transnational securities frauds, ante, at 6, 16, it does give strong clues that it should cover at least some of them, see n. |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | it should cover at least some of them, see n. And in my view, the Second Circuit has done the best job of discerning what sorts of transnational frauds Congress meant in 4—and still means today—to regulate. I do not take issue with the Court for beginning its inquiry with the statutory text, rather than the doctrine in the Courts of Appeals. Cf. ante, at 18, n. I take issue with the Court for beginning and ending its inquiry with the statutory text, when the text does not speak with geo graphic precision, and for dismissing the long pedigree of, and the persuasive account of congressional intent embod ied in, the Second Circuit’s rule. Repudiating the Second Circuit’s approach in its en tirety, the Court establishes a novel rule that will foreclose private parties from bringing actions whenever the relevant securities were purchased or sold abroad and are not listed on a domestic exchange.12 The real motor of the —————— 11 Given its focus on “domestic conditions,” Foley Bros., (14), I expect that virtually all “ ‘foreign-cubed’ ” actions—actions in which “(1) foreign plaintiffs [are] suing (2) a foreign issuer in an American court for violations of American securities laws based on securities transactions in (3) foreign countries,” 547 F.3d, at 172—would fail the Second Circuit’s test. As they generally should. Under these circumstances, the odds of the fraud having a substantial connection to the United States are low. In recognition of the Exchange Act’s focus on American investors and the novelty of foreign-cubed lawsuits, and in the interest of promoting clarity, it might have been appropriate to incorporate one bright line into the Second Circuit’s test, by categorically excluding such lawsuits from ’s ambit. 12 The Court’s opinion does not, however, foreclose the Commission from bringing enforcement actions in additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission’s authority is presented by this case. The Commission’s enforcement proceedings not only differ from private actions in numerous potentially relevant respects, see Brief for 12 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment Court’s opinion, it seems, is not the presumption against extraterritoriality but rather the Court’s belief that trans actions on domestic exchanges are “the focus of the Ex change Act” and “the objects of [its] solicitude.” Ante, at 17, 18. In reality, however, it is the “public interest” and “the interests of investors” that are the objects of the statute’s solicitude. Europe & Overseas Commodity Trad ers, S. (CA2 18) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32–33 (4)); see also Basic Inc. v. |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | Cong., 2d Sess., 32–33 (4)); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (188) (“The 4 Act was designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices” (citing S. Rep. No. 72, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1–5 (4)); Ernst & 15 (176) (“The 4 Act was intended principally to protect inves tors ”); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (4) (“The Securities Exchange Act of 4 aims to protect the interests of the public against the predatory operations of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corpora tions ”). And while the clarity and simplicity of the Court’s test may have some salutary consequences, like all bright-line rules it also has drawbacks. Imagine, for example, an American investor who buys shares in a company listed only on an overseas exchange. That company has a major American subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was in New York City that the executives masterminded and imple mented a massive deception which artificially inflated the stock price—and which will, upon its disclosure, cause the —————— United States as Amicus Curiae 12–13, but they also pose a lesser threat to international comity, at 26–27; cf. Empagran, 542 U.S., at (“ ‘[P]rivate plaintiffs often are unwilling to exercise the degree of self-restraint and consideration of foreign governmental sensibilities generally exercised by the U. S. Government’ ” (quoting Griffin, Extra territoriality in U. S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 Antitrust L. J. 15, 14 (1); alteration in original)). Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 13 STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment price to plummet. Or, imagine that those same executives go knocking on doors in Manhattan and convince an unso phisticated retiree, on the basis of material misrepresen tations, to invest her life savings in the company’s doomed securities. Both of these investors would, under the Court’s new test, be barred from seeking relief under The oddity of that result should give pause. For in walling off such individuals from the Court nar rows the provision’s reach to a degree that would surprise and alarm generations of American investors—and, I am convinced, the Congress that passed the Exchange Act. Indeed, the Court’s rule turns jurisprudence (and the presumption against extraterritoriality) on its head, by withdrawing the statute’s application from cases in which there is both substantial wrongful conduct that occurred in the United States and a substantial injurious effect on United States markets and citizens. III In my judgment, if petitioners’ allegations of fraudulent misconduct that took place in Florida are true, then re spondents may have violated and could |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | are true, then re spondents may have violated and could potentially be held accountable in an enforcement proceeding brought by the Commission. But it does not follow that sharehold ers who have failed to allege that the bulk or the heart of the fraud occurred in the United States, or that the fraud had an adverse impact on American investors or markets, may maintain a private action to recover damages they suffered abroad. Some cases involving foreign securities transactions have extensive links to, and ramifications for, this country; this case has Australia written all over it. Accordingly, for essentially the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, I would affirm its judgment. The Court instead elects to upend a significant area of securities law based on a plausible, but hardly decisive, 14 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment construction of the statutory text. In so doing, it pays short shrift to the United States’ interest in remedying frauds that transpire on American soil or harm American citizens, as well as to the accumulated wisdom and experi ence of the lower courts. I happen to agree with the result the Court reaches in this case. But “I respectfully dis sent,” once again, “from the Court’s continuing campaign to render the private cause of action under toothless.” (STEVENS, J., dissenting) |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | concurring | Blackledge v. Allison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109648/blackledge-v-allison/ | I join the opinion of the Court, and write briefly only to emphasize the importance of finality to a system of justice.[*] Our traditional concern for "persons whom society has *84 grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation," has resulted in a uniquely elaborate system of appeals and collateral review, even in cases in which the issue presented has little or nothing to do with innocence of the accused. The substantial societal interest in both innocence and finality of judgments is subordinated in many instances to formalisms. The case before us today is not necessarily an example of abuse of the system. It is an example, however, of how finality can be frustrated by failure to adhere to proper procedures at the trial court level. I do not prejudge the ultimate result in this case by saying that respondent's guilty plea may well have been made knowingly and voluntarily. The case is here, five years after respondent's conviction, and following review by the North Carolina courts, the United States District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, primarily because the record before us leaves room for some doubt as to the reliability of the procedure followed with respect to the guilty plea. All that we have in the record, as a basis for testing the possible merit of respondent's petition, are answers to a printed form certified by the trial judge. We do not know whether anything was said by the judge, the prosecutor, or counsel for respondent, other than the questions read from the form and the monosyllabic answers by respondent. There was no transcript of the proceedings. As the Court's opinion indicates, there is every reason to believe that if a procedure similar to that prescribed by the new North Carolina statute is followed, a contention such as that made by respondent will justify an evidentiary hearing "only in the most extraordinary circumstances." Ante, at 80 n. 19. If all participants in the process at the plea stage are mindful of the importance of adhering carefully to prescribed procedures and of preserving a full record thereof, the causes of justice and finality both will be served. |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | This case presents the question whether utility s may be issued for plants under 35 U.S. C. 101 (1994 ed.), or whether the Plant Variety Protection Act, as amended, 7 U.S. C. 2321 et seq., and the Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S. C. 161-164 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), are the exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant varieties. We hold that utility s may be issued for plants. I The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has issued some 1,800 utility s for plants, plant parts, and seeds pursuant to 35 U.S. C. 101. Seventeen of these s are held by respondent Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer). Pioneer's s cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of the company's inbred and hybrid corn seed products. A for an inbred corn line protects both the seeds and plants of the inbred line and the hybrids produced by crossing the protected inbred line with another corn line. See, e. g. U. S. Patent No. 5,506,367, col. 3, App. 42. A hybrid plant protects the plant, its seeds, variants, mutants, and trivial modifications of the hybrid. See U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295, cols. 2-3, Pedigree inbred corn plants are developed by crossing corn plants with desirable characteristics and then inbreeding the resulting plants for several generations until the resulting plant line is homogenous. Inbreds are often weak *128 and have a low yield; their value lies primarily in their use for making hybrids. See, e. g., U. S. Patent No. 5,506,367, col. 6, Hybrid seeds are produced by crossing two inbred corn plants and are especially valuable because they produce strong and vibrant hybrid plants with selected highly desirable characteristics. For instance, Pioneer's hybrid corn plant 3394 is "characterized by superior yield for maturity, excellent seedling vigor, very good roots and stalks, and exceptional stay green." U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295, cols. 2-3, Hybrid plants, however, generally do not reproduce true-to-type, i. e., seeds produced by a hybrid plant do not reliably yield plants with the same hybrid characteristics. Thus, a farmer who wishes to continue growing hybrid plants generally needs to buy more hybrid seed. Pioneer sells its ed hybrid seeds under a limited label license that provides: "License is granted solely to produce grain and/or forage." The license "does not extend to the use of seed from such crop or the progeny thereof for propagation or seed multiplication." It strictly prohibits "the use of such seed or the progeny thereof for propagation or |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | of such seed or the progeny thereof for propagation or seed multiplication or for production or development of a hybrid or different variety of seed." Petitioner J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., purchased ed hybrid seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing this license agreement. Although not a licensed sales representative of Pioneer, Farm Advantage resold these bags. Pioneer subsequently brought a complaint for infringement against Farm Advantage and several other corporations and residents of the State of Iowa who are distributors and customers for Farm Advantage (referred to collectively as Farm Advantage or petitioners). Pioneer alleged that Farm Advantage has "for a long-time *129 past been and still [is] infringing one or more [Pioneer s] by making, using, selling, or offering for sale corn seed of the hybrids in infringement of these s-in-suit." Farm Advantage answered with a general denial of infringement and entered a counterclaim of invalidity, arguing that s that purport to confer protection for corn plants are invalid because sexually reproducing plants are not able subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S. C. 101 (1994 ed.). App. 12-13, 17. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for the protection of plant life because these statutes are more specific than 101, and thus each carves out subject matter from 101 for special treatment.[1] The District Court granted summary judgment to Pioneer. Relying on this Court's broad construction of 101 in the District Court held that the subject matter covered by 101 clearly includes plant life. It further concluded that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from 101's subject matter. In particular, the District Court noted that Congress did not implicitly repeal 101 by passing the more specific PVPA because there was no irreconcilable conflict between the PVPA and 101. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment and reasoning of the District *130 Court. We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II The question before us is whether utility s may be issued for plants pursuant to 35 U.S. C. 101 (1994 ed.). The text of 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in the language of 101 is extremely broad. "In choosing such |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | the language of 101 is extremely broad. "In choosing such expansive terms as `manufacture' and `composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive `any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the laws would be given wide scope." This Court thus concluded in that living things were able under 101, and held that a manmade micro-organism fell within the scope of the statute. As Congress recognized, "the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions." In the Court also rejected the argument that Congress must expressly authorize protection for new able subject matter: "It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of ability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken it is `the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining able subject matter in 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. *131 The subject-matter provisions of the law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting `the Progress of Science and the useful Arts' with all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson." Thus, in approaching the question presented by this case, we are mindful that this Court has already spoken clearly concerning the broad scope and applicability of 101.[2] Several years after the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences held that plants were within the understood meaning of "manufacture" or "composition of matter" and therefore were within the subject matter of 101. In re Hibberd, It has been the unbroken practice of the PTO since that time to confer utility s for plants. To obtain utility protection, a plant breeder must show that the plant he has developed is new, useful, and nonobvious. 35 U.S. C. 101-103 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). In addition, the plant must meet the specifications of 112, which require a written description of the plant and a deposit of seed that is publicly accessible. See 37 CFR 1.801-1.809 Petitioners do not allege that Pioneer's s are invalid for failure to meet the requirements for a utility Nor do they dispute that plants otherwise fall within the terms of 101's broad language that includes "manufacture" *132 or "composition of matter." Rather, petitioners argue that the PPA and the PVPA provide the exclusive means of protecting new varieties of plants, and so awarding utility s for plants upsets the scheme contemplated by Congress. Brief for Petitioners 11. We |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | the scheme contemplated by Congress. Brief for Petitioners 11. We disagree. Considering the two plant specific statutes in turn, we find that neither forecloses utility coverage for plants. A The 1930 PPA conferred protection to asexually reproduced plants. Significantly, nothing within either the original 1930 text of the statute or its recodified version in 1952 indicates that the PPA's protection for asexually reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive. Plants were first explicitly brought within the scope of protection in 1930 when the PPA included "plants" among the useful things subject to s. Thus the 1930 PPA amended the general utility provision, Rev. Stat. 4886, to provide: "Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used by others in this country, before his invention or discovery thereof, may obtain a therefor." Act of May 23, 1930, 1, This provision limited protection to the asexual reproduction of the plant. Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting, budding, or the like, and produces an offspring with a genetic combination identical to that of the single parentessentially a clone.[3] The PPA also amended Revised Statutes *133 4888 by adding: "No plant shall be declared invalid on the ground of noncompliance with this section if the description is made as complete as is reasonably possible." 2, In 1952, Congress revised the statute and placed the plant s into a separate chapter 15 of Title 35 entitled, "Patents for plants." 35 U.S. C. 161-164.[4] This was merely a housekeeping measure that did nothing to change the substantive rights or requirements for a plant A "plant "[5] continued to provide only the exclusive right to asexually reproduce a protected plant, 163, and the description requirement remained relaxed, 162.[6] Plant s under the PPA thus have very limited coverage and less stringent requirements than 101 utility s. Importantly, chapter 15 nowhere states that plant s are the exclusive means of granting intellectual property protection to plants. Although unable to point to any language that requires, or even suggests, that Congress intended the PPA's protections to be exclusive, petitioners advance three reasons why the PPA should preclude assigning utility s for plants. We find none of these arguments to be persuasive. *134 First, petitioners argue that plants were not covered by the general utility statute prior to 1930. Brief for Petitioners 19 ("If the laws before 1930 allowed s |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | for Petitioners 19 ("If the laws before 1930 allowed s on `plants' then there would have been no reason for Congress to have passed the 1930 PPA"). In advancing this argument, petitioners overlook the state of law and plant breeding at the time of the PPA's enactment. The Court in explained the realities of law and plant breeding at the time the PPA was enacted: "Prior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from protection. The first was the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the law. The second obstacle to protection for plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the `written description' requirement of the law." -312. Congress addressed these concerns with the 1930 PPA, which recognized that the work of a plant breeder was a able invention and relaxed the written description requirement. See 1-2, The PPA thus gave protection to breeders who were previously unable to overcome the obstacles described in This does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could not have fallen within the subject matter of 101. Rather, it illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed that plants were not able under 101, both because they were living things and because in practice they could not meet the stringent description requirement. Yet these premises were disproved over time. As this Court held in "the relevant distinction" for purposes of 101 is not "between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and humanmade inventions." 447 U.S., In addition, advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant breeders to satisfy 101's demanding description requirement. *135 Whatever Congress may have believed about the state of law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants have always had the potential to fall within the general subject matter of 101, which is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions. "A rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the law that anticipation undermines ability." Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility protection for sexually reproduced plants because it was unforeseen in 1930 that such plants could receive protection under 101. Denying protection under 101 simply because such coverage was thought technologically infeasible in 1930, however, would be inconsistent with the forwardlooking perspective of the utility statute. As we noted in "Congress employed broad general language in drafting 101 precisely because [new types of] inventions are often unforeseeable." Second, petitioners maintain that the PPA's limitation to asexually |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | unforeseeable." Second, petitioners maintain that the PPA's limitation to asexually reproduced plants would make no sense if Congress intended 101 to authorize s on plant varieties that were sexually reproduced. But this limitation once again merely reflects the reality of plant breeding in 1930. At that time, the primary means of reproducing bred plants true-to-type was through asexual reproduction. Congress thought that sexual reproduction through seeds was not a stable way to maintain desirable bred characteristics.[7]*136 Thus, it is hardly surprising that plant s would protect only asexual reproduction, since this was the most reliable type of reproduction for preserving the desirable characteristics of breeding. See generally E. Sinnott, Botany Principles and Problems 266-267 (1935); J. Priestley & L. Scott, Introduction to Botany 530 (1938). Furthermore, like other laws protecting intellectual property, the plant provision must be understood in its proper context. Until 1924, farmers received seed from the Government's extensive free seed program that distributed millions of packages of seed annually. See The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation, 82 J. Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc. 621, 623, 632[8] In 1930, seed companies were not primarily concerned with varietal protection, but were still trying to successfully commodify seeds. There was no need to protect seed breeding because there were few markets for seeds. See Kloppenburg 71 ("Seed companies' first priority was simply to establish a market, and they continued to view the congressional distribution as a principal constraint"). By contrast, nurseries at the time had successfully commercialized asexually reproduced fruit trees and flowers. These plants were regularly copied, draining profits from those who discovered or bred new varieties. Nurseries *137 were the primary subjects of agricultural marketing and so it is not surprising that they were the specific focus of the PPA. See ; Kneen, Patent Plants Enrich Our World, National Geographic 357, 363 (1948). Moreover, seed companies at the time could not point to genuinely new varieties and lacked the scientific knowledge to engage in formal breeding that would increase agricultural productivity. See Kloppenburg 77; ("Absent significant numbers of distinct new varieties being produced by seed companies, variety protection through something like a law would hardly have been considered a business necessity"). In short, there is simply no evidence, let alone the overwhelming evidence needed to establish repeal by implication, see Elec. Industrial that Congress, by specifically protecting asexually reproduced plants through the PPA, intended to preclude utility protection for sexually reproduced plants.[9] Third, petitioners argue that in 1952 Congress would not have moved plants out of the utility provision and into 161 |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | moved plants out of the utility provision and into 161 if it had intended 101 to allow for protection of plants. Brief for Petitioners 20. Petitioners again rely on *138 negative inference because they cannot point to any express indication that Congress intended 161 to be the exclusive means of ing plants. But this negative inference simply does not support carving out subject matter that otherwise fits comfortably within the expansive language of 101, especially when 101 can protect different attributes and has more stringent requirements than does 161. This is especially true given that Congress in 1952 did nothing to change the substantive rights or requirements for obtaining a plant Absent a clear intent to the contrary, we are loath to interpret what was essentially a housekeeping measure as an affirmative decision by Congress to deny sexually reproduced plants protection under 101. B By passing the PVPA in 1970, Congress specifically authorized limited -like protection for certain sexually reproduced plants. Petitioners therefore argue that this legislation evidences Congress' intent to deny broader 101 utility protection for such plants. Petitioners' argument, however, is unavailing for two reasons. First, nowhere does the PVPA purport to provide the exclusive statutory means of protecting sexually reproduced plants. Second, the PVPA and 101 can easily be reconciled. Because it is harder to qualify for a utility than for a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, it only makes sense that utility s would confer a greater scope of protection. 1 The PVPA provides plant variety protection for: "The breeder of any sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the variety" 7 U.S. C. 2402(a). *139 Infringement of plant variety protection occurs, inter alia, if someone sells or markets the protected variety, sexually multiplies the variety as a step in marketing, uses the variety in producing a hybrid, or dispenses the variety without notice that the variety is protected.[10] Since the 1994 amendments, the PVPA also protects "any variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety," 2541(c)(1), and "any variety whose production requires the *140 repeated use of a protected variety," 2541(c)(3). See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, 9, Practically, this means that hybrids created from protected plant varieties are also protected; however, it is not infringement to use a protected variety for the development of a hybrid. See 7 U.S. C. 2541(a)(4).[11] The PVPA also contains exemptions for saving seed and for research. A farmer who legally purchases and plants a protected variety can save the seed from these plants for replanting on |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | can save the seed from these plants for replanting on his own farm. See 2543 ("[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person"); see also Asgrow Seed In addition, a protected variety may be used for research. See 7 U.S. C. 2544 ("The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this chapter"). The utility statute does not contain similar exemptions.[12] Thus, while the PVPA creates a statutory scheme that is comprehensive with respect to its particular protections and subject matter, giving limited protection to plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable, 2402(a), nowhere does it restrict the scope of able subject matter under 101. With nothing in the statute to bolster their view that *141 the PVPA provides the exclusive means for protecting sexually reproducing plants, petitioners rely on the legislative history of the PVPA. They argue that this history shows the PVPA was enacted because sexually reproducing plant varieties and their seeds were not and had never been intended by Congress to be included within the classes of things able under Title 35.[13] The PVPA itself, however, contains no statement that PVP certificates were to be the exclusive means of protecting sexually reproducing plants. The relevant statements in the legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by some Members of Congress who believed that protection was unavailable for sexually reproduced plants. This view stems from a lack of awareness concerning scientific possibilities. Furthermore, at the time the PVPA was enacted, the PTO had already issued numerous utility s for hybrid plant processes. Many of these s, especially since the 1950's, included claims on the products of the ed process, i. e., the hybrid plant itself. See Kloppenburg 264. Such plants were protected as part of a hybrid process and not on their own. Nonetheless, these hybrids still enjoyed protection under 101, which reaffirms that such material was within the scope of 101. 2 Petitioners next argue that the PVPA altered the subjectmatter coverage of 101 by implication. Brief for Petitioners 33-36. Yet "the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes *142 are irreconcilable." "The rarity with which [the |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | later statutes *142 are irreconcilable." "The rarity with which [the Court has] discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for such findings, namely, that there be an irreconcilable conflict between the two federal statutes at issue." 516 U. S., at To be sure, there are differences in the requirements for, and coverage of, utility s and PVP certificates issued pursuant to the PVPA. These differences, however, do not present irreconcilable conflicts because the requirements for obtaining a utility under 101 are more stringent than those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded by a utility are greater than those afforded by a PVP certificate. Thus, there is a parallel relationship between the obligations and the level of protection under each statute. It is much more difficult to obtain a utility for a plant than to obtain a PVP certificate because a utility able plant must be new, useful, and nonobvious, 35 U.S. C. 101-103. In addition, to obtain a utility a breeder must describe the plant with sufficient specificity to enable others to "make and use" the invention after the term expires. 112. The disclosure required by the Patent Act is "the quid pro quo of the right to exclude." Kewanee Oil The description requirement for plants includes a deposit of biological material, for example, seeds, and mandates that such material be accessible to the public. See 37 CFR 1.801-1.809 ; see also App. 39 (seed deposits for U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295). By contrast, a plant variety may receive a PVP certificate without a showing of usefulness or nonobviousness. See 7 U.S. C. 2402(a) (requiring that the variety be only new, distinct, uniform, and stable). Nor does the PVPA require a description and disclosure as extensive as those required under 101. The PVPA requires a "description of the variety *143 setting forth its distinctiveness, uniformity and stability and a description of the genealogy and breeding procedure, when known." 7 U.S. C. 2422(2). It also requires a deposit of seed in a public depository, 2422(4), but neither the statute nor the applicable regulation mandates that such material be accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP certificate. See 7 CFR 97.6 Because of the more stringent requirements, utility holders receive greater rights of exclusion than holders of a PVP certificate. Most notably, there are no exemptions for research or saving seed under a utility Additionally, although Congress increased the level of protection under the PVPA in 1994, a PVP certificate still does not grant the full range of protections afforded by a |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | not grant the full range of protections afforded by a utility For instance, a utility on an inbred plant line protects that line as well as all hybrids produced by crossing that inbred with another plant line. Similarly, the PVPA now protects "any variety whose production requires the repeated use of a protected variety." 7 U.S. C. 2541(c)(3). Thus, one cannot use a protected plant variety to produce a hybrid for commercial sale. PVPA protection still falls short of a utility however, because a breeder can use a plant that is protected by a PVP certificate to "develop" a new inbred line while he cannot use a plant ed under 101 for such a purpose. See 7 U.S. C. 2541(a)(4) (infringement includes "use [of] the variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom"). See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-1605, p. 11 (1970); 1 D. Chisum, Patents 1.05[2][d][i], p. 549 For all of these reasons, it is clear that there is no "positive repugnancy" between the issuance of utility s for plants and PVP coverage for plants. Nor can it be said that the two statutes "cannot mutually coexist." Indeed, "when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention *144 to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Here we can plainly regard each statute as effective because of its different requirements and protections. The plain meaning of 101, as interpreted by this Court in clearly includes plants within its subject matter. The PPA and the PVPA are not to the contrary and can be read alongside 101 in protecting plants. 3 Petitioners also suggest that even when statutes overlap and purport to protect the same commercially valuable attribute of a thing, such "dual protection" cannot exist. Brief for Petitioners 44-45. Yet this Court has not hesitated to give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as each reaches some distinct cases. See Connecticut Nat. Here, while utility s and PVP certificates do contain some similar protections, as discussed above, the overlap is only partial. Moreover, this Court has allowed dual protection in other intellectual property cases. "Certainly the policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [trade secret protection and s] are not and never would be in conflict." Kewanee Oil, at ; see also (the ability of an object does not preclude the copyright of that object as a work of art). In this case, many |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | JEM Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118469/jem-ag-supply-inc-v-pioneer-hi-bred-international-inc/ | object as a work of art). In this case, many plant varieties that are unable to satisfy the stringent requirements of 101 might still qualify for the lesser protections afforded by the PVPA. III We also note that the PTO has assigned utility s for plants for at least 16 years and there has been no indication *145 from either Congress or agencies with expertise that such coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which has specific expertise in issues of law, relied heavily on this Court's decision in when it interpreted the subject matter of 101 to include plants. In re Hibberd, This highly visible decision has led to the issuance of some 1,800 utility s for plants. Moreover, the PTO, which administers 101 as well as the PPA, recognizes and regularly issues utility s for plants. In addition, the Department of Agriculture's Plant Variety Protection Office acknowledges the existence of utility s for plants. In the face of these developments, Congress has not only failed to pass legislation indicating that it disagrees with the PTO's interpretation of 101; it has even recognized the availability of utility s for plants. In a 1999 amendment to 35 U.S. C. 119, which concerns the right of priority for rights, Congress provided: "Applications for plant breeder's rights filed in a WTO [World Trade Organization] member country shall have the same effect for the purpose of the right of priority as applications for s, subject to the same conditions and requirements of this section as apply to applications for s." 35 U.S. C. 119(f) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Crucially, 119(f) is part of the general provisions of Title 35, not the specific chapter of the PPA, which suggests a recognition on the part of Congress that plants are able under 101. IV For these reasons, we hold that newly developed plant breeds fall within the terms of 101, and that neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of 101's coverage. As in we decline to narrow the reach of 101 where Congress has given us no indication that it intends *146 this 447 U.S., -316. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | We decide whether the penalty for tax underpayments attributable to valuation misstatements, 26 U.S. C. is applicable to an underpayment resulting from a basis-inflating transaction subsequently disregarded for lack of economic substance. I. The Facts A This case involves an offsetting-option tax shelter, vari ants of which were marketed to high-income taxpayers in the late 1990’s. Tax shelters of this type sought to gener ate large paper losses that a taxpayer could use to reduce taxable income. They did so by attempting to give the tax payer an artificially high basis in a partnership interest, which enabled the taxpayer to claim a significant tax loss upon disposition of the interest. See IRS Notice –44, –2 Cum. Bull. 255 (describing offsetting-option tax shelters). The particular tax shelter at issue in this case was developed by the now-defunct law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist and marketed by the accounting firm Ernst & 2 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court Young under the name “Current Options Bring Reward Alternatives,” or COBRA. Respondent Gary Woods and his employer, Billy Joe McCombs, agreed to participate in COBRA to reduce their tax liability for 1999. To that end, in November 1999 they created two general partnerships: one, Tesoro Drive Partners, to produce ordinary losses, and the other, SA Tesoro Investment Partners, to produce capital losses. Over the next two months, acting through their respec tive wholly owned, limited liability companies, Woods and McCombs executed a series of transactions. First, they purchased from Deutsche Bank five 30-day currency option spreads. Each of these option spreads was a pack age consisting of a so-called long option, which entitled Woods and McCombs to receive a sum of money from Deutsche Bank if a certain currency exchange rate ex ceeded a certain figure on a certain date, and a so-called short option, which entitled Deutsche Bank to receive a sum of money from Woods and McCombs if the exchange rate for the same currency on the same date exceeded a certain figure so close to the figure triggering the long option that both were likely to be triggered (or not to be triggered) on the fated date. Because the premium paid to Deutsche Bank for purchase of the long option was largely offset by the premium received from Deutsche Bank for sale of the short option, the net cost of the package to Woods and McCombs was substantially less than the cost of the long option alone. Specifically, the premiums paid for all five of the spreads’ long options totaled $46 million, and the premiums received for the five |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | totaled $46 million, and the premiums received for the five spreads’ short options totaled $43.7 million, so the net cost of the spreads was just $2.3 million. Woods and McCombs contributed the spreads to the partnerships along with about $900,000 in cash. The partnerships used the cash to purchase assets—Canadian dollars for the partnership that sought to produce ordinary losses, and Sun Microsystems stock Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court for the partnership that sought to produce capital losses. The partnerships then terminated the five option spreads in exchange for a lump-sum payment from Deutsche Bank. As the tax year drew to a close, Woods and McCombs transferred their interests in the partnerships to two S corporations. One corporation, Tesoro Drive Investors, Inc., received both partners’ interests in Tesoro Drive Partners; the other corporation, SA Tesoro Drive Inves tors, Inc., received both partners’ interests in SA Tesoro Investment Partners. Since this left each partnership with only a single partner (the relevant S corporation), the partnerships were liquidated by operation of law, and their assets—the Canadian dollars and Sun Microsystems stock, plus the remaining cash—were deemed distributed to the corporations. The corporations then sold those assets for modest gains of about $2,000 on the Canadian dollars and about $57,000 on the stock. But instead of gains, the corporations reported huge losses: an ordinary loss of more than $13 million on the sale of the Canadian dollars and a capital loss of more than $32 million on the sale of the stock. The losses were allocated between Woods and McCombs as the corporations’ co-owners. The reason the corporations were able to claim such vast losses—the alchemy at the heart of an offsetting-options tax shelter—lay in how Woods and McCombs calculated the tax basis of their interests in the partnerships. Tax basis is the amount used as the cost of an asset when computing how much its owner gained or lost for tax purposes when disposing of it. See J. Downes & J. Good man, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 736 A partner’s tax basis in a partnership interest— called “outside basis” to distinguish it from “inside basis,” the partnership’s basis in its own assets—is tied to the value of any assets the partner contributed to acquire the interest. See 26 U.S. C. Collectively, Woods and 4 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court McCombs contributed roughly $3.2 million in option spreads and cash to acquire their interests in the two partnerships. But for purposes of computing outside basis, Woods and McCombs considered only the long |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | computing outside basis, Woods and McCombs considered only the long component of the spreads and disregarded the nearly offset ting short component on the theory that it was “too con tingent” to count. Brief for Respondent 14. As a result, they claimed a total adjusted outside basis of more than $48 million. Since the basis of property distributed to a partner by a liquidating partnership is equal to the ad justed basis of the partner’s interest in the partnership (reduced by any cash distributed with the property), see the inflated outside basis figure was carried over to the S corporations’ basis in the Canadian dollars and the stock, enabling the corporations to report enormous losses when those assets were sold. At the end of the day, Woods’ and McCombs’ $3.2 million investment generated tax losses that, if treated as valid, could have shielded more than $45 million of income from taxation. B The Internal Revenue Service, however, did not treat the COBRA-generated losses as valid. Instead, after auditing the partnerships’ tax returns, it issued to each partnership a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, or “FPAA.” In the FPAAs, the IRS deter mined that the partnerships had been “formed and availed of solely for purposes of tax avoidance by artificially over stating basis in the partnership interests of [the] purported partners.” App. 92, 146. Because the partnerships had “no business purpose other than tax avoidance,” the IRS said, they “lacked economic substance”—or, put more starkly, they were “sham[s]”—so the IRS would disregard them for tax purposes and disallow the related losses. And because there were no valid partnerships for tax purposes, the IRS determined that the partners had Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court “not established adjusted bases in their respective part nership interests in an amount greater than zero,” at 95, ¶7, 149, ¶7 so that any resulting tax underpayments would be subject to a 40-percent penalty for gross valua tion misstatements, see 26 U.S. C. Woods, as the tax-matters partner for both partner ships, sought judicial review of the FPAAs pursuant to The District Court held that the partner- ships were properly disregarded as shams but that the valuation-misstatement penalty did not apply. The Govern ment appealed the decision on the penalty to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. While the appeal was pend ing, the Fifth Circuit held in a similar case that, under Circuit precedent, the valuation-misstatement penalty does not apply when the relevant transaction is disregarded for lacking economic substance. Invs., LLC v. United States, In a concur |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | economic substance. Invs., LLC v. United States, In a concur rence joined by the other members of the panel, Judge Prado acknowledged that this rule was binding Circuit law but suggested that it was mistaken. See at 351– 355. A different panel subsequently affirmed the District Court’s decision in this case in a one-paragraph opinion, declaring the issue “well settled.” (per curiam), reh’g denied1 We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split over whether the valuation-misstatement penalty is applicable in these circumstances. 569 U. S. (2013). See at 354–355 (Prado, J., concurring) (recognizing “near-unanimous opposition” to the Fifth Circuit’s rule). Because two Courts of Appeals have held that District Courts lacked jurisdiction to consider the valuation —————— 1 The District Court held that the partnerships did not have to be “honored as legitimate for tax purposes” because they did not possess “ ‘economic substance.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. Woods did not appeal the District Court’s application of the economic-substance doctrine, so we express no view on it. 6 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court misstatement penalty in similar circumstances, see Jade Trading, ; FX Partners, we ordered briefing on that question as well. II. District-Court Jurisdiction A We begin with a brief explanation of the statutory scheme for dealing with partnership-related tax matters. A partnership does not pay federal income taxes; instead, its taxable income and losses pass through to the partners. 26 U.S. C. A partnership must report its tax items on an information return, and the partners must report their distributive shares of the partnership’s tax items on their own individual returns, 704. Before 1982, the IRS had no way of correcting errors on a partnership’s return in a single, unified proceeding. Instead, tax matters pertaining to all the members of a partnership were dealt with just like tax matters pertain ing only to a single taxpayer: through deficiency proceed ings at the individual-taxpayer level. See generally (2006 ed. and Supp. V). Deficiency proceed ings require the IRS to issue a separate notice of deficien cy to each taxpayer, (2006 ed.), who can file a petition in the Tax Court disputing the alleged deficiency before paying it, Having to use deficiency pro ceedings for partnership-related tax matters led to du plicative proceedings and the potential for inconsistent treatment of partners in the same partnership. Congress addressed those difficulties by enacting the Tax Treatment of Partnership Items Act of 1982, as Title IV of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). 96 Stat. 648 (codified as amended at 26 U.S. C. |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | 96 Stat. 648 (codified as amended at 26 U.S. C. (2006 ed. and Supp. V)). Under TEFRA, partnership-related tax matters are Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court addressed in two stages. First, the IRS must initiate proceedings at the partnership level to adjust “partnership items,” those relevant to the partnership as a whole. 6231(a)(3). It must issue an FPAA notifying the partners of any adjustments to partnership items, and the partners may seek judicial review of those adjustments, Once the adjustments to partnership items have become final, the IRS may under take further proceedings at the partner level to make any resulting “computational adjustments” in the tax liability of the individual partners. Most computa tional adjustments may be directly assessed against the partners, bypassing deficiency proceedings and permitting the partners to challenge the assessments only in post payment refund actions. (c). Deficiency proceedings are still required, however, for certain com putational adjustments that are attributable to “affected items,” that is, items that are affected by (but are not themselves) partnership items. 6231(a)(5). B Under the TEFRA framework, a court in a partnership level proceeding like this one has jurisdiction to determine not just partnership items, but also “the applicability of any penalty which relates to an adjustment to a part nership item.” As both sides agree, a determina tion that a partnership lacks economic substance is an adjustment to a partnership item. Thus, the jurisdictional question here boils down to whether the valuation misstatement penalty “relates to” the determination that the partnerships Woods and McCombs created were shams. The Government’s theory of why the penalty was trig gered is based on a straightforward relationship between the economic-substance determination and the penalty. In 8 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court the Government’s view, there can be no outside basis in a sham partnership (which, for tax purposes, does not exist), so any partner who underpaid his individual taxes by declaring an outside basis greater than zero committed a valuation misstatement. In other words, the penalty flows logically and inevitably from the economic-substance determination. Woods, however, argues that because outside basis is not a partnership item, but an affected item, a penalty that would rest on a misstatement of outside basis cannot be considered at the partnership level. He maintains, in short, that a penalty does not relate to a partnership-item adjustment if it “requires a partner-level determination,” regardless of “whether or not the penalty has a connection to a partnership item.” Brief for Respondent 27. Because “relates to” language is “essentially indeterminate,” we must |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | 27. Because “relates to” language is “essentially indeterminate,” we must resolve this dispute by looking to “the structure of [TEFRA] and its other provisions.” Mar- acich v. Spears, 570 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). That inquiry makes clear that the District Court’s jurisdiction is not as narrow as Woods contends. Prohibiting courts in partnership-level proceedings from considering the ap plicability of penalties that require partner-level inquiries would be inconsistent with the nature of the “applicabil ity” determination that TEFRA requires. Under TEFRA’s two-stage structure, penalties for tax underpayment must be imposed at the partner level, because partnerships themselves pay no taxes. And im posing a penalty always requires some determinations that can be made only at the partner level. Even where a partnership’s return contains significant errors, a partner may not have carried over those errors to his own return; or if he did, the errors may not have caused him to under pay his taxes by a large enough amount to trigger the penalty; or if they did, the partner may nonetheless have Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court acted in good faith with reasonable cause, which is a bar to the imposition of many penalties, see None of those issues can be conclusively determined at the partnership level. Yet notwithstanding that every pen alty must be imposed in partner-level proceedings after partner-level determinations, TEFRA provides that the applicability of some penalties must be determined at the partnership level. The applicability determination is therefore inherently provisional; it is always contingent upon determinations that the court in a partnership-level proceeding does not have jurisdiction to make. Barring partnership-level courts from considering the applicability of penalties that cannot be imposed without partner-level inquiries would render TEFRA’s authorization to consider some penalties at the partnership level meaningless. Other provisions of TEFRA confirm that conclusion. One requires the IRS to use deficiency proceedings for computational adjustments that rest on “affected items which require partner level determinations (other than penalties that relate to adjustments to partnership items).” Another states that while a partnership-level determination “concerning the applica bility of any penalty which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item” is “conclusive” in a subsequent re fund action, that does not prevent the partner from “as sert[ing] any partner level defenses that may apply.” Both these provisions assume that a penalty can relate to a partnership-item adjustment even if the penalty cannot be imposed without additional, partner-level determinations. These considerations lead us to reject Woods’ interpreta tion of We hold that |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | us to reject Woods’ interpreta tion of We hold that TEFRA gives courts in partnership-level proceedings jurisdiction to determine the applicability of any penalty that could result from an adjustment to a partnership item, even if imposing the penalty would also require determining affected or non 10 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court partnership items such as outside basis. The partnership level applicability determination, we stress, is provisional: the court may decide only whether adjustments properly made at the partnership level have the potential to trigger the penalty. Each partner remains free to raise, in subse quent, partner-level proceedings, any reasons why the penalty may not be imposed on him specifically. Applying the foregoing principles to this case, we con clude that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the valuation-misstatement penalty— to determine, that is, whether the partnerships’ lack of economic substance (which all agree was properly decided at the partnership level) could justify imposing a valua tion-misstatement penalty on the partners. When making that determination, the District Court was obliged to consider Woods’ arguments that the economic-substance determination was categorically incapable of triggering the penalty. Deferring consideration of those arguments until partner-level proceedings would replicate the precise evil that TEFRA sets out to remedy: duplicative proceed ings, potentially leading to inconsistent results, on a ques tion that applies equally to all of the partners. To be sure, the District Court could not make a formal ad justment of any partner’s outside basis in this partnership level proceeding. See But it nonetheless could determine whether the adjustments it did make, including the economic-substance deter mination, had the potential to trigger a penalty; and in doing so, it was not required to shut its eyes to the legal impossibility of any partner’s possessing an outside basis greater than zero in a partnership that, for tax purposes, did not exist. Each partner’s outside basis still must be adjusted at the partner level before the penalty can be imposed, but that poses no obstacle to a partnership-level court’s provisional consideration of whether the economic substance determination is legally capable of triggering Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court the penalty.2 III. Applicability of Valuation-Misstatement Penalty A Taxpayers who underpay their taxes due to a “valuation misstatement” may incur an accuracy-related penalty. A 20-percent penalty applies to “the portion of any under payment which is attributable to [a]ny substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1.” 26 U.S. C. (b)(3). Under the version of the penalty statute in effect when the transactions at issue here occurred, |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | statute in effect when the transactions at issue here occurred, “there is a substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1 if the value of any property (or the ad justed basis of any property) claimed on any return of tax imposed by chapter 1 is 200 percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct amount of such valuation or adjusted basis (as the case may be).” ( ed.). If the reported value or adjusted basis exceeds the correct —————— 2 Some amici warn that our holding bodes an odd procedural result: The IRS will be able to assess the 40-percent penalty directly, but it will have to use deficiency proceedings to assess the tax underpayment upon which the penalty is imposed. See Brief for New Millennium Trading, LLC, et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13. That criticism assumes that the underpayment would not be exempt from deficiency proceed ings because it would rest on outside basis, an “affected ite[m] other than [a] penalt[y],” 26 U.S. C. We need not resolve that question today, but we do not think amici’s answer necessarily follows. Even an underpayment attributable to an affected item is exempt so long as the affected item does not “require partner level determinations,” ibid.; see 1333–1334 (CA Fed. 2011) (en banc); and it is not readily apparent why additional partner-level determinations would be required before adjusting outside basis in a sham partnership. Cf. FX Partners, (“If disregarding a partnership leads ineluctably to the conclusion that its partners have no outside basis, that should be just as obvious in partner-level proceedings as it is in partnership-level proceedings”). 12 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court amount by at least 400 percent, the valuation misstate ment is considered not merely substantial, but “gross,” and the penalty increases to 40 percent. The penalty’s plain language makes it applicable here. As we have explained, the COBRA transactions were designed to generate losses by enabling the partners to claim a high outside basis in the partnerships. But once the partnerships were deemed not to exist for tax purposes, no partner could legitimately claim an outside basis greater than zero. Accordingly, if a partner used an out side basis figure greater than zero to claim losses on his tax return, and if deducting those losses caused the part ner to underpay his taxes, then the resulting underpay ment would be “attributable to” the partner’s having claimed an “adjusted basis” in the partnerships that ex ceeded “the correct amount of such adjusted basis.” An IRS regulation provides that when an asset’s true value or |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | IRS regulation provides that when an asset’s true value or adjusted basis is zero, “[t]he value or adjusted basis claimed is considered to be 400 percent or more of the correct amount,” so that the resulting valuation misstatement is automatically deemed gross and subject to the 40-percent penalty. –5(g), 26 CFR (2013).4 B Against this straightforward application of the statute, —————— 3 Congress has since lowered the thresholds for substantial and gross misstatements to 150 percent and 200 percent, respectively. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, 4 An amicus suggests that this regulation is in tension with the math ematical rule forbidding division by zero. See Brief for Prof. Amandeep S. Grewal as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 7; cf. Lee’s (discussing “problems posed by applying [a] 100% increase standard to a baseline of zero”). Woods has not challenged the regulation before this Court, so we assume its validity for purposes of deciding this case. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court Woods’ primary argument is that the economic-substance determination did not result in a “valuation misstate ment.” He asserts that the statutory terms “value” and “valuation” connote “a factual—rather than legal— concept,” and that the penalty therefore applies only to factual misrepresentations about an asset’s worth or cost, not to misrepresentations that rest on legal errors (like the use of a sham partnership). Brief for Respondent 35. We are not convinced. To begin, we doubt that “value” is limited to factual issues and excludes threshold legal determinations. Cf. Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 259, 260 (1941) (“[W]hat criterion should be employed for determining the ‘value’ of the gifts is a question of law”); Chapman Glen 2013 WL2319282, *17 (2013) (“[T]hree approaches are used to determine the fair market value of property,” and “which approach to apply in a case is a question of law”). But even if “value” were limited to factual matters, the statute refers to “value” or “adjusted basis,” and there is no justification for extending that limitation to the latter term, which plainly incorporates legal inquiries. An as set’s “basis” is simply its cost, 26 U.S. C. (2006 ed., Supp. V), but calculating its “adjusted basis” requires the application of a host of legal rules, see (2006 ed.), 1016 (2006 ed. and Supp. V), including specialized rules for calculating the adjusted basis of a partner’s interest in a partnership, see (2006 ed.). The statute contains no indication that the misapplication of one of those legal rules cannot trigger the penalty. Were we to hold otherwise, we would read the word “adjusted” out of |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | hold otherwise, we would read the word “adjusted” out of the statute. To overcome the plain meaning of “adjusted basis,” Woods asks us to interpret the parentheses in the statutory phrase “the value of any property (or the adjusted basis of any property)” as a signal that “adjusted basis” is merely explanatory or illustrative and has no meaning inde 14 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court pendent of “value.” The parentheses cannot bear that much weight, given the compelling textual evidence to the contrary. For one thing, the terms reappear later in the same sentence sans parentheses—in the phrase “such valuation or adjusted basis.” Moreover, the operative terms are connected by the conjunction “or.” While that can sometimes introduce an appositive—a word or phrase that is synonymous with what precedes it (“Vienna or Wien,” “Batman or the Caped Crusader”)—its ordinary use is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to “be given separate meanings.” v. Sonotone Corp., And, of course, there is no way that “adjusted basis” could be regarded as synonymous with “value.” Finally, the terms’ second disjunctive appearance is followed by “as the case may be,” which eliminates any lingering doubt that the preceding items are alternatives. See New Oxford American Dic tionary 269 The parentheses thus do not justify “rob[bing] the term [‘adjusted basis’] of its inde pendent and ordinary significance.” at 338–. Our holding that the valuation-misstatement penalty encompasses legal as well as factual misstatements of adjusted basis does not make superfluous the new penalty that Congress enacted in for transactions lacking in economic substance, see –1069 (codified at 26 U.S. C. (2006 ed., Supp. V)). The new penalty covers all sham transactions, including those that do not cause the taxpayer to misrepresent value or basis; thus, it can apply in situations where the valuation misstatement penalty cannot. And the fact that both penalties are potentially applicable to sham transactions resulting in valuation misstatements is not problematic. Congress recognized that penalties might overlap in a given case, and it addressed that possibility by providing that a taxpayer generally cannot receive more than one Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court accuracy-related penalty for the same underpayment. See (2006 ed. and Supp. V).5 C In the alternative, Woods argues that any underpay ment of tax in this case would be “attributable,” not to the misstatements of outside basis, but rather to the deter mination that the partnerships were shams—which he describes as an “independent legal ground.” Brief for Respondent 46. That is the rationale that the Fifth and |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | Respondent 46. That is the rationale that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have adopted for refusing to apply the valuation-misstatement penalty in cases like this, although both courts have voiced doubts about it. See 679 F.3d, at ; at 351–355 (Prado, J., concurring); 1060– 1061 (CA9 2009). We reject the argument’s premise: The economic substance determination and the basis misstatement are not “independent” of one another. This is not a case where a valuation misstatement is a mere side effect of a sham transaction. Rather, the overstatement of outside basis was the linchpin of the COBRA tax shelter and the mech anism by which Woods and McCombs sought to reduce their taxable income. As Judge Prado observed, in this type of tax shelter, “the basis misstatement and the trans action’s lack of economic substance are inextricably inter twined,” so “attributing the tax underpayment only to the artificiality of the transaction and not to the basis over —————— 5 We do not consider Woods’ arguments based on legislative history. Whether or not legislative history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here, the statutory text is unambiguous. Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. (slip op., at 8). Nor do we evaluate the claim that application of the penalty to legal rather than factual misrepresentations is a recent innovation. An agency’s failure to assert a power, even if prolonged, cannot alter the plain meaning of a statute. 16 UNITED STATES v. WOODS Opinion of the Court valuation is making a false distinction.” at 354 (concurring opinion). In short, the partners underpaid their taxes because they overstated their outside basis, and they overstated their outside basis because the part nerships were shams. We therefore have no difficulty concluding that any underpayment resulting from the COBRA tax shelter is attributable to the partners’ misrep resentation of outside basis (a valuation misstatement). Woods contends, however, that a document known as the “Blue Book” compels a different result. See General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (Pub. L. 97–34), 97 Cong., 1st Sess., 333, and n. 2 (Jt. Comm. Print 1980). Blue Books are prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation as commentaries on recently passed tax laws. They are “written after passage of the legislation and therefore d[o] not inform the deci sions of the members of Congress who vot[e] in favor of the [law].” (CA9 1994). We have held that such “[p]ost-enactment legisla tive history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | United States v. Woods | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2644672/united-states-v-woods/ | of statutory interpretation.” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. (2011) (slip op., at 17–18); accord, Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1309 (CA Fed. 2004) (dismissing Blue Book as “a post-enactment explanation”). While we have relied on similar documents in the past, see our more recent precedents disapprove of that practice. Of course the Blue Book, like a law review article, may be relevant to the extent it is persuasive. But the passage at issue here does not persuade. It concerns a situation quite different from the one we confront: two separate, non overlapping underpayments, only one of which is attribut able to a valuation misstatement. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of the Court * * * The District Court had jurisdiction in this partnership level proceeding to determine the applicability of the valuation-misstatement penalty, and the penalty is appli cable to tax underpayments resulting from the partners’ participation in the COBRA tax shelter. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | Since its enactment during the Civil War, the False Claims Act, 3 U.S. C. has authorized both the Attorney General and private qui tam relators to recover from persons who make false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. The Act now contains a provision barring qui tam actions based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in certain speci fied sources. The question before us is whether the reference to “administrative” reports, audits, and investigations in that provision encompasses disclo sures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources. We hold that it does. —————— On March 23, 200, the President signed into law the Patient Pro tection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. –48, Section 004(j)(2) of this legislation replaces the prior version of 3 U.S. C. with new language. The legislation makes no mention of retroactivity, which would be necessary for its application to pending cases given that it eliminates petitioners’ claimed defense to a qui tam suit. See Hughes Aircraft Throughout this opinion, we use the present 2 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court I In 995 the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) entered into contracts with two counties in North Carolina authorizing them to perform, or to hire others to perform, cleanup and repair work in areas that had suf fered extensive flooding. The Federal Government agreed to shoulder 75 percent of the contract costs. Respondent Karen T. Wilson was at that time an employee of the Graham County and Conservation District, a special purpose government body that had been delegated partial responsibility for coordinating and performing the reme diation effort. Suspecting possible fraud in connection with this effort, Wilson voiced her concerns to local offi cials in the summer of 995. She sent a letter to, and had a meeting with, agents of the USDA. Graham County officials began an investigation. An accounting firm hired by the county performed an audit and, in 996, d a report (Audit Report) that identified several potential irregularities in the county’s administra tion of the contracts. Shortly thereafter, the North Caro lina Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources d a report (DEHNR Report) identifying similar problems. The USDA’s Office of Inspector General eventually d a third report that contained additional findings. In 200 Wilson filed this action, alleging that petition ers, the Graham County and Cherokee County and Water Conservation Districts and a number of local and federal officials, violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting false |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting false claims for payment pursuant to the 995 contracts. She further alleged that petitioners retaliated against her for aiding the federal investigation of those false claims. Following this Court’s review of the —————— tense in discussing the statute as it existed at the time this case was argued. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 3 Opinion of the Court statute of limitations applicable to Wilson’s retaliation claim, Graham County & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, the Court of Appeals ordered that that claim be dismissed as time barred. On remand, the District Court subsequently dismissed Wilson’s qui tam action for lack of jurisdiction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 95a– a. The court found that Wilson had failed to refute that her action was based upon allegations publicly dis closed in the Audit Report and the DEHNR Report. at 95a–98a. Those reports, the District Court determined, constituted “administrative report[s], audit[s], or investigation[s]” within the meaning of the FCA’s public disclosure bar, 3 U.S. C. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court because the reports had been generated by state and local entities. “[O]nly federal administrative reports, audits or investigations,” the Fourth Circuit concluded, “qualify as public disclosures under the FCA.” The Circuits having divided over this2 we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 557 U. S. (2009). —————— 2 528 F.3d, at –307 (limiting this portion of the public disclosure bar to federal sources), and United States ex rel. v. County of Delaware, with United States ex rel. 98–99 (concluding that state and local sources may qualify), cert. denied, and (assuming without analysis that state audits may qualify). The Eighth Circuit appears to have taken a “middle road” on this 528 F.3d, at holding that disclosures made in nonfederal forums may count as “ ‘administrative report[s]’ ” or “ ‘audit[s]’ ” under (A) in some instances, as when they relate to “a cooperative federal-state program through which the federal government provides financial assistance.” 4 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court II We have examined the FCA’s qui tam provisions in several recent opinions.3 At in this case is the FCA’s public disclosure bar, which deprives courts of jurisdiction over qui tam suits when the relevant information has already entered the public domain through certain chan nels. The statute contains three categories of jurisdiction stripping disclosures. Following the example of the Court of Appeals, see –, we have inserted Arabic numerals to identify these |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | see –, we have inserted Arabic numerals to identify these categories: “No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allega tions or transactions [] in a criminal, civil, or admin istrative hearing, [2] in a congressional, administra tive, or Government Accounting Office [(GAO)] report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or [3] from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an origi nal source[4] of the information.” (A) (foot note omitted). This dispute turns on the meaning of the adjective “ad ministrative” in the second category (Category 2): whether it embraces only forums that are federal in nature, as respondent alleges, or whether it extends to disclosures made in state and local sources such as the DEHNR Re —————— 3 See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l (construing (A)’s original source exception); Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, (holding that local governments are subject to qui tam liability); Vermont Agency of Natural (holding that States are not subject to private FCA actions). 4 A separate statutory provision defines an “original source” as “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the informa tion on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.” 3 U.S. C. (B). Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 5 Opinion of the Court port and the Audit Report, as petitioners allege. In debating this question, petitioners have relied pri marily on the statute’s text whereas respondent and the Solicitor General, as her amicus, have relied heavily on considerations of history and policy. Although there is some overlap among the three types of argument, it is useful to discuss them separately. We begin with the text. III The term “administrative” “may, in various contexts, bear a range of related meanings,” (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ), pertaining to private bodies as well as to governmental bodies. When used to modify the nouns “report, hearing, audit, or inves tigation,” in the context of a statutory provision about “the public disclosure” of fraud on the United States, the term is most naturally read to describe the activities of govern mental agencies. See Black’s Law Dictionary 49 (9th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Black’s) (defining “administration,” “[i]n public law, [as] the practical management and direction of the executive department and its agencies”). Given that “administrative” is not itself modified by “federal,” there is no immediately apparent textual basis for excluding the activities of |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | no immediately apparent textual basis for excluding the activities of state and local agencies (or their contractors) from its ambit. As the Court of Appeals recognized, “the statute by its express terms does not limit its reach to federal administrative reports or investigations.” 528 F.3d, at “[T]here is nothing inherently federal about the word ‘administrative,’ and Congress did not define the term in the FCA.” The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “administrative” nevertheless reaches only federal sources rested on its application of the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis. See –305. This maxim, literally translated as “ ‘it is known by its associates,’ ” Black’s 60, counsels 6 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court lawyers reading statutes that “a word may be known by the company it keeps,” Motor Car All participants in this litigation acknowledge that the terms “congressional” and “[GAO]” are federal in nature; Congress is the Legislative Branch of the Federal Government,5 and the GAO is a federal agency.6 Relying on our opinions in S. D. Warren v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370 and (994), the Court of Appeals reasoned that “the placement of ‘administrative’ squarely in the middle of a list of obvi ously federal sources strongly suggests that ‘administra tive’ should likewise be restricted to federal administrative reports, hearings, audits, or investigations.” 528 F.3d, at 302. In so holding, the Court of Appeals embraced what we might call the Sandwich Theory of the Third Circuit. Both courts “ ‘f[ou]nd it hard to believe that the drafters of this provision intended the word “administrative” to refer to both state and federal reports when it lies sandwiched between modifiers which are unquestionably federal in character.’ ” ). We find this use of noscitur a sociis unpersuasive. A list —————— 5 SeeU. S. Const., Art. I, cl. (distinguishing “State Legislature[s]” from “the Congress”). 6 The statute refers to the GAO, mistakenly, as the “Government Accounting Office.” It is undisputed that the intended referent was the General Accounting Office, now renamed the Government Accountabil ity Office. See 3 U.S. C. p. 254, n. 2 (compiler’s note); 528 F.3d 292, 300, n. 4 ; United States ex rel. cert. denied, ; see (Becker, C. J., dissenting) (noting that courts have “frequently” made the same scrivener’s error). We have described the GAO as “an inde pendent agency within the Legislative Branch that exists in large part to serve the needs of Congress.” 844 (983). Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 7 Opinion of the Court of three items, |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | S. (200) 7 Opinion of the Court of three items, each quite distinct from the other no mat ter how construed, is too short to be particularly illuminat ing. Although this list may not be “completely disjunc tive,” 528 F.3d, —it refers to “congressional, administrative, or [GAO]” sources, (A), rather than “congressional, or administrative, or [GAO]” sources—neither is it completely harmonious. The sub stantive connection, or fit, between the terms “congres sional,” “administrative,” and “GAO” is not so tight or so self-evident as to demand that we “rob” any one of them “of its independent and ordinary significance.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., ; see 26 U.S., at (“That a word may be known by the company it keeps is not an invariable rule, for the word may have a character of its own not to be submerged by its association”). The adjectives in Category 2 are too few and too disparate to qualify as “a string of statutory terms,” S. D. Warren or “items in a list,” in the sense that we used those phrases in the cited cases.7 —————— 7 In Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & the Court applied the noscitur a sociis maxim in construing a statutory provision that referred to “ ‘[i]ncome resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting,’ ” (quoting of the Internal Revenue Code of 939). JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR contends that “the three terms in Category 2 are no more ‘distinct’ or ‘disparate’ than the phrase at in Jarecki.” Post, at 4 (dissenting opinion) (citation omitted). We disagree. Whether taken in isolation or in context, the phrase “con gressional, administrative, or GAO” is not as cohesive as the phrase “exploration, discovery, or prospecting.” That is one reason why nosci tur a sociis proved illuminating in Jarecki, and why it is less helpful in this case. On their “face,” the terms “exploration,” “discovery,” and “prospecting” all describe processes of searching, seeking, speculating; the centrality of such activities to “the oil and gas and mining indus tries” gave a clue that it was those industries Congress had in mind when it drafted the (internal quotation marks omitted). The terms “congressional,” “administrative,” and “GAO” do not share any comparable core of meaning—or indeed any 8 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court More important, we need to evaluate “administrative” within the larger scheme of the public disclosure bar. Both parties acknowledge, as they must, that “[s]tatutory language has meaning only in context,” Graham County ; where they differ is in determining the relevant context. The Sandwich Theory presupposes that |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | in determining the relevant context. The Sandwich Theory presupposes that Category 2 is the only piece of (A) that matters. We agree with petitioners, however, that all of the sources listed in (A) provide interpretive guidance. All of these sources drive at the same end: specifying the types of disclosures that can foreclose qui tam actions. In light of the public disclosure bar’s gram matical structure, it may be convenient and even clarify ing to parse the list of sources into three categories. But it does not follow that we should treat these categories as islands unto themselves. Courts have a “duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” Gustafson v. Alloyd When we consider the entire text of the public disclosure bar, the case for limiting “administrative” to federal sources becomes significantly weaker. The “news media” referenced in Category 3 plainly have a broader sweep. The Federal Government funds certain media outlets, and certain private outlets have a national focus; but no one contends that Category 3 is limited to these sources. There is likewise no textual basis for assuming that the “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing[s]” listed in Category must be federal hearings.8 Of the numerous —————— “common feature” at all, post, at 4—apart from a governmental conno tation. It takes the Sandwich Theory to graft a federal limitation onto “administrative.” 8 A number of lower courts have concluded that, as used in Category “ ‘hearing’ is roughly synonymous with ‘proceeding.’ ” United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R. v. Quinn, (CADC 994); see J. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions p. 4–59, and n. 23 (hereinafter Boese); C. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 9 Opinion of the Court types of sources that serve a common function in (A), then, only two are distinctly federal in nature, while one (the news media) is distinctly nonfederal in nature. If the Court of Appeals was correct that the term “ad ministrative” encompasses state and local sources in Category see it becomes even harder to see why the term would not do the same in Category 2. See (“[A] legislative body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context”). Respondent and the Solicitor General assert that (A)’s two references to “administrative” can be distinguished be cause Category is best understood to refer to adjudica tive proceedings, whereas Category 2 is best understood to refer to legislative or quasi-legislative activities such as rulemaking, oversight, and investigations. See Brief for Respondent 6–8; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25–26 (hereinafter Brief for United States). Yet |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | as Amicus Curiae 25–26 (hereinafter Brief for United States). Yet even if this reading were correct, state and local adminis trative reports, hearings, audits, and investigations of a legislative-type character are presumably just as public, and just as likely to put the Federal Government on notice of a potential fraud, as state and local administrative hearings of an adjudicatory character.9 —————— Sylvia, The False Claims Act: Fraud Against the Government p. 642 (2004) (hereinafter Sylvia). 9 See (“Indeed, the statute would seem to be inconsistent if it included state and local administrative hearings as sources of public disclosures [in Category ] and then, in the next breath, excluded state administrative reports as sources”); In re Natu ral Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litigation, 43–44 (“There is no reason to conclude that Congress intended to limit administrative reports, audits, and investigations to federal actions, while simultaneously allowing all state and local civil litiga tion, state and local administrative hearings, and state and local news media to be treated as public disclosures. To interpret the statute so 0 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court Respondent and the Solicitor General try to avoid this inference, and to turn a weakness into a strength, by further averring that the sources listed in Category are themselves only federal. See Brief for Respondent 23–24; Brief for United States 25–26. No court has ever taken such a view of these sources. See (citing cases from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and stating that “[t]he courts have easily con cluded that [Category ] applies to state-level hearings”); Sylvia at 643, n. (citing additional cases).0 The arguments in favor of reading a federal limitation into Category are supported, if at all, by legislative history and policy; they find no support in the statute’s text. Moving from the narrow lens of the Sandwich Theory to a bird’s eye view, respondent and the Solicitor General maintain that the “exclusively federal focus” of the FCA counsels against reading the public disclosure bar to encompass nonfederal sources. Brief for Respondent 0, 8; Brief for United States 3. The FCA undoubtedly has a federal focus. But so does every other federal statute. —————— narrowly would have the anomalous result of allowing public disclosure status to the most obscure local news report and the most obscure state and local civil lawsuit or administrative hearing, but denying public disclosure status to a formal public report of a state government agency”). 0 Following the Court of Appeals, see respondent asserts that only the Ninth |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | Court of Appeals, see respondent asserts that only the Ninth Circuit, in A- Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, has explicitly considered and rejected the argument that Category is limited to federal sources. Brief for Respondent 23–24. At least one other Circuit, however, has done the same, see United States ex rel. and no lower court, as far as we are aware, has so much as suggested that an alternative construction might be viable. Moreover, the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit cases cited by the Court of Appeals postdate A- Ambulance and both of which put litigants and courts on notice of the possibility that (A) might be limited to federal sources. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) Opinion of the Court And as respondent and the Solicitor General elsewhere acknowledge, quite a few aspects of the FCA, including a reference to “administrative” proceedings in (7)(A) and the reference to “news media” in (A) itself, are not just federal. In any event, the “federal focus” of the statute, as a whole, does not shine light on the specific question whether the public disclosure bar extends to certain nonfederal contexts. It is the fact of “public disclosure”—not Federal Government creation or receipt—that is the touchstone of Respondent and the Solicitor General make one last argument grounded in the statutory text: It would be anomalous, they say, for state and local administrative reports to count as public disclosures, when state legisla tive reports do not. See Brief for Respondent 5; Brief for United States 5–6. Yet neither respondent nor the Solicitor General disputes the contention of petitioners and their amici that, at the time the public disclosure bar was enacted in 986, Congress rarely gave state legisla tures a meaningful role in administering or overseeing federally funded programs. See Brief for Petitioners 36– 39; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 8–3. As in the instant case, the Federal Govern ment was far more likely to enter into contracts with, and to provide moneys to, state and local executive agencies. Whether or not state legislative sources should have been included in (A), their exclusion therefore car ries no clear implications for the status of state adminis trative sources. In sum, although the term “administrative” may be sandwiched in Category 2 between terms that are federal —————— On its face, (7)(A) is silent as to whether it includes nonfed eral proceedings. Respondent and the Solicitor General suggest that it does, though they fairly argue that this provision, relating to civil investigative demands, has little if any relevance to the case |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | investigative demands, has little if any relevance to the case at hand. See Brief for Respondent 2, n. 8; Brief for United States 3–32. 2 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court in nature, those terms are themselves sandwiched be tween phrases that have been generally understood to include nonfederal sources; and one of those phrases, in Category contains the exact term that is the subject of our inquiry. These textual clues negate the force of the noscitur a sociis canon, as it was applied by the Court of Appeals.2 We are not persuaded that the associates with which “administrative” keeps company in (A) endow it with an exclusively federal character. IV As originally enacted, the FCA did not limit the sources from which a relator could acquire the information to bring a qui tam action. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, we upheld the relator’s recov ery even though he had discovered the fraud by reading a federal criminal indictment—a quintessential “parasitic” suit. –548; see (“Even if, as the gov ernment suggests, the petitioner has contributed nothing to the discovery of this crime, he has contributed much to accomplishing one of the purposes for which the Act was passed”). Congress promptly reacted to that decision by amending the statute to preclude qui tam actions “based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, —————— 2 The Court of Appeals repeatedly referred to the three categories in (A) as “clauses.” See –305. Were they in fact clauses rather than prepositional phrases, reliance on noscitur a sociis might have been supported by one of our earliest cases using that term, (Reporter’s statement of the case), which suggested that “different clauses of the same sen tence” should be presumed “to embrace the subject matter of the sentence.” The Court of Appeals’ mistaken reference to “clauses” is of course less significant than its failure to treat the public disclosure bar as an integrated whole. Cf. The Shakespeare Canon of Statu tory Construction, (emphasizing importance of reading provisions in their broader statutory context). Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 3 Opinion of the Court at the time such suit was brought.” Act of Dec. 23, 943, (codified at 3 U.S. C. (946 ed.)). This amendment erected what came to be known as a Government knowledge bar: “[O]nce the United States learned of a false claim, only the Government could assert its rights under the FCA against the false claimant.” Hughes Aircraft v. |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | under the FCA against the false claimant.” Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the years that followed the 943 amendment, the vol ume and efficacy of qui tam litigation dwindled. “Seeking the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own,” United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R. v. Quinn, 4 F.3d 645, 649 (CADC 994), Congress overhauled the statute once again in 986 “to make the FCA a ‘more useful tool against fraud in modern times,’ ” Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–345, p. 2 (986) (hereinafter S. Rep.)). The present text of was enacted in 986 as part of this larger reform. Congress apparently concluded that a total bar on qui tam actions based on information already in the Government’s possession thwarted a sig nificant number of potentially valuable claims. Rather than simply repeal the Government knowledge bar, how ever, Congress replaced it with the public disclosure bar in an effort to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits such as the one in Hess. How exactly came to strike this balance in the way it did is a matter of consid erable uncertainty. The House and Senate Judiciary Committees each reported bills that contained very differ ent public disclosure bars from the one that emerged in the Statutes at Large; the Senate bill, for example, did not 4 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court include the words “administrative,” “audit,” or “investiga tion” in its version of Category 2, nor did it contain an original source exception. See S. Rep., at 42–43 (text of proposed ).3 In respondent and her amici’s view, this background counsels in favor of an exclusively federal interpretation of “administrative” for three separate reasons. First, the drafting history of the public disclosure bar suggests that Congress intended such a result. Second, a major aim of the 986 amendments was to limit the scope of the Gov ernment knowledge bar, and “[c]onstruing [(A)] as limited to disclosures in federal proceedings furthers Congress’s purpose ‘to encourage more private enforce ment suits.’ ” Brief for United States 2 (quoting S. Rep., at 23–24). Third, whereas federal administrative proceed ings can be presumed to provide the Attorney General with a fair opportunity to decide whether to bring an FCA action based on |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | to decide whether to bring an FCA action based on revelations made therein, the Attorney General is much less likely to learn of fraud disclosed in state proceedings. Respondent and her amici further maintain that it would be perverse to include nonfederal sources in Category 2, as local governments would then be able to shield themselves from qui tam liability by dis cretely disclosing evidence of fraud in “public” reports.4 These arguments are reasonable so far as they go, but they do not go very far. As many have observed, the draft ing history of the public disclosure bar raises more ques tions than it answers.5 Significant substantive changes— —————— 3 See H. R. Rep. No. 99–660, pp. 2–3 (986) (text of proposed The public disclosure bar that was enacted more closely resembles the version in the Senate bill. 4 State governments are already shielded from qui tam liability un der our precedent. 5 See, e.g., 23 F.3d, at (“Congress gave us little spe cific guidance to determine the scope of public disclosure sources”); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P. A. v. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 5 Opinion of the Court including the introduction of the term we are construing in this case—were inserted without floor debate, as “techni cal” amendments. That the original Senate bill mentioned only congressional and GAO sources in Category 2 is therefore of little moment. Neither the House nor the Senate Committee Report explained why a federal limita tion would be appropriate, and the subsequent addition of “administrative” sources to this Category might be taken as a sign that such a limitation was rejected by the full Chambers.6 —————— Prudential Ins. (“The bill that eventuated in the 986 amendments underwent substantial revisions during its legislative path. This provides ample opportunity to search the legislative history and find some support somewhere for almost any construction of the many ambiguous terms in the final version”); at 63 (Scirica, J., dissenting) (“One difficulty in interpreting the 986 amendments is that Congress was never completely clear about what kind of ‘parasitic’ suits it was attempting to avoid”); Boese at 4–46 (“The present Section 3730(e)(4) was enacted without explana tion by Congress”); at 4–47 to 4–48 (“[A]pplicable legisla tive history explaining versions [of ] not adopted is of little help in deciphering this Because Section 3730(e)(4) was drafted subsequent to the completion of the House and Senate Commit tee reports on the proposed False Claims Act Amendments, those reports, which contained discussion of altogether different bars, cannot be used in interpreting it. And the |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | different bars, cannot be used in interpreting it. And the sponsors’ interpretations of the provision ultimately enacted are spare, often incorrect, and wide ranging enough to provide some support for almost any construction of its many ambiguities”). 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR makes a valiant effort to unearth from the legislative history “the balance Congress evidently sought to achieve through the 986 amendments.” Post, at 0. But her reconstruction of the history assigns little weight to the side of this balance preserved by the public disclosure bar: the desire to minimize “the potential for parasitic lawsuits by those who learn of the fraud through public channels and seek remuneration although they contributed nothing to the exposure of the fraud,” United States ex rel. And her narrative contains no account of why Category 2 emerged in the form that it did. Any such account would necessarily be an exercise in speculation, as the record is silent 6 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court Respondent and her amici place particular emphasis on a remark made by the lead sponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Grassley. See Brief for Respondent 29; Brief for United States 20; Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae 3–4; Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 30–3. In a floor statement, Grassley said that “the term ‘Gov ernment’ in the definition of original source is meant to include any Government source of disclosures cited in [the public disclosure bar]; that is[,] Government includes Congress, the General Accounting Office, any executive or independent agency as well as all other governmental bodies that may have publicly disclosed the allegations.” 32 Cong. Rec. 20536 (986). Yet even if a single sentence by a single legislator were entitled to any meaningful weight, Senator Grassley’s remark merely begs the ques tion before us. His formulation fails to indicate whether the “other governmental bodies” may be state or local bodies. It turns on a term, “Government” with a capital “G,” that does not appear in the codified version of the public disclosure bar, which Congress subsequently revised in numerous respects prior to passage. There is, in fact, only one item in the legislative record that squarely corroborates respondent’s reading of the statute: a letter sent by the primary sponsors of the 986 amendments to the Attorney General in See 45 Cong. Rec. 6032 (reproducing text of letter in which Rep. Berman and Sen. Grassley state: “We did intend, and any fair reading of the statute will confirm, that |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | and any fair reading of the statute will confirm, that the disclosure must be in a federal criminal, civil or administrative hearing. Disclosure in a state proceeding —————— on the matter. In our view, neither the general trajectory of 20th century FCA reform nor the specific statements made during the 986 legislative process clearly point one way or the other on the question before us. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 7 Opinion of the Court of any kind should not be a bar to a subsequent qui tam suit”). Needless to say, this letter does not qualify as legislative “history,” given that it was written 3 years after the amendments were enacted. It is consequently of scant or no value for our purposes.7 We do not doubt that Congress passed the 986 amendments to the FCA “to strengthen the Government’s hand in fighting false claims,” Cook County, 538 U.S., at –34, and “to encourage more private enforcement suits,” S. Rep., at 23–24. It is equally beyond cavil, how ever, that Congress passed the public disclosure bar to bar a subset of those suits that it deemed unmeritorious or downright harmful. The question before us concerns the precise scope of that subset; and on this matter, the record is all but opaque. While “the absence of specific legislative history in no way modifies the conventional judicial duty to give faithful meaning to the language Congress adopted in the light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting the law in question,” United 423 U. S. —————— 7 See Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 02, 8 (980); ; see 90 F.3d, at (refusing to credit the Berman-Grassley letter in interpreting the public disclosure bar). Respondent and her amici additionally contend that the enactment of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 986 (PFCRA), 00 Stat. 934 (codified at 3 U.S. C. et seq.), shortly before the enactment of the FCA amendments supports their reading of the latter. See Brief for Respondent 30–33; Brief for United States 4–5; Brief for Taxpay ers Against Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 28–29. Yet while “there is no question that the PFCRA was designed to operate in tandem with the FCA,” n. 7, or that the PFCRA is addressed to federal administrative agencies, there is no explicit evidence to suggest that Congress intended to limit Category 2’s reference to “administrative” sources to the same set of agencies. The FCA’s public disclosure bar serves a distinct function not replicated in the PFCRA; the text of the public disclosure bar contains no refer |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | the text of the public disclosure bar contains no refer ence to the PFCRA; and no Member of Congress, so far as we are aware, articulated any such intent. 8 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court 303, 30 (976), there is no “evident legislative purpose” to guide our resolution of the discrete that confronts us. V Respondent and her amici likewise fail to prove their case that petitioners’ reading of the statute will lead to results that Congress could not have intended. Their argument rests on an empirical proposition: “While federal inquiries and their outcomes are readily available to De partment of Justice [(DOJ)] attorneys, many state and local reports and investigations never come to the atten tion of federal authorities.” Brief for United States 22; see (“Because the federal government is unlikely to learn about state and local investigations, a large number of fraudulent claims against the government would go unremedied without the financial incentives offered by the qui tam provisions of the FCA”). This proposition is not implausible, but it is sheer conjecture. Numerous federal investigations may be occurring at any given time, and DOJ attorneys may not reliably learn about their findings. DOJ attorneys may learn about quite a few state and local inquiries, especially when the inquiries are conducted pursuant to a joint federal-state program financed in part by federal dollars, such as the program at in this case.8 Just how accessible to the Attorney General a typical state or local source will be, as compared to a federal source, is an open question. And it —————— 8 In some instances, federal law dictates that state and local govern ments receiving federal funds perform an audit of their programs. See 3 U.S. C. (requiring nonfederal entities that expend federal awards above a certain amount to “undergo a single audit” in accordance with specified conditions); Brief for State of Pennsylvania et al. as Amici Curiae 7–0 (discussing the Single Audit Act of 984). It bears mention that, to the extent one is worried about Federal Gov ernment ignorance of state and local antifraud efforts, see post, at 0– today’s ruling may induce federal authorities to pay closer attention to such efforts going forward. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 9 Opinion of the Court is not even the right question. The statutory touchstone, once again, is whether the allegations of fraud have been “public[ly] disclos[ed],” (A), not whether they have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer. Respondent’s argument gives insufficient weight to Congress’ decision |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | DOJ lawyer. Respondent’s argument gives insufficient weight to Congress’ decision to bar qui tam actions based on disclo sures “from the news media.” Because there was no such bar prior to 986, the addition of the news media as a jurisdiction-stripping category forecloses the suggestion that the 986 amendments implemented a single-minded intent to increase the availability of qui tam litigation. And since the “news media” include a large number of local newspapers and radio stations, this category likely describes a multitude of sources that would seldom come to the attention of the Attorney General. As for respondent and her amici’s concern that local governments will insulate themselves from qui tam liabil ity “through careful, low key ‘disclosures’ ” of potential fraud, Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae 7, this argument rests not just on specu lation but indeed on rather strained speculation. Any such disclosure would not immunize the local government from FCA liability in an action brought by the United States, see Rockwell Int’l 549 U.S. 457, 478 —and to the contrary it could tip off the Attorney General that such an action might be fruitful. It seems to us that petitioners have the more clear-eyed view when they assert that, “[g]iven the fact that the submis sion of a false claim to the United States subjects a defen dant to criminal liability, fines, debarment, treble dam ages and attorneys’ fees, no rational entity would prepare a report that self-discloses fraud with the sole purpose of cutting off qui tam actions.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 9; see United States ex rel. 470 F.3d 94, 99 (“The fear [of self-insulating disclosures] is unfounded in general because it is unlikely 20 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON Opinion of the Court that an agency trying to cover up its fraud would reveal the requisite ‘allegations or transactions’ underlying the fraud in a public document”).9 Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Congress carefully preserved the rights of the most deserving qui tam plaintiffs: those whistle-blowers who qualify as origi nal sources. Notwithstanding public disclosure of the allegations made by a qui tam plaintiff, her case may go forward if she is “an original source of the information.” It is therefore flat wrong to suggest that a finding for petitioners will “ ‘in effect return us to the unduly restrictive “government knowledge” standard’ ” that prevailed prior to 986. Brief for United States 3 (quoting ); see Brief for Re spondent 34 (asserting that “petitioners’ construction would reimpose |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | for Re spondent 34 (asserting that “petitioners’ construction would reimpose a form of the ‘government knowledge’ bar” (capitalization omitted)). Today’s ruling merely confirms that disclosures made in one type of context—a state or local report, audit, or investigation—may trigger the public disclosure bar. It has no bearing on disclosures made in other contexts, and it leaves intact the ability of original sources to prosecute qui tam actions irrespective of the state of Government knowledge. Whether respon dent can qualify as an “original source,” as that term is defined in is one of many s that remain open on remand. —————— 9 Petitioners and their amici counter with public policy argu ments of their own. Under the Court of Appeals’ reading of the statute, they allege, there is an increased likelihood that parasitic relators will beat more deserving relators to the courthouse, Brief for Petitioners 3, and that state and local governments will find their antifraud investi gations impeded, or will decline to conduct such investigations in the first place, on account of “opportunistic potential relators trolling state records and reports, available to the public,” in search of a qui tam claim, Brief for State of Pennsylvania et al. as Amici Curiae Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) 2 Opinion of the Court VI Respondent and the Solicitor General have given nu merous reasons why they believe their reading of the FCA moves it closer to the golden mean between an inadequate and an excessive scope for private enforcement. Congress may well have endorsed those views in its recent amend ment to the public disclosure bar. See n. With respect to the version of (A) that is before us, however, we conclude that the term “administrative” in Category 2 is not limited to federal sources. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) Opinion of SCALIA, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–304 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVA- TION DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KAREN T. WILSON ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [March 30, 200] JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I–III and V–VI of the Court’s opinion. As for Part IV, I agree that the stray snippets of legislative his tory respondent, the Solicitor General, and the dissent have collected prove nothing at all about Congress’s pur pose in enacting 3 U.S. C. |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | majority | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1726/graham-county-soil-and-water-conservation-dist-v-united-states-ex-rel/ | all about Congress’s pur pose in enacting 3 U.S. C. Ante, at 4– 8. But I do not share the Court’s premise that if a “ ‘legis lative purpose’ ” were “ ‘evident’ ” from such history it would make any difference. Ante, at 7 (quoting United 30 (976)). The Con stitution gives legal effect to the “Laws” Congress enacts, Art. VI, cl. 2, not the objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting for them. See (998). If (A)’s text includes state and local administra tive reports and audits, as the Court correctly concludes it does, then it is utterly irrelevant whether the Members of Congress intended otherwise. Anyway, it is utterly impos sible to discern what the Members of Congress intended except to the extent that intent is manifested in the only remnant of “history” that bears the unanimous endorse ment of the majority in each House: the text of the en rolled bill that became law. Cite as: 559 U. S. (200) SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–304 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVA- TION DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES EX REL. KAREN T. |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | We must decide whether the National Labor Relations Board may issue a cease-and-desist order to halt the prosecution of a state-court civil suit brought by an employer to retaliate against employees for exercising federally protected labor rights, without also finding that the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law. I The present controversy arises out of a labor dispute at "Bill Johnson's Big Apple East," one of four restaurants owned and operated by the petitioner in Phoenix, Ariz. It began on August 8, 1978, when petitioner fired Myrland Helton, one of the most senior waitresses at the restaurant. Believing that her termination was the result of her efforts to organize a union, she filed unfair labor practice charges against the restaurant with the Board. On September 20, after an investigation, the Board's General Counsel issued a complaint. On the same day, Helton, joined by three co-waitresses and a few others, picketed the restaurant. The picketers carried signs asking customers to boycott the restaurant because its management was unfair to the waitresses. Petitioner's manager confronted the picketers and threatened to "get even" with them "if it's the last thing I do." Petitioner's president telephoned the husband *734 of one of the picketing waitresses and impliedly threatened that the couple would "get hurt" and lose their new home if the wife continued to participate in the protest. The picketing continued on September 21 and 22. In addition, the picketers distributed a leaflet that accused management of making "[u]nwarranted sexual advances" and maintaining a "filthy restroom for women employees." The leaflet also stated that a complaint against the restaurant had been filed by the Board and that Helton had been fired after suggesting that a union be organized. On the morning of September 25, petitioner and three of its co-owners filed a verified complaint against Helton and the other demonstrators in an Arizona state court. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had engaged in mass picketing, harassed customers, blocked public ingress to and egress from the restaurant, and created a threat to public safety. The complaint also contained a libel count, alleging that the leaflet contained false and outrageous statements published by the defendants with the malicious intent to injure the plaintiffs. The complaint sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages, $500,000 in punitive damages, and appropriate further legal and equitable App. 3-9. After a hearing, the state court declined to enjoin the distribution of leaflets but otherwise issued the requested restraining order. Expedited depositions were also permitted. The defendants retained counsel and, |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | Expedited depositions were also permitted. The defendants retained counsel and, after a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on November 16, the court dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive Meanwhile, on the day after the state-court suit was filed, Helton filed a second charge with the Board alleging that petitioner had committed a number of new unfair labor practices in connection with the dispute between the waitresses and the restaurant. Among these was a charge that petitioner had filed the civil suit in retaliation for the defendants' protected, concerted activities, and because they had filed *735 charges under the Act. The General Counsel issued a complaint based on these new charges on October 23. As relevant here, the complaint alleged that petitioner, by filing and prosecuting the state suit, was attempting to retaliate against Helton and the others, in violation of 8(a)(1) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(1) and (4).[1] In December 1978, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a 4-day consolidated hearing on the two unfair labor practice complaints.[2] On September 27, the ALJ rendered a decision concluding that petitioner had committed a total of seven unfair labor practices during the course of the *736 labor dispute. 249 N. L. R. B. 155, 168-169 (1980). With regard to the matter presently before us, the ALJ agreed with the General Counsel that the prosecution of the civil suit violated 8(a)(1) and (4). The ALJ applied the rationale of Power Systems, Inc., 239 N. L. R. B. 445, 449-450 enf. denied, in which the Board held that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to institute a civil lawsuit for the purpose of penalizing or discouraging its employees from filing charges with the Board or seeking access to the Board's processes. In Power Systems, the Board inferred that the employer had acted with retaliatory animus from the fact that the employer lacked "a reasonable basis upon which to assert" that its suit had merit. Similarly, in the present case, the ALJ found that petitioner's suit lacked a reasonable basis and then concluded from this fact that the suit violated the Act because it was "an attempt to penalize Helton for having filed charges with the Board, and to penalize the other defendants for assisting Helton in her protest of the unfair labor practice committed against her." 249 N. L. R. B., He bolstered his conclusion by noting the direct evidence that the suit had been filed for a retaliatory purpose, i. e., the threats |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | been filed for a retaliatory purpose, i. e., the threats to "get even with" and "hurt" the defendants. The ALJ reached his conclusion that petitioner's state suit lacked a reasonable basis "on the basis of the record and from [his] observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor, and upon the extensive briefs of the parties." In the view of the ALJ, the "evidence fail[ed] to support" the complaint's allegations that the picketers clogged the sidewalks, harassed customers, or blocked entrances and exits to the restaurant. The libel count was deemed baseless because "the evidence establishe[d] the truthfulness" of everything stated in the leaflet.[3] *737 On petitioner's appeal, the Board adopted, with minor exceptions, the ALJ's findings, conclusions of law, and recommended order. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered to undertake a number of remedial measures. Among other things, petitioner was required to withdraw its state-court complaint and to reimburse the defendants for all their legal expenses in connection with the suit. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order in its entirety, holding that substantial evidence supported both the Board's findings that the employer's "lawsuit lacked a reasonable basis in fact, and that it was filed to penalize Helton [and] the picketers for engaging in protected activity." Petitioner sought certiorari, urging that it could not properly be enjoined from maintaining its state-court action.[4] We granted the writ, and we now vacate and remand for further proceedings. II The question whether the Board may issue a cease-and-desist order to halt an allegedly retaliatory lawsuit filed by an employer in a state court has had a checkered history before the Board.[5] At first, in W. T. Carter & Bro., 90 N. L. R. B. *738 2020, 2023-2024 (1950), where an employer sued and obtained a state-court injunction barring its employees from holding union meetings on company property, a divided Board held that the prosecution of the suit constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board analogized from the common law of malicious prosecution and rejected the employer's contention that its "resort to court proceedings was a lawful exercise of a basic right." The dissent objected that the Board should recognize the employer's right to present its case to a judicial forum, even if its motive in doing so was to interfere with its employees' rights. Ten years later, in Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N. L. R. B. 103, 109 (1960), where the employer obtained an injunction banning peaceful union picketing in protest of unlawful discharges, the Board overruled W. T. Carter and adopted the view of the earlier dissent. During the next 18 years after |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | of the earlier dissent. During the next 18 years after Clyde Taylor, the Board's decisions do not appear to us to have been entirely consistent.[6]*739 Then, in Power Systems, 239 N. L. R. B., at 450, the Board concluded: "Since we have found that Respondent had no reasonable basis for its lawsuit, the lawsuit had as its purpose the unlawful objective of penalizing [the employee] for filing a charge with the Board." The suit therefore was enjoined as an unfair labor practice. The gravamen of the offense was thus held to be the unlawful objective, which could be inferred by lack of a reasonable basis for the employer's suit. Although the Board in Power Systems purported to distinguish Clyde Taylor and its progeny on the basis that the lawsuit in each of those cases "was not a tactic calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act," 239 N. L. R. B., the distinction was illusory. In Clyde Taylor itself the Board found no unfair labor practice despite the ALJ's specific finding that the employer's lawsuit "was for the purpose of preventing his employees from exercising the rights guaranteed to them under the Act, rather than for the purpose of advancing any legitimate interest of his own." 127 N. L. R. B., at 121. Since 1978, the Board has consistently adhered to the Power Systems rule that an employer or union who sues an employee for a retaliatory motive is guilty of a violation of the Act.[7] Under this line of cases, as the Board's brief and its counsel's remarks at *740 oral argument in the present case confirm,[8] the Board does not regard lack of merit in the employer's suit as an independent element of the 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice. Rather, it asserts that the only essential element of a violation is retaliatory motive. III A At first blush, the Board's position seems to have substance. Sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act are broad, remedial provisions that guarantee that employees will be able to enjoy their rights secured by 7 of the Act including the right to unionize, the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, and the right to utilize the Board's processes without fear of restraint, coercion, discrimination, or interference from their employer. The Court has liberally construed these laws as prohibiting a wide variety of employer conduct that is intended to restrain, or that has the likely effect of restraining, employees in the exercise of protected activities.[9] A lawsuit no doubt may be |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | exercise of protected activities.[9] A lawsuit no doubt may be used by an employer as a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation. As the Board has observed, by suing an employee who files charges with the Board or engages in other protected activities, an employer can place its employees on notice that anyone who engages in such conduct is subjecting himself to the possibility of a burdensome lawsuit. Regardless of how unmeritorious the employer's suit is, the employee will most likely have to retain counsel and incur substantial legal expenses *741 to defend against it. Power Systems, Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals in the present case noted, the chilling effect of a state lawsuit upon an employee's willingness to engage in protected activity is multiplied where the complaint seeks damages in addition to injunctive n. 3. Where, as here, such a suit is filed against hourly-wage waitresses or other individuals who lack the backing of a union, the need to allow the Board to intervene and provide a remedy is at its greatest. There are weighty countervailing considerations, however, that militate against allowing the Board to condemn the filing of a suit as an unfair labor practice and to enjoin its prosecution. In California Motor Transport we recognized that the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. Accordingly, we construed the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff's anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, unless the suit was a "mere sham" filed for harassment purposes. We should be sensitive to these First Amendment values in construing the NLRA in the present context. As the Board itself has recognized: "[G]oing to a judicial body for redress of alleged wrongs stands apart from other forms of action directed at the alleged wrongdoer. The right of access to a court is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on the ground that what is sought in the court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected right." Peddie Buildings, 203 N. L. R. B. 265, 272 (1973), enf. denied on other grounds, See also Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N. L. R. B., at 109. Moreover, in recognition of the States' compelling interest in the maintenance of domestic peace, the Court has construed the Act as not pre-empting the States from providing a civil remedy for conduct touching interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." San Diego Building Trades It *742 has therefore repeatedly been held |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | Diego Building Trades It *742 has therefore repeatedly been held that an employer has the right to seek local judicial protection from tortious conduct during a labor dispute. See, e. g., Sears, Roebuck & ; ; ; Construction In we held that an employer can properly recover damages in a tort action arising out of a labor dispute if it can prove malice and actual injury. See also If the Board is allowed to enjoin the prosecution of a well-grounded state lawsuit, it necessarily follows that any state plaintiff subject to such an injunction will be totally deprived of a remedy for an actual injury, since the "Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief" to the plaintiff. Thus, to the extent the Board asserts the right to declare the filing of a meritorious suit to be a violation of the Act, it runs headlong into the basic rationale of and other cases in which we declined to infer a congressional intent to ignore the substantial state interest "in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens." See also Sears, Roebuck & ; Of course, in light of the Board's special competence in applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life, its interpretations of the Act are entitled to deference, even where, as here, its position has not been entirely consistent. ; And here, were only the literal language of 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) to be considered, we would be inclined to uphold the Board, because its present construction of the statute is not irrational. Considering the First Amendment right of access to the courts and the state interests identified in cases such as and however, we conclude *743 that the Board's interpretation of the Act is untenable. The filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the Act. B Although it is not unlawful under the Act to prosecute a meritorious action, the same is not true of suits based on insubstantial claims suits that lack, to use the term coined by the Board, a "reasonable basis." Such suits are not within the scope of First Amendment protection: "The first amendment interests involved in private litigation compensation for violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, public airing of disputed facts are not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims. Furthermore, since sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, it does not come within the first amendment right to petition."[10] Just as false statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, see ; baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition. Similarly, the state interests recognized in the line of cases do not enter into play when the state-court suit has no basis. Since, by definition, the plaintiff in a baseless suit has not suffered a legally protected injury, the State's interest "in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens," is not implicated. States have only a *744 negligible interest, if any, in having insubstantial claims adjudicated by their courts, particularly in the face of the strong federal interest in vindicating the rights protected by the national labor laws. Considerations analogous to these led us in the antitrust context to adopt the "mere sham" exception in California Motor Transport We should follow a similar course under the NLRA. The right to litigate is an important one, and the Board should consider the evidence with utmost care before ordering the cessation of a state-court lawsuit. In a proper case, however, we believe that Congress intended to allow the Board to provide this remedy. Therefore, we hold that it is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by 7 of the NLRA. IV Having concluded that the prosecution of an improperly motivated suit lacking a reasonable basis constitutes a violation of the Act that may be enjoined by the Board, we now inquire into what steps the Board may take in evaluating whether a state-court suit lacks the requisite basis. Petitioner insists that the Board's prejudgment inquiry must not go beyond the four corners of the complaint. Its position is that as long as the complaint seeks lawful relief that the state court has jurisdiction to grant, the Board must allow the state litigation to proceed. The Board, on the other hand, apparently perceives no limitations on the scope of its pre-judgment determination as to whether a lawsuit has a reasonable basis. In the present case, for example, the ALJ conducted a virtual trial on the merits of petitioner's state-court claims. Based on this de facto trial, the ALJ concluded, in his independent judgment, based in part on "his observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor," that petitioner's suit |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor," that petitioner's suit lacked a reasonable basis. We cannot agree with either party. Although the Board's reasonable-basis inquiry need not be limited to the bare *745 pleadings, if there is a genuine issue of material fact that turns on the credibility of witnesses or on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, it cannot, in our view, be concluded that the suit should be enjoined. When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state plaintiff's First Amendment interest in petitioning the state court for redress of his grievance, his interest in having the factual dispute resolved by a jury, and the State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, lead us to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to usurp the traditional fact-finding function of the state-court jury or judge.[11] Hence, we conclude that if a state plaintiff is able to present the *746 Board with evidence that shows his lawsuit raises genuine issues of material fact, the Board should proceed no further with the 8(a)(1)- 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice proceedings but should stay those proceedings until the state-court suit has been concluded.[12] In the present case, the only disputed issues in the state lawsuit appear to be factual in nature. There will be cases, however, in which the state plaintiff's case turns on issues of state law or upon a mixed question of fact and law. Just as the Board must refrain from deciding genuinely disputed material factual issues with respect to a state suit, it likewise must not deprive a litigant of his right to have genuine state-law legal questions decided by the state judiciary.[13] While *747 the Board need not stay its hand if the plaintiff's position is plainly foreclosed as a matter of law or is otherwise frivolous, the Board should allow such issues to be decided by the state tribunals if there is any realistic chance that the plaintiff's legal theory might be adopted. In instances where the Board must allow the lawsuit to proceed, if the employer's case in the state court ultimately proves meritorious and he has judgment against the employees, the employer should also prevail before the Board, for the filing of a meritorious lawsuit, even for a retaliatory motive, is not an unfair labor practice. If judgment goes against the employer in the state court, however, or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise shown to be without merit, the employer has had its day in court, the interest of the State in providing a forum |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | court, the interest of the State in providing a forum for its citizens has been vindicated, and the Board may then proceed to adjudicate the 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice case. The employer's suit having proved unmeritorious, the Board would be warranted in taking that fact into account in determining whether the suit had been filed in retaliation for the exercise of the employees' 7 rights. If a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorney's fees and other expenses. It may also order any other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act. 29 U.S. C. 160(c).[14] V The Board argues that, since petitioner has not sought review of the factual findings below that the state suit in the present case lacked a reasonable basis and was filed for a *748 retaliatory motive, the judgment should be affirmed once it is concluded that the Board may enjoin a suit under these circumstances. Petitioner does, however, challenge the right of the Board to issue a cease-and-desist order in the circumstances present here, and the Board did not reach its reasonable-basis determination in accordance with this opinion. As noted above, the ALJ had no reservations about weighing the evidence and making credibility judgments. Based on his own evaluation of the evidence, he concluded that the libel count in petitioner's suit lacked merit, because the statements in the leaflet were true, and that the business interference counts were groundless, because the evidence failed to support petitioner's factual allegations. 249 N. L. R. B., -165. See It was not the ALJ's province to make such factual determinations. What he should have determined is not whether the statements in the leaflet were true, but rather whether there was a genuine issue as to whether they were knowingly false. Similarly, he should not have decided the facts regarding the business interference counts; rather, he should have limited his inquiry to the question whether petitioner's evidence raised factual issues that were genuine and material. Furthermore, because, in enforcing the Board's order, the Court of Appeals ultimately relied on the fact that "substantial evidence" supported the Board's finding that the prosecution of the lawsuit violated the Act, the Board's error has not been cured. Accordingly, without expressing a view as to whether petitioner's suit is in fact enjoinable, we shall return this case to the Board for further consideration in light of the proper standards. VI To summarize, we hold that the Board may not halt the prosecution of a state-court |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110943/bill-johnsons-restaurants-inc-v-nlrb/ | the Board may not halt the prosecution of a state-court lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff's motive, unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law. Retaliatory motive and lack of reasonable basis are both essential prerequisites to the issuance of a cease-and-desist *749 order against a state suit. The Board's reasonable-basis inquiry must be structured in a manner that will preserve the state plaintiff's right to have a state-court jury or judge resolve genuine material factual or state-law legal disputes pertaining to the lawsuit. Therefore, if the Board is called upon to determine whether a suit is unlawful prior to the time that the state court renders final judgment, and if the state plaintiff can show that such genuine material factual or legal issues exist, the Board must await the results of the state-court adjudication with respect to the merits of the state suit. If the state proceedings result in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff, the Board may then consider the matter further and, if it is found that the lawsuit was filed with retaliatory intent, the Board may find a violation and order appropriate In short, then, although it is an unfair labor practice to prosecute an unmeritorious lawsuit for a retaliatory purpose, the offense is not enjoinable unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[15] So ordered. |
Justice Powell | 1,979 | 17 | second_dissenting | Fare v. Michael C. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110117/fare-v-michael-c/ | Although I agree with the Court that the Supreme Court of California misconstrued[1] I would not reverse the California court's judgment. This Court repeatedly has recognized that "the greatest care" must be taken to assure that an alleged confession of a juvenile was voluntary. See, e. g., In re Gault, ; ; Respondent was a young person, 16 years old at the time of his arrest and the subsequent prolonged interrogation at the station house. Although respondent had had prior brushes with the law, and was under supervision by a probation officer, the taped transcript of his interrogationas well as his testimony at the suppression hearingdemonstrates that he was immature, emotional,[2] and uneducated, and therefore was likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of interrogation to which he was subjected. App. -82. When given Miranda warnings and asked whether he desired an attorney, respondent requested permission to "have my probation officer here," a request that was refused. That officer testified later that he had communicated frequently with respondent, that respondent had serious and "extensive" family problems, and that the officer had instructed respondent to call him immediately "at any time he has a police contact, even if they stop him and talk to him on the street."[3] The reasons given by the probation officer for having so instructed his charge were substantially the same reasons that prompt this Court to examine with special care the circumstances under which a minor's alleged confession was obtained. After stating that respondent had been "going through problems," the officer observed that "many times the kids don't understand what is going on, and what they are supposed to do relative to police" This view of the limited understanding of the average 16-year-old was borne out by respondent's question when, *734 during interrogation, he was advised of his right to an attorney: "How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?" It was during this part of the interrogation that the police had denied respondent's request to "have my probation officer here." The police then proceeded, despite respondent's repeated denial of any connection to the murder under investigation, see persistently to press interrogation until they extracted a confession. In In re Gault, in addressing police interrogation of detained juveniles, the Court stated: "If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained [from a child], the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. et seq., prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or retaliating against their employ- ees for opposing or seeking relief from such discrimination. Before a federal civil servant can sue his employer for violating Title VII, he must, among other things, “initiate contact” with an Equal Employment Opportunity counse- lor at his agency “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.” (a)(1) (5). If an employee claims he has been fired for discrimina- tory reasons, the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” includes the discharge itself and the 45-day limitations period begins running only after the employee is fired. We address here when the limitations period begins to run for an employee who was not fired, but resigns in the face of intolerable discrimination—a “constructive” dis- charge. We hold that, in such circumstances, the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” includes the employee’s 2 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court resignation, and that the 45-day clock for a constructive discharge begins running only after the employee resigns. I We recite the following facts in the light most favorable to petitioner Marvin Green, against whom the District Court entered summary judgment. Green is a black man who worked for the Postal Service for 35 years. In 2008, he was serving as the postmaster for Englewood, Colorado when he applied for a promotion to the vacant postmaster position in nearby Boulder. He was passed over. Shortly thereafter, Green complained he was denied the promotion because of his race. Green’s relations with his supervisors crumbled follow- ing his complaint. Tensions peaked on December 11, 2009, when two of Green’s supervisors accused him of intentionally delaying the mail—a criminal offense. See 18 U.S. C. They informed Green that the Postal Service’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was inves- tigating the charge and that OIG agents had arrived to interview him as part of their investigation. After Green met with the OIG agents, his supervisors gave him a letter reassigning him to off-duty status until the matter was resolved. Even though the OIG agents reported to Green’s supervisors that no further investigation was warranted, the supervisors continued to represent to Green that “the OIG is all over this” and that the “criminal” charge “could be a life changer.” App. 53. On December 16, 2009, Green and the Postal Service signed an agreement whose meaning remains disputed. Relevant here, the Postal Service promised not to pursue criminal charges in |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | the Postal Service promised not to pursue criminal charges in exchange for Green’s promise to leave his post in Englewood. The agreement also apparently gave Green a choice: effective March 31, 0, he could either retire or report for duty in Wamsutter, Wyoming— population 451—at a salary considerably lower than what Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 3 Opinion of the Court he earned in his Denver suburb. Green chose to retire and submitted his resignation to the Postal Service on Febru- ary 9, 0, effective March 31. On March 22—41 days after submitting his resignation paperwork to the Postal Service on February 9, but 96 days after signing the settlement agreement on December 16—Green contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor to report an unlawful constructive dis- charge. He contended that his supervisors had threatened criminal charges and negotiated the resulting agreement in retaliation for his original complaint.1 He alleged that the choice he had been given effectively forced his resigna- tion in violation of Title VII. Green eventually filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging, inter alia, that the Postal Service constructively discharged him. The Postal Service moved for summary judgment, arguing that Green had failed to make timely contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the “matter alleged to be discrimina- tory,” as required by (a)(1). The District Court granted the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” encompassed only the Postal Service’s discriminatory actions and not Green’s inde- pendent decision to resign on February 9. Therefore, the 45-day limi- tations period started running when both parties signed the settlement agreement on December 16, 2009. Accord- ingly, because 96 days passed between the agreement and when Green contacted an EEO counselor on March 22, —————— 1 We assume without deciding that it is unlawful for a federal agency to retaliate against a civil servant for complaining of discrimination. See ; Brief for Respondent 2. 4 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court 0, his constructive-discharge claim was time barred. Two other Courts of Appeals agree with the Tenth Cir- cuit’s view that the limitations period begins to run for a constructive-discharge claim after the employer’s last discriminatory act.2 As the Tenth Circuit recognized, however, other Courts of Appeals have held that the limi- tations period for a constructive-discharge claim does not begin to run until the employee resigns.3 We granted certiorari to resolve this split. 575 U. S. (5). Because no party here supports the Tenth Cir- cuit’s |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | (5). Because no party here supports the Tenth Cir- cuit’s holding that an employee’s resignation is not part of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory,” we appointed Catherine M. A. Carroll to defend that aspect of the judgment below. 576 U. S. (5). She has ably discharged her duties and the Court thanks her for her service. II Before a federal civil servant can sue his employer in court for discriminating against him in violation of Title VII, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies. 42 U.S. C. –16(c). To exhaust those remedies, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promulgated regulations that require, among other things, that a federal employee consult with an EEO counselor prior to filing a discrimination lawsuit. Specifically, he “must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective —————— 2 Mayers v. Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund of North America, 478 F.3d 364, 370 ; 3 ; Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., ; Hukkanen v. Operating Engineers, ; Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 5 Opinion of the Court date of the action.” (a)(1).4 The timeli- ness of Green’s claim therefore turns on our interpretation of this EEOC regulation implementing Title VII.5 Although we begin our interpretation of the regulation with its text, the text in this case is not particularly help- ful. Nowhere does indicate whether a “matter alleged to be discriminatory” in a constructive-discharge claim includes the employee’s resignation, as Green con- tends, or only the employer’s discriminatory conduct, as amica contends. The word “matter” simply means “an allegation forming the basis of a claim or defense,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1126 —a term that could readily apply to a discrimination-precipitated resignation. So the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” could refer to all of the allegations underlying a claim of discrimina- tion, including the employee’s resignation, or only to those allegations concerning the employer’s discrimina- tory conduct. We therefore must turn to other canons of interpretation. The most helpful canon in this context is “the ‘standard rule’ ” for limitations periods. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Ordinarily, a “ ‘limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’ ” “[A] cause of action does not become ‘complete and present’ for limitations purposes —————— 4 Thisregulation, applicable to federal employees only, has a statutory analog for private-sector Title VII plaintiffs, who are required to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days “after |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | charge with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days “after the alleged unlaw- ful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S. C. –5(e)(1). Al- though the language is different, the EEOC treats the federal and private-sector employee limitations periods as identical in operation. See EEOC Compliance Manual: Threshold Issues n. 179. 5 Green does not contend that his alleged constructive discharge is a “personnel action.” See Brief for Petitioner 17–18; We therefore address the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” clause only. 6 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Although the standard rule can be displaced such that the limitations period begins to run before a plaintiff can file a suit, we “will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication” in the text of the limitations period. Applying this default rule, we are persuaded that the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” in a constructive- discharge claim necessarily includes the employee’s resig- nation for three reasons. First, in the context of a constructive-discharge claim, a resignation is part of the “complete and present cause of action” necessary before a limitations period ordinarily begins to run. Second, noth- ing in the regulation creating the limitations period here, clearly indicates an intent to displace this standard rule. Third, practical considerations confirm the merit of applying the standard rule here. We therefore interpret the term “matter alleged to be discriminatory” for a constructive-discharge claim to include the date Green resigned. A The standard rule for limitations periods requires us first to determine what is a “complete and present cause of action” for a constructive-discharge claim. We hold that such a claim accrues only after an employee resigns. The constructive-discharge doctrine contemplates a situation in which an employer discriminates against an employee to the point such that his “working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Pennsylvania State (2004). When the employee resigns in the face of such circumstances, Title VII treats that resignation as tanta- Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 7 Opinion of the Court mount to an actual discharge. –143. A claim of constructive discharge therefore has two basic elements. A plaintiff must prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a reasonable person in his position would have felt com- pelled to resign. But he must also show that he actually resigned. (“A constructive discharge involves both an employee’s decision to leave and |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | constructive discharge involves both an employee’s decision to leave and precipi- tating conduct” (emphasis added)). In other words, an employee cannot bring a constructive-discharge claim until he is constructively discharged. Only after both elements are satisfied can he file suit to obtain relief. Under the standard rule for limitations periods, the limitations period should begin to run for a constructive- discharge claim only after a plaintiff resigns. At that point—and not before—he can file a suit for constructive discharge. So only at that point—and not before—does he have a “complete and present” cause of action. And only after he has a complete and present cause of action does a limitations period ordinarily begin to run. Cf. Mac’s Shell Service, 189– 190 (0) (the limitations period for a constructive termi- nation of a franchise agreement starts running when the agreement is constructively terminated). In this respect, a claim that an employer constructively discharged an employee is no different from a claim that an employer actually discharged an employee. An ordi- nary wrongful discharge claim also has two basic ele- ments: discrimination and discharge. See St. Mary’s Honor ; 1 B. Lindemann, P. Grossman, & C. Weirich, Employment Discrimination Law 21–33 (5th ed. 2) (Lindemann) (“The sine qua non of a discharge case is, of course, a discharge”). The claim accrues when the employee is fired. At that point—and not before—he has a “complete and present cause of action.” So at that point—and not 8 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court before—the limitations period begins to run. With claims of either constructive discharge or actual discharge, the standard rule thus yields the same result: a limitations period should not begin to run until after the discharge itself. In light of this rule, we interpret the term “matter alleged to be discriminatory” in to refer to all of the elements that make up a constructive- discharge claim—including an employee’s resignation. B Although the standard rule dictates that a limitations period should commence only after a claim accrues, there is an exception to that rule when the text creating the limitations period clearly indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Nothing in the text of Title VII or the regulation, however, suggests that the standard rule should be displaced here. To the contrary, the language of the regulation confirms our application of the default rule. As noted previously, the word “matter” generally refers to “an allegation forming the basis of a claim or defense.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1126. The natural reading of “matter alleged to be discriminatory” thus refers to the allegation forming the basis of |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | discriminatory” thus refers to the allegation forming the basis of the discrimination claim— here, a claim of constructive discharge. And as discussed above, a constructive discharge claim requires two basic allegations: discriminatory conduct by the employer that leads to resignation of the employee. So long as those acts are part of the same, single claim under consideration, they are part of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory,” whatever the role of discrimination in each individual element of the claim. Cf. National Railroad Passenger (holding that a hostile-work-environment claim is a single “unlawful employment practice” that includes every act composing that claim, whether those acts are inde- Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 9 Opinion of the Court pendently actionable or not). C Finally, we are also persuaded that applying the stand- ard rule for limitations periods to constructive discharge makes a good deal of practical sense. Starting the limita- tions clock ticking before a plaintiff can actually sue for constructive discharge serves little purpose in furthering the goals of a limitations period—and it actively negates Title VII’s remedial structure. Cf. (holding that the Title VII limitations period should be construed to “honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement”). This Court has recognized “that the limitations perio[d] should not commence to run so soon that it becomes diffi- cult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights statutes.” Delaware State 449 U.S. 250, 262, n. 16 (1980). If the limitations period begins to run following the employer’s precipitating dis- criminatory conduct, but before the employee’s resigna- tion, the employee will be forced to file a discrimination complaint after the employer’s conduct and later amend the complaint to allege constructive discharge after he resigns. Nothing in the regulation suggests it intended to require a layperson, while making this difficult decision, to follow such a two-step process in order to preserve any remedy if he is constructively discharged. Moreover, forcing an employee to lodge a complaint before he can bring a claim for constructive discharge places that employee in a difficult situation. An employee who suffered discrimination severe enough that a reason- able person in his shoes would resign might nevertheless force himself to tolerate that discrimination for a period of time. He might delay his resignation until he can afford to 10 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court leave. Or he might delay in light of other circumstances, as in the case of a teacher waiting until the end of the school year to resign. Tr. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | until the end of the school year to resign. Tr. 17. And, if he feels he must stay for a period of time, he may be reluctant to complain about discrimination while still employed. A complaint could risk termination—an additional adverse consequence that he may have to disclose in future job applications. III Amica and the dissent read “matter alleged to be dis- criminatory” as having a clear enough meaning to displace our reliance on the standard rule for limitations periods. They argue that “matter” is not equivalent to “claim” or “cause of action,” and that the use of the phrase “matter alleged to be discriminatory” is a sufficiently clear state- ment that the standard claim accrual rule should not apply. According to amica and the dissent, “matter” refers only to the discriminatory acts of the Postal Service, not Green’s resignation. We disagree. There is nothing inherent in the phrase “matter alleged to be discriminatory” that clearly limits it to employer conduct. Rather, as discussed above, the term can reasonably be interpreted to include the factual basis for a claim. Green is not alleging just that the Postal Service discriminated against him. He claims that the discrimination left him no choice but to resign. Amica and the dissent dispute that a constructive dis- charge is a separate claim. According to amica and the dissent, the constructive-discharge doctrine merely allows a plaintiff to expand any underlying discrimination claim to include the damages from leaving his job, thereby in- creasing his available remedies. See 1 Lindemann 21–49 (constructive discharge allows plaintiff to seek backpay, front pay, or reinstatement). In support of this argument, amica and the dissent emphasize this Court’s statement in Suders that “[u]nder the constructive discharge doctrine, Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 11 Opinion of the Court an employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes.” 542 U.S., at (em- phasis added); see also (“[A] constructive dis- charge is functionally the same as an actual termination in damages-enhancing respects”). But the Court did not hold in Suders that a constructive discharge is tantamount to a formal discharge for remedial purposes exclusively. To the contrary, it expressly held that constructive discharge is a claim distinct from the underlying discriminatory act. (holding that a hostile-work-environment claim is a “lesser included component” of the “graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge”). This holding was no mere dic- tum. See (“[A] claim for constructive discharge lies under Title VII”). We see no reason to excise an em- ployee’s resignation from his constructive-discharge claim |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | to excise an em- ployee’s resignation from his constructive-discharge claim for purposes of the limitations period. The concurrence sets out a theory that there are two kinds of constructive discharge for purposes of the limita- tions period: constructive discharge “claims” where the employer “makes conditions intolerable with the specific discriminatory intent of forcing the employee to resign,” and constructive discharge “damages” where the employer does not intend to force the employee to quit, but the discriminatory conditions of employment are so intolerable that the employee quits anyway. Post, at 6–11 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). According to the concurrence, the limitations period does not begin to run until an em- ployee resigns under the “claim” theory of constructive discharge, but begins at the last discriminatory act before resignation under the “damages” theory. This sometimes-a-claim-sometimes-not theory of con- structive discharge is novel and contrary to the construc- tive discharge doctrine. The whole point of allowing an employee to claim “constructive” discharge is that in cir- 12 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court cumstances of discrimination so intolerable that a reason- able person would resign, we treat the employee’s resigna- tion as though the employer actually fired him. Suders, 542 U.S., at –143.6 We do not also require an em- ployee to come forward with proof—proof that would often be difficult to allege plausibly—that not only was the dis- crimination so bad that he had to quit, but also that his quitting was his employer’s plan all along. Amica and the dissent also argue that their interpreta- tion is more consistent with this Court’s prior precedent on when the limitations period begins to run for discrimi- nation claims. Under their interpretation, Green’s resig- nation was not part of the discriminatory “matter,” but was instead the mere inevitable consequence of the Postal Service’s discriminatory conduct, and therefore cannot be used to extend the limitations period. See Brief for Court- Appointed Amica Curiae in Support of Judgment Below —————— 6 The concurrence suggests that its theory is consistent with state- ments in the Suders opinion that constructive discharge is akin to an actual discharge “ ‘for remedial purposes’ ” and in “ ‘damages-enhancing respects.’ ” Post, at 10 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (quoting Suders, 542 U.S., at 148). This ignores the more obvious explanation for this qualifi- cation: The Court was distinguishing between the merits of a claim of constructive discharge generally, where resignation is imputed as a discriminatory act of the employer, and the affirmative defense avail- able to an employer in a hostile work environment claim specifically, which allows an employer |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | a hostile work environment claim specifically, which allows an employer to defend against a hostile work environment claim in certain circumstances if it took no “ ‘official act’ ” against the employee. at 143–146. The Court in Suders recognized that it would be bizarre to always impute resignation as an “official act” of the employer in a constructive discharge hostile work environment case and prohibit the employer from relying on the no-“official-act” defense, because it would make it easier to prove the “graver” claim of a con- structive discharge hostile work environment than to prove a hostile work environment claim. –149. Thus, the Court declined to hold that resignation in a constructive discharge case was categorically an “official act” in all instances. In other words, the Court sought a measure of parity between constructive discharge and ordinary discrimination—parity that we extend to the limitations period here. Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 13 Opinion of the Court 21–27 (Brief for Amica Curiae) overruled by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, ; Delaware State ; United Air Lines, ); post, at 3–7 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) ). Similarly, the concurrence argues these cases require that an act done with discriminatory intent must occur within the limitations period. Post, at 4 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But these cases are consistent with the standard rule that a limitations period begins to run after a claim ac- crues, not after an inevitable consequence of that claim. In for example, the Court considered the discrimi- nation claim of a college faculty member who was denied tenure and given a 1-year “ ‘terminal’ ” contract for his last year The plaintiff ’s claim accrued—and he could have sued—when the college in- formed him he would be denied tenure and gave him “explicit notice that his employment would end” when his 1-year contract expired. The Court held that the limitations period began to run on that date, and not after his 1-year contract expired. That final year of teaching was merely an inevitable consequence of the tenure denial the plaintiff claimed was discriminatory. Green’s resignation, by contrast, is not merely an inevi- table consequence of the discrimination he suffered; it is an essential part of his constructive-discharge claim. That is, Green could not sue for constructive discharge until he actually resigned. Of course, Green could not resign and then wait until the consequences of that resignation be- came most painful to complain. For example, he could not use the date of the expiration of his health insurance after his resignation to extend the limitations period. But |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | insurance after his resignation to extend the limitations period. But the “inevitable consequence” principle of Ledbetter, and Evans does not change the focus of the limitations period, 14 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court which remains on the claim of discrimination itself. See (0) (holding Evans and its progeny “establish only that a Title VII plaintiff must show a present violation within the limitations period” (internal quotation marks omitted)); National Railroad Passenger 536 U.S., at (holding limitations period for hostile-work- environment claim runs from the last act composing the claim).7 For a constructive discharge, the claim does not exist until the employee resigns. Finally, amica contends that her interpretation of the regulation better advances the EEOC’s goal of promoting conciliation for federal employees through early, informal contact with an EEO counselor. See Exec. Order No. 11478, (1969) (counseling for federal employees “shall encourage the resolution of employee problems on an informal basis”). The dissent suggests that our holding will make a discrimination victim the master of his complaint, permitting him to “ ‘exten[d] the limitation[s period] indefinitely’ ” by waiting to resign. Post, at 7 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The concurrence claims that an employee who relies on the limitations period in waiting —————— 7 The dissent relies on Morgan’s other holding that, unlike a hostile- work-environment claim that may comprise many discriminatory acts, discrete claims of discrimination based on independent discriminatory acts cannot be aggregated to extend the limitations period. See post, at 3 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (citing –113). But this just proves the point: The analysis for the limitations period turns on the nature of the specific legal claim at issue. In Morgan, the Court noted that even if a claim of discrimination based on a single discriminatory act is time barred, that same act could still be used as part of the basis for a hostile-work-environment claim, so long as one other act that was part of that same hostile-work-environment claim occurred within the limitations period. (“It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we do not hold, as have some of the Circuits, that the plaintiff may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations ”). Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 15 Opinion of the Court to resign is “doubly out of luck” if his otherwise-meritorious discrimination claim is time barred and he cannot show the discrimination was so intolerable that it amounted to a constructive discharge. Post, at 13 (opinion of ALITO, J.). These concerns are overblown. Amica |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | 13 (opinion of ALITO, J.). These concerns are overblown. Amica may be right that it is more difficult to achieve conciliation after an employee resigns. But the same is true for a federal civil servant who is fired by his agency for what the employee believes to be a discriminatory purpose. And neither decision is necessarily permanent—a resignation or a termination may be undone after an employee contacts a counselor. Conciliation, while important, does not warrant treating a constructive discharge different from an actual discharge for purposes of the limitations period. As for the dissent’s fear, we doubt that a victim of em- ployment discrimination will continue to work in an intol- erable environment merely because he can thereby extend the limitations period for a claim of constructive dis- charge. If anything, a plaintiff who wishes to prevail on the merits of his constructive discharge claim has the opposite incentive. A claim of constructive discharge requires proof of a causal link between the allegedly intol- erable conditions and the resignation. See 1 Lindemann 21–45, and n. 106. And as for the concurrence’s double-loser concern, no plaintiff would be well advised to delay pursuing what he believes to be a meritorious non-constructive-discharge- discrimination claim on the ground that a timely filed constructive discharge claim could resuscitate other time- lapsed claims. The 45-day limitations period begins run- ning on any separate underlying claim of discrimina- tion when that claim accrues, regardless of whether the plaintiff eventually claims constructive discharge. The limitations-period analysis is always conducted claim by claim. 16 GREEN v. BRENNAN Opinion of the Court IV Our decision that a resignation triggers the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim raises the ques- tion of when precisely an employee resigns. Here, Green and the Government agree that an employee resigns when he gives his employer definite notice of his intent to re- sign. If an employee gives “two weeks’ notice”—telling his employer he intends to leave after two more weeks of employment—the limitations period begins to run on the day he tells his employer, not his last day at work. (This issue was not addressed by the Tenth Circuit and, accord- ingly, amica takes no position on it. See Brief for Amica Curiae 42.) We agree. A notice rule flows directly from this Court’s precedent. In and Chardon v. Fernandez, the Court explained that an ordi- nary wrongful-discharge claim accrues—and the limita- tions period begins to run—when the employer notifies the employee he is fired, not on the last day of his employ- ment. –259; Chardon, 454 U.S., at 8. Likewise, here, |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | majority | Green v. Brennan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205842/green-v-brennan/ | employ- ment. –259; Chardon, 454 U.S., at 8. Likewise, here, we hold that a constructive-discharge claim accrues—and the limitations period begins to run— when the employee gives notice of his resignation, not on the effective date of that resignation. One factual issue remains: when exactly Green gave the Postal Service notice of his resignation. The Government argues that Green resigned on December 16, 2009—when he signed the settlement agreement—and that his claim is therefore still time barred. Green argues that he did not resign until February 9, 0—when he submitted his retirement paperwork—and that his claim is therefore timely. We need not resolve this issue. Having concluded that the limitations period for Green’s constructive- discharge claim runs from the date he gave notice of his resignation, we leave it to the Tenth Circuit to determine when this in fact occurred. Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 17 Opinion of the Court * * * For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings con- sistent with this opinion. So ordered. Cite as: 578 U. S. (6) 1 ALITO, J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 14–613 MARVIN GREEN, PETITIONER v. MEGAN J. BRENNAN, POSTMASTER GENERAL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT [May 23, 6] JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | second_dissenting | Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108740/papish-v-board-of-curators-of-univ-of-mo/ | We held in that "state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment." But that general proposition does not decide the concrete case now before us. Healy held that the public university there involved had not afforded adequate notice and hearing of the action it proposed to take with respect to the students involved. Here the Court of Appeals found, and that finding is not questioned in this Court's opinion, that "the issue arises in the context of a student dismissal, after service of written charges and after a full and fair hearing, for violation of a University rule of conduct." Both because I do not believe proper exercise of our jurisdiction warrants summary reversal in a case dependent in part on assessment of the record and not squarely governed by one of our decisions, and because I have serious reservations about the result reached by the Court, I dissent from the summary disposition of this case. I Petitioner Papish has for many years been a graduate student at the University of Missouri. Judge Stephenson, writing for the Court of Appeals in this case, summarized her record in these words: "Miss Papish's academic record reveals that she was in no rush to complete the requirements for her graduate *674 degree in Journalism. She possesses a 1958 academic degree from the University of Connecticut; she was admitted to graduate school at the University of Missouri in September in 1963; and although she attended school through the fall, winter, and summer semesters, she was, after 6 years of work, making little, if any, significant progress toward the achievement of her stated academic objective. At the time of her dismissal, Miss Papish was enrolled in a one-hour course entitled `Research Journalism' and in a three-hour course entitled `Ceramics 4.' In the semester immediately preceding her dismissal, she was enrolled only in `Ceramics 3.'" 464 F.2d, at n. 2. Whatever may have been her lack of ability or motivation in the academic area, petitioner had been active on other fronts. In the words of the Court of Appeals: "3. On November 1, 1967, the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct, after notice of charges and a hearing, placed Miss Papish on disciplinary probation for the remainder of her student status at the University. The basis for her probation was her violation of the general standard of student conduct This action arose out of events which took place on October 14, 1967 at a time when the University was hosting high school seniors and their parents for the purpose of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | second_dissenting | Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108740/papish-v-board-of-curators-of-univ-of-mo/ | high school seniors and their parents for the purpose of acquainting them with its educational programs and other aspects of campus life. She specifically was charged, inter alia, with openly distributing, on University grounds, without the permission of appropriate University personnel, two non-University publications of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS). It was alleged in the notice of charges, and apparently established at *675 the ensuing hearing, that one of these publications, the New Left Notes, contained `pornographic, indecent and obscene words, "f," "bull s," and "shs."' The notice of charges also recites that the other publication, The CIA at College: Into Twilight and Back, contained `a pornographic and indecent picture depicting two rats apparently fornicating on its cover' "4. Some two weeks prior to the incident causing her dismissal, Miss Papish was placed on academic probation because of prolonged submarginal academic progress. It was a condition of this probation that she pursue satisfactory work on her thesis, and that such work be evidenced by the completion and presentation of several completed chapters to her thesis advisor by the end of the semester. By letter dated January 31, 1969, Miss Papish was notified that her failure to comply with this special condition within the time specified would result in the termination of her candidacy for a graduate degree." at -139, nn. 3, 4. It was in the light of this background that respondents finally expelled petitioner for the incident described in the Court's opinion. The Court fails to note, however, two findings made by the District Court with respect to the circumstances under which petitioner hawked her newspaper near the memorial tower of the University: "The Memorial Tower is the central unit of integrated structures dedicated to the memory of those students who died in the Armed Services in World Wars I and II. Other adjacent units include the Student Union and a Non-Sectarian chapel for prayer and meditation. Through the Memorial Arch pass parents of students, guests of the University, students, *676 including many persons under 18 years of age and high school students." 1325 n. 4. "The plaintiff knowingly and intentionally participated in distributing the publication to provoke a confrontation with the authorities by pandering the publication with crude, puerile, vulgar obscenities." II I continue to adhere to the dissenting views expressed in that the public use of the word "Mf" is "lewd and obscene" as those terms were used by the Court in There the Court said: "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | second_dissenting | Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108740/papish-v-board-of-curators-of-univ-of-mo/ | the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or `fighting' wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." But even were I convinced of the correctness of the Court's disposition of Rosenfeld, I would not think it should control the outcome of this case. It simply does not follow under any of our decisions or from the language of the First Amendment itself that because petitioner *677 could not be criminally prosecuted by the Missouri state courts for the conduct in question, she may not therefore be expelled from the University of Missouri for the same conduct. A state university is an establishment for the purpose of educating the State's young people, supported by the tax revenues of the State's citizens. The notion that the officials lawfully charged with the governance of the university have so little control over the environment for which they are responsible that they may not prevent the public distribution of a newspaper on campus which contained the language described in the Court's opinion is quite unacceptable to me, and I would suspect would have been equally unacceptable to the Framers of the First Amendment. This is indeed a case where the observation of a unanimous Court in Chaplinsky that "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality" applies with compelling force. III The Court cautions that "disenchantment with Miss Papish's performance, understandable as it may have been, is no justification for denial of constitutional rights." Quite so. But a wooden insistence on equating, for constitutional purposes, the authority of the State to criminally punish with its authority to exercise even a modicum of control over the university which it operates, serves neither the Constitution nor public education well. There is reason to think that the "disenchantment" of which the Court speaks may, after this decision, become widespread among taxpayers and legislators. The system of tax-supported public universities which has grown up |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Fuller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/ | I dissent from a decision which, in my view, dilutes the meaning of the just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment when property is condemned by the Government. As a full understanding of the facts is necessary, I will begin by restating them. This is a condemnation proceeding brought by the United States to acquire title to 920 of 1,280 acres of land, owned in fee by respondents, which is within the area to *495 be flooded by a dam and reservoir project in Arizona. At the time of the taking respondents used this fee land as a base for a cattle operation known as a "cow-calf" ranch. A dependable source of water allowed intense cultivation of the fee land to provide the basic source of feed for the cattle. In connection with their fee land, respondents used 31,461 acres of adjacent public land on which they held revocable grazing permits issued under the Taylor Grazing Act. 43 U.S. C. 315 et seq.[1] The public land was used for grazing during favorable seasons, and roads running across the public land connected respondents' three parcels of fee land. The permits held by respondents on the public land accorded exclusive but revocable grazing rights to respondents. By the terms of the Act, the issuance of a permit does not "create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands." 43 U.S. C. 315b. Nonetheless, grazing permits are of considerable value to ranchers and serve a corresponding public interest in assuring the "most beneficial use" of range lands. Respondents' permits had not been revoked at the time of the taking, nor, so far as the record reveals, have they yet been revoked. The record also shows that only a small fraction of the public grazing land will be flooded in the dam and reservoir project. Thus, the public land which respondents assert gave added value to their fee land remains substantially intact and available for Taylor Grazing Act purposes. The District Court allowed respondents to introduce testimony as to the market value of the fee land which took into consideration its proximity to this public *496 land. In relevant part, the District Court instructed the jury as follows: "During the course of this trial, reference has been made to grazing permits held by the defendants on public land. You are instructed that such permits are mere licenses which may be revoked and are not compensable as such. However, should you determine that the highest and best use of the property taken is a use in conjunction with those permit lands, you |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Fuller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/ | is a use in conjunction with those permit lands, you may take those permits into consideration in arriving at your value of the subject land, keeping in mind the possibility that they may be withdrawn or canceled at any time without a constitutional obligation to pay the compensation therefor. "Evidence has been introduced of defendants' use of their deeded land which is being taken, in conjunction with surrounding land owned by the United States, for which defendants have grazing permits, and land belonging to the State of Arizona, which defendants leased. In fixing the fair market value of the fee land being taken and the compensation to be awarded, you are not to award defendants any compensation for the land owned by the United States or the State of Arizona. However, in determining the value of the fee land and in awarding compensation to the owners, you should consider the availability and accessibility of the permit and leased land and its use in conjunction with the fee land taken and give to the fee land such value as, in your judgment, according to the evidence, should be given on account of such availability and accessibility of the permit and leased land, if any. You should also consider the possibility that the permits on the United States land could be withdrawn at any time without constitutional obligation to pay compensation therefor and determine the effect you *497 feel such possibility, according to the evidence, would have upon the value of the fee land." App. 26-27. I have reproduced this extensive excerpt to underline the careful manner in which the condemnation jury was instructed. Contrary to the implication in the Government's framing of the question in this case,[2] the jury was not allowed to include "the value of revocable grazing permits." The instruction expressly stated that "such permits are mere licenses which may be revoked and are not compensable as such." The emphasis of the instruction was on the location of the fee land, with the resulting "availability and accessibility" of the adjacent public grazing land. I find the instruction to be an appropriate statement of the applicable principles of just compensation. The opinion of the Court recognizes that the just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment when the Government exercises its power of eminent domain is ordinarily the market value of the property taken. United It is commonplace, in determining market valuewhether *498 in condemnation or in private transactionsto consider such elements of value as derive from the location of the land. But today the Court enunciates an exception to these |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Fuller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/ | land. But today the Court enunciates an exception to these recognized principles where the value of the land to be condemned may be enhanced by its location in relation to Government-owned property. The Court relies on two lines of cases which, indeed, are said to go far toward establishing "the general principle that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements of value that the Government has created, or that it might have destroyed under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain." Ante, at 492. Applying this new principle to the present case, the Court now holds that since the Government "created" an element of value by owning grazing land and making it available under the Taylor Grazing Act, and since it has the power to "destroy" this element of value by barring respondents and others from the land, the condemnation jury must ignore the fact that respondents' land is adjacent to public land. Under this formulation, it is quite immaterial that the grazing land remains substantially intact, and that the Government has taken no action and none is shown to be contemplated in the record to convert such land to some other use. The test is not whether the Government has in fact put its property to some other use or removed it entirely; rather, it is quite simply whether the Government has the power to do this. Neither of the lines of cases on which the Court relies seems apposite. The first includes United in which the Court held that the Government need not pay for an increase in value occasioned *499 by the very project for which the land was condemned, and United in which the Court held that in condemning tugboats during wartime the Government need not offer compensation for an increase in value attributable to its own extraordinary wartime demand for such craft. These cases support only the modest generalization that compensation need not be afforded for an increase in market value stemming from the very Government undertaking which led to the condemnation. The other cases on which the Court relies, United and United deal with the condemnation of lands adjacent to navigable waters. In the condemnee owned land on the Columbia River which the United States condemned "in connection with the John Day Lock and Dam Project, authorized by Congress as part of a comprehensive plan for the development of the Columbia River." Relying on the "unique position" of the Government "in connection with navigable waters," ibid., the Court held that no special |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Fuller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/ | with navigable waters," ibid., the Court held that no special element of value could be accorded the land by virtue of its possible use as a port. In Twin City, the condemnee was holding land on the Savannah River as a potential hydroelectric powersite. The Government condemned the land as part of a major flood control, navigation, and hydroelectric project. By a bare majority vote, the Court held that the condemnee was not entitled to the "special water-rights value" of the land as a potential powersite, distinguishing other cases with the comment: "We have a different situation here, one where the United States displaces all competing interests and appropriates the entire flow of the river." *500 The water rights cases may be subject to varying interpretations, but it is important to remember when interpreting them that they cut sharply against the grain of the fundamental notion of just compensation, that a person from whom the Government takes land is entitled to the market value, including location value, of the land. They could well be confined to cases involving the Government's "unique position" with respect to "navigable waters."[3] At most, these cases establish a principle no broader than that the Government need not compensate for location value attributable to the proximity of Government property utilized in the same project. In as in Twin City, the river adjacent to the property condemned was the focal point of the development project which led to the condemnation. The Government simply decided to put the river to a new use and in connection with that new use condemned adjacent land. To understand why compensation is not required in such cases, it is important to distinguish the Government's role as condemnor from its role as property owner. While as condemnor the Government must pay market value, as property owner it may change the use of its property as if it were a private party, without paying compensation for the loss in value suffered by neighboring land. *501 When the Government condemns adjoining parcels of privately owned land for the same project, it may not take advantage of a drop in market value of one parcel resulting from the decision to condemn another. When, however, as in and Twin City, a project encompasses not only parcels of private land, but also the public property which enhances the value of the private land, a more difficult question is presented. In each of those cases, the Government held a dominant servitude over the flow of a river, and it condemned adjacent private lands in connection with a decision to |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Fuller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/ | condemned adjacent private lands in connection with a decision to exercise its servitude. Arguably, the measure of compensation for the taking of the private lands should have included the value of the riparian location unaffected by the Government's decision to exercise its own rights in the river. But this result would have impinged on the Government's right to use the river by raising the cost of any new use which required the condemnation of private land. Accordingly, in those cases the Court excluded evidence of riparian location value since the Government was exercising its lawful power to appropriate "the entire flow of the river." "The proper exercise of this power [over navigable waters] is not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been subject." United In any event, the present case is quite different. Respondents' lands were condemned not because the Government as property owner decided to put its grazing land to some other use and needed additional land, but *502 rather because the Government wanted respondents' land for a project which left the grazing land substantially intact and available.[4] The Government's role here is not an ambiguous one it is simply a condemnor of private land which happens to adjoin public land. If the Government need not pay location value in this case, what are the limits upon the principle today announced? Will the Government be relieved from paying location value whenever it condemns private property adjacent to or favorably located with respect to Government property?[5] Does the principle apply, for example, to the taking of a gasoline station at an interchange of a federal highway, or to the taking of a farm which in private hands could continue to be irrigated with water from a federal reservoir? The majority proposes to distinguish such cases with the "working rule" that "there is a significant difference between the value added to property by a completed public works project, for which the Government must pay, and the value added to fee lands by a revocable permit *503 authorizing the use of neighboring lands which the Government owns." Ante, at 492. The Court can hardly be drawing a distinction between Government-owned "completed public works" and Government-owned parks and grazing lands in their natural state. The "working rule" as articulated can, therefore, only mean that the respondents' revocable |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Fuller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108659/united-states-v-fuller/ | as articulated can, therefore, only mean that the respondents' revocable permit to use the neighboring lands is regarded by the Court as the distinguishing element. This is an acceptance of the Government's argument that the added value derives from the permit and not from the favorable location with respect to the grazing land.[6] The answer to this, not addressed either by the Government or the Court, is that the favorable location is the central fact. Even if no permit had been issued to these respondents, their three tracts of landlargely surrounded by the grazing landwere strategically located and logical beneficiaries of the Taylor Grazing Act. In determining the market value of respondents' land, surely this location whether or not a permit had been issued[7]would enter into any rational estimate of value. This is precisely the rationale of the District Court's jury instruction, which carefully distinguished between the revocable permits "not compensable as such" and the "availability and accessibility" of the grazing land. It is this distinction which the Court's opinion simply ignores. Finally, I do not think the Court's deviation from the market-value rule can be justified by invocation of long-established *504 "basic equitable principles of fairness." Ante, at 490. It hardly serves the principles of fairness as they have been understood in the law of just compensation to disregard what respondents could have obtained for their land on the open market in favor of its value artificially denuded of its surroundings.[8] I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | his case involves an employer’s claims against a local union and the union’s international parent for economic damages arising out of a 2004 strike. he claims turn in part on whether a collective-bargaining agreement (BA) containing a no-strike provision was validly formed during the strike period. he employer contends that it was, while the unions contend that it was not. Because the BA contains an arbitration we first address whether the parties’ dispute over the BA’s ratification date was a matter for the District ourt or an arbitrator to resolve. We conclude that it was a matter for judicial resolution. Next, we address whether the ourt of Ap peals erred in declining the employer’s request to recog nize a new federal cause of action under of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 1 Stat. 15, 29 U.S. for the international union’s alleged tortious interference with the BA. he ourt of Appeals did not err in declining this request. 2 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt I Petitioner Granite Rock ompany is a concrete and building materials company that has operated in alifor nia since 1900. Granite Rock employs approximately 800 employees under different labor contracts with several unions, including respondent International Brotherhood of eamsters, Local 287 (Local). Granite Rock and Local were parties to a 1999 BA that expired in April 2004. he parties’ attempt to negotiate a new BA hit an im passe and, on June 9, 2004, Local members initiated a strike in support of their contract demands.1 he strike continued until July 2, 2004, when the par ties reached agreement on the terms of a new BA. he BA contained a no-strike but did not directly address union members’ liability for any strike-related damages Granite Rock may have incurred before the new BA was negotiated but after the prior BA had expired. At the end of the negotiating session on the new BA, Local’s business representative, George Netto, approached Granite Rock about executing a separate “back-to-work” agreement that would, among other things, hold union members harmless for damages incurred during the June 2004 strike. Netto did not make execution of such an agreement a condition of Local’s ratification of the BA, or of Local’s decision to cease picketing. hus, Local did not have a back-to-work or hold-harmless agreement in place when it voted to ratify the BA on July 2, 2004. Respondent International Brotherhood of eamsters (IB), which had advised Local throughout the BA nego —————— 1 In deciding the arbitration question in this case we rely upon the terms of the BA |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | this case we rely upon the terms of the BA and the facts in the District ourt record. In review ing the judgment affirming dismissal of Granite Rock’s tort claims against respondent International Brotherhood of eamsters (IB) for failure to state a claim, we rely on the facts alleged in Granite Rock’s hird Amended omplaint. See, e.g., H. J. ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 3 Opinion of the ourt tiations and whose leadership and members supported the June strike, opposed Local’s decision to return to work without a back-to-work agreement shielding both Local and IB members from liability for strike-related dam ages. In an effort to secure such an agreement, IB in structed Local’s members not to honor their agreement to return to work on July 5, and instructed Local’s leaders to continue the work stoppage until Granite Rock agreed to hold Local and IB members free from liability for the June strike. Netto demanded such an agreement on July but Granite Rock refused the request and informed Local that the company would view any continued strike activity as a violation of the new BA’s no-strike IB and Local responded by announcing a company-wide strike that involved numerous facilities and hundreds of workers, including members of IB locals besides Local 287. According to Granite Rock, IB not only instigated this strike; it supported and directed it. IB provided pay and benefits to union members who refused to return to work, directed Local’s negotiations with Granite Rock, supported Local financially during the strike period with a $1.2 million loan, and represented to Granite Rock that IB had unilateral authority to end the work stoppage in exchange for a hold-harmless agreement covering IB members within and outside Local’s bargaining unit. On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock sued IB and Local in the District ourt, seeking an injunction against the ongoing strike and strike-related damages. Granite Rock’s complaint, originally and as amended, invoked federal jurisdiction under LMRA alleged that the July strike violated Local’s obligations under the BA’s no strike provision, and asked the District ourt to enjoin the strike because the hold-harmless dispute giving rise to the strike was an arbitrable grievance. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail lerks, 4 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt (holding that federal courts may enjoin a strike where a BA contemplates arbitration of the dispute that occa sions the strike). he unions conceded that LMRA gave the District ourt jurisdiction over the suit but op posed Granite Rock’s complaint, asserting that the BA was not validly ratified on July 2 (or |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | the BA was not validly ratified on July 2 (or at any other time relevant to the July 2004 strike) and, thus, its no-strike did not provide a basis for Granite Rock’s claims challenging the strike. he District ourt initially denied Granite Rock’s re quest to enforce the BA’s no-strike provision because Granite Rock was unable to produce evidence that the BA was ratified on July 2. App. 203–213. Shortly after the District ourt ruled, however, a Local member testi fied that Netto had put the new BA to a ratification vote on July 2, and that the voting Local members unani mously approved the agreement. Based on this statement and supporting testimony from 12 other employees, Gran ite Rock moved for a new trial on its injunction and dam ages claims. On August 22, while that motion was pending, Local conducted a second successful “ratification” vote on the BA, and on September 13, the day the District ourt was scheduled to hear Granite Rock’s motion, the unions called off their strike. Although their return to work mooted Granite Rock’s request for an injunction, the District ourt proceeded with the hearing and granted Granite Rock a new trial on its damages claims. he parties pro ceeded with discovery and Granite Rock amended its complaint, which already alleged federal2 claims for breach of the BA against both Local and IB, to add federal inducement of breach and interference with con —————— 2 his ourt has recognized a federal common-law claim for breach of a BA under LMRA See, e.g., extile ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 5 Opinion of the ourt tract (hereinafter tortious interference) claims against IB. IB and Local both moved to dismiss. Among other things, IB argued that Granite Rock could not plead a federal tort claim under because that provision supports a federal cause of action only for breach of con tract. he District ourt agreed and dismissed Granite Rock’s tortious interference claims. he District ourt did not, however, grant Local’s separate motion to send the parties’ dispute over the BA’s ratification date to arbitra tion.3 he District ourt held that whether the BA was ratified on July 2 or August 22 was an issue for the court to decide, and submitted the question to a jury. he jury reached a unanimous verdict that Local ratified the BA on July 2, 2004. he District ourt entered the verdict and ordered the parties to proceed with arbitration on Granite Rock’s breach-of-contract claims for strike-related damages. he ourt of Appeals for the Ninth ircuit affirmed in part and reversed |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | Appeals for the Ninth ircuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. See he ourt of Appeals affirmed the District ourt’s dismissal of Granite Rock’s tortious interference claims against IB. See at 1170–1175. But it disagreed with the District ourt’s determination that the date of the BA’s ratifica tion was a matter for judicial resolution. See at 117– 1178. he ourt of Appeals reasoned that the parties’ dispute over this issue was governed by the BA’s arbitra tion because the clearly covered the related strike claims, the “national policy favoring arbitration” required that any ambiguity about the scope of the parties’ arbitration be resolved in favor of arbitrability, and, —————— 3 he BA’s ratification date is important to Granite Rock’s underly ing suit for strike damages. If the District ourt correctly concluded that the BA was ratified on July 2, Granite Rock could argue on remand that the July work stoppage violated the BA’s no-strike GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt in any event, Granite Rock had “implicitly” consented to arbitrate the ratification-date dispute “by suing under the ” We granted certiorari. See 5 U. S. (2009). II It is well settled in both commercial and labor cases that whether parties have agreed to “submi[t] a particular dispute to arbitration” is typically an “ ‘ issue for judicial determination.’ ” ); see John Wiley & Sons, 54–547 (194). It is similarly well settled that where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is generally for courts to decide. See, e.g., First of hicago, (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter courts generally should apply ordinary principles that govern the formation of contracts”); A& − (explaining the settled rule in labor cases that “ ‘arbitration is a matter of con tract’ ” and “arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration”); heck ashing, (distinguishing treatment of the generally nonarbitral question whether an arbitration agreement was “ever concluded” from the question whether a contract con- taining an arbitration was illegal when formed, which question we held to be arbitrable in certain circumstances). hese principles would neatly dispose of this case if the formation dispute here were typical. But it is not. It is based on when (not whether) the BA that contains the parties’ arbitration was ratified and thereby ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 7 Opinion of the ourt formed.4 And at the time the District ourt considered Local’s demand to send this issue to an arbitrator, Granite Rock, |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | demand to send this issue to an arbitrator, Granite Rock, the party resisting arbitration, conceded both the formation and the validity of the BA’s arbitration hese unusual facts require us to reemphasize the proper framework for deciding when disputes are arbitra ble under our precedents. Under that framework, a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. See First ; A& −. o satisfy itself that such agreement exists, the court must resolve any issue that calls into question the formation or applicability of the specific arbitration that a party seeks to have the court enforce. See, e.g., Rent-A-enter, West, Inc. v. Jackson, ante, at 4− (opinion of SALIA, J.). Where there is no provision validly committing them to an arbitrator, see ante, at 7, these issues typically concern the scope of the arbitration and its enforceability. In addition, these issues always include whether the was agreed to, and may include when that agreement was formed. A he parties agree that it was proper for the District ourt to decide whether their ratification dispute was arbitrable.5 hey disagree about whether the District ourt answered the question correctly. Local contends that the District ourt erred in holding that the BA’s —————— 4 Although a union ratification vote is not always required for the provisions in a BA to be considered validly formed, the parties agree that ratification was such a predicate here. See App. 349–351. 5 Because neither party argues that the arbitrator should decide this question, there is no need to apply the rule requiring “ ‘clear and unmistakable’ ” evidence of an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability. First of hicago, (alterations omitted)). 8 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt ratification date was an issue for the court to decide. he ourt of Appeals agreed, holding that the District ourt’s refusal to send that dispute to arbitration violated two principles of arbitrability set forth in our precedents. See −1178. he first principle is that where, as here, parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration the “law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration” counsel that “ ‘ any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’ ” First at 945 ); see 54 F.3d, at 1177−1178 (citing this principle and the “national policy favoring arbitration” in concluding that arbitration s “are to be construed very broadly” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). he second principle the ourt of Appeals invoked is that |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | he second principle the ourt of Appeals invoked is that this presumption of arbitrability applies even to disputes about the enforce ability of the entire contract containing the arbitration because at least in cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S. et seq., courts must treat the arbitration as severable from the contract in which it appears, and thus apply the to all dis putes within its scope “ ‘[u]nless the [validity] challenge is to the arbitration itself’ ” or the party “disputes the —————— We, like the ourt of Appeals, discuss precedents applying the FAA because they employ the same rules of arbitrability that govern labor cases. See, e.g., A& Indeed, the rule that arbitration is strictly a matter of consent—and thus that courts must typically decide any questions concerning the formation or scope of an arbitration agreement before ordering parties to comply with it— is the cornerstone of the framework the ourt announced in the Steel workers rilogy for deciding arbitrability disputes in LMRA cases. See ; ; ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 9 Opinion of the ourt formation of [the] contract,” (quoting −44); and n. 4 (explaining that it would treat the parties’ arbitration as enforceable with respect to the ratification-date dispute because no party argued that the “ is invalid in any way”)). Local contends that our precedents, particularly those applying the “ ‘ federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,’ ” permit no other result. Brief for Respondent Local, p. 15 ); see Brief for Respondent Local, pp. 10–13; 1–25. Local, like the ourt of Appeals, over reads our precedents. he language and holdings on which Local and the ourt of Appeals rely cannot be di vorced from the first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is strictly “a matter of consent,” Information Sciences, and thus “is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to sub mit to arbitration,” First 514 U.S., (em phasis added).7 Applying this principle, our precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue. Where a party contests either or both matters, “the court” must resolve the disagreement. Local nonetheless interprets some of our opinions to depart from this framework and to require arbitration of —————— 7 See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, ; Dean Witter |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, ; Dean Witter Reynolds 219– 220 ; ; A& ; & at ; United 10 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt certain disputes, particularly labor disputes, based on policy grounds even where evidence of the parties’ agree ment to arbitrate the dispute in question is lacking. See Brief for Respondent Local, p. 1 (citing cases emphasizing the policy favoring arbitration generally and the “impres sive policy considerations favoring arbitration” in LMRA cases ). hat is not a fair reading of the opinions, all of which compelled arbitra tion of a dispute only after the ourt was persuaded that the parties’ arbitration agreement was validly formed and that it covered the dispute in question and was legally enforceable. See, e.g., First at –945. hat and some of our cases applying a presump tion of arbitrability to certain disputes do not discuss each of these requirements merely reflects the fact that in those cases some of the requirements were so obviously satisfied that no discussion was needed. In the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement was not at issue because the parties agreed that they had “concluded” an agreement to arbitrate and memorialized it as an arbitration in their loan 54 U.S., at he arbitration ’s scope was also not at issue, because the provision ex pressly applied to “ ‘[a]ny claim, dispute, or controversy arising from or relating to the validity, enforceability, or scope of this Arbitration Provision or the entire Agree ment.’ ” he parties resisting arbitration (customers who agreed to the broad arbitration as a condition of using ’s loan service) claimed only that a usurious interest provision in the loan agreement invalidated the entire contract, including the arbitration and thus precluded the ourt from relying on the as evidence of the parties’ consent to arbitrate matters within its scope. See In rejecting this argument, we simply applied the requirement in of the FAA that courts treat an arbitration as severable ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 11 Opinion of the ourt from the contract in which it appears and enforce it ac cording to its terms unless the party resisting arbitration specifically challenges the enforceability of the arbitration itself, see −445 ; Prima Paint 402−404 (197)), or claims that the agreement to arbitrate was “[n]ever concluded,” 54 U.S., at ; see also Rent-A-enter, ante, at −7, and n. 2. Our cases invoking the federal “policy favoring arbitra tion” of commercial and labor disputes apply the same framework. hey recognize that, except where “the par ties clearly and unmistakably |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | recognize that, except where “the par ties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,” A& 475 U.S., at it is “the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning” a particular matter, hey then discharge this duty by: (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agree ment is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand; and (2) adhering to the presumption and ordering arbitration only where the presumption is not rebutted. See –52; Prima Paint at 39–398; Gateway oal 374– ; Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 25–2 ; ; Steelworkers v. & Nav. o.,8 —————— 8 hat our labor arbitration precedents apply this rule is hardly sur prising. As noted above, see n. the rule is the foundation for the arbitrability framework this ourt announced in the Steelworkers rilogy. Local’s assertion that & suggests otherwise is misplaced. Although & contains language that might in isolation be misconstrued as establishing a presumption that labor disputes are arbitrable whenever they are not expressly excluded from an arbitration 33 U.S., at 8–, the opinion elsewhere 12 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt Local is thus wrong to suggest that the presumption of arbitrability we sometimes apply takes courts outside our settled framework for deciding arbitrability. he pre sumption simply assists in resolving arbitrability disputes within that framework. onfining the presumption to this role reflects its foundation in “the federal policy favoring arbitration.” As we have explained, this “policy” is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to “overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” (inter nal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, we have never held that this policy overrides the principle that a court may submit to arbitration “only those dis putes that the parties have agreed to submit.” First 514 U.S., ; see also (“[]he FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contract parties”); A& ech 475 U.S., −51 (applying the same rule to the “presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes”). Nor —————— emphasizes that even in LMRA cases, “courts” must construe arbitra tion s because “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitra tion any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” at (applying this rule and finding the dispute at issue arbitrable only after determining that the parties’ arbitration could be construed under standard principles of contract interpretation to cover it). Our |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | under standard principles of contract interpretation to cover it). Our use of the same rules in FAA cases is also unsurprising. he rules are suggested by the statute itself. Section 2 of the FAA requires courts to enforce valid and enforceable arbitration agreements accord ing to their terms. And provides in pertinent part that where a party invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court over a matter that the court could adjudicate but for the presence of an arbitration “[t]he court shall hear the parties” and “direc[t] the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement” except “[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue,” in which case “the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” 9 U.S. ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 13 Opinion of the ourt have we held that courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement. See, e.g., at 48−51; We have applied the pre sumption favoring arbitration, in FAA and in labor cases, only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is what the parties intended because their express agree ment to arbitrate was validly formed and (absent a provi sion clearly and validly committing such issues to an arbitrator) is legally enforceable and best construed to encompass the dispute. See First at – 945 (citing 473 U.S., at ); Howsam, 537 U.S., at –84; A& (citing & at –5); Drake Bakeries, su pra, at 259–20. his simple framework compels reversal of the ourt of Appeals’ judgment because it requires judicial resolution of two questions central to Local’s arbitration demand: when the BA was formed, and whether its arbitration covers the matters Local wishes to arbitrate. B We begin by addressing the grounds on which the ourt of Appeals reversed the District ourt’s decision to decide the parties’ ratification-date dispute, which the parties characterize as a formation dispute because a union vote ratifying the BA’s terms was necessary to form the con tract. See App. 351.9 For purposes of determining arbi —————— 9 he parties’ dispute about the BA’s ratification date presents a formation question in the sense above, and is therefore not on all fours with, for example, the formation disputes we referenced in heck ashing, which concerned whether, not when, an agreement to arbitrate was “con cluded.” hat said, the manner in which the BA’s ratification date relates to Local’s arbitration demand makes the ratification-date dispute in this case one that |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | demand makes the ratification-date dispute in this case one that requires judicial resolution. See infra, at 14−19. 14 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt trability, when a contract is formed can be as critical as whether it was formed. hat is the case where, as here, the date on which an agreement was ratified determines the date the agreement was formed, and thus determines whether the agreement’s provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the parties’ dispute.10 his formation date question requires judicial resolution here because it relates to Local’s arbitration demand in such a way that the District ourt was required to decide the BA’s ratification date in order to determine whether the parties consented to arbitrate the matters covered by the demand.11 he parties agree that the BA’s arbitra tion pertains only to disputes that “arise under” the agreement. Accordingly, to hold the parties’ ratification date dispute arbitrable, the ourt of Appeals had to decide whether that dispute could be characterized as “arising under” the BA. In answering this question in the af firmative, both Local and the ourt of Appeals tied the arbitrability of the ratification-date issue—which Local raised as a defense to Granite Rock’s strike claims—to the arbitrability of the strike claims themselves. See at 347. hey did so because the BA’s arbitration which pertains only to disputes “arising under” the BA —————— 10 Our conclusions about the significance of the BA’s ratification date to the specific arbitrability question before us do not disturb the general rule that parties may agree to arbitrate past disputes or future disputes based on past events. 11 In reaching this conclusion we need not, and do not, decide whether every dispute over a BA’s ratification date would require judicial resolution. We recognize that ratification disputes in labor cases may often qualify as “formation disputes” for contract law purposes because contract law defines formation as acceptance of an offer on specified terms, and in many labor cases ratification of a BA is necessary to satisfy this formation requirement. See App. 349−351. But it is not the mere labeling of a dispute for contract law purposes that determines whether an issue is arbitrable. he test for arbitrability remains whether the parties consented to arbitrate the dispute in question. ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 15 Opinion of the ourt and thus presupposes the BA’s existence, would seem plainly to cover a dispute that “arises under” a specific substantive provision of the BA, but does not so obvi ously cover disputes about the BA’s own formation. Accordingly, the ourt |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | cover disputes about the BA’s own formation. Accordingly, the ourt of Appeals relied upon the ratifica tion dispute’s relationship to Granite Rock’s claim that Local breached the BA’s no-strike (a claim the ourt of Appeals viewed as clearly “arising under” the BA) to conclude that “the arbitration is certainly ‘susceptible of an interpretation’ that covers” Local’s for mation-date n. 4. he ourt of Appeals overlooked the fact that this the ory of the ratification dispute’s arbitrability fails if the BA was not formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to Granite Rock’s strike claims. he unions began their strike on July 2004, and Granite Rock filed its suit on July 9. If, as Local asserts, the BA containing the parties’ arbitration was not ratified, and thus not formed, until August 22, there was no BA for the July no-strike dispute to “arise under,” and thus no valid basis for the ourt of Appeals’ conclusion that Gran ite Rock’s July 9 claims arose under the BA and were thus arbitrable along with, by extension, Local’s formation date defense to those claims.12 See For the foregoing reasons, resolution of the parties’ dispute about whether the BA was ratified in July or August was central to deciding Local’s arbitration demand. Accordingly, the ourt of Appeals erred in holding that it was not neces sary for the District ourt to determine the BA’s ratifica tion date in order to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate Granite Rock’s no-strike claim or the ratification date dispute Local raised as a defense to that claim. —————— 12 his analysis pertains only to the ourt of Appeals’ decision, which did not engage the 11th-hour retroactivity argument Local raised in its merits brief in this ourt, and that we address below. 1 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt Local seeks to address this flaw in the ourt of Appeals’ decision by arguing that in December 2004 the parties executed a document that rendered the BA effective as of May 1, 2004 (the date the prior BA expired), and that this effective-date language rendered the BA’s arbitra tion (but not its no-strike ) applicable to the July strike period notwithstanding Local’s view that the agreement was ratified in August (which ratification date Local continues to argue controls the period during which the no-strike applies). See Brief for Respondent Local, pp. 2–27; r. of Oral Arg. 32, 37−39. he ourt of Appeals did not rule on the merits of this claim (i.e., it did not decide whether the BA’s effective date |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | (i.e., it did not decide whether the BA’s effective date language indeed renders some or all of the agreement’s provisions retroactively applicable to May 2004), and we need not do so either. Even accepting Local’s assertion that it raised this retroactivity argument in the District ourt, see Brief for Respondent Local, p. 2,13 Local did not raise this argument in the ourt of Appeals. Nor, more importantly, did Local’s brief in opposition to Granite Rock’s petition for certiorari raise the argument as an alternative ground on which this ourt could or should affirm the ourt of Ap peals’ judgment finding the ratification-date dispute arbi trable for the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the argument is properly “deemed waived.” his ourt’s Rule 15.2; arcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. (2009) (slip op., at 15−1).14 —————— 13 his claim is questionable because Local’s February 2005 refer ences to the agreement “now in effect” are not obviously equivalent to the express retroactivity argument Local asserts in its merits brief in this ourt. See Brief for Respondent Local, pp. 2−27. 14 JUSIE SOOMAYOR’s conclusion that we should nonetheless excuse Local’s waiver and consider the retroactivity argument, see post, at 5− (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), is flawed. his ourt’s Rule 15.2 reflects the fact that our adversarial system assigns both sides responsibility for framing the issues in a case. he impor tance of enforcing the Rule is evident in cases where, as here, excusing ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 17 Opinion of the ourt Although the foregoing is sufficient to reverse the ourt of Appeals’ judgment, there is an additional reason to do so: he dispute here, whether labeled a formation dispute or not, falls outside the scope of the parties’ arbitration on grounds the presumption favoring arbitration cannot cure. Section 20 of the BA provides in relevant part that “[a]ll disputes arising under this agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the [Grievance] procedure,” which includes arbitration. App. 434 (emphasis added); see also at 434–437. he parties’ ratification-date dispute cannot properly be characterized as falling within the (relatively narrow, cf., e.g., Drake Bakeries Inc., 370 U.S., at 25–2) scope of this provision for at least two reasons. First, we do not think the question whether the BA was validly ratified on July 2, 2004—a question that concerns the BA’s very existence—can fairly be said to “arise under” the BA. Second, even if the “arising under” language could in isolation be construed to cover this dispute, Section 20’s remaining provisions all but foreclose such a reading by describing that section’s arbitration |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | but foreclose such a reading by describing that section’s arbitration requirement as applicable to labor disagreements that are addressed in the BA and are subject to its requirement of mandatory mediation. See App. 434–437 (requiring arbi tration of disputes “arising under” the BA, but only after the Union and Employer have exhausted mandatory mediation, and limiting any arbitration decision under this provision to those “within the scope and terms of this agreement and specifically limited to the matter submitted”). —————— a party’s noncompliance with it would require this ourt to decide, in the first instance, a question whose resolution could affect this and other cases in a manner that the District ourt and ourt of Appeals did not have an opportunity to consider, and that the parties’ argu ments before this ourt may not fully address. 18 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt he ourt of Appeals’ contrary conclusion does not find support in the text of 0. he ourt of Appeals’ only effort to grapple with that text misses the point because it focuses on whether Granite Rock’s claim to enforce the BA’s no-strike provisions could be characterized as “aris ing under” the agreement. See n. 4. Even assuming that claim can be characterized as “arising under” the BA, it is not the issue here. he issue is whether the formation-date defense that Local raised in response to Granite Rock’s no-strike suit can be character ized as “arising under” the BA. It cannot for the reasons we have explained, namely, the BA provision requiring arbitration of disputes “arising under” the BA is not fairly read to include a dispute about when the BA came into existence. he ourt of Appeals erred in failing to address this question and holding instead that the arbitra tion is “susceptible of an interpretation” that covers Local’s formation-date defense to Granite Rock’s suit “[b]ecause Granite Rock is suing ‘under’ the alleged new BA” and “[a]rbitration s are to be construed very broadly.” ; see also D Local’s remaining argument in support of the ourt of Appeals’ judgment is similarly unavailing. Local reiter ates the ourt of Appeals’ conclusion that Granite Rock “implicitly” consented to arbitration when it sued to en force the BA’s no-strike and arbitrable grievance provi sions. See Brief for Respondent Local, pp. 17–18. We do not agree that by seeking an injunction against the strike so the parties could arbitrate the labor grievance that gave rise to it, Granite Rock also consented to arbitrate the ratification (formation) date dispute we address above. See 54 F.3d, It is of |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | dispute we address above. See 54 F.3d, It is of course true that when Granite Rock sought that injunction it viewed the BA (and all of its provisions) as enforceable. But Granite ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 19 Opinion of the ourt Rock’s decision to sue for compliance with the BA’s grievance procedures on strike-related matters does not establish an agreement, “implicit” or otherwise, to arbi trate an issue (the BA’s formation date) that Granite Rock did not raise, and that Granite Rock has always (and rightly, see Part II−, characterized as beyond the scope of the BA’s arbitration he mere fact that Local raised the formation date dispute as a defense to Granite Rock’s suit does not make that dispute attribut able to Granite Rock in the waiver or estoppel sense the ourt of Appeals suggested, see 54 F.3d, much less establish that Granite Rock agreed to arbitrate it by suing to enforce the BA as to other matters. Accordingly, we hold that the parties’ dispute over the BA’s formation date was for the District ourt, not an arbitrator, to re solve, and remand for proceedings consistent with that conclusion. III We turn now to the claims available on remand. he parties agree that Granite Rock can bring a breach-of contract claim under LMRA against Local as a BA signatory, and against IB as Local’s agent or alter ego. See Brief for Respondent IB 10–13; Reply Brief for Petitioner 12–13 and n. 11.15 he question is whether —————— 15 Although the parties concede the general availability of such a claim against IB, they dispute whether Granite Rock abandoned its agency or alter ego allegations in the course of this litigation. ompare Brief for Respondent IB, p. 10 with Reply Brief for Petitioner 12–13, n. 11. Granite Rock concedes that it has abandoned its claim that IB acted as Local’s undisclosed principal in orchestrating the ratification response to the July 2, 2004, BA. See Plaintiff Granite Rock’s Memo randum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant IB’s Motion to Dismiss in No. 5:04–cv–0277–JW Doc. 178, pp. 8 (hereinafter Points and Authorities). But Granite Rock insists that it preserved its argument that Local served as IB’s agent or alter ego when Local denied ratification and engaged in 20 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt Granite Rock may also bring a federal tort claim under for IB’s alleged interference with the BA.1 Brief for Petitioner 32. he ourt of Appeals joined virtu ally all other ircuits in holding that it would not recog nize such a claim |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | holding that it would not recog nize such a claim under Granite Rock asks us to reject this position as inconsis tent with federal labor law’s goal of promoting industrial peace and economic stability through judicial enforcement of BAs, as well as with our precedents holding that a federal common law of labor contracts is necessary to further this goal. See ; see also, e.g., extile Explaining that IB’s conduct in this case undermines the very core of the bargaining relationship federal labor laws exist to protect, Granite Rock argues that a federal common-law tort remedy for IB’s conduct is necessary because other potential avenues for deterring and redress ing such conduct are either unavailable or insufficient. See Brief for Petitioner 32–33; Reply Brief for Petitioner 19–20. On the unavailable side of the ledger Granite Rock lists state-law tort claims, some of which this ourt has held pre-empts, as well as administrative (unfair labor practices) claims, which Granite Rock says the Na tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cannot entertain —————— unauthorized strike activity in July 2004. Nothing in the record before us unequivocally refutes this assertion. See App. 30, 311–315, 318; Points and Authorities n. 3. Accordingly, nothing in this opinion forecloses the parties from litigating these claims on remand. 1 IB argues that we should dismiss this question as improvidently granted because Granite Rock abandoned its tortious interference claim when it declared its intention to seek only contractual (as opposed to punitive) damages on the claim. See Brief for Respondent IB 1. We reject this argument, which confuses Granite Rock’s decision to forgo the pursuit of punitive damages on its claim with a decision to abandon the claim itself. he two are not synonymous, and IB cites no author ity for the proposition that Granite Rock must allege more than eco nomic damages to state a claim on which relief could be granted. ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 21 Opinion of the ourt against international unions that (like IB) are not part of the certified local bargaining unit they allegedly control. On the insufficient side of the ledger Granite Rock lists federal common-law breach-of-contract claims, which Granite Rock says are difficult to prove against non-BA signatories like IB because international unions struc ture their relationships with local unions in a way that makes agency or alter ego difficult to establish. Based on these assessments, Granite Rock suggests that this case presents us with the choice of either recognizing the fed eral common-law tort claim Granite Rock seeks or sanc tioning conduct inconsistent with federal labor statutes and our |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | sanc tioning conduct inconsistent with federal labor statutes and our own precedents. See Brief for Petitioner 13–14. We do not believe the choice is as stark as Granite Rock implies. It is of course true that we have construed “Sec tion 301 [to] authoriz[e] federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.” Lewis v. Benedict oal 31 U.S. 459, 470 (citing Lincoln But we have also emphasized that in developing this common law we “did not envision any freewheeling inquiry into what the fed eral courts might find to be the most desirable rule.” Howard Johnson o. v. Hotel Employees, 255 he balance federal statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-bargaining arena is carefully calibrated, see, e.g., 32 U.S. 274, and as the parties’ briefs illustrate, creating a federal common-law tort cause of action would require a host of policy choices that could easily upset this balance, see Brief for Respondent IB 42–44; Reply Brief for Petitioner 22–25. It is thus no surprise that virtually all ourts of Appeals have held that federal courts’ authority to “create a federal common law of collective bargaining agreements under section 301” should be confined to “a common law of contracts, not a source of independent rights, let alone tort rights; for 22 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt section 301 is a grant of jurisdiction only to enforce contracts.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives o., F.3d 117, 1180 (A7 1993). We see no reason for a different result here because it would be premature to recognize the federal common law tort Granite Rock re quests in this case even assuming that authorizes us to do so. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the question before us is a narrow one. It is not whether the conduct Granite Rock challenges is remediable, but whether we should augment the claims already available to Granite Rock by creating a new federal common-law cause of action under hat we decline to do so does not mean that we approve of IB’s alleged actions. Granite Rock describes a course of conduct that does indeed seem to strike at the heart of the collective bargaining process federal labor laws were designed to protect. As the record in this case demonstrates, however, a new federal tort claim is not the only possible remedy for this conduct. Granite Rock’s allegations have prompted favorable judgments not only from a federal jury, but also from the NLRB. In proceedings that predated those in which the District ourt entered |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | proceedings that predated those in which the District ourt entered judgment for Granite Rock on the BA’s formation date,17 the NLRB concluded that a “complete agreement” was reached on July 2, and that Local and IB violated federal labor laws by attempt ing to delay the BA’s ratification pending execution of a separate agreement favorable to IB. See In re eamsters Local 287, 347 N. L. R. B. 339, 340–341, and n. 1 ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 23 Opinion of the ourt Local and IB on the grounds that IB did not disaffiliate from the AFL–IO until July 25, 2005). hese proceedings, and the proceedings that remain to be conducted on remand, buttress our conclusion that Granite Rock’s case for a new federal common-law cause of action is based on assumptions about the adequacy of other avenues of relief that are at least questionable be cause they have not been fully tested in this case and thus their efficacy is simply not before us to evaluate. Notably, Granite Rock (like IB and the ourt of Appeals) assumes that federal common law provides the only possible basis for the type of tort claim it wishes to pursue. See Brief for Respondent IB 33–34; Reply Brief for Petitioner 1. But Granite Rock did not litigate below, and thus does not present us with occasion to address, whether state law might provide a remedy. See, e.g., 495 U.S. 32, 39−371 ; extron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVO v. Automobile Workers, 523 U.S. 53, 5, 58 Nor did Granite Rock fully explore the breach-of-contract and administra tive causes of action it suggests are insufficient to remedy IB’s conduct. For example, far from establishing that an agency or alter ego claim against IB would be unsuccess ful, the record in this case suggests it might be easier to prove than usual if, as the NLRB’s decision observes, IB and Local were affiliated in 2004 in a way relevant to Granite Rock’s claims. See In re eamsters Local 287, at 340, n. Similarly, neither party has estab lished that the Board itself could not issue additional relief against IB. IB’s amici argue that the “overlap between Granite Rock’s claim against the IB and the NLRB General ounsel’s unfair labor practice com plaint against Local 287 brings into play the National Labor Relations Act rule that an international union commits an unfair labor practice by causing its affiliated local unions to ‘impose extraneous non-bargaining unit 24 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of the ourt considerations into the collective bargaining process.’ ” Brief for American |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | considerations into the collective bargaining process.’ ” Brief for American Federation of Labor et al. 30–31 (quot ing Paperworkers Local 20, 309 N. L. R. B. 44, 44 (1992)). he fact that at least one ourt of Appeals has recognized the viability of such a claim, see 95 F.2d 1401, 1407−1409 (A 1992), further persuades us that Granite Rock’s argu ments do not justify recognition of a new federal tort claim under * * * We reverse the ourt of Appeals’ judgment on the arbi trability of the parties’ formation-date dispute, affirm its judgment dismissing Granite Rock’s claims against IB to the extent those claims depend on the creation of a new federal common-law tort cause of action under and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 1 Opinion of SOOMAYOR, J. SUPREME OUR OF HE UNIED SAES No. 08–1214 GRANIE ROK OMPANY, PEIIONER v. INERNAIONAL BROHERHOOD OF EAMSERS E AL. ON WRI OF ERIORARI O HE UNIED SAES OUR OF APPEALS FOR HE NINH IRUI [June 24, 0] JUSIE SOOMAYOR, with whom JUSIE SEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join Part III of the ourt’s opinion, which holds that petitioner Granite Rock’s tortious interference claim against respondent International Brotherhood of eam sters (IB) is not cognizable under of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S. 85(a). I respectfully dissent, however, from the ourt’s conclusion that the arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement (BA) between Granite Rock and IB Local 287 does not cover the parties’ dispute over whether Local 287 breached the BA’s no-strike In my judgment, the parties clearly agreed in the BA to have this dispute resolved by an arbitrator, not a court. he legal principles that govern this case are simpler than the ourt’s exposition suggests. Arbitration, all agree, “is a matter of contract and a party cannot be re quired to submit to arbitration any dispute which [it] has not agreed so to submit.” Steelworkers v. & Nav. o., Before ordering par ties to arbitrate, a court must therefore confirm (1) that the parties have an agreement to arbitrate and (2) that the agreement covers their dispute. See ante, at 9. In determining the scope of an arbitration agreement, “there 2 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of SOOMAYOR, J. is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that ‘[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration is not susceptible of |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | with positive assurance that the arbitration is not susceptible of an interpreta tion that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.’ ” A& Inc. v. ommunications Workers, 50 (quot ing 33 U.S., at –5); see also John Wiley & Sons, (194) (“[W]hen a contract is scrutinized for evidence of an inten tion to arbitrate a particular kind of dispute, national labor policy requires, within reason, that an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute be favored” (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted)).1 he application of these established precepts to the facts of this case strikes me as equally straightforward: It is undisputed that Granite Rock and Local 287 executed a BA in December 2004. he parties made the BA retro actively “effect[ive] from May 1, 2004,” the day after the expiration of their prior collective-bargaining agreement. App. to Pet. for ert. A–190. Among other things, the BA prohibited strikes and lockouts. at A–181. he BA authorized either party, in accordance with certain grievance procedures, to “refe[r] to arbitration” “[a]ll dis putes arising under this agreement,” except for three —————— 1 When the question is “ ‘who (primarily) should decide arbitrability’ ” (as opposed to “ ‘whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitra ble’ ”), “the law reverses the presumption.” First of hicago, –945 In other words, “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,” it is presumed that courts, not arbitrators, are responsible for resolving antecedent questions concerning the scope of an arbitration agreement. A& As the majority correctly observes, ante, at 7, n. 5, this case does not implicate the reversed presumption because both parties accept that a court, not an arbitrator, should resolve their current disagreement about whether their underlying dispute is arbitrable. ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 3 Opinion of SOOMAYOR, J. specified “classes of disputes” not implicated here. at A–17 to A–179. Granite Rock claims that Local 287 breached the BA’s no-strike by engaging in a work stoppage in July 2004. Local 287 contests this claim. Specifically, it con tends that it had no duty to abide by the no-strike in July because it did not vote to ratify the BA until August. As I see it, the parties’ disagreement as to whether the no-strike proscribed the July work stoppage is plainly a “disput[e] arising under” the BA and is therefore subject to arbitration as Local 287 de mands. Indeed, the parties’ no-strike dispute is indistin guishable from myriad other disputes that an employer and union might have concerning the interpretation and application of the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | and application of the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. hese are precisely the sorts of controversies that labor arbitrators are called upon to resolve every day. he majority seems to agree that the BA’s arbitration provision generally encompasses disputes between Gran ite Rock and Local 287 regarding the parties’ compliance with the terms of the BA, including the no-strike he majority contends, however, that Local 287’s “forma tion-date defense” raises a preliminary question of con tract formation that must be resolved by a court rather than an arbitrator. Ante, at 15. he majority’s reasoning appears to be the following: If Local 287 did not ratify the BA until August, then there is “no valid basis” for apply ing the BA’s arbitration provision to events that occurred in July. he majority’s position is flatly inconsistent with the language of the BA. he parties expressly chose to make the agreement effective from May 1, 2004. As a result, “the date on which [the] agreement was ratified” does not, as the majority contends, determine whether the parties’ dispute about the permissibility of the July work stoppage 4 GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of SOOMAYOR, J. falls within the scope of the BA’s arbitration provision. Ante, at 14. When it comes to answering the arbitrability question, it is entirely irrelevant whether Local 287 rati fied the BA in August (as it contends) or in July (as Granite Rock contends). In either case, the parties’ dis pute—which postdates May 1—clearly “aris[es] under” the BA, which is all the arbitration provision requires to make a dispute referable to an arbitrator. f. Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, (recognizing that “a collective-bargaining agreement might be drafted so as to eliminate any hiatus between expiration of the old and execution of the new agreement”).2 Given the BA’s express retroactivity, the majority errs in treating Local 287’s ratification-date defense as a “for mation dispute” subject to judicial resolution. Ante, at 13. he defense simply goes to the merits of Granite Rock’s claim: Local 287 maintains that the no-strike should not be construed to apply to the July work stoppage because it had not ratified the BA at the time of that action. f. First of hicago, 514 U.S. 9, 942 (distinguishing a disagreement that “makes up the merits of the dispute” from a disagreement “about the arbitrability of the dispute”). Accordingly, the defense is necessarily a matter for the arbitrator, not the court. See A&, 475 U.S., (“In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think |
Justice Thomas | 2,010 | 1 | majority | Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149288/granite-rock-co-v-teamsters/ | express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitra tion can prevail”). ite as: 51 U. S. (0) 5 Opinion of SOOMAYOR, J. stantive interpretations of the agreement”). Indeed, this ourt has been emphatic that “courts have no business weighing the merits of the grievance.” Steelworkers v. American Mfg. o., 58 “When the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a griev ance under the guise of interpreting the [arbitration provi sions] of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.” at 59; see also A&, 475 U.S., at (“[I]n deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the po tential merits of the underlying claims”); 33 U.S., at 585 (“[]he judicial inquiry under [LMRA] must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance”; “the court should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement”). Attempting to sidestep this analysis, the majority de clares that Local 287 waived its retroactivity argument by failing in the courts below to challenge Granite Rock’s consistent characterization of the parties’ dispute as one of contract formation. See ante, at 1. As a result of Local 287’s omission, the District ourt and ourt of Appeals proceeded under the understanding that this case pre sented a formation question. It was not until its merits brief in this ourt that Local 287 attempted to correct this mistaken premise by pointing to the parties’ execution of the December 2004 BA with its May 2004 effective date. his ourt’s rules “admonis[h] [counsel] that they have an obligation to the ourt to point out in the brief in opposi tion [to certiorari], and not later, any perceived misstate ment made in the petition [for certiorari]”; nonjurisdic tional arguments not raised at that time “may be deemed waived.” his ourt’s Rule 15.2. Although it is regretta ble and inexcusable that Local 287 did not present its GRANIE ROK O. v. EAMSERS Opinion of SOOMAYOR, J. argument earlier, I do not see it as one we can ignore. he question presented in this case presupposes that “it is disputed whether any binding contract exists.” Brief for Petitioner i. Because it is instead undisputed that the parties executed a binding contract in December 2004 that was effective as of May 2004, we can scarcely pretend that the parties have a |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110797/united-states-v-valenzuela-bernal/ | I concur in the judgment of the Court essentially for the reasons set forth by Judge Roney, in writing for a panel of the former Fifth Circuit, in United At least a "plausible theory" of how the testimony of the deported witnesses would be helpful to the defense must be offered. None was advanced here; therefore, the motion to dismiss the indictment was properly denied by the District Court. *875 JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." In short, the right to compulsory process is essential to a fair trial. Today's decision, I fear, may not protect adequately the interests of the prosecution and the defense in a fair trial, and may encourage litigation over whether the defendant has made a "plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense." Ante, at 873. A preferable approach would be to accommodate both the Government's interest in prompt deportation of illegal aliens and the defendant's need to interview alien witnesses in order to decide which of them can provide material evidence for the defense. Through a suitable standard, imposed on the federal courts under our supervisory powers, a practical accommodation can be reached without any increase in litigation. I One cannot discount the importance of the Federal Government's role in the regulation of immigration.[1] As the Court points out, Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agency authorized to make such policy decisions, *876 have decided that prompt deportation is the appropriate response to the tremendous influx of illegal aliens. Ante, at 864. The Court is also correct that the Federal Government has legitimate reasons for reducing the number of illegal aliens detained for possible use as material witnesses. Particularly because most of the detained aliens are never called to testify, we should be careful not to permit either needless human suffering or excessive burdens on the Federal Government. Under these circumstances, courts should be especially circumspect about interfering with congressional judgments. Nevertheless, the constitutional obligation of the Executive to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U. S. Const., Art. II, including the immigration laws, does not lessen the importance of affording the defendant the "fundamental fairness" inherent in due process, 314 U.S. 2, (41). Moreover, the defendant's express right |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110797/united-states-v-valenzuela-bernal/ | process, 314 U.S. 2, (41). Moreover, the defendant's express right in the Sixth Amendment to compel the testimony of "witnesses in his favor," requires recognition of the importance, both to the individual defendant and to the integrity of the criminal justice system, of permitting the defendant the opportunity to interview eyewitnesses to the alleged crime. A governmental policy of deliberately putting potential defense witnesses beyond the reach of compulsory process is not easily reconciled with the spirit of the Compulsory Process Clause. II The Court's solution to this apparent conflict between the Executive's duty to enforce the immigration laws and its duty not to impair the defendant's rights to due process and compulsory process is to permit the Government to deport potential alien witnesses, and to put the burden on the defendant of making a plausible showing that the deported aliens would have provided material and relevant evidence. The Court's approach thus permits the Government to make *877 a practice of deporting alien witnesses immediately, taking only the risk that the defendant will be able to show that the deported witnesses, whom the defendant's counsel never will be able to interview, would have provided useful testimony. In effect, to the extent that the Government has conflicting obligations, the defendant is selected to carry the burden of their resolution. As the Court poses the issue today, the only alternatives are either to (1) permit routine deportation of witnesses and require the defendant to make some showing of prejudice, or (2) delay deportation so that defense counsel can interview the potential witnesses, and provide for automatic dismissal of the indictment if the witnesses are deported. There is, however, another alternative that would avoid unduly burdening either the Government or the defendant. The Court could require that deportation of potential alien witnesses be delayed for a very brief interval to allow defense counsel, as well as the Government, to interview them. That approach is somewhat similar to the Ninth Circuit's practice, originally described in United (71). Under the holding in that case, illegal alien witnesses were held in custody for a short period, an average of five days, following the appointment of counsel. During that time, defense counsel had the opportunity to interview the witnesses and determine whether any of them might provide material and relevant evidence. Following the interviews, a Federal Magistrate held a hearing to determine whether any of the witnesses could provide material evidence, and ordered deportation of those aliens who could not provide such testimony. On those occasions when the Government nevertheless deported potential witnesses before the materiality hearing |
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