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Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | have not been specifically adopted by any court of appeals. The first is based on legislative history. Respondents focus on the fact that while the Conference Committee accepted the Senate's concept of a three-year maximum deadline for attainment of national standards, *95 it also strengthened the Senate's provision by specifying that attainment should be achieved "as expeditiously as practicable but in no case later than three years." (Emphasis added.) Respondents further make the contention that the Conference Committee altered the Senate's version of the postponement provision to "provide that a source's attempt to delay compliance with `any requirement' of a State Plan would be considered a `postponement.' " Brief for Respondents 36. According to respondents the latter change "was necessary to conform" the postponement provision with the Conference Committee's "as expeditiously as practicable" requirement.[29]*96 The argument is that because any variance would delay attainment of national standards beyond the date previously considered the earliest practicable, and that because the Act requires attainment as soon as practicable, any variance must therefore be treated as a postponement. This argument is not persuasive, for multiple reasons. First, this interpretation of the Conference Committee's work finds no specific support in legislative documents or debates. This is true despite the significance of the change which, under respondents' interpretation, was madethe expansion of 110 (f) from a safety valve against mandatory deadlines into the exclusive mechanism by which a State could make even minor modifications of its emission limitations mix. Respondents' interpretation arises instead from their own reading of the statute and inferences as to legislative purpose. Second, as we have already discussed, and contrary to respondents' contention, 110 (f) simply does not state that any deferral of compliance with "any requirement" of a state plan "would be considered a postponement." Rather, it merely states that a postponement may be sought with respect to any source and any requirement. Third, respondents' reading equates "practicable" in 110 (a) (2) (A) with 110 (f)'s "essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." Yet plainly there could be many circumstances in which attainment in less than three years would be impracticable, and thus not required, but in which deferral could not possibly be justified as essential to the national security, or public *97 health or welfare.[30] Fourth, the statute requires only attainment as expeditiously as practicable, not attainment as expeditiously as was thought practicable when the initial implementation plan was devised. Finally, even if respondents' argument had force with regard to a preattainment variance, it would still be of no relevance whatsoever once the national standards |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | still be of no relevance whatsoever once the national standards were attained. A variance which does not compromise national standards that have been attained does no damage to the congressional goals of attaining the standards as expeditiously as practicable and maintaining them thereafter. The last of respondents' arguments which merit our attention is related to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that revisions are restricted to general requirements, and that all specific modifications must therefore be funneled through the postponement provision. Respondents go one step further and contend that the revision authority is limited not only to general changes, but to those which also are initiated by the Agency in order to "accelerate abatement or attain it in greater concert with other national goals." Brief for Respondents 26. This highly restrictive view of 110 (a) (3) is based on 110 (a) (2) (H),[31] which specifies that to obtain Agency approval *98 a State's plan must provide a mechanism for revision to take account of revised national standards, of more expeditious methods of achieving the standards, and of Agency determinations that a plan is substantially inadequate. The argument is specious. Section 110 (a) (2) (H) does nothing more than impose a minimum requirement that state plans be capable of such modifications as are necessary to meet the basic goal of cleansing the ambient air to the extent necessary to protect public health, as expeditiously as practicable within a three-year period. The section in no way prevents the States from also permitting ameliorative revisions which do not compromise the basic goal. Nor does it, by requiring a particular type of revision, preclude those of a different type. As we have already noted, 110 (a) (3) requires the Agency to approve "any revision" which is consistent with 110 (a) (2)'s minimum standards for an initial plan, and which the State adopted after reasonable public notice and hearing; no other restrictions whatsoever are placed on the Agency's duty to approve revisions.[32] VI For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was in error when it concluded that the postponement provision of 110 (f) is the sole method by which may be obtained specific ameliorative modifications *99 of state implementation plans. The Agency had properly concluded that the revision mechanism of 110 (a) (3) is available for the approval of those variances which do not compromise the basic statutory mandate that, with carefully circumscribed exceptions, the national primary ambient air standards be attained in not more than three years, and maintained thereafter. To the extent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals |
Justice Blackmun | 1,975 | 11 | majority | Ellis v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109253/ellis-v-dyson/ | This action, instituted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, challenges the constitutionality of the loitering ordinance of the city of Dallas. We do not reach the merits, for the District Court dismissed the case under the compulsion of a procedural precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which we have since reversed. I Petitioners Tom E. Ellis and Robert D. Love, while in an automobile, were arrested in Dallas at 2 a. m. on January 18, and were charged with violating the city's loitering ordinance. That ordinance, 31-60 of the 1960 Revised Code of Civil and Criminal Ordinances of the City of Dallas, Texas, as amended by Ordinance No. 12991, adopted July 20, 1970, provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to loiter, as hereinafter defined, in, on or about any place, public or private, when such loitering is accompanied by activity or is under circumstances that afford probable cause for alarm or concern for the safety and wellbeing of persons or for the security of property, in the surrounding area." The term "loiter" is defined to "include the following activities: The walking about aimlessly without apparent purpose; lingering; hanging around; lagging behind; the idle spending of *428 time; delaying; sauntering and moving slowly about, where such conduct is not due to physical defects or conditions." A violation of the ordinance is classified as a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not more than $200. Before their trial in the Dallas Municipal Court[1] petitioners sought a writ of prohibition from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to preclude their prosecution on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. App. 29. The petitioners contended, in particular, that 31-60 is vague and overbroad, that it "permits arrest on the basis of alarm or concern only," and that it allows the offense to be defined "upon the moment-by-moment opinions and suspicions of a police officer on patrol." App. 31. The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, denied the application without opinion on February 21,[2] The following day the Municipal Court proceeded to try the case. After overruling petitioners' motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds of the ordinance's unconstitutionality, the court accepted their pleas of nolo contendere[3] and fined each petitioner $10 plus $2.50 costs. *429 Under Texas' two-tier criminal justice system, petitioners could not directly appeal the judgment of the Municipal Court, but were entitled to seek a trial de novo in the County Court,[4] Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 44.17 (1966), by filing at |
Justice Blackmun | 1,975 | 11 | majority | Ellis v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109253/ellis-v-dyson/ | Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 44.17 (1966), by filing at least a $50 bond within the 10 days following the Municipal Court's judgment. Arts. 44.13 and 44.16. At the de novo trial petitioners would have been subject to the same maximum fine of $200. Appellate review of the County Court judgment would be available in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals if the fine imposed exceeded $100. Art. 4.03. Electing to avoid the possibility of the imposition of a larger fine by the County Court than was imposed by the Municipal Court, petitioners brought the present federal action[5] under the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S. C. 1983[6] and 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3) and (4), and under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S. C. 2201-2202. *430 Named as defendants, in both their individual and official capacities, were the then chief of police, the city attorney, the then city manager, the then clerk of the Municipal Courts, and the mayor. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the loitering ordinance is unconstitutional. They complained that the statute is vague and overbroad, places too much discretion in arresting officers, proscribes conduct that may not constitutionally be limited, and impermissibly chills the rights of free speech, association, assembly, and movement. Petitioners also sought equitable relief in the form of expunction of their records of arrests and convictions for violating the ordinance, and of some counteraction to any distribution to other law enforcement agencies of information as to their arrests and convictions. No injunctive relief against any future application of the statute to them was requested. Cf. The petitioners moved for summary judgment upon the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and "other matters of record." App. 42. The respondents, in turn, moved to dismiss and suggested, as well, "that the abstention doctrine is applicable." The District Court held that federal declaratory and injunctive relief against future state criminal prosecutions was not available where there was no allegation of bad-faith prosecution, harassment, or other unusual circumstances presenting a likelihood of irreparable injury and harm to the petitioners if the ordinance were enforced. This result, it concluded, was mandated by the decision of its controlling court in In Becker, the Fifth Circuit had held that the principles of applied not only where a state criminal prosecution was actually pending, but also where a state criminal prosecution was merely threatened. Since the present petitioners' complaint *431 contained insufficient allegation of irreparable harm, the case was dismissed.[7] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion. After we unanimously reversed the Becker decision on which the District |
Justice Blackmun | 1,975 | 11 | majority | Ellis v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109253/ellis-v-dyson/ | we unanimously reversed the Becker decision on which the District Court had relied, we granted the petition for certiorari. II In the Court considered the issue whether the doctrine should apply to a case where state prosecution under a challenged ordinance was merely threatened but not pending. In that case, and his companion, Becker, engaged in protest handbilling at a shopping center. Police informed them that they would be arrested for violating the Georgia criminal trespass statute if they did not desist. ceased his handbilling activity, but his companion persisted in the endeavor and was arrested and charged. then filed suit under 42 U.S. C. 1983 and 28 U.S. C. 1343 in Federal District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment[8] that the ordinance was being applied in violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It was stipulated that if returned and refused upon request to stop handbilling, a warrant would be sworn out and he might be arrested and charged with a violation of the statute. Contrary *432 to the views of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals in the present case, we held that "federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied." Thus, in we rejected the argument that badfaith prosecution, harassment, or other unique and extraordinary circumstances must be shown before federal declaratory relief may be invoked against a genuine threat of state prosecution. Unlike the situation where state prosecution is actually pending, cf. where there is simply a threatened prosecution, considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have less vitality.[9] Instead, the opportunity for adjudication of constitutional rights in a federal forum, as authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act, becomes -463. Exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies in was ruled not to be necessary, for we have long held that an action under 1983 is free of that requirement. * -473. See, e. g., We did require, however, that it be clearly demonstrated that there was a continuing, actual controversy, as is mandated both by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S. C. 2201, and by Art. III of the Constitution itself. Although we noted in that the threats of prosecution were not "imaginary or speculative," as those terms were used in we remanded the case to the District Court to determine, among other things, if the controversy was still live and continuing. See In particular, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,975 | 11 | majority | Ellis v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109253/ellis-v-dyson/ | the controversy was still live and continuing. See In particular, we observed that the handbilling had been directed against our Government's policy in Vietnam and "the recent developments reducing the Nation's involvement in that part of the world" could not be ignored, so that there was a possibility there no longer existed " `a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment,' " ibid., quoting Maryland Casualty III The principles and approach of are applicable here. The District Court and the Court of Appeals decided this case under the misapprehension that the doctrine applied where there is a threatened state criminal prosecution as well as where there is a state criminal prosecution already pending. Those courts had no reason to reach the merits of the case or to determine the actual existence of a genuine threat of prosecution, or to inquire into the relationship between the past prosecution and the threat of prosecutions for similar activity in the future. Now that has been decided, these issues may properly be investigated. *434 We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court for reconsideration in the light of our opinion in Thompson, reversing Thompson. It is appropriate to observe in passing, however, that we possess greater reservations here than we did in as to whether a case or controversy exists today. First, at oral argument counsel for petitioners acknowledged that they had not been in touch with their clients for approximately a year and were unaware of their clients' whereabouts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7, 18-22, 25-26. Petitioners, apparently, are not even apprised of the progress of this litigation. Unless petitioners have been found by the time the District Court considers this case on remand, it is highly doubtful that a case or controversy could be held to exist; it is elemental that there must be parties before there is a case or controversy. Further, if petitioners no longer frequent Dallas, it is most unlikely that a sufficiently genuine threat of prosecution for possible future violations of the Dallas ordinance could be established. Second, there is some question on this record as it now stands regarding the pattern of the statute's enforcement. Answers to interrogatories reveal an average of somewhat more than two persons per day were arrested in Dallas during seven specified months in for the statutory loitering offense. App. 68. Of course, on remand, the District Court will find it desirable to examine the current enforcement scheme in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,975 | 11 | majority | Ellis v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109253/ellis-v-dyson/ | find it desirable to examine the current enforcement scheme in order to determine whether, indeed, there now is a credible threat that petitioners, assuming they are physically present in Dallas, might be arrested and charged with loitering. A genuine threat must be demonstrated if a case or controversy, within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution and of the Declaratory Judgment Act, may be said to exist. See ; Further, the credible threat must be shown to be alive at each stage of the litigation. U. S., at 459 n. 10, and cases cited therein. Because of the fact that the District Court has not had the opportunity to consider this case in the light of and because of our grave reservations about the existence of an actual case or controversy, we have concluded that it would be inappropriate for us to touch upon any of the other complex and difficult issues that the case otherwise might present. The District Court must determine that the litigation meets the threshold requirements of a case or controversy before there can be resolution of such questions as the interaction between the past prosecution and the threat of future prosecutions, and of the potential considerations, in the context of this case, of the doctrine, of res judicata, of the plea of nolo contendere, and of the petitioners' failure to utilize the state appellate remedy available to them. Expunction of the records of the arrests and convictions and the nature of corrective action with respect thereto is another claim we do not reach at this time. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed. It is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | dissenting | Barnard v. Thorstenn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112216/barnard-v-thorstenn/ | In Supreme Court of New the Court held that a rule of the New Hampshire Supreme Court which limited bar admission to state residents violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2. Today the Court extends the reasoning of Piper to invalidate a Virgin Islands rule limiting bar admission to attorneys who demonstrate that they have resided in the Virgin Islands for at least one year and will, if admitted, continue to reside and practice there. I agree that the durational residency requirement is invalid under our prior cases dealing with the "right" of interstate travel. E. g., But I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that the simple residency requirement is invalid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accepting *560 Piper's view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, I think the unique circumstances of legal practice in the Virgin Islands, as compared to the mainland States, could justify upholding this simple residency requirement even under that view. Because the record reveals the existence of genuine factual disputes about the nature of these circumstances and their relationship to the challenged residency requirement, I would reverse the judgment below and remand for trial on those issues. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | concurring | McCarthy v. Madigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112701/mccarthy-v-madigan/ | I agree with the Court's holding that a federal prisoner need not exhaust the procedures promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. My view, however, is based entirely on the fact that the grievance procedure at issue does not provide for any award of monetary damages. As a result, in cases such as this one where prisoners seek monetary relief, the Bureau's administrative remedy furnishes no effective remedy at all, and it is therefore improper to impose an exhaustion requirement. See ; Montana National Bank of *157 Because I would base the decision on this ground, I do not join the Court's extensive discussion of the general principles of exhaustion, nor do I agree with the implication that those general principles apply without modification in the context of a Bivens claim. In particular, I disagree with the Court's reliance on the grievance procedure's filing deadlines as a basis for excusing exhaustion. As the majority observes, ante, at 146-147, we have previously refused to require exhaustion of administrative remedies where the administrative process subjects plaintiffs to unreasonable delay or to an indefinite time frame for decision. See Coit Independence Joint ; ; ; 270 U.S. This principle rests on our belief that when a plaintiff might have to wait seemingly forever for an agency decision, agency procedures are "inadequate" and therefore need not be exhausted. Coit Independence Joint at But the Court makes strange use of this principle in holding that filing deadlines imposed by agency procedures may provide a basis for finding that those procedures need not be exhausted. Ante, at 152-153. Whereas before we have held that procedures without "reasonable time limit[s]" may be inadequate because they make a plaintiff wait too long, Coit Independence Joint at today the majority concludes that strict filing deadlines might also contribute to a finding of inadequacy because they make a plaintiff move too quickly. But surely the second proposition does not follow from the first. In fact, short filing deadlines will almost always promote quick decisionmaking by an agency, the very result that we have advocated repeatedly in the cases cited above. So long as there is an escape clause, as there is here, and the time limit is within a *158 zone of reasonableness, as I believe it is here, the length of the period should not be a factor in deciding the adequacy of the remedy. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | majority | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110213/lewis-v-united-states/ | This case presents the question whether a defendant's extant prior conviction, flawed because he was without counsel, as required by may constitute the predicate for a subsequent conviction under 2 (a) (1), as amended, of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S. C. App. 2 (a) (1).[1] I In 1961, petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr., upon his plea of guilty, was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony *57 for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. See Fla. Stat. 810.05 (1961). He served a term of imprisonment. That conviction has never been overturned, nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying pardon or permission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a firearm. See 18 U.S. C. App. 3 (2) and 18 U.S. C. 925 (c). In January 17, Lewis, on probable cause, was arrested in Virginia, and later was charged by indictment with having knowingly received and possessed at that time a specified firearm, in violation of 18 U.S. C. App. 2 (a) (1).[2] He waived a jury and was given a bench trial. It was stipulated that the weapon in question had been shipped in interstate commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an exemplified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida felony proceeding. App. 10. Shortly before the trial, petitioner's counsel informed the court that he had been advised that Lewis was not represented by counsel in the 1961 Florida proceeding.[3] He claimed that under a violation of 2 *58 (a) (1) could not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained in violation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court rejected that claim, ruling that the constitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction was immaterial with respect to petitioner's status under 2 (a) (1) as a previously convicted felon at the time of his arrest. Petitioner, accordingly, offered no evidence as to whether in fact he had been convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We therefore assume, for present purposes, that he was without counsel at that time. On appeal, the United Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. It held that a defendant, purely as a defense to a prosecution under 2 (a) (1), could not attack collatery an outstanding prior felony conviction, and that the statutory prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior conviction was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals also rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the effect that the use of the prior conviction as a predicate for |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | majority | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110213/lewis-v-united-states/ | the use of the prior conviction as a predicate for his prosecution under 2 (a) (1) violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Because of conflict among the Courts of Appeals,[4] we granted certiorari. *59 II Four cases decided by this Court provide the focus for petitioner's attack upon his conviction. The first, and pivotal one, is where the Court held that a state felony conviction without counsel, and without a valid waiver of counsel, was unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling is fully retroactive. *60 The second case is There the Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon could not be used for enhancement of punishment under a State's recidivist statute. The third is United where it was held that such a conviction could not be considered by a court in sentencing a defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is where the Court disowed the use of the conviction to impeach the general credibility of the defendant. The prior conviction, the plurality opinion said, "lacked reliability." quoting We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the present case. Petitioner's position, however, is that the four cases require a reversal of his conviction under 2 (a) (1) on both statutory and constitutional grounds. III The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case concerning the interpretation of a statute the "starting point" must be the language of the statute itself. See also Touche Ross & ; Southeastern Community An examination of 2 (a) (1) reveals that its proscription is directed unambiguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court of the United or of a State of a felony." No modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction on the scope of the term "convicted." "Nothing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage to persons [whose convictions are not subject to collateral attack]." United ; see United The statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is *61 relieved of his disability by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying pardon or a consent from the Secretary of the Treasury.[5] The obvious breadth of the language may well reflect the expansive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express findings and declarations, in 18 U.S. C. App. 1,[6] concerning the problem of firearm abuse by felons and certain specificy described persons. Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce its broad sweep. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | majority | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110213/lewis-v-united-states/ | provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce its broad sweep. Section 3 enumerates exceptions to *62 2 (a) (1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has expressly been entrusted with a firearm by prison authority; a person who has been pardoned and who has expressly been authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm). In addition, 2 (c) (2) defines "felony" to exclude certain state crimes punishable by no more than two years' imprisonment. No exception, however, is made for a person whose outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, 2 (a) (1) contains nothing by way of restrictive language. It thus stands in contrast with other federal statutes that explicitly permit a defendant to chenge, by way of defense, the validity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. 3575 (e) (dangerous special offender) and 21 U.S. C. 851 (c) (2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 10). When we turn to the legislative history of 2 (a) (1), we find nothing to suggest that Congress was willing to ow a defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a defense to a charge under 2 (a) (1). The section was enacted as part of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, It was added by way of a floor amendment to the Act and thus was not a subject of discussion in the legislative reports. See United ; ; United What little legislative history there is that is relevant reflects an intent to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on the fact of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and directed the passage of Title VII, repeatedly stressed conviction, not a "valid" conviction, and not a conviction not subject to constitutional chenge, as the criterion. For example, the Senator observed: "So, under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun *63 until the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the future except where he has been pardoned by the President or a State Governor and had been expressedly authorized by his pardon to possess a firearm." 114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968). See also Inasmuch as Senator Long was the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are entitled to weight. It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII, as well as Title IV |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | majority | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110213/lewis-v-united-states/ | significance, furthermore, that Title VII, as well as Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in response to the precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots, and other violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in this country in the 1960's. See e. g., S. Rep. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 76-78 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22-23 (1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed: "The legislative history [of Title VII] in its entirety, while brief, further supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadlyto keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that `they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.'" The legislative history, therefore, affords no basis for a loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional chenge, to the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section 2 (a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to require the Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction. The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title IV, enacted *64 simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion. Each Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous persons from transporting or receiving firearms. See 18 U.S. C. 922 (g) and (h). Actuy, with regard to the statutory question at issue here, we detect little significant difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks to keep a firearm away from "any person who has been convicted" of a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs somewhat in the respective statutes. But to limit the scope of 922 (g) (1) and (h) (1) to a validly convicted felon would be at odds with the statutory scheme as a whole. Those sections impose a disability not only on a convicted felon but also on a person under a felony indictment, even if that person subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Since the fact of mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori the much more significant fact of conviction must deprive the person of a right to a firearm. Finy, it is important to note that a convicted felon is not without relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus Act, in 3 (2) and 925 (c), states that the disability may be removed by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary's consent. Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, could have chenged his prior conviction in an appropriate proceeding in the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const., Art. 5, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | majority | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110213/lewis-v-united-states/ | in the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const., Art. 5, 5 (3); ; See also United v. Morgan,[7] It seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these remedies, two of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus Act itself, suggests that Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose "broadly to keep firearms away *65 from the persons Congress classified as potentiy irresponsible and dangerous." Barrett v. United With the face of the statute and the legislative history so clear, petitioner's argument that the statute nevertheless should be construed so as to avoid a constitutional issue is inapposite. That course is appropriate only when the statute provides a fair alternative construction. This statute could not be more plain. ; United -123. Similarly, any principle of lenity, see Rewis v. United has no application. The touchstone of that principle is statutory ambiguity. Huddleston v. United ; United -122. There is no ambiguity here. We therefore hold that 2 (a) (1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds. IV The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is "some `rational basis' for the statutory distinctions made or they `have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.'" Marsh v. United quoting from and See[8] *66 Section 2 (a) (1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as its expressed purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U.S. C. App. 1, was concerned that the receipt and possession of a firearm by a felon constitutes a threat, among other things, to the continued and effective operation of the Government of the United The legislative history of the gun control laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy availability of firearms, especiy to those persons who pose a threat to community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus between violent crime and the possession of a firearm by any person with a criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec. 220 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings); Congress could rationy conclude that any felony conviction, even an egedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See, e. g., United v. Ransom, cert. denied, This Court has recognized repeatedly that a legislature constitutiony may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm. See ; De ; |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | majority | Lewis v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110213/lewis-v-united-states/ | than the possession of a firearm. See ; De ; We recognize, of course, that under the Sixth Amendment an uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used for certain purposes. See Tucker, and Loper, The Court, however, has never suggested that an uncounseled conviction *67 is invalid for purposes. See ; U. S., at 482. n. 11 (plurality opinion). Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal sanction, is not inconsistent with Tucker, and Loper. In each of those cases, this Court found that the subsequent conviction of sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because it depended upon the reliability of a past uncounseled conviction. The federal gun laws, however, focus not on reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in order to keep firearms away from potentiy dangerous persons. Congress' judgment that a convicted felon. even one whose conviction was egedly uncounseled, is among the class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational.[9] Enforcement of that essentiy civil disability through a criminal sanction does not "support guilt or enhance punishment." see on the basis of a conviction that is unreliable when one considers Congress' broad purpose. Moreover, unlike the situation in the sanction imposed by 2 (a) (1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's first conviction. Again, it is important to note that a convicted felon may chenge the validity of a prior conviction. or otherwise remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm. We simply hold today that the firearms prosecution does not open the predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack. See Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968. *68 Cf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Guam v. Olsen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109660/guam-v-olsen/ | Although this case may at first glance seem unimportant to anyone but the residents of Guam, the result of the Court's *205 decision is perhaps unprecedented in our history. The Court today abolishes the Supreme Court of Guam, a significant part of the system of self-government established by some 85,000 American citizens through their freely elected legislature.[1] The Court's error, in my view, lies in its misinterpretation of the Organic Act of Guam. I do not doubt that Congress has the authority in the exercise of its plenary power over Territories of the United States, Art. IV, 3, to reverse Guam's decision to reorganize its local court system. In this case, however, Congress has plainly authorized enactment of the challenged legislation, while there has been no corresponding delegation to this Court of the congressional power to veto such laws. Because "our judicial function" is limited "to apply[ing] statutes on the basis of what Congress has written, not what Congress might have written," United I must respectfully dissent. In reaching its decision, the Court focuses exclusively on the meaning of the second half of the second sentence of 22 (a) of the Organic Act of Guam,[2] With all respect, this approach ignores the horse while concentrating on minute details of the cart's design. If the sentences of 22 *206 (a) are simply read in the order in which they are written, their meaning is plain without resort to complex exegesis. The first sentence creates the federal "District Court of Guam." It goes on to provide that "the judicial authority of Guam shall be vested in the District Court of Guam and in such court or courts as may have been or may hereafter be established by the laws of Guam." This language is strikingly similar to the familiar words of Art. III, 1: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Both provisions describe the bodies that will exercise the judicial power. They name one court and mandate its establishment. They leave the creation of the remainder of the court system to the legislature. But there is one key distinction: Where Art. III expressly describes the relationship among the courts, making one "supreme" and the others "inferior," 22 (a) is silent. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from this distinction is that the Organic Act, unlike our Constitution, was intended to allow the elected representatives of the people governed by the courts to control the relationship among |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Guam v. Olsen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109660/guam-v-olsen/ | people governed by the courts to control the relationship among the courts. The absence of any indication of a superior-inferior structure in 22 (a) also indicates that there is no reason to consider the federal and local courts other than co-equal in matters as to which they share jurisdiction, i. e., cases that might be appealed. Rather, the conspicuously incomplete emulation of the well-known Art. III model suggests that the people of Guam may terminate the District Court's appellate jurisdiction. The Court ascribes great significance to the different language used to describe the legislature's power to "transfer" trial jurisdiction to the local courts, as contrasted with the power to "determine" appellate jurisdiction. The words, read in context, seem to me to be no more than alternative expressions for the same concept, used in the interest of avoiding *207 repetition. Thus, the first sentence of 22 (a) gives Guam the authority to establish any courts it deems necessary. The last sentence of the section, also ignored in the Court's analysis, gives Guam the power to prescribe the "jurisdiction of and procedure in" such local courts. "Determine" as used in the context of the second sentence of 22 (a) is an obvious synonym for "grant." If the Guam Legislature may grant the District Court appellate jurisdiction in the first instance, it has the converse power to withdraw it. Read as a whole, 22 (a) plainly encompasses the power to give all appellate jurisdiction to a local court. The Court relies on the fact that this interpretation of the Organic Act might insulate decisions of the local courts that involve questions of federal constitutional or statutory law from review in Art. III courts, something which other territorial charters have apparently not granted. With respect to the latter point, it is worth nothing that Guam is a small and isolated possession that Congress might well have wished to give unusual autonomy in local affairs. No doubt, too, Congress' sense of the proper way to govern far-distant citizens has changed considerably in recent decades from the expansionist ethic which prevailed when Hawaii was annexed, the Spanish possessions (including Guam) ceded, and the Virgin Islands purchased. It is thus not surprising to find a broad authorization for self-government granted by the Organic Act passed in 1950. And it speaks well for the good sense of the people of Guam that they observed the functioning of the judicial system on their island for 23 years before deciding that a local appellate court would best serve their needs. This hiatus, therefore, does not indicate that Guam lacked the |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | Guam v. Olsen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109660/guam-v-olsen/ | This hiatus, therefore, does not indicate that Guam lacked the power to act, as the Court assumes, ante, at 201, but rather that the people deemed it unwise at that stage in their development to do so. Moreover, as careful analysis of the relevant sections of other territorial charters demonstrates, see Agana Bay Dev. Co., "the Guam Organic Act is unique and it delegates the widest powers of any of the territories to the legislature for the creation of appellate courts." If there are constitutional problems with this interpretation of the Organic Act, see ante, at 201-202, 204, they do not arise from the action of the Guam Legislature in creating a local appellate court. Rather, they stem from the absence of a statute expressly providing for appeals from the Guam courts to an Art. III tribunal. As petitioner notes, Brief for Petitioner 15-19, Congress has in its dealings with Guam historically reacted to the developing legal needs of the island rather than anticipating them. See, e. g., This is not surprising; since the Organic Act did not set up a local court structure, it was impossible for Congress to foresee the manner in which the system as actually established would mesh with the Art. III courts. Most recently, Congress authorized Guam to design a local court system as part of the drafting of a new constitution, recognizing that it would thereafter be necessary to enact legislation "regulating the relationship between the local courts of Guam and the Federal judicial system." Stat. 2899, 2 (b) (7). In view of the willingness of Congress to accommodate both the aspirations of the people of Guam and the requirements of federal jurisdiction, I think there is no need to search for constitutional questions where none yet exist.[3] In the meantime, we should not eviscerate the court system carefully devised by the people of Guam in the exercise of their right of self-government. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | concurring | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every other State, has resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust.[1] It does not follow, however, and I cannot find, that this system violates the Constitution of the United States. I join the opinion and judgment of the Court because I am convinced that any other course would mark an extraordinary departure from principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The uncharted directions of such a departure are suggested, I think, by the imaginative dissenting opinion my Brother MARSHALL has filed today. Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties.[2] The function of the Equal Protection Clause, rather, is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws. *60 There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people differently from others. But the basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.[3] And with respect to such legislation, it has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are invidiously discriminatoryonly by classifications that are wholly arbitrary or capricious. See, e. g., This settled principle of constitutional law was compendiously stated in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in in the following words: "Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." This doctrine is no more than a specific application of one of the first principles of constitutional adjudication the basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, *61 Under the Equal Protection Clause, this presumption of constitutional validity disappears when a State has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently "suspect." Because |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | concurring | San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108751/san-antonio-independent-school-dist-v-rodriguez/ | criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently "suspect." Because of the historic purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prime example of such a "suspect" classification is one that is based upon race. See, e. g., ; But there are other classifications that, at least in some settings, are also "suspect"for example, those based upon national origin,[4] alienage,[5] indigency,[6] or illegitimacy.[7] Moreover, quite apart from the Equal Protection Clause, a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law's purpose or effect is to create any classifications. For example, a law that provided that newspapers could be published only by people who had resided in the State for five years could be superficially viewed as invidiously discriminating against an identifiable class in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But, more basically, such a law would be invalid simply because it abridged the freedom of the press. Numerous cases in this Court illustrate this principle.[8] *62 In refusing to invalidate the Texas system of financing its public schools, the Court today applies with thoughtfulness and understanding the basic principles I have so sketchily summarized. First, as the Court points out, the Texas system has hardly created the kind of objectively identifiable classes that are cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.[9] Second, even assuming the existence of such discernible categories, the classifications are in no sense based upon constitutionally "suspect" criteria. Third, the Texas system does not rest "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Finally, the Texas system impinges upon no substantive constitutional rights or liberties. It follows, therefore, under the established principle reaffirmed in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed. MR. |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | The religious ceremony that these respondents seek to attend is not presumptively dangerous, and the prison has completely foreclosed respondents' participation in it. I therefore would require prison officials to demonstrate that the restrictions they have imposed are necessary to further an important government interest, and that these restrictions are no greater than necessary to achieve prison objectives. See Turner v. Safley, ante, at 101, n. 1 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ). As a result, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' order to remand the case to the District Court, and would require prison officials to make this showing. Even were I to accept the Court's standard of review, however, I would remand the case to the District Court, since that court has not had the opportunity to review respondents' claim under the new standard established by this Court in Turner. As the record now stands, the reasonableness of foreclosing respondents' participation in Jumu'ah has not been established. I Prisoners are persons whom most of us would rather not think about. Banished from everyday sight, they exist in a shadow world that only dimly enters our awareness. They are members of a "total institution"[1] that controls their daily existence in a way that few of us can imagine: "[P]rison is a complex of physical arrangements and of measures, all wholly governmental, all wholly performed by agents of government, which determine the total existence of certain human beings (except perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and inevitably there as well) from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent, *355 working, playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading, alone, with others. It is not so, with members of the general adult population. State governments have not undertaken to require members of the general adult population to rise at a certain hour, retire at a certain hour, eat at certain hours, live for periods with no companionship whatever, wear certain clothing, or submit to oral and anal searches after visiting hours, nor have state governments undertaken to prohibit members of the general adult population from speaking to one another, wearing beards, embracing their spouses, or corresponding with their lovers." It is thus easy to think of prisoners as members of a separate netherworld, driven by its own demands, ordered by its own customs, ruled by those whose claim to power rests on raw necessity. Nothing can change the fact, however, that the society that these prisoners inhabit is our own. Prisons may exist on the margins of that society, but no act of will can sever them from |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | society, but no act of will can sever them from the body politic. When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional claim, they invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture. Rather, they speak the language of the charter upon which all of us rely to hold official power accountable. They ask us to acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows must be restrained at least as diligently as power that acts in the sunlight. In reviewing a prisoner's claim of the infringement of a constitutional right, we must therefore begin from the premise that, as members of this society, prisoners retain constitutional rights that limit the exercise of official authority against them. See At the same time, we must acknowledge that incarceration by its nature changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving security in a potentially explosive setting, *356 as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares some inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. The challenge for this Court is to determine how best to protect those prisoners' rights that remain. Our objective in selecting a standard of review is therefore not, as the Court declares, "[t]o ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials." Ante, at 349. The Constitution was not adopted as a means of enhancing the efficiency with which government officials conduct their affairs, nor as a blueprint for ensuring sufficient reliance on administrative expertise. Rather, it was meant to provide a bulwark against infringements that might otherwise be justified as necessary expedients of governing. The practice of Europe, wrote James Madison, was "charters of liberty granted by power"; of America, "charters of power granted by liberty." 6 Writings of James Madison 83 (G. Hunt ed. 1906). While we must give due consideration to the needs of those in power, this Court's role is to ensure that fundamental restraints on that power are enforced. In my view, adoption of "reasonableness" as a standard of review for all constitutional challenges by inmates is inadequate to this task. Such a standard is categorically deferential, and does not discriminate among degrees of deprivation. From this perspective, restricting use of the prison library to certain hours warrants the same level of scrutiny as preventing inmates from reading at all. Various "factors" may be weighed differently in each situation, but the message to prison officials is clear: merely act "reasonably" and your actions will be upheld. If a directive that officials |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | your actions will be upheld. If a directive that officials act "reasonably" were deemed sufficient to check all exercises of power, the Constitution would hardly be necessary. Yet the Court deems this single standard adequate to restrain any type of conduct in which prison officials might engage. *357 It is true that the degree of deprivation is one of the factors in the Court's reasonableness determination. This by itself does not make the standard of review appropriate, however. If it did, we would need but a single standard for evaluating all constitutional claims, as long as every relevant factor were considered under its rubric. Clearly, we have never followed such an approach. A standard of review frames the terms in which justification may be offered, and thus delineates the boundaries within which argument may take place.[2] The use of differing levels of scrutiny proclaims that on some occasions official power must justify itself in a way that otherwise it need not. A relatively strict standard of review is a signal that a decree prohibiting a political demonstration on the basis of the participants' political beliefs is of more serious concern, and therefore will be scrutinized more closely, than a rule limiting the number of demonstrations that may take place downtown at noon. Thus, even if the absolute nature of the deprivation may be taken into account in the Court's formulation, it makes a difference that this is merely one factor in determining if official conduct is "reasonable." Once we provide such an elastic and deferential principle of justification, "[t]he principle lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forth a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes." Mere assertions of exigency have a way of providing a colorable defense for governmental deprivation, and we should be especially wary of expansive delegations of power to those who wield it on the margins of society. Prisons are too often shielded from public view; there is no need to make them virtually invisible. An approach better suited to the sensitive task of protecting the constitutional rights of inmates is laid out by Judge Kaufman in Abdul That approach maintains that the degree of scrutiny of prison regulations should depend on "the nature of the right being asserted by prisoners, the type of activity in which they seek to engage, and whether the challenged restriction works a total deprivation (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the exercise of |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the exercise of that right." Essentially, if the activity in which inmates seek to engage is presumptively dangerous, or if a regulation merely restricts the time, place, or manner in which prisoners may exercise a right, a prison regulation will be invalidated only if there is no reasonable justification for official action. Where exercise of the asserted right is not presumptively dangerous, however, and where the prison has completely deprived an inmate of that right, then prison officials must show that "a particular restriction is necessary to further an important governmental interest, and that the limitations on freedoms occasioned by the restrictions are no greater than necessary to effectuate the governmental objective involved." The court's analytical framework in Abdul Wali recognizes that in many instances it is inappropriate for courts "to substitute our judgments for those of trained professionals with years of firsthand experience." It would thus apply a standard of review identical to the Court's "reasonableness" standard in a significant percentage of cases. At the same time, the Abdul Wali approach takes seriously the Constitution's function of requiring that official power be called to account when it completely deprives a person of a right that *359 society regards as basic. In this limited number of cases, it would require more than a demonstration of "reasonableness" to justify such infringement. To the extent that prison is meant to inculcate a respect for social and legal norms, a requirement that prison officials persuasively demonstrate the need for the absolute deprivation of inmate rights is consistent with that end. Furthermore, prison officials are in control of the evidence that is essential to establish the superiority of such deprivation over other alternatives. It is thus only fair for these officials to be held to a stringent standard of review in such extreme cases. The prison in this case has completely prevented respondent inmates from attending the central religious service of their Muslim faith. I would therefore hold prison officials to the standard articulated in Abdul Wali, and would find their proffered justifications wanting. The State has neither demonstrated that the restriction is necessary to further an important objective nor proved that less extreme measures may not serve its purpose. Even if I accepted the Court's standard of review, however, I could not conclude on this record that prison officials have proved that it is reasonable to preclude respondents from attending Jumu'ah. Petitioners have provided mere unsubstantiated assertions that the plausible alternatives proposed by respondents are infeasible. II In Turner, the Court set forth a framework for |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | II In Turner, the Court set forth a framework for reviewing allegations that a constitutional right has been infringed by prison officials. The Court found relevant to that review "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates." Ante, at 90. The Court in this case acknowledges that "respondents' sincerely held religious beliefs compe[l] attendance at Jumu'ah," ante, at 345, and concedes that there are "no alternative means of attending Jumu'ah." Ante, at 351. Nonetheless, the Court finds that prison policy does not work a complete *360 deprivation of respondents' asserted religious right, because respondents have the opportunity to participate in other religious activities. Ante, at 352. This analysis ignores the fact that, as the District Court found, Jumu'ah is the central religious ceremony of Muslims, "comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects." As with other faiths, this ceremony provides a special time in which Muslims "assert their identity as a community covenanted to God." Brief for Imam Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin et al. as Amici Curiae 32. As a result: "unlike other Muslim prayers which are performed individually and can be made up if missed, the Jumu'ah is obligatory, cannot be made up, and must be performed in congregation. The Jumu'ah is therefore regarded as the central service of the Muslim religion, and the obligation to attend is commanded by the Qur'an, the central book of the Muslim religion." 595 F. Supp., at Jumu'ah therefore cannot be regarded as one of several essentially fungible religious practices. The ability to engage in other religious activities cannot obscure the fact that the denial at issue in this case is absolute: respondents are completely foreclosed from participating in the core ceremony that reflects their membership in a particular religious community. If a Catholic prisoner were prevented from attending Mass on Sunday, few would regard that deprivation as anything but absolute, even if the prisoner were afforded other opportunities to pray, to discuss the Catholic faith with others, and even to avoid eating meat on Friday if that were a preference. Prison officials in this case therefore cannot show that " `other avenues' remain available for the exercise of the asserted right." Turner, ante, at 90 ). Under the Court's approach, as enunciated in Turner, the availability of other means of exercising the right in question *361 counsels considerable deference to prison officials. Ante, at 90. By the same token, the infliction of an absolute deprivation should require more than mere assertion that such a deprivation is |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | require more than mere assertion that such a deprivation is necessary. In particular, "the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an `exaggerated response' to prison concerns." In this case, petitioners have not established the reasonableness of their policy, because they have provided only bare assertions that the proposals for accommodation offered by respondents are infeasible. As discussed below, the federal policy of permitting inmates in federal prisons to participate in Jumu'ah, as well as Leesburg's own policy of permitting participation for several years, lends plausibility to respondents' suggestion that their religious practice can be accommodated. In Turner, the Court found that the practices of the Federal Bureau of Prisons were relevant to the availability of reasonable alternatives to the policy under challenge.[3] In upholding a ban on inmate-to-inmate mail, the Court noted that the Bureau had adopted "substantially similar restrictions." Ante, at 93 (citing (1986)). In finding that there were alternatives to a stringent restriction on the ability to marry, the Court observed that marriages by inmates in federal prisons were generally permitted absent a threat to security or public safety. See ante, at 97 (citing (1986)). In the present case, it is therefore worth noting that Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations require the adjustment of work assignments to permit inmate participation in religious ceremonies, absent a threat to "security, safety, and good order." (1986). The Bureau's Directive implementing the regulations on Religious Beliefs and Practices of Committed Offenders, *362 (1986), states that, with respect to scheduling religious observances, "[t]he more central the religious activity is to the tenets of the inmate's religious faith, the greater the presumption is for relieving the inmate from the institution program or assignment." App. to Brief for Respondents 8a. Furthermore, the Chaplain Director of the Bureau has spoken directly to the issue of participation of Muslim inmates in Jumu'ah: "Provision is made, by policy, in all Bureau facilities for the observance of Jumu-ah by all inmates in general population who wish to keep this faith practice. The service is held each Friday afternoon in the general time frame that corresponds to the requirements of Islamic jurisprudence. "Subject only to restraints of security and good order in the institution all routine and normal work assignments are suspended for the Islamic inmates to ensure freedom to attend such services. "In those institutions where the outside work details contain Islamic inmates, they are permitted access to the inside of the institution to attend the Jumu-ah." at 1a. That Muslim inmates are able to participate in Jumu'ah throughout |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | That Muslim inmates are able to participate in Jumu'ah throughout the entire federal prison system suggests that the practice is, under normal circumstances, compatible with the demands of prison administration.[4] Indeed, the Leesburg State Prison permitted participation in this ceremony for five years, and experienced no threats to security or safety as a result. In light of both standard federal prison practice and Leesburg's own past practice, a reasonableness test in this *363 case demands at least minimal substantiation by prison officials that alternatives that would permit participation in Jumu'ah are infeasible.[5] Under the standard articulated by the Court in Turner, this does not mean that petitioners are responsible for identifying and discrediting these alternatives; "prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." Ante, at 90-91. When prisoners themselves present alternatives, however, and when they fairly call into question official claims that these alternatives are infeasible, we must demand at least some evidence beyond mere assertion that the religious practice at issue cannot be accommodated. Examination of the alternatives proposed in this case indicates that prison officials have not provided such substantiation. III Respondents' first proposal is that gang minimum prisoners be assigned to an alternative inside work detail on Friday, as they had been before the recent change in policy. Prison officials testified that the alternative work detail is now restricted to maximum security prisoners, and that they did not wish maximum and minimum security prisoners to *364 mingle. Even the District Court had difficulty with this assertion, as it commented that "[t]he defendants did not explain why inmates of different security levels are not mixed on work assignments when otherwise they are mixed." The court found, nonetheless, that this alternative would be inconsistent with Standard 853's mandate to move gang minimum inmates to outside work details. This conclusion, however, neglects the fact that the very issue is whether the prison's policy, of which Standard 853 is a part, should be administered so as to accommodate Muslim inmates. The policy itself cannot serve as a justification for its failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The record as it now stands thus does not establish that the Friday alternative work detail would create a problem for the institution. Respondents' second proposal is that gang minimum inmates be assigned to work details inside the main building on a regular basis. While admitting that the prison used inside details in the kitchen, bakery, and tailor shop, officials stated that these jobs are reserved for the riskiest gang minimum inmates, |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | these jobs are reserved for the riskiest gang minimum inmates, for whom an outside job might be unwise. Thus, concluded officials, it would be a bad idea to move these inmates outside to make room for Muslim gang minimum inmates. Respondents contend, however, that the prison's own records indicate that there are a significant number of jobs inside the institution that could be performed by inmates posing a lesser security risk. This suggests that it might not be necessary for the riskier gang minimum inmates to be moved outside to make room for the less risky inmates. Officials provided no data on the number of inside jobs available, the number of high-risk gang minimum inmates performing them, the number of Muslim inmates that might seek inside positions, or the number of staff that would be necessary to monitor such an arrangement. Given the plausibility of respondents' claim, prison officials should present at least *365 this information in substantiating their contention that inside assignments are infeasible. Third, respondents suggested that gang minimum inmates be assigned to Saturday or Sunday work details, which would allow them to make up any time lost by attending Jumu'ah on Friday. While prison officials admitted the existence of weekend work details, they stated that "[s]ince prison personnel are needed for other programs on weekends, the creation of additional weekend details would be a drain on scarce human resources." The record provides no indication, however, of the number of Muslims that would seek such a work detail, the current number of weekend details, or why it would be infeasible simply to reassign current Saturday or Sunday workers to Friday, rather than create additional details. The prison is able to arrange work schedules so that Jewish inmates may attend services on Saturday and Christian inmates may attend services on Sunday. Despite the fact that virtually all inmates are housed in the main building over the weekend, so that the demand on the facility is greater than at any other time, the prison is able to provide sufficient staff coverage to permit Jewish and Christian inmates to participate in their central religious ceremonies. Given the prison's duty to provide Muslims a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts," prison officials should be required to provide more than mere assertions of the infeasibility of weekend details for Muslim inmates. Finally, respondents proposed that minimum security inmates living at the Farm be assigned to jobs either in the Farm building or in its immediate vicinity. Since Standard 853 permits |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | building or in its immediate vicinity. Since Standard 853 permits such assignments for full minimum inmates, and since such inmates need not return to prison facilities through the main entrance, this would interfere neither with Standard 853 nor the concern underlying the no-return policy.[6]*366 Nonetheless, prison officials stated that such an arrangement might create an "affinity group" of Muslims representing a threat to prison authority. Officials pointed to no such problem in the five years in which Muslim inmates were permitted to assemble for Jumu'ah, and in which the alternative Friday work detail was in existence. Nor could they identify any threat resulting from the fact that during the month of Ramadan all Muslim prisoners participate in both breakfast and dinner at special times.[7] Furthermore, there was no testimony that the concentration of Jewish or Christian inmates on work details or in religious services posed any type of "affinity group" threat. As the record now stands, prison officials have declared that a security risk is created by a grouping of Muslim inmates in the least dangerous security classification, but not by a grouping of maximum security inmates who are concentrated in a work detail inside the main building, and who are the only Muslims assured of participating in Jumu'ah. Surely, prison officials should be required to provide at least some substantiation for this facially implausible contention. Petitioners also maintained that the assignment of full minimum Muslim inmates to the Farm or its near vicinity might provoke resentment because of other inmates' perception that Muslims were receiving special treatment. Officials pointed to no such perception during the period in which the alternative Friday detail was in existence, nor to any resentment of the fact that Muslims' dietary preferences are accommodated and that Muslims are permitted to operate on a special schedule during the month of Ramadan. Nor do they identify any such problems created by the accommodation of *367 the religious preferences of inmates of other faiths. Once again, prison officials should be required at a minimum to identify the basis for their assertions. Despite the plausibility of the alternatives proposed by respondents in light of federal practice and the prison's own past practice, officials have essentially provided mere pronouncements that such alternatives are not workable. If this Court is to take seriously its commitment to the principle that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution," Turner, ante, at 84, it must demand more than this record provides to justify a Muslim inmate's complete foreclosure from participation in the central religious service |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | dissenting | O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111913/olone-v-estate-of-shabazz/ | inmate's complete foreclosure from participation in the central religious service of the Muslim faith. IV That the record in this case contains little more than assertions is not surprising in light of the fact that the District Court proceeded on the basis of the approach set forth in St. That case held that mere "sincer[e]" and "arguably correct" testimony by prison officials is sufficient to demonstrate the need to limit prisoners' exercise of constitutional rights. (quoting ). This Court in Turner, ante, p. 78, however, set forth a more systematic framework for analyzing challenges to prison regulations. Turner directed attention to two factors of particular relevance to this case: the degree of constitutional deprivation and the availability of reasonable alternatives. The respondents in this case have been absolutely foreclosed from participating in the central religious ceremony of their Muslim faith. At least a colorable claim that such a drastic policy is not necessary can be made in light of the ability of federal prisons to accommodate Muslim inmates, Leesburg's own past practice of doing so, and the plausibility of the alternatives proposed by respondents. If the Court's standard of review is to represent anything more than reflexive deference to prison officials, any *368 finding of reasonableness must rest on firmer ground than the record now presents. Incarceration by its nature denies a prisoner participation in the larger human community. To deny the opportunity to affirm membership in a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an inmate's last source of hope for dignity and redemption.[8] Such a denial requires more justification than mere assertion that any other course of action is infeasible. While I would prefer that this case be analyzed under the approach set out in I, I would at a minimum remand to the District Court for an analysis of respondents' claims in accordance with the standard enunciated by the Court in Turner and in this case. I therefore dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117946/milwaukee-v-cement-div-national-gypsum-co/ | This is an admiralty case in which the plaintiff's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence. The question presented is whether that fact, together with the existence of a genuine dispute over liability, justified the District Court's departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. I Respondents are the owner and the insurers of the E. M. Ford, a ship that sank in Milwaukee's outer harbor on Christmas Eve 1979. At the time of this disaster, the Ford was berthed in a slip owned by the city of Milwaukee (City). In the course of a severe storm, she broke loose from her moorings, battered against the head wall of the slip, took on water, and sank. She was subsequently raised and repaired. In the Ford `s owner, the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. (National Gypsum), brought suit against the City, invoking the District Court's admiralty and maritime *191 jurisdiction.[1] The complaint alleged that the City had breached its duty as a wharfinger by assigning the vessel to a berthing slip known to be unsafe in heavy winds and by failing to give adequate warning of hidden dangers in the slip. The plaintiff sought damages of $4.5 million, later increased to $6.5 million. The City denied fault and filed a $250,000 counterclaim for damage to its dock. The City alleged that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned in winter, with no means aboard for monitoring weather conditions or summoning help. In the District Court conducted a 3-week trial on the issue of liability. Finding that both National Gypsum and the City had been negligent, the court determined that the owner bore 96% of the responsibility for the disaster, while the City bore 4% of the fault. Given the disparity in the parties' damages, a final judgment giving effect to that allocation (and awarding the damages sought in the pleadings) would have essentially left each party to bear its own losses. Respondents took an interlocutory appeal from the District Court's ruling.[2] The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court's conclusion that both parties were at fault, and that the owner's negligence was "more egregious" than the City's, but it rejected the allocation of 96% of the responsibility to the owner as clearly erroneous. Cement Div., National Gypsum cert. denied, After making its own analysis of the record, the Court of *192 Appeals apportioned liability two-thirds to National Gypsum and one-third to the Thereafter the parties entered into a partial settlement fixing respondents' damages, excluding |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117946/milwaukee-v-cement-div-national-gypsum-co/ | parties entered into a partial settlement fixing respondents' damages, excluding prejudgment interest, at $1,677,541.86.[3] The parties agreed that any claim for interest would be submitted to the District Court for decision. A partial judgment for the stipulated amount was entered and satisfied. Respondents then sought an award of over $5.3 million in prejudgment [4] The District Court denied respondents' request. It noted that "an award of prejudgment interest calculated from the date of the loss is the rule rather than the exception in cases brought under a district court's admiralty jurisdiction," App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a, but held that special circumstances justified a departure from that rule in this case. The court explained: "In the instant case the record shows that from the outset there has been a genuine dispute over [respondents'] good faith claim that the City of Milwaukee was negligent for failing to warn the agents of [National *193 Gypsum] (who were planning to leave the FORD unmanned during the Christmas holidays) that a winter storm could create conditions in the outer harbor at Milwaukee which could damage the ship. The trial court and the court of appeals both found mutual fault for the damage which ensued to the ship and to the [City's] dock. The court of appeals ascribed two-thirds of the negligence to [National Gypsum]. Thus, in this situation the court concludes that [National Gypsum's] contributory negligence was of such magnitude that an award of prejudgment interest would be inequitable." at 22a.[5] The Court of Appeals reversed. It noted that prior to this Court's announcement of the comparative fault rule in United some courts had denied prejudgment interest in order to mitigate the harsh effects of the earlier rule commanding an equal division of damages whenever a collision resulted from the fault of both parties, even though one party was only slightly negligent. In the court's view, however, after the divided damages rule was "thrown overboard" and replaced with comparative fault, mutual fault could no longer provide a basis for denying prejudgment -585. The Court of Appeals also read our decision in West as disapproving of a "balancing of the equities" as a method of deciding whether to allow prejudgment The Court of Appeals' decision deepened an existing Circuit split regarding the criteria for denying prejudgment interest in maritime collision cases. Compare, e. g., Inland *194 Oil & Transport with Alkmeon Naviera, S. We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II Although Congress has enacted a statute governing the award of postjudgment interest in federal court litigation, see 28 U.S. C. there is no comparable legislation |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117946/milwaukee-v-cement-div-national-gypsum-co/ | litigation, see 28 U.S. C. there is no comparable legislation regarding prejudgment Far from indicating a legislative determination that prejudgment interest should not be awarded, however, the absence of a statute merely indicates that the question is governed by traditional judgemade principles. Monessen Southwestern R. ; Those principles are well developed in admiralty, where "the Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies." Reliable Throughout our history, admiralty decrees have included provisions for prejudgment In Del a prize case decided in 1796, we affirmed a decree awarding the libellant interest from "the day of capture." In The Amiable Nancy, we considered a similar decree. In augmenting the damages awarded by the lower court, we directed that the additional funds should bear prejudgment interest, as had the damages already awarded by the lower court. The Amiable Nancy arose out of the "gross and wanton" seizure of a Haitian vessel near the island of Antigua by the Scourge, an American privateer. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Story explained that even though the "loss of the supposed profits" of the Amiable Nancy `s voyage was not recoverable, "the prime cost, or value of the property *195 lost, at the time of the loss, and in case of injury, the diminution in value, by reason of the injury, with interest upon such valuation, afforded the true measure for assessing damages." We applied the same rule in The Umbria, explaining that "in cases of total loss by collision damages are limited to the value of the vessel, with interest thereon, and the net freight pending at the time of the collision." (Emphasis added.)[6] The Courts of Appeals have consistently and correctly construed decisions such as these as establishing a general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases, subject to a limited exception for "peculiar" or "exceptional" circumstances. See, e. g., Inland Oil & Transport Co., 696 F. 2d, at 327; Central Rivers Towing, ; Ohio River ; Alkmeon Naviera, 633 F. 2d, at 797; Parker Towing The essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss.[7] Full compensation has long been recognized as a *196 basic principle of admiralty law, where "[r]estitutio in integrum is the leading maxim applied by admiralty courts to ascertain damages resulting from a collision." Standard Oil Co. of N. By compensating "for the loss of use of money due as damages from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered," West -311, n. 2, an award of prejudgment interest |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117946/milwaukee-v-cement-div-national-gypsum-co/ | entered," West -311, n. 2, an award of prejudgment interest helps achieve the goal of restoring a party to the condition it enjoyed before the injury occurred, The President Madison, Despite admiralty's traditional hospitality to prejudgment interest, however, such an award has never been automatic. In The Scotland, we stated that the "allowance of interest on damages is not an absolute right. Whether it ought or ought not to be allowed depends upon the circumstances of each case, and rests very much in the discretion of the tribunal which has to pass upon the subject, whether it be a court or a jury." See also The Maggie J. Smith, Although we have never attempted to exhaustively catalog the circumstances that will justify the denial of interest, and do not do so today,[8] the most obvious example is the plaintiff's responsibility for "undue delay in prosecuting the lawsuit." General Motors Other circumstances may appropriately be invoked as warranted by the facts of particular cases. In this case, the City asks us to characterize two features of the instant litigation as sufficiently unusual to justify a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded to make the injured party whole. First, the City stresses the fact that there was a good-faith dispute *197 over its liability for respondents' loss. In our view, however, this fact carries little weight. If interest were awarded as a penalty for bad-faith conduct of the litigation, the City's argument would be well taken. But prejudgment interest is not awarded as a penalty; it is merely an element of just compensation. The City's "good-faith" argument has some resonance with the venerable common-law rule that prejudgment interest is not awarded on unliquidated claims (those where the precise amount of damages at issue cannot be computed). If a party contests liability in good faith, it will usually be the case that the party's ultimate exposure is uncertain. But the liquidated/unliquidated distinction has faced trenchant criticism for a number of years.[9] Moreover, that distinction "has never become so firmly entrenched in admiralty as it has been at law." Moore-McCormack Lines,[10] Any fixed rule allowing prejudgment interest only on liquidated claims would be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with admiralty's traditional presumption. Yet unless we were willing to adopt such a rulewhich we are notuncertainty about the outcome of a case should not preclude an award of *198 In sum, the existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117946/milwaukee-v-cement-div-national-gypsum-co/ | most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment See Alkmeon Naviera, 633 F. 2d, at 798. The second purportedly "peculiar" feature of this case is the magnitude of the plaintiff's fault. Leaving aside the empirical question whether such a division of fault is in fact an aberration, it is true in this case that the owner of the E. M. Ford was primarily responsible for the vessel's loss. As a result, it might appear somewhat inequitable to award a large sum in prejudgment interest against a relatively innocent party. But any unfairness is illusory, because the relative fault of the parties has already been taken into consideration in calculating the amount of the loss for which the City is responsible. In United we "replaced the divided damages rule, which required an equal division of property damage whatever the relative degree of fault may have been, with a rule requiring that damages be assessed on the basis of proportionate fault when such an allocation can reasonably be made." McDermott, Thus, in this case, before prejudgment interest even entered the picture, the total amount of respondents' recovery had already been reduced by two-thirds because of National Gypsum's own negligence. The City's responsibility for the remaining one-third is no different than if it had performed the same negligent acts and the owner, instead of also being negligent, had engaged in heroic maneuvers that avoided two-thirds of the damages. The City is merely required to compensate the owner for the loss for which the City is responsible.[11] *199 In light of Reliable we are unmoved by the City's contention that an award of prejudgment interest is inequitable in a mutual fault situation. Indeed, the converse is true: a denial of prejudgment interest would be unfair. As Justice Kennedy noted while he was sitting on the Ninth Circuit, "under any rule allowing apportionment of liability, denying prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would seem to penalize a party twice for the same mistake." Alkmeon Naviera, 633 F. 2d, at 798, n. 12. Such a double penalty is commended neither by logic nor by fairness; the rule giving rise to it is a relic of history that has ceased to serve any purpose in the wake of Reliable Accordingly, we hold that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. Questions related to the calculation of the prejudgment interest award, including the rate to be applied, have not been raised in this Court |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | This case arises out of a decision by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa. The District Court held that APHIS violated the National Environ mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S. C. et seq., by issuing its deregulation deci sion without first completing a detailed assessment of the environmental consequences of its proposed course of action. To remedy that violation, the District Court vacated the agency’s decision completely deregulating the alfalfa variety in question; ordered APHIS not to act on the deregulation petition in whole or in part until it had completed a detailed environmental review; and enjoined almost all future planting of the genetically engineered alfalfa pending the completion of that review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s entry of permanent injunctive relief. The main issue now in dispute concerns the breadth of that relief. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 2 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court I A The Plant Protection Act (PPA), 7 U.S. C. et seq., provides that the Secretary of the Depart ment of Agriculture (USDA) may issue regulations “to prevent the introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States.” The Secretary has delegated that authority to APHIS, a division of the USDA. 7 CFR 2.80(a)(36) (2010). Acting pursuant to that delegation, APHIS has promulgated regulations governing “the introduction of organisms and products altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant pests.” See and n. 1. Under those regulations, certain genetically engi neered plants are presumed to be “plant pests”—and thus “regulated articles” under the PPA—until APHIS deter mines otherwise. See ; 340.2, 340.6; see also App. 183. However, any person may petition APHIS for a determination that a regulated article does not present a plant pest risk and therefore should not be subject to the applicable regulations. 7 U.S. C. 7 CFR APHIS may grant such a petition in whole or in part. In deciding whether to grant nonregulated status to a genetically engineered plant variety, APHIS must comply with NEPA, which requires federal agencies “to the fullest extent possible” to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environ ment.” 42 U.S. C. The statutory text “speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not require an agency to consider |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | proposed actions; it does not require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions.” Kleppe v. Sierra Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court Club, An agency need not complete an EIS for a particular proposal if it finds, on the basis of a shorter “environ mental assessment” (EA), that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the environment. 40 CFR 1508.13 Even if a particular agency proposal requires an EIS, applicable regulations allow the agency to take at least some action in furtherance of that proposal while the EIS is being prepared. See (“no action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would: (1) Have an adverse environmental impact; or (2) Limit the choice of reasonable alternatives”); (“While work on a required program environmental impact statement is in progress and the action is not covered by an existing program statement, agencies shall not under take in the interim any major Federal action covered by the program which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment unless such action” satisfies certain requirements). B This case involves Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a kind of alfalfa crop that has been genetically engineered to be tolerant of glyphosate, the active ingredient of the herbi cide Roundup. Petitioner Monsanto Company (Monsanto) owns the intellectual property rights to RRA. Monsanto licenses those rights to co-petitioner Forage Genetics International (FGI), which is the exclusive developer of RRA seed. APHIS initially classified RRA as a regulated article, but in 2004 petitioners sought nonregulated status for two strains of RRA. In response, APHIS prepared a draft EA assessing the likely environmental impact of the requested deregulation. It then published a notice in the Federal Register advising the public of the deregulation petition and soliciting public comments on its draft EA. After 4 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court considering the hundreds of public comments that it re ceived, APHIS issued a Finding of No Significant Impact and decided to deregulate RRA unconditionally and with out preparing an EIS. Prior to this decision, APHIS had authorized almost 300 field trials of RRA conducted over a period of eight years. App. 348. Approximately eight months after APHIS granted RRA nonregulated status, respondents (two conventional alfalfa seed farms and environmental groups concerned with food safety) filed this action against the Secretary of Agricul ture and certain other officials in Federal District Court, challenging APHIS’s decision to completely deregulate RRA. Their complaint alleged violations of NEPA, the Endangered |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | deregulate RRA. Their complaint alleged violations of NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S. C. et seq., and the PPA. Respondents did not seek preliminary injunctive relief pending resolution of those claims. Hence, RRA enjoyed nonregulated status for approximately two years. During that period, more than 3,000 farmers in 48 States planted an estimated 220,000 acres of RRA. App. 350. In resolving respondents’ NEPA claim, the District Court accepted APHIS’s determination that RRA does not have any harmful health effects on humans or livestock. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a; accord, at 45a. Neverthe less, the District Court held that APHIS violated NEPA by deregulating RRA without first preparing an EIS. In particular, the court found that APHIS’s EA failed to answer substantial questions concerning two broad conse quences of its proposed action: first, the extent to which complete deregulation would lead to the transmission of the gene conferring glyphosate tolerance from RRA to organic and conventional alfalfa; and, second, the extent to which the introduction of RRA would contribute to the development of Roundup-resistant weeds. at 52a. In light of its determination that the deregulation decision ran afoul of NEPA, the District Court dismissed without Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court prejudice respondents’ claims under the ESA and PPA. After these rulings, the District Court granted petition ers permission to intervene in the remedial phase of the lawsuit. The court then asked the parties to submit pro posed judgments embodying their preferred means of remedying the NEPA violation. APHIS’s proposed judg ment would have ordered the agency to prepare an EIS, vacated the agency’s deregulation decision, and replaced that decision with the terms of the judgment itself. at 184a (proposed judgment providing that “[the federal] defendants’ [June 14,] 2005 Determination of Nonregu lated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Toler ance to the Herbicide Glyphosate is hereby vacated and replaced by the terms of this judgment” (emphasis added)). The terms of the proposed judgment, in turn, would have permitted the continued planting of RRA pending comple tion of the EIS, subject to six restrictions. Those restric tions included, among other things, mandatory isolation distances between RRA and non-genetically-engineered alfalfa fields in order to mitigate the risk of gene flow; mandatory harvesting conditions; a requirement that planting and harvesting equipment that had been in contact with RRA be cleaned prior to any use with conven tional or organic alfalfa; identification and handling re quirements for RRA seed; and a requirement that all RRA seed producers and hay growers be under contract with |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | RRA seed producers and hay growers be under contract with either Monsanto or FGI and that their contracts require compliance with the other limitations set out in the pro posed judgment. The District Court rejected APHIS’s proposed judgment. In its preliminary injunction, the District Court prohibited almost all future planting of RRA pending APHIS’s com pletion of the required EIS. But in order to minimize the harm to farmers who had relied on APHIS’s deregulation decision, the court expressly allowed those who had al ready purchased RRA to plant their seeds until March 30, 6 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court 2007. at 58a. In its subsequently entered permanent injunction and judgment, the court (1) vacated APHIS’s deregulation decision; (2) ordered APHIS to prepare an EIS before it made any decision on Monsanto’s deregula tion petition; (3) enjoined the planting of any RRA in the United States after March 30, 2007, pending APHIS’s completion of the required EIS; and (4) imposed certain conditions (suggested by APHIS) on the handling and identification of already-planted RRA. at 79a, 109a. The District Court denied petitioners’ request for an evi dentiary hearing. The Government, Monsanto, and FGI appealed, chal lenging the scope of the relief granted but not disputing the existence of a NEPA violation. See Geertson Seed A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af firmed. Based on its review of the record, the panel first concluded that the District Court had “recognized that an injunction does not ‘automatically issue’ when a NEPA violation is found” and had instead based its issuance of injunctive relief on the four-factor test traditionally used for that purpose. The panel held that the District Court had not committed clear error in making any of the subsidiary factual findings on which its assess ment of the four relevant factors was based. And the panel rejected the claim that the District Court had not given sufficient deference to APHIS’s expertise concerning the likely effects of allowing continued planting of RRA on a limited basis. In the panel’s view, APHIS’s proposed interim measures would have perpetuated a system that had been found by the District Court to have caused envi ronmental harm in the past. Hence, the panel concluded that the District Court had not abused its discretion “in choosing to reject APHIS’s proposed mitiga tion measures in favor of a broader injunction to prevent more irreparable harm from occurring.” Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court The panel majority also rejected petitioners’ alternative argument that the |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | The panel majority also rejected petitioners’ alternative argument that the District Court had erred in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing before entering its permanent injunction. Writing in dissent, Judge N. Randy Smith disagreed with that conclusion. In his view, the District Court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before issuing a permanent injunction unless the facts were undisputed or the adverse party expressly waived its right to such a hearing. Neither of those two exceptions, he found, applied here. We granted certiorari. 558 U. S. (2010). II A At the threshold, respondents contend that petitioners lack standing to seek our review of the lower court rulings at issue here. We disagree. Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling. Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S. (slip op., at 8). Petitioners here sat isfy all three criteria. Petitioners are injured by their inability to sell or license RRA to prospective customers until such time as APHIS completes the required EIS. Because that injury is caused by the very remedial order that petitioners challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by a favorable ruling from this Court. Respondents do not dispute that petitioners would have standing to contest the District Court’s permanent injunc tion order if they had pursued a different litigation strat egy. Instead, respondents argue that the injury of which petitioners complain is independently caused by a part of the District Court’s order that petitioners failed to chal lenge, namely, the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation deci sion. The practical consequence of the vacatur, respon 8 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court dents contend, was to restore RRA to the status of a regu lated article; and, subject to certain exceptions not appli cable here, federal regulations ban the growth and sale of regulated articles. Because petitioners did not specifically challenge the District Court’s vacatur, respondents reason, they lack standing to challenge a part of the District Court’s order (i.e., the injunction) that does not cause petitioners any injury not also caused by the vacatur. See Brief for Respondents 19–20. Respondents’ argument fails for two independent rea sons. First, although petitioners did not challenge the vacatur directly, they adequately preserved their objection that the vacated deregulation decision should have been replaced by APHIS’s proposed injunction. Throughout the remedial phase of this litigation, one of the main disputes between the parties has been whether the District Court was required to adopt APHIS’s proposed judgment. |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | the District Court was required to adopt APHIS’s proposed judgment. See, e.g., Intervenor-Appellants’ Opening Brief in No. 07–16458 etc. (CA9), p. 59 (urging the Court of Appeals to “vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case to the district court with instructions to enter APHIS’s proposed relief”); Opening Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellants in No. 16458 etc. (CA9), pp. 21, 46 (“The blanket injunc tion should be narrowed in accordance with APHIS’s proposal”); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 25–27, 53–54. That judgment would have replaced the vacated deregulation decision with an order expressly allowing continued plant ing of RRA subject to certain limited conditions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a (proposed judgment providing that “[the federal] defendants’ 14 June 2005 Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate is hereby va cated and replaced by the terms of this judgment” (empha sis added)). Accordingly, if the District Court had adopted the agency’s suggested remedy, there would still be au thority for the continued planting of RRA, because there Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 9 Opinion of the Court would, in effect, be a new deregulation decision.1 Second, petitioners in any case have standing to chal lenge the part of the District Court’s order enjoining par tial deregulation. Respondents focus their standing ar gument on the part of the judgment enjoining the planting of RRA, but the judgment also states that “[b]efore grant ing Monsanto’s deregulation petition, even in part, the federal defendants shall prepare an environmental impact statement.” at 108a (emphasis added); see also at 79a (“The Court will enter a final judgment ordering the government to prepare an EIS before it makes a deci sion on Monsanto’s deregulation petition”). As respon dents concede, that part of the judgment goes beyond the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37, 46. At oral argument, respondents contended that the re triction on APHIS’s ability to effect a partial deregulation of RRA does not cause petitioners “an actual or an immi nent harm.” –40. In order for a partial deregula tion to occur, respondents argued, the case would have to be remanded to the agency, and APHIS would have to prepare an EA “that may or may not come out in favor of a partial deregulation.” Because petitioners cannot prove that those two events would happen, respon dents contended, the asserted harm caused by the District Court’s partial deregulation ban is too speculative to satisfy the actual or imminent injury requirement. We reject this argument. If the injunction were lifted, |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | requirement. We reject this argument. If the injunction were lifted, we do not see why the District Court would have to re mand the matter to the agency in order for APHIS to effect a partial deregulation. And even if a remand were —————— 1 We need not decide whether the District Court had the authority to replace the vacated agency order with an injunction of its own making. The question whether petitioners are entitled to the relief that they seek goes to the merits, not to standing. 10 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court required, we perceive no basis on which the District Court could decline to remand the matter to the agency so that it could determine whether to pursue a partial deregulation during the pendency of the EIS process. Nor is any doubt as to whether APHIS would issue a new EA in favor of a partial deregulation sufficient to defeat petitioners’ standing. It is undisputed that peti tioners have submitted a deregulation petition and that a partial deregulation of the kind embodied in the agency’s proposed judgment would afford petitioners much of the relief that they seek; it is also undisputed that, absent the District Court’s order, APHIS could attempt to effect such a partial deregulation pending its completion of the EIS. See at 7–8, 25–27, 38. For purposes of resolving the particular standing question before us, we need not decide whether or to what extent a party challenging an injunc tion that bars an agency from granting certain relief must show that the agency would be likely to afford such relief if it were free to do so. In this case, as is clear from APHIS’s proposed judgment and from its briefing throughout the remedial phase of this litigation, the agency takes the view that a partial deregulation reflect ing its proposed limitations is in the public interest. Thus, there is more than a strong likelihood that APHIS would partially deregulate RRA were it not for the District Court’s injunction. The District Court’s elimination of that likelihood is plainly sufficient to establish a constitu tionally cognizable injury. Moreover, as respondents essentially conceded at oral argument, that injury would be redressed by a favorable decision here, since “vacating the current injunction will allow [petitioners] to go back to the agency, [to] seek a partial deregulation,” even if the District Court’s vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision is left intact. We therefore hold that Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 11 Opinion of the Court petitioners have standing to seek this Court’s review.2 B |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | Court petitioners have standing to seek this Court’s review.2 B We next consider petitioners’ contention that respon dents lack standing to seek injunctive relief. See Daim lerChrysler (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Petitioners argue that respondents have failed to show that any of the named respondents is likely to suffer a constitutionally cognizable injury absent injunctive relief. See Brief for Petitioners 40. We disagree. Respondents include conventional alfalfa farmers. Emphasizing “the undisputed concentration of alfalfa seed farms,” the District Court found that those farmers had “established a ‘reasonable probability’ that their organic and conventional alfalfa crops will be infected with the engineered gene” if RRA is completely deregulated. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a.3 A substantial risk of gene flow —————— 2 We do not rest “the primary basis for our jurisdiction on the premise that the District Court enjoined APHIS from partially deregulating RRA in any sense.” See post, at 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Even if the District Court’s order prohibiting a partial deregulation applies only to “the particular partial deregulation order proposed to the court by APHIS,” see post, at 8, petitioners would still have standing to chal lenge that aspect of the order. 3At least one of the respondents in this case specifically alleges that he owns an alfalfa farm in a prominent seed-growing region and faces a significant risk of contamination from RRA. See Record, Doc. 62, pp. 1– 2; at 3–4 (Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support of Plan tiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment) (“Since alfalfa is pollinated by honey, bumble and leafcutter bees, the genetic contamination of the Roundup Ready seed will rapidly spread through the seed growing regions. Bees have a range of at least two to ten miles, and the alfalfa seed farms are much more concentrated”). Other declarations in the record provide further support for the District Court’s conclusion that the deregulation of RRA poses a significant risk of contamination to respondents’ crops. See, e.g., Doc. 53, ¶9, at 2 (Declaration of Jim Munsch) (alleging risk of “significant contamination due to the 12 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court injures respondents in several ways. For example, re spondents represent that, in order to continue marketing their product to consumers who wish to buy non genetically-engineered alfalfa, respondents would have to conduct testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been contaminated. See, e.g., Record, Doc. 62, p. 5 (Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support of Plantiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment) (hereinafter Geertson |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | in Support of Plantiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment) (hereinafter Geertson Declaration) (“Due to the high potential for contamination, I will need to test my crops for the pres ence of genetically engineered alfalfa seed. This testing will be a new cost to my seed business and we will have to raise our seed prices to cover these costs, making our prices less competitive”); Doc. 57, p. 4 (Declaration of Patrick Trask in Support of Plantiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment) (“To ensure that my seeds are pure, I will need to test my crops and obtain certification that my seeds are free of genetically engineered alfalfa”); see also Record, Doc. 55, p. 2 (“There is zero tolerance for contaminated seed in the organic market”). Respondents also allege that the risk of gene flow will cause them to take certain meas ures to minimize the likelihood of potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of non-genetically engineered alfalfa. See, e.g., Geertson Declaration 3 (not ing the “increased cost of alfalfa breeding due to potential for genetic contamination”); (“Due to the threat of contamination, I have begun contracting with growers outside of the United States to ensure that I can supply genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed. Finding new growers has already resulted in increased administrative —————— compact geographic area of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas and the fact that pollen is distributed by bees that have large natural range of activity”); App. ¶8, p. 401 (Declaration of Marc Asumendi) (“Roundup alfalfa seed fields are currently being planted in all the major alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to contamination to non-GMO seed production fields”). Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 13 Opinion of the Court costs at my seed business”). Such harms, which respondents will suffer even if their crops are not actually infected with the Roundup ready gene, are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional standing analysis. Those harms are readily attributable to APHIS’s deregulation decision, which, as the District Court found, gives rise to a significant risk of gene flow to non-genetically-engineered varieties of alfalfa. Finally, a judicial order prohibiting the growth and sale of all or some genetically engineered alfalfa would remedy respondents’ injuries by eliminating or minimizing the risk of gene flow to conventional and organic alfalfa crops. We therefore conclude that respon dents have constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from the complete deregulation order at issue here. Petitioners appear to suggest that respondents fail to satisfy the “zone of interests” test we have previously articulated as a prudential standing requirement |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | test we have previously articulated as a prudential standing requirement in cases challenging agency compliance with particular statutes. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 (arguing that protection against the risk of commercial harm “is not an interest that NEPA was enacted to address”); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–163 (1997). That argument is unpersua sive because, as the District Court found, respondents’ injury has an environmental as well as an economic com ponent. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. In its ruling on the merits of respondents’ NEPA claim, the District Court held that the risk that the RRA gene conferring gly phosate resistance will infect conventional and organic alfalfa is a significant environmental effect within the meaning of NEPA. Petitioners did not appeal that part of the court’s ruling, and we have no occasion to revisit it here. Respondents now seek injunctive relief in order to avert the risk of gene flow to their crops—the very same effect that the District Court determined to be a signifi cant environmental concern for purposes of NEPA. The 14 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court mere fact that respondents also seek to avoid certain economic harms that are tied to the risk of gene flow does not strip them of prudential standing. In short, respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief, and petitioners have standing to seek this Court’s review of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment affirming the entry of such relief. We therefore proceed to the merits of the case. III A The District Court sought to remedy APHIS’s NEPA violation in three ways: First, it vacated the agency’s decision completely deregulating RRA; second, it enjoined APHIS from deregulating RRA, in whole or in part, pend ing completion of the mandated EIS; and third, it entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all future planting of RRA. at 108a–110a. Because petitioners and the Government do not argue otherwise, we assume without deciding that the District Court acted lawfully in vacating the deregulation decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (“[T]he district court could have vacated the order in its entirety and sent it back to the agency”); accord, at 15– 16. We therefore address only the latter two aspects of the District Court’s judgment. Before doing so, however, we provide a brief overview of the standard governing the entry of injunctive relief. B “[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suf fered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | it has suf fered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to com pensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 15 Opinion of the Court in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay The traditional four-factor test applies when a plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to remedy a NEPA violation. See v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. (2008) (slip op., at 21–23). Petitioners argue that the lower courts in this case proceeded on the erroneous assumption that an injunction is generally the appropriate remedy for a NEPA violation. In particular, petitioners note that the District Court cited pre- Ninth Circuit precedent for the proposition that, in “ ‘the run of the mill NEPA case,’ ” an injunction delaying the contemplated government project is proper “ ‘until the NEPA violation is cured.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a (quoting Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 833 (CA9 2002)); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a (quoting same language in preliminary injunction order). In addition, petitioners observe, the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case both stated that, “in unusual circumstances, an injunction may be withheld, or, more likely, limited in scope” in NEPA cases. 6a (internal quotation marks omitted)); 570 F.3d, Insofar as the statements quoted above are intended to guide the determination whether to grant injunctive relief, they invert the proper mode of analysis. An injunction should issue only if the traditional four-factor test is satis fied. See at (slip op., at 21–24). In contrast, the statements quoted above appear to presume that an injunction is the proper remedy for a NEPA viola tion except in unusual circumstances. No such thumb on the scales is warranted. Nor, contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, could any such error be cured by a court’s perfunctory recognition that “an injunction does 16 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court not automatically issue” in NEPA cases. See 570 F.3d, at 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue; rather, a court must determine that an injunc tion should issue under the traditional four-factor test set out above. Notwithstanding the lower courts’ apparent reliance on the incorrect standard set |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | the lower courts’ apparent reliance on the incorrect standard set out in the pre- Circuit precedents quoted above, respondents argue that the lower courts in fact applied the traditional four-factor test. In their view, the statements that injunctive relief is proper in the “run-of-the-mill” NEPA case, and that such injunctions are granted except in “unusual circumstances,” are descriptive rather than prescriptive. See Brief for Respondents 28, n. 14. We need not decide whether re spondents’ characterization of the lower court opinions in this case is sound. Even if it is, the injunctive relief granted here cannot stand. C We first consider whether the District Court erred in enjoining APHIS from partially deregulating RRA during the pendency of the EIS process.4 The relevant part of the District Court’s judgment states that, “[b]efore granting Monsanto’s deregulation petition, —————— 4 Petitionersfocus their challenge on the part of the District Court’s order prohibiting the planting of RRA. As we explain below, however, the broad injunction against planting cannot be valid if the injunction against partial deregulation is improper. See infra, at 23; see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a (District Court order recognizing that APHIS’s proposed remedy “seek[s], in effect, a partial deregulation that permits the continued expansion of the Roundup Ready alfalfa market subject to certain conditions” (emphasis added)). The validity of the injunction prohibiting partial deregulation is therefore properly before us. Like the District Court, we use the term “partial deregulation” to refer to any limited or conditional deregulation. See 4a, 69a. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 17 Opinion of the Court even in part, the federal defendants shall prepare an environmental impact statement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a (emphasis added); see also at 79a (“The Court will enter a final judgment ordering the government to prepare an EIS before it makes a decision on Monsanto’s deregulation petition”). The plain text of the order prohib its any partial deregulation, not just the particular partial deregulation embodied in APHIS’s proposed judgment. We think it is quite clear that the District Court meant just what it said. The related injunction against planting states that “no [RRA] may be planted” “[u]ntil the federal defendants prepare the EIS and decide the deregu lation petition.” at 108a (emphasis added). That injunction, which appears in the very same judgment and directly follows the injunction against granting Mon santo’s petition “even in part,” does not carve out an ex ception for planting subsequently authorized by a valid partial deregulation decision. In our view, none of the traditional four factors govern ing the entry of permanent injunctive |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | traditional four factors govern ing the entry of permanent injunctive relief supports the District Court’s injunction prohibiting partial deregula tion. To see why that is so, it is helpful to understand how the injunction prohibiting a partial deregulation fits into the broader dispute between the parties. Respondents in this case brought suit under the APA to challenge a particular agency order: APHIS’s decision to completely deregulate RRA. The District Court held that the order in question was procedurally defective, and APHIS decided not to appeal that determination. At that point, it was for the agency to decide whether and to what extent it would pursue a partial deregulation. If the agency found, on the basis of a new EA, that a limited and temporary deregulation satisfied applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, it could proceed with such a deregulation even if it had not yet finished the onerous EIS required for complete deregulation. If and when the 18 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court agency were to issue a partial deregulation order, any party aggrieved by that order could bring a separate suit under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge the particular deregulation attempted. See 5 U.S. C. In this case, APHIS apparently sought to “streamline” the proceedings by asking the District Court to craft a remedy that, in effect, would have partially deregulated RRA until such time as the agency had finalized the EIS needed for a complete deregulation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, 23–24; App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a. To justify that dispo sition, APHIS and petitioners submitted voluminous documentary submissions in which they purported to show that the risk of gene flow would be insignificant if the District Court allowed limited planting and harvesting subject to APHIS’s proposed conditions. Respondents, in turn, submitted considerable evidence of their own that seemed to cut the other way. This put the District Court in an unenviable position. “The parties’ experts disagreed over virtually every factual issue relating to possible environmental harm, including the likelihood of genetic contamination and why some contamination had already occurred.” The District Court may well have acted within its dis cretion in refusing to craft a judicial remedy that would have authorized the continued planting and harvesting of RRA while the EIS is being prepared. It does not follow, however, that the District Court was within its rights in enjoining APHIS from allowing such planting and harvest ing pursuant to the authority vested in the agency by law. When the District Court entered its permanent injunction, APHIS had not yet exercised |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | Court entered its permanent injunction, APHIS had not yet exercised its authority to partially deregulate RRA. Until APHIS actually seeks to effect a partial deregulation, any judicial review of such a decision is premature.5 —————— 5 NEPA provides that an EIS must be “include[d] in every recommen Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 19 Opinion of the Court Nor can the District Court’s injunction be justified as a prophylactic measure needed to guard against the possi bility that the agency would seek to effect on its own the particular partial deregulation scheme embodied in the terms of APHIS’s proposed judgment. Even if the District Court was not required to adopt that judgment, there was no need to stop the agency from effecting a partial deregu lation in accordance with the procedures established by law. Moreover, the terms of the District Court’s injunction do not just enjoin the particular partial deregulation embodied in APHIS’s proposed judgment. Instead, the District Court barred the agency from pursuing any de regulation—no matter how limited the geographic area in which planting of RRA would be allowed, how great the isolation distances mandated between RRA fields and fields for growing non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, how stringent the regulations governing harvesting and distri bution, how robust the enforcement mechanisms available —————— dation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S. C. (emphasis added); see also (“A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and determine a point during the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact state ment should be prepared” (first emphasis added)). When a particular agency proposal exists and requires the preparation of an EIS, NEPA regulations allow the agency to take at least some action pertaining to that proposal during the pendency of the EIS process. See 40 CFR §, (c) We do not express any view on the Govern ment’s contention that a limited deregulation of the kind embodied in its proposed judgment would not require the prior preparation of an EIS. See Brief for Federal Respondents 21–22 (citing ); Tr. of Oral Arg. 20 (“what we were proposing for the interim, that is allowing continued planting subject to various protective measures, was funda mentally different from the action on which the EIS was being pre pared”). Because APHIS has not yet invoked the procedures necessary to attempt a limited deregulation, any judicial consideration of such issues is not warranted at this time. 20 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court at the |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court at the time of the decision, and—consequently—no matter how small the risk that the planting authorized under such conditions would adversely affect the environment in general and respondents in particular. The order enjoining any partial deregulation was also inconsistent with other aspects of the very same judgment. In fashioning its remedy for the NEPA violation, the District Court steered a “middle course” between more extreme options on either end. See at On the one hand, the District Court rejected APHIS’s proposal (supported by petitioners) to allow continued planting and harvesting of RRA subject to the agency’s proposed limita tions. On the other hand, the District Court did not bar continued planting of RRA as a regulated article under permit from APHIS, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a, and it expressly allowed farmers to harvest and sell RRA planted before March 30, 2007, at 76a–79a. If the District Court was right to conclude that any partial deregulation, no matter how limited, required the preparation of an EIS, it is hard to see why the limited planting and harvesting that the District Court allowed did not also require the preparation of an EIS. Conversely, if the District Court was right to conclude that the limited planting and har vesting it allowed did not require the preparation of an EIS, then an appropriately limited partial deregulation should likewise have been possible. Based on the analysis set forth above, it is clear that the order enjoining any deregulation whatsoever does not satisfy the traditional four-factor test for granting perma nent injunctive relief. Most importantly, respondents cannot show that they will suffer irreparable injury if APHIS is allowed to proceed with any partial deregula tion, for at least two independent reasons. First, if and when APHIS pursues a partial deregulation that arguably runs afoul of NEPA, respondents may file a new suit challenging such action and seeking appropriate Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 21 Opinion of the Court preliminary relief. See 5 U.S. C. 705. Accordingly, a permanent injunction is not now needed to guard against any present or imminent risk of likely irreparable harm. Second, a partial deregulation need not cause respon dents any injury at all, much less irreparable injury; if the scope of the partial deregulation is sufficiently limited, the risk of gene flow to their crops could be virtually nonexis tent. For example, suppose that APHIS deregulates RRA only in a remote part of the country in which respondents neither grow nor intend to grow non-genetically engineered alfalfa, and in which |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | nor intend to grow non-genetically engineered alfalfa, and in which no conventional alfalfa farms are currently located. Suppose further that APHIS issues an accompanying administrative order mandating isolation distances so great as to eliminate any apprecia ble risk of gene flow to the crops of conventional farmers who might someday choose to plant in the surrounding area. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition 9, n. 6 (quoting study concluding “ ‘that in order for there to be zero tolerance of any gene flow between a [RRA] seed field and a conven tional seed field, those fields would have to have a five mile isolation distance between them’ ”); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16 (representation from the Solicitor General that APHIS may impose conditions on the deregulation of RRA via issuance of an administrative order). Finally, suppose that APHIS concludes in a new EA that its lim ited deregulation would not pose a significant risk of gene flow or harmful weed development, and that the agency adopts a plan to police vigorously compliance with its administrative order in the limited geographic area in question. It is hard to see how respondents could show that such a limited deregulation would cause them likely irreparable injury. (Respondents in this case do not repre sent a class, so they could not seek to enjoin such an order on the ground that it might cause harm to other parties.) In any case, the District Court’s order prohibiting any 22 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court partial deregulation improperly relieves respondents of their burden to make the requisite evidentiary showing.6 Of course, APHIS might ultimately choose not to par tially deregulate RRA during the pendency of the EIS, or else to pursue the kind of partial deregulation embodied in its proposed judgment rather than the very limited de regulation envisioned in the above hypothetical. Until such time as the agency decides whether and how to exer cise its regulatory authority, however, the courts have no cause to intervene. Indeed, the broad injunction entered here essentially pre-empts the very procedure by which the agency could determine, independently of the pending EIS process for assessing the effects of a complete deregu lation, that a limited deregulation would not pose any appreciable risk of environmental harm. See 40 CFR 1508.9(a) In sum, we do not know whether and to what extent APHIS would seek to effect a limited deregulation during the pendency of the EIS process if it were free to do so; we do know that the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision means |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | do know that the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision means that virtually no RRA can be grown or sold until such time as a new deregulation decision is in place, and we also know that any party aggrieved by a hypothetical future deregulation decision will have ample opportunity —————— 6 The District Court itself appears to have recognized that its broad injunction may not have been necessary to avert any injury to respon dents. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a (“It does complicate it to try to fine-tune a particular remedy. So the simpler the remedy, the more attractive it is from the Court’s point of view, because it appears to me enforcement is easier. Understanding it is easier, and it may be, while a blunt instrument, it may actually, for the short term, achieve its result, achieve its purpose, even maybe it overachieves it. Maybe a lot of it is not necessary. I don’t know” (emphasis added)); see also (“I don’t say you have to be greater than 1.6 miles, you have to be away from the bees, you have be dah dah dah. That’s the farm business. I’m not even in it”); at 192a (“I am not going to get into the isolation distances”). Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 23 Opinion of the Court to challenge it, and to seek appropriate preliminary relief, if and when such a decision is made. In light of these particular circumstances, we hold that the District Court did not properly exercise its discretion in enjoining a partial deregulation of any kind pending APHIS’s prepa ration of an EIS. It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that aspect of the District Court’s judgment. D We now turn to petitioners’ claim that the District Court erred in entering a nationwide injunction against planting RRA. Petitioners argue that the District Court did not apply the right test for determining whether to enter permanent injunctive relief; that, even if the District Court identified the operative legal standard, it erred as a matter of law in applying that standard to the facts of this case; and that the District Court was required to grant petitioners an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested issues of fact germane to the remedial dispute between the parties. We agree that the District Court’s injunction against planting went too far, but we come to that conclu sion for two independent reasons. First, the impropriety of the District Court’s broad injunction against planting flows from the impropriety of its injunction against partial deregulation. If APHIS may partially deregulate RRA |
Justice Alito | 2,010 | 8 | majority | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149005/monsanto-co-v-geertson-seed-farms/ | injunction against partial deregulation. If APHIS may partially deregulate RRA before preparing a full-blown EIS—a question that we need not and do not decide here— farmers should be able to grow and sell RRA in accordance with that agency determination. Because it was inappro priate for the District Court to foreclose even the possibil ity of a partial and temporary deregulation, it necessarily follows that it was likewise inappropriate to enjoin any and all parties from acting in accordance with the terms of such a deregulation decision. Second, respondents have represented to this Court that 24 MONSANTO CO. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS Opinion of the Court the District Court’s injunction against planting does not have any meaningful practical effect independent of its vacatur. See Brief for Respondents 24; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 37 (“[T]he mistake that was made [by the District Court] was in not appreciating that the vacatur did have [the] effect” of independently prohibiting the growth and sale of almost all RRA). An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course. See, e.g., If a less drastic remedy (such as partial or complete vacatur of APHIS’s deregula tion decision) was sufficient to redress respondents’ injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted. See ; see also 555 U. S., at (slip op., at 21–23). E In sum, the District Court abused its discretion in en joining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation and in prohibiting the possibility of planting in accordance with the terms of such a deregulation. Given those errors, this Court need not express any view on whether injunctive relief of some kind was available to respondents on the record before us. Nor does the Court address the question whether the District Court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before entering the relief at issue here. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 1 STEVENS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09–475 MONSANTO COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS ET AL. |
per_curiam | 2,005 | 200 | per_curiam | Medellin v. Dretke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142898/medellin-v-dretke/ | We granted certiorari in this case to consider two questions: first, whether a federal court is bound by the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that United States *662 courts must reconsider petitioner José Medellín's claim for relief under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U S T 77, 100-101, T I A S No 6820, without regard to procedural default doctrines; and second, whether a federal court should give effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation, to the ICJ's judgment After we granted certiorari, Medellín filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, relying in part upon a memorandum from President George W Bush that was issued after we granted certiorari This state-court proceeding may provide Medellín with the very reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that he now seeks in the present proceeding The merits briefing in this case also has revealed a number of hurdles Medellín must surmount before qualifying for federal habeas relief in this proceeding, based on the resolution of the questions he has presented here For these reasons we dismiss the writ as improvidently granted See Ticor Title Ins ; The ; Medellín, a Mexican national, confessed to participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993 He was convicted and sentenced to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on direct appeal Medellín then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming for the first time that Texas failed to notify him of his right to consular access as required by the Vienna Convention The state trial court rejected this claim, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed Medellín then filed this federal habeas corpus petition, again raising the Vienna Convention claim The District Court denied the petition Subsequently, while Medellín's application to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a certificate of appealability was pending, see 28 US C *663 2253(c), the ICJ issued its decision in Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex v U S), I C J No 128 (Judgment of Mar 31), in which the Republic of Mexico had alleged violations of the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellín and other Mexican nationals facing the death penalty in the United States The ICJ determined that the Vienna Convention guaranteed individually enforceable rights, that the United States had violated those rights, and that the United States must "provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of |
per_curiam | 2,005 | 200 | per_curiam | Medellin v. Dretke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142898/medellin-v-dretke/ | choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals" to determine whether the violations "caused actual prejudice," without allowing procedural default rules to bar such review ¶¶ 153 The Court of Appeals denied Medellín's application for a certificate of appealability It did so based on Medellín's procedural default, see and its prior holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right, see, e g, United While acknowledging the existence of the ICJ's Avena judgment, the court gave no dispositive effect to that judgment More than two months after we granted certiorari, and a month before oral argument in this case, President Bush issued a memorandum that stated the United States would discharge its international obligations under the Avena judgment by "having State courts give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision" George W Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb 28, 2005), App 2 to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9a Relying on this memorandum and the Avena judgment as separate bases for relief that were not available at the time of his first state habeas corpus action, Medellín filed a successive state application for a writ of habeas corpus *664 just four days before oral argument here That state proceeding may provide Medellín with the review and reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that the ICJ required, and that Medellín now seeks in this proceeding This new development, as well as the factors discussed below, leads us to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted[1] There are several threshold issues that could independently preclude federal habeas relief for Medellín, and thus render advisory or academic our consideration of the questions presented These issues are not free from doubt First, even accepting, arguendo, the ICJ's construction of the Vienna Convention's consular access provisions, a violation of those provisions may not be cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding In this Court recognized that a violation of federal statutory rights ranked among the "nonconstitutional lapses we have held not cognizable in a postconviction proceeding" unless they meet the "fundamental defect" test announced in our decision in ; see also id, (SCALIA, J, concurring in part and concurring in judgment) In order for Medellín to obtain federal habeas relief, Medellín must therefore establish that Reed does not bar his treaty claim Second, with respect to any claim the state court "adjudicated on the merits," habeas relief in federal court is available only if such adjudication |
per_curiam | 2,005 | 200 | per_curiam | Medellin v. Dretke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142898/medellin-v-dretke/ | relief in federal court is available only if such adjudication "was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as *665 determined by the Supreme Court" 28 US C 2254(d)(1); see Woodford v Visciotti, 537 US 19, The state habeas court, which disposed of the case before the ICJ rendered its judgment in Avena, arguably "adjudicated on the merits" three claims It found that the Vienna Convention did not create individual, judicially enforceable rights and that state procedural default rules barred Medellín's consular access claim Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state trial court found that Medellín "fail[ed] to show that he was harmed by any lack of notification to the Mexican consulate concerning his arrest for capital murder; [Medellín] was provided with effective legal representation upon [his] request; and [his] constitutional rights were safeguarded" App to Pet for Cert 56a[2] Medellín would have to overcome the deferential standard with regard to all of these findings before obtaining federal habeas relief on his Vienna Convention claim[3] Third, a habeas corpus petitioner generally cannot enforce a "new rule" of law Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 *666 Before relief could be granted, then, we would be obliged to decide whether or how the Avena judgment bears on our ordinary "new rule" jurisprudence Fourth, Medellín requires a certificate of appealability in order to pursue the merits of his claim on appeal 28 US C 2253(c)(1) A certificate of appealability may be granted only where there is "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added) To obtain the necessary certificate of appealability to proceed in the Court of Appeals, Medellín must demonstrate that his allegation of a treaty violation could satisfy this standard See Slack v McDaniel, 529 US 473, Fifth, Medellín can seek federal habeas relief only on claims that have been exhausted in state court See 28 US C 2254(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) To gain relief based on the President's memorandum or ICJ judgments, Medellín would have to show that he exhausted all available state-court remedies[4] In light of the possibility that the Texas courts will provide Medellín with the review he seeks pursuant to the Avena judgment and the President's memorandum, and the potential for review in this Court once the Texas courts have heard and decided Medellín's pending action, we think it would be unwise to reach and resolve the multiple hindrances *667 to dispositive answers to the questions here presented Accordingly, we dismiss the writ as improvidently granted It is so ordered |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | majority | Edwards v. Carpenter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118357/edwards-v-carpenter/ | This case presents the question whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim as "cause" for the procedural default of another claim when the ineffective-assistance claim has itself been procedurally defaulted. I Respondent was indicted by an Ohio grand jury for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. He entered a guilty plea while maintaining his innocencea procedure we held to be constitutional in North in exchange for the prosecution's agreement that the guilty plea could be withdrawn if the three-judge panel that accepted it elected, after a mitigation hearing, to impose the death penalty. The panel accepted respondent's plea based on the prosecution's recitation of the evidence supporting the charges and, following a mitigation hearing, sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years on the aggravated-murder count and to a concurrent term of 10 to 25 years on the aggravated-robbery count. On direct appeal respondent, represented by new counsel, assigned only the single error that the evidence offered in mitigation established that he should have been *449 eligible for parole after 20 rather than 30 years. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, and respondent did not appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. After unsuccessfully pursuing state postconviction relief pro se, respondent, again represented by new counsel, filed an application in the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal, pursuant to Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B),[1] on the ground that his original appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise on direct appeal a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court dismissed the application because respondent had failed to show, as the rule required, good cause for filing after the 90-day period allowed.[2] The Ohio Supreme Court, in a one-sentence per curiam opinion, affirmed. On May 3, respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, alleging, inter alia, that the evidence supporting his plea and sentence was insufficient, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise that claim on direct appeal. Concluding that respondent's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was procedurally defaulted, the District Court considered next whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could *450 serve as cause excusing that default. The District Court acknowledged that the ineffective-assistance claim had been dismissed on procedural grounds, but concluded that Rule 26(B)'s inconsistent application by the Ohio courts rendered it inadequate to bar federal habeas review. See Proceeding to the merits of the ineffectiveassistance claim, the District Court concluded that |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | majority | Edwards v. Carpenter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118357/edwards-v-carpenter/ | merits of the ineffectiveassistance claim, the District Court concluded that respondent's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the test established in and granted the writ of habeas corpus conditioned on the state appellate court's reopening of respondent's direct appeal of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. On cross-appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that respondent's ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim served as "cause" to excuse the procedural default of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, whether or not the ineffective-assistance claim itself had been procedurally defaulted. In the panel's view, it sufficed that respondent had exhausted the ineffective-assistance claim by presenting it to the state courts in his application to reopen the direct appeal, even though that application might, under Ohio law, have been time barred. Finding in addition prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiencyof-the-evidence claim on direct appeal, the Sixth Circuit directed the District Court to issue the writ of habeas corpus conditioned upon the state court's according respondent a new culpability hearing. We granted certiorari. II Petitioner contends that the Sixth Circuit erred in failing to recognize that a procedurally defaulted ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel *451 claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the habeas petitioner can satisfy the "cause and prejudice" standard with respect to the ineffective-assistance claim itself. We agree. The procedural default doctrine and its attendant "cause and prejudice" standard are "grounded in concerns of comity and federalism," and apply alike whether the default in question occurred at trial, on appeal, or on state collateral attack, "[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance." We therefore require a prisoner to demonstrate cause for his statecourt default of any federal claim, and prejudice therefrom, before the federal habeas court will consider the merits of that claim. The one exception to that rule, not at issue here, is the circumstance in which the habeas petitioner can demonstrate a sufficient probability that our failure to review his federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Although we have not identified with precision exactly what constitutes "cause" to excuse a procedural default, we have acknowledged that in certain circumstances counsel's ineffectiveness in failing properly to preserve the claim for review in state court will suffice. -489. Not just any deficiency in counsel's performance will do, however; the assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | majority | Edwards v. Carpenter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118357/edwards-v-carpenter/ | Federal Constitution. In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim. And we held in that the principles of comity and federalism that underlie our longstanding exhaustion doctrinethen as *452 now codified in the federal habeas statute, see 28 U.S. C. 2254(b), (c)require that constitutional claim, like others, to be first raised in state court. "[A] claim of ineffective assistance," we said, generally must "be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default." The question raised by the present case is whether `s exhaustion requirement for claims of ineffective assistance asserted as cause is uniquely immune from the procedural-default rule that accompanies the exhaustion requirement in all other contextswhether, in other words, it suffices that the ineffective-assistance claim was "presented" to the state courts, even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires. That is not a hard question. An affirmative answer would render `s exhaustion requirement illusory.[3] We recognized the inseparability of the exhaustion rule and the procedural-default doctrine in : "In the absence of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting their federal claims in state court. The independent and adequate state *453 ground doctrine ensures that the States' interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases." We again considered the interplay between exhaustion and procedural default last Term in concluding that the latter doctrine was necessary to "`protect the integrity' of the federal exhaustion rule." (quoting ). The purposes of the exhaustion requirement, we said, would be utterly defeated if the prisoner were able to obtain federal habeas review simply by "`letting the time run' " so that state remedies were no longer available. Those purposes would be no less frustrated were we to allow federal review to a prisoner who had presented his claim to the state court, but in such a manner that the state court could not, consistent with its own procedural rules, have entertained it. In such circumstances, though the prisoner would have "concededly exhausted his state remedies," it could hardly be said that, as comity and federalism require, the State had been given a "fair `opportunity to pass upon [his claims].' " (emphasis added) ). To hold, as we do, that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted is |
Justice Scalia | 2,000 | 9 | majority | Edwards v. Carpenter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118357/edwards-v-carpenter/ | default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted is not to say that that procedural default may not itself be excused if the prisoner can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to that claim. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit may well conclude on remand that respondent can meet that standard in this case (although we should note that respondent has not argued that he can, preferring instead to argue that he does not have to). Or it may conclude, as did the District Court, that Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B) does not constitute an adequate procedural ground to bar federal habeas review of the ineffective-assistance claim. We express no view as to these issues, or on the question *454 whether respondent's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in the first place. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | This case involves challenges to United States Air Force regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations violate the First The second question is whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions to Members of Congress violates 10 U.S. C. 1034, which proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to communicate with a Member of Congress. I The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force personnel have the right to petition Members of Congress and other public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971). The regulations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force facility" and "any [Air Force] member in uniform or in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate commander. [1] They also provide that "[n]o member *350 of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written material within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander." Air Force Reg. (a) (1) (1970). The commander can deny permission only if he determines that distribution of the material would result in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with the accomplishment of a military mission." (a) (2).[2] *351 Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves. While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in California, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air Force's grooming standards.[3] Aware that he needed command approval in order to solicit signatures within a base, Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. During a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before military authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines' commander promptly removed him from active duty, determined that he had failed to meet the professional standards expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby reserves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California claiming that the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and 10 U.S. C. 1034.[4] The court granted Glines' motion for *352 summary judgment and declared the regulations facially invalid.[5] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding of facial invalidity.[6] Following its decision in |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | affirmed the finding of facial invalidity.[6] Following its decision in an earlier case involving collective petitions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that the regulations violated 10 U.S. C. 1034.[7] The statute prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's communication with Congress "unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of the United States." The Air Force regulations against unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the statutory standard, the court concluded, because the Government had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam were necessary to the national security. Since 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of Defense, the court next considered whether the regulations violated the First The court acknowledged that requirements of military discipline could justify otherwise impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that *353 the Air Force regulations are unconstitutionally overbroad because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually all controversial written material." Such restrictions the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to the government's interests." We granted certiorari, and we now reverse. II In MR. JUSTICE STEWART wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitution. disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command." In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political literature on a military base challenged an Army regulation substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at issue. See and n. 2. The civilians claimed that the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized that a base commander may prevent the circulation of material that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness of his troops. See We therefore sustained the Army regulation. at[8] For the same reasons, we now uphold the Air Force regulations.[9] *354 These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, protect a substantial Government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression. See The military is, "by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." Military personnel must be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. To ensure that they always are capable of performing their mission promptly and reliably, the military services "must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life." ; see Department of Air "`Speech that is protected in the civil population may undermine the effectiveness of response to command.'" quoting United States v. Priest, 21 U.S. C. M. A. |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | quoting United States v. Priest, 21 U.S. C. M. A. 564, 570, 45 Cow. M. R. 338, 344 (1972). Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, "the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections." The rights of military men must yield somewhat "`to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.'" quoting[10] Speech likely to interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock, * 424 U. S., at ; ; Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest. See Both the Army and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set forth in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969).[11] That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's "right of expression to the maximum extent possible, consistent with good order and discipline and the national security." ¶ II. Thus, the regulations in both services prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of any materials other than those posing a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Force Reg. (a) (2) (1970); Army Reg. 210-10, ¶ 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir. 1325.6, ¶ III (A) (1) (1969). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifically prevent commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the Government or its policies. Air Force Reg. (a) (4) (1970); see DOD Dir. 1325.6, ¶ III (A) (1969). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post exchange newsstands. Air Force Reg. (a) (1) (1970); see DOD Dir. 1325.6, ¶ III (A) (1) (1969).[12] Nor may they interfere with the "[d]istribution of publications and other materials through *356 the United States mail." Air Force Reg. (a) (1) (1970). The Air Force regulations also require any commander who prevents the circulation of materials within his base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Force Reg. (a) (2) (1970); see Army Reg. 210-10, ¶ 5-5 (d) (1970). Spock held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military base do not violate the First 424 U.S., at ; Spock also established that a regulation requiring members of the military services to secure command approval before circulating written materials within a military base is not invalid on its face. at[13] Without the opportunity to review materials before they are dispersed throughout his |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | opportunity to review materials before they are dispersed throughout his base, a military commander could not avert possible disruptions among his troops. Since a commander is charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have authority over the distribution of materials that could affect adversely these essential attributes of an effective military force.[14] "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command *357 depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and customary reliability of the superior." Department of Air Because the right to command and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this Court long ago recognized that the military must possess substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; In re Grimley, In Spock, we found no facial constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander to determine before distribution whether particular materials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops.[15]*358 The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in purpose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock. We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First III The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U.S. C. 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command approval for the circulation within a military base of petitions to Members of Congress. The statute says that "[n]o person may restrict any member of an armed force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We find his contention unpersuasive. Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in response to a specific and limited problem. While Congress was debating the Act, Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship discharge from the Navy "had been told by his commanding officer that a direct communication with his Congressman was prohibited and [that] it would make him subject to court-martial." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). When the Congressman made inquiry about the regulations imposing this restriction, the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they required "any letter from a member of the naval service to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment [to] be sent through official channels." [16] The Congressman *359 then proposed an amendment to the |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | majority | Brown v. Glines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110173/brown-v-glines/ | [16] The Congressman *359 then proposed an amendment to the pending military legislation that would outlaw this requirement. Congressman Byrnes' purpose was "to permit any man who is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write to his Congressman or Senator." [17] The entire legislative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue for the communication of individual grievances. The Chairman of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was intended "to let every man in the armed services have the privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any subject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with some secret matter." It therefore is clear that Congress enacted 1034 to ensure that an individual member of the Armed Services could write to his elected representatives without sending his communication through official channels.[18] *360 Both Congress and this Court have found that the special character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g., ; ; ; -94.[19] In construing a statute that touches on such matters, therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended by Congress." rev'd, post, p. 453. Permitting an individual member of the Armed Services to submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves the legislative purpose of 1034 without unnecessarily endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legislative purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and no indication that Congress contemplated such a result.[20] We therefore decide *361 that 1034 does not protect the circulation of collective petitions within a military base. IV We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10 U.S. C. 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring members of the service to secure approval from the base commander before distributing petitions within a military base. We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are not invalid on their face. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | This case poses issues under and related cases, as well as the preliminary question as to our jurisdiction of this direct appeal from a judgment of a three-judge District Court. I On November 23 and 24, pursuant to four separate warrants issued seriatim, the police seized four copies of the film "Deep Throat," each of which had been shown at the Pussycat Theatre in Buena Park, Orange *335 County, Cal.[1] On November 26 an eight-court criminal misdemeanor charge was filed in the Orange County Municipal Court against two employees of the theater, each film seized being the subject matter of two counts in the complaint. Also on November 26, the Superior Court of Orange County ordered appellees[2] to show cause why "Deep Throat" should not be declared obscene, an immediate hearing being available to appellees, who appeared that day, objected on state-law grounds to the court's jurisdiction to conduct such a proceeding, purported to "reserve" all federal questions, and refused further to participate. Thereupon, on November 27 the Superior Court held a hearing, viewed the film, took evidence, and then declared the movie to be obscene *336 and ordered seized all copies of it that might be found at the theater. This judgment and order were not appealed by appellees.[3] *337 Instead, on November 29, they filed this suit in the District Court against appellantsfour police officers of Buena Park and the District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney of Orange Country. The complaint recited the seizures and the proceedings in the Superior Court, stated that the action was for an injunction against the enforcement of the California obscenity statute, *338 and prayed for judgment declaring the obscenity statute unconstitutional, and for an injunction ordering the return of all copies of the film, but permitting one of the films to be duplicated before its return. A temporary restraining order was requested and denied, the District Judge finding the proof of irreparable injury to be lacking and an insufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits to warrant an injunction.[4] He requested the convening of a three-judge court, however, to consider the constitutionality of the statute. Such a court was then designated on January 8,[5] Service of the complaint was completed on January 14, and answers and motions to dismiss, as well as a motion for summary judgment, were filed by appellants. Appellees moved for a preliminary injunction.[6] None *339 of the motions was granted and no hearings held, all of the issues being ordered submitted on briefs and affidavits. The Attorney General of California also appeared and urged the District Court to |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | of California also appeared and urged the District Court to follow which, after had upheld the California obscenity statute. Meanwhile, on January 15, the criminal complaint pending in the Municipal Court had been amended by naming appellees[7] as additional parties defendant and by adding four conspiracy counts, one relating to each of the seized films. Also, on motions of the defendants in that case, two of the films were ordered suppressed on the ground that the two search warrants for seizing "Deep Throat" last issued, one on November 23 and the other on November 24, did not sufficiently allege that the films to be seized under those warrants differed from each other and from the films previously seized, the final two seizures being said to be invalid multiple seizures.[8] Immediately after this order, which was later appealed and reversed, the defense and the prosecution stipulated that for purposes of the trial, which was expected to be forth-coming, *340 the four prints of the film would be considered identical and only one copy would have to be proved at trial.[9] On June 4, the three-judge court issued its judgment and opinion declaring the California obscenity statute to be unconstitutional for failure to satisfy the requirements of Miller I and ordering appellants to return to appellees all copies of "Deep Throat" which had been seized as well as to refrain from making any additional seizures. Appellants' claim that and required dismissal of the case was rejected, the court holding that no criminal charges were pending in the state court against appellees and that in any event the pattern of search warrants and seizures demonstrated bad faith and harassment on the part of the authorities, all of which relieved the court from the strictures of and its related cases. Appellants filed various motions for rehearing, to amend the judgment, and for relief from judgment, also later calling the court's attention to two developments they considered important: First, the dismissal on July 25, "for want of a substantial federal question" of the appeal in (Miller II), from a judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Department, Orange County, California, sustaining the constitutionality of the very California obscenity statute which the District Court had declared unconstitutional; second, the reversal by the Superior Court, Appellate Department, of the suppression order which had been issued in the criminal case pending in the Municipal Court, the per curiam reversal citing and saying the "requisite prompt adversary determination of obscenity under has been held."[10] On September 30, the three-judge court denied appellants' motions, reaffirmed its June 4 ruling and, after |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | denied appellants' motions, reaffirmed its June 4 ruling and, after concluding it was not bound by the dismissal of MIller II, adhered to its judgment that the California statute was invalid under the Federal Constitution. *342 In response to appellants' claim that they were without power to comply with the June 4 injunction, the films being in the possession of the Municipal Court, the court amended the injunctive portion of its order so as to read as follows: "The defendants shall in good faith petition the Municipal Court of the North Orange County Judicial District to return to the plaintiffs three of the four film prints seized from the plaintiffs on November 23 and 24, in the City of Buena Park." Appeals were taken to this Court from both the judgment of June 4 and the amended judgment of September 30. We postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to the consideration of the merits of the case.[11] II We deal first with question about our jurisdiction over this direct appeal under 28 U.S. C. 1253.[12] At the *343 outset, this case was concededly a matter for a three-judge court. Appellees' complaint asserted as much, and they do not now contend otherwise.[13] Furthermore, on June 4 the District Court declared the California obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordered the return of all copies of the film that had been seized. Appellees do not claim that this order, which would have aborted the pending criminal prosecution, was not an injunction within the meaning of 1253 and was not appealable here. The jurisdictional issues arise from events that occurred subsequent to June 4. A The first question emerges from our summary dismissal in Miller II. Appellants claimed in the District Court, and claim here, that Miller II was binding on the District Court and required that court to sustain the California obscenity statute and to dismiss the case. If appellants are correct in this position, the question arises whether Miller II removed the necessity for a three-judge court under the rule of in which event our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1253 would also evaporate. We agree with appellants that the District Court was in error in holding that it could disregard the decision in Miller II. That case was an appeal from a decision by a *344 state court upholding a state statute against federal constitutional attack. A federal constitutional issue was properly presented, it was within our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1257 (2), and we had no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits as would |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | refuse adjudication of the case on its merits as would have been true had the case been brought here under our certiorari jurisdiction. We were not obligated to grant the case plenary consideration, and we did not; but we were required to deal with its merits. We did so by concluding that the appeal should be dismissed because the constitutional challenge to the California statute was not a substantial one. The three-judge court was not free to disregard this pronouncement. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN once observed, "[v]otes to affirm summarily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case" Ohio ex rel. ; cf. R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 197 (4th ed. 1969) ("The Court is, however, deciding a case on the merits, when it dismisses for want of a substantial question"); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 495 (2d ed. 1970) ("Summary disposition of an appeal, however, either by affirmance or by dismissal for want of a substantial federal question, is a disposition on the merits"). The District Court should have followed the Second Circuit's advice, first, in Port Authority Bond-holders Protective that "unless and until the Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise"; and, later, in that the lower courts are bound by summary *345 decisions by this Court " `until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are not.' " Although the constitutional issues which were presented in Miller II and which were declared to be insubstantial by this Court, could not be considered substantial and decided otherwise by the District Court, we cannot conclude that Miller II required that the three-judge court be dissolved in the circumstances of this case.[14] Appellees, as plaintiffs in the District Court, not only challenged the enforcement of the obscenity statute but also sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California search warrant statutes, Penal Code 1523-1542 insofar as they might be applied, contrary to to permit the multiple seizures that occurred in this case. The application for a preliminary injunction made this aim of the suit quite express. The three-judge court in its June 4 decision declared the obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordered four copies of the film returned. Its constitutional conclusion was reaffirmed on September 30, despite Miller II, and its injunction was to some extent modified. Miller II, however, had nothing to do with |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | extent modified. Miller II, however, had nothing to do with the validity of multiple seizures as an issue wholly independent of the validity of the obscenity statutes. *346 That issuethe validity, in light of Heller, of the challenged application of the search warrant statutesremained in the case after the Miller II dismissal. Indeed, although the District Court based its injunctive order on the unconstitutionality of the obscenity statutes, the injunction also interfered with the enforcement of the California search warrant statutes, necessarily on constitutional grounds.[15] With this question in the case, the three-judge court should have remained in session, as it did, and, as it also did, should have dealt with the Younger issue before reaching the merits of the constitutional issues presented. That issue, however, as we show in Part III, was not correctly decided. *347 B Appellees contend (1) that under and MTM, the only injunctions issued by properly convened three-judge courts that are directly appealable here are those that three-judge courts alone may issue and (2) that the injunction finally issued on September 30 was not one that is reserved to a three-judge court under 28 U.S. C. 2281. Even if appellees' premise is correct, but see we cannot agree with the conclusion that the injunction entered here was not appealable. Not only was a state statute declared unconstitutional but also the injunctive order, as amended September 30, required appellants to seek the return of the three prints of "Deep Throat" which were the subject of nine of the 12 counts of the amended criminal complaint still pending in the Municipal Court. Return of the copies would prohibit their use as evidence and would, furthermore, prevent their retention and probable destruction as contraband should the State prevail in the criminal case. Plainly, the order interfered with the pending criminal prosecution and with the enforcement of a state obscenity statute. In the circumstances here, the injunctive order, issued as it was by a federal court against state authorities, necessarily rested on federal constitutional grounds. Aside from its opinion that the California statute was unconstitutional, the District Court articulated no basis for assuming authority to order the return of the films and in effect to negate not only three of the four seizures under state search warrants, which the Appellate Department of the Superior Court had upheld, but also the proceedings in the Superior Court that had declared the film to be obscene *348 and seizable.[16] The District Court's June 4 opinion, we think, made its constitutional thesis express: "The gravamen of the defendants' justification is, of course, that |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | "The gravamen of the defendants' justification is, of course, that the property is contraband, both the evidence and the fruit of an illegal activity. Such a justification, however, dissipates in the face of a declaration by this court that the statute is invalid." We accordingly conclude that the September 30 injunction, as well as the declaratory judgment underlying it, is properly before the Court. III The District Court committed error in reaching the merits of this case despite the appellants' insistence that it be dismissed under and When they filed their federal complaint, no state criminal proceedings were pending against appellees by name; but two employees of the theater had been charged and four copies of "Deep Throat" belonging to appellees had been seized, were being held, and had been declared to be obscene and seizable by the Superior Court. Appellees had a substantial stake in the state proceedings, so much so that they sought federal relief, demanding that the state statute be declared void and their films be returned to them. Obviously, their interests and those of their employees were intertwined; *349 and, as we have pointed out, the federal action sought to interfere with the pending state prosecution. Absent a clear showing that appellees, whose lawyers also represented their employees, could not seek the return of their property in the state proceedings and see to it that their federal claims were presented there, the requirements of could not be avoided on the ground that no criminal prosecution was pending against appellees on the date the federal complaint was filed. The rule in is designed to "permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts," particularly where the party to the federal case may fully litigate his claim before the state court. Plainly, "[t]he same comity considerations apply," where the interference is sought by some, such as appellees, not parties to the state case. What is more, on the day following the completion of service of the complaint, appellees were charged along with their employees in Municipal Court. Neither nor any other case in this Court has held that for to apply, the state criminal proceedings must be pending on the day the federal case is filed. Indeed, the issue has been left open;[17] and we now hold that where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of should apply in full force. Here, appellees were charged *350 on |
Justice White | 1,975 | 6 | majority | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | apply in full force. Here, appellees were charged *350 on January 15, prior to answering the federal case and prior to any proceedings whatsoever before the three-judge court. Unless we are to trivialize the principles of the federal complaint should have been dismissed on the appellants' motion absent satisfactory proof of those extraordinary circumstances calling into play one of the limited exceptions to the rule of and related cases.[18] The District Court concluded that extraordinary circumstances had been shown in the form of official harassment and bad faith, but this was also error. The relevant findings of the District Court were vague and conclusory.[19] There were references to the "pattern of *351 seizure" and to "the evidence brought to light by the petition for rehearing"; and the unexplicated conclusion was then drawn that "regardless of the nature of any judicial proceeding," the police were bent on banishing "Deep Throat" from Buena Park. Yet each step in the pattern of seizures condemned by the District Court was authorized by judicial warrant or order; and the District Court did not purport to invalidate any of the four warrants, in any way to question the propriety of the proceedings in the Superior Court,[20] or even to mention the reversal of the suppression order in the Appellate Department of that court. Absent at least some effort by the District Court to impeach the entitlement of the prosecuting officials to rely on repeated judicial authorization for their conduct, we cannot agree that bad faith and harassment were made out. Indeed, such conclusion would not necessarily follow even if it were shown that the state courts were in error on some one or more issues of state or federal law.[21] *352 In the last analysis, it seems to us that the District Court's judgment rests almost entirely on its conclusion that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutional and unenforceable. But even assuming that the District Court was correct in its conclusion, the statute had not been so condemned in November and the District Court was not entitled to infer official bad faith merely because itthe District Courtdisagreed with Otherwise, bad faith and harassment would be present in every case in which a state statute is ruled unconstitutional, and the rule of would be swallowed up by its exception. The District Court should have dismissed the complaint before it and we accordingly reverse its judgment. So ordered. MR. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | Some habeas petitioners are unable to develop the fac tual basis of their claims in state court through no fault of their own. Congress recognized as much when it en acted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 996 (AEDPA), and permitted therein the introduction of new evidence in federal habeas proceed ings in certain limited circumstances. See 2 U.S. C. Under the Court’s novel interpretation of however, federal courts must turn a blind eye to new evidence in deciding whether a petitioner has satisfied threshold obstacle to federal habeas relief—even when it is clear that the petitioner would be entitled to relief in light of that evidence. In reading the statute to “compe[l]” this harsh result, ante, at 9, the Court ignores a key textual difference between and 224(d)(2) and discards the previous understanding in our precedents that new evidence can, in fact, inform the inquiry. I therefore dissent from the Court’s first holding. I also disagree with the Court that, even if the analysis is limited to the state-court record, respondent Scott Pinholster failed to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s decision denying his ineffec 2 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting tive-assistance-of-counsel claim was an unreasonable application of (94). There is no reason for the majority to decide whether the analysis is limited to the state court record because Pinholster satisfied on either the state- or federal-court record. I The Court first holds that, in determining whether a state-court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent under “review is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Ante, at 9. New evidence adduced at a federal evidentiary hearing is now irrelevant to determining whether a petitioner has satisfied This holding is unnecessary to pro mote AEDPA’s purposes, and it is inconsistent with the provision’s text, the structure of the statute, and our precedents. A To understand the significance of the majority’s holding, it is important to view the issue in context. AEDPA’s entire structure—which gives state courts the opportunity to decide factual and legal questions in the first instance— ensures that evidentiary hearings in federal habeas pro ceedings are very rare. See N. King, F. Cheesman, & B. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U. S. District Courts 3–36 (evidentiary hearings under AEDPA occur in 0.4 percent of noncapital cases and 9. percent of capital cases). Even absent the new restric tion created by today’s holding, AEDPA erects multiple hurdles to a state prisoner’s ability to introduce new evi dence in a federal habeas |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | ability to introduce new evi dence in a federal habeas proceeding. First, “[u]nder the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner challenging a state conviction must first at Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting tempt to present his claim in state court.” Harrington v. Richter, 62 U. S. (20) (slip op., at 3); see also With certain narrow exceptions, federal courts cannot consider a claim at all, let alone accept new evidence relevant to the claim, if it has not been exhausted in state court. The exhaustion requirement thus reserves to state courts the first opportunity to resolve factual disputes relevant to a state prisoner’s claim. See Second, the exhaustion requirement is “complement[ed]” by the standards set forth in Harrington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., at 4). Under this provision, a fed eral court may not grant habeas relief on any “claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the adjudication “() resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or “(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an un reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” These standards “control whether to grant habeas relief.” Accord ingly, we have said, if the factual allegations a petitioner seeks to prove at an evidentiary hearing would not satisfy these standards, there is no reason for a hearing. See at 4. In such a case, the district court may exercise its “discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing.” ; see also infra, at 3–4. This approach makes eminent sense: If district courts held evidentiary hearings without first —————— Relatedly,a state prisoner must, as a general matter, properly ex haust his federal claims in state court to avoid having his claim de faulted on procedural grounds. See U.S. 722, 70 (99). 4 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting asking whether the evidence the petitioner seeks to pre sent would satisfy AEDPA’s demanding standards, they would needlessly prolong federal habeas proceedings. Third, even when a petitioner seeks to introduce new evidence that would entitle him to relief, AEDPA prohibits him from doing so, except in a narrow range of cases, unless he “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pur sue claims in state court.” v. Taylor, 29 U.S. 420, 43 (Michael ). Thus, provides: “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— “(A) the claim relies on— “(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or “(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due dili gence; and “(B) the facts underlying the claim would be suffi cient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” In Michael we construed the opening clause of this provision—which triggers the bar on evidentiary hearings—to apply when “there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”2 AEDPA thus bars an —————— 2 Section 224(e)(2) also governs an attempt to obtain relief “based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.” 42 U.S. 649, 63 (2004) (emphasis deleted). Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting evidentiary hearing for a nondiligent petitioner unless the petitioner can satisfy both §(A) and (B), which few petitioners can. Section 224(e)(2) in this way incen tivizes state petitioners to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court. To the limited extent that federal evidentiary hearings are available under AEDPA, they ensure that petitioners who diligently developed the factual basis of their claims in state court, discovered new evidence after the state court proceeding, and cannot return to state court retain the ability to access the Great Writ. See ante, at 2 (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). “When Congress codified new rules governing this previously judicially managed area of law, it did so without losing sight of the fact that the ‘writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 60 U. S. (200) (slip op., at 6) ). Allowing a petitioner to introduce new evidence at a hearing in the limited circumstance permitted by does not upset the balance that Congress struck in AEDPA be tween the state and federal courts. By construing to do the work of other provisions in AEDPA, the majority has subverted Congress’ careful balance of responsibilities. It has also created unnecessarily a brand new set of procedural complexities that lower courts will have to confront.3 B The majority’s interpretation of finds no support in the provision’s text or the statute’s structure as a whole. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | the provision’s text or the statute’s structure as a whole. Section 224(d)() requires district courts to ask —————— 3 See, e.g., nn. 7, and 3, infra. 6 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting whether a state-court adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Because this provision uses “backward-looking lan guage”—i.e., past-tense verbs—the majority believes that it limits review to the state-court record. Ante, at 9. But both and 224(d)(2) use “backward-looking language,” and —expressly directs district courts to base their review on “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” If use of the past tense were sufficient to indicate Congress’ intent to re strict analysis to the state-court record, the phrase “in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed ing” in would be superfluous. The majority’s construction of fails to give meaning to Con gress’ decision to include language referring to the evi dence presented to the state court in Cf. (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Ignoring our usual “reluctan[ce] to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting,” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 34 U.S. 9, 3 (200) (internal quotation marks omitted), the majority characterizes the phrase appearing in as mere “clarifying language,” ante, at 2, n. 7. It specu lates that “[t]he omission of clarifying language from just as likely reflects Congress’ belief that such language was unnecessary as it does anything else.” Ante, at 2–3, n. 7. The argument that this phrase is merely “clarifying” might have more force, however, had Congress included this phrase in but not in As between the two provisions, —which re Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 7 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting quires review of the state court’s “determination of the facts”—more logically depends on the facts presented to the state court. Because this provision needs less clarifi cation on this point than it is all the more telling that Congress included this phrase in but elected to exclude it from Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I refuse to assume that Congress simply engaged in sloppy drafting. The inclusion of this phrase in —coupled with its omission from ’s partner provision, —provides strong reason to think that Con gress did not intend for the analysis |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | think that Con gress did not intend for the analysis to be limited categorically to “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 2 The “ ‘broader context of the statute as a whole,’ ” ante, at 9 ), reinforces this conclusion. In particular, Con gress’ decision to include in AEDPA a provision, that permits federal evidentiary hearings in certain circumstances provides further evidence that Congress did not intend to limit the inquiry to the state-court record in every case. We have long recognized that some diligent habeas petitioners are unable to develop all of the facts support ing their claims in state court.4 As discussed above, in —————— 4 See, e.g., Michael (noting that diligent efforts to develop the facts might be “thwarted, for example, by the conduct of another or by happenstance”); (noting that the prosecution might have “concealed the facts” supporting “a claim which was pursued with diligence”); (requiring federal courts to grant evidentiary hearings when, inter alia, “the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing” or “there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence”), overruled in part on other grounds by CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting enacting AEDPA, Congress generally barred evidentiary hearings for petitioners who did not “exercise diligence in pursuing their claims” in state court. Michael 29 U.S., at ; see also Importantly, it did not impose any express limit on evidentiary hearings for petitioners who had been diligent in state court. See at (“[T]he statute does not equate prisoners who exer cise diligence in pursuing their claims with those who do not”). For those petitioners, Congress left the decision to hold a hearing “to the sound discretion of district courts.” 0 U.S., at 473. Faced with situations in which a diligent petitioner offers additional evidence in federal court, the courts of appeals have taken two approaches to applying Some courts have held that when a federal court admits new evidence supporting a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, does not apply at all and the federal court may review the claim de novo. See ante, at 2; 42 U.S. 649, 63 (2004) ; see, e.g., Winston v. Kelly, 92 F.3d 3, –6 (CA4 200). I agree with the majority’s rejection of this approach. See ante, at 2. It would un dermine the comity principles motivating AEDPA to de cline to defer to a state-court adjudication of a claim because the state court, through no fault of its own, lacked all the relevant evidence. —————— Of course, only applies when |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | all the relevant evidence. —————— Of course, only applies when a state court has adjudi cated a claim on the merits. There may be situations in which new evidence supporting a claim adjudicated on the merits gives rise to an altogether different claim. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner 0– ). The majority opinion does not foreclose this possibility. I assume that the majority does not intend to suggest that review is limited to the state-court record when a petitioner’s inability to develop the facts supporting his claim was the fault of the state court itself. See generally Tr. of Oral Arg. in Bell v. Kelly, O. T. 200, No. 07–223. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 9 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Other courts of appeals, including the court below, have struck a more considered balance. These courts have held that continues to apply but that new evidence properly presented in a federal hearing is relevant to the reasonableness of the state-court decision. See Pinholster v. Ayers, 90 F.3d 6, (“If the evidence is admissible under Michael or and if it does not render the petitioner’s claims unexhausted then it is properly considered in evaluating whether the legal conclusion reached by the state habeas court was a reasonable application of Su preme Court law”); accord, Wilson v. Mazzuca, 70 F.3d 490, 00 ; ; 92 (CA 200). This approach accommodates the competing goals, reflected in §§224(d) and 224(e)(2), of according defer ence to reasonable state-court decisions and preserving the opportunity for diligent petitioners to present evidence to the federal court when they were unable to do so in state court. The majority charts a third, novel course that, so far as I am aware, no court of appeals has adopted: continues to apply when a petitioner has additional evi dence that he was unable to present to the state court, but the district court cannot consider that evidence in deciding whether the petitioner has satisfied The problem with this approach is its potential to bar federal habeas relief for diligent habeas petitioners who cannot present new evidence to a state court. Consider, for example, a petitioner who diligently at tempted in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory witness statements in violation of The state court denied relief on the ground that the withheld evidence then known did not rise to the level of materiality required under Brady. Before the time for 0 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting filing a federal habeas petition has expired, however, a state court orders the State to |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | has expired, however, a state court orders the State to disclose additional docu ments the petitioner had timely requested under the State’s public records Act. The disclosed documents reveal that the State withheld other exculpatory witness state ments, but state law would not permit the petitioner to present the new evidence in a successive petition.6 Under our precedent, if the petitioner had not presented his Brady claim to the state court at all, his claim would be deemed defaulted and the petitioner could attempt to show cause and prejudice to overcome the default. See Michael 29 U.S., at 444; see also n. If, however, the new evidence merely bolsters a Brady claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, it is unclear how the petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief after today’s holding. What may have been a rea sonable decision on the state-court record may no longer be reasonable in light of the new evidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 4 U.S. 49, (99) (materiality of Brady evidence is viewed “collectively, not item by item”). Be cause the state court adjudicated the petitioner’s Brady claim on the merits, would still apply. Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of a fed eral court is now prohibited from considering the new evidence in determining the reasonableness of the state court decision. The majority’s interpretation of thus sug gests the anomalous result that petitioners with new claims based on newly obtained evidence can obtain fed eral habeas relief if they can show cause and prejudice for their default but petitioners with newly obtained evidence supporting a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court —————— 6 See, e.g., at 37–3 (statement by counsel for the respondent warden that Virginia law bars all successive habeas applications, even in cases where the petitioner has new evidence). Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting cannot obtain federal habeas relief if they cannot first satisfy without the new evidence. That the majority’s interpretation leads to this anomaly is good reason to conclude that its interpretation is wrong. See (“[I]t is irrational to distinguish between failing to properly assert a federal claim in state court and failing in state court to properly develop such a claim”). The majority responds to this anomaly by suggesting that my hypothetical petitioner “may well [have] a new claim.”7 Ante, at 4, n. 0. This suggestion is puzzling. New evidence does not usually give rise to a new claim; it merely provides additional proof of a claim already adjudi cated on the merits. The majority presumably means to suggest that |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | on the merits. The majority presumably means to suggest that the petitioner might be able to obtain federal-court review of his new evidence if he can show cause and prejudice for his failure to present the “new” claim to a state court. In that scenario, however, the federal court would review the purportedly “new” claim de novo. The majority’s approach thus threatens to replace deferential review of new evidence under with de novo review of new evidence in the form of “new” claims.9 Because it is unlikely that Congress intended de novo review—the result suggested by the majority’s opinion—it must have intended for district courts to consider newly discovered evidence in conducting the analysis. —————— 7 The majority declines, however, to provide any guidance to the lower courts on how to distinguish claims adjudicated on the merits from new claims. Even if it can fairly be argued that my hypothetical petitioner has a new claim, the majority fails to explain how a diligent petitioner with new evidence supporting an existing claim can present his new evi dence to a federal court. 9 In this vein, it is the majority’s approach that “would not take seri ously AEDPA’s requirement that federal courts defer to state-court decisions.” Ante, at 0, n. 3. 2 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting The majority’s reading of appears ultimately to rest on its understanding that state courts must have the first opportunity to adjudicate habeas petitioners’ claims. See ante, at 9–0 (“It would be contrary to [AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement] to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evi dence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance effectively de novo”).0 JUSTICE BREYER takes the same position. See ante, at 2 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (AEDPA is designed “to give the State a first opportunity to consider most matters”). I fully agree that habeas petitioners must attempt to present evidence to state courts in the first instance, as does JUSTICE ALITO, see ante, at 2. Where I disagree with the majority is in my understanding that already accomplishes this result. By reading to do the work of the majority gives an unnaturally cramped reading. As a result, the majority either has foreclosed habeas relief for diligent petitioners who, through no fault of their own, were unable to present exculpatory evidence to the state court that adjudicated their claims or has created a new set of procedural com plexities for the lower courts to navigate to ensure the availability of the Great Writ |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | to navigate to ensure the availability of the Great Writ for diligent petitioners. 3 These considerations lead me to agree with the courts of appeals that have concluded that a federal court should assess the reasonableness of a state court’s application of clearly established federal law under in light of evidence properly admitted in a federal evidentiary hearing. There is nothing “strange” about this approach. —————— 0 Under my reading of of course, the district court would review properly admitted new evidence through the deferential lens of not de novo. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Ante, at 0. Under federal courts routinely engage in analysis that the state court itself might never have conducted or did not conduct. For example, when a state court summarily denies a claim without explanation, as the California Supreme Court did here, district courts must deny habeas relief pursuant to so long as “there is any reasonable argument” supporting the denial of the petitioner’s claim. Harrington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., at 6). We likewise ask whether a state-court decision unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when the state court issued a reasoned decision but failed to cite federal law altogether. See 37 U.S. 3, Determining whether a state court could reasonably have denied a petitioner relief in light of newly discovered evidence is not so different than determining whether there is any reasonable basis for a state court’s unreasoned decision. Admittedly, the text of standing alone, does not compel either reading of that provision. But constru ing to permit consideration of evidence prop erly introduced in federal court best accords with the text of and AEDPA’s structure as a whole. By interpreting to prevent nondiligent petitioners from gaming the system—the very purpose of —the majority potentially has put habeas relief out of reach for diligent petitioners with meritorious claims based on new evidence. C The majority claims that its holding is “consistent” with our case law. Ante, at 0. Quite the opposite is true: Our cases reflect our previous understanding that evidence properly admitted pursuant to is relevant to the analysis. In JUSTICE THOMAS, the author of today’s opinion, confirmed this understanding of the interplay 4 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting between and 224(e)(2). As noted above, we admonished district courts to consider whether a peti tioner’s allegations, if proved true, would satisfy §224(d) in determining whether to grant a hearing. After high lighting the deference owed to state courts under §§224(d) and 224(e)(), we stated: “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s fac tual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Because the defer ential standards prescribed by §224 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evi dentiary hearing is appropriate.” 0 U.S., at (ci tation omitted). By instructing district courts to consider the §224(d) standards in deciding whether to grant a hearing, we must have understood that the evidence admitted at a hearing could be considered in the analysis. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 9 (“The whole point of ’s admonition that the court must decide whether to hold a hearing with an eye on is that some proffers of evidence will not justify federal fact-finding in view of but that other proffers of proof will”). In Michael the warden argued that bars an evidentiary hearing whenever a peti tioner was unable to develop the factual record in state court, “whether or not through his own fault or neglect.” —————— The majority overlooks this aspect of It quotes Landri gan’s observation that “if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing,” 0 U.S., at but that statement has no bearing on the question decided by the Court today. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 29 U.S., at 430. Under the warden’s argument, a peti tioner who did not develop the record in state court, what ever the reason, would be barred from presenting evidence to the federal court. In rejecting that argument, we observed: “A prisoner who developed his claim in state court and can prove the state court’s decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es tablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ is not barred from obtain ing relief by If the opening clause of covers a request for an evidentiary hear ing on a claim which was pursued with diligence but remained undeveloped in state court because, for in stance, the prosecution concealed the facts, a prisoner lacking clear and convincing evidence of innocence could be barred from a hearing on the claim even if he could satisfy ” (citation omitted; emphasis added). A petitioner in the latter situation would almost certainly be unable to “satisfy §224(d)” without introducing the concealed facts in federal |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | to “satisfy §224(d)” without introducing the concealed facts in federal court. This passage thus reflects our understanding that, in some circumstances, a peti tioner might need an evidentiary hearing in federal court to prove the facts necessary to satisfy To avoid foreclosing habeas relief for such petitioners, we concluded that could not bear the warden’s “harsh read ing,” which essentially would have held petitioners strictly at fault for their inability to develop the facts in state court. The majority today gives an equally “harsh reading” to to achieve the result we rejected in Michael2 —————— 2 The majority claims that Michael supports its reading of With respect to one claim asserted by the petitioner, we observed that “[t]he Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the merits 6 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting None of the other cases cited by the majority supports its result. In v. Taylor, 29 U.S. 362 (Terry ), we interpreted to ask whether the state-court decision “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” at 43. However, we had no reason to decide whether the inquiry was limited to the state-court record, as the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing in that case. See In we stated that “we have made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreason able must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.” 42 U.S., at 62. In the next sentence, how ever, we observed that the evidence at issue “could have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing by the District Court, but only if respondent was not at fault in failing to develop that evidence in state court.” at 62–63. We proceeded to find that the evidence was not properly ad mitted under before concluding that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis. at 63; see also 46 U.S. 74, (200) In sum, our cases reflect our recognition that it is some times appropriate to consider new evidence in deciding whether a petitioner can satisfy In reading our precedent to require the opposite conclusion, the ma jority disregards the concerns that motivated our decision in Michael : Some petitioners, even if diligent, —————— under so it is unnecessary to reach the question whether would permit a hearing on the claim.” 29 U.S., at 444. That statement merely reflects the fact that the Court of Appeals had rejected that claim under without considering whether the petitioner was entitled to a hearing because the petitioner |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | the petitioner was entitled to a hearing because the petitioner had not requested a hearing on that claim. See v. Taylor, 9 F.3d 42, 42, 42–429 Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 7 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting may be unable to develop the factual record in state court through no fault of their own. We should not interpret to foreclose these diligent petitioners from accessing the Great Writ when the state court will not consider the new evidence and could not reasonably have reached the same conclusion with the new evidence before it. II I also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Pinholster had satisfied on the basis of the state-court record.3 A The majority omits critical details relating to the per formance of Pinholster’s trial counsel, the mitigating evidence they failed to discover, and the history of these proceedings. I therefore highlight several aspects of the facts and history of this case. —————— 3 I agree with the majority that the state-court record in this case consists of “the ‘allegations of [the] habeas corpus petition and any matter of record pertaining to the case.’ ” Ante, at 6, n. 2 (quot ing In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 70, 74, n. 2, 47 P.2d 3–4, n. 2 (970); some internal quotation marks omitted). The majority does not decide which of the two state-court decisions should be reviewed. See ante, at n. One amicus argues that Pinholster must prove that both state-court decisions involved an unreasonable application of law. See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 26. This argument is based on amicus’ understanding that the California Supreme Court rejected the second petition as successive and, alternatively, on the merits. The State has not argued, however, that the second ruling rests on a procedural ground. See ante, at 6, n. 2. When a state court denies two petitions on the merits and the difference between the petitions is that the second petition contains additional evidence supporting the petitioner’s claim, I see no reason why the petitioner must independently show that the first decision was unreasonable. CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court in structed the jury to return six days later for the penalty phase. This prompted discussion at sidebar regarding whether the State had provided notice of its intent to offer aggravating evidence. Pinholster’s court-appointed attor ney, Wilbur Dettmar, argued that the State should be precluded from offering aggravating evidence: “I am not presently prepared to offer anything by way of |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | am not presently prepared to offer anything by way of mitigation. If I was going to proceed on mitigation, the people would have the right to rebuttal with or without notice. “I took the position, since the people had not given notice, I had not prepared any evidence by way of miti gation. I would submit it on that basis.” 2 Re porter’s Tr. 720 (hereinafter Tr.) Undoubtedly anticipating that counsel might need addi tional time to prepare an adequate mitigation defense, the court asked Dettmar whether a continuance would be helpful in the event it ruled against him. He declined the offer on the spot, stating: “I think we would probably still go forward on Monday. Clearly the one person that comes to mind is the defendant’s mother. How much beyond that I don’t know. I don’t think the pa[ss]age of time would make a great deal of difference.” at 727–72. After hearing testimony, the court denied Pinholster’s motion to preclude aggravating evidence. At the penalty phase, defense counsel called only one witness: Pinholster’s mother, Burnice Brashear. Brashear testified that Pinholster “never really wanted for anything at home too much” and “had everything normally materi alwise that most people have.” at 739. She said that Pinholster was “different” from his siblings, whom she characterized as “basically very good children.” at 740–7402. Pinholster, she said, had a “friendly” relation Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 9 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting ship with his stepfather, although his stepfather “some times would lose his temper” with Pinholster, who “had a mind of his own.” –7393; see also (stating that his stepfather was “at times” “abusive or near abusive”). Brashear provided brief testimony regarding Pinhol ster’s childhood. She described two car accidents—one when she ran over him in the driveway and one when he went through the windshield. at 739–739. She stated that he started failing school in the first grade and that the school eventually “sent him to [an] educationally handicapped class.” at 7393–7394. When Pinholster was 0, a psychologist recommended placing him in a mental institution, but she “didn’t think he was that far gone.” at 739. A few years later, she testified, he spent six months in a state hospital for emotionally handi capped children. According to Brashear, Pinholster had suffered from epilepsy since age when he was beaten in jail. at 7397. She said that her family doctor, Dr. Dubin, had given him medication to treat the epilepsy. Brashear also suggested that Pinholster did not have long to live, stating that he had “a chip in his head floating around” |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | that he had “a chip in his head floating around” and that “they don’t think—he won’t be here very much longer anyway.”4 In closing argument, the prosecutor ridiculed Brashear’s testimony. See 3 (“She said his stepfather disciplined him. So what? I am sure you have all disci plined your children. I was disciplined myself”); (“He was run over by a car when he was three years old. That’s very unfortunate. There is no evidence of any brain dam age. A lot of children get dropped, fall from their cribs or —————— 4 The judge instructed the jury to disregard this testimony upon motion by the prosecutor, but the prosecutor then discussed the testi mony in her closing argument. See infra, at 33–34. 20 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting whatever”); at 7444–744 (“I submit to you that if this defendant truly had epilepsy, a doctor would have been brought in to tell you that. Medical records, something”). The prosecutor also highlighted Brashear’s testimony about Pinholster’s stable home environment, arguing, “He came from a good home. You heard that he was not a deprived child. Had many things going for him, probably more than many children.” Notwithstanding the meager mitigation case presented by Pinholster’s counsel, it took the jury two days to reach a decision to sentence Pinholster to death. His counsel later moved to modify the sentence to life imprisonment. In denying the motion, the trial judge stated, “The evidence which the defense offered concerning the defendant’s extenuation was merely some testimony from his mother that was not persuasive. His mother did not, in the court’s opinion, present any evidence which the court would find to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. No witness supplied such evidence.” 4 at 74. 2 After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Pinholster filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court alleging, among other things, that his counsel had “unreasonably failed to investigate, prepare and present available mitigating evidence during penalty phase.” Record ER–03. Pinholster’s state-court petition included 2 exhibits. In a series of declarations, his trial attorney Harry Brainard (who had by then been disbarred) confirmed what Dettmar had forthrightly told the trial court: Brainard and Dettmar neither expected nor prepared to present mitigation evidence. See at ER–333 (“Mr. —————— By the time of Pinholster’s state-court habeas petition, Dettmar was deceased. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 2 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Dettmar and I did not prepare a case in mitigation. We felt there would be no penalty phase hearing inasmuch as we did not receive written |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | penalty phase hearing inasmuch as we did not receive written notice of evidence in aggrava tion pursuant to Penal Code §90.3”). Brainard further confirmed what was apparent from the mitigation case they eventually put on: They conducted virtually no miti gation investigation. See at ER–2 (“I have no recol lection of Mr. Dettmar having secured or reviewed any of Scott’s medical records, nor did I see any of Scott’s medical So far as I recollect, neither Mr. Dettmar nor myself interviewed any of Scott’s previous medical provid ers”); at ER–3 (“I do not recall interviewing or at tempting to interview Scott’s family members or any other persons regarding penalty phase testimony, except Mrs. Brashears [sic]”); (“I have no recollection of seeing or attempting to secure Scott’s school records, juvenile re cords, medical records, or records of prior placements”); (“I have no recollection of interviewing or attempting to interview Scott’s former school teachers, counselors, or juvenile officers”).6 Statements by relatives (none of whom trial counsel had attempted to interview regarding Pinholster’s background) and documentary evidence revealed that the picture of Pinholster’s family life painted by his mother at trial was false. Pinholster was “raised in chaos and poverty.” at ER–32. A relative remembered seeing the children mix together flour and water in an attempt to get some thing to eat. Pinholster’s stepfather beat him several times a week, including at least once with a two-by-four board. “There was so much violence in [the] home” that Pinholster’s brother “dreaded coming home each day.” at ER–. Pinholster’s half sister was removed from the home as a result of a beating by his stepfather. —————— 6 Counsel’s billing records, which were before the California Supreme Court as part of the trial record, confirmed Brainard’s recollection. 22 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Documentary evidence showed, directly contrary to Brashear’s trial testimony, that Pinholster’s siblings had very troubled pasts. Pinholster’s elder brother was ar rested for armed burglary, robbery, and forcible rape of a 4-year-old with a deadly weapon. While in custody, he was diagnosed as “catatonic-like” and “acutely psychotic, probably suffering some type of schizophrenia.” at ER–29, ER–224. He later committed suicide.7 Pinhol ster’s half sister, a recovering alcoholic, had been made a ward of the juvenile court for prostitution and forcible sexual battery on a 4-year-old. Pinholster’s petition and exhibits described a long his tory of emotional disturbance and neurological problems. A former schoolteacher stated that, as a child, Pinholster “seemed incapable of relating either to his peers or to adults,” that “[i]t was even hard to maintain eye contact with him,” and |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | was even hard to maintain eye contact with him,” and that “[h]is hyperactivity was so extreme that [she] formed the opinion it probably had an organic base.” at ER–23. School records revealed that he “talk[ed] to self continuously,” had “many grimaces,” fought in his sleep, and could “control self for only hour per day.” at ER–230, ER–233. He “show[ed] progres sive deterioration each semester since Kindergarten.” at ER–230. School officials recommended placement in a school for emotionally handicapped students and referral to a neurologist. At age nine, he had an abnormal EEG, revealing “an organic basis for his behavior.” at ER– 7, ER–234. Just months before the homicides, a doctor recommended placement in the Hope Psychiatric Insti tute, but this did not occur. This and other evidence attached to the petition was —————— 7 Accordingto Pinholster’s half sister, “The death of our brother Al vin was a severe emotional blow to me and to Scott. I believed Scott’s substance abuse (heroin) arose following and as a result of Alvin’s death.” Record ER–34. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 23 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting summarized in a declaration by Dr. George Woods. Dr. Woods opined that Pinholster “suffer[ed] from severe and long standing seizure disorders,” at ER–6, that his childhood head traumas “may have been the precipitating factors for [his] seizure disorder,” at ER–7, and that he suffered from bipolar mood disorder. He pointed to trial testimony that immediately before the burglary on the night of the homicides, Pinholster announced that he “ ‘ha[d] a message from God’ ”—which Dr. Woods believed to reflect “[a]uditory hallucinations” and “severe psycho sis.” at ER–69. He concluded that at the time of the homicides Pinholster “was suffering from bipolar mood disorder with psychotic ideation and was suffering a com plex partial seizure.” at ER–70. He also observed that Pinholster’s “grossly dysfunctional family, the abuse he received as a child, his history of suffering from sub stantial seizure and mood disorders, his frequently un treated psychiatric and psychological disabilities and his educational handicaps were relevant circumstances which would extenuate the gravity of the crime.” at ER–7. On the basis of Pinholster’s submission, the California Supreme Court denied Pinholster’s ineffective-assistance of-counsel claim. Pinholster then filed a habeas petition in Federal Dis trict Court. He included an additional exhibit: a declara tion by Dr. John Stalberg, a psychiatrist who had hastily examined Pinholster and produced a two-page report in the middle of the original trial. After reviewing the new material collected by Pinholster’s habeas counsel, Dr. Stalberg stated that the available evidence showed a —————— Counsel had arranged |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | that the available evidence showed a —————— Counsel had arranged for Dr. Stalberg to examine Pinholster in the middle of his original trial. The only documents they provided to him were police reports relating to the case and a 97 probation report. In a two-page report that focused primarily on Pinholster’s mental state at the time of the offenses, Dr. Stalberg concluded that Pinholster had “psychopathic personality traits.” at ER–7. 24 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting familial history of “severe psychiatric disorders,” “a history of seizure disorders of unknown etiology,” “repeated head traumas,” “an abnormal EEG,” and “evidence of mental disturbance during Mr. Pinholster’s childhood and some degree of brain damage.” at ER–493. He also opined that “there [was] voluminous mitigating evidence which includes a childhood of physical abuse, emotional neglect, and a family history of mental illness and criminal behav ior.” at ER–494. The District Court stayed the federal proceedings while Pinholster sought state-court review of claims the District Court deemed unexhausted. Pinholster’s second habeas submission to the California Supreme Court included Stalberg’s declaration. That court summarily denied Pinholster’s petition on the merits. Pinholster returned to Federal District Court and filed an amended petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court concluded that Pinholster had demon strated deficient performance and prejudice under Strick land.9 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. 90 F.3d 6. B As the majority notes, Pinholster’s claim arises under “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [under ] must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” 466 U. S., —————— 9 The District Court based its decision on the evidence adduced at an evidentiary hearing. The District Court did not apply 2 U.S. C. §224(d) because it thought, erroneously, that the California Supreme Court had not adjudicated Pinholster’s claim on the merits. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27. For the reasons I discuss, however, the District Court could have concluded that Pinholster had satisfied on the basis of the state-court record alone. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 2 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting at 66. To satisfy this benchmark, a defendant must show both that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” at 67. When applies, the question is whether “ ‘fair minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., at ) (quoting 4 U.S. 62, 664 (2004)). When the state court rejected a claim on the pleadings assuming |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | the state court rejected a claim on the pleadings assuming the allegations to be true, as here, see ante, at 6, n. 2, the federal court must ask whether “there is any reasonable argument” support ing the state court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s allega tions did not state a claim, Harrington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., at 6). This standard is “difficult,” but not im possible, “to meet.” at (slip op., at 2). This case is one in which fairminded jurists could not disagree that the state court erred. C Under “the defendant must show that coun sel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” measured according to “prevailing pro fessional norms.” 466 U.S., at 6. We “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” at 69. When §224(d) applies, federal-court review is “ ‘doubly’ ” deferential. Harrington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., at 6) (slip op., at )). In the present AEDPA posture, “[t]he question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied ’s deferential standard.” Har rington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., at 6). Here, there is none. The majority surmises that counsel decided on a strat egy “to get the prosecution’s aggravation witnesses ex 26 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting cluded for lack of notice, and if that failed, to put on Pin holster’s mother.” Ante, at 9. This is the sort of “ ‘post hoc rationalization’ for counsel’s decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel’s actions” that courts cannot indulge. Harrington, 62 U. S., at (slip op., ) (quoting 39 U.S. 0, 26–27 (2003)). The majority’s explanation for counsel’s conduct contradicts the best available evidence of counsel’s actions: Dettmar’s frank, contemporaneous statement to the trial judge that he “had not prepared any evidence by way of mitigation.” 2 Tr. 720. The majority’s conjecture that counsel had in fact prepared a mitigation defense, based primarily on isolated entries in counsel’s billing records, requires it to assume that Dettmar was lying to the trial judge.20 In any event, even if Pinholster’s counsel had a strategic reason for their actions, that would not automatically render their actions reasonable. For example, had counsel decided their best option was to move to exclude the ag gravating evidence, it would have been unreasonable to forgo a mitigation investigation on the hope that the mo tion would be granted. With a client’s life at stake, it would “flou[t] prudence,” 4 U.S. 374, —————— 20 The majority misleadingly cites entries showing that counsel were preparing Brashear’s penalty phase |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | cites entries showing that counsel were preparing Brashear’s penalty phase testimony after counsel learned that the State intended to present aggravation evidence. The cited entries predating that event show only that counsel conducted about one day’s worth of investigation—consisting of talking to Brashear and researching epilepsy—two months before the penalty phase. See 3 Clerk’s Tr. (.-hour phone call to Brashear on Jan. 3); at 64, 69 (3-hour meeting with Brashear regarding “childhood problems” on Feb. 23); at 69 (3. hours for “[r]esearch re; epilepsy and conf. with nurse” on Feb. 2). There is no evidence in the records that counsel actually planned to present mitigating evidence. Indeed, their complete failure to follow up on any of the information they learned in their minimal investigation only confirms that they were not planning to present mitigating evidence. See infra, at 29–3. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 27 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 39 (200), for an attorney to rely on the possibility that the court might preclude aggravating evidence pursuant to a “legal technicality” without any backup plan in place in case the court denied the motion, ante, at 9. No rea sonable attorney would pursue such a risky strategy. I do not understand the majority to suggest otherwise. Instead, I understand the majority’s conclusion that counsel’s actions were reasonable to rest on its belief that they did have a backup plan: a family-sympathy defense. In reaching this conclusion, the majority commits the same error that we corrected, applying in : It holds a purportedly “tactical judgment” to be reasonable without assessing “the ade quacy of the investigatio[n] supporting [that] judgmen[t],” 39 U.S., at 2. As we stated in : “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are vir tually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made af ter less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to inves tigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” – 69. We have repeatedly applied this principle since Strick land. See Sears v. Upton, 6 U. S. (200) (per curiam) (slip op., at 9); Porter v. McCollum, U. S. (slip op., at 0); 39 U. S., 2 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting at 27; Terry 29 U.S., at 396.2 As these cases make clear, the prevailing |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | U.S., at 396.2 As these cases make clear, the prevailing professional norms at the time of Pinholster’s trial required his attor neys to “conduct a thorough investigation of the defen dant’s background,” (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4., commentary, p. 4– (2d ed. 90) (hereinafter ABA Standards)), or “to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unneces sary,” 466 U.S., at 69.22 “In judging the defense’s investigation, as in applying gener ally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to ‘coun sel’s perspective at the time’ investigative decisions are made, and by giving a ‘heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’ ” 4 U.S., at 3 (quot ing 466 U.S., at 69, 69; citation omitted). In some cases, “reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” 4 U.S., at 33; see, e.g., Bobby v. Van Hook, U. S. (slip op., at ); U.S. 776, 4– (97). In other cases, however, requires fur ther investigation. —————— 2 I do not doubt that a decision to present a family-sympathy mitiga tion defense might be consistent “with the standard of professional competence in capital cases that prevailed in Los Angeles in 94” in some cases. Ante, at 24. My point is that even if counsel made a strategic decision to proceed with such a defense, that decision was unreasonable because it was based on an unreasonably incomplete investigation. 22 See also ABA Standards 4–4., commentary, at 4– (“Informa tion concerning the defendant’s background, education, employment record, mental and emotional stability, family relationships, and the like, will be relevant, as will mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense itself”). As we recognized in the ABA Standards, though not dispositive, “are guides to determining what is reasonable.” 466 U.S., at 6; see also 39 U.S. 0, 24 (2003). Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 29 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting is illustrative of the competence we have re quired of counsel in a capital case. There, counsel’s in vestigation was limited to three sources: psychological testing, a presentencing report, and Department of Social Services 39 U.S., at 23–24. The records revealed that the petitioner’s mother was an alcoholic, that he displayed emotional difficulties in foster care, that he was frequently absent from school, and that on one occasion, his mother left him alone for days without food. at 2. In these circumstances, we concluded, “any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an in formed choice among possible defenses.” Accord ingly, we held, the state court’s |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | among possible defenses.” Accord ingly, we held, the state court’s assumption that counsel’s investigation was adequate was an unreasonable applica tion of 39 U.S., at 2.23 This case is remarkably similar to As the majority reads the record, counsel’s mitigation investiga tion consisted of talking to Pinholster’s mother, consulting with Dr. Stalberg, and researching epilepsy.24 Ante, What little information counsel gleaned from this “rudi mentary” investigation, 39 U.S., at 24, would have led any reasonable attorney “to investigate further,” at 27. Counsel learned from Pinholster’s mother that he attended a class for educationally handicapped chil dren, that a psychologist had recommended placing him in a mental institution, and that he spent time in a state —————— 23 As the majority notes, see ante, at 24–2, ’ trial counsel acknowledged that the investigation he conducted was inconsistent with standard practice in Maryland. See 39 U.S., at 24. We inde pendently concluded, however, that the investigation “was also unrea sonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the ” at 2 24 The majority also posits that Brainard likely spent time preparing Pinholster’s brother Terry. However, Terry averred in a declaration that Pinholster’s attorneys “never asked [him] any questions relating to Scott’s background or [their] family history.” Record ER–. 30 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting hospital for emotionally handicapped children. They knew that Pinholster had been diagnosed with epilepsy. “[A]ny reasonably competent attorney would have real ized that pursuing” the leads suggested by this informa tion “was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses.” at 2; see also 39 (99) (“[E]vidence about the defen dant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvan taged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet counsel made no effort to obtain the readily available evidence suggested by the information they learned, such as Pin holster’s schooling or medical records, or to contact Pinholster’s school authorities. They did not contact Dr. Dubin or the many other health-care providers who had treated Pinholster. Put simply, counsel “failed to act while potentially powerful mitigating evidence stared them in the face.” Bobby, U. S., at (slip op., at ) (citing 39 U.S., at 2). The “impediments” facing counsel, ante, at 2, did not justify their minimal investigation. It is true that Pinhol ster was “an unsympathetic client.” But this fact compounds, rather than excuses, counsel’s deficiency in ignoring the glaring avenues of |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | than excuses, counsel’s deficiency in ignoring the glaring avenues of investigation that could explain why Pinholster was the way he was. See Sears, 6 U. S., at (slip op., at 7) (“This evidence might not have made Sears any more likable to the jury, but it might well have helped the jury understand Sears, and his hor rendous acts—especially in light of his purportedly stable upbringing”). Nor can Dr. Stalberg’s two-page report, which was based on a very limited record and focused primarily on Pinholster’s mental state at the time of the homicides, excuse counsel’s failure to investigate the Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting broader range of potential mitigating circumstances. “The record of the actual sentencing proceedings under scores the unreasonableness of counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly re sulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment.” 39 U.S., at 26. Dettmar told the trial judge that he was unprepared to present any mitigation evi dence. The mitigation case that counsel eventually put on can be described, at best, as “halfhearted.” Counsel made no effort to bolster Brashear’s self-interested testi mony with school or medical records, as the prosecutor effectively emphasized in closing argument. And because they did not pursue obvious leads, they failed to recognize that Brashear’s testimony painting Pinholster as the bad apple in a normal, nondeprived family was false. In denying Pinholster’s claim, the California Supreme Court necessarily overlooked ’s clearly estab lished admonition that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations.” –69. As in in light of the information available to Pinholster’s counsel, it is plain that “reasonable professional judgments” could not have supported their woefully inadequate investigation.2 466 U.S., at 69. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court could not reasonably have concluded that Pinholster —————— 2 The majority chastises the Court of Appeals for “attributing strict rules to this Court’s recent case law.” Ante, at 24. I agree that courts should not interpret our cases to prescribe strict rules regarding the required scope of mitigation investigations. See 4 U.S. 374, 394 (200) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting “our longstand ing case-by-case approach to determining whether an attorney’s per formance was unconstitutionally deficient under ”). The Ninth Circuit, however, did no such thing. It appropriately gave thoughtful consideration to the guideposts contained in these cases, just as we have previously done. See, e.g., Bobby v. Van Hook, U. S. (slip op., at ). 32 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting had failed to allege that his |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting had failed to allege that his counsel’s investigation was inadequate under D The majority also concludes that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Pinholster did not state a claim of prejudice. This conclusion, in light of the overwhelming mitigating evidence that was not before the jury, is wrong. To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro ceeding would have been different.” When a habeas petitioner challenges a death sentence, “the ques tion is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circum stances did not warrant death.” at 69. This inquiry requires evaluating “the totality of the available mitiga tion evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evi dence adduced in the habeas proceeding—in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation.” Terry 29 U.S., at 397–39. The ultimate question in this case is whether, taking into account all the mitigating and aggra vating evidence, “there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” 39 U.S., at 37; see Cal. Penal Code Ann. §90.4(b) (West 200) (requiring a unanimous jury verdict to impose a death sentence). Like the majority, I first consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at trial. By virtue of its verdict in the guilt phase, the jury had already concluded that Pinholster had stabbed and killed the victims. As the majority states, the jury saw Pinholster “revel” in his history of burglaries during the guilt phase. Ante, at 26. Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 33 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting The jury heard evidence of Pinholster’s violent tendencies: He had kidnapped someone with a knife, cut a person in the arm with a razor, and had a history of hitting and kicking people. He threatened to kill the State’s lead witness. And he had an extensive disciplinary record in jail. Brashear offered brief testimony that was apparently intended to be mitigating. See at 9–20; see also ante, at 27–2.26 However, as the prosecutor argued, Brashear was not a neutral witness. See 3 Tr. 744 (“A mother clearly loves her son, ladies and gentlemen. Clearly not the most unbiased witness in the world”). Notwithstanding Brashear’s obvious self-interest, counsel failed to offer readily available, objective evidence that would have substantiated and expanded on her testimony. Their failure to do so allowed the prosecutor to belittle her testimony in closing argument. See at 9–20. And Brashear’s statement |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | testimony in closing argument. See at 9–20. And Brashear’s statement that Pinholster would not be alive much longer because he had “a chip in his head floating around,” 2 Tr. 7397, could only have undermined her credibility, as the prosecutor urged, see 3 (“Does she want you to believe sometime before he got to —————— 26 The majority mischaracterizes several aspects of Brashear’s testi mony. Although Brashear testified that the family “didn’t have lots of money,” she followed up that comment by stating that Pinholster did not bring friends to the house because “it was too nice a house.” 2 Tr. 7404. The prosecutor did not understand Brashear to have testified that Pinholster’s childhood was deprived. See 3 (“You heard that he was not a deprived child”). Nor did the California Su preme Court on direct appeal. Cal. 4th 6, 90, 24 P.2d 7, 7 Brashear did testify that Pinholster’s stepfather tried to “discipline” him and that he was “at times” “abusive or near abusive.” 2 Tr. 7392– 7393. She suggested, however, that Pinholster deserved the “disci pline” he received. See, e.g., (“Scott was always—he had a mind of his own”). It is unlikely the jury understood Brashear to be suggesting that her husband routinely beat Pinholster. The prosecutor did not come away with this understanding. See 3 34 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting country jail some doctor looked in a crystal ball and said, ‘In three years you are going to die’? That’s ridicu lous”). The trial judge was thoroughly unimpressed with Brashear’s testimony. See Moreover, the evidence presented in Pinholster’s state court petition revealed that Brashear distorted facts in her testimony in ways that undermined Pinholster’s mitiga tion case. As in Sears, 6 U. S., at (slip op., at 3), the prosecutor used Brashear’s testimony that Pinholster came from a good family against him. See 3 Tr. 7442. In sum, counsel presented little in the way of mitigating evidence, and the prosecutor effectively used their half hearted attempt to present a mitigation case to advocate for the death penalty. The jury nonetheless took two days to reach a decision to impose a death sentence. 2 The additional mitigating evidence presented to the California Supreme Court “adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation” to Brashear’s unsubstantiated testimony. 4 U.S., at 393. Assuming the evidence presented to the California Supreme Court to be true, as that court was required to do, the new mitigating evidence presented to that court would have shown that Pinholster was raised in “chaos and poverty.” Record ER–32. The family home was |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | in “chaos and poverty.” Record ER–32. The family home was filled with violence. Pinholster’s siblings had extremely trou bled pasts. There was substantial evidence of “mental disturbance during Mr. Pinholster’s childhood and some degree of brain damage.” at ER–493. Dr. Woods concluded that Pinholster’s aggressive con duct resulted from bipolar mood disorder. Just months before the murders, a doctor had recommended that Pin holster be sent to a psychiatric institute. Dr. Woods also explained that Pinholster’s bizarre behavior before the murders reflected “[a]uditory hallucinations” and “severe Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting psychosis.” at ER–69. The available records con firmed that Pinholster suffered from longstanding seizure disorders, which may have been caused by his childhood head injuries. On this record, I do not see how it can be said that “[t]he ‘new’ evidence largely duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial.” Ante, at 29; see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 2, 29–299 (99) (evidence is not “merely cumulative” if it corroborates other evidence that is “unbelievable” on its own). Brashear’s self-interested testimony was not confirmed with objective evidence, as the prosecutor high lighted. The new evidence would have “destroyed the [relatively] benign conception of [Pinholster’s] upbringing” presented by his mother. 4 U.S., at 39. The jury heard no testimony at all that Pinholster likely suf fered from brain damage or bipolar mood disorder, and counsel offered no evidence to help the jury understand the likely effect of Pinholster’s head injuries or his bizarre behavior on the night of the homicides. The jury heard no testimony recounting the substantial evidence of Pinhol ster’s likely neurological problems. And it heard no medi cal evidence that Pinholster suffered from epilepsy. The majority responds that “much” of Pinholster’s new mitigating evidence “is of questionable mitigating value.” Ante, at 29. By presenting psychiatric testimony, it con tends, “Pinholster would have opened the door to rebuttal by a state expert.” But, because the California Supreme Court denied Pinholster’s petition on the plead ings, it had no reason to know what a state expert might have said. Moreover, given the record evidence, it is rea sonably probable that at least one juror would have cred ited his expert. In any event, even if a rebuttal expert testified that Pinholster suffered from antisocial personal ity disorder, this would hardly have come as a surprise to the jury. See ante, at 22 (describing Pinholster as a “psy chotic client whose performance at trial hardly endeared 36 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting him to the jury”). It is for this reason that it was espe cially |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | It is for this reason that it was espe cially important for counsel to present the available evi dence to help the jury understand Pinholster. See Sears, 6 U. S., at (slip op., at 6–7). Had counsel conducted an adequate investigation, the judge and jury would have heard credible evidence show ing that Pinholster’s criminal acts and aggressive tenden cies were “attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems.” Penry, 492 U.S., at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). They would have learned that Pinholster had the “ ‘kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.’ ” Porter, U. S., at (slip op., at 2) (quoting 39 U.S., at 3). Applying we have repeatedly found “a reasonable probability,” 466 U.S., that the sentencer would have reached a different result had counsel presented similar evidence. See, e.g., Porter, U. S., at (slip op., at 2–3) (evi dence of the defendant’s childhood history of physical abuse, brain abnormality, limited schooling, and heroic military service); 4 U.S., at 392 (evidence of severe abuse and neglect as a child, as well as brain damage); 39 U.S., at 3 (evidence of the de fendant’s “severe privation and abuse” as a child, home lessness, and “diminished mental capacities”); Terry 29 U.S., at 39 (evidence of childhood mistreatment and neglect, head injuries, possible organic mental impairments, and borderline mental retardation). The majority does not dispute the similarity between this case and the cited cases. However, it criticizes the Court of Appeals for relying on and Terry Wil liams on the ground that we reviewed the prejudice ques tion de novo in those cases. See ante, at 3. I do not read Terry to review the prejudice question de novo.27 —————— 27 Terry held that the state court’s decision was “unreason Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 37 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting More fundamentally, however, I cannot agree with the premise that “[t]hose cases offer no guidance with respect to whether a state court has unreasonably deter mined that prejudice is lacking.” Ante, at 3 (emphasis deleted). In each of these cases, we did not purport to create new law; we simply applied the same clearly estab lished precedent, to a different set of facts. Because these cases illuminate the kinds of mitigation evidence that suffice to establish prejudice under Strick land, they provide useful, but not dispositive, guidance for courts to consider when determining whether a state court has unreasonably applied In many cases, a state court presented with additional mitigation evidence will reasonably conclude that there is no “reasonable |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | mitigation evidence will reasonably conclude that there is no “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S., This is not such a case. Admittedly, Pinholster unjustifiably stabbed and killed two people, and his history of violent outbursts and burglaries surely did not endear him to the jury. But the homicides did not appear premeditated. And the State’s aggravation case was no stronger than in and Terry See 4 U.S., at 37, 33 (the defendant committed murder by torture and had a significant history of violent felonies, including a rape); 29 U.S., at 4 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the defendant had a lifetime of crime, and after the murder he “savagely beat an elderly woman,” set a home on fire, and stabbed a man (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even on the trial record, it took the jury two days to decide on a penalty. The contrast between the “not —————— able in at least two respects”: () It applied the wrong legal standard, see 29 U.S., at 397, and (2) it “failed to accord appropriate weight to the body of mitigation evidence available to trial counsel,” at 39. We did not purport to conduct de novo review. 3 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting persuasive” mitigation case put on by Pinholster’s counsel, 4 Tr. 74, and the substantial mitigation evidence at their fingertips was stark. Given these considerations, it is not a foregone conclusion, as the majority deems it, that a juror familiar with his troubled background and psychi atric issues would have reached the same conclusion regarding Pinholster’s culpability. Fairminded jurists could not doubt that, on the record before the California Supreme Court, “there [was] a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” 39 U.S., at 37. III The state-court record on its own was more than ade quate to support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the California Supreme Court could not reasonably have rejected Pinholster’s claim. The additional evidence presented in the federal evidentiary hearing only confirms that conclusion. A At the hearing, Pinholster offered many of the same documents that were before the state habeas court. He also offered his trial attorneys’ billing records, which were before the state habeas court as part of the trial record. Of the seven lay witnesses who testified at the hearing, six had previously executed declarations in support of Pinhol ster’s state-court petition. (The seventh, Pinholster’s uncle, provided testimony cumulative of other testimony.) Two experts testified on |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,011 | 24 | dissenting | Cullen v. Pinholster | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213842/cullen-v-pinholster/ | provided testimony cumulative of other testimony.) Two experts testified on Pinholster’s behalf; neither had presented declarations to the state habeas court. The first was Dr. Donald Olson, assistant professor of neurology and neurological sciences and director of the Pediatric Epilepsy Program at Stanford University Medical Center. It appears that Pinholster retained Dr. Olson to rebut the testimony of the expert disclosed by the State in the fed Cite as: 63 U. S. (20) 39 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting eral proceeding. See Decl. of Michael D. Abzug in Support of Stipulated Ex Parte Application to Continue Eviden tiary Hearing and Discovery Cut-Off and to Substitute Counsel in Pinholster v. Calderon, No. CV 9–6240–GLT (CD Cal.), p. 2. Relying in part on Pinholster’s abnormal EEG, Dr. Olson opined that Pinholster’s childhood acci dents “likely result[ed] in brain injury” and that these injuries “conferred a risk of epilepsy.” Record ER–699 to ER–700. He concluded that it was reasonably probable that Pinholster had suffered from partial epilepsy since at least 96 and had suffered from brain injury since at least 964. at ER–70. Pinholster’s second expert was Dr. Sophia Vinogradov, associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco. Dr. Vinogradov’s testimony was based on essentially the same facts as Dr. Woods’ and Dr. Stalberg’s state-court declarations. She highlighted Pinholster’s childhood head traumas, history of epilepsy, abusive and neglected upbringing, history of substance abuse, and bizarre behavior on the night of the homicides. She opined that his aggressive behavior resulted from childhood head traumas: “All data indicates that there were severe effects of the two serious head injuries sustained at age 2 and age 3, with evidence for behavioral changes related to dysfunction of frontal cortex: severe attentional and learning problems in childhood, hyperactivity, aggres sivity, impulsivity, social-emotional impairment, sei zure disorder, and explosive dyscontrol.” at ER– 73. She also opined that, right before the homicides, Pinhol ster was in an “apparently hallucinatory state [that] was likely the result of his intoxication with multiple sub stances.” at ER–707 The State presented two experts: Dr. Stalberg, the 40 CULLEN v. PINHOLSTER SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting psychiatrist who had examined Pinholster in the middle of trial,2 and Dr. David Rudnick. Although Dr. Stalberg maintained that Pinholster suffered from antisocial per sonality disorder, which was his original diagnosis in the middle of trial, he again emphasized that there was “vo luminous” and “compelling” mitigation evidence that had not previously been made available to him or presented to the jury. at ER–926, ER–93. He stated that conver sations with Pinholster’s family revealed that he and his siblings were |
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