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Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss is a final decision under the collateral-order doctrine over which the Court of Appeals had, and this Court has, jurisdiction. We proceed to consider the merits of petitioners' III In the Court found it necessary first to discuss the antitrust principles implicated by the complaint. Here too we begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. In Bivensproceeding on the theory that a right suggests a remedythis Court "recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional " Correctional Services 122 S. Ct. 5, 1 L. Ed. 2d 456 Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability "to any new context or new category of defendants." 122 S. Ct. 5. See also -550, That reluctance might well have disposed of respondent's First Amendment of religious discrimination. For while we have allowed a Bivens action to redress a violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see we have not found an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a sounding in the First Amendment. Petitioners do not press this argument, however, so we assume, without deciding, that respondent's First Amendment is actionable under Bivens. In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the implied cause of action is the "federal analog to suits brought against state officials under Rev. Stat. 42 U.S.C." n. 2, Cf. 143 L. Ed. 2d Based on the rules our precedents establish, respondent correctly concedes that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal Brief 46 ("[I]t is undisputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be established solely on a theory of respondeat superior"). See ; see also ; 5-6, Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where the is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, ; Under extant precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than "intent as volition or intent |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | purposeful discrimination requires more than "intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences." Personnel Administrator of It instead involves a decisionmaker's undertaking a course of action "`because of,' not merely `in spite of,' [the action's] adverse effects upon an identifiable group." It follows that, to state a based on a violation of a clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that * petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin. Respondent disagrees. He argues that, under a theory of "supervisory liability," petitioners can be liable for "knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates' use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees." Iqbal Brief 45-46. That is to say, respondent believes a supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor's violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent's conception of "supervisory liability" is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a suit or a Bivens actionwhere masters do not answer for the torts of their servantsthe term "supervisory liability" is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities. IV A We turn to respondent's complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As the Court held in the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. ). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S., Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a to relief that is plausible on its face." A has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of `entitlement to relief.'" (brackets omitted). Two working principles underlie our decision in First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we *1950 "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" ). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 490 F.3d, 57-158. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has allegedbut it has not "show[n]""that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Our decision in illustrates the two-pronged approach. There, we considered the sufficiency of a complaint alleging that incumbent telecommunications providers had entered an agreement not to compete and to forestall competitive entry, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Recognizing that 1 enjoins only anticompetitive conduct "effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy," Copperweld the plaintiffs in flatly pleaded that the defendants "ha[d] entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry. and ha[d] |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry. and ha[d] agreed not to compete with one another." 550 U.S., at 5, The complaint also alleged that the defendants' "parallel course of conduct to prevent competition" and inflate prices was indicative of the unlawful agreement alleged. The Court held the plaintiffs' complaint deficient under Rule 8. In doing so it first noted that the plaintiffs' assertion of an unlawful agreement was a "`legal conclusion'" and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth. Had the Court simply credited the allegation of a conspiracy, the plaintiffs would have stated a for relief and been entitled to proceed perforce. The Court next addressed the "nub" of the plaintiffs' complaintthe well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel behaviorto determine whether it gave rise to a "plausible suggestion of conspiracy." at 565-5, Acknowledging that parallel conduct was consistent with an unlawful agreement, the Court nevertheless concluded that it did not plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior. Because the well-pleaded fact of parallel conduct, accepted as true, did not plausibly suggest an unlawful agreement, the Court held the plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed. B Under 's construction of Rule 8, we conclude that respondent's complaint *19 has not "nudged [his] s" of invidious discrimination "across the line from conceivable to plausible." We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Respondent pleads that petitioners "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest." Complaint App. to Pet. for Cert. 173a-174a. The complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of this invidious policy, 57a, and that Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing it, 57a. These bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a constitutional discrimination 550 U.S., namely, that petitioners adopted a policy "`because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 442 U.S., at As such, the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true. -555, To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. We do not so characterize them any more than the Court in rejected the plaintiffs' express allegation of a "`contract, combination |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | in rejected the plaintiffs' express allegation of a "`contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry,'" at 5, because it thought that too chimerical to be maintained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent's allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth. We next consider the factual allegations in respondent's complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. The complaint alleges that "the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation of the events of September 11." Complaint App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a. It further s that "[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were `cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11," 68a. Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners' purposefully designating detainees "of high interest" because of their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose. The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab MuslimOsama bin Ladenand composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts. As between that "obvious alternative explanation" for the arrests, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent *1952 asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion. But even if the complaint's well-pleaded facts give rise to a plausible inference that respondent's arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference alone would not entitle respondent to relief. It is important to recall that respondent's complaint challenges neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial detention in the MDC. Respondent's constitutional s against petitioners rest solely on their ostensible "policy of holding post-September-11th detainees" in the ADMAX SHU once they were categorized as "of high interest." Complaint App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. To prevail on that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. To prevail on that theory, the complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as "of high interest" because of their race, religion, or national origin. This the complaint fails to do. Though respondent alleges that various other defendants, who are not before us, may have labeled him a person of "of high interest" for impermissible reasons, his only factual allegation against petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving "restrictive conditions of confinement" for post-September-11 detainees until they were "`cleared' by the FBI." Accepting the truth of that allegation, the complaint does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race, religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is that the Nation's top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity. Respondent does not argue, nor can he, that such a motive would violate petitioners' constitutional obligations. He would need to allege more by way of factual content to "nudg[e]" his of purposeful discrimination "across the line from conceivable to plausible." 550 U.S., To be sure, respondent can attempt to draw certain contrasts between the pleadings the Court considered in and the pleadings at issue here. In the complaint alleged general wrongdoing that extended over a period of years, at 5, whereas here the complaint alleges discrete wrongsfor instance, beatingsby lower level Government actors. The allegations here, if true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be the basis for some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners' part. Despite these distinctions, respondent's pleadings do not suffice to state a Unlike in where the doctrine of respondeat superior could bind the corporate defendant, here, as we have noted, petitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic. Yet respondent's complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners' discriminatory state of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard necessary to comply with Rule 8. It is important to note, however, that we express no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent's complaint against the defendants who are not before us. Respondent's account of his prison ordeal alleges serious official misconduct that we need not address here. Our decision is limited to the determination that respondent's complaint does not entitle him to relief from petitioners. C Respondent offers three arguments that bear on our |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | petitioners. C Respondent offers three arguments that bear on our disposition of his case, but none is persuasive. *1953 1 Respondent first says that our decision in should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute. Iqbal Brief 37-38. This argument is not supported by and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard "in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in expounded the pleading standard for "all civil actions," ib and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike. See 550 U.S., -556, and n. 3, 2 Respondent next implies that our construction of Rule 8 should be tempered where, as here, the Court of Appeals has "instructed the district court to cabin discovery in such a way as to preserve" petitioners' defense of qualified immunity "as much as possible in anticipation of a summary judgment motion." Iqbal Brief 27. We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery process. ("It is no answer to say that a just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful case management given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including "avoidance of disruptive discovery." There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government. The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with responding to, as Judge |
Justice Kennedy | 2,009 | 4 | majority | Ashcroft v. Iqbal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145875/ashcroft-v-iqbal/ | when Government officials are charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly put it, "a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic." 490 F.3d, 79. It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery. We decline respondent's invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the *1954 ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. That promise provides especially cold comfort in this pleading context, where we are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties. Because respondent's complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise. 3 Respondent finally maintains that the Federal Rules expressly allow him to allege petitioners' discriminatory intent "generally," which he equates with a conclusory allegation. Iqbal Brief 32 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9). It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is sufficiently well pleaded because it s that petitioners discriminated against him "on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest." Complaint App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a-173a. Were we required to accept this allegation as true, respondent's complaint would survive petitioners' motion to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its factual context. It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading "fraud or mistake," while allowing "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind [to] be alleged generally." But "generally" is a relative term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake. Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigidthough still operativestrictures of Rule 8. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1301, p. 291 (3d ed. 2004) ("[A] rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of a condition of mind would |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Alabama v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112454/alabama-v-white/ | Based on an anonymous telephone tip, police stopped respondent's vehicle. A consensual search of the car revealed drugs. The issue is whether the tip, as corroborated by independent *32 police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory We hold that it did. On April 22, 198, at approximately 3 p.m., Corporal B. H. Davis of the Montgomery Police Department received a telephone call from an anonymous person, stating that Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey's and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache case. Corporal Davis and his partner, Corporal P. A. Reynolds, proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace Apartments. The officers saw a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight in the parking lot in front of the 235 building. The officers observed respondent leave the 235 building, carrying nothing in her hands, and enter the station wagon. They followed the vehicle as it drove the most direct route to Dobey's When the vehicle reached the Mobile Highway, on which Dobey's is located, Corporal Reynolds requested a patrol unit to stop the vehicle. The vehicle was stopped at approximately 4:18 p. m., just short of Dobey's Corporal Davis asked respondent to step to the rear of her car, where he informed her that she had been stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle. He asked if they could look for cocaine, and respondent said they could look. The officers found a locked brown attache case in the car, and, upon request, respondent provided the combination to the lock. The officers found marijuana in the attache case and placed respondent under arrest. During processing at the station, the officers found three milligrams of cocaine in respondent's purse. Respondent was charged in Montgomery County Court with possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine. The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress, and she pleaded guilty to the charges, reserving the right to appeal *328 the denial of her suppression motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama held that the officers did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary under to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car, and that the marijuana and cocaine were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. The court concluded that respondent's motion to dismiss should have been granted and reversed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the State's petition |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Alabama v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112454/alabama-v-white/ | conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the State's petition for writ of certiorari, two justices dissenting. Because of differing views in the state and federal courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for a stop, we granted the State's petition for certiorari, We now reverse. sustained a stop and frisk undertaken on the basis of a tip given in person by a known informant who had provided information in the past. We concluded that, while the unverified tip may have been insufficient to support an arrest or search warrant, the information carried sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify a forcible We did not address the issue of anonymous tips in Adams, except to say that "[t]his is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip," dealt with an anonymous tip in the probable-cause context. The Court there abandoned the "two-pronged test" of and in favor of a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause. made clear, however, that those factors that had been considered critical under Aguilar and Spinelli an informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" remain "highly relevant in determining the value of his report." These factors are also relevant in the reasonable-suspicion context, although allowance *329 must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required to meet that standard. The opinion in recognized that an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations and given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is "by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable." This is not to say that an anonymous caller could never provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a But the tip in was not an exception to the general rule, and the anonymous tip in this case is like the one in : "[It] provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that [the caller] is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the [tip] gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the [caller's] predictions regarding [Vanessa White's] criminal activities." By requiring "[s]omething more," as did, ib we merely apply what we said in Adams: "Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized," Simply put, a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not " `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Alabama v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112454/alabama-v-white/ | " `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that [a stop] was appropriate." quoting As there was in however, in this case there is more than the tip itself. The tip was not as detailed, and the corroboration was not as complete, as in but the required degree of suspicion was likewise not as high. We discussed the difference in the two standards last Term in United : "The officer [making a stop] must be able to articulate something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch." ' [, 392 U. S.,] at 2. The Fourth Amendment requires `some minimal *330 level of objective justification' for making the 21 That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means `a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,' [, ], and the level of suspicion required for a stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause." Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. demonstrates as much. We there assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors quantity and quality are considered in the "totality of the circumstances the whole picture," United 41 that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. The Court applied its totality-of-the-circumstances approach in this manner, taking into account the facts known to the officers from personal observation, and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability as established through independent police work. The same approach applies in the reasonable-suspicion context, the only difference *331 being the level of suspicion that must be established. Contrary to the court below, we conclude that when the officers stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Alabama v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112454/alabama-v-white/ | that when the officers stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity and that the investigative stop therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It is true that not every detail mentioned by the tipster was verified, such as the name of the woman leaving the building or the precise apartment from which she left; but the officers did corroborate that a woman left the 235 building and got into the particular vehicle that was described by the caller. With respect to the time of departure predicted by the informant, Corporal Davis testified that the caller gave a particular time when the woman would be leaving, App. 5, but he did not state what that time was. He did testify that, after the call, he and his partner proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace Apartments to put the 235 building under surveillance, Given the fact that the officers proceeded to the indicated address immediately after the call and that respondent emerged not too long thereafter, it appears from the record before us that respondent's departure from the building was within the time frame predicted by the caller. As for the caller's prediction of respondent's destination, it is true that the officers stopped her just short of Dobey's and did not know whether she would have pulled in or continued past it. But given that the 4-mile route driven by respondent was the most direct route possible to Dobey's 550 So. 2d, at 105, Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, but nevertheless involved several turns, App. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, we think respondent's destination was significantly corroborated. The Court's opinion in gave credit to the proposition that because an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal Thus, it is not *332 unreasonable to conclude in this case that the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer's predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller. We think it also important that, as in "the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted." The fact that the officers found a car precisely matching the caller's description in front of the 235 building is an example of the former. Anyone could |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Alabama v. White | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112454/alabama-v-white/ | 235 building is an example of the former. Anyone could have "predicted" that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at the time of the call. What was important was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information a special familiarity with respondent's affairs. The general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey's Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities. See When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the Although it is a close case, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. created four new criminal offenses involving the activities of organized criminal groups in relation to an enterprise. (d). RICO also created a new civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of those prohibitions. We are asked to decide whether RICO applies extraterritorially— that is, to events occurring and injuries suffered outside the United States. I A RICO is founded on the concept of racketeering activity. The statute defines “racketeering activity” to encompass dozens of state and federal offenses, known in RICO par lance as pred These predicates include any act “indictable” under specified federal statutes, (C), (E)–(G), as well as certain crimes “chargeable” under state law, and any offense involving bank ruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related activity that is 2 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court “punishable” under federal law, A predicate offense implicates RICO when it is part of a “pattern of racketeering activity”—a series of related predicates that together demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal activity. H. J. ; see (specify ing that a “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two predicates committed within 10 years of each other). RICO’s sets forth four specific prohibitions aimed at different ways in which a pattern of racketeering activ- ity may be used to infiltrate, control, or operate “a[n] en terprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” These prohibitions can be summarized as follows. Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful to invest income derived from a pattern of rack eteering activity in an enterprise. Section 1962(b) makes it unlawful to acquire or maintain an interest in an enter prise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for a person employed by or associated with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Finally, (d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions.1 —————— 1 In full, 18 U.S. C. provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partic ipated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court Violations of are subject to criminal penalties, and civil proceedings to enforce those prohibi tions may be brought by the Attorney General, (b). Separately, RICO creates a private civil cause of action that allows “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” to sue in federal district court and recover treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. 2 —————— the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. “(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racket eering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. “(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi- rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. “(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” The attentive reader will notice that these prohibitions concern not only patterns of racketeering activity but also the collection of unlawful debt. As is typical in our RICO cases, we have no occasion here to address this aspect of the statute. 2 In full, provides: “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola tion of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is crimi nally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.” 4 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court B This case arises from allegations that petitioners—RJR Nabisco and numerous related entities (collectively RJR)— participated in a global money-laundering scheme in association with various organized crime groups. Re spondents—the European Community and 26 of its mem ber states—first sued RJR in the Eastern District of New York in 2000, alleging that RJR had violated RICO. Over the past 16 years, the resulting litigation (spread over at least three separate actions, with this case the lone survi vor) has seen multiple complaints and multiple trips up and down the federal court system. See *1–*2 (tracing the procedural his- tory through the District Court’s dismissal of the present complaint). In the interest of brevity, we confine our discussion to the operative complaint and its journey to this Court. Greatly simplified, the complaint alleges a scheme in which Colombian and Russian drug traffickers smuggled narcotics into Europe and sold the drugs for euros that— through a series of transactions involving black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers— were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes into Europe. In other variations of this scheme, RJR allegedly dealt directly with drug traffickers and money launderers in South America and sold cigarettes to Iraq in violation of international sanctions. RJR is also said to have acquired Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation for the purpose of expanding these illegal activities. The complaint alleges that RJR engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of numerous acts of money laundering, material support to foreign terrorist organiza tions, mail fraud, wire fraud, and violations of the Travel Act. RJR, in concert with the other participants in the scheme, allegedly formed an association in fact that was engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, and therefore Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court constituted a RICO enterprise that the complaint dubs the “RJR Money-Laundering Enterprise.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 238a, Complaint ¶158; |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | Money-Laundering Enterprise.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 238a, Complaint ¶158; see (defining an enterprise to include “any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”). Putting these pieces together, the complaint alleges that RJR violated each of RICO’s prohibitions. RJR allegedly used income derived from the pattern of racketeering to invest in, acquire an interest in, and operate the RJR Money-Laundering Enterprise in violation of (a); acquired and maintained control of the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering in violation of (b); oper ated the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering in violation of (c); and conspired with other partici pants in the scheme in violation of (d).3 These viola tions allegedly harmed respondents in various ways, including through competitive harm to their state-owned cigarette businesses, lost tax revenue from black-market cigarette sales, harm to European financial institutions, currency instability, and increased law enforcement costs.4 RJR moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that RICO does not apply to racketeering activity occurring outside U. S. territory or to foreign enterprises. The District Court agreed and dismissed the RICO claims as imper missibly extraterritorial. —————— 3 The complaint also alleges that RJR committed a variety of state- law torts. Those claims are not before us. 4 At an earlier stage of respondents’ litigation against RJR, the Sec ond Circuit “held that the revenue rule barred the foreign sovereigns’ civil claims for recovery of lost tax revenue and law enforcement costs.” European (Sotomayor, J.), cert. denied, It is unclear why respondents subsequently included these alleged injuries in their present complaint; they do not ask us to disturb or distinguish the Second Circuit’s holding that such injuries are not cognizable. We express no opinion on the matter. Cf. 6 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court The Second Circuit reinstated the RICO claims. It concluded that, “with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and are alleged in this case, Congress has clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially.” “By incorporating these statutes into RICO as predicate racketeering acts,” the court reasoned, “Congress has clearly communicated its intention that RICO apply to extraterritorial conduct to the extent that extraterritorial violations of these statutes serve as the basis for RICO liability.” Turning to the predicates alleged in the complaint, the Second Circuit found that they passed muster. The court concluded that the money laundering and material support of terrorism statutes expressly apply extraterritorially in the circumstances alleged in the complaint. at 139–140. The court held that the mail fraud, wire fraud, |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | 139–140. The court held that the mail fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act statutes do not apply extraterritorially. But it concluded that the complaint states domestic violations of those predicates because it “allege[s] conduct in the United States that satisfies every essential element” of those offenses. at 142. RJR sought rehearing, arguing (among other things) that RICO’s civil cause of action requires a plaintiff to allege a domestic injury, even if a domestic pattern of racketeering or a domestic enterprise is not necessary to make out a violation of RICO’s substantive prohibitions. The panel denied rehearing and issued a supplemental opinion holding that RICO does not require a domestic injury. If a for eign injury was caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially, the court concluded, then the plaintiff may seek recovery for that injury under RICO. The Second Circuit later denied re hearing en banc, with five judges dissenting. 783 F.3d 123 (2015). Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court The lower courts have come to different conclusions regarding RICO’s extraterritorial application. Compare (case below) (holding that RICO may apply extraterritorially) with United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–975 (CA9 2013) (holding that RICO does not apply extraterritorially; collecting cases). Because of this conflict and the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 576 U. S. (2015). II The question of RICO’s extraterritorial application really involves two questions. First, do RICO’s substan tive prohibitions, contained in apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries? Second, does RICO’s private right of action, contained in apply to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries? We consider each of these questions in turn. To guide our inquiry, we begin by reviewing the law of extraterritoriality. It is a basic premise of our legal system that, in general, “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft 454 (2007). This principle finds expression in a canon of statutory construction known as the presumption against extraterritoriality: Absent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application. The ques tion is not whether we think “Congress would have wanted” a statute to apply to foreign conduct “if it had thought of the situation before the court,” but whether Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the statute will do so. “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” at There are several reasons for this presumption. Most notably, it serves to avoid the international discord that 8 |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | notably, it serves to avoid the international discord that 8 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. – (2013) (slip op., at 4–5); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., (Ar- amco); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). But it also reflects the more prosaic “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” We therefore apply the presumption across the board, “regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.” at Twice in the past six years we have considered whether a federal statute applies extraterritorially. In we addressed the question whether of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies to misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities traded only on foreign exchanges. We first examined whether gives any clear indication of extraterritorial effect, and found that it does –265. We then engaged in a separate inquiry to determine whether the complaint before us involved a permissible domestic application of because it alleged that some of the relevant misrepresentations were made in the United States. At this second step, we considered the “ ‘focus’ of congressional concern,” asking whether ’s focus is “the place where the deception originated” or rather “pur chases and sale of securities in the United States.” at 266. We concluded that the statute’s focus is on domestic securities transactions, and we therefore held that the statute does not apply to frauds in connection with foreign securities transactions, even if those frauds involve do mestic misrepresentations. In Kiobel, we considered whether the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) confers federal-court jurisdiction over causes of action alleging international-law violations committed Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of the Court overseas. We acknowledged that the presumption against extraterritoriality is “typically” applied to statutes “regu lating conduct,” but we concluded that the principles supporting the presumption should “similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.” 569 U. S., at (slip op., at 5). We applied the presumption and held that the ATS lacks any clear indication that it extended to the foreign violations alleged in that case. at – (slip op., at 7–14). Because “all the relevant conduct” regarding those viola tions “took place outside the United States,” at (slip op., at 14), we did not need to determine, as we did in the statute’s “focus.” and |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | to determine, as we did in the statute’s “focus.” and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues. At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritori ally. We must ask this question regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If the statute is not extrater ritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extrater ritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U. S. territory. What if we find at step one that a statute clearly does have extraterritorial effect? Neither nor Kiobel involved such a finding. But we addressed this issue in explaining that it was necessary to consider ’s “focus” only because we found that the statute 10 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court does not apply extraterritorially: “If did apply abroad, we would not need to determine which transna tional frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some other limitation).” n. 9. The scope of an extraterritorial statute thus turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application, and not on the statute’s “focus.”5 III With these guiding principles in mind, we first consider whether RICO’s substantive prohibitions in may apply to foreign conduct. Unlike in and Kiobel, we find that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—but only with respect to certain appli cations of the statute. A The most obvious textual clue is that RICO defines racketeering activity to include a number of predicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct. These predicates include the prohibition against engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, which expressly applies, when “the defendant is a United States person,” to offenses that “tak[e] place outside the United States.” 18 U.S. C. Other examples include the prohibitions against the assassination of Gov ernment officials, (“There is extraterritorial juris diction over the conduct prohibited by this section”); (same), and the prohibition against hostage taking, which applies to conduct that “occurred outside the United States” if either the |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | conduct that “occurred outside the United States” if either the hostage or the offender is a —————— 5 Because a finding of extraterritoriality at step one will obviate step two’s “focus” inquiry, it will usually be preferable for courts to proceed in the sequence that we have set forth. But we do not mean to preclude courts from starting at step two in appropriate cases. Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court U. S. national, if the offender is found in the United States, or if the hostage taking is done to compel action by the U. S. Government, At least one predicate— the prohibition against “kill[ing] a national of the United States, while such national is outside the United States”— applies only to conduct occurring outside the United States. We agree with the Second Circuit that Congress’s incor poration of these (and other) extraterritorial predicates into RICO gives a clear, affirmative indication that applies to foreign racketeering activity—but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially. Put another way, a pattern of racketeering activity may include or consist of offenses committed abroad in violation of a predicate statute for which the presumption against extraterritorial ity has been overcome. To give a simple (albeit grim) example, a violation of could be premised on a pattern of killings of Americans abroad in violation of predicate that all agree applies extraterritori ally—whether or not any domestic predicates are also alleged.6 We emphasize the important limitation that foreign conduct must violate “a predicate statute that manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterri torially.” Although a number of RICO predicates have extraterritorial effect, many do The inclusion of some extraterritorial predicates does not mean that all RICO predicates extend to foreign conduct. This is apparent for two reasons. First, “when a statute pro vides for some extraterritorial application, the presump tion against extraterritoriality operates to limit that —————— 6 The foreign killings would, of course, still have to satisfy the relat edness and continuity requirements of RICO’s pattern element. See H. J. 12 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court provision to its terms.” Second, RICO defines as racketeering activity only acts that are “indictable” (or, what amounts to the same thing, “charge able” or “punishable”) under one of the statutes identified in If a particular statute does not apply extra- territorially, then conduct committed abroad is not “in dictable” under that statute and so cannot qualify as a predicate under RICO’s plain terms. RJR |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | cannot qualify as a predicate under RICO’s plain terms. RJR resists the conclusion that RICO’s incorporation of extraterritorial predicates gives RICO commensurate extraterritorial effect. It points out that “RICO itself ” does not refer to extraterritorial application; only the underlying predicate statutes do. Brief for Petitioners 42. RJR thus argues that Congress could have intended to capture only domestic applications of extraterritorial predicates, and that any predicates that apply only abroad could have been “incorporated solely for when such offenses are part of a broader pattern whose overall locus is domestic.” The presumption against extraterritoriality does not require us to adopt such a constricted interpretation. While the presumption can be overcome only by a clear indication of extraterritorial effect, an express statement of extraterritoriality is not essential. “Assuredly context can be consulted as well.” Con text is dispositive here. Congress has not expressly said that (c) applies to patterns of racketeering activity in foreign countries, but it has defined “racketeering activ ity”—and by extension a “pattern of racketeering activ ity”—to encompass violations of predicate statutes that do expressly apply extraterritorially. Short of an explicit declaration, it is hard to imagine how Congress could have more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some) extraterritorial effect. This unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that clearly evidences extra territorial effect despite lacking an express statement of Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 13 Opinion of the Court extraterritoriality. We therefore conclude that RICO applies to some for eign racketeering activity. A violation of may be based on a pattern of racketeering that includes predicate offenses committed abroad, provided that each of those offenses violates a predicate statute that is itself extrater ritorial. This fact is determinative as to (b) and (c), both of which prohibit the employment of a pattern of racketeering. Although they differ as to the end for which the pattern is employed—to acquire or maintain control of an enterprise under subsection (b), or to conduct an enterprise’s affairs under subsection (c)—this differ ence is immaterial for extraterritoriality purposes. Section 1962(a) presents a thornier question. Unlike subsections (b) and (c), subsection (a) targets certain uses of income derived from a pattern of racketeering, not the use of the pattern itself. Cf. While we have no difficulty concluding that this prohibition applies to in come derived from foreign patterns of racketeering (within the limits we have discussed), arguably (a) extends only to domestic uses of the income. The Second Circuit did not decide this question because it found that respond ents have alleged “a domestic investment of racketeering proceeds |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | respond ents have alleged “a domestic investment of racketeering proceeds in the form of RJR’s merger in the United States with Brown & Williamson and investments in other U. S. operations.” n. 5. RJR does not dispute the basic soundness of the Second Circuit’s reasoning, but it does contest the court’s reading of the complaint. See Brief for Petitioners 57–58. Because the parties have not focused on this issue, and because it makes no difference to our resolution of this case, see infra, at 27, we assume without deciding that respondents have pleaded a domes tic investment of racketeering income in violation of (a). Finally, although respondents’ complaint alleges a 14 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court violation of RICO’s conspiracy provision, (d), the parties’ briefs do not address whether this provision should be treated differently from the provision ((a), (b), or (c)) that a defendant allegedly conspired to violate. We therefore decline to reach this issue, and assume without deciding that (d)’s extraterritoriality tracks that of the provision underlying the alleged conspiracy. B RJR contends that, even if RICO may apply to foreign patterns of racketeering, the statute does not apply to foreign enterprises. Invoking ’s discussion of the Exchange Act’s “focus,” RJR says that the “focus” of RICO is the enterprise being corrupted—not the pattern of racketeering—and that RICO’s enterprise element gives no clear indication of extraterritorial effect. Accordingly, RJR reasons, RICO requires a domestic enterprise. This argument misunderstands As explained at 9–10, only at the second step of the in quiry do we consider a statute’s “focus.” Here, however, there is a clear indication at step one that RICO applies extraterritorially. We therefore do not proceed to the “focus” step. The Court’s discussion of the statu tory “focus” made this clear, stating that “[i]f did apply abroad, we would not need to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some other limitation).” n. 9. The same is true here. RICO—or at least §(b) and (c)—applies abroad, and so we do not need to deter mine which transnational (or wholly foreign) patterns of racketeering it applies to; it applies to all of them, regard less of whether they are connected to a “foreign” or “do mestic” enterprise. This rule is, of course, subject to the important limitation that RICO covers foreign predicate offenses only to the extent that the underlying predicate statutes are extraterritorial. But within those bounds, the Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 15 Opinion of the Court location of the affected enterprise does |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | Opinion of the Court location of the affected enterprise does not impose an independent constraint. It is easy to see why Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to difficult line-drawing problems and counter intuitive results. It would exclude from RICO’s reach foreign enterprises—whether corporations, crime rings, other associations, or individuals—that operate within the United States. Imagine, for example, that a foreign corpo ration has operations in the United States and that one of the corporation’s managers in the United States conducts its U. S. affairs through a pattern of extortion and mail fraud. Such domestic conduct would seem to fall well within what Congress meant to capture in enacting RICO. Congress, after all, does not usually exempt foreigners acting in the United States from U. S. legal requirements. See (“Surely the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not command giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the United States”). Yet RJR’s theory would insulate this scheme from RICO liabil ity—both civil and criminal—because the enterprise at issue is a foreign, not domestic, corporation. Seeking to avoid this result, RJR offers that any “ ‘emis saries’ ” a foreign enterprise sends to the United States— such as our hypothetical U. S.-based corporate manager— could be carved off and considered a “distinct domestic enterprise” under an association-in-fact theory. Brief for Petitioners 40. RJR’s willingness to gerrymander the enterprise to get around its proposed domestic enterprise requirement is telling. It suggests that RJR is not really concerned about whether an enterprise is foreign or do mestic, but whether the relevant conduct occurred here or abroad. And if that is the concern, then it is the pattern of racketeering activity that matters, not the enterprise. Even spotting RJR its “domestic emissary” theory, this 16 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court approach would lead to strange gaps in RICO’s coverage. If a foreign enterprise sent only a single “emissary” to engage in racketeering in the United States, there could be no RICO liability because a single person cannot be both the RICO enterprise and the RICO defendant. Cedric Kushner Promotions, (2001). RJR also offers no satisfactory way of determining whether an enterprise is foreign or domestic. Like the District Court, RJR maintains that courts can apply the “nerve center” test that we use to determine a corpora tion’s principal place of business for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 ; 28 U.S. C. §2(c)(1); at *5– *6. |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | U.S. 77 ; 28 U.S. C. §2(c)(1); at *5– *6. But this test quickly becomes meaningless if, as RJR suggests, a corporation with a foreign nerve center can, if necessary, be pruned into an association-in-fact enterprise with a domestic nerve center. The nerve center test, developed with ordinary corporate command structures in mind, is also ill suited to govern RICO association-in-fact enterprises, which “need not have a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command.’ ” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948 These difficulties are largely avoided if, as we conclude today, RICO’s extraterritorial effect is pegged to the extraterritoriality judgments Congress has made in the predicate statutes, often by providing precise instructions as to when those statutes apply to foreign conduct. The practical problems we have identified with RJR’s proposed domestic enterprise requirement are not, by themselves, cause to reject it. Our point in reciting these troubling consequences of RJR’s theory is simply to rein force our conclusion, based on RICO’s text and context, that Congress intended the prohibitions in 18 U.S. C. §(b) and (c) to apply extraterritorially in tandem with the underlying predicates, without regard to the Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 17 Opinion of the Court locus of the enterprise. Although we find that RICO imposes no domestic enter prise requirement, this does not mean that every foreign enterprise will qualify. Each of RICO’s substantive prohi bitions requires proof of an enterprise that is “engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com merce.” §(a), (b), (c). We do not take this reference to “foreign commerce” to mean literally all commerce occurring abroad. Rather, a RICO enterprise must engage in, or affect in some significant way, commerce directly involving the United States—e.g., commerce between the United States and a foreign country. Enterprises whose activities lack that anchor to U. S. commerce cannot sus tain a RICO violation. C Applying these principles, we agree with the Second Circuit that the complaint does not allege impermissibly extraterritorial violations of §(b) and (c).7 The alleged pattern of racketeering activity consists of five basic predicates: (1) money laundering, (2) material support of foreign terrorist organizations, (3) mail fraud, (4) wire fraud, and (5) violations of the Travel Act. The Second Circuit observed that the relevant provisions of the money laundering and material support of terrorism statutes expressly provide for extraterritorial application in certain circumstances, and it concluded that those circumstances are alleged to be present here. 764 F.3d, at 139–140. The court found that the fraud statutes and the Travel Act do not contain the |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | fraud statutes and the Travel Act do not contain the clear indication needed to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. But it held that the complaint alleges domestic violations of those statutes because it “allege[s] conduct in the United States that satisfies every essential element of the mail —————— 7 As to §(a) and (d), see at 13–14. 18 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act claims.” RJR does not dispute these characterizations of the alleged pred We therefore assume without deciding that the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consists entirely of predicate offenses that were either committed in the United States or committed in a foreign country in violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritori ally. The alleged enterprise also has a sufficient tie to U. S. commerce, as its members include U. S. companies, and its activities depend on sales of RJR’s cigarettes con ducted through “the U. S. mails and wires,” among other things. App. to Pet. for Cert. 186a, Complaint ¶96. On these premises, respondents’ allegations that RJR violated §(b) and (c) do not involve an impermissibly extra territorial application of RICO.8 IV We now turn to RICO’s private right of action, on which respondents’ lawsuit rests. Section 1964(c) allows “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” to sue for treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Irrespective of any extraterritorial application of we conclude that does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. A private RICO plaintiff therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property. A The Second Circuit thought that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to inde pendently of its application to reasoning that the —————— 8 We stress that we are addressing only the extraterritoriality ques tion. We have not been asked to decide, and therefore do not decide, whether the complaint satisfies any other requirements of RICO, or whether the complaint in fact makes out violations of the relevant predicate statutes. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 19 Opinion of the Court presumption “is primarily concerned with the question of what conduct falls within a statute’s purview.” 764 F.3d, We rejected that view in Kiobel, holding that the presumption “constrain[s] courts considering causes of action” under the ATS, a “ ‘strictly jurisdictional’ ” statute that “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief.” 569 U. S., at (slip op., at 5). We reached this conclu sion even though the underlying substantive law consisted of well-established norms of international law, |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | underlying substantive law consisted of well-established norms of international law, which by definition apply beyond this country’s borders. See at – (slip op., at 5–7). The same logic requires that we separately apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibi tions. “The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the mere consideration whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision to permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.” Thus, as we have observed in other contexts, providing a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond that presented by merely applying U. S. substantive law to that foreign conduct. See, e.g., Kiobel, at (slip op., at 6) (“Each of th[e] decisions” involved in defining a cause of action based on “conduct within the territory of another sovereign” “carries with it significant foreign policy implications”). Consider antitrust. In that context, we have observed that “[t]he application of American private treble- damages remedies to anticompetitive conduct taking place abroad has generated considerable controversy” in other nations, even when those nations agree with U. S. sub stantive law on such things as banning price fixing. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. S. A., 542 U.S. 20 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court 155, 167 Numerous foreign countries—including some respondents in this case—advised us in that “to apply [U. S.] remedies would unjustifiably permit their citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance of competing consid erations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody.” 9 We received similar warnings in where France, a respondent here, informed us that “most foreign countries proscribe securities fraud” but “have made very —————— 9 See Brief for Governments of Federal Republic of Germany et al. as Amici Curiae, O. T. 2003, No. 03–724, p. 11 (identifying “controversial features of the U. S. legal system,” including treble damages, extensive discovery, jury trials, class actions, contingency fees, and punitive damages); (“Private plaintiffs rarely exercise the type of self- restraint or demonstrate the requisite sensitivity to the concerns of foreign governments that mark actions brought by the United States government”); Brief for United Kingdom et al. as Amici Curiae, O. T. 2003, No. 03–724, p. 13 (“No other country has adopted the United States’ unique ‘bounty hunter’ approach that permits a private plaintiff to ‘recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.’ Expanding the jurisdiction of this generous United States private claim system could skew enforce ment and increase international business risks. It makes United States courts the forum of choice without regard to whose laws are applied, where the injuries occurred or even if there is any connection to the court except the ability to get in personam jurisdiction over the defendants”); see also Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 2003, No. 03–724, p. 14 (“[T]he attractiveness of the [U. S.] treble damages remedy would supersede the national policy decision by Canada that civil recovery by Canadian citizens for injuries resulting from anti-competitive behavior in Canada should be limited to actual damages”). concerned not the presumption against extraterritoriality per se, but the related rule that we construe statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with other nations’ sovereign authority where possible. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche ; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, (dis cussing the two canons). As the foregoing discussion makes clear, considerations relevant to one rule are often relevant to the other. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 21 Opinion of the Court different choices with respect to the best way to implement that proscription,” such as “prefer[ring] ‘state actions, not private ones’ for the enforcement of law.” Brief for Repub lic of France as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 2009, No. 08–1191, p. 20; see (“Even when foreign countries permit private rights of action for securities fraud, they often have different schemes” for litigating them and “may approve of different measures of damages”). Allowing foreign investors to pursue private suits in the United States, we were told, “would upset that delicate balance and offend the sovereign interests of foreign nations.” at 26. Allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO action, including treble damages, presents the same dan ger of international friction. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31–34. This is not to say that friction would necessarily result in every case, or that Congress would violate international law by permitting such suits. It is to say only that there is a potential for international controversy that militates against recognizing foreign- injury claims without clear direction from Congress. Although “a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law” is not a prerequisite for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, 561 U.S., at where such a risk is evident, the need to enforce the presumption is at its apex. Respondents urge that concerns about international friction are inapplicable in this |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | urge that concerns about international friction are inapplicable in this case because here the plaintiffs are not foreign citizens seeking to bypass their home countries’ less generous remedies but rather the foreign countries themselves. Brief for Respondents 52– 53. Respondents assure us that they “are satisfied that the[ir] complaint comports with limitations on pre scriptive jurisdiction under international law and respects the dignity of foreign sovereigns.” Even assuming that this is true, however, our interpretation of ’s 22 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court injury requirement will necessarily govern suits by non governmental plaintiffs that are not so sensitive to foreign sovereigns’ dignity. We reject the notion that we should forgo the presumption against extraterritoriality and instead permit extraterritorial suits based on a case-by case inquiry that turns on or looks to the consent of the affected sovereign. See (“Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases”); cf. Respond ents suggest that we should be reluctant to permit a for eign corporation to be sued in the courts of this country for events occurring abroad if the nation of incorporation objects, but that we should discard those reservations when a foreign state sues a U. S. entity in this country under U. S. law—instead of in its own courts and under its own laws—for conduct committed on its own soil. We refuse to adopt this double standard. “After all, in the law, what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.” Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 6). B Nothing in provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the United States. The statute provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a violation of The word “any” ordinarily connotes breadth, but it is insufficient to displace the presumption against extrater ritoriality. See Kiobel, 569 U. S., at (slip op., at 7). The statute’s reference to injury to “business or property” also does not indicate extraterritorial application. If anything, by cabining RICO’s private cause of action to particular kinds of injury—excluding, for example, per sonal injuries—Congress signaled that the civil remedy is not coextensive with ’s substantive prohibitions. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 23 Opinion of the Court The rest of places a limit on RICO plaintiffs’ ability to rely on securities fraud to make out a claim. This too suggests that is narrower in its applica tion than and in any |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | is narrower in its applica tion than and in any event does not support extra territoriality. The Second Circuit did not identify anything in that shows that the statute reaches foreign injuries. Instead, the court reasoned that ’s extraterritorial effect flows directly from that of Citing our holding in S. P. R. that the “compensable injury” addressed by “nec essarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern,” the Court of Appeals held that a RICO plaintiff may sue for foreign injury that was caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially, just as a substan tive RICO violation may be based on extraterritorial pred 764 F.3d, JUSTICE GINSBURG advances the same theory. See post, at 4–5 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This reasoning has surface ap peal, but it fails to appreciate that the presumption against extraterritoriality must be applied separately to both RICO’s substantive prohibitions and its private right of action. See at 18–22. It is not enough to say that a private right of action must reach abroad because the underlying law governs conduct in foreign countries. Something more is needed, and here it is absent.10 Respondents contend that background legal principles allow them to sue for foreign injuries, invoking what they call the “ ‘traditional rule’ that ‘a plaintiff injured in a foreign country’ could bring suit ‘in American courts.’ ” —————— 10 Respondents note that itself involved an injury suffered by a Belgian corporation in Belgium. Brief for Respondents 45–46; see S. P. R. Re spondents correctly do not contend that this fact is controlling here, as the Court did not address the foreign-injury issue. 24 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court Brief for Respondents 41 (quoting – 707). But the rule respondents invoke actually provides that a court will ordinarily “apply foreign law to determine the tortfeasor’s liability” to “a plaintiff injured in a foreign country.” Respondents’ argument might have force if they sought to sue RJR for violations of their own laws and to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction as a basis for proceeding in U. S. courts. See U. S. Const., Art. III, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to Controversies be tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States”); 28 U.S. C. §2(a)(4) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and is between a foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a State or |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States”). The question here, however, is not “whether a federal court has jurisdic tion to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U. S. law” for injury suffered overseas. Kiobel, at (slip op., at 8) As to that question, the relevant background principle is the pre sumption against extraterritoriality, not the “traditional rule” respondents cite. Respondents and JUSTICE GINSBURG point out that RICO’s private right of action was modeled after of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. see which we have held allows recovery for injuries suffered abroad as a result of antitrust violations, see 314–315 It follows, respondents and JUSTICE GINSBURG contend, that likewise allows plaintiffs to sue for injuries suffered in foreign countries. We disagree. Al- though we have often looked to the Clayton Act for guid Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 25 Opinion of the Court ance in construing we have not treated the two statutes as interchangeable. We have declined to trans plant features of the Clayton Act’s cause of action into the RICO context where doing so would be inappropriate. For example, in we held that a RICO plaintiff need not allege a special “racketeering injury,” rejecting a require ment that some lower courts had adopted by “[a]nalog[y]” to the “antitrust injury” required under the Clayton Act. There is good reason not to interpret to cover foreign injuries just because the Clayton Act does so. When we held in that the Clayton Act allows recov ery for foreign injuries, we relied first and foremost on the fact that the Clayton Act’s definition of “person”—which in turn defines who may sue under that Act—“explicitly includes ‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of any foreign country.’ ” 434 U.S., at 313; see 15 U.S. C. RICO lacks the lan guage that the Court found critical. See 18 U.S. C. To the extent that the Court cited other —————— 11 most directly concerned whether a foreign government is a “person” that may be a Clayton Act plaintiff. But it is clear that the Court’s decision more broadly concerned recovery for foreign injuries, see (expressing concern that “persons doing business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into anti competitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expecta tion that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home”), as respondents |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home”), as respondents themselves contend, see Brief for Respondents 44 (“[T]his Court clearly recognized in that Section 4 extends to foreign injuries”). The Court also permitted an antitrust plaintiff to sue for foreign injuries in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., but the Court’s discussion in that case focused on the extraterritoriality of the underly ing antitrust prohibitions, not the Clayton Act’s private right of action, see at 704–705, and so sheds little light on the interpretive question now before us. 12 This does not mean that foreign plaintiffs may not sue under RICO. The point is that RICO does not include the explicit foreign-oriented 26 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court factors that might apply to they were not suffi cient in themselves to show that the provision has extra territorial effect. For example, the Court, writing before we honed our extraterritoriality jurisprudence in and Kiobel, reasoned that Congress “[c]learly did not intend to make the [Clayton Act’s] treble-damages remedy available only to consumers in our own country” because “the antitrust laws extend to trade ‘with foreign nations’ as well as among the several States of the Union.” –314. But we have emphatically rejected reliance on such language, holding that “ ‘even statutes that expressly refer to “foreign commerce” do not apply abroad.’ ” –263. This reasoning also fails to distinguish between extending substantive antitrust law to foreign conduct and extending a private right of action to foreign injuries, two separate issues that, as we have explained, raise distinct extraterritoriality problems. See at 18–22. Finally, the Court expressed concern that it would “defeat th[e] purposes” of the antitrust laws if a defendant could “escape full liability for his illegal actions.” But this justifi cation was merely an attempt to “divin[e] what Congress would have wanted” had it considered the question of extraterritoriality—an approach we eschewed in 561 U.S., Given all this, and in particular the fact that RICO lacks the language that found integral to its decision, we decline to extend this aspect of our Clayton Act jurisprudence to RICO’s cause of action. Underscoring our reluctance to read as broadly as we have read the Clayton Act is Congress’s more recent decision to define precisely the antitrust laws’ extraterri torial effect and to exclude from their reach most conduct that “causes only foreign injury.” 542 U. S., at —————— language that the Court found to support foreign-injury suits under the Clayton Act. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 27 Opinion of the Court 158 (describing |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | U. S. (2016) 27 Opinion of the Court 158 (describing Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982); see also at 169–171, 173–174 (discussing how the applicability of the antitrust laws to foreign inju ries may depend on whether suit is brought by the Gov ernment or by private plaintiffs). Although this later enactment obviously does not limit ’s scope by its own force, it does counsel against importing into RICO those Clayton Act principles that are at odds with our current extraterritoriality doctrine. C Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries. The applica tion of this rule in any given case will not always be self- evident, as disputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged injury is “foreign” or “domestic.” But we need not concern ourselves with that question in this case. As this case was being briefed before this Court, respondents filed a stipulation in the District Court waiving their damages claims for domestic injuries. The District Court accepted this waiver and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Respondents’ remaining RICO damages claims there fore rest entirely on injury suffered abroad and must be dismissed.13 —————— 13 In respondents’ letter notifying this Court of the waiver of their domestic-injury damages claims, respondents state that “[n]othing in the stipulation will affect respondents’ claims for equitable relief, including claims for equitable relief under state common law that are not at issue in this case before this Court.” Letter from David C. Frederick, Counsel for Respondents, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Feb. 29, 2016). Although the letter mentions only state-law claims for equitable relief, Count 5 of respondents’ complaint seeks equitable relief under RICO. App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a–262a, Complaint ¶¶181– 188. This Court has never decided whether equitable relief is available to private RICO plaintiffs, the parties have not litigated that question here, and we express no opinion on the issue today. We note, however, 28 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court * * * The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. —————— that any claim for equitable relief under RICO based on foreign injuries is necessarily foreclosed by our holding that ’s cause of action requires a domestic injury to business or property. It is unclear whether respondents |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | injury to business or property. It is unclear whether respondents intend to seek equitable relief under RICO based on domestic injuries, and it may prove unnecessary to decide whether (or respondents’ stipulation) permits such relief in light of respondents’ state-law claims. We leave it to the lower courts to determine, if necessary, the status and availability of any such claims. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 1 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–138 RJR NABISCO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [June 20, 2016] JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring in Parts I, II, and III and dissenting from Part IV and from the judgment. In enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. et seq., Congress sought to provide a new tool to combat “organized crime and its economic roots.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983). RICO accordingly proscribes various ways in which an “enterprise,” might be con- trolled, operated, or funded by a “pattern of racketeering activity,” (1), (5). See1 RICO builds on predi- cate statutes, many of them applicable extraterritorially. App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27a–33a. Congress not only armed the United States with authority to initiate criminal and civil proceedings to enforce RICO, 1964(b), Congress also created in a pri- vate right of action for “[a]ny person injured in his busi- ness or property by reason of a violation of [RICO’s sub- —————— 1 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. et seq., makes it unlawful “to invest” in an enterprise income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, (a), “to acquire or maintain” an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, (b), “to conduct or participate in the conduct” of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, (c), or “to conspire” to violate any of those provisions, (d). 2 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of GINSBURG, J. stantive provision].” Invoking this right, respondents, the European Com- munity and 26 member states, filed suit against petition- ers, RJR Nabisco, Inc., and related entities. Alleging that petitioners orchestrated from their U. S. headquarters a complex money-laundering scheme in violation of RICO, respondents sought to recover for various injuries, includ- ing losses sustained by financial institutions and lost opportunities to collect duties. See ante, at 4–7. Denying respondents a remedy under RICO, the Court today reads into |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | respondents a remedy under RICO, the Court today reads into a domestic-injury requirement for suits by private plaintiffs nowhere indicated in the statute’s text. Correctly, the Court imposes no such restriction on the United States when it initiates a civil suit under Unsupported by RICO’s text, inconsistent with its pur- poses, and unnecessary to protect the comity interests the Court emphasizes, the domestic-injury requirement for private suits replaces Congress’ prescription with one of the Court’s own invention. Because the Court has no authority so to amend RICO, I dissent. I As the Court recounts, ante, at 7, “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters.” v. National Australia Bank Ltd., So recognizing, the Court employs a presump- tion that “ ‘legislation is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ ” ()). But when a statute demonstrates Con- gress’ “affirmative inten[t]” that the law should apply beyond the borders of the United States, as numerous RICO predicate statutes do, the presumption is rebutted, and the law applies extraterritorially to the extent Con- gress prescribed. See 561 U.S., at (quoting 499 U.S., at ). The presumption, in short, Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. aims to distinguish instances in which Congress con- sciously designed a statute to reach beyond U. S. borders, from those in which nothing plainly signals that Congress directed extraterritorial application. In this case, the Court properly holds that Congress signaled its “affirmative inten[t],” 561 U.S., at that RICO, in many instances, should apply extrater- ritorially. See ante, at 10–18; App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27a–33a. As the Court relates, see ante, at 10–14, Congress deliberately included within RICO’s compass predicate federal offenses that manifestly reach conduct occurring abroad. See, e.g., (money laundering); (material support to foreign terrorist organizations). Accordingly, the Court concludes, when the predicate crimes underlying invocation of thrust extraterritorially, so too does I agree with that conclusion. I disagree, however, that the private right of action authorized by requires a domestic injury to a person’s business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries. One cannot extract such a limitation from the text of which affords a right of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” Section 1962, at least sub- sections (b) and (c), all agree, encompasses foreign inju- ries. How can exclude them when, by its express terms, is triggered by “a violation of section 1962”? To the extent RICO reaches injury abroad when the |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | 1962”? To the extent RICO reaches injury abroad when the Government is the suitor pursuant to (specify- ing prohibited activities) and (criminal penalties) or (civil remedies), to that same extent, I would hold, RICO reaches extraterritorial injury when, pursuant to the suitor is a private plaintiff. 4 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of GINSBURG, J. II A I would not distinguish, as the Court does, between the extraterritorial compass of a private right of action and that of the underlying proscribed conduct. See ante, at 18–22, 23, 26. Instead, I would adhere to precedent ad- dressing RICO, linking, not separating, prohibited activi- ties and authorized remedies. See S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., (“If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [], and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under ”); (refusing to require a “dis- tinct ‘racketeering injury’ ” for private RICO actions under where imposes no such requirement).2 To reiterate, a right of action may be main- tained by “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” “[I]ncorporating one statute into another,” the Court has long understood, “serves to bring into the latter all that is fairly covered by the reference.” Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, RICO’s private right of action, it cannot be gainsaid, expressly incorporates whose extraterritoriality, the Court recognizes, is coextensive with the underlying predicate offenses —————— 2 Insisting that the presumption against extraterritoriality should “apply to independently of its application to” ante, at 18–19, the Court cites Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. (2013). That decision will not bear the weight the Court would place on it. As the Court comprehends, the statute there at issue, the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S. C. is a spare jurisdictional grant that itself does not “regulate conduct or afford relief.” Kiobel, 569 U. S., at (slip op., at 5). With no grounding for extraterritorial application in the statute, Kiobel held, courts have no warrant to fashion, on their own initiative, claims for relief that operate extraterritorially. See (“[T]he question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”). Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. charged. See ante, at 10–18. See also ante, at 12 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how Congress could have more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some) extraterri- torial effect.”). The sole additional condition imposes on access to relief is an injury |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | additional condition imposes on access to relief is an injury to one’s “business or property.” Nothing in that condition should change the extraterritoriality assessment. In agreement with the Second Circuit, I would hold that “[i]f an injury abroad was proximately caused by the violation of a statute which Congress intended should apply to injurious conduct performed abroad, [there is] no reason to import a domes- tic injury requirement simply because the victim sought redress through the RICO statute.” What ’s text conveys is confirmed by its history. As this Court has repeatedly observed, Congress modeled on of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. the private civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, which employs nearly identical language: “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there- for.” See 189– 190 (1997); ; 473 U.S., at 485, 489. Clayton Act the Court has held, provides a remedy for injuries both foreign and domestic. (“Congress did not intend to make the [Clayton Act’s] treble-damages remedy available only to consumers in our own country.”); Continental Ore (allowing recovery in Clayton Act suit for injuries in Canada). “The similarity of language in [the two statutes] is, of course, a strong indication that [they] should be interpreted pari passu,” and I see 6 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of GINSBURG, J. no contradictory indication here.3 Indeed, when the Court has addressed gaps in it has aligned the RICO private right of action with the private right afforded by Clayton Act See, e.g., –189 (adopting for private RICO actions Clayton Act ’s ac- crual rule—that a claim accrues when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff ’s business—rather than criminal RICO’s “most recent, predicate act” rule); Holmes, (requiring private plaintiffs under like private plaintiffs under Clayton Act to show proximate cause); Agency Holding (applying to actions Clayton Act ’s shorter statute of limitations instead of “catchall” federal statute of limitations applicable to RICO criminal prosecutions). This very case illustrates why pinning a domestic-injury requirement onto makes little sense. All defend- ants are U. S. corporations, headquartered in the United States, charged with a pattern of racketeering activity directed and managed from the United States, involving —————— 3 TheCourt asserts that “[t]here is good reason not to interpret to cover foreign injuries just because the Clayton Act does.” Ante, at 25. The Clayton Act’s definition of “person,” 15 U.S. C. the Court observes, “explicitly includes ‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of any foreign country.’ |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | under or authorized by the laws of any foreign country.’ ” Ante, at 25 (some internal quotation marks omitted). RICO, the Court stresses, lacks this “critical” language. The Court’s point is underwhelming. RICO’s definition of “persons” is hardly confining: “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” 18 U.S. C. (3). Moreover, there is little doubt that Congress anticipated plaintiffs like the suitors here. See 147 Cong. Rec. 20676, 20710 (2001) (remarks of Sen. Kerry) (“Since some of the money-laundering conducted in the world today also defrauds foreign governments, it would be hostile to the intent of [the USA PATRIOT Act, which added as RICO predicates additional money laundering offenses,] for us to interject into the statute any rule of construction of legislative language which would in any way limit our foreign allies access to our courts to battle against money laundering.”). Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. conduct occurring in the United States. In particular, according to the complaint, defendants received in the United States funds known to them to have been gener- ated by illegal narcotics trafficking and terrorist activity, conduct violative of traveled using the facili- ties of interstate commerce in furtherance of unlawful activity, in violation of provided material support to foreign terrorist organizations “in the United States and elsewhere,” in violation of ; and used U. S. mails and wires in furtherance of a “scheme or artifice to de- fraud,” in violation of and 1343. App. to Pet. for Cert. 238a–250a. In short, this case has the United States written all over it. B The Court nevertheless deems a domestic-injury re- quirement for private RICO plaintiffs necessary to avoid international friction. See ante, at 20–22. When the United States considers whether to initiate a prosecution or civil suit, the Court observes, it will take foreign-policy considerations into account, but private parties will It is far from clear, however, that the Court’s blanket rule would ordinarily work to ward off international discord. Invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality as a bar to any private suit for injuries to business or property abroad, this case suggests, might spark, rather than quell, international strife. Making such litigation available to domestic but not foreign plaintiffs is hardly solicitous of international comity or respectful of foreign interests. Cf. –319 (“[A] foreign nation is gener- ally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do. To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). RICO’s definitional provisions exclude “[e]ntirely foreign 8 RJR NABISCO, (Lynch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Thus no suit under RICO would lie for injuries resulting from “[a] pattern of mur- ders of Italian citizens committed by members of an Ital- ian organized crime group in Italy.” That is so because “murder is a RICO predicate only when it is ‘chargeable under state law’ or indictable under specific federal statutes.” (citing (G)). To the extent extraterritorial application of RICO could give rise to comity concerns not present in this case, those concerns can be met through doctrines that serve to block litigation in U. S. courts of cases more appropriately brought elsewhere. Where an alternative, more appropri- ate forum is available, the doctrine of forum non conven- iens enables U. S. courts to refuse jurisdiction. See Piper Aircraft (dismissing wrongful-death action arising out of air crash in Scotland involving only Scottish victims); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1969). Due process constraints on the exercise of general personal jurisdiction shelter foreign corporations from suit in the United States based on conduct abroad unless the corporation’s “affiliations with the [forum] in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render it essentially at home [there].’ ” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. – (slip op., at 2–3) ; alterations omitted). These controls provide a check against civil RICO litigation with little or no connection to the United States. * * * The Court hems in RICO out of concern about establish- ing a “double standard.” Ante, at 22. But today’s decision does exactly that. U. S. defendants commercially engaged here and abroad would be answerable civilly to U. S. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. victims of their criminal activities, but foreign parties similarly injured would have no RICO remedy. “ ‘Sauce for the goose’ ” should indeed serve the gander as well. See (quoting Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 6)). I would resist reading into a domestic-injury requirement Congress did not prescribe. Instead, I would affirm the Second Circuit’s sound judgment: “To establish a compensable injury under a private plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant ‘en- gage[d] in a pattern of racketeering activity in a man- ner forbidden by’ and (2) that these ‘racketeer- ing activities’ were the proximate cause of some injury to the plaintiff ’s business or property.” 764 F.3d, at |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3214884/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-european-community/ | to the plaintiff ’s business or property.” 764 F.3d, at (quoting 473 U.S., at ; U.S., at 268)). Because the Court overturns that judgment, I dissent. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 1 Opinion of BREYER, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–138 RJR NABISCO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [June 20, 2016] JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment. I join Parts I through III of the Court’s opinion. But I do not join Part IV. The Court there holds that the private right of action provision in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. has no extraterritorial application. Like JUSTICE GINSBURG, I believe that it does. In saying this, I note that this case does not involve the kind of purely foreign facts that create what we have sometimes called “foreign-cubed” litigation (i.e., cases where the plaintiffs are foreign, the defendants are for- eign, and all the relevant conduct occurred abroad). See, e.g., v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283, n. 11 (Stevens, J., concurring in judg- ment). Rather, it has been argued that the statute at issue does not extend to such a case. See 18 U.S. C. (1) (limiting qualifying RICO predicates to those that are, e.g., “chargeable” under state law, or “indictable” or “punishable” under federal law); Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, 33– 34 (respondents conceding that all of the relevant RICO predicates require some kind of connection to the United States). And, as JUSTICE GINSBURG points out, “this case has the United States written all over it.” Ante, at 7 (opin- ion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting 2 RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Opinion of BREYER, J. from judgment). Unlike the Court, I cannot accept as controlling the Government’s argument as amicus curiae that “[a]llowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO action presents the danger of international friction.” Ante, at 21. The Government does not provide examples, nor apparently has it consulted with foreign governments on the matter. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26 (“[T]o my knowledge, [the Government] didn’t have those consultations” with foreign states concerning this case). By way of contrast, the European Community and 26 of its member states tell us “that the complaint in this case, which alleges that American corporations engaged in a pattern of racketeer- ing activity that caused injury to respondents’ businesses and property, comports with limitations on |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | US Ind./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110669/us-indfed-sheet-metal-inc-v-director-owcp/ | In the early morning of November 20, 1975, respondent Ralph Riley awoke with severe pains in his neck, shoulders, and arms, which ler were tributed by physicians to an exacerbion of an arthritic condition. The United Stes Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held th this "injury" was sufficient to invoke the "stutory presumption of compensability,"[1] 20(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compension Act, 44 St. (part 2) 1436, 33 U.S. C. 920(a), and vaced the administrive denial of disability benefits. We granted certiorari, and we now reverse. *610 Contending th he was permanently and totally disabled by the arthritic condition,[2] Riley's retained counsel filed with the Deputy Commissioner a claim for compension under the Act. See 33 U.S. C. 913. On standard form LS-203, in response to the direction to "[d]escribe in full how the accident occurred,"[3] Riley wrote th on November 19, 1975, he was "[l]ifting duct work with co-worker, weighing approximely 500 pounds, felt sharp pain in neck and s down." App. 111. An evidentiary hearing was convened before an Administrive Law Judge. After construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Riley and resolving all doubts in his favor, the Administrive Law Judge found "th Claimant sustained no injury within the meaning of Sec. 2(2) of the Act on November 19, 1975, as alleged, and th Claimant and Sutherland [Riley's co-worker] gave false testimony as to the happening of the accident." App. to Pet. for Cert. 24A. A divided panel of the Benefits Review Board affirmed the denial of disability benefits, holding th the Administrive Law Judge's findings were supported by substantial evidence. In dissent, Member Miller sted: "The Act does not require th claimant prove an accident in order to establish a claim. To the contrary, compension is payable under the Act if claimant is disabled because of injury which is causally reled to his employment. 33 U.S. C. 902(10), 902(2)." 9 BRBS 936, 940 (1979) (emphasis in original). *611 Member Miller defined an injury as "something go[ne] wrong within the human frame." Riley suffered such an injury when he awoke on November 20 with severe pain. Therefore, Member Miller would have remanded the case for a determinion of "the real issue in this case," which "is not whether claimant sustained an accident work but whether claimant's injury is causally reled to his employment." Th determinion was to be made in light of the 20(a) presumption, which "places the burden on employer to prove by substantial evidence th claimant's injury did not arise out of or in the course of |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | US Ind./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110669/us-indfed-sheet-metal-inc-v-director-owcp/ | did not arise out of or in the course of employment." On Riley's petition for review, the Court of Appeals vaced the decision of the Benefits Review Board, agreeing with Member Miller's position. Riley v. U. S. Industries/Federal Sheet Metal, Inc., 200 U. S. App. D. C. 402, The court sted th "it can hardly be disputed th petitioner suffered an `injury' when he awakened in pain on November 20, 1975." The court then turned its "tention to the stutory presumption and the range of situions to which this Court has applied it." It construed its earlier cases as holding "th an injury need not have occurred during working hours" and "need not be traceable to any particular work-reled incident to be compensable." -, -459.[4] "The foregoing cases make clear the pervasive scope of the stutory presumption of compensability. Indeed, no decision of this Court has ever failed to apply the presumption *612 to any facet of any claim before it. We now hold expressly th where a claimant has been injured, the Act requires th, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a claimant be given the benefit of a rebuttable presumption th the injury arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment." The question for remand was not whether Riley's "injury" stemmed from a "work-reled incident," but whether it was " `employment-bred.' " The Court of Appeals erred because it overlooked (1) the stutory language th reles the 20(a) presumption to the employee's claim, and (2) the stutory definition of the term "injury." I The Court of Appeals' first error was its invocion of the 20(a) presumption in support of a claim th was not made by Riley. Riley claimed th he suffered an injury work on November 19 when he was lifting duct work and felt a sharp pain in his neck. The Administrive Law Judge found as a mter of fact th the accident had not occurred; this finding is no longer challenged. The Court of Appeals' theory of recovery was th Riley suffered an injury home in bed on November 20 and th Riley was entitled to a presumption th this injury was "employment-bred." Section 20(a), 44 St. (part 2) 1436, provides th "[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compension under this Act it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary [t]h the claim comes within the provisions of this Act." The coverage of the presumption is debable,[5] but one thing is clear: the presumption *613 applies to the claim. Even |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | US Ind./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110669/us-indfed-sheet-metal-inc-v-director-owcp/ | is clear: the presumption *613 applies to the claim. Even if a claimant has an unfettered right to amend his claim to conform to the proof, the presumption by its terms cannot apply to a claim th has never been made. Section 13 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. 913, provides th a claimant must timely file a claim with the Deputy Commissioner. The content of the claim is not specified in th section. But 12(b), 33 U.S. C. 912(b), requires th the claimant timely give the Deputy Commissioner and his employer notice of his injury, and provides further th "[s]uch notice shall contain a stement of the time, place, nure, and cause of the injury."[6] The claim, like the notice required by 12 and like the pleadings required in any type of litigion, serves the purposes of notifying the adverse party of the allegions and of confining the issues to be tried and adjudiced.[7] *614 In Riley's claim, he alleged th he suffered an accidental injury in the course of his employment on November 19. No claim has ever been made th the "injury" occurred home and th it was somehow "employment-bred." Even if such a vague claim sted a prima facie case of compensability, the stutory presumption does not require the administrive law judge to address and the employer to rebut every conceivable theory of recovery. At least when the claimant is represented by counsel,[8] as Riley was, there is no reason to depart from the specific stutory direction th a claim be *615 made and th the presumption, however construed, tach to the claim. II The Court of Appeals' second error was its incorrect use of the term "injury." The court sted th Riley's tack of pain in the early morning of November 20 was an "injury" compensable under the Act if the employer did not disprove by substantial evidence th the "injury" was "employment-bred." The fact th " `something unexpectedly goes wrong with the human frame,' " 200 U. S. App. D. C., ), however, does not establish an "injury" within the meaning of the Act. The mere existence of a physical impairment is plainly insufficient to shift the burden of proof to the employer. Section 3(a) provides th "[c]ompension shall be payable under this Act in respect of disability of an employee, but only if the disability results from an injury." 44 St. (part 2) 1426, as amended, 33 U.S. C. 903(a). Injury is defined as an "accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment." 33 U.S. C. 902(2). Arising "out of" |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | US Ind./Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110669/us-indfed-sheet-metal-inc-v-director-owcp/ | course of employment." 33 U.S. C. 902(2). Arising "out of" and "in the course of" employment are separe elements: the former refers to injury causion; the lter refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury.[9] Not only must the injury have been caused by the employment, it also must have arisen during the employment. A prima facie "claim for compension," to which the stutory presumption refers, must least allege an injury th arose in the course of employment as well as out of employment.[10] The "injury" noticed by the Court of Appeals, however, *616 arose in bed, not in the course of employment. Even if the Court of Appeals simply mislabeled the early morning tack of pain as the "injury" itself rher than as a manifestion of an earlier injury, the claim envisioned by the Court of Appeals did not allege any facts th would establish th Riley suffered an injury th arose in the course of employment. The stutory presumption is no substitute for the allegions necessary to ste a prima facie case. III Riley's claim sted a prima facie case of compensability; if the Administrive Law Judge had believed Riley's allegions, he would have found th Riley's tack of pain in the early morning of November 20 was caused by an injury suffered when Riley was lifting duct work on the job on November 19. The judge, however, disbelieved Riley's allegions and marshaled substantial evidence to support his findings. The stutory presumption did not require him to adjudice any claim th was not made, and the Court of Appeals erred in remanding for th purpose. Nor could the stutory presumption have aided Riley had he made the claim envisioned by the Court of Appeals th he suffered an "injury" home for such a claim omits the requirement th a compensable injury arise in the course of employment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the considerion or decision of this case. |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109810/united-states-v-sheffield-bd-of-commrs/ | The principal question presented by this case is whether the city of Sheffield, Ala., is covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.[1] If that question could be answered solely by reference to the Act's broad remedial purposes, it might be an easy one. But on the basis of the statute as written, the question is not nearly as simple as the Court implies. I believe it requires two separate inquiries: First, whether the city of Sheffield is a "political subdivision" within the meaning of 5; and second, even if that question is answered in the negative, whether action by the city should *141 be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of that section. I Briefly stated, 5 provides that whenever a State or a political subdivision, designated pursuant to 4, seeks to change a voting practice, it must obtain clearance for that change from either the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General of the United States.[2] This so-called "preclearance" requirement is one of the most extraordinary remedial provisions in an Act noted for its broad remedies. Even the Department of Justice has described it as a "substantial departure from ordinary concepts of our federal system";[3] its encroachment on state sovereignty is significant and undeniable. The section must, therefore, be read and interpreted with care. As a starting point, it is clear that it applies only to actions taken by two types of political unitsStates or political subdivisions. Since Alabama is a designated State under 4, "each and every political subdivision within that State" is covered by 5. See H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1965). This does not, however, mean that the city of Sheffield is a "political subdivision" of Alabama covered by 5. For the Act specifically defines "political subdivision," and that definition does not even arguably include an entity such as Sheffield. Section 14 (c) (2) of the Act provides: "The term `political subdivision' shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not *142 conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting." Sheffield is not a county or a parish, and it does not conduct registration for voting. Consequently, it is not a "political subdivision."[4] The legislative history of 14 (c) (2) demonstrates that the term "political subdivision" was defined for the specific purpose of limiting the coverage of the Act. Because the term had not been defined in the |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109810/united-states-v-sheffield-bd-of-commrs/ | Act. Because the term had not been defined in the bill as originally drafted, Senator Ervin, among others, recognized that it might be read to encompass minor, local governmental units. It was to allay this concern that the definition was included in the Act. "Senator ERVIN. This [an early version of the Voting Rights Act] not only applies to a State, but this would apply to any little election district in the State "Attorney General KATZENBACH. I do not believe so, Senator. There is a question as to what the term `political subdivision' means. I have taken the view in the other body and I would state it here that we are talking about the area in which people are registered, the appropriate unit for registering. I believe in every State *143 that comes within the provisions of this, we are talking about no area smaller than a county or a parish. "Senator ERVIN. Do you not think that you had better amend your bill to so provide, because in North Carolina, every municipality is a political subdivision of the State, even every sanitary district is a subdivision of the State. Also every election district is a subdivision of the State, every school district every special bond, school-bond, district is a subdivision of the State. "Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think that might be done to define political subdivision here in the bill in that way, Senator. That is what I intended." Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1965) (1965 Senate Hearings). See also Hearings on H. R. 6400 before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1965) (1965 House Hearings). Later, during the Senate debate on the Voting Rights Act, Senator Ervin referred to the above dialogue with Attorney General Katzenbach and stated, without contradiction, that the term "political subdivision" had been defined to avoid a construction of the Act that would "confer jurisdiction upon the Federal Government to intervene in every ward of every city and town covered by the bill." 111 Cong. Rec. 9270 (1965). The Senate Report on the Voting Rights Act made the same point equally bluntly: "This definition makes clear that the term `political subdivision' is not intended to encompass precincts, election districts, or other similar units when they are within a county or parish which supervises registration for voting." S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1965).[5] *144 In short, whatever other ambiguities there may be in the Act, the definition of |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109810/united-states-v-sheffield-bd-of-commrs/ | ambiguities there may be in the Act, the definition of "political subdivision" is not one of them. It was clearly intended to limit the reach of the Act, and the definition clearly excludes cities, such as Sheffield, that do not register voters. II The remaining question is whether a political unit that does not register voters may be regarded as the "State," as that term is used in 5. If there were no contrary legislative history, it might be reasonable to treat the action of entities such as Sheffield, which are within the jurisdiction of a covered State, as "state action," just as such governmental action would be regarded as state action in a constitutional sense. However, such an interpretation of the word "State" would extend the reach of the statute to the same kind of purely local matters that Congress intended to exclude by defining the term "political subdivision." As is apparent from the comments of Senator Ervin, there was congressional concern over whether the Act would extend to governmental units below the county level. That concern was repeatedly expressed and was specifically addressed in 14 (c) (2). Unquestionably, as the Court recognizes, ante, at 128-129, that section protects small political units, such as school boards, from being separately designated for coverage under 4 (b). The concerns which motivated this exclusion from 4 (b) apply equally to 5.[6] Indeed, the *145 legislative history provides a perfectly logical explanation of why Congress deliberately limited the reach of 5, as well as 4 (b), to "political subdivisions," as defined by the Act. First, a preclearance requirement limited to governmental units engaged in the registration process would be in accord with the fact that the Act was principally concerned with literacy tests and other devices which were being used to prevent black citizens from registering to vote. As Attorney General Katzenbach repeatedly emphasized, the "bill really is aimed at getting people registered." See 1965 House Hearings 21.[7] *146 Second, the Act limits judicial review of an election change under 5 to a three-judge District Court sitting in the District of Columbia. The opponents of the Act frequently expressed their outrage at this limitation, arguing that it was unfair to make people travel "250 or 1,000 or 3,000 miles in order to gain access to a court of justice." See, e. g., 1965 Senate Hearings 43 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 111 Cong. Rec. 10371 (remarks of Sen. Ellender) (1965). Proponents of 5 justified the provision on the ground that it would not be difficult or unusual for a State, county, or comparable body |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109810/united-states-v-sheffield-bd-of-commrs/ | difficult or unusual for a State, county, or comparable body to have to make its arguments in Washington, D. C. See, e. g., Senate Hearing 44 (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach). Senator Javits' comments on the floor of the Senate are typical of this line of argument. "Finally, it cannot be claimed that the bill is unfair to litigants other than the Federal Government because we are not dealing with litigants who are unable to pursue a legal remedy. We are not dealing with litigants who might find travel difficult or legal proceedings or appearances expensive. We are dealing with political subdivisions and States, which have county attorneys or State *147 attorneys general who come to Washington, D. C., for many things, and they would not be required to come to Washington merely to participate in litigation that might arise under the bill." 111 Cong. Rec. 10363 (1965). Obviously, this same argument does not apply to most townships, school boards, and the numerous other small, local units involved in the political process. Whether or not it would be "fair" to make these smaller political units argue their cases only in Washington, D. C., the drafters and supporters of the Act gave assurances that 5 was not so intended. A broad definition of "State" would nullify those assurances just as surely as a loose interpretation of "political subdivision." Finally, the logistical and administrative problems inherent in reviewing all voting changes of all political units strongly suggest that Congress placed limits on the preclearance requirement. Statistics show that the Attorney General's staff is now processing requests for voting changes at the rate of over 1,000 per year.[8] and this rate is by no means indicative of the number of submissions involved if all covered States and political units fully complied with the preclearance requirement, as interpreted by the Attorney General.[9] Furthermore, under the statute each request must be passed upon within 60 days of its submission. This large and rapid volume *148 of work is a product, in part, of this Court's decision in Allen.[10] But even apart from Allen, it is certainly reasonable to believe that Congress, having placed a strict time limit on the Attorney General's consideration of submissions, also deliberately placed a limit on the number and importance of the submissions themselves.[11] This result was achieved by restricting the reach of 5 to enactments of either the States themselves or their political subdivisions, as defined by 14 (c) (2). Neither the "contemporaneous" construction of the Act by the Attorney General nor the subsequent amendments of 5 by Congress, in |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109810/united-states-v-sheffield-bd-of-commrs/ | General nor the subsequent amendments of 5 by Congress, in my judgment, undermine the validity of this reading of the section. The Court asserts that the "Attorney General has, since the Act was adopted in 1965, interpreted 5 as requiring all political units in designated jurisdictions to preclear proposed voting changes." Ante, at 131. The unambiguous historical evidence is to the contrary. The Department of Justice did not adopt regulations implementing 5's preclearance provisions until September six years after the passage of the Act and nearly two years after this Court's decision in Allen. ; see And it was not until the Allen decision that the Department even attempted *149 to develop standards and procedures for enforcing 5. See 1975 Senate Hearings 537 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger). In short, there was no "contemporaneous" construction of the Act by the Attorney General. It may have been reasonable for the Attorney General, in promulgating regulations after the Allen decision, to have assumed that, since the section now covered all voting changes and not simply registration changes, all political units and not simply political subdivisions were also covered. But that assumption sheds no light on Congress' intention in passing the Act in 1965. Nor, in my judgment, are the subsequent amendments of the Act in 1970 and 1975 reliable guides to what Congress intended in 1965 when it drafted the relevant statutory language. The 1970 and 1975 extensions of the Act did not change the operative language in 5 or alter the definition of the term "political subdivision." As I suggested a few years ago, "[a]n interpretation of a provision in [a] controversial and integrated statute cannot fairly be predicated on unexplained inaction by different Congresses in subsequent years."[12] *150 In sum, I am persuaded that the result the Court reaches today is not a faithful reflection of the actual intent of the Congress that enacted the statute. I therefore respectfully dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,998 | 19 | concurring | American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118229/american-telephone-telegraph-co-v-central-office-telephone-inc/ | The Court concludes that respondent's tortious interference claim is "wholly derivative of the contract claim" and therefore barred by the filed rate doctrine. The Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's finding to that effect, ante, at 226, and I agree: The acts of tortious interference asserted *229 against AT&T amount to no more than an intentional refusal to provide services to respondent in an amount or manner contrary to the filed tariff. I write separately to note that this finding is necessary to the conclusion that respondent's state-law tort claim may not proceed. As the majority correctly states, the filed rate doctrine exists to protect the "antidiscriminatory policy which lies at `the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications Act.' " Ante, at 223. Central to that antidiscriminatory policy is the notion that all purchasers of services covered by the tariff will pay the same rate. The filed rate doctrine furthers this policy by disallowing suits brought to enforce agreements to provide services on terms different from those listed in the tariff. This ensures that the tariff governs the terms by which the common carrier provides those services to its customers. It is crucial to note, however, that this is all the tariff governs. In order for the filed rate doctrine to serve its purpose, therefore, it need pre-empt only those suits that seek to alter the terms and conditions provided for in the tariff. This is how the doctrine has been applied in the past. In Chicago & Alton R. for example, respondent entered into a contract with petitioner to ship horses from Springfield, Illinois, to New York City via a special fast train. The tariff that the petitioner had filed "did not provide for an expedited service, nor for transportation by any particular train." The Court ruled that respondent's suit to enforce the special arrangement could not proceed: "An advantage accorded by special agreement which affects the value of the service to the shipper and its cost to the carrier should be published in the tariffs, and for a breach of such a contract, relief will be denied, because its allowance without such publication is a violation of the act. It is also illegal because it is an undue advantage *230 in that it is not one open to all others in the same situation." In the question was not whether a separate contract could be enforced, but rather whether petitioner could bring an antitrust complaint challenging the rate that respondents had filed in their tariff. The Court ruled that he could not: "The legal rights of shipper |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,998 | 19 | concurring | American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118229/american-telephone-telegraph-co-v-central-office-telephone-inc/ | ruled that he could not: "The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier." In this case respondent's contract claim seeks to enforce side arrangements that it made with petitioner. Respondent contends that petitioner promised to provide it with services on terms different from those listed in the tariff. As the above cases make clear, the filed rate doctrine bars such a claim. Respondent's tort claim is entirely derivative of its contractual claim, and the Court is therefore correct in concluding that the doctrine also bars the tort claim. The tariff does not govern, however, the entirety of the relationship between the common carrier and its customers. For example, it does not affect whatever duties state law might impose on petitioner to refrain from intentionally interfering with respondent's relationships with its customers by means other than failing to honor unenforceable side agreements, or to refrain from engaging in slander or libel, or to satisfy other contractual obligations. The filed rate doctrine's purpose is to ensure that the filed rates are the exclusive source of the terms and conditions by which the common carrier provides to its customers the services covered by the tariff. It does not serve as a shield against all *231 actions based in state law. It is with this understanding that I join the Court's opinion. |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | The Court’s decision passes off private speech as gov- ernment speech and, in doing so, establishes a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. Under our First Amendment cases, the dis- tinction between government speech and private speech is critical. The First Amendment “does not regulate gov- ernment speech,” and therefore when government speaks, it is free “to select the views that it wants to express.” Pleasant Grove 467–468 (2009). By contrast, “[i]n the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.” Unfortunately, the Court’s decision categorizes private speech as government speech and thus strips it of all First Amendment protection. The Court holds that all the privately created messages on the many specialty plates issued by the State of Texas convey a government message rather than the message of the motorist displaying the plate. Can this possibly be correct? Here is a test. Suppose you sat by the side of a Texas 2 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting highway and studied the license plates on the vehicles passing by. You would see, in addition to the standard Texas plates, an impressive array of specialty plates. (There are now more than 350 varieties.) You would likely observe plates that honor numerous colleges and universi- ties. You might see plates bearing the name of a high school, a fraternity or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of the American Revolution, a realty company, a favorite soft drink, a favorite burger restaurant, and a favorite NASCAR driver. As you sat there watching these plates speed by, would you really think that the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars? If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed by at 8:30 am on a Mon- day morning, would you think: “This is the official policy of the State—better to golf than to work?” If you did your viewing at the start of the college football season and you saw Texas plates with the names of the University of Texas’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming games— Notre Dame, Oklahoma State, the University of Okla- homa, Kansas State, Iowa State—would you assume that the State of Texas was officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns’ opponents? And when a car zipped by with a plate that reads “NASCAR – 24 Jeff Gordon,” would you think that Gordon (born in California, raised in Indiana, resides in North |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | Gordon (born in California, raised in Indiana, resides in North Carolina)1 is the official favorite of the State government? The Court says that all of these messages are govern- ment speech. It is essential that government be able to express its own viewpoint, the Court reminds us, because otherwise, how would it promote its programs, like recy- cling and vaccinations? Ante, at 5–6. So when Texas issues a “Rather Be Golfing” plate, but not a “Rather Be —————— 1 Elliot, Shifting Gears, Forbes Life, Oct. 2013, pp. 55, 57. Cite as: 576 U. S. 3 ALITO, J., dissenting Playing Tennis” or “Rather Be Bowling” plate, it is fur- thering a state policy to promote golf but not tennis or bowling. And when Texas allows motorists to obtain a Notre Dame license plate but not a University of South- ern California plate, it is taking sides in that long-time rivalry. This capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and painful bite out of the First Amendment. Specialty plates may seem innocuous. They make motor- ists happy, and they put money in a State’s coffers. But the precedent this case sets is dangerous. While all li- cense plates unquestionably contain some government speech (e.g., the name of the State and the numbers and/or letters identifying the vehicle), the State of Texas has converted the remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile billboards on which motorists can display their own messages. And what Texas did here was to reject one of the messages that members of a private group wanted to post on some of these little billboards be- cause the State thought that many of its citizens would find the message offensive. That is blatant viewpoint discrimination. If the State can do this with its little mobile billboards, could it do the same with big, stationary billboards? Sup- pose that a State erected electronic billboards along its highways. Suppose that the State posted some govern- ment messages on these billboards and then, to raise money, allowed private entities and individuals to pur- chase the right to post their own messages. And suppose that the State allowed only those messages that it liked or found not too controversial. Would that be constitutional? What if a state college or university did the same thing with a similar billboard or a campus bulletin board or dorm list serve? What if it allowed private messages that are consistent with prevailing views on campus but banned those that disturbed some students or faculty? 4 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting Can there be any doubt that these examples of viewpoint discrimination would violate the First Amendment? I hope not, but the future uses of today’s precedent remain to be seen. I A Specialty plates like those involved in this case are a recent development. License plates originated solely as a means of identifying vehicles. In 1901, New York became the first State to require automobiles to be licensed, but rather than issue license plates itself, New York required drivers to display their initials on their cars. J. Minard & T. Stentiford, A Moving History 50 (2004). Two years later, Massachusetts became the first State to issue li- cense plates. The plates said “Mass. Automobile Register” and displayed the vehicle’s registration number. at 51. Plates of this type—featuring a registration number, the name of the State, and sometimes the date—were the standard for decades thereafter. See at 52–94; see also generally, J. Fox, License Plates of the United States 10– 99 (1997). Texas license plates initially followed this pattern. When the first official state plate appeared in 1917, it featured a number and the abbreviation “TEX.” Texas Department of Transportation, The History of Texas License Plates 9 (1999) (History). In 1925, the year of issue was added, and the State began issuing plates that identified certain vehicle types, e.g., “C-M” for commercial trucks (1925), at 14–15; “FARM” for farm trucks (1935), ; “Overwidth” (1949), ; “House Trailer” (1951), In 1936, a special plate with the word “CENTENNIAL” was created to mark the State’s 100th birthday, and the first plate identifying the owner as a “State Official” appeared two years later. 25. Starting in the 1950’s, Texas began issuing plates to Cite as: 576 U. S. 5 ALITO, J., dissenting identify some other registrants, such as “Amateur Radio Operator” (1954), “State Judge” (1970) ; and “Disabled Veteran,” (1972), A sesquicentennial plate appeared in 1985, and two years later, legislation was introduced to create a bronze license plate with 14-karat gold-plated lettering, available for a fee of $1,000. The proposal aimed to make the State a profit, but it failed to pass. It was not until 1989 that anything that might be con- sidered a message was featured regularly on Texas plates. The words “The Lone Star State” were added “as a means of bringing favorable recognition to Texas.” Finally, in the late 1990’s, license plates containing a small variety of messages, selected by the State, became available for the first time. These messages included slogans like “Read to Succeed,” “Keep |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | time. These messages included slogans like “Read to Succeed,” “Keep Texas Beautiful,” “Animal Friendly,” “Big Bend National Park,” “Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo,” and “Lone Star Proud.” 113. Also issued in the 1990’s were plates bearing the names of colleges and universities, and some plates (e.g., “State of the Arts,” “State Capitol Resto- ration”) were made available to raise funds for special purposes. Once the idea of specialty plates took hold, the number of varieties quickly multiplied, and today, we are told, Texas motorists can choose from more than 350 messages, including many designs proposed by nonprofit groups or by individuals and for-profit businesses through the State’s third-party vendor. Brief for Respondents at 2; see also Texas Department of Motor Vehicles, online at http:// www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/specialty-license- plates (all Internet materials as visited June 12, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); http:// www.myplates.com. Drivers can select plates advertising organizations and causes like 4–H, the Boy Scouts, the American Legion, Be 6 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting a Blood Donor, the Girl Scouts, Insure Texas Kids, Moth- ers Against Drunk Driving, Marine Mammal Recovery, Save Texas Ocelots, Share the Road, Texas Reads, Texas Realtors (“I am a Texas Realtor”), the Texas State Rifle Association (“WWW.TSRA.COM”), the Texas Trophy Hunters Association, the World Wildlife Fund, the YMCA, and Young Lawyers.2 There are plates for fraternities and sororities and for in-state schools, both public (like Texas A & M and Texas Tech) and private (like Trinity University and Baylor). An even larger number of schools from out-of-state are hon- ored: Arizona State, Brigham Young, Florida State, Mich- igan State, Alabama, and South Carolina, to name only a few. There are political slogans, like “Come and Take It” and “Don’t Tread on Me,” and plates promoting the citrus industry and the “Cotton Boll.” Commercial businesses can have specialty plates, too. There are plates advertis- ing Remax (“Get It Sold with Remax”), Dr. Pepper (“Al- ways One of a Kind”), and Mighty Fine Burgers. B The Texas Division of Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) is an organization composed of descendants of Confederate soldiers. The group applied for a Texas spe- cialty license plate in 2009 and again in 2010. Their proposed design featured a controversial symbol, the Confederate battle flag, surrounded by the words “Sons of Confederate Veterans 1896” and a gold border. App. 29. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board (or Board) invited public comments and considered the plate design at a meeting in April 2011. At that meeting, one board member was absent, and the |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | At that meeting, one board member was absent, and the remaining eight members —————— 2 The Appendix, infra, reproduces the available specialty plates men- tioned throughout this opinion in order of first reference. When catego- ries are referenced, examples from the category have been included. Cite as: 576 U. S. 7 ALITO, J., dissenting deadlocked on whether to approve the plate. The Board thus reconsidered the plate at its meeting in November 2011. This time, many opponents of the plate turned out to voice objections. The Board then voted unanimously against approval and issued an order stating: “The Board has considered the information and finds it necessary to deny this plate design applica- tion, specifically the confederate flag portion of the de- sign, because public comments have shown that many members of the general public find the design offen- sive, and because such comments are reasonable. The Board finds that a significant portion of the public as- sociate the confederate flag with organizations advo- cating expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or groups.” –65. The Board also saw “a compelling public interest in pro- tecting a conspicuous mechanism for identification, such as a license plate, from degrading into a possible public safety issue.” And it thought that the public interest required rejection of the plate design because the controversy surrounding the plate was so great that “the design could distract or disturb some drivers to the point of being unreasonably dangerous.” At the same meeting, the Board approved a Buffalo Soldiers plate design by a 5-to-3 vote. Proceeds from fees paid by motorists who select that plate benefit the Buffalo Soldier National Museum in Houston, which is “dedicated primarily to preserving the legacy and honor of the Afri- can American soldier.” Buffalo Soldier National Museum, online at http://www.buffalosoldiermuseum.com. “Buffalo Soldiers” is a nickname that was originally given to black soldiers in the Army’s 10th Cavalry Regiment, which was formed after the Civil War, and the name was later used to describe other black soldiers. W. Leckie & S. Leckie, 8 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West 21, 26–27 (2003). The original Buffalo Soldiers fought with distinction in the Indian Wars, but the “Buf- falo Soldiers” plate was opposed by some Native Americans. One leader commented that he felt “ ‘the same way about the Buffalo Soldiers’ ” as African-Americans felt about the Confederate flag. Scharrer, Specialty License Plates can Bring in Revenue, But Some |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | Scharrer, Specialty License Plates can Bring in Revenue, But Some Stir Up Controversy, Hous- ton Chronicle, Nov. 26, 2011, P.B2. “ ‘When we see the U. S. Cavalry uniform,’ ” he explained, “ ‘we are forced to relive an American holocaust.’ ” II A Relying almost entirely on one precedent—Pleasant Grove —the Court holds that messages that private groups succeed in placing on Texas license plates are government messages. The Court badly misunderstands Summum. In Summum, a private group claimed the right to erect a large stone monument in a small city park. The 2.5-acre park contained 15 permanent displays, 11 of which had been donated by private parties. The central question concerned the nature of the municipal government’s conduct when it accepted privately donated monuments for placement in its park: Had the city created a forum for private speech, or had it accepted donated monuments that expressed a government message? We held that the monuments represented government speech, and we identified several important factors that led to this conclusion. First, governments have long used monuments as a means of expressing a government message. As we put it, “[s]ince ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected statues of themselves to remind their sub- jects of their authority and power.” Here in Cite as: 576 U. S. 9 ALITO, J., dissenting the United States, important public monuments like the Statue of Liberty, the Washington Monument, and the Lincoln Memorial, express principles that inspire and bind the Nation together. Thus, long experience has led the public to associate public monuments with government speech. Second, there is no history of landowners allowing their property to be used by third parties as the site of large permanent monuments that do not express messages that the landowners wish to convey. See While “[a] great many of the monuments that adorn the Nation’s public parks were financed with private funds or donated by private parties,” “cities and other jurisdictions take some care in accepting donated monuments” and select those that “conve[y] a government message.” – 472. We were not presented in Summum with any exam- ples of public parks that had been thrown open for private groups or individuals to put up whatever monuments they desired. Third, spatial limitations played a prominent part in our analysis. See at 478–479. “[P]ublic parks can accom- modate only a limited number of permanent monuments,” and consequently permanent monuments “monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere perma- nently with other uses of public space.” Because only a limited number of monuments can be |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | space.” Because only a limited number of monuments can be built in any given space, governments do not allow their parks to be cluttered with monuments that do not serve a government purpose, a point well understood by those who visit parks and view the monuments they contain. These characteristics, which rendered public monu- ments government speech in Summum, are not present in Texas’s specialty plate program. 10 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting B 1 I begin with history. As we said in Summum, govern- ments have used monuments since time immemorial to express important government messages, and there is no history of governments giving equal space to those wishing to express dissenting views. In 1775, when a large gilded equestrian statue of King George III dominated Bowling Green, a small park in lower Manhattan,3 the colonial governor surely would not have permitted the construction on that land of a monument to the fallen at Lexington and Concord. When the United States accepted the Third French Republic’s gift of the Statue of Liberty in 1877, see Congress, it seems safe to say, would not have welcomed a gift of a Statue of Authoritarianism if one had been offered by another country. Nor is it likely that the National Park Service today would be receptive if private groups, pointing to the Lincoln Memorial, the Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial, and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the National Mall, sought permission to put up monuments to Jefferson Davis, Orval Faubus, or the North Vietnamese Army. Governments have always used public monuments to express a government message, and members of the public understand this. The history of messages on license plates is quite differ- ent. After the beginning of motor vehicle registration in 1917, more than 70 years passed before the proliferation of specialty plates in Texas. It was not until the 1990’s that motorists were allowed to choose from among 10 messages, such as “Read to Succeed” and “Keep Texas Beautiful.” History Up to this point, the words on the Texas plates can be considered government speech. The messages were created —————— 3 The Statue That Was Made Into Bullets, N. Y. Times Magazine, July 21, 1901, at p.6. Cite as: 576 U. S. 11 ALITO, J., dissenting by the State, and they plausibly promoted state pro- grams.4 But when, at some point within the last 20 years or so, the State began to allow private entities to secure plates conveying their own messages, Texas crossed the line. The contrast between the history of public |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | crossed the line. The contrast between the history of public monuments, which have been used to convey government messages for centuries, and the Texas license plate program could not be starker. In an attempt to gather historical support for its posi- tion, the Court relies on plates with the mottos or symbols of other States. As the Court notes, some of these were issued well before “The Lone Star State” made its debut in Texas in 1991. But this history is irrelevant for present purposes. Like the 1991 Texas plate, these out-of- state plates were created by the States that issued them, and motorists generally had no choice but to accept them. For example, the State of New Hampshire made it a crime to cover up the words “Live Free or Die” on its plates. See The words and symbols on plates of this sort were and are government speech, but plates that are essentially commissioned by private entities (at a cost that exceeds $8,000) and that express a message chosen by those enti- ties are very different—and quite new. Unlike in Sum- mum, history here does not suggest that the messages at issue are government speech. 2 The Texas specialty plate program also does not exhibit the “selective receptivity” present in Summum. To the contrary, Texas’s program is not selective by design. The Board’s chairman, who is charged with approving designs, —————— 4 This opinion does not address whether the unique combination of letters and/or numbers assigned to each vehicle, even when selected by the motorist, is private speech. 12 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting explained that the program’s purpose is “to encourage private plates” in order to “generate additional revenue for the state.” Ib 58. And most of the time, the Board “base[s] [its] decisions on rules that primarily deal with reflectivity and readability.” A Department bro- chure explains: “Q. Who provides the plate design? A. You do, though your design is subject to reflectivity, legi- bility, and design standards.”b. Pressed to come up with any evidence that the State has exercised “selective receptivity,” Texas (and the Court) rely primarily on sketchy information not contained in the record, specifically that the Board’s predecessor (might have) rejected a “pro-life” plate and perhaps others on the ground that they contained messages that were offensive. See ante, at 11 (citing Reply Brief 10 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–51). But even if this happened, it shows only that the present case may not be the only one in which the State has exercised viewpoint |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | the only one in which the State has exercised viewpoint discrimination. Texas’s only other (also extrarecord) evidence of selectiv- ity concerns a proposed plate that was thought to create a threat to the fair enforcement of the State’s motor vehicle laws. Reply Brief 9–10 (citing publicly avail- able Transcript of Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board Meeting, Aug. 9, 2012, p. 112, online at http:// www.txdmv.gov/reports-and-data/doc_download/450–2012– tran-aug9). This proposed plate was a Texas DPS Troopers Foundation (Troopers) plate, proposed in 2012. The Board considered that proposed plate at an August 2012 meet- ing, at which it approved six other plate designs without discussion, but it rejected the Troopers plate in a dead- locked vote due to apparent concern that the plate could give the impression that those displaying it would receive favored treatment from state troopers. at 109–112. The constitutionality of this Board action does not neces- sarily turn on whether approval of this plate would have made the message government speech. If, as I believe, the Cite as: 576 U. S. 13 ALITO, J., dissenting Texas specialty plate program created a limited public forum, private speech may be excluded if it is inconsistent with the purpose of the forum. 515 U.S., at 829. Thus, even if Texas’s extrarecord information is taken into account, the picture here is different from that in Summum. Texas does not take care to approve only those proposed plates that convey messages that the State supports. Instead, it proclaims that it is open to all pri- vate messages—except those, like the SCV plate, that would offend some who viewed them. The Court believes that messages on privately created plates are government speech because motorists want a seal of state approval for their messages and therefore prefer plates over bumper stickers. Ante, at 10–11. This is dangerous reasoning. There is a big difference between government speech (that is, speech by the government in furtherance of its programs) and governmental blessing (or condemnation) of private speech. Many private speak- ers in a forum would welcome a sign of government ap- proval. But in the realm of private speech, government regulation may not favor one viewpoint over another. at 3 A final factor that was important in Summum was space. A park can accommodate only so many permanent monuments. Often large and made of stone, monuments can last for centuries and are difficult to move. License plates, on the other hand, are small, light, mobile, and designed to last for only a relatively brief time. The only absolute limit on the number of specialty plates that a State |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | limit on the number of specialty plates that a State could issue is the number of registered vehicles. The variety of available plates is limitless, too. Today Texas offers more than 350 varieties. In 10 years, might it be 3,500? 14 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting In sum, the Texas specialty plate program has none of the factors that were critical in Summum, and the Texas program exhibits a very important characteristic that was missing in that case: Individuals who want to display a Texas specialty plate, instead of the standard plate, must pay an increased annual registration fee. See http://www.dmv.org/tx-texas/license-plates.php. How many groups or individuals would clamor to pay $8,000 (the cost of the deposit required to create a new plate) in order to broadcast the government’s message as opposed to their own? And if Texas really wants to speak out in support of, say, Iowa State University (but not the Univer- sity of Iowa) or “Young Lawyers” (but not old ones), why must it be paid to say things that it really wants to say? The fees Texas collects pay for much more than merely the administration of the program. States have not adopted specialty license plate programs like Texas’s because they are now bursting with things they want to say on their license plates. Those programs were adopted because they bring in money. Texas makes public the revenue totals generated by its specialty plate program, and it is apparent that the program brings in many millions of dollars every year. See http://www.txdmv.gov/reports-and-data/doc_download/5050– specialty-plates-revenue-fy-1994-2014. Texas has space available on millions of little mobile billboards. And Texas, in effect, sells that space to those who wish to use it to express a personal message— provided only that the message does not express a view- point that the State finds unacceptable. That is not gov- ernment speech; it is the regulation of private speech. III What Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to create what we have called a limited public forum. It has allowed state property 15 ALITO, J., dissenting license plates) to be used by private speakers according to rules that the State prescribes. Cf. Good News v. Milford Central School, Under the First Amendment, however, those rules cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. See 515 U.S., 9 ). But that is exactly what Texas did here. The Board rejected Texas SCV’s design, “specifically the confederate flag portion of the design, because public comments have shown that many members of the general public find the |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | shown that many members of the general public find the design offensive, and because such comments are reason- able.” App. 64. These statements indisputably demon- strate that the Board denied Texas SCV’s design because of its viewpoint. The Confederate battle flag is a controversial symbol. To the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans, it is said to evoke the memory of their ancestors and other soldiers who fought for the South in the Civil War. See at 15– 16. To others, it symbolizes slavery, segregation, and hatred. Whatever it means to motorists who display that symbol and to those who see it, the flag expresses a view- point. The Board rejected the plate design because it concluded that many Texans would find the flag symbol offensive. That was pure viewpoint discrimination. If the Board’s candid explanation of its reason for reject- ing the SCV plate were not alone sufficient to establish this point, the Board’s approval of the Buffalo Soldiers plate at the same meeting dispels any doubt. The propo- nents of both the SCV and Buffalo Soldiers plates saw them as honoring soldiers who served with bravery and honor in the past. To the opponents of both plates, the images on the plates evoked painful memories. The Board rejected one plate and approved the other. Like these two plates, many other specialty plates have the potential to irritate and perhaps even infuriate those 16 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO, J., dissenting who see them. Texas allows a plate with the words “Choose Life,” but the State of New York rejected such a plate because the message “ ‘[is] so incredibly divisive,’ ” and the Second Circuit recently sustained that decision. Children First Foundation, Texas allows a specialty plate honoring the Boy Scouts, but the group’s refusal to accept gay leaders angers some. Virginia, an- other State with a proliferation of specialty plates, issues plates for controversial organizations like the National Rifle Association, controversial commercial enterprises (raising tobacco and mining coal), controversial sports (fox hunting), and a professional sports team with a controver- sial name (the Washington Redskins). Allowing States to reject specialty plates based on their potential to offend is viewpoint discrimination. The Board’s decision cannot be saved by its suggestion that the plate, if allowed, “could distract or disturb some drivers to the point of being unreasonably dangerous.” App. 65. This rationale cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Other States allow specialty plates with the Confederate Battle Flag,5 and Texas has not pointed to evidence that these plates have led to incidents of road rage or |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2809762/walker-v-texas-div-sons-of-confederate-veterans-inc/ | these plates have led to incidents of road rage or accidents. Texas does not ban bumper stickers bearing the image of the Confederate battle flag. Nor does it ban any of the many other bumper stickers that convey political messages and other messages that are capable of exciting the ire of those who loathe the ideas they express. Cf. Good News at 111–112. * * * Messages that are proposed by private parties and placed on Texas specialty plates are private speech, not —————— 5 See http://www.dmv.virginia.gov/vehicles/#splates/category.asp? category=SCITTexas Cite as: 576 U. S. 17 ALITO, J., dissenting government speech. Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint. That is what it did here. Because the Court approves this violation of the First Amendment, I respectfully dissent. 18 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO Appendix to, J., dissenting opinion of ALITO, J. APPENDIX Sample Texas Specialty Plates Cite as: 576 U. S. 19 ALITO Appendix to, J., dissenting opinion of ALITO, J. 20 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO Appendix to, J., dissenting opinion of ALITO, J. Cite as: 576 U. S. 21 ALITO Appendix to, J., dissenting opinion of ALITO, J. 22 WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC. ALITO Appendix to, J., dissenting opinion of ALITO, J. Cite as: 576 U. S. 23 ALITO Appendix to, J., dissenting opinion of ALITO, J. All found at http://txdmv.gov/motorists/license- plates/specialty-license-plate |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | majority | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110992/bolger-v-youngs-drug-products-corp/ | Title 39 U.S. C. 3001(e)(2) prohibits the mailig of usolicited advertisemets for cotraceptives. The District Court held that, as applied to appellee's mailigs, the statute violates the First Amedmet. We affirm. I Sectio 3001(e)(2) states that "[a]y usolicited advertisemet of matter which is desiged, adapted, or iteded for prevetig coceptio is omailable matter, shall ot be carried or delivered by mail, ad shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs"[1] As iterpreted by Postal *62 Service regulatios,[2] the statutory provisio does ot apply to usolicited advertisemets i which the mailer has o commercial iterest. I additio to the civil cosequeces of a violatio of 3001(e)(2), 18 U.S. C. 1461 makes it a crime kowigly to use the mails for aythig declared by 3001(e) to be omailable.[3] Appellee Yougs Drug Products Corp. (Yougs) is egaged i the maufacture, sale, ad distributio of cotraceptives. Yougs markets its products primarily through sales to chai warehouses ad wholesale distributors, who i tur sell cotraceptives to retail pharmacists, who the sell those products to idividual customers. Appellee publicizes the availability ad desirability of its products by various methods. This litigatio resulted from Yougs' decisio to udertake a campaig of usolicited mass mailigs to members of the public. I cojuctio with its wholesalers ad retailers, Yougs seeks to mail to the public o a usolicited basis three types of materials: multi-page, multi-item flyers promotig a large variety of products available at a drugstore, icludig prophylactics; flyers exclusively or substatially devoted to promotig prophylactics; iformatioal pamphlets discussig the desirability ad availability of prophylactics i geeral or Yougs' products i particular.[4] *63 I 1979 the Postal Service traced to a wholesaler of Yougs' products a allegatio of a usolicited mailig of cotraceptive advertisemets. The Service wared the wholesaler that the mailig violated 39 U.S. C. 3001(e)(2). Subsequetly, Yougs cotacted the Service ad furished it with copies of Yougs' three types of proposed mailigs, statig its view that the statute could ot costitutioally restrict the mailigs. The Service rejected Yougs' legal argumet ad otified the compay that the proposed mailigs would violate 3001(e)(2). Yougs the brought this actio for declaratory ad ijuctive relief i the Uited States District Court for the District of Columbia. It claimed that the statute, as applied to its proposed mailigs, violated the First Amedmet ad that Yougs ad its wholesaler were refraiig from distributig the advertisemets because of the Service's warig. The District Court determied that 3001(e)(2), by its plai laguage, prohibited all three types of proposed mailigs. The court the addressed the costitutioality of the statute as applied to |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | majority | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110992/bolger-v-youngs-drug-products-corp/ | the addressed the costitutioality of the statute as applied to these mailigs. Fidig all three types of materials to be commercial solicitatios, the court cosidered the costitutioality of the statute withi the framework established by this Court for aalyzig restrictios imposed o commercial speech. The court cocluded that the statutory prohibitio was more extesive tha ecessary to the iterests asserted by the Govermet, ad *64 it therefore held that the statute's absolute ba o the three types of mailigs violated the First Amedmet.[5] Appellats brought this direct appeal pursuat to 28 U.S. C. 1252, see Uited ad we oted probable jurisdictio, II Begiig with this Court exteded the protectio of the First Amedmet to commercial speech.[6] Noetheless, our decisios have recogized "the `commo-sese' distictio betwee speech proposig a commercial trasactio, which occurs i a area traditioally subject to govermet regulatio, ad other varieties of speech." Thus, we have held that the Costitutio accords less protectio to commercial speech tha *65 to other costitutioally safeguarded forms of expressio. Cetral Hudso Gas & Electric ; Pharmacy For example, as a geeral matter, "the First Amedmet meas that govermet has o power to restrict expressio because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its cotet." Police Departmet of With respect to ocommercial speech, this Court has sustaied cotet-based restrictios oly i the most extraordiary circumstaces.[7] See Cosolidated Ediso ; Stoe, Restrictios of Speech Because of its Cotet: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictios, By cotrast, regulatio of commercial speech based o cotet is less problematic. I light of the greater potetial for deceptio or cofusio i the cotext of certai advertisig messages, see I re R. M. J., cotet-based restrictios o commercial speech may be permissible. See Because the degree of protectio afforded by the First Amedmet depeds o whether the activity sought to be regulated costitutes commercial or ocommercial speech, we must first determie the proper classificatio of the mailigs at issue here. Appellee coteds that its proposed mailigs costitute "fully protected" speech, so that 3001(e)(2) amouts to a impermissible cotet-based restrictio *66 o such expressio.[8] Appellats argue,[9] ad the District Court held,[10] that the proposed mailigs are all commercial speech. The applicatio of 3001(e)(2) to appellee's proposed mailigs must be examied carefully to esure that speech deservig of greater costitutioal protectio is ot iadvertetly suppressed.[11] Most of appellee's mailigs fall withi the core otio of commercial speech "speech which does `o more tha propose a commercial trasactio.' " Pharmacy quotig Pittsburgh Press[12] Yougs' iformatioal pamphlets, however, caot be characterized merely as proposals to egage i commercial trasactios. Their |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | majority | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110992/bolger-v-youngs-drug-products-corp/ | characterized merely as proposals to egage i commercial trasactios. Their proper classificatio as commercial or ocommercial speech thus presets a closer questio. The mere fact that these pamphlets are coceded to be advertisemets clearly does ot compel the coclusio that they are commercial speech. See New Times Similarly, the referece to a specific product does ot by itself reder the pamphlets commercial speech.[13] See Associated Studets for Uiv. of Cal. at Fially, the fact that Yougs has a ecoomic motivatio for mailig the pamphlets would clearly be isufficiet by itself to tur the materials ito commercial speech. See ; ; The combiatio of all these characteristics, however, provides strog support for the District Court's coclusio that the iformatioal pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech.[14] The mailigs costitute commercial speech otwithstadig the fact that they cotai discussios *68 of importat public issues[15] such as veereal disease ad family plaig. We have made clear that advertisig which "liks a product to a curret public debate" is ot thereby etitled to the costitutioal protectio afforded ocommercial speech. Cetral Hudso Gas & Electric 5. A compay has the full paoply of protectios available to its direct commets o public issues,[16] so there is o reaso for providig similar costitutioal protectio whe such statemets are made i the cotext of commercial trasactios. See Advertisers should ot be permitted to immuize false or misleadig product iformatio from govermet regulatio simply by icludig refereces to public issues. Cf. Metromedia, v. Sa Diego, We coclude, therefore, that all of the mailigs i this case are etitled to the qualified but oetheless substatial protectio accorded to commercial speech. III "The protectio available for particular commercial expressio turs o the ature both of the expressio ad of the govermetal iterests served by its regulatio." Cetral Hudso Gas & Electric I Cetral Hudso we adopted a four-part aalysis for assessig the validity of restrictios o commercial speech. First, we determie whether the expressio is costitutioally protected. For commercial speech to receive such protectio, "it at least must cocer lawful activity ad ot be misleadig." Secod, we ask whether the govermetal iterest is *69 substatial. If so, we must the determie whether the regulatio directly advaces the govermet iterest asserted, ad whether it is ot more extesive tha ecessary to serve that iterest. Applyig this aalysis, we coclude that 3001(e)(2) is ucostitutioal as applied to appellee's mailigs. We tur first to the protectio afforded by the First Amedmet. The State may deal effectively with false, deceptive, or misleadig sales techiques. Pharmacy -772. The State may also prohibit commercial speech related to |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | majority | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110992/bolger-v-youngs-drug-products-corp/ | -772. The State may also prohibit commercial speech related to illegal behavior. Pittsburgh Press I this case, however, appellats have ever claimed that Yougs' proposed mailigs fall ito ay of these categories. To the cotrary, advertisig for cotraceptives ot oly implicates " `substatial idividual ad societal iterests' " i the free flow of commercial iformatio, but also relates to activity which is protected from uwarrated state iterferece. See Carey v. Populatio Services Iteratioal, quotig Pharmacy[17] Yougs' proposed commercial speech is therefore clearly protected by the First Amedmet. Ideed, where as i this case a speaker desires to covey truthful iformatio relevat to importat social issues such as family plaig ad the prevetio of veereal disease, we have previously foud the First Amedmet iterest served by such speech paramout. See Carey v. Populatio Services Iteratioal, supra.[18] *70 We must ext determie whether the Govermet's iterest i prohibitig the mailig of usolicited cotraceptive advertisemets is a substatial oe. The prohibitio i 3001(e)(2) origiated i 1873 as part of the Comstock Act, a crimial statute desiged "for the suppressio of Trade i ad Circulatio of obscee Literature ad Articles of immoral Use." Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 2,[19] Appellats do ot purport to rely o justificatios for the *71 statute offered durig the 19th cetury.[20] Istead, they advace iterests that cocededly were ot asserted whe the prohibitio was eacted ito law.[] This reliace is permissible sice the isufficiecy of the origial motivatio does ot dimiish other iterests that the restrictio may ow serve. See Cf. Doe v. Bolto, (a State may readjust its views ad emphases i light of moder kowledge). I particular, appellats assert that the statute (1) shields recipiets of mail from materials that they are likely to fid offesive ad (2) aids parets' efforts to cotrol the maer i which their childre become iformed about sesitive ad importat subjects such as birth cotrol.[22] The first of these iterests carries little weight. I strikig dow a state prohibitio of cotraceptive advertisemets i Carey v. Populatio Services Iteratioal, we stated that offesiveess was "classically ot [a] justificatio[] validatig the suppressio of expressio protected by the First Amedmet. At least where obsceity is ot ivolved, we have cosistetly held that the fact that protected speech may be offesive to some does ot justify its suppressio."[23] We specifically declied to recogize a distictio *72 betwee commercial ad ocommercial speech that would reder this iterest a sufficiet justificatio for a prohibitio of commercial speech. at 701, 28. Recogizig that their reliace o this iterest is "problematic,"[] appellats attempt to avoid the |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | majority | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110992/bolger-v-youngs-drug-products-corp/ | o this iterest is "problematic,"[] appellats attempt to avoid the clear import of Carey by emphasizig that 3001(e)(2) is aimed at the mailig of materials to the home. We have, of course, recogized the importat iterest i allowig addressees to give otice to a mailer that they wish o further mailigs which, i their sole discretio, they believe to be erotically arousig or sexually provocative. See Rowa v. Post Office Departmet, (upholdig the costitutioality of 39 U.S. C. 3008).[25] But we have ever held that the Govermet itself ca shut off the flow of mailigs to protect those recipiets who might potetially be offeded. The First Amedmet "does ot permit the govermet to prohibit speech as itrusive uless the `captive' audiece caot avoid objectioable speech." Cosolidated Ediso Recipiets of objectioable mailigs, however, may " `effectively avoid further bombardmet of their sesibilities simply by avertig their eyes.' " quotig Cohe v. Califoria, Cosequetly, the "short, though regular, jourey from mail box to trash ca is a acceptable burde, at least so far as the Costitutio is cocered." Lamot v. Commissioer of Motor Vehicles, (SDNY), summarily aff'd, cert. deied, *73 The secod iterest asserted by appellats aidig parets' efforts to discuss birth cotrol with their childre is udoubtedly substatial. "[P]arets have a importat `guidig role' to play i the upbrigig of their childre which presumptively icludes couselig them o importat decisios." H. L. v. Matheso, quotig As a meas of effectuatig this iterest, however, 3001(e)(2) fails to withstad scrutiy. To begi with, 3001(e)(2) provides oly the most limited icremetal support for the iterest asserted. We ca reasoably assume that parets already exercise substatial cotrol over the dispositio of mail oce it eters their mailboxes. Uder 39 U.S. C. 3008, parets ca also exercise cotrol over iformatio that flows ito their mailboxes. Ad parets must already cope with the multitude of exteral stimuli that color their childre's perceptio of sesitive subjects.[26] Uder these circumstaces, a ba o usolicited advertisemets serves oly to assist those parets who desire to keep their childre from cofrotig such mailigs, who are otherwise uable to do so, ad whose childre have remaied relatively free from such stimuli. This margial degree of protectio is achieved by purgig all mailboxes of usolicited material that is etirely suitable for adults. We have previously made clear that a restrictio of this scope is more extesive tha the Costitutio permits, for the govermet may ot "reduce the adult populatio to readig oly what is fit for childre." Butler v. Michiga, *74 (17).[27] The level of discourse reachig a mailbox simply caot |
Justice Marshall | 1,983 | 15 | majority | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110992/bolger-v-youngs-drug-products-corp/ | (17).[27] The level of discourse reachig a mailbox simply caot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sadbox. I FCC v. Pacifica Foudatio, this Court did recogize that the Govermet's iterest i protectig the youg justified special treatmet of a afteroo broadcast heard by adults as well as childre.[28] At the same time, the majority "emphasize[d] the arrowess of our holdig," explaiig that broadcastig is "uiquely pervasive" ad that it is "uiquely accessible to childre, eve those too youg to read." The receipt of mail is far less itrusive ad ucotrollable. Our decisios have recogized that the special iterest of the Federal Govermet i regulatio of the broadcast media[29] does ot readily traslate ito a justificatio for regulatio of other meas of commuicatio. See Cosolidated Ediso ; FCC v. Pacifica Foudatio, (broadcastig has received the most limited First Amedmet protectio). Sectio 3001(e)(2) is also defective because it deies to parets truthful iformatio bearig o their ability to discuss birth cotrol ad to make iformed decisios i this area.[30]*75 See Associated Studets for Uiv. of Cal. at Riverside v. Attorey Geeral, 368 F. Supp., at Cf. Carey v. Populatio Services Iteratioal, (POWELL, J., cocurrig i part ad cocurrig i judgmet) (provisio prohibitig parets from distributig cotraceptives to childre costitutes "direct iterferece with paretal guidace"). Because the proscribed iformatio "may bear o oe of the most importat decisios" parets have a right to make, the restrictio of "the free flow of truthful iformatio" costitutes a "basic" costitutioal defect regardless of the stregth of the govermet's iterest. Limark Associates, v. Willigboro, -96 IV We thus coclude that the justificatios offered by appellats are isufficiet to warrat the sweepig prohibitio o the mailig of usolicited cotraceptive advertisemets. As applied to appellee's mailigs, 3001(e)(2) is ucostitutioal. The judgmet of the District Court is therefore Affirmed. JUSTICE BRENNAN took o part i the decisio of this case. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR jois, cocurrig i the judgmet. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | This case concerns regulation of the business of insurance by the States, as secured by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1011 et seq., and the extent to which federal legislation, specifically, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. 1961 et seq., is compatible with state regulation. The controversy before us stems from a scheme employed by petitioner Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc. (Humana Insurance), a group health insurer, to gain discounts for hospital services which the insurer did not disclose and pass on to its policy beneficiaries. The scheme is alleged to violate both Nevada law and RICO. Under the McCarran- *303 Ferguson Act, the federal legislation may be applied if it does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" the State's regulation. 15 U.S. C. 1012(b). The federal law at issue, RICO, does not proscribe conduct that the State's laws governing insurance permit. But the federal and state remedial regimes differ. Both provide a private right of action. RICO authorizes treble damages; Nevada law permits recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. We hold that RICO can be applied in this case in harmony with the State's regulation. When federal law is applied in aid or enhancement of state regulation, and does not frustrate any declared state policy or disturb the State's administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the federal action. I Plaintiffs in the District Court, respondents in this Court, are beneficiaries of group health insurance policies issued by Humana Insurance. Between 1985 and plaintiffsrespondents received medical care from the Humana Hospital-Sunrise, an acute care facility owned by codefendant (now copetitioner) Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80% of the policy beneficiaries' hospital charges over a designated deductible. The beneficiaries bore responsibility for payment of the remaining 20%. But pursuant to a concealed agreement, the complaint in this action alleged, the hospital gave Humana Insurance large discounts on the insurer's portion of the hospital's charges for care provided to the policy beneficiaries.[1] As a result, *304 Humana Insurance paid significantly less than 80% of the hospital's actual charges for the care that policy beneficiaries received, and the beneficiaries paid significantly more than 20% of those charges.[2] The employee beneficiaries brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada,[3] alleging that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. violated RICO through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of mail, wire, radio, and television fraud.[4] Defendants Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. moved for summary judgment, citing 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides: "No Act of Congress shall be construed |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | Act, which provides: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S. C. 1012(b). The District Court granted the motion. In that court's view, RICO's private remedies, including the federal statute's treble damages provision, 18 U.S. C. 1964(c), so exceeded Nevada's administrative penalties for insurance fraud, see infra, at 311-312, that applying RICO to the alleged conduct would have been "tantamount to allowing Congress to intercede in an area expressly left to the states under *305 the McCarran-Ferguson Act,"[5] The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. See In Merchants Delivery Serv., a decision handed down after the District Court rejected the policy beneficiaries' right to sue under RICO in this case, the Court of Appeals adopted a "direct conflict" test for determining when a federal law "invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]" a state law governing insurance. As declared in Merchants the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude "application of a federal statute prohibiting acts which are also prohibited under a state's insurance laws." Guided by Merchants and assuming that Nevada law provided for administrative remedies only, the Ninth Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar suit under RICO by the Humana Insurance policy beneficiaries. See Circuit courts have divided on the question presented: Does a federal law, which proscribes the same conduct as state law, but provides materially different remedies, "impair" state law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act?[6] We granted certiorari to address that question. *306 II Prior to our decision in United we had consistently held that the business of insurance was not commerce. See, e. g., ; see also n. 18 The business of insurance, in consequence, was largely immune from federal regulation. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. In SouthEastern, we held for the first time that an insurance company doing business across state lines engages in interstate commerce. See In accord with that holding, we further decided that the Sherman Act applied to the business of insurance. See Concerned that our decision might undermine state efforts to regulate insurance, Congress in 1945 enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Section 1 of the Act provides that "continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest," and that "silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." 15 U.S. C. 1011. In 2(b) of the Actthe centerpiece of this caseCongress ensured that federal statutes not identified in the Act or not yet enacted would not automatically override state insurance regulation. Section 2(b) provides that when Congress enacts a law specifically relating to the business of insurance, that law controls. See 1012(b). The subsection further provides that federal legislation general in character shall not be "construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law *307 enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." [7] The McCarran-Ferguson Act thus precludes application of a federal statute in face of state law "enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance," if the federal measure does not "specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance," and would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" the State's law. See Department of RICO is not a law that "specifically relates to the business of insurance." This case therefore turns on the question: Would RICO's application to the employee beneficiaries' claims at issue "invalidate, impair, or supersede" Nevada's laws regulating insurance? The term "invalidate" ordinarily means "to render ineffective, generally without providing a replacement rule or law." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 6 ). And the term "supersede" ordinarily means "to displace (and thus render ineffective) while providing a substitute rule." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 6 ). Under these standard definitions, RICO's *308 application to the policy beneficiaries' complaint would neither "invalidate" nor "supersede" Nevada law. The key question, then, is whether RICO's application to the scheme in which the Humana defendants are alleged to have collaborated, to the detriment of the plaintiff policy beneficiaries, would "impair" Nevada's law. The answer would be "no" were we to read "impair," as the policy beneficiaries suggest, to be "interchangeabl[e]" with "invalidate" and "supersede." Brief for Respondents 14; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 6 (describing the use of the three terms as an "instanc[e] of lawyerly iteration"). The answer would also be "no" if we understood "impair" to mean "the displacement of some portion of a statute or its preclusion in certain contexts." This is so because insurers can comply with both RICO and Nevada's laws governing insurance. These laws do not directly conflict. The acts the policy beneficiaries identify as unlawful under RICO are also unlawful under Nevada law. See infra, at 311-313. On the other hand, the answer would be "yes" were we to agree with |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | the answer would be "yes" were we to agree with Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. that the word "impair," in the McCarran-Ferguson Act context, signals the federal legislators' intent "to withdraw Congress from the field [of insurance] absent an express congressional statement to the contrary." Brief for Petitioners 10. Under that reading, "impair" would convey "a very broad proscription against applying federal law where a state has regulated, or chosen not to regulate, in the insurance industry." Merchants 50 F. 3d, 91 See also Reply Brief 4 (McCarran-Ferguson Act "precludes federal law that is at material variance with state insurance lawas to substantive prohibitions, procedures or remedies."). We reject any suggestion that Congress intended to cede the field of insurance regulation to the States, saving only instances in which Congress expressly orders otherwise. If *309 Congress had meant generally to preempt the field for the States, Congress could have said, as the Ninth Circuit noted: "No federal statute [that does not say so explicitly] shall be construed to apply to the business of insurance." Merchants 50 F. 3d, (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24 ("The Act does not declare that `No Act of Congress shall apply to the business of insurance unless such Act specifically relates thereto.' "). Alternatively, Congress could have provided, as it did with respect to the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts, see 15 U.S. C. 1012(b), that federal legislation generally, or RICO in particular, would be "applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law," Moreover, 2(b)'s second prohibition bears attention in this regard. That proscription, barring construction of federal statutes to "invalidate, impair, or supersede" "any [state] law which imposes a fee or tax upon [the business of insurance]," belies any congressional intent to preclude federal regulation merely because the regulation imposes liability additional to, or greater than, state law. Were this not so, federal law would "impair" state insurance laws imposing fees or taxes whenever federal law imposed additional fees or greater tax liability. Under our federal system of dual taxation, however, it is scarcely in doubt that "generally applicable federal fees and taxes do not `invalidate, impair, or supersede' state insurance taxes and fees within the meaning of Section 2(b) where nothing precludes insurers from paying both." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26. While we reject any sort of field preemption, we also reject the polar opposite of that view, i. e., that Congress intended a green light for federal regulation whenever |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | that Congress intended a green light for federal regulation whenever the federal law does not collide head on with state regulation. The dictionary definition of "impair" is "[t]o weaken, to make *310 worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner." Black's Law Dictionary 752 (6th ed. 1990). The following formulation seems to us to capture that meaning and to construe, most sensibly, the text of 2(b): When federal law does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a State's administrative regime, the McCarranFerguson Act does not preclude its application. See Brief for National Association of Insurance Commissioners as Amicus Curiae 6-7. Our decision in is similar in tenor. In that case, we considered whether a New York law forbidding discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy was preempted by ERISA. State agencies and officials, appellants in Shaw, argued that the State's law was not preempted; they relied on ERISA 514(d), which provides that ERISA's preemption clause shall not be "construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States." 29 U.S. C. 1144(d). The state agencies and officials maintained that preempting the state law would impair the administration of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., as amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S. C. 2000e(k), for under the enforcement scheme Title VII accommodates, state remedies serve to promote compliance with federal antidiscrimination prescriptions. See -102. We held in Shaw that the New York law was preempted only to the extent it prohibited practices lawful under Title VII. See To the extent the New York law prohibited practices also prohibited under federal law, we explained, the New York law was not preempted; the blanket preemption urged by the employer appellees in Shaw, we pointed out, would "impair" Title VII by "frustrat[ing] the *311 goal of encouraging joint state/federal enforcement of [that federal measure]." Shaw thus supports the view that to "impair" a law is to hinder its operation or "frustrate [a] goal" of that law. Our standard accords with In that case, we upheld, in face of a McCarran-Ferguson Act challenge, the Securities and Exchange Commission's authority to unwind an insurance company merger that the Arizona Director of Insurance had approved. Our opinion pointed to the absence of any "direct conflict": "Arizona has not commanded something which the Federal Government seeks to prohibit. It has permitted respondents to |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | Federal Government seeks to prohibit. It has permitted respondents to consummate the merger; it did not order them to do so." But that statement did not stand alone. We also observed that "any `impairment' in [that] case [was] a most indirect one." And we concluded: "The paramount federal interest in protecting shareholders [was] perfectly compatible with the paramount state interest in protecting policyholders." There, as here, federal law did not "directly conflict with state regulation," application of federal law did not "frustrate any declared state policy," nor did it "interfere with a State's administrative regime." Applying the standard just announced to the facts of this case, we conclude that suit under RICO by policy beneficiaries would not "impair" Nevada law and therefore is not precluded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Nevada provides both statutory and common-law remedies to check insurance fraud. The Nevada Unfair Insurance Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 686A.010 et seq. (1996), patterned substantially on the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' model Unfair Trade Practices Act,[8] is a comprehensive administrative scheme that prohibits various forms of insurance *312 fraud and misrepresentation.[9] Under this legislation, Nevada's Insurance Commissioner has the authority to issue charges if there is reason to believe the Act has been violated, see 686A.160, and may issue cease and desist orders and administer fees, see 686A. Victims of insurance fraud may also pursue private actions under Nevada law. The Unfair Insurance Practices Act authorizes a private right of action for violations of a number of unfair insurance practices, including "[m]isrepresenting to insureds or claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverage," 686A.310(1)(a). See 686A.310(2) ("In addition to any rights or remedies available to the commissioner, an insurer is liable to its insured for any damages sustained by the insured as a result of the commission of any act set forth in subsection 1 as an unfair practice."). Moreover, the Act is not hermetically sealed; it does not exclude application of other state laws, statutory or decisional. Specifically, Nevada law provides that an insurer is under a common-law duty "to negotiate with its insureds in good faith and to deal with them fairly." ; see United States Fidelity & Guaranty[10] *313 Furthermore, aggrieved insured parties may be awarded punitive damages if a jury finds clear and convincing evidence that the insurer is guilty of "oppression, fraud or malice." Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(1) Nevada's punitive damages statute places certain limits on those damagesthree times the amount of compensatory damages if they are more than $100,000, and $300,000 if compensatories are less than $100,000. See 42.005(1)(a), (b). |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | majority | Humana Inc. v. Forsyth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118258/humana-inc-v-forsyth/ | $300,000 if compensatories are less than $100,000. See 42.005(1)(a), (b). But the same law adds that these limits do not apply to claims against "[a]n insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage." 42.005(2)(b).[11] Accordingly, plaintiffs seeking relief under Nevada law may be eligible for damages exceeding the treble damages available under RICO.[12] In sum, we see no frustration of state policy in the RICO litigation at issue here. RICO's private right of action and treble damages provision appears to complement Nevada's statutory and common-law claims for relief. In this regard, we note that Nevada filed no brief at any stage of this lawsuit urging that application of RICO to the alleged conduct would frustrate any state policy, or interfere with the State's administrative regime. Cf. We further note that insurers, too, have relied on the statute when they were the fraud victims. See, e. g., Aetna Casualty Surety ; see also Brief for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae 19-21. * * * Because RICO advances the State's interest in combating insurance fraud, and does not frustrate any articulated Nevada policy, we hold that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not block the respondent policy beneficiaries' recourse to RICO in this case. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Affirmed. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Black v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149285/black-v-united-states/ | In Skilling v. United States, decided today, ante, p. we vacated a conviction because the indictment rested, in part, on an improper construction of the “honest services” component of the federal ban on mail fraud, 18 U.S. C. 1346. A similar infirmity is present in this case. Here, too, the Government and trial court advanced an interpretation of rejected by the Court’s opinion in Skilling. Nevertheless, the Government urges, the convic tions of the defendants below, petitioners here, should be affirmed for an independent reason. At trial, the Govern ment pursued alternative theories: (1) money-or-property fraud; and (2) honest-services fraud. To pinpoint whether the jury based its verdict on money-or-property fraud, or honest-services fraud, or both, the Government proposed special interrogatories to accompany the verdict. The defendants resisted, preferring an unelaborated general verdict, and the Government ultimately acquiesced in that standard form of submission. The Court of Appeals held that the defendants, by op posing the Government-suggested special interrogatories, 2 BLACK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court forfeited their objection to the honest-services-fraud in structions given to the jury. (CA7 2008). We reverse that ruling. A criminal defendant, we hold, need not request special interrogatories, nor need he acquiesce in the Government’s request for discrete find ings by the jury, in order to preserve in full a timely raised objection to jury instructions on an alternative theory of guilt. I Petitioners Conrad Black, John Boultbee, and Mark Kipnis, as well as Peter Atkinson,1 (collectively, Defen dants) were leading executives of Hollinger International, Inc. (Hollinger), a publicly held U. S. company that, through subsidiaries, owned newspapers here and abroad. In 2005, the Government indicted Defendants on multiple counts, of prime concern here, three counts of mail fraud in violation of and 1346.2 Two theories were pur sued by the Government on each mail-fraud count. The Government charged that (1) Defendants stole millions from Hollinger by fraudulently paying themselves bogus “noncompetition fees”; and that (2) by failing to disclose their receipt of those fees, Defendants deprived Hollinger of their honest services as managers of the company. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a–54a. At the close of the four-month trial, the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois instructed the jury, discretely, on the theft-of-money-or-property and —————— 1 Peter Atkinson is a respondent in support of petitioners who quali fies for relief under this Court’s Rule 12.6. See Letter from Michael S. Schachter to the Clerk of Court (July 29, 2009). 2 Section 1341 criminalizes use of the mails to further “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Black v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149285/black-v-united-states/ | to further “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Section 1346 defines the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court honest-services deprivation theories advanced by the Government. at 235a. As to the latter, the District Court informed the jury, over Defendants’ objection, that a person commits honest-services fraud if he “misuse[s] his position for private gain for himself and/or a co-schemer” and “knowingly and intentionally breache[s] his duty of loyalty.” at 235a–236a. Before jury deliberations began, the Government asked the District Court to employ a special-verdict form, which would reveal, in the event that the jury voted to convict on a mail-fraud count, the theory or theories accounting for the verdict—money-or-property fraud, honest-services fraud, or both. See App. 430a.3 Defendants opposed the Government-proposed special interrogatories and urged, instead, standard general-verdict forms. at 432a. Comprehending, however, that in the event of a guilty verdict, “the jury’s specification of the [mail-]fraud theory might [aid] appellate review,” ib Defendants proposed an accommodation: Upon return of a guilty verdict on any mail-fraud count, jurors could be asked to specify the theory on which they relied, at 433a. The Government objected to special interrogatories presented to the jury postverdict, App. to Pet. for Cert. 222a, and the District Court declined to adopt that proce dure, at 225a.4 When the court rejected postverdict —————— 3 The Government proposed this language for each defendant on each mail-fraud count: “If you find the defendant Guilty with respect to [this Count], you must answer the following question by checking the applicable lines. “With respect to [this Count], we, the jury, find the following has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt (check all that apply): “Defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud [Hollinger] and its shareholders of money or property “Defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud [Hollinger] and its shareholders of their intangible right to honest services” App. 430a. 4 In her years at the bar and on the bench, the trial judge commented, 4 BLACK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court interrogatories, the Government represented that it would not object to submission of the mail-fraud counts for jury decision by general verdict. at 228a. The jury re turned general verdicts of “guilty” on the three mail-fraud counts;5 it also found defendant Black guilty of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S. C. and it acquitted |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Black v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149285/black-v-united-states/ | justice in violation of 18 U.S. C. and it acquitted Defendants on all other charges. On appeal, Defendants urged the invalidity of the jury instructions on honest-services fraud. Under the rule declared by this Court in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957), a general verdict may be set aside “where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on an other, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.” Relying on that rule, Defendants urged reversal of their mail-fraud convictions. The Court of Appeals found no infirmity in the honest-services instructions, 530 F.3d, at 600–602, but further determined that Defendants could not prevail even if those instructions were wrong, at 602–. For this determination, the court homed in on the Government’s special-verdict proposal. The challenge to the honest-services instructions would have become moot, the court observed, had the jury re ceived special-verdict forms separating money-or-property fraud from honest-services fraud, and reported on the forms that Defendants were not guilty of honest-services fraud. Defendants, the Court of Appeals reasoned, bore responsibility for the obscurity of the jury’s verdict. True, the court acknowledged, it was not incumbent on Defen dants to request special verdicts. But by resisting the Government’s proposal for separate findings on money-or property fraud and on honest-services fraud, and request —————— she had “absolutely” never seen the postverdict procedure used. App. to Pet. for Cert. 225a. 5 The District Court later granted Kipnis’ motion for judgment of acquittal on one of these counts. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court ing general verdicts instead, the Seventh Circuit con cluded, Defendants had “forfeited their objection to the [honest-services] instruction[s].” at Defendants’ suggestion of postverdict interrogatories did not, in the Court of Appeals’ view, overcome the forfeiture, for “[q]uestioning the jurors after they have handed down their verdict is not a good procedure and certainly not one that a district judge is required to employ.” Ibid.6 We granted certiorari in this case, 556 U. S. (2009), along with Skilling v. United States, 558 U. S. (2009), and Weyhrauch v. United States, 557 U. S. (2009), to determine what conduct Congress rendered criminal by proscribing, in fraudulent deprivation of “the in tangible right of honest services.” We also agreed to con sider in this case the question whether Defendants for feited their objection to the honest-services jury instructions by opposing the Government’s request for special verdicts. II We decided in Skilling that properly confined, criminalizes only schemes to defraud that involve bribes or kickbacks. See ante, p. That holding renders the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Black v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149285/black-v-united-states/ | bribes or kickbacks. See ante, p. That holding renders the honest-services instructions given in this case incorrect,7 and brings squarely before us the question presented by the Seventh Circuit’s forfeiture ruling: Did Defendants, by failing to acquiesce in the Government’s request for spe cial verdicts, forfeit their objection, timely made at trial, to the honest-services instructions? —————— 6 See, e.g., Jacobs Mfg. (CA8 1994) (“Postverdict interrogatories may imply the jury’s verdict is unjustified and cause the jury to answer the interrogatories in a man ner inconsistent with the verdict.”); cf. Yeager v. United States, 557 U. S. (2009) (slip op., at 11) (“Courts properly avoid explora tions into the jury’s sovereign space.”). 7 The scheme to defraud alleged here did not involve any bribes or kickbacks. 6 BLACK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court In addressing this issue, we note first the absence of any provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for submission of special questions to the jury. See Stein v. New York, (“Our own Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision for anything but a general verdict.”), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. Denno,8 The sole call for special findings in the Criminal Rules concerns nonjury trials. Rule 23(c) provides: “If a party [in a case tried without a jury] requests before the finding of guilty or not guilty, the court must state its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or opinion.” In contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for jury interrogatories of two kinds: special verdicts, which instruct the jury to return “a special written finding on each issue of fact,” Rule 49(a); and general verdicts with answers to “written questions on one or more issues of fact,” Rule 49(b).9 Although not dispositive,10 the ab sence of a Criminal Rule authorizing special verdicts counsels caution.11 —————— 8 The absence of a special verdict or interrogatory provision in the Criminal Rules is hardly accidental. See (“I should like to subject a verdict, as narrowly as was practical, to a review which should make it in fact, what we very elaborately pretend that it should be: a decision based upon law. In criminal prosecutions there may be, and in my judgment there are, other considerations which intervene to make such an attempt undesirable.”). 9 Although the special interrogatories requested by the Government in this case have been called “special verdicts” by the parties and the courts below, they more closely resemble what Civil Rule 49(b) de scribes as “general verdict[s] with answers to written questions.” (Capitalization omitted.) 10 |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Black v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149285/black-v-united-states/ | “general verdict[s] with answers to written questions.” (Capitalization omitted.) 10 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 57(b) (when there is no controlling law, “[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and the local rules of the district”). 11 By calling for caution, we do not mean to suggest that special ver dicts in criminal cases are never appropriate. See United States v. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court While the Criminal Rules are silent on special verdicts, they are informative on objections to instructions. Rule 30(d) “clarifies what counsel must do to preserve a claim of error regarding an instruction.” Advisory Com mittee’s Notes on 2002 Amendment on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 30(d), 18 U.S. C. App., p. 915. The Rule provides: “A party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate.” Defendants here, it is undisputed, complied with that requirement.12 The Court of Appeals, in essence, added a further re quirement for preservation of a meaningful objection to jury instructions. It devised a forfeiture sanction un moored to any federal statute or criminal rule. And it placed in the prosecutor’s hands authority to trigger the sanction simply by requesting a special verdict. See 530 —————— Ruggiero, (in complex Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cases, “it can be extremely useful for a trial judge to request the jury to record their specific dispositions of the separate predicate acts charged, in addition to their verdict of guilty or innocence”); (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] District Court should have the discre tion to use a jury interrogatory in cases where risk of prejudice to the defendant is slight and the advantage of securing particularized fact finding is substantial.”). 12 The Government asserts that Defendants’ opposition to a special verdict resulted in forfeiture not of their jury-instruction objection, but of their “Yates argument” that any instructional error may “requir[e] reversal.” Brief for United States 52, and n. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government thus appears to concede that Defen dants preserved their instructional challenge, but maintains that they are powerless to ask a court to assess the prejudicial effect of any error they may be able to demonstrate. See Reply Brief 29, n. 10 (on Gov ernment’s view, “[Defendants] could still ‘claim’ they were wrongly convicted, they just could not ask a court to do anything |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Black v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149285/black-v-united-states/ | they just could not ask a court to do anything about it”). We see little merit in the Government’s attempt to divorce preservation of a claim from preservation of the right to redress should the claim succeed. 8 BLACK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court F. 3d, at13 To boot, the Court of Appeals applied the sanction to Defendants, although they lacked any notice that forfeiture would attend their resistance to the Gov ernment’s special-verdict request. There is a Rule de signed to ward off judicial invention of the kind present here. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) admon ishes: “No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law [or] federal rules unless the alleged violator was fur nished with actual notice of the requirement before the noncompliance.” We hold, in short, that, by properly objecting to the honest-services jury instructions at trial, Defendants secured their right to challenge those instructions on appeal. They did not forfeit that right by declining to acquiesce in the Government-proposed special-verdict forms. Our decision in Skilling makes it plain that the honest-services instructions in this case were indeed incorrect. As in Skilling, ante, at 40–41, we express no opinion on the question whether the error was ultimately harmless, but leave that matter for consideration on remand.14 * * * For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceed ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— 13 Renderingthe Seventh Circuit’s forfeiture ruling all the more anomalous, at the time the trial court settled on the general verdict form, the Government was no longer pressing its special-verdict re quest. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 228a. 14 Black contends that spillover prejudice from evidence introduced on the mail-fraud counts requires reversal of his obstruction-of-justice conviction. Brief for Petitioners 47–49. That question, too, is one on which we express no opinion. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 1 Opinion of SCALIA, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–876 CONRAD M. BLACK, JOHN A. BOULTBEE, AND MARK S. KIPNIS, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [June 24, 2010] JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | Between 1976 and an statute required a jury that convicted a defendant of any one of a number of specified crimes "with aggravation" to "fix the punishment at death." (a) (1975).[1] The "sentence" *374 imposed by the jury, however, was not dispositive. Instead, "[n]otwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury," 13-11-4, the trial judge then was to hear evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and, after weighing those circumstances, to sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment without parole. This case concerns the constitutionality of the peculiar and unusual requirement of the 1975 Act that the jury "shall fix the punishment at death," even though the trial judge is the actual sentencing authority.[2] The United s Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the scheme was facially unconstitutional. Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court of with two dissenting votes, ruled to the contrary in the present case. Ex parte Baldwin, We granted certiorari to resolve this significant conflict. I A The facts are sordid, but a brief recital of them must be made. Petitioner Brian Keith Baldwin, then 18 years of age, escaped from a North prison camp on Saturday, March 12, That evening, he and a fellow escapee, Edward Horsley, came upon 16-year-old Naomi Rolon, who was having trouble with her automobile. The two forcibly took over her car and drove her to Charlotte, N. C. There, both men attempted to rape her, petitioner sodomized her, and the two attempted to choke her to death. They then ran over her with the car, locked her in its trunk, and left *375 her there while they drove through and Twice, when they heard the young woman cry out, they stopped the car, opened the trunk, and stabbed her repeatedly. On Monday afternoon, they stole a pickup truck, drove both vehicles to a secluded spot, and, after again using the car to run over the victim, cut her throat with a hatchet. She died after this 40-hour ordeal. Petitioner was apprehended the following day driving the stolen truck. He was charged with theft. While in custody, he confessed to the victim's murder and led the police to her body. He was then indicted for "robbery when the victim is intentionally killed," a capital offense, 13-11-2(a)(2), and was tried before a jury in Monroe County. At the close of the evidence regarding guilt or innocence, the judge instructed the jury that if it found the petitioner guilty, "the Legislature of the of has said this is a situation [in] which the punishment would be |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | this is a situation [in] which the punishment would be death by electrocution," Tr. 244-245, and the jury therefore would be required to sentence petitioner to death. The jury found petitioner guilty, in the terms of the statute, of robbery with the aggravated circumstance of intentionally killing the victim, and returned a verdict form that stated: "We, the Jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and fix his punishment at death by electrocution." App. 4. B Under 's 1975 Death Penalty Act, once a defendant was convicted of any one of 14 specified aggravated offenses, see (a) (1975), and the jury returned the required death sentence, the trial judge was obligated to hold a sentencing hearing: "[T]he court shall thereupon hold a hearing to aid the court to determine whether or not the court will sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment without parole. In the hearing, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to *376 sentence and shall include any matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in sections 13-11-6 and 13-11-7." 13-11-3. The judge was then required to sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment without parole: "Notwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, which shall be served without parole; or the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may accordingly sentence the defendant to death." 13-11-4. If the court imposed a death sentence, it was required to set forth in writing the factual findings from the trial and the sentencing hearing, including the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that formed the basis for the sentence. The judgment of conviction and sentence of death were subject to automatic review by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and, if that court affirmed, by the Supreme Court of 13-11-5, XX-XX-XXX; Ala. Rule App. Proc. 39(c). See ; rev'd on other grounds, rev'd sub nom. C Following petitioner's conviction, the trial judge held the sentencing hearing required by 13-11-3. The reintroduced the evidence submitted at trial, and introduced petitioner's juvenile and adult criminal records, as well as Edward Horsley's statement regarding the crime. Petitioner then took the stand and testified that he had "a hard *377 time growing up"; that he left home at the age of 13 because his |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | he left home at the age of 13 because his father did not like him to come home late at night; that he dropped out of school after the ninth grade; that he made a living by "street hustling"; that he had been arrested approximately 30 times; and that he was a drug addict. App. 8-10. At the conclusion of petitioner's testimony, the trial judge stated: "Brian Keith Baldwin, today is the day you have in court to tell this judge whatever is on your mind now is your time to tell the judge anything that you feel like might be helpful to you in the position that you find yourself in. I want to give you every opportunity in the world that I know about. Anything you feel like you can tell this Judge that will help you in your present position." Petitioner then complained about various aspects of his trial, and concluded: "I ain't saying I'm guilty but I might be guilty for murder but I ain't guilty for robbery down here. That's all I got to say." The judge stated that "having considered the evidence presented at the trial and at said sentence hearing," the court found the following aggravating circumstances: the capital offense was committed while petitioner was under a sentence of imprisonment in the of North from which he had escaped; petitioner previously had pleaded guilty to a felony involving the use of violence to the person; the capital offense was committed while petitioner was committing a robbery or in flight after the robbery; and the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.[3] The judge found that petitioner's age 18 at the *378 time of the crime was the only mitigating circumstance. He then stated: "The Court having considered the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is the judgment of the Court that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the death penalty as fixed by the jury should be and is hereby accepted." The Supreme Court of eventually affirmed the conviction and sentence.[4] In his argument to that court, petitioner contended that the 1975 Act was facially invalid. Tracking the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in 726 F. 2d, at 1516-1517, he argued that the jury's mandatory sentence was unconstitutional because it was unguided, standardless, and reflected no consideration of the particular defendant or crime, and that the judge's sentence was unconstitutional because it was based in part upon consideration of the impermissible jury sentence and was infected by it. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | of the impermissible jury sentence and was infected by it. The court rejected petitioner's arguments, *379 holding that even though the jury had no discretion regarding the "sentence" it would impose, the sentencing procedure was saved by the fact that it was the trial judge who was the true sentencing authority, and he considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing sentence. 456 So. 2d, 9.[5] II If the jury's "sentence" were indeed the dispositive sentence, the scheme would be unconstitutional under the principles announced in and Roberts See *380 also Roberts In Woodson, the Court held that North 's sentencing scheme, which imposed a mandatory death sentence for a broad category of homicidal offenses, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in three respects. First, such mandatory schemes offend contemporary standards of decency, as evidenced by the frequency with which jurors avoid the imposition of mandatory death sentences by disregarding their oaths and refusing to convict, and by the consistent movement of the s and Congress away from such schemes. -301. Second, by refusing to convict defendants who the jurors think do not deserve the death penalty, juries exercise unguided and unchecked discretion regarding who will be sentenced to death. Third, such mandatory schemes fail to allow particularized consideration of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense. 's requirement that the jury impose a mandatory sentence for a wide range of homicides, standing alone, would suffer each of those defects. The jury's mandatory "sentence," however, does not stand alone under the scheme. Instead, as has been described above, the trial judge thereafter conducts a separate hearing to receive evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and determines whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The judge's discretion is guided by the requirement that the death penalty be imposed only if the judge finds the aggravating circumstance that serves to define the capital crime in this case the fact that the homicide took place during the commission of a robbery and only if the judge finds that the definitional aggravating circumstance, plus any other specified aggravating circumstance,[6] outweighs *381 any statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 13-11-4. Petitioner accordingly does not argue that the judge's discretion under 13-11-4 is not "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action," Nor is there any issue before this Court that the 1975 Act did not allow "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors" by the sentencing judge that has been held constitutionally indispensable in capital ; see also *382 |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | been held constitutionally indispensable in capital ; see also *382 ; Petitioner's challenge to the scheme rests instead on the provision of the 1975 Act that allows the judge to weigh "the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury" in determining whether death is the appropriate sentence. 13-11-4. This Court has stated that a death sentence based upon consideration of "factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant," would violate the Constitution. Relying upon Zant, petitioner contends that, because the jury's mandatory "sentence" would be unconstitutional standing alone, it is an impermissible factor for the trial judge to consider, as the statute appears to require, in the sentencing process. That argument conceivably might have merit if the judge actually were required to consider the jury's "sentence" as a recommendation as to the sentence the jury believed would be appropriate, cf. and if the judge were obligated to accord some deference to it. The jury's verdict is not considered in that fashion, however, as the appellate courts' construction of the Act, as well as the judge's statements regarding the process by which he arrived at the sentence, so definitely indicates. A The language of 13-11-4, to be sure, in so many words does not preclude the sentencing judge from considering the jury's "sentence" in determining whether the death penalty is appropriate. The first clause of the section "the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment *383 without parole" does not authorize or require the court to weigh the jury's "sentence" in determining whether to refuse to impose the death penalty. The second clause "or the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may accordingly sentence the defendant to death" does seem to authorize consideration of the jury's "sentence." It is not clear whether the second clause allows consideration of the jury's "sentence" only if the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances authorized in the first clause has indicated that the "sentence" should not be rejected, or whether the second clause allows the judge to ignore the first clause and count the jury's "sentence" as a factor, similar to an aggravating circumstance, weighing in favor of the death penalty. We therefore look to the courts' construction of 13-11-4. See The |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | therefore look to the courts' construction of 13-11-4. See The appellate courts have interpreted the 1975 Act expressly to mean that the sentencing judge is to impose a sentence without regard to the jury's mandatory "sentence." The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated: "The jury's function is only to find guilt or innocence. The jury is not the sentencing authority." aff'd, cert. denied, Indeed, the court has gone so far as to state: "No sentence exists until the pronouncement by the trial judge at the conclusion of the sentence hearing. It is for this reason the court cannot be said to be commuting a sentence of death imposed by the jury, but, in truth and in fact, it is sentencing the accused after a jury's finding of guilt." rev'd on other grounds, *384 The court further has described the judge's role as follows: "The sentencing hearing is one of the most important and critical stages under 's death penalty law. The guilt stage has passed. Now an experienced trial judge must consider the particularized circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender and determine if the accused is to die or be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The trial evidence must be reviewed to determine all of the aggravating circumstances leading up to and culminating in the death of the victim and then all the mitigating circumstances must be considered in determining if any outweigh the aggravating circumstances so found in the trial court's findings of fact." aff'd, Conspicuously absent from the court's description of the judge's duty is any mention of according weight or deference to the jury's "sentence." The Supreme Court of agrees that "the jury is not the sentencing authority in" and has described the sentencing judge not as a reviewer of the jury's "sentence," but as the sentencer: "In the jury is not the body which finally determines which murderers must die and which must not. In fact, 's statute mandatorily requires the court to `hold a hearing to aid the court to determine whether or not the court will sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment without parole,' and specifically provides that the court may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and may `sentence' the defendant to death or life without parole. Code of Ala. 1975, 13-11-4. That section provides that if the court imposes a `sentence of death' it must set forth, in writing, the basis for the sentence." *385 See also Ritter v. ; B In this case, moreover, it is clear that the sentencing judge |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | this case, moreover, it is clear that the sentencing judge did not interpret the statute as requiring him to consider the jury's "sentence," because he never described the "sentence" as a factor in his deliberations. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge informed petitioner: "Let me say this: The jury has found you guilty of the crime of robbery with the aggravated circumstances of intentionally killing the victim and set your punishment at death by electrocution but the law of this state provides first that there will be an additional hearing in this case at which time the Court will consider aggravating circumstances, extenuating and all other circumstances, concerning the commission of this particular offense" (emphasis added). Tr. 249. In addition, in imposing the sentence, the judge stated: "The Court having considered the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is the judgment of the Court that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the death penalty as fixed by the jury should be and is hereby accepted" (emphasis added). App. 18. None of these statement indicates that the judge considered the jury's verdict to be a factor that he added, or that he was required to add, to the scale in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty, or that he believed the jury's verdict was entitled to a presumption of correctness. The judge, of course, knew the system and all that it signified, knew that the jury's "sentence" was mandatory, and knew that it did not reflect consideration of any mitigating circumstance. The judge logically, therefore, would not *386 have thought that he owed any deference to the jury's "sentence" on the issue whether the death penalty was appropriate for petitioner.[8] III Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that a judge's decision to impose the death penalty must be swayed by the fact that the jury returned a "sentence" of death. He points to this Court's opinion in which expressed some skepticism about the influence the jury's "sentence" would have on a judge. Beck held unconstitutional the provision of the 1975 Act that precluded the jury from considering lesser included noncapital offenses. The Court reasoned that the provision violated due process, because where the jury's only choices were to convict a defendant of the capital offense and "sentence" him to death, or to acquit him, but the evidence would have supported a lesser included offense verdict, the factfinding process was tainted with irrelevant considerations. On the one hand, the Court reasoned, the unavailability of the option of convicting |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | the Court reasoned, the unavailability of the option of convicting on a lesser included offense may encourage the jury to convict the defendant of a capital crime because it believes that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should be punished. On the other hand, the apparently mandatory nature of the death penalty may encourage the jury to acquit because it believes the defendant does not deserve the death penalty. The unavailability of the lesser included offense option, when it is warranted by the evidence, thus "introduce[s] a level of uncertainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital case." In so holding, this Court rejected 's argument that, even if the unavailability of a lesser included offense *387 led a jury erroneously to convict a defendant, the fact that the judge was the true sentencer would ensure that the defendant was not improperly sentenced to death. It reasoned: "[I]t is manifest that the jury's verdict must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did. Indeed, according to statistics submitted by the 's Attorney General, it is fair to infer that the jury verdict will ordinarily be followed by the judge even though he must hold a separate hearing in aggravation and mitigation before he imposes sentence. Under these circumstances, we are unwilling to presume that a post-trial hearing will always correct whatever mistakes have occurred in the performance of the jury's factfinding function." at -646 This Court's concern in Beck was that the judge would be inclined to accept the jury's factual finding that the defendant was guilty of a capital offense, not that the judge would be influenced by the jury's "sentence" of death. To "correct" an erroneous guilty verdict, the sentencing judge would have to determine that death was an inappropriate punishment, not because mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances, but because the defendant had not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Obviously, a judge will think hard about the jury's guilty verdict before basing a sentence on the belief that the defendant was not proved guilty of the capital offense. Indeed, the judge should think hard before rejecting the guilty verdict, because the determination of guilt is properly within the province of the jury, and the jury heard the same evidence regarding guilt as the judge. It does not follow, however, that the judge will be swayed to impose a sentence of death merely because the jury returned a mandatory death "sentence," when it had no opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,985 | 11 | majority | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | "sentence," when it had no opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances. The judge *388 knows that determination of the appropriate sentence is not within the jury's province, and that the jury does not consider evidence in mitigation in arriving at its "sentence." The jury's "sentence" means only that the jury found the defendant guilty of a capital crime that is, that it found the fact of intentional killing in the course of a robbery and that if the judge finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the judge is authorized to impose a sentence of death. The "sentence" thus conveys nothing more than the verdict of guilty, when it is read in conjunction with the provisions of the 1975 Act making the offense a capital crime, would convey. It defies logic to assume that a judge will be swayed to impose the death penalty by a "sentence" that has so little meaning. Despite its misdescribed label, it is not a sentence of death. Petitioner also argues that the requirement that the jury return a "sentence" of death "blurs" the issue of guilt with the issue whether death is the appropriate punishment, and may cause the jury arbitrarily to nullify the mandatory death penalty by acquitting a defendant who is proved guilty, but who the jury, without any guidance, finds undeserving of the death penalty. Petitioner's argument stems from Woodson, where the plurality opinion noted that American juries "persistently" have refused to convict "a significant portion" of those charged with first-degree murder in order to avoid mandatory death-penalty statutes, and expressed concern that the unguided exercise of the power to nullify a mandatory sentence would lead to the same "wanton" and "arbitrary" imposition of the death penalty that troubled the Court in 428 U. S., The scheme, however, has not resulted in such arbitrariness. Juries deliberating under the 1975 statute did not act to nullify the mandatory "sentence" by refusing to convict in a significant number of cases; indeed, only 2 of the first 50 defendants tried for capital crimes during the time the 1975 Act was in effect were acquitted. See n. 18. Thus, while the specter of a mandatory *389 death sentence may have made juries more prone to acquit, thereby benefiting the two defendants acquitted, it did not render 's scheme unconstitutionally arbitrary. IV The wisdom and phraseology of 's curious 1975 statute surely are open to question, as 's abandonment of the statutory scheme in perhaps indicates.[9] This Court has made clear, however, that "we are unwilling to say that there is any one |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | Petitioner, David Patchak, sued the Secretary of the Interior for taking land into trust on behalf of an Indian Tribe. While his suit was pending in the District Court, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act or Act), Pub. L. 113–179, 128 Stat. 3, which provides that suits relating to the land “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.” Patchak contends that, in enacting this statute, Congress impermissibly infringed the judicial power that Article III of the Constitution vests exclusively in the Judicial Branch. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. I The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (Band) resides in southwestern Michigan, near the township of Wayland. The Band traces its relation- ship with the United States back hundreds of years, point- 2 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. ing to treaties it negotiated with the Federal Government as early as 1795. But the Secretary of the Interior did not formally recognize the Band until 1999. See 63 Fed. Reg. 56936 ; After obtaining formal recognition, the Band identified a 147-acre parcel of land in Wayland, known as the Bradley Property, where it wanted to build a casino. The Band asked the Secretary to invoke the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S. C. and take the Brad- ley Property into trust.1 In 2005, the Secretary agreed and posted a notice informing the public that the Bradley Property would be taken into trust for the Band. See 70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (2005). The Michigan Gambling Opposition (MichGO) sued, alleging that the Secretary’s decision violated federal environmental and gaming laws. After several years of litigation, the D. C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of MichGo’s claims, and this Court denied certiorari. Michi- gan Gambling (2008), cert. denied, In January the Secretary formally took the Bradley Property into trust. And in February 2011, the Band opened its casino. Before the Secretary formally took the land into trust, a nearby landowner, David Patchak, filed another lawsuit challenging the Secretary’s decision. Invoking the Admin- istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. 706(2), Patchak alleged that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the Bradley Property into trust for the Band. The Indian Reorganization Act does not allow the Secretary to take land into trust for tribes that were not under federal —————— 1 Federal law allows Indian tribes to operate casinos on “Indian lands,” 25 U.S. C. which includes lands “held in trust by the United States for the benefit |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | “held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe,” Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of THOMAS, J. jurisdiction when the statute was enacted in 1934. See The Band was not federally recognized until 1999, which Patchak argued was more than 65 years too late. Based on this alleged statutory violation, Patchak sought to reverse the Secretary’s decision to take the Bradley Prop- erty into trust. The Secretary raised preliminary objections to Patchak’s suit, contending that it was barred by sovereign immunity and that Patchak lacked prudential standing to bring it. The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, but the D. C. Circuit reversed. rev’d, (2011). This Court granted certiorari and affirmed the D. C. Circuit. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Potta- watomi (Patchak I ). This Court’s decision in Patchak I held that Congress had waived the Secretary’s sovereign immunity from suits like Patchak’s. at 215–224. It also held that Patchak had prudential standing because his suit arguably fell within the “zone of interests” protected by the Indian Reorganization Act. at 224–228. Because Patchak had standing and the Secretary lacked immunity, this Court concluded that “Patchak’s suit may proceed,” at and remanded for further proceedings, In September 2014, while Patchak’s suit was back in the District Court, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Act, 128 Stat. 3. Section 2(a) of the Act states that the Bradley Property “is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust are ratified and confirmed.” Section 2(b) then provides the following: “NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Fed- eral court as of the date of enactment of this Act) re- 4 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. lating to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.” Based on the District Court entered summary judg- ment against Patchak and dismissed his suit for lack of jurisdiction. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (2016). It held that “[t]he language of the Gun Lake Act makes plain that Congress has stripped federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction” over suits, like Patchak’s, that relate to the Bradley Property. The D. C. Circuit rejected Patchak’s argument that vio- lates Article III of the Constitution. –1003. Article III prohibits Congress from “direct[ing] the result of pending litigation,” the D. C. Circuit reasoned, but it does not prohibit Congress from “ ‘supply[ing] new law.’ ” |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | does not prohibit Congress from “ ‘supply[ing] new law.’ ” ). Section 2(b) supplies new law: “[I]f an action relates to the Bradley Property, it must promptly be dismissed.” We granted certiorari to review whether violates Article III of the Constitution.2 See 581 U. S. (2017). Because it does not, we now affirm. II A The Constitution creates three branches of Government and vests each branch with a different type of power. See Art. I, Art. II, cl. 1; Art. III, “To the legislative department has been committed the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of executing them; and to the —————— 2 Patchak does not challenge the constitutionality of of the Gun Lake Act. See Reply Brief 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. We thus limit our analysis to Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of THOMAS, J. judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the courts.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, ; see also Wayman v. Southard, (“[T]he legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judici- ary construes the law”). By vesting each branch with an exclusive form of power, the Framers kept those powers separate. See 2 U.S. 919, 9 Each branch “exercise[s] the powers appropriate to its own department,” and no branch can “encroach upon the powers confided to the others.” This system prevents “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,” The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison)—an accumula- tion that would pose an inherent “threat to liberty,” Clin- (KENNEDY, J., concurring). The separation of powers, among other things, prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power. See v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., One way that Congress can cross the line from legislative power to judicial power is by “usurp[ing] a court’s power to interpret and apply the law to the [circumstances] before it.” Bank v. Peterson, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 12). The simplest example would be a statute that says, “In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” See at –, n. 17 (slip op., at 12–13, n. 17). At the same time, the legislative power is the power to make law, and Con- gress can make laws that apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even when it effectively ensures that one side wins. See at – (slip op., at 15–19). To distinguish between permissible exercises of the legislative power and impermissible infringements of the judicial power, this Court’s precedents establish the fol- lowing rule: Congress violates Article III when it “com- 6 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | Article III when it “com- 6 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. pel[s] findings or results under old law.” Seattle But Congress does not violate Article III when it “changes the law.” at B Section 2(b) changes the law. Specifically, it strips federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the Bradley Property. Before the Gun Lake Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. See 28 U.S. C. Now they do not. This kind of legal change is well within Congress’ authority and does not violate Article III. 1 Section 2(b) strips federal jurisdiction over suits relating to the Bradley Property. The statute uses jurisdictional language. It states that an “action” relating to the Brad- ley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court.” It imposes jurisdictional consequences: Actions relating to the Bradley Property “shall be promptly dis- missed.” See Ex parte (“[W]hen [jurisdiction] ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause”). Section 2(b) has no exceptions. Cf. Reed Elsevier, And it applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” including the general grant of federal-question juris- diction, 28 U.S. C. Although does not use the word “jurisdiction,” this Court does not require jurisdic- tional statutes to “incant magic words.” Indeed, uses language similar to other statutes that this Court has deemed jurisdictional. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, (“ ‘[n]o person shall file or prosecute’ ” (quoting )); Wein- Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of THOMAS, J. (“ ‘[n]o action shall be brought under [28 U.S. C. ” (quoting 42 U.S. C. Our conclusion that is jurisdictional is bolstered by the fact that it cannot plausibly be read as anything else. Section 2(b) is not one of the nonjurisdictional rules that this Court’s precedents have identified as “important and mandatory” but not governing “a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” (2011). Section 2(b) does not identify an “element of [the] plaintiff’s claim for relief” or otherwise define its “substan- tive adequacy.” 5 U.S. 500, 516, 504 (2006). Nor is it a “claim-processing rule,” like a filing deadline or an exhaustion requirement, that re- quires the parties to “take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” at In- stead, completely prohibits actions relating to the Bradley Property. Because addresses “a court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases,” Wachovia Bank, N. 5 U.S. 303, (2006), it is best read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute. 2 Statutes that strip jurisdiction “chang[e] the law” for the purpose of Article III, at just as much as other |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | purpose of Article III, at just as much as other exercises of Congress’ legislative authority. Article I permits Congress “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,” and Article III vests the judicial power “in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab- lish,” These provisions reflect the so-called Madison- ian Compromise, which resolved the Framers’ disagree- ment about creating lower federal courts by leaving that decision to Congress. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997); 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 125 (M. Farrand ed. 1). Congress’ greater 8 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. power to create lower federal courts includes its lesser power to “limit the jurisdiction of those Courts.” United ; accord, Lockerty v. Phillips, So long as Congress does not violate other constitutional provisions, its “control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts” is “plenary.” 63–64 (14); see also (2007) (“Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider”). Thus, when Congress strips federal courts of jurisdic- tion, it exercises a valid legislative power no less than when it lays taxes, coins money, declares war, or invokes any other power that the Constitution grants it. Indeed, this Court has held that Congress generally does not violate Article III when it strips federal jurisdic- tion over a class of cases.3 Shortly after the Civil War, for example, Congress repealed this Court’s appellate juris- diction over certain habeas corpus cases. See Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, ; see also U. S. Const., Art. III, (permitting Congress to make “Exceptions” to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction). William a military prisoner whose appeal was pending at the time, argued that the repealing statute was “an exercise by the Congress of judicial power.” This Court disagreed. Jurisdiction-stripping statutes, the Court explained, do not involve “the exercise of judicial power” or “legislative interference with courts in the exercising of continuing jurisdiction.” at Because jurisdiction —————— 3 Jurisdiction-stripping statutes can violate other provisions of the Constitution. And, under our precedents, jurisdiction-stripping stat- utes can violate Article III if they “attemp[t] to direct the result” by effectively altering legal standards that Congress is “powerless to prescribe.” Bank v. Peterson, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 15) (citing United 1–147 (2)). Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of THOMAS, J. is the “power to declare the law” in the first place, “judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Con- stitution and the laws confer.” at –515.4 This Court has reaffirmed these principles on many occasions. Congress generally does not infringe the judi- cial power when it strips jurisdiction because, with limited exceptions, a congressional grant of jurisdiction is a pre- requisite to the exercise of judicial power. See Steel v. Citizens for Better Environment, –95 (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established —————— 4 The dissent appears to disagree with questions the mo- tives of the unanimous Court that decided it, asserts that it is “incon- sistent” with and distinguishes it on the ground that the statute there “did not foreclose all avenues of judicial review.” Post, at 12–13 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). But the core holding of —that Congress does not exercise the judicial power when it strips jurisdiction over a class of cases—has never been questioned, has been repeatedly reaffirmed, and was reaffirmed in itself. See (“[T]here could be no doubt” that Congress can “den[y] the right of appeal in a particular class of cases”). And if there is any inconsistency between the two, this Court has said that it is —not — that “cannot [be] take[n] ‘at face value.’ ” Bank 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 15) ). Moreover, it is true that empha- sized that the statute there did not withdraw “the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus.” (empha- sis added). But ’s reservation, this Court later explained, was responding to a potential problem under the Suspension Clause, not a potential problem under Article III. See Ex parte Yerger, 102–103 (“We agree that [jurisdiction] is given subject to excep- tion and regulation by Congress; but it is too plain for argument that the denial to this court of appellate jurisdiction in this class of cases must greatly weaken the efficacy of the writ”); (“It would have been a remarkable anomaly if this court had been denied, under a constitution which absolutely prohibits suspension of the writ, except under extraordinary exigencies, that power in cases of alleged unlawful restraint”). 10 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ ” (quoting Mans- field, C. & L. M. R. (1884))); (“[T]he judicial power of the United States is (except in enu- merated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent entirely upon the action of Congress”); at “To deny this position” would undermine the separation of powers by “elevat[ing] the judicial over |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | undermine the separation of powers by “elevat[ing] the judicial over the legislative branch.” at Congress’ power over federal jurisdiction is “an es- sential ingredient of separation and equilibration of pow- ers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently re- garding certain subjects.” Steel In sum, strips jurisdiction over suits relating to the Bradley Property. It is a valid exercise of Congress’ legislative power. And because it changes the law, it does not infringe the judicial power. The constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping statutes like this one is well established. III Patchak does not dispute Congress’ power to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts. He instead raises two arguments why violates Article III, even if it strips jurisdiction. First, relying on United 13 Wall. 128 (2), Patchak argues that flatly directs federal courts to dismiss lawsuits without allowing them to interpret or apply any new law. Second, relying on Patchak argues that attempts to interfere with this Court’s decision in Patchak I— specifically, its conclusion that his suit “may proceed,” 567 U.S., at We reject both arguments. Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 11 Opinion of THOMAS, J. A Section 2(b) does not flatly direct federal courts to dis- miss lawsuits under old law. It creates new law for suits relating to the Bradley Property, and the District Court interpreted and applied that new law in Patchak’s suit. Section 2(b)’s “relating to” standard effectively guaranteed that Patchak’s suit would be dismissed. But “a statute does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts.” Bank 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 17). “[I]t is not any the less a case or controversy upon which a court pos- sessing the federal judicial power may rightly give judg- ment” when the arguments before the court are “uncon- tested or incontestable.” Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11 (14). Patchak argues that the last four words of —“shall be promptly dismissed”—direct courts to reach a particu- lar outcome. But a statute does not violate Article III merely because it uses mandatory language. See Seattle 503 U.S., at Instead of directing outcomes, the mandatory language in “simply imposes the consequences” of a court’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction because a suit relates to the Bradley Property. ; see 7 Wall., at5 Patchak compares to the statute this Court held unconstitutional in In that case, the administrator —————— 5 To prove that it does not change the law, Patchak repeatedly asserts that does not amend any “generally applicable” statute. |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | repeatedly asserts that does not amend any “generally applicable” statute. Brief for Petitioner 11; Reply Brief 1, 4, 9. But this Court rejected that same argument in Seattle Congress can change a law “directly,” or it can change a law indirectly by passing “an entirely separate statute.” 503 U.S., at –440. Either way, it changes the law. The same is true for jurisdictional statutes. See Insurance v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541 (1867). 12 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. of the estate of V. F. Wilson, a former Confederate soldier, sued to recover the value of some cotton that the Govern- ment had seized during the The relevant statute required claimants to prove their loyalty in order to reclaim their property. Ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820. Wilson had received a pardon before he died, 13 Wall., at 132, and this Court had held that pardons con- clusively prove loyalty under the statute, see United (0). But after Wilson’s administrator secured a judgment in his favor, 13 Wall., at 132, Congress passed a statute making pardons proof of disloyalty and declaring that, if a claimant had accepted one, “the jurisdiction of the court in the case shall cease, and the court shall forthwith dismiss the suit of such claimant.” Act of July 12, 0, If the court had already entered judgment in favor of a pardoned claimant and the Government had appealed, the statute instructed this Court to dismiss the whole suit for lack of jurisdiction. See held that this statute in- fringed the executive power by attempting to “change the effect of a pardon.” also held that the statute infringed the judicial power, see although its reasons for this latter holding were not en- tirely clear. This Court has since explained that “the statute in infringed the judicial power, not because it left too little for courts to do, but because it attempted to direct the result without altering the legal standards governing the effect of a pardon—standards Congress was powerless to prescribe.” Bank at (slip op., at 15). Congress had no authority to declare that pardons are not evidence of loyalty, so it could not achieve the same result by stripping jurisdiction whenever claimants cited pardons as evidence of loyalty. See 13 Wall., –148. Nor could Congress confer jurisdiction to a federal court but then strip jurisdiction from that same court once the Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 13 Opinion of THOMAS, J. court concluded that a pardoned claimant should prevail under the statute. See at 1–147. Patchak’s attempts to compare to the statute in are unpersuasive. |
Justice Thomas | 2,018 | 1 | majority | Patchak v. Zinke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4471243/patchak-v-zinke/ | Patchak’s attempts to compare to the statute in are unpersuasive. Section 2(b) does not attempt to exercise a power that the Constitution vests in another branch. And unlike the selective jurisdiction-stripping statute in strips jurisdiction over every suit relating to the Bradley Property. Indeed, itself explained that statutes that do “nothing more” than strip jurisdiction over “a particular class of cases” are constitu- tional. That is precisely what does. B Section 2(b) does not unconstitutionally interfere with this Court’s decision in Patchak I. Article III, this Court explained in prohibits Congress from “retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments.” U.S., at 219. But Patchak I did not finally conclude Patchak’s case. See When this Court said that his suit “may proceed,” 567 U.S., at it meant that the Secretary’s preliminary defenses lacked merit and that Patchak could return to the District Court for further proceedings. It did not mean that Congress was powerless to change the law that governs his case. As this Court emphasized in Article III does not prohibit Con- gress from enacting new laws that apply to pending civil cases. See U.S., at 226–227. When a new law clearly governs pending cases, Article III does not prevent courts from applying it because “each court, at every level, must ‘decide according to existing laws.’ ” ). This principle applies equally to statutes that strip jurisdiction. See (19); Kline v. Burke Constr. (1922); (6). 14 PATCHAK v. ZINKE Opinion of THOMAS, J. Because expressly references “pending” cases, it applies to Patchak’s suit. And because Patchak’s suit is not final, applying here does not offend Article III.6 Of course, we recognize that the Gun Lake Act was a response to this Court’s decision in Patchak I. The text of the Act, after all, cites both the administrative decision and the property at issue in that case. See §–(b). And we understand why Patchak would view the Gun Lake Act as unfair. By all accounts, the Band exercised its political influence to persuade Congress to enact a narrow jurisdiction-stripping provision that effectively ends all lawsuits threatening its casino, including Patchak’s. But the question in this case is “[n]ot favoritism, nor even corruption, but power.” ; see also 7 Wall., at (“We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution”). Under this Court’s precedents, Congress has the power to “apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases,” Bank 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 16), even when the legislation “govern[s] one or a very |
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