author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | a new claim was "not intended to foreclose judicial application of the abuse-of-writ principle as developed in Wong Doo and Price." Sanders also recognized our special responsibility in the development of habeas corpus with respect to another provision of the 148 revision of the judicial code, 28 U.S. C. 2255 (164 ed.). The statute created a new postconviction remedy for federal prisoners with a provision for repetitive petitions different from the one found in 2244. While 2244 permitted dismissal of subsequent habeas petitions that "present[ed] no new ground not theretofore presented and determined," 2255 allowed a federal district court to refuse to entertain a subsequent petition seeking "similar relief." On its face, 2255 appeared to announce a much stricter abuse-of-the-writ standard than its counterpart in 2244. We concluded in Sanders, however, that the language in 2255 "cannot be taken literally," and construed it to be the "material equivalent" of the abuse standard in 2244. Sanders v. United -14. In addition to answering these questions, Sanders undertook a more general "formulation of basic rules to guide the lower federal courts" concerning the doctrine of abuse of the After reiterating that the government must plead abuse of the writ and the petitioner must refute a well-pleaded allegation, Sanders addressed the definition of and rationale for the doctrine. It noted that equitable principles governed abuse of the writ, including "the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may *485 disentitle him to the relief he seeks," and that these principles must be applied within the sound discretion of district courts. The Court furnished illustrations of writ abuse: "Thus, for example, if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground. The same may be true if, as in Wong Doo, the prisoner deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing. Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless, piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay." The Court also cited and for further guidance on the doctrine of abuse of the writ, stating that the principles of those cases "govern equally here." 373 U.S., Finally, Sanders established that federal courts must reach the merits of an abusive petition if "the ends of justice demand." |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | of an abusive petition if "the ends of justice demand." Three years after Sanders, Congress once more amended the habeas corpus statute. The amendment was an attempt to alleviate the increasing burden on federal courts caused by successive and abusive petitions by "introducing a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 17, 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (166); see also H. R. Rep. No. 182, 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (166). The amendment recast 2244 into three subparagraphs. Subparagraph (a) deletes the reference to state prisoners in the old 2244 but left the provision otherwise intact. 28 U.S. C. 2244(a). Subparagraph (c) states that where a state prisoner seeks relief for an alleged denial of a federal *486 constitutional right before this Court, any decision rendered by the Court shall be "conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right" 28 U.S. C. 2244(c). Congress added subparagraph (b) to address repetitive applications by state prisoners: "(b) When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United or a justice or judge of the United release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United or a justice or judge of the United unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the " 28 U.S. C. 2244(b). Subparagraph (b) establishes a "qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." S. Rep. No. 17, It states that a federal court "need not entertain" a second or subsequent habeas petition "unless" the petitioner satisfies two conditions. First, the subsequent petition must allege a new ground, factual or otherwise. Second, the applicant must satisfy the judge that he did not deliberately withhold the ground earlier or "otherwise abus[e] the " See ("essential question [under 2244(b)] is whether the petitioner `deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground' in the prior proceeding, or `otherwise abused the writ'"). If the petitioner meets these |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | or `otherwise abused the writ'"). If the petitioner meets these conditions, the court must consider the subsequent petition * as long as other habeas errors, such as nonexhaustion, 28 U.S. C. 2254(b), or procedural default, are not present. Section 2244(b) raises, but does not answer, other questions. It does not state whether a district court may overlook a deliberately withheld or otherwise abusive claim to entertain the petition in any event. That is, it does not state the limits on the district court's discretion to entertain abusive petitions. Nor does the statute define the term "abuse of the " As was true of similar silences in the original 148 version of 2244, however, see Congress did not intend 2244(b) to foreclose application of the court-announced principles defining and limiting a district court's discretion to entertain abusive petitions. See U.S. 320, Rule (b) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings, promulgated in 176, also speaks to the problem of new grounds for relief raised in subsequent petitions. It provides: "A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the " 28 U.S. C. 2254 Rule (b). Like 28 U.S. C. 2244(b), Rule (b) "incorporates the judge-made principle governing the abuse of the writ set forth in Sanders." ; (same). The Advisory Committee Notes make clear that a new claim in a subsequent petition should not be entertained if the judge finds the failure to raise it earlier "inexcusable." Advisory Committee Notes to *488 Rule 28 U.S. C., pp. 426-427. The Notes also state that a retroactive change in the law and newly discovered evidence represent acceptable excuses for failing to raise the claim earlier. In recent years we have applied the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine in various contexts. In the petitioner offered no explanation for asserting three claims in a second federal habeas petition not raised in the first. Five Justices inferred from the lack of explanation that the three claims "could and should have been raised in" the first petition, and that the failure to do so constituted abuse of the at 378-3, and 3 (, J., joined by four Justices, concurring in grant of application to vacate stay). Similarly, in we upheld the Court of Appeals' judgment that claims presented for the first time in a second federal petition constituted |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | for the first time in a second federal petition constituted an abuse of the We rejected petitioner's argument that he should be excused from his failure to raise the claims in the first federal petition because his counsel during first federal habeas prepared the petition in haste and did not have time to become familiar with the case. 05-206, and 4. And just last Term, we held that claims raised for the first time in a fourth federal habeas petition abused the writ because they "could have been raised" or "could have been developed" in the first federal habeas petitio at See also (petition that raises grounds "available but not relied upon in a prior petition" is an example of abuse of the writ); (new arguments in second petition that "plainly could have been raised earlier" constitute abuse of the writ); at (prisoner who proceeds with exhausted claims in first federal *48 petition and deliberately sets aside his unexhausted claims risks dismissal of subsequent federal petitions). III Our discussion demonstrates that the doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions. Because of historical changes and the complexity of the subject, the Court has not "always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ." -412. Today we attempt to define the doctrine of abuse of the writ with more precisio Although our decisions on the subject do not all admit of ready synthesis, one point emerges with clarity: Abuse of the writ is not confined to instances of deliberate abandonment. Sanders mentioned deliberate abandonment as but one example of conduct that disentitled a petitioner to relief. Sanders cited a passage in 372 U. S., at which applied the principle of inexcusable neglect, and noted that this principle also governs in the abuse-of-the-writ context, Sanders v. United 373 U. S., As Sanders' reference to Townsend demonstrates, as many Courts of Appeals recognize, see, e. g., 80 F. 2d, (case below); ; ; and as McCleskey concedes, Brief for Petitioner 3-40, 45-48, a petitioner may abuse the writ by failing to raise a claim through inexcusable neglect. Our recent decisions confirm that a petitioner can abuse the writ by raising a claim in a subsequent petition that he could have raised in his first, regardless of whether the failure to raise it earlier stemmed from a deliberate choice. See, e. g., U. S., at ; 05-206. See also 28 U.S. C. 2244(b) (recognizing that a petitioner *40 |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | also 28 U.S. C. 2244(b) (recognizing that a petitioner *40 can abuse the writ in a fashion that does not constitute deliberate abandonment). The inexcusable neglect standard demands more from a petitioner than the standard of deliberate abandonment. But we have not given the former term the content necessary to guide district courts in the ordered consideration of allegedly abusive habeas corpus petitions. For reasons we explain below, a review of our habeas corpus precedents leads us to decide that the same standard used to determine whether to excuse state procedural defaults should govern the determination of inexcusable neglect in the abuse-of-the-writ context. The prohibition against adjudication in federal habeas corpus of claims defaulted in state court is similar in purpose and desigu to the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, which in general prohibits subsequent habeas consideration of claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first federal habeas proceeding. The terms "abuse of the writ" and "inexcusable neglect," on the one hand, and "procedural default," on the other, imply a background norm of procedural regularity binding on the petitioner. This explains the presumption against habeas adjudication both of claims defaulted in state court and of claims defaulted in the first round of federal habeas. A federal habeas court's power to excuse these types of defaulted claims derives from the court's equitable discretio See ; Sanders v. United 373 U. S., In habeas, equity recognizes that "a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks." For these reasons, both the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine and our procedural default jurisprudence concentrate on a petitioner's acts to determine whether he has a legitimate excuse for failing to raise a claim at the appropriate time. The doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ implicate nearly identical concerns flowing from the significant *41 costs of federal habeas corpus review. To begin with, the writ strikes at finality. One of the law's very objects is the finality of its judgments. Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is know "Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." 48 U.S. 288, 30 And when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the "`erosion of memory' and `dispersion of witnesses' that occur with the passage of time," prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudicatio Though may have cast doubt upon these propositions, since Fay we have taken care in our habeas corpus decisions to reconfirm the importance of finality. See, e. g., at 308-30; |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | reconfirm the importance of finality. See, e. g., at 308-30; ; ; Finality has special importance in the context of a federal attack on a state convictio at ; Reexamination of state convictions on federal habeas "frustrate[s] `both the ' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.'" at (quoting ). Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them. Habeas review extracts further costs. Federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes. (173) Finally, habeas corpus review may give litigants incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes and may establish disincentives to *42 present claims when evidence is fresh. ; 433 U. S., at 8. Far more severe are the disruptions when a claim is presented for the first time in a second or subsequent federal habeas petitio If "[c]ollateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused," at 126-, the ordeal worsens during subsequent collateral proceedings. Perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal justice system. "A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of underlying substantive commands. There comes a point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility." Bator, -453 If reexamination of a conviction in the first round of federal habeas stretches resources, examination of new claims raised in a second or subsequent petition spreads them thinner still. These later petitions deplete the resources needed for federal litigants in the first instance, including litigants commencing their first federal habeas actio The phenomenon calls to mind Justice Jackson's admonition that "[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones." And if reexamination of convictions in the first round of habeas offends federalism and comity, the offense increases when a State must defend its conviction in a second or subsequent habeas proceeding on grounds not even raised in the first petitio The federal writ of habeas corpus overrides all these considerations, essential as they are to the rule of law, when a petitioner raises a meritorious constitutional claim in a *43 |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | a petitioner raises a meritorious constitutional claim in a *43 proper manner in a habeas petitio Our procedural default jurisprudence and abuse-of-the-writ jurisprudence help define this dimension of procedural regularity. Both doctrines impose on petitioners a burden of reasonable compliance with procedures designed to discourage baseless claims and to keep the system open for valid ones; both recognize the law's interest in finality; and both invoke equitable principles to define the court's discretion to excuse pleading and procedural requirements for petitioners who could not comply with them in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. It is true that a habeas court's concern to honor state procedural default rules rests in part on respect for the integrity of procedures "employed by a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system," and that such respect is not implicated when a petitioner defaults a claim by failing to raise it in the first round of federal habeas review. Nonetheless, the doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ are both designed to lessen the injury to a State that results through reexamination of a state conviction on a ground that the State did not have the opportunity to address at a prior, appropriate time; and both doctrines seek to vindicate the State's interest in the finality of its criminal judgments. We conclude from the unity of structure and purpose in the jurisprudence of state procedural defaults and abuse of the writ that the standard for excusing a failure to raise a claim at the appropriate time should be the same in both contexts. We have held that a procedural default will be excused upon a showing of cause and prejudice. We now hold that the same standard applies to determine if there has been an abuse of the writ through inexcusable neglect. In procedural default cases, the cause standard requires the petitioner to show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in state court. Objective *44 factors that constitute cause include "`interference by officials'" that makes compliance with the State's procedural rule impracticable, and "a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel." In addition, constitutionally "[i]neffective assistance of counsel is cause." Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause and will not excuse a procedural default. Once the petitioner has established cause, he must show "`actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of which he complains." United v. Frady, Federal courts retain the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow class of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show cause for a procedural default. These are extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime. We have described this class of cases as implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The cause and prejudice analysis we have adopted for cases of procedural default applies to an abuse-of-the-writ inquiry in the following manner. When a prisoner files a second or subsequent application, the government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the The government satisfies this burden if, with clarity and particularity, it notes petitioner's prior writ history, identifies the claims that appear for the first time, and alleges that petitioner has abused the The burden to disprove abuse then becomes petitioner's. To excuse his failure to raise the claim earlier, he must show cause for failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom as those concepts have been defined in our procedural default decisions. The petitioner's opportunity to meet the burden of cause and prejudice will not include an evidentiary hearing if the district court determines as a matter of law that petitioner cannot satisfy the standard. If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may * nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim. Application of the cause and prejudice standard in the abuse-of-the-writ context does not mitigate the force of 48 U.S. 288 which prohibits, with certain exceptions, the retroactive application of new law to claims raised in federal habeas. Nor does it imply that there is a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus. See Although the cause and prejudice standard differs from some of the language in it is consistent with Cuddy, Salinger, Wong Doo, and Sanders, as well as our modern abuse-of-the-writ decisions, including Antone, Woodard, and Delo. In addition, the exception to cause for fundamental miscarriages of justice gives meaningful content to the otherwise unexplained "ends of justice" inquiry mandated by Sanders. Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" from the 148 version of 2244. 28 U.S. C. 2244 (164 ed.) (judge need not entertain subsequent application if he is satisfied that "the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry"). Sanders v. United 373 U. S., -17. Although the 166 revision to the habeas statute eliminated any reference to an "ends of justice" inquiry, a plurality of the |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | to an "ends of justice" inquiry, a plurality of the Court in held that this inquiry remained appropriate, and required federal courts to entertain successive petitions when a petitioner supplements a constitutional claim with a "colorable showing of factual innocence." The miscarriage of justice exception to cause serves as "an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty," 428 U. S., at 42-43, 31, guaranteeing that the ends of justice will be served in full. *46 Considerations of certainty and stability in our discharge of the judicial function support adoption of the cause and prejudice standard in the abuse-of-the-writ context. Well defined in the case law, the standard will be familiar to federal courts. Its application clarifies the imprecise contours of the term "inexcusable neglect." The standard is an objective one, and can be applied in a manner that comports with the threshold nature of the abuse-of-the-writ inquiry. See 334 U. S., 87 Finally, the standard provides "a sound and workable means of channeling the discretion of federal habeas courts." 477 U. S., at 47. "[I]t is important, in order to preclude individualized enforcement of the Constitution in different parts of the Nation, to lay down as specifically as the nature of the problem permits the standards or directions that should govern the District Judges in the disposition of applications for habeas corpus by prisoners under sentence of State Courts." -502 The cause and prejudice standard should curtail the abusive petitions that in recent years have threatened to undermine the integrity of the habeas corpus process. "Federal courts should not continue to tolerate even in capital cases this type of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus." 464 U. S., at 3. The writ of habeas corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties. "But the writ has potentialities for evil as well as for good. Abuse of the writ may undermine the orderly administration of justice and therefore weaken the forces of authority that are essential for civilizatio" Adoption of the cause and prejudice standard acknowledges the historic purpose and function of the writ in our constitutional system, and, by preventing its abuse, assures its continued efficacy. *47 We now apply these principles to the case before us. IV McCleskey based the Massiah claim in his second federal petition on the 21-page Evans document alone. Worthy's identity did not come to light until the hearing. The District Court found, based on the document's revelation of the tactics used by Evans in engaging McCleskey in conversation (such as his pretending to |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | in engaging McCleskey in conversation (such as his pretending to be Ben Wright's uncle and his claim that he was supposed to participate in the robbery), that the document established an ab initio relationship between Evans and the authorities. It relied on the finding and on Worthy's later testimony to conclude that the State committed a Massiah violatio This ruling on the merits cannot come before us or any federal court if it is premised on a claim that constitutes an abuse of the We must consider, therefore, the preliminary question whether McCleskey had cause for failing to raise the Massiah claim in his first federal petitio The District Court found that neither the 21-page document nor Worthy were known or discoverable before filing the first federal petitio Relying on these findings, McCleskey argues that his failure to raise the Massiah claim in the first petition should be excused. For reasons set forth below, we disagree. That McCleskey did not possess, or could not reasonably have obtained, certain evidence fails to establish cause if other known or discoverable evidence could have supported the claim in any event. "[Clause requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim." 477 U. S., at 42 For cause to exist, the external impediment, whether it be government interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented petitioner from raising the claim. See (cause if "interference by officials made compliance *48 impracticable"); Abuse-of-the-writ doctrine examines petitioner's conduct: The question is whether petitioner possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege a claim in the first petition and pursue the matter through the habeas process, see 28 U.S. C. 2254 Rule 6 (Discovery); Rule 7 (Expansion of Record); Rule 8 (Evidentiary Hearing). The requirement of cause in the abuse-of-the-writ context is based on the principle that petitioner must conduct a reasonable and diligent investigation aimed at including all relevant claims and grounds for relief in the first federal habeas petitio If what petitioner knows or could discover upon reasonable investigation supports a claim for relief in a federal habeas petition, what he does not know is irrelevant. Omission of the claim will not be excused merely because evidence discovered later might also have supported or strengthened the claim. In applying these principles, we turn first to the 21-page signed statement. It is essential at the outset to distinguish between two issues: (1) Whether petitioner knew about or could have discovered the 21-page document; and (2) whether he knew about |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | discovered the 21-page document; and (2) whether he knew about or could have discovered the evidence the document recounted, namely, the jail-cell conversations. The District Court's error lies in its conflation of the two inquiries, an error petitioner would have us perpetuate here. The 21-page document unavailable to McCleskey at the time of the first petition does not establish that McCleskey had cause for failing to raise the Massiah claim at the outset.[*] Based on testimony and questioning at trial, McCleskey *4 knew that he had confessed the murder during jail-cell conversations with Evans, knew that Evans claimed to be a relative of Ben Wright during the conversations, and knew that Evans told the police about the conversations. Knowledge of these facts alone would put McCleskey on notice to pursue the Massiah claim in his first federal habeas petition as he had done in the first state habeas petitio But there was more. The District Court's finding that the 21-page document established an ab initio relationship between Evans and the authorities rested in its entirety on conversations in which McCleskey himself participated. *500 Though at trial McCleskey denied the inculpatory conversations, his current arguments presuppose them. Quite apart from the inequity in McCleskey's reliance on that which he earlier denied under oath, the more fundamental point remains that because McCleskey participated in the conversations reported by Evans, he knew everything in the document that the District Court relied upon to establish the ab initio connection between Evans and the police. McCleskey has had at least constructive knowledge all along of the facts he now claims to have learned only from the 21-page document. The unavailability of the document did not prevent McCleskey from raising the Massiah claim in the first federal petition and is not cause for his failure to do so. And of course, McCleskey cannot contend that his false representations at trial constitute cause for the omission of a claim from the first federal petitio The District Court's determination that jailer Worthy's identity and testimony could not have been known prior to the first federal petition does not alter our conclusio It must be remembered that the 21-page statement was the only new evidence McCleskey had when he filed the Massiah claim in the second federal petition in 187. Under McCleskey's own theory, nothing was known about Worthy even the If McCleskey did not need to know about Worthy and his testimony to press the Massiah claim in the second petition, neither did he need to know about him to assert it in the first. Ignorance about Worthy |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | him to assert it in the first. Ignorance about Worthy did not prevent McCleskey from raising the Massiah claim in the first federal petition and will not excuse his failure to do so. Though this reasoning suffices to show the irrelevance of the District Court's finding concerning Worthy, the whole question illustrates the rationale for requiring a prompt investigation and the full pursuit of habeas claims in the first petitio At the time of the first federal petition, written logs and records with prison staff names and assignments existed. By the time of the second federal petition officials had *501 destroyed the records pursuant to normal retention schedules. Worthy's inconsistent and confused testimony in this case demonstrates the obvious proposition that factfinding processes are impaired when delayed. Had McCleskey presented this claim in the first federal habeas proceeding when official records were available, he could have identified the relevant officers and cell assignment sheets. The critical facts for the Massiah claim, including the reason for Evans' placement in the cell adjacent to McCleskey's and the precise conversation that each officer had with Evans before he was put there, likely would have been reconstructed with greater precision than now can be achieved. By failing to raise the Massiah claim in 181, McCleskey foreclosed the procedures best suited for disclosure of the facts needed for a reliable determinatio McCleskey nonetheless seeks to hold the State responsible for his omission of the Massiah claim in the first petitio His current strategy is to allege that the State engaged in wrongful conduct in withholding the 21-page document. This argument need not detain us long. When all is said and done, the issue is not presented in the case, despite all the emphasis upon it in McCleskey's brief and oral argument. The Atlanta police turned over the 21-page document upon request in 187. The District Court found no misrepresentation or wrongful conduct by the State in failing to hand over the document earlier, and our discussion of the evidence in the record concerning the existence of the statement, see as well as the fact that at least four courts have considered and rejected petitioner's Brady claim, belies McCleskey's characterization of the case. And as we have taken care to explain, the document is not critical to McCleskey's notice of a Massiah claim anyway. Petitioner's reliance on the procedural default discussion in is misplaced. In Amadeo the Court mentioned that government concealment of evidence could be cause for a procedural default if it "was *502 the reason for the failure of a petitioner's lawyers to raise |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | reason for the failure of a petitioner's lawyers to raise the jury challenge in the trial court." 22. This case differs from Amadeo in two crucial respects. First, there is no finding that the State concealed evidence. And second, even if the State intentionally concealed the 21-page document, the concealment would not establish cause here because, in light of McCleskey's knowledge of the information in the document, any initial concealment would not have prevented him from raising the claim in the first federal petitio As McCleskey lacks cause for failing to raise the Massiah claim in the first federal petition, we need not consider whether he would be prejudiced by his inability to raise the alleged Massiah violation at this late date. See 477 U. S., at 44 We do address whether the Court should nonetheless exercise its equitable discretion to correct a miscarriage of justice. That narrow exception is of no avail to McCleskey. The Massiah violation, if it be one, resulted in the admission at trial of truthful inculpatory evidence which did not affect the reliability of the guilt determinatio The very statement McCleskey now seeks to embrace confirms his guilt. As the District Court observed: "After having read [the Evans statement], the court has concluded that nobody short of William Faulkner could have contrived that statement, and as a consequence finds the testimony of Offie Evans absolutely to be true, and the court states on the record that it entertains absolutely no doubt as to the guilt of Mr. McCleskey." 4 Tr. 4. We agree with this conclusio McCleskey cannot demonstrate that the alleged Massiah violation caused the conviction of an innocent perso at 46. The history of the proceedings in this case, and the burden upon the State in defending against allegations made for the *503 first time in federal court some nine years after the trial, reveal the necessity for the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. The cause and prejudice standard we adopt today leaves ample room for consideration of constitutional errors in a first federal habeas petition and in a later petition under appropriate circumstances. Petitioner has not satisfied this standard for excusing the omission of the Massiah claim from his first petitio The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Petitioner's Claims for Relief at Various Stages of the Litigation 1. Direct Appeal. On direct appeal, McCleskey raised the following claims: (1) the death penalty was administered in a discriminatory fashion because of prosecutorial discretion; (2) the prosecutor conducted an illegal postindictment lineup; (3) the trial court erred in |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | an illegal postindictment lineup; (3) the trial court erred in admitting at trial the statement McCleskey made to the police; (4) the trial court erred in allowing Evans to testify about McCleskey's jail-house confession; (5) the prosecutor failed to disclose certain impeachment evidence; and (6) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of McCleskey's prior criminal acts. -114, -151 2. First State Habeas Corpus Petitio McCleskey's first state habeas petition alleged the following constitutional violations: (1) the Georgia death penalty is administered arbitrarily, capriciously, and whimsically; (2) Georgia officials imposed McCleskey's capital sentence pursuant to a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and poverty; (3) the death penalty lacks theoretical or factual justification and fails to serve any rational interest; (4) McCleskey's death sentence is cruel and unusual punishment in light of all mitigating factors; (5) McCleskey received inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard; (6) the jury did not constitute a fair cross section of the community; (7) the jury was biased *504 in favor of the prosecution; (8) the trial court improperly excused two jurors who were opposed to the death penalty; () McCleskey's postarrest statement should have been excluded because it was obtained after an allegedly illegal arrest; (10) the postarrest statement was extracted involuntarily; (11) the State failed to disclose an "arrangement" with one of its key witnesses, Evans; (12) the State deliberately withheld a statement made by McCleskey to Evans; (13) the trial court erred in failing to grant McCleskey funds to employ experts in aid of his defense; (14) three witnesses for the State witnessed a highly suggestive lineup involving McCleskey prior to trial; (15) the trial court's jury instructions concerning intent impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion to McCleskey; (16) the prosecution impermissibly referred to the appellate process during the sentencing phase; (17) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other crimes for which McCleskey had not been convicted; (18) the trial court's instructions concerning evidence of McCleskey's other bad acts was overbroad; (1) the appellate review procedures of Georgia denied McCleskey effective assistance of counsel, a fair hearing, and the basic tools of an adequate defense; (20) the means by which the death penalty is administered inflicts wanton and unnecessary torture; (21) McCleskey was denied effective assistance of counsel in numerous contexts; (22) introduction of statements petitioner made to Evans were elicited in a situation created to induce McCleskey to make incriminating statements; and (23) the evidence was insufficient to convict McCleskey of capital murder. Petition, HC No. 40, 2 Tr., Exh. H. 3. First Federal Habeas |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | McCleskey v. Zant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112573/mccleskey-v-zant/ | No. 40, 2 Tr., Exh. H. 3. First Federal Habeas Corpus Petitio McCleskey raised the following claims in his first federal habeas petition: (1) the Georgia death penalty discriminated on the basis of race; (2) the State failed to disclose an "understanding" with Evans; (3) the trial court's instructions to the jury impermissibly shifted the burden to McCleskey; (4) the prosecutor improperly referred to the appellate process at the sentencing *505 phase; (5) the trial court impermissibly refused to grant McCleskey funds to employ experts in aid of his defense; (6) the trial court's instructions concerning evidence of McCleskey's other bad acts was overbroad; (7) the trial court's instructions gave the jury too much discretion to consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; (8) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other crimes for which McCleskey had not been convicted; () three witnesses for the State witnessed a highly suggestive lineup involving McCleskey prior to trial; (10) McCleskey's postarrest statement should have been excluded because it was extracted involuntarily; (11) the trial court impermissibly excluded two jurors who were opposed to the death penalty; (12) the death penalty lacks theoretical or factual justification and fails to serve any rational interest; (13) the State deliberately withheld a statement made by McCleskey to Evans; (14) the evidence was insufficient to convict McCleskey of capital murder; (15) McCleskey's counsel failed to investigate the State's evidence adequately; (16) McCleskey's counsel failed to raise certain objections or make certain motions at trial; (17) McCleskey's counsel failed to undertake an independent investigation of possible mitigating circumstances prior to trial; and (18) after trial, McCleskey's counsel failed to review and correct the judge's sentence report. 4. Second State Habeas Petitio In his second state habeas petition, McCleskey alleged the following claims: (1) the prosecutor systematically excluded blacks from the jury; (2) the State of Georgia imposed the death penalty against McCleskey in a racially discriminatory manner; (3) the State failed to disclose its agreement with Evans; (4) the trial court impermissibly refused to grant McCleskey funds to employ experts in aid of his defense; and (5) the prosecutor improperly referred to the appellate process at the sentencing phase. Petition, 2 Tr., Exh. G. * 5. Second Federal Habeas Corpus Petitio In his second federal habeas petition, McCleskey alleged the following claims: (1) Evans' testimony concerning his conversation with McCleskey was inadmissible because Evans acted as a state informant in a situation created to induce McCleskey to make incriminating statements; (2) the State failed to correct the misleading testimony of Evans; (3) the State failed to disclose "an arrangement" with Evans; |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | dissenting | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | Respondent DeMont Conner is a prisoner in a maximumsecurity Hawaii prison. After Conner reacted angrily to a strip search, a misconduct report charged him with obstructing the performance of a correctional officer's duties, using abusive language when talking to a staff member, and harassing a staff member. Conner received notice of the charges and had an opportunity, personally, to answer them. However, the disciplinary committee denied his request to call as witnesses staff members he said would attest to his innocence. Conner contested the misconduct charges, but, according to the report of the disciplinary committee, he admitted his hesitation to follow orders and his use of profanity during the search. Based on Conner's statement to the committee, and on written statements submitted by the officer who conducted the search and his supervisor, the committee found Conner guilty of all charges. Sentenced to 30 days in the prison's segregation unit, Conner pursued an administrative appeal, which ultimately resulted in reversal of the obstruction conviction. Unlike the Court, I conclude that Conner had a liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, in avoiding the disciplinary confinement he endured. As Justice Breyer details, Conner's prison punishment effected a severe alteration in the conditions of his incarceration. See post, at 494. Disciplinary confinement *489 as punishment for "high misconduct" not only deprives prisoners of privileges for protracted periods; unlike administrative segregation and protective custody, disciplinary confinement also stigmatizes them and diminishes parole prospects. Those immediate and lingering consequences should suffice to qualify such confinement as liberty depriving for purposes of Due Process Clause protection. See[1] I see the Due Process Clause itself, not Hawaii's prison code, as the wellspring of the protection due Conner. Deriving protected liberty interests from mandatory language in local prison codes would make of the fundamental right something more in certain States, something less in others. Liberty that may vary from Ossining, New York, to San Quentin, California, does not resemble the "Liberty" enshrined among "unalienable Rights" with which all persons are "endowed by their Creator." Declaration of Independence; see ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects [the unalienable liberty recognized in the Declaration of Independence] rather *490 than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.").[2] Deriving the prisoner's due process right from the code for his prison, moreover, yields this practical anomaly: a State that scarcely attempts to control the behavior of its prison guards may, for that very laxity, escape constitutional accountability; a State that tightly cabins the discretion of its prison workers may, for that attentiveness, become vulnerable to constitutional claims. An |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | dissenting | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | may, for that attentiveness, become vulnerable to constitutional claims. An incentive for ruleless prison management disserves the State's penological goals and jeopardizes the welfare of prisoners. To fit the liberty recognized in our fundamental instrument of government, the process due by reason of the Constitution similarly should not depend on the particularities of the local prison's code. Rather, the basic, universal requirements are notice of the acts of misconduct prison officials say the inmate committed, and an opportunity to respond to the charges before a trustworthy decisionmaker. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," (an unbiased tribunal, notice of the proposed government action and the grounds asserted for it, and an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken are fundamental; additional safeguards depend on the importance of the private interest, the utility of the particular safeguards, and the burden of affording them). *491 For the reasons Justice Breyer cogently presents, see post, at 504, a return of this case to the District Court would be unavoidable if it were recognized that Conner was deprived of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. But upon such a return, a renewed motion for summary judgment would be in order, for the record, as currently composed, does not show that Conner was denied any procedural protection warranted in his case. In particular, a call for witnesses is properly refused when the projected testimony is not relevant to the matter in controversy. See Unless Conner were to demonstrate, in face of the disciplinary committee's stated reliance on his own admissions, that an issue of material fact is genuinely in controversy, see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 56(c), (e), his due process claim would fail. * * * Because I conclude that Conner was deprived of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, I dissent from the judgment of the Court. I would return the case for a precisely focused determination whether Conner received the process that was indeed due. |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | This case concerns respondent John David Stumpf's conviction and death sentence for the murder of Mary Jane In adjudicating Stumpf's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted him relief on two grounds: that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and that his conviction and sentence could not stand because the State, in a later trial of Stumpf's accomplice, pursued a theory of the case inconsistent with the theory it had advanced *178 in Stumpf's case. We granted certiorari to review both holdings. I On May 14, 1984, Stumpf and two other men, Clyde Daniel Wesley and Norman Leroy Edmonds, were traveling in Edmonds' car along Interstate 70 through Guernsey County, Ohio. Needing money for gas, the men stopped the car along the highway. While Edmonds waited in the car, Stumpf and Wesley walked to the home of Norman and Mary Jane Stout, about 100 yards away. Stumpf and Wesley, each concealing a gun, talked their way into the home by telling the Stouts they needed to use the phone. Their real object, however, was robbery: Once inside, Stumpf held the Stouts at gunpoint, while Wesley ransacked the house. When Mr. Stout moved toward Stumpf, Stumpf shot him twice in the head, causing Mr. Stout to black out. After he regained consciousness, Mr. Stout heard two male voices coming from another room, and then four gunshots the shots that killed his wife. Edmonds was arrested shortly afterward, and his statements led the police to issue arrest warrants for Stumpf and Wesley. Stumpf, who surrendered to the police, at first denied any knowledge of the crimes. After he was told that Mr. Stout had survived, however, Stumpf admitted to participating in the robbery and to shooting Mr. Stumpf. But he claimed not to have shot Mrs. Stout, and he has maintained that position ever since. The proceedings against Stumpf occurred while Wesley, who had been arrested in Texas, was still resisting extradition to Ohio. Stumpf was indicted for aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and two counts of grand theft. With respect to the aggravated murder charge, the indictment listed four statutory "specifications" three of them aggravating circumstances making Stumpf eligible for the death penalty. See App. 117-118; *179 (Anderson 1982).[*] The case was assigned to a three-judge panel in the Court of Common Pleas. Rather than proceed to trial, however, Stumpf and the State worked out a plea agreement: Stumpf would plead guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder, and the State would |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder, and the State would drop most of the other charges; with respect to the aggravated murder charge, Stumpf would plead guilty to one of the three capital specifications, with the State dropping the other two. The plea was accepted after a colloquy with the presiding judge, and after a hearing in which the panel satisfied itself as to the factual basis for the plea. Because the capital specification to which Stumpf pleaded guilty left him eligible for the death penalty, a contested penalty hearing was held before the same three-judge panel. Stumpf's mitigation case was based in part on his difficult childhood, limited education, dependable work history, youth, and lack of prior serious offenses. Stumpf's principal argument, however, was that he had participated in the plot only at the urging and under the influence of Wesley, that it was Wesley who had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Stout, and that Stumpf's assertedly minor role in the murder counseled against the death sentence. See 2929.04(B)(6) (directing the sentencer to consider as a potential mitigating circumstance, "[i]f the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender's participation in the offense"). The State, on the other hand, argued that Stumpf had indeed shot Mrs. Still, while the prosecutor claimed Stumpf's allegedly primary role in the shooting as a special reason to reject Stumpf's mitigation argument, the prosecutor also noted that Ohio law did not restrict the death penalty to those who commit murder by their own hands an accomplice to murder could also receive *180 the death penalty, so long as he acted with the specific intent to cause death. As a result, the State argued, Stumpf deserved death even if he had not personally shot Mrs. Stout, because the circumstances of the robbery provided a basis from which to infer Stumpf's intent to cause death. The three-judge panel, agreeing with the State's first contention, specifically found that Stumpf "was the principal offender" in the aggravated murder of Mrs. App. 196. Determining that the aggravating factors in Stumpf's case outweighed any mitigating factors, the panel sentenced Stumpf to death. Afterward, Wesley was successfully extradited to Ohio to stand trial. His case was tried to a jury, before the same judge who had presided over the panel overseeing Stumpf's proceedings, and with the same prosecutor. This time, however, the prosecutor had new evidence: James Eastman, Wesley's cellmate after his extradition, testified that Wesley had admitted to firing the shots that killed Mrs. The prosecutor introduced Eastman's testimony |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | the shots that killed Mrs. The prosecutor introduced Eastman's testimony in Wesley's trial, and in his closing argument he argued for Eastman's credibility and lack of motive to lie. The prosecutor claimed that Eastman's testimony, combined with certain circumstantial evidence and with the implausibility of Wesley's own account of events, proved that Wesley was the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and that Wesley therefore deserved to be put to death. One way Wesley countered this argument was by noting that the prosecutor had taken a contrary position in Stumpf's trial, and that Stumpf had already been sentenced to death for the crime. Wesley also took the stand in his own defense, and testified that Stumpf had shot Mrs. In the end, the jury sentenced Wesley to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 20 years. After the Wesley trial, Stumpf, whose direct appeal was still pending in the Ohio Court of Appeals, returned to the Court of Common Pleas with a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate his death sentence. Stumpf argued that *181 Eastman's testimony, and the prosecution's endorsement of that testimony in Wesley's trial, cast doubt upon Stumpf's conviction and sentence. The State (represented again by the same prosecutor who had tried both Wesley's case and Stumpf's original case) disagreed. According to the prosecutor, the court's first task was to decide whether the Eastman testimony was sufficient to alter the court's prior determination that Stumpf had been the shooter. Contrary to the argument he had presented in the Wesley trial, however, the prosecutor now noted that Eastman's testimony was belied by certain other evidence (ballistics evidence and Wesley's testimony in his own defense) confirming Stumpf to have been the primary shooter. In the alternative, the State noted as it had before that an aider-and-abettor theory might allow the death sentence to be imposed against Stumpf even if he had not shot Mrs. Although one judge speculated during oral argument that the court's earlier conclusion about Stumpf's principal role in the killing "may very well have had an effect upon" the prior sentencing determination, ibid., the Court of Common Pleas denied Stumpf's motion in a brief summary order without explanation. That order was appealed together with the original judgment in Stumpf's case, and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. cert. denied, After a subsequent request for state postconviction relief was denied by the state courts, Stumpf filed this federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in November 1995. The District |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | the Southern District of Ohio in November 1995. The District Court denied Stumpf relief, but granted permission to appeal on four claims, including the two at issue here. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that habeas relief was warranted on "either or both" of "two alternative grounds." First, the court determined that Stumpf's *182 guilty plea was invalid because it had not been entered knowingly and intelligently. More precisely, the court concluded that Stumpf had pleaded guilty to aggravated murder without understanding that specific intent to cause death was a necessary element of the charge under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2903.01(B) and (D). Noting that Stumpf had all along denied shooting Mrs. Stout, and considering those denials inconsistent with an informed choice to plead guilty to aggravated murder, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf must have entered his plea out of ignorance. Second, the court concluded that "Stumpf's due process rights were violated by the state's deliberate action in securing convictions of both Stumpf and Wesley for the same crime, using inconsistent theories." 367 F. 3d, at This violation, the court held, required setting aside "both Stumpf's plea and his sentence." One member of the panel dissented. II Because Stumpf filed his habeas petition before enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we review his claims under the standards of the pre-AEDPA habeas statute. See Moreover, because petitioner has not argued that Stumpf's habeas claims were barred as requiring announcement of a new rule, we do not apply the rule of to this case. See ; A The Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf's plea of guilty to aggravated murder was invalid because he was not aware of the specific intent element of the chargea determination we find unsupportable. Stumpf's guilty plea would indeed be invalid if he had not been aware of the nature of the charges against him, including *183 the elements of the aggravated murder charge to which he pleaded guilty. A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Where a defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of the crime's elements, this standard is not met and the plea is invalid. But the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Stumpf had not been properly informed before pleading guilty. In Stumpf's plea hearing, his attorneys represented on the record that they had explained to their client |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge; Stumpf himself then confirmed that this representation was true. See App. 135, 137-138. While the court taking a defendant's plea is responsible for ensuring "a record adequate for any review that may be later sought," we have never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. Cf. Henderson, (granting relief to a defendant unaware of the elements of his crime, but distinguishing that case from others where "the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused"). Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty. Seeking to counter this natural inference, Stumpf argues, in essence, that his choice to plead guilty to the aggravated *184 murder charge was so inconsistent with his denial of having shot the victim that he could only have pleaded guilty out of ignorance of the charge's specific intent requirement. But Stumpf's asserted inconsistency is illusory. The aggravated murder charge's intent element did not require any showing that Stumpf had himself shot Mrs. Rather, Ohio law considers aiders and abettors equally in violation of the aggravated murder statute, so long as the aiding and abetting is done with the specific intent to cause death. See In re Washington, ; As a result, Stumpf's steadfast assertion that he had not shot Mrs. Stout would not necessarily have precluded him from admitting his specific intent under the statute. That is particularly so given the other evidence in this case. Stumpf and Wesley had gone to the Stouts' home together, carrying guns and intending to commit armed robbery. Stumpf, by his own admission, shot Mr. Stout in the head at close range. Taken together, these facts could show that Wesley and Stumpf had together agreed to kill both of the Stouts in order to leave no witnesses to the crime. And that, in turn, could make both men guilty of aggravated murder regardless of who actually killed Mrs. See ibid., Stumpf |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | murder regardless of who actually killed Mrs. See ibid., Stumpf also points to aspects of the plea hearing transcript which he says show that both he and his attorneys were confused about the relevance and timing of defenses Stumpf and his attorneys had planned to make. First, at one point during the hearing, the presiding judge stated that by pleading guilty Stumpf would waive his trial rights and his right to testify in his own behalf. Stumpf's attorney answered that Stumpf "was going to respond but we have informed him that there is, after the plea, a hearing or trial relative to the underlying facts so that he is of the belief that there will be [a] presentation of evidence." App. 140. The presiding judge responded that "[o]f course in the sentencing portion of this trial you do have those rights to speak in your own *185 behalf [and] to present evidence and testimony on your own behalf." A few moments later, there was another exchange along similar lines, after the judge asked Stumpf whether he was "in fact guilty of" the aggravated murder charge and its capital specification: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the defendant has asked me to explain his answer. His answer is yes. He will recite that with obviously his understanding of his right to present evidence at a later time relative to his conduct, but he'll respond to that. "JUDGE HENDERSON: At no time am I implying that the defendant will not have the right to present evidence in [the] mitigation hearing. And I'm going to ask that the defendant, himself, respond to the question that I asked with that understanding that he has the right to present evidence in mitigation. I'm going to ask the defendant if he is in fact guilty of the charge set forth in Count one, including specification one. ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir." Reviewing this exchange, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf "obviously was reiterating his desire to challenge the [S]tate's account of his actions"that is, to show that he did not intend to kill Mrs. But the desire to contest the State's version of events would not necessarily entail the desire to contest the aggravated murder charge or any of its elements. Rather, Stumpf's desire to put on evidence "relative to the underlying facts" and "relative to his conduct" could equally have meant that Stumpf was eager to make his mitigation casean interpretation bolstered by the attorney's and Stumpf's approving answers after the presiding judge confirmed that the defense could put on evidence "in mitigation" and in "the |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | defense could put on evidence "in mitigation" and in "the sentencing" phase. While Stumpf's mitigation case was premised on the argument that Stumpf had not shot Mrs. Stout, that was *186 fully consistent with his plea of guilty to aggravated murder. See Finally, Stumpf, like the Court of Appeals, relies on the perception that he obtained a bad bargain by his pleathat the State's dropping several nonmurder charges and two of the three capital murder specifications was a bad tradeoff for Stumpf's guilty plea. But a plea's validity may not be collaterally attacked merely because the defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. See ; Rather, the shortcomings of the deal Stumpf obtained cast doubt on the validity of his plea only if they show either that he made the unfavorable plea on the constitutionally defective advice of counsel, see or that he could not have understood the terms of the bargain he and Ohio agreed to. Though Stumpf did bring an independent claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim is not before us in this case. And in evaluating the validity of Stumpf's plea, we are reluctant to accord much weight to his post hoc reevaluation of the wisdom of the bargain. Stumpf pleaded guilty knowing that the State had copious evidence against him, including the testimony of Mr. Stout; the plea eliminated two of the three capital specifications the State could rely on in seeking the death penalty; and the plea allowed Stumpf to assert his acceptance of responsibility as an argument in mitigation. Under these circumstances, the plea may well have been a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent reaction to a litigation situation that was difficult, to say the least. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Stumpf was uninformed about the nature of the charge he pleaded guilty to, and we reverse that portion of the judgment below. B The Court of Appeals was also wrong to hold that prosecutorial inconsistencies between the Stumpf and Wesley cases *187 required voiding Stumpf's guilty plea. Stumpf's assertions of inconsistency relate entirely to the prosecutor's arguments about which of the two men, Wesley or Stumpf, shot Mrs. For the reasons given above, see the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to Stumpf's conviction for aggravated murder. Moreover, Stumpf has never provided an explanation of how the prosecution's postplea use of inconsistent arguments could have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea. The prosecutor's use of allegedly inconsistent theories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf's sentence, however, for |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | majority | Bradshaw v. Stumpf | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799973/bradshaw-v-stumpf/ | have a more direct effect on Stumpf's sentence, however, for it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel's conclusion about Stumpf's principal role in the offense was material to its sentencing determination. The opinion below leaves some ambiguity as to the overlap between how the lower court resolved Stumpf's due process challenge to his conviction, and how it resolved Stumpf's challenge to his sentence. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals would have concluded that Stumpf was entitled to resentencing had the court not also considered the conviction invalid. Likewise, the parties' briefing to this Court, and the question on which we granted certiorari, largely focused on the lower court's determination about Stumpf's conviction. See, e. g., Pet. for Cert. ii (requesting review of Stumpf's conviction, not sentence); Reply Brief for Petitioner 3 (challenge to Court of Appeals' decision is focused on issue of conviction); Brief for Respondent 15, n. 3 ("arguments regarding Stumpf's death sentence are not before this Court"). In these circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to resolve the merits of Stumpf's sentencing claim, and we therefore express no opinion on whether the prosecutor's actions amounted to a due process violation, or whether any such violation would have been prejudicial. The Court of Appeals should have the opportunity to consider, in the first instance, the question of how Eastman's testimony and the *188 prosecutor's conduct in the Stumpf and Wesley cases relate to Stumpf's death sentence in particular. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the judgment below relating to Stumpf's prosecutorial inconsistency claim, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | The Clean Water Act forbids the “addition” of any pollu- tant from a “point source” to “navigable waters” without the appropriate permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 502(12)(A), as amended by the Federal Water Pol- lution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) 886, 33 U.S. C. 1362(12)(A). The question presented here is whether the Act “requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source,” here, “groundwater.” Pet. for Cert. i. Suppose, for example, that a sewage treatment plant discharges polluted water into the ground where it mixes with groundwater, which, in turn, flows into a navigable river, or perhaps the ocean. Must the plant’s owner seek an EPA permit before emitting the pollutant? We conclude that the statutory provisions at issue require a permit if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters. 2 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court I A Congress’ purpose as reflected in the language of the Clean Water Act is to “ ‘restore and maintain the integ- rity of the Nation’s waters,’ ” Prior to the Act, Federal and State Governments regulated water pollution in large part by setting water quality standards. See The Act restructures federal regulation by insisting that a person wishing to dis- charge any pollution into navigable waters first obtain EPA’s permission to do so. See at 203–205; v. Illinois, The Act’s provisions use specific definitional language to achieve this result. First, the Act defines “pollutant” broadly, including in its definition, for example, any solid waste, incinerator residue, “ ‘heat,’ ” “ ‘discarded equip- ment,’ ” or sand (among many other things). 86 Stat. 886. Second, the Act defines a “point source” as “ ‘any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance from which pollutants are or may be discharged,’ ” including, for example, any “ ‘container,’ ” “ ‘pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,’ ” or “ ‘well.’ ” Third, it defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” as “ ‘any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters [including navigable streams, rivers, the ocean, or coastal waters] from any point source.’ ” The Act then sets forth a statutory provision that, using these terms, broadly states that (with certain exceptions) “ ‘the discharge of any pollutant by any person’ ” without an appropriate permit “ ‘shall be unlawful.’ ” The question here, as we have said, is whether, or how, this statutory language applies to |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | said, is whether, or how, this statutory language applies to a pollutant that reaches nav- igable waters only after it leaves a “point source” and then travels through groundwater before reaching navigable wa- ters. In such an instance, has there been a “discharge of a Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 3 Opinion of the Court pollutant,” that is, has there been “any addition of any pol- lutant to navigable waters from any point source? ” B The petitioner, the County of Maui, operates a wastewater reclamation facility on the island of Maui, Ha- waii. The facility collects sewage from the surrounding area, partially treats it, and pumps the treated water through four wells hundreds of feet underground. This ef- fluent, amounting to about 4 million gallons each day, then travels a further half mile or so, through groundwater, to the ocean. In 2012, several environmental groups, the respondents here, brought this citizens’ Clean Water Act lawsuit against Maui. See They claimed that Maui was “discharg[ing]” a “pollutant” to “navigable waters,” namely, the Pacific Ocean, without the permit required by the Clean Water Act. The District Court, relying in part upon a de- tailed study of the discharges, found that a considerable amount of effluent from the wells ended up in the ocean (a navigable water). It wrote that, because the “path to the ocean is clearly ascertainable,” the discharge from Maui’s wells into the nearby groundwater was “functionally one into navigable water.” And it granted summary judgment in favor of the environ- mental groups. See The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, but it de- scribed the relevant statutory standard somewhat differ- ently. The appeals court wrote that a permit is required when “the pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into the navigable wa- ter.” The court left “for another day the task of determining when, if ever, the connection between a point source and a navigable wa- ter is too tenuous to support liability” 4 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court Maui petitioned for certiorari. In light of the differences in the standards adopted by the different Courts of Appeals, we granted the petition. Compare, 886 F.3d, at (“fairly traceable”), with Upstate (“di- rect hydrological connection”), and Kentucky Waterways Al- 932–938 (discharges through groundwater are excluded from the Act’s permitting requirements). II The linguistic question here concerns the statutory word “from.” Is pollution that reaches navigable waters only through groundwater pollution that is “from” a point |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | waters only through groundwater pollution that is “from” a point source, as the statute uses the word? The word “from” is broad in scope, but context often imposes limitations. “Fin- land,” for example, is often not the right kind of answer to the question, “Where have you come from?” even if long ago you were born there. The parties here disagree dramatically about the scope of the word “from” in the present context. The environmental groups, the respondents, basically adopt the Ninth Circuit’s view—that the permitting requirement applies so long as the pollutant is “fairly traceable” to a point source even if it traveled long and far (through groundwater) before it reached navigable waters. They add that the release from the point source must be “a proximate cause of the addition of pollutants to navigable waters.” Brief for Respondents 20. Maui, on the other hand, argues that the statute creates a “bright-line test.” Brief for Petitioner 27–28. A point source or series of point sources must be “the means of de- livering pollutants to navigable waters.” They add that, if “at least one nonpoint source (, unconfined rainwater runoff or groundwater)” lies “between the point Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 5 Opinion of the Court source and the navigable water,” then the permit require- ment “does not apply.” A pollutant is “from” a point source only if a point source is the last “conveyance” that conducted the pollutant to navigable waters. The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, supports Maui, at least in respect to groundwater. Reiterating the position taken in a recent EPA “Interpretive Statement,” see 84 Fed. Reg. 16810 (2019), he argues that, given the Act’s structure and history, “a release of pollutants to groundwater is not subject to” the Act’s permitting requirement “even if the pollutants subsequently migrate to jurisdictional surface waters,” such as the ocean. Brief for United States as Ami- cus Curiae 12 (capitalization omitted). We agree that statutory context limits the reach of the statutory phrase “from any point source” to a range of cir- cumstances narrower than that which the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation suggests. At the same time, it is signifi- cantly broader than the total exclusion of all discharges through groundwater described by Maui and the Solicitor General. III Virtually all water, polluted or not, eventually makes its way to navigable water. This is just as true for groundwa- ter. See generally 2 Van Nostrand’s Scientific Encyclopedia 2600 (10th ed. 2008) (defining “Hydrology”). Given the power of modern science, the Ninth Circuit’s limitation, “fairly traceable,” may well allow EPA to assert permitting |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | limitation, “fairly traceable,” may well allow EPA to assert permitting authority over the release of pollutants that reach naviga- ble waters many years after their release (say, from a well or pipe or compost heap) and in highly diluted forms. See, Brief for Aquatic Scientists et al. as Amici Curiae 13–28. The respondents suggest that the standard can be nar- rowed by adding a “proximate cause” requirement. That is, to fall within the permitting provision, the discharge from 6 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court a point source must “proximately cause” the pollutants’ eventual addition to navigable waters. But the term “prox- imate cause” derives from general tort law, and it takes on its specific content based primarily on “policy” considera- tions. See CSX Transp., (2011) (plurality opinion). In the context of water pollution, we do not see how it significantly narrows the statute be- yond the words “fairly traceable” themselves. Our view is that Congress did not intend the point source- permitting requirement to provide EPA with such broad au- thority as the Ninth Circuit’s narrow focus on traceability would allow. First, to interpret the word “from” in this lit- eral way would require a permit in surprising, even bizarre, circumstances, such as for pollutants carried to navigable waters on a bird’s feathers, or, to mention more mundane instances, the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to a river. Second, and perhaps most important, the structure of the statute indicates that, as to groundwater pollution and non- point source pollution, Congress intended to leave substan- tial responsibility and autonomy to the States. See, (stating Congress’ purpose in this re- gard). Much water pollution does not come from a readily identifiable source. See 3 Van Nostrand’s Scientific Ency- clopedia, at 5801 (defining “Water Pollution”). Rainwater, for example, can carry pollutants (say, as might otherwise collect on a roadway); it can pollute groundwater, and pol- lution collected by unchanneled rainwater runoff is not or- dinarily considered point source pollution. Over many dec- ades, and with federal encouragement, the States have developed methods of regulating nonpoint source pollution through water quality standards, and otherwise. See, Nonpoint Source Program, Annual Report (California) 6 (2016–2017) (discussing state timberland management pro- grams to address addition of sediment-pollutants to navi- Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 7 Opinion of the Court gable waters); at 10–11 (discussing regulations of vine- yards to control water pollution); at 17–19 (discussing livestock grazing management, including utilization ratios and time restrictions); Nonpoint Source Management Pro- gram, Annual Report (Maine) 8–10 (discussing in- stallation |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | Management Pro- gram, Annual Report (Maine) 8–10 (discussing in- stallation of livestock fencing and planting of vegetation to reduce nonpoint source pollution); Oklahoma’s Nonpoint Source Management Program, Annual Report 5, 14 (2017) (discussing program to encourage voluntary no-till farming to reduce sediment pollution). The Act envisions EPA’s role in managing nonpoint source pollution and groundwater pollution as limited to studying the issue, sharing information with and collecting information from the States, and issuing monetary grants. See 208, 839; see also Water Quality Act of 1987, (establishing Nonpoint Source Management Programs). Although the Act grants EPA specific authority to regulate certain point source pol- lution (it can also delegate some of this authority to the States acting under EPA supervision, see 86 Stat. 880), these permitting provisions refer to “point sources” and “navigable waters,” and say nothing at all about non- point source regulation or groundwater regulation. We must doubt that Congress intended to give EPA the author- ity to apply the word “from” in a way that could interfere as seriously with States’ traditional regulatory authority—au- thority the Act preserves and promotes—as the Ninth Cir- cuit’s “fairly traceable” test would. Third, those who look to legislative history to help inter- pret a statute will find that this Act’s history strongly supports our conclusion that the permitting provision does not extend so far. Fifty years ago, when Congress was consid- ering the bills that became the Clean Water Act, William Ruckelshaus, the first EPA Administrator, asked Congress to grant EPA authority over “ground waters” to “assure that 8 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court we have control over the water table so we can main- tai[n] a control over all the sources of pollution, be they dis- charged directly into any stream or through the ground wa- ter table.” Water Pollution Control Legislation–1971 (Proposed Amendments to Existing Legislation): Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 230 (1971). Representative Les Aspin similarly pointed out that there were “conspicuou[s ]” references to groundwater in all sections of the bill except the permitting section at issue here. Water Pollution Control Legislation– 1971: Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works on H. R. 11896 and H. R. 11895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 727 (1972). The Senate Committee on Public Works “recog- nize[d] the essential link between ground and surface wa- ters.” S. Rep. No. 92–414, p. 73 (1971). But Congress did not accept these requests for general EPA authority over groundwater. It rejected Representa- tive Aspin’s amendment that would have extended the per- mitting |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | tive Aspin’s amendment that would have extended the per- mitting provision to groundwater. Instead, Congress pro- vided a set of more specific groundwater-related measures such as those requiring States to maintain “affirmative con- trols over the injection or placement in wells” of “any pollu- tants that may affect ground water.” These specific state-related programs were, in the words of the Senate Public Works Committee, “designed to protect ground wa- ters and eliminate the use of deep well disposal as an un- controlled alternative to toxic and pollution control.” The upshot is that Congress was fully aware of the need to address groundwater pollution, but it satisfied that need through a variety of state-specific controls. Congress left general groundwater regulatory authority to the States; its failure to include groundwater in the general EPA permit- ting provision was deliberate. Finally, longstanding regulatory practice undermines the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the statute. EPA it- self for many years has applied the permitting provision to Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 9 Opinion of the Court pollution discharges from point sources that reached navi- gable waters only after traveling through groundwater. See, United States Steel 832 (CA7 1977) (permit for “deep waste-injection well” on the shore of navigable waters). But, in doing so, EPA fol- lowed a narrower interpretation than that of the Ninth Cir- cuit. See, In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 2 E. A. D. 715, 718 (EAB 1989) (Act’s permitting requirement applies only to injection wells “that inject into ground water with a phys- ically and temporally direct hydrologic connection to sur- face water”). EPA has opposed applying the Act’s permit- ting requirements to discharges that reach groundwater only after lengthy periods. See McClellan Ecological Seep- age Situation (ED Cal. 1989) (United States argued that permitting provisions do not apply when it would take “literally dozens, and per- haps hundreds, of years for any pollutants” to reach navi- gable waters); Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1139 (Idaho 2009) (same in respect to in- stances where it would take “between 60 and 420 years” for pollutants to travel “one to four miles” through groundwa- ter before reaching navigable waters). Indeed, in this very case (prior to its recent Interpretive Statement, see infra, at 12–13), EPA asked the Ninth Circuit to apply a more lim- ited “direct hydrological connection” test. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 15–17447 (CA9), pp. 13–20. The Ninth Circuit did not accept this suggestion. We do not defer here to EPA’s interpretation of the stat- ute embodied in this practice. |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | EPA’s interpretation of the stat- ute embodied in this practice. Indeed, EPA itself has changed its mind about the meaning of the statutory provi- sion. See infra, at 12–14. But this history, by showing that a comparatively narrow view of the statute is administra- tively workable, offers some additional support for the view that Congress did not intend as broad a delegation of regu- latory authority as the Ninth Circuit test would allow. As we have said, the specific meaning of the word “from” 10 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court necessarily draws its meaning from context. The apparent breadth of the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” approach is inconsistent with the context we have just described. IV A Maui and the Solicitor General argue that the statute’s permitting requirement does not apply if a pollutant, hav- ing emerged from a “point source,” must travel through any amount of groundwater before reaching navigable waters. That interpretation is too narrow, for it would risk serious interference with EPA’s ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges. Consider a pipe that spews pollution directly into coastal waters. There is an “addition of ” a “pollutant to navigable waters from [a] point source.” Hence, a permit is required. But Maui and the Government read the permitting require- ment not to apply if there is any amount of groundwater between the end of the pipe and the edge of the navigable water. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5–6, 24–25. If that is the correct interpretation of the statute, then why could not the pipe’s owner, seeking to avoid the permit requirement, simply move the pipe back, perhaps only a few yards, so that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before reaching the sea? Cf. Brief for State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 9, n. 4. We do not see how Congress could have intended to create such a large and obvious loop- hole in one of the key regulatory innovations of the Clean Water Act. Cf. California ex rel. State Water Resources Con- trol –204 (basic purpose of Clean Wa- ter Act is to regulate pollution at its source); The Emily, 9 Wheat. 381, 390 (1824) (rejecting an interpretation that would facilitate “evasion of the law”). B Maui argues that the statute’s language requires its Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 11 Opinion of the Court reading. That language requires a permit for a “discharge.” A “discharge” is “any addition” of a pollutant to navigable waters “from any point source.” And a “point source” is “any |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | “from any point source.” And a “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” (such as a pipe, ditch, well, etc.). Reading “from” and “conveyance” to- gether, Maui argues that the statutory meaning of “from any point source” is not about where the pollution origi- nated, but about how it got there. Under what Maui calls the means-of-delivery test, a permit is required only if a point source itself ultimately delivers the pollutant to nav- igable waters. Under this view, if the pollutant must travel through groundwater to reach navigable waters, then it is the groundwater, not the pipe, that is the conveyance. Congress sometimes adopts less common meanings of common words, but this esoteric definition of “from,” as con- noting a means, does not remotely fit in this context. The statute couples the word “from” with the word “to”—strong evidence that Congress was referring to a destination (“nav- igable waters”) and an origin (“any point source”). Further underscoring that Congress intended this every day mean- ing is that the object of “from” is a “point source”—a source, again, connoting an origin. That Maui’s proffered interpre- tation would also create a serious loophole in the permitting regime also indicates it is an unreasonable one. C The Solicitor General agrees that, as a general matter, the permitting requirement applies to at least some addi- tions of pollutants to navigable waters that come indirectly from point sources. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33–35. But the Solicitor General argues that the proper interpretation of the statute is the one reflected in EPA’s recent Interpretive Statement. After receiving more than 50,000 comments from the public, and after the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in this case, EPA wrote that 12 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court “the best, if not the only, reading” of the statutory provi- sions is that “all releases of pollutants to groundwater” are excluded from the scope of the permitting program, “even where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface wa- ters via groundwater.” 16811. Neither the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to give what the Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Even so, we often pay particular attention to an agency’s views in light of the agency’s expertise in a given area, its knowledge gained through practical experi- ence, and its familiarity with the interpretive demands of administrative need. See United States v. Mead |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | interpretive demands of administrative need. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–235 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–140 (1944). But here, as we have explained, to follow EPA’s reading would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of the statutory provision’s basic purposes. Such an interpretation is neither persuasive nor reasonable. EPA correctly points out that Congress did not require a permit for all discharges to groundwater; rather, Congress authorized study and funding related to groundwater pol- lution. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15– 19. But there is quite a gap between “not all” and “none.” The statutory text itself alludes to no exception for dis- charges through groundwater. These separate provisions for study and funding that EPA points to would be a “sur- prisingly indirect route” to convey “an important and easily expressed message”—that the permit requirement simply does not apply if the pollutants travel through groundwa- ter. (1994). In truth, the most these provisions show is that Congress thought that the problem of groundwater pollu- tion, as distinct from navigable water pollution, would pri- marily be addressed by the States or perhaps by other fed- eral statutes. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 13 Opinion of the Court EPA’s new interpretation is also difficult to reconcile with the statute’s reference to “any addition” of a pollutant to navigable waters. Cf. (“Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a per- mit” (footnote omitted)). It is difficult to reconcile EPA’s in- terpretation with the statute’s inclusion of “wells” in the definition of “point source,” for wells most ordinarily would discharge pollutants through groundwater. And it is diffi- cult to reconcile EPA’s interpretation with the statutory provisions that allow EPA to delegate its permitting au- thority to a State only if the State (among other things) pro- vides “ ‘adequate authority’ ” to “ ‘control the disposal of pol- lutants into wells.’ ” What need would there be for such a proviso if the federal permitting program the State replaces did not include such discharges (from wells through groundwater) in the first place? In short, EPA’s oblique argument about the statute’s ref- erences to groundwater cannot overcome the statute’s structure, its purposes, or the text of the provisions that ac- tually govern. D Perhaps, as the two dissents suggest, the language could be narrowed to similar effect by reading the statute to refer only to the pollutant’s immediate origin. See post, at 2–3 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 8 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But there is no linguistic basis |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | (opinion of ALITO, J.). But there is no linguistic basis here to so limit the statute in that way. Again, whether that is the correct reading turns on context. JUSTICE THOMAS insists that in the case of a discharge through groundwater, the pollutants are added “from the groundwater.” Post, at 2. Indeed, but that does not mean they are not also “from the point source.” When John comes to the hotel, John might have come from the train station, from Baltimore, from Europe, from any two of those three places, or from all three. A sign that asks all persons who arrive from Baltimore to speak to the desk 14 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court clerk includes those who took a taxi from the train station. There is nothing unnatural about such a construction. As the plurality correctly noted in the statute here does not say “directly” from or “immediately” from. (opinion of Scalia, J.). Indeed, the expansive language of the provision—any addition from any point source—strongly suggests its scope is not so limited. JUSTICE ALITO appears to believe that there are only two possible ways to read “from”: as referring either to the im- mediate source, or else to the original source. Post, at 5, 8. Because he agrees that the statute cannot reasonably be read always to reach the original source, he concludes the statute must refer only to the immediate origin. But as the foregoing example illustrates, context may indicate that “from” includes an intermediate stop—Baltimore, not Eu- rope or the train station. JUSTICE THOMAS relies on the word “addition,” but we fail to see how that word limits the statute to discharges di- rectly to navigable waters. Ordinary language abounds in counter examples: A recipe might instruct to “add the drip- pings from the meat to the gravy”; that instruction does not become incomprehensible, or even peculiar, simply because the drippings will have first collected in a pan or on a cut- ting board. And while it would be an unusual phrasing (as statutory phrasings often are), we do not see how the rec- ipe’s meaning would transform if it instead said to “add the drippings to the gravy from the meat.” To take another ex- ample: If Timmy is told to “add water to the bath from the well” he will know just what it means—even though he will have to use a bucket to complete the task. And although JUSTICE THOMAS resists the inevitable im- plications of his reading of the statute, post, at 5–6, that reading would |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | reading of the statute, post, at 5–6, that reading would create the same loopholes as those offered by the petitioner and the Government, and more. It would nec- essarily exclude a pipe that drains onto the beach next to Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 15 Opinion of the Court navigable waters, even if the pollutants then flow to those waters. It also seems to exclude a pipe that hangs out over the water and adds pollutants to the air, through which the pollutants fall to navigable waters. The absurdity of such an interpretation is obvious enough. We therefore reject this reading as well: Like Maui’s and the Government’s, it is inconsistent with the statutory text and simultaneously creates a massive loophole in the per- mitting scheme that Congress established. E For the reasons set forth in Part III and in this Part, we conclude that, in light of the statute’s language, structure, and purposes, the interpretations offered by the parties, the Government, and the dissents are too extreme. V Over the years, courts and EPA have tried to find general language that will reflect a middle ground between these extremes. The statute’s words reflect Congress’ basic aim to provide federal regulation of identifiable sources of pol- lutants entering navigable waters without undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory authority over land and groundwater. We hold that the statute requires a permit when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge. We think this phrase best captures, in broad terms, those circumstances in which Congress in- tended to require a federal permit. That is, an addition falls within the statutory requirement that it be “from any point source” when a point source directly deposits pollutants into navigable waters, or when the discharge reaches the same result through roughly similar means. Time and distance are obviously important. Where a pipe ends a few feet from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel those few feet through groundwater 16 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court (or over the beach), the permitting requirement clearly ap- plies. If the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later, the permitting requirements likely do not apply. The object in a given scenario will be to advance, in a manner consistent with the statute’s language, the statu- tory purposes that Congress sought to achieve. |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | language, the statu- tory purposes that Congress sought to achieve. As we have said (repeatedly), the word “from” seeks a “point source” origin, and context imposes natural limits as to when a point source can properly be considered the origin of pollu- tion that travels through groundwater. That context in- cludes the need, reflected in the statute, to preserve state regulation of groundwater and other nonpoint sources of pollution. Whether pollutants that arrive at navigable wa- ters after traveling through groundwater are “from” a point source depends upon how similar to (or different from) the particular discharge is to a direct discharge. The difficulty with this approach, we recognize, is that it does not, on its own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances. But there are too many potentially relevant fac- tors applicable to factually different cases for this Court now to use more specific language. Consider, for example, just some of the factors that may prove relevant (depending upon the circumstances of a particular case): (1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, (7) the degree to which the pol- lution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity. Time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 17 Opinion of the Court At the same time, courts can provide guidance through decisions in individual cases. The Circuits have tried to do so, often using general language somewhat similar to the language we have used. And the traditional common-law method, making decisions that provide examples that in turn lead to ever more refined principles, is sometimes use- ful, even in an era of statutes. The underlying statutory objectives also provide guid- ance. Decisions should not create serious risks either of un- dermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal regu- latory objectives. EPA, too, can provide administrative guidance (within statutory boundaries) in numerous ways, including through, for example, grants of individual permits, promul- gation of general permits, or the development of general rules. Indeed, over the years, EPA and the States have of- ten considered the Act’s application to discharges through groundwater. Both Maui and the Government |
Justice Breyer | 2,020 | 2 | majority | County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4747780/county-of-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-fund/ | application to discharges through groundwater. Both Maui and the Government object that to subject dis- charges to navigable waters through groundwater to the statute’s permitting requirements, as our interpretation will sometimes do, would vastly expand the scope of the statute, perhaps requiring permits for each of the 650,000 wells like petitioner’s or for each of the over 20 million sep- tic systems used in many Americans’ homes. Brief for Pe- titioner 44–48; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24–25. Cf. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 But EPA has applied the permitting provision to some (but not to all) discharges through groundwater for over 30 years. See at 8–9. In that time we have seen no evidence of unmanageable expansion. EPA and the States also have tools to mitigate those harms, should they arise, by (for example) developing general permits for recurring situations or by issuing permits based on best practices 18 COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND Opinion of the Court where appropriate. See, (k) (2019). Judges, too, can mitigate any hardship or injustice when they apply the statute’s penalty provision. That provision vests courts with broad discretion to set a penalty that takes account of many factors, including “any good-faith ef- forts to comply” with the Act, the “seriousness of the viola- tion,” the “economic impact of the penalty on the violator,” and “such other matters as justice may require.” See 33 U.S. C. We expect that district judges will exer- cise their discretion mindful, as we are, of the complexities inherent to the context of indirect discharges through groundwater, so as to calibrate the Act’s penalties when, for example, a party could reasonably have thought that a per- mit was not required. In sum, we recognize that a more absolute position, such as the means-of-delivery test or that of the Government or that of the Ninth Circuit, may be easier to administer. But, as we have said, those positions have consequences that are inconsistent with major congressional objectives, as re- vealed by the statute’s language, structure, and purposes. We consequently understand the permitting requirement, as applicable to a discharge (from a point source) of pollutants that reach navigable waters after traveling through groundwater if that discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters. VI Because the Ninth Circuit applied a different standard, we vacate its judgment and remand the case for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 1 KAVANAUGH, J., concurring SUPREME |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Wingo v. Wedding | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109094/wingo-v-wedding/ | The question here is whether federal magistrates are authorized to conduct evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases. In 1968, Congress enacted the *463 Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S. C. 631-639, to upgrade and expand the former United States commissioner system. The Act authorizes magistrates to exercise all powers formerly exercised by United States commissioners,[1] and also, as a means of relieving the caseload burden of the federal district judges, empowers magistrates to try minor offenses when all parties consent,[2] and to perform such additional duties assigned by the district court as are "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."[3] Pursuant to *464 the Act, the Judges of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky amended Local Rule 16 of that court to provide: "In addition to submitting such other reports and recommendations as may be required concerning petitions for writs of habeas corpus from state prisoners the full-time Magistrate is directed to schedule and hear evidentiary matters deemed by the Magistrate to be necessary and proper in the determination of each such petition, and to report thereon with an appropriate recommendation for the disposition thereof to the District Judge having jurisdiction of the case. The Magistrate shall cause the testimony of such hearing to be recorded on suitable electronic sound recording equipment. He shall submit his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the proper Judge for his consideration, copies of which shall be provided at that time to the petitioner and respondent, and the Magistrate shall expeditiously transmit the proceedings, including the recording of the testimony, to the proper District Judge. Upon written request of either party, filed within ten days from the date such is so transmitted to the District Judge having jurisdiction thereof, the District Judge shall proceed to hear the recording of the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and give it de novo consideration." *465 Respondent is a state prisoner whose petition for federal habeas corpus relief was assigned by the District Court to a full-time Magistrate for processing under the rule. The part of the rule challenged here is that which directs the full-time magistrate "to schedule and hear evidentiary matters [to be electronically recorded] deemed by the Magistrate to be necessary and proper in the determination of such petition, and to report thereon with an appropriate recommendation for the disposition thereof to the District Judge [who] [u]pon request shall proceed to hear the recording of the testimony and give it de novo consideration." The question is whether this portion of the rule |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Wingo v. Wedding | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109094/wingo-v-wedding/ | consideration." The question is whether this portion of the rule is invalid because "inconsistent with the laws of the United States" within the meaning of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S. C. 636 (b), or because 636 (b) itself should be construed to preclude district courts from assigning such duties to magistrates. I Respondent, Carl James Wedding, is a prisoner in the Kentucky State Penitentiary serving a life sentence imposed in 1949 by the Webster Circuit Court, Commonwealth of Kentucky, after a plea of guilty to a charge of willful murder. Wedding filed this petition for habeas corpus in 1971. After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the initial dismissal of his petition, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, the District Court invoked Local Rule 16 and assigned the case to a full-time Magistrate to hold the hearing. Wedding promptly moved that the Magistrate be disqualified and the hearing be reassigned to a District Judge, on the ground that the Federal Magistrates Act did not authorize district courts to assign to magistrates the duty to hold habeas corpus evidentiary hearings. When the District Court denied the motion, the Magistrate proceeded *466 with the hearing, and electronically recorded all testimonial evidence as required by Local Rule 16. Thereafter, the Magistrate transmitted the recording of the testimony to the District Judge and submitted written findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the petition be dismissed. Wedding moved that the District Court give the matter a de novo hearing. The District Judge's response was to listen, as authorized by Local Rule 16, to the recording of the hearing before the Magistrate. On this basis and the Magistrate's findings and conclusions, the District Court entered an order dismissing respondent's petition. On appeal, Wedding renewed his challenge to Local Rule 16, relying upon Holiday was also a federal habeas corpus case. There, after determining that the petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged facts which, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the District Judge issued a writ compelling the respondent to produce the petitioner before a designated United States Commissioner. The Commissioner held an evidentiary hearing at which the petitioner testified and the respondent submitted the depositions of two witnesses. On the basis of the evidence received, the Commissioner made findings of fact and stated conclusions of law recommending that the writ be denied. After hearing oral argument on the Commissioner's report, the District Judge entered an order discharging the writ. This Court reversed, holding that the factfinding procedure employed failed to conform to Congress' express command in |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Wingo v. Wedding | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109094/wingo-v-wedding/ | procedure employed failed to conform to Congress' express command in the Habeas Corpus Act that "[t]he court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require." Rev. Stat. 761, *467 28 U.S. C. 461 (1940 ed.) The Court held that the statute plainly accords a prisoner the right of testifying before a judge, stating: "One of the essential elements of the determination of the crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony. Plainly it was intended that the prisoner might invoke the exercise of this appraisal by the judge himself. We cannot say that an appraisal of the truth of the prisoner's oral testimony by a master or commissioner is, in the light of the purpose and object of the proceeding, the equivalent of the judge's own exercise of the function of the trier of the facts. "The District Judge should himself have heard the prisoner's testimony and, in the light of it and the other testimony, himself have found the facts and based his disposition of the cause upon his findings." Wedding contended that neither the text nor legislative history of the Federal Magistrates Act evidences a congressional intent to overrule Holiday. The Court of Appeals agreed and accordingly "vacate[d] the judgment of dismissal and remand[ed] the case with instructions that the [District] Court itself hold an evidentiary hearing on [Wedding's] constitutional claims." We granted certiorari, We affirm.[4] *468 II Under our constitutional framework, the "great constitutional privilege" of habeas corpus, Ex parte Bollman has historically provided "a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release." More often than not, claims of unconstitutional detention turn upon the resolution of contested issues of fact. Accordingly, since the Judiciary Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, 1, Congress has expressly vested plenary power in the federal courts "for taking testimony and trying the facts anew in habeas hearings"[5], See also In connection with the 1948 revision and recodification of the Judicial Code,[6] Rev. Stat. 761, construed in Holiday, and other procedural provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act were consolidated into 28 U.S. C. 2243. The pertinent portion covering habeas corpus evidentiary hearings provides that "[t]he court |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Wingo v. Wedding | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109094/wingo-v-wedding/ | portion covering habeas corpus evidentiary hearings provides that "[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." The Revisers thus deleted some *469 words from Rev. Stat. 761, but the Revisers' Notes accompanying 2243, together with the reports of the Committee of the Judiciary of the Senate,[7] and of the House,[8] make abundantly clear that the word changes and omissions in Rev. Stat. 761 were intended only as changes in form.[9] Accordingly, the construction of 2243 has been that given 761 in Holiday. United (12); (13). The Court held in the latter case: "A federal judge on a habeas corpus application is required to `summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require,' 28 U.S. C. 2243. This has long been the law. R. S. 761, old 28 U.S. C. 461." III Our inquiry is thus narrowed to the question whether the Federal Magistrates Act changed the requirement of 2243 that federal judges personally conduct habeas corpus evidentiary hearings. Certainly nothing in the text *470 or legislative history of the Magistrates Act suggests that Congress meant to change that requirement.[10] Rather, both text and legislative history plainly reveal a congressional determination to retain the requirement. For, although the Act gives district judges broad authority to assign a wide range of duties to magistrates, Congress carefully circumscribed the permissible scope of assignment to only "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S. C. 636 (b) And in defining assignable duties, Congress decreed that the duty of holding evidentiary hearings was not assignable. This clearly emerges from the legislative history of subsection (3) of 636 (b), which provides: "(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing." (Emphasis added.) That legislative history reveals that the Judicial Conference of the United States objected to successive phrasings of subsection (b) (3) until it was phrased to make clear that the authority given district courts to assign duties to magistrates did not include authority to hold evidentiary hearings on applications for posttrial relief.[11]*471 The original draft of the subsection[12] had proposed that magistrates' duties include "(3) preliminary consideration of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses." But because that language was susceptible of the interpretation that magistrates might conduct evidentiary |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | majority | Wingo v. Wedding | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109094/wingo-v-wedding/ | was susceptible of the interpretation that magistrates might conduct evidentiary hearings, the Judicial Conference of the United States objected to it.[13] Accordingly, the subsection was rewritten to provide for "(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case" The Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference objected that the revision did not "make it clear that it is the judge's responsibility to make the ultimate decisions and to hold hearings on such applications, rather than that of the *472 magistrate."[14] The Committee therefore recommended the addition of the phrase "as to whether there should be a hearing" immediately following the word "case."[15] The proposed addition was made,[16] and subsection (b) (3) in its present form was enacted. Thus, although 636 (b) provides that "additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to," duties defined in subsection (b) (3), the legislative history of the subsection compels the conclusion that Congress made a deliberate choice to preclude district courts from assigning magistrates the duty to hold evidentiary hearings. We conclude that, since 2243 requires that the District Judge personally hold evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases, Local Rule 16, insofar as it authorizes the full-time magistrate to hold such hearings, is invalid because it is "inconsistent with the laws of the United States" under 636 (b). We conclude further that the Rule is to that extent invalid because, as we construe 636 (b), that section itself precludes district judges from assigning magistrates the duty of conducting evidentiary hearings.[17] Review by magistrates of applications for post-trial relief is thus limited to review for the purpose of proposing, not holding, evidentiary *473 hearings.[18] In connection with the preliminary review whether or not to propose that the district judge hold an evidentiary hearing, we agree that magistrates may receive the state court record and all affidavits, stipulations, and other documents submitted by the parties.[19] Magistrates are prohibited only from conducting the actual evidentiary hearings.[20] The invalidity of Local Rule 16 is not cured by its provision that the "District Judge shall proceed to hear *474 the recording of the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and give it de novo consideration." Holiday reasoned that the command of 761, now 2243, was designed by Congress in recognition that "[o]ne of the essential elements of the determination of the crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony." "To experienced lawyers |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | The question presented by the Secretary's appeal is whether Congress may condition an alien's eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United States for a five-year period and admission for permanent residence. The District Court held that the first condition was unconstitutional and that it could not be severed from the second. Since we conclude that both conditions are constitutional, we reverse. Each of the appellees is a resident alien who was lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years ago. Appellees Diaz and Clara are Cuban refugees who remain in this country at the discretion of the Attorney General; appellee Espinosa has been admitted for permanent *70 residence. All three are over 65 years old and have been denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program established by 1831 et seq. of the Social Security Act of 1935, as added, and as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1395j et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV).[1] They brought this action to challenge the statutory basis for that denial. Specifically, they attack 42 U.S. C. 1395o (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which grants eligibility to resident citizents who are 65 or older but denies eligibility to comparable aliens unless they have been admitted for permanent residence and also have resided in the United States for at least five years.[2] Appellees Diaz and Clara meet neither requirement; appellee Espinosa meets only the first. On August 18, 1972, Diaz filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern *71 District of Florida alleging that his application for enrollment had been denied on the ground that he was not a citizen and had neither been admitted for permanent residence nor resided in the United States for the immediately preceding five years. He further alleged that numerous other persons had been denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B program for the same reasons. He sought relief on behalf of a class of persons who have been or will denied enrollment in the Medicare insurance program for failure to meet the requirements of 42 U.S. C. 1395o (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Since the complaint prayed for a declaration that 1395o (2) was unconstitutional and for an injunction requiring the Secretary to approve all applicants who had been denied eligibility solely for failure to comply with its requirements, a three-judge court was constituted. On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint. That pleading alleged that Clara |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | to file an amended complaint. That pleading alleged that Clara had been denied enrollment for the same reasons as Diaz, but explained that Espinosa, although a permanent resident since 1971, had not attempted to enroll because he could not meet the durational residence requirement, and therefore any attempt would have been futile. The amended complaint sought relief on behalf of a subclass represented by Espinosathat is, aliens admitted for permanent residence who have been or will be denied enrollment for failure to meet the five-year continuous residence requirementas well as relief on behalf of the class represented by Diaz and Clara.[3] *72 On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because none of the plaintiffs had exhausted his administrative remedies under the Social Security Act. Two days later, on October 26, 1972, Espinosa filed his application for enrollment with the Secretary. He promptly brought this fact to the attention of the District Court, without formally supplementing the pleadings. None of the appellees completely exhausted available avenues for administrative review. Nevertheless, the *73 Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara raised no disputed issues of fact and therefore the interlocutory denials of their applications should be treated as final for the purpose of this litigation. This satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U.S. C. 405 (g). ; 641 n. 8. The Secretary did not make an equally unambiguous concession with respect to Espinosa, but in colloquy with the court he acknowledged that Espinosa had filed an application which could not be allowed under the statute.[4] The District Court overruled the Secretary's motion to dismiss and decided the merits on cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment[5] and that since it could not be severed from the requirement of admission for permanent residence, the alien-eligibility provisions of 1395o (2) (B) were entirely unenforceable. The District Court reasoned that "even though fourteenth amendment notions of equal protection are not entirely congruent with fifth amendment concepts of due process," the danger of unjustifiable discrimination against aliens in the enactment of welfare programs is so great, in view of their complete lack of representation in the political process, that this federal statute should be tested under the same pledge of equal protection as a state statute. So tested, the court concluded that the statute was invalid because it was not both rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. It rejected |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | both rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. It rejected the desire to preserve the fiscal *74 integrity of the program, or to treat some aliens as less deserving than others, as adequate justification for the statute. Accordingly, the court enjoined the Secretary from refusing to enroll members of the class and subclass represented by appellees. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court.[6] We noted probable jurisdiction. After hearing argument last Term, we set the case for reargument. We now consider (1) whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa's claim; (2) whether Congress may discriminate in favor of citizens and against aliens in providing welfare benefits; and (3) if so, whether the specific discriminatory provisions in 1395o (2) (B) are constitutional. I Espinosa's claim squarely raises the question whether the requirement of five years' continuous residence is constitutional, a question that is not necessarily presented by the claims of Diaz and Clara. For if the requirement of admission for permanent residence is valid, their applications were properly denied even if the durational residence requirement is ineffective.[7] We *75 must therefore decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa's claim. We have little difficulty with Espinosa's failure to file an application with the Secretary until after he was joined in the action. Although 42 U.S. C. 405 (g) establishes filing of an application as a nonwaivable condition of jurisdiction, ; Espinosa satisfied this condition while the case was pending in the District Court. A supplemental complaint in the District Court would have eliminated this jurisdictional issue;[8] since the record discloses, both by affidavit and stipulation, that the jurisdictional condition was satisfied, it is not too late, even now, to supplement the complaint to allege this fact.[9] Under these circumstances, we treat the pleadings as properly supplemented by the Secretary's stipulation that Espinosa had filed an application. A further problem is presented by the absence of any formal administrative action by the Secretary denying Espinosa's application. Section 405 (g) requires a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing as a prerequisite of jurisdiction. at -330; However, *76 we held in that the Secretary could waive the exhaustion requirements which this provision contemplates and that he had done so in that case. ; accord, at -330 ; n. 8. We reach a similar conclusion here. The plaintiffs in alleged that their claims had been denied by the local and regional Social Security offices and that the only question was one of constitutional law, beyond the competence of the Secretary to decide. These allegations did not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | decide. These allegations did not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of 405 (g) or the Secretary's regulations, but the Secretary failed to challenge the sufficiency of the allegations on this ground. We interpreted this failure as a determination by the Secretary that exhaustion would have been futile and deferred to his judgment that the only issue presented was the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act. The same reasoning applies to the present case. Although the Secretary moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, at the hearing on the motion he stipulated that no facts were in dispute, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary judgment, and that the only issue before the District Court was the constitutionality of the statute.[10] As in this constitutional question is beyond the Secretary's competence. Indeed, the Secretary has twice stated in this Court that he stipulated in the District Court that Espinosa's application would be denied for failure to meet the durational residence requirement.[11] For jurisdictional purposes, we *77 treat the stipulation in the District Court as tantamount to a decision denying the application and as a waiver of the exhaustion requirements. Cf. at 640 n. 6, 641 n. 8. We conclude, as we did in that the Secretary's submission of the question for decision on the merits by the District Court satisfied the statutory requirement of a hearing and final decision. We hold that Espinosa's claim, as well as the claims of Diaz and Clara, must be decided. II There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wong Yang ; Wong ; see Russian Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. Wong Yang Wong *78 The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other;[12] and the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous *79 multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country.[13] In the |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country.[13] In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization *80 and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens[14] and the reservation of the power to deport[15] have no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry.[16] The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is "invidious." In particular, the fact that Congress has provided some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens. Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its guests. The decision to share that bounty with our guests may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country: Congress may decide that as the alien's tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that munificence. The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliensallowing benefits to some aliens but not to othersis permissible. We turn to that question. *81 III For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.[17] Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudication. Appellees Diaz and Clara are but two of over 440,000 Cuban refugees who arrived in the United States between 1961 and 1972.[18] And the Cuban parolees are but one of several categories of aliens who have been admitted in order to make a humane response to a natural catastrophe or an international political situation.[19] Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution.[20] The reasons *82 that preclude judicial review of political questions[21] also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization. Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens, the party challenging the constitutionality of the particular line Congress has drawn has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line separating some aliens from others. In this case the appellees have challenged two requirementsfirst, that the alien be admitted as a permanent resident, and, second, that his residence be of a duration of at least five years. But if these requirements were eliminated, surely Congress would at least require that the alien's entry be lawful; even then, unless mere transients are to be held constitutionally entitled to benefits, some durational requirement would certainly be appropriate. In short, it *83 is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his residence. Since neither requirement is wholly irrational, this case essentially involves nothing more than a claim that it would have been more reasonable for Congress to select somewhat different requirements of the same kind. We may assume that the five-year line drawn by Congress is longer than necessary to protect the fiscal integrity of the program.[22] We may also assume that unnecessary hardship is incurred by persons just short of qualifying. But it remains true that some line is essential, that any line must produce some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences, and, of greatest importance, that those who qualify under the test Congress has chosen may reasonably be presumed to have a greater affinity with the United States than those who do not. In short, citizens and those who are most like citizens qualify. Those who are less like citizens do not. The task of classifying persons for medical benefits, like the task of drawing lines for federal tax purposes, inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line; the differences between the *84 eligible and the ineligible are differences in degree rather than differences in the character of their respective claims. When this kind of policy choice must be made, we are especially reluctant to question the exercise of congressional judgment.[23] In this case, since appellees |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | the exercise of congressional judgment.[23] In this case, since appellees have not identified a principled basis for prescribing a different standard than the one selected by Congress, they have, in effect, merely invited us to substitute our judgment for that of Congress in deciding which aliens shall be eligible to participate in the supplementary insurance program on the same conditions as citizens. We decline the invitation. IV The cases on which appellees rely are consistent with our conclusion that this statutory classification does not deprive them of liberty or property without due process of law. provides the strongest support for appellees' position. That case holds that state statutes that deny welfare benefits to resident aliens, or to aliens not meeting a requirement of durational residence within the United States, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and encroach upon the exclusive federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens. Of course, the latter ground of decision actually supports our holding today that it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. The equal protection analysis also involves significantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between *85 aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal Government. Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned,[24] there is little, if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State's interests in administering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its business. Furthermore, whereas the Constitution inhibits every State's power to restrict travel across its own borders, Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over travel across the borders of the United States.[25] The distinction between the constitutional limits on state power and the constitutional grant of power to the Federal Government also explains why appellees' reliance on Memorial is misplaced. That case involved Arizona's requirement of durational residence within a county in order to receive nonemergency medical care at the *86 county's expense. No question of alienage was involved. Since the sole basis for the classification between residents impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | majority | Mathews v. Diaz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109463/mathews-v-diaz/ | between residents impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel within the United States, the holding in U.S. 618, required that it be justified by a compelling state interest.[26] Finding no such justification, we held that the requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause. This case, however, involves no state impairment of the right to travelnor indeed any impairment whatever of the right to travel within the United States; the predicate for the equal protection analysis in those cases is simply not present. Contrary to appellees' characterization, it is not "political hypocrisy" to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment's *87 limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization. Finally, we reject the suggestion that U. S. Dept. of lends relevant support to appellees' claim. No question involving alienage was presented in that case. Rather, we found that the denial of food stamps to households containing unrelated members was not only unsupported by any rational basis but actually was intended to discriminate against certain politically unpopular groups. This case involves no impairment of the freedom of association of either citizens or aliens. We hold that 1395o (2) (B) has not deprived appellees of liberty or property without due process of law. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | concurring | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | I join the opinion of the Court with one qualification that goes to the appropriateness of considering the long dormancy of any claim to tribal authority over the parcels in question, as a basis to hold that the Oneida Indian Nation is not now immune from the taxing authority of local government. The Tribe's claim, whether affirmative or defensive, see ante, at 214, n. 7, is one of territorial sovereign status entitled to recognition by the territorial state sovereign and its subdivisions. The claim of present sovereign status turns not only on background law and the provisions of treaties, but also on the Tribe's behavior over a long period of time: the absence of the Tribe and tribal members from the particular lots of land, and the Tribe's failure to assert sovereignty over them. The Tribe's inaction cannot, therefore, be ignored here as affecting only a remedy to be considered later; it is, rather, central to the very claims of right made by the contending parties. Since the subject of inaction was not expressly raised as a separate question presented for review, see ante, at 214, n. 8, there is some question whether we should order reargument before dealing with it. I think that is unnecessary; the issue was addressed by each side in the argument prior to submission of the case, notwithstanding the terms of the questions on which review was granted. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | dissenting | Supreme Court of NH v. Piper | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111363/supreme-court-of-nh-v-piper/ | Today the Court holds that New Hampshire cannot decide that a New Hampshire lawyer should live in New Hampshire. This may not be surprising to those who view law as just another form of business frequently practiced across state lines by interchangeable actors; the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, has long been held to apply to States' attempts to discriminate against nonresidents who seek to ply their trade interstate. The decision will be surprising to many, however, because it so clearly disregards the fact that the practice of law is almost by definition fundamentally different from those other occupations that are practiced across state lines without significant deviation from State to State. The fact that each State is free, in a large number of areas, to establish independently of the other States its own laws for the governance of its citizens, is *290 a fundamental precept of our Constitution that, I submit, is of equal stature with the need for the States to form a cohesive union. What is at issue here is New Hampshire's right to decide that those people who in many ways will intimately deal with New Hampshire's self-governance should reside within that State. The Court's opinion states that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, "was intended to `fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States.' " Ante, at 279 ). To this end, we are told, the Clause has been construed to protect the fundamental "privilege" of citizens of one State to do business in another State on terms substantially equal with that State's citizens. This privilege must be protected to effectuate the Clause's purpose to "create a national economic union." Ante, at 280. And for the Court, the practice of law is no different from those occupations considered in earlier Privileges and Immunities Clause cases, because "the practice of law is important to the national economy." Ante, at 281. After concluding that the Clause applies to lawyers, the Court goes on to reject the many reasons the Supreme Court of New Hampshire advances for limiting the State's lawyers to those who reside in state. The Court either labels these reasons insubstantial, or it advances, with the assurance of an inveterate second-guesser, a "less restrictive means" for the State to attack the perceived problem. The Framers of our Constitution undoubtedly wished to ensure that the newly created Union did not revert to its component parts because of interstate jealousies and insular tendencies, and it seems clear that the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause was one |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | dissenting | Supreme Court of NH v. Piper | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111363/supreme-court-of-nh-v-piper/ | that the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause was one result of these concerns. But the Framers also created a system of federalism that deliberately allowed for the independent operation of many sovereign States, each with their own laws created by their own legislators and judges. The assumption from the beginning was that the various States' laws need not, and would not, *291 be the same; the lawmakers of each State might endorse different philosophies and would have to respond to differing interests of their constituents, based on various factors that were of inherently local character. Any student of our Nation's history is well aware of the differing interests of the various States that were represented at Philadelphia; despite the tremendous improvements in transportation and communication that have served to create a more homogeneous country the differences among the various States have hardly disappeared. It is but a small step from these facts to the recognition that a State has a very strong interest in seeing that its legislators and its judges come from among the constituency of state residents, so that they better understand the local interests to which they will have to respond. The Court does not contest this point; it recognizes that a State may require its lawmakers to be residents without running afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2. See ante, at 282, n. 13. Unlike the Court, I would take the next step, and recognize that the State also has a very "substantial" interest in seeing that its lawyers also are members of that constituency. I begin with two important principles that the Court seems to have forgotten: first, that in reviewing state statutes under this Clause "States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and prescribing appropriate cures," United Building & Construction Trades and second, that regulation of the practice of law generally has been "left exclusively to the States" My belief that the practice of law differs from other trades and businesses for Art. IV, 2, purposes is not based on some notion that law is for some reason a superior profession. The reason that the practice of law should be treated differently is that law is one occupation that does not *292 readily translate across state lines.[1] Certain aspects of legal practice are distinctly and intentionally nonnational; in this regard one might view this country's legal system as the antithesis of the norms embodied in the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. Put simply, the State has a substantial interest in creating its own set of laws |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | dissenting | Supreme Court of NH v. Piper | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111363/supreme-court-of-nh-v-piper/ | a substantial interest in creating its own set of laws responsive to its own local interests, and it is reasonable for a State to decide that those people who have been trained to analyze law and policy are better equipped to write those state laws and adjudicate cases arising under them. The State therefore may decide that it has an interest in maximizing the number of resident lawyers, so as to increase the quality of the pool from which its lawmakers can be drawn.[2] A residency law such as the one at issue is the obvious way to accomplish these goals. Since at any given time within a State there is only enough legal work to support a certain number of lawyers, each out-of-state *293 lawyer who is allowed to practice necessarily takes legal work that could support an in-state lawyer, who would otherwise be available to perform various functions that a State has an interest in promoting.[3] Nor does the State's interest end with enlarging the pool of qualified lawmakers. A State similarly might determine that because lawyers play an important role in the formulation of state policy through their adversary representation, they should be intimately conversant with the local concerns that should inform such policies. And the State likewise might conclude that those citizens trained in the law are likely to bring their useful expertise to other important functions that benefit from such expertise and are of interest to state governments such as trusteeships, or directorships of corporations or charitable organizations, or school board positions, or merely the role of the interested citizen at a town meeting. Thus, although the Court suggests that state bars can require out-of-state members to "represent indigents and perhaps to participate in formal legal-aid work," ante, at 287, the Court ignores a host of other important functions that a State could find would likely be performed only by in-state bar members. States may find a substantial interest in members of their bar being residents, and this insular interest as with the opposing interest in interstate harmony represented by Art. IV, 2 itself has its genesis in the language and structure of the Constitution.[4] *294 It is no answer to these arguments that many lawyers simply will not perform these functions, or that out-of-state lawyers can perform them equally well, or that the State can devise less restrictive alternatives for accomplishing these goals. Conclusory second-guessing of difficult legislative decisions, such as the Court resorts to today, is not an attractive way for federal courts to engage in judicial review. Thus, whatever |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | dissenting | Supreme Court of NH v. Piper | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111363/supreme-court-of-nh-v-piper/ | for federal courts to engage in judicial review. Thus, whatever the reality of how much New Hampshire can expect to gain from having the members of its bar reside within that State, the point is that New Hampshire is entitled to believe and hope that its lawyers will provide the various unique services mentioned above, just as it is entitled to believe that the residency requirement is the appropriate way to that end. As noted, some of these services can only be provided by lawyers who also are residents. With respect to the other services, the State can reasonably find that lawyers who reside in state are more likely to undertake them. In addition, I find the Court's "less restrictive means" analysis both ill-advised and potentially unmanageable. Initially I would note, as I and other Members of this Court have before, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. ); cf. that such an analysis, when carried too far, will ultimately lead to striking *295 down almost any statute on the ground that the Court could think of another "less restrictive" way to write it. This approach to judicial review, far more than the usual application of a standard of review, tends to place courts in the position of second-guessing legislators on legislative matters. Surely this is not a consequence to be desired. In any event, I find the less-restrictive-means analysis, which is borrowed from our First Amendment jurisprudence, to be out of place in the context of the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. 334 U. S., and indicate that the means employed by the State should bear a "substantial" or "close relation" to the State's objectives, and they speak in terms of whether the State's approach is "tailored" to its stated goal. This approach perhaps has a place: to the extent that an obvious way to accomplish the State's proffered goal is apparent, the fact that the State did not follow that path may indicate that the State had another, less legitimate goal in mind. But I believe the challenge of a "less restrictive means" should be overcome if merely a legitimate reason exists for not pursuing that path. And in any event courts should not play the game that the Court has played here independently scrutinizing each asserted state interest to see if it could devise a better way than the State to accomplish that goal. Here the appellee primarily argues that if the State really was concerned about out-of-state lawyers it would not allow those who leave the State after joining the bar to remain members. The |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | dissenting | Supreme Court of NH v. Piper | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111363/supreme-court-of-nh-v-piper/ | the State after joining the bar to remain members. The answer to this argument was well stated by the dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: "[T]he Supreme Court of New Hampshire might have concluded that not many New Hampshire lawyers will both pull up stakes and continue to practice in the state. And it might further believe that the bureaucracy required to keep track of such comings and goings would not be worth the trouble" *296 There is yet another interest asserted by the State that I believe would justify a decision to limit membership in the state bar to state residents. The State argues that out-of-state bar members pose a problem in situations where counsel must be available on short notice to represent clients on unscheduled matters. The Court brushes this argument aside, speculating that "a high percentage of nonresident lawyers willing to take the state bar examination and pay the annual dues will reside in places reasonably convenient to New Hampshire," and suggesting that in any event the trial court could alleviate this problem by requiring the lawyer to retain local counsel. Ante, at 286-287. Assuming that the latter suggestion does not itself constitute unlawful discrimination under the Court's test, there nevertheless may be good reasons why a State or a trial court would rather not get into structuring attorney-client relationships by requiring the retention of local counsel for emergency matters. The situation would have to be explained to the client, and the allocation of responsibility between resident and nonresident counsel could cause as many problems as the Court's suggestion might cure. Nor do I believe that the problem can be confined to emergency matters. The Court admits that even in the ordinary course of litigation a trial judge will want trial lawyers to be available on short notice; the uncertainties of managing a trial docket are such that lawyers rarely are given a single date on which a trial will begin; they may be required to "stand by" or whatever the local terminology is for days at a time, and then be expected to be ready in a matter of hours, with witnesses, when the case in front of them suddenly settles. A State reasonably can decide that a trial court should not have added to its present scheduling difficulties the uncertainties and added delays fostered by counsel who might reside 1,000 miles from New Hampshire. If there is any single problem with state legal systems that this Court might consider "substantial," it is the problem of delay *297 in |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | concurring | Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109724/hazelwood-school-dist-v-united-states/ | I join the Court's opinion. Similarly to our decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, post, p. 406, today's opinion revolves around the relative factfinding roles of district courts and courts of appeals. It should be plain, however, that the liberal substantive standards for establishing a Title VII violation, including the usefulness of statistical proof, are reconfirmed. In the present case, the District Court had adopted a wholly inappropriate legal standard of discrimination, and therefore *314 did not evaluate the factual record before it in a meaningful way. This remand in effect orders it to do so. It is my understanding, as apparently it is MR. JUSTICE STEVENS', post, at 318 n. 5, that the statistical inquiry mentioned by the Court, ante, at 311 n. 17, and accompanying text, can be of no help to the Hazelwood School Board in rebutting the Government's evidence of discrimination. Indeed, even if the relative comparison market is found to be 5.7% rather than 15.4% black, the applicable statistical analysis at most will not serve to bolster the Government's case. This obviously is of no aid to Hazelwood in meeting its burden of proof. Nonetheless I think that the remand directed by the Court is appropriate and will allow the parties to address these figures and calculations with greater care and precision. I also agree that given the misapplication of governing legal principles by the District Court, Hazelwood reasonably should be given the opportunity to come forward with more focused and specific applicant-flow data in the hope of answering the Government's prima facie case. If, as presently seems likely, reliable applicant data are found to be lacking, the conclusion reached by my Brother STEVENS will inevitably be forthcoming. MR. |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | Far more important than the question whether nude dancing is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment are the dramatic changes in legal doctrine that the Court endorses today. Until now, the "secondary effects" of commercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location. For the first time, the Court has now held that such effects may justify *318 the total suppression of protected speech. Indeed, the plurality opinion concludes that admittedly trivial advancements of a State's interests may provide the basis for censorship. The Court's commendable attempt to replace the fractured decision in with a single coherent rationale is strikingly unsuccessful; it is supported neither by precedent nor by persuasive reasoning. I As the preamble to Ordinance No. 75-1994 candidly acknowledges, the council of the city of Erie enacted the restriction at issue "for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City." Ante, at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the enactment of the ordinance, the dancers at Kandyland performed in the nude. As the Court recognizes, after its enactment they can perform precisely the same dances if they wear "pasties and G-strings." Ante, at 294; see also ante, at 313, n. 2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In both instances, the erotic messages conveyed by the dancers to a willing audience are a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. Ante, at 289.[1] Despite the similarity between the messages conveyed by the two forms of dance, they are not identical. If we accept Chief Judge Posner's evaluation of this art form, see the difference between the two messages is significant. The plurality assumes, however, that the difference in the content of the message resulting from *319 the mandated costume change is "de minimis. " Ante, at 294. Although I suspect that the patrons of Kandyland are more likely to share Chief Judge Posner's view than the plurality's, for present purposes I shall accept the assumption that the difference in the message is small. The crucial point to remember, however, is that whether one views the difference as large or small, nude dancing still receives First Amendment protection, even if that protection lies only in the "outer ambit" of that Amendment. Ante, at 289. Erie's ordinance, therefore, burdens a message protected by the First Amendment. If one assumes that the same erotic message is conveyed by nude dancers as by those wearing miniscule costumes, one means of expressing that message is banned;[2] if one assumes that the messages are different, one of |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | if one assumes that the messages are different, one of those messages is banned. In either event, the ordinance is a total ban. The plurality relies on the so-called "secondary effects" test to defend the ordinance. Ante, at 290-296. The present use of that rationale, however, finds no support whatsoever in our precedents. Never before have we approved the use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on protected First Amendment expression. On the contrary, we have been quite clear that the doctrine would not support that end. In we upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that placed special restrictions on the location of motion picture theaters that exhibited "adult" movies. The "secondary effects" of the adult theaters on the neighborhoods where they were locatedlower property values and increases in crime (especially prostitution) to name a fewjustified the burden imposed *320 by the ordinance. and n. 34 Essential to our holding, however, was the fact that the ordinance was "nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited" and did not limit the size of the market in such speech. ; see also As Justice Powell emphasized in his concurrence: "At most the impact of the ordinance on [the First Amendment] interests is incidental and minimal. Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has imposed no limitation upon those who wish to view them. The ordinance is addressed only to the places at which this type of expression may be presented, a restriction that does not interfere with content. Nor is there any significant overall curtailment of adult movie presentations, or the opportunity for a message to reach an audience." See also In we upheld a similar ordinance, again finding that the "secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community" justified a restrictive zoning law. We noted, however, that "[t]he ordinance, like the one in American Mini does not ban adult theaters altogether," but merely "circumscribe[s] their choice as to location." ; see also Indeed, in both and American Mini the zoning ordinances were analyzed as mere "time, *321 place, and manner" regulations.[3] See ; American Mini and n. 18; Because time, place, and manner regulations must "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information," a total ban would necessarily fail that test.[4] And we so held in There, we addressed a zoning ordinance that did not merely require the dispersal of adult theaters, but prohibited *322 them altogether. In striking down that law, we focused precisely on that distinction, holding that the secondary effects analysis endorsed in the |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | distinction, holding that the secondary effects analysis endorsed in the past did not apply to an ordinance that totally banned nude dancing: "The restriction [in Young v. American Mini ] did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could operate in the city; it merely dispersed them. The Court did not imply that a municipality could ban all adult theatersmuch less all live entertainment or all nude dancingfrom its commercial districts citywide." ; see also ; (joining plurality); (same). The reason we have limited our secondary effects cases to zoning and declined to extend their reasoning to total bans is clear and straightforward: A dispersal that simply limits the places where speech may occur is a minimal imposition, whereas a total ban is the most exacting of restrictions. The State's interest in fighting presumed secondary effects is sufficiently strong to justify the former, but far too weak to support the latter, more severe burden.[5] Yet it is perfectly clear that in the present caseto use Justice Powell's metaphor in American Mini the city of Erie has totally silenced a message the dancers at Kandyland want to convey. The fact that this censorship may have a laudable ulterior purpose cannot mean that censorship is not censorship. For these reasons, the Court's holding rejects the explicit reasoning in American Mini and and the express holding in Schad. The Court's use of the secondary effects rationale to permit a total ban has grave implications for basic free speech principles. Ordinarily, laws regulating the primary effects of speech, i. e., the intended persuasive effects caused by the *323 speech, are presumptively invalid. Under today's opinion, a State may totally ban speech based on its secondary effectswhich are defined as those effects that "happen to be associated" with speech, ; see ante, at 291yet the regulation is not presumptively invalid. Because the category of effects that "happen to be associated" with speech includes the narrower subset of effects caused by speech, today's holding has the effect of swallowing whole a most fundamental principle of First Amendment jurisprudence. II The plurality's mishandling of our secondary effects cases is not limited to its approval of a total ban. It compounds that error by dramatically reducing the degree to which the State's interest must be furthered by the restriction imposed on speech, and by ignoring the critical difference between secondary effects caused by speech and the incidental effects on speech that may be caused by a regulation of conduct. In what can most delicately be characterized as an enormous understatement, the plurality concedes that "requiring dancers |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | as an enormous understatement, the plurality concedes that "requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly reduce these secondary effects." Ante, at 301. To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a titanic surrender to the implausible. It would be more accurate to acknowledge, as Justice Scalia does, that there is no reason to believe that such a requirement "will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster sexually transmitted disease." Ante, at 310 (opinion concurring in judgment); see also ante, at 313, n. 2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nevertheless, the plurality concludes that the "less stringent" test announced in United "requires only that the regulation further the interest in *324 combating such effects," ante, at 301; see also ante, at 289. It is one thing to say, however, that O'Brien is more lenient than the "more demanding standard" we have imposed in cases such as See ante, at 289. It is quite another to say that the test can be satisfied by nothing more than the mere possibility of de minimis effects on the neighborhood. The plurality is also mistaken in equating our secondary effects cases with the "incidental burdens" doctrine applied in cases such as O'Brien; and it aggravates the error by invoking the latter line of cases to support its assertion that Erie's ordinance is unrelated to speech. The incidental burdens doctrine applies when "`speech' and `nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," and the government's interest in regulating the latter justifies incidental burdens on the former. O'Brien, Secondary effects, on the other hand, are indirect consequences of protected speech and may justify regulation of the places where that speech may occur. See American Mini 427 U. S., n. 34[6] When a State enacts a regulation, it might focus on the secondary effects of speech as its aim, or it might concentrate on nonspeech related concerns, having no thoughts at all with respect to how its regulation will affect speechand only later, when the regulation is found to burden speech, justify the imposition as an unintended incidental consequence.[7] But those interests are not the *325 same, and the plurality cannot ignore their differences and insist that both aims are equally unrelated to speech simply because Erie might have "recogniz[ed]" that it could possibly have had either aim in mind. See ante, at 295.[8] One can think of an apple |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | See ante, at 295.[8] One can think of an apple and an orange at the same time; that does not turn them into the same fruit. Of course, the line between governmental interests aimed at conduct and unrelated to speech, on the one hand, and interests arising out of the effects of the speech, on the other, may be somewhat imprecise in some cases. In this case, however, we need not wrestle with any such difficulty because Erie has expressly justified its ordinance with reference to secondary effects. Indeed, if Erie's concern with the effects of the message were unrelated to the message itself, it is strange that the only means used to combat those effects is the suppression of the message.[9] For these reasons, the plurality's argument that "this case is similar to O'Brien, " ante, at 291; see also ante, at 294, is quite wrong, as are its *326 citations to and ante, at 293-295, neither of which involved secondary effects. The plurality cannot have its cake and eat it tooeither Erie's ordinance was not aimed at speech and the plurality may attempt to justify the regulation under the incidental burdens test, or Erie has aimed its law at the secondary effects of speech, and the plurality can try to justify the law under that doctrine. But it cannot conflate the two with the expectation that Erie's interests aimed at secondary effects will be rendered unrelated to speech by virtue of this doctrinal polyglot. Correct analysis of the issue in this case should begin with the proposition that nude dancing is a species of expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. As Chief Judge Posner has observed, nude dancing fits well within a broad, cultural tradition recognized as expressive in nature and entitled to First Amendment protection. See 904 F.2d, at ; see also Note, The nudity of the dancer is both a component of the protected expression and the specific target of the ordinance. It is pure sophistry to reason from the premise that the regulation of the nudity component of nude dancing is unrelated to the message conveyed by nude dancers. Indeed, both the text of the ordinance and the reasoning in the plurality's opinion make it pellucidly clear that the city of Erie has prohibited nude dancing "precisely because of its communicative attributes." (emphasis in original); see III The censorial purpose of Erie's ordinance precludes reliance on the judgment in as sufficient support for the Court's holding today. Several differences between the Erie ordinance and the statute at issue in belie the plurality's |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | ordinance and the statute at issue in belie the plurality's assertion that the two laws are "almost identical." *327 Ante, at 289. To begin with, the preamble to Erie's ordinance candidly articulates its agenda, declaring: "Council specifically wishes to adopt the concept of Public Indecency prohibited by the laws of the State of Indiana, which was approved by the U. S. Supreme Court in vs. Glen Theatre Inc., for the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City. " App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a (emphasis added); see also ante, at 290.[10] As its preamble forthrightly admits, the ordinance's "purpose" is to "limi[t]" a protected form of speech; its invocation of cannot obliterate that professed aim.[11] Erie's ordinance differs from the statute in in another respect. In the Court expressly observed that the Indiana statute had not been given a limiting construction by the Indiana Supreme Court. As presented to this Court, there was nothing about the law itself that would confine its application to nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments. See n. 1 ; see also *328 Erie's ordinance, however, comes to us in a much different posture. In an earlier proceeding in this case, the Court of Common Pleas asked Erie's counsel "what effect would this ordinance have on theater productions such as Equus, Hair, O[h!] Calcutta[!]? Under your ordinance would these things be prevented ?" Counsel responded: "No, they wouldn't, Your Honor." App. 53.[12] Indeed, as stipulated in the record, the city permitted a production of Equus to proceed without prosecution, even after the ordinance was in effect, and despite its awareness of the nudity involved in the production.[13] Even if, in light of its broad applicability, the statute in was not aimed at a particular form of speech, Erie's ordinance is quite different. As presented to us, the ordinance is deliberately targeted at Kandyland's type of nude dancing (to the exclusion of plays like Equus), in terms of both its applicable scope and the city's enforcement.[14] *329 This narrow aim is confirmed by the expressed views of the Erie City Councilmembers who voted for the ordinance. The four city councilmembers who approved the measure (of the six total councilmembers) each stated his or her view that the ordinance was aimed specifically at nude adult entertainment, and not at more mainstream forms of entertainment that include total nudity, nor even at nudity in general. One lawmaker observed: "We're not talking about nudity. We're not talking about the theater or art We're talking about what is indecent and immoral. We're not prohibiting nudity, |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Erie v. Pap's AM | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118353/erie-v-paps-am/ | about what is indecent and immoral. We're not prohibiting nudity, we're prohibiting nudity when it's used in a lewd and immoral fashion." App. 39. Though not quite as succinct, the other councilmembers expressed similar convictions. For example, one member illustrated his understanding of the aim of the law by contrasting it with his recollection about high school students swimming in the nude in the school's pool. The ordinance was not intended to cover those incidents of nudity: "But what I'm getting at is [the swimming] wasn't indecent, it wasn't an immoral thing, and *330 yet there was nudity." The same lawmaker then disfavorably compared the nude swimming incident to the activities that occur in "some of these clubs" that exist in Erieclubs that would be covered by the law. Ibid.[15] Though such comments could be consistent with an interest in a general prohibition of nudity, the complete absence of commentary on that broader interest, and the councilmembers' exclusive focus on adult entertainment, is evidence of the ordinance's aim. In my view, we need not strain to find consistency with more general purposes when the most natural reading of the record reflects a near obsessive preoccupation with a single target of the law.[16] The text of Erie's ordinance is also significantly different from the law upheld in In the statute defined "nudity" as "the showing of the human male or female *331 genitals" (and certain other regions of the body) "with less than a fully opaque covering." n. 2. The Erie ordinance duplicates that definition in all material respects, but adds the following to its definition of "[n]udity": "`[T]he exposure of any device, costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum anal region or pubic hair region; or the exposure of any device worn as a cover over the nipples and/or areola of the female breast, which device simulates and gives the realistic appearance of nipples and/or areola.' " Ante, at 283 284, n. (emphasis added). Can it be doubted that this out-of-the-ordinary definition of "nudity" is aimed directly at the dancers in establishments such as Kandyland? Who else is likely to don such garments? [17] We should not stretch to embrace fanciful explanations when the most natural reading of the ordinance unmistakably identifies its intended target. It is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Erie ordinance was a response to a more specific concern than nudity in general, namely, nude dancing of the sort found in Kandyland.[18] Given that the Court has not even tried to defend *332 |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Smith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/815038/smith-v-united-states/ | Upon joining a criminal conspiracy, a defendant’s mem- bership in the ongoing unlawful scheme continues until he withdraws. A defendant who withdraws outside the rele- vant statute-of-limitations period has a complete defense to prosecution. We consider whether, when the defend- ant produces some evidence supporting such a defense, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not withdraw outside the statute-of-limitations period. I Petitioner Calvin Smith was indicted for crimes con- nected to his role in an organization that distributed cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in Washing- ton, D. C., for about a decade. The 158-count indictment charged Smith and 1 alleged co-conspirators with con- spiring to run, and actually running, an illegal drug busi- ness, as well as with committing acts of violence, including 31 murders, to further their goals. Smith was tried along- side five codefendants. A jury of the United States Dis- trict Court for the District of Columbia convicted him of (1) conspiracy to distribute narcotics and to possess narcotics 2 SMITH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court with the intent to distribute them, in violation of 21 U.S. C. (2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S. C. (3) murder in connection with a contin- uing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S. C. and (4) four counts of murder while armed, in violation of D. C. Code and 22–3202 (199).1 At issue here are Smith’s conspiracy convictions. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the conspiracy counts as barred by the applicable 5-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S. C. because he had spent the last six years of the charged conspiracies in prison for a felony conviction. The court denied his motion and Smith renewed his statute-of-limitations defense at trial. In the final jury charge, the court instructed the jury to convict Smith of each conspiracy count if the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracies existed, that Smith was a member of those conspiracies, and that the conspir- acies “continued in existence within five years” before the indictment. App. 2a, 300a. After it began deliberations, the jury asked the court what to do in the event that a defendant withdrew from the conspiracies outside the relevant limitations period.2 Smith had not yet raised an affirmative defense of with- drawal, so the court for the first time instructed the jury on the defense. The court explained that “[t]he relevant date for purposes of determining the statute of limitations —————— 1 On appeal, the D. C. Circuit remanded two of the |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Smith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/815038/smith-v-united-states/ | On appeal, the D. C. Circuit remanded two of the murder counts for the District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding whether Smith received ineffective assistance of counsel as to those convictions. United 2 The note to the judge inquired: “ ‘If we find that the Narcotics or RICO conspiracies continued after the relevant date under the statute of limitations, but that a particular defendant left the conspiracy before the relevant date under the statute of limitations, must we find that defendant not guilty? ’ ” App. 174a. Cite as: 58 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court is the date, if any, on which a conspiracy concludes or a date on which that defendant withdrew from that conspir- acy.” at 328a. It defined withdrawal as “affirmative acts inconsistent with the goals of the conspiracy” that “were communicated to the defendant’s coconspirators in a manner reasonably calculated to reach those conspira- tors.” “Withdrawal,” the court instructed, “must be un- equivocal.” Over the defense’s objection, the court told the jury that “[o]nce the government has proven that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the burden is on the defendant to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.” The jury then convicted Smith of the conspiracy crimes. As relevant here, the Court of Appeals affirmed Smith’s conspiracy convictions. Recognizing that the Circuits are divided on which party bears the burden of proving or dis- proving a defense of withdrawal prior to the limitations period, the court concluded that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not vio- late the Due Process Clause. United 51 F.3d 30, –90 We granted certiorari. 57 U. S. (2012). II Petitioner’s claim lies at the intersection of a withdrawal defense and a statute-of-limitations defense. He asserts that once he presented evidence that he ended his mem- bership in the conspiracy prior to the statute-of- limitations period, it became the Government’s burden to prove that his individual participation in the conspiracy persisted within the applicable five-year window. This position draws support neither from the Constitution (as discussed in this Part II), nor from the conspiracy and limitations statutes at issue (as discussed in Part III, infra). Establishing individual withdrawal was a burden that rested firmly on the defendant regardless of when the 4 SMITH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court purported withdrawal took place. Allocating to a defendant the burden of proving with- drawal does not violate the Due Process Clause. While the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “every fact necessary |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Smith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/815038/smith-v-united-states/ | Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the de- fendant] is charged,” In re Winship, “[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative de- fenses has never been constitutionally required,” Patterson v. New York, The State is fore- closed from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant only “when an affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime.” (Powell, J., dissenting). Where instead it “excuse[s] con- duct that would otherwise be punishable,” but “does not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself,” the Government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Withdrawal does not negate an element of the conspir- acy crimes charged here. The essence of conspiracy is “the combination of minds in an unlawful purpose.” United To convict a de- fendant of narcotics or RICO conspiracy, the Govern- ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more people agreed to commit a crime covered by the specific conspiracy statute (that a conspiracy existed) and that the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the agreement (that he was a member of the conspiracy).3 —————— 3 Narcoticsconspiracy under 21 U.S. C. §84 criminalizes “con- spir[ing] to commit any offense” under the Controlled Substances Act, including the knowing distribution of, or possession with intent to distribute, controlled substances, Section 192(d) of Title 18 makes it unlawful to “conspire to violate” RICO, which makes it unlaw- ful, among other things, “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the Cite as: 58 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court Far from contradicting an element of the offense, with- drawal presupposes that the defendant committed the offense. Withdrawal achieves more modest ends than exoneration. Since conspiracy is a continuing offense, United 218 U.S. 01, 10 a de- fendant who has joined a conspiracy continues to violate the law “through every moment of [the conspiracy’s] exist- ence,” 225 U.S. 7, 39 and he becomes responsible for the acts of his co- conspirators in pursuit of their common plot, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 40, 4 (194). Withdrawal terminates the defendant’s liability for postwithdrawal acts of his co-conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy. Withdrawal also starts the clock running on the time within which the defendant may be prosecuted, and pro- vides a complete defense when the withdrawal occurs beyond the applicable statute-of-limitations period.4 A complete defense, however, is not necessarily |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Smith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/815038/smith-v-united-states/ | applicable statute-of-limitations period.4 A complete defense, however, is not necessarily one that establishes the defendant’s innocence. For example, we have held that although self-defense may entirely excuse or justify aggravated murder, “the elements of aggravated murder and self-defense [do not] overlap in the sense that evidence to prove the latter will often tend to negate the former.” at 2; see Leland v. Oregon, 3 U.S. 790, 794–79 (1952) (same for insanity defense). Likewise, although the statute of limitations may inhibit —————— conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” §192(c). 4 The conspiracy statutes at issue here do not contain their own limi- tations periods, but are governed by which provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” At the time petitioner was in- dicted, contained no subsections; what was the full text of the sec- tion is now subsection (a). SMITH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court prosecution, it does not render the underlying conduct noncriminal. Commission of the crime within the statute- of-limitations period is not an element of the conspiracy offense. See United 17 Wall. 18, (1872). The Government need not allege the time of the offense in the indictment, at 179–, and it is up to the defendant to raise the limitations defense, Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917). A statute-of-limitations defense does not call the criminality of the defendant’s conduct into ques- tion, but rather reflects a policy judgment by the legis- lature that the lapse of time may render criminal acts ill suited for prosecution. See, e.g., Thus, although union of withdrawal with a statute-of-limitations defense can free the defendant of criminal liability, it does not place upon the prosecution a constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not withdraw. As with other affirmative defenses, the burden is on him. III Of course, Congress may choose to assign the Govern- ment the burden of proving the nonexistence of withdrawal, even if that is not constitutionally required. It did not do so here. “[T]he common-law rule was that affirmative defenses were matters for the defendant to prove.” ; see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 201 (179). Because Congress did not address in 21 U.S. C. §84 or 18 U.S. C. §192(d) the burden of proof for withdrawal, we presume that Con- gress intended to |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Smith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/815038/smith-v-united-states/ | proof for withdrawal, we presume that Con- gress intended to preserve the common-law rule. Dixon, 548 U. S., at 13–14. That Congress left the traditional burden of proof undis- turbed is both practical and fair. “ ‘[W]here the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party,’ ” that party is best situated to bear the burden of Cite as: 58 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court proof. On the matter of withdrawal, the in- formational asymmetry heavily favors the defendant. Pas- sive nonparticipation in the continuing scheme is not enough to sever the meeting of minds that constitutes the conspiracy. “[T]o avert a continuing criminality” there must be “affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose” of the conspiracy. at 39. The defendant knows what steps, if any, he took to dissociate from his confederates. He can testify to his act of with- drawal or direct the court to other evidence substantiating his claim.5 It would be nearly impossible for the Gov- ernment to prove the negative that an act of with- drawal never happened. See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §248, p. 288 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981) (“It is often said that the burden is upon the party having in form the affirmative allegation”). Witnesses with the primary power to refute a withdrawal defense will often be beyond the Government’s reach: The defendant’s co-conspirators are likely to invoke their right against self-incrimination rather than explain their unlawful association with him. Here again, the analysis does not change when with- drawal is the basis for a statute-of-limitations defense. To be sure, we have held that the Government must prove the time of the conspiracy offense if a statute-of-limitations defense is raised. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 39 (1957). But the Government satisfied that bur- den here when it proved that the conspiracy continued past the statute-of-limitations period. For the offense in these conspiracy prosecutions was not the initial act of agreement, but the banding-together against the law effected by that act, which continues until termination of —————— 5 Here, Smith introduced a stipulation of his dates spent incarcerated, as well as “testimonial evidence showing that he was no longer a member of the charged conspiracies during his incarceration.” Brief for Petitioner 3. The jury found that this did not establish by a preponder- ance of the evidence an affirmative act of withdrawal. 8 SMITH v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the conspiracy or, as to a particular defendant, until that defendant’s withdrawal. And as we have discussed, the burden of |
Justice Scalia | 2,013 | 9 | majority | Smith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/815038/smith-v-united-states/ | defendant’s withdrawal. And as we have discussed, the burden of establishing that withdrawal rests upon the defendant. Petitioner’s claim that assertion of a statute-of- limitations defense shifts that burden is incompatible with the established proposition that a defendant’s membership in the conspiracy, and his responsibility for its acts, en- dures even if he is entirely inactive after joining it. (“As he has started evil forces he must withdraw his support from them or incur the guilt of their continuance.” 225 U. S., at 39–370.) For as a practical matter, the only way the Government would be able to establish a failure to withdraw would be to show active participation in the conspiracy during the limitations period. * * * Having joined forces to achieve collectively more evil than he could accomplish alone, Smith tied his fate to that of the group. His individual change of heart (assuming it occurred) could not put the conspiracy genie back in the bottle. We punish him for the havoc wreaked by the un- lawful scheme, whether or not he remained actively in- volved. It is his withdrawal that must be active, and it was his burden to show that. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | Michigan v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108794/michigan-v-payne/ | A writ of certiorari was granted in this case, to decide whether the due process holding of North is to be given retroactive effect. For the reasons that follow, we hold today that this decision is nonretroactive. I Respondent, Leroy Payne, pleaded guilty in a county circuit court in Michigan to a charge of assault with intent to commit murder in connection with an armed *48 attack upon two sheriff's deputies. In March 196 he was sentenced to a prison term of from 19 to 40 years. Several years later, respondent's conviction and sentence were set aside when a hearing, ordered by the Michigan Court of Appeals, disclosed that his confession and subsequent guilty plea were involuntary. Following a retrial, at which he exercised his rights to trial by jury and to plead innocent, respondent again was found guilty on the same assault charge. On August 0, 1967, he was resentenced to prison from 25 to 50 years with full credit for all time served under the prior sentence. During the resentencing hearing, the judge explained that the higher sentence was "based on the nature of the crime and on the impressions which I formed of [respondent] and of the crime." Respondent appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction and approved the higher sentence. While the case was pending before the Michigan Supreme Court, the trial judge who had presided over respondent's second trial was requested to submit an affidavit detailing his reasons for imposing a higher sentence. The judge's affidavit stated that his sentencing determination was based primarily on (i) his personal belief that respondent's attitude since the first sentencing proceeding had changed from one of regret to remorselessness, (ii) his view that respondent's alibi defense, given under oath, was a "tissue of lies," and (iii) his heightened opportunity to learn of the details of the crime during the three-day trial.[1] *49 The Michigan Supreme Court, in a 4-to- decision, upheld the conviction but rejected the higher sentence as violative of the due process restrictions established in North The court recognized that this Court had not yet decided whether applied to resentencing proceedings which, as in this case, occurred prior to 's date of decision.[2] While declining to predict how the retroactivity question would ultimately be resolved, the Michigan Supreme Court decided to apply to the case then before it "pending clarification" by this Court. at 90 n. n. 2. Before this Court, the State contends that should not be applied retrospectively, but that, even if applicable, the state supreme court erred in holding the |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | Michigan v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108794/michigan-v-payne/ | if applicable, the state supreme court erred in holding the higher sentence invalid under the test. Because we hold today that does not apply retroactively, we do not reach the State's second contention.[] *50 II In the Court emphasized that "[i]t can hardly be doubted" that, while "there exists no absolute constitutional bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon retrial," it would be entirely impermissible for judges to render harsher penalties as punishment for those defendants who have succeeded in getting their convictions reversed. 95 U.S., at 72. "[V]indictiveness" against a defendant for having exercised his rights to appeal or to attack his conviction collaterally, the Court held, "must play no part in the sentence [a defendant] receives after a new trial." In so holding, the Court recognized that "fundamental notions of fairness embodied within the concept of due process" absolutely preclude the imposition of sentences based upon such a " `retaliatory motivation.' " Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, ante, at 25. No "new" constitutional rule was thereby established and it cannot be questioned that this basic due process protection articulated *51 in is available equally to defendants resentenced before and after the date of decision in that case. On this point the parties do not disagree. The dispute in this case centers, instead, around the "prophylactic"[4] limitations established to guard against the possibility of vindictiveness in the resentencing process. Those limitations, applicable "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial," 95 U.S., at 726, require that the sentencing judge's reasons "must affirmatively appear," and that those reasons "must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." The question here is whether these restrictions govern resentencing proceedings predating The contours of the retroactivity inquiry have been clearly delineated in numerous decisions over the last decade. The test utilized repeatedly by this Court to ascertain whether "new" constitutional protections in the area of criminal procedure are to be applied retroactively calls for the consideration of three criteria: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 88 U.S. 29, See also 81 U.S. 618, 629, 66 ; 82 U.S. 406, ; 84 U.S. 719, The two purposes for the resentencing restrictions imposed by were to ensure (i) "that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | Michigan v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108794/michigan-v-payne/ | (i) "that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction [would] play no part in the sentence *52 he receives after a new trial" and (ii) that apprehension of such vindictiveness would not "deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction." 95 U.S., ; The latter purpose is not pertinent to this case, since respondent was not deterred from exercising his right to challenge his first conviction. But, in any event, we think it clear that this function of the new resentencing rules could be served only in futuro: nothing in suggests that the Court contemplated that its decision might provide a ground for the untimely reopening of appeals by defendants who decided not to appeal prior to the date of decision in[5] See 441 F.2d 2 The first-articulated purpose of the rulesto protect against the possibility that actual vindictiveness will infect a resentencing proceedingdeserves closer scrutiny. Unlike the purposes underlying many of the decisions heretofore accorded retrospective application,[6] this purpose does not implicate the " `fair determination' of guilt or innocence." 92 U.S. 29, It does, however, involve questions touching on the "integrity" of one aspect of the judicial process. 9 U.S. 2, The restrictions serve to ensure *5 that resentencing decisions will not be based on improper considerations, such as a judge's unarticulated resentment at having been reversed on appeal, or his subjective institutional interest in discouraging meritless appeals. By eliminating the possibility that these factors might occasion enhanced sentences, the prophylactic rules assist in guaranteeing the propriety of the sentencing phase of the criminal process. In this protective role, is analogous to 84 U.S. 46 in which the Court established rules to govern police practices during custodial interrogations in order to safeguard the rights of the accused and to assure the reliability of statements made during those interrogations. Thus, the prophylactic rules in and Miranda are similar in that each was designed to preserve the integrity of a phase of the criminal process. Because of this similarity, we find that 84 U.S. 719 which held Miranda nonretroactive, provides considerable guidance here. See also 95 U.S. 21 It is an inherent attribute of prophylactic constitutional rules, such as those established in Miranda and that their retrospective application will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional deprivation. Miranda's well-known warning requirements provided a protection "against the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation," and thereby covered many "situations in which the danger [was] not necessarily as great as when the accused is |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | Michigan v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108794/michigan-v-payne/ | [was] not necessarily as great as when the accused is subjected to overt and obvious coercion." at 70 Thus, had Miranda been applied retroactively, it would have required the reversal of many convictions in which no serious constitutional violation had occurred. at 71. Likewise, the retroactive application of would require the repudiation *54 of many sentences rendered under circumstances in which there was no genuine possibility that vindictiveness played a role. Judicial impropriety in the resentencing process, albeit intolerable wherever it happens, surely is not a common practice. Indeed, nothing in intimates that the Court regarded it as anything more than an infrequently appearing blemish on the sentencing process.[7] Absent countervailing considerations rooted in the purposes underlying a new rule, this factorthat retroactive application of such broadly protective rules would occasion reversals in many instances in which no actual prejudice has been sufferedpoints toward a ruling of prospectivity. Nonretroactivity is also suggested by the second similarity between Miranda and While each created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee, neither conferred a constitutional right that had not existed prior to those decisions. The right against use of an involuntary confession long preceded Miranda just as the right to be free from fundamentally unfair sentencing considerations predated Because these foundational rights remain available to defendants in pre-Miranda and pre- cases, a decision of nonretroactivity is less likely to result in the continued incarceration of those whose convictions or sentences rest on unconstitutional acts.[8], 81 U. S., at 640 *55 Of course, the question of the impact of particular decisions on the reliability and fairness of any aspect of a criminal proceeding is inherently a matter of balancing "probabilities." 84 U. S., at 729; Yet in view of the fact that, if retroactive, would apply to innumerable cases in which no hint of vindictiveness appears, coupled with the consideration that due process claims may always be made in those prior cases in which some evidence of retaliatory motivation exists,[9] we have little doubt that the "probabilities" in this case preponderate in favor of a ruling of nonretroactivity.[10] Although the remaining factorsreliance and burden on the administration of justicehave been regarded as having controlling significance "only when the purpose of the rule in question did not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity," 94 U.S. 244, those considerations also support the nonretroactivity of The result in was not "foreshadowed" by any prior decision of this Court.[11] Indeed, prior to resentencing judges were bound by no requirement that they articulate their reasons and *56 generally enjoyed a wide discretion in terms of the |
Justice Powell | 1,973 | 17 | majority | Michigan v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108794/michigan-v-payne/ | *56 generally enjoyed a wide discretion in terms of the factors they might legitimately consider. See 7 U.S. 241 Nor could it be said that the Court's decision was clearly forecast by any trend of lower court decisions. In itself the Court noted that lower federal and state courts were divided on all of the questions 95 U.S., at 715 n. 5. Under these circumstances, judicial reliance on prior law was certainly justifiable.[12] Because of that reliance, it is fair to assume that in prior years few, if any, judges complied during resentencing with 's recordation requirement, and that they often considered a variety of factors relating to the defendant and his crime which might or might not have fallen within the standard. We have been presented with no statistical indications as to how many persons received increased penalties after retrials.[1] We cannot say, however, that the potential interference with the administration of justice would be insubstantial if were applied retroactively. In order to comply with a resentencing judgeassuming he is still on the bench or otherwise availablewould be required to make a factual determination as to the reasons for sentences he may have meted out years in the past. *57 Compliance with that requirement would present considerable difficulties, since judges, like witnesses in criminal trials, lack infallible memories and perfect records of their motivations.[14], 81 U. S., at 67. While we would not shy from imposing these burdens were we persuaded that it was necessary to do so in order to effectuate the purposes underlying we have found no such need here. In sum, upon application of the three-part test, we hold that the requirements are not to be accorded retroactive application.[15] III Since the resentencing hearing in this case took place approximately two years before was decided, we hold that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in applying its proscriptions here. Accordingly, the judgment of that court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. *58 MR. |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | A federal employee subjected to an adverse personnel action such as a discharge or demotion may appeal her agency’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board). See 5 U.S. C. 7701. In that challenge, the employee may claim, among other things, that the agency discriminated against her in violation of a federal statute. See The question presented in this case arises when the MSPB dismisses an appeal alleging discrimination not on the merits, but on proce- dural grounds. Should an employee seeking judicial re- view then file a petition in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or instead bring a suit in district court under the applicable antidiscrimination law? We hold she should go to district court. I A The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S. C. et seq., establishes a framework for evaluating per- sonnel actions taken against federal employees. That statutory framework provides graduated procedural pro- 2 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court tections depending on an action’s severity. If (but only if ) the action is particularly serious—involving, for example, a removal from employment or a reduction in grade or pay—the affected employee has a right to appeal the agency’s decision to the MSPB, an independent adjudica- tor of federal employment disputes.1 See 7512, 7701. Such an appeal may merely allege that the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA; but the appeal may also or instead charge the agency with discrimination prohibited by another federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. et seq., or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C. et seq. See 5 U.S. C. When an employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB and alleges that the action was based on discrimination, she is said (by pertinent regulation) to have brought a “mixed case.” See (2012). The CSRA and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set out special proce- dures to govern such a case—different from those used when the employee either challenges a serious personnel action under the CSRA alone or attacks a less serious action as discriminatory. See 5 U.S. C. 7703(b)(2) (2006 ed. and Supp. V); 5 CFR pt. 1201, subpt. E (2012); 29 CFR pt. 1614, subpt. C. A federal employee bringing a mixed case may pro- ceed in a variety of ways. She may first file a discrim- ination complaint with the agency itself, much as an employee challenging a personnel practice |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | agency itself, much as an employee challenging a personnel practice not appealable to the MSPB could do. See (a); 29 CFR —————— 1 Theactions entitling an employee to appeal a case to the MSPB include “(1) a removal; (2) a suspension for more than 14 days; (3) a reduction in grade; (4) a reduction in pay; and (5) a furlough.” 5 U.S. C. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court If the agency decides against her, the em- ployee may then either take the matter to the MSPB or bypass further administrative review by suing the agency in district court. See (b); 29 CFR Alternatively, the employee may initi- ate the process by bringing her case directly to the MSPB, forgoing the agency’s own system for evaluating discrimi- nation charges. See (a); 29 CFR If the MSPB upholds the personnel action (whether in the first instance or after the agency has done so), the employee again has a choice: She may request additional administrative process, this time with the EEOC, or else she may seek judicial review. See 5 U.S. C. (b); ; The question in this case concerns where that judicial review should take place. Section 7703 of the CSRA governs judicial review of the MSPB’s decisions. Section 7703(b)(1) gives the basic rule: “Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition to review a final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Section 7703(b)(2) then spells out the exception: “Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title shall be filed under [the enforcement sections of the Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Fair Labor Standards Act], as applicable. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed under any such section must be filed within 30 days after the date the individual filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable action under such section 7702.” The enforcement provisions of the antidiscrimination statutes listed in this exception all authorize suit in fed- eral district court. See 42 U.S. C. §–16(c), 2000e– 4 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court 5(f ); 29 U.S. C. see also Elgin v. De- partment of Treasury, 567 U.S. (2012) (slip op., at 9–10). Section 7702 describes and provides for the “cases of discrimination” referenced in exception. In relevant part, states: “[I]n the case of any employee who— “(A) has been affected by an action which the em- ployee may appeal to the Merit Systems Protec- tion |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | em- ployee may appeal to the Merit Systems Protec- tion Board, and “(B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimi- nation prohibited by [specified antidiscrimination statutes], “the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in accordance with the Board’s appellate procedures.” The “cases of discrimination” in exception, in other words, are mixed cases, in which an employee chal- lenges as discriminatory a personnel action appealable to the MSPB. The parties here dispute whether, in light of these in- terwoven statutory provisions, an employee should go to the Federal Circuit (pursuant to the general rule of or instead to a district court (pursuant to the exception in when the MSPB has dismissed her mixed case on procedural grounds. B Petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner used to work at the De- partment of Labor (DOL or agency). In June 2005, while still an employee, she filed a complaint with the agency’s civil rights office, alleging that DOL had engaged in un- lawful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile work environment. At that point, Kloeckner’s case was not appealable to the MSPB because she had not Cite as: 568 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court suffered a sufficiently serious personnel action (e.g., a removal or demotion). See at 1–2. Her claim thus went forward not under the special procedures for mixed cases, but under the EEOC’s regulations for all other charges of discrimination. See 29 CFR pt. 1614, subpts. A, D. In line with those rules, the agency completed an internal investigation and report in June 2006, and Kloeckner requested a hearing before an EEOC adminis- trative judge. The next month, DOL fired Kloeckner. A removal from employment is appealable to the MSPB, see at 1–2, and Kloeckner believed the agency’s action was discrimi- natory; she therefore now had a mixed case. As permitted by regulation, see she initially elected to file that case with the MSPB. Her claim of discriminatory removal, however, raised issues similar to those in her hostile work environment case, now pending before an EEOC judge; as a result, she became concerned that she would incur duplicative discovery expenses. To address that problem, she sought leave to amend her EEOC com- plaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal, and she asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without prejudice for four months to allow the EEOC process to go forward. See App. 13, 50–51. Both of those motions were granted. The EEOC judge accepted the amendment,2 and on |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | were granted. The EEOC judge accepted the amendment,2 and on Sep- tember 18, 2006, the MSPB dismissed her appeal “without prejudice to [her] right to refile either (A) within 30 —————— 2 Neither the CSRA nor any regulation explicitly authorizes an EEOC judge to consider the legality of a removal or other serious personnel action before the Board has done so. See at 2–3. Nonetheless, the EEOC has approved that approach when the issues the personnel action raises are “firmly enmeshed” in an ongoing EEOC proceeding in order to avoid “delay[ing] justice and creat[ing] unnecessary proce- dural complications.” Burton v. Espy, Appeal No. 01932, 1994 WL 748214, *12 (EEOC, Oct. 28, 1994); see also We express no view on the propriety of this practice. 6 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court days after a decision is rendered in her EEOC case; or (B) by January 18, 2007—whichever occurs first.” Discovery continued in the EEOC proceeding well past the MSPB’s January 18 deadline. In April, the EEOC judge found that Kloeckner had engaged in bad-faith conduct in connection with discovery. As a sanction, the judge terminated the EEOC proceeding and returned Kloeckner’s case to DOL for a final decision. Six months later, in October 2007, DOL issued a ruling rejecting all of Kloeckner’s claims. See at 10–49. Kloeckner appealed DOL’s decision to the Board in November 2007. That appeal was filed within 30 days, the usual window for seeking MSPB review of an agency’s determination of a mixed case. See (a); (d)(1)(ii). But the MSPB declined to treat Kloeckner’s filing as an ordinary appeal of such an agency decision. Instead, the Board viewed it as an effort to reopen her old MSPB case—many months after the January 18 deadline for doing so had expired. The Board therefore dismissed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely. See App. 53–57. Kloeckner then brought this action against DOL in Federal District Court, alleging unlawful discrimination. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See Kloeckner v. Solis, Civ. Action No. 4:09CV804 (ED Mo., Feb. 18, 2010). Relying on the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Brumley v. Levinson, 991 F.2d 801 (1993) (per curiam), the court held that because the MSPB had dismissed Kloeckner’s claims on procedural grounds, she should have sought review in the Federal Circuit under in the court’s view, the only discrimination cases that could go to district court pursu- ant to were those the MSPB had decided on the merits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the same reasoning. See We granted certiorari, 565 U. S. (2012), to resolve a Cite as: 568 |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | 565 U. S. (2012), to resolve a Cite as: 568 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court Circuit split on whether an employee seeking judicial review should proceed in the Federal Circuit or in a dis- trict court when the MSPB has dismissed her mixed case on procedural grounds.3 We now reverse the Eighth Cir- cuit’s decision. II As the above account reveals, the intersection of fed- eral civil rights statutes and civil service law has produced a complicated, at times confusing, process for resolving claims of discrimination in the federal workplace. But even within the most intricate and complex systems, some things are plain. So it is in this case, where two sections of the CSRA, read naturally, direct employees like Kloeck- ner to district court. Begin with which governs judicial review of the MSPB’s rulings. As already noted, see –4, provides that petitions to review the Board’s final decisions should be filed in the Federal Circuit— “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” Paragraph (2), i.e., then sets out a different rule for one category of cases—“[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title.” Such a case, paragraph (2) instructs, “shall be filed under” the enforcement provision of an enumerated antidiscrimina- tion statute. And each of those enforcement provisions authorizes an action in federal district court. See –4. So “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provi- sions of section 7702” shall be filed in district court. Turn next to which identifies the cases “subject to [its] provisions.” As also stated earlier, de- scribes cases in which a federal employee “(A) has been —————— 3 Compare (Federal Circuit); with Harms v. IRS, ; 8 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and (B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed federal statute. The subsection thus describes what we (adopting the lingo of the applicable regulations) have called “mixed cases.” See Those are the “cases of discrimination subject to” the rest of provisions. Now just put and together—say, in the form of a syllogism, to make the point obvious. Under “cases of discrimination subject to []” shall be filed in district court. Under the “cases of discrimination subject to []” are mixed cases—those appealable to the MSPB and alleging dis- crimination. Ergo, mixed cases shall be filed in district court. And so that is where Kloeckner’s case should have been filed (as indeed it was). No one here contests that Kloeck- ner |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | indeed it was). No one here contests that Kloeck- ner brought a mixed case—that she was affected by an action (i.e., removal) appealable to the MSPB and that she alleged discrimination prohibited by an enumerated fed- eral law. And under the CSRA’s terms, that is all that matters. Regardless whether the MSPB dismissed her claim on the merits or instead threw it out as untimely, Kloeckner brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes, in crystalline fashion, to district court. III The Government offers an alternative view (as did the Eighth Circuit)—that the CSRA directs the MSPB’s merits decisions to district court, while channeling its procedural rulings to the Federal Circuit. According to the Govern- ment, that bifurcated scheme, though not prescribed in the CSRA in so many words, lies hidden in the statute’s timing requirements. But we return from the Govern- ment’s mazelike tour of the CSRA persuaded only that the Cite as: 568 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court merits-procedure distinction is a contrivance, found no- where in the statute’s provisions on judicial review. The Government’s argument has two necessary steps. First, the Government claims that exception to Federal Circuit jurisdiction applies only when the MSPB’s decision in a mixed case is a “judicially review- able action” under Second, the Government asserts that the Board’s dismissal of a mixed case on procedural grounds does not qualify as such a “judicially reviewable action.” We describe in turn the way the Government arrives at each of these conclusions. The first step of the Government’s argument derives from second sentence. Right after stating that “cases of discrimination subject to []” shall be filed under specified antidiscrimination statutes (i.e., shall be filed in district court), provides: “Notwith- standing any other provision of law, any such case filed under any such [statute] must be filed within 30 days after the date the individual filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable action under section 7702.” The Government reads that sentence to establish an ad- ditional prerequisite for taking a case to district court, instead of to the Federal Circuit. To fall within the exception, the Government says, it is not enough that a case qualify as a “case of discrimination subject to []”; in addition, the MSPB’s decision must count as a “judicially reviewable action.” See Brief for United States 20–21. If the MSPB’s decision is not a “judicially reviewable action”—a phrase the Government characterizes as a “term of art in this context,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28—the ruling still may be subject to judicial review (i.e., “judicially reviewable” |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | still may be subject to judicial review (i.e., “judicially reviewable” in the ordinary sense), but only in the Federal Circuit. The Government’s second step—that the Board’s pro- cedural rulings are not “judicially reviewable actions”— begins with the language of (a)(3). That provision, 10 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court the Government states, “defines for the most part which MSPB decisions qualify as ‘judicially reviewable ac- tions[s]’ ” by “providing that ‘[a]ny decision of the Board under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be a judicially reviewable action as of’ the date of the decision.” Brief for Respondent 21 (quoting (a)(3); emphasis and brackets added by Government). From there, the Govern- ment moves on to the cross-referenced paragraph— —which states, among other things, that the Board “shall, within 120 days of [the employee’s filing], decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in accordance with the Board’s appellate proce- dures.” According to the Government, the Board only “decide[s] the issue of discrimination” when it rules on the merits, rather than on procedural grounds. On that view, a procedural decision is not in fact a “decision of the Board under paragraph (1),” which means that it also is not a “judicially reviewable action” under (a)(3). See Brief for Respondent 21–22. And so (returning now to the first step of the Government’s argument), judicial review of a procedural decision can occur only in the Federal Circuit, and not in district court. If you need to take a deep breath after all that, you’re not alone. It would be hard to dream up a more round- about way of bifurcating judicial review of the MSPB’s rulings in mixed cases. If Congress had wanted to send merits decisions to district court and procedural dismis- sals to the Federal Circuit, it could just have said so. The Government has offered no reason for Congress to have constructed such an obscure path to such a simple result. And taking the Government’s analysis one step at a time makes it no more plausible than as a gestalt. The Government’s initial move is to read second sentence as adding a requirement for a case to fall within the exception to Federal Circuit jurisdiction. But that sentence does no such thing; it is nothing more than a Cite as: 568 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court filing deadline. Consider each sentence of in turn. The first sentence defines which cases should be brought in district court, rather than in the Federal Cir- cuit; here, the full description is “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | full description is “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702”—to wit, mixed cases. The second sentence then states when those cases should be brought: “any such case must be filed within 30 days” of the date the employee “received notice of the judicially reviewable action.” The reference to a “judicially reviewable action” in that sentence does important work: It sets the clock running for when a case that belongs in district court must be filed there. What it does not do is to further define which timely-brought cases belong in dis- trict court instead of in the Federal Circuit. Describing those cases is the first sentence’s role. Proof positive that the Government misreads comes from considering what the phrase “ju- dicially reviewable action” would mean under its theory. In normal legal parlance, to say that an agency action is not “judicially reviewable” is to say simply that it is not subject to judicial review—that, for one or another reason, it cannot be taken to a court. But that ordinary under- standing will not work for the Government here, because it wants to use the phrase to help determine which of two courts should review a decision, rather than whether judicial review is available at all. In the Government’s alternate universe, then, to say that an agency action is not “judicially reviewable” is to say that it is subject to judicial review in the Federal Circuit (even though not in district court). Small wonder that the Government must call the phrase “judicially reviewable action” a “term of art,” at 9: On a natural reading, the phrase defines cases amenable to judicial review, rather than routes those cases as between two courts. And even were we to indulge the Government that far, we could not accept the second step of its analysis. At that 12 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court stage, remember, the Government contends that under only decisions on the merits qualify as “judicially reviewable actions.” The language on which the Govern- ment principally relies, stated again, is as follows: “[T]he Board shall, within 120 days of [the employee’s filing], decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action.” But that provision, too, is only a timing require- ment; it is designed to ensure that the Board act promptly on employees’ complaints. We see no reason to think that embedded within that directive is a limitation on the class of “judicially reviewable actions.” Nor (even were we to indulge the Government on that point as well) can we find the particular restriction the Government urges. |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | well) can we find the particular restriction the Government urges. Accord- ing to the Government, the MSPB does not “decide the issue of discrimination” when it dismisses a mixed case on procedural grounds. But that phrase cannot bear the weight the Government places on it. All the phrase signi- fies is that the Board should dispose of the issue in some way, whether by actually adjudicating it or by holding that it was not properly raised. Indeed, were the Government right, (a)’s statement that the Board “shall” decide the issue of discrimination would appear to bar procedural dismissals, requiring the Board to resolve on the merits even untimely complaints. No one (least of all the Gov- ernment, which here is defending a procedural ruling) thinks that a plausible congressional command. Another section of the statute—(e)(1)(B)—puts the final nail in the coffin bearing the Government’s argu- ment. That section states: “[I]f at any time after the 120th day following [an employee’s filing] with the Board there is no judicially reviewable action[,] an employee shall be entitled to file a civil action” in district court under a listed antidiscrimination statute. That provision, as the Government notes, is designed “to save employees from being held in perpetual uncertainty by Board inac- tion.” Brief for Respondent 28. But if, as the Government Cite as: 568 U. S. (2012) 13 Opinion of the Court insists, a procedural ruling is not a “judicially reviewable action,” then the provision would have another, surprising effect—essentially blowing up the Government’s argument from the inside. In that event, an employee whose suit the Board had dismissed on procedural grounds could bring suit in district court under 7702(e)(1)(B) (so long as 120 days had elapsed from her Board filing), because she would have received “no judicially reviewable action.” And what’s more, she could do so even many years later, be- cause the statute’s usual 30-day filing deadline begins to run only upon “notice of [a] judicially reviewable action.” So an argument intended to keep employees like Kloeckner out of district court would paradoxically, and nonsensically, result in giving them all the time in the world to file suit there. Responding to this unwelcome outcome, the Govern- ment offers us an exit route: We should avoid “absurd results,” the Government urges, by applying (e)(1)(B) only to “cases over which the Board continues to exert jurisdiction.” Brief for Respondent 27, 28, n. 4. But as the Government admits, that “gloss on the statute is not found in the text,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 50; the Government’s remedy requires our reading new words into |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Kloeckner v. Solis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/813289/kloeckner-v-solis/ | 50; the Government’s remedy requires our reading new words into the statute. We think a better option lies at hand. If we reject the Gov- ernment’s odd view of “judicially reviewable actions,” then no absurdity arises in the first place: (e)(1)(B) would have no bearing on any case the MSPB dismissed within 120 days, whatever the grounds. It is the Govern- ment’s own misreading that creates the need to “fix” (e)(1)(B); take that away and the provision serves, as it was intended, only as a remedy for Board inaction.4 —————— 4 The Government supplements its tortuous reading of the CSRA’s text with an appeal to one of the statute’s purposes—in its words, “ensuring that the Federal Circuit would develop a uniform body of case law governing federal personnel issues.” Brief for Respondent 32. We have previously recognized that Congress, through the CSRA, 14 KLOECKNER v. SOLIS Opinion of the Court IV A federal employee who claims that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in should seek judicial review in district court, not in the Federal Circuit. That is so whether the MSPB decided her case on procedural grounds or instead on the merits. Kloeckner therefore brought her suit in the right place. We reverse the con- trary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— sought to avoid “unnecessary layer[s] of judicial review in lower federal courts, and encourag[e] more consistent judicial decisions.” United (internal quotation marks and some bracketing omitted). But in this case, the Government’s argument about the necessity of Federal Circuit review runs into an inconvenient fact: When Congress passed the CSRA, the Federal Circuit did not exist, and thus provided, as the general rule, that a federal employee should appeal a Board decision to 1 of the 12 Courts of Appeals or the Court of Claims. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Moreover, the Government’s own approach would leave many cases involving federal employment issues in district court. If the MSPB rejects on the merits a complaint alleging that an agency violated the CSRA as well as an antidiscrimination law, the suit will come to district court for a decision on both questions. See Wil- (en banc). In any event, even the most formidable argument concerning the statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity we find in the statute’s text |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | I this case we are called upo to resolve a dispute betwee the State of Washigto ad the Yakima Idia Natio over the validity of the State's exercise of jurisdictio o the Yakima Reservatio. I 1963 the Washigto Legislature obligated the State to assume civil ad crimial jurisdictio over Idias ad Idia territory withi the State, subject oly to the coditio that i all but eight subject-matter areas jurisdictio would ot exted to Idias o trust or restricted lads without the request of the Idia tribe affected. Ch. 36, 1963 Wash. Laws.[1] The Yakima Natio *466 did ot make such a request. State authority over Idias withi the Yakima Reservatio was thus made by Chapter 36 to deped o the title status of the property o which the offese or trasactio occurred ad upo the ature of the subject matter. The Yakima Natio brought this actio i a Federal District Court challegig the statutory ad costitutioal validity of the State's partial assertio of jurisdictio o its Reservatio. The Tribe coteded that the federal statute upo which the State based its authority to assume jurisdictio over the Reservatio, Pub. L. 280,[2] imposed certai procedural requiremets, with which the State had ot compliedmost otably, a requiremet that Washigto first amed its ow costitutioad that i ay evet Pub. L. 280 did ot *467 authorize the State to assert oly partial jurisdictio withi a Idia reservatio. Fially, the Tribe coteded that Chapter 36, eve if authorized by Cogress, violated the equal protectio ad due process guaratees of the Fourteeth Amedmet. The District Court rejected both the statutory ad costitutioal claims ad etered judgmet for the State.[3] O appeal, the cotetio that Washigto's assumptio of oly partial jurisdictio was ot authorized by Cogress was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Nith Circuit, sittig e bac. The e bac court the referred the case to the origial pael for cosideratio of the remaiig issues. Cofederated Bads ad Tribes of the Yakima Idia (Yakima I).[4] The three-judge *468 pael, cofiig itself to cosideratio of the costitutioal validity of Chapter 36, cocluded that the "checkerboard" jurisdictioal system it produced was without ay ratioal foudatio ad therefore violative of the Equal Protectio Clause of the Fourteeth Amedmet. Fidig o basis upo which to sever the offedig portio of the legislatio, the appellate court declared Chapter 36 ucostitutioal i its etirety, ad reversed the judgmet of the District Court. Cofederated Bads ad Tribes of the Yakima Idia (Yakima II). The State the brought a appeal to this Court. I otig probable jurisdictio of the appeal, we requested |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | Court. I otig probable jurisdictio of the appeal, we requested the parties to address the issue whether the partial geographic ad subject-matter jurisdictio ordaied by Chapter 36 is authorized by federal law, as well as the Equal Protectio Clause issue.[5] *469 I The Cofederated Bads ad Tribes of the Yakima Idia Natio comprise 14 origially distict Idia tribes that joied together i the middle of the 19th cetury for purposes of their relatioships with the Uited States. A treaty was siged with the Uited States i 1855, uder which it was agreed that the various tribes would be cosidered "oe atio" ad that specified lads located i the Territory of Washigto would be set aside for their exclusive use. The treaty was ratified by Cogress i 1859. Sice that time, the Yakima Natio has without iterruptio maitaied its tribal idetity. The Yakima Reservatio is located i the southeaster part of the State of Washigto ad ow cosists of approximately 1,387,505 acres of lad, of which some 80% is held i trust by the Uited States for the Yakima Natio or idividual members of the Tribe. The remaiig parcels of lad are held i fee by Idia ad o-Idia owers. Much of the trust acreage o the Reservatio is forest. The Tribe receives the bulk of its icome from timber, ad over half of the Reservatio is closed to permaet settlemet i order to protect the forest area. The remaiig lads are primarily agricultural. *470 There are three icorporated tows o the Reservatio, the largest beig Toppeish, with a populatio of uder 6,000. The lad held i fee is scattered throughout the Reservatio, but most of it is cocetrated i the ortheaster portio close to the Yakima River ad withi the three tows of Toppeish, Wapato, ad Harrah. Of the 25,000 permaet residets of the Reservatio, 3,074 are members of the Yakima Natio, ad tribal members live i all of the ihabited areas of the Reservatio.[6] I the three towswhere over half of the o-Idia populatio residesmembers of the Tribe are substatially outumbered by o-Idia residets occupyig fee lad. Before the eactmet of the state law here i issue, the Yakima Natio was subject to the geeral jurisdictioal priciples that apply i Idia coutry i the absece of federal legislatio to the cotrary. Uder those priciples, which received their first ad fullest expressio i state law reaches withi the exterior boudaries of a Idia reservatio oly if it would ot ifrige "o the right of reservatio Idias to make their ow laws ad be ruled by them."[7] As a practical matter, |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | laws ad be ruled by them."[7] As a practical matter, this has meat that crimial offeses by or agaist Idias have bee subject oly to federal or tribal laws, except where Cogress i the exercise of its pleary ad exclusive power over Idia affairs has "expressly *471 provided that State laws shall apply." Public Law 280, upo which the State of Washigto relied for its authority to assert jurisdictio over the Yakima Reservatio uder Chapter 36, was eacted by Cogress i 1953 i part to deal with the "problem of lawlessess o certai Idia reservatios, ad the absece of adequate tribal istitutios for law eforcemet." The basic terms of Pub. L. 280, which was the first federal jurisdictioal statute of geeral applicability to Idia reservatio lads,[8] are well kow.[9] To five States it effected *472 a immediate cessio of crimial ad civil jurisdictio over Idia coutry, with a express exceptio for the reservatios of three tribes. Pub. L. 280, 2 ad 4.[10] To the remaiig *473 States it gave a optio to assume jurisdictio over crimial offeses ad civil causes of actio i Idia coutry without cosultig with or securig the coset of the tribes that *474 would be affected. States whose costitutios or statutes cotaied orgaic law disclaimers of jurisdictio over Idia coutry were dealt with i 6.[11] The people of those States were give permissio to amed "where ecessary" their state costitutios or existig statutes to remove ay legal impedimet to the assumptio of jurisdictio uder the Act. All others were covered i 7.[12] The Washigto Costitutio cotais a disclaimer of authority over Idia coutry,[13] ad the State is, therefore, oe of those covered by 6 of Pub. L. 280. The State did ot take ay actio uder the purported authority of Pub. L. 280 util 1957. I that year its legislature eacted a statute which obligated the State to assume crimial ad civil jurisdictio over ay Idia reservatio withi the State at the request of the tribe affected.[14] Uder this legislatio state jurisdictio was requested by ad exteded to several Idia tribes withi the State.[15] *475 I oe of the first prosecutios brought uder the 1957 jurisdictioal scheme, a Idia defedat whose tribe had coseted to the extesio of jurisdictio challeged its validity o the groud that the disclaimer clause i the state costitutio had ot bee ameded i the maer allegedly required by 6 of Pub. L. 280. The Washigto Supreme Court rejected the argumet, costruig the state costitutioal provisio to mea that the barrier posed by the disclaimer could be lifted by the state legislature.[16] |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | by the disclaimer could be lifted by the state legislature.[16] I 1963, Washigto eacted Chapter 36, the law at issue i this litigatio.[17] The most sigificat feature of the ew statute was its provisio for the extesio of at least some jurisdictio over all Idia lads withi the State, whether or ot the affected tribe gave its coset. Full crimial ad civil jurisdictio to the extet permitted by Pub. L. 280 was exteded to all fee lads i every Idia reservatio ad to trust ad allotted lads therei whe o-Idias were ivolved. Except for eight categories of law, however, state jurisdictio was ot exteded to Idias o allotted ad trust lads uless the affected tribe so requested. The eight jurisdictioal categories of state law that were thus exteded to all parts of every Idia reservatio were i the areas of compulsory school attedace, public assistace, domestic relatios, *476 metal illess, juveile deliquecy, adoptio proceedigs, depedet childre, ad motor vehicles.[18] The Yakima Idia Natio did ot request the full measure of jurisdictio made possible by Chapter 36, ad the Yakima Reservatio thus became subject to the system of jurisdictio outlied at the outset of this opiio.[19] This litigatio followed. II The Yakima Natio relies o three separate ad idepedet grouds i assertig that Chapter 36 is ivalid. First, it argues that uder the terms of Pub. L. 280 Washigto was ot authorized to eact Chapter 36 util the state costitutio had bee ameded by "the people" so as to elimiate its Art. XXVI which disclaimed state authority over Idia lads.[20]*477 Secod, it coteds that Pub. L. 280 does ot authorize a State to exted oly partial jurisdictio over a Idia reservatio. Fially, it asserts that Chapter 36, eve if authorized *478 by Pub. L. 280, violates the Fourteeth Amedmet of the Costitutio. We tur ow to cosideratio of each of these argumets. III We first address the cotetio that Washigto was required to amed its costitutio before it could validly legislate uder the authority of Pub. L. 280. If the Tribe is correct, we eed ot cosider the statutory ad costitutioal questios raised by the system of partial jurisdictio established i Chapter 36. The Tribe, supported by the Uited States as amicus curiae,[21] argues that a requiremet for popular amedatory actio is to be foud i the express terms of 6 of Pub. L. 280 or, if ot there, i the terms of the Eablig Act that admitted Washigto to the Uio.[22] The *479 argumet ca best be uderstood i the cotext of the specific statutory provisios ivolved. A The Eablig |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | cotext of the specific statutory provisios ivolved. A The Eablig Act uder which Washigto, alog with the States of Motaa, North Dakota, ad South Dakota, gaied etry ito the Uio, was passed i 1889.[23] Sectio 4 of that *480 Act required the costitutioal covetios of the prospective ew States to eact provisios by which the people disclaimed title to lads owed by Idias or Idia tribes ad ackowledged that those lads were to remai "uder the absolute jurisdictio ad cotrol of" Cogress util the Idia or Uited States title had bee extiguished. The disclaimers were to be made "by ordiaces irrevocable without the coset of the Uited States ad the people of said States." Washigto's costitutioal covetio eacted the disclaimer of authority over Idia lads as part of Art. XXVI of the state costitutio.[24] That Article, captioed "Compact with *481 the Uited States," is prefaced with the statemetprecisely trackig the laguage of the admittig statutethat "the followig ordiace shall be irrevocable without the coset of the Uited States ad the people of [the State of Washigto]." Its substative terms mirror the laguage used i the eablig legislatio. We have already oted that two distict provisios of Pub. L. 280 are potetially applicable to States ot grated a immediate cessio of jurisdictio. The first, 6, without questio applies to Washigto ad the seve other States admitted ito the Uio uder eablig legislatio requirig orgaic law disclaimers similar to that just described. This much is clear from the legislative history of Pub. L. 280,[25] as well as from the express laguage of 6. That sectio provides "Notwithstadig the provisios of ay Eablig Act for the admissio of a State, the coset of the Uited States is hereby give to the people of ay State to amed, where ecessary, their State costitutio or existig statutes, as the case may be, to remove ay legal impedimet to the assumptio of civil ad crimial jurisdictio i accordace with the provisios of this Act: Provided, That the provisios of this Act shall ot become effective with respect to such assumptio of jurisdictio by ay such State util the people thereof have appropriately ameded their State costitutio or statutes as the case may be." All other States were covered by 7. I that sectio Cogress gave the coset of the Uited States "to ay other State to assume jurisdictio at such *482 time ad i such maer as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative actio, obligate ad bid the State to assumptio thereof." These provisios appear to establish differet modes of procedure by which |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | provisios appear to establish differet modes of procedure by which a optio State, depedig o which sectio applies to it, is to accept the Pub. L. 280 jurisdictioal offer. The procedure specified i 7 is straightforward: affirmative legislative actio by which the State obligates ad bids itself to assume jurisdictio. Sectio 6, i cotrast, is delphic. The oly procedure metioed is actio by the people "to amed their State costitutios or existig statutes, as the case may be" to remove ay legal impedimets to the assumptio of jurisdictio. The phrase "where ecessary" i the mai clause suggests that a requiremet for popular as opposed to legislativeactio must be foud if at all i some source of law idepedet of Pub. L. 280. The proviso, however, has a differet import. B The proper costructio to be give to the sigle iartful setece i 6 has provoked chapters of argumet from the parties. The Tribe ad the Uited States urge that otwithstadig the phrase "where ecessary," 6 should be costrued to madate costitutioal amedmet by disclaimer States. It is their positio that 6 operates ot oly to grat the coset of the Uited States to state actio icosistet with the terms of the eablig legislatio but also to establish a distict procedure to be followed by Eablig Act States. To support their positio, they rely o the laguage of the proviso ad upo certai legislative history of 6.[26] I the alterative, the Tribe ad the Uited States argue that popular amedatory actio, if ot compelled by the terms of 6, is madated by the terms of the Eablig Act of *483 Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 4. Although they ackowledge that Cogress i 6 did grat the "coset of the Uited States" required uder the Eablig Act before the State could remove the disclaimer, they coted that 6 did ot elimiate the eed for the "coset of the people" specified i the Eablig Act. I their view, the 1889 Actif ot Pub. L. 280dictates that costitutioal amedmet is the oly valid procedure by which that coset ca be give. The State draws a etirely differet message from 6. It coteds that the sectio must be costrued i light of the overall cogressioal purpose to facilitate a trasfer of jurisdictio to those optio States willig to accept the resposibility. Sectio 6 was desiged, it says, ot to establish but to remove legal barriers to state actio uder the authority of Pub. L. 280. The phrase "where ecessary" i its view is cosistet with this purpose. It would costrue the word "appropriately" i the |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | this purpose. It would costrue the word "appropriately" i the proviso to be syoymous with "where ecessary" ad the etire sectio to mea that costitutioal amedmet is required oly if "ecessary" as a matter of state law. The Washigto Supreme Court havig foud that legislative actio is sufficiet to grat the "coset of the people" to removal of the disclaimer i Art. XXVI of the state costitutio,[27] the State argues that the procedural *484 requiremets of 6 have bee fully satisfied. It fids the Eablig Act irrelevat sice i its view 6 effectively repealed ay federal-law impedimets i that Act to state assertio of jurisdictio uder Pub. L. 280.[28] C From our review of the statutory, legislative, ad historical materials cited by the parties, we are persuaded that Washigto's assumptio of jurisdictio by legislative actio fully complies with the requiremets of 6. Although we adhere to the priciple that the procedural requiremets of Pub. L. 280 must be strictly followed, ; ad to the geeral rule that ambiguities i legislatio affectig retaied tribal sovereigty are to be costrued i favor of the Idias, see, e. g., those priciples will ot stretch so far as to permit us to fid a federal requiremet affectig the maer i which the States are to modify their orgaic legislatio o the basis of materials that are essetially speculative. Cf. Board of Couty Comm'rs v. Uited States, The laguage of 6, its legislative * history, ad its role i Pub. L. 280 all clearly poit the other way. We tur first to the laguage of 6. The mai clause is framed i permissive, ot madatory, terms. Had the drafters iteded by that clause to require popular amedatory actio, it is ulikely that they would have icluded the words "where ecessary." As writte, the clause suggests that the substative requiremet for costitutioal amedmet must be foud i some source of law idepedet of 6. The basic questio, the, is whether that requiremet ca be foud i the laguage of the proviso to 6 or alteratively i the terms of the Eablig Act. We are uable to fid the procedural madate missig from the mai clause of 6 i the laguage of the proviso. That laguage i the abstract could be read to suggest that costitutioal amedmet is a coditio precedet to a valid assumptio of jurisdictio by disclaimer States. Whe examied i its cotext, however, it caot fairly be read to impose such a coditio. Two cosideratios prevet this readig. First, it is doubtful that Cogressi order to compel disclaimer States to amed their costitutios by |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | order to compel disclaimer States to amed their costitutios by popular vote would have doe so i a provisio the first clause of which cosets to that procedure "where ecessary" ad the proviso to which idicates that the procedure is to be followed if "appropriate." Secod, the referece to popular amedatory actio i the proviso is ot framed as a descriptio of the procedure the States must follow to assume jurisdictio, but istead is writte as a coditio to the effectiveess of "the provisios of" Pub. L. 280. Whe it is recalled that the oly substative provisios of the Actother tha those arguably to be foud i 7accomplish a immediate trasfer of jurisdictio to specifically amed States, it seems most likely that the proviso was icluded to esure that 6 would ot be costrued to effect a immediate trasfer to the disclaimer group of optio States. The mai clause removes a federal-law barrier *486 to ay ew state jurisdictio over Idia coutry. The proviso suggests that disclaimer States are ot automatically to receive jurisdictio by virtue of that removal. Without the proviso, i the evet that state costitutioal amedmet were ot foud "ecessary,"[29] 6 could be costrued as effectig a immediate cessio. Cogress clearly wated all the optio States to "obligate ad bid" themselves to assume the jurisdictio offered i Pub. L. 280.[30] To *487 be sure, costitutioal amedmet was referred to as the process by which this might be accomplished i disclaimer States. But, give the distictio that Cogress clearly drew betwee those States ad automatic-trasfer States, this referece ca hardly be costrued to require that process. Before turig to the legislative history, which, as we shall see, accords with this iterpretatio of 6, we address the argumet that popular amedatory actio, if ot a requiremet of Pub. L. 280, is madated by the legislatio admittig Washigto to the Uio. This argumet requires that two assumptios be made. The first is that 6 elimiated some but preserved other Eablig Act barriers to a State's assertio of jurisdictio over Idia coutry. The secod is that the phrase "where ecessary" i the mai clause of 6 was iteded to refer to those federal-law barriers that had bee preserved. Oly if each of these premises is accepted does the Eablig Act have ay possible applicatio. Sice we fid the first premise impossible to accept, we proceed o further. Admittig legislatio is, to be sure, the oly source of law metioed i the mai clause of 6 ad might therefore be looked to as a referet for the phrase "where ecessary" i the |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | as a referet for the phrase "where ecessary" i the clause. This readig, however, is ot teable. It supplies o satisfactory aswer to the questio why Cogressi order to give the coset of the Uited States to the removal of state orgaic law disclaimerswould ot also have by ecessary implicatio coseted to the removal of ay procedural costraits o the States imposed by the Eablig Acts. The phrase "[]otwithstadig the provisios of ay Eablig Act" i 6 is broadbroad eough to suggest that Cogress whe it referred to a possible ecessity for state costitutioal amedmet did ot ited thereby to perpetuate ay such requiremet i a Eablig Act. Eve assumig that the phrase "coset of the people" i the Eablig Act must be costrued to preclude coset by legislative actioad the Tribe ad the Uited States have offered *488 o cocrete authority to support this restrictive readig of the phrase[31] we thik it obvious that i the "otwithstadig" clause of 6 Cogress meat to remove ay federal impedimets to state jurisdictio that may have bee created by a Eablig Act. The legislative history of Pub. L. 280 supports the coclusio that 6 did ot of its ow force establish a state costitutioal amedmet requiremet ad did ot preserve ay such requiremet that might be foud i a Eablig Act. Public Law 280 was the first jurisdictioal bill of geeral applicability ever to be eacted by Cogress. It reflected cogressioal cocer over the law-ad-order problems o Idia reservatios ad the fiacial burdes of cotiued federal jurisdictioal resposibilities o Idia lads, It was also, however, without questio reflective of the geeral assimilatioist policy followed by Cogress from the early 1950's through the late 1960's.[32]*489 See H. R. Rep. No. 83d Cog., 1st Sess. See also Hearigs o H. R. 459, H. R. 3235, ad H. R. 3624 before the Subcommittee o Idia Affairs of the House Committee o Iterior ad Isular Affairs, 82d Cog., 2d Sess. (1952) (hereiafter 1952 Hearigs). The failure of Cogress to write a tribal-coset provisio ito the trasfer provisio applicable to optio States as well as its failure to cosult with the tribes durig the fial deliberatios o Pub. L. 280 provide ample evidece of this.[33] *490 Ideed, the circumstaces surroudig the passage of Pub. L. 280 i themselves fully bear out the State's geeral thesis that Pub. L. 280 was iteded to facilitate, ot to impede, the trasfer of jurisdictioal resposibility to the States. Public Law 280 origiated i a series of idividual bills itroduced i the 83d Cogress to trasfer jurisdictio to the five willig States |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | 83d Cogress to trasfer jurisdictio to the five willig States which evetually were covered i 2 ad 4.[34] H. R. Rep. No. Those bills were cosolidated ito H. R. 1063, which was referred to the House Committee o Iterior ad Isular Affairs for cosideratio. Closed hearigs o the bills were held before the Subcommittee o Idia Affairs o Jue 29 ad before the Committee o July 15, 1953.[35] Durig the opeig sessio o Jue 29, *491 Committee Members, cousel, ad represetatives of the Departmet of the Iterior discussed various proposals desiged to give H. R. 1063 geeral applicability. Jue 29 Hearigs 1-22. It rapidly became clear that the Members favored a geeral bill. At this poit, Committee cousel oted that several States "have costitutioal prohibitios agaist jurisdictio." There followed some discussio of the maer i which these States should be treated. O July 15, a versio of 6 was proposed. July 15 Hearigs 6. After further discussio of the disclaimer problem, the "otwithstadig" clause was added, ad the laguage evetually eacted as 6 was approved by the Committee that day. The speed ad the cotext aloe suggest that 6 was desiged to remove a obstacle to state jurisdictio, ot to create oe. Ad the discussio at the hearigs, which i essece were markup sessios, makes this clear.[36] *492 While some Committee Members apparetly thought that 6 States, as a matter of state law, would have to amed their costitutios i order to remove the disclaimers foud there,[37]*493 there is o idicatio that the Committee iteded to impose ay such requiremet.[38] We coclude that 6 of Pub. L. 280 does ot require disclaimer States to amed their costitutios to make a effective acceptace of jurisdictio. We also coclude that ay Eablig Act requiremet of this ature was effectively repealed by 6. If as a matter of state law a costitutioal amedmet is required, that procedure mustas a matter of state lawbe followed. Ad if uder state law a costitutioal amedmet is ot required, disclaimer States must still take positive actio before Pub. L. 280 jurisdictio ca become effective. The Washigto Supreme Court havig determied that for purposes of the repeal of Art. XXVI of the Washigto Costitutio legislative actio is sufficiet,[39] ad appropriate state legislatio havig bee eacted, it follows that the State of Washigto has satisfied the procedural requiremets of 6. IV We tur to the questio whether the State was authorized uder Pub. L. 280 to assume oly partial subject-matter ad geographic jurisdictio over Idia reservatios withi the State.[40] *494 The argumet that Pub. L. 280 does ot permit |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | *494 The argumet that Pub. L. 280 does ot permit this scheme of partial jurisdictio relies primarily upo the text of the federal law. The mai cotetio of the Tribe ad the Uited States is that partial jurisdictio, because ot specifically authorized, must therefore be forbidde. I additio, they assert that the iterplay betwee the provisios of Pub. L. 280 demostrates that 6 States are required, if they assume ay jurisdictio, to assume as much jurisdictio as was trasferred to the madatory States.[41] Poitig out that 18 U.S. C. 1151 defies Idia coutry for purposes of federal jurisdictio as icludig a etire reservatio otwithstadig "the issuace of ay patet," they reaso that whe Cogress i 2 trasferred to the madatory States "crimial jurisdictio" over "offeses committed by or agaist Idias i the Idia coutry," it meat that all parts of Idia coutry were to be covered. Similarly, they emphasize that civil jurisdictio of comparable scope was trasferred to the madatory *495 States. They stress that i both 2 ad 4, the cosequece of state assumptio of jurisdictio is that the state "crimial laws" ad "civil laws of geeral applicatio" are heceforth to "have the same force ad effect withi Idia coutry as they have elsewhere withi the State." Fially, the Tribe ad the Uited States coted that the cogressioal purposes of elimiatig the jurisdictioal hiatus thought to exist o Idia reservatios, of reducig the cost of the federal resposibility for jurisdictio o tribal lads, ad of assimilatig the Idia tribes ito the geeral state populatio are disserved by the type of checkerboard arragemet permitted by Chapter 36. We agree, however, with the State of Washigto that statutory authorizatio for the state jurisdictioal arragemet is to be foud i the very words of 7. That provisio permits optio States to assume jurisdictio "i such maer" as the people of the State shall "by affirmative legislative actio, obligate ad bid the State to assumptio thereof." Oce the requiremets of 6 have bee satisfied, the terms of 7 appear to gover the scope of jurisdictio coferred upo disclaimer States. The phrase "i such maer" i 7 meas at least that ay optio State ca coditio the assumptio of full jurisdictio o the coset of a affected tribe. Ad here Washigto has doe o more tha refrai from exercisig the full measure of allowable jurisdictio without coset of the tribe affected. Sectio 6, as we have see, was placed i the Act to elimiate possible orgaic law barriers to the assumptio of jurisdictio by disclaimer States. The Tribe ad the Uited States ackowledge that |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | disclaimer States. The Tribe ad the Uited States ackowledge that it is a procedural, ot a substative, sectio. The clause cotais oly oe referece of relevace to the partial-jurisdictio questio. This is the phrase "assumptio of civil ad crimial jurisdictio i accordace with the provisios of this Act." As both parties recogize, this phrase ecessarily leads to other "provisios" of the Act for *496 clarificatio of the substative scope of the jurisdictioal grat. The first questio the is which other "provisios" of the Act gover. The secod is what costraits those "provisios" place o the jurisdictioal arragemets made by optio States. The Tribe argues as a iitial matter that 7 is ot oe of the "provisios" referred to by 6. It relies i part upo the cotrast betwee the phrase "assumptio of civil ad crimial jurisdictio" i 6 ad the disjuctive phrase "crimial offeses or civil causes of actio" i 7. From this distictio betwee the "civil ad crimial jurisdictio" laguage of 6 ad the optioal laguage i 7, we are asked to coclude that 6 States must assume full jurisdictio i accord with the terms applicable to the madatory States eve though 7 States are permitted more discretio. We are uable to accept this argumet, ot oly because the statutory laguage does ot fairly support it, but also because the legislative history is wholly to the cotrary. It is clear from the Committee hearigs that the States covered by 6 were, except for the possible impedimets cotaied i their orgaic laws, to be treated o precisely the same terms as optio States.[42] Sectio 6, as we have see, was essetially a afterthought desiged to accomplish the limited purpose of removig ay barrier to jurisdictio posed by state orgaic law disclaimers of jurisdictio over Idias. All optio States were origially treated uder the aegis of 7.[43] The record of the Committee hearigs makes clear that the sole purpose of 6 was to resolve the disclaimer problem.[44] Ideed, to the extet that the Tribe ad the Uited States suggest that disclaimer States stad o a differet footig from all other optio States, their argumet makes o sese. It would ascribe to Cogress a *497 itet to require States that by force of orgaic law barriers may have had oly a limited ivolvemet with Idia coutry to establish the most itrusive presece possible o Idia reservatios, if ay at all, ad at the same time a itet to allow States with differet traditios to exercise more restrait i extedig the coverage of their law. The Tribe ad the Uited States urge that |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | their law. The Tribe ad the Uited States urge that eve if, as we have cocluded, all optio States are ultimately govered by 7, the referece i that sectio to assumptio of jurisdictio "as provided for i [the] Act" should be costrued to mea that the automatic-trasfer provisios of 2 ad 4 must still apply. The argumet would require a coclusio that the optio States stad o the same footig as the madatory States. This view is ot persuasive. The madatory States were cosulted prior to the itroductio of the sigle-state bills that were evetually to become Pub. L. 280. All had idicated their willigess to accept whatever jurisdictio Cogress was prepared to trasfer. This, however, was ot the case with the optio States. Few of those States had bee cosulted, ad from the Jue 29 ad July 15 hearigs it is apparet that the drafters were primarily cocered with establishig a geeral trasfer scheme that would facilitate, ot impede, future actio by other States willig to accept jurisdictio. It is clear that the all-or-othig approach suggested by the Tribe would impede eve the most resposible ad sesitive jurisdictioal arragemets desiged by the States. To fid that uder Pub. L. 280 a State could ot exercise partial jurisdictio, eve if it were willig to exted full jurisdictio at tribal request, would be quite icosistet with this basic history. The laguage of 7, which we have foud applicable here, provides, we believe, surer guidace to the issue before us.[45]*498 The critical laguage i 7 is the phrase permittig the assumptio of jurisdictio "at such time ad i such maer as the people of the State shall obligate ad bid the State to assumptio thereof." Whether or ot "i such maer" is fully syoymous with "to such extet," the phrase is at least broad eough to authorize a State to coditio the extesio of full jurisdictio over a Idia reservatio o the coset of the tribe affected. The Uited States argues that a costructio of Pub. L. 280 which permits selective extesio of state jurisdictio allows a State to "pick ad choose" oly those subject-matter areas ad geographical parts of reservatios over which it would like to assume resposibility. Cogress, we are told, passed Pub. L. 280 ot as a measure to beefit the States, but to reduce the ecoomic burdes associated with federal jurisdictio o reservatios, to respod to a perceived hiatus i law eforcemet protectios available to tribal Idias, ad to achieve a orderly assimilatio of Idias ito the geeral populatio. That these were the major cocers uderlyig the passage |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | populatio. That these were the major cocers uderlyig the passage of Pub. L. 280 caot be doubted. See 426 U. S., at But Chapter 36 does ot reflect a attempt to reap the beefits ad to avoid the burdes of the jurisdictioal offer made by Cogress. To the cotrary, the State must assume total jurisdictio wheever a tribal request is made that it do so. Moreover, the partial geographic ad subject-matter jurisdictio that exists i the absece of tribal coset is resposive to the law eforcemet cocers that uderlay the adoptio of Pub. L. 280. State jurisdictio is complete as to all o-Idias o reservatios ad is also complete as to Idias o otrust lads. The law eforcemet hiatus that preoccupied the 83d Cogress has to that extet bee elimiated. O trust ad restricted lads withi the reservatios *499 whose tribes have ot requested the coverage of state law, jurisdictio over crimes by Idias is, as it was whe Pub. L. 280 was eacted, shared by the tribal ad Federal Govermets. To the extet that this shared federal ad tribal resposibility is iadequate to preserve law ad order, the tribes eed oly request ad they will receive the protectio of state law. The State of Washigto i 1963 could have uilaterally exteded full jurisdictio over crimes ad civil causes of actio i the etire Yakima Reservatio without violatig the terms of Pub. L. 280. We are uable to coclude that the State, i assertig a less itrusive presece o the Reservatio while at the same time obligatig itself to assume full jurisdictioal resposibility upo request, somehow flouted the will of Cogress. A State that has accepted the jurisdictioal offer i Pub. L. 280 i a way that leaves substatial play for tribal self-govermet, uder a volutary system of partial jurisdictio that reflects a resposible attempt to accommodate the eeds of both Idias ad o-Idias withi a reservatio, has plaily take actio withi the terms of the offer made by Cogress to the States i 1953. For Cogress surely did ot dey a optio State the power to coditio its offer of full jurisdictio o tribal coset. V Havig cocluded that Chapter 36 violates either the procedural or the substative terms of Pub. L. 280, we tur, fially, to the questio whether the "checkerboard" patter of jurisdictio applicable o the reservatios of ocosetig tribes is o its face ivalid uder the Equal Protectio Clause of the Fourteeth Amedmet.[46] The Court of Appeals *500 for the Nith Circuit cocluded that it is, reasoig that the lad-title classificatio is too bizarre to meet |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.