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Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | reasoig that the lad-title classificatio is too bizarre to meet "ay formulatio of the ratioal basis test." The Tribe advaces several differet lies of argumet i defese of this rulig. First, it argues that the classificatios implicit i Chapter 36 are racial classificatios, "suspect" uder the test euciated i McLaughli v. Florida, U.S. 184, ad that they caot stad uless justified by a compellig state iterest. Secod, it argues that its iterest i self-govermet is a fudametal right, ad that Chapter 36as a law abridgig this rightis presumptively ivalid. Fially, the Tribe argues that Chapter 36 is ivalid eve if reviewed uder the more traditioal equal protectio criteria articulated i such cases as Massachusetts Bd. of Retiremet v. U.S. 307.[47] We agree with the Court of Appeals to the extet that its opiio rejects the first two of these argumets ad reflects a judgmet that Chapter 36 must be sustaied agaist a Equal Protectio Clause attack if the classificatios it employs "ratioally furthe[r] the purpose idetified by the State." Massachusetts Bd. of Retiremet v. It is settled that "the uique legal status of Idia tribes uder *501 federal law" permits the Federal Govermet to eact legislatio siglig out tribal Idias, legislatio that might otherwise be costitutioally offesive. Morto v. Macari, States do ot ejoy this same uique relatioship with Idias, but Chapter 36 is ot simply aother state law. It was eacted i respose to a federal measure explicitly desiged to readjust the allocatio of jurisdictio over Idias. The jurisdictio permitted uder Chapter 36 is, as we have foud, withi the scope of the authorizatio of Pub. L. 280. Ad may of the classificatios made by Chapter 36 are also made by Pub. L. 280. Ideed, classificatios based o tribal status ad lad teure ihere i may of the decisios of this Court ivolvig jurisdictioal cotroversies betwee tribal Idias ad the States, see, e. g., Uited States v. McBratey, For these reasos, we fid the argumet that such classificatios are "suspect" a uteable oe. The cotetio that Chapter 36 abridges a "fudametal right" is also uteable. It is well established that Cogress, i the exercise of its pleary power over Idia affairs, may restrict the retaied sovereig powers of the Idia tribes. See, e. g., Uited I eactig Chapter 36, Washigto was legislatig uder explicit authority grated by Cogress i the exercise of that federal power.[48] The questio that remais, the, is whether the lies draw by Chapter 36 fail to meet covetioal Equal Protectio Clause criteria, as the Court of Appeals held. Uder those criteria, legislative classificatios are valid |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109972/washington-v-confederated-bands-and-tribes-of-yakima-nation/ | of Appeals held. Uder those criteria, legislative classificatios are valid uless they bear o ratioal relatioship to the State's objectives. Massachusetts Bd. of Retiremet v. State legislatio "does ot violate the Equal Protectio Clause merely because the classificatios [it makes] are imperfect." *502 Dadridge v. Williams, Uder these stadards we have o difficulty i cocludig that Chapter 36 does ot offed the Equal Protectio Clause. The lies the State has draw may well be difficult to admiister. But they are o more or less so tha may of the classificatios that pervade the law of Idia jurisdictio. See Seymour v. Superitedet, ; Chapter 36 is fairly calculated to further the State's iterest i providig protectio to o-Idia citizes livig withi the boudaries of a reservatio while at the same time allowig scope for tribal self-govermet o trust or restricted lads. The lad-teure classificatio made by the State is either a irratioal or arbitrary meas of idetifyig those areas withi a reservatio i which tribal members have the greatest iterest i beig free of state police power. Ideed, may of the rules developed i this Court's decisios i cases accommodatig the sovereig rights of the tribes with those of the States are strikigly similar. See, e. g., Uited States v. McBratey, Draper v. Uited States, ; ; I short, checkerboard jurisdictio is ot ovel i Idia law, ad does ot, as such, violate the Costitutio. For the reasos set out i this opiio, the judgmet of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | second_dissenting | United States v. Gonzales | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118091/united-states-v-gonzales/ | I believe that Justice Stevens is right. Section 924(c) concerns federal, not state, sentences. Hence Congress intended the words "other term of imprisonment" to refer to other federal, not other state, "terms." With respect to undischarged state sentences, therefore, 18 U.S. C. 924(c) is permissive, not mandatory. That is, it permits the federal sentencing judge to make a 924(c) sentence and an undischarged state sentence concurrent. Quite often, it will make little difference that, in this state/ federal circumstance, the consecutive/concurrent decision is permissive, not mandatory. That is because federal sentencing judges, understanding that 924 requires consecutive sentencing where undischarged federal sentences are at issue, would normally treat undischarged state sentences the same way. They would make the 924(c) sentence consecutive *15 to undischarged state sentences (even though 924(c) would not force that result) in order to avoid treating similarly situated offenders differently. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 5G1.3 Ordinarily, the fact that the State, rather than the Federal Government, imposed an undischarged sentence is irrelevant in terms of any sentencing objective. In at least one circumstance, however, federal sentencing judges would probably not treat an undischarged state sentence as if it were federal. That is where the undischarged state sentence is a sentence under a state statute that itself simply mimics 924(c). Such a situation cannot arise where the initial undischarged sentence is federal. Indeed, the Constitution would forbid any effort to apply 924(c) twice to a single instance of gun possession. But a State might have its own version of 924(c), and a federal 924(c) offender could be subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment imposed under such a statute. To run a 924(c) sentence consecutively in such an instance ; ) would treat the state offender differently, and far more harshly, than any possible federal counterpart. I am not inventing a purely hypothetical possibility. The State, in the very case before us, has punished respondents, in part, pursuant to a mandatory state sentence enhancement statute that has no counterpart in federal law but for 924(c) itself, which the state statute, N. M. Stat. Ann. 31-18-16(A) (Supp. 1994), very much resembles. But cf. I understand that Congress wanted to guarantee that 924(c)'s sentence would amount to an additional sentence. But I do not see why Congress would have wanted to pile Pelion on Ossa in this way, adding the 924(c) sentence to another sentence that does the identical thing. Nor do I believe that *16 Congress would have intended potentially to create this kind of harsh distinction between those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109855/memphis-light-gas-water-div-v-craft/ | In my judgment, the Court's holding confuses and trivializes the principle that the State may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. I have no quarrel with the Court's conclusion that as a matter of Tennessee law a customer has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued utility services as long as the undisputed portions of his utility bills are paid. For that reason, a municipality may not terminate utility service without giving the customer a fair opportunity to avoid termination either by paying the bill or questioning its accuracy. I do not agree, however, that this record discloses any constitutional defect in the termination procedures employed by the Light, Gas and Water Division of the city of Memphis (Division). The Court focuses on two aspects of the Division's collection procedures. First, according to the Court, the Division's standard form of termination notice did not adequately inform the customer of the availability of a procedure for protesting a proposed termination of service as unjustified. Ante, at 15. Second, the Division did not afford its customers an adequate *23 opportunity to meet with an employee who had the authority to settle billing disputes. Ante, at 18. Whether we consider the evidence describing the unusual dispute between the Crafts and the Division, or the evidence concerning the general operation of the Division's collection procedures, I find no basis for concluding that either of the Court's criticisms is justified; its conclusion that a constitutional violation has been proved is truly extraordinary. Although the details of the dispute between the Crafts and the Division are obscure, the record describes the Division's customary practices in some detail. Each month the Division terminates the service of about 2,000 customers.[1] Terminations are preceded by a written notice advising the customer of the date by which payment must be made to avoid a cutoff and requesting the customer to contact the credit and collections department if he is having difficulty paying the bill.[2] The notices contain a prominent legend:[3] "PHONE 523-0711 INFORMATION CENTER" Calls to the listed phone number are answered by 30 or 40 Division employees, all of whom are empowered to delay cutoffs for three days based on representations made by customers over the phone. These employees also direct callers to credit counselors who are authorized to resolve disputes on a more permanent basis and who can set up extended payment plans for customers in financial difficulty.[4] *24 The District Court did not find that the Division's notice was defective in any respect or that its regular practices were |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109855/memphis-light-gas-water-div-v-craft/ | defective in any respect or that its regular practices were not adequate to handle the Crafts' unusual problems. The Crafts' dispute with the Division stemmed from the use of two sets of meters to measure utility consumption in different parts of the Crafts' home. Ante, at 4. The Crafts, believing they were being billed twice for the same utilities, did not pay on the second account. In fact, the two accounts were independent; because the Crafts refused to pay the balance on the second account, the Division terminated their service on several occasions.[5] The District Court expressly found that the Division sent a final notice before each termination. The District Court did not find that Mrs. Craft was unable to meet with credit department personnel possessing adequate authority to make an adjustment in her bill.[6] She was successful in working out a deferred-payment arrangement but apparently was unable to have the amount of the bills reduced. The record therefore indicates that Mrs. Craft did meet with *25 Division employees having adequate authority but simply failed to persuade any of them that there was any error in her bills.[7] I The Court's constitutional objection to the Division's notice rests entirely on the classic statement from 314: "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." That statement identifies the two essential characteristics of adequate notice: It must inform the recipient of the impending loss; and it must be given in time to afford the recipient an opportunity to defend. These essentials must, of course, be expressed in terms which the layman can understand. The Division's notice unquestionably satisfied these two basic requirements.[8] No doubt there may be situations in which these two essentials *26 would not be sufficient to constitute fair notice. For example, if the notice describes a threatened loss which can only follow a prescheduled hearing, it must also inform the recipient of the time and place of the hearing. But I do not understand the Court to require municipal utilities to schedule a hearing before each termination notice is mailed. The Court seems to assume, as I do, that no hearing of any kind is necessary unless the customer has reason to believe he has been overcharged. Such a customer may protest his bill in either of two ways: He may communicate directly with the utility, or he may seek relief in court. |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109855/memphis-light-gas-water-div-v-craft/ | with the utility, or he may seek relief in court. In this case the Court finds the Division's notice constitutionally defective because it does not describe the former alternative. The Division must "advise the customer of the availability of a procedure for protesting a proposed termination of utility service as unjustified." Ante, at 15. That advice is much less valuable to the customer than an explanation of the legal remedies that are available if a wrongful termination should occur. Yet the Court wisely avoids holding that the customer must be given that sort of legal advice. The advice the Court does require is wholly unnecessary in all but the most unusual situations. For a homeowner surely need not be told how to complain about an error in a utility bill; it is, of course, helpful to include the telephone number and office address in the termination notice, but our democratic government would cease to function if, as the Court seems to assume, our citizenry were unable to find such information on their own initiative. The Court's holding that the Division's notice was constitutionally defective rests on a paternalistic predicate that I cannot accept. Even accepting the Court's predicate, a notice which advises customers to call the "information center" should be adequate; if not, it seems clear that advising customers to call, during normal business hours, a "dispute resolution center" manned by the same personnel would cure the constitutional *27 objection. Distinctions of this small magnitude are the appropriate concern of administrative rulemaking; they are too trivial to identify constitutional error. II The Court's pronouncement "that due process requires the provision of an opportunity for the presentation to a designated employee of a customer's complaint that he is being overcharged or charged for services not rendered," ante, at 16, is equally divorced from the facts of this case. The Division processes more than 30,000 complaints of excess charges each year, and it has designated scores of employees to hear and investigate those complaints. Except for the Crafts' troubles, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Division's customers are denied access to these employees, or that the employees lack the power to deal appropriately with meritorious complaints. Indeed, as already noted, there is no finding by either of the courts below that the Crafts themselves did not meet with responsible officials empowered to resolve their dispute.[9] Although the Court's pronouncement in this case is therefore gratuitous, it cannot be dismissed as harmless. For it warns municipal utilities that unless they provide "some kind of hearing," ibid., they may be |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109855/memphis-light-gas-water-div-v-craft/ | they provide "some kind of hearing," ibid., they may be acting unconstitutionally. Just what, or why, additional procedural safeguards are constitutionally required is most difficult to discern.[10] *28 In deciding that more process is due, the Court relies on two quite different hypothetical considerations. First, the Court stresses the fact that disconnection of water or heating "may threaten health and safety." Ante, at 18. Second, the Court discounts the value of the protection afforded by the available judicial remedies because the "factual disputes typically [involve] sums of money too small to justify engaging counsel or bringing a lawsuit." Ante, at 21. Neither of these examples is disclosed by this record. The Crafts' dispute involved only a relatively small amount, but they did obtain counsel and thereafter they encountered no billing problems. Although the Division's terminations number about 2,000 each month, the record does not reveal any actual case of harm to health or safety. The District Court found that the Division does not discontinue service when there is illness in a home. Since a customer can always avoid termination by the simple expedient of paying the disputed bill and claiming a refund,[11] it is not surprising that the real emergency case is *29 rare, if indeed it exists at all.[12] When a true emergency does present a serious threat to health or safety, the customer will have ample motivation to take the important step of consulting counsel or filing suit even if the amount of his disputed bill is small. A potential loss of utility service sufficiently grievous to qualify as a constitutional deprivation can hardly be too petty to justify invoking the aid of counsel or the judiciary. Conversely, routine billing disputes too petty for the bench or the bar can hardly merit extraordinary constitutional protection. Even if the customer does not consult counsel in a specific case, the potential damages remedy nevertheless provides far more significant protection against an unjustified termination than does the vague requirement of "some kind of hearing." Without the threat of damages liability for mistakes, the informal procedures required today would neither qualify the utility's ultimate power to enforce collection by terminating service nor deter the exercise of that power. On the other hand, even without specific informal procedures, the danger of substantial liability will by itself ensure careful attention to genuine customer disputes. The utility's potential liability therefore provides customers with real pretermination protection even though damages may not be recovered until later. The need for a procedural innovation is not demonstrated *30 by the record in this judicial proceeding, but rather is |
Justice Stevens | 1,978 | 16 | dissenting | Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109855/memphis-light-gas-water-div-v-craft/ | by the record in this judicial proceeding, but rather is justified on the basis of hypothetical examples, information gleaned from cases not before us, and legislative reports. See ante, at 18 nn. 20 and 21. These justifications suggest that the Court's new rule is the product of a policy determination rather than a traditional construction of the Constitution. As judges we have experience in appraising the fairness of legal remedies and judicial proceedings, but we have no similar ability to balance the cost of scheduling thousands of billing conferences against the benefit of providing additional protection to the occasional customer who may be unable to forestall an unjustified termination. It is an unfortunate fact that when the State assesses taxes or operates a utility, it occasionally overcharges the citizen. It is also unfortunate that effective collection procedures sometimes require the citizen to pay an unjust charge in order to forestall a serious deprivation of property. But if the State has given the citizen fair notice and afforded him procedural redress which is entirely adequate when invoked by his lawyer, the demands of the Due Process Clause are satisfied. I do not believe the Constitution requires the State to employ procedures that are so simple that every lay person can always act effectively without the assistance of counsel. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | dissenting | Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112741/fort-gratiot-sanitary-landfill-inc-v-michigan-dept-of-natural-resources/ | When confronted with a dormant Commerce Clause challenge "[t]he crucial inquiry must be directed to determining whether [the challenged statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental." Because I think the Michigan statute is at least arguably directed to legitimate local concerns, rather than improper economic protectionism, I would remand this case for further proceedings. The substantial environmental, esthetic, health, and safety problems flowing from this country's waste piles were already apparent at the time we decided Philadelphia. Those problems have only risen in the intervening years. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The StandardForm Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, In part this is due to increased waste volumes, volumes that are expected to continue rising for the foreseeable future. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the United States: 1990 Update 10 (municipal solid wastes have increased from 128.1 million tons in 1975 to 179.6 million tons in 1988, expected to rise to 216 million tons by the year 2000); at ES-3 (1988 waste was the equivalent of 4.0 pounds per person per day, expected to rise to 4.4 pounds per person by the year 2000). In part it is due to exhaustion of existing capacity. ; It is no secret why capacity is not expanding sufficiently to meet demandthe substantial risks attendant to waste sites make them extraordinarily unattractive neighbors. Swin Resource Systems, cert. denied, The result, of course, is that while many are willing to generate wasteindeed, it is a practical impossibility to solve the waste problem by banning waste productionfew are willing to help dispose of it. Those locales that do provide disposal capacity to serve foreign waste effectively are affording reduced environmental and safety risks to the States that will not take charge of their own waste.[*] The State of Michigan has stepped into this quagmire in order to address waste problems generated by its own populace. It has done so by adopting a comprehensive approach to the disposal of solid wastes generated within its borders. The legislation challenged today is simply one part of a broad package that includes a number of features: a state-mandated statewide effort to control and plan for waste disposal, and 299.430 requirements that local units of government participate in the planning process, ib and 299.426 restrictions to assure safe transport, 299.431 (1984), a ban on the operation of waste disposal facilities unless various design and technical |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | dissenting | Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112741/fort-gratiot-sanitary-landfill-inc-v-michigan-dept-of-natural-resources/ | operation of waste disposal facilities unless various design and technical requirements are satisfied and appropriate permits obtained, ib and 299.432a and commitments to promote source separation, composting, and recycling, 299.430a The Michigan legislation is *370 thus quite unlike the simple outright ban that we confronted in Philadelphia. In adopting this legislation, the Michigan Legislature also appears to have concluded that, like the State, counties should reap as they have sownhardly a novel proposition. It has required counties within the State to be responsible for the waste created within the county. It has accomplished this by prohibiting waste facilities from accepting waste generated from outside the county, unless special permits are obtained. In the process, of course, this facially neutral restriction (i. e., it applies equally to both interstate and intrastate waste) also works to ban disposal from out-ofstate sources unless appropriate permits are procured. But I cannot agree that such a requirement, when imposed as one part of a comprehensive approach to regulating in this difficult field, is the stuff of which economic protectionism is made. If anything, the challenged regulation seems likely to work to Michigan's economic disadvantage. This is because, by limiting potential disposal volumes for any particular site, various fixed costs will have to be recovered across smaller volumes, increasing disposal costs per unit for Michigan consumers. The regulation also will require some Michigan countiesthose that until now have been exporting their waste to other locations in the Stateto confront environmental and other risks that they previously have avoided. Commerce Clause concerns are at their nadir when a state Act works in this fashionraising prices for all the State's consumers, and working to the substantial disadvantage of other segments of the State's populationbecause in these circumstances "`a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations.' " ). In sum, the law simply incorporates the commonsense *371 notion that those responsible for a problem should be responsible for its solution to the degree they are responsible for the problem but not further. At a minimum, I think the facts just outlined suggest the State must be allowed to present evidence on the economic, environmental, and other effects of its legislation. The Court suggests that our decisions in and Dean foreclose the possibility that a statute attacked on Commerce Clause grounds may be defended by pointing to the statute's effects on intrastate commerce. But our decisions in those cases did not rest on such a broad proposition. Instead, as the passages quoted by the Court make clear, in both and Dean the Court simply |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | dissenting | Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112741/fort-gratiot-sanitary-landfill-inc-v-michigan-dept-of-natural-resources/ | Court make clear, in both and Dean the Court simply rejected the notion that there could be a noneconomic protectionist reason for the bans at issue, because the objects being banned presented no health or environmental risk. See ; see also ; Dean It seems unlikely that the waste here is "wholesome" or "entirely sound and fit." It appears, instead, to be potentially dangerousat least the State has so concluded. Nor does the legislation appear to protect "a major local industry against competition from without the State." Neither Dean nor prohibits a State from adopting health and safety regulations that are directed to legitimate local concerns. See I would remand this case to give the State an opportunity to show that this is such a regulation. *372 We confirmed in that a State's effort to adopt a comprehensive regime to address a major environmental threat or threat to natural resources need not run afoul of the Commerce Clause. In that case we noted that "[o]bviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State." Substitute "attractive and safe environment" for "water" and one has the present case. Michigan has limited the ability of its own population to despoil the environment and to create health and safety risks by excessive and uncontrolled waste disposal. It does not thereby violate the Commerce Clause when it seeks to prevent this resource from being exportedthe effect if Michigan is forced to accept foreign waste in its disposal facilities. Rather, the "resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage." Of course the State may choose not to do this, and in fact, in this case Michigan does permit counties to decide on an individualized basis whether to accept out-of-county waste. But such a result is not constitutionally mandated. The modern landfill is a technically complex engineering exercise that comes replete with liners, leachate collection systems, and highly regulated operating conditions. As a result, siting a modern landfill can now proceed largely independent of the landfill location's particular geological characteristics. See ; Given this, the laws of economics suggest that landfills will sprout in places *373 where land is cheapest and population densities least. See Alm, "Not in My Backyard:" Facing the Siting Question, 10 EPA J. 9 (1984) (noting the need for each county to accept a share of the overall waste stream equivalent to |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | The statutory provision that the Court construes today was enacted in 1927. Although one 1985 case reached the result the Court adopts today, (CA4), over 60 years of otherwise consistent precedent accords with respondents' interpretation of the Act. For the reasons stated by Judge Warriner in his dissent in Fleetwood, I would not change this settled view of the law without an appropriate directive from Congress. Judge Warriner correctly observed: "Beginning with the first opinion dealing with the question, handed down in 1933, and continuing without wavering thereafter, the courts have uniformly interpreted *302 the term `change in conditions' in Section 22 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S. 922 to refer exclusively to a change in the physical condition of the employee receiving compensation. This also was `the meaning generally attributed to similar phraseology in state workman's compensation acts' in existence before or shortly after the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927. See Atlantic Coast Shipping "The majority's nice effort to distinguish this prior case law serves only to highlight the numerous and varied factual situations in which the federal courts have withstood temptation and have strictly adhered to this interpretation. In McCormick Steamship for example, the Court refused to allow the modification of a compensation order under Section 22 where the employee's earnings were diminished as a result of deteriorating economic conditions. Conversely, the fact that an employee received higher wages because of better economic conditions in the 1940's was held not to constitute a `change in conditions' so as to allow a reduction in the employee's compensation award. Burley Welding The courts have refused to find a `change in conditions' where the employee was imprisoned in a penitentiary for life, Atlantic Coast Shipping -19, or where the employee was committed to an insane asylum. Bay Ridge Operating "In every one of these cases, decided soon after the effective date of the Act, the respective courts explicitly stated and held that the term `change in conditions' in Section 22 refers to the physical condition of the employee *303 receiving compensation. In a more recent case, General Dynamics, the court reiterated this interpretation: `[c]ourts uniformly have held a "change in conditions" means a change in the employee's physical condition, not other conditions.' [, n. 6] (citing Burley Welding Works, Inc. v. Lawson, 141 F. 2d at ). "Despite fifty years, and more, of precedent, the majority has overturned this established construction of the term `change in conditions' and has revised it to have it apply to changes in economic conditions occurring during the term of |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | The State of Ohio has established a pilot program designed to provide educational choices to families with children who *644 reside in the Cleveland City School District. The question presented is whether this program offends the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not. There are more than 75,000 children enrolled in the Cleveland City School District. The majority of these children are from low-income and minority families. Few of these families enjoy the means to send their children to any school other than an inner-city public school. For more than a generation, however, Cleveland's public schools have been among the worst performing public schools in the Nation. In 1995, a Federal District Court declared a "crisis of magnitude" and placed the entire Cleveland school district under state control. See Reed v. Rhodes, No. 1:73 CV 1300 Shortly thereafter, the state auditor found that Cleveland's public schools were in the midst of a "crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education." Cleveland City School District Performance Audit 2-1 (Mar. 1996). The district had failed to meet any of the 18 state standards for minimal acceptable performance. Only 1 in 10 ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination, and students at all levels performed at a dismal rate compared with students in other Ohio public schools. More than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or failed out before graduation. Of those students who managed to reach their senior year, one of every four still failed to graduate. Of those students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels comparable to their counterparts in other cities. It is against this backdrop that Ohio enacted, among other initiatives, its Pilot Project Scholarship Program, (program). The program provides financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been "under federal court order requiring supervision and operational *645 management of the district by the state superintendent." 3313.975(A). Cleveland is the only Ohio school district to fall within that category. The program provides two basic kinds of assistance to parents of children in a covered district. First, the program provides tuition aid for students in kindergarten through third grade, expanding each year through eighth grade, to attend a participating public or private school of their parent's choosing. 3313.975(B) and (C)(1). Second, the program provides tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. 3313.975(A). The tuition aid portion of the program is designed to provide educational choices to parents who reside in a covered district. Any |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | choices to parents who reside in a covered district. Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious, may participate in the program and accept program students so long as the school is located within the boundaries of a covered district and meets statewide educational standards. 313.976(A)(3). Participating private schools must agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to "advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion." 3313.976(A)(6). Any public school located in a school district adjacent to the covered district may also participate in the program. 3313.976(C). Adjacent public schools are eligible to receive a $2,250 tuition grant for each program student accepted in addition to the full amount of per-pupil state funding attributable to each additional student. 3313.976(C), 3317.03(I)(1).[1] All participating schools, *646 whether public or private, are required to accept students in accordance with rules and procedures established by the state superintendent. 3313.977(A)(1)(a)(c). Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. Families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250. 3313.978(A) and (C)(1). For these lowest income families, participating private schools may not charge a parental copayment greater than $250. 3313.976(A)(8). For all other families, the program pays 75% of tuition costs, up to $1,875, with no copayment cap. 3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(A). These families receive tuition aid only if the number of available scholarships exceeds the number of low-income children who choose to participate.[2] Where tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where parents who receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child. If parents choose a private school, checks are made payable to the parents who then endorse the checks over to the chosen school. 3313.979. The tutorial aid portion of the program provides tutorial assistance through grants to any student in a covered district who chooses to remain in public school. Parents arrange for registered tutors to provide assistance to their children and then submit bills for those services to the State for payment. 3313.976(D), 3313.979(C). Students from low-income families receive 90% of the amount charged for such assistance up to $360. All other students receive 75% of that amount. 3313.978(B). The number of tutorial assistance grants offered to students in a covered district must equal the number of tuition aid scholarships provided to students *647 enrolled at participating private or adjacent public schools. 3313.975(A). The program has been in operation within the Cleveland City School District since |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | been in operation within the Cleveland City School District since the 1996-1997 school year. In the -2000 school year, 56 private schools participated in the program, 46 (or 82%) of which had a religious affiliation. None of the public schools in districts adjacent to Cleveland have elected to participate. More than 3,700 students participated in the scholarship program, most of whom (96%) enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of these students were from families at or below the poverty line. In the 1998- school year, approximately 1,400 Cleveland public school students received tutorial aid. This number was expected to double during the -2000 school year. The program is part of a broader undertaking by the State to enhance the educational options of Cleveland's schoolchildren in response to the 1995 takeover. That undertaking includes programs governing community and magnet schools. Community schools are funded under state law but are run by their own school boards, not by local school districts. 3314.01(B), 3314.04. These schools enjoy academic independence to hire their own teachers and to determine their own curriculum. They can have no religious affiliation and are required to accept students by lottery. During the -2000 school year, there were 10 startup community schools in the Cleveland City School District with more than 1,900 students enrolled. For each child enrolled in a community school, the school receives state funding of $4,518, twice the funding a participating program school may receive. Magnet schools are public schools operated by a local school board that emphasize a particular subject area, teaching method, or service to students. For each student enrolled in a magnet school, the school district receives $7,746, including state funding of $4,167, the same amount received *648 per student enrolled at a traditional public school. As of parents in Cleveland were able to choose from among 23 magnet schools, which together enrolled more than 13,000 students in kindergarten through eighth grade. These schools provide specialized teaching methods, such as Montessori, or a particularized curriculum focus, such as foreign language, computers, or the arts. In 1996, respondents, a group of Ohio taxpayers, challenged the Ohio program in state court on state and federal grounds. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected respondents' federal claims, but held that the enactment of the program violated certain procedural requirements of the Ohio Constitution. The state legislature immediately cured this defect, leaving the basic provisions discussed above intact. In July respondents filed this action in United States District Court, seeking to enjoin the reenacted program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | it violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In August the District Court issued a preliminary injunction barring further implementation of the program, (ND Ohio), which we stayed pending review by the Court of Appeals, In December the District Court granted summary judgment for respondents. In December 2000, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, finding that the program had the "primary effect" of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. (CA6). The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate pending disposition in this Court. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-1779, p. 151. We granted certiorari, and now reverse the Court of Appeals. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the "purpose" *649 or "effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. There is no dispute that the program challenged here was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system. Thus, the question presented is whether the Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden "effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. To answer that question, our decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools, ; ; ; and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals, ; ; While our jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of direct aid programs has "changed significantly" over the past two decades, our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has remained consistent and unbroken. Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges. In we rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota program authorizing tax deductions for various educational expenses, including private school tuition *650 costs, even though the great majority of the program's beneficiaries (96%) were parents of children in religious schools. We began by focusing on the class of beneficiaries, finding that because the class included "all parents," including parents with "children [who] attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools," the program was "not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause," ). Then, viewing the program as a whole, we emphasized the principle of private choice, noting that public funds were |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | the principle of private choice, noting that public funds were made available to religious schools "only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children." -400. This, we said, ensured that "no `imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally." (quoting at )). We thus found it irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry that the vast majority of beneficiaries were parents of children in religious schools, saying: "We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." That the program was one of true private choice, with no evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward religious schools, was sufficient for the program to survive scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. In we used identical reasoning to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a student studying at a religious institution to become a pastor. Looking at the program as a whole, we observed that "[a]ny aidthat ultimately *651 flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients." We further remarked that, as in "[the] program is made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." In light of these factors, we held that the program was not inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. Five Members of the Court, in separate opinions, emphasized the general rule from that the amount of government aid channeled to religious institutions by individual aid recipients was not relevant to the constitutional -491 (citing at 398 399); ; Our holding thus rested not on whether few or many recipients chose to expend government aid at a religious school but, rather, on whether recipients generally were empowered to direct the aid to schools or institutions of their own choosing. Finally, in we applied and to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal program that permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools. Reviewing our earlier decisions, we stated that "government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge." Looking once again to the challenged program as a whole, we observed that the program "distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as `disabled.' " Its "primary beneficiaries," we said, were "disabled children, not sectarian schools." |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | "primary beneficiaries," we said, were "disabled children, not sectarian schools." *652 We further observed that "[b]y according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents." Our focus again was on neutrality and the principle of private choice, not on the number of program beneficiaries attending religious schools. -11. See, e. g., Because the program ensured that parents were the ones to select a religious school as the best learning environment for their handicapped child, the circuit between government and religion was broken, and the Establishment Clause was not implicated. and thus make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. As a plurality of this Court recently observed: "[I]f numerous private choices, rather than the single choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid, pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria, then a government cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special *653 favors that might lead to a religious establishment." See also ("[W]hen government aid supports a school's religious mission only because of independent decisions made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, `no reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief' " (quoting )). It is precisely for these reasons that we have never found a program of true private choice to offend the Establishment Clause. We believe that the program challenged here is a program of true private choice, consistent with and and thus constitutional. As was true in those cases, the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion. It is part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State of Ohio to provide educational opportunities to the children of a failed school district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion, i. e., any parent of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District. The program permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or nonreligious. Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a financial incentive to do so. Program benefits are available to participating families on neutral terms, with no reference to religion. The only preference stated anywhere in the program is a preference for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission at participating schools. There are no "financial incentive[s]" that "ske[w]" the program toward religious schools. Such incentives "[are] not present where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious *654 and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis." The program here in fact creates financial dis incentives for religious schools, with private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community schools and one-third the assistance given to magnet schools. Adjacent public schools, should any choose to accept program students, are also eligible to receive two to three times the state funding of a private religious school. Families too have a financial disincentive to choose a private religious school over other schools. Parents that choose to participate in the scholarship program and then to enroll their children in a private school (religious or nonreligious) must copay a portion of the school's tuition. Families that choose a community school, magnet school, or traditional public school pay nothing. Although such features of the program are not necessary to its constitutionality, they clearly dispel the claim that the program "creates financial incentive[s] for parents to choose a sectarian school." 509 U. S.,[3] Respondents suggest that even without a financial incentive for parents to choose a religious school, the program creates a "public perception that the State is endorsing religious practices and beliefs." Brief for Respondents Simmons-Harris et al. 37-38. But we have repeatedly recognized *655 that no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement. 463 U. S., ; ; -11; e. g., at -843 ("In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious schools differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the same |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | in turn, decide to use the aid at the same religious schools"). The argument is particularly misplaced here since "the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware" of the "history and context" underlying a challenged program. Good News See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Any objective observer familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general. There also is no evidence that the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options for their school-age children. Cleveland schoolchildren enjoy a range of educational choices: They may remain in public school as before, remain in public school with publicly funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose a nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. That 46 of the 56 private schools now participating in the program are religious schools does not condemn it as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing *656 parents into sending their children to religious schools, and that question must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a program scholarship and then choose a religious school. Justice Souter speculates that because more private religious schools currently participate in the program, the program itself must somehow discourage the participation of private nonreligious schools. Post, at 703-705 (dissenting opinion).[4] But Cleveland's preponderance of religiously affiliated *657 private schools certainly did not arise as a result of the program; it is a phenomenon common to many American cities. See U. S. Dept. of Ed., National Center for Education Statistics, Private School Universe Survey: -2000, pp. 2-4 (hereinafter Private School Universe Survey) (cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24). Indeed, by all accounts the program has captured a remarkable cross-section of private schools, religious and nonreligious. It is true that 82% of Cleveland's participating private schools are religious schools, but it is also true that 81% of private schools in Ohio are religious schools. See Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 16 (citing Private School Universe Survey). To attribute constitutional significance to this figure, moreover, would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in some parts of Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower percentage of |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | of Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower percentage of private schools are religious schools, see Ohio Educational Directory (Lodging of Respondents Gatton et al., available in Clerk of Court's case file), and Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-1751, p. 12, n. 1, but not in inner-city Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed, but where the preponderance of religious schools happens to be greater. Cf. Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 17 ("[T]he percentages of sectarian to nonsectarian private schools within Florida's 67 school districts vary from zero to 100 percent"). Likewise, an identical private choice program might be constitutional in some States, such as Maine or Utah, where less *658 than 45% of private schools are religious schools, but not in other States, such as Nebraska or Kansas, where over 90% of private schools are religious schools. at 15-16 (citing Private School Universe Survey). Respondents and Justice Souter claim that even if we do not focus on the number of participating schools that are religious schools, we should attach constitutional significance to the fact that 96% of scholarship recipients have enrolled in religious schools. They claim that this alone proves parents lack genuine choice, even if no parent has ever said so. We need not consider this argument in detail, since it was flatly rejected in where we found it irrelevant that 96% of parents taking deductions for tuition expenses paid tuition at religious schools. Indeed, we have recently found it irrelevant even to the constitutionality of a direct aid program that a vast majority of program benefits went to religious schools. See ("Nor are we willing to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on the number of sectarian school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid" (citing )); see also n. 6 ("[] held that the proportion of aid benefiting students at religious schools pursuant to a neutral program involving private choices was irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry"); (same) (quoting ). The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school. As we said in "[s]uch an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated." *659 This point is aptly illustrated here. The 96% figure upon which respondents and Justice Souter |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | here. The 96% figure upon which respondents and Justice Souter rely discounts entirely (1) the more than 1,900 Cleveland children enrolled in alternative community schools, (2) the more than 13,000 children enrolled in alternative magnet schools, and (3) the more than 1,400 children enrolled in traditional public schools with tutorial assistance. See Including some or all of these children in the denominator of children enrolled in nontraditional schools during the 2000 school year drops the percentage enrolled in religious schools from 96% to under 20%. See also J. Greene, The Racial, Economic, and Religious Context of Parental Choice in Cleveland 11, Table 4 App. 217a (reporting that only 16.5% of nontraditional schoolchildren in Cleveland choose religious schools). The 96% figure also represents but a snapshot of one particular school year. In the 1997 1998 school year, by contrast, only 78% of scholarship recipients attended religious schools. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-1751, p. 5a. The difference was attributable to two private nonreligious schools that had accepted 15% of all scholarship students electing instead to register as community schools, in light of larger per-pupil funding for community schools and the uncertain future of the scholarship program generated by this litigation. See App. 59a62a, 209a, 223a227a.[5] Many of the students enrolled in these schools *660 as scholarship students remained enrolled as community school students, at 145a146a, thus demonstrating the arbitrariness of counting one type of school but not the other to assess primary effect, e. g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3314.11 In spite of repeated questioning from the Court at oral argument, respondents offered no convincing justification for their approach, which relies entirely on such arbitrary classifications. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-60.[6] *661 Respondents finally claim that we should look to Committee for Public Ed. & Religious to decide these cases. We disagree for two reasons. First, the program in was quite different from the program challenged here. involved a New York program that gave a package of benefits exclusively to private schools and the parents of private school enrollees. Although the program was enacted for ostensibly secular purposes, we found that its "function" was "unmistakably to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions," Its genesis, we said, was that private religious schools faced "increasingly grave fiscal problems." The program thus provided direct money grants to religious schools. It provided tax benefits "unrelated to the amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition," ensuring a windfall to parents of children in religious schools. It similarly provided tuition reimbursements designed explicitly to "offe[r] an incentive to |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | majority | Zelman v. Simmons-Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121168/zelman-v-simmons-harris/ | provided tuition reimbursements designed explicitly to "offe[r] an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools." Indeed, the program flatly prohibited the participation of any public school, or parent of any public school enrollee. Ohio's program shares none of these features. Second, were there any doubt that the program challenged in is far removed from the program challenged here, we expressly reserved judgment with respect to "a case involving some form of public assistance (e. g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." That, of course, is the very question now before us, and it has since been answered, first in -399 ("[A] program that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause" (citing )), *662 then in ("Washington's program is `made available generally without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited' " (quoting )), and again in 509 U. S., -13 ("[T]he function of the [program] is hardly `to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions' " (quoting )). To the extent the scope of has remained an open question in light of these later decisions, we now hold that does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the program here, offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to religion.[7] In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of *663 decisions rejecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not offend the Establishment Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | Petitioner Dionisio Hernandez asks us to review the New York state courts' rejection of his claim that the prosecutor in his criminal trial exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos from the jury by reason of their ethnicity. If true, the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes would violate the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by our decision in We must determine whether the prosecutor offered a race-neutral basis for challenging Latino potential jurors and, if so, whether the state courts' decision to accept the prosecutor's explanation should be sustained. Petitioner and respondent both use the term "Latino" in their briefs to this Court. The amicus brief employs instead the term "Hispanic," and the parties referred to the excluded jurors by that term in the trial court. Both words appear in the state-court opinions. No attempt has been made at a distinction by the parties and we make no attempt to distinguish the terms in this opinion. We will refer to the excluded venirepersons as Latinos in deference to the terminology preferred by the parties before the Court. I The case comes to us on direct review of petitioner's convictions on two counts of attempted murder and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon. On a Brooklyn street, petitioner fired several shots at Charlene Calloway and her mother, Ada Saline. Calloway suffered three gunshot wounds. Petitioner missed Saline and instead hit two men in a nearby restaurant. The victims survived the incident. The trial was held in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County. We concern ourselves here only with the jury selection process and the proper application of which had been handed down before the trial took place. After 63 potential jurors had been questioned and 9 had been empaneled, *356 defense counsel objected that the prosecutor had used four peremptory challenges to exclude Latino potential jurors. Two of the Latino venirepersons challenged by the prosecutor had brothers who had been convicted of crimes, and the brother of one of those potential jurors was being prosecuted by the same District Attorney's office for a probation violation. Petitioner does not press his claim with respect to those prospective jurors, and we concentrate on the other two excluded individuals. After petitioner raised his objection, the prosecutor did not wait for a ruling on whether petitioner had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Instead, the prosecutor volunteered his reasons for striking the jurors in question. He explained: "Your honor, my reason for rejecting thethese two jurorsI'm not certain as to whether they're Hispanics. I didn't notice how many Hispanics had |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | whether they're Hispanics. I didn't notice how many Hispanics had been called to the panel, but my reason for rejecting these two is I feel very uncertain that they would be able to listen and follow the interpreter." App. 3. After an interruption by defense counsel, the prosecutor continued: "We talked to them for a long time; the Court talked to them, I talked to them. I believe that in their heart they will try to follow it, but I felt there was a great deal of uncertainty as to whether they could accept the interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said by each of the witnesses, especially where there were going to be Spanish-speaking witnesses, and I didn't feel, when I asked them whether or not they could accept the interpreter's translation of it, I didn't feel that they could. They each looked away from me and said with some hesitancy that they would try, not that they could, but that they would try to follow the interpreter, and I feel that *357 in a case where the interpreter will be for the main witnesses, they would have an undue impact upon the jury."[1] Defense counsel moved for a mistrial "based on the conduct of the District Attorney," and the prosecutor requested a chance to call a supervisor to the courtroom before the judge's ruling. Following a recess, defense counsel renewed his motion, which the trial court denied. Discussion of the objection continued, however, and the prosecutor explained that he would have no motive to exclude Latinos from the jury: "[T]his case, involves four complainants. Each of the complainants is Hispanic. All my witnesses, that is, civilian witnesses, are going to be Hispanic. I have absolutely no reasonthere's no reason for me to want to exclude Hispanics because all the parties involved are Hispanic, and I certainly would have no reason to do that."[2] * After further interchange among the judge and attorneys, the trial court again rejected petitioner's claim. On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, noted that though the ethnicity of one challenged bilingual juror remained uncertain, the prosecutor had challenged the only three prospective jurors with definite Hispanic surnames. The court ruled that this fact made out a prima facie showing of discrimination. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of petitioner's claim, however, on the ground that the prosecutor had offered race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes sufficient to rebut petitioner's prima facie case. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the judgment, holding that the prosecutor had offered a |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | affirmed the judgment, holding that the prosecutor had offered a legitimate basis for challenging the individuals in question and deferring to the factual findings of the lower New York courts. Two judges dissented, concluding that on this record, analyzed in the light of standards they would adopt as a matter of state constitutional law, the prosecutor's exclusion of the bilingual potential jurors should not have been permitted. We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II In we outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection -98. The analysis set forth in permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral *359 explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This three-step inquiry delimits our consideration of the arguments raised by petitioner. A The prosecutor defended his use of peremptory strikes without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court. As a result, the trial court had no occasion to rule that petitioner had or had not made a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. This departure from the normal course of proceeding need not concern us. We explained in the context of employment discrimination litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that "[w]here the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant." United States Postal Service Bd. of The same principle applies under Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. B Petitioner contends that the reasons given by the prosecutor for challenging the two bilingual jurors were not race neutral. In evaluating the race neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law. A court addressing this issue must keep in mind the fundamental principle that "official action will not be held unconstitutional |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | fundamental principle that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate *360 impact. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection " Arlington ; see also "`Discriminatory purpose' implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of ; see also 481 U.S. A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Petitioner argues that Spanish-language ability bears a close relation to ethnicity, and that, as a consequence, it violates the Equal Protection Clause to exercise a peremptory challenge on the ground that a Latino potential juror speaks Spanish. He points to the high correlation between Spanish-language ability and ethnicity in New York, where the case was tried. We need not address that argument here, for the prosecutor did not rely on language ability without more, but explained that the specific responses and the demeanor of the two individuals during voir dire caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the official translation of Spanish-language testimony.[3] *361 The prosecutor here offered a race-neutral basis for these peremptory strikes. As explained by the prosecutor, the challenges rested neither on the intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals. The prosecutor's articulated basis for these challenges divided potential jurors into two classes: those whose conduct during voir dire would persuade him they might have difficulty in accepting the translator's rendition of Spanish-language testimony and those potential jurors who gave no such reason for doubt. Each category would include both Latinos and non-Latinos. While the prosecutor's criterion might well result in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Petitioner contends that despite the prosecutor's focus on the individual responses of these jurors, his reason for the peremptory strikes has the effect of a pure, language-based *362 reason because "[a]ny honest bilingual juror would have answered the prosecutor in the exact same way." Brief for Petitioner 14. Petitioner asserts that |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | exact same way." Brief for Petitioner 14. Petitioner asserts that a bilingual juror would hesitate in answering questions like those asked by the judge and prosecutor due to the difficulty of ignoring the actual Spanish-language testimony. In his view, no more can be expected than a commitment by a prospective juror to try to follow the interpreter's translation. But even if we knew that a high percentage of bilingual jurors would hesitate in answering questions like these and, as a consequence, would be excluded under the prosecutor's criterion, that fact alone would not cause the criterion to fail the race-neutrality test. As will be discussed below, disparate impact should be given appropriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent, but it will not be conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality step of the inquiry. An argument relating to the impact of a classification does not alone show its purpose. See Personnel Administrator of at Equal protection analysis turns on the intended consequences of government classifications. Unless the government actor adopted a criterion with the intent of causing the impact asserted, that impact itself does not violate the principle of race neutrality. Nothing in the prosecutor's explanation shows that he chose to exclude jurors who hesitated in answering questions about following the interpreter because he wanted to prevent bilingual Latinos from serving on the jury. If we deemed the prosecutor's reason for striking these jurors a racial classification on its face, it would follow that a trial judge could not excuse for cause a juror whose hesitation convinced the judge of the juror's inability to accept the official translation of foreign-language testimony. If the explanation is not race neutral for the prosecutor, it is no more so for the trial judge. While the reason offered by the prosecutor for a peremptory strike need not rise to the level of a *363 challenge for cause, the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will demonstrate its race-neutral character. C Once the prosecutor offers a race-neutral basis for his exercise of peremptory challenges, "[t]he trial court then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." While the disproportionate impact on Latinos resulting from the prosecutor's criterion for excluding these jurors does not answer the race-neutrality inquiry, it does have relevance to the trial court's decision on this question. "[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the [classification] bears more heavily on one race than another." 426 U. S., |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | more heavily on one race than another." 426 U. S., at. 242. If a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory challenge that results in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination. In the context of this trial, the prosecutor's frank admission that his ground for excusing these jurors related to their ability to speak and understand Spanish raised a plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language might be a pretext for what in fact were race-based peremptory challenges. This was not a case where by some rare coincidence a juror happened to speak the same language as a key witness, in a community where few others spoke that tongue. If it were, the explanation that the juror could have undue influence on jury deliberations might be accepted without concern that a racial generalization had come into play. But this trial took place in a community with a substantial Latino population, and petitioner and other interested parties were members of that ethnic group. It would be common knowledge in the locality that a significant percentage of the Latino *364 population speaks fluent Spanish, and that many consider it their preferred language, the one chosen for personal communication, the one selected for speaking with the most precision and power, the one used to define the self. The trial judge can consider these and other factors when deciding whether a prosecutor intended to discriminate. For example, though petitioner did not suggest the alternative to the trial court here, Spanish-speaking jurors could be permitted to advise the judge in a discreet way of any concerns with the translation during the course of trial. A prosecutor's persistence in the desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors despite this measure could be taken into account in determining whether to accept a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. The trial judge in this case chose to believe the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors in question, rejecting petitioner's assertion that the reasons were pretextual. In we explained that the trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal: "In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that `a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." n. 21. 's treatment of intent to discriminate as a pure issue of fact, subject to review under a deferential standard, accords with our treatment of that issue in other equal protection cases. See ; ; Dayton Bd. of ; ; see also As 's citation to Anderson suggests, it also corresponds with our treatment of the intent inquiry under Title VII. See Deference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this context because, as we noted in the finding "largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." 476 U.S., n. 21. In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province." citing The precise formula used for review of factfindings, of course, depends on the context. Anderson was a federal civil case, and we there explained that a federal appellate court reviews the finding of a district court on the question of intent to discriminate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which permits factual findings to be set aside only if clearly erroneous. While no comparable rule exists for federal criminal cases, we have held that the same standard *366 should apply to review of findings in criminal cases on issues other than guilt. ; See also 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 374 On federal habeas review of a state conviction, 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) requires the federal courts to accord state-court factual findings a presumption of correctness. This case comes to us on direct review of the state-court judgment. No statute or rule governs our review of facts found by state courts in cases with this posture. The reasons justifying a deferential standard of review in other contexts, however, apply with equal force to our review of a state trial court's findings of fact made in connection with a federal constitutional claim. Our cases have indicated that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to state-court factual findings, even when those findings relate to a constitutional issue. See 324 Liquor ; California Liquor Dealers ; see also Time, ; General Motors ); Bantam Books, ; Lloyd A. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | Time, ; General Motors ); Bantam Books, ; Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Moreover, "an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question." at Whether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging potential jurors is, as recognized, a question of historical fact. Petitioner also looks to a line of this Court's decisions reviewing state-court challenges to jury selection procedures. Many of these cases, following have emphasized this Court's duty to "analyze the facts in order that the appropriate enforcement of the federal *3 right may be assured," or to "make independent inquiry and determination of the disputed facts," See, e. g., ; ; 332 U.S. ; The review provided for in those cases, however, leaves room for deference to state-court factual determinations, in particular on issues of credibility. For instance, in we said: "[T]he transcript of the evidence presents certain inconsistencies and conflicts of testimony in regard to limiting the number of Negroes on the grand jury. Therefore, the trier of fact who heard the witnesses in full and observed their demeanor on the stand has a better opportunity than a reviewing court to reach a correct conclusion as to the existence of that type of discrimination. While our duty, in reviewing a conviction upon a complaint that the procedure through which it was obtained violates due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, calls for our examination of evidence to determine for ourselves whether a federal constitutional right has been denied, expressly or in substance and effect, ; we accord in that examination great respect to the conclusions of the state judiciary, That respect leads us to accept the conclusion of the trier on disputed issues `unless it is so lacking in support in the evidence that to give it effect would work that fundamental unfairness which is at war with due process,' or equal protection. Cf. ;" at *369 Other cases in the Norris line also express our respect for factual findings made by state courts. See at ; at In the case before us, we decline to overturn the state trial court's finding on the issue of discriminatory intent unless convinced that its determination was clearly erroneous. It "would pervert the concept of federalism," Bose to conduct a more searching review of findings made in state trial court than we conduct with respect to federal district court findings. As a general matter, we think the Norris line of cases reconcilable with this clear error standard of review. In those cases, the evidence |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | clear error standard of review. In those cases, the evidence was such that a "reviewing court on the entire evidence [would be] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha[d] been committed." United For instance, in Norris itself, uncontradicted testimony showed that "no negro had served on any grand or petit jury in [Jackson County, Alabama,] within the memory of witnesses who had lived there all their lives." ; see also at 560-; at ; In circumstances such as those, a finding of no discrimination was simply too incredible to be accepted by this Court. We discern no clear error in the state trial court's determination that the prosecutor did not discriminate on the basis of the ethnicity of Latino jurors. We have said that "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." The trial court took a permissible view of the evidence in crediting the prosecutor's explanation. Apart from the prosecutor's demeanor, which of course we have no opportunity to review, the court could have relied on the facts that the prosecutor defended his use of peremptory challenges without being asked to do so by the judge, that he did not know which *370 jurors were Latinos, and that the ethnicity of the victims and prosecution witnesses tended to undercut any motive to exclude Latinos from the jury. Any of these factors could be taken as evidence of the prosecutor's sincerity. The trial court, moreover, could rely on the fact that only three challenged jurors can with confidence be identified as Latinos, and that the prosecutor had a verifiable and legitimate explanation for two of those challenges. Given these factors, that the prosecutor also excluded one or two Latino venirepersons on the basis of a subjective criterion having a disproportionate impact on Latinos does not leave us with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United at D Language permits an individual to express both a personal identity and membership in a community, and those who share a common language may interact in ways more intimate than those without this bond. Bilinguals, in a sense, inhabit two communities, and serve to bring them closer. Indeed, some scholarly comment suggests that people proficient in two languages may not at times think in one language to the exclusion of the other. The analogy is that of a high-hurdler, who combines the ability to sprint and to jump to accomplish a third feat with characteristics of its own, rather than two separate functions. Grosjean, The |
Justice Kennedy | 1,991 | 4 | majority | Hernandez v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112601/hernandez-v-new-york/ | of its own, rather than two separate functions. Grosjean, The Bilingual as a Competent but Specific Speaker-Hearer, 6 J. Multilingual & Multicultural Development 467 This is not to say that the cognitive processes and reactions of those who speak two languages are susceptible of easy generalization, for even the term "bilingual" does not describe a uniform category. It is a simple word for a more complex phenomenon with many distinct categories and subdivisions. Sánchez, Our Linguistic and Social Context, in Spanish in the United States 9, 12 ; Dodson, Second Language Acquisition and Bilingual Development: *371 A Theoretical Framework, 6 J. Multilingual & Multicultural Development 325, 326-327 Our decision today does not imply that exclusion of bilinguals from jury service is wise, or even that it is constitutional in all cases. It is a harsh paradox that one may become proficient enough in English to participate in trial, see, e. g., 28 U.S. C. 1865(b)(2), (3) (English-language ability required for federal jury service), only to encounter disqualification because he knows a second language as well. As the Court observed in a somewhat related context: "Mere knowledge of [a foreign] language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable." Just as shared language can serve to foster community, language differences can be a source of division. Language elicits a response from others, ranging from admiration and respect, to distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. Reactions of the latter type all too often result from or initiate racial hostility. In holding that a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge means a reason other than race, we do not resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race should be defined for equal protection purposes. We would face a quite different case if the prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the explanation that he did not want Spanish-speaking jurors. It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis. Cf. Yu Cong ; And, as we make clear, a policy of striking all who speak a given language, *372 without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination. But that case is not before us. III We find no error in the application by the New York courts of the three-step analysis. |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | NLRB v. Operating Engineers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108222/nlrb-v-operating-engineers/ | In this cause we are asked to determine whether strikes by Operating Engineers at the site of the construction of a nuclear power generator plant at Oyster Creek, New Jersey, violated 8 (b) (4) (B)[1] of the National Labor Relations Act. Although the National Labor Relations Board found the strikes to be in violation of this section, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order.[2] We believe the Court of Appeals construed the Act too narrowly. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for consideration of the propriety of the Board's order. *300 The general contractor for the project, Burns & Roe, Inc., subcontracted all of the construction work to three companiesWhite Construction Co., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., and Poirier & McLane Corp. All three employed operating engineers who were members of Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers. But White, unlike Chicago Bridge and Poirier, did not have a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 825. In the latter part of September 1965, White installed an electric welding machine and assigned the job of pushing the buttons that operated the machine to members of the Ironworkers Union, who were to perform the actual welding. Upon learning of this work assignment, Local 825's job steward and its lead engineer threatened White with a strike if operating engineers were not given the work. White, however, refused to meet the demand. On September 29, 1965, the job steward and lead engineer met with the construction manager for Burns, the general contractor. They informed him that the members of Local 825 working at the jobsite had voted to strike unless Burns signed a contract, which would be binding[3] on all three subcontractors as well as Burns, giving Local 825 jurisdiction over all power equipment, including electric welding machines, operated on the job-site. On October 1, after White and Burns refused to *301 accede to the demands, the operating engineers employed by Chicago Bridge and Poirier as well as those employed by White walked off the job. They stayed out from 8 a. m. to 1 p. m., returning to work when negotiations over their demands started. On October 6, Burns submitted the work assignment dispute to the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes for the Construction Industry.[4] The same day, Local 825 threatened Burns and all the subcontractors with another work stoppage unless the contracts were signed and the work transferred to the operating engineers. The employers again refused, and the operating engineers walked off the project. This strike lasted from October 7 to October 11. On October 20, |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | NLRB v. Operating Engineers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108222/nlrb-v-operating-engineers/ | lasted from October 7 to October 11. On October 20, the Joint Board notified the parties that there was no reason to change the assignment of the disputed work. Local 825 did not accept this resolution; and when the welding machine was started on November 4, the operating engineers surrounded the machine and physically prevented its operation. On November 8, the NLRB Regional Director obtained from the United States District Court a temporary injunction under 10 (l)[5] of the Act restraining the union from coercing a cessation of business on the project or to compel White to change the work assignment.[6] *302 An unfair labor practice proceeding against Local 825 subsequently ensued. The Board found that the union had violated 8 (b) (4) (D)[7] of the Act by inducing employees of White, Chicago Bridge, and Poirier to strike to force White to take the disputed work away from the Ironworkers and assign it to the Operating Engineers. The Court of Appeals' approval of this finding is not questioned here. But the Board's finding that Local 825's encouragement of the Chicago Bridge and Poirier employees to strike and the union's coercion of Burns violated 8 (b) (4) (B) of the Act was not approved by the Court of Appeals and is in issue here. I Congressional concern over the involvement of third parties in labor disputes not their own prompted 8 (b) (4) (B). This concern was focused on the "secondary boycott,"[8] which was conceived of as pressure brought to *303 bear, not "upon the employer who alone is a party [to a dispute], but upon some third party who has no concern in it"[9] with the objective of forcing the third party to bring pressure on the employer to agree to the union's demands.[10] Section 8 (b) (4) (B) is, however, the product of legislative compromise and also reflects a concern with protecting labor organizations' right to exert legitimate pressure aimed at the employer with whom there is a primary dispute.[11] This primary activity is protected even though it may seriously affect neutral third parties. Steelworkers (Carrier ; Electrical Workers (General Thus there are two threads to 8 (b) (4) (B) that require disputed conduct to be classified as either "primary" or "secondary." And the tapestry that has been woven in classifying such conduct is among the labor law's most intricate. See Brotherhood of Railroad But here the normally difficult task of classifying union conduct is easy. As the Court of Appeals said, the "record amply justifies the conclusion that [Burns and the neutral subcontractors] were subjected to coercion in |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | NLRB v. Operating Engineers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108222/nlrb-v-operating-engineers/ | [Burns and the neutral subcontractors] were subjected to coercion in the *304 form of threats or walkouts, or both." And, as the Board said, it is clear that this coercion was designed "to achieve the assignment of [the] disputed work" to operating engineers. 162 N. L. R. B. 1617, 1621. Local 825's coercive activity was aimed directly at Burns and the subcontractors that were not involved in the dispute. The union engaged in a strike against these neutral employers for the specific, overt purpose of forcing them to put pressure on White to assign the job of operating the welding machine to operating engineers. Local 825 was not attempting to apply the full force of primary action by directing its efforts at all phases of Burns' normal operation as was the case in Steelworkers and Electrical Workers The more difficult task is to determine whether one of Local 825's objectives was to force Burns and the other neutrals to "cease doing business" with White as 8 (b) (4) (B) requires. The Court of Appeals concluded that the union's objective was to force Burns "to use its influence with the subcontractor to change the subcontractor's conduct, not to terminate their relationship" and that this was not That court read the statute as requiring that the union demand nothing short of a complete termination of the business relationship between the neutral and the primary employer. Such a reading is too narrow. Some disruption of business relationships is the necessary consequence of the purest form of primary activity. These foreseeable disruptions are, however, clearly protected. Steelworkers (Carrier), ; Electrical Workers (General Electric), *305 Likewise, secondary activity could have such a limited goal and the foreseeable result of the conduct could be, while disruptive, so slight that the "cease doing business" requirement is not met. Local 825's goal was not so limited nor were the foreseeable consequences of its secondary pressure slight. The operating engineers sought to force Burns to bind all the subcontractors on the project to a particular form of job assignments. The clear implication of the demands was that Burns would be required either to force a change in White's policy or to terminate White's contract. The strikes shut down the whole project. If Burns was unable to obtain White's consent, Local 825 was apparently willing to continue disruptive conduct that would bring all the employers to their knees. Certainly, the union would have preferred to have the employers capitulate to its demands; it wanted to take the job of operating the welding machines away from the Ironworkers. It was willing, |
Justice Marshall | 1,971 | 15 | majority | NLRB v. Operating Engineers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108222/nlrb-v-operating-engineers/ | the welding machines away from the Ironworkers. It was willing, however, to try to obtain this capitulation by forcing neutrals to compel White to meet union demands. To hold that this flagrant secondary conduct with these most serious disruptive effects was not prohibited by 8 (b) (4) (B) would be largely to ignore the original congressional concern. II In addition to its argument that 8 (b) (4) (B) does not cover its conduct, Local 825 argues that 8 (b) (4) (D) provides the exclusive remedy. Clearly, 8 (b) (4) (D) is, as the Board and Court of Appeals held, applicable. But that section is aimed at protecting "the employer trapped between the claims" of rival unions. National Woodwork Mfrs. Although 8 (b) (4) (D) also *306 applies to neutrals, the basic purpose is different from that of 8 (b) (4) (B). The practices here were unfair under both sections and there is no indication that Congress intended either section to have exclusive application. III Since the Court of Appeals did not believe that 8 (b) (4) (B) was applicable, it did not consider the propriety of the portion of the Board's order relating to that section. But the order was not narrowly confined to the conduct involved here; so we must remand these cases for the Court of Appeals to consider whether the order is necessary to further the goals of the Act. See Communications ; Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | concurring | Microsoft Corp. v. Baker | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403813/microsoft-corp-v-baker/ | I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over respondents’ appeal, but I would ground that conclusion in Article III of the Constitution instead of 28 U.S. C. I therefore concur only in the judgment. The plaintiffs in this case, respondents here, sued Mi- crosoft, petitioner here, to recover damages after they purchased allegedly faulty video game consoles that Mi- crosoft manufactured. The plaintiffs brought claims for themselves (individual claims) and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated consumers (class allegations). Early in the litigation, the District Court granted Mi- crosoft’s motion to strike the class allegations, effectively declining to certify the class. The Court of Appeals denied permission to appeal that decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f ), which requires a party to obtain permission from the court of appeals before appealing a decision regarding class certification. The plaintiffs decided not to pursue their individual claims, instead stipulating to a voluntary dismissal of those claims with prejudice. They then filed a notice of appeal from the voluntary dismissal order. On appeal, they did not ask the Court of Appeals to reverse the Dis- trict Court’s dismissal of their individual claims. They 2 MICROSOFT CORP. v. BAKER THOMAS THOMAS J., concurring J., concurring in judgment instead asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the order striking their class allegations. The question presented in this case is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under both which grants appel- late jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over “final deci- sions” by district courts, and under Article III of the Con- stitution, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” The Court today holds that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under because the voluntary dismissal with prejudice did not result in a “final decision.” I dis- agree with that holding. A decision is “final” for purposes of if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” The order here dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and left nothing for the District Court to do but execute the judgment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a (“direct[ing] the Clerk to enter Judgment and close th[e] case”). The Court reaches the opposite conclusion, relying not on the text of or this Court’s precedents about final- ity, but on Rule 23(f ). Rule 23(f ) makes interlocutory orders regarding class certification appealable only with the permission of the court of appeals. The Court con- cludes that |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | concurring | Microsoft Corp. v. Baker | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403813/microsoft-corp-v-baker/ | of the court of appeals. The Court con- cludes that the plaintiffs’ “voluntary dismissal” “does not qualify as a ‘final decision’ ” because allowing the plain- tiffs’ appeal would “subvert the balanced solution Rule 23(f ) put in place for immediate review of class-action orders.” Ante, at 2. The Court’s conclusion does not follow from its reason- ing. Whether a dismissal with prejudice is “final” depends on the meaning of not Rule 23(f ). Rule 23(f ) says nothing about finality, much less about the finality of an order dismissing individual claims with prejudice. I agree with the Court that the plaintiffs are trying to avoid the Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 3 THOMAS THOMAS J., concurring J., concurring in judgment requirements for interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f ), but our view of the balance struck in that rule should not warp our understanding of finality under Although I disagree with the Court’s reading of I agree that the plaintiffs could not appeal in these circum- stances. In my view, they could not appeal because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. The “judicial Power” of the United States extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Art. III, This requirement limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issues presented “in an adversary con- text,” in which the parties maintain an “actual” and “concrete” interest, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, “Article III denies federal courts the power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them, and confines them to resolving real and substantial controversies admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., (inter- nal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). The plaintiffs’ appeal from their voluntary dismissal did not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. When the plaintiffs asked the District Court to dismiss their claims, they consented to the judgment against them and dis- avowed any right to relief from Microsoft. The parties thus were no longer adverse to each other on any claims, and the Court of Appeals could not “affect the[ir] rights” in any legally cognizable manner. Indeed, it has long been the rule that a party may not appeal from the voluntary dismissal of a claim, since the party consented to the judgment against it. See, e.g., Evans v. Phillips, 4 Wheat. 73 (1819); ; United ; Deakins v. Monaghan, 4 MICROSOFT CORP. v. BAKER THOMAS THOMAS J., concurring J., concurring in judgment The |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | concurring | Microsoft Corp. v. Baker | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403813/microsoft-corp-v-baker/ | BAKER THOMAS THOMAS J., concurring J., concurring in judgment The plaintiffs contend that their interest in reversing the order striking their class allegations is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, but they misunderstand the status of putative class actions. Class allegations, without an underlying individual claim, do not give rise to a “case” or “controversy.” Those allega- tions are simply the means of invoking a procedural mechanism that enables a plaintiff to litigate his individ- ual claims on behalf of a class. See Shady Grove Orthope- dic Associates, P. (2010) (plurality opinion). Thus, because the Court of Appeals lacked Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate the individual claims, it could not hear the plaintiffs’ appeal of the order striking their class allegations. Plaintiffs’ representation that they hope to “revive their [individual] claims should they prevail” on the appeal of the order striking their class allegations does not under- mine this conclusion. Brief for Respondents 45. This Court has interpreted Article III “to demand that an ac- tual controversy be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Campbell Ewald Co., at (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). And in any event, a favorable ruling on class certification would not “revive” their individual claims: A court’s decision about class allegations “in no way touch[es] the merits” of those claims. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., * * * Because I would hold that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under Article III to consider respondents’ appeal, I concur in the judgment |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | concurring | Hicks v. Miranda | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109296/hicks-v-miranda/ | I join the opinion of the Court but I add a word about the composition of the three-judge District Court and the circumstances under which it was convened. Under 28 U.S. C. 2284 (1) the district judge to whom the application for relief is presented, and who notifies the chief judge of the need to convene the three-judge court, "shall constitute one member of such court." It is well settled that "shall" means "must," cf. Merced yet the judge who called for the three-judge court here was not named to the panel. However, appellants made no timely objection to the composition of the court. Ante, at 338 n. 5. Obviously occasions can arise rendering it impossible for the district judge who initiates the convening of such a court under 2284 (1) to serve on the court, but, in light of the unqualified mandatory language of the statute, when that occurs there is an obligation to *353 see to it that the record reveal, at the very least, a statement of the circumstances accounting for the substitution. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. |
Justice Scalia | 2,006 | 9 | dissenting | Youngblood v. West Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145639/youngblood-v-west-virginia/ | In we greatly expanded our "no-fault V & R practice" (GVR) *871 beyond its traditional bounds. At the time, I remarked that "[t]he power to `revise and correct' for error has become a power to void for suspicion" of error, ; alterations omitted). And I predicted that "`GVR'd for clarification of '" would "become a common form of order, drastically altering the role of this Court." Today, by vacating the judgment of a state court simply because "[i]f this Court is to reach the merits of this case, it would be better to have the benefit of the views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the Brady issue," ante, at 870, the Court brings this prediction to fulfillment. In I identified three narrow circumstances in which this Court could, consistent with the traditional understanding of our appellate jurisdiction (or at least consistent with entrenched practice), justify vacating a lower court's judgment without first identifying error: "(1) where an intervening factor has arisen [e. g., new legislation or a recent judgment of this Court] that has a legal bearing upon the decision, (2) where, in a context not governed by clarification of the opinion below is needed to assure our jurisdiction, and (3) (in acknowledgment of established practice, though not necessarily in agreement with its validity) where the respondent or appellee confesses error in the judgment below." -192 Needless to say, today's novel GVR order falls into none of these categories. There has been no intervening change in law that might bear upon the judgment. Our jurisdiction is not in doubt, see ante, at 870; And the State has confessed no errornot even on the broadest and least supportable theory of what constitutes an error justifying vacatur. See, e. g., (vacating when the Solicitor General confessed error in the lower court's "`analysis,'" but not its judgment); (vacating when the Solicitor General confessed error in a position taken before the Court of Appeals, on which the court might have relied; discussed in ); Department of (vacating when "the Government, having lost below, wishes to try out a new legal position"). Here, the Court vacates and remands in light of nothing. Instead, the Court remarks tersely that it would be "better" to have "the benefit" of the West Virginia court's views on petitioner's Brady claim, should we eventually decide to take the case. Ante, at 870. The Court thus purports to conscript the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to write what is essentially an amicus brief on the merits of an issue they |
Justice Scalia | 2,006 | 9 | dissenting | Youngblood v. West Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145639/youngblood-v-west-virginia/ | an amicus brief on the merits of an issue they have already decided, in order to facilitate our possible review of the merits at some later time. It is not at all clear why it would be so much "better" to have the full court below address the Brady claim. True, we often prefer to review reasoned opinions that facilitate our considerationthough we may review even a summary disposition. See But the dissenting judges in the case below discussed petitioner's Brady claim at some length (indeed, at greater length than appears in many of the decisions we agree to review), and argued that it was meritorious. See Since we sometimes review judgments with no opinion, and often review judgments with opinion only on one side of the issue, it is not clear why we need opinions on both sides here. To tell the truth, there is only one obvious sense in which it might be "better" to have the West Virginia court revisit *873 the Brady issue: If the majority suspects that the court below erred, there is a chance that the GVR-in-light-of-nothing will induce it to change its mind on remand, sparing us the trouble of correcting the suspected error. It is noteworthy that, to justify its GVR order, the Court does not invoke even the flabby standard adopted in namely, whether there is "a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration," That is because (there being no relevant intervening event to create such a probability) the only possibility that the West Virginia court will alter its considered judgment is created by this Court's GVR order itself. A case such as this, which meets none of the usual, outcome-neutral criteria for granting certiorari set forth in this Court's Rules 10(a)(c), could attract our notice only if we suspected that the judgment appealed from was in error. Those whose judgments we review have sometimes viewed even our legitimate, intervening-event GVR orders as polite directives that they reverse themselves. See, e. g., ("Once again, I think the majority has mistaken gentleness in instruction for indefiniteness in command. The Supreme Court was seeking to be gentle with us but there is, I submit, no mistaking what they expected us to do"). How much more is that suspicion justified when the GVR order rests on nothing more than our statement that it would be "better" for the lower court to reconsider its decision (much as a mob enforcer might suggest that it would be "better" to make |
Justice Scalia | 2,006 | 9 | dissenting | Youngblood v. West Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145639/youngblood-v-west-virginia/ | enforcer might suggest that it would be "better" to make protection payments). Even when we suspect error, we may have many reasons not to grant certiorari outright in a case such as thisan overcrowded docket, a reluctance to correct "the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law," this Court's Rule 10, or (in this particular case) even a neo-Victorian desire to keep the lurid phrases of the "graphically explicit note," *874 ante, at 868, out of the U. S. Reports. But none of these reasons justifies "a tutelary remand, as to a schoolboy made to do his homework again." -186 In "the nature of the appellate system created by the Constitution and laws of the United States," state courts and lower federal courts are constitutionally distinct tribunals, independently authorized to decide issues of federal law. They are not, as we treat them today, "the creatures and agents of this body," -179. If we suspect that a lower court has erred and wish to correct its error, we should grant certiorari and decide the issue ourselves in accordance with the traditional exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. It is particularly ironic that the Court inaugurates its "GVR-in-light-of-nothing" practice by vacating the judgment of a state court. Our no-fault GVR practice had its origins "in situations calling forth the special deference owed to state law and state courts in our system of federalism." We first used it to allow the state court to decide the effect of an intervening change in state law. ). Likewise, our other legitimate category of no-fault GVRto ensure our own jurisdiction"originate[d] in the special needs of federalism." In vacating the judgment of a state court for no better reason than our own convenience, we not only fail to observe, but positively flout the "special deference owed to state courts," Like the Ouroboros swallowing its tail, our GVR practice has ingested its own original justification. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in that "[i]t is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted" 1 Cranch, at At best, today's unprecedented decision rests on a finding that the state court's "opinion, though arguably correct, [is] incomplete and unworkmanlike," *875 which all Members of the Court in agreed was an illegitimate basis for a GVR, see At worst, it is an implied threat to the lower court, not backed by a judgment of our own, that it had "better" reconsider its holding. I suppose it would be available to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, on remand, simply to reaffirm its |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | This case concerns the Sixth Amendment right of an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both, to the assistance of courtappointed counsel. Two prior decisions control the Court's judgment. First, in this Court held that defense counsel must be appointed in any criminal prosecution, "whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony," "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period," Later, in the Court drew the line at "actual imprisonment," holding that counsel need not be appointed when the defendant is fined for the charged crime, but is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. *658 Defendant-respondent LeReed Shelton, convicted of third-degree assault, was sentenced to a jail term of 30 days, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on probation for two years. The question presented is whether the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as delineated in and Scott, applies to a defendant in Shelton's situation. We hold that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. I After representing himself at a bench trial in the District Court of Etowah County, Alabama, Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault, a class A misdemeanor carrying a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment and a $2,000 fine, Ala. Code 13A-6-22, 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1) He invoked his right to a new trial before a jury in Circuit Court, where he again appeared without a lawyer and was again convicted. The court repeatedly warned Shelton about the problems selfrepresentation entailed, see App. 9, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. The Circuit Court sentenced Shelton to serve 30 days in the county prison. As authorized by Alabama law, however, the court suspended that sentence and placed Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation, conditioned on his payment of court costs, a $500 fine, reparations of $25, and restitution in the amount of $516.69. Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the Alabama Court of Criminal *659 Appeals affirmed.[1] That court initially held that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended prison sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and remanded for a determination whether Shelton had "made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right." App. 7. When the case returned from remand, however, the appeals court reversed course: A suspended sentence, the court concluded, does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel unless there is |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel unless there is "evidence in the record that the [defendant] has actually been deprived of liberty." Because Shelton remained on probation, the court held that he had not been denied any Sixth Amendment right at trial. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals in relevant part. Referring to this Court's decisions in and Scott, the Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant may not be "sentenced to a term of imprisonment" absent provision of counsel. App. 37. In the Alabama high court's view, a suspended sentence constitutes a "term of imprisonment" within the meaning of and Scott even though incarceration is not immediate or inevitable. And because the State is constitutionally barred from activating the conditional sentence, the Alabama court concluded, "`the threat itself is hollow and should be considered a nullity.' " App. 37 ). Accordingly, the court affirmed Shelton's conviction and the monetary portion of his punishment, but invalidated "that aspect of his sentence imposing 30 days of *660 suspended jail time." App. 40. By reversing Shelton's suspended sentence, the State informs us, the court also vacated the two-year term of probation. See Brief for Petitioner 6.[2] Courts have divided on the Sixth Amendment question presented in this case. Some have agreed with the decision below that appointment of counsel is a constitutional prerequisite to imposition of a conditional or suspended prison sentence. See, e. g., Reilley, 948 F. 2d, at ; United ; United Others have rejected that proposition. See, e. g., (CA5), vacated on other grounds, ; ; 273 Mont. 3, We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. II Three positions are before us in this case. In line with the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Shelton argues that an indigent defendant may not receive a suspended sentence unless he is offered or waives the assistance of state-appointed counsel. Brief for Respondent 5-27.[3] Alabama *661 now concedes that the Sixth Amendment bars activation of a suspended sentence for an uncounseled conviction, but maintains that the Constitution does not prohibit imposition of such a sentence as a method of effectuating probationary punishment. Reply Brief 4-13. To assure full airing of the question presented, we invited an amicus curiae (amicus) to argue in support of a third position, one Alabama has abandoned: Failure to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant "does not bar the imposition of a suspended or probationary sentence upon conviction of a misdemeanor, even though the defendant might be incarcerated in the event probation is revoked."[4] A In we held that the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | event probation is revoked."[4] A In we held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to state-appointed counsel, firmly established in federal-court proceedings in applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. We clarified the scope of that right in holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any misdemeanor case "that actually leads to imprisonment." 407 U.S., Seven Terms later, Scott confirmed `s "delimit[ation]," 440 U.S., 3. Although the governing statute in Scott authorized a jail sentence of up to one year, see we held that the defendant had no right to state-appointed counsel because the sole sentence actually imposed on him was a $50 fine, 3. "Even were the matter res nova, " we stated, "the central premise of that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonmentis eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel" in nonfelony cases. *662 Subsequent decisions have reiterated the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard. See, e. g., ; M. L. ; ; ("The Court in Scott, relying on [,] drew a bright line between imprisonment and lesser criminal penalties."); It is thus the controlling rule that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 407 U. S., B Applying the "actual imprisonment" rule to the case before us, we take up first the question we asked amicus to address: Where the State provides no counsel to an indigent defendant, does the Sixth Amendment permit activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant's violation of the terms of probation? We conclude that it does not. A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying The uncounseled conviction at that point "result[s] in imprisonment," 511 U. S., at ; it "end[s] up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty," This is precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in and Scott, does not allow. Amicus resists this reasoning primarily on two grounds. First, he attempts to align this case with our decisions in and See Brief for Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court 11-18 *663 (hereinafter Fried Brief). We conclude that Shelton's case is not properly bracketed with those dispositions. presented the question whether the Sixth Amendment barred consideration of a defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in determining his sentence for a |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in determining his sentence for a subsequent felony pleaded guilty to federal felony drug charges. Several years earlier, unrepresented by counsel, he was fined but not incarcerated for the state misdemeanor of driving under the influence (DUI). Including the DUI conviction in the federal Sentencing Guidelines calculation allowed the trial court to impose a sentence for the felony drug conviction "25 months longer than if the misdemeanor conviction had not been considered." We upheld this result, concluding that "an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction." In the question was whether the defendant, who was placed on probation pursuant to a suspended sentence for armed robbery, had a due process right to representation by appointed counsel at a probation revocation We held that counsel was not invariably required in parole or probation revocation proceedings; we directed, instead, a "case-by-case approach" turning on the character of the issues involved. at 788-. Considered together, amicus contends, and establish this principle: Sequential proceedings must be analyzed separately for Sixth Amendment purposes, Fried Brief 11-18, and only those proceedings "result[ing] in immediate actual imprisonment" trigger the right to stateappointed counsel, Thus, the defendant in had no right to appointed counsel in the DUI proceeding because he was not immediately imprisoned at the conclusion of that proceeding. The uncounseled DUI, valid when imposed, did not later become invalid because *664 it was used to enhance the length of imprisonment that followed a separate and subsequent felony proceeding. Just so here, amicus contends: Shelton had no right to appointed counsel in the Circuit Court because he was not incarcerated immediately after trial; his conviction and suspended sentence were thus valid and could serve as proper predicates for actual imprisonment at a later hearing to revoke his probation. See Fried Brief 14, 23-24. and do not stand for the broad proposition amicus would extract from them. The dispositive factor in those cases was not whether incarceration occurred immediately or only after some delay. Rather, the critical point was that the defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for which he was imprisoned. See n. 9 Unlike this case, in which revocation of probation would trigger a prison term imposed for a misdemeanor of which Shelton was found guilty without the aid of counsel, the sentences imposed in and were for felony convictionsa federal drug conviction in and a state armed robbery conviction in for which the right to counsel |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | armed robbery conviction in for which the right to counsel is unquestioned. See ; Thus, neither nor altered or diminished `s command that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at his trial," 407 U.S., Far from *665 supporting amicus ` position, and simply highlight that the Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of the proceedings corresponding to Shelton's Circuit Court trial, where his guilt was adjudicated, eligibity for imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined. is further distinguishable for the related reason that the Court there applied a "less exacting" standard "consistent with the traditional understanding of the sentencing process." Once guilt has been established, we noted in sentencing courts may take into account not only "a defendant's prior convictions, but also [his] past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior." Thus, in accord with due process, "could have been sentenced more severely based simply on evidence of the underlying conduct that gave rise" to his previous conviction, even if he had never been charged with that conduct, and even if he had been acquitted of the misdemeanor with the aid of appointed counsel, United That relaxed standard has no application in this case, where the question is whether the defendant may be jailed absent a conviction credited as reliable because the defendant had access to "the guiding hand of counsel," Amicus also contends that "practical considerations clearly weigh against" the extension of the Sixth Amendment appointed-counsel right to a defendant in Shelton's situation. Fried Brief 23. He cites figures suggesting that although conditional sentences are commonly imposed, they are rarely activated. ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20- (speculating that "hundreds of thousands" of uncounseled defendants receive suspended sentences, but only "thousands" of that large number are incarcerated upon violating the terms of their probation). Based on these estimations, ami- *666 cus argues that a rule requiring appointed counsel in every case involving a suspended sentence would unduly hamper the States' attempts to impose effective probationary punishment. A more "workable solution," he contends, would permit imposition of a suspended sentence on an uncounseled defendant and require appointment of counsel, if at all, only at the probation revocation stage, when incarceration is imminent. Fried Brief 18, 23-24. Amicus observes that probation is "now a critical tool of law enforcement in low level cases." Even so, it does not follow that preservation of that tool warrants the reduction of the Sixth Amendment's domain that would result from the regime amicus hypothesizes. Amicus does not describe the contours of the hearing that, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | Amicus does not describe the contours of the hearing that, he suggests, might precede revocation of a term of probation imposed on an uncounseled defendant. See In Alabama, however, the character of the probation revocation hearing currently afforded is not in doubt. The proceeding is an "informal" one, 4, 5 So. 2d 202, at which the defendant has no right to counsel, and the court no obligation to observe customary rules of evidence, (Crim. App. 0). More significant, the sole issue at the hearingapart from determinations about the necessity of confinement, see (d)(4) (5)is whether the defendant breached the terms of probation. See ("All that is required in a hearing of this character is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has violated a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended." ). The validity or reliability of the underlying conviction is beyond attack. See 48 Ala. App., at 4, * 5 So. 2d, at We think it plain that a hearing so timed and structured cannot compensate for the absence of trial counsel, for it does not even address the key Sixth Amendment inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration. Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, and sentenced, and unable to challenge the original judgment at a subsequent probation revocation hearing, a defendant in Shelton's circumstances faces incarceration on a conviction that has never been subjected to "the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing," United The Sixth Amendment does not countenance this result. In a variation on amicus' position, the dissent would limit review in this case to the question whether the imposition of Shelton's suspended sentence required appointment of counsel, answering that question "plainly no" because such a step "does not deprive a defendant of his personal liberty." Post, at 676. Only if the sentence is later activated, the dissent contends, need the Court "ask whether the procedural safeguards attending the imposition of [Shelton's] sentence comply with the Constitution." Severing the analysis in this manner makes little sense. One cannot assess the constitutionality of imposing a suspended sentence while simultaneously walling off the procedures that will precede its activation. The dissent imagines a set of safeguards Alabama might provide at the probation revocation stage sufficient to cure its failure to appoint counsel prior to sentencing, including, perhaps, "complete retrial of the misdemeanor violation with assistance of counsel," post, at 677. But there is no cause for speculation about Alabama's procedures; they are established by Alabama |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | for speculation about Alabama's procedures; they are established by Alabama statute and decisional law, see at 666 and this page, and they bear no resemblance to those the dissent invents in its effort to sanction the prospect of Shelton's imprisonment on *668 an uncounseled conviction.[5] Assessing the issue before us in light of actual circumstances, we do not comprehend how the procedures Alabama in fact provides at the probation revocation hearing could bring Shelton's sentence within constitutional bounds.[6] Nor do we agree with amicus or the dissent that our holding will "substantially limit the states' ability" to impose probation, Fried Brief 22, or encumber them with a "large, new burden," post, at 680. Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law right to appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal Constitution. See *669 511 U. S., -749, n. 12. All but 16 States, for example, would provide counsel to a defendant in Shelton's circumstances, either because he received a substantial fine[7] or because state law authorized incarceration for the charged offense[8] or provided for a maximum prison term of one year.[9] See Ala. Code 13A-6-22, 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A 5-12(a)(1) There is thus scant reason to believe that a rule conditioning imposition of a suspended sentence on provision of appointed counsel would affect existing practice *670 in the large majority of the States.[10] And given the current commitment of most jurisdictions to affording courtappointed counsel to indigent misdemeanants while simultaneously preserving the option of probationary punishment, we do not share amicus' concern that other States may lack the capacity and resources to do the same. Moreover, even if amicus is correct that "some courts and jurisdictions at least [can]not bear" the costs of the rule we confirm today, Fried Brief 23, those States need not abandon probation or equivalent measures as viable forms of punishment. *671 Although they may not attach probation to an imposed and suspended prison sentence, States unable or unwilling routinely to provide appointed counsel to misdemeanants in Shelton's situation are not without recourse to another option capable of yielding a similar result. That option is pretrial probation, employed in some form by at least 23 States. See App. to Reply Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 1a2a (collecting state statutes). Under such an arrangement, the prosecutor and defendant agree to the defendant's participation in a pretrial rehabilitation program,[11] which includes conditions typical of post-trial probation. The adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence for the underlying offense then occur only if and when the defendant breaches those conditions. ; see, e. g., |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | when the defendant breaches those conditions. ; see, e. g., -56e ; Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 310-320, 316 (2002) ("The conditions of the [pretrial rehabilitation] program may be such as may be imposed with respect to probation after conviction of a crime."); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law 170.55(3) (pretrial "adjournment in contemplation of dismissal" may require defendant "to observe certain specified conditions of conduct").[12] Like the regime urged by amicus, this system reserves the appointed-counsel requirement for the "small percentage" *672 of cases in which incarceration proves necessary, Fried Brief thus allowing a State to "supervise a course of rehabilitation" without providing a lawyer every time it wishes to pursue such a course, Unlike amicus ` position, however, pretrial probation also respects the constitutional imperative that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at his trial," 407 U. S., C Alabama concedes that activation of a suspended sentence results in the imprisonment of an uncounseled defendant "for a term that relates to the original offense" and therefore "crosses the line of `actual imprisonment' " established in and Scott. Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 8. Shelton cannot be imprisoned, Alabama thus acknowledges, "unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense," Scott, 440 U. S.,4; see Reply Brief 9. Alabama maintains, however, that there is no constitutional barrier to imposition of a suspended sentence that can never be enforced; the State therefore urges reversal of the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment insofar as it vacated the term of probation Shelton was ordered to serve. In effect, Alabama invites us to regard two years' probation for Shelton as a separate and independent sentence, which "the State would have the same power to enforce [as] a judgment of a mere fine." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Scott, Alabama emphasizes, squarely held that a fine-only sentence does not trigger a right to court-appointed counsel, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6; similarly, Alabama maintains, probation uncoupled from a prison sentence should trigger no immediate right to appointed counsel. Seen as a freestanding sentence, Alabama further asserts, probation could be enforced, as a criminal fine or restitution order could, in a contempt proceeding. *673 See Reply Brief 11-12; Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 10-13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Alabama describes the contempt proceeding it envisions as one in which Shelton would receive "the full panoply of due process," including the assistance of counsel. Reply Brief 12. Any sanction imposed would be for "postconviction wrongdoing," not for the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,002 | 5 | majority | Alabama v. Shelton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118507/alabama-v-shelton/ | sanction imposed would be for "postconviction wrongdoing," not for the offense of conviction. Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae Professor Charles Fried 11. "The maximum penalty faced would be a $100 fine and five days' imprisonment," Reply Brief 12 (citing Ala. Code 12 11-30(5) ), not the 30 days ordered and suspended by the Alabama Circuit Court, see There is not so much as a hint, however, in the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, that Shelton's probation term is separable from the prison term to which it was tethered. Absent any prior presentation of the position the State now takes,[13] we resist passing on it in the first instance. Our resistance to acting as a court of first view instead of one of review is heightened by the Alabama Attorney General's acknowledgment at oral argument that he did not know of any State that imposes, postconviction, on a par with a fine, a term of probation unattached to a suspended sentence. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. The novelty of the State's current position is further marked by the unqualified statement in Alabama's opening brief that, "[b]y reversing Shelton's suspended sentence, the [Supreme Court of Alabama] correspondingly vacated the two-year probationary term." Brief for Petitioner 6. *674 In short, Alabama has developed its position late in this litigation and before the wrong forum. It is for the Alabama Supreme Court to consider before this Court does whether the suspended sentence alone is invalid, leaving Shelton's probation term freestanding and independently effective. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 4 U.S. 482, We confine our review to the ruling the Alabama Supreme Court made in the case as presented to it: "[A] defendant who receives a suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to counsel." App. 40 ; see Brief for Petitioner 6. We find no infirmity in that holding. * * * Satisfied that Shelton is entitled to appointed counsel at the critical stage when his guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decided and his vulnerability to imprisonment is determined, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama. It is so ordered. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | The underlying dispute in this case concerns where housing for low-income persons should be constructed in Dallas, Texas—that is, whether the housing should be built in the inner city or in the suburbs. This dispute comes to the Court on a disparate-impact theory of liabil- ity. In contrast to a disparate-treatment case, where a “plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discrim- inatory intent or motive,” a plaintiff bringing a disparate- impact claim challenges practices that have a “dispropor- tionately adverse effect on minorities” and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale. (internal quotation marks omit- ted). The question presented for the Court’s determina- tion is whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (or FHA), as amended, 42 U.S. C. et seq. I A Before turning to the question presented, it is necessary 2 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court to discuss a different federal statute that gives rise to this dispute. The Federal Government provides low-income housing tax credits that are distributed to developers through designated state agencies. 26 U.S. C. Con- gress has directed States to develop plans identifying selection criteria for distributing the credits. Those plans must include certain criteria, such as public housing waiting lists, as well as certain preferences, including that low-income housing units “contribut[e] to a concerted community revitalization plan” and be built in census tracts populated predominantly by low-income residents. 42(d)(5)(ii)(I). Federal law thus favors the distribution of these tax cred- its for the development of housing units in low-income areas. In the State of Texas these federal credits are distrib- uted by the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (Department). Under Texas law, a developer’s application for the tax credits is scored under a point system that gives priority to statutory criteria, such as the financial feasibility of the development project and the income level of tenants. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. (West 2008). The Texas Attorney General has interpreted state law to permit the considera- tion of additional criteria, such as whether the housing units will be built in a neighborhood with good schools. Those criteria cannot be awarded more points than statu- torily mandated criteria. Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. GA– 0208, pp. 2–6 (2004), *4–*6. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP), is a Texas-based nonprofit corporation that assists low-income families in obtaining affordable housing. In 2008, the ICP brought this suit against the Department and its officers in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis- trict of Texas. As relevant here, it brought |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | Northern Dis- trict of Texas. As relevant here, it brought a disparate- impact claim under and 805(a) of the FHA. The Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segre- gated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in pre- dominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The ICP contended that the Department must modify its selection criteria in order to encourage the construction of low- income housing in suburban communities. The District Court concluded that the ICP had estab- lished a prima facie case of disparate impact. It relied on two pieces of statistical evidence. First, it found “from 1999–2008, [the Department] approved tax credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to 9.9% Cauca- sian areas, but only approved 37.4% of proposed non- elderly units in 90% to 100% Caucasian areas.” 749 F. Supp. 2d 6, 499 (footnote omitted). Second, it found “92.29% of [low-income housing tax credit] units in the city of Dallas were located in census tracts with less than 50% Caucasian residents.” The District Court then placed the burden on the De- partment to rebut the ICP’s prima facie showing of dis- parate impact. After assuming the Department’s proffered interests were legitimate, the District Court held that a de- fendant—here the Department—must prove “that there are no other less discriminatory alternatives to advancing their proffered interests,” Because, in its view, the Department “failed to meet [its] burden of proving that there are no less discriminatory alternatives,” the District Court ruled for the ICP. The District Court’s remedial order required the addi- tion of new selection criteria for the tax credits. For in- stance, it awarded points for units built in neighborhoods with good schools and disqualified sites that are located adjacent to or near hazardous conditions, such as high crime areas or landfills. See WL 301 The remedial order contained no explicit racial targets or quotas. While the Department’s appeal was pending, the Secre- tary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a regulation interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate- impact liability. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, (2013). The regulation also established a burden-shifting framework for adjudicating disparate-impact claims. Under the regulation, a plaintiff first must make a prima facie showing of disparate impact. That is, the plaintiff “has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” (c)(1) If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | (c)(1) If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no liability. After a plaintiff does establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prov[e] that the challenged practice is neces- sary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, non- discriminatory interests.” HUD has clari- fied that this step of the analysis “is analogous to the Title VII requirement that an employer’s interest in an em- ployment practice with a disparate impact be job related.” Once a defendant has satisfied its burden at step two, a plaintiff may “prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory inter- ests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, con- sistent with its precedent, that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. On the merits, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Relying on HUD’s regulation, the Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the District Court to Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court have placed the burden on the Department to prove there were no less discriminatory alternatives for allocating low- income housing tax credits. at 282–283. In a concur- ring opinion, Judge Jones stated that on remand the District Court should reexamine whether the ICP had made out a prima facie case of disparate impact. She suggested the District Court incorrectly relied on bare statistical evidence without engaging in any analysis about causation. She further observed that, if the fed- eral law providing for the distribution of low-income hous- ing tax credits ties the Department’s hands to such an extent that it lacks a meaningful choice, then there is no disparate-impact liability. See at 283–284 (specially concurring opinion). The Department filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on the question whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The question was one of first impression, see and certiorari followed, 573 U. S. It is now appropriate to provide a brief history of the FHA’s enactment and its later amendment. B De jure residential segregation by race was declared unconstitutional almost a century ago, but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the country’s economic and social life. Some segregated housing patterns can be traced to condi- tions that arose in the mid-20th century. Rapid urbaniza- tion, concomitant with the rise of suburban developments accessible by car, led many white families to leave the inner |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | by car, led many white families to leave the inner cities. This often left minority families concentrated in the center of the Nation’s cities. During this time, various practices were followed, sometimes with govern- mental support, to encourage and maintain the separation 6 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court of the races: Racially restrictive covenants prevented the conveyance of property to minorities, see ; steering by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider homes in racially homogenous areas; and discriminatory lending practices, often referred to as redlining, precluded minority families from purchas- ing homes in affluent areas. See, e.g., M. Klarman, Unfin- ished Business: Racial Equality in American History 140– 141 ; Brief for Housing Scholars as Amici Curiae 22–23. By the 1960’s, these policies, practices, and preju- dices had created many predominantly black inner cities surrounded by mostly white suburbs. See K. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power 11, 21–26 (1965). The mid-1960’s was a period of considerable social un- rest; and, in response, President Lyndon Johnson estab- lished the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor- ders, commonly known as the Kerner Commission. Exec. Order No. 11365, 3 CFR 674 (1966–1970 Comp.). After extensive factfinding the Commission identified residen- tial segregation and unequal housing and economic condi- tions in the inner cities as significant, underlying causes of the social unrest. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 91 (1968) (Kerner Com- mission Report). The Commission found that “[n]early two-thirds of all nonwhite families living in the central cities today live in neighborhoods marked by substandard housing and general urban blight.” The Com- mission further found that both open and covert racial discrimination prevented black families from obtaining better housing and moving to integrated communities. The Commission concluded that “[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white— separate and unequal.” To reverse “[t]his deep- ening racial division,” ib it recommended enactment of “a comprehensive and enforceable open-occupancy law making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court any housing on the basis of race, creed, color, or na- tional origin.” In April 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassi- nated in Memphis, Tennessee, and the Nation faced a new urgency to resolve the social unrest in the inner cities. Congress responded by adopting the Kerner Commission’s recommendation and passing the Fair Housing Act. The statute addressed the denial of housing opportunities on the basis of “race, color, religion, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | of housing opportunities on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin.” Civil Rights Act of 1968, Then, in Congress amended the FHA. Among other provisions, it created certain exemptions from liability and added “fa- milial status” as a protected characteristic. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of II The issue here is whether, under a proper interpretation of the FHA, housing decisions with a disparate impact are prohibited. Before turning to the FHA, however, it is necessary to consider two other antidiscrimination stat- utes that preceded it. The first relevant statute is of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Court ad- dressed the concept of disparate impact under this statute in There, the employer had a policy requiring its manual laborers to possess a high school diploma and to obtain satisfactory scores on two intelligence tests. The Court of Appeals held the employer had not adopted these job requirements for a racially discriminatory purpose, and the plaintiffs did not challenge that holding in this Court. Instead, the plain- tiffs argued (2) covers the discriminatory effect of a practice as well as the motivation behind the practice. Section 703(a), as amended, provides as follows: “It shall be an unlawful employer practice for an employer— 8 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi- vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi- vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi- tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or “(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ- ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S. C. The Court did not quote or cite the full statute, but rather relied solely on (2). n. 1. In interpreting (2), the Court reasoned that disparate-impact liability furthered the purpose and de- sign of the statute. The Court explained that, in (2), Congress “proscribe[d] not only overt discrimi- nation but also practices that are fair in form, but discrim- inatory in operation.” For that reason, as the Court noted, “Congress directed the thrust of [(2)] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.” In light of the statute’s goal of achieving “equality of employment opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past” to favor some |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | barriers that have operated in the past” to favor some races over others, the Court held (2) of Title VII must be interpreted to allow disparate-impact claims. at 429–430. The Court put important limits on its holding: namely, not all employment practices causing a disparate impact impose liability under (2). In this respect, the Court held that “business necessity” constitutes a defense to disparate-impact claims. This rule pro- vides, for example, that in a disparate-impact case, Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 9 Opinion of the Court (2) does not prohibit hiring criteria with a “mani- fest relationship” to job performance. ; see also –589 (emphasizing the importance of the business necessity defense to disparate-impact liability). On the facts before it, the Court in found a violation of Title VII because the employer could not establish that high school diplomas and general intelli- gence tests were related to the job performance of its manual laborers. See 401 U.S., –432. The second relevant statute that bears on the proper interpretation of the FHA is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), et seq., as amended. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides: “It shall be unlawful for an employer— “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi- vidual or otherwise discriminate against any individ- ual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi- tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; “(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or “(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in or- der to comply with this chapter.” 29 U.S. C. The Court first addressed whether this provision allows disparate-impact claims in v. City of son, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). There, a group of older employees chal- lenged their employer’s decision to give proportionately greater raises to employees with less than five years of experience. Explaining that “represented the better reading of [Title VII’s] statutory text,” a plurality of the Court concluded that the same reasoning pertained 10 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court to of the ADEA. The plurality emphasized that both (2) of Title VII and of the ADEA contain language “prohibit[ing] such actions that ‘deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s’ race or age.” As the plural- ity observed, the text of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | or age.” As the plural- ity observed, the text of these provisions “focuses on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the moti- vation for the action of the employer” and therefore com- pels recognition of disparate-impact liability. In a separate opinion, JUSTICE SCALIA found the ADEA’s text ambiguous and thus deferred under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to an Equal Employment Opportunity Com- mission regulation interpreting the ADEA to impose disparate-impact liability, see –247 (opin- ion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Together, holds and the plurality in in- structs that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose. These cases also teach that disparate- impact liability must be limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make the practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system. And before rejecting a business justification—or, in the case of a governmental entity, an analogous public interest—a court must deter- mine that a plaintiff has shown that there is “an available alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.” at 578. The cases interpreting Title VII and the ADEA pro- vide essential background and instruction in the case now before the Court. Turning to the FHA, the ICP relies on two provisions. Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 11 Opinion of the Court Section 804(a) provides that it shall be unlawful: “To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S. C. Here, the phrase “otherwise make unavailable” is of cen- tral importance to the analysis that follows. Section 805(a), in turn, provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in real estate- related transactions to discriminate against any per- son in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” Applied here, the logic of and provides strong support for the conclusion that the FHA encom- passes disparate-impact claims. Congress’ use of the phrase “otherwise make unavailable” refers to the conse- quences of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | phrase “otherwise make unavailable” refers to the conse- quences of an action rather than the actor’s intent. See United (explaining that the “word ‘make’ has many meanings, among them ‘[t]o cause to exist, appear or occur’ ” (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 15 (2d ed. 1934))). This results-oriented language counsels in favor of recognizing disparate-impact liability. See The Court has construed statutory language similar to to include disparate-impact liability. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 140–141 (1979) (holding the term “discriminat[e]” encompassed disparate-impact liability in the context of a statute’s text, history, purpose, and structure). 12 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court A comparison to the antidiscrimination statutes exam- ined in and is useful. Title VII’s and the ADEA’s “otherwise adversely affect” language is equiva- lent in function and purpose to the FHA’s “otherwise make unavailable” language. In these three statutes the opera- tive text looks to results. The relevant statutory phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes: Located at the end of lengthy sen- tences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treat- ment, they serve as catchall phrases looking to conse- quences, not intent. And all three statutes use the word “otherwise” to introduce the results-oriented phrase. “Otherwise” means “in a different way or manner,” thus signaling a shift in emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions. Webster’s Third New Inter- national Dictionary 1598 This similarity in text and structure is all the more compelling given that Con- gress passed the FHA in 1968—only four years after pass- ing Title VII and only four months after enacting the ADEA. It is true that Congress did not reiterate Title VII’s exact language in the FHA, but that is because to do so would have made the relevant sentence awkward and unclear. A provision making it unlawful to “refuse to sell[,] or otherwise [adversely affect], a dwelling to any person” because of a protected trait would be grammatically obtuse, difficult to interpret, and far more expansive in scope than Congress likely intended. Congress thus chose words that serve the same purpose and bear the same basic meaning but are consistent with the structure and objectives of the FHA. Emphasizing that the FHA uses the phrase “because of race,” the Department argues this language forecloses disparate-impact liability since “[a]n action is not taken ‘because of race’ unless race is a reason for the action.” Brief for Petitioners 26. and however, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | reason for the action.” Brief for Petitioners 26. and however, Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 13 Opinion of the Court dispose of this argument. Both Title VII and the ADEA contain identical “because of ” language, see 42 U.S. C. 29 U.S. C. and the Court nonetheless held those statutes impose disparate-impact liability. In addition, it is of crucial importance that the existence of disparate-impact liability is supported by amendments to the FHA that Congress enacted in By that time, all nine Courts of Appeals to have addressed the question had concluded the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate- impact claims. See Branch, NAACP v. ; Resident Advisory ; v. Clarkton, ; Han- (CA5 1986); –575 (CA6 1986); Metropolitan Housing Development ; United 1184–1185 (CA8 1974); ; United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559, n. 20 (CA11 1984). When it amended the FHA, Congress was aware of this unanimous precedent. And with that understanding, it made a considered judgment to retain the relevant statu- tory text. See H. R. Rep. No. 100–711, p. 21, n. 52 (H. R. Rep.) (discussing suits premised on disparate- impact claims and related judicial precedent); 134 Cong. Rec. 23711 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting unanimity of Federal Courts of Appeals concerning dis- parate impact); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 558 before the Subcommittee on the Con- stitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 529 (1987) (testimony of Professor Robert Schwemm) (describing consensus judicial view that the FHA imposed disparate-impact liability). Indeed, Con- 14 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court gress rejected a proposed amendment that would have eliminated disparate-impact liability for certain zoning decisions. See H. R. Rep., at 89–93. Against this background understanding in the legal and regulatory system, Congress’ decision in to amend the FHA while still adhering to the operative language in and 805(a) is convincing support for the conclu- sion that Congress accepted and ratified the unanimous holdings of the Courts of Appeals finding disparate-impact liability. “If a word or phrase has been given a uni- form interpretation by inferior courts a later version of that act perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 ; see also Forest Grove School Dist. v. T. A., 557 U.S. 230, 244, n. 11 (“When Congress amended [the Act] without altering the text of [the relevant provision], it implicitly adopted [this Court’s] construction of the stat- ute”); |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | it implicitly adopted [this Court’s] construction of the stat- ute”); Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320, 336 (1934) (explaining, where the Courts of Appeals had reached a consensus interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act and Congress had amended the Act with- out changing the relevant provision, “[t]his is persua- sive that the construction adopted by the [lower federal] courts has been acceptable to the legislative arm of the government”). Further and convincing confirmation of Congress’ un- derstanding that disparate-impact liability exists under the FHA is revealed by the substance of the amend- ments. The amendments included three exemptions from liability that assume the existence of disparate-impact claims. The most logical conclusion is that the three amendments were deemed necessary because Congress presupposed disparate impact under the FHA as it had been enacted in 1968. The relevant amendments were as follows. First, Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 15 Opinion of the Court Congress added a clarifying provision: “Nothing in [the FHA] prohibits a person engaged in the business of fur- nishing appraisals of real property to take into considera- tion factors other than race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or familial status.” 42 U.S. C. Second, Congress provided: “Nothing in [the FHA] prohib- its conduct against a person because such person has been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled sub- stance.” And finally, Congress specified: “Nothing in [the FHA] limits the applicability of any rea- sonable restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.” The exemptions embodied in these amendments would be superfluous if Congress had assumed that disparate- impact liability did not exist under the FHA. See Gus- (“[T]he Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant”). Indeed, none of these amend- ments would make sense if the FHA encompassed only disparate-treatment claims. If that were the sole ground for liability, the amendments merely restate black-letter law. If an actor makes a decision based on reasons other than a protected category, there is no disparate-treatment liability. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 2, But the amendments do constrain disparate-impact liability. For instance, certain criminal convictions are correlated with sex and race. See, e.g., 98 (discussing the racial disparity in convictions for crack cocaine offenses). By adding an exemption from liability for exclusionary practices aimed at individuals with drug convictions, Congress ensured disparate-impact liability would not lie if a landlord excluded tenants with such convictions. The same is true of the provision allow- ing |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | convictions. The same is true of the provision allow- ing for reasonable restrictions on occupancy. And the 16 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court exemption from liability for real-estate appraisers is in the same section as ’s prohibition of discriminatory practices in real-estate transactions, thus indicating Con- gress’ recognition that disparate-impact liability arose under In short, the amendments signal that Congress ratified disparate-impact liability. A comparison to ’s discussion of the ADEA further demonstrates why the Department’s interpretation would render the amendments superfluous. Under the ADEA’s reasonable-factor-other-than-age (RFOA) provi- sion, an employer is permitted to take an otherwise pro- hibited action where “the differentiation is based on rea- sonable factors other than age.” 29 U.S. C. )(1). In other words, if an employer makes a decision based on a reasonable factor other than age, it cannot be said to have made a decision on the basis of an employee’s age. Accord- ing to the plurality, the RFOA provision “plays its principal role” “in cases involving disparate-impact claims” “by precluding liability if the adverse impact was attribut- able to a nonage factor that was ‘reasonable.’ ” 544 U.S., at 239. The plurality thus reasoned that the RFOA provi- sion would be “simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA” if liability were limited to disparate-treatment claims. A similar logic applies here. If a real-estate appraiser took into account a neighborhood’s schools, one could not say the appraiser acted because of race. And by embed- ding 42 U.S. C. exemption in the statutory text, Congress ensured that disparate-impact liability would not be allowed either. Indeed, the inference of disparate- impact liability is even stronger here than it was in As originally enacted, the ADEA included the RFOA pro- vision, see whereas here Congress added the relevant exemptions in the amendments against the backdrop of the uniform view of the Courts of Appeals that the FHA imposed disparate-impact liability. Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 17 Opinion of the Court Recognition of disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA’s central purpose. See ; 401 U.S., The FHA, like Title VII and the ADEA, was enacted to eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s economy. See 42 U.S. C. (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States”); H. R. Rep., 5 (explaining the FHA “provides a clear national policy against discrimination in housing”). These unlawful practices include zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any suffi- cient justification. Suits targeting such practices reside at the heartland of disparate-impact liability. See, e.g., 8 U.S., 6–18 (invalidating zoning law preventing construction of multifamily rental units); Black 508 F.2d, 182–1188 (invalidating ordinance prohibiting construction of new multifamily dwellings); Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action –578 (invalidating post-Hurricane Katrina ordinance restricting the rental of housing units to only “ ‘blood relative[s]’ ” in an area of the city that was 88.3% white and 7.6% black); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53 (discuss- ing these cases). The availability of disparate-impact liability, furthermore, has allowed private developers to vindicate the FHA’s objectives and to protect their prop- erty rights by stopping municipalities from enforcing arbi- trary and, in practice, discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types of housing units. See, e.g., 8. Recognition of disparate- impact liability under the FHA also plays a role in uncov- ering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to coun- teract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment. In this 18 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court way disparate-impact liability may prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping. But disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity. Disparate-impact liability man- dates the “removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,” not the displacement of valid governmental policies. The FHA is not an in- strument to force housing authorities to reorder their priorities. Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation. Unlike the heartland of disparate-impact suits targeting artificial barriers to housing, the underlying dispute in this case involves a novel theory of liability. See Seicsh- naydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 357, 360–363 (2013) (noting the rarity of this type of claim). This case, on remand, may be seen simply as an attempt to second-guess which of two reasonable ap- proaches a housing authority should follow in the sound exercise of its discretion in allocating tax credits for low- income housing. An important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited is to give housing |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | that disparate-impact liability is properly limited is to give housing authorities and private developers leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by their policies. This step of the analysis is analogous to the business necessity standard under Title VII and provides a defense against disparate-impact liability. See (explaining that HUD did not use the phrase “business necessity” because that “phrase may not be easily under- Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 19 Opinion of the Court stood to cover the full scope of practices covered by the Fair Housing Act, which applies to individuals, busi- nesses, nonprofit organizations, and public entities”). As the Court explained in an entity “could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the [challenged practices] were not job related and consistent with busi- ness necessity.” Just as an employer may maintain a workplace requirement that causes a disparate impact if that requirement is a “reasonable measure[ment] of job performance,” so too must housing authorities and private developers be allowed to maintain a policy if they can prove it is neces- sary to achieve a valid interest. To be sure, the Title VII framework may not transfer exactly to the fair-housing context, but the comparison suffices for present purposes. It would be paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs on actors who encourage revitalizing dilapi- dated housing in our Nation’s cities merely because some other priority might seem preferable. Entrepreneurs must be given latitude to consider market factors. Zoning offi- cials, moreover, must often make decisions based on a mix of factors, both objective (such as cost and traffic patterns) and, at least to some extent, subjective (such as preserving historic architecture). These factors contribute to a com- munity’s quality of life and are legitimate concerns for housing authorities. The FHA does not decree a particular vision of urban development; and it does not put housing authorities and private developers in a double bind of liability, subject to suit whether they choose to rejuvenate a city core or to promote new low-income housing in sub- urban communities. As HUD itself recognized in its re- cent rulemaking, disparate-impact liability “does not mandate that affordable housing be located in neighbor- hoods with any particular characteristic.” 78 Fed. Reg. 11476. In a similar vein, a disparate-impact claim that relies on 20 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity. A robust causality requirement ensures that “[r]acial imbalance does not, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | A robust causality requirement ensures that “[r]acial imbalance does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact” and thus protects defend- ants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S. C. Without adequate safeguards at the prima facie stage, disparate-impact liability might cause race to be used and considered in a pervasive way and “would almost inexorably lead” governmental or private entities to use “numerical quotas,” and serious constitutional questions then could The litigation at issue here provides an example. From the standpoint of determining advantage or disadvantage to racial minorities, it seems difficult to say as a general matter that a decision to build low-income housing in a blighted inner-city neighborhood instead of a suburb is discriminatory, or vice versa. If those sorts of judgments are subject to challenge without adequate safeguards, then there is a danger that potential defendants may adopt racial quotas—a circumstance that itself raises serious constitutional concerns. Courts must therefore examine with care whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact and prompt resolution of these cases is important. A plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal con- nection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. For instance, a plaintiff challenging the decision of a private developer to construct a new building in one location rather than another will not easily be able to show this is a policy causing a disparate impact because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at all. It may also be difficult to establish causation because of the mul- Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 21 Opinion of the Court tiple factors that go into investment decisions about where to construct or renovate housing units. And as Judge Jones observed below, if the ICP cannot show a causal connection between the Department’s policy and a dispar- ate impact—for instance, because federal law substantially limits the Department’s discretion—that should result in dismissal of this –284 (specially concurring opinion). The FHA imposes a command with respect to disparate- impact liability. Here, that command goes to a state entity. In other cases, the command will go to a private person or entity. Governmental or private policies are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” 401 U.S., Difficult questions might arise if disparate-impact liability under the FHA caused race to be used |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | disparate-impact liability under the FHA caused race to be used and considered in a pervasive and explicit manner to justify governmental or private actions that, in fact, tend to perpetuate race-based considerations rather than move beyond them. Courts should avoid interpreting disparate- impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial con- siderations into every housing decision. The limitations on disparate-impact liability discussed here are also necessary to protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims. If the specter of disparate-impact litigation causes private developers to no longer construct or renovate housing units for low-income individuals, then the FHA would have undermined its own purpose as well as the free-market system. And as to governmental entities, they must not be prevented from achieving legitimate objectives, such as ensuring compli- ance with health and safety codes. The Department’s amici, in addition to the well-stated principal dissenting opinion in this case, see post, –2, 29–30 (opinion of ALITO, J.), call attention to the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Gallagher v. Magner, 22 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court Although the Court is reluctant to approve or disapprove a case that is not pending, it should be noted that Magner was decided without the cautionary standards announced in this opinion and, in all events, the case was settled by the parties before an ultimate deter- mination of disparate-impact liability. Were standards for proceeding with disparate-impact suits not to incorporate at least the safeguards discussed here, then disparate-impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely “remov[ing] artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” 401 U.S., And that, in turn, would set our Nation back in its quest to reduce the sali- ence of race in our social and economic system. It must be noted further that, even when courts do find liability under a disparate-impact theory, their remedial orders must be consistent with the Constitution. Remedial orders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice that “arbitrar[ily] operate[s] invidiously to discriminate on the basis of rac[e].” If additional measures are adopted, courts should strive to design them to eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral means. See 8 U.S. 469, (“[T]he city has at its disposal a whole array of race- neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city con- tracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races”). Remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise more difficult constitutional questions. While the automatic or pervasive injection of race into public and private |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | automatic or pervasive injection of race into public and private transactions covered by the FHA has special dangers, it is also true that race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion. Cf. Parents in Community (KENNEDY, J., con- curring in part and concurring in judgment) (“School Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 23 Opinion of the Court boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; [and] drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods”). Just as this Court has not “question[ed] an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the [promotion] process,” it likewise does not impugn hous- ing authorities’ race-neutral efforts to encourage revitali- zation of communities that have long suffered the harsh consequences of segregated housing patterns. When setting their larger goals, local housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools, and mere awareness of race in attempt- ing to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at the outset. The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are cog- nizable under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language, the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims in against the backdrop of the unanimous view of nine Courts of Appeals, and the statutory purpose. III In light of the longstanding judicial interpretation of the FHA to encompass disparate-impact claims and congres- sional reaffirmation of that result, residents and policy- makers have come to rely on the availability of disparate- impact claims. See Brief for Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (“Without disparate impact claims, States and others will be left with fewer crucial tools to combat the kinds of systemic discrimination that the FHA was in- tended to address”). Indeed, many of our Nation’s largest cities—entities that are potential defendants in disparate- 24 TEXAS DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC. Opinion of the Court impact suits—have submitted an amicus brief in this case supporting disparate-impact liability under the FHA. See Brief for City of San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae 3–6. The existence of disparate-impact liability in the substan- tial majority of the Courts of Appeals for the last several decades “has not given rise to dire consequences.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. (slip op., at 21). Much progress remains |
Justice Kennedy | 2,015 | 4 | majority | Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959750/texas-dept-of-housing-and-community-affairs-v-inclusive-communities/ | 565 U. S. (slip op., at 21). Much progress remains to be made in our Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation. In striving to achieve our “historic commitment to creating an integrated society,” Parents (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), we must remain wary of policies that reduce homeowners to noth- ing more than their race. But since the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and against the backdrop of disparate-impact liability in nearly every jurisdiction, many cities have become more diverse. The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner Commis- sion’s grim prophecy that “[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and un- equal.” Kerner Commission Report 1. The Court acknowl- edges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 576 U. S. (2015) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–1371 TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMU- NITY AFFAIRS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. THE IN- CLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC., ET AL. |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108425/diffenderfer-v-central-baptist-church-of-miami-inc/ | This is an action for a declaratory judgment that Florida Stat. 192.06 (4) (1967) violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States *413 insofar as it authorizes a tax exemption for church property used, inter alia, as a commercial parking lot, and for an injunction requiring appropriate state and local officials to assess and collect taxes against such property. It is brought by citizens and taxpayers of Dade County, Florida, where the property in question is located. The crux of their complaint is that state aid in the form of a tax exemption for church property used primarily for commercial purposes amounts not only to an establishment of the one religion aided, but also to an inhibition on the free exercise of other religions. A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2281, 2284, upheld the validity of the statute as applied to the property involved herein, and plaintiffs appealed to this Court. 28 U.S. C. 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction on March 1, 1971. The Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., is the owner of nearly a full square block of land in downtown Miami which is occupied by church buildings and an offstreet parking lot. The parking facilities are utilized by numerous persons pursuing a variety of church activities. These facilities are also used as a commercial parking lot every day except Sunday. At the time this suit was instituted and decided in the District Court, Fla. Stat. 192.06 (4) provided for exemption from taxation of: "All houses of public worship and lots on which they are situated, and all pews or steps and furniture therein, every parsonage and all burying grounds not owned or held by individuals or corporations for speculative purposes, tombs and right of burial" Prior to the decision of the District Court, the Florida Supreme Court had held, in a case involving the same property as is involved here, that church parking lots *414 retain their full tax exemption under state law even though they may be used for commercial as well as church purposes. Central Baptist This led to the constitutional challenge in the District Court. At its 1971 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature repealed 196.191 (the 1969 successor to 192.06) and enacted new legislation, approved June 15, 1971, effective December 31, 1971, which provides, in relevant part, that church property is exempt from taxation only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes and only "to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the non-exempt use." Fla. Stat. 196.192 (2). We |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108425/diffenderfer-v-central-baptist-church-of-miami-inc/ | bears to the non-exempt use." Fla. Stat. 196.192 (2). We must review the judgment of the District Court in light of Florida law as it now stands, not as it stood when the judgment below was entered. ; United ; cf. ; It is clear that the church parking lot that was the subject of the taxpayers' complaint is no longer fully exempt from taxation. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that the lot is predominantly used for nonreligious purposes, it will receive no exemption whatever. "The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law." at This is not a case that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal nor is it the kind of case that may produce irreparable injury if not decided immediately, see, e. g., ; The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that *415 the now repealed Fla. Stat. 192.06 (4) is unconstitutional as applied to a church parking lot used for commercial purposes and an injunction against its application to said lot. This relief is, of course, inappropriate now that the statute has been repealed. Because it is possible that appellants may wish to amend their complaint so as to demonstrate that the repealed statute retains some continuing force or to attack the newly enacted legislation, rather than remanding the case to the District Court for dismissal as is our usual practice when a case has become moot pending a decision by this Court, United we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court with leave to the appellants to amend their pleadings. Judgment will be entered accordingly. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. |
Justice White | 1,976 | 6 | majority | Montanye v. Haymes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109511/montanye-v-haymes/ | On June 7, 1972, respondent Haymes was removed from his assignment as inmate clerk in the law library at the Attica Correctional Facility in the State of New York. That afternoon Haymes was observed circulating among other inmates a document prepared by him and at the time signed by 82 other prisoners. Among other things, each signatory complained that he had been deprived of legal assistance as the result of the removal of Haymes and another inmate from the prison law library.[1]*238 The document, which was addressed to a federal judge but sought no relief, was seized and held by prison authorities. On June 8, Haymes was advised that he would be transferred to Clinton Correctional Facility, which, like Attica, was a maximum-security institution. The transfer was effected the next day. No loss of good time, segregated confinement, loss of privileges, or any other disciplinary measures accompanied the transfer. On August 3, Haymes filed a petition with the United States District Court which was construed by the judge to be an application under 42 U.S. C. 1983 and 28 U.S. C. 1343 seeking relief against petitioner Montanye, the then Superintendent at Attica. The petition complained that the seizure and retention of the document, despite requests for its return, not only violated Administrative Bulletin No. 20, which allegedly made any communication to a court privileged and confidential, but also infringed Haymes' federally guaranteed right to petition the court for redress of grievances. It further asserted that Haymes' removal to Clinton was to prevent him from pursuing his remedies and also was in reprisal for his having rendered legal assistance to various prisoners as well as having, along with others, sought to petition the court for redress. In response to a show-cause order issued by the court, petitioner Brady, the correctional officer at Attica in charge of the law library, stated in an affidavit that Haymes had been relieved from his assignment as an inmate clerk in the law library "because of his continual disregard for the rules governing inmates and the use of the law library" and that only one of the inmates who had signed the petition being circulated by Haymes had ever made an official request for legal assistance. The affidavit of Harold Smith, Deputy Superintendent of Attica, furnished the court with Paragraph 21 of the *239 Inmate's Rule Book,[2] which prohibited an inmate from furnishing legal assistance to another inmate without official permission and with a copy of a bulletin board notice directing inmates with legal problems to present them to Officer Bradyinmates were in no circumstances to |
Justice White | 1,976 | 6 | majority | Montanye v. Haymes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109511/montanye-v-haymes/ | present them to Officer Bradyinmates were in no circumstances to set themselves up as legal counselors and receive pay for their services.[3] The affidavit asserted that the petition taken from Haymes was being circulated "in direct disregard of the above rule forbidding legal assistance except with the approval of the Superintendent" and that Haymes had been cautioned on several occasions about assisting other inmates without the required approval. Haymes responded by a motion to join Brady as a defendant, which was granted, and with a counteraffidavit denying that there was a rulebook at Attica, reasserting that the document seized was merely a letter to the court not within the scope of the claimed rule and alleging that his removal from the law library, the seizure of his petition, and his transfer to Clinton were acts of reprisal for his having attempted to furnish legal assistance to the other prisoners rather than merely hand out library books to them. *240 After retained counsel had submitted a memorandum on behalf of Haymes, the District Court dismissed the action. It held that the rule against giving legal assistance without consent was reasonable and that the seizure of Haymes' document was not in violation of the Constitution. The court also ruled that the transfer to Clinton did not violate Haymes' rights: "Although a general allegation is made that punishment was the motive for the transfer, there is no allegation that the facilities at [Clinton] are harsher or substantially different from those afforded to petitioner at Attica. Petitioner's transfer was consistent with the discretion given to prison officials in exercising proper custody of inmates." App. 26a. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Because the District Court had considered affidavits outside the pleadings, the dismissal was deemed to have been a summary judgment under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56. The judgment was ruled erroneous because there were two unresolved issues of material fact: whether Haymes' removal to Clinton was punishment for a disobedience of prison rules and if so whether the effects of the transfer were sufficiently burdensome to require a hearing under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court's legal theory was that Haymes should no more be punished by a transfer having harsh consequences than he should suffer other deprivations which under prison rules could not be imposed without following specified procedures. Disciplinary transfers, the Court of Appeals thought, were in a different category from "administrative" transfers. "When harsh treatment is meted out to reprimand, deter, or reform an individual, elementary fairness demands that the one punished be |
Justice White | 1,976 | 6 | majority | Montanye v. Haymes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109511/montanye-v-haymes/ | an individual, elementary fairness demands that the one punished be given a satisfactory opportunity to establish *241 that he is not deserving of such handling. [T]he specific facts upon which a decision to punish are predicated can most suitably be ascertained at an impartial hearing to review the evidence of the alleged misbehavior, and to assess the effect which transfer will have on the inmate's future incarceration." The Court of Appeals found it difficult "to look upon the circumstances of the transfer as a mere coincidence," ; it was also convinced that Haymes might be able to demonstrate sufficiently burdensome consequences attending the transfer to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause, even though Attica and Clinton were both maximum-security prisons.[4] The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings to the District *242 Court. We granted certiorari, and heard the case with Meachum v. Fano, ante, p. 215. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals did not hold, as did the Court of Appeals in Meachum v. Fano, that every disadvantageous transfer must be accompanied by appropriate hearings. Administrative transfers, although perhaps having very similar consequences for the prisoner, were exempt from the Court of Appeals ruling. Only disciplinary transfers having substantial adverse impact on the prisoner were to call for procedural formalities. Even so, our decision in Meachum requires a reversal in this case. We held in Meachum v. Fano, that no Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison to another within the State, whether with or without a hearing, absent some right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified events. We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeals' general proposition that the Due Process Clause by its own force requires hearings whenever prison authorities transfer a prisoner to another institution because of his breach of prison rules, at least where the transfer may be said to involve substantially burdensome consequences. As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight. The Clause does not require hearings in connection with transfers whether or not they are the result of the inmate's misbehavior or may be labeled as disciplinary or punitive. *243 We also agree with |
Justice White | 1,976 | 6 | majority | Montanye v. Haymes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109511/montanye-v-haymes/ | labeled as disciplinary or punitive. *243 We also agree with the State of New York that under the law of that State Haymes had no right to remain at any particular prison facility and no justifiable expectation that he would not be transferred unless found guilty of misconduct. Under New York law, adult persons sentenced to imprisonment are not sentenced to particular institutions, but are committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections. He receives adult, male felons at a maximum-security reception center for initial evaluation and then transfers them to specified institutions. N. Y. Correc. Law 71 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); 7 N.Y. C. R. R. 103.10. Thereafter, the Commissioner is empowered by statute to "transfer inmates from one correctional facility to another." N. Y. Correc. Law 23 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1975-1976). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because under the applicable state statutes and regulations, various specified punishments were reserved as sanctions for breach of prison rules and could not therefore be imposed without appropriate hearings, neither could the harsh consequences of a transfer be imposed as punishment for misconduct absent appropriate due process procedures. But under the New York law, the transfer of inmates is not conditional upon or limited to the occurrence of misconduct. The statute imposes no conditions on the discretionary power to transfer, and we are advised by the State that no such requirements have been promulgated. Transfers are not among the punishments which may be imposed only after a prison disciplinary hearing. 7 N.Y. C. R. R. 253.5. Whatever part an inmate's behavior may play in a decision to transfer, there is no more basis in New York law for invoking the protections of the Due Process Clause than we found to be the case under the Massachusetts law in the Meachum case. *244 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Zant v. Moore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112229/zant-v-moore/ | I would dismiss the petition for certiorari as having been improvidently granted, rather than vacate and remand the *837 case for reconsideration in the light of Teague v. Lane, ante, p. 288. The Court's discussion of retroactivity in Teague, to be sure, could have some bearing on the issues in this case. But petitioner did not raise nonretroactivity as a defense to respondent's claim for federal habeas relief, and that defense therefore should be deemed waived. In Teague, the Court did not consider the claim of nonretroactivity to have been waived. Instead, it addressed retroactivity as a threshold matter. But that approach was dictated by the posture of the case. The petitioner in Teague sought the announcement of a new rule of constitutional law to be applied for the first time in his case. It was this Court's judgment that no new rule of law should be announced in the first instance in a habeas case if similarly situated habeas petitioners could not benefit from that rule because of established principles of nonretroactivity. The present litigation is in a different posture in that respondent here did not seek the announcement of a new rule of constitutional law in his case in the first instance. I see no reason to give petitioner a second opportunity to interject the issue of nonretroactivity as a defense. In any event, I must assume that it is not the thrust of this Court's order to prejudge the availability of a retroactivity defense. That issue is for the Court of Appeals on remand. |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | In its opinion the majority assumes, without analysis, that the question presented by this case concerns the legality of a "vertical nonprice restraint." As I shall demonstrate, the restraint that results when one or more dealers threaten to boycott a manufacturer unless it terminates its relationship with a price-cutting retailer is more properly viewed as a "horizontal restraint." Moreover, an agreement to terminate a dealer because of its price cutting is most certainly not a "nonprice restraint." The distinction between "vertical nonprice restraints" and "vertical price restraints," on which the majority focuses its attention, is therefore quite irrelevant to the outcome of this case. Of much greater importance is the distinction between "naked restraints" and "ancillary restraints" that has been a part of our law since the landmark opinion written by Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft in United aff'd, I The plain language of 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every" contract that restrains trade.[1] Because such a literal reading of the statute would outlaw the entire body of private contract law, and because Congress plainly intended *737 the Act to be interpreted in the light of its common-law background, the Court has long held that certain "ancillary" restraints of trade may be defended as reasonable. As we recently explained without dissent: "The Rule of Reason suggested by Mitchel v. Reynolds [1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)] has been regarded as a standard for testing the enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade which are ancillary to a legitimate transaction, such as an employment contract or the sale of a going business. Judge (later Mr. Chief Justice) Taft so interpreted the Rule in his classic rejection of the argument that competitors may lawfully agree to sell their goods at the same price as long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable. United" National Society of Professional Judge Taft's rejection of an argument that a price-fixing agreement could be defended as reasonable was based on a detailed examination of common-law precedents. He explained that in England there had been two types of objection to voluntary restraints on one's ability to transact business. "One was that by such contracts a man disabled himself from earning a livelihood with the risk of becoming a public charge, and deprived the community of the benefit of his labor. The other was that such restraints tended to give to the covenantee, the beneficiary of such restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he had thus excluded one competitor, and by the same means might exclude others." Certain contracts, however, such as covenants not |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | might exclude others." Certain contracts, however, such as covenants not to compete in a particular business, for a certain period of time, within a defined geographical area, had always been considered reasonable when necessary to carry out otherwise procompetitive contracts, such as the sale of a business. The difference between ancillary covenants that *738 may be justified as reasonable and those that are "void" because there is "nothing to justify or excuse the restraint," was described in the opinion's seminal discussion: "[T]he contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted only to protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the execution of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer from the unrestrained competition of the other. The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such restraints may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the restraint exceeds the necessity presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void for two reasons: First, because it oppresses the covenantor, without any corresponding benefit to the covenantee; and, second, because it tends to a monopoly. But where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as expressed therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and therefore would be void. In such a case there is no measure of what is necessary to the protection of either party, except the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain competition. There is in such contracts no main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is permitted, and by which its reasonableness is measured, but the sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition which it has always been the policy of the common law to foster." Although Judge Taft was writing as a Circuit Judge, his opinion is universally accepted as authoritative. We affirmed *739 his decision without dissent, we have repeatedly cited it with approval,[2] and it is praised by a respected scholar as "one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in the history of the law." R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 26 In accordance with the teaching in that opinion, it is |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | In accordance with the teaching in that opinion, it is therefore appropriate to look more closely at the character of the restraint of trade found by the jury in this case. II It may be helpful to begin by explaining why the agreement in this case does not fit into certain categories of agreement that are frequently found in antitrust litigation. First, despite the contrary implications in the majority opinion, this is not a case in which the manufacturer is alleged to have imposed any vertical nonprice restraints on any of its dealers. The term "vertical nonprice restraint," as used in Continental T. V., and similar cases, refers to a contractual term that a dealer must accept in order to qualify for a franchise. Typically, the dealer must agree to meet certain standards in its advertising, promotion, product display, and provision of repair and maintenance services in order to protect the goodwill of the manufacturer's product. Sometimes a dealer must agree to sell only to certain classes of customers for example, wholesalers generally may only sell to retailers and may be required not to sell directly to consumers. In Sylvania, to take another example, we examined agreements between a manufacturer and its dealers that included "provisions barring the retailers from selling franchised products from locations other than those specified in agreements." Restrictions of that kind, which are a part of, or ancillary to, *740 the basic franchise agreement, are perfectly lawful unless the "rule of reason" is violated. Although vertical nonprice restraints may have some adverse effect on competition, as long as they serve the main purpose of a procompetitive distribution agreement, the ancillary restraints may be defended under the rule of reason. And, of course, a dealer who violates such a restraint may properly be terminated by the manufacturer.[3] In this case, it does not appear that respondent imposed any vertical nonprice restraints upon either petitioner or Hartwell. Specifically, respondent did not enter into any "exclusive" agreement, as did the defendant in Sylvania. It is true that before Hartwell was appointed and after petitioner was terminated, the manufacturer was represented by only one retailer in the Houston market, but there is no evidence that respondent ever made any contractual commitment to give either of them any exclusive rights. This therefore is not a case in which a manufacturer's right to grant exclusive territories, or to change the identity of the dealer in an established exclusive territory, is implicated. The case is one in which one of two competing dealers entered into an agreement with the manufacturer to terminate |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | dealers entered into an agreement with the manufacturer to terminate a particular competitor without making any promise to provide better or more efficient services and without receiving any guarantee of exclusivity in the future. The contractual relationship between respondent and Hartwell was exactly *741 the same after petitioner's termination as it had been before that termination. Second, this case does not involve a typical vertical price restraint. As the Court of Appeals noted, there is some evidence in the record that may support the conclusion that respondent and Hartwell implicitly agreed that Hartwell's prices would be maintained at a level somewhat higher than petitioner had been charging before petitioner was terminated. The illegality of the agreement found by the jury does not, however, depend on such evidence. For purposes of analysis, we should assume that no such agreement existed and that respondent was perfectly willing to allow its dealers to set prices at levels that would maximize their profits. That seems to have been the situation during the period when petitioner was the only dealer in Houston. Moreover, after respondent appointed Hartwell as its second dealer, it was Hartwell, rather than respondent, who objected to petitioner's pricing policies. Third, this is not a case in which the manufacturer acted independently. Indeed, given the jury's verdict, it is not even a case in which the termination can be explained as having been based on the violation of any distribution policy adopted by respondent. The termination was motivated by the ultimatum that respondent received from Hartwell and that ultimatum, in turn, was the culmination of Hartwell's complaints about petitioner's competitive price cutting. The termination was plainly the product of coercion by the stronger of two dealers rather than an attempt to maintain an orderly and efficient system of distribution.[4] *742 In sum, this case does not involve the reasonableness of any vertical restraint imposed on one or more dealers by a manufacturer in its basic franchise agreement. What the jury found was a simple and naked " `agreement between Sharp and Hartwell to terminate Business Electronics because of Business Electronics' price cutting.' " Ante, at 722. III Because naked agreements to restrain the trade of third parties are seldom identified with such stark clarity as in this case, there appears to be no exact precedent that determines the outcome here. There are, however, perfectly clear rules that would be decisive if the facts were changed only slightly. Thus, on the one hand, if it were clear that respondent had acted independently and decided to terminate petitioner because respondent, for reasons of its |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | decided to terminate petitioner because respondent, for reasons of its own, objected to petitioner's pricing policies, the termination would be lawful. See United On the other hand, it is equally clear that if respondent had been represented by three dealers in the Houston market instead of only two, and if two of them had threatened to terminate their dealerships "unless respondent ended its relationship with petitioner within 30 days," ante, at 721, an agreement to comply with the ultimatum would be an obvious violation of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., United ; Klor's,[5] The *743 question then is whether the two-party agreement involved in this case is more like an illegal three-party agreement or a legal independent decision. For me, the answer is plain. The distinction between independent action and joint action is fundamental in antitrust jurisprudence.[6] Any attempt *744 to define the boundaries of per se illegality by the number of parties to different agreements with the same anticompetitive consequences can only breed uncertainty in the law and confusion for the businessman. More importantly, if instead of speculating about irrelevant vertical nonprice restraints, we focus on the precise character of the agreement before us, we can readily identify its anticompetitive nature. Before the agreement was made, there was price competition in the Houston retail market for respondent's products. The stronger of the two competitors was unhappy about that competition; it wanted to have the power to set the price level in the market and therefore it "complained to respondent on a number of occasions about petitioner's prices." Ante, at 721. Quite obviously, if petitioner had agreed with either Hartwell or respondent to discontinue its competitive pricing, there would have been no ultimatum from Hartwell and no termination by respondent. It is equally obvious that either of those agreements would have been illegal per se.[7] Moreover, it is also reasonable to assume that if respondent were to replace petitioner with another price-cutting dealer, there would soon be more complaints and another ultimatum from Hartwell. Although respondent has not granted Hartwell an exclusive dealership it retains the right to appoint multiple dealers its *745 agreement has protected Hartwell from price competition. Indeed, given the jury's finding and the evidence in the record, that is the sole function of the agreement found by the jury in this case. It therefore fits squarely within the category of "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition." White Motor This is the sort of agreement that scholars readily characterize as "inherently suspect."[8] When a manufacturer responds to coercion from |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | as "inherently suspect."[8] When a manufacturer responds to coercion from a dealer, instead of making an independent decision to enforce a predetermined distribution policy, the anticompetitive character of the response is evident.[9] As Professor Areeda has correctly noted, the fact that the agreement is between only one complaining dealer and the manufacturer does not prevent it from imposing a "horizontal" restraint.[10] If two critical facts are present a *746 naked purpose to eliminate price competition as such and coercion of the manufacturer[11] the conflict with antitrust policy is manifest.[12] *747 Indeed, since the economic consequences of Hartwell's ultimatum to respondent are identical to those that would result from a comparable ultimatum by two of three dealers in a market and since a two-party price-fixing agreement is just as unlawful as a three-party price-fixing agreement it is appropriate to employ the term "boycott" to characterize this agreement. In my judgment the case is therefore controlled by our decision in United The majority disposes quickly of both General Motors and Klor's, by concluding that "both cases involved horizontal combinations." Ante, at 734. But this distinction plainly will *748 not suffice. In General Motors, a group of Chevrolet dealers conspired with General Motors to eliminate sales from the manufacturer to discounting dealers. We held that "[e]limination, by joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the market is a per se violation of the Act," and explained that "inherent in the success of the combination in this case was a substantial restraint upon price competition a goal unlawful per se when sought to be effected by combination or conspiracy." Precisely the same goal was sought and effected in this case the elimination of price competition at the dealer level. Moreover, the method of achieving that goal was precisely the same in both cases the manufacturer's refusal to sell to discounting dealers. The difference between the two cases is not a difference between horizontal and vertical agreements in both cases the critical agreement was between market actors at the retail level on the one hand and the manufacturer level on the other. Rather, the difference is simply a difference in the number of conspirators. Hartwell's coercion of respondent in order to eliminate petitioner because of its same-level price competition is not different in kind from the Chevrolet dealers' coercion of General Motors in order to eliminate other, price-cutting dealers; the only difference between the two cases one dealer seeking a naked price-based restraint in today's case, many dealers seeking the same end in General Motors |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | case, many dealers seeking the same end in General Motors is merely a difference in degree. Both boycotts lack any efficiency justification they are simply naked restraints on price competition, rather than integral, or ancillary, parts of the manufacturers' predetermined distribution policies. IV What is most troubling about the majority's opinion is its failure to attach any weight to the value of intrabrand competition. In Continental T. V., *749 we correctly held that a demonstrable benefit to interbrand competition will outweigh the harm to intrabrand competition that is caused by the imposition of vertical nonprice restrictions on dealers. But we also expressly reaffirmed earlier cases in which the illegal conspiracy affected only intrabrand competition.[13] Not a word in the Sylvania opinion implied that the elimination of intrabrand competition could be justified as reasonable without any evidence of a purpose to improve interbrand competition. In the case before us today, the relevant economic market was the sale at retail in the Houston area of calculators manufactured by respondent.[] There is no dispute that an agreement *750 to fix prices in that market, either horizontally between petitioner and Hartwell or vertically between respondent and either or both of the two dealers, would violate the Sherman Act. The "quite plausible" assumption, see ante, at 729, that such an agreement might enable the retailers to provide better services to their customers would not have avoided the strict rule against price fixing that this Court has consistently enforced in the past. *751 Under petitioner's theory of the case, an agreement between respondent and Hartwell to terminate petitioner because of its price cutting was just as indefensible as any of those price-fixing agreements. At trial the jury found the existence of such an agreement to eliminate petitioner's price competition. Respondent had denied that any agreement had been made and asked the jury to find that it had independently decided to terminate petitioner because of its poor sales performance,[15] but after hearing several days of testimony, the jury concluded that this defense was pretextual. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the majority questions the accuracy of the jury's resolution of the factual issues in this case. Nevertheless, the rule the majority fashions today is based largely on its concern that in other cases juries will be unable to tell the difference between truthful and pretextual defenses. Thus, it opines that "even a manufacturer that agrees with one dealer to terminate another for failure to provide contractually obligated services, exposes itself to the highly plausible claim that its real motivation was to terminate a price cutter." |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | that its real motivation was to terminate a price cutter." Ante, at 728. But such a "plausible" concern in a hypothetical case that is so different from this one should not be given greater weight than facts that can be established by hard evidence. If a dealer has, in fact, failed to provide contractually obligated services, and if the manufacturer has, in fact, terminated the dealer for that reason, both of those objective facts should be provable by admissible *752 evidence.[16] Both in its disposition of this case and in its attempt to justify a new approach to agreements to eliminate price competition, the majority exhibits little confidence in the judicial process as a means of ascertaining the truth.[17] *753 The majority fails to consider that manufacturers such as respondent will only be held liable in the rare case in which the following can be proved: First, the terminated dealer must overcome the high hurdle of Monsanto A terminated dealer must introduce "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently." Requiring judges to adhere to the strict test for agreement laid down in Monsanto, in their jury instructions or own findings of fact, goes a long way toward ensuring that many legitimate dealer termination decisions do not succumb improperly to antitrust liability.[18] Second, the terminated dealer must prove that the agreement was based on a purpose to terminate it because of its price cutting. Proof of motivation is another commonplace in antitrust litigation of which the majority appears apprehensive, but as we have explained or demonstrated many times, see, e. g., Aspen Skiing ; ; United ; Chicago Board of ; see also Piraino, The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, in antitrust, as in many other areas of the law, motivation matters and factfinders are able to distinguish bad from good intent. Third, the manufacturer may rebut the evidence tending to prove that the sole purpose of the agreement was to eliminate a price cutter by offering evidence that it entered the agreement for legitimate, nonprice-related reasons. Although in this case the jury found a naked agreement to terminate a dealer because of its price cutting, ante, at 721-722, the majority boldly characterizes the same agreement as "this nonprice vertical restriction." Ante, at 729. That characterization is surely an oxymoron when applied to the agreement the jury actually found. Nevertheless, the majority proceeds to justify it as "ancillary" to a "quite plausible purpose to enable Hartwell to provide better services under the sales franchise agreement." There |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | to provide better services under the sales franchise agreement." There are two significant reasons why that justification is unacceptable. First, it is not supported by the jury's verdict. Although it did not do so with precision, the District Court did instruct the jury that in order to hold respondent liable it had to find that the agreement's purpose was to eliminate petitioner because of its price cutting and that no valid vertical nonprice restriction existed to which the motivation to eliminate price competition at the dealership level was merely ancillary.[19] *755 Second, the "quite plausible purpose" the majority hypothesizes as salvation for the otherwise anticompetitive elimination of price competition "to enable Hartwell to provide better services under the sales franchise agreement," ib is simply not the type of concern we sought to protect in Continental T. V., I have emphasized in this dissent the difference between restrictions imposed in pursuit of a manufacturer's structuring of its product distribution, and those imposed at the behest of retailers who care less about the general efficiency of a product's promotion than their own profit margins. Sylvania stressed the importance of the former, not the latter; we referred to the use that manufacturers can *756 make of vertical nonprice restraints, see and nowhere did we discuss the benefits of permitting dealers to structure intrabrand competition at the retail level by coercing manufacturers into essentially anticompetitive agreements. Thus, while Hartwell may indeed be able to provide better services under the sales franchise agreement with petitioner out of the way, one would not have thought, until today, that the mere possibility of such a result at the expense of the elimination of price competition and absent the salutary overlay of a manufacturer's distribution decision with the entire product line in mind would be sufficient to legitimate an otherwise purely anticompetitive restraint. See n. In fact, given the majority's total reliance on "economic analysis," see ante, at 735, it is hard to understand why, if such a purpose were sufficient to avoid the application of a per se rule in this context, the same purpose should not also be sufficient to trump the per se rule in all other price-fixing cases that arguably permit cartel members to "provide better services." If, however, we continue to accept the premise that competition in the relevant market is worthy of legal protection that we should not rely on competitive pressures exerted by sellers in other areas and purveyors of similar but not identical products and if we are faithful to the competitive philosophy that |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | dissenting | Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112051/business-electronics-corp-v-sharp-electronics-corp/ | and if we are faithful to the competitive philosophy that has animated our antitrust jurisprudence since Judge Taft's opinion in Addyston Pipe, we can agree that the elimination of price competition will produce wider gross profit margins for retailers, but we may not assume that the retailer's self-interest will result in a better marketplace for consumers. "The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. `The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.' Standard Oil The assumption that competition is the best *757 method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain quality, service, safety, and durability and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad." National Society of Professional The "plausible purpose" posited by the majority as its sole justification for this mischaracterized "nonprice vertical restriction" is inconsistent with the legislative judgment that underlies the Sherman Act itself. Under the facts as found by the jury in this case, the agreement before us is one whose "sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition which it has always been the policy of the common law to foster." United V In sum, this simply is not a case in which procompetitive vertical nonprice restraints have been imposed; in fact, it is not a case in which any procompetitive agreement is at issue.[20] The sole purpose of the agreement between respondent *758 and Hartwell was to eliminate price competition at Hartwell's level. As Judge Bork has aptly explained: "Since the naked boycott is a form of predatory behavior, there is little doubt that it should be a per se violation of the Sherman Act." Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, at 334. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | New York v. Belton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110559/new-york-v-belton/ | When the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, does the constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his arrest include the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was riding? That is the question at issue in the present case. I On April 9, 78, Trooper Douglas Nicot, a New York State policeman driving an unmarked car on the New York Thruway, was passed by another automobile traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Nicot gave chase, overtook the speeding vehicle, and ordered its driver to pull it over to the side of the road and stop. There were four men in the car, one of whom was Roger Belton, the respondent in this case. The policeman asked to see the driver's license and automobile registration, and discovered that none of the men owned the vehicle or was related to its owner. Meanwhile, the policeman had smelled burnt marihuana and had seen on * the floor of the car an envelope marked "Supergold" that he associated with marihuana. He therefore directed the men to get out of the car, and placed them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marihuana. He patted down each of the men and "split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway at this time so they would not be in physical touching area of each other." He then picked up the envelope marked "Supergold" and found that it contained marihuana. After giving the arrestees the warnings required by the state policeman searched each one of them. He then searched the passenger compartment of the car. On the back seat he found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton. He unzipped one of the pockets of the jacket and discovered cocaine. Placing the jacket in his automobile, he drove the four arrestees to a nearby police station. Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. In the trial court he moved that the cocaine the trooper had seized from the jacket pocket be suppressed. The court denied the motion. Belton then pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, but preserved his claim that the cocaine had been seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure, reasoning that "[o]nce defendant was validly arrested for possession of marihuana, the officer was justified in searching the immediate area for other contraband." 16 N. Y. S. 2d 922, 925. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "[a] |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | New York v. Belton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110559/new-york-v-belton/ | The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "[a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the article." Two judges dissented. *57 They pointed out that the "search was conducted by a lone peace officer who was in the process of arresting four unknown individuals whom he had stopped in a speeding car owned by none of them and apparently containing an uncertain quantity of a controlled substance. The suspects were standing by the side of the car as the officer gave it a quick check to confirm his suspicions before attempting to transport them to police headquarters" We granted certiorari to consider the constitutionally permissible scope of a search in circumstances such as these. U.S. 1109. II It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so. This Court has recognized, however, that "the exigencies of the situation" may sometimes make exemption from the warrant requirement "imperative." Specifically, the Court held in that a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area. Such searches have long been considered valid because of the need "to remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape" and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. The Court's opinion in Chimel emphasized the principle that, as the Court had said in "[t]he scope of [a] search must be `strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Quoted in Thus while the Court in Chimel found "ample justification" for a search of "the area from within which [an arrestee] *58 might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," the Court found "no comparable justification for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occursor, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself." 395 U.S., Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest may be stated clearly enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific cases. Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "can only |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | New York v. Belton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110559/new-york-v-belton/ | the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement." LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Dilemma, 7 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 12. This is because "Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be `literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.'" In short, "[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." *59 So it was that, in United the Court hewed to a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced: "[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a `reasonable' search under that Amendment." In so holding, the Court rejected the suggestion that "there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest." But no straightforward rule has emerged from the litigated cases respecting the question involved herethe question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants. The difficulty courts have had is reflected in the conflicting views of the New York judges who dealt with the problem in the present case, and is confirmed by a look at even a small sample drawn from the narrow class of cases in which courts have decided whether, in the course of a search incident to the lawful custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile, police may search inside the automobile after the arrestees are no longer in it. On the |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | New York v. Belton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110559/new-york-v-belton/ | after the arrestees are no longer in it. On the one hand, decisions in cases such as United (CA8 80); United 558 F.2d 9 (CA9 77); and United (CA5 73), have upheld such warrantless searches as incident to lawful arrests. On the other hand, in cases such as United (CA8 80), and United (CA5 80), such searches, in comparable factual circumstances, have been held constitutionally invalid.[1] When a person cannot know how a court will apply a *60 settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority. While the Chimel case established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of "the area within the immediate control of the arrestee" when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]." Chimel, 395 U. S., In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,[2] he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.[3] It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.[]United Draper Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. Thus, while the Court in Chimel held that the police could not search all the drawers in an arrestee's house simply because the police had arrested him at home, the Court noted that drawers within an arrestee's reach could be searched because of the danger their contents might pose to the police. 395 U.S., It is true, |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | New York v. Belton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110559/new-york-v-belton/ | might pose to the police. 395 U.S., It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested. However, in United the Court rejected the argument that such a containerthere a "crumpled up cigarette package"located during a search of incident to his arrest could not be searched: "The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." 1 U.S., The New York Court of Appeals relied upon United and in concluding that the search and seizure in the present case were constitutionally invalid.[5] But neither of those *62 cases involved an arguably valid search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. As the Court pointed out in the Chadwick case: "Here the search was conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the foot-locker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency." And in the Sanders case, the Court explicitly stated that it did not "consider the constitutionality of searches of luggage incident to the arrest of its possessor. See, e. g., United (73). The State has not argued that respondent's suitcase was searched incident to his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not within his `immediate control' at the time of the search." n. 11. (The suitcase in question was in the trunk of the taxicab. See n. III It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest on a charge of possessing marihuana. The search of the respondent's jacket followed immediately upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was "within the arrestee's immediate control" within the meaning of the Chimel case.[6] The search of the jacket, therefore, was a *63 search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and it |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | The Massachusetts statute challenged here forbids the use of corporate funds to publish views about referenda issues having no material effect on the business, property, or assets of *803 the corporation. The legislative judgment that the personal income tax issue, which is the subject of the referendum out of which this case arose, has no such effect was sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and is not disapproved by this Court today. Hence, as this case comes to us, the issue is whether a State may prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to propagate views having no connection with the corporate business. The Court commendably enough squarely faces the issue but unfortunately errs in deciding it. The Court invalidates the Massachusetts statute and holds that the First Amendment guarantees corporate managers the right to use not only their personal funds, but also those of the corporation, to circulate fact and opinion irrelevant to the business placed in their charge and necessarily representing their own personal or collective views about political and social questions. do not suggest for a moment that the First Amendment requires a State to forbid such use of corporate funds, but do strongly disagree that the First Amendment forbids state interference with managerial decisions of this kind. By holding that Massachusetts may not prohibit corporate expenditures or contributions made in connection with referenda involving issues having no material connection with the corporate business, the Court not only invalidates a statute which has been on the books in one form or another for many years, but also casts considerable doubt upon the constitutionality of legislation passed by some 31 States restricting corporate political activity,[1] as well as upon the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S. C. 441b (1976 ed.). The Court's fundamental error is its failure to realize that the state regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment *804 of First Amendment rights accomplished by the statute must be evaluated are themselves derived from the First Amendment. The question posed by this case, as approached by the Court, is whether the State has struck the best possible balance, i. e., the one which it would have chosen, between competing First Amendment interests. Although in my view the choice made by the State would survive even the most exacting scrutiny, perhaps a rational argument might be made to the contrary. What is inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to the proper balance for that of Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation reasonably designed to further First Amendment interests |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | has passed legislation reasonably designed to further First Amendment interests in the context of the political arena where the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.[2] Moreover, the result reached today in critical respects marks a drastic departure from the Court's prior decisions which have protected against governmental infringement the very First Amendment interests which the Court now deems inadequate to justify the Massachusetts statute. There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within the scope of the First Amendment. This, however, is merely the starting point of analysis, because an examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not. ndeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all *805 furthered by corporate speech.[3] t is clear that the communications of profitmaking corporations are not "an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self."[4] They do not represent a manifestation of individual freedom or choice. Undoubtedly, as this Court has recognized, see there are some corporations formed for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological causes shared by all their members, or, as in the case of the press, of disseminating information and ideas. Under such circumstances, association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a means of achieving effective self-expression. But this is hardly the case generally with corporations operated for the purpose of making profits. Shareholders in such entities do not share a common set of political or social views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of advancing political or social causes or in an enterprise engaged in the business of disseminating news and opinion. n fact, as infra, the government has a strong interest in assuring that investment decisions are not predicated upon agreement or disagreement with the activities of corporations in the political arena. Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are united by a desire to make money, for the value of their investment to increase. Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection, activities such as advertising and other communications integrally related to the operation of the corporation's |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | other communications integrally related to the operation of the corporation's business may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires of individual shareholders.[5] This unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations make expenditures or undertake activities designed *806 to influence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such expenditures because their managers believe that it is in the corporations' economic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a particular corporate investment. This is particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate business. Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals would.[6] The self-expression of the communicator is not the only value encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to as the right to hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas. Any communication of ideas, and consequently any expenditure of funds which makes the communication of ideas possible, it *807 can be argued, furthers the purposes of the First Amendment. This proposition does not establish, however, that the right of the general public to receive communications financed by means of corporate expenditures is of the same dimension as that to hear other forms of expression. n the first place, as corporate expenditures designed to further political causes lack the connection with individual self-expression which is one of the principal justifications for the constitutional protection of speech provided by the First Amendment. deas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection. Secondly, the restriction of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much less severely upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions upon individual speech. Even the complete curtailment of corporate communications concerning political or ideological questions not integral to day-to-day business functions would leave individuals, including corporate shareholders, employees, and customers, free to communicate their thoughts. Moreover, it |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | employees, and customers, free to communicate their thoughts. Moreover, it is unlikely that any significant communication would be lost by such a prohibition. These individuals would remain perfectly free to communicate any ideas which could be conveyed by means of the corporate form. ndeed, such individuals could even form associations for the very purpose of promoting political or ideological causes.[7] recognize that there may be certain communications undertaken by corporations which could not be restricted without impinging seriously upon the right to receive information. n the absence of advertising and similar promotional activities, for example, the ability of consumers to obtain information relating to products manufactured by corporations *808 would be significantly impeded. There is also a need for employees, customers, and shareholders of corporations to be able to receive communications about matters relating to the functioning of corporations. Such communications are clearly desired by all investors and may well be viewed as an associational form of self-expression. See United Moreover, it is unlikely that such information would be disseminated by sources other than corporations. t is for such reasons that the Court has extended a certain degree of First Amendment protection to activities of this kind.[8] None of these considerations, however, are implicated by a prohibition upon corporate expenditures relating to referenda concerning questions of general public concern having no connection with corporate business affairs. t bears emphasis here that the Massachusetts statute forbids the expenditure of corporate funds in connection with referenda but in no way forbids the board of directors of a corporation from formulating and making public what it represents as the views of the corporation even though the subject addressed has no material effect whatsoever on the business of the corporation. These views could be publicized at the individual *809 expense of the officers, directors, stockholders, or anyone else interested in circulating the corporate view on matters irrelevant to its business. The governmental interest in regulating corporate political communications, especially those relating to electoral matters, also raises considerations which differ significantly from those governing the regulation of individual speech. Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of furthering certain economic goals. n order to facilitate the achievement of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets are normally applied to them. States have provided corporations with such attributes in order to increase their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy generally. t has long been recognized, however, that the special status of corporations has placed them in a position |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | special status of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process. Although provides support for the position that the desire to equalize the financial resources available to candidates does not justify the limitation upon the expression of support which a restriction upon individual contributions entails,[9] the interest of Massachusetts and the many other States which have restricted corporate political activity is quite different. t is not one of equalizing the resources of opposing candidates or opposing positions, but rather of preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass wealth as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an unfair advantage in the political process, especially where, as here, the issue involved has no material connection with the business of the corporation. The State need not permit its own creation to consume it. Massachusetts could *810 permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon the political activities of corporations would have placed it in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate acquisition of funds to finance such activities. Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas. Ordinarily, the expenditure of funds to promote political causes may be assumed to bear some relation to the fervency with which they are held. Corporate political expression, however, is not only divorced from the convictions of individual corporate shareholders, but also, because of the ease with which corporations are permitted to accumulate capital, bears no relation to the conviction with which the ideas expressed are held by the communicator.[10] The Court's opinion appears to recognize at least the possibility that fear of corporate domination of the electoral process would justify restrictions upon corporate expenditures and contributions in connection with referenda but brushes this interest aside by asserting that "there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts," ante, at 789, and by suggesting that the statute in issue represents an attempt to give an unfair advantage to those who hold views in opposition to positions which would otherwise be financed by corporations. Ante, at 785-786. t fails even to allude to the fact, however, that Massachusetts' most recent experience with unrestrained |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | the fact, however, that Massachusetts' most recent experience with unrestrained corporate expenditures in connection *811 with ballot questions establishes precisely the contrary. n 1972, a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution which would have authorized the imposition of a graduated income tax on both individuals and corporations was put to the voters. The Committee for Jobs and Government Economy, an organized political committee, raised and expended approximately $120,000 to oppose the proposed amendment, the bulk of it raised through large corporate contributions. Three of the present appellant corporations each contributed $3,000 to this committee. n contrast, the Coalition for Tax Reform, nc., the only political committee organized to support the 1972 amendment, was able to raise and expend only approximately $7,000. App. to Jurisdictional Statement 41; App. to Record 48-84. Perhaps these figures reflect the Court's view of the appropriate role which corporations should play in the Massachusetts electoral process, but it nowhere explains why it is entitled to substitute its judgment for that of Massachusetts and other States,[11] as well as the United States, which have acted to correct or prevent similar domination of the electoral process by corporate wealth. This Nation has for many years recognized the need for measures designed to prevent corporate domination of the political process. The Corrupt Practices Act, first enacted in 1907, has consistently barred corporate contributions in connection *812 with federal elections. This Court has repeatedly recognized that one of the principal purposes of this prohibition is "to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital." United See ; United Although this Court has never adjudicated the constitutionality of the Act, there is no suggestion in its cases construing it, that this purpose is in any sense illegitimate or deserving of other than the utmost respect; indeed, the thrust of its opinions, until today, has been to the contrary. See Automobile at ; at There is an additional overriding interest related to the prevention of corporate domination which is substantially advanced by Massachusetts' restrictions upon corporate contributions: assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree where, as is the case here, the issue involved does not materially affect the business, property, or other affairs of the corporation.[12] The State has not interfered with the prerogatives of corporate management to communicate about matters that have material impact on the business affairs entrusted to them, however much individual stockholders may disagree on economic or ideological grounds. Nor has the State forbidden |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | on economic or ideological grounds. Nor has the State forbidden management from formulating and circulating its views at its own expense or at the expense of others, even where the subject at issue is irrelevant to corporate business affairs. But Massachusetts *813 has chosen to forbid corporate management from spending corporate funds in referenda elections absent some demonstrable effect of the issue on the economic life of the company. n short, corporate management may not use corporate monies to promote what does not further corporate affairs but what in the last analysis are the purely personal views of the management, individually or as a group. This is not only a policy which a State may adopt consistent with the First Amendment but one which protects the very freedoms that this Court has held to be guaranteed by the First Amendment. n Board of the Court struck down a West Virginia statute which compelled children enrolled in public school to salute the flag and pledge allegiance to it on the ground that the First Amendment prohibits public authorities from requiring an individual to express support for or agreement with a cause with which he disagrees or concerning which he prefers to remain silent. Subsequent cases have applied this principle to prohibit organizations to which individuals are compelled to belong as a condition of employment from using compulsory dues to support candidates, political parties, or other forms of political expression which which members disagree or do not wish to support. n the Court was presented with allegations that a union shop authorized by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S. C. 152 Eleventh, had used the union treasury to which all employees were compelled to contribute "to finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom [the petitioners] opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which [they] disagreed." The Court recognized that compelling contributions for such purposes presented constitutional "questions of the utmost gravity" and consequently construed the Act to prohibit the use of compulsory union dues for political purposes. Last Term, *814 in we confronted these constitutional questions and held that a State may not, even indirectly, require an individual to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of employment. At issue were political expenditures made by a public employees' union. Michigan law provided that unions and local government employers might agree to an agency-shop arrangement pursuant to which every employeeeven those not union membersmust pay to the union, as a condition of employment, union |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | dissenting | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | pay to the union, as a condition of employment, union dues or a service fee equivalent in amount to union dues. The legislation itself was not coercive; it did not command that local governments employ only those workers who were willing to pay union dues, but left it to a bargaining representative democratically elected by a majority of the employees to enter or not enter into such a contractual arrangement through collective bargaining. n addition, of course, no one was compelled to work at a job covered by an agency-shop arrangement. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that under such circumstances the use of funds contributed by dissenting employees for political purposes impermissibly infringed their First Amendment right to adhere to their own beliefs and to refuse to defer to or support the beliefs of others. Presumably, unlike the situations presented by Street and Abood, the use of funds invested by shareholders with opposing views by Massachusetts corporations in connection with referenda or elections would not constitute state action and, consequently, would not violate the First Amendment. Until now, however, the States have always been free to adopt measures designed to further rights protected by the Constitution even when not compelled to do so. t could hardly be plausibly contended that just because Massachusetts' regulation of corporations is less extensive than Michigan's regulation of labor-management relations, Massachusetts may not constitutionally prohibit the very evil which Michigan may not constitutionally *815 permit. Yet this is precisely what the Court today holds. Although the Court places great stress upon the alleged infringement of the right to receive information produced by Massachusetts' ban on corporate expenditures which, for the reasons believe to be misconceived, it fails to explain why such an interest was not sufficient to compel a different weighing of First Amendment interests and, consequently, a different result in Abood. After all, even contributions for political causes coerced by labor unions would, under the Court's analysis, increase unions' ability to disseminate their views and, consequently, increase the amount of information available to the general public. The Court assumes that the interest in preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views which are irrelevant to the corporate business and with which some shareholders may disagree is a compelling one, but concludes that the Massachusetts statute is nevertheless invalid because the State has failed to adopt the means best suited, in its opinion, for achieving this end. Ante, at 792-795. t proposes that the aggrieved shareholder assert his interest in preventing the expenditure of funds for nonbusiness causes he finds unconscionable through the channels |
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