author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110797/united-states-v-valenzuela-bernal/ | the Government nevertheless deported potential witnesses before the materiality hearing was held, the District Court determined whether the deported witnesses could have been of some "conceivable benefit" to the defendant. If the defendant met that standard, the court dismissed the indictment. *878 The principal difficulty with the Ninth Circuit's approach was, as the Court notes, ante, at 866-867, that it required virtually no evidence that the deported witness' testimony would have been material to the defense. Under the Ninth Circuit's formulation, the Government's deportation of an alien witness resulted in virtually an automatic dismissal of the indictment. In adopting a standard requiring brief detention of potential alien witnesses, the Court need not take so extreme a position. In United for example, the Fifth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's rationale in concluding that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated if the Government deports an alien witness before the defendant has had an opportunity to interview him. The court nevertheless affirmed the defendant's conviction because he could not offer a "plausible theory" explaining how the witness' testimony would have been helpful to the defense. The court thus adopted a more stringent test than the Ninth Circuit's "conceivable benefit" test. The standard I propose is an amalgam of the approaches used by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.[2] As a matter of course, the deportable aliens who are potential witnesses should be detained for a very brief period to afford Government *879 and defense counsel the opportunity to interview them. If, within that period, the defendant requests that certain aliens not be deported, a federal magistrate should hold a hearing to determine whether deportation of any of the witnesses should be deferred until after trial. As evidenced by the statistics provided by the respondent, similar procedures in the Ninth Circuit have produced very little litigation. See Brief for Respondent 30. Of course, the Government could be expected to abide by such a rule, but in the occasional event that it deports alien witnesses without affording the defendant any opportunity to interview them, the defendant should not be entitled to an automatic dismissal of the indictment; nor should the defendant be expected to prove prejudiceafter all, the Government has deported his potential witnesses. Instead, I agree with the Court that sanctions should be available against the Government if the defendant sets forth some plausible theory explaining how the deported witnesses would have provided material evidence that was not simply cumulative of evidence readily available to the defendant. III In the case before us, the respondent made no plausible suggestion that the deported aliens possessed any |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | An amendment to the Oregon Constitution prohibits judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury "unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict." The question presented is whether that prohibition is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that it is not. I Petitioner Honda Motor Co., Ltd., manufactured and sold the three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle that overturned while respondent was driving it, causing him severe and permanent injuries. Respondent brought suit alleging that petitioner knew or should have known that the vehicle had an inherently and unreasonably dangerous design. The jury found petitioner liable and awarded respondent $919,390.39 in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $5 million. The compensatory damages, however, were reduced by 20% to $735,512.31, because respondent's own negligence contributed to the accident. On appeal, relying on our then-recent decision in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. petitioner argued that the award of punitive damages violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the punitive damages were excessive and because Oregon courts lacked the power to correct excessive verdicts. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Oregon Supreme Court. The latter court relied heavily on the fact that the Oregon statute governing the award of punitive damages in product liability actions and the jury instructions in this case[1] contain substantive criteria that provide *9 at least as much guidance to the factfinders as the Alabama statute and jury instructions that we upheld in The Oregon Supreme Court also noted that Oregon law provides an additional protection by requiring the plaintiff to prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. Recognizing that other state courts had interpreted as including a "clear constitutional mandate for meaningful judicial scrutiny of punitive damage awards," ; see also Alexander & Alexander, the court nevertheless declined to "interpret to hold that an award of punitive damages, to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, always must be subject to a form of post-verdict or appellate review that includes the possibility of remittitur." It also noted that trial and appellate courts were "not entirely powerless" because a judgment may be vacated if "there is no evidence to support the jury's decision," and because "appellate review is available to test the sufficiency of the jury instructions." 851 P.2d, at -1097. *420 We granted certiorari, to consider whether Oregon's limited judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards is consistent with our decision in II Our recent cases have recognized |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | with our decision in II Our recent cases have recognized that the Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. ; TXO Production Although they fail to "draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable," ; a majority of the Justices agreed that the Due Process Clause imposes a limit on punitive damages awards. A plurality in TXO assented to the proposition that "grossly excessive" punitive damages would violate due -455, while Justice O'Connor, who dissented because she favored more rigorous standards, noted that "[i]t is thus common ground that an award may be so excessive as to violate due" In the case before us today we are not directly concerned with the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards; rather, we are confronted with the question of what procedures are necessary to ensure that punitive damages are not imposed in an arbitrary manner. More specifically, the question is whether the Due Process Clause requires judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awards. The opinions in both and TXO strongly emphasized the importance of the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. In the Court held that the common-law method of assessing punitive damages did not violate procedural due In so holding, the Court stressed the availability of both "meaningful and adequate review by the trial court" and subsequent appellate review. Similarly, in TXO, the plurality opinion *421 found that the fact that the "award was reviewed and upheld by the trial judge" and unanimously affirmed on appeal gave rise "to a strong presumption of validity." Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) considered it sufficient that traditional common-law procedures were followed. In particular, he noted that "`procedural due ' requires judicial review of punitive damages awards for reasonableness." All of those opinions suggest that our analysis in this case should focus on Oregon's departure from traditional procedures. We therefore first contrast the relevant commonlaw practice with Oregon's procedure, which that State's Supreme Court once described as "a system of trial by jury in which the judge is reduced to the status of a mere monitor." Van We then examine the constitutional implications of Oregon's deviation from established common-law procedures. III Judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been awarded. One of the earliest reported cases involving exemplary damages, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C. P. 1763), arose out |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C. P. 1763), arose out of King George III's attempt to punish the publishers of the allegedly seditious North Briton, No. 45. The King's agents arrested the plaintiff, a journeyman printer, in his home and detained him for six hours. Although the defendants treated the plaintiff rather well, feeding him "beef steakes and beer, so that he suffered very little or no damages," 2 Wils., at 205, 95 Eng. Rep., at 768, the jury awarded him £ 300, an enormous sum almost 300 times the plaintiff's weekly wage. The defendant's lawyer requested a new trial, arguing that the jury's award was excessive. Plaintiff's *422 counsel, on the other hand, argued that "in cases of tort the court will never interpose in setting aside verdicts for excessive damages." 95 Eng. Rep., at 768. While the court denied the motion for new trial, the Chief Justice explicitly rejected plaintiff's absolute rule against review of damages amounts. Instead, he noted that when the damages are "outrageous" and "all mankind at first blush must think so," a court may grant a new trial "for excessive damages." at 207, 95 Eng. Rep., at 769. In accord with his view that the amount of an award was relevant to the motion for a new trial, the Chief Justice noted that "[u]pon the whole I am of opinion the damages are not excessive." Subsequent English cases, while generally deferring to the jury's determination of damages, steadfastly upheld the court's power to order new trials solely on the basis that the damages were too high. Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 2 Black. W. 929, 96 Eng. Rep. 549 (C. P. 1773) (Damages "may be so monstrous and excessive, as to be in themselves an evidence of passion or partiality in the jury");[2]Sharpe v. Brice, 2 Black. W. 942, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (C. P. 1774) ("It has never been laid down, that the Court will not grant a new trial for excessive damages in any cases of tort"); Leith v. Pope, 2 Black. W. 27, 28, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C. P. 1779) ("[I]n cases of tort the Court will not interpose on account of the largeness of damages, unless they are so flagrantly excessive as to afford an internal evidence of the prejudice and partiality *423 of the jury"); Jones v. Sparrow, 5 T. R. 257, 101 Eng. Rep. 144 (K. B. 1793) (new trial granted for excessive damages); Goldsmith v. Lord Sefton, 3 Anst. 808, 145 Eng. Rep. 1046 (Exch. 1796) (same); Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277, 281, 128 Eng. Rep. |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277, 281, 128 Eng. Rep. 696, 698 (C. P. 18) ("[I]t is now well acknowledged in all the Courts of Westminster-hall, that whether in actions for criminal conversation, malicious prosecutions, words, or any other matter, if the damages are clearly too large, the Courts will send the inquiry to another jury"). Respondent calls to our attention the case of Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (C. P. 1764), in which the court asserted that "there is not one single case, (that is law), in all the books to be found, where the court has granted a new trial for excessive damages in actions for torts." 95 Eng. Rep., at 793. Respondent would infer from that statement that 18th-century common law did not provide for judicial review of damages. Respondent's argument overlooks several crucial facts. First, the Beardmore case antedates all but one of the cases cited in the previous paragraph. Even if respondent's interpretation of the case were correct, it would be an interpretation the English courts rejected soon thereafter. Second, Beardmore itself cites at least one case that it concedes granted a new trial for excessive damages, Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Str. 691, 93 Eng. Rep. 787 (K. B. 1726), although it characterizes the case as wrongly decided. Third, to say that "there is not one single case in all the books" is to say very little, because then, much more so than now, only a small proportion of decided cases was reported. For example, for 1764, the year Beardmore was decided, only 16 Common Pleas cases are recorded in the standard reporter. 2 Wils. 208-257, 95 Eng. Rep. 769-797. Finally, the inference respondent would draw, that 18th-century English common law did not permit a judge to order new trials for excessive damages, is explicitly rejected by Beardmore itself, *424 which cautioned against that very inference: "We desired to be understood that this court does not say, or lay down any rule that there can never happen a case of such excessive damages in tort where the court may not grant a new trial." 2 Wils., at 250, 95 Eng. Rep., at 793. Common-law courts in the United States followed their English predecessors in providing judicial review of the size of damages awards. They too emphasized the deference ordinarily afforded jury verdicts, but they recognized that juries sometimes awarded damages so high as to require correction. Thus, in 1822, Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff agreed to a reduction in his damages.[3] In |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | the plaintiff agreed to a reduction in his damages.[3] In explaining his ruling, he noted: "As to the question of excessive damages, I agree, that the court may grant a new trial for excessive damages. It is indeed an exercise of discretion full of delicacy and difficulty. But if it should clearly appear that the jury have committed a gross error, or have acted from improper motives, or have given damages excessive in relation to the person or the injury, it is as much the duty of the court to interfere, to prevent the wrong, as in any other case." (No. 1,578) (CC Mass. 1822). See also (No. 17, 516) (CC Me. 1843). *425 In the 19th century, both before and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, many American courts reviewed damages for "partiality" or "passion and prejudice." Nevertheless, because of the difficulty of probing juror reasoning, passion and prejudice review was, in fact, review of the amount of awards. Judges would infer passion, prejudice, or partiality from the size of the ; ; ; Belknap v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 49 N. H. 358, 374 (1870) (setting aside & compensatory[49] punitive both and damages, because "[w]e think it evident that the jury were affected by some partiality or prejudice"). Nineteenth-century treatises similarly recognized judges' authority to award new trials on the basis of the size of damages awards. 1 D. Graham, A Treatise on the Law of New Trials 442 (2d ed. 1855) ("[E]ven in personal torts, where the jury find outrageous damages, clearly evincing partiality, prejudice and passion, the court will interfere for the relief *426 of the defendant, and order a new trial"); T. Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages 707 (5th ed. 1869) ("The court again holds itself at liberty to set aside verdicts and grant new trials whenever the damages are so excessive as to create the belief that the jury have been misled either by passion, prejudice, or ignorance"); 3 J. Sutherland, A Treatise on the Law of Damages 469 (1883) (When punitive damages are submitted to the jury, "the amount which they may think proper to allow will be accepted by the court, unless so exorbitant as to indicate that they have been influenced by passion, prejudice or a perverted judgment"). Modern practice is consistent with these earlier authorities. In the federal courts and in every State, except Oregon, judges review the size of damages awards. See ; ; Alexander & Alexander, -711, cert. denied, ; Texaco, v. Pennzoil, Co., ; ; Draper, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Punitive Damages |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | Co., ; ; Draper, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal Injury or Death Cases, 12 A. L. R. 5th 195 ; Schnapper, Judges Against Juries Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, IV There is a dramatic difference between the judicial review of punitive damages awards under the common law and the scope of review available in Oregon. An Oregon trial judge, or an Oregon appellate court, may order a new trial if the jury was not properly instructed, if error occurred during the trial, or if there is no evidence to support any punitive damages at all. But if the defendant's only basis for relief is the amount of punitive damages the jury awarded, Oregon *427 provides no procedure for reducing or setting aside that award. This has been the law in Oregon at least since when the State Supreme Court announced its opinion in Van definitively construing the 1910 amendment to the Oregon Constitution.[5] In that case the court held that it had no power to reduce or set aside an award of both compensatory and punitive damages that was admittedly excessive.[6] It recognized that the constitutional amendment placing a limitation on its power was a departure from the traditional common-law approach.[7] That opinion's characterization of Oregon's "lonely eminence" in this regard, at 210 P.2d, is still an accurate portrayal of its unique position. Every other State in the Union affords postverdict judicial review of the *428 amount of a punitive damages award, see and subsequent decisions have reaffirmed Oregon judges' lack of authority to order new trials or other relief to remedy excessive damages. 202 Ore. 3, ;, 873 P.2d 3 Respondent argues that Oregon's procedures do not deviate from common-law practice, because Oregon judges have the power to examine the size of the award to determine whether the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice. This is simply incorrect. The earliest Oregon cases interpreting the 1910 amendment squarely held that Oregon courts lack precisely that power. ; McCulley v. Homestead Bakery, 1 Ore. 460, Although dicta in later cases have suggested that the issue might eventually be revisited, see Van the earlier holdings remain Oregon law. No Oregon court for more than half a century has inferred passion and prejudice from the size of a damages award, and no court in more than a decade has even hinted that courts might possess the power to do so.[8] Finally, if Oregon courts *429 could evaluate the excessiveness of punitive damages awards through passion and prejudice review, the Oregon Supreme Court would have mentioned that |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | prejudice review, the Oregon Supreme Court would have mentioned that power in this very case. Petitioners argued that Oregon procedures were unconstitutional precisely because they failed to provide judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards. The Oregon Supreme Court responded by rejecting the idea that judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards was required by As the court noted, two state appellate courts, including the California Supreme Court, had reached the opposite conclusion. at n. 851 P.2d, at n. If, as respondent claims, Oregon law provides passion and prejudice review of excessive verdicts, the Oregon Supreme Court would have had a more obvious response to petitioners' argument. Respondent also argues that Oregon provides adequate review, because the trial judge can overturn a punitive damages award if there is no substantial evidence to support an award of punitive damages. See 202 Ore., at 274 P.2d, at This argument is unconvincing, because the review provided by Oregon courts ensures only that there is evidence to support some punitive damages, not that there is evidence to support the amount actually awarded. While Oregon's judicial review ensures that punitive damages are not awarded against defendants entirely innocent of conduct warranting exemplary damages, Oregon, unlike the common law, provides no assurance that those whose conduct is sanctionable by punitive damages are not subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary amounts. What we are concerned with is the possibility that a culpable defendant may be unjustly punished; evidence of culpability warranting some punishment is not a substitute for evidence providing at least a rational basis for the particular deprivation of property imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing. *430 V Oregon's abrogation of a well-established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption that its procedures violate the Due Process Clause. As this Court has stated from its first due cases, traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis. Murray's ; ; ; In re ; ; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Because the basic procedural protections of the common law have been regarded as so fundamental, very few cases have arisen in which a party has complained of their denial. In fact, most of our due decisions involve arguments that traditional procedures provide too little protection and that additional safeguards are necessary to ensure compliance with the Constitution. ; ; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party has been deprived of liberty or property without the safeguards of common-law procedure. ; ; ; In re Oliver, ; In re 397 U. S., |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | ; In re Oliver, ; In re 397 U. S., at When the absent procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due ; ; In re Oliver, ; In re 397 U. S., at Of course, not all deviations from established procedures result in constitutional infirmity. As the Court noted in Hurtado, to hold all procedural *431 change unconstitutional "would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." A review of the cases, however, suggests that the case before us is unlike those in which abrogations of common-law procedures have been upheld. In Hurtado, for example, examination by a neutral magistrate provided criminal defendants with nearly the same protection as the abrogated common-law grand jury procedure. Oregon, by contrast, has provided no similar substitute for the protection provided by judicial review of the amount awarded by the jury in punitive damages. Similarly, in International Shoe this Court upheld the extension of state-court jurisdiction over persons not physically present, in spite of contrary well-established prior practice. That change, however, was necessitated by the growth of a new business entity, the corporation, whose ability to conduct business without physical presence had created new problems not envisioned by rules developed in another era. See In addition, the dramatic improvements in communication and transportation made litigation in a distant forum less onerous. No similar social changes suggest the need for Oregon's abrogation of judicial review, nor do improvements in technology render unchecked punitive damages any less onerous. If anything, the rise of large, interstate and multinational corporations has aggravated the problem of arbitrary awards and potentially biased juries.[9] *432 Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences. Judicial review of the amount awarded was one of the few procedural safeguards which the common law provided against that danger. Oregon has removed that safeguard without providing any substitute procedure and without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over time. For these reasons, we hold that Oregon's denial of judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[10] VI Respondent argues that Oregon has provided other safeguards against |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117862/honda-motor-co-v-oberg/ | VI Respondent argues that Oregon has provided other safeguards against arbitrary awards and that, in any event, the exercise of this unreviewable power by the jury is consistent with the jury's historic role in our judicial system. Respondent points to four safeguards provided in the Oregon courts: the limitation of punitive damages to the amount specified in the complaint, the clear and convincing standard of proof, preverdict determination of maximum allowable punitive damages, and detailed jury instructions. The first, *433 limitation of punitive damages to the amount specified, is hardly a constraint at all, because there is no limit to the amount the plaintiff can request, and it is unclear whether an award exceeding the amount requested could be set aside. See 873 P.2d 3 The second safeguard, the clear and convincing standard of proof, is an important check against unwarranted imposition of punitive damages, but, like the "no substantial evidence" review it provides no assurance that those whose conduct is sanctionable by punitive damages are not subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary amounts. Regarding the third purported constraint, respondent cites no cases to support the idea that Oregon courts do or can set maximum punitive damages awards in advance of the verdict. Nor are we aware of any court which implements that procedure. Respondent's final safeguard, proper jury instruction, is a wellestablished and, of course, important check against excessive awards. The problem that concerns us, however, is the possibility that a jury will not follow those instructions and may return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict.[11] *434 In support of his argument that there is a historic basis for making the jury the final arbiter of the amount of punitive damages, respondent calls our attention to early civil and criminal cases in which the jury was allowed to judge the law as well as the facts. See As we have already explained, in civil cases, the jury's discretion to determine the amount of damages was constrained by judicial review.[12] The criminal cases do establishas does our practice todaythat a jury's arbitrary decision to acquit a defendant charged with a crime is completely unreviewable. There is, however, a vast difference between arbitrary grants of freedom and arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property. The Due Process Clause has nothing to say about the former, but its whole purpose is to prevent the latter. A decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction of *435 exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The common-law practice, the procedures |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Procunier v. Atchley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108231/procunier-v-atchley/ | In 1959 a jury in a California trial court found the respondent guilty of murdering his wife by firing six bullets into her body at close range. A key prosecution witness at the trial was Ray Travers, an insurance agent. Two days after the respondent's wife was killed, Travers visited the respondent in jail at the latter's request, and the two conversed regarding an insurance policy on the life of the decedent. During the course of this conversation the respondent told Travers his version of how his wife had been killed, admitting that he had lain in wait for her with a gun, but insisting that her shooting had been accidental. As he was leaving the jail, Travers told the sheriff's officers about the respondent's statement. They asked him if he would be willing to have his next conversation with the respondent electronically recorded, and, since he planned to return to get additional information for the insurance company, he agreed. Later the same day Travers returned to the jail and had another conversation with the respondent, in the course of which the respondent again gave Travers substantially the same account of the circumstances of his wife's death. This conversation was recorded.[1] Over the objection of defense counsel, the recording of the second conversation was admitted in evidence at the trial. Travers in detailed testimony verified the authenticity of the recording, and orally recounted the two conversations he had had with the respondent. The accuracy of the recording and of Travers' testimony was not questioned; indeed, when the respondent took the stand he gave substantially the same account of how his wife had been killed that he had given to Travers. *448 On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the respondent contended that the second conversation with Travers was an involuntary confession, and that the record of the conversation and Travers' supporting testimony had, therefore, been wrongly admitted in evidence at the trial. The state appellate court unanimously rejected this contention and affirmed the conviction. Proceeding upon the proposition that "any statement by an accused relative to the offense charged is inadmissible against him if made involuntarily," Justice Traynor's opinion for the Supreme Court of California reasoned as follows: "Travers testified that no threats were made, that no inducements were offered, and that in an earlier conversation defendant had volunteered substantially the same statements without being asked. Defendant at no time contradicted this testimony or suggested that any of his recorded statements were untrue. Moreover, the recorded conversation demonstrates that Travers referred to the insurance policy to explain why he |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Procunier v. Atchley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108231/procunier-v-atchley/ | Travers referred to the insurance policy to explain why he was asking questions and not as an inducement for any particular answers. The trial court listened to the tape in chambers before ruling on its admissibility. There is therefore no merit in defendant's contention that the recording was admitted without a proper showing that his statements were made voluntarily. "Defendant also contends that the recording was obtained by such fraud that its use as evidence was inconsistent with due process. He relies primarily on Although there was a similar deception in the present case, there was no comparable mental The deception itself does not render defendant's statements *449 inadmissible, for it was not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement. "While cross-examining Travers as to the voluntariness of defendant's recorded statements, defense counsel attempted to ask whether defendant had complained to Travers of not being permitted by the police, despite numerous requests, to talk to a lawyer. The trial court sustained an objection to this question and explained to the jury that the answer would have no bearing on the question of voluntariness. Defendant correctly contends that this ruling was erroneous, but fails to show that it was prejudicial. Although a refusal to permit defendant to talk to counsel suggests an intent to coerce, it seems highly improbable that either the trial judge or the jury would have inferred from such a refusal alone in the light of the substantial and uncontradicted evidence that no occurred." -171, 346 P. 2d, at 769-770. This Court granted certiorari.[2] After hearing argument, we disposed of the case as follows: "After hearing oral argument and fully examining the record, we conclude that the totality of circumstances as the record makes them manifest did not warrant bringing the case here. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed."[3] In 1967 the respondent initiated the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. He contended that decisions of this Court rendered subsequent to his direct appeal had established that the recording of his conversation with Travers had been unconstitutionally *450 introduced into evidence, and that he was accordingly entitled to a new trial. It was asserted that his statements were involuntary under the criteria stated in because he had been denied access to a lawyer and because he had not been advised of his right to remain silent; and that in any event the procedures used to determine the voluntariness of these statements were constitutionally inadequate under the criteria stated in The District Court, although making clear that |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Procunier v. Atchley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108231/procunier-v-atchley/ | criteria stated in The District Court, although making clear that it was not "presently able to say that the confession was involuntary," nonetheless concluded that the respondent was entitled to relief because the state trial court had "excluded relevant and perhaps crucial evidence on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary" and thus "did not reliably determine whether Atchley's confession was voluntary or involuntary." The excluded evidence that the District Court thought "relevant and perhaps crucial" had to do with what the police had said to Travers before the recorded interview, whether the respondent had been trying to obtain a lawyer, whether Travers had deceived the respondent about his motives and feigned sympathy, whether the respondent knew that the conversation was being recorded, and, finally, with the respondent's intellectual and educational qualifications. Because inquiry into these matters had been restricted, the federal court held that the wrong standard of voluntariness had been applied in the state trial proceeding. Accordingly, the District Court ruled that the respondent was entitled to a new hearing in the state courts on the issue of voluntariness and, in the event that the statements should be found involuntary, to a new trial. The Court of Appeals[4] affirmed on the *451 opinion of the District Court, Judge Barnes dissenting, and we granted certiorari.[5] In Jackson, the Court held that to commit the determination of the voluntariness of a confession solely to the same jury that decided guilt was inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the procedures used to determine voluntariness be reliable. Concern for the reliability of the procedures utilized to decide the voluntariness issue was also reflected in where it was held that a state trial court's resolution of a disputed issue of historical fact could not be dispositive in a later federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the petitioner had had a "full and fair hearing" on that issue in the trial court.[6] But those decisions did not establish that an applicant for federal habeas corpus is entitled to a new hearing on the voluntariness issue, in either the federal or state courts, merely because he can point to shortcomings in the procedures used to decide the issue of voluntariness in the state courts. Our decisions make clear that he must also show that his version of events, if true, would require the conclusion that his confession was involuntary. Thus in we did not reach the question whether a hearing was required until we had determined, as a threshold matter, that the application for habeas corpus alleged facts which, if true, would establish that the |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Procunier v. Atchley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108231/procunier-v-atchley/ | corpus alleged facts which, if true, would establish that the petitioner had been deprived of constitutional rights by the use of an involuntary We said that "the Federal District Court could not conclude that the state trial judge admitted the confession because he disbelieved the evidence which would show that it was involuntary." *452 at 321. And in we did not jump from the premise that the procedures used to determine voluntariness were inadequate, to the conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing. Instead, we pointed out: "This is not a case where the facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the confession are undisputed and the task is only to judge the voluntariness of the confession based upon the clearly established facts and in accordance with proper constitutional standards. Here there are substantial facts in dispute. Whether Jackson is entitled to relief depends upon how these facts are resolved, for if the State is to be believed we cannot say that Jackson's confession was involuntary, whereas if Jackson's version of the facts is accepted the confession was involuntary and inadmissible." -392. The reason for this approach is obvious. Unless the result of the habeas corpus proceeding turns on disputed issues of historical fact, a rehearing on the issue of the involuntariness of a defendant's incriminating statement would be an exercise in futility, since the applicant for federal habeas would not be entitled to relief even if his allegations of historical fact should be found to be true. Yet the District Court in this case quite evidently failed to make the threshold determination that the respondent would be entitled to relief if his allegations were believed. Rather the court, disavowing any present ability to say whether the respondent's statement was involuntary, said only that "the trial court could have more competently determined whether [the respondent's] will was overborne" had the circumstances surrounding the statement been more fully The respondent's trial took place several years before the decisions of the Court in and and those decisions have not been given retroactive effect. The admissibility of the respondent's statement as a constitutional matter was governed, therefore, by the contemporary case law elaborating the due process standard of voluntariness. The question was whether the will of the defendant had been overborne so that the statement was not his free and voluntary act, and that question was to be resolved in light of the totality of the circumstances. See, e. g., ; ; ; There is no reason to infer that the Supreme Court of California did not apply the correct constitutional criteria |
Justice Stewart | 1,971 | 18 | majority | Procunier v. Atchley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108231/procunier-v-atchley/ | Court of California did not apply the correct constitutional criteria in reviewing the issue, and the court quite clearly assumed the truth of the respondent's version of the historical facts still in dispute, in holding that his statement was not involuntary. The respondent contended that his confession was involuntary because he had been denied a lawyer, because he had not been advised of his right to remain silent, because he had thought he was giving Travers information that Travers needed to obtain the insurance money, because he had thought that what he told Travers would be held in confidence, because he had not known that his conversation with Travers was being recorded, and because he was lower than average in intelligence and educational attainments. Of these six assertedly coercive factors, three went only to the weight to be given other evidence of actual Low intelligence, denial of the right to counsel, and failure to advise of the right to remain silent were not in themselves coercive. Rather they were relevant only in establishing a setting in which actual might have been exerted to overcome *454 the will of the suspect. See ; ; The circumstance that the conversation was recorded without the respondent's knowledge did not tend to show either actual or a potentially coercive setting. The factual issue whether the respondent thought his statements to Travers would be held in confidence was resolved in the trial court. Travers testified that he advised the respondent that what he said would have to be reported to the insurance company and that the respondent knew it would be a matter of record. This testimony was not contradicted, and there was no reason for the California Supreme Court to disturb the finding, implicit in the trial record, that the respondent had had no reason to believe that Travers would not repeat what he had been told. See The remaining contention was that the respondent's statement was improperly induced by the suggestion that Travers needed the information in order to obtain insurance money for Atchley's children and stepchildren. The California Supreme Court properly found that "the recorded conversation demonstrates that Travers referred to the insurance policy to explain why he was asking questions and not as an inducement for any particular answers." It is clear that the California courts gave full consideration to the issue of the voluntariness of the respondent's statement, and that they applied correct standards of constitutional law in upholding its admission in evidence. Accordingly, the District Court was in error in requiring a new trial of claims that were long |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | dissenting | Rhodes v. Stewart | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112151/rhodes-v-stewart/ | I continue to believe that it is unfair to litigants and damaging to the integrity and accuracy of this Court's decisions *5 to reverse a decision summarily without the benefit of full briefing on the merits of the question decided. ; ; The Rules of this Court urge litigants filing petitions for certiorari to focus on the exceptional need for this Court's review rather than on the merits of the underlying case. Summary disposition thus flies in the face of legitimate expectations of the parties seeking review by this Court and deprives them of the opportunity to argue the merits of their claim before judgment. Moreover, briefing on the merits leads to greater accuracy in our decisions and helps this Court to reduce as much as is humanly possible the inevitable incidence of error in our opinions. Finally, the practice of summary disposition demonstrates insufficient respect for lower court judges and for our own dissenting colleagues on this Court. It is my view that when the Court is considering summary disposition of a case, it should, at the very least, so inform the litigants and invite them to submit supplemental briefs on the merits. I remain unconvinced that this slight modification of our practice would unduly burden the Court. The benefits of increasing the fairness and accuracy of our decisionmaking and the value of according greater respect to our colleagues on this and other courts more than outweigh any burden associated with such a modest accommodation. I dissent. |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | A Minnesota law provides that “the dissolution or an- nulment of a marriage revokes any revocable[] beneficiary designation[ ] made by an individual to the individual’s former spouse.” –804, subd. 1 (2016). That statute establishes a default rule for use when Min- nesotans divorce. If one spouse has made the other the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or similar asset, their divorce automatically revokes that designation—on the theory that the policyholder would want that result. But if he does not, the policyholder may rename the ex-spouse as beneficiary. We consider here whether applying Minnesota’s automatic- revocation rule to a beneficiary designation made before the statute’s enactment violates the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. We hold it does not. I All good trust-and-estate lawyers know that “[d]eath is not the end; there remains the litigation over the estate.” 8 The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce 365 (1911). That epigram, beyond presaging this case, helps explain the statute at its center. 2 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court The legal system has long used default rules to resolve estate litigation in a way that conforms to decedents’ presumed intent. At common law, for example, marriage automatically revoked a woman’s prior will, while mar- riage and the birth of a child revoked a man’s. See 4 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 507, 512 The testator could then revive the old will or execute a new one. But if he (or she) did neither, the laws of intes- tate succession (generally prioritizing children and current spouses) would control the estate’s distribution. See 95 C. J. S., Wills pp. 409–410 (2011); R. Sitkoff & J. Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 63 Courts reasoned that the average person would prefer that allocation to the one in the old will, given the intervening life events. See T. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills 423 (2d ed. 1953). If he’d only had the time, the thought went, he would have replaced that will himself. Changes in society brought about changes in the laws governing revocation of wills. In addition to removing gender distinctions, most States abandoned the common- law rule canceling whole wills executed before a marriage or birth. In its place, they enacted statutes giving a new spouse or child a specified share of the decedent’s estate while leaving the rest of his will intact. See Sitkoff & Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 40. But more important for our purposes, climbing divorce rates led almost all States by the 1980s to adopt another kind of automatic-revocation law. So-called revocation-on- divorce statutes treat an |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | kind of automatic-revocation law. So-called revocation-on- divorce statutes treat an individual’s divorce as voiding a testamentary bequest to a former spouse. Like the old common-law rule, those laws rest on a “judgment about the typical testator’s probable intent.” They presume, in other words, that the average Joe does not want his ex inheriting what he leaves behind. Over time, many States extended their revocation-on- divorce statutes from wills to “will substitutes,” such as Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court revocable trusts, pension accounts, and life insurance policies. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1109 (1984) (describing nonprobate assets). In doing so, States followed the lead of the Uniform Probate Code, a model statute amended in 1990 to include a provision revoking on divorce not just testamentary bequests but also beneficiary designations to a former spouse. See 804(a)(1), (b)(1), 8 U. L. A. –331 (2013). The new section, the drafters wrote, aimed to “unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers.” Comment, at 333. The underlying idea was that the typical decedent would no more want his former spouse to benefit from his pension plan or life insurance than to inherit under his will. A wealth transfer was a wealth transfer—and a former spouse (as compared with, say, a current spouse or child) was not likely to be its desired recipient. So a dece- dent’s failure to change his beneficiary probably resulted from “inattention,” not “intention.” Statement of the Joint Editorial Bd. for Uniform Probate Code, 17 Am. College Trust & Est. Counsel 184 (1991). Agreeing with that assumption, 26 States have by now adopted revocation-on- divorce laws substantially similar to the Code’s.1 Minne- —————— 1 See –4–17 (2016); (2016); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2012); –11–804 ; ; –804 (2006); Idaho Code Ann. ( Cum. Supp.);20A ; Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 190B, (2016); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. (West 2018 Cum. Supp.); –804 subd. 1 (2016); –2–814 ; (2015); N. J. Stat. Ann. (West 2007); N. M. Stat. Ann. 804 (2014); N. Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law Ann. (West 2018 Cum. Supp.); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. (2010); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ; 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. (2010); S. C. Code Ann. ( Cum. Supp.); S. D. Codified Laws (2004); (West 2006); Utah Code ; –111.1 4 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court sota is one. Under prior Minnesota law, a divorce alone did not affect a beneficiary designation—but a particular divorce decree could do so. Take first the simple |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | particular divorce decree could do so. Take first the simple case: Joe names his wife Ann as beneficiary of his insurance policy, later gets divorced, but never changes the designation. Upon his death, Ann would receive the insurance proceeds— even if Joe had just forgotten to redirect the money. In other words, the insurance contract’s beneficiary provision would govern after the divorce, exactly as it would have before. See Larsen v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. App. 1990). But now introduce a complication, in the form of a court addressing a spousal designation in a divorce decree. In Minnesota, as across the nation, divorce courts have always had “broad discre- tion in dividing property upon dissolution of a marriage.” ; see 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation (2008). In exercising that power, a court could revoke a beneficiary designation to a soon-to-be ex-spouse; or conversely, a court could mandate that the old designation remain. See, e.g., (Minn. App. 1987); (Minn. 1984). Either way, the court, rather than the insured, would decide whether the ex-spouse would stay the beneficiary. In contrast to the old law, Minnesota’s new revocation- on-divorce statute starts from another baseline: the can- cellation, rather than continuation, of a beneficiary desig- nation. Enacted in 2002 to track the Code, the law provides that “the dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable[ ] disposition, beneficiary designa- tion, or appointment of property made by an individual to the individual’s former spouse in a governing instrument.” —————— (2016); (2016); (2011). Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court –804, subd. 1. The term “governing instrument” is defined to include an “insurance or annuity policy,” along with a will and other will substitutes. So now when Joe and Ann divorce, the clause naming Ann as Joe’s insurance beneficiary is automatically revoked. If nothing else occurs before Joe’s death, his insurance proceeds go to any contingent beneficiary named in the policy (perhaps his daughter Emma) or, failing that, to his estate. See subd. 2. Something else, however, may well happen. As under Minnesota’s former law, a divorce decree may alter the natural state of things. So in our example, the court could direct that Ann remain as Joe’s insurance beneficiary, despite the normal revocation rule. See subd. 1 (providing that a “court order” trumps the rule). And just as important, the policyholder himself may step in to override the revocation. Joe, for example, could agree to a marital settlement ensuring Ann’s continued status as his beneficiary. See (providing that such an agreement |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | status as his beneficiary. See (providing that such an agreement controls). Or else, and more simply, he could notify his insurance company at any time that he wishes to restore Ann to that position. But enough of our hypothetical divorcees: It is time they give way to Mark Sveen and Kaye Melin, whose marriage and divorce led to this case. In 1997, Sveen and Melin wed. The next year, Sveen purchased a life insurance policy. He named Melin as the primary beneficiary, while designating his two children from a prior marriage, Ashley and Antone Sveen, as the contingent beneficiaries. The Sveen-Melin marriage ended in 2007. The divorce decree made no mention of the insurance policy. And Sveen took no action, then or later, to revise his beneficiary designa- tions. In 2011, he passed away. In this action, petitioners the Sveen children and re- spondent Melin make competing claims to the insurance proceeds. The Sveens contend that under Minnesota’s 6 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court revocation-on-divorce law, their father’s divorce canceled Melin’s beneficiary designation and left the two of them as the rightful recipients. Melin notes in reply that the Minnesota law did not yet exist when her former husband bought his insurance policy and named her as the primary beneficiary. And she argues that applying the later- enacted law to the policy would violate the Constitution’s Contracts Clause, which prohibits any state “Law impair- ing the Obligation of Contracts.” Art. I, cl. 1. The District Court rejected Melin’s argument and awarded the insurance money to the Sveens. See Civ. No. 14–5015 (D Minn., Jan. 7, 2016), App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a– 16a. But the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that a “revocation-upon-divorce statute like [Minnesota’s] violates the Contract Clause when applied retroactively.” F.3d 410, We granted certiorari, 583 U. S. to resolve a split of authority over whether the Contracts Clause pre- vents a revocation-on-divorce law from applying to a pre- existing agreement’s beneficiary designation.2 We now reverse the decision below. II The Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to disrupt contractual arrangements. It provides that “[n]o state shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 1. The origins of the Clause lie in legislation enacted after the Revolution- ary War to relieve debtors of their obligations to creditors. —————— 2 Compare F.3d 410, (yes, it does); 819 (1998) (same), with 1199–1200 (no, it does not); (same); In re Estate of DeWitt, (same). Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | as: 584 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 4, 502–503 (1987). But the Clause applies to any kind of contract. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, That includes, as here, an insurance policy. At the same time, not all laws affecting pre-existing contracts violate the Clause. See El v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506–507 (1965). To determine when such a law crosses the constitutional line, this Court has long applied a two-step test. The threshold issue is whether the state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a con- tractual relationship.” Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S., 44. In answering that question, the Court has considered the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights. See ; El 379 U.S., 14–515; If such factors show a substantial impairment, the inquiry turns to the means and ends of the legislation. In particular, the Court has asked whether the state law is drawn in an “appropriate” and “reasonable” way to ad- vance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411– (1983). Here, we may stop after step one because Minnesota’s revocation-on-divorce statute does not substantially im- pair pre-existing contractual arrangements. True enough that in revoking a beneficiary designation, the law makes a significant change. As Melin says, the “whole point” of buying life insurance is to provide the proceeds to the named beneficiary. Brief for Respondent 16. But three aspects of Minnesota’s law, taken together, defeat Melin’s argument that the change it effected “severely impaired” her ex-husband’s contract. First, the statute is designed to reflect a policyholder’s intent—and so to sup- 8 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court port, rather than impair, the contractual scheme. Second, the law is unlikely to disturb any policyholder’s expecta- tions because it does no more than a divorce court could always have done. And third, the statute supplies a mere default rule, which the policyholder can undo in a mo- ment. Indeed, Minnesota’s revocation statute stacks up well against laws that this Court upheld against Contracts Clause challenges as far back as the early 1800s.3 We now consider in detail each of the features that make this so. To begin, the Minnesota statute furthers the policyhold- er’s intent in many cases—indeed, the drafters reasonably thought in the typical one. As earlier described, legisla- tures have long made judgments about a decedent’s likely testamentary |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | tures have long made judgments about a decedent’s likely testamentary intent after large life changes—a marriage, a birth, or a divorce. See And on that basis, they have long enacted statutes revoking earlier-made wills by operation of law. Legislative presumptions about divorce are now especially prevalent—probably because they accurately reflect the intent of most divorcing parties. Although there are exceptions, most divorcees do not aspire to enrich their former partners. (“No[t] every statute which affects the value of a contract impair[s] its obligation”). And in particular, the Court has always approved statutes like this one, which enable a party with only minimal effort to protect his original contract rights against the law’s operation. See, e.g., 3 Pet. 280, 290 So this case presents no clash, of the kind Melin says we should resolve, between the Court’s two-step test and any older approach to applying the Contracts Clause. Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court even when an ex-spouse has custody of shared children, given the many ways to provide them with independent support.) The Minnesota statute (like the model code it tracked) applies that understanding to beneficiary desig- nations in life insurance policies and other will substi- tutes. See at 3–5. Melin rightly notes that this extension raises a brand-new constitutional question because “an insurance policy is a contract under the Con- tracts Clause, and a will is not.” Brief for Respondent 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). But in answering that question, it matters that the old legislative presump- tion equally fits the new context: A person would as little want his ex-spouse to benefit from his insurance as to collect under his will. Or said otherwise, the insured’s failure to change the beneficiary after a divorce is more likely the result of neglect than choice. And that means the Minnesota statute often honors, not undermines, the intent of the only contracting party to care about the beneficiary term. The law no doubt changes how the insurance contract operates. But does it impair the con- tract? Quite the opposite for lots of policyholders. And even when presumed and actual intent diverge, the Minnesota law is unlikely to upset a policyholder’s expec- tations at the time of contracting. That is because an insured cannot reasonably rely on a beneficiary designa- tion remaining in place after a divorce. As noted above, divorce courts have wide discretion to divide property between spouses when a marriage ends. See The house, the cars, the sporting equipment are all up for grabs. See Judgment and Decree in 14–cv–5015 (D Minn.), p. 51 |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | See Judgment and Decree in 14–cv–5015 (D Minn.), p. 51 (awarding Melin, among other things, a snowmobile and all-terrain vehicle). And (what matters here) so too are the spouses’ life insurance policies, with their beneficiary provisions. Although not part of the Sveen-Melin divorce decree, they could have been; as Melin acknowledges, they sometimes are. See ; 10 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court Brief for Respondent 38. Melin counters that the Con- tracts Clause applies only to legislation, not to judicial decisions. See at 38–39; see also post, at 9 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). That is true, but of no moment. The power of divorce courts over insurance policies is relevant here because it affects whether a party can reasonably expect a beneficiary designation to survive a marital breakdown. We venture to guess that few people, when purchasing life insurance, give a thought to what will happen in the event of divorce. But even if someone out there does, he can conclude only that he cannot possibly know. So his reliance interests are next to nil. And as this Court has held before, that fact cuts against providing protection under the Contracts Clause. See, e.g., El 379 U.S., 14–515. Finally, a policyholder can reverse the effect of the Minnesota statute with the stroke of a pen. The law puts in place a presumption about what an insured wants after divorcing. But if the presumption is wrong, the insured may overthrow it. And he may do so by the simple act of sending a change-of-beneficiary form to his insurer. (Or if he wants to commit himself forever, like Ulysses binding himself to the mast, he may agree to a divorce settlement continuing his ex-spouse’s beneficiary status. See) That action restores his former spouse to the posi- tion she held before the divorce—and in so doing, cancels the state law’s operation. The statute thus reduces to a paperwork requirement (and a fairly painless one, at that): File a form and the statutory default rule gives way to the original beneficiary designation. In cases going back to the 1800s, this Court has held that laws imposing such minimal paperwork burdens do not violate the Contracts Clause. One set of decisions addresses so-called recording statutes, which extinguish contractual interests unless timely recorded at govern- ment offices. In Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 11 Opinion of the Court for example, the Court rejected a Contracts Clause chal- lenge to a New York law granting title in property to a later rather than earlier purchaser whenever the earlier had failed to record his deed. It |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | whenever the earlier had failed to record his deed. It made no difference, the Court held, whether the unrecorded deed was “dated before or after the passage” of the statute; in neither event did the law’s modest recording condition “impair[ ] the obligation of contracts.” 90. Likewise, in Vance v. Vance, the Court upheld a statute rendering unrecorded mortgages unenforceable against third parties—even when the mortgages predated the law. We reasoned that the law gave “due regard to existing contracts” because it demanded only that the mortgagee make a “public registration,” and gave him several months to do so. And more recently, in the Court held that a statute terminating pre-existing mineral interests unless the owner filed a “statement of claim” in a county office did not “unconstitutionally impair” a contract. at The filing requirement was “minimal,” we explained, and compliance with it would effectively “safeguard any con- tractual obligations or rights.” So too, the Court has long upheld against Contracts Clause attack laws mandating other kinds of notifications or filings. In for example, the Court approved a statute retroactively affect- ing buyers of “certificates” for land offered at tax sales. The law required the buyer to notify the tax-delinquent property owner, who could then put up the funds neces- sary to prevent the land’s final sale. If the buyer failed to give the notice, he could not take the land—and if he provided the notice, his chance of gaining the land de- clined. Still, the Court made short work of the Contracts Clause claim. Not “every statute which affects the value of a contract,” the Court stated, “impair[s] its obligation.” at Because the law’s notice rule was “easy [to] 12 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court compl[y] with,” it did not raise a constitutional problem. Similarly, in the Court sustained a state law providing that an existing bondholder’s failure to reject a settlement proposal in writing would count as consent to the deal. The law operated to reduce the interest received by an investor who did not respond. Yet the Court re- buffed the ensuing Contracts Clause suit. “If [the bond- holder did] not wish to abandon his old rights and accept the new,” the Court explained, “all he ha[d] to do [was] to say so in writing.” 06. And one last: In v. Barton, the Court held that the Contracts Clause did not bar a State from compelling existing mortgagees to complete affidavits before finally foreclosing on properties. The law effectively added a paperwork requirement to the mortgage contracts’ foreclo- sure terms. But the Court said it |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | mortgage contracts’ foreclo- sure terms. But the Court said it was “only [a] condition, easily complied with, which the law, for its purposes, requires.” The Minnesota statute places no greater obligation on a contracting party—while imposing a lesser penalty for noncompliance. Even supposing an insured wants his life insurance to benefit his ex-spouse, filing a change-of- beneficiary form with an insurance company is as “easy” as, say, providing a landowner with notice or recording a deed. 13 Wall., Here too, with only “mini- mal” effort, a person can “safeguard” his contractual pref- erences. 454 U.S., at And here too, if he does not “wish to abandon his old rights and accept the new,” he need only “say so in writing.” Gilfillan, 109 U.S., 06. What’s more, if the worst happens—if he wants his ex-spouse to stay as beneficiary but does not send in his form—the consequence pales in comparison with the losses incurred in our earlier cases. When a person ig- nored a recording obligation, for example, he could forfeit the sum total of his contractual rights—just ask the plain- Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 13 Opinion of the Court tiffs in Jackson and Vance. But when a policyholder in Minnesota does not redesignate his ex-spouse as benefi- ciary, his right to insurance does not lapse; the upshot is just that his contingent beneficiaries (here, his children) receive the money. See That redirection of proceeds is not nothing; but under our precedents, it gives the policyholder—who, again, could have “easily” and entirely escaped the law’s effect—no right to complain of a Contracts Clause violation. 260 U.S., In addressing those precedents, Melin mainly urges us to distinguish between two ways a law can affect a con- tract. The Minnesota law, Melin claims, “operate[s] on the contract itself ” by “directly chang[ing] an express term” (the insured’s beneficiary designation). Brief for Respond- ent 51; Tr. of Oral Arg. 57. In contrast, Melin continues, the recording statutes “impose[ ] a consequence” for failing to abide by a “procedural” obligation extraneous to the agreement (the State’s recording or notification rule). Brief for Respondent 51; Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. The differ- ence, in her view, parallels the line between rights and remedies: The Minnesota law explicitly alters a person’s entitlement under the contract, while the recording laws interfere with his ability to enforce that entitlement against others. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 57–59; see also post, at 9–10 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). But we see no meaningful distinction among all these laws. The old statutes also “act[ed] on the contract” in a significant way. |
Justice Kagan | 2,018 | 3 | majority | Sveen v. Melin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4505999/sveen-v-melin/ | statutes also “act[ed] on the contract” in a significant way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 59. They added a paper- work obligation nowhere found in the original agree- ment—“record the deed,” say, or “notify the landowner.” And they informed a contracting party that unless he complied, he could not gain the benefits of his bargain. Or viewed conversely, the Minnesota statute also “impose[s] a consequence” for not satisfying a burden outside the con- tract. Brief for Respondent 51. For as we have shown, that law overrides a beneficiary designation only when the 14 SVEEN v. MELIN Opinion of the Court insured fails to send in a form to his insurer. See at 10. Of course, the statutes (both old and new) vary in their specific mechanisms. But they all make contract benefits contingent on some simple filing—or more posi- tively spun, enable a party to safeguard those benefits by taking an action. And that feature is what the Court, again and again, has found dispositive. Nor does Melin’s attempt to distinguish the cases gain force when framed in terms of rights and remedies. First, not all the old statutes, as a formal matter, confined the consequence of noncompliance to the remedial sphere. In Gilfillan, for example, the result of failing to give written consent to a settlement was to diminish the interest rate a bondholder got, not to prevent him from enforcing a claim against others. And second, even when the consequence formally related to enforcement—for example, precluding an earlier purchaser from contesting a later one’s title— the laws in fact wiped out substantive rights. Failure to record or notify, as noted earlier, would mean that the contracting party lost what (according to his agreement) was his land or mortgage or mineral interest. See at 12–13. In we replied to an argument like Melin’s by saying that when the results of “eliminating a remedy” and “extinguishing a right” are “identical,” the Contracts Clause “analysis is the same.” 454 U.S., 28; see El 379 U.S., 06–507. That statement rebuts Melin’s claim too. Once again: Just like Minnesota’s statute, the laws discussed above hinged core contractual benefits on compliance with noncontractual paperwork burdens. When all is said and done, that likeness controls. For those reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 1 GORSUCH, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 16–1432 ASHLEY SVEEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | concurring | United States v. Clark | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110210/united-states-v-clark/ | The question in this case is whether the illegitimate children of a federal employee, who lived with his children after their birth and had a legal obligation to contribute to their support until his death, are eligible to receive survivors' benefits under the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S. C. 8331 et seq. The statutory definition of "child" under that Act includes a "recognized natural child who lived with the employee in a regular parent-child relationship." 5 U.S. C. 8341 (a) (3) *35 (A) (ii). Because I agree that these children satisfy the statutory definition, I concur in the judgment of the Court. I write separately because I do not believe that the Court's broad construction of the "lived with" requirement is compatible with congressional intent or necessary to avoid constitutional difficulties. The Court recognizes that the "lived with" requirement could serve governmental purposes by providing proof of either paternity or dependence. The Court concludes that the "lived with" requirement is not designed to prove paternity because the statute separately requires that an eligible illegitimate be a "recognized natural child." Ante, at 30. I agree. I cannot accept so easily the Court's further conclusion that the "lived with" requirement was not designed to prove dependency. Although the 1966 amendment demonstrates that the "lived with" requirement cannot be interpreted to demand that more than one-half of a child's support come from the deceased parent, it does not demonstrate that Congress intended to eliminate entirely the dependency requirement. As a matter of statutory construction and common sense, the statement that an illegitimate who fulfills the "lived with" requirement need not meet an additional dependency requirement, ante, at 32, quoting H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966), indicates that Congress intended the "lived with" test to serve as the functional equivalent of a dependency requirement. The Court's assumption to the contrary deprives the "lived with" requirement of any legislative purpose. Rather than construe a statutory provision to serve no identifiable congressional goal, I would conclude that Congress intended the "lived with" requirement to serve as a means through which illegitimate children may prove actual dependency on the deceased parent. Congress may require illegitimate children to demonstrate actual dependency even though legitimate children are presumed to be dependent, so long as the means by which illegitimates *36 must demonstrate such dependency are substantially related to achievement of the statutory goal. ; see The possible constitutional infirmity in the Government's construction of the statute is its assumption that only illegitimates who "lived with" a parent at the time of his death |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | concurring | United States v. Clark | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110210/united-states-v-clark/ | "lived with" a parent at the time of his death were actually dependent. Such a requirement may be unconstitutionally restrictive because, as in this case, it would bar the claims of children who lived with their father for some part of their lives, and who received support from their father until his death.[*] The recognition of the children's claim in this case clearly does not frustrate the congressional intent that only dependent illegitimate children receive survivors' annuities. I therefore would hold that children who show a continuing relationship of dependency with their father, which includes living with him in the past and receiving support from him when they lived apart, satisfy the requirement of 5 U.S. C. 8341 (a) (3) (A) (ii). I do not believe, however, that the Court needs to find the requirement satisfied no matter when the child lived with the deceased parent. In some circumstances proof of a domestic living situation at some far distant period in the child's life may not demonstrate actual dependency. Accordingly, I would go no further than concluding that these children have satisfied the "lived with" requirement. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | This case concerns eligibility for federal trademark regis- tration. Respondent Booking.com, an enterprise that main- tains a travel-reservation website by the same name, sought to register the mark “Booking.com.” Concluding that “Booking.com” is a generic name for online hotel-reservation services, the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) re- fused registration. A generic name—the name of a class of products or ser- vices—is ineligible for federal trademark registration. The word “booking,” the parties do not dispute, is generic for hotel-reservation services. “Booking.com” must also be ge- neric, the PTO maintains, under an encompassing rule the PTO currently urges us to adopt: The combination of a ge- neric word and “.com” is generic. In accord with the first- and second-instance judgments in this case, we reject the PTO’s sweeping rule. A term styled “generic.com” is a generic name for a class of goods or services only if the term has that meaning to Consumers, according to lower court determinations un- contested here by the PTO, do not perceive the term 2 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court “Booking.com” to signify online hotel-reservation services as a class. In circumstances like those this case presents, a “generic.com” term is not generic and can be eligible for fed- eral trademark registration. I A A trademark distinguishes one producer’s goods or ser- vices from another’s. Guarding a trademark against use by others, this Court has explained, “secure[s] to the owner of the mark the goodwill” of her business and “protect[s] the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing pro- ducers.” Park ’N 46 U.S. 18, 18 ; see S. Rep. No. 1333, 7th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (146) (trademark statutes aim to “protect the pub- lic so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bear- ing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get”). Trademark protection has roots in common law and equity. Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. (slip op., at 2). To- day, the Lanham Act, enacted in 146, provides federal statutory protection for trademarks. as amended, 15 U.S. C. et seq. We have recognized that federal trademark protection, supplementing state law, “supports the free flow of commerce” and “foster[s] compe- tition.” Matal, 582 U. S., at – (slip op., at 3, 4–5) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Lanham Act not only arms trademark owners with federal claims for relief; importantly, it establishes a sys- tem of federal trademark registration. The owner of a mark on the principal register enjoys “valuable benefits,” includ- |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | a mark on the principal register enjoys “valuable benefits,” includ- ing a presumption that the mark is valid. Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U. S. (201) (slip op., at 2); see §, 1052. The supplemental register contains other product and ser- vice designations, some of which could one day gain eligibil- ity for the principal register. See The supplemental Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) 3 Opinion of the Court register accords more modest benefits; notably, a listing on that register announces one’s use of the designation to oth- ers considering a similar mark. See 3 J. McCarthy, Trade- marks and Unfair Competition (5th ed. 201) (here- inafter McCarthy). Even without federal registration, a mark may be eligible for protection against infringement under both the Lanham Act and other sources of law. See Matal, 582 U. S., at – (slip op., at 4–5). Prime among the conditions for registration, the mark must be one “by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others.” see (supplemental register contains “marks capable of distin- guishing goods or services”). Distinctiveness is often ex- pressed on an increasing scale: Word marks “may be (1) ge- neric; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (12). The more distinctive the mark, the more readily it quali- fies for the principal register. The most distinctive marks— those that are “ ‘arbitrary’ (‘Camel’ cigarettes), ‘fanciful’ (‘Kodak’ film), or ‘suggestive’ (‘Tide’ laundry detergent)”— may be placed on the principal register because they are “inherently distinctive.” Wal-Mart “Descriptive” terms, in contrast, are not eligible for the principal register based on their inherent qualities alone. E.g., Park ’N (CA 183) (“Park ’N ” airport parking is descriptive), rev’d on other grounds, The Lanham Act, “lib- eraliz[ing] the common law,” “extended protection to de- scriptive marks.” Qualitex But to be placed on the principal register, descriptive terms must achieve significance “in the minds of the public” as identifying the applicant’s goods or services—a quality called “acquired distinctiveness” or “sec- ondary meaning.” Wal-Mart 4 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court (internal quotation marks omitted); see (f ). Without secondary meaning, descriptive terms may be eligible only for the supplemental register. At the lowest end of the distinctiveness scale is “the generic name for the goods or services.” 1064(3), 1065(4). The name of the good itself (e.g., “wine”) is incapable of “distinguish[ing] [one producer’s goods] from the goods of others” and is therefore ineligible for registra- tion. see Indeed, generic terms |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | is therefore ineligible for registra- tion. see Indeed, generic terms are ordi- narily ineligible for protection as trademarks at all. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition p. 142 (13); Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270 (CA2 1) (“[E]veryone may use [generic terms] to refer to the goods they designate.”). B Booking.com is a digital travel company that provides hotel reservations and other services under the brand “Booking.com,” which is also the domain name of its web- site.1 Booking.com filed applications to register four marks in connection with travel-related services, each with different visual features but all containing the term “Booking.com.”2 Both a PTO examining attorney and the PTO’s Trade- mark Trial and Appeal Board concluded that the term “Booking.com” is generic for the services at issue and is therefore unregistrable. “Booking,” the Board observed, means making travel reservations, and “.com” signifies a —————— 1 A domain name identifies an address on the Internet. The rightmost component of a domain name—“.com” in “Booking.com”—is known as the top-level domain. Domain names are unique; that is, a given domain name is assigned to only one entity at a time. 2 For simplicity, this opinion uses the term “trademark” to encompass the marks whose registration Booking.com seeks. Although Book- ing.com uses the marks in connection with services, not goods, rendering the marks “service marks” rather than “trademarks” under 15 U.S. C. that distinction is immaterial to the issue before us. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) 5 Opinion of the Court commercial website. The Board then ruled that “customers would understand the term BOOKING.COM primarily to refer to an online reservation service for travel, tours, and lodgings.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, 176a. Alternatively, the Board held that even if “Booking.com” is descriptive, not generic, it is unregistrable because it lacks secondary meaning. Booking.com sought review in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, invoking a mode of review that allows Booking.com to introduce evidence not pre- sented to the agency. See Relying in significant part on Booking.com’s new evidence of consumer percep- tion, the District Court concluded that “Booking.com”—un- like “booking”—is not generic. The “consuming public,” the court found, “primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that domain name.” Book- ing.com Having determined that “Booking.com” is descriptive, the District Court additionally found that the term has ac- quired secondary meaning as to hotel-reservation services. For those services, the District Court therefore concluded, Booking.com’s marks meet the distinctiveness requirement for |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | Court therefore concluded, Booking.com’s marks meet the distinctiveness requirement for registration. The PTO appealed only the District Court’s determina- tion that “Booking.com” is not generic. Finding no error in the District Court’s assessment of how consumers perceive the term “Booking.com,” the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the court of first instance’s judg- ment. In so ruling, the appeals court rejected the PTO’s contention that the combination of “.com” with a generic term like “booking” “is necessarily generic.” 15 F.3d 184 (201). Dissenting in relevant part, Judge Wynn con- cluded that the District Court mistakenly presumed that “generic.com” terms are usually descriptive, not generic. 6 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court We granted certiorari, 58 U. S. (201), and now af- firm the Fourth Circuit’s decision. II Although the parties here disagree about the circum- stances in which terms like “Booking.com” rank as generic, several guiding principles are common ground. First, a “ge- neric” term names a “class” of goods or services, rather than any particular feature or exemplification of the class. Brief for Petitioners 4; Brief for Respondent 6; see 1064(3), 1065(4) (referring to “the generic name for the goods or services”); Park ’N (“A generic term is one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”). Second, for a compound term, the distinctiveness inquiry trains on the term’s meaning as a whole, not its parts in isolation. Reply Brief ; Brief for Respondent 2; see Estate of P. D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, Third, the relevant meaning of a term is its meaning to Brief for Petitioners 43–44; Brief for Respondent 2; see Bayer 50 (SDNY 121) (Hand, J.) (“What do the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?”). Eligibility for registration, all agree, turns on the mark’s capacity to “distinguis[h]” goods “in commerce.” Evidencing the Lanham Act’s focus on consumer perception, the section governing cancellation of registration provides that “[t]he primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services.” —————— 3 The U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) suggests that the primary-significance test might not govern outside the context of which subjects to cancellation marks previously registered that have “become” generic. See Reply Brief 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 1. To Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) 7 Opinion of the Court Under these principles, whether “Booking.com” is generic turns on whether that term, taken as |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | “Booking.com” is generic turns on whether that term, taken as a whole, signifies to consumers the class of online hotel-reservation services. Thus, if “Booking.com” were generic, we might expect consumers to understand Travelocity—another such service—to be a “Booking.com.” We might similarly expect that a consumer, searching for a trusted source of online hotel-reservation services, could ask a frequent traveler to name her favorite “Booking.com” provider. Consumers do not in fact perceive the term “Booking.com” that way, the courts below determined. The PTO no longer disputes that determination. See Pet. for Cert. I; Brief for Petitioners 17–18 (contending only that a consumer-perception inquiry was unnecessary, not that the lower courts’ consumer-perception determination was wrong). That should resolve this case: Because “Booking.com” is not a generic name to consumers, it is not generic. III Opposing that conclusion, the PTO urges a nearly per se rule that would render “Booking.com” ineligible for regis- tration regardless of specific evidence of consumer percep- tion. In the PTO’s view, which the dissent embraces, when a generic term is combined with a generic top-level domain —————— so confine the primary-significance test, however, would upset the un- derstanding, shared by Courts of Appeals and the PTO’s own manual for trademark examiners, that the same test governs whether a mark is reg- istrable in the first place. See, e.g., In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc., 823 F.3d 54, 5 (CA Fed. 2016); Nartron ; Genesee ; Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure p. 1200–267 (Oct. 2018), http://tmep.uspto.gov. We need not address today the scope of the primary-significance test’s application, for our analysis does not depend on whether one meaning among several is “primary.” Sufficient to resolve this case is the undis- puted principle that consumer perception demarcates a term’s meaning. 8 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court like “.com,” the resulting combination is generic. In other words, every “generic.com” term is generic according to the PTO, absent exceptional circumstances.4 The PTO’s own past practice appears to reflect no such comprehensive rule. See, e.g., Trademark Registration No. 3,601,346 (“ART.COM” on principal register for, inter alia, “[o]nline retail store services” offering “art prints, original art, [and] art reproductions”); Trademark Registration No. 2,580,467 (“DATING.COM” on supplemental register for “dating services”). Existing registrations inconsistent with the rule the PTO now advances would be at risk of cancel- lation if the PTO’s current view were to prevail. See We decline to adopt a rule essentially excluding registration of “generic.com” marks. As explained below, we discern no support for the PTO’s current view in trade- mark law or policy. A The |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | current view in trade- mark law or policy. A The PTO urges that the exclusionary rule it advocates follows from a common-law principle, applied in Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 58 (1888), that a generic corporate designation added to a generic term does not confer trademark eligibility. In Goodyear, a decision predating the Lanham Act, this Court held that “Goodyear Rubber Company” was not “capable of exclusive appropriation.” Standing alone, the term “Goodyear Rubber” could not serve as a trademark because it referred, in those days, to “well-known classes of goods produced by the process known as Goodyear’s invention.” “[A]ddition of the word ‘Company’ ” supplied no protectable meaning, the Court concluded, —————— 4 The PTO notes only one possible exception: Sometimes adding a ge- neric term to a generic top-level domain results in wordplay (for example, “tennis.net”). That special case, the PTO acknowledges, is not presented here and does not affect our analysis. See Brief for Petitioners 25, n. 6; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–26. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) Opinion of the Court because adding “Company” “only indicates that parties have formed an association or partnership to deal in such goods.” Permitting exclusive rights in “Goodyear Rubber Company” (or “Wine Company, Cotton Company, or Grain Company”), the Court explained, would tread on the right of all persons “to deal in such articles, and to publish the fact to the world.” –603. “Generic.com,” the PTO maintains, is like “Generic Com- pany” and is therefore ineligible for trademark protection, let alone federal registration. According to the PTO, adding “.com” to a generic term—like adding “Company”—“conveys no additional meaning that would distinguish [one pro- vider’s] services from those of other providers.” Brief for Petitioners 44. The dissent endorses that proposition: “Ge- neric.com” conveys that the generic good or service is of- fered online “and nothing more.” Post, at 1. That premise is faulty. A “generic.com” term might also convey to consumers a source-identifying characteristic: an association with a particular website. As the PTO and the dissent elsewhere acknowledge, only one entity can occupy a particular Internet domain name at a time, so “[a] con- sumer who is familiar with that aspect of the domain-name system can infer that BOOKING.COM refers to some spe- cific entity.” Brief for Petitioners 40. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (“Because domain names are one of a kind, a signifi- cant portion of the public will always understand a generic ‘.com’ term to refer to a specific business”); post, at 7 (the “exclusivity” of “generic.com” terms sets |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | business”); post, at 7 (the “exclusivity” of “generic.com” terms sets them apart from terms like “Wine, Inc.” and “The Wine Company”). Thus, consumers could understand a given “generic.com” term to describe the corresponding website or to identify the website’s proprietor. We therefore resist the PTO’s position that “generic.com” terms are capable of signifying only an entire class of online goods or services and, hence, 10 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court are categorically incapable of identifying a source.5 The PTO’s reliance on Goodyear is flawed in another re- spect. The PTO understands Goodyear to hold that “Ge- neric Company” terms “are ineligible for trademark protec- tion as a matter of law”—regardless of how “consumers would understand” the term. Brief for Petitioners 38. But, as noted, whether a term is generic depends on its meaning to That bedrock principle of the Lanham Act is incompatible with an unyielding legal rule that entirely disregards consumer perception. Instead, Goodyear reflects a more modest principle harmonious with Congress’ subsequent enactment: A compound of generic el- ements is generic if the combination yields no additional meaning to consumers capable of distinguishing the goods or services. The PTO also invokes the oft-repeated principle that “no matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise —————— 5 In passing, the PTO urges us to disregard that a domain name is as- signed to only one entity at a time. That fact, the PTO suggests, stems from “a functional characteristic of the Internet and the domain-name system,” and functional features cannot receive trademark protection. Brief for Petitioners “[A] product feature is functional, and cannot serve as a trademark,” we have held, “if it is essential to the use or pur- pose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” TrafFix Devices, (internal quotation marks omitted); see (barring from the principal reg- istrar “any matter that, as a whole, is functional”). This case, however, does not concern trademark protection for a feature of the Internet or the domain-name system; Booking.com lays no claim to the use of unique domain names generally. Nor does the PTO contend that the particular domain name “Booking.com” is essential to the use or purpose of online hotel-reservation services, affects these services’ cost or quality, or is oth- erwise necessary for competitors to use. In any event, we have no occa- sion to decide the applicability of ’s functionality bar, for the sole ground on which the PTO refused registration, and |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | the sole ground on which the PTO refused registration, and the sole claim before us, is that “Booking.com” is generic. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) 11 Opinion of the Court it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the prod- uct of the right to call an article by its name.” Abercrombie & Fitch (CA2 176). That principle presupposes that a generic term is at issue. But the PTO’s only legal basis for deeming “generic.com” terms generic is its mistaken reliance on Goodyear. While we reject the rule proffered by the PTO that “generic.com” terms are generic names, we do not embrace a rule automatically classifying such terms as nongeneric. Whether any given “generic.com” term is generic, we hold, depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of dis- tinguishing among members of the class.6 B The PTO, echoed by the dissent, post, at 10–12, objects that protecting “generic.com” terms as trademarks would —————— 6 Evidence informing that inquiry can include not only consumer sur- veys, but also dictionaries, usage by consumers and competitors, and any other source of evidence bearing on how consumers perceive a term’s meaning. Surveys can be helpful evidence of consumer perception but require care in their design and interpretation. See Brief for Trademark Scholars as Amici Curiae 18–20 (urging that survey respondents may conflate the fact that domain names are exclusive with a conclusion that a given “generic.com” term has achieved secondary meaning). Moreover, difficult questions may be presented when a term has multiple concur- rent meanings to consumers or a meaning that has changed over time. See, e.g., 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (5th ed. 201) (discussing terms that are “a generic name to some, a trade- mark to others”); §12:4 (“Determining the distinction between ge- neric and trademark usage of a word when there are no other sellers of [the good or service] is one of the most difficult areas of trademark law.”). Such issues are not here entailed, for the PTO does not contest the lower courts’ assessment of consumer perception in this case. See Pet. for Cert. I; Brief for Petitioners 17–18. For the same reason, while the dissent questions the evidence on which the lower courts relied, post, at 7–8, we have no occasion to reweigh that evidence. Cf. post, at 1–2 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). 12 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court disserve trademark law’s animating policies. We disagree. The PTO’s principal concern is that trademark protection for a term |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | PTO’s principal concern is that trademark protection for a term like “Booking.com” would hinder competitors. But the PTO does not assert that others seeking to offer online hotel-reservation services need to call their services “Booking.com.” Rather, the PTO fears that trademark pro- tection for “Booking.com” could exclude or inhibit competi- tors from using the term “booking” or adopting domain names like “ebooking.com” or “hotel-booking.com.” Brief for Petitioners 27–28. The PTO’s objection, therefore, is not to exclusive use of “Booking.com” as a mark, but to undue con- trol over similar language, i.e., “booking,” that others should remain free to use. That concern attends any descriptive mark. Responsive to it, trademark law hems in the scope of such marks short of denying trademark protection altogether. Notably, a competitor’s use does not infringe a mark unless it is likely to confuse See 1125(a)(1)(A); 4 McCarthy (collecting state law). In assessing the likelihood of confusion, courts consider the mark’s distinc- tiveness: “The weaker a mark, the fewer are the junior uses that will trigger a likelihood of consumer confusion.” 2 When a mark incorporates generic or highly de- scriptive components, consumers are less likely to think that other uses of the common element emanate from the mark’s owner. Similarly, “[i]n a ‘crowded’ field of look- alike marks” (e.g., hotel names including the word “grand”), consumers “may have learned to carefully pick out” one mark from another. And even where some con- sumer confusion exists, the doctrine known as classic fair use, see protects from liability anyone who uses a descriptive term, “fairly and in good faith” and “otherwise than as a mark,” merely to describe her own goods. 15 U.S. C. see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) 13 Opinion of the Court These doctrines guard against the anticompetitive ef- fects the PTO identifies, ensuring that registration of “Booking.com” would not yield its holder a monopoly on the term “booking.” Booking.com concedes that “Booking.com” would be a “weak” mark. Tr. of Oral Arg. 66. See also at 42–43, 55. The mark is descriptive, Booking.com recog- nizes, making it “harder to show a likelihood of confu- sion.” Furthermore, because its mark is one of many “similarly worded marks,” Booking.com accepts that close variations are unlikely to infringe. 6. And Booking.com acknowledges that federal registration of “Booking.com” would not prevent competitors from using the word “booking” to describe their own services. at 55. The PTO also doubts that owners of “generic.com” brands need trademark protection in addition to existing competi- tive advantages. Booking.com, the PTO argues, has |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,020 | 5 | majority | Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4764769/patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingcom-b-v/ | to existing competi- tive advantages. Booking.com, the PTO argues, has al- ready seized a domain name that no other website can use and is easy for consumers to find. Consumers might enter “the word ‘booking’ in a search engine,” the PTO observes, or “proceed directly to ‘booking.com’ in the expectation that [online hotel-booking] services will be offered at that ad- dress.” Brief for Petitioners Those competitive ad- vantages, however, do not inevitably disqualify a mark from federal registration. All descriptive marks are intuitively linked to the product or service and thus might be easy for consumers to find using a search engine or telephone direc- tory. The Lanham Act permits registration nonetheless. See (f ). And the PTO fails to explain how the ex- clusive connection between a domain name and its owner makes the domain name a generic term all should be free to use. That connection makes trademark protection more appropriate, not less. See at Finally, even if “Booking.com” is generic, the PTO urges, unfair-competition law could prevent others from passing off their services as Booking.com’s. Cf. Genesee Co. 14 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V. Opinion of the Court v. Stroh Co., 14 ; Blinded Veterans (CADC 18). But federal trademark registration would offer Booking.com greater protection. See, e.g., Genesee (unfair-competition law would oblige competitor at most to “make more of an effort” to reduce confusion, not to cease marketing its product using the disputed term); Matal, 582 U. S., at (slip op., at 5) (federal registration confers val- uable benefits); Brief for Respondent 26 (expressing inten- tion to seek protections available to trademark owners un- der the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S. C. Brief for Coalition ofCom Brand Own- ers as Amici Curiae 14–1 (trademark rights allow mark owners to stop domain-name abuse through private dispute resolution without resorting to litigation). We have no cause to deny Booking.com the same benefits Congress ac- corded other marks qualifying as nongeneric. * * * The PTO challenges the judgment below on a sole ground: It urges that, as a rule, combining a generic term with “.com” yields a generic composite. For the above-stated rea- sons, we decline a rule of that order, one that would largely disallow registration of “generic.com” terms and open the door to cancellation of scores of currently registered marks. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding eligibility for trademark registra- tion is Affirmed. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2020) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 1–46 UNITED STATES PATENT AND |
Justice Powell | 1,986 | 17 | second_dissenting | Automobile Workers v. Brock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111720/automobile-workers-v-brock/ | The Court today holds that petitioner UAW has standing to proceed in a suit challenging the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the eligibility provisions of the Trade Act, codified at 19 U.S. C. 2291, because those members of the UAW who have claims pending before a state administrative agency would have standing to bring a similar suit. The record, however, provides no information as to how many members of the UAW fall within this potential class. There is the danger that ultimately the number of members that the UAW can represent will be quite small. The Union may therefore lack the incentive to provide the adequate representation needed by the courts. It is well settled that an association can represent its members' interest in a third-party action when an association has alleged a related injury. E. g., Moreover, in appropriate circumstances this Court has conferred standing upon an association whose members have suffered an alleged injury, even though the organization itself has not suffered an injury. In the Court stated: "[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." It is undisputed that achieving unemployment benefits under the program of trade readjustment allowance is "germane" to the UAW's purpose in the sense that one of its goals is to secure such benefits for its workers. I do not believe, however, that a determination of "germane" in this formalistic *297 sense should be sufficient to confer standing upon the UAW here. A consistent concern of our standing cases has been the adequacy of representation of the organization purportedly acting on behalf of the injured parties, especially when the organization itself has not suffered injury. This Court has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to confer standing on third parties for fear of inadequate representation. "The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before them." See, e. g., ; Since the concept of organizational representation is based on a theoretical identity between the organization and its members, the organization's interest in the outcome is based on the members' stake in the outcome. The number of members in the organization with a concrete stake in the outcome, however, may be so small that this theoretical identity |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) metes out severe immigration consequences to a noncitizen convicted of any of a number of “aggravated felon[ies].” U.S. C. An offense “described in” 1 U.S. C. a federal arson statute—qualifies as such a crime. In this case, petitioner, who goes by George Luna, was convicted of third-degree arson under N. Y. Penal Law Ann. (West 2010), which punishes anyone who (1) “intentionally” (2) “damages,” by (3) “starting a fire or causing an explosion,” (4) “a building or motor vehicle.” By contrast, the federal arson statute, 1 U.S. C. applies when someone (1) “maliciously” (2) “damages or destroys,” (3) “by means of fire or an explosive,” (4) “any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property” (5) “used in interstate or foreign commerce.” There is one more element in the federal offense than in the state offense—(5), the interstate or foreign commerce element. Luna thus was not convicted of an offense “described in” the federal statute. Case closed. Not for the majority. It dubs the fifth element “jurisdic tional,” then relies on contextual clues to read it out of the statute altogether. As a result of the majority’s sleuthing, Luna—a long-time legal permanent resident—is foreclosed 2 LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from even appealing to the sound discretion of the Attor ney General to obtain relief from removal. Because prece dent and the text and structure of the INA require the opposite result, I respectfully dissent. I A Noncitizens convicted of crimes face various conse quences under the INA. Among the harshest of those consequences fall on noncitizens convicted of 1 of the approximately 0 “aggravated felonies.” A crime that falls into one of the listed provisions can be an aggravated felony “whether in violation of Federal or State law” or “in violation of the law of a foreign country.” See U.S. C. An aggravated felony conviction has two primary reper cussions for noncitizens: It renders them deportable, and it makes them categorically ineli gible for several forms of immigration relief ordinarily left to the discretion of the Attorney General. See, e.g., (cancellation of removal). The dozens of aggravated felonies in the INA are speci fied in two main ways. First, some are specified by refer ence to a generic crime. It is an aggravated felony, for instance, to commit “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” Some of those crimes use a federal definition as one of the elements. For example: “Illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in [21 U.S. C. U.S. C. (emphasis added). (“Illicit trafficking” is a |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | U.S. C. U.S. C. (emphasis added). (“Illicit trafficking” is a generic crime; the element of “controlled substance” takes the meaning in 21 U.S. C. the “Definitions” provision of the Controlled Sub stances Act.) Second, it lists crimes that are wholly “described in” the federal criminal code. See, e.g., (“an of fense described in section 75, 76, 77, or 1202 of title 1 Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom)”); (“an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 1 (relating to child pornography)”). The Government contends that Luna committed a crime in this second category: an “offense described in” 1 U.S. C. which criminalizes arson. U.S. C. B In Luna was found removable from the United States. He attempted to apply for cancellation of removal, a form of relief available to long-time legal permanent residents at the discretion of the Attorney General. Nothing in Luna’s history would otherwise preclude cancellation. He was the sole source of financial support for his U. S. citizen fiancée, enrolled in college and studying engineering, a homeowner, and a law-abiding legal permanent resident since he was brought to the United States as a child over 30 years ago, aside from the one third-degree arson conviction at issue in this case, for which he served a day in jail. But the Immigration Judge found—and the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Second Circuit confirmed— that Luna was ineligible for cancellation of removal. Luna’s New York State arson conviction, the judge held, qualified as an aggravated felony under the provision for “an offense described in” a federal arson statute. See Aggravated felons are ineligible for can- cellation of removal. See Luna’s cancellation- of-removal application was thus summarily denied. II But the offense of which Luna was convicted is not “described in” This Court’s ordinary method of interpreting the aggravated felony statute, the plain text of that provision, and the structure of the INA all confirm as much. 4 LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting A This is not the first time the Court has been tasked with determining whether a state offense constitutes an “ag gravated felony” under the INA. Until today, the Court has always required the state offense to match every ele ment of the listed “aggravated felony.” Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U. S. (slip op., at 4); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 4–5); (2010); ; Gon- ; Lopez v. Gonzales, ; Our ordinary methodology thus confirms that the federal arson statute does |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | ordinary methodology thus confirms that the federal arson statute does not describe the New York arson stat ute under which Luna was convicted. As I have outlined above, see the federal statute is more limited: It applies only to fires that involve “interstate or foreign commerce.” The state statute contains no such limitation. Thus, under the approach we have used in every case to date, the omission of the interstate commerce element means that Luna’s state arson conviction was not an aggravated felony under the INA. B The plain language of the statute supports this straight forward approach. The word “describe” means to “ex press,” “portray,” or “represent.” See Black’s Law Diction ary 445 (6th ed. 1990); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 610 (196). A description may be “detailed” or it may be general, setting forth only the “recognizable features, or characteristic marks,” of the thing described while leaving the rest to the imagination. 4 Oxford Eng lish Dictionary 512 (2d ed. 199). For example, a Craigslist ad describing an apartment with “in-unit laun dry, a dishwasher, rooftop access, central A/C, and a walk-in Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 5 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting closet” may leave much to the imagination. After all, the description does not mention the apartment’s square footage, windows, or floor number. But though the ad omits features, we would still call it a “description” be cause it accurately conveys the “recognizable features” of the apartment. However, even the most general description cannot refer to features that the thing being described does not have. The ad is only an accurate description if the apartment “described in” it has at least the five features listed. If the apartment only has four of the five listed features—there is no rooftop access, say, or the walk-in closet is not so much walk-in as shimmy-in—then the Craigslist ad no longer “describes” the apartment. Rather, it misdescribes it. So, too, with the statutes in this case. The federal de scription can be general as long as it is still accurate—that is, as long as the state law has at least all of the elements in the federal law. But there is no meaning of “describe” that allows the Court to say §44(i) “describes” the New York offense when the New York offense only has four of the five elements listed in Section 44(i) misde scribes the New York offense just as surely as the too- good-to-be-true Craigslist ad misdescribes the real-life apartment. C The structure of the INA confirms that conclusion and makes clear that we need not contort the ordinary, |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | and makes clear that we need not contort the ordinary, accepted meaning of the phrase “described in.” The INA has many overlapping provisions that assign carefully calibrated consequences to various types of criminal convictions. The Court thus need not interpret any provision—and certainly none of the aggravated felony provisions, among the harshest in the INA—as broadly as possible because the INA as a whole ensures that serious criminal conduct 6 LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting is adequately captured. That overlapping structure is apparent throughout the INA. First, the aggravated felony list itself has multiple fail-safe provisions. Most serious offenses, for instance, will qualify as “crime[s] of violence for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” U.S. C. even if they are not covered by a more specific provision in the aggravated felony list. Had his crime been charged as a more serious arson and had he been punished by one year of imprisonment instead of one day, Luna might have qualified as an aggravated felon under that provision. See v. Holder, 714 F.3d 140, 145 (CA2 2013) (second-degree arson in New York is a “crime of violence”).1 —————— 1 Manyof the majority’s own examples of “the gravest” state offenses supposedly excluded from the aggravated felony list by Luna’s reading actually fall within these fail-safe provisions. Ante, 0. Many state arsons will qualify as “crime[s] of violence” under U.S. C. see, e.g., 42 F.3d 276, ; an even greater fraction of the most serious arsons will fall under that heading because States like New York have enacted gra- dated statutes under which more severe degrees of arson are crimes of violence, see 714 F.3d, 45. To take another of the majori ty’s examples, while a state conviction for demanding a ransom in a kidnaping is not “an offense described in [1 U.S. C. §75]” under a state conviction for kidnaping or conspiring to kidnap may qualify as a crime of violence under See United And even under the majority’s reading, a state-law conviction will only qualify as an aggravated felony if the “right state charge is filed.” Ante, 4, n. 10. For example, even on the majority’s reading, a state- court defendant who sells a child for purposes of child pornography is unlikely to be convicted of “an offense described in [1 U.S. C.] see That is because virtually no States have a statute corresponding to 1 U.S. C. with or without the interstate commerce element. (But see Fla. Stat. §47.0145 (2015).) Such a defendant may, however, be convicted of a state offense that qualifies as |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | however, be convicted of a state offense that qualifies as an aggravated felony for conspiring to commit sexual abuse of a minor under U.S. C. and 1101(a)(43)(A). Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 7 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Second, other sections of the INA provide intertwining coverage for serious crimes. Some examples of provisions that encompass many offenses include those for the com mission of a “crime involving moral turpitude,” a firearms offense, or a controlled substance offense, all of which will render a noncitizen removable, even if he or she has not committed an aggravated felony. See (B)(i), (C); §§112(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Cf. 4 (commenting on the breadth of the “crime involving moral turpitude” provision).2 And finally, in Luna’s case or anyone else’s, the Attor ney General can exercise her discretion to deny relief to a serious criminal whether or not that criminal has been convicted of an aggravated felony. See Carachuri- 560 U.S., at 51 (doubting that a narrow read ing of will have “any practical effect on polic ing our Nation’s borders”). To be sure, on Luna’s reading, some serious conduct may not be captured by the INA. But not nearly so much as the majority suggests. By contrast, once the aggra vated felony statute applies to a noncitizen, no provision in the INA—and virtually no act by the Attorney General— can prevent him or her from being removed. Looking for consistency in the aggravated felony provi sions of the INA is often a fool’s errand. See Kawashima, 565 U. S., at n. 2 (slip op., at 9, n. 2) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (noting the absurdity of making a tax misde —————— 2 Other crimes in the majority’s list of serious offenses, ante, 0–14, will be covered by these separate INA provisions. For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals has held that any child pornography offense is a “crime involving moral turpitude,” rendering a noncitizen removable in many cases. See 112(a)(2)(A)(i); In re Olquin-Rufino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 96 Any offense involving a gun would make a noncitizen deportable under one of the catchall provisions for buying, selling, or possessing a firearm in violation of “any law.” See LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting meanor, but not driving while drunk and causing serious bodily injury, an aggravated felony). But the structure of the INA gives the Court no reason to read the aggravated felony provisions as broadly as possible.3 That is why this Court has repeatedly cautioned against interpreting the aggravated felony section to sweep in offenses that—like many state arson convictions—may be neither aggravated nor felonies. See |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | many state arson convictions—may be neither aggravated nor felonies. See Carachuri-, ; Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Law yers et al. as Amici Curiae 2– (collecting state misde meanor arson statutes). III The majority denies Luna the opportunity to present his case to the Attorney General based on two “contextual —————— 3 If the aggravated felony provisions were the primary mechanism for removing serious noncitizen criminals, we would expect any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony to face immigration consequences. In fact, the aggravated felony provisions only apply to noncitizens who are lawfully admitted or later paroled. Matter of Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. 397, 399 Other noncitizens—such as undocumented immigrants, noncitizens applying for a visa, or some legal permanent residents returning after an extended stay abroad—cannot be removed based on the conviction of an aggravated felony; the Government must rely on the other provisions of the INA, including the statute’s other criminal provisions, to remove such noncitizens. See 112, 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Similarly, if the aggravated felony provision were the only way to ensure that the Attorney General exercised her discretion wisely, we would expect that discretion to be constrained as to all noncitizens who potentially pose a threat to the United States. In fact, the Attorney General is not prevented from granting cancellation of removal—the discretionary relief at issue in this case—to, for instance, a noncitizen who has not been convicted of a crime but is removable for having “received military-type training” from a terrorist organization. See 112(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII), 12b(a). In short, it cannot be the case that the aggravated felony provisions were intended to be the statute’s sole mechanism for identifying the most dangerous noncitizens. Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 9 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting considerations,” ante, at 7, and an intuition about how the statute ought to work. None are sufficiently persuasive to overcome the most natural reading of the aggravated felony statute. A The majority first perceives a conflict between Luna’s reading of the INA and what it calls the “penultimate sentence” of the aggravated felony statute. The “penulti mate sentence” provides that an offense can be an aggra vated felony “whether in violation of Federal or State law” or “in violation of the law of a foreign country.” U.S. C. The majority claims that Luna’s reading of the INA would vitiate the quoted proviso. Ante, at –10. It is true that, on Luna’s reading, some of the aggra- vated felonies listed in the INA (including “an offense de scribed in” §44(i)) will have no state or foreign analog. But the proviso still applies to |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | state or foreign analog. But the proviso still applies to generic offenses, which constitute nearly half of the entries in the aggravated felony list. See, e.g., §(A), (G), (M)(i). And that already-large portion jumps to close to three-quarters of the offenses after counting those many listed federal statutes with no jurisdictional element. See, e.g., §(C), (E)(ii), (J). In fact, it applies to the vast majority of offenses adjudicated under the INA given that most serious crimes are also “crimes of violence.” See 4 And the majority must admit that its interpretation will also leave entries in the aggravated-felony section with no state or foreign analogs. For instance, it seems unlikely that the proviso contemplates state analogs for the aggra —————— 4 When the proviso was added to the INA in 1990, it would have ap plied to an even greater fraction of the aggravated felonies: At that time, the aggravated felony statute listed only five offenses, four of which would have had state analogs even on Luna’s reading. See 104 Stat. 504 (1990). 10 LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting vated felony provisions regarding treason, levying war against the United States, or disclosing national defense information. See §(L)(i), (P). In other words, under Luna’s reading, the “penultimate sentence” applies to most, but not all, of the entries of the aggravated felony statute; under the majority’s reading, the “penultimate sentence” also applies to most, but not all, of the entries of the aggravated felony statute. The majority’s first “contextual consideration” thus supplies no reason to prefer one reading over the other. B Just as important, the majority suggests, is a “settled practice of distinguishing between substantive ele ments”—those that define “the evil Congress seeks to prevent”—and “jurisdictional element[s],” which merely “establis[h] legislative authority.” Ante, 5. The major ity admits that the Court does not distinguish between substantive and jurisdictional elements for many purposes, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial. ; see 536 U.S. 54, 606 (2002). But it nonetheless insists on a standard dis tinction so entrenched that Congress must have intended it to apply even absent any particular indication in the INA. None of the three examples that the majority proffers is evidence of such a strong norm. First, the majority in vokes our rules for interpreting criminal statutes. Ante, at 15–16. Whereas our general assumption is that a de- fendant must know each fact making his conduct illegal, courts generally hold that a criminal defendant need not know the facts that satisfy the jurisdictional element of a statute. But jurisdictional |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | that satisfy the jurisdictional element of a statute. But jurisdictional elements are not the only elements a defendant need not know. Under the “default rule,” ante, n. 12, for interpreting so-called “public welfare” Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 11 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting offenses, courts have held that a defendant need not know that the substance he possesses is a narcotic, that the device he possesses is unregistered, or that he reentered the United States after previously being deported. See 606–609, 611 and United ); United 50–509 ; United (CA1 200); United 11 F.3d 710, 715–717 (CA10 1997). But surely the majority would not suggest that if we agree with those holdings regarding mens rea, we must then ignore the “controlled substance” element of the drug trafficking aggravated felony, the “unregistered” element of the unregistered firearms aggravated felony, or the “following deportation” element of the illegal reentry aggravated felony. See U.S. C. §, (E)(iii), (M)(i), (O). So there is likewise no reason to believe that the “default rule” for assigning mens rea to jurisdictional elements is embedded in the INA. The majority next points to two of the many statutes that, like the INA, require comparing the elements of federal and state offenses. But in each case, it is the statute’s language and context, not some “settled practice,” ante, 5, that command the omission of the jurisdic- tional element. The majority’s first example, ante, 6–17, is the Assimilative Crimes Act, 1 U.S. C. a gap-filling statute that incorporates state criminal law into federal enclaves if the “act or omission” is not “made punishable by any enactment of Congress” but “would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State.” The Court held that, in identifying such a gap, courts should ignore “jurisdictional, or other technical,” differ ences between a state and federal statute. (199). But the way courts 12 LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting match the elements of a state law to a federal analog under the Assimilative Crimes Act differs fundamentally from our INA inquiry. The basic question under the As similative Crimes Act is whether “federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of the field as would exclude the use of the particular state statute at issue.” at 164. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act, the state statute is not compared to a single federal statute, but rather to a complex of federal statutes that roughly cover the same general conduct and “policies.” That statute thus has little to teach us about U.S. C. : In interpreting the Assimilative Crimes Act, every |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | U.S. C. : In interpreting the Assimilative Crimes Act, every Member of the Court rejected the simple elements-matching approach that the Court generally employs to construe the aggra vated felony provisions of the INA. See 523 U.S., 2 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (allowing “slight differences” in definition between federal and state statute and using “same-elements inquiry” only as a “starting point”). The majority’s analogy to the federal three strikes stat ute, 1 U.S. C. ante, 7–1, is similarly unhelpful. That provision counts as a predicate “‘serious violent felony’” any “ ‘Federal or State offense wherever committed, consisting of ’ ” various crimes, including sev eral “ ‘as described in’ ” federal statutes. Ante, 7. (em phasis added). Though this Court has not construed the statute, the majority notes that courts of appeals disre gard the jurisdictional element of federal statutes in as sessing whether a state conviction is for a “serious violent felony.” Ante, 5–16. But nearly all of the statutes listed in contain place-based jurisdiction elements—the crime must take place “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” e.g., or within “the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States,” 49 U.S. C. and so on. In the two cases cited by the majority, for instance, ante, 7, Courts of Appeals concluded that a state robbery offense Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 13 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting qualified as an offense “described in” the federal bank robbery statute even though the robbery did not take place in a bank. See United 132 F.3d 33, 37 (CA7 1997); United States v. Rosario-Delgado, 19 F.3d 1354, 1357 (CA11 1999). In that statute, it is the “wher ever committed,” not some loose construction of “described in,” that specifically instructs the courts that the location where a crime occurs does not matter. Moreover, in other statutes where Congress wants to exclude jurisdictional elements when comparing state and federal offenses, it ordinarily just says so. See, e.g., 1 U.S. C. (requiring detention of defendant pending trial if “the person has been convicted of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in subsection (f )(1) of this section if a circum stance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed”); 42 U.S. C. (II). Absent comparably clear language, the Court should not presume that the INA intended deportability to de pend on a not-so-“settled practice,” ante, 5, of occasion ally distinguishing between substantive and jurisdictional elements. C Finally, the majority suggests that it would be “peculiarly perverse,” ante, 0, to adopt Luna’s plain-text reading of the statute because it would |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,016 | 24 | dissenting | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3205023/luna-torres-v-lynch/ | adopt Luna’s plain-text reading of the statute because it would draw a distinction among crimes based on a jurisdictional element that the majority assumes is wholly divorced from “the evil Congress seeks to prevent,” ante, 5. The jurisdictional element of a federal statute, the majority asserts, is as trivial as the perfunctory warning on a new electronic device: “[A] per son would say that she had followed the instructions for setting up an iPhone that are ‘described in’ the user’s manual, even if she in fact ignored the one” instructing 14 LUNA TORRES v. LYNCH SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting that she “begin by ‘read[ing] important safety infor mation.’ ” Ante, at 7, n. 5; see also (comparing juris dictional element to a “detour” in a 3-week itinerary). For instance, the majority assumes that it would not be “plausible,” ante, 2, for Congress to have thought that interstate crimes are worse than wholly intrastate crimes. Perhaps. But when faced with an offense that, like arson, admits of a range of conduct, from the minor to the seri ous, Congress could plausibly have concluded that arsons prosecuted as federal crimes are more uniformly serious than arsons prosecuted as state crimes and counted only the former as aggravated felonies. See, e.g., Klein et al., Why Federal Prosecutors Charge: A Comparison of Fed eral and New York State Arson and Robbery Filings, – 2010, 51 Houston L. Rev. 131, 1406, 1416–1419 (2014) (finding that arsons prosecuted federally involve more property damage and more injury than arsons prosecuted under state law). That is because, far from being token, “conventional jurisdictional elements” serve to narrow the kinds of crimes that can be prosecuted, not just to specify the sovereign that can do the prosecuting. Take the federal statute at issue in this case. Section 44(i) requires that the property destroyed be “used in interstate com merce.” The Court has held that “standard, jurisdictional” element, ante, at 21, demands the property’s “active em ployment for commercial purposes, and not merely a pas sive, passing, or past connection to commerce.” Jones v. United States, 5 U.S. 4, 55 As a result, the Court held that a defendant who threw a Molotov cocktail through the window of an owner-occupied residential house could not be guilty under §44(i) because the house was not “active[ly] used” in interstate commerce. at 51. Surely, however, a New York prosecutor could have secured a conviction under N. Y. Penal Law Ann. had the same crime been prosecuted in state, rather than Cite as: 57 U. S. (2016) 15 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting federal, court. The difference |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S. C. (), this case requires us to decide whether a defendant charged with a felony under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure and salary under Art. III of the Constitution. We hold that under its Art. I, 8, cl. power to legislate for the District of Columbia, Congress may provide for trying local criminal before judges who, in accordance with the District of Columbia Code, are not accorded life tenure and protection against reduction in salary. In this respect, the position of the District of Columbia defendant is similar to that of the citizen of *391 any of the 0 States when charged with violation of a state criminal law: Neither has a federal constitutional right to be tried before judges with tenure and salary guarantees. I The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department observed a moving automobile with license tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the officer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver's license and car-rental agreement. Palmore, the driver of the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove compartment of the car and explained why the car appeared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time, one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a gun protruding from under the armrest in the front seat of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the District of Columbia after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of the District of Columbia Code, -304 (1967).[1] He was tried and found guilty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. *39 Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,[] the judges of the Superior *393 Court are appointed by the President and serve for terms of 1 years. D. C. Code Ann. 11-101 (a), 11-10[3] Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him, urging that only a court "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" in accordance with Art. III of the United States Constitution could constitutionally try him for a felony prosecution under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The motions were denied in the Superior Court, and Palmore was convicted. The District of Columbia Court |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | Court, and Palmore was convicted. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia, conferred by Art. I, 8, cl. of the Constitution, Congress had "constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only in the District and to select the appropriate court, whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, to hear and determine these particular criminal within the District." Palmore filed a notice of appeal with the District of *394 Columbia Court of Appeals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting to perfect an appeal under 8 U.S. C. (). We postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to review this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the merits. II Title 8 U.S. C. [4] specifies the circumstances under which the final judgments of the highest court of a State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by (a) (1) of the Reorganization Act, the term "highest court of a State" as used in includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies from such courts only where a statute of the United States is struck down, 8 U.S. C. (1), or where a statute of a State is sustained against federal constitutional attack, (). Because the statute at *39 issue was upheld in this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment lies only if the statute was a "statute of any state" within the meaning of (). Palmore insists that it is, but we cannot agree. The 1970 amendment to plainly provided that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should be treated as the "highest court of a State," but nowhere in or elsewhere, has Congress provided that the words "statute of any state," as used in (), are to include the provisions of the District of Columbia Code. A reference to "state statutes" would ordinarily not include provisions of the District of Columbia Code, which was enacted, not by a state legislature, but by Congress, and which applies only within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is constitutionally distinct from the States, ; cf. National Mutual Ins. Nor does it follow from the decision to treat the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as a state court that the District Code was to be considered a state statute for the purposes of We are entitled to assume that in amending Congress legislated with care, and that had Congress intended to |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | Congress legislated with care, and that had Congress intended to equate the District Code and state statutes for the purposes of it would have said so expressly, and not left the matter to mere implication.[] *396 Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed "with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes," Cheng Fan ; and we are particularly prone to accord "strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals" to this Court. We will not, therefore, hold that Congress intended to treat the District of Columbia Code as a state statute for the purposes of (). Cf. Palmore relies on where an enactment of the territorial legislature of Puerto was held to be a statute of a State within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory provisions governing appeals to this Court. That result has been codified in 8 U.S. C. 18; but, even so, the Balzac rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris, where we held that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto is not "a State statute" within the meaning of 8 U.S. C. 14 (), and that it should not be treated as such in the absence of more definitive guidance from Congress. We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal constitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ of certiorari under (3); and treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari, cf. 8 U.S. C. 103, we grant the petition limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled to be tried by *397 a court ordained and established in accordance with Art. III, 1, of the Constitution.[6] It is to this issue that we now turn. III Art. I, 8, cl. of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over" the District of Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress "may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a State might exercise within the State; and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the United States." Capital Traction This has been the |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | of the United States." Capital Traction This has been the characteristic view in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the District.[7] It is apparent that the power of Congress *398 under Clause permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art. I, 8. See Pursuant to its Clause authority, Congress has from time to time enacted laws that compose the District of Columbia Code. The 1970 Reorganization Act amended the Code by creating the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the courts being expressly "established pursuant to article I of the Constitution." D. C. Code Ann. 11-101 () See n. The Superior Court, among other things, was vested with jurisdiction to hear criminal involving alleged violations of the criminal laws applicable only to the District of Columbia, 11-93; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction to hear appeals in such 11-71. At the same time, Congress exercised its powers under Art. I, 8, cl. 9, and Art. III to redefine the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 11-301, 11-01, and 11-0. As the Committee on the District of Columbia said, H. R. Rep. No. p. 44: "This title makes clear (section 11-101) that the District of Columbia Courts (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia) are Article I courts, created pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause of the United States Constitution, and not Article III courts. The authority under which the local courts are established has not been statutorily provided in prior law; the Supreme Court of the United States *399 has not declared the local system to be either Article I or Article III courts, decisions having indicated that the District of Columbia courts are, in this respect, both fish and fowl. This expression of the intent of the Congress clarifies the status of the local courts." It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by the 1970 Reorganization Act that Palmore was convicted of violation of -304 of the District of Columbia Code (1967). The conviction was clearly within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, 8, cl. unless, as Palmore contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecutions for |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecutions for District of Columbia felonies must be presided over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections provided by Art. III.[8]*400 Palmore's argument is straightforward: Art. III vests the "judicial Power" of the United States in courts with judges holding office during good behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the "judicial Power" that these courts are to exercise "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority"; the District of Columbia Code, having been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States; this prosecution for violation of -304 of the Code is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, involves an exercise of the "judicial Power" of the United States, and must therefore be tried by an Art. III judge. This position ultimately rests on the proposition that an Art. III judge must preside over every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense is based on an Act of Congress or a law made under its authority. At the very least, it asserts that criminal offenses under the laws passed by Congress may not be prosecuted except in courts established pursuant to Art. III. In our view, however, there is no support for this view in either constitutional text or in constitutional history and practice. Article III describes the judicial power as extending to all among others, arising under the laws of the United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The decision with *401 respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of Congress. That body was not constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide within the judicial power of the United States, including those criminal arising under the laws of the United States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III. "[T]he judicial power of the United States is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) and of investing them with jurisdiction either |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | the Supreme Court) and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good." 3 How. 36, 4 (184).[9] Congress plainly understood this, for until 187 Congress refrained from providing the lower federal courts with general federal-question jurisdiction. Until that time, the state courts provided the only forum for vindicating many important federal claims. Even then, with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum for the trial of federal not involving the required jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retained *40 concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial and decision of all federal questions were reserved for Art. III judges. Nor, more particularly, has the enforcement of federal criminal law been deemed the exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very early in our history, Congress left the enforcement of selected federal criminal laws to state courts and to state court judges who did not enjoy the protections prescribed for federal judges in Art. III. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 1-3, 70-7 (19); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 93 (197); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, More recently, this Court unanimously held that Congress could constitutionally require state courts to hear and decide Emergency Price Control Act involving the enforcement of federal penal laws; the fact "that Rhode Island has an established policy against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal, cannot be accepted as a `valid excuse.' " 39 Although recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed in 16 Pet. 39, 61-616 (184), and other the sense of the Testa opinion was that it merely reflected longstanding constitutional decision and policy represented by such as and 3 U.S. 1 (191). It is also true that throughout our history, Congress has exercised its power under Art. IV to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" by creating *403 territorial courts and manning them with judges appointed for a term of years. These courts have not been deemed subject to the strictures of Art. III, even though they characteristically enforced not only the civil and criminal laws of Congress applicable throughout the United States, but also |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | laws of Congress applicable throughout the United States, but also the laws applicable only within the boundaries of the particular territory. Speaking for a unanimous Court in American Ins. 1 Pet. 11 (188), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the territorial courts of Florida, although not Art. III courts, could hear and determine governed by the admiralty and maritime law that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III judges. "[T]he same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government." at 46. This has been the consistent view of this Court.[10] Territorial courts, therefore, have regularly tried criminal arising under the general laws of Congress,[11] as well as those brought under territorial laws.[1] *404 There is another context in which criminal arising under federal statutes are tried, and defendants convicted, in non-Art. III courts. Under its Art. I, 8, cl. 14, power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," Congress has declared certain behavior by members of the Armed Forces to be criminal and provided for the trial of such by court-martial proceedings in the military mode, not by courts ordained and established under Art. III. Within their proper sphere, courts-martial are constitutional instruments to carry out congressional and executive will. 0 How. 6, 79, 8 (187). The "exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply," 39 U.S. 8, 61 ; and "the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials," 30 U.S. 11, (19). "The same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result in [American Ins. has governed the decision in later sanctioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited tenure," Glidden 370 U.S. 30, 47 (196), such as the Court of Private Land Claims, United 1 U.S. 76, 8-86 ; the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, 4 U.S. 44 ; Ex parte Joins, ; 04 U.S. 41 ; courts created in unincorporated districts outside the mainland, 18 U.S. 44, 66-67 ; 8 U. S., at 31-313, and the Consular Courts established by concessions from foreign countries, In re Ross, 140 U.S. 43, 464-46, 480 *40 IV Whatever may be true in other instances, however, it is strongly argued that 89 U.S. 16 constrains us to hold that all of the courts of the District of Columbia must be deemed Art. III courts and |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | District of Columbia must be deemed Art. III courts and that the judges presiding over them must be appointed to serve during their good behavior in accordance with the requirements of Art. III. O' involved the question whether the judges of the District of Columbia's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were constitutionally protected from having their salaries reduced by an Act of Congress. This Court, over three dissents and contrary to extensive prior dicta, see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 79 U.S. 438, 40 (199); 11 U.S. 0 ; 61 U.S. 48 (193); Federal Radio 81 U.S. 464 held that the two courts under consideration were constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States and that the judges in question were not subject to the salary reduction legislation as they would have been had they been judges of legislative courts. We cannot agree that O' governs this case.[13] The District of Columbia courts there involved, the *406 Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority not only in the District, but also over all those controversies, civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and having nationwide application. These courts, as this Court noted in its opinion, were "of equal rank and power with those of other inferior courts of the federal system" O', at 34. Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court considered that Congress, by consistently providing the judges of these courts with lifetime tenure, had indicated a "congressional practice from the beginning [which] recognize[d] a complete parallelism between the courts of the District [of Columbia] and the district and circuit courts of appeals of the United States." at 49. Moreover, these courts, constituted as they were, and being closer to the legislative department, "exercise a more extensive jurisdiction in affecting the operations of the general government and its various departments," at 3, and were the only courts within the District in which District inhabitants could exercise their "right to have their arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with the judicial power conferred by, Art. III." at 40. The case before us is a far cry from O'. Here Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in the District. One of them is made up of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia *407 Circuit, which are constitutional courts manned by Art. III judges to which the citizens of the District must or may resort |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | which the citizens of the District must or may resort for consideration of those constitutional and statutory matters of general concern which so moved the Court in O'. The other system is made up of strictly local courts, the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. These courts were expressly created pursuant to the plenary Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann. 11-101 () and to exercise the "powers of a State government in all where legislation is possible." 19 U.S. 141, The O' Court had before it District of Columbia courts in which the consideration of "purely local affairs [was] obviously subordinate and incidental." O', at 39. Here, on the other hand, we have courts the focus of whose work is primarily upon arising under the District of Columbia Code and to other matters of strictly local concern. They handle criminal only under statutes that are applicable to the District of Columbia alone. O' did not concern itself with courts like these, and it is not controlling here. V It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law, or even every criminal prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduction. Rather, both Congress and this Court have recognized that state courts are appropriate forums in which federal questions and federal crimes may at times be tried; and that the * requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment. Here, Congress reorganized the court system in the District of Columbia and established one set of courts in the District with Art. III characteristics and devoted to matters of national concern. It also created a wholly separate court system designed primarily to concern itself with local law and to serve as a local court system for a large metropolitan area. From its own studies, Congress had concluded that there was a crisis in the judicial system of the District of Columbia, that case loads had become unmanageable, and that neither those matters of national concern nor those of strictly local cognizance were being promptly tried and disposed of by the existing court system. See, e. g., 11 Cong. Rec. |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | majority | Palmore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108767/palmore-v-united-states/ | the existing court system. See, e. g., 11 Cong. Rec. 38 ; 116 Cong. Rec. 8091-809[14] The remedy in part, was to relieve the regular Art. III courts, that is, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States *409 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the smothering responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil and criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court system in a major city and to confine the work of those courts to that which, for the most part, they were designed to do, namely, to try arising under the Constitution and the nationally applicable laws of Congress. The other part of the remedy, equally essential, was to establish an entirely new court system with functions essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the 0 States of the Union with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 91-40, pp. 1-3, 18; H. R. Rep. No. pp. 3-4, 33. Furthermore, Congress, after careful consideration, determined that it preferred, and had the power to utilize, a local court system staffed by judges without lifetime tenure. S. Rep. No. 91-40, at -18; H. R. Rep. No. Congress made a deliberate choice to create judgeships with terms of 1 years, D. C. Code Ann. 11-10 and to subject judges in those positions to removal or suspension by a judicial commission under certain established circumstances. 11-10, 11-11 et seq. It was thought that such a system would be more workable and efficient in administering and discharging the work of a multifaceted metropolitan court system. See S. Rep. No. 91-40, ; H. R. Rep. No. at 3-39. In providing for fixed terms of office, Congress was cognizant of the fact that "virtually no State has provided" for tenure during good behavior, S. Rep. No. 91-40, see H. R. Rep. No. *410 at 38, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noting that 46 of the 0 States have not provided life tenure for trial judges who hear felony 90 A.d, at 78 n. 1; and the provisions of the Act, with respect to court administration and to judicial removal and suspension, were considered by some as a model for the States. 11 Cong. Rec. 38 See Hearings on H. R. 13689 and 184 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 69, 71 We do |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Florida v. Wells | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112412/florida-v-wells/ | A Florida Highway Patrol trooper stopped respondent Wells for speeding. After smelling alcohol on Wells' breath, the trooper arrested Wells for driving under the influence. Wells then agreed to accompany the trooper to the station to take a breathalyzer test. The trooper informed Wells that the car would be impounded and obtained Wells' permission to open the trunk. At the impoundment facility, an inventory search of the car turned up two marijuana cigarette butts in an ashtray and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Under the trooper's direction, employees of the facility forced open the suitcase and discovered a garbage bag containing a considerable amount of marijuana. Wells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. His motion to suppress the marijuana on the ground that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was denied by the trial court. *3 He thereupon pleaded nolo contendere to the charge but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District held, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying suppression of the marijuana found in the suitcase. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. We granted certiorari, and now affirm (although we disagree with part of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida). The Supreme Court of Florida relied on the opinions in ; Referring to language in the Bertine concurrence and a footnote in the majority opinion, the court held that "[i]n the absence of a policy specifically requiring the opening of closed containers found during a legitimate inventory search, Bertine prohibits us from countenancing the procedure followed in this instance." 539 So. 2d, at According to the court, the record contained no evidence of any Highway Patrol policy on the opening of closed containers found during inventory searches. The court added, however: "The police under Bertine must mandate either that all containers will be opened during an inventory search, or that no containers will be opened. There can be no room for discretion." While this latter statement of the Supreme Court of Florida derived support from a sentence in the Bertine concurence taken in isolation, we think it is at odds with the thrust of both the concurrence and the opinion of the Court in that case. We said in Bertine: "Nothing in [South Dakota v.] Opperman[,] or [Illinois v.] Lafayette[,] prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that *4 discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Florida v. Wells | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112412/florida-v-wells/ | exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Our view that standardized criteria, ib or established routine, must regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches is based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory. The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into "a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime," Bertine, 479 U. S., But in forbidding uncanalized discretion to police officers conducting inventory searches, there is no reason to insist that they be conducted in a totally mechanical "all or nothing" fashion. "[I]nventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger." ; see also South A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself. Thus, while policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are unquestionably permissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allow the opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers' exteriors. The allowance of the exercise of judgment based on concerns related to the purposes of an inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In the present case, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during *5 an inventory search. We hold that absent such a policy, the instant search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment and that the marijuana which was found in the suitcase, therefore, was properly suppressed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Its judgment is therefore Affirmed. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | dissenting | Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118127/associates-commercial-corp-v-rash/ | Although the meaning of 11 U.S. C. 506(a) is not entirely clear, I think its text points to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in this case. The first sentence in 506(a) tells courts to determine the value of the "creditor's interest in the estate's interest" in the property. 11 U.S. C. 506(a) (emphasis added). This language suggests that the value should be determined from the creditor's perspective, i. e., what the collateral is worth, on the open market, in the creditor's hands, rather than in the hands of another party. The second sentence explains that "[s]uch value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." In this context, the "purpose of the valuation" is determined by 11 U.S. C. 1325(a)(5)(B). Commonly known as the Bankruptcy Code's "cram down" provision, this section authorizes the debtor to keep secured property over the creditor's objections in a Chapter 13 reorganization, but, if he elects to do so, directs the debtor to pay the creditor the "value" of the secured claim. The "purpose" of this provision, and hence of the valuation under 506(a), is to put the creditor in the same shoes as if he were able to exercise his lien and foreclose.[*] *967 It is crucial to keep in mind that 506(a) is a provision that applies throughout the various chapters of the Bankruptcy Code; it is, in other words, a "utility" provision that operates in many different contexts. Even if the words "proposed disposition or use" did not gain special meaning in the cram down context, this would not render them surplusage because they have operational significance in their many other Code applications. In this context, I also think the foreclosure standard best comports with economic reality. Allowing any more than the foreclosure value simply grants a general windfall to under secured creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors. Cf. In re Hoskins, As Judge Easter brook explained in rejecting the split-thedifference approach as a general rule, see at 318-, a foreclosure-value standard is also consistent with the larger statutory scheme by keeping the respective recoveries of secured and unsecured creditors the same throughout the various bankruptcy chapters. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | The issue presented in this case is whether the Supremacy Clause bars the State of Ohio from subjecting a private contractor operating a federally owned nuclear production facility to a state-law workers' compensation provision that provides an increased award for injuries resulting from an employer's violation of a state safety regulation. I This case arises from an accident involving a worker at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, a nuclear production facility located near Piketon, Ohio. The plant is owned by the United but at all times relevant to this action it was operated by a private company, appellant Goodyear Atomic Corporation, under contract with the Department of Energy (DOE). On July 30, 1980, appellee Esto Miller, a maintenance mechanic employed by Goodyear at the Portsmouth plant, fell from a scaffold while performing routine maintenance work and fractured his left ankle. His fall apparently was caused when his glove caught on a bolt protruding from the guardrail of the scaffolding. Miller applied to the Ohio Industrial Commission for an award under the State's workers' compensation program, for which Goodyear pays premiums to cover its Portsmouth employees. He received about $9,000 in workers' compensation. After returning to work, Miller filed an application for an additional award on the ground that his injury had resulted from Goodyear's violation of a state safety requirement. *177 Miller alleged that his fall was caused by Goodyear's failure to comply with Ohio Admin. Code 4121:1-5-03(D)(2) which provides that "[e]xposed surfaces [on scaffolds] shall be free from sharp edges, burrs or other projecting parts." The Ohio Constitution provides that when an injury is caused by an employer's failure to comply with a specific state safety requirement, the Industrial Commission shall provide an additional award of 15% to 50% of the benefits already received. Ohio Const., Art. II, 35. The state insurance fund recoups these additional payments by increasing the premium paid by the employer. The Ohio Industrial Commission denied Miller's claim for a supplemental award. The Commission held that "the [Ohio] Codes of Specific Safety Requirements may not be applied to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant under the doctrine of federal preemption." Claim No. 80-19975 App. 18. Miller filed a mandamus action in the Ohio Court of Appeals, seeking an order directing the Industrial Commission to consider his application. The court held that "[u]ntil it is clear that the federal government has preempted the field of safety regulation for safety hazards unrelated to radiation, state specific safety regulations that give rise to an award for violation thereof are equally applicable to an entity that contracts with the federal |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | equally applicable to an entity that contracts with the federal government for operation of a nuclear power facility owned exclusively by the federal government." No. 84AP-208 (July 25, 1985), App. 17. The court therefore ordered the Industrial Commission to consider Miller's claim that he was due an additional award because his injury was caused by a violation of a state safety regulation. A divided Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Relying on the federal pre-emption analysis of the court held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 2011 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), *178 did not pre-empt Ohio from applying workers' compensation safety requirements unrelated to radiation hazards to nuclear -78. In dissent, Justice Wright agreed with Goodyear's separate claim, not addressed by the majority, that in the absence of clearly expressed authorization from Congress, the Supremacy Clause barred the application of the state workers' compensation safety requirements to a federally owned facility. Justice Wright argued that Congress had not provided the necessary clear authorization to justify the application of the Ohio workers' compensation scheme. -80. We noted probable jurisdiction of Goodyear's appeal, and now affirm the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on different reasoning. II Although neither party contests our appellate jurisdiction over this case, we must independently determine as a threshold matter that we have jurisdiction. See Brown Shoe Title 28 U.S. C. 1257(2) gives this Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments by the highest court of a State where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution and the decision is in favor of its validity. "[A] state statute is sustained within the meaning of 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds." Japan Line, In this case, the additional-award provision of Ohio's workers' compensation statute, as applied to the Portsmouth facility, was drawn in question on the ground that it violated the Supremacy Clause, and the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute's application. The more difficult question is whether the judgment is "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. 1257(2), even though further proceedings are anticipated before the Ohio Industrial *179 Commission. The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court requires that the Industrial Commission consider appellee's claim that his injury was caused by a failure to comply with a state safety regulation. In Cox Broadcasting we recognized four situations |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | state safety regulation. In Cox Broadcasting we recognized four situations in which this Court views a judgment as final under 1257(2) although further state proceedings are contemplated. In the fourth category are cases "where the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come. In these circumstances, if a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy, the Court has entertained and decided the federal issue, which itself has been finally determined by the state courts for purposes of the state litigation." We believe the present case falls within this fourth category. The federal question whether the additional workers' compensation award is barred by federal law has been finally determined by the Ohio Supreme Court, and a reversal of the Ohio Supreme Court's holding would preclude any further proceedings. In addition, even if appellant prevails before the Industrial Commission on nonfederal grounds, for example, if the Commission determines that there was no violation of the state safety regulation, the unreviewed decision of the Ohio Supreme Court might seriously erode federal policy in the area of nuclear production. The federal pre-emption analysis of the Ohio court sanctions direct state regulation of *180 nonradiological hazards at the Portsmouth facility, the only nuclear facility producing nuclear fuel for the Navy's nuclear fleet. Moreover, the decision has important implications for the regulation of federally owned nuclear production facilities in other Following our "pragmatic approach" to the question of finality, Cox Broadcasting we therefore conclude that the Ohio decision on the federal issue is a final judgment for purposes of 28 U.S. C. 1257(2). III It is well settled that the activities of federal installations are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation unless Congress provides "clear and unambiguous" authorization for such regulation. ; accord, ; 319 U.S. As an initial matter, therefore, we consider whether the federally owned Portsmouth facility is likewise shielded from direct state regulation even though the facility is operated by a private party under contract with the United[1] We believe this question was answered in in which we faced the issue whether a State could enforce its |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | we faced the issue whether a State could enforce its pollution emission limitations against "federally owned or operated installations" by requiring that such installations obtain a state permit. One of the facilities at issue in Hancock was the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, *181 which, like the Portsmouth facility, is a federally owned nuclear production facility operated by a private contractor. Nuclear production facilities such as the Paducah and Portsmouth plants are authorized by statute to carry out a federal mission, with federal property, under federal control.[2] The Court struck down the permit requirement in Hancock, reasoning that without clear congressional authorization, " `the federal function must be left free' of [state] regulation." quoting Hancock thus establishes that a federally owned facility performing a federal function is shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such regulation.[3] In this case, however, we are not presented with a direct state regulation of the operation of the Portsmouth facility. Rather, the case involves the imposition of a supplemental *182 award of workers' compensation, chargeable against Goodyear, for an injury caused by Goodyear's failure to comply with a state safety regulation. Appellant and the Solicitor General argue that the application of the Ohio additional award provision is nonetheless tantamount to a regulation of the Portsmouth facility and is thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We need not decide this issue, however, for we conclude that even if the provision is sufficiently akin to direct regulation of the Portsmouth facility to be potentially barred by the Supremacy Clause, ch. 822, 40 U.S. C. 290, provides the requisite clear congressional authorization for the application of the provision to workers at the Portsmouth facility. Section 290 provides in relevant part: "Whatsoever constituted authority of each of the several is charged with the enforcement of and requiring compliances with the State workmen's compensation laws of said and with the enforcement of and requiring compliance with the orders, decisions, and awards of said constituted authority of said shall have the power and authority to apply such laws to all lands and premises owned or held by the United of America by deed or act of cession, by purchase or otherwise, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State and to all projects, buildings, constructions, improvements, and property belonging to the United of America, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State, in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be."[4] *183 Both appellant and the Solicitor General concede that the initial workers' compensation award received by respondent Miller is authorized by 290. They contend, however, that 290 does not authorize the supplemental award provided in Ohio's workers' compensation law when an employer violates a specific state safety regulation. At bottom, appellant and the Solicitor General argue that the phrase "workmen's compensation laws" in 290, which is not defined, was not intended to include the additional-award provision in Ohio's workers' compensation law. Appellant claims that in the absence of a precise definition, we should infer that Congress envisioned the typical workers' compensation Act, under which workers are automatically entitled to certain benefits when they suffer a work-related injury, without regard to the employer's fault. A State's authority to enforce its workers' compensation laws under 290, appellant continues, should be limited to such standard awards. We do not believe appellant's construction of 290 can be squared with the statute's language and history. Section 290 provides that a state authority charged with enforcing "workmen's compensation laws," which in Ohio is the Industrial Commission, "shall have the power and authority to apply such laws" to federal premises "in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State." This language places no express limitation on the type of workers' compensation scheme that is authorized.[5] On its face, 290 compels the same workers' *184 compensation award for an employee injured at a federally owned facility as the employee would receive if working for a wholly private facility. In addition, at the time of the passage of 290 in 1936, workers' compensation laws provided a wide variety of compensation schemes that do not fit neatly within appellant's view of the "typical" scheme. At least 15 provided remedies in addition to basic workers' compensation awards when an employee was injured because of specified kinds of employer misconduct.[6] Eight of these including Ohio, provided supplemental awards when the employer violated a specific safety regulation.[7] We generally *185 presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts. See Director, In the absence of affirmative evidence in the language or history of the statute, we are unwilling to assume that Congress was ignorant of the substantial number of providing additional workers' compensation awards when a state safety regulation was violated by the employer. Indeed, Congress appears to have recognized the diversity of workers' compensation schemes when it provided that |
Justice Marshall | 1,988 | 15 | majority | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | the diversity of workers' compensation schemes when it provided that workers' compensation would be awarded to workers on federal premises "in the same way and to the same extent" as provided by state law. The meaning of "workmen's compensation laws" in 290, of course, is not infinitely elastic. We need not address the outer boundaries of that term in this case, however, because we believe it is clear that Congress intended Ohio's law and others of its ilk, which were solidly entrenched at the time of the enactment of 290, to apply to federal facilities "to the same extent" that they apply to private facilities within the State. The only evidence in the legislative history of 290 that appellant and the Solicitor General muster in support of their position is that Congress rejected a proposal that would have authorized to apply state safety and insurance laws directly to federal projects. See S. Rep. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936). But Congress' reluctance to allow direct state regulation of federal projects says little about whether Congress was likewise concerned with the incidental regulatory effects arising from the enforcement of a workers' compensation law, like Ohio's, that provides an additional award when the injury is caused by the breach of a safety regulation. The effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal projects are significantly more intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of such an additional award provision. Appellant may choose to disregard Ohio safety regulations and simply pay an additional workers' compensation *186 award if an employee's injury is caused by a safety violation. We believe Congress may reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure is acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not.[8] Cf. Because the permission of incidental regulation is consistent with the preclusion of direct regulation, the legislative history relied on by appellant and the Solicitor General does not undermine the plain language of 290. We conclude that the additional award provision of Ohio's workers' compensation law is unambiguously authorized by 290 and therefore does not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.[9] Accordingly, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | This case concerns the application of 46 U.S. C. 596, which requires certain masters and vessel owners to pay seamen promptly after their discharge and authorizes seamen to *566 recover double wages for each day that payment is delayed without sufficient cause. The question is whether the district courts, in the exercise of discretion, may limit the period during which this wage penalty is assessed, or whether imposition of the penalty is mandatory for each day that payment is withheld in violation of the statute. I On February 18, 1976, petitioner signed an employment contract with respondent in New Orleans, agreeing to work as a senior pipeline welder on board vessels operated by respondent in the North Sea. The contract specified that petitioner's employment would extend "until December 15, 1976 or until Oceanic's 1976 pipeline committal in the North Sea is fulfilled, whichever shall occur first." App. 41. The contract also provided that respondent would pay for transportation to and from the worksite, but that if petitioner quit the job prior to its termination date, or if his services were terminated for cause, he would be charged with the cost of transportation back to the United States. Respondent reserved the right to withhold $137.50 from each of petitioner's first four paychecks "as a cash deposit for the payment of your return transportation in the event you should become obligated for its payment." On March 6, 1976, petitioner flew from the United States to Antwerp, Belgium, where he reported to work at respondent's vessel, the "Lay Barge 27," berthed in the Antwerp harbor for repairs. On April 1, 1976, petitioner suffered an injury while working on the deck of the vessel readying it for sea. Two days later he underwent emergency surgery in Antwerp. On April 5, petitioner was discharged from the hospital and went to respondent's Antwerp office, where he spoke with Jesse Williams, the welding superintendent, and provided a physician's statement that he was not fit for duty. Williams refused to acknowledge that petitioner's injury was work-related *567 and denied that respondent was liable for medical and hospital expenses, maintenance, or unearned wages. Williams also refused to furnish transportation back to the United States, and continued to retain $412.50 in earned wages that had been deducted from petitioner's first three paychecks for that purpose. Petitioner returned to his home in Houston, Tex., the next day at his own expense. He was examined there by a physician who determined that he would be able to resume work on May 3, 1976. On May 5, petitioner began working as a welder |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | 1976. On May 5, petitioner began working as a welder for another company operating in the North Sea. In 1978 he brought suit against respondent under the Jones Act, 20, as amended, 46 U.S. C. 688, and under general maritime law, seeking damages for respondent's failure to pay maintenance, cure, unearned wages, repatriation expenses, and the value of certain personal effects lost on board respondent's vessel. Petitioner also sought penalty wages under Rev. Stat. 4529, as amended, 46 U.S. C. 596, for respondent's failure to pay over the $412.50 in earned wages allegedly due upon discharge. The District Court found for petitioner and awarded damages totalling $23,670.40. Several findings made by that court are particularly relevant to this appeal. First, the court found that petitioner's injury was proximately caused by an unseaworthy condition of respondent's vessel. App. 17, ¶ 10; 23, ¶ 6. Second, the court found that petitioner was discharged from respondent's employ on the day of the injury, and that the termination of his employment was caused solely by that injury. ; 23, ¶ 7.[1] Third, it found that respondent's failure to pay petitioner the $412.50 in earned wages was "without sufficient *568 cause." ; 25, ¶ 11.[2] Finally, the court found that petitioner had exercised due diligence in attempting to collect those wages. In assessing penalty wages under 46 U.S. C. 596, the court held that "[t]he period during which the penalty runs is to be determined by the sound discretion of the district court and depends on the equities of the case." App. 25, ¶ 11. It determined that the appropriate period for imposition of the penalty was from the date of discharge, April 1, 1976, through the date of petitioner's reemployment, May 5, 1976, a period of 34 days. Applying the statute, it computed a penalty of $6,881.[3] Petitioner appealed the award of damages as inadequate. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. That court concluded, inter alia, that the District Court had not erred in limiting assessment of the penalty provided by 46 U.S. C. 596 to the period beginning April 1 and ending May 5. The court recognized that the statute required payment of a penalty for each day during which wages were withheld until the date they were actually paid, which in this case did not occur until September 17, 1980, when respondent satisfied the judgment of the District Court. ; see App. 30. Nevertheless, the court believed itself bound by prior decisions within the Circuit, which left calculation of the penalty period to the sound discretion of the district |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | the penalty period to the sound discretion of the district 664 F.2d, It concluded *569 that the District Court in this case had not abused its discretion by assessing a penalty only for the period during which petitioner was unemployed. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits regarding the proper application of the wage penalty statute.[4] We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to that issue.[5] II A The language of the statute first obligates the master or owner of any vessel making coasting or foreign voyages to pay every seaman the balance of his unpaid wages within specified periods after his discharge.[6] It then provides: *570 "Every master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payment in the manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods" The statute in straightforward terms provides for the payment of double wages, depending upon the satisfaction of two conditions. First, the master or owner must have refused or failed to pay the seaman his wages within the periods specified. Second, this failure or refusal must be "without sufficient cause." Once these conditions are satisfied, however, the unadorned language of the statute dictates that the master or owner "shall pay to the seaman" the sums specified "for each and every day during which payment is delayed." The words chosen by Congress, given their plain meaning, leave no room for the exercise of discretion either in deciding whether to exact payment or in choosing the period of days by which the payment is to be calculated. As this Court described the statute many years ago, it "affords a definite and reasonable procedure by which the seaman may establish his right to recover double pay where his wages are unreasonably withheld." Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, "that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety * The District Court found that respondent had refused to pay petitioner the balance of his earned wages promptly after discharge, and that its refusal was "without sufficient cause." Respondent challenges neither of these findings. Although the two statutory conditions were satisfied, however, the District Court obviously did not assess double wages "for each and every day" during which payment was delayed, but instead limited the assessment to the period of petitioner's unemployment. Nothing in the language of the statute vests |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | petitioner's unemployment. Nothing in the language of the statute vests the courts with the discretion to set such a limitation. B Nevertheless, respondent urges that the legislative purpose of the statute is best served by construing it to permit some choice in determining the length of the penalty period. In respondent's view, the purpose of the statute is essentially remedial and compensatory, and thus it should not be interpreted literally to produce a monetary award that is so far in excess of any equitable remedy as to be punitive. Respondent, however, is unable to support this view of legislative purpose by reference to the terms of the statute. "There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes." United See Nevertheless, in rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling. We have reserved "some `scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.'" This, however, is not the exceptional case. *572 As the Court recognized in the "evident purpose" of the statute is "to secure prompt payment of seamen's wages and thus to protect them from the harsh consequences of arbitrary and unscrupulous action of their employers, to which, as a class, they are peculiarly exposed." This was to be accomplished "by the imposition of a liability which is not exclusively compensatory, but designed to prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to induce prompt payment when payment is possible." -56. Thus, although the sure purpose of the statute is remedial, Congress has chosen to secure that purpose through the use of potentially punitive sanctions designed to deter negligent or arbitrary delays in payment. The legislative history of the statute leaves little if any doubt that this understanding is correct. The law owes its origins to the Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 6, passed by the First Congress. Although the statute as originally enacted gave every seaman the right to collect the wages due under his contract "as soon as the voyage is ended," it did not provide for the recovery of additional sums to encourage compliance. Such a provision was added by the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 2, 35, which provided for the payment of "a sum not exceeding the amount of two days' pay |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | "a sum not exceeding the amount of two days' pay for each of the days, not exceeding ten days, during which payment is delayed." The Act of 1872 obviously established a ceiling of 10 days on the period during which the penalty could be assessed and, by use of the words "not exceeding," left the courts with discretion to choose an appropriate penalty within that period.[7] *573 Congress amended the law again in 1898. As amended, it read in relevant part: "Every master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payment in manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to one day's pay for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods." Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, 4, The amending legislation thus effected two changes: first, it removed the discretion theretofore existing by which courts might award less than an amount calculated on the basis of each day during which payment was delayed, and, second, it removed the 10-day ceiling which theretofore limited the number of days upon which an award might be calculated. The accompanying Committee Reports identify the purpose of the legislation as "the amelioration of the condition of the American seamen," and characterize the amended wage penalty in particular as "designed to secure the promptest possible payment of wages." H. R. Rep. No. 1657, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 3 (1898). See also S. Rep. No. 8, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1896).[8] Nothing in the legislative history of the *574 1898 Act suggests that Congress intended to do anything other than what the Act's enacted language plainly demonstrates: to strengthen the deterrent effect of the statute by removing the courts' latitude in assessing the wage penalty. The statute was amended for the last time in 1915 to increase further the severity of the penalty by doubling the wages due for each day during which payment of earned wages was delayed. Seamen's Act of 1915, ch. 153, 3, There is no suggestion in the Committee Reports or in the floor debates that, in so doing, Congress intended to reinvest the courts with the discretion it had removed in the Act of 1898. Resort to the legislative history, therefore, merely confirms that Congress intended the statute to mean exactly what its plain language says. III Respondent argues, however, that a literal construction of the statute in this case would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended. The District Court found that the daily wage to be used in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | Court found that the daily wage to be used in computing the penalty was $101.20. If the statute is applied literally, petitioner would receive twice this amount for each day after his discharge until September 17, 1980, when respondent satisfied the District Court's judgment.[9] Petitioner would receive *575 over $300,000 simply because respondent improperly withheld $412.50 in wages. In respondent's view, Congress could not have intended seamen to receive windfalls of this nature without regard to the equities of the case. It is true that interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available. See United -; Haggar In refusing to nullify statutes, however hard or unexpected the particular effect, this Court has said: "Laws enacted with good intention, when put to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the law maker himself, turn out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise objectionable. But in such case the remedy lies with the law making authority, and not with the " It is highly probable that respondent is correct in its contention that a recovery in excess of $300,000 in this case greatly exceeds any actual injury suffered by petitioner as a result of respondent's delay in paying his wages. But this Court has previously recognized that awards made under this statute were not intended to be merely compensatory: "We think the use of this language indicates a purpose to protect seamen from delayed payments of wages by the imposition of a liability which is not exclusively compensatory, but designed to prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to induce prompt payment when payment is possible." 281 U. S., -56. *576 It is in the nature of punitive remedies to authorize awards that may be out of proportion to actual injury; such remedies typically are established to deter particular conduct, and the legislature not infrequently finds that harsh consequences must be visited upon those whose conduct it would deter. It is probably true that Congress did not precisely envision the grossness of the difference in this case between the actual wages withheld and the amount of the award required by the statute. But it might equally well be said that Congress did not precisely envision the trebled amount of some damages awards in private antitrust actions, see or that, because it enacted the Endangered Species Act, "the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress ha[d] expended more than |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | majority | Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110787/griffin-v-oceanic-contractors-inc/ | virtually completed dam for which Congress ha[d] expended more than $1 million," It is enough that Congress intended that the language it enacted would be applied as we have applied it. The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we may not. See Consumer Product Safety -124; Reiter v. at Finally, we note that our holding is consistent with Pacific Mail S.S. The employer in that case challenged a decision by the Court of Appeals to apply the wage penalty to the delay after the District Court's judgment occasioned by the employer's appeal. The Court held that on the facts of that case, application of the penalty beyond the date of the District Court's judgment was error. Contrary to respondent's assertion, however, the holding does not reflect the discretionary tailoring of the penalty to the equities of the case. Instead, the Court held that the delay pending appeal was not "without sufficient cause," as required by the statute before the penalty can attach. *577[10] As we explained earlier, a condition to the imposition of the wage penalty is a finding that the delay in payment is "without sufficient cause." To the extent that the equities of the situation are to be considered, see they bear on that finding, and not on the calculation of the penalty period once that finding has been made. IV The District Court found that respondent's refusal to pay petitioner earned wages following his discharge was without sufficient cause. It applied the wage penalty only for the period of nonpayment during which petitioner was unable to work. It made no finding, however, that respondent's continuing delay in payment beyond that period was for sufficient cause. Under the plain language of the statute, therefore, its decision to limit the penalty period was error. The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming that decision accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | The Court holds that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars petitioner’s retrial for arson because his attorney managed to convince a judge to terminate petitioner’s first trial prior to verdict on the specious ground that the offense with which he was charged contains an imaginary “ele- ment” that the prosecution could not prove. The Court’s decision makes no sense. It is not consistent with the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause; it does not serve the purposes of the prohibition against double jeopardy; and contrary to the Court’s reasoning, the trial judge’s ruling was not an “acquittal,” which our cases have “consistently” defined as a decision that “ ‘actually repre- sents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense ’ ” E.g., v. Massachusetts, (quoting United (1977); emphasis added). For no good reason, the Court deprives the State of Michigan of its right to have one fair opportunity to convict petitioner, and I therefore respect- fully dissent. I After Detroit police officers heard an explosion at a burning house, they observed petitioner running away from the building with a gasoline can. The officers pur- 2 EVANS v. MICHIGAN ALITO, J., dissenting sued and ultimately apprehended petitioner, who admit- ted that he had burned down the house. No one was living in the house at the time of the fire. If the house in question had been a “dwelling house,” petitioner could have been charged under Mich. Comp. Laws (1981) for burning a dwelling, an offense punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years. But peti- tioner was instead charged with “[b]urning other real property” in violation of This offense, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, applies to “[a]ny person who wilfully or maliciously burns any building or other real property other than those specified in [].” This crime is a lesser included offense of the crime of burning a dwelling house. The “necessary elements to prove either offense are the same, except to prove the greater [offense] it must be shown that the building is a dwelling.” 19–20, (internal quota- tion marks omitted). To prove the lesser offense, however, “ ‘it is not necessary to prove that the building is not a dwelling.’ ” 810 N.W. 2d, at 546 (emphasis added). At the close of the prosecution’s case, petitioner’s attor- ney moved for a directed verdict on the ground that (1) the prosecution was required to prove, as an “element” of the charged offense, that “the building was not a dwelling” and (2) “the prosecution had failed to prove |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | a dwelling” and (2) “the prosecution had failed to prove that the burned building was not a dwelling house.” N.W. 2d, at 537. The prosecutor responded by arguing that nothing in the charged offense requires proof that the building was not a dwelling, and the prosecutor requested “a moment” to “pull the statute” and “consult with [her] supervisors.” at 5–7, 810 N.W. 2d, at 537–539. The trial judge denied the prosecutor’s requests and errone- ously concluded that the prosecution was required to prove that the burned building was not a dwelling. After deter- Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 3 ALITO, J., dissenting mining that the State had not proved this nonexistent “element,” the trial judge granted petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict and entered an order that it labeled an “[a]cquittal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72. The trial judge’s ruling was plainly wrong, and on ap- peal, defense counsel did not even attempt to defend its correctness, conceding that the judge had “wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute” under which his client was 810 N.W. 2d, at 536; see also and n. 2, 794 N.W.2d 848, 852, and n. 2 (2010). The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed with this concession and went on to hold that the trial judge’s ruling did not constitute an “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes because the ruling did not rep- resent “a resolution in the defendant’s favor of a fac- tual element necessary for a criminal conviction.” at 421–422, 794 N.W. 2d, at 856 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when, as here, a trial judge erroneously adds an ex- tra “element” to a charged offense and subsequently de- termines that the prosecution did not prove that extra “element,” the trial judge’s decision is not based on the de- fendant’s guilt or innocence of the elements of the charged –4, 19–21, 810 N.W. 2d, at 536– 537, Accordingly, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s ruling in this case “does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is not barred.” 810 N.W. 2d, at 537. II This Court now reverses the decision of the State Su- preme Court, but the Court’s holding is supported by neither the original understanding of the prohibition against double jeopardy nor any of the reasons for that prohibition. 4 EVANS v. MICHIGAN ALITO, J., dissenting A The prohibition against double jeopardy “had its origin in the three common-law pleas of autrefois acquit, autre- fois convict, and pardon,” which “prevented the retrial of a person who |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | and pardon,” which “prevented the retrial of a person who had previously been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned for the same ” United ; see 33 As the Court has previously explained, “the common-law protection against double jeopardy historically applied only to charges on which a jury had rendered a verdict.” 543 U. S., 661 As a result, the original understanding of the Clause, which is “hardly a matter of dispute,” at does not compel the Court’s conclusion that a defendant is acquit- ted for double jeopardy purposes whenever a judge issues a preverdict ruling that the prosecution has failed to prove a nonexistent “element” of the charged Although our decisions have expanded double jeopardy protection beyond its common-law origins, see, e.g., 66–467 (acknowledging the Court’s expansion of “the common-law protection against double jeopardy”); —————— 1 See also (“The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy derived from English common law, which followed the relatively simple rule that a defendant has been put in jeopardy only when there has been a conviction or an acquittal—after a complete trial. And it is clear that in the early years of our national history the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy was considered to be equally limited in scope”); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States p. 659 (1833) (“The mean- ing of [the Double Jeopardy Clause] is, that a party shall not be tried a second time for the same offence, after he has once been convicted, or acquitted of the offence charged, by the verdict of a jury, and judgment has passed thereon for or against him. But it does not mean, that he shall not be tried for the offence a second time, if the jury have been discharged without giving any verdict” ); 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 246 (1778) (“It must be an acquittal upon trial either by verdict or battle”). Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 5 ALITO, J., dissenting at 33–34, I nonetheless count it significant that the result the Court reaches today finds no support in the relevant common-law analogues that “lie at the core of the area protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause,” see And given how far we have depart- ed from the common-law principles that applied at the time of the founding, we should at least ensure that our decisions in this area serve the underlying purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See at 95–96, 100–101. Yet today’s decision fails to ad- vance the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. B The Double Jeopardy Clause is largely |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | Double Jeopardy Clause. B The Double Jeopardy Clause is largely based on “the deeply ingrained principle that the State with all its re- sources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and or- deal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibil- ity that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. (slip op., at 5); Martin Allowing retrial in the circum- stances of the present case would not result in any such abuse. The prosecution would not be afforded a second opportunity to persuade the factfinder that its evidence satisfies the actual elements of the Instead, be- cause the trial judge’s ruling in the first trial was not based on an actual element of the charged offense, retrial would simply give the prosecution one fair opportunity to prove its case. Allowing retrial in this case would not permit prosecu- tors “to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,” It was 6 EVANS v. MICHIGAN ALITO, J., dissenting petitioner, not the prosecutor, who sought to terminate the trial prior to verdict. Thus, contrary to the Court’s unex- plained suggestion, see ante, at 5–6, “[t]his case hardly presents the specter of ‘an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact.’ ” v. Pennsylvania, (quoting ). On the contrary, this is a case in which defense counsel fooled the judge into committing an error that provided his client with an undeserved benefit, the termination of a trial that the defense obviously did not want to run to completion. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not require that the defense receive an even greater benefit, the protection provided by an acquittal. As this Court has repeatedly emphasized in double jeopardy cases, a State has an interest in receiving “one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws,” (internal quotation marks omitted); but today’s decision deprives the State of Michigan of this valuable right. C The Court’s decision also flies in the face of our estab- lished understanding of the meaning of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5 Thus, “[d]ouble- jeopardy analysis focuses on the individual ‘offence’ ” 543 U. S., 69, n. 3. And to determine what constitutes “the individual ‘offence’ charged,” ib the Court homes in on the elements of the See United (“In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution con- texts, this Court has concluded that where the two of- Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 7 ALITO, J., dissenting fenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same-elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies”). Consistent with the constitutional text’s focus on the “offence”—and thus the elements—with which a defendant is charged, the Court’s “double-jeopardy cases have consistently” defined an acquittal as a decision that “ ‘actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense ’ ” at (quoting Martin at ); see also (“[A] defendant is acquit- ted only when the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution in the defendant’s favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Today, the Court effectively abandons the well- established definition of an acquittal. Indeed, in the face of our repeated holdings that an acquittal for double jeop- ardy purposes requires a “resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged,” at ; Martin at ; see also the Court now declares that “the touchstone [is] not whether any particular elements were resolved,” ante, at 10 Instead, the Court proclaims that the dispositive question is whether a midtrial termination represented a “procedural dismissa[l]” or a “substantive rulin[g],” ante, at 5. This reformulation of double jeopardy law is not faithful to our prece- dents—or to the Double Jeopardy Clause itself. The key question is not whether a ruling is “procedural” or “sub- stantive” (whatever those terms mean in this context), but whether a ruling relates to the defendant’s factual guilt or innocence with respect to the “offence,” see U. S. Const., Amdt. 5—and thus the elements—with which he is See at 97–99, and n. 11. When a judge evaluates the evidence and determines 8 EVANS v. MICHIGAN ALITO, J., dissenting that the prosecution has not proved facts that are legally sufficient to satisfy the actual elements of the charged offense, the ruling, however labeled, represents an acquit- tal because it is founded on the defendant’s factual inno- cence. See Martin But when a judge manufactures an additional |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | cence. See Martin But when a judge manufactures an additional “element” of an offense and then holds that there is insufficient evidence to prove that extra “element,” the judge has not resolved the de- fendant’s “factual guilt or innocence” as to any of the actual elements of the 2 Thus, the ruling, no mat- ter what the judge calls it, does not acquit the defendant of the offense with which he is No acquittal occurs when a criminal trial is terminated “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which [a defendant] is accused.” 437 U. S., at 94–95, 98– 99. “[I]n a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cog- nizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the Govern- ment is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant.” at 98–99 (reasoning that, in such a case, the defendant was “neither acquitted nor convicted, because he himself successfully undertook to persuade the trial court not to submit the issue of guilt or innocence to the jury which had been empaneled to try him”). —————— 2 Because culpability for an offense can be negated by proof of an affirmative defense, the Court has held that a ruling that the prosecu- tion did not submit sufficient evidence to rebut an affirmative defense constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. See Burks v. United States, ; 437 U. S., –98. Thus, as used in this opinion, the “elements” of an offense include legally recognized affirmative defenses that would negate culpability. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 9 ALITO, J., dissenting III Contrary to the Court’s opinion, its decision in this case is not supported by prior precedent. In all three of the principal cases on which the Court ; ; and —trial judges ruled that the prosecution had failed to introduce suffi- cient evidence to prove one or more of the actual elements of the offenses in question. In none of these cases (and in none of our other double jeopardy cases) did a trial judge terminate a prosecution before verdict based on an ele- ment of the judge’s own creation. The first two cases, Smalis and involved gar- den variety preverdict acquittals, i.e., rulings based on the ground that the prosecution had failed to introduce suffi- cient evidence to prove one or more of the actual elements of |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | to prove one or more of the actual elements of an (Using conventional modern terminology, Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly labels such rulings “acquittal[s].”) In Smalis, the judge, at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief, granted a demurrer with respect to certain charges on the ground that the evidence regarding those charges was “legally insufficient to support a conviction.” The State Supreme Court held that this ruling was not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes because it was based on a legal determination (i.e., that the evidence was not sufficient) rather than a factual finding, but we rejected that distinction. at 143–144. See also 71–72 involved a similar situation. There, one of the elements of a firearms offense with which the defendant was charged required proof that the gun “had a barrel ‘less than 16 inches’ in length,” 543 U. S., 64, and the trial judge dismissed this charge before verdict on the ground that the prosecution had not introduced sufficient evi- 10 EVANS v. MICHIGAN ALITO, J., dissenting dence to establish this undisputed element, 64– 465. Before the remaining charges were submitted to the jury, however, the judge reversed this ruling and allowed the charge to go to the jury. 65. We held, how- ever, that the judge’s prior ruling constituted an acquittal and therefore barred the defendant’s conviction for this 67–469. Thus, both Smalis and involved rulings that were very different from the one at issue here. In both of those earlier cases, the trial judges held that the evidence was insufficient to prove undis- puted elements of the offenses in question. In neither case did the judge invent a new element. The final case, Rumsey, differs from Smalis and in only one particular. Like Smalis and Rumsey involved a ruling that the prosecution’s evidence was in- sufficient to prove an element, but in Rumsey the ruling was predicated on a misconstruction of an element. In that case, after the defendant was found guilty of first- degree murder, the “trial judge, with no jury, con- ducted a separate sentencing hearing” at which he deter- mined that no aggravating circumstances were present. 467 U. S., 5. In particular, the judge found that the prosecution had not proved that the murder had been committed “ ‘as consideration for the receipt, or in expecta- tion of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.’ ” at 205–206 (quoting –703(F)(5) ). The judge reached this conclusion because, in his (incorrect) view, that aggravating circum- stance was limited to contract 467 U. S., 5– 206. Holding that |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | dissenting | Evans v. Michigan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/820896/evans-v-michigan/ | limited to contract 467 U. S., 5– 206. Holding that the judge’s ruling constituted an acquit- tal on the merits of the question whether a death sentence was appropriate, we noted that the ruling rested on “a misconstruction of the statute defining the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.” Accordingly, the ruling was based on a determination that there was insuf- ficient evidence to prove a real element; it was not based Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 11 ALITO, J., dissenting on the judicial invention of an extra “element.” And for that reason, it does not support the nonsensical result that the Court reaches today. The Court may feel compelled to reach that result be- cause it thinks that it would be unworkable to draw a distinction between a preverdict termination based on the trial judge’s misconstruction of an element of an offense and a preverdict termination based on the judge’s percep- tion that a statute contains an “element” that is actually nonexistent. This practical concern is overblown. There may be cases in which this determination presents prob- lems, but surely there are many cases in which the de- termination is quite easy. The present case is a perfect example, for here there is no real dispute that the trial judge’s ruling was based on a nonexistent statutory “ele- ment.” As noted, defense counsel conceded on appeal that the judge had “wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute” under which his client was 491 Mich., at 3, 810 N.W. 2d, at 536. Another good example is provided by where a Magistrate erroneously concluded that the offense of criminal trespass under Idaho law requires a showing that the defendant did something to justify the property owner’s request for the defendant to leave the premises. 716–717, 136–137. There is no question that the Magistrate in Korsen “effectively created an additional statutory element” before concluding that the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence as to this purported “element.” See (holding that double jeopardy did not bar a retrial because the Magistrate’s “finding did not actually determine in [defendant’s] favor any of the essen- tial elements of the crime of trespass”). Cases in which it can be said that a trial judge did not simply misinterpret a real element of an offense but in- stead invented an entirely new and nonexistent “element” 12 EVANS v. MICHIGAN ALITO, J., dissenting are cases in which the judge’s error is particularly egre- gious. Permitting retrial in these egregious cases is espe- cially appropriate. * * * I would hold that double jeopardy protection is not triggered by a |
Justice Harlan | 1,970 | 22 | concurring | Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108024/carter-v-west-feliciana-parish-school-bd/ | I join the Court's order. I agree that the action of the Court of Appeals in these cases does not fulfill the requirements of our recent decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, ante, p. 19, and accordingly that the judgments below cannot stand. However, in fairness to the Court of Appeals and to the parties, and with a view to giving further guidance to litigants in future cases of this kind, I consider that something more is due to be said respecting the intended effect of the Alexander decision. Since the Court has not seen fit to do so, I am constrained to set forth at least my own understanding of the procedure to be followed in these cases. Because of the shortness of the time available, I must necessarily do this in a summary way. The intent of Alexander, as I see it, was that the burden in actions of this type should be shifted from plaintiffs, seeking redress for a denial of constitutional *292 rights, to defendant school boards. What this means is that upon a prima facie showing of noncompliance with this Court's holding in sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial, plaintiffs may apply for immediate relief that will at once extirpate any lingering vestiges of a constitutionally prohibited dual school system. Cf. Magnum Import Such relief, I believe it was intended, should consist of an order providing measures for achieving disestablishment of segregated school systems, and should, if appropriate, include provisions for pupil and teacher reassignments, rezoning, or any other steps necessary to accomplish the desegregation of the public school system as required by Green. Graduated implementation of the relief is no longer constitutionally permissible. Such relief shall become effective immediately after the courts, acting with dispatch, have formulated and approved an order that will achieve complete disestablishment of all aspects of a segregated public school system. It was contemplated, I think, that in determining the character of such relief the courts may consider submissions of the parties or any recommendations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that may exist or may request proposals from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. If Department recommendations are already available the school districts are to bear the burden of demonstrating beyond question, after a hearing, the unworkability of the proposals, and if such proposals are found unworkable, the courts shall devise measures to provide the required relief. It would suffice that such measures will tend to accomplish the goals set forth in Green, and, if they are less than educationally |
Justice Harlan | 1,970 | 22 | concurring | Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108024/carter-v-west-feliciana-parish-school-bd/ | forth in Green, and, if they are less than educationally perfect, proposals for amendments may thereafter be made. Such proposals for amendments are in *293 no way to suspend the relief granted in accordance with the requirements of Alexander. Alexander makes clear that any order so approved should thereafter be implemented in the minimum time necessary for accomplishing whatever physical steps are required to permit transfers of students and personnel or other changes that may be necessary to effectuate the required relief. Were the recent orders of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United and that of the Fourth Circuit in each implementing in those cases our decision in Alexander, to be taken as a yardstick, this would lead to the conclusion that in no event should the time from the finding of noncompliance with the requirements of the Green case to the time of the actual operative effect of the relief, including the time for judicial approval and review, exceed a period of approximately eight weeks. This, I think, is indeed the "maximum" timetable established by the Court today for cases of this kind. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL express their disagreement with the opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, joined by MR. JUSTICE WHITE. They believe that those views retreat from our holding in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, ante, at 20, that "the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." Memorandum of THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE STEWART. We would not peremptorily reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court, sitting en banc and acting unanimously after our decision *294 in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, ante, p. 19, has required the respondents to effect desegregation in their public schools by February 1, 1970, save for the student bodies, which are to be wholly desegregated during the current year, no later than September. In light of the measures the Court of Appeals has directed the respondent school districts to undertake, with total desegregation required for the upcoming school year, we are not prepared summarily to set aside its judgments. That court is far more familiar than we with the various situations of these several school districts, some large, some small, some rural, and some metropolitan, and has exhibited responsibility and fidelity to the objectives of our holdings in school desegregation cases. To say peremptorily that the Court of Appeals erred in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | We granted certiorari in this case, to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which required petitioner Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to disapprove a portion of the implementation plan submitted to him by the State of Georgia pursuant to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.[1] The case presents an issue of statutory construction which is illuminated by the anatomy of the statute itself, by its legislative history, and by the history of congressional efforts to control air pollution. I Congress initially responded to the problem of air pollution by offering encouragement and assistance to the States. In 1955 the Surgeon General was authorized to study the problem of air pollution, to support research, training, and demonstration projects, and to provide technical assistance to state and local governments attempting to abate pollution. In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon General to focus his attention on the health hazards resulting from motor vehicle emissions. Stat. 162. The Clean Air Act of 1963, authorized federal authorities to expand their research efforts, to make grants to state air pollution *64 control agencies, and also to intervene directly to abate interstate pollution in limited circumstances. Amendments in 1965, 101, and in 1966, broadened federal authority to control motor vehicle emissions and to make grants to state pollution control agencies. The focus shifted somewhat in the Air Quality Act of 1967, It reiterated the premise of the earlier Clean Air Act "that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments." Its provisions, however, increased the federal role in the prevention of air pollution, by according federal authorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement. But the States generally retained wide latitude to determine both the air quality standards which they would meet and the period of time in which they would do so. The response of the States to these manifestations of increasing congressional concern with air pollution was disappointing. Even by 1970, state planning and implementation under the Air Quality Act of 1967 had made little progress. Congress reacted by taking a stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Stat. 1676, enacted on December 31 of that year. These Amendments sharply increased federal authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution. Nonetheless, the Amendments explicitly preserved the principle: "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State" 107 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 42 U.S. C. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | of the Clean Air Act, as added, 42 U.S. C. 1857c-2 (a). The difference under the Amendments was that the States were no longer given any choice as to whether they would meet this responsibility. For the first time they were required to *65 attain air quality of specified standards, and to do so within a specified period of time. The Amendments directed that within 30 days of their enactment the Environmental Protection Agency should publish proposed regulations describing national quality standards for the "ambient air," which is the statute's term for the outdoor air used by the general public. After allowing 90 days for comments on the proposed standards, the Agency was then obliged to promulgate such standards. 109 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 42 U.S. C. 1857c-4 (a) (1). The standards were to be of two general types: "primary" standards, which in the judgment of the Agency were "requisite to protect the public health," 109 (b) (1), and "secondary" standards, those that in the judgment of the Agency were "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." 109 (b) (2). Within nine months after the Agency's promulgation of primary and secondary air quality standards, each of the 50 States was required to submit to the Agency a plan designed to implement and maintain such standards within its boundaries. 110 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 42 U.S. C. 1857c-5 (a) (1). The Agency was in turn required to approve each State's plan within four months of the deadline for submission, if it had been adopted after public hearings and if it satisfied eight general conditions set forth in 110 (a) (2).[2]*66 Probably the principal of these conditions, and the heart of the 1970 Amendments, is that the plan provide for the attainment of the national primary ambient air *67 quality standards in the particular State "as expeditiously as practicable but in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan." 110 (a) (2) (A). In providing for such attainment, a State's plan must include "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations"; it must also contain such other measures as may be necessary to insure both timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. 110 (a) (2) (B). Although the Agency itself was newly organized, the States looked to it for guidance in formulating the plans they were required to submit. On April 7, 1971scarcely |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | plans they were required to submit. On April 7, 1971scarcely three months after the enactment of the Clean Air Amendmentsthe Agency published proposed guidelines for the preparation, adoption, and submission of such plans. After receiving numerous comments, including those from respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), it issued final guidelines on August 14, 1971, See 40 CFR Part 51 The national standards themselves were timely promulgated on April 30, 1971, See 40 CFR Part 50 *68 No one can doubt that Congress imposed upon the Agency and States a comprehensive planning task of the first magnitude which was to be accomplished in a relatively short time. In the case of the States, it was soon realized that in order to develop the requisite plans within the statutory nine-month deadline, efforts would have to be focused on determining the stringent emission limitations necessary to comply with national standards. This was true even though compliance with the standards would not be necessary until the attainment date, which normally would be three years after Agency approval of a plan. The issue then arose as to how these stringent limitations, which often could not be satisfied without substantial research and investment, should be applied during the period prior to that date. One approach was that adopted by Florida, under which the plan's emission limitations would not take effect until the attainment date. Under this approach, no source is subject to enforcement actions during the preattainment period, but all are put on notice of the limitations with which they must eventually comply.[3] Since the Florida approach basically does not require preattainment date pollution reductions on the part of those sources which might be able to effect them,[4] the Agency encouraged an alternative approach. Under it a State's emission limitations would be immediately effective. The State, however, *69 would have the authority to grant variances to particular sources which could not immediately comply with the stringent emission limitations necessary to meet the standards. Georgia chose the Agency's preferred approach.[5] Its plan provided for immediately effective categorical emission limitations, but also incorporated a variance whereby particular sources could obtain individually tailored relief from general requirements. This variance provision, Ga. Code Ann. 88-912 (1971),[6] was one of the *70 bases upon which the Agency's approval of the Georgia plan was successfully challenged by respondents in the Court of Appeals. It is the only aspect of that court's decision as to which the Agency petitioned for certiorari. II The Agency's approval of Georgia's variance provision was based on its interpretation of 110 (a) (3),[7] which provides that the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | its interpretation of 110 (a) (3),[7] which provides that the Agency shall approve any revision of an implementation plan which meets the 110 (a) (2) requirements applicable to an original plan. The Agency concluded that 110 (a) (3) permits a State to grant individual variances from generally applicable emission standards, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of 110 (a) (2). Since that section requires, inter alia, that primary ambient air standards be attained by a particular date, it is of some consequence under this approach whether the period for which the variance is sought extends beyond that date. If it does not, the practical effect of treating such preattainment date variances as revisions is that they can be granted rather freely. This interpretation of 110 (a) (3) was incorporated in the Agency's original guidelines for implementation *71 plans, 40 CFR 51.6 51.32 (f)[8] Although a spokesman for respondent NRDC had earlier stated that the Agency's guideline in this regard "correctly provides that variances which do not threaten attainment of a national standard are to be considered revisions of the plan,"[9] that organization later developed second thoughts on the matter. Its present position, in which it is joined by another environmental organization and by two individual respondents who reside in affected air quality control regions within the State of Georgia, is that variances applicable to individual sources may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards of 110 (f).[10] This section permits one-year "postponements" of any requirement of a plan, subject to conditions which will be discussed below. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, and ordered the Agency to disapprove Georgia's variance provision, although it did not specify which of the 110 (a) (2) requirements were thereby violated.[11] It held *72 that while the revision authority of 110 (a) (3) was available for generally applicable changes of an implementation plan, the postponement provision of 110 (f) was the only method by which individual sources could obtain relief from applicable emission limitations. In reaching this conclusion the court rejected petitioners' suggestion that whether a proposed variance should be treated as a "revision" under 110 (a) (3), or as a "postponement" under 110 (f), depended on whether it would affect attainment of a national ambient air standard, rather than on whether it applied to one source or to many. Other Circuits have also been confronted with this issue, and while none has adopted the Agency's position, all have differed from |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | none has adopted the Agency's position, all have differed from the Fifth Circuit. The first case was Natural Resources Defense For reasons to be discussed, infra, at 91-94, the First Circuit rejected the revision authority as a basis for a variance It nonetheless concluded that prior to the three-year date for mandatory attainment of primary standards, a State could grant variances to sources which could not immediately meet applicable emission limitations. The court reasoned: "We can see value in permitting a state to impose strict emission limitations now, subject to individual exemptions if practicability warrants; otherwise it may be forced to adopt less stringent limitations in order to accommodate those who, notwithstanding reasonable efforts, are as yet unable to comply. "The Administrator sees his power to allow such exemption s as deriving from the `revision' authority in [110] (a) (3). We tend to view it more as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme, which anticipates greater flexibility during the preattainment period." *73 The First Circuit's resolution, which has been described as "Solomonesque," is not tied to any specific provision of the Clean Air Act. Rather, it is quite candidly a judicial creation providing flexibility which, according to its creators, Congress may be inferred to have intended to provide. Two other Circuits subsequently followed the First Circuit. Natural Resources Defense ; Natural Resources Defense Neither expanded on the First Circuit's reasoning. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a third approach to this question, in Natural Resources Defense After considering legislative history, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend the postponement mechanism to be the exclusive source for variances. But the court also did not adopt the Agency's view that variances could be authorized as 110 (a) (3) revisions, although it did not explain its rejection of this interpretation. Rather, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit that flexibility was "a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme." It explained: "As long as a possible variance from a state plan will not preclude the attainment or maintenance of such standards, we discern no legislative intent to commit a state, in toto, to its initial plan, without any flexibility whatsoever." The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the First Circuit's distinction between the preattainment and postattainment periods. It concluded that statutory support for flexibility was as strong after the attainment date as before, especially in light of the Act's encouragement of the States to adopt plans even stricter than those required *74 to attain national standards.[12] The court thus adopted an approach which differs from the Agency's, but which reaches the same resultauthorization |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | differs from the Agency's, but which reaches the same resultauthorization of variances on standards other than those required for 110 (f) postponements, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not prevent timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. After the Courts of Appeals for the First, Eighth, Fifth, and Second Circuits had spoken, but prior to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Agency modified its guidelines to comply with the then-unanimous rulings that after the attainment date the postponement provision was the only basis for obtaining a variance. -34535, adding 40 CFR 51.11 51.15 (d) and revising 51.32 (f). At the same time, the Agency formally disapproved variance provisions to the extent they authorized variances extending beyond attainment dates, unless the standards of 110 (f) were met. adding 40 CFR 52.26. Because the Agency has conformed its regulations to the decisions of the First, Eighth, and Second Circuits, this case on its facts is now limited to the validity of the Georgia variance provision insofar as it authorizes variances effective before Georgia's attainment date, which is in July 1975.[13] The Agency nonetheless has not abandoned its original view that the revision section authorizes variances which do not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of national ambient air standards. Moreover, the Agency is candid in admitting that should we *75 base our decision on its interpretation of 110 (a) (3), the decision would support the approval of implementation plans which provide for variances effective after the attainment date. The disparity among the Courts of Appeals rather strongly indicates that the question does not admit of an easy answer. Without going so far as to hold that the Agency's construction of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts. III Both of the sections in controversy are contained in 110 of the amended Clean Air Act, which is entitled "Implementation Plans." Section 110 (a) (3) provides in pertinent part: "(A) The Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan applicable to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets the requirement of paragraph (2) and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public hearings." Section 110 (f) provides: "(1) Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of moving sources is required to comply with any requirement of an applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | an applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to which such plan applies may apply to the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such source (or class) for not more than one year. If the Administrator determines that "(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such date, "(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply *76 with such requirement because the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not available or have not been available for a sufficient period of time, "(C) any available alternative operating s and interim control measures have reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health, and "(D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare, "then the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such requirement."[14] *77 As previously noted, respondents contend that "variances" applicable to individual sourcesfor example, a particular factorymay be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards set forth in 110 (f). As is apparent from the text of 110 (f), its postponements may be for no more than one year, may be granted only if application is made prior to the date of required compliance, and must be supported by the Agency's determination that the source's continued operation "is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." Petitioners, on the other hand, rely on the revision authority of 110 (a) (3) for the contention that a state plan may provide for an individual variance from generally applicable emission limitations so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of 110 (a) (2). Since a variance would normally implicate only the 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that plans provide for attainment and maintenance of national ambient air standards, treatment as revisions would result in variances being readily approved in two situations: first, where the variance does not defer compliance beyond the attainment date;[15] and second, where the national standards have been attained and the variance is not so great that a plan incorporating it could not insure their continued maintenance. Moreover, a 110 (a) (3) revision may be granted on the basis of hearings conducted by the State, whereas a 110 (f) *78 postponement is available only after the Agency itself conducts hearings. There is thus considerable practical importance attached to the issue of whether variances are to be treated as revisions or as postponements, or for that matter, as the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | revisions or as postponements, or for that matter, as the First Circuit would have it, as neither until the mandatory attainment date but as postponements thereafter. This practical importance reaches not merely the operator of a particular source who believes that circumstances justify his receiving a variance from categorical limitations. It also reaches the broader issue of whether Congress intended the States to retain any significant degree of control of the manner in which they attain and maintain national standards, at least once their initial plans have been approved or, under the First Circuit's approach, once the mandatory attainment date has arrived. To explain our conclusion as to Congress' intent, it is necessary that we consider the revision and postponement sections in the context of other provisions of the amended Clean Air Act, particularly those which distinguish between national ambient air standards and emission limitations. As we have already noted, primary ambient air standards deal with the quality of outdoor air, and are fixed on a nationwide basis at levels which the Agency determines will protect the public health. It is attainment and maintenance of these national standards which 110 (a) (2) (A) requires that state plans provide. In complying with this requirement a State's plan must include "emission limitations," which are regulations of the composition of substances emitted into the ambient air from such sources as power plants, service stations, and the like. They are the specific rules to which operators of pollution sources are subject, and which if enforced should result in ambient air which meets the national standards. *79 The Agency is plainly charged by the Act with the responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards. Just as plainly, however, it is relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be met.[16] Under 110 (a) (2), the Agency is required to approve a state plan which provides for the timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of ambient air standards, and which also satisfies that section's other general requirements. The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom of a State's choices of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of 110 (a) (2), and the Agency may devise and promulgate a specific plan of its own only if a State fails to submit an implementation plan which satisfies those standards. 110 Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation. This analysis of the Act's division of responsibilities is not challenged by respondents insofar as it concerns the process of devising and promulgating an initial implementation *80 plan. Respondents do, however, deny that the States have such latitude once the initial plan is approved. Yet the third paragraph of 110 (a), and the one immediately following the paragraphs which specify that States shall file implementation plans and that the Agency shall approve them if they satisfy certain broad criteria, is the section which requires the Agency to "approve any revision of an implementation plan" if it "determines that it meets the requirements" of 110 (a) (2). On its face, this provision applies to any revision, without regard either to its breadth of applicability, or to whether it is to be effective before or after the attainment date; rather, Agency approval is subject only to the condition that the revised plan satisfy the general requirements applicable to original implementation plans. Far from evincing congressional intent that the Agency assume control of a State's emission limitations mix once its initial plan is approved, the revision section is to all appearances the mechanism by which the States may obtain approval of their developing policy choices as to the most practicable and desirable methods of restricting total emissions to a level which is consistent with the national ambient air standards. In order to challenge this characterization of 110 (a) (3), respondents principally rely on the contention that the postponement provision, 110 (f), is the only mechanism by which exceptions to a plan's requirements may be obtained, under any circumstances. Were this an accurate description of 110 (f), we would agree that the revision authority does not have the broad application asserted by the Agency. Like the Ninth Circuit,[17] however, we believe that 110 (f) serves a function different from that of supervising state efforts to modify the initial *81 mix of emission limitations by which they implement national standards. In our view, 110 (f) is a safety valve by which may be accorded, under certain carefully specified circumstances, exceptions to the national standards themselves. That this is its role is strongly suggested by the process by which it became a part of the Clean Air Act. The House version of the Amendment, H. R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., contained no provisions for either postponements |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | 91st Cong., 2d Sess., contained no provisions for either postponements or, most significantly, mandatory deadlines for the attainment of national ambient air standards. The Senate bill, S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., did contain both the three-year deadline, which now appears in 110 (a) (2), and the predecessor of the present 110 (f). That predecessor[18] permitted the governor of a *82 State to petition a three-judge district court for "relief from the effect" of expiration of the three-year deadline as to a region or persons, and provided for the grant of such relief upon a showing of conditions similar to those *83 now appearing in 110 (f). Under its language the postponement provision plainly applied only when deferral of a national deadline was sought.[19] The Conference Committee adopted the Senate's general approach to the deadline issue. Its report states: "The conference substitute follows the Senate amendment is establishing deadlines for implementing primary ambient air quality standards but leaves the States free to establish a reasonable time period within which secondary ambient air quality standards will be implemented. The conference substitute modifies the Senate amendment in that it allows the Administrator to grant extensions for good causes shown upon application by the Governors." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, p. 45 (1970). (Emphasis added.) Nowhere does the report suggest that other changes in the Senate's proposed 111 (f) were intended to dramatically broaden its reach, such that it would not merely be available to obtain deferral of the strict deadlines for compliance with national standards, but would also be the exclusive mechanism for any ameliorative modification of a plan, no matter how minor. *84 That the postponement provision was intended merely as a method of escape from the mandatory deadlines becomes even clearer when one considers the summary of the conference's work which Senator Muskie presented to the Senate. The summary referred to a provision under which a single two-year extension of the deadline could be obtained were it shown to be necessary at the time a State's initial plan was submitted. It then immediately discussed the postponement provision, as follows: "A Governor may also apply for a postponement of the deadline if, when the deadline approaches, it is impossible for a source to meet a requirement under an implementation plan, interim control measures have reduced (or will reduce) the adverse health effects of the source, and the continued operation of the source is essential to national security or the public health or welfare of that State." 116 Cong. Rec. 42384-42385. (Emphasis added.) This limited view of the role of 110 |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | (Emphasis added.) This limited view of the role of 110 (f) is reinforced by comparison with the section which immediately precedes it in the statute, 110 (e).[20] This is the provision *85 to which Senator Muskie's summary was obviously referring when it stated that the three-year deadline could be extended for up to two years if proper application were made at the time a State first submitted its plan. Like 110 (f), 110 (e) is available only if an emission source is unable to comply with plan requirements because "the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance." Section 110 (e) also contains a requirement parallel to that of 110 (f) (1) (C), that available alternative s and control measures have been considered and utilized. Unlike 110 (f), however, 110 (e) contains no requirement that "the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." Section 110 (e) thus permits a two-year extension on a showing considerably less stringent than that required for a 110 (f) one-year postponement. This disparity is quite logical, however, because the relief under 110 (e) is limited to an initial two-year period, whereas that under 110 (f) is available at any time, so long as application is made prior to the effective date of the relevant requirement.[21] *86 On the other hand, the disparity between the standards of 110 (e) and those of 110 (f) would be inexplicable were 110 (f) also the sole mechanism by which States could modify the particular emission limitations mix incorporated in their initial implementation plans, even though the desired modifications would have no impact on the attainment or maintenance of national standards. Respondents' interpretation requires the anomalous conclusion that Congress, having stated its goal to be the attainment and maintenance of specified ambient air standards, nonetheless made it significantly more difficult for a State to modify an emission limitations mix which met those standards both before and after modification than for a State to obtain a two-year deferral in the attainment of the standards themselves. The interpretation suffers, therefore, not only from its contrariety to the revision authority which Congress provided, but also from its willingness to ascribe inconsistency to a carefully considered congressional enactment. We believe that the foregoing analysis of the structure and legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments shows that Congress intended to impose national ambient air standards to be attained within a specific period of time. It also shows that in 110 (e) and (f) Congress |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | It also shows that in 110 (e) and (f) Congress carefully limited the circumstances in which timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of these standards could be compromised. We also believe that Congress, consistent with its declaration that "[e]ach State *87 shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality" within its boundaries, 107 (a), left to the States considerable latitude in determining specifically how the standards would be met. This discretion includes the continuing authority to revise choices about the mix of emission limitations. We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation of 110 (a) (3) and 110 (f) was "correct," to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the "correct" one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency. ; We are not persuaded to the contrary by any of the arguments advanced by respondents or by the Courts of Appeals which have rejected 110 (a) (3) as authority for granting variances. To these various arguments we now turn. IV The principal basis on which the Fifth Circuit rejected the Agency's view of the revision and postponement sections was its analysis of their language. The court focused first on the fact that 110 (f) speaks in terms of "any stationary source," and of the postponement of "any requirement of an applicable implementation plan." (Emphasis added.) This language, according to the Fifth Circuit, belies the Agency's contention that the postponement section is inapplicable to those variances which do not jeopardize the attainment or maintenance *88 of national standards. The court went on to state, without citation or supporting reasoning: "A revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement; a postponement or variance [is a] change in the application of a requirement to a particular party. The distinction between the two is familiar and clear." We think that the Fifth Circuit has read more into 110 (f), and more out of 110 (a) (3), than careful analysis can sustain. In the first place, the "any stationary source" and "any requirement" language of 110 (f) serves only to define the matters with respect to which the governor of a State may apply for a postponement. The language does not, as the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | apply for a postponement. The language does not, as the Fifth Circuit would have it, state that all sources desirous of any form of relief must rely solely on the postponement provision. While 110 (f) makes its relief available to any source which can qualify for it, regardless of whether the relief would jeopardize national standards, the section does not even suggest that other forms of relief, having no impact on the national goal of achieving air quality standards, are not also available on appropriately less rigorous showings. As for the Fifth Circuit's observation that "a revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement," whereas a "postponement or variance" deals with particular parties, we are not satisfied that the distinction is so "familiar and clear." While a variance is generally thought to be of specific applicability,[22] whether a revision *89 is general or specific depends on what is being revised. In this instance, it is implementation plans which are being revised, and it is clear that such plans may be quite detailed, both as to sources and the remedial steps required of the sources. Not only does 110 (a) (2) (B) specify that a plan shall include "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance,"[23] but respondents themselves have urged that the very specific variances which have already been granted in Georgia should have been, and may still be, treated as "compliance schedules" contained within the original plan.[24] A further difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the language of 110 (a) (3) and 110 (f) is that it entirely overlooks an obvious distinction between revisions and postponements. In normal usage, to "postpone" is to defer, whereas to "revise" is to remake or amend. In the implementation plan context, normal usage would suggest that a postponement is a deferral of the effective date of a requirement which remains a part of the applicable plan, whereas a revision is a change in the plan itself which deletes or modifies the requirement. If by revision a requirement of a plan is removed, then a person seeking relief from that requirement has no *90 need to seek its postponement, and 110 (f) is by its terms inapplicable. But if such a person cannot obtain a revision, because for example the plan as so revised would no longer insure timely attainment of the national standards, then under the Act he has no alternative but to comply or to obtain a postponement of the requirement's effective dateif he can satisfy the stringent conditions of 110 (f). This distinction between the two is so straightforward, and |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | (f). This distinction between the two is so straightforward, and so consistent with the structure and history of the Act, as discussed in Part III of this opinion, that we perceive no basis for the Fifth Circuit's strained line of analysis.[25] The Fifth Circuit also relied on the "technology forcing" nature of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. It reasoned that because the statute was intended to force technology to meet specified, scheduled standards, *91 it was essential to insure that commitments made at the planning stage could not be readily abandoned when the time for compliance arrived. According to the Fifth Circuit, 110 (f) "is the device Congress chose to assure this." 489 F.2d, at Clearly 110 (f) does present a formidable hurdle for those proposed departures from earlier commitments which are in fact subject to its stringent conditions. What the Fifth Circuit failed to consider, however, is that so long as the national standards are being attained and maintained, there is no basis in the present Clean Air Act for forcing further technological developments. Agency review assures that variances granted under 110 (a) (3) will be consistent with the 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that the national standards be attained as expeditiously as practicable and maintained thereafter. Thus 110 (a) (3) variances ex hypothesi do not jeopardize national standards, and the technology-forcing character of the Amendments is no reason at all for judging them under the provisions of 110 (f). The First Circuit also rejected the Agency's contention that variances could be handled under the revision but it did so for reasons different from those relied upon by the Fifth Circuit.[26] It stated: "Had Congress meant [ 110 (f)] to be followed only if a polluter, besides violating objective state *92 requirements, was shown to be preventing maintenance of a national standard, it would have said so. To allow a polluter to raise and perhaps litigate that issue is to invite protracted delay. The factual question could have endless refinements: is it the individual variance-seeker or others whose pollution is preventing maintenance of standards? See e. g., Getty Oil remanded with directions, where Getty raised this issue in various forums." Respondents also stress this argument: treating variances as revisions rather than as postponements would invite litigation, would be impractical in application, and would therefore result in degradation of the environment. Aside from the fact that it goes more to the wisdom of what Congress has chosen to do than to determining what Congress has done, we believe this argument to be overstated. As made clear in the Getty |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | majority | Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109238/train-v-natural-resources-defense-council-inc/ | argument to be overstated. As made clear in the Getty case cited by the First Circuit, a polluter is subject to existing requirements until such time as he obtains a variance, and variances are not available under the revision authority until they have been approved by both the State and the Agency. Should either entity determine that granting the variance would prevent attainment or maintenance of national air standards, the polluter is presumably within his rights in seeking judicial review. This litigation, however, is carried out on the polluter's time, not the public's, for during its pendency the original regulations remain in effect, and the polluter's failure to comply may subject him to a variety of enforcement s.[27] *93 We are further impressed that the Agency itself has displayed no concern for the purported administrative difficulty of treating variances as revisions. Ordinarily, an agency may be assumed capable of meeting the responsibilities which it contends are placed upon it. Were respondents able to make a contrary showing, that fact might have some weight in interpreting Congress' intent, although we would doubt its relevance unless Congress were also shown to have been aware of the problem when it drafted legislation which otherwise is consistent with the Agency's contentions. Respondents have made no such showings. The judgments which the Agency must make when passing on variances under 110 (a) (3) are whether the ambient air complies with national standards, and if so whether a proposed variance would cause a plan to fail to insure maintenance of those standards. These judgments are little different from those which the Agency had to make when it approved the initial plans into which respondents seek to have the States frozen. In each instance the Agency must measure the existing level of pollution, compare it with the national standards, and determine the effect on this comparison of specified emission modifications.[28] That Congress is of the opinion *94 that the Agency can feasibly and reliably perform these functions is manifest not only in its 1970 legislation, but also in a amendment designed to conserve energy. The amendment provides that the Agency should report to each State on whether its implementation plan could be revised in relation to fuel burning stationary sources, "without interfering with the attainment and maintenance of any national ambient air quality standard." 110 (a) (3) (B) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 42 U.S. C. 1857c-5 (a) (3) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.) V Respondents have put forward several additional arguments which have not been specifically adopted by any court of appeals. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.