author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | We are asked in this case to decide whether federal law prohibits the State of California from treating as community property a divorcing husband's expectancy interest in pension benefits afforded under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. There can be no doubt that the State is free to treat this interest as property. The only question, therefore, is whether something in the federal Act prevents the State from applying its normal substantive property law, under which assets acquired during marriage are commonly owned by the husband and wife. From the Court's own review of the Railroad Retirement Act, it is apparent to me that the asserted federal conflict with California community property lawfar from being grounded upon the concrete expressions that ordinarily are required to support a finding of federal pre-emption, see, e. g., is patched together from statutory provisions that have no relationship at all to substantive marital property rights. Indeed, the federal "policies" the Court perceives amount to little more than the commonplace that retirement benefits are designed to provide an income on retirement to the employee. There is simply nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress meant to insulate these pension benefits from the rules of ownership that in California are a normal incident of marriage. I Congress, when it acts, ordinarily does so "against the background of the total corpus juris of the states." (citation *592 omitted). In any case where it is claimed that a federal statute pre-empts state substantive law, therefore, it is essential to understand what the state law is. ; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Although the question here arises in the context of a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the state law at issue has to do with the ownership of property during marriage. Despite the Court's repeated suggestions to the contrary, community property law is simply not a body of law that is designed to provide a "benefit" for a divorced spouse. "Community of property between husband and wife is that system whereby the property which the husband and wife have is common property, that is, it belongs to both by halves." W. deFuniak & M. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property 1, p. 1 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter Principles). This definition of the property rights of a married couple was first recognized in written form in 93 A. D. in Visigothic Spain, 2, p. 3, and now prevails in eight States of the Union. As we have recognized many times in the past, the community property system reflects a concept of property and of the marital relationship entirely |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | a concept of property and of the marital relationship entirely different from that at common law. See ; ; ; United See generally Principles. Fundamental to the system is the premise that husband and wife are equal partners in marriage. 2, p. 5; W. Reppy & W. deFuniak, Community Property in the United States 13 Each is deemed to make equal contributions to the marital enterprise, and each accordingly shares equally in its assets. Principles 11.1, p. 28. Under the Spanish ganancial system followed in our community property States, property acquired before the marriage or after its termination is the separate property of the spouse who acquired it. 1. p. 1; The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community Property *593 System, 1849-1975, All property acquired during the marriage, however, is presumed to be community property. See, e. g., The presumption is regarded as a rule of substantive property law, not one of procedure or evidence. 9 P. 315. Cf. In general, all property which stems from the labors of either spouse during the marriage, "irrespective of direct contributions to its acquisition or the condition of title" is, in the absence of an agreement between the spouses to the contrary, community property. at The spouses are deemed to have contributed equally to the acquisition of the property, regardless of the actual division of labor in the marriage and regardless of whether only one spouse formally "earned" it. [1] The interests of the spouses in the assets of the marital community are "during continuance of the marriage relation. present, existing and equal interests." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 5105 (West Supp. 1978). Upon dissolution of the marriage, each possesses an equal and absolute right to his or her one-half interest. at ; In re Marriage of 544 P.2d 51, 57. The right of each spouse to his or her share of the community assets, then, is a substantive property right entirely distinct from the right that a spouse might have to the award of alimony upon dissolution of the marriage. A community property settlement merely distributes to the spouses property which, by virtue of the marital relationship, he or she already owns. An alimony award, by contrast, reflects a *594 judgment that one spouseeven after the termination of the marriageis entitled to continuing support by the other. In California, retirement benefits attributable to employment during marriage are community property. In re Marriage of As long as the employee spouse has some reasonable expectancy of receiving the benefits in the future, the nonemployee spouse's interest may attach even if the pension rights |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | nonemployee spouse's interest may attach even if the pension rights are not formally "vested." Pension rights created by act of the state legislature have been treated as community property by the California courts, 7 Cal. 2d 55, 1 P.2d 754, as have federal military pension benefits, In re Marriage of Fithian, and benefits afforded by the federal civil service retirement plan, In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 42, The California Supreme Court in this case, having found no conflict with the express provisions or policies of the Railroad Retirement Act, applied these settled rules of state marital property law to the petitioner's expectation of receiving the retirement benefits afforded by the Act. The State's decision to treat as property benefits that arguably are not "vested" is one that it is free to make. The only question for this Court, then, is whether the State can, consistently with the federal Act, follow its normal substantive community property law in dealing with these prospective benefits. II It is clear that Congress, when it established the railroad retirement system, did not purport to regulate the marital property rights of workers covered by the Act. Federal preemption, then, must be based on a perceived conflict between the provisions of the Act and the substantive law of California. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, ; New York Dept. of Social 423 n. 29. When the state substantive law in *595 question regulates family and family-property arrangementsmatters that traditionally have been left to local law, see In re Burrus, 13 U.S. 58, ; De 580state interests "should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied." United The full force of this rule applies no less when the property in question consists of federally created benefits. De Cf. 384 U. S., at Consistently with this principle, the cases that have held that a State's community property law was pre-empted have depended upon specific provisions in the federal statute governing the ownership of the property involved and, as well, upon a finding that application of the state law would substantially disserve demonstrable federal policies. ; 39 U.S. 3. In Wissner, for example, the Court held that California could not treat the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy as community property even though it assumed that the policy had been purchased with community assets. The decedent soldier in that case had, without obtaining his wife's |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | decedent soldier in that case had, without obtaining his wife's consent, designated his mother and father as the beneficiaries under his policy. The Court's conclusion was based primarily upon a section of the National Service Life Insurance Act that specifically gave the insured the "right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance" and "at all times" the "right to change" that designation. See 38 U.S. C. 802 (g) (194 ed.). From this explicit provision, the Court found that Congress had "spoken with force and clarity" in directing that the proceeds were to belong to the "named beneficiary and no other." 338 U.S., at 58. California's judgment awarding one-half *59 of the proceeds to the wife, the Court said, would nullify the choice Congress had expressly given to the soldier, at 59, and frustrate the federal purpose of "enhanc[ing] the morale of the serviceman," at 0. The Court also noted that the state-court judgment, insofar as it ordered the "diversion of future payments" as soon as they were paid to the beneficiary, was contrary to a provision in the Act protecting such payments from "seizure either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." at 59. In a treasury bond purchased by a husband with community assets designated the owner as husband "or" wife. Federal regulations explicitly provided that the survivor of an "or" form bond was to be the absolute owner. This directive, coupled with the substantial federal interest in establishing uniform rules governing the transfer of bonds, the Court found sufficient to override state community property law. Essential to the finding of pre-emption in the Wissner and Bland cases was a determination that the ownership of the asset involved had, by express federal directive, been defined in a manner inconsistent with state community property law. In each case, explicit provisions of federal law not only conflicted with principles of state law but also created property rights at variance with the rights that normally would have been created by local property law.[2] *597 III In the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 Congress did not with "force and clarity" direct that the employee's pension benefits should not be subject to the substantive community property law of California. A The Railroad Retirement Act contains no express provisions governing the ownership rights that may or may not attach to the pension interest of a married employee. The provisions governing the basic annuity are in themselves neutral. Both 45 U.S. C. 231a (a) (1), which defines the eligibility requirements for the employee's annuity, and 231b, which contains the provisions governing the computation of |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | and 231b, which contains the provisions governing the computation of annuities, state simply that the annuity is that "of the individual" employee. This indication that the benefit belongs to the employee is in this context wholly unremarkable. The congressional decision to "title" this federal benefit in the worker cannot, without more, be taken as evidence that Congress intended to disturb a body of state law that obtains whether or not the asset was earned by or is titled in one or the other spouse. The benefit structure of the Act is also neutral. To be sure, Congress has chosen to provide a separate and additional benefit for spouses of retired workers, 45 U.S. C. 231a (c) (3) (i), and to terminate that benefit upon divorce. 45 U.S. C. 231d (c) (3). These provisions, however, do not preclude a rule of state property law that treats an annuity payable to either spouse as an asset of the marital community. *598 The congressional decision to terminate the separate spousal benefit upon divorce in no way conflicts with that rule, for the community property interestapart from the fact that it is an ownership interest and not a "benefit" for a divorced spouseattaches only to that portion of an annuity attributable to labor performed during the marriage. And the provision of the separate and additional spousal benefit surely does not itself indicate an intent to displace community property law. The legislative history demonstrates quite clearly that Congress created this benefit in 1951 in order to respond to the greater financial needs of retired workers who are married. H. R. Rep. No. 97, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The original Act afforded an annuity only for the individual employee. The amount of the benefit was tied to length of service and to salary, with no account taken of marital status upon retirement. See Report of the Commission on Railroad Retirement, H. R. Doc. No. 92-350, p. 7 (1972). When Congress increased the amounts available to employees with families by providing benefits for spouses, its purpose was simply to increase the level of benefits for employees with families, not to ordain the ownership of property within the family. B The only provision in the Act that even arguably might conflict with California community property law is 231m the anti-attachment provision. It states: "Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated." Yet this language certainly does not speak to substantive ownership interests that may or may not exist in annuities or *599 pension payments. Like similar language often included in spendthrift trusts, it seems to have been designed to protect the benefits from the reach of creditors. See generally E. Spendthrift Trusts (2d ed. 1947). The provision thus has no real relevance to the question whether the annuity is the property of the marital community.[3] For under community property law, the husband and wife are not one another's creditors; they are co-owners. Upon dissolution of the marital community, the community property is divided, not adjudicated as indebtedness. Neither the prohibition against "garnishment" nor that against "attachment" bears on an action to enforce a community property decree. Both terms govern remedies, not ownership rights, and the remedies themselves traditionally have been unavailable in an action grounded upon the theory that the property at issue "belongs" to the claimant. See generally J. Rood, Law of Garnishment (189); S. Kneeland, Law of Attachments (1885).[4] The prohibition against "assignment" *00 of pension payments is equally irrelevant to the question in this case. A determination that a particular asset is community property is clearly not an "assignment" of that property from one spouse to another. It is no more than a conclusion that the property interestfrom the moment it arosebelonged equally to the two parties to the marriage. Principles 97. It is no doubt for these reasons that the Court places no great reliance on the "garnishment," "attachment," or "assignment" provisions of 231m. The Court does, however, discern a major conflict between the clause prohibiting "anticipation" of payments and the California community property law. Yet it seems to me demonstrably clear that this provision of 231m is no more relevant to the issue in this case than the "garnishment," "attachment," and "assignment" provisions. There is, as the Court acknowledges, no legislative history to explain the meaning of the "anticipation" restraint in the *01 Railroad Retirement Act. It can only be assumed, therefore, that Congress intended that it was to operate, as at common law,[5] to ensure that the trustees of the fund would not make or be compelled to make lump-sum payments inconsistent with the periodic benefits provided by statute. See 512. Like the other terms of 231m, its import is thus procedural, not substantive. 512. The Court suggests that the "anticipation" restraint conflicts with California community property law because state law permits a court, upon dissolution of a |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | because state law permits a court, upon dissolution of a marriage, to consider the value of benefits that are not yet due and then to make the actual award of community property out of other assets that are currently available. The reasoning seems to be that if an employee cannot "anticipate" benefits by securing a lump-sum award, the employee's spouse is similarly prevented from "anticipating" a community property interest by receiving assets of equal value from the marital estate. This reasoning ignores the express wording of 231m. The clause prohibits anticipation of "the payment" of a pension or annuity. A state judgment that considers the value of the pension interest acquired during marriage and satisfies that interest by ordering the transfer of other community assets does not anticipate a pension "payment." There is, accordingly, no conflict between such a judgment and 231m, for it has no impact at all upon the timing of payments to the employee *02 and is therefore not at all incompatible with the distribution system established by Congress. The Court also suggests that the "no anticipation" provision of 231m was designed to preserve congressional "freedom to amend the Act." Yet it has never been established that Congress is free to terminate or reduce the benefits afforded by the railroad retirement system. Unlike the Social Security Act, see 33 U.S. 03, 08-11, the Railroad Retirement Act contains no express provision permitting Congress to terminate it. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act suggests that it was established to provide security to railroad workers whose benefits under private pension programs had frequently been treated as discretionary payments. See H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1935). The drafters of the original legislation expressly stated that one of the important features of any retirement plan was a guarantee to the worker of an "absolute" right to receive the pension. It thus seems obvious that the "no anticipation" provisionincluded as it was in the 1935 version of the Acthad no relationship whatever to any possibility that Congress might try to terminate or reduce the benefits payable under the Act. Whether Congress could ever do so is an open question, a question neither presented nor properly to be decided in the present case. Finally the Court suggests that "anticipation" would harm an employee who leaves the industry before retirement and thus is unable to "regain" the amount of the offset. But this difficulty becomes wholly imaginary when the nature of the community property award is understood. A spouse receives only one-half the value of the pension interest attributable |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | dissenting | Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109976/hisquierdo-v-hisquierdo/ | receives only one-half the value of the pension interest attributable to work performed by the other spouse during the marriage. The "current connection with industry" requirement for supplemental benefits referred to by the Court obtains at the time the employee becomes eligible for current pension payments. If the employee is still working at the time the marriage is *03 dissolved, a California court would be obligated to give heed to the benefit provisions of the Act in appraising the value of the interest acquired by the employee's spouse during the marriage. And surely occasional problems in assessing the precise value of the community propertyproblems with which the courts of California routinely dealcannot provide a basis for the Court's finding of pre-emption.[] IV The Railroad Retirement Act, unlike the statutes involved in and thus contains no evidence that Congress intended to withdraw the benefits at issue from the reach of California community property law. Believing, as I do, that the pre-emption perceived by the Court is entirely of its own making, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | dissenting | Turner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403802/turner-v-united-states/ | Consider two criminal cases. In the first, the govern- ment accuses ten defendants of acting together to commit a vicious murder and robbery. At trial, each defendant accepts that the attack occurred almost exactly as the government describes—contending only that he wasn’t part of the rampaging group. The defendants thus un- dermine each other’s arguments at every turn. In the second case, the government makes the same arguments as before. But this time, all of the accused adopt a com- mon defense, built around an alternative account of the crime. Armed with new evidence that someone else perpe- trated the murder, the defendants vigorously dispute the government’s gang-attack narrative and challenge the credibility of its investigation. The question this case presents is whether such a unified defense, relying on evidence unavailable in the first scenario, had a “reason- able probability” (less than a preponderance) of shifting 2 TURNER v. UNITED STATES KAGAN, J., dissenting even one juror’s vote. (2009); see That is the relevant question because the Government here knew about but withheld the evidence of an alterna- tive perpetrator—and so prevented the defendants from coming together to press that theory of the case. If the Government’s non-disclosure was material, in the sense just described, this Court’s decision in demands a new trial. The Court today holds it was not material: In light of the evidence the Government offered, the majority argues, the transformed defense stood little chance of persuading a juror to vote to acquit. That conclusion is not indefensible: The Govern- ment put on quite a few witnesses who said that the de- fendants committed the crime. But in the end, I think the majority gets the answer in this case wrong. With the undisclosed evidence, the whole tenor of the trial would have changed. Rather than relying on a “not me, maybe them” defense, ante, at 6, all the defendants would have relentlessly impeached the Government’s (thoroughly impeachable) witnesses and offered the jurors a way to view the crime in a different light. In my view, that could well have flipped one or more jurors—which is all Brady requires. Before explaining that view, I note that the majority and I share some common ground. We agree on the uni- verse of exculpatory or impeaching evidence suppressed in this case: The majority’s description of that evidence, and of the trial held without it, is scrupulously fair. See ante, at 2–6, 7–9. We also agree—as does the Government— that such evidence ought to be disclosed to defendants as a matter of course. See ante, at 10. Constitutional require- ments |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | dissenting | Turner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403802/turner-v-united-states/ | matter of course. See ante, at 10. Constitutional require- ments aside, turning over exculpatory materials is a core responsibility of all prosecutors—whose professional inter- est and obligation is not to win cases but to ensure justice is done. See And finally, we Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 3 KAGAN, J., dissenting agree on the legal standard by which to assess the materi- ality of undisclosed evidence for purposes of applying the constitutional rule: Courts are to ask whether there is a “reasonable probability” that disclosure of the evidence would have led to a different outcome—i.e., an acquittal or hung jury rather than a conviction. See ante, at 10. But I part ways with the majority in applying that standard to the evidence withheld in this case. That evidence falls into three basic categories, discussed below. Taken together, the materials would have recast the trial significantly—so much so as to “undermine[] confidence” in the guilty verdicts reached in their absence. 514 U.S., at First, the Government suppressed information identify- ing a possible alternative perpetrator. The defendants knew that, shortly before the police arrived, witnesses had observed two men acting suspiciously near the alleyway garage where Catherine Fuller’s body was found. But they did not know—because the Government never told them—that a witness had identified one of those men as James McMillan. Equipped with that information, the defendants would have discovered that in the weeks fol- lowing Fuller’s murder, McMillan assaulted and robbed two other women of comparable age in the same neighbor- hood. And using that information, the defendants would have united around a common defense. They would all have pointed their fingers at McMillan (rather than at each other), arguing that he committed Fuller’s murder as part of a string of similar crimes. Second, the Government suppressed witness statements suggesting that one or two perpetrators—not a large group—carried out the attack. Those statements were given by two individuals who walked past the garage around the time of Fuller’s death. They told the police that they heard groans coming from inside the garage; and one remarked that the garage’s doors were closed at the 4 TURNER v. UNITED STATES KAGAN, J., dissenting time. Introducing that evidence at trial would have sown doubt about the Government’s group-attack narrative, because that many people (as everyone agrees) couldn’t have fit inside the small garage. And the questions thus raised would have further supported the defendants’ theory that McMillan (and perhaps an accomplice) had committed the murder. Third and finally, the Government suppressed a raft of evidence discrediting its investigation and impeaching its witnesses. |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | dissenting | Turner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403802/turner-v-united-states/ | raft of evidence discrediting its investigation and impeaching its witnesses. Undisclosed files, for example, showed that the police took more than nine months to look into a witness’s claim that a man named James Blue had murdered Fuller. Evidence of that kind of negligence could easily have led jurors to wonder about the competence of all the police work done in the case. Other withheld documents re- vealed that one of the Government’s main witnesses was high on PCP when she met with investigators to identify participants in the crime—and that she also encouraged a friend to lie to the police to support her story. Using that sort of information, see also ante, at 9, the defendants could have undercut the Government’s witnesses—even while presenting their own account of the murder. In reply to all this, the majority argues that “none of the [accused] attempted to mount [an alternative-perpetrator] defense” and that such a defense would have challenged “the very cornerstone of the Government’s case.” Ante, at 12. But that just proves my point. The defendants didn’t offer an alternative-perpetrator defense because the Gov- ernment prevented them from learning what made it credible: that one of the men seen near the garage had a record of assaulting and robbing middle-aged women, and that witnesses would back up the theory that only one or two individuals had committed the murder. Moreover, that defense had game-changing potential exactly because it challenged the cornerstone of the Government’s case. Without the withheld evidence, each of the defendants had Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 5 KAGAN, J., dissenting little choice but to accept the Government’s framing of the crime as a group attack—and argue only that he wasn’t there. That meant the defendants often worked at cross- purposes. In particular, each defendant not identified by a Government witness sought to bolster that witness’s credibility, no matter the harm to his co-defendants. As one defense lawyer remarked after another’s supposed cross-examination of a Government witness: “They’ve got [an extra] prosecutor[ ] in the courtroom now.” Saperstein & Walsh, 10 Defendants Complicate Trial, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1985, p. A14, col. 1. Credible alternative- perpetrator evidence would have allowed the defendants to escape this cycle of mutually assured destruction. By enabling the defendants to jointly attack the Govern- ment’s “cornerstone” theory, the withheld evidence would have reframed the case presented to the jury. Still, the majority claims, an alternative-perpetrator defense would have had no realistic chance of changing the outcome because the Government had ample evidence of a group attack, including five witnesses who testified that |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | dissenting | Turner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403802/turner-v-united-states/ | of a group attack, including five witnesses who testified that they had participated in it or seen it happen. See ante, at 12–13. But the Government’s case wasn’t nearly the slam-dunk the majority suggests. No physical evi- dence tied any of the defendants to the crime—a highly surprising fact if, as the Government claimed, more than ten people carried out a spur-of-the-moment, rampage-like attack in a confined space. And as even the majority recognizes, the Government’s five eyewitnesses had some serious credibility deficits. See Two had been charged as defendants, and agreed to testify only in ex- change for favorable plea deals. See (D. C. 2015). Two admitted they were high on PCP at the time. See ; App. A535–A536, A649. (As noted above, one was also high when she later met with police to identify the culprits.) One was an eighth-grader whose own aunt contradicted parts of his trial testimony. 6 TURNER v. UNITED STATES KAGAN, J., dissenting See 116 A.3d, Even in the absence of an alternative account of the crime, the jury took more than a week—and many dozens of votes—to reach its final ver- dict. Had the defendants offered a unified counter- narrative, based on the withheld evidence, one or more jurors could well have concluded that the Government had not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, the issue here concerns the difference between two criminal cases. The Government got the case it most wanted—the one in which the defendants, each in an effort to save himself, formed something of a circular firing squad. And the Government avoided the case it most feared—the one in which the defendants acted jointly to show that a man known to assault women like Fuller committed her murder. The difference between the two cases lay in the Government’s files—evidence of obvious relevance that prosecutors nonetheless chose to suppress. I think it could have mattered to the trial’s outcome. For that reason, I respectfully dissent |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | In this Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a jury from considering a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The document at issue in was compiled by the Division of Parole and Probation on the basis of extensive interviews with the two murder victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. In addition to evidence relating to the personal qualities of the victims themselves, the statement in described the emotional impact of the crime on the victims' family members, including their resulting sleeplessness, fear, depression, and constant painful memories. The statement also described *813 the family members' opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the proper penalty to be imposed. The majority in took the view that such information "may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant," and could divert the capital sentencer's attention from the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's background and record, The majority noted that introduction of evidence of a victim's good character would entitle the defendant to rebut this evidence, resulting in "a `mini-trial' on the victim's character." The Court also expressed concern that the opinions of family members regarding the crime and the defendant could serve to "inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant." Since our decision in there has been considerable confusion in the lower courts about the precise scope of its holding. Some courts, like the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case, have read for the broad proposition that "the injection of the victim's personal characteristics into the sentencing determination" violates the Eighth Amendment. 295 S. C. 476, 484, Other courts have declined to read so broadly, holding that it does not prohibit prosecutorial argument at the penalty phase concerning the personal characteristics of the victim. See, e. g., ; See also ; I joined both dissents in see ; believing that the case was wrongly decided on its facts and rested on a misinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment and this Court's cases thereunder. Although I remain persuaded that was wrong when decided and stand ready *814 to overrule it if the Court would do so, we can reach a proper disposition in this case without such action. 's central holding that statements about the harm to a victim's family have no place in capital sentencing does not control the case before us today. At issue here are solely prosecutorial comments about the victim himself. Thus, we must decide whether to adopt a broad reading of as establishing a rigid |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | to adopt a broad reading of as establishing a rigid Eighth Amendment rule eliminating virtually all consideration of the victim at the penalty phase, or a narrower reading of that decision which would allow jury consideration of information about the victim and the extent of the harm caused in arriving at its moral judgment concerning the appropriate punishment. See ("I do not interpret as foreclosing the introduction of all evidence, in whatever form, about a murder victim"). Because the Eighth Amendment itself requires "that the penalty imposed in a capital case be proportional to the harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness," 458 U.S. I would reject a rigid Eighth Amendment rule which prohibits a sentencing jury from hearing argument or considering evidence concerning the personal characteristics of the victim. I would thus reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case. I also would decline respondent's invitation that this Court comb the record for indications that the prosecutor "misrepresented the evidence" in his closing argument or appealed to religious bias in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief for Respondent 21-24. Instead, I would remand the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court for that particular inquiry. I On a Saturday evening in September 1986, Richard Haynes sat peacefully on a park bench near his mother's home with a Bible and various religious items at his side. A *815 vulnerable man with a history of mental problems, Haynes called himself "Reverend Minister" and shared his religious views with those who would listen. Haynes was approached by respondent Demetrius Gathers and three companions who sat down on the bench next to him and drank beer. After Haynes told Gathers he did not wish to converse with him, Gathers and two of his companions beat Haynes brutally, and Gathers smashed a bottle over his head. App. 18-22. As Haynes lay helpless, Gathers and one of his compatriots rummaged through the various religious and other items in Haynes' possession, strewing them around on the ground as they looked for something to steal. Gathers' companions then left, but Gathers remained at the scene striking the unconscious Haynes with an umbrella and then forcing the umbrella into his anus. Gathers then departed and walked to a nearby apartment complex. Sometime later, Gathers and one other companion returned to the park with a knife. Gathers admitted that he then stabbed Haynes to death. At Gathers' trial for murder and criminal sexual conduct, Richard Haynes' mother testified without objection about her son's mental problems and his practice of carrying |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | about her son's mental problems and his practice of carrying a Bible and other religious items and "talk[ing] to people all the time about the Lord." One of Gathers' companions testified that Haynes' Bible was clearly visible on the park bench as they approached him on the night of the murder. -27. All the items Haynes carried with him that night including olive oil, plastic angels, rosary beads, two Bibles, a voter registration card, and the "Game Guy's Prayer" were introduced into evidence without objection during the guilt phase of the trial. ; Record 565-567, -783, 785-787. Those items were reintroduced into evidence without objection at the penalty phase. *816 The jury convicted respondent of murder and first degree criminal sexual conduct. During his closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor referred to the fact that Richard Haynes was a religious person as well as a vulnerable man with mental problems who was unable to keep a regular job. The prosecutor referred to several of the religious items that had been introduced into evidence. He also read the "Game Guy's Prayer" in its entirety, suggesting that Haynes was the sort of person who "took things as they came along" and "was prepared to deal with tragedies that he came across in his life." App. 43. The prosecutor also referred to Haynes' voter registration card found beside his body, arguing that the card "[s]peaks a lot about Reverend Minister Haynes" who "believed in this community" and believed "that in this country you could go to a public park and sit on a public bench and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius Gathers." The sentencing jury was then given instructions which are not challenged here and returned a recommendation that the death sentence be imposed. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed Gathers' death sentence, finding that the prosecutor's closing argument at the sentencing proceeding violated the Eighth Amendment "by focusing extensively on the personal characteristics of the victim." 295 S. C., at 482, II should not be read, in my view, to preclude prosecutorial comment which gives the sentencer a "glimpse of the life" a defendant "chose to extinguish." "The fact that there is a victim, and facts about the victim properly developed during the course of the trial, are not so far outside the realm of `circumstances of the crime' that mere mention will always be problematic." vacated on other grounds, judgment reinstated, (CA11) cert. denied, In my view, nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes the prosecutor from conveying to the jury a sense of the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | prosecutor from conveying to the jury a sense of the unique human being whose life the defendant has taken. More fundamentally, this case illustrates the one-sided nature of the moral judgment that the Court's broad reading of would require of the capital sentencer. This Court has consistently required that a jury at the penalty phase be allowed to consider a wide range of information concerning the background of the defendant. Thus, not merely the circumstances of the crime are relevant, but as we stated in : "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death" (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). See also Our decisions in Lockett and Eddings were based on the proposition that the decision of the capital sentencer is a profoundly moral one and must reflect the moral judgment of the community regarding the proper penalty to be inflicted on a particular individual for his or her actions. Evidence extraneous to the crime itself is deemed relevant and indeed, constitutionally so, "because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse." In this case, the sentencing jury heard testimony from respondent's mother, his sister, and his cousin, all indicating that he was an affectionate and caring person. Record 1, 1187, 1199. Gathers' sixth grade teacher testified that he was a quiet and affectionate child but that he was not given sufficient guidance and discipline at home. None of this evidence was directly relevant to *818 the events of September 13, 1986, but all of it was relevant to the jury's assessment of respondent himself and his moral blameworthiness. Similarly, one of the factors that has long entered into society's conception of proper punishment is the harm caused by the defendant's actions. Thus, we have long recognized that retribution itself is a valid penological goal of the death penalty. See Indeed, we have expressly noted that while "retribution is an element of all punishments society imposes," it "clearly plays a more prominent role in a capital case." "The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender." Moreover, one essential factor in determining the defendant's culpability is the extent of the harm caused. That the harm caused |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | the extent of the harm caused. That the harm caused by a defendant's actions is relevant to the capital sentencer's moral judgment concerning the appropriate penalty, even if the defendant did not specifically intend that harm, is a principle recognized both in the decisions of this Court and in legislative decisions concerning appropriate levels of punishment. In we held that the Eighth Amendment did not preclude imposing the death penalty on two brothers who participated substantially in their father's armed prison breakout and in a related kidnaping and robbery that resulted in four murders, even though neither defendant "took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain would, cause death." We found that the Tisons' involvement in the crime was such that "both subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life," and that "the record would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to human life," We noted that "reckless indifference to the value of *819 human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an `intent to kill,' " and we remanded the case to the Supreme Court of for a specific determination whether the Tisons possessed that mental state, What was critical to the defendants' eligibility for the death penalty in Tison was the harm they helped bring about: the death of four innocent human beings. In a similar manner, society punishes reckless driving differently from vehicular homicide; the distinction rests not on any difference in the defendant's mental state but on the notion that one of the legitimate concerns of any sentencer is the harm that the defendant's actions have caused. See 482 U. S., 16 ("There is nothing aberrant in a juror's inclination to hold a murderer accountable not only for his internal disposition in committing the crime but also for the full extent of the harm he caused"). In the death penalty context, no State authorizes infliction of the penalty for attempted murder, yet the criminal defendant who has attempted to kill another human being has the same mental state as the actual killer. Indeed, as JUSTICE SCALIA noted in dissent in the difference between murder and attempted murder may often hinge on a fortuity over which the defendant has no control at all. See The only distinction is the harm to the community which results from the defendant's actions, and this distinction is deemed sufficient to support a difference in punishment between a sentence of years and the ultimate penalty. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | the ultimate penalty. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes a State, if it chooses, from "includ[ing] as a sentencing consideration the particularized harm that an individual's murder causes to the rest of society," 17 Indeed, precisely because the harm caused to society by a particular victim's death is relevant to society's moral judgment concerning the proper punishment, I would decline to read for the broad proposition that the victim's personal characteristics are irrelevant at the sentencing phase of *820 a capital trial. A rigid Eighth Amendment rule which excludes all such considerations is not supported by history or societal consensus, and it withholds information which a State may clearly deem relevant to the reasoned moral judgment of a capital sentencer. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court on this issue. In his closing argument in this case, the prosecutor focused on the heinous nature of respondent's crime. App. 40-41. The prosecutor brought the jury's attention to the fact that Richard Haynes was a religious person whose religious belongings were callously ransacked by Gathers during the attack. The prosecutor commented on some of the specific items introduced into evidence, and he read the "Game Guy's Prayer," which was found at the scene of the murder. That "Prayer," which invokes sports metaphors and stresses the virtues of being an accepting and resilient "good sport" in the game of life, was used by the prosecutor to stress the vulnerability and simple humanity of the victim. As the prosecutor argued: "Reverend Minister Haynes, we know, was a very small person. He had his mental problems. Unable to keep a regular job. And he wasn't blessed with fame or fortune." The prosecutor also commented on the victim's possession of a voter registration card at the time of his death, indicating that it "[s]peaks a lot about Reverend Minister Haynes," and exemplified the victim's "belie[f] in this community." In sum, the prosecutor stressed that the victim was an ordinary citizen who trusted that he could sit quietly on a public park bench without the risk of death. In my view, no aspect of the prosecutor's argument in this case violated the Eighth Amendment. The jury found at the guilt phase that Gathers made a conscious decision to kill another human being. Just as Gathers' own background was important to the jury's assessment of him as a "uniquely individual human bein[g]," see so information about his equally unique *821 victim was relevant to the jury's assessment of the harm he had caused and the appropriate penalty. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | and the appropriate penalty. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes the community from considering its loss in assessing punishment nor requires that the victim remain a faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial. That the victim in this case was a deeply religious and harmless individual who exhibited his care for his community by religious proselytization and political participation in its affairs was relevant to the community's loss at his demise, just as society would view with grief and anger the killing of the mother or father of small children. See 16 The Eighth Amendment stands as a shield against those practices and punishments which are either inherently cruel or which so offend the moral consensus of this society as to be deemed "cruel and unusual." Because neither aspect of the Eighth Amendment was offended by the prosecutor's remarks, I would reverse the judgment below. III As an alternative ground supporting the judgment below, Gathers argues that the prosecutor engaged in "manipulation of the evidence and outright fabrication" in his portrait of the victim's personal characteristics based on inferences from the "Game Guy's Prayer" and the voter registration card. Brief for Respondent 22. Gathers also contends that the prosecutor's closing argument impermissibly invited the jury to impose the death sentence on the basis of the victim's religion and political affiliation in violation of the Due Process Clause. It would indeed be improper for a prosecutor to urge that the death penalty be imposed because of the race, religion, or political affiliation of the victim. As JUSTICE WHITE wrote in dissent in "It is no doubt true that the State may not encourage the sentencer to rely on a factor such as the victim's race in determining whether the death penalty is appropriate. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. *822 279" 482 U. S., 17. See also U.S. 862, (if a State "attached the `aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant. due process of law would require that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside"); ; 762 F. 2d, at Evaluation of Gathers' claim requires consideration of the entire record to determine whether any allegedly erroneous or improper remarks so infected the entire proceedings with unfairness as to render the resulting sentence a denial of due process. See ; Because the "Game Guy's Prayer" was already in evidence without objection and could have been read by the jury even if the prosecutor never mentioned |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | dissenting | South Carolina v. Gathers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112277/south-carolina-v-gathers/ | read by the jury even if the prosecutor never mentioned it, the prosecutor's reading of that document during his closing argument may constitute harmless error. Nevertheless, I would remand this case to the South Carolina Supreme Court to conduct this inquiry in the first instance. Gathers also argues that he did not have the opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's positive statements about the victim's characteristics, and thus that his death sentence violates the dictates of (due process precludes imposition of the death penalty on the basis of information in a presentence report which the defendant had no opportunity to rebut). Brief for Respondent 18-20. "No doubt a capital defendant must be allowed to introduce relevant evidence in rebuttal to a victim impact statement." 482 U. S., 18 ; 06-507 In this case, however, respondent has pointed to no evidence introduced at the penalty phase that he was precluded from rebutting. Rather, the prosecutor commented * upon evidence introduced without objection at the guilt phase of the trial and drew various inferences from that evidence. Just as the prosecutor could comment upon evidence in the record about the victim during his closing argument, so could defense counsel. In fact, defense counsel did comment upon the prosecutor's repeated reference to Haynes as "Reverend Minister." App. 45. But, like respondent's other due process claim, this issue is best addressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court on remand. Because the majority instead adopts an Eighth Amendment barrier to virtually any discussion of the victim's personal characteristics at the penalty phase of a murder trial, I respectfully dissent. |
per_curiam | 1,985 | 200 | per_curiam | Thompson v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111282/thompson-v-louisiana/ | In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the validity of a warrantless "murder scene" search of petitioner's home. Because this holding is in direct conflict with our opinion in we reverse. I The Louisiana Supreme Court states the facts as follows: "On May 18, 182, several deputies from the Jefferson parish Sheriff's Department arrived at [petitioner's] home in response to a report by the [petitioner's] daughter of a homicide. The deputies entered the house, made a cursory search and discovered [petitioner's] husband dead of a gunshot wound in a bedroom and the [petitioner] lying unconscious in another bedroom due to an apparent drug overdose. According to the [petitioner's] daughter, the [petitioner] had shot her husband, then ingested a quantity of pills in a suicide attempt, and then, changing her mind, called her daughter, informed her of the situation and requested help. The daughter then contacted the police. Upon their arrival, the daughter admitted them into the house and directed them to the rooms containing the [petitioner] and the victim. The deputies immediately transported the then unconscious [petitioner] to a hospital and secured the scene. Thirty-five minutes later two members of the homicide unit of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office arrived and conducted a follow-up investigation of the homicide and attempted suicide. "The homicide investigators entered the residence and commenced what they described at the motion to suppress hearing as a `general exploratory search for evidence of a crime.' During their search, which lasted *1 approximately two hours, the detectives examined each room of the house." Petitioner was subsequently indicted for the second-degree murder of her husband. She moved to suppress three items of evidence discovered during the search, including a pistol found inside a chest of drawers in the same room as the deceased's body, a torn up note found in a wastepaper basket in an adjoining bathroom, and another letter (alleged to be a suicide note) found folded up inside an envelope containing a Christmas card on the top of a chest of drawers. All of this evidence was found in the "general exploratory search for evidence" conducted by two homicide investigators who arrived at the scene approximately 35 minutes after petitioner was sent to the hospital. See By the time those investigators arrived, the officers who originally arrived at the scene had already searched the premises for other victims or suspects. See The investigators testified that they had time to secure a warrant before commencing the search, see 448 So. 2d, at and that no one had given consent to the search, see App. C to Pet. |
per_curiam | 1,985 | 200 | per_curiam | Thompson v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111282/thompson-v-louisiana/ | given consent to the search, see App. C to Pet. for Cert. 7-8, 16, 1- (transcript of testimony of Detectives Zinna and Masson at suppression hearing). The trial court originally denied petitioner's motion to suppress. However, the trial court then granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration and partially reversed its former decision, holding that the gun and the suicide letter found in the Christmas card were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be suppressed. The Louisiana Court of Appeal denied the State's application for a writ of review. A sharply divided Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently held all of the evidence seized to be admissible. II As we stated in United "in this area we do not write on a clean slate." In a long line of cases, this Court has stressed that "searches * conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." 38 U.S. 7, (167) This was not a principle freshly coined for the occasion in but rather represented this Court's longstanding understanding of the relationship between the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment.[1] See at nn. 18 and 1. Since the time of this Court has recognized the existence of additional exceptions. See, e. g., 452 U.S. 54 (181); United (176); South (176). However, we have consistently reaffirmed our understanding that in all cases outside the exceptions to the warrant requirement the Fourth Amendment requires the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate between the police and the "persons, houses, papers, and effects" of citizens. See, e. g., ; United 462 U.S. 66, (183); United 456 U.S. 78, (182); (181); at 30; (171) ; 3 U.S. 30, (170); 32 U.S. 1, (168). A Although the homicide investigators in this case may well have had probable cause to search the premises, it is undisputed *21 that they did not obtain a warrant.[2] Therefore, for the search to be valid, it must fall within one of the narrow and specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. In we unanimously rejected the contention that one of the exceptions to the Warrant Clause is a "murder scene exception." Although we noted that police may make warrantless entries on premises where "they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid," and that "they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises," we held that "the |
per_curiam | 1,985 | 200 | per_curiam | Thompson v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111282/thompson-v-louisiana/ | killer is still on the premises," we held that "the `murder scene exception' is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that the warrantless search of 's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there." at 35. is squarely on point in the instant case. B The Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to distinguish in several ways. The court noted that involved a 4-day search of the premises, while the search in this case took only two hours and was conducted on the same day as the murder. See Although we agree that the scope of the intrusion was certainly greater in than here, nothing in turned on the length of time taken in the search or the date on which it was conducted. A 2-hour general search remains a significant intrusion on petitioner's privacy and therefore may only be conducted subject to the constraints including the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. *22 The Louisiana Supreme Court also believed that petitioner had a "diminished" expectation of privacy in her home, thus validating a search that otherwise would have been The court noted that petitioner telephoned her daughter to request assistance. The daughter then called the police and let them in the residence. These facts, according to the court, demonstrated a diminished expectation of privacy in petitioner's dwelling and therefore legitimated the warrantless search.[3] Petitioner's attempt to get medical assistance does not evidence a diminished expectation of privacy on her part. To be sure, this action would have justified the authorities in seizing evidence under the plain-view doctrine while they were in petitioner's house to offer her assistance. In addition, the same doctrine may justify seizure of evidence obtained in the limited "victim-or-suspect" search discussed in However, the evidence at issue here was not discovered in plain view while the police were assisting petitioner to the hospital, nor was it discovered during the "victim-or-suspect" search that had been completed by the time the homicide investigators arrived. Petitioner's call for help can hardly be seen as an invitation to the general public that would have converted her home into the sort of public place for which no warrant to search would be necessary. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court's diminished-expectation-of-privacy argument fails to distinguish this case from[4] *23 The State contends that there was a sufficient element of consent in this case to distinguish it from the facts of The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision does not attempt to validate the search as consensual, although it attempts to support its diminished-expectation-of-privacy argument by reference to the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | dissenting | New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108778/new-jersey-welfare-rights-organization-v-cahill/ | The New Jersey Legislature has enacted a statute entitled "Assistance to Families of the Working Poor," which is designed to provide grants to supplement the income of a discrete class of families with children when independent sources of income are inadequate to support the family unit. The program is completely financed by the State, and therefore need not conform to any of the strictures of the Social Security Act. The New Jersey program for assistance to the working poor does not provide financial grants to classes of children as such, as is the case under various federal plans. Instead, it provides grants to classes of families as units. The Court *622 holds that because benefits are limited to families "which consist of a household composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least one minor child of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child adopted by both," the legislative scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court relies on where a Louisiana statute that denied workmen's compensation benefits to an illegitimate child was invalidated. But the very language that the Court quotes from Weber shows how different this case is from that. There a disability was visited solely on an illegitimate child. Here the statute distinguishes among types of families. While the classification adopted by the New Jersey Legislature undoubtedly results in denying benefits to "families" consisting of a mother and father not ceremonially married who are living with natural children, whatever denial of benefits the classification makes is imposed equally on the parents as well as the children. Here the New Jersey Legislature has determined that special financial assistance should be given to family units that meet the statutory definition of "working poor." It does not seem to me irrational in establishing such a special program to condition the receipt of such grants on the sort of ceremonial marriage that could quite reasonably be found to be an essential ingredient of the family unit that the New Jersey Legislature is trying to protect from dissolution due to the economic vicissitudes of modern life. The Constitution does not require that special financial assistance designed by the legislature to help poor families be extended to "communes" as well. In the area of economics and social welfare the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit a State from taking one step at a time in attempting to overcome a social ill, provided only that the classifications made by *623 the State are rational. Here |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Minnesota v. Carter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118249/minnesota-v-carter/ | Respondents and the lessee of an apartment were sitting in one of its rooms, bagging cocaine. While so engaged they were observed by a police officer, who looked through a drawn window blind. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the officer's viewing was a search that violated respondents' Fourth Amendment rights. We hold that no such violation occurred. James Thielen, a police officer in the Twin Cities' suburb of Eagan, Minnesota, went to an apartment building to investigate a tip from a confidential informant. The informant said that he had walked by the window of a ground-floor apartment and had seen people putting a white powder into bags. The officer looked in the same window through a gap in the closed blind and observed the bagging operation for several minutes. He then notified headquarters, which began preparing affidavits for a search warrant while he returned to the apartment building. When two men left the building in a previously identified Cadillac, the police stopped the car. Inside were respondents Carter and Johns. As the police opened the door of the car to let Johns out, they observed a black, zippered pouch and a handgun, later determined to be loaded, on the vehicle's floor. Carter and Johns were arrested, and a later police search of the vehicle the next day discovered pagers, a scale, and 47 grams of cocaine in plastic sandwich bags. *86 After seizing the car, the police returned to apartment 103 and arrested the occupant, Kimberly Thompson, who is not a party to this appeal. A search of the apartment pursuant to a warrant revealed cocaine residue on the kitchen table and plastic baggies similar to those found in the Cadillac. Thielen identified Carter, Johns, and Thompson as the three people he had observed placing the powder into baggies. The police later learned that while Thompson was the lessee of the apartment, Carter and Johns lived in Chicago and had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine. Carter and Johns had never been to the apartment before and were only in the apartment for approximately 2[1]20442 hours. In return for the use of the apartment, Carter and Johns had given Thompson one-eighth of an ounce of the cocaine. Carter and Johns were charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime in the first degree and aiding and abetting in a controlled substance crime in the first degree, in violation of subds. 1(1), 3(a), 609.05 They moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the apartment and the Cadillac, as well as to suppress |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Minnesota v. Carter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118249/minnesota-v-carter/ | the apartment and the Cadillac, as well as to suppress several postarrest incriminating statements they had made. They argued that Thielen's initial observation of their drug packaging activities was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that all evidence obtained as a result of this unreasonable search was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Minnesota trial court held that since, unlike the defendant in Carter and Johns were not overnight social guests but temporary out-of-state visitors, they were not entitled to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the government intrusion into the apartment. The trial court also concluded that Thielen's observation was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. After a trial, Carter and Johns were each convicted of both offenses. The Minnesota Court of Appeals *87 held that respondent Carter did not have "standing" to object to Thielen's actions because his claim that he was predominantly a social guest was "inconsistent with the only evidence concerning his stay in the apartment, which indicates that he used it for a business purposeto package drugs." In a separate appeal, the Court of Appeals also affirmed Johns' conviction, without addressing what it termed the "standing" issue. State v. Johns, No. C9-95-1765 App. D-1, D-3 (unpublished). A divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that respondents had "standing" to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment because they had "`a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' " The court noted that even though "society does not recognize as valuable the task of bagging cocaine, we conclude that society does recognize as valuable the right of property owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a common task, be it legal or illegal activity. We, therefore, hold that [respondents] had standing to bring [their] motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of Thielen's observations." ; see also Based upon its conclusion that respondents had "standing" to raise their Fourth Amendment claims, the court went on to hold that Thielen's observation constituted a search of the apartment under the Fourth Amendment, and that the search was unreasonable. We granted certiorari, and now reverse. The Minnesota courts analyzed whether respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the rubric of "standing" doctrine, an analysis that this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in -140. In that case, we held that automobile passengers could not assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the *88 seizure of incriminating evidence from a vehicle where they owned neither the vehicle |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Minnesota v. Carter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118249/minnesota-v-carter/ | evidence from a vehicle where they owned neither the vehicle nor the evidence. Central to our analysis was the idea that in determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment rights, the "definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing." Thus, we held that in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i. e., one that has "a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." at -144, and n. 12. See also The Fourth Amendment guarantees: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches of "their persons [and] houses" and thus indicates that the Fourth Amendment is a personal right that must be invoked by an individual. See But the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are. We have held that "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." at See also *89 The text of the Amendment suggests that its protections extend only to people in "their" houses. But we have held that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else. In for example, we decided that an overnight guest in a house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects. We said: "To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the every day expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others' homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Minnesota v. Carter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118249/minnesota-v-carter/ | relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend. "From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend." In the defendant seeking to exclude evidence resulting from a search of an apartment had been given the use of the apartment by a friend. He had clothing in the apartment, had slept there "`maybe a night,' " and at the time was the sole occupant of the apartment. But while the holding of Jones that a search of the apartment violated the defendant's *90 Fourth Amendment rightsis still valid, its statement that "anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality," was expressly repudiated in Thus, an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not. Respondents here were obviously not overnight guests, but were essentially present for a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours. There is no suggestion that they had a previous relationship with Thompson, or that there was any other purpose to their visit. Nor was there anything similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household.[*] While the apartment was a dwelling place for Thompson, it was for these respondents simply a place to do business. Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential property. "An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home." New And while it was a "home" in which respondents were present, it was not their home. Similarly, the Court has held that in some circumstances a worker can claim Fourth Amendment protection over his *91 own workplace. See, e. g., But there is no indication that respondents in this case had nearly as significant a connection to Thompson's apartment as |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,999 | 19 | majority | Minnesota v. Carter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118249/minnesota-v-carter/ | had nearly as significant a connection to Thompson's apartment as the worker in O'Connor had to his own private office. See If we regard the overnight guest in as typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely "legitimately on the premises" as typifying those who may not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in between. But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to conclude that respondents' situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold that any search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights. Because we conclude that respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, we need not decide whether the police officer's observation constituted a "search." The judgments of the Supreme Court of Minnesota are accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | dissenting | Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110549/postal-service-v-council-of-greenburgh-civic-assns/ | When the Framers of the Constitution granted Congress the authority "[t]o establish Post Offices and Post Roads," Art. I, 8, cl. 7, they placed the powers of the Federal Government behind a national communication service. Protecting the economic viability and efficiency of that service remains a legitimate and important congressional objective. This case involves a statute defended on that ground, but I believe it is unnecessary for achieving that purpose and inconsistent with the underlying commitment to communication. The challenged statute, 18 U.S. C. 1725, prohibits anyone from knowingly placing unstamped "mailable matter" in any box approved by the United s Postal Service for receiving or depositing material carried by the Postal Service. Violators may be punished with fines of up to $300 for each offense. In this case, appellee civic associations claimed, and *143 the District Court agreed, that this criminal statute unreasonable restricts their First Amendment right of free expression. The Court today upholds the statute on the theory that its focusthe letterbox situated on residential propertyis not a public forum to which the First Amendment guarantees access. I take exception to the result, the analysis, and the premise that private persons lose their prerogatives over the letterboxes they own and supply for mail service. First, I disagree with the Court's assumption that if no public forum is involved, the only First Amendment challenges to be considered are whether the regulation is contentbased, see ante, at 132-133, and reasonable, ante, at 131, n. 7. Even if the Postal Service were not a public forum, which, as I later suggest, I do not accept, the statute advanced in its aid is a law challenged as an abridgment of free expression. Appellees seek to carry their own circulars and to deposit them in letterboxes owned by private persons who use them to receive mail, and challenge the criminal statute forbidding this use of private letterboxes. The question, then, is whether this statute burdens any First Amendment rights enjoyed by appellees. If so, it must be determined whether this burden is justified by a significant governmental interest substantially advanced by the statute. See Consolidated Edison ; ; ; That appellee civic associations enjoy the First Amendment right of free expression cannot be doubted; both their purposes and their practices fall within the core of the First Amendment's protections. We have long recognized the constitutional rights of groups which seek, as appellees do, to "communicate ideas, positions on local issues, and civic information to their constituents"[1] through written handouts *144 and thereby to promote the free discussion of governmental affairs so central |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | dissenting | Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110549/postal-service-v-council-of-greenburgh-civic-assns/ | to promote the free discussion of governmental affairs so central to our democracy. See, e. g., ; ; By traveling door to door to hand-deliver their messages to the homes of community members, appellees employ the method of written expression most accessible to those who are not powerful, established, or well financed. "Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people." See Moreover, "[f]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." And such freedoms depend on liberty to circulate; "`indeed, without circulation, the publication would be of little value.'" quoting Countervailing public interests, such as protection against fraud and preservation of privacy, may warrant some limitation on door-to-door solicitation and canvassing. But we have consistently held that nay such restrictions, to be valid, must be narrowly drawn "`in such a manner as not to intrude upon the rights of free speech.'" quoting -541 Consequently, I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion, ante, at 132-133, that we need not ask whether the ban against placing such messages in letterboxes is a restriction on appellees' free expression rights. Once appellees are at the doorstep, only 1725 restricts them from placing their circulars in the box provided by the resident. The District Court determined after an evidentiary hearing that only by placing their circulars in the letterboxes may appellees be certain that their messages will be secure from wind, rain, or snow, and at the same time will alert the attention of the residents without *145 notifying would-be burglars that no one has returned home to remove items from doorways or stoops. The court concluded that the costs and delays of mail service put the mails out of appellees' reach, and that other alternatives, such as placing their circulars in doorways, are "much less satisfactory."[2] We have in the past similarly recognized the burden placed on First Amendment rights when the alternative channels of communication involve more cost, less autonomy, and reduced likelihood of reaching the intended audience. Linmark Associates, I see no ground to disturb these factual determinations of the trier of fact. And, given these facts, the Postal Service bears a heavy burden to show that its interests are legitimate and substantially served by the restriction of appellees' freedom of expression. See, e. g., Hynes v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of ; Konigsberg v. Bar of California, ; Although the majority does not rule that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, as would be required |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | dissenting | Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110549/postal-service-v-council-of-greenburgh-civic-assns/ | trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, as would be required to set them aside, the Court finds persuasive the interests asserted by the Postal Service in defense of the statute. Those interests"protect[ing] mail revenues while at the same time facilitating the secure and efficient delivery of the mails," ante, at 129are indeed both legitimate and important. But mere assertion of an important, legitimate interest does not satisfy the requirement that the challenged restriction specifically and precisely serve that end. See Hynes v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of *146 See also Here, the District Court concluded that the Postal Service "has not shown that failure to enforce the statute as to [appellees] would result in a substantial loss of revenue, or a significant reduction in the government's ability to protect the mails by investigating and prosecuting mail theft, mail fraud, or unauthorized private mail delivery service."[3] In light of this failure of proof, I cannot join the Court's conclusion that the Federal Government may thus curtail appellees' ability to inform community residents about local civic matters. That decision, I fear, threatens a departure from this Court's belief that free expression, as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom," (17), must not yield unnecessarily before such governmental interests as economy or efficiency. Certainly, free expression should not have to yield here, where the intruding statute has seldom been enforced.[4] As the exceptions created *147 by the Postal Service itself demonstrate,[5] the statute's asserted purposes easily could be advanced by less intrusive alternatives, such as a nondiscriminatory permit requirement for depositing unstamped circulars in letterboxes.[6] Therefore, I would find 18 U.S. C. 1725 constitutionally defective. Even apart from the result in this case, I must differ with the Court's use of the public forum concept to avoid application of the First Amendment. Rather than a threshold barrier that must be surmounted before reaching the terrain of the First Amendment, the concept of a public forum has more properly been used to open varied governmental locations to equal public access for free expression, subject to the constraints on time, place, or manner necessary to preserve the governmental function. E. g., U. S., at -117 ; Chicago Area Military (CA7) (city airport), cert. denied, ; Albany Welfare Rights 4 F.2d 1319 (CA2) (welfare office waiting room), cert. denied sub nom. ; *148 (CA2) (port authority), cert. denied, 3 U.S. 940 ; See generally ; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, S. Ct. Rev. 233, 251-252 These decisions apply the public forum concept to secure the First Amendment's |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | dissenting | Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110549/postal-service-v-council-of-greenburgh-civic-assns/ | apply the public forum concept to secure the First Amendment's commitment to expression unfettered by governmental designation of its proper scope, audience, or occasion. I believe these precedents support my conclusion that appellees should prevail in their First Amendment claim. The traditional function of the mails led this Court to embrace Justice Holmes' statement that "`[t]he United s may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues'" quoting United s ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Given its pervasive and traditional use as purveyor of written communication, the Postal Service, I believe, may properly be viewed as a public forum. The Court relies on easily distinguishable cases in reaching the contrary conclusion. For the Postal Service's very purpose is to facilitate communication, which surely differentiates it from the military bases, jails, and mass transportation discussed in cases relied on by the Court, ante, at 129-130.[7] Cf. 3 U.S. 503, Drawing from the exceptional cases, where speech has been limited for special reasons, does not strike me as commendable analysis. The inquiry in our public forum cases has instead asked whether "the manner of expression is basically incompatible *150 with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Compare (restriction on speech permissible near school while in session) with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School ; with ; with Assuming for the moment that the letterboxes, as "authorized depositories," are under governmental control and thus part of the governmental enterprise, their purpose is hardly incompatible with appellees' use. For the letterboxes are intended to receive written communication directed to the residents and to protect such materials from the weather or the intruding eyes of would-be burglars. Reluctance to treat the letterboxes as public forums might stem not from the Postal Service's approval of their form but instead from the fact that their ownership and use remain in the hands of private individuals.[8] Even that hesitation, I should think, would be misguided, for those owners necessarily retain the right to receive information as a counterpart of the right of speakers to speak. ; Red Lion Broadcasting ; ; Cf. On that basis alone, I would doubt the validity of 18 U.S. C. 1725, for it deprives residents of the information *151 which civic groups or individuals may wish to deliver to these private receptacles.[9] I remain troubled by the Court's effort to transform the letterboxes entirely into components of the governmental enterprise |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Hutto v. Ross | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109554/hutto-v-ross/ | In March 1972, in Johnson County, Ark., respondent was charged by information with the crime of embezzlement. With the assistance of counsel, respondent entered into plea negotiations with the prosecuting attorney, and the parties reached an agreement that respondent would enter a plea of guilty on the understanding that the prosecutor would recommend a 15-year prison sentence, with 10 years suspended. Approximately two weeks later, the prosecuting attorney asked respondent's counsel whether respondent would be willing to make a statement concerning the crimes.[1] Although counsel advised respondent of his Fifth Amendment privilege and informed him that the terms of the negotiated plea bargain were available regardless of his willingness to comply with the prosecuting attorney's request, the respondent agreed to make a statement confessing to the crime charged. The record discloses that the statement was *29 made under oath in the office of respondent's counsel, with counsel present, and after respondent had been advised of his rights under[2] Respondent subsequently withdrew from the plea bargain, retained new counsel, and demanded a jury trial. The trial court ruled, after hearing evidence outside the presence of the jury, that respondent had confessed voluntarily. The statement was admitted at trial, and respondent was convicted and sentenced to 21 years' imprisonment. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. This Court denied certiorari. Respondent then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United District Court for the Western District of Arkansas challenging the state court's finding of voluntariness. 28 U.S. C. 2254. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing, and on May 23, denied the petition, agreeing with the state court that the confession was voluntary and therefore admissible. Mobley ex rel. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the statement inadmissible because "it was made in connection with an offer to plead guilty and after a [plea] bargain had been agreed upon." It made no difference, in the court's view, that the confession was not an express precondition of the plea bargain; the confession became "part and parcel" of the plea bargain because "[the] confession would [not] have been made at the request of the prosecution but for the plea bargain." Since the plea bargain *30 had not been executed, the court found the confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. The only question in this case is whether a confession is per se inadmissible in a criminal trial because it was made subsequent to an agreed upon plea bargain that did not call for such a confession.[3] We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it held |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Hutto v. Ross | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109554/hutto-v-ross/ | conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that any statement made as a result of a plea bargain is inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reasoned that respondent's confession was involuntary because it was made "as a result of the plea bargain" and would not have been made "but for the plea bargain." at 927, But causation in that sense has never been the test of voluntariness. See The test is whether the confession was " `extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.' " ; see The existence of the bargain may well have entered into respondent's decision to give a statement, but counsel made it clear to respondent that he could enforce the terms of the plea bargain whether or not he confessed. The confession thus does not appear to have been the result of " `any direct or implied promises' " or any coercion on the part of the prosecution, and was not involuntary. at *31 The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MR. JUSTICE STEWART dissents. Agreeing with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, he would affirm its judgment. It is so ordered. |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | dissenting | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | When we interpret a treaty, we accord the judgments of our sister signatories "`considerable weight.'" Air True to that canon, our previous Warsaw Convention opinions have carefully considered foreign case law. See, e. g., El Al Israel Airlines, ; Eastern Airlines, ; at Today's decision stands out for its failure to give any serious consideration to how the courts of our treaty partners have resolved the legal issues before us. This sudden insularity is striking, since the Court in recent years has canvassed the prevailing law in other nations (at least Western European nations) to determine the meaning of an American Constitution that those nations had no part in framing and that those nations' courts have no role in enforcing. See ; One would have thought that foreign courts' interpretations of a treaty that their governments adopted jointly with ours, and that they have an actual role in applying, would be (to put it mildly) all the more relevant. The Court's new abstemiousness with regard to foreign fare is not without consequence: Within the past year, appellate courts in both England and Australia have rendered decisions squarely at odds with today's holding. Because the Court offers no convincing explanation why these cases should not be followed, I respectfully dissent. I The Court holds that an airline's mere inaction can constitute an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. *659 Ante, at 654-657. It derives this principle from our definition of "accident" in as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger." The Court says this definition encompasses failures to act like the flight attendant's refusal to reseat Hanson in the face of a request for assistance. That is far from clear. The word "accident" is used in two distinct senses. One refers to something that is unintentional, not "on purpose" as in, "the hundred typing monkeys' verbatim reproduction of War and Peace was an accident." The other refers to an unusual and unexpected event, intentional or not: One may say he has been involved in a "train accident," for example, whether or not the derailment was intentionally caused. As the Court notes, ante, at 651, n. 6, adopted the latter definition rather than the former. That distinction is crucial because, while there is no doubt that inaction can be an accident in the former sense ("I accidentally left the stove on"), whether it can be so in the latter sense is questionable. Two of our sister signatories have concluded that it cannot. In Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, [] Q. |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | dissenting | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, [] Q. B. 234, England's Court of Appeal, in an opinion by the Master of the Rolls that relied heavily on and analyzed more than a half-dozen other non-English decisions, held as follows: "A critical issue in this appeal is whether a failure to act, or an omission, can constitute an accident for the purposes of article 17. Often a failure to act results in an accident, or forms part of a series of acts and omissions which together constitute an accident. In such circumstances it may not be easy to distinguish between acts and omissions. I cannot see, however, how inaction itself can ever properly be described as an accident. It is not an event; it is a non-event. Inaction is the antithesis *660 of an accident." [] Q. B., at 247, ¶ 25 (Lord Phillips, M. R.). Six months later, the appellate division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, in an opinion that likewise gave extensive consideration to American and other foreign decisions, agreed: "The allegations in substance do no more than state a failure to do something, and this cannot be characterised as an event or happening, whatever be the concomitant background to that failure to warn or advise. That is not to say that a failure to take a specific required step in the course of flying an aircraft, or in picking up or setting down passengers, cannot lead to an event or happening of the requisite unusual or unexpected kind and thus be an accident for the purpose of the article. A failure by a pilot to use some device in the expected and correct manner, such as a failure to let down the landing wheels or a chance omission to adjust the level of pressurisation, may lead, as has been held, to an accident contemplated by Article 17, but I would venture to suggest that it is not the failure to take the step which is properly to be characterised as an accident but rather its immediate and disastrous consequence whether that be the dangerous landing on the belly of the aircraft or an immediate unexpected and dangerous drop in pressurisation." Qantas We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions. Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting parties. Moreover, it is reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty consistently. (The Warsaw Convention's preamble specifically acknowledges "the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | dissenting | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | specifically acknowledges "the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of the liability *661 of the carrier.") Finally, even if we disagree, we surely owe the conclusions reached by appellate courts of other signatories the courtesy of respectful consideration. The Court nonetheless dismisses Deep Vein Thrombosis and Povey in a footnote responding to this dissent. Ante, at 655-656, n. 9. As to the former, it claims (choosing its words carefully) that the "conclusion" it reaches is "not inconsistent" with that case. Ante, at 655 The reader should not think this to be a contention that the Master of the Rolls' opinion might be read to agree with today's holding that inaction can constitute an "accident." (To repeat the conclusion of that opinion: "Inaction is the antithesis of an accident." [] Q. B., at 247, ¶ 25.) What it refers to is the fact that the Master of the Rolls distinguished the Court of Appeals' judgment below (announced in an opinion that assumed inaction was involved, but did not at all discuss the action-inaction distinction) on the ground that action was involved namely, "insistence that [Hanson] remain seated in the area exposed to smoke."[1] As I explain below, see Part II, infra, that theory does not quite work because, *662 in fact, the flight attendant did not insist that Hanson remain seated. But we can ignore this detail for the time being. The point is that the English court thought Husain could recover, not because the action-inaction distinction was irrelevant, but because, even though action was indispensable, it had in fact occurred. The Court charts our course in exactly the opposite direction, spending three pages explaining why the action-inaction distinction is irrelevant. See ante, at 654-657. If the Court agrees with the Master of the Rolls that this case involves action, why does it needlessly place us in conflict with the courts of other signatories by deciding the then-irrelevant issue of whether inaction can constitute an accident? It would suffice to hold that our case involves action and end the analysis there. Whether inaction can constitute an accident under the Warsaw Convention is a significant issue on which international consensus is important; whether Husain can recover for her husband's death in this one case is not. As they stand, however, the core holdings of this case and Deep Vein Thrombosis their rationes decidendi are not only not "not inconsistent"; they are completely opposite.[2] *663 I would follow the holdings of Deep Vein Thrombosis and Povey, since the Court's analysis today is no more convincing than theirs. |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | dissenting | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | the Court's analysis today is no more convincing than theirs. Merely pointing to dictionaries that define "`event'" as an "`occurrence'" or "`[s]omething that happens,'" ante, at 655, hardly resolves the problem; it only reformulates one question (whether "accident" includes nonevents) into an equivalent one (whether "accident" includes nonoccurrences and nonhappenings). Equally unavailing is the reliance, ante, at 656-657, on Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention (which lifts liability caps for injury caused by a "default" of the airline equivalent to willful misconduct) and Article 20 (which precludes the airline's due-care defense if it fails to take "all necessary measures" to avoid the injury). The Court's analytical error in invoking these provisions is to assume that the inaction these provisions contemplate is the accident itself. The treaty imposes no such requirement. If a pilot negligently forgets to lower the landing gear, causing the plane to crash and killing all passengers on board, then recovery is presumptively available (because the crash that caused the deaths is an accident), and the due-care defense is inapplicable (because the pilot's negligent omission also caused the deaths), even though the omission is not the accident. Similarly, if a flight attendant fails to prevent the boarding of an individual whom she knows to be a terrorist, and who later shoots a passenger, the damages cap might be lifted even though the accident (the shooting) and the default (the failure to prevent boarding) do not coincide. Without the invented restriction that the Article 20 or 25 default be the accident itself, the Court's argument based on those provisions loses all force. *664 As for the Court's hypothetical of the crew that refuses to divert after a passenger collapses, ante, at 656: This would be more persuasive as a reductio ad absurdum if the Eleventh Circuit had not already ruled out Article 17 liability in substantially these very circumstances. See A legal construction is not fallacious merely because it has harsh results. The Convention denies a remedy, even when outrageous conduct and grievous injury have occurred, unless there has been an "accident." Whatever that term means, it certainly does not equate to "outrageous conduct that causes grievous injury." It is a mistake to assume that the Convention must provide relief whenever traditional tort law would do so. To the contrary, a principal object of the Convention was to promote the growth of the fledgling airline industry by limiting the circumstances under which passengers could sue. See -171. Unless there has been an accident, there is no liability, whether the claim is trivial, cf. or cries out for redress. Were |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | dissenting | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | claim is trivial, cf. or cries out for redress. Were we confronting the issue in the first instance, perhaps the Court could persuade me to its view. But courts in two other countries have already rejected it, and their reasoning is no less compelling than the Court's. I would follow Deep Vein Thrombosis and Povey and hold that mere inaction cannot be an "accident" under Article 17. II Respondents argue that, even if the Convention distinguishes action from inaction, this case involves sufficient elements of action to support recovery. That argument is not implausible; as noted earlier, the court in Deep Vein Thrombosis suggested that "[t]he refusal of the attendant to move [Hanson] could be described as insistence that he remain seated in the area exposed to smoke." [] Q. B., at 254, *665 I cannot agree with this analysis, however, because it miscomprehends the facts of this case. Preliminarily, I must note that this was not the rationale of the District Court. That court consistently referred to the relevant "accident" not as the flight attendant's insistence that Hanson remain seated, but as her "failure" or "refusal" to reseat him. See Its findings of fact were infected by its erroneous legal assumption that Article 17 makes no distinction between action and inaction. The only question is whether we can nonetheless affirm on the ground that, since there was action in any event, this error was harmless. It was not. True, in response to the first request, the flight attendant insisted that Husain and her husband "`have a seat.'" This insistence might still have been implicit in her response to the second request. But these responses were both given while the plane was still on the ground, preparing to take off. The flight attendant's response to Husain's third request made once the plane was in the air and other passengers had started smoking was quite different. She did not insist that Husain and her husband remain seated; on the contrary, she invited them to walk around the cabin in search of someone willing to switch. That the flight attendant explicitly refused Husain's pleas for help after the third request, rather than simply ignoring them, does not transform her inaction into action. The refusal acknowledged her inaction, but it was the inaction, not the acknowledgment, that caused Hanson's death. Unlike the previous responses, the third was a mere refusal to assist, and so cannot be the basis for liability under Article 17. The District Court's failure to make the distinction between the flight attendant's pretakeoff responses and her in-flight response |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | dissenting | Olympic Airways v. Husain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/131164/olympic-airways-v-husain/ | between the flight attendant's pretakeoff responses and her in-flight response undermines its decision in two respects. First, the court's findings as to airline and industry policy did not distinguish between reseating a passenger while in flight and reseating a passenger while still on the ground *666 preparing to take off. In fact, some of the evidence on this point specifically related only to in-flight behavior. See ; (testimony of a company official that its policy is to move passengers "who become ill during flights" ). To establish that it is company policy to reseat an asthmatic does not establish that it is company policy to do so before takeoff, while the attendants are busy securing the plane for departure and before anyone has started smoking. In other words, there may have been nothing unusual about the initial insistence that Hanson stay seated, and for that reason no "accident." We do not know the policy in this more specific regard. The District Court made no findings because it applied an erroneous legal standard that did not require it to distinguish among the three requests. But even if the flight attendant's insistence that Hanson remain seated before takeoff was unusual or unexpected, and hence an accident, it was not a compensable cause of Hanson's death. It was perhaps a but-for cause (had the flight attendant allowed him to move before takeoff, he might have lived, just as he might have lived if he had taken a different flight); but it was not a proximate cause, which is surely a predicate for recovery. Any early insistence that Hanson remain seated became moot once the attendant later told Husain and her husband they were free to move about. There is, however, one complication, which I think requires us to remand this case to the District Court: Although the flight attendant, once the plane was aloft, invited Husain to find another passenger willing to switch seats, she did not invite Husain to find an empty seat, but to the contrary affirmatively represented that the plane was full. If such a misrepresentation is unusual and unexpected; and (the more difficult question) if it can reasonably be said that it caused Hanson's death i. e., that Husain would have searched for *667 and found an empty seat, although unwilling to ask another passenger to move then a cause of action might lie. I would remand so that the District Court could consider in the first instance whether the flight attendant's misrepresentation about the plane's being full, independent of any failure to reseat, was an accident |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | The question presented in this case is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction in a capital sentencing proceeding of the fact that the defendant was a member of an organization called the Aryan Brotherhood, where the evidence has no relevance to the issues being decided in the proceeding. We hold that they do. Shortly after midnight on December 1, 1986, petitioner David Dawson and three other inmates escaped from the Delaware Correctional Center near Smyrna, Delaware. Dawson stole a car and headed south, while the other three inmates stole another car and drove north. Early that *161 morning, Dawson burglarized a house near Kenton, Delaware, stealing a motorcycle jacket, several pocket watches, and containers of loose change. He then proceeded to the home of Richard and Madeline Kisner, located about half a mile from the burglary site. Mrs. Kisner was alone in the house, preparing to leave for work. Dawson brutally murdered Mrs. Kisner, stole the Kisners' car and some money, and fled further south. He reappeared later that evening at the Zoo Bar in Milford, Delaware, wearing a motorcycle jacket that was too big for him. While at the bar, Dawson introduced himself to Patty Dennis, and told her that his name was "Abaddon," which he said meant "[o]ne of Satan's disciples." App. 80-81. Dawson was subsequently asked to leave the bar. Later that evening, a Delaware state police officer responded to a call to investigate a one-car accident. The car involved in the accident had been stolen from a location near the Zoo Bar and had been driven into a ditch, but the driver had left the scene. The police began a house-to-house search for Dawson, and found him at 5:25 the next morning, on the floor of a Cadillac parked about three-tenths of a mile from the accident site. A jury convicted Dawson of first-degree murder, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and various other crimes. The trial court then conducted a penalty hearing before the jury to determine whether Dawson should be sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction. See Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 4209 (1987). The prosecution gave notice that it intended to introduce (1) expert regarding the origin and nature of the Aryan Brotherhood, as well as the fact that Dawson had the words "Aryan Brotherhood" tattooed on the back of his right hand, (2) that Dawson referred to himself as "Abaddon" and had the name "Abaddon" tattooed in red letters across his stomach, and (3) photographs of multiple swastika tattoos on Dawson's back |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | and (3) photographs of multiple swastika tattoos on Dawson's back and a picture of a swastika he had painted *162 on the wall of his prison cell. Dawson argued that this evidence was inflammatory and irrelevant, and that its admission would violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Before the penalty phase began, the parties agreed to a stipulation regarding the Aryan Brotherhood evidence. The stipulation provided: "The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware." App. 132. In return for Dawson's agreement to the stipulation, the prosecution agreed not to call any expert witnesses to testify about the Aryan Brotherhood. Although Dawson agreed to the stipulation in order to avoid presentation of this expert it is apparent from the record and from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware that he continued to assert that the admission of the stipulated facts into evidence violated the Constitution. At the penalty hearing, the prosecution read the stipulation to the jury and introduced evidence that Dawson had tattooed the words "Aryan Brotherhood" on his hand. The trial judge permitted the prosecution to present the evidence related to the name "Abaddon" as well, but excluded all of the swastika evidence. In addition, the prosecution submitted proof of Dawson's lengthy criminal record. Dawson, in turn, presented mitigating evidence based on the of two family members and on the fact that he had earned good time credits in prison for enrolling in various drug and alcohol programs. The jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances, each making Dawson eligible for the death penalty under Delaware law; it determined (1) that the murder was committed by an escaped prisoner, (2) that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary, and (3) *163 that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. See and n. 27. The jury further concluded that the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence, and recommended that Dawson be sentenced to death. The trial court, bound by that recommendation, imposed the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. The court rejected Dawson's claim that the evidence concerning the Aryan Brotherhood and his use of the name "Abaddon" should have been excluded from the penalty hearing. It observed that having found at least one statutory aggravating factor, the jury was "required to make an individualized determination of whether Dawson should be executed or |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | an individualized determination of whether Dawson should be executed or incarcerated for life, based upon Dawson's character, his record and the circumstances of the crime," and that it was desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when making that decision. -1103 The court acknowledged that the Constitution would prohibit the consideration of certain irrelevant factors during the sentencing process, but stated that "`[p]unishing a person for expressing his views or for associating with certain people is substantially different from allowing evidence of [the defendant's] character [to be considered] where that character is a relevant inquiry.' " Because the evidence relating to the Aryan Brotherhood and the name "Abaddon" properly focused the jury's attention on Dawson's character, and did not appeal to the jury's prejudices concerning race, religion, or political affiliation, the court upheld its introduction during the penalty phase. We granted certiorari, to consider whether the admission of this evidence was constitutional error. We hold that its admission in this case was error and so reverse. We have held that the First Amendment protects an individual's right to join groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs. See ; Because his right to associate with the Aryan Brotherhood is constitutionally protected, Dawson argues, admission of evidence related to that association at his penalty hearing violated his constitutional rights. Relying on our statement in that an aggravating circumstance is invalid if "it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected," he contends that the Constitution forbids the consideration in sentencing of any evidence concerning beliefs or activities that are protected under the First Amendment. We think this submission is, in the light of our decided cases, too broad. These cases emphasize that "the sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide range of relevant material." ; United ; We have previously upheld the consideration, in a capital sentencing proceeding, of evidence of racial intolerance and subversive advocacy where such evidence was relevant to the issues involved. In for example, we held that a sentencing judge in a capital case might properly take into consideration "the elements of racial hatred" in Barclay's crime as well as "Barclay's desire to start a race war." See ; and n. 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). One year later, in United we held that the Government could impeach a defense witness by showing that both the defendant and the witness were members of the Aryan Brotherhood, and that members were sworn to lie on behalf of each other. We held the evidence |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | lie on behalf of each other. We held the evidence admissible to show bias, even assuming that membership *165 in the organization was among the associational freedoms protected by the First Amendment. Though Abel did not involve a capital sentencing proceeding, its logic is perfectly applicable to such a proceeding. We therefore conclude that the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment. Although we cannot accept Dawson's broad submission, we nevertheless agree with him that, in this case, the receipt into evidence of the stipulation regarding his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was constitutional error. Before the penalty hearing, the prosecution claimed that its expert witness would show that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that advocates the murder of fellow inmates. If credible and otherwise admissible evidence to that effect had been presented, we would have a much different case. But, after reaching an agreement with Dawson, the prosecution limited its proof regarding the Aryan Brotherhood to the stipulation. The brief stipulation proved only that an Aryan Brotherhood prison gang originated in California in the 1960's, that it entertains white racist beliefs, and that a separate gang in the Delaware prison system calls itself the Aryan Brotherhood. We conclude that the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's sentencing proceeding. As an initial matter, the second sentence of the stipulation, when carefully parsed, says nothing about the beliefs of the Aryan Brotherhood "chapter" in the Delaware prisons. Prior to trial, the prosecution acknowledged that there are differences among the various offshoots of the Aryan Brotherhood, stating that "there are cells or specific off-shoots within various local jurisdictions that don't see eye to eye or share a union, if you will." App. 33. But the juxtaposition *166 of the second sentence with the first sentence, which describes the Aryan Brotherhood in California prisons as a "white racist prison gang," invited the jury to infer that the beliefs of the Delaware chapter are identical to those of the California chapter. Even if the Delaware group to which Dawson allegedly belongs is racist, those beliefs, so far as we can determine, had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding in this case. For example, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied in any way to the murder of Dawson's victim. In Barclay, on the contrary, the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | murder of Dawson's victim. In Barclay, on the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendant's membership in the Black Liberation Army, and his consequent desire to start a "racial war," were related to the murder of a white hitchhiker. See -944 We concluded that it was most proper for the sentencing judge to "tak[e] into account the elements of racial hatred in this murder." In the present case, however, the murder victim was white, as is Dawson; elements of racial hatred were therefore not involved in the killing. Because the prosecution did not prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was also not relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstance. In many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. A defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future. Other evidence concerning a defendant's associations might be relevant in proving other aggravating circumstances. But the inference which the jury was invited to draw in this case tended to prove nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter. Delaware counters that even these abstract beliefs constitute a portion of *167 Dawson's "character," and thus are admissible in their own right under Delaware law. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 4209(d) (1987). Whatever label is given to the evidence presented, however, we conclude that Dawson's First Amendment rights were violated by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case, because the evidence proved nothing more than Dawson's abstract beliefs. Cf. Delaware might have avoided this problem if it had presented evidence showing more than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson's part, but on the present record one is left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible. Because Delaware failed to do more, we cannot find the evidence was properly admitted as relevant character evidence. Nor was the Aryan Brotherhood evidence relevant to rebut any mitigating evidence offered by Dawson. We have held that a capital defendant is entitled to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence that he proffers in support of a sentence less than death. ; But just as the defendant has the right to introduce any sort of relevant mitigating evidence, the State is entitled to rebut that evidence with proof of its own. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Dawson v. Delaware | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112702/dawson-v-delaware/ | entitled to rebut that evidence with proof of its own. See (internal quotation marks omitted); In this case, Dawson's mitigating evidence consisted of about his kindness to family members, as well as evidence regarding good time credits he earned in prison for enrolling in various drug and alcohol programs. Delaware argues that because Dawson's evidence consisted of "good" character evidence, it was entitled to introduce any "bad" character *168 evidence in rebuttal, including that concerning the Aryan Brotherhood. The principle of broad rebuttal asserted by Delaware is correct, but the argument misses the mark because, as stated above, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence presented in this case cannot be viewed as relevant "bad" character evidence in its own right. The dissent takes us to task for failing to recognize the broader implications of membership in a prison gang, and for extending the protection of the First Amendment to evidence introduced at a sentencing hearing. The material adduced by the dissent as to the nature of prison gangssimilar to the evidence which the prosecution in this case at one time considered adducing by expert at 165would, if it had been presented to the jury, have made this a different case. But we do not have the same confidence as the dissent does that jurors would be familiar with the court decisions and studies upon which it relies. Regarding the reach of the First Amendment, the dissent correctly points out that it prevents the State from criminalizing certain conduct in the first instance. But it goes further than that. It prohibits a State from denying admission to the bar on the grounds of previous membership in the Communist Party, when there is no connection between that membership and the "good moral character" required by the State to practice law. It prohibits the State from requiring information from an organization that would impinge on First Amendment associational rights if there is no connection between the information sought and the State's interest. ; We think that it similarly prevents Delaware here from employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried. The question whether the wrongful admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence at sentencing was harmless *169 error is not before us at this time, and we therefore leave it open for consideration by the Supreme Court of Delaware on remand. See For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | I agree with the Court’s conclusion that there is no special exception to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) for claim construction. But that is not the ques tion in this case. Because Rule 52(a)(6) provides for clear error review only of “findings of fact” and “does not apply to conclusions of law,” -Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982), the question here is whether claim construction involves findings of fact.1 Because it does not, Rule 52(a)(6) does not apply, and the Court of Appeals properly applied a de novo standard of review. I In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority fails to —————— 1 The majority argues that we are bound by petitioners’ phrasing of the question presented and by respondents’ concession at oral argu ment that claim construction “will sometimes require subsidiary factfinding.” Ante, at 10–11. But the parties’ stipulations that claim construction involves subsidiary factual determinations, with which I do not quarrel, do not settle the question whether those determinations are “findings of fact” within the meaning of Rule 52(a)(6). And to the extent that the majority premises its holding on what it sees as stipula tions that these determinations are “findings of fact” for purposes of Rule 52(a)(6), then its holding applies only to the present dispute, and other parties remain free to contest this premise in the future. 2 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting engage the “vexing distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.” Unfortunately, “Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact,” and we have found it difficult to discern “any other rule or principle that will unerringly” differentiate the two. That inquiry is thus not as simple as pointing out the undeni- able “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction. Ante, at 10–11. Instead, we must consider how “findings of fact” and “conclusions of law” were understood at the time Rule 52 was adopted. Cf. 168 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that, because the federal rules have their background in common-law principles, “the body of common law knowledge must be a source of guidance in our interpretation of the Rules” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unfortunately, the pre-1937 evidence of this Court’s treatment of evidentiary determinations underly ing claim construction is inconclusive. In several deci sions, the Court considered extrinsic evidence related to claim construction with no apparent deference to the District Courts’ findings based on that evidence. Coupe v. Royer, ; Loom v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 584–587 (1882); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 729– |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | 580, 584–587 (1882); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 729– (1881); 339 (1854). None of those decisions, however, expressly turned on a disagreement over a subsidiary evidentiary determination. Absent specific evidence of the treatment of a particular issue at the time Rule 52 was adopted, we have drawn analogies to the treatment of other issues under Rule 52(a)(6). See, e.g., In general, we have treated district-court determinations as “analytically more akin to a fact” the more they pertain to a simple historical fact of the case, and as “analytically more akin Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting to a legal conclusion” the more they define rules appli cable beyond the parties’ dispute. v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 ; see also Bose ; Baum- Under this approach, determinations underlying claim construc tion fall on the law side of the dividing line. A Patents are written instruments, so other written in struments supply the logical analogy. See v. Westview Instruments, Inc., And as the majority recognizes, the construction of written instruments is generally a question of law. See ante, at 5. But in certain contexts, a court construing a written in strument makes subsidiary determinations that the law treats as findings of fact. The classic case of a written instrument whose construc tion does not involve subsidiary findings of fact is a stat ute. Our treatment of subsidiary evidentiary findings underlying statutory construction as conclusions of law makes sense for two reasons. First, although statutory construction may demand some inquiry into legislative “intent,” that inquiry is an- alytically legal: The meaning of a statute does not turn on what an individual lawmaker intended as a matter of fact, but only on what intent has been enacted into law through the constitutionally defined channels of bicamer alism and presentment. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). This remains so even if deciding what passed through those channels requires a court to determine a “fact” of historical understanding through an examination of ex trinsic evidence. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–715 (2004) (examining the historical under standing of the term “law of nations” when the Alien Tort 4 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting Statute was enacted); see also, e.g., (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (construing a consti tutional provision by asking how the words were originally understood and marshaling evidence of that understand ing). The Court has given no hint that this practice changes when the statute it construes is a land patent— that is, |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | the statute it construes is a land patent— that is, a public land grant. See Leo Sheep (making detailed histori cal findings in the course of construing a land grant be cause “ ‘courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it’ ”); see also Marvin M. Brandt Revocable v. United States, 572 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 10) (looking to the historical background against which a land grant was passed to confirm its interpretation). Second, statutes govern the rights and duties of the public as a whole, so subsidiary evidentiary findings shape legal rules that apply far beyond the boundaries of the dispute involved. Our rules of construction for legislative acts have long been consciously shaped by the public’s stake in those acts. See, e.g., The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, (describing a rule of construction bor rowed from English common law and reflected in the decisions of the several States). The construction of contracts and deeds, by contrast, sometimes involves subsidiary findings of fact. Our treatment of subsidiary evidentiary findings as findings of fact in this context makes sense because, in construing contracts and deeds, “the avowed purpose and primary function of the court is to ascertain the intention of the parties.” 11 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts pp. 17– 18 (4th ed. 2012) (Williston); see also 288– Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting 289 (1850). Sometimes that intention is clearly “set forth in the express language of the contract,” 11 Williston at 341–342, so no subsidiary findings of fact are necessary to its construction, But when ambi guities require a court to look beyond the express lan guage, its search for intent becomes factual in nature. That search focuses on “real intention[s]”—embodied in an actual meeting of minds or an actual conveyance of a physical parcel of land—that have an existence outside the written instrument and that the instrument merely rec ords. See William & James Brown & v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479, 493 (1840) (Story, J.); See generally Union Pacific R. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl. 548, 577–578 (1874) (declining to interpret a contract-like statute according to contract rules because “[a]ll the terms of the compact are dictated and accepted by one side, and the only intent which judicial construction can make certain is the intent of the legislative power”), cited in 3 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction p. 405, n. 6 (7th |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction p. 405, n. 6 (7th ed. 2008). Of course, not all subsidiary inquiries that a court makes in the course of construing contracts amount to findings of fact. For example, when a court searches for the meaning that a hypothetical person “conversant with the subject-matter with which the contract is dealing” would give to the words of the contract, its conclusion often remains one of law. Silver King Coalition Mines of Nevada v. Silver King Consol. Mining of Utah, 204 F. 166 (CA8 1913), cited in Advisory Committee’s 1937 Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 686. The question we must ask, then, is whether the subsidi ary findings underlying claim construction more closely resemble the subsidiary findings underlying the construc tion of statutes or those underlying the construction of contracts and deeds that are treated as findings of fact. This, in turn, depends on whether patent claims are more 6 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting like statutes or more like contracts and deeds. B A patent, generally speaking, is “an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made public, or ‘patent.’ ” Marvin M. Brandt Revocable at (slip op., at 5). Invention patents originated not as private property rights, but as royal prerogatives. See 4 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 350–351 (1924). They could be issued and revoked only by the Crown, which sometimes used the patent to delegate governmen tal power to regulate an industry. at 344–347. Pro voked by the Crown’s use of these so-called “monopoly patents” to promote private economic interests over inno vation and beneficial commerce, Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies in 1624. But even under the regime that Parliament put in place, patents remained sovereign grants, issued, enforced, and revoked by the Privy Council. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid? The Framers adopted a similar scheme. Article I of the U. S. Constitution vests the patent power in Congress, authorizing it “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U. S. Const. Art. I, cl. 8. Although Congress could issue such patents as special statutes, see, e.g., it has mostly acted by authorizing the Executive Branch to issue patents when certain statutory requirements are met. See 35 U.S. C. see also Act of July 8, 1870, ; Act of July 4, 1836, ; Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, –110. |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | 1836, ; Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, –110. Like the royal prerogatives that were their historical antecedents, patents have a regulatory effect: They “re strain others from manufacturing, using or selling that Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting which [the patent holder] has invented” for a specified period of time. Motion Picture Patents And because the regulatory scope of a patent is deter mined by the claims in the patent, the subsidiary findings that a court makes during claim construction contribute to rules that limit conduct by the public at large. Because they are governmental dispositions and provide rules that bind the public at large, patent claims resemble statutes. The scope of a patent holder’s monopoly right is defined by claims legally actualized through the proce dures established by Congress pursuant to its patent power. Thus, a patent holder’s actual intentions have effect only to the extent that they are expressed in the public record. See Keystone Bridge ; see also Goodyear Dental Vulcanite (examin ing “the avowed understanding of the patentee,” but dis claiming any holding that such understanding “c[ould] be allowed to enlarge, diminish, or vary the language of a patent afterwards issued”). Moreover, because the ultimate meaning of a patent claim, like the ultimate meaning of a statute, binds the public at large, it should not depend on the specific evi dence presented in a particular infringement case. Al though the party presentations shape even statutory con- struction, de novo review on appeal helps to ensure that the construction is not skewed by the specific evidence presented in a given case. C For purposes of construction, contracts and deeds are less natural analogies for patents. In particular, patents lack the characteristics of those instruments that have justified departing from the usual practice of treating document construction as a wholly legal inquiry, not sub 8 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting ject to subsidiary findings of fact. To be sure, we have occasionally characterized a patent as “a carefully crafted bargain” between the inventor and the public. (1998); see also 327–328 (1859); But, as our decisions have also recognized, the patent is perhaps better characterized as a reward for feats already accom plished—that is, innovation and public disclosure—than as a mutual exchange of executory promises. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents ; Seymour v. Osborne, ; at ; see also v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985, n. 14 aff ’d (distinguishing patents from contracts). In grant ing a patent, the Government is acting not as a party |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | a patent, the Government is acting not as a party to a bilateral contract binding upon itself alone, but instead as a sovereign bestowing upon the inventor a right to exclude the public at large from the invention marked out by his claims. In this sense, patents are more closely analogous to deeds, Motion Picture Patents at (collecting cases), because they share the common characteristic of describing rights that the owner holds against the world. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989). But in the context of land patents, we have been unwilling to interpret sovereign dispositions in the same way we interpret analogous private convey ances. See, e.g., Leo Sheep –682; Missouri, K. & T. R. v. Kansas Pacific R. 97 U.S. 491, 497 (1878); Leavenworth, L. & G. R. ; see also Marvin M. Brandt Revocable (interpreting a land grant as a statute rather than as a deed). We should not blithely extend the rules governing the construction of deeds to Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 9 THOMAS, J., dissenting their even more distant cousins, invention patents.2 Bearing these differences in mind, the subsidiary facts relevant to the construction of patents, on the one hand, and contracts and deeds, on the other, differ substantially. As explained above, we have justified treating subsidiary determinations about the actual intentions of parties to contracts and deeds as findings of fact. But the subsidiary determinations about patent claims that the majority identifies as factual do not concern historical facts, such as what the parties agreed to do or how a given parcel of land —————— 2 The Anglo-American legal tradition has long distinguished between “core” private rights—including the traditional property rights repre sented by deeds—and other types of rights. Adjudication in the Political Branches, These other rights fall into two categories: “ ‘public rights belonging to the people at large,’ ” and “privileges” or “franchises,” “which public author ities ha[ve] created purely for reasons of public policy and which ha[ve] no counterpart in the Lockean state of nature.” at 566– Not withstanding a movement to recognize a “core” property right in inven tions, the English common law placed patents squarely in the final category, as franchises that “depend upon express legislation,” and “hath [their] essence by positive municipal law.” 7 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 479, n. 7, 480, and n. 4, 497 (1926). The distinc tion between “core” private rights, on the one hand, and public rights and government-created privileges, on the other, has traditionally had significant implications for the way |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | the other, has traditionally had significant implications for the way in which rights are adjudicated. Thus, no matter how closely a franchise resembles some “core” private right, it does not follow that it must be subject to the same rules of judicial interpretation as its counterpart. Cases interpreting deeds and land patents exemplify this rule and show why the majority’s assertion that patents affect fewer people than statutes, in addition to being a dubious overgeneralization, is not a material distinction. Land patents are more like deeds than statutes in the sense that their effects are more localized, yet the judicial power approaches them differently because they dispose of public rights held by the government on behalf of the people, 566. See also The Binghamton Bridge, (interpreting a state grant of a corporate charter as a “contract” but subject to the special common- law rule that all ambiguities must be construed in favor of the State because “in grants by the public nothing passes by implication”). 10 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting is situated. See William & James Brown & 14 Pet., at 493; 8 How., For example, the “fact” of how a skilled artisan would understand a given term or phrase at a particular point in history is a legal fiction; it has no existence independent of the claim construction process. There is no actual “skilled artisan” who, at the moment the application was filed, formed an understanding of the terms of the claim—an understanding that an omniscient factfinder could ascer tain. Neither is the skilled artisan’s understanding a proxy for some external fact that, could the court know it, would supply the meaning of a patent claim. Whatever the scope of the inventor’s right under the patent before the introduction of claims, the law has limited that right to the claims as written in the patent. See Our decision in rested in part on this characteristic of claim construction, distinguishing it from other patent determinations that must go to a jury because they require the factfinder to inspect “ ‘an embod ied conception outside of the patent itself ’ ” or things “ ‘which have their existence in pais.’ ” – 386 (distinguishing (1870)). Because the skilled artisan inquiry in claim construction more closely resembles determinations categorized as “conclusions of law” than determinations categorized as “findings of fact,” I would hold that it falls outside the scope of Rule 52(a)(6) and is subject to de novo review. II A The majority makes little effort to justify its assertion that the subsidiary determinations a district |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | to justify its assertion that the subsidiary determinations a district court makes in the course of claim construction are findings of fact. And the few analogies that it attempts to draw either lack support or prove too much. Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 11 THOMAS, J., dissenting For example, relying on Great Northern R. v. Mer- chants Elevator the major- ity compares the search for the meaning of “ ‘technical words or phrases not commonly understood’ ” in claim construction to “questions of fact” about the scope of a railway tariff. See ante, at 6. It is true that, in Great Northern, the Court referred to questions of fact arising in the context of contract construction, which, it pointed out, must go to a 259 U.S., at –293. But the Court’s conclusion that similar questions must be settled by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) when they relate to the interpretation of a railway tariff merely proves the point that the allocation of a technical usage inquiry de pends upon the legal instrument that the court is constru ing. In that case, the Court was faced with a tariff filed with, and administered by, the ICC. And it was not con cerned with allocating evidentiary determinations be tween trial and appellate courts, but with allocating them between an agency and the judiciary. So understood, the distinction the Court drew pertains more to an emerging rule of administrative deference than to a definitive classification of judicial determinations. Further reinforcing the point that the nature of the legal instrument dictates our treatment of subsidiary findings is that, although terms in statutes and regulations frequently have technical meanings unknown outside the special- ized community they are meant to regulate, we treat the inquiry into those meanings as involving only conclusions of law. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western R. v. Hiles, 516 U.S. 400, 401–407, 413–414 ; Aluminum of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 The majority’s unexamined reliance on technical usage could be read to cast doubt on this prac tice, as well as on our holding in that claim construction is exclusively for the court. If claim construc tion involves subsidiary questions of technical meaning or 12 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting usage that are indistinguishable from those questions submitted to the jury in the contract context, see 12 Wil liston then one might wonder why such issues are not submitted to the jury in the patent and statute con texts, too. The majority also analogizes to the obviousness inquiry in patent |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | The majority also analogizes to the obviousness inquiry in patent law, which involves findings of fact subject to Rule 52(a)(6). Ante, at 11 ). But this analogy is even further off the mark because obviousness turns on historical facts about the circum stances of the invention, rather than on the construction of a written instrument. at 810–. Cf. (distinguishing the novelty inquiry from claim construction on these grounds). B Nor does the majority attempt to justify its holding by reference to which “ ‘judicial actor is better positioned to decide the issue in question,’ ” at 388—an inquiry that we have also treated as relevant to the classification of fact versus law, 474 U.S., at 114. In resolving issues of judicial administration, we have considered that federal appellate courts are “exposi tor[s] of law,” ib and have acknowledged that they are better positioned than district courts to promote uniform- ity, ; see also We have recog nized, however, that trial courts have a special competence in judging witness credibility and weighing the evidence, and have been cautious not to waste judicial and party resources through needless relitigation, see 5 To the extent that the construction of a patent claim turns on testimony of expert witnesses, especially live testimony, there is no denying that it falls within the Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 13 THOMAS, J., dissenting bounds of a district court’s special competence. But as we recognized in and as the majority is careful to reiterate today, “subsidiary factfinding is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated claim construction.” Ante, at 10. The majority’s reluctance to highlight “alloca tion,” is thus understandable. The arguments favoring allocation to the district court, dimin ished by the majority’s own prediction, are outweighed by the remaining rule-of-law and uniformity considerations that factored into our allocation in 517 U.S., at 388–391. 1 We have long been cautious not to allocate issues in a way that would “strip a federal appellate court of its pri mary function as an expositor of law.” 474 U.S., at 114. Although we have recognized that “an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate” dispute, we have been less inclined to defer to seemingly factual determina tions that play a dispositive role in the development of legal rules. For example, we have sanctioned de novo appellate review of the mixed determinations of “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion” on the ground that “the legal rules acquire content only through application.” ; see also Al- though such determinations depend on the |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | ; see also Al- though such determinations depend on the specific facts in a case, their role in shaping rules of law demand a de novo standard of review. As previously noted, patents are authoritative govern mental dispositions. Thus, when a judge construes a patent, he is, in a very real sense, “say[ing] what the law is,” not just for the parties to the dispute, but for the public at large. It follows that, any time a district court’s claim construction turns on subsidiary evidentiary disputes, the 14 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting majority’s rule will distort the appellate court’s construc tion of the law by requiring it to defer to subsidiary deter minations that are dispositive as to its meaning. Surely the majority would not countenance such an abdication of the appellate court’s role in the construction of statutes. Yet the majority has not justified applying a different rule to the construction of legislative acts that take the form of a patent. 2 The need for uniformity in claim construction also weighs heavily in favor of de novo review of subsidiary evidentiary determinations. Uniformity is a critical fea ture of our patent system because “ ‘[t]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.’ ” 517 U.S., If the boundaries of the patent right could shift from case to case, then the result would be “a ‘zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement.’ ” ; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki (2002). So damaging is this unpredictability that we identified uniformity as an “independent” reason justify ing our allocation of claim construction to the court. See The majority attempts to downplay the effect its deci sion will have on uniformity by pointing out that “prior cases [construing the same claim] will sometimes be bind ing because of issue preclusion, and sometimes will serve as persuasive authority.” Ante, at 9–10 (citing ; citation omitted). But we have already rejected the notion that issue preclusion adequately safe guards the uniformity that our patent system requires. See Cite as: 574 U. S. (2015) 15 THOMAS, J., dissenting Perhaps the majority is correct that “subsidiary factfind ing is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated claim construction.” Ante, at 10. But I doubt it. If this case proves anything, it is that the line between fact |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2771248/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc/ | case proves anything, it is that the line between fact and law is an uncertain one—made all the more uncertain by the majority’s failure to identify sound principles for the lines it draws. The majority’s rule provides litigants who prevail in district court a significant opportunity and incentive to take advantage of this uncertainty by arguing on appeal that the district court’s claim construction in volved subsidiary findings of fact. At best, today’s holding will spawn costly—and, if the majority is correct about the frequency with which these evidentiary determinations make a difference, meritless—collateral litigation over the line between law and fact. We generally avoid any rule of judicial administration that “results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult ques tions that have no effect on the outcome of the case,” Pear- and there is no reason to embrace one here. But I fear worse: that today’s decision will result in fewer claim construction decisions receiving precedential effect, thereby injecting uncertainty into the world of invention and innovation. In short, the majority’s rule finds no support in either the historical understanding of “findings of fact” or consid erations of policy that have served as our guide when we have been confronted with a difficult question of fact-law classification. I would not adopt it. III The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo not only the District Court’s claim construction, but also its holding that the claims were sufficiently definite to satisfy 35 U.S. C. ¶2 (2006 ed.). I would hold that the Court of Appeals correctly treated the indefiniteness inquiry as a question of law because it depends entirely on claim 16 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. v. SANDOZ, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting construction. “[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable cer tainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the in vention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 1). This standard falls somewhere between a notice requirement and a prohibi tion on ambiguity. See at – (slip op., at 9–11). Determining whether a claim is indefinite is thus akin to other legal inquiries commonly performed in the course of interpreting written instruments. See, e.g., Mayo Founda- tion for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2011) ); 11 Williston at (“The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court”). Thus, a holding that a patent satisfies the definiteness |
Justice Marshall | 1,991 | 15 | dissenting | Florida v. Jimeno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112595/florida-v-jimeno/ | The question in this case is whether an individual's general consent to a search of the interior of his car for narcotics should reasonably be understood as consent to a search of closed containers inside the car. Nothing in today's opinion dispels my belief that the two are not one and the same from the consenting individual's standpoint. Consequently, an individual's consent to a search of the interior of his car should not be understood to authorize a search of closed containers inside the car. I dissent. *253 In my view, analysis of this question must start by identifying the differing expectations of privacy that attach to cars and closed containers. It is well established that an individual has but a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of his car. A car ordinarily is not used as a residence or repository for one's personal effects, and its passengers and contents are generally exposed to public view. See Moreover, cars "are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls," South and may be seized by the police when necessary to protect public safety or to facilitate the flow of traffic, see at -369. In contrast, it is equally well established that an individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container. See, e. g., United Luggage, handbags, paper bags, and other containers are common repositories for one's papers and effects, and the protection of these items from state intrusion lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. U. S. Const., Amdt. 4 ("The right of the people to be secure in their papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). By placing his possessions inside a container, an individual manifests an intent that his possessions be "preserve[d] as private," and thus kept "free from public examination," United The distinct privacy expectations that a person has in a car as opposed to a closed container do not merge when the individual uses his car to transport the container. In this situation, the individual still retains a heightened expectation of privacy in the container. See ; Nor does an individual's heightened expectation of privacy turn on the type of container *254 in which he stores his possessions. Notwithstanding the majority's suggestion to the contrary, see ante, at 251-252, this Court has soundly rejected any distinction between "worthy" containers, like locked briefcases, and "unworthy" containers, like paper bags. "Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were |
Justice Marshall | 1,991 | 15 | dissenting | Florida v. Jimeno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112595/florida-v-jimeno/ | paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case." United Because an individual's expectation of privacy in a container is distinct from, and far greater than, his expectation of privacy in the interior of his car, it follows that an individual's consent to a search of the interior of his car cannot necessarily be understood as extending to containers in the car. At the very least, general consent to search the car is ambiguous with respect to containers found inside the car. In my view, the independent and divisible nature of the privacy interests in cars and containers mandates that a police officer who wishes to search a suspicious container found during a consensual automobile search obtain additional consent to search the container. If the driver intended to authorize search of the container, he will say so; if not, then he will say no.[*] The only objection that the police could have to such a *255 rule is that it would prevent them from exploiting the ignorance of a citizen who simply did not anticipate that his consent to search the car would be understood to authorize the police to rummage through his packages. According to the majority, it nonetheless is reasonable for a police officer to construe generalized consent to search an automobile for narcotics as extending to closed containers, because "[a] reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container." Ante, at 251. This is an interesting contention. By the same logic a person who consents to a search of the car from the driver's seat could also be deemed to consent to a search of his person or indeed of his body cavities, since a reasonable person may be expected to know that drug couriers frequently store their contraband on their persons or in their body cavities. I suppose (and hope) that even the majority would reject this conclusion, for a person who consents to the search of his car for drugs certainly does not consent to a search of |
Justice Marshall | 1,991 | 15 | dissenting | Florida v. Jimeno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112595/florida-v-jimeno/ | for drugs certainly does not consent to a search of things other than his car for drugs. But this example illustrates that if there is a reason for not treating a closed container as something "other than" the car in which it sits, the reason cannot be based on intuitions about where people carry drugs. The majority, however, never identifies a reason for conflating the distinct privacy expectations that a person has in a car and in closed containers. The majority also argues that the police should not be required to secure specific consent to search a closed container, because "`[t]he community has a real interest in encouraging consent.'" Ante, at 252, quoting I find this rationalization equally unsatisfactory. If anything, a rule that permits the police to construe a consent to search more broadly than it may have been intended would discourage individuals from consenting to searches of their cars. Apparently, the majority's real concern is that if the police were required to ask for additional consent to search a closed container found during the *256 consensual search of an automobile, an individual who did not mean to authorize such additional searching would have an opportunity to say no. In essence, then, the majority is claiming that "the community has a real interest" not in encouraging citizens to consent to investigatory efforts of their law enforcement agents, but rather in encouraging individuals to be duped by them. This is not the community that the Fourth Amendment contemplates. Almost 20 years ago, this Court held that an individual could validly "consent" to a searchor, in other words, waive his right to be free from an otherwise unlawful searchwithout being told that he had the right to withhold his consent. See In Schneckloth, as in this case, the Court cited the practical interests in efficacious law enforcement as the basis for not requiring the police to take meaningful steps to establish the basis of an individual's consent. I dissented in Schneckloth, and what I wrote in that case applies with equal force here. "I must conclude, with some reluctance, that when the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would be "practical" for the police to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean that more criminals will be apprehended, even though the constitutional rights of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110903/metropolitan-edison-co-v-people-against-nuclear-energy/ | The issue in these cases is whether petitioner Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) complied with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 4321 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V) (NEPA), when it considered whether to permit petitioner Metropolitan Edison Co. to resume operation of the Three Mile Island Unit 1 nuclear powerplant (TMI-1). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NRC improperly failed to consider whether the risk of an accident at TMI-1 might cause harm to the psychological health and community well-being of residents of the surrounding area. 219 U. S. App. D. C. 358, We reverse. Metropolitan owns two nuclear powerplants at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pa. Both of these plants were licensed by the NRC after extensive proceedings, which included preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS's). On March 28, TMI-1 was not operating; it had been shut down for refueling. TMI-2 was operating, and it suffered a serious accident that damaged the reactor.[1] Although, as it turned out, no dangerous radiation was released, *769 the accident caused widespread concern. The Governor of Pennsylvania recommended an evacuation of all pregnant women and small children, and many area residents did leave their homes for several days. After the accident, the NRC ordered Metropolitan to keep TMI-1 shut down until it had an opportunity to determine whether the plant could be operated safely. The NRC then published a notice of hearing specifying several safety-related issues for consideration. Metropolitan Edison Co., 10 N. R. C. 141 The notice stated that the Commission had not determined whether to consider psychological harm or other indirect effects of the accident or of renewed operation of TMI-1. It invited interested parties to submit briefs on this issue. Respondent People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) intervened and responded to this invitation. PANE is an association of residents of the Harrisburg area who are opposed to further operation of either TMI reactor. PANE contended that restarting TMI-1 would cause both severe psychological health damage to persons living in the vicinity, and serious damage to the stability, cohesiveness, and well-being of the neighboring communities.[2] *770 The NRC decided not to take evidence concerning PANE's contentions. Metropolitan Edison Co., 12 N. R. C. 607 (1980); Metropolitan Edison Co., 14 N. R. C. 593 (1981).[3] PANE filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, contending that both NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), require the NRC to address its contentions.[4] Metropolitan intervened |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110903/metropolitan-edison-co-v-people-against-nuclear-energy/ | V), require the NRC to address its contentions.[4] Metropolitan intervened on the side of the NRC. *771 The Court of Appeals concluded that the Atomic Energy Act does not require the NRC to address PANE's contentions. 219 U. S. App. D. C., at -3. It did find, however, that NEPA requires the NRC to evaluate "the potential psychological health effects of operating" TMI-1 which have arisen since the original EIS was prepared. It also held that, if the NRC finds that significant new circumstances or information exist on this subject, it shall prepare a "supplemental [EIS] which considers not only the effects on psychological health but also effects on the well-being of the communities surrounding Three Mile Island." -372, -236. We granted certiorari.[5] All the parties agree that effects on human health can be cognizable under NEPA, and that human health may include psychological health. The Court of Appeals thought these propositions were enough to complete a syllogism that disposes of the case: NEPA requires agencies to consider effects on health. An effect on psychological health is an effect on health. Therefore, NEPA requires agencies to consider the effects on psychological health asserted by PANE. See 219 U. S. App. D. C., at PANE, using similar reasoning, contends that because the psychological health damage to its members would be caused by a change in the environment (renewed operation of TMI-1), NEPA requires the NRC to consider that damage. See Brief for *772 Respondents 23. Although these arguments are appealing at first glance, we believe they skip over an essential step in the analysis. They do not consider the closeness of the relationship between the change in the environment and the "effect" at issue. Section 102(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S. C. 4332(C), directs all federal agencies to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on "(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, [and] "(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented" To paraphrase the statutory language in light of the facts of this case, where an agency action significantly affects the quality of the human environment, the agency must evaluate the "environmental impact" and any unavoidable adverse environmental effects of its proposal. The theme of 102 is sounded by the adjective "environmental": NEPA does not require the agency to assess every impact or effect of its proposed action, but only the impact or effect on the environment. If we were |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110903/metropolitan-edison-co-v-people-against-nuclear-energy/ | the impact or effect on the environment. If we were to seize the word "environmental" out of its context and give it the broadest possible definition, the words "adverse environmental effects" might embrace virtually any consequence of a governmental action that someone thought "adverse." But we think the context of the statute shows that Congress was talking about the physical environment the world around us, so to speak. NEPA was designed to promote human welfare by alerting governmental actors to the effect of their proposed actions on the physical environment. The statements of two principal sponsors of NEPA, explaining to their colleagues the Conference Report on the bill that was ultimately enacted, illustrate this point: *773 "What is involved [in NEPA] is a congressional declaration that we do not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate actions which do irreparable damage to the air, land and water which support life on earth." 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson) (emphasis supplied). "[W]e can now move forward to preserve and enhance our air, aquatic, and terrestrial environments to carry out the policies and goals set forth in the bill to provide each citizen of this great country a healthful environment." (emphasis supplied). Thus, although NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare,[6] these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of protecting the physical environment. To determine whether 102 requires consideration of a particular effect, we must look at the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical environment caused by the major federal action at issue. For example, if the Department of Health and Human Services were to implement extremely stringent requirements for hospitals and nursing homes receiving federal funds, many perfectly adequate hospitals and homes might be forced out of existence. The remaining facilities might be so limited or so expensive that *774 many ill people would be unable to afford medical care and would suffer severe health damage. Nonetheless, NEPA would not require the Department to prepare an EIS evaluating that health damage because it would not be proximately related to a change in the physical environment. Some effects that are "caused by" a change in the physical environment in the sense of "but for" causation, will nonetheless not fall within 102 because the causal chain is too attenuated. For example, residents of the Harrisburg area have relatives in other parts of the country. Renewed |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110903/metropolitan-edison-co-v-people-against-nuclear-energy/ | area have relatives in other parts of the country. Renewed operation of TMI-1 may well cause psychological health problems for these people. They may suffer "anxiety, tension and fear, a sense of helplessness," and accompanying physical disorders, n. 2, because of the risk that their relatives may be harmed in a nuclear accident. However, this harm is simply too remote from the physical environment to justify requiring the NRC to evaluate the psychological health damage to these people that may be caused by renewed operation of TMI-1. Our understanding of the congressional concerns that led to the enactment of NEPA suggests that the terms "environmental effect" and "environmental impact" in 102 be read to include a requirement of a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical environment and the effect at issue. This requirement is like the familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law. See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts, ch. 7 (4th ed. 1971).[7] The issue before us, then, is how to give content to this requirement. This is a question of first impression in this Court. *775 The federal action that affects the environment in this case is permitting renewed operation of TMI-1.[8] The direct effects on the environment of this action include release of low-level radiation, increased fog in the Harrisburg area (caused by operation of the plant's cooling towers), and the release of warm water into the Susquehanna River. The NRC has considered each of these effects in its EIS, and again in the EIA. See App. 51-58. Another effect of renewed operation is a risk of a nuclear accident. The NRC has also considered this effect.[9] See PANE argues that the psychological health damage it alleges "will flow directly from the risk of [a nuclear] accident." Brief for Respondents 23. But a risk of an accident is not an effect on the physical environment. A risk is, by definition, unrealized in the physical world. In a causal chain from renewed operation of TMI-1 to psychological health damage, the element of risk and its perception by PANE's members are necessary middle links.[10] We believe that the element of risk lengthens the causal chain beyond the reach of NEPA. Risk is a pervasive element of modern life; to say more would belabor the obvious. Many of the risks we face are generated by modern technology, which brings both the possibility of major accidents and opportunities for tremendous achievements. Medical experts apparently agree that risk *776 can generate stress in human beings, which in turn may rise to the level of serious health |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110903/metropolitan-edison-co-v-people-against-nuclear-energy/ | in turn may rise to the level of serious health damage. For this reason, among many others, the question whether the gains from any technological advance are worth its attendant risks may be an important public policy issue. Nonetheless, it is quite different from the question whether the same gains are worth a given level of alteration of our physical environment or depletion of our natural resources. The latter question rather than the former is the central concern of NEPA. Time and resources are simply too limited for us to believe that Congress intended to extend NEPA as far as the Court of Appeals has taken it. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power The scope of the agency's inquiries must remain manageable if NEPA's goal of "insur[ing] a fully informed and well-considered decision," is to be accomplished. If contentions of psychological health damage caused by risk were cognizable under NEPA, agencies would, at the very least, be obliged to expend considerable resources developing psychiatric expertise that is not otherwise relevant to their congressionally assigned functions. The available resources may be spread so thin that agencies are unable adequately to pursue protection of the physical environment and natural resources. As we said in another context in United "[w]e cannot attribute to Congress the intention to open the door to such obvious incongruities and undesirable possibilities." This case bears strong resemblance to other cases in which plaintiffs have sought to require agencies to evaluate the risk of crime from the operation of a jail or other public facility in their neighborhood. See, e. g., Como-Falcon Coalition, ; Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners 524 F.2d 2 ; First National Bank of The plaintiffs in these cases could have alleged *777 that the risk of crime (or their dislike of the occupants of the facility) would cause severe psychological health damage.[11] The operation of the facility is an event in the physical environment, but the psychological health damage to neighboring residents resulting from unrealized risks of crime is too far removed from that event to be covered by NEPA. The psychological health damage alleged by PANE is no closer to an event in the environment or to environmental concerns. The Court of Appeals thought that PANE's contentions are qualitatively different from the harm at issue in the cases just described. It thought PANE raised an issue of health damage, while those cases presented questions of fear or policy disagreement. We do not believe this line is so easily drawn. Anyone who fears or dislikes a project may find himself suffering from "anxiety, tension[,] fear, [and] a |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110903/metropolitan-edison-co-v-people-against-nuclear-energy/ | may find himself suffering from "anxiety, tension[,] fear, [and] a sense of helplessness." N. 2, Neither the language nor the history of NEPA suggests that it was intended to give citizens a general opportunity to air their policy objections to proposed federal actions. The political process, and not NEPA, provides the appropriate forum in which to air policy disagreements.[12] We do not mean to denigrate the fears of PANE's members, or to suggest that the psychological health damage they fear could not, in fact, occur. Nonetheless, it is difficult for us to see the differences between someone who dislikes a *778 government decision so much that he suffers anxiety and stress, someone who fears the effects of that decision so much that he suffers similar anxiety and stress, and someone who suffers anxiety and stress that "flow directly," Brief for Respondents 23, from the risks associated with the same decision. It would be extraordinarily difficult for agencies to differentiate between "genuine" claims of psychological health damage and claims that are grounded solely in disagreement with a democratically adopted policy. Until Congress provides a more explicit statutory instruction than NEPA now contains, we do not think agencies are obliged to undertake the inquiry. See Maryland National Capital Park & Planning The Court of Appeals' opinion seems at one point to acknowledge the force of these arguments, 219 U. S. App. D. C., at but seeks to distinguish the situation suggested by the related cases. First, the Court of Appeals thought the harm alleged by PANE is far more severe than the harm alleged in other cases. It thought the severity of the harm is relevant to whether NEPA requires consideration of an effect. This cannot be the case. NEPA addresses environmental effects of federal actions. The gravity of harm does not change its character.[13] If a harm does not have a sufficiently close connection to the physical environment, NEPA does not apply. Second, the Court of Appeals noted that PANE's claim was made "in the wake of a unique and traumatic nuclear accident." We do not understand how the accident at TMI-2 transforms PANE's contentions into "environmental effects." The Court of Appeals "cannot believe that the psychological aftermath of the March accident falls outside" *779 NEPA. On the contrary, NEPA is not directed at the effects of past accidents and does not create a remedial scheme for past federal actions. It was enacted to require agencies to assess the future effects of future actions. There is nothing in the language or the history of NEPA to suggest that its scope should |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Simopoulos v. Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110970/simopoulos-v-virginia/ | We have considered today mandatory hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. 41, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, p. 47. The principal issue here is whether Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitutional. I Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In November 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, Va., at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls Church, Va. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of cardiac/ respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant sought any license for it. P. M. was a 17-year-old high school student when she went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that P. M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but never advised her parents of her decision. Two days later, P. M. returned to the clinic with her boyfriend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline solution. P. M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. Appellant gave P. M. a prescription for an analgesic and a "Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had *509 undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also advised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. Although P. M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. P. M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left the fetus, followup instructions, and pain medication in the wastebasket at the motel. Her boyfriend took her home. Police found the fetus later that day and began an investigation.[1] Appellant was indicted[2] for unlawfully performing an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Simopoulos v. Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110970/simopoulos-v-virginia/ | licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, and now affirm. II Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends that Va. Code 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his conviction unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by United ; and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as required by The authoritative construction of 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a defense. See 277 S. E. 2d, Appellant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this allegation. See Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See ; Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See -1070, 277 S. E. 2d, -201. III We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health *511 of the mother" that becomes " `compelling' at approximately the end of the first trimester." See City of Akron, ante, at 428. This interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See Appellant argues, however, that Virginia prohibits all nonhospital second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional challenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization requirement differs significantly from the hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. A In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Simopoulos v. Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110970/simopoulos-v-virginia/ | performed during the second trimester. As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under Virginia law.[3] Virginia law does not, however, permit a *512 physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 18.2-73 The Virginia abortion statute itself does not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in Va. Code 32.1-123.1 (1979),[4] that defines "hospital" to include "outpatient hospitals."[5] Section 20.2.11 of the *513 Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (regulations)[]*514 defines "outpatient hospitals" in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of surgical procedures on outpatients"[7] and provides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics.[8] Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion *515 may be performed in an outpatient surgical hospital provided that facility has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categories. The first grouping relates to organization, management, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 40.3 ; see also 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manual, 43.2, an administrative officer, 40., a licensed physician who must supervise clinical services and perform surgical procedures, 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," 50.2.1. There are also construction requirements that set forth standards for the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, *51 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, and general building, 50.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 52.4. The final group of regulations relates to patient care services. Most of these set the requirements for various services that the facility may offer, such as anesthesia, 43.1, laboratory, 43.1, 4.1.3, 4.1.4, and pathology, 43.3, 4.2.4. Some of the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12. There are also guidelines on medical records, 43.7, preoperative admission, 43.8, and postoperative recovery, 43.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emergency services |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Simopoulos v. Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110970/simopoulos-v-virginia/ | postoperative recovery, 43.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emergency services and evacuation planning. 43.4.1, 43.5. B It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hospitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 431-432, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 481. In those cases, we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 437. The requirements at issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 481. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester *517 abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in which such abortions are performed. On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Public Health Association (APHA) (Resolution No. 7907), although recognizing "that greater use of the Dilatation and Evacuation procedure makes it possible to perform the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 1th week after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979). The medical profession has not thought that a State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services should meet the same standards of care as those recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 See also Indeed, the medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Simopoulos v. Virginia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110970/simopoulos-v-virginia/ | recommended for hospitals." We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the State's interest in protecting health.[9] His challenge *518 throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals. In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in substance from those reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases.[10] At the same time, however, appellant took the position both before the Virginia courts and this Court that a state licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional.[11] We can only assume that by continuing to challenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement appellant either views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization requirement that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hospitalization requirement. Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and the history of their adoption, see n. we see no reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon *519 proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe,[12] As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong with the physician and the patient. IV The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is Affirmed. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Locke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111403/united-states-v-locke/ | I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. I write separately only because under the special circumstances of this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Congress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in believing that Congress intended to require filings on or before the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statutory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional requirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear and definite notice of what they must do to protect their existing property interests. As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 86, the Government since the 19th century has encouraged its citizens to discover and develop certain minerals on the public lands. Under the general mining laws, 30 U.S. C. 22 et seq., an individual who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive possession *113 of the land for mining purposes and may extract and sell minerals he finds there without paying a royalty to the Federal Government. 26. After making a valuable mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim so long as he performs $100 worth of assessment work each year. 28. If he performs certain additional conditions, the claimant may patent the claim for a nominal sum and thereby obtain further rights over the land and minerals. See 29. Until recently, there were no federal recordation requirements. Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S. C. 1744.[1] This provision required existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain them. More specifically, it required that "within the three-year period following October 21, 1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter," 1744(a), claimholders file with *114 the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assessment work, or a special form, 1744(a)(1) and (2). Failure to make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing was to "be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim" 1744(c). Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of 10 unpatented mining claims on federal land in Nevada. Appellees' predecessors located these claims in 1952 and 1954, and appellees have, since they purchased the claims in 1960, earned their livelihood by producing gravel and other building materials from them. From 1960 to the present, they have produced approximately $4 million worth of materials. During the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Locke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111403/united-states-v-locke/ | million worth of materials. During the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and other materials worth more than $1 million. In no sense were their claims stale. The Lockes fully complied with 314's initial recordation requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October 19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the subsequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the Ely, Nevada, office of the BLM. There she inquired into how and when they should file the assessment notice and was told, among other things, that the documents should be filed at the Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." Following this advice, the Lockes hand-delivered their documents at the Reno office on that date. On April 4, 1981, they received notice from the BLM that their mining claims were "abandoned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they had filed on, rather than prior to, December 31.[2] It is this 1-day difference *115 in good-faith interpretation of the statutory deadline that gives rise to the present controversy. JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of circumstances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress drafted 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that (i) the section does not clearly describe what must be filed, let alone when it must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the deadline in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR 3833.2-1(a)(1) (1984), indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory deadline confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requiring filing "on or before December 31"; (iv) BLM, charged with enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and (v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 123. As JUSTICE STEVENS also states, these facts, particularly the last, suggest not only that Congress drafted 314 inartfully but also that Congress may actually have intended to require filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31. This is certainly the more reasonable interpretation of congressional intent and is consistent with all the policies of the Act. I do not believe, however, that given the special circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress actually intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power to |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | dissenting | United States v. Locke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111403/united-states-v-locke/ | Takings Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 103-108. In Texaco, we identified one of the most important of these limitations when we stated that "the State has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a] *116 property right on the performance of reasonable conditions." ; accord, Furthermore, conditions, like those here, imposed after a property interest is created must also meet due process standards. These standards require, among other things, that there be no question as to what actions an individual must take to protect his interests. Texaco, Together the Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily. In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" creates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing period ends.[3] Given the natural tendency to interpret this phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty *117 and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The statement in at least one of the Government's own publications that filing was required "on or before December 31," Department of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a property interest because a property holder reasonably believed that under the statute he had an additional day to satisfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than terminating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an unreasonable amount of time. Cf. ; 95 U.S. 8, Although the latter may rest on impossibility, the former rests on good-faith performance a day late of what easily could have been performed the day before. Neither serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of property rights to the State. I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the property holder with more certainty and definiteness than did 314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements imposed after a property interest is created. Given the statutory uncertainty here, I would find a forfeiture imposed for filing on December 31 to be invalid.[4] I accordingly dissent. |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | dissenting | Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112684/lechmere-inc-v-nlrb/ | "We will uphold a Board rule so long as it is rational and consistent with the Act, even if we would have formulated a different rule had we sat on the Board." The judicial role is narrow: The Board's application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, must be enforced. Beth Israel In the Court said that where nonemployee union representatives seek access to the employer's parking lot for the purpose of communicating with employees, the employer's property rights and the organizational rights of employees must be "[a]ccommodat[ed] with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." Although it said that it was slow to overturn an administrative decision, the Court disagreed with the balance the Board had struck in granting access to the union because the Board had failed to recognize that access by nonemployees required a different accommodation than where employees are involved. at -113. The Court went on to say that "when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property *5 has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize." Later the Court said: "The right of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others. Consequently, if the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, the employer must allow the union to approach his employees on his property." The Court went on to hold that no such conditions were shown in the records of the cases before it. In the case before us, the Court holds that Babcock itself stated the correct accommodation between property and organizational rights; it interprets that case as construing 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to contain a general rule forbidding third-party access, subject only to a limited exception where the union demonstrates that the location of the employer's place of business and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable efforts to communicate with them. The Court refuses to enforce the Board's order in this case, which rested on its prior decision in Jean Country, 291 N. L. R. B. 11 (1988), because, in the Court's view, Jean Country revealed the that Board misunderstood the basic holding in Babcock, as well as the |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | dissenting | Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112684/lechmere-inc-v-nlrb/ | misunderstood the basic holding in Babcock, as well as the narrowness of the exception to the general rule announced in that case. For several reasons, the Court errs in this case. First, that Babcock stated that inaccessibility would be a reason to grant access does not indicate that there would be no other circumstance that would warrant entry to the employer's parking lot and would satisfy the Court's admonition that accommodation must be made with as little destruction of property rights as is consistent with the right of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others. Of course the union must show that its "reasonable efforts," *543 without access, will not permit proper communication with employees. But I cannot believe that the Court in Babcock intended to confine the reach of such general considerations to the single circumstance that the Court now seizes upon. If the Court in Babcock indicated that nonemployee access to a logging camp would be required, it did not say that only in such situations could nonemployee access be permitted. Nor did Babcock require the Board to ignore the substantial difference between the entirely private parking lot of a secluded manufacturing plant and a shopping center lot which is open to the public without substantial limitation. Nor indeed did Babcock indicate that the Board could not consider the fact that employees' residences are scattered throughout a major metropolitan area; Babcock itself relied on the fact that the employees in that case lived in a compact area which made them easily accessible. Moreover, the Court in Babcock recognized that actual communication with nonemployee organizers, not mere notice that an organizing campaign exists, is necessary to vindicate 7 351 U.S., If employees are entitled to learn from others the advantages of self-organization, ib it is singularly unpersuasive to suggest that the union has sufficient access for this purpose by being able to hold up signs from a public grassy strip adjacent to the highway leading to the parking lot. Second, the Court's reading of Babcock is not the reading of that case reflected in later opinions of the Court. We have consistently declined to define the principle of Babcock as a general rule subject to narrow exceptions, and have instead repeatedly reaffirmed that the standard is a neutral and flexible rule of accommodation. In Central Hardware we explicitly stated that the "guiding principle" for adjusting conflicts between 7 rights and property rights enunciated in Babcock is that contained in its neutral "accommodation" language. gave this Court the * occasion to provide direct guidance to the Board on |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | dissenting | Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112684/lechmere-inc-v-nlrb/ | * occasion to provide direct guidance to the Board on this issue. In that case, we emphasized Babcock's necessity-toaccommodate admonition, pointed out the differences between Babcock and Hudgens, and left the balance to be struck by the Board. "The locus of that accommodation may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context. In each generic situation, the primary responsibility for making this accommodation must rest with the Board in the first instance." Hudgens did not purport to modify Babcock and surely indicates that Babcock announced a more flexible rule than the narrow, ironclad rule that the Court now extracts from that case. If Babcock means what the Court says it means, there is no doubt tension between that case and Hudgens. If that is so, Hudgens, as the later pronouncement on the question, issued as a directive to the Board, should be controlling.[*] *545 The majority today asserts that "[i]t is only where [reasonable alternative] access is infeasible that it becomes necessary and proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a second level, balancing the employees' and employers' " Ante, at 538. Our cases, however, are more consistent with the Jean Country view that reasonable alternatives are an important factor in finding the least destructive accommodation between 7 and property The majority's assertion to this effect notwithstanding, our cases do not require a prior showing regarding reasonable alternatives as a precondition to any inquiry balancing the two The majority can hardly fault the Board for a decision which "conflates two stages of the inquiry," ante, at 538, when no two-stage inquiry has been set forth by this Court. Third, and more fundamentally, Babcock is at odds with modern concepts of deference to an administrative agency charged with administering a statute. See Chevron U. S. A. When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, we ask first whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue. If it has not, we do not simply impose our own construction on the statute; rather, we determine if the agency's view is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Babcock did not ask if Congress had specifically spoken to the issue of access by third parties and did not purport to explain how the NLRA specifically dealt with what the access rule should be where third parties are concerned. If it had made such an inquiry, the only basis for finding statutory language that settled the issue would have been the language of |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | dissenting | Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112684/lechmere-inc-v-nlrb/ | that settled the issue would have been the language of 7, which speaks only of the rights of employees; i. e., the Court might have found that 7 extends no access rights at all to union representatives. But Babcock itself recognized that *546 employees have a right to learn from others about 351 U.S., and itself recognized that in some circumstances, 7 and 8 required the employer to grant the union access to parking lots. So have later Courts, and so does the Court today. That being the case, the Babcock Court should have recognized that the Board's construction of the statute was a permissible one and deferred to its judgment. Instead, the Court simply announced that as far as access is concerned, third parties must be treated less favorably than employees. Furthermore, after issuing a construction of the statute different from that of the Board, rather than remanding to the Board to determine how third parties should be dealt with, the Babcock Court essentially took over the agency's job, not only by detailing how union organizer access should be determined but also by announcing that the records before it did not contain facts that would satisfy the newly coined access rule. Had a case like Babcock been first presented for decision under the law governing in 1991, I am quite sure that we would have deferred to the Board, or at least attempted to find sounder ground for not doing so. Furthermore, had the Board ruled that third parties must be treated differently than employees and held them to the standard that the Court now says Babcock mandated, it is clear enough that we also would have accepted that construction of the statute. But it is also clear, at least to me, that if the Board later reworked that rule in the manner of Jean Country, we would also accept the Board's change of mind. See 494 U. S., at ; NLRB v. J. Weingarten, As it is, the Court's decision fails to recognize that Babcock is at odds with the current law of deference to administrative agencies and compounds that error by adopting the substantive approach Babcock applied lock, stock, and barrel. And unnecessarily so, for, as indicated above, Babcock certainly *547 does not require the reading the Court gives it today, and in any event later cases have put a gloss on Babcock that the Court should recognize. Finally, the majority commits a concluding error in its application of the outdated standard of Babcock to review the Board's conclusion that there were no reasonable alternative means available |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | dissenting | Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112684/lechmere-inc-v-nlrb/ | Board's conclusion that there were no reasonable alternative means available to the union. Unless the Court today proposes to turn back time in the law of judicial deference to administrative agencies, the proper standard for judicial review of the Board's rulings is no longer for "`erroneous legal foundations,'" ante, at 539, but for rationality and consistency with the statute. Litton Financial Printing U.S. 190 ; Fall River Dyeing & Finishing ; ; Beth Israel 437 U. S., at "The judicial role is narrow: the Board's application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, must be enforced." The Board's conclusion as to reasonable alternatives in this case was supported by evidence in the record. Even if the majority cannot defer to that application, because of the depth of its objections to the rule applied by the Board, it should remand to the Board for a decision under the rule it arrives at today, rather than sitting in the place Congress has assigned to the Board. The more basic legal error of the majority today, like that of the Court of Appeals in Chevron, is to adopt a static judicial construction of the statute when Congress has not commanded that construction. 467 U.S., By leaving open the question of how 7 and private property rights were to be accommodated under the NLRA, Congress delegated authority over that issue to the Board, and a court should not substitute its own judgment for a reasonable construction by the Board. *548 Under the law that governs today, it is Babcock that rests on questionable legal foundations. The Board's decision in Jean Country, by contrast, is both rational and consistent with the governing statute. The Court should therefore defer to the Board, rather than resurrecting and extending the reach of a decision which embodies principles which the law has long since passed by. It is evident, therefore, that, in my view, the Court should defer to the Board's decision in Jean Country and its application of Jean Country in this case. With all due respect, I dissent. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | Federal law vests in the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to make emergency loans to farmers who suffer economic losses as a result of a natural disaster. See Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (Act), 321-330, as amended, 7 U.S. C. 1961-1971. *928 Pursuant to an agency rule, the Secretary required loan applicants suffering from disasters occurring between December 26, 1972, and April 20, 1973, to file their applications by April 2, 1974. (1974) (later codified at (a) (1975)). That rule embodied a statutory command to keep the loan program open at least until that date. Stat. 1025. The question presented is whether a federal court has the remedial authority to reopen this long-terminated loan program on the basis of its finding that the Secretary, in alleged violation of another rule, failed adequately to notify affected farmers of the program's availability and terms. I In early April 1973 torrential rains struck 13 counties in the northern part of Florida. Initial estimates, which were later sharply reduced, projected that resulting crop and property losses would be in excess of $3 million. In light of the scope of these anticipated losses, on May 26, 1973, President Nixon declared the region a major disaster area. See Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Stat. 1744 (repealed or transferred 1974). As a result of this declaration, the Secretary of Agriculture came under a statutory obligation to "make loans" to qualifying individuals in the region. 7 U.S. C. 1961(b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). At the time of the declaration, the federal disaster relief program, like much of the rest of the Federal Government, had become embroiled in a budgetary dispute between the Executive and Legislative Branches. In 1972, Congress had passed Stat. 554, which authorized emergency loans under terms far more generous than those available under later versions of the Act. Under the 1972 law as implemented by the Secretary, loans carried a 1% interest rate and were not conditioned upon the unavailability of alternative sources of credit. In addition, the Secretary was *929 directed to forgive outright up to $5,000 of the principal of the loan. On December 27, 1972, as part of a larger, administrationwide effort to control what were viewed as excessive congressional appropriations, the Secretary directed that regional Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) officials effectively cease processing loan applications. See generally ; Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Committee on Government Operations of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 532 Aware that the "forgiveness features |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 532 Aware that the "forgiveness features and low interest rates provided for by " had contributed to the unilateral executive decision to curtail the program, Congress attempted to resolve the crisis by repealing those provisions. S. Rep. No. 93-85, p. 1 Stat. 24, which became effective on April 20, 1973, set the interest rate on emergency loans at 5%, limited the availability of loans to those unable to obtain credit from other sources, and eliminated entirely the provision that had previously allowed for cancellation of a portion of the principal. A grandfather clause provided that the terms of the earlier act, would remain applicable to disasters designated between January 1 and December 27, 1972. Left unclear, however, was the status of disasters occurring during the 4-month period between December 27, 1972, and April 20, 1973, the effective date of Congress resolved this uncertainty by passing the provision at the center of this case. Section 4 of the new Act provided that, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of " loans "with respect to natural disasters which occurred" during this interim period would be governed by the more generous terms of In addition, 10(c) provided that the deadline for applying for a loan would be extended 90 days beyond the date of the enactment *930 of This 90-day extension supplanted the established regulatory policy of the Secretary to accept loan applications for crop losses only if filed within nine months of the formal disaster declaration. (For physical losses the deadline was 60 days.) According to the Conference Report, the purpose of the extension was to make sure that the FmHA's "administratively set deadlines" took into account the confusion among farmers concerning the numerous changes in federal disaster relief law in the recent past. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-363, p. 6 The bill was signed into law on January 2, 1974. Thus, the congressionally mandated 90-day period for loans under expired on April 2, 1974. The Florida flood coincided with this period of confusion in the administration of federal disaster relief. Between May 26, 1973 (the date the disaster was declared), and January 2, 1974 (the date became law), the loan program was administered pursuant to the terms of Accordingly, during this initial loan period, farmers had nine months, or until February 26, 1974, to submit applications for emergency loans. At the time of the May 26, 1973, Presidential disaster declaration, and throughout the initial loan period, FmHA rules required the agency to follow certain procedures designed to notify potential borrowers of the availability of disaster relief. 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1) In |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | of the availability of disaster relief. 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1) In addition to a general obligation to "make such public announcements as appear appropriate," the regulations required the FmHA County Supervisor to inform various local officials and "agricultural lenders" of "the assistance available under [the] program." [1] It is undisputed that during the initial loan period no applications were filed. *931 On February 15, 1974, approximately six weeks after the enactment of the FmHA issued instructions to its staff concerning the implementation of the new emergency loan program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary published these instructions without material change in the Federal Register.[2] (1974) (later codified at 7 CFR 1832.81-1832.92 (1975)). The Federal Register publication set out in detail the terms and conditions of the new program, including the 1% interest rate, the $5,000 forgiveness provision, and the absence of any requirement that the applicant demonstrate the unavailability of other credit. (1974). The regulation also specified that "the termination date for acceptance of applications will be April 2, 1974." Also included in the staff instructions were directions that "State Directors and County Supervisors inform the news media, including newspapers, radio, and television in the affected counties of the provisions of P. L. 93-237." App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a (later published as 1832.82(a) of the "Special Emergency Loan Policies Implementing Applicable Provisions of " (1974)). Attached to the instructions was a suggested news *932 release.[3] App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a-51a. The release explained that farmers who had not yet received an emergency loan could apply for such a loan at the local FmHA office. Although not setting out the details of the new program, the model release did state that "loan applications will be taken under the terms of a new law (P. L. 93-237) enacted January 2, 1974." at 51a. Consistent with these instructions, the State FmHA director forwarded the sample news release to local agency offices. Those offices in turn sent copies to the local media, and, on at least two occasions, the releases were carried in newspapers in the north Florida disaster area. Record, Defendants' Exhibits 10-12. During this second loan period, that is, the period between the enactment of and the expiration of the 90-day deadline on April 2, 1974, no more than four farmers from the Florida disaster area applied for emergency loans. On August 19, 1976, respondent Payne, a north Florida farmer, instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Although he had received actual notice of the special 1974 emergency |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | he had received actual notice of the special 1974 emergency loan program, he sought to represent a class of approximately 2,500 farmers who had been eligible for loans under that program but, because of lack of notice, had not been aware of their eligibility. Contending that the FmHA's failure to publicize the program more fully violated the agency's own regulations and deprived them of property without due process of law, respondents sought an injunction directing the FmHA to reopen the loan program under the terms prevailing during the period "up to and including April 2, 1974." Complaint 6. The District Court certified the class and granted the requested relief.[4] In a variety of different ways, the court *933 found, the FmHA had failed to give adequate notice of the availability of loans. Most of the notice deficiencies specifically found by the court occurred during the initial loan period. It found, for example, that a number of farmers had left a June 1973 meeting with the incorrect impression that they were ineligible for loans, that FmHA officials knew of this misimpression, and that they failed to correct it. The court also found that press releases describing the terms of both the initial and new loan programs were incomplete. Finally, the court determined that, in violation of the specific requirements of 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1) the FmHA had failed to notify various state and county officials of the availability of emergency loans. The District Court did not allude to the specific notice requirements promulgated by the agency in connection with the implementation of See (1974) ( 1832.82(a)). Apparently assuming, however, that the earlier notice requirements contained in 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1) continued to apply during the new loan period, the court held that the agency's failure to adhere to these requirements required it to reopen the new loan program for a 60-day period extending from April 15, to June 15, In particular, the court premised the remedy on the FmHA's failure "to make such public announcements as appear appropriate." The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. It accepted the District Court's various findings concerning the FmHA's failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1) Those findings, however, "pertain[ed] only peripherally" to its decision to Regardless of any violations of 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1), the court concluded, the FmHA had failed to comply with its self-imposed obligation to notify the *934 public of the new loan program. The agency had announced in the Federal Register that it would "inform the news media. of the provisions |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | that it would "inform the news media. of the provisions of P. L. 93-237." (1974) ( 1832.82(a)). This it had not done, the court believed, because the news releases announcing the new loan program had failed to explain its generous terms. In view of the established proposition that agencies are duty bound to adhere to their own procedures, the court held, the most appropriate remedy for the violation was an injunction directing the agency to reopen the loan program. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals rejected the Government's argument that the April 2, 1974, application deadline was required by an Act of Congress and, therefore, beyond the authority of the District Court to expand. In the court's view, had merely required the FmHA to extend its administratively set deadline for 90 days. Nothing in the Act, however, divested the agency of discretion to extend it further. The Secretary sought review in this Court, and we granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment below, and remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in In Community Health Services, the Court held that, even assuming that principles of equitable estoppel ever applied against the Government, "a private party surely cannot prevail [on that theory] without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of estoppel are present." The Court of Appeals, observing that petitioners' liability was premised not on a theory of equitable estoppel but on the agency's failure to follow its own regulations, adhered to its prior views and reinstated its decision. Because the decision below exposes the Federal Government to substantial potential liability and because its reasoning implicates important questions about a federal court's *935 remedial powers, we again granted certiorari. We now reverse. II The Secretary's principal argument in this Court is that the remedy granted below shares all of the essential characteristics of an equitable estoppel against the Government and, accordingly, should be analyzed on those terms. We acknowledge that the practical effect of the injunction requiring the reopening of the loan program is to estop the FmHA from relying on the validly promulgated regulatory deadline as a basis for refusing to process further loan applications.[5] And we readily agree that, had respondents sought relief on an equitable estoppel theory, they could not prevail. As we observed only recently, even assuming that the Government is ever subject to estoppel, a "private party surely cannot prevail without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of an estoppel are present." An essential element of any estoppel is detrimental reliance on the adverse party's misrepresentations, at 59 (citing 3 |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | reliance on the adverse party's misrepresentations, at 59 (citing 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 805, p. 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941)); and neither the named plaintiffs, much less the 2,500 members of the class they represent, have sought to demonstrate such reliance. Moreover, the only misconduct specifically found by the District Court was the failure to give effective notice of information that, at least with respect to the second loan period, was concededly published in the Federal Register. Our cases leave no doubt that "failure to fully publicize the rights accorded" by an Act of Congress does not "give rise to an estoppel against the Government." INS See also ; Federal Crop Ins. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, however, respondents' inability to satisfy the stringent requirements of common-law estoppel does not independently decide the case. Indeed, beginning with their initial complaint and throughout the course of the litigation, respondents have never sought to rely on estoppel as a basis for recovery. Their theory instead, and the theory on which the lower courts granted the injunction, is that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S. C. 551 et seq., authorizes this kind of relief to remedy the FmHA's alleged failure to comply with its duly promulgated notice regulations. It may well be that some of the same concerns that limit the application of equitable estoppel against the Government bear on the appropriateness of awarding other remedies that have a close substantive resemblance to an estoppel. We reject, however, petitioners' suggestion that any remedy that can be analogized to an equitable estoppel is necessarily invalid, regardless of the source of the cause of action, unless the plaintiff succeeds in proving all the elements of common-law estoppel. Cf. Indeed, any other rule has the potential for divesting the courts of the remedial authority specifically envisioned by Congress under the APA. If, for example, a farmer had filed a loan application prior to the expiration of the loan deadline and a court determined that the denial of the application after the deadline's expiration was "arbitrary, capricious [and] not in accordance with law," 5 U.S. C. 706(2)(A), the appropriate remedy under the APA would be to direct that the application be granted or reconsidered. Although this would, in a sense, estop the Government from applying the deadline, we have never suggested that the applicant would be under an *937 obligation to satisfy the requirements of proving an equitable estoppel to obtain the relief specifically available under the APA. The question before us then is not whether the Secretary should be estopped from applying |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | is not whether the Secretary should be estopped from applying the deadline, but whether the relief afforded by the District Court was appropriate under the APA. Respondents contend that the notice regulations, having been promulgated pursuant to the Secretary's delegated rulemaking authority, had the force and effect of law and therefore were binding on the agency. To remedy this noncompliance, they suggest, the District Court had the authority under 5 U.S. C. 706 to "compe[l] `action unlawfully withheld' [notice] and `set aside agency action' [application of the deadline] found to be `without observance of procedures required by law.' " Brief for Respondents 21 (quoting 5 U.S. C. 706) (bracketed material in original). To prevail on this theory, respondents must clear at least three substantial hurdles. At the outset, not all agency publications are of binding force, ; and it remains to be shown that the notice provisions, which began life as unpublished staff instructions, are the kind of agency law the violation of which is remediable at all. Second, an agency's power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress. Thus, even assuming that left the Secretary some discretion to extend the 90-day deadline beyond April 2, 1974, it would hardly be an abuse of that discretion to refuse to do so many years after the disaster had receded if such an extension would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Finally, the "agency action" respondents seek to have set aside is the "application of the deadline." Yet, with the exception of respondent Payne, who clearly has no standing,[6] there is no *938 allegation that any member of the class has ever applied for a loan. Although the APA includes "failure to act" in its definition of reviewable agency action, 5 U.S. C. 551(13), it is far from clear that relief under the APA is appropriate when the allegedly aggrieved party has failed entirely to present its claim to the agency. Cf. We need not, however, definitively resolve any of these issues. Nor need we confront the Secretary's broader contention that it is in all instances inappropriate for a court, reviewing for agency compliance with the APA, to set aside one validly promulgated regulation to remedy an alleged violation of another entirely independent one. An essential predicate of the relief granted below is that the FmHA in fact failed to comply with its own rules. As we now explain, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the FmHA violated its self-imposed obligation to give notice of the loan program is insupportable. The Court of Appeals relied exclusively on the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | is insupportable. The Court of Appeals relied exclusively on the FmHA's purported violation of 1832.82(a), the new notice provision, to uphold the injunction directing the Secretary to reopen the loan program. Although the agency did issue press releases, the court reasoned, its failure to describe the generous terms of the new program breached its regulatory obligation to " `inform the news media of the provisions of P. L. No. 93-237.' " quoting (1974) This reasoning is demonstrably incorrect. itself said nothing at all about the availability of a reduced interest rate, the possibility of partial forgiveness of the loan principal, or the elimination of the requirement that credit be unavailable from other sources. It merely stated that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of " loans with respect to disasters occurring prior to April 20, 1973, would *939 be administered under Thus, the statement in the news release that "loan applications will be taken under the terms of a new law (P. L. 93-237) enacted January 2, 1974," though not a model of clarity, was no less informative than were the "provisions" of the Act the release was endeavoring to describe. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a; (a) (1975). Moreover, the Court of Appeals' holding runs roughshod over the established proposition that an agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference. United ; The publicity directive that was later codified at (a) (1975) was originally issued as a staff instruction designed to describe the procedures for implementing App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-49a. Accompanying the instruction was a sample press release identical in all pertinent respects to those sent to the media in the area of the Florida disaster. at 50a-51a. Because the suggested release obviously reflected the agency's contemporaneous understanding of the scope of the publicity directive, it is logically untenable to suggest that the agency violated the directive by issuing press releases modeled explicitly on the sample. The Court of Appeals specifically disclaimed any reliance on 7 CFR 1832.3(a)(1) the Secretary's previous publicity directive, to support its affirmance of the District Court's judgment. As they are entitled to do, however, respondents now defend that judgment on the alternative theory that the agency's violation of this earlier notice provision warranted the remedy of an injunction reopening the loan program. We find this theory no more supportable than that relied on by the Court of Appeals. As an initial matter, any violations of this regulation that occurred during the first loan period are plainly irrelevant. Starting with their complaint, and throughout the course of this lengthy litigation, respondents have sought |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | throughout the course of this lengthy litigation, respondents have sought to have the loan program reopened *940 under the more generous terms available under And such was the relief granted by the District Court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. As a simple matter of causation, any failure to inform respondents about the old loan program cannot support the remedy of requiring the FmHA to process loan applications under the "terms and benefits" available under the new one. Nor do we believe that any noncompliance with the terms of 7 CFR 1832.3 during the second loan period would justify the District Court's remedy.[7] Although the District Court did find that this provision had been violated during the initial loan period, it is far from clear from the face of its opinion that it found any such violations during the second period. Even assuming such findings, however, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the notice provisions of 7 CFR 1832.3 were no longer applicable during the period after the enactment of at least with respect to disasters declared prior to the date the new law came into force. See Emergency Disaster Loan Assn., v. Block, By its terms, 1832.3(a) requires only notice of the loan program in place at the time of the Presidential disaster declaration. See also 1832.92 (1975) (describing 1832.3 as *941 setting out procedures for reporting natural disaster designations). Accordingly, its plain language casts serious doubt on respondents' assumption that it was also intended to serve as a means of giving notice of midcourse changes in the terms of the loan program long after the disaster had been declared. Any ambiguity about the regulation's reach is dispelled by the history of itself. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Congress was acutely aware of confusion in the administration of the Nation's disaster relief laws when it enacted 714 F.2d, at 1516-1517. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-363, p. 6 A central objective of the new Act was to correct this confusion by clarifying the credit terms available during this period and by requiring the Secretary to extend the application deadline to compensate for prior "uncertain[ties]" in the law. Consistent with that objective, the Secretary announced in the Federal Register the new procedures the agency would follow to "implemen[t] applicable provisions of" (1974). These procedures, which included the notice provision later codified at (a), were designed to "supplemen[t] and modif[y]" the procedures that had been in place under the old regime, including 7 CFR 1832.3(a). While this language is ambiguous, the regulatory |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | majority | Lyng v. Payne | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111696/lyng-v-payne/ | 7 CFR 1832.3(a). While this language is ambiguous, the regulatory history strongly suggests that in adopting notice procedures specifically geared to the new law, the Secretary intended for those procedures to be the principal mechanism for spreading the word about in areas in which a disaster had already been declared. Aware of Congress' belief that prior efforts to implement the old program had failed, this history suggests, the Secretary sought to take a different tack to assure effective implementation of the new one notification of the media pursuant to 1832.82. This interpretation is confirmed by 1832.92, also adopted as part of the FmHA's efforts to implement 39 Fed. Reg. 7575 (1974). There, the Secretary specifically provided that for any "new" disaster designations, notice *942 should be given pursuant to 1832.3. There is no mention whatever of 1832.3 in the balance of the regulations dealing with disasters that had already been declared at the time the regulation was published. A fair inference from this omission is that for disasters, such as the Florida flood, that had already been declared at the time of the enactment of the Secretary intended that 1832.82(a), rather than 1832.3, provide the appropriate mechanism for notifying affected farmers about the new loan program. Accordingly, any failure to follow the old notice provisions during the second loan period was entirely consistent with the Secretary's intended approach and provides no permissible basis for ordering the new program reopened. III We conclude, therefore, that the lower courts erred in holding that the Secretary's conduct violated the only notice procedures relevant to the implementation of Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that reopening the loan program would have been an appropriate remedy had the relevant regulations been violated, awarding that relief was clearly improper in light of the FmHA's compliance with its own procedures. Nor can the relief be supported on the theory, not addressed by either court below, that inadequate notice of the loan program deprived respondents of property without due process of law. We have never held that applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Even on the assumption that they do, however, the notice published in the Federal Register, as well as that afforded by the Secretary in full compliance with his own procedures, was more than ample to satisfy any due process concerns. See 44 U.S. C. 1507 (Publication in *943 Federal Register "is sufficient to give notice of the contents of the document to a person |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,018 | 24 | concurring | Hughes v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503547/hughes-v-united-states/ | In this Court confronted the same question it definitively resolves today: whether criminal defendants who enter into plea agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) are eligible for sentencing reduc- tions under 18 U.S. C. ended in a 4–1–4 decision that left lower courts confused as to whether the plurality or the concurring opinion controlled. The plurality of four Justices in concluded that defendants who plead guilty pursuant to a so-called “Type-C agreement” may be eligible for a sentence re- duction under because Type-C sentences are “based on the Guidelines” “to whatever extent the sen- tencing range in question was a relevant part of the an- alytic framework the judge used to determine the sen- tence or to approve the agreement.” Four Justices dissented. at 544–551 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). They would have held that a defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a Type-C agreement is categorically ineligible for a sentence reduction under because such a sentence is always “based on” the plea agreement, and not on the Guidelines. at 544–548. 2 HUGHES v. UNITED STATES SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring Parting ways with all eight of my colleagues, I con- curred only in the judgment. at 534–544. I held the view that sentences imposed under Type-C agreements are typically “based on” the agreements themselves, not on the Guidelines. at 535–536. “In the (C) agree- ment context,” I explained, “it is the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of impris- onment to which the defendant is sentenced.” at 535. But, in my view, that general rule was not abso- lute. Rejecting the categorical rule adopted by the dis- sent, I instead concluded that some Type-C sentences were “based on” the Guidelines and thus eligible for sen- tencing reductions under at 538–539. Specifically, I clarified that relief was avail- able in cases where the Type-C agreement “call[s] for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular Guidelines sentencing range,” or in cases where the “plea agreement provide[s] for a specific term of im- prisonment but also make[s] clear that the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range.” at 538–539. Because ’s agreement presented one such case, I agreed with the plurality that he was eligible for a sentence reduction under See at 542–544. I continue to believe that my concurrence sets forth the most convincing interpretation of ’s statutory text. But I also acknowledge that my concurrence precipitated a 4–1–4 decision that left significant confusion in its wake. Because ’s fractured disposition provided insufficient guidance, courts of appeals have struggled over whether they should |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,018 | 24 | concurring | Hughes v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503547/hughes-v-united-states/ | guidance, courts of appeals have struggled over whether they should follow the plurality or my separate con- currence. See ante, at 2–3. As a result, “in the after- math of a defendant’s eligibility for a reduced sentence under turns on the Circuit in which the case arises.” Ante, at 8. And, “even within Circuits Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring that follow the concurrence, unwarranted dis- parities have resulted depending on the fortuity of whether a defendant’s Type-C agreement includes a specific-enough reference to a Guidelines range.” The integrity and legitimacy of our criminal justice system depends upon consistency, predictability, and evenhandedness. Regrettably, the divided decisions in and my concurrence in particular, have done little to foster those foundational principles. Quite the opposite, my individual views, which “[n]o other Justice shares,” have contributed to ongoing discord among the lower courts, sown confusion among litigants, and left “the governing rule uncertain.” ; see Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Law- yers et al. as Amici Curiae 3–27 (arguing that the Free- man concurrence leads to unpredictable and incon- sistent results). I therefore join the majority in full because doing so helps to ensure clarity and stability in the law and pro- motes “uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Molina- Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks and alteration omit- ted; emphasis deleted). Today’s majority opinion charts a clear path forward: It mitigates the inconsistencies and disparities occasioned (at least in part) by my con- currence. It ensures that similarly situated defendants are subject to a uniform legal rule. It studiously ad- heres to “this Court’s precedents since” which firmly establish “that the Guidelines remain the founda- tion of federal sentencing decisions.” Ante, at 8; see ante, at 12 ). And it aligns more closely than the dissent does with the view I 4 HUGHES v. UNITED STATES SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring articulated in1 For all these reasons, I now lend my vote to the majority and accede in its holding “that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agree- ment is ‘based on’ the defendant’s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the dis- trict court relied on in imposing the sentence or accept- ing the agreement.” Ante, at 9.2 —————— 1 Unlike the majority, the dissent’s position is incompatible with my view in (and in this case) that criminal defendants who plead guilty under Type-C agreements are not categorically ineligible for relief under See –540 (SOTOMAYOR, J., |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,018 | 24 | concurring | Hughes v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4503547/hughes-v-united-states/ | not categorically ineligible for relief under See –540 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment). Accordingly, I continue to “reject the categori- cal rule advanced by the Government and endorsed by the dissent.” 2 I am sensitive to the Government’s contention that allowing crimi- nal defendants to obtain reductions of Type-C sentences under might deprive the Government of the benefit of its bargain. Brief for United States 52. But, as the majority persuasively explains, that argument “has nothing to do with whether a defendant’s sentence was based on the Sentencing Guidelines under ” and there- fore has no bearing on whether a defendant who has entered into a Type-C agreement is eligible for a sentence reduction. Ante, at 12; see (“What is at stake is a defendant’s eligibility for relief, not the extent of that relief ”). All that said, there may be circumstances in which the Government makes substantial concessions in entering into a Type-C agreement with a defendant—e.g., by declining to pursue easily proved and weighty sentencing enhancements—such that there is a compelling case that the agreed-upon sentence in the Type-C agreement would not have been affected if the subsequently lowered Guidelines range had been in place at the relevant time. If such circumstances exist, I expect that district courts will take that into account when deciding whether, and to what extent, a Type-C sentence should be reduced under See ante, at 12–13. Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 1 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17–155 ERIK LINDSEY HUGHES, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,980 | 11 | concurring | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | I join the Court's opinion, holding that the decision in leads to the conclusion that 18 U.S. C. 924 (c) is inapplicable where a defendant is charged with committing a substantive federal offense violative of a statute that already provides for enhanced punishment for the use of a firearm. *413 It should be made clear, however, that the Court of Appeals' initial opinion in these cases, discussed by the Court, ante, at 401-402, reflects the confusion that has existed among lower courts about the meaning of this Court's recent pronouncements respecting the multiple punishments aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See The Court of Appeals there rejected the view that Congress did not intend the enhancement provisions of 924 (c) to apply when the substantive offense charged was 18 U.S. C. 111. See and n. 3. The decision in Simpson, of course, revealed the error of that holding. But the Court of Appeals went on to hold that regardless of Congress' intent to provide for enhanced punishment in this context, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented it from doing so, at least in certain cases. See I do not subscribe to that view, and write separately only to state, once again, that it is my belief that when defendants are sentenced in a single proceeding, "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed." MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | While I agree that petitioners have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, my reasoning differs from the Court’s. I would adhere to the general approach that has been the law in the Second Circuit, and most of the rest of the country, for nearly four decades. I Today the Court announces a new “transactional test,” ante, at 21, for defining the reach of of the Securi ties Exchange Act of 4 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S. C. and SEC Rule 10b–5,10b–5(b) (200): Henceforth, those provisions will extend only to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other securities,” ante, at 18. If one confines one’s gaze to the statutory text, the Court’s conclusion is a plausible one. But the federal courts have been construing in a different manner for a long time, and the Court’s textual analysis is not nearly so compelling, in my view, as to warrant the aban donment of their doctrine. The text and history of are famously opaque on the question of when, exactly, transnational securities 2 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment frauds fall within the statute’s compass. As those types of frauds became more common in the latter half of the 20th century, the federal courts were increasingly called upon to wrestle with that question. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, located in the Nation’s financial cen ter, led the effort. Beginning in earnest with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, rev’d on rehearing on other grounds, that court strove, over an extended series of cases, to “discern” under what circumstances “Congress would have wished the precious resources of the United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to [transnational] transactions,” (internal quotation marks omit ted). Relying on opinions by Judge Henry Friendly,1 the Second Circuit eventually settled on a conduct-and-effects test. This test asks “(1) whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the Unites States, and (2) whether the wrong ful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.” Numerous cases flesh out the proper application of each prong. The Second Circuit’s test became the “north star” of jurisprudence, ante, at 8, not just regionally but nationally as well. With minor variations, other courts converged on the same basic approach.2 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15 ; ; ; Data Processing Equip. 2 I acknowledge that the Courts of Appeals have differed in their ap plications of the conduct-and-effects test, with the consequence that their respective rulings are not perfectly “cohesive.” |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | the consequence that their respective rulings are not perfectly “cohesive.” Ante, at 10, n. 4. It is nevertheless significant that the other Courts of Appeals, along with the other branches of Government, have “embraced the Second Circuit’s approach,” ante, at If this Court were to do likewise, as I would have us do, the lower courts would of course cohere even more tightly around the Second Circuit’s rule. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 3 STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment uniformly agreed that Section 10(b) can apply to a trans national securities fraud either when fraudulent conduct has effects in the United States or when sufficient conduct relevant to the fraud occurs in the United States”); see also 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (186) (setting forth conduct-and effects test). Neither Congress nor the Securities Ex change Commission (Commission) acted to change the law. To the contrary, the Commission largely adopted the Second Circuit’s position in its own adjudications. See ante, at 23–24. In light of this history, the Court’s critique of the deci sion below for applying “judge-made rules” is quite mis placed. Ante, at 11. This entire area of law is replete with judge-made rules, which give concrete meaning to Con gress’ general commands.3 “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b–5,” then-Justice Rehnquist wrote many years ago, “we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue The “ ‘Mother Court’ ” of securities law tended to that oak. (describing the Second Circuit). One of our greatest jurists—the judge who, “without a doubt, did more to shape the law of securi ties regulation than any [other] in the country”4—was its master arborist. The development of law was hardly an instance of —————— 3 It is true that “when it comes to ‘the scope of [the] conduct prohib ited by [Rule 10b–5 and] the text of the statute [has] control[led] our decision[s].’ ” Ante, at 12, n. 5 ; some brackets in original). The problem, when it comes to transna tional securities frauds, is that the text of the statute does not provide a great deal of control. As with any broadly phrased, longstanding statute, courts have had to fill in the gaps. 4 Loss, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, (186). 4 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment judicial usurpation. Congress invited an expansive role for judicial elaboration when it crafted such an open-ended statute in 4. And both Congress and the Commission subsequently affirmed that role when they left |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | and the Commission subsequently affirmed that role when they left intact the relevant statutory and regulatory language, respectively, throughout all the years that followed. See Brief for Alecta pensionsförsäkring, ömsesidigt et al. as Amici Curiae 31–33; cf. Musick, & (inferring from recent legislation Congress’ desire to “acknowledg[e]” the 10b–5 action without “entangling” itself in the precise formulation thereof). Unlike certain other domains of securities law, this is “a case in which Congress has en acted a regulatory statute and then has accepted, over a long period of time, broad judicial authority to define substantive standards of conduct and liability,” and much else besides. Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., This Court has not shied away from acknowledging that authority. We have consistently confirmed that, in apply ing and Rule 10b–5, courts may need “to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regula tions offer conclusive guidance.” Blue 421 U.S., at And we have unanimously “recogniz[ed] a judicial authority to shape the 10b–5 cause of action,” for that is a task “Congress has left to us.” Musick, 508 U.S., at 23, ; see also (noting with ap proval that “federal courts have accepted and exercised the principal responsibility for the continuing elaboration of the scope of the 10b–5 right and the definition of the duties it imposes”). Indeed, we have unanimously en dorsed the Second Circuit’s basic interpretive approach to —ridiculed by the Court today—of striving to “di Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 5 STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment vin[e] what Congress would have wanted,” ante, at 12.5 “Our task,” we have said, is “to attempt to infer how the 4 Congress would have addressed the issue.” Musick, 508 U.S., at Thus, while the Court devotes a considerable amount of attention to the development of the case law, ante, at 6– 10, it draws the wrong conclusions. The Second Circuit refined its test over several decades and dozens of cases, with the tacit approval of Congress and the Commission and with the general assent of its sister Circuits. That history is a reason we should give additional weight to the Second Circuit’s “judge-made” doctrine, not a reason to denigrate it. “The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress’ failure to reject [its] reasonable interpretation of the wording of argues signifi cantly in favor of acceptance of the [Second Circuit] rule by this Court.” Blue II The Court’s other main critique of the Second Circuit’s approach—apart from what the Court views as its exces sive reliance on functional considerations |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | Court views as its exces sive reliance on functional considerations and recon structed congressional intent—is that the Second Circuit —————— 5 Even as the Court repeatedly declined to grant certiorari on cases raising the issue, individual Justices went further and endorsed the Second Circuit’s basic approach to determining the transnational reach of See, e.g., 52– 530 (174) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) )). 6 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment has “disregard[ed]” the presumption against extraterrito riality. Ante, at 6. It is the Court, however, that misap plies the presumption, in two main respects. First, the Court seeks to transform the presumption from a flexible rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement rule. We have been here before. In the case on which the Court primarily relies, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion included a sentence that appeared to make the same move. See at 258 (“Congress’ awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demon strated by the numerous occasions on which it has ex pressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute”). Justice Marshall, in dissent, vigorously ob jected. See (“[C]ontrary to what one would conclude from the majority’s analysis, this canon is not a ‘clear statement’ rule, the application of which relieves a court of the duty to give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will”). Yet even Aramco—surely the most extreme application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in my time on the Court6—contained numerous passages suggesting that the presumption may be overcome without a clear directive. See at 248–255 (majority opinion) (repeat edly identifying congressional “intent” as the touchstone of the presumption). And our cases both before and after Aramco make perfectly clear that the Court continues to give effect to “all available evidence about the meaning” of a provision when considering its extraterritorial applica tion, lest we defy Congress’ will.7 —————— 6 And also one of the most short lived. See Civil Rights Act of 11, 7 See also, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) 7 STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment Contrary to JUSTICE SCALIA’s personal view of statutory interpretation, that evidence legitimately encompasses more than the enacted text. Hence, while the Court’s dictum that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,” ante, at 6, makes for a nice catchphrase, the point is overstated. The presumption against extraterritoriality can be useful as a theory of congressional purpose, a tool for managing in |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | a theory of congressional purpose, a tool for managing in ternational conflict, a background norm, a tiebreaker. It does not relieve courts of their duty to give statutes the most faithful reading possible. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court errs in suggesting that the presumption against extraterritorial ity is fatal to the Second Circuit’s test. For even if the presumption really were a clear statement (or “clear indi cation,” ante, at 6, 16) rule, it would have only marginal relevance to this case. It is true, of course, that “this Court ordinarily construes —————— (declining to apply presumption in assessing question of Sherman Act extraterritoriality); 201–204 (opinion for the Court by Rehnquist, C. J.) (considering presumption “[l]astly,” to resolve “any lingering doubt,” after consider ing structure, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of Federal Tort Claims Act); cf. (stating that presumption “has special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provi sions that,” unlike “may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility”); Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 85, 110 (18) (explaining that lower courts “have been unanimous in concluding that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a clear statement rule”). The Court also relies on Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., Ante, at 16. Yet Micro soft’s articulation of the presumption is a far cry from the Court’s rigid theory. “As a principle of general application,” Microsoft innocuously observed, “we have stated that courts should ‘assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws.’ ” ). 8 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations,” F. Hoffmann-La Roche 542 U.S. 155, and that, absent contrary evidence, we presume “Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions,” Foley Bros., (14). Accordingly, the presumption against extraterrito riality “provides a sound basis for concluding that Section 10(b) does not apply when a securities fraud with no ef fects in the United States is hatched and executed entirely outside this country.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. But that is just about all it provides a sound basis for concluding. And the conclusion is not very illu minating, because no party to the litigation disputes it. No one contends that applies to wholly foreign frauds. Rather, the real question in this case is how much, and what kinds of, domestic contacts are sufficient to trigger application of8 In developing its conduct-and effects test, the Second Circuit endeavored to |
Justice Stevens | 2,010 | 16 | concurring | Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/149289/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-ltd/ | developing its conduct-and effects test, the Second Circuit endeavored to derive a solution from the Exchange Act’s text, structure, history, and purpose. Judge Friendly and his colleagues were well aware that United States courts “cannot and should not expend [their] resources resolving cases that do not affect Americans or involve fraud emanating from America.” ; see also (overriding concern is “ ‘whether there is sufficient United States involvement’ ” (quoting Itoba (CA2 15))). The question just stated does not admit of an easy an —————— 8 Cf. Dodge, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L., at 88, n. 25 (regardless whether one frames question as “whether the presumption against extraterrito riality should apply [or] whether the regulation is extraterritorial,” “one must ultimately grapple with the basic issue of what connection to the United States is sufficient to justify the assumption that Congress would want its laws to be applied”). Cite as: 561 U. S. (2010) STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment swer. The text of the Exchange Act indicates that extends to at least some activities with an international component, but, again, it is not pellucid as to which ones. The Second Circuit draws the line as follows: ex tends to transnational frauds “only when substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed within the United States,” (CA2 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), or when the fraud was “ ‘intended to produce’ ” and did produce “ ‘det rimental effects within’ ” the United States, Schoenbaum,10 This approach is consistent with the understanding —————— By its terms, regulates “interstate commerce,” 15 U.S. C. which the Exchange Act defines to include “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication between any foreign country and any State, or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof.” Other provisions of the Exchange Act make clear that Congress contemplated some amount of transnational application. See, e.g., (stating, in explaining necessity for regulation, that “[t]he prices established and offered in [securities] transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries and constitute a basis for determining and establishing the prices at which securities are bought and sold”); (exempting from regulation foreign parties “unless” they transact business in securities “in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter” ); see also Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d, at 206–208 (reviewing statutory text and legislative history). The Court finds these textual references insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, ante, at 13–15, but as ex plained in the main text, that finding rests upon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.