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Justice Burger
| 1,983 | 12 |
majority
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Missouri v. Hunter
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110824/missouri-v-hunter/
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in addition to any conviction and sentence for the underlying felony. The court nevertheless held that the Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits imposing punishment for both armed criminal action and for the underlying felony." t then set aside the defendant's conviction for armed criminal action.[2] When the State sought review here in Sours we remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our holding in On remand, in Sours the Missouri Supreme Court adhered to its previous ruling that armed criminal action and the underlying felony are the "same offense" and that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars separate punishment of a defendant for each offense, notwithstanding the acknowledged intent of the legislature to impose two separate punishments for the two defined offenses.[3] Most recently, in the Missouri Supreme Court reexamined its decisions in Sours and Sours in light of our holding in[4] The Missouri court, however, remained unpersuaded, stating: *365 "Until such time as the Supreme Court of the United declares clearly and unequivocally that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United Constitution not apply to the legislative branch of government, we cannot do other than what we perceive to be our duty to refuse to enforce multiple punishments for the same offense arising out of a single transaction." This view manifests a misreading of our cases on the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; we need hardly go so far as suggested to decide that a legislature constitutionally can prescribe cumulative punishments for violation of its first-degree robbery statute and its armed criminal action statute. The Double Jeopardy Clause is cast explicitly in terms of being "twice put in jeopardy." We have consistently interpreted it " `to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.' " quoting Because respondent has been subjected to only one trial, it is not contended that his right to be free from multiple trials for the same offense has been violated. Rather, the Missouri court vacated respondent's conviction for armed *366 criminal action because of the statements of this Court that the Double Jeopardy Clause also "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North 395 U.S. 7, Particularly in light of recent precedents of this Court, it is clear that the Missouri Supreme Court has misperceived the nature of the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishments. With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than
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Justice Burger
| 1,983 | 12 |
majority
|
Missouri v. Hunter
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110824/missouri-v-hunter/
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than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. n we addressed the question whether cumulative punishments for the offenses of rape and of killing the same victim in the perpetration of the crime of rape was contrary to federal statutory and constitutional law. A divided Court relied on in holding that the two statutes in controversy proscribed the "same" offense. The opinion in stated: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other not." n Whalen we also noted that established a rule of statutory construction in these terms: "The assumption underlying the rule is that Congress ordinarily not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the `same offense,' they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." -692 *367 We went on to emphasize the qualification on that rule: "[W]here the offenses are the same cumulative sentences are not permitted, unless elsewhere specially authorized by Congress." t is clear, therefore, that the result in Whalen turned on the fact that the Court saw no "clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Accordingly, under the rule of statutory construction, we held that cumulative punishment could not be imposed under the two statutes. n we addressed the issue whether a defendant could be cumulatively punished in a single trial for conspiracy to import marihuana and conspiracy to distribute marihuana. There, in contrast to Whalen, we concluded that the two statutes did not proscribe the "same" offense in the sense that " `each provision requires proof of a fact [that] the other not.' " quoting We might well have stopped at that point and upheld the petitioners' cumulative punishments under the challenged statutes since cumulative punishment can presumptively be assessed after conviction for two offenses that are not the "same" under See, e. g., American Tobacco Co. v. United However, we went on to state that because "[t]he test is a `rule of statutory construction,' and because it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." We found "[n]othing in the legislative history which discloses an intent contrary to the presumption which should be accorded to these statutes after application of the test." bid.
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Justice Burger
| 1,983 | 12 |
majority
|
Missouri v. Hunter
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110824/missouri-v-hunter/
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accorded to these statutes after application of the test." bid. We concluded our discussion of the impact of clear legislative intent on the Whalen rule of statutory construction with this language: *368 "[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is no different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences not violate the Constitution." Here, the Missouri Supreme Court has construed the two statues at issue as defining the same crime. n addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature intended that punishment for violations of the statutes be cumulative. We are bound to accept the Missouri court's construction of that State's statutes. See However, we are not bound by the Missouri Supreme Court's legal conclusion that these two statutes violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, and we reject its legal conclusion. Our analysis and reasoning in Whalen and Albernaz lead inescapably to the conclusion that simply because two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the test not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes. The rule of statutory construction noted in Whalen is not a constitutional rule requiring courts to negate clearly expressed legislative intent. Thus far, we have utilized that rule only to limit a federal court's power to impose convictions and punishments when the will of Congress is not clear. Here, the Missouri Legislature has made its intent crystal clear. Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments.[5] Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under *369 a court's task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered.
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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We consider whether the pre-emption clause enacted in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 USC 360k, bars common-law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a medical device given premarket approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) I A The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), as amended, 21 USC 301 et seq, has long required FDA approval for the introduction of new drugs into the market Until the statutory enactment at issue here, however, the introduction of new medical devices was left largely for the States to supervise as they saw fit See Medtronic, The regulatory landscape changed in the 1960's and 1970's, as complex devices proliferated and some failed Most notably, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, introduced in 1970, was linked to serious infections and several deaths, not to mention a large number of pregnancies Thousands of tort claims followed R Bacigal, The Limits of Litigation: The Dalkon Shield Controversy 3 (1990) In the view of many, the Dalkon Shield failure and its aftermath demonstrated the inability of the common-law tort system to manage the risks associated with dangerous devices See, eg, S Foote, Managing the Medical Arms Race 151-152 Several States adopted regulatory measures, including California, which in 1970 enacted a law requiring premarket approval of medical devices 1970 Cal Stats ch 1573, 26670-26693; see also Leflar & Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 Tenn LRev 691, 703, n 66 (identifying 13 state statutes governing medical devices as of 1976) Congress stepped in with passage of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976(MDA), 21 USC 360c et seq,[1] which swept back some state obligations and imposed a regime of detailed federal oversight The MDA includes an express pre-emption provision that states: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement "(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and "(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter" 360k(a) The exception contained in subsection (b) permits the FDA to exempt some state and local requirements from pre-emption The new regulatory regime established various levels of oversight for medical devices, depending on the risks they present Class I, which includes such devices as elastic bandages and examination gloves, is subject to the lowest level of oversight:
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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examination gloves, is subject to the lowest level of oversight: "general controls," such as labeling requirements 360c(a)(1)(A); FDA, Device Advice: Device http://wwwfda gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132html (all Internet materials as visited Feb 14, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) Class II, which includes such devices as powered wheelchairs and surgical drapes, ib is subject in addition to "special controls" such as performance standards and postmarket surveillance measures, 360c(a)(1)(B) The devices receiving the most federal oversight are those in Class III, which include replacement heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators, and pacemaker pulse generators, FDA, Device Advice: Device In general, a device is assigned to Class III if it cannot be established that a less stringent classification would provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, and the device is "purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health," or "presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) *1004 Although the MDA established a rigorous regime of premarket approval for new Class III devices, it grandfathered many that were already on the market Devices sold before the MDA's effective date may remain on the market until the FDA promulgates, after notice and comment, a regulation requiring premarket approval 360c(f)(1), 360e(b)(1) A related provision seeks to limit the competitive advantage grandfathered devices receive A new device need not undergo premarket approval if the FDA finds it is "substantially equivalent" to another device exempt from premarket approval 360c(f)(1)(A) The agency's review of devices for substantial equivalence is known as the 510(k) process, named after the section of the MDA describing the review Most new Class III devices enter the market through 510(k) In for example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under 510(k) and granted premarket approval to just 32 devices P Hutt, R Merrill, & L Grossman, Food and Drug Law 992 Premarket approval is a "rigorous" process A manufacturer must submit what is typically a multivolume application FDA, Device AdvicePremarket Approval (PMA) 18, http://wwwfdagov/cdrh/ devadvice/pma/printerhtml It includes, among other things, full reports of all studies and investigations of the device's safety and effectiveness that have been published or should reasonably be known to the applicant; a "full statement" of the device's "components, ingredients, and properties and of the principle or principles of operation"; "a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation of, such device"; samples or device components required by the FDA; and
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
|
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
|
device"; samples or device components required by the FDA; and a specimen of the proposed labeling 360e(c)(1) Before deciding whether to approve the application, the agency may refer it to a panel of outside experts, 21 CFR 81444(a) and may request additional data from the manufacturer, 360e(c)(1)(G) The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing each application, and grants premarket approval only if it finds there is a "reasonable assurance" of the device's "safety and effectiveness," 360e(d) The agency must "weig[h] any probable benefit to health from the use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use" 360c(a)(2)(C) It may thus approve devices that present great risks if they nonetheless offer great benefits in light of available alternatives It approved, for example, under its Humanitarian Device Exemption procedures, a ventricular assist device for children with failing hearts, even though the survival rate of children using the device was less than 50 percent FDA, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Summary of Safety and Probable Benefit 20 (2004), online at http://wwwfdagov/cdrh/pdf3/H 030003bpdf The premarket approval process includes review of the device's proposed labeling The FDA evaluates safety and effectiveness under the conditions of use set forth on the label, 360c(a)(2)(B), and must determine that the proposed labeling is neither false nor misleading, 360e(d)(1)(A) After completing its review, the FDA may grant or deny premarket approval 360e(d) It may also condition approval on adherence to performance standards, 21 CFR 8611(b)(3), restrictions upon sale or distribution, or compliance with other requirements, 81482 The agency is also *1005 free to impose device-specific restrictions by regulation 360j(e)(1) If the FDA is unable to approve a new device in its proposed form, it may send an "approvable letter" indicating that the device could be approved if the applicant submitted specified information or agreed to certain conditions or restrictions 21 CFR 81444(e) Alternatively, the agency may send a "not approvable" letter, listing the grounds that justify denial and, where practical, measures that the applicant could undertake to make the device approvable 81444(f) Once a device has received premarket approval, the MDA forbids the manufacturer to make, without FDA permission, changes in design specifications, manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute, that would affect safety or effectiveness 360e(d)(6)(A)(i) If the applicant wishes to make such a change, it must submit, and the FDA must approve, an application for supplemental premarket approval, to be evaluated under largely the same criteria as an initial application 360e(d)(6); 21 CFR 81439(c) After premarket approval, the devices are subject to reporting requirements 360i These include the
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
|
devices are subject to reporting requirements 360i These include the obligation to inform the FDA of new clinical investigations or scientific studies concerning the device which the applicant knows of or reasonably should know of, 21 CFR 81484(b)(2), and to report incidents in which the device may have caused or contributed to death or serious injury, or malfunctioned in a manner that would likely cause or contribute to death or serious injury if it recurred, 80350(a) The FDA has the power to withdraw premarket approval based on newly reported data or existing information and must withdraw approval if it determines that a device is unsafe or ineffective under the conditions in its labeling 360e(e)(1); see also 360h(e) (recall authority) B Except as otherwise indicated, the facts set forth in this section appear in the opinion of the Court of Appeals The device at issue is an Evergreen Balloon Catheter marketed by defendant-respondent Medtronic, Inc It is a Class III device that received premarket approval from the FDA in 1994; changes to its label received supplemental approvals in 1995 and Charles Riegel underwent coronary angioplasty in shortly after suffering a myocardial infarction App to Pet for Cert 56a His right coronary artery was diffusely diseased and heavily calcified Riegel's doctor inserted the Evergreen Balloon Catheter into his patient's coronary artery in an attempt to dilate the artery, although the device's labeling stated that use was contraindicated for patients with diffuse or calcified stenoses The label also warned that the catheter should not be inflated beyond its rated burst pressure of eight atmospheres Riegel's doctor inflated the catheter five times, to a pressure of 10 atmospheres; on its fifth inflation, the catheter ruptured Complaint 3 Riegel developed a heart block, was placed on life support, and underwent emergency coronary bypass surgery Riegel and his wife Donna brought this lawsuit in April 1999, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York Their complaint alleged that Medtronic's catheter was designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law, and that these defects caused Riegel to suffer severe and permanent injuries The complaint raised a number of common-law claims The District Court held that the *1006 MDA pre-empted Riegel's claims of strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and negligence in the design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale of the catheter App to Pet for Cert 68a; Complaint 3-4 It also held that the MDA pre-empted a negligent manufacturing claim insofar as it was not premised on the theory that Medtronic violated federal law App
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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premised on the theory that Medtronic violated federal law App to Pet for Cert 71a Finally, the court concluded that the MDA preempted Donna Riegel's claim for loss of consortium to the extent it was derivative of the pre-empted claims at 68a; see also at 75a[2] The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed these dismissals The court concluded that Medtronic was "clearly subject to the federal, device-specific requirement of adhering to the standards contained in its individual, federally approved" premarket approval application The Riegels' claims were pre-empted because they "would, if successful, impose state requirements that differed from, or added to" the device-specific federal requirements We granted certiorari[3] 551 US II Since the MDA expressly pre-empts only state requirements "different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable to the device" under federal law, 360k(a)(1), we must determine whether the Federal Government has established requirements applicable to Medtronic's catheter If so, we must then determine whether the Riegels' common-law claims are based upon New York requirements with respect to the device that are "different from, or in addition to" the federal ones, and that relate to safety and effectiveness 360k(a) We turn to the first question In a majority of this Court interpreted the MDA's pre-emption provision in a manner "substantially informed" by the FDA regulation set forth at 21 CFR 8081(d) ; see also That regulation says that state requirements are pre-empted "only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device" 21 CFR 8081(d) Informed by the regulation, we concluded that federal manufacturing and labeling requirements applicable across the board to almost all medical devices did not pre-empt the common-law claims of negligence and strict liability at issue in The federal requirements, we said, were not requirements specific to the device in question they reflected "entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally" 518 US, at 501, While we disclaimed a conclusion that general federal requirements could never pre-empt, or general state duties never be pre-empted, *1007 we held that no pre-emption occurred in the case at hand based on a careful comparison between the state and federal duties at issue Even though substantial-equivalence review under 510(k) is device specific, also rejected the manufacturer's contention that 510(k) approval imposed device-specific "requirements" We regarded the fact that products entering the market through 510(k) may be marketed only so long as they remain substantial equivalents of the relevant pre-1976 devices as a qualification for an exemption rather than a requirement ; see also (O'Connor,
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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an exemption rather than a requirement ; see also (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) Premarket approval, in contrast, imposes "requirements" under the MDA as we interpreted it in Unlike general labeling duties, premarket approval is specific to individual devices And it is in no sense an exemption from federal safety reviewit is federal safety review Thus, the attributes that found lacking in 510(k) review are present here While 510(k) is "`focused on equivalence, not safety,'" (opinion of the Court), premarket approval is focused on safety, not equivalence While devices that enter the market through 510(k) have "never been formally reviewed under the MDA for safety or efficacy," ib the FDA may grant premarket approval only after it determines that a device offers a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, 360e(d) And while the FDA does not "`require'" that a device allowed to enter the market as a substantial equivalent "take any particular form for any particular reason," ib the FDA requires a device that has received premarket approval to be made with almost no deviations from the specifications in its approval application, for the reason that the FDA has determined that the approved form provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness III We turn, then, to the second question: whether the Riegels' common-law claims rely upon "any requirement" of New York law applicable to the catheter that is "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements and that "relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device" 360k(a) Safety and effectiveness are the very subjects of the Riegels' common-law claims, so the critical issue is whether New York's tort duties constitute "requirements" under the MDA A In five Justices concluded that common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability do impose "requirement[s]" and would be pre-empted by federal requirements specific to a medical device See 518 US, at 512, (opinion of O'Connor, J, joined by Rehnquist, C J, and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ); (opinion of BREYER, J) We adhere to that view In interpreting two other statutes we have likewise held that a provision pre-empting state "requirements" pre-empted common-law duties Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431, 125 S Ct 1788, 161 L Ed 2d 687 found common-law actions to be pre-empted by a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act that said certain States "`shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under *1008
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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in addition to or different from those required under *1008 this subchapter'" 125 S Ct 1788 (discussing 7 USC 136v(b); emphasis added) Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 112 S Ct 2608, 120 L Ed 2d 407 held common-law actions pre-empted by a provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 USC 1334(b), which said that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes" whose packages were labeled in accordance with federal law See 505 US, at 523, 112 S Ct 2608 (plurality opinion); 112 S Ct 2608 (SCALIA, J, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments Absent other indication, reference to a State's "requirements" includes its common-law duties As the plurality opinion said in Cipollone, common-law liability is "premised on the existence of a legal duty," and a tort judgment therefore establishes that the defendant has violated a state-law obligation 112 S Ct 2608 And while the common-law remedy is limited to damages, a liability award "`can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy'" 112 S Ct 2608 In the present case, there is nothing to contradict this normal meaning To the contrary, in the context of this legislation excluding common-law duties from the scope of pre-emption would make little sense State tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect Indeed, one would think that tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or strict-liability standard, is less deserving of preservation A state statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA: How many more lives will be saved by a device which, along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm? A jury, on the other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in court As Justice BREYER explained in it is implausible that the MDA was meant to "grant greater power (to set state standards `different from, or in addition to' federal standards) to a single state jury than to
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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to' federal standards) to a single state jury than to state officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes" 518 US, at 504, That perverse distinction is not required or even suggested by the broad language Congress chose in the MDA,[4] and we will not turn somersaults to create it B The dissent would narrow the pre-emptive scope of the term "requirement" on *1009 the grounds that it is "difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse" for consumers injured by FDA-approved devices Post, at 1015 (opinion of GINSBURG, J) (internal quotation marks omitted) But, as we have explained, this is exactly what a pre-emption clause for medical devices does by its terms The operation of a law enacted by Congress need not be seconded by a committee report on pain of judicial nullification See, eg, Connecticut Nat Bank v Germain, 503 US 249, 112 S Ct 1146, 117 L Ed 2d 391 It is not our job to speculate upon congressional motives If we were to do so, however, the only indication available the text of the statutesuggests that the solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved devices, which the dissent finds controlling, was overcome in Congress's estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations[5] In the case before us, the FDA has supported the position taken by our opinion with regard to the meaning of the statute We have found it unnecessary to rely upon that agency view because we think the statute itself speaks clearly to the point at issue If, however, we had found the statute ambiguous and had accorded the agency's current position deference, the dissent is correct, see post, at 1016, n 8, thatinasmuch as mere Skidmore deference would seemingly be at issuethe degree of deference might be reduced by the fact that the agency's earlier position was different See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 65 S Ct 161, 89 L Ed 124 ; United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 121 S Ct 2164, 150 L Ed 2d 292 ; Good Samaritan Hospital v Shalala, 508 US 402, 113 S Ct 2151, 124 L Ed 2d 368 But of course the agency's earlier position (which the dissent describes at some length, post, at 1015-1016, and finds preferable) is even more compromised, indeed deprived of all claim to deference, by the fact that it is no longer the agency's position The dissent also describes at
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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no longer the agency's position The dissent also describes at great length the experience under the FDCA with respect to drugs and food and color additives Post, at 1016-1018 Two points render the conclusion the dissent seeks to draw from that experiencethat the pre-emption clause permits tort suits unreliable (1) It has not been established (as the dissent assumes) that no tort lawsuits are pre-empted by drug or additive approval under the FDCA (2) If, as the dissent believes, the pre-emption clause permits tort lawsuits for medical devices just as they are (by hypothesis) permitted for drugs and additives; and if, as the dissent believes, Congress wanted the two regimes to be alike; Congress could have applied the pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause that applies only to medical devices C The Riegels contend that the duties underlying negligence, strict-liability, and implied-warranty claims are not pre-empted even if they impose "`requirements,'" because general common-law duties are not requirements maintained "`with respect to devices'" Brief for Petitioner 34-36 Again, a majority of this Court suggested otherwise in See 518 US, at 504-505, (opinion of BREYER, J); (opinion of *1010 O'Connor, J, joined by Rehnquist, C J, and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ)[6] And with good reason The language of the statute does not bear the Riegels' reading The MDA provides that no State "may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device any requirement" relating to safety or effectiveness that is different from, or in addition to, federal requirements 360k(a) (emphasis added) The Riegels' suit depends upon New York's "continu[ing] in effect" general tort duties "with respect to" Medtronic's catheter Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the pre-empted state requirement must apply only to the relevant device, or only to medical devices and not to all products and all actions in general The Riegels' argument to the contrary rests on the text of an FDA regulation which states that the MDA's preemption clause does not extend to certain duties, including "[s]tate or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other products in addition to devices (eg, requirements such as general electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness)), or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices" 21 CFR 8081(d)(1) Even assuming that this regulation could play a role in defining the MDA's pre-emptive scope, it does not provide unambiguous support for the Riegels' position The agency's reading of its own rule is entitled
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
majority
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145831/riegel-v-medtronic-inc/
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position The agency's reading of its own rule is entitled to substantial deference, see Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 117 S Ct 905, 137 L Ed 2d 79 and the FDA's view put forward in this case is that the regulation does not refer to general tort duties of care, such as those underlying the claims in this case that a device was designed, labeled, or manufactured in an unsafe or ineffective manner Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28 That is so, according to the FDA, because the regulation excludes from pre-emption requirements that relate only incidentally to medical devices, but not other requirements General tort duties of care, unlike fire codes or restrictions on trade practices, "directly regulate" the device itself, including its design We find the agency's explanation less than compelling, since the same could be said of general requirements imposed by electrical codes, the Uniform Commercial Code, or unfair-trade-practice law, which the regulation specifically excludes from pre-emption Other portions of 21 CFR 8081, however, support the agency's view that 8081(d)(1) has no application to this case (though still failing to explain why electrical codes, the Uniform Commercial Code or unfair-trade-practice requirements are different) Section 8081(b) states that the MDA sets forth a "general rule" pre-empting state duties "having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision)" (Emphasis added) This sentence is far more comprehensible under the FDA's view that 8081(d)(1) has no application here than under the Riegels' view We are aware of no duties established by court decision other than common-law duties, and we are aware of no common-law duties that relate solely to medical devices *1011 The Riegels' reading is also in tension with the regulation's statement that adulteration and misbranding claims are pre-empted when they "ha[ve] the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device, eg, a specific labeling requirement" that is "different from, or in addition to" a federal requirement 8081(d)(6)(ii) Surely this means that the MDA would pre-empt a jury determination that the FDA-approved labeling for a pacemaker violated a state common-law requirement for additional warnings The Riegels' reading of 8081(d)(1), however, would allow a claim for tortious mislabeling to escape pre-emption so long as such a claim could also be brought against objects other than medical devices All in all, we think that 8081(d)(1) can add nothing to our analysis but confusion Neither accepting nor rejecting the proposition that this regulation can properly be consulted to determine the statute's meaning; and neither accepting nor rejecting the FDA's distinction between
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
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meaning; and neither accepting nor rejecting the FDA's distinction between general requirements that directly regulate and those that regulate only incidentally; the regulation fails to alter our interpretation of the text insofar as the outcome of this case is concerned IV State requirements are pre-empted under the MDA only to the extent that they are "different from, or in addition to" the requirements imposed by federal law 360k(a)(1) Thus, 360k does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case "parallel," rather than add to, federal requirements ; see also (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) The District Court in this case recognized that parallel claims would not be pre-empted, see App to Pet for Cert 70a-71a, but it interpreted the claims here to assert that Medtronic's device violated state tort law notwithstanding compliance with the relevant federal requirements, see at 68a Although the Riegels now argue that their lawsuit raises parallel claims, they made no such contention in their briefs before the Second Circuit, nor did they raise this argument in their petition for certiorari We decline to address that argument in the first instance here * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed Justice STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
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Justice Scalia
| 2,007 | 9 |
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145767/medimmune-inc-v-genentech-inc/
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We must decide whether Article III's limitation of federal courts' jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies," reflected in the "actual controversy" requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act, (a), requires a patent licensee, to terminate or be in breach of its license agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. I Because the declaratory-judgment claims in this case were disposed of at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we take the following facts from the allegations in petitioner's amended complaint and the unopposed declarations that petitioner submitted in response to the motion to dismiss. Petitioner MedImmune, Inc., manufactures Synagis, a drug used to prevent respiratory tract disease in infants and young children. In 1997, petitioner entered into a patent license agreement with respondent Genentech, Inc. *768 (which acted on behalf of itself as patent assignee and on behalf of the coassignee, respondent City of Hope). The license covered an existing patent relating to the production of "chimeric antibodies" and a then-pending patent application relating to "the coexpression of immunoglobulin chains in recombinant host cells." Petitioner agreed to pay royalties on sales of "Licensed Products," and respondents granted petitioner the right to make, use, and sell them. The agreement defined "Licensed Products" as a specified antibody, "the manufacture, use or sale of which would, if not licensed under th[e] Agreement, infringe one or more claims of either or both of [the covered patents,] which have neither expired nor been held invalid by a court or other body of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal has been or may be taken." App. 399. The license agreement gave petitioner the right to terminate upon six months' written notice. In December 2001, the "coexpression" application covered by the 1997 license agreement matured into the "Cabilly II" patent. Soon thereafter, respondent Genentech delivered petitioner a letter expressing its belief that Synagis was covered by the Cabilly II patent and its expectation that petitioner would pay royalties beginning March 1, 2002. Petitioner did not think royalties were owing, believing that the Cabilly II patent was invalid and unenforceable,[1] and that its claims were in any event not infringed by Synagis. Nevertheless, petitioner considered the letter to be a clear threat to enforce the Cabilly II patent, terminate the 1997 license agreement, and sue for patent infringement if petitioner did not make royalty payments as demanded. If respondents were to prevail in a patent infringement action, petitioner could be ordered to pay treble damages and attorney's fees, and could be enjoined from selling Synagis, a product that has accounted for more than
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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selling Synagis, a product that has accounted for more than 80 percent of its revenue from sales since 1999. Unwilling to risk such serious consequences, petitioner paid the demanded royalties "under protest and with reservation of all of [its] rights." This declaratory-judgment action followed. Petitioner sought the declaratory relief discussed in detail in Part II below. Petitioner also requested damages and an injunction with respect to other federal and state claims not relevant here. The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Gen-Probe Gen-Probe had held that a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an Article III case or controversy with regard to validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent because the license agreement "obliterated any reasonable apprehension" that the licensee will be sued for infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court, also relying on Gen-Probe. We granted certiorari. II At the outset, we address a disagreement concerning the nature of the dispute at issue herewhether it involves only a freestanding claim of patent invalidity or rather a claim that, both because of *769 patent invalidity and because of noninfringement, no royalties are owing under the license agreement.[2] That probably makes no difference to the ultimate issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, but it is well to be clear about the nature of the case before us. Respondents contend that petitioner "is not seeking an interpretation of its present contractual obligations." Brief for Respondent Genentech 37; see also Brief for Respondent City of Hope 48-49. They claim this for two reasons: (1) because there is no dispute that Synagis infringes the Cabilly II patent, thereby making royalties payable; and (2) because while there is a dispute over patent validity, the contract calls for royalties on an infringing product whether or not the underlying patent is valid. See Brief for Respondent Genentech 7, 37. The first point simply does not comport with the allegations of petitioner's amended complaint. The very first count requested a "DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS," and stated that petitioner "disputes its obligation to make payments under the 1997 License Agreement because [petitioner's] sale of its Synagis® product does not infringe any valid claim of the [Cabilly II] Patent." App. 136. These contentions were repeated throughout the complaint.[3] And the phrase "does not infringe any valid claim" cannot be thought to be no more than a challenge to the patent's validity, since elsewhere the amended complaint states with unmistakable clarity that "the
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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elsewhere the amended complaint states with unmistakable clarity that "the patent is not infringed by [petitioner's] Synagis ® product and that [petitioner] owes no payments under license agreements with [respondents]."[4] As to the second point, petitioner assuredly did contend that it had no obligation under the license to pay royalties on an invalid patent. 136, 147. Nor is that contention frivolous. True, the license requires petitioner to pay royalties until a patent claim has been held invalid by a competent body, and the Cabilly II patent has not. But the license at issue in Lear, similarly provided that "royalties are to be paid until such time as the `patent is held invalid,'" and we rejected the argument that a repudiating licensee must comply with its contract and pay royalties until its claim is vindicated in court. We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating *770 licensee is similarly relieved of its contract obligation during a successful challenge to a patent's validitythat is, on the applicability of licensee estoppel under these circumstances. Cf. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, (C.A.Fed.1997) ("[A] licensee. cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid"). All we need determine is whether petitioner has alleged a contractual dispute. It has done so. Respondents further argue that petitioner waived its contract claim by failing to argue it below. Brief for Respondent Genentech 10-11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31. The record reveals, however, that petitioner raised the contract point before the Federal Circuit. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant MedImmune, Inc., in Nos. 04-1300, 04-1384 (CA Fed.), p. 38 ("Here, MedImmune is seeking to define its rights and obligations under its contract with Genentechprecisely the type of action the Declaratory Judgment Act contemplates"). That petitioner limited its contract argument to a few pages of its appellate brief does not suggest a waiver; it merely reflects counsel's sound assessment that the argument would be futile. The Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe precedent precluded jurisdiction over petitioner's contract claims, and the panel below had no authority to overrule Gen-Probe.[5] Having determined that petitioner has raised and preserved a contract claim,[6] we turn to the jurisdictional question. III The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction any court of the United States may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." *771 (a).
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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not further relief is or could be sought." *771 (a). There was a time when this Court harbored doubts about the compatibility of declaratory-judgment actions with Article III's case-or-controversy requirement. See ; Liberty Warehouse ; see also ("The award of execution is an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power"). We dispelled those doubts, however, in Nashville, C. & St. L.R. holding (in a case involving a declaratory judgment rendered in state court) that an appropriate action for declaratory relief can be a case or controversy under Article III. The federal Declaratory Judgment Act was signed into law the following year, and we upheld its constitutionality in Life Ins. Our opinion explained that the phrase "case of actual controversy" in the Act refers to the type of "Cases" and "Controversies" that are justiciable under Article III. and the cases following it do not draw the brightest of lines between those declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and those that do not. Our decisions have required that the dispute be "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests"; and that it be "real and substantial" and "admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." -241, we summarized as follows: "Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."[7] There is no dispute that these standards would have been satisfied if petitioner had taken the final step of refusing to make royalty payments under the 1997 *772 license agreement. Respondents claim a right to royalties under the licensing agreement. Petitioner asserts that no royalties are owing because the Cabilly II patent is invalid and not infringed; and alleges (without contradiction) a threat by respondents to enjoin sales if royalties are not forthcoming. The factual and legal dimensions of the dispute are well defined and, but for petitioner's continuing to make royalty payments, nothing about the dispute would render it unfit for judicial resolution. Assuming (without deciding) that respondents here could not claim an anticipatory breach and repudiate the license, the continuation of royalty payments makes what would otherwise be an imminent threat at least remote, if not nonexistent. As long as those payments are made, there is no risk that respondents will seek to enjoin petitioner's sales. Petitioner's own
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Justice Scalia
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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that respondents will seek to enjoin petitioner's sales. Petitioner's own acts, in other words, eliminate the imminent threat of harm.[8] The question before us is whether this causes the dispute no longer to be a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. Our analysis must begin with the recognition that, where threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threatfor example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced. The plaintiffs own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction. For example, in the State threatened the plaintiff with forfeiture of his farm, fines, and penalties if he entered into a lease with an alien in violation of the State's anti-alien land law. Given this genuine threat of enforcement, we did not require, as a prerequisite to testing the validity of the law in a suit for injunction, that the plaintiff bet the farm, so to speak, by taking the violative action. ; Ex parte Young, Likewise, in we did not require the plaintiff to proceed to distribute handbills and risk actual prosecution before he could seek a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting such distribution. As then-Justice Rehnquist put it in his concurrence, "the declaratory judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal activity." In each of these cases, the plaintiff had eliminated the imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to do (enter into a lease, or distribute handbills at the shopping center). That did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction because the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced. See *773 ; The dilemma posed by that coercionputting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecutionis "a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate." Abbott Supreme Court jurisprudence is more rare regarding application of the Declaratory Judgment Act to situations in which the plaintiffs self-avoidance of imminent injury is coerced by threatened enforcement action of a private party rather than the government. Lower federal courts, however (and state courts interpreting declaratory-judgment acts requiring "actual controversy"), have long accepted jurisdiction in such cases. See, e.g., Keener Oil & Gas ; American Machine & Metals, ; ; Washington-Detroit Theater 249 Mich. ; see also Advisory Committee's Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 57, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 790.[9] The only Supreme Court decision
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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28 U.S.C. App., p. 790.[9] The only Supreme Court decision in point is, fortuitously, close on its facts to the case before us. held that a licensee's failure to cease its payment of royalties did not render nonjusticiable a dispute over the validity of the patent. In that litigation, several patentees had sued their licensees to enforce territorial restrictions in the license. The licensees filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the underlying patents were invalid, in the meantime paying "under protest" royalties required by an injunction the patentees had obtained in an earlier case. The patentees argued that "so long as [licensees] continue to pay royalties, there is only an academic, not a real controversy, between the parties." We rejected that argument and held that the declaratory-judgment claim presented a justiciable case or controversy: "The fact that royalties were being paid did not make this a 'difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character.'" Ibid, (quoting 300 U.S., ). The royalties "were being paid under protest and under the compulsion of an injunction decree," and "[u]nless the injunction decree were modified, the only other course [of action] was to defy it, and to risk not only actual but treble damages in infringement suits." We concluded that "the requirements of [a] case or controversy are met where payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction preserves the right to recover the sums paid or to challenge the legality of the claim." Ibid.[10] *774 The Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe decision distinguished on the ground that it involved the compulsion of an injunction. But cannot be so readily dismissed. Never mind that the injunction had been privately obtained and was ultimately within the control of the patentees, who could permit its modification. More fundamentally, and contrary to the Federal Circuit's conclusion, did not say that the coercion dispositive of the case was governmental, but suggested just the opposite. The opinion acknowledged that the licensees had the option of stopping payments in defiance of the injunction, but explained that the consequence of doing so would be to risk "actual [and] treble damages in infringement suits" by the patentees. It significantly did not mention the threat of prosecution for contempt, or any other sort of governmental sanction. Moreover, it cited approvingly a treatise which said that an "actual or threatened serious injury to business or employment" by a private party can be as coercive as other forms of coercion supporting restitution actions at common law; and that "[t]o
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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coercion supporting restitution actions at common law; and that "[t]o imperil a man's livelihood, his business enterprises, or his solvency, [was] ordinarily quite as coercive" as, for example, "detaining his property." F. Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts 218 (1913), cited in[11] *775 Jurisdiction over the present case is not contradicted by There a ground lessee wanted to demolish an antiquated auditorium and replace it with a modern commercial building. The lessee believed it had the right to do this without the lessors' consent, but was unwilling to drop the wrecking ball first and test its belief later. Because there was no declaratory-judgment act at the time under federal or applicable state law, the lessee filed an action to remove a "cloud" on its lease. This Court held that an Article III case or controversy had not arisen because "[n]o defendant ha[d] wronged the plaintiff or ha[d] threatened to do so." It was true that one of the colessors had disagreed with the lessee's interpretation of the lease, but that happened in an "informal, friendly, private conversation," a year before the lawsuit was filed; and the lessee never even bothered to approach the other colessors. The Court went on to remark that "[w]hat the plaintiff seeks is simply a declaratory judgment," and "[t]o grant that relief is beyond the power conferred upon the federal judiciary." at Had Willing been decided after the enactment (and our upholding) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and had the legal disagreement between the parties been as lively as this one, we are confident a different result would have obtained. The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.[12] Respondents assert that the parties in effect settled this dispute when they entered into the 1997 license agreement. When a licensee enters such an agreement, they contend, it essentially purchases an insurance policy, immunizing it from suits *776 for infringement so long as it continues to pay royalties and does not challenge the covered patents. Permitting it to challenge the validity of the patent without terminating or breaking the agreement alters the deal, allowing the licensee to continue enjoying its immunity while bringing a suit, the elimination of which was part of the patentee's quid pro quo. Of course even if it were valid, this argument would have no force with regard to petitioner's claim that the agreement does not call for
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Justice Scalia
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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to petitioner's claim that the agreement does not call for royalties because their product does not infringe the patent. But even as to the patent invalidity claim, the point seems to us mistaken. To begin with, it is not clear where the prohibition against challenging the validity of the patents is to be found. It can hardly be implied from the mere promise to pay royalties on patents "which have neither expired nor been held invalid by a court or other body of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal has been or may be taken," App. 399. Promising to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity. Respondents appeal to the common-law rule that a party to a contract cannot at one and the same time challenge its validity and continue to reap its benefits, citing Commodity Credit and Kingman & Lear, they contend, did not suspend that rule for patent licensing agreements, since the plaintiff in that case had already repudiated the contract. Even if Lear's repudiation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel was so limited (a point on which, as we have said earlier, we do not opine), it is hard to see how the common-law rule has any application here. Petitioner is not repudiating or impugning the contract while continuing to reap its benefits. Rather, it is asserting that the contract, properly interpreted, does not prevent it from challenging the patents, and does not require the payment of royalties because the patents do not cover its products and are invalid. Of course even if respondents were correct that the licensing agreement or the common-law rule precludes this suit, the consequence would be that respondents win this case on the meritsnot that the very genuine contract dispute disappears, so that Article III jurisdiction is somehow defeated. In short, Article III jurisdiction has nothing to do with this "insurance-policy" contention. Lastly, respondents urge us to affirm the dismissal of the declaratory-judgment claims on discretionary grounds. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party," (a) not that it must do so. This text has long been understood "to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants." ; see also Cardinal Chemical 113 S. Ct. ; We have found it "more consistent with the statute," however, "to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing on the usefulness of the
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
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first instance, because facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp." at The District Court here gave no consideration to discretionary dismissal, since, despite its "serious misgivings" about the Federal Circuit's rule, it considered *777 itself bound to dismiss by Gen-Probe. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Discretionary dismissal was irrelevant to the Federal Circuit for the same reason. Respondents have raised the issue for the first time before this Court, exchanging competing accusations of inequitable conduct with petitioner. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Genentech 42-44; Reply Brief for Petitioner 17, and n. 15. Under these circumstances, it would be imprudent for us to decide whether the District Court should, or must, decline to issue the requested declaratory relief. We leave the equitable, prudential, and policy arguments in favor of such a discretionary dismissal for the lower courts' consideration on remand. Similarly available for consideration on remand are any merits-based arguments for denial of declaratory relief. * * * We hold that petitioner was not required, insofar as Article III is concerned, to break or terminate its 1997 license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112513/minnick-v-mississippi/
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To protect the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, we have held that the police must terminate interrogation of an accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel. We reinforced the protections of Miranda in which held that once the accused requests counsel, officials may not reinitiate questioning "until counsel has been made available" to him. The issue in the case before us is whether Edwards' protection ceases once the suspect has consulted with an attorney. *148 Petitioner Robert Minnick and fellow prisoner James Dyess escaped from a county jail in Mississippi and, a day later, broke into a mobile home in search of weapons. In the course of the burglary they were interrupted by the arrival of the trailer's owner, Ellis Thomas, accompanied by Lamar Lafferty and Lafferty's infant son. Dyess and Minnick used the stolen weapons to kill Thomas and the senior Lafferty. Minnick's story is that Dyess murdered one victim and forced Minnick to shoot the other. Before the escapees could get away, two young women arrived at the mobile home. They were held at gunpoint, then bound hand and foot. Dyess and Minnick fled in Thomas' truck, abandoning the vehicle in New Orleans. The fugitives continued to Mexico, where they fought, and Minnick then proceeded alone to California. Minnick was arrested in Lemon Grove, California, on a Mississippi warrant, some four months after the murders. The confession at issue here resulted from the last interrogation of Minnick while he was held in the San Diego jail, but we first recount the events which preceded it. Minnick was arrested on Friday, August 22, 16. Petitioner testified that he was mistreated by local police during and after the arrest. The day following the arrest, Saturday, two Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents came to the jail to interview him. Petitioner testified that he refused to go to the interview, but was told he would "have to go down or else." App. 45. The FBI report indicates that the agents read petitioner his Miranda warnings, and that he acknowledged he understood his rights. He refused to sign a rights waiver form, however, and said he would not answer "very many" questions. Minnick told the agents about the jailbreak and the flight, and described how Dyess threatened and beat him. Early in the interview, he sobbed "[i]t was my life or theirs," but otherwise he hesitated to tell what happened at the trailer. The agents reminded him he did not have to answer questions without a lawyer present. According to the report, "Minnick stated `Come
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112513/minnick-v-mississippi/
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a lawyer present. According to the report, "Minnick stated `Come back Monday when I have a lawyer,' *149 and stated that he would make a more complete statement then with his lawyer present." App. 16. The FBI interview ended. After the FBI interview, an appointed attorney met with petitioner. Petitioner spoke with the lawyer on two or three occasions, though it is not clear from the record whether all of these conferences were in person. On Monday, August 25, Deputy Sheriff J. Denham of Clarke County, Mississippi, came to the San Diego jail to question Minnick. Minnick testified that his jailers again told him he would "have to talk" to Denham and that he "could not refuse." Denham advised petitioner of his rights, and petitioner again declined to sign a rights waiver form. Petitioner told Denham about the escape and then proceeded to describe the events at the mobile home. According to petitioner, Dyess jumped out of the mobile home and shot the first of the two victims, once in the back with a shotgun and once in the head with a pistol. Dyess then handed the pistol to petitioner and ordered him to shoot the other victim, holding the shotgun on petitioner until he did so. Petitioner also said that when the two girls arrived, he talked Dyess out of raping or otherwise hurting them. Minnick was tried for murder in Mississippi. He moved to suppress all statements given to the FBI or other police officers, including Denham. The trial court denied the motion with respect to petitioner's statements to Denham, but suppressed his other statements. Petitioner was convicted on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, petitioner argued that the confession to Denham was taken in violation of his rights to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the claims. With respect to the Fifth Amendment aspect of the case, the court found "the Edwards bright-line rule as to initiation" inapplicable. Relying on language in Edwards indicating that the bar on interrogating the accused after a request for counsel *150 applies "`until counsel has been made available to him,'" ibid., quoting at the court concluded that "[s]ince counsel was made available to Minnick, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied." 551 So. 2d, at The court also rejected the Sixth Amendment claim, finding that petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he spoke with Denham. at -85. We granted certiorari, and, without reaching any Sixth Amendment implications in the case, we decide that the Fifth Amendment
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112513/minnick-v-mississippi/
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implications in the case, we decide that the Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel. In at we indicated that once an individual in custody invokes his right to counsel, interrogation "must cease until an attorney is present"; at that point, "the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning." Edwards gave force to these admonitions, finding it "inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." We held that "when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." Further, an accused who requests an attorney, "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." at Edwards is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights." *151 See also The rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness, and implements the protections of Miranda in practical and straightforward terms. The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application. We have confirmed that the Edwards rule provides "`clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement profession." v. Cf. (16). Even before Edwards, we noted that Miranda's "relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the accused's request for an attorney has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis." This pre-Edwards explanation applies as well to Edwards and its progeny. v. at 681-. The Mississippi Supreme Court relied
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112513/minnick-v-mississippi/
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its progeny. v. at 681-. The Mississippi Supreme Court relied on our statement in Edwards that an accused who invokes his right to counsel "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him" 451 U.S., at We do not interpret this language to mean, as the Mississippi court thought, that the protection of Edwards terminates once counsel has consulted with the suspect. In *1 context, the requirement that counsel be "made available" to the accused refers to more than an opportunity to consult with an attorney outside the interrogation room. In Edwards, we focused on Miranda's instruction that when the accused invokes his right to counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present," 384 U. S., at agreeing with Edwards' contention that he had not waived his right "to have counsel present during custodial interrogation." In the sentence preceding the language quoted by the Mississippi Supreme Court, we referred to the "right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation," and in the sentence following, we again quoted the phrase "`interrogation must cease until an attorney is present'" from Miranda. 451 U. S., at The full sentence relied on by the Mississippi Supreme Court, moreover, says: "We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Our emphasis on counsel's presence at interrogation is not unique to Edwards. It derives from Miranda, where we said that in the cases before us "[t]he presence of counsel would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." See Our cases following Edwards have interpreted the decision to mean that the authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in counsel's absence. Writing for a plurality of the Court, for instance, then-JUSTICE REHNQUIST described the holding of *153 Edwards to be "that subsequent incriminating statements made without [Edwards'] attorney present violated the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." (19) See also v. ; (15) ("In. this Court ruled that a criminal defendant's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the use of his confession obtained by police-instigated interrogationwithout counsel presentafter
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112513/minnick-v-mississippi/
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use of his confession obtained by police-instigated interrogationwithout counsel presentafter he requested an attorney"). These descriptions of Edwards' holding are consistent with our statement that "[p]reserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of Edwards and its progeny." In our view, a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent cases demonstrates that we have interpreted the rule to bar police-initiated interrogation unless the accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning. Whatever the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. We consider our ruling to be an appropriate and necessary application of the Edwards rule. A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights, or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged. The case before us well illustrates the pressures, and abuses, that may be concomitants of custody. Petitioner testified that though he resisted, he was required to submit to both the FBI and the *154 Denham interviews. In the latter instance, the compulsion to submit to interrogation followed petitioner's unequivocal request during the FBI interview that questioning cease until counsel was present. The case illustrates also that consultation is not always effective in instructing the suspect of his rights. One plausible interpretation of the record is that petitioner thought he could keep his admissions out of evidence by refusing to sign a formal waiver of rights. If the authorities had complied with Minnick's request to have counsel present during interrogation, the attorney could have corrected Minnick's misunderstanding, or indeed counseled him that he need not make a statement at all. We decline to remove protection from police-initiated questioning based on isolated consultations with counsel who is absent when the interrogation resumes. The exception to Edwards here proposed is inconsistent with Edwards' purpose to protect the suspect's right to have counsel present at custodial interrogation. It is inconsistent as well with Miranda, where we specifically rejected respondent's theory that the opportunity to consult with one's attorney would substantially counteract the compulsion created by custodial interrogation. We noted in Miranda that "[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Thus the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,990 | 4 |
majority
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112513/minnick-v-mississippi/
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the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." The exception proposed, furthermore, would undermine the advantages flowing from Edwards' "clear and unequivocal" character. Respondent concedes that even after consultation with counsel, a second request for counsel should reinstate the Edwards protection. We are invited by this formulation to adopt a regime in which Edwards' protection could pass in and out of existence multiple times prior to arraignment, *155 at which point the same protection might reattach by virtue of our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, see (16). Vagaries of this sort spread confusion through the justice system and lead to a consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional principle. In addition, adopting the rule proposed would leave far from certain the sort of consultation required to displace Edwards. Consultation is not a precise concept, for it may encompass variations from a telephone call to say that the attorney is en route, to a hurried interchange between the attorney and client in a detention facility corridor, to a lengthy in-person conference in which the attorney gives full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might be covered in further interrogations. And even with the necessary scope of consultation settled, the officials in charge of the case would have to confirm the occurrence and, possibly, the extent of consultation to determine whether further interrogation is permissible. The necessary inquiries could interfere with the attorney-client privilege. Added to these difficulties in definition and application of the proposed rule is our concern over its consequence that the suspect whose counsel is prompt would lose the protection of Edwards, while the one whose counsel is dilatory would not. There is more than irony to this result. There is a strong possibility that it would distort the proper conception of the attorney's duty to the client and set us on a course at odds with what ought to be effective representation. Both waiver of rights and admission of guilt are consistent with the affirmation of individual responsibility that is a principle of the criminal justice system. It does not detract from this principle, however, to insist that neither admissions nor waivers are effective unless there are both particular and systemic assurances that the coercive pressures of custody were not the inducing cause. The Edwards rule sets forth a specific standard to fulfill these purposes, and we have declined *156 to confine it in other instances. See v. It would detract from the efficacy of the
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Justice Douglas
| 1,970 | 10 |
dissenting
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Cole v. Richardson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108095/cole-v-richardson/
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The plaintiff Richardson brought this action before a three-judge District Court to declare unconstitutional a Massachusetts loyalty oath statute, to enjoin her superiors at the Boston State Hospital from prohibiting her from discharging her duties at the hospital, and to recover back pay. The District Court entered its opinion, granting the declaratory and injunctive relief but denying the claim for back pay, on June 26, 1969. Appellants in No. 679 filed a notice of appeal from the grant of injunctive and declaratory relief in the District Court on July 30, 1969, and docketed a timely appeal in this Court on September 29, 1969. Notice of appeal from the denial of back pay was filed in No. 774 in the District Court on August 25, 1969, and a timely appeal was docketed in this Court on October 24, 1969. On October 25, 1969, appellee in No. 679 filed a motion to affirm or dismiss on the grounds of mootness: "At the time this case was heard and argued in the district court the appellee's job at Boston State Hospital was still in existence, but at or before the time the appellants filed their present appeal such job had been discontinued." In reply, appellants in No. 679 deny that the case is *242 moot and in support thereof submit an affidavit of Dr. Cole, Superintendent of the Boston State Hospital, which states: "1. At all times subsequent to the decision of the United States District Court in the above-entitled case on June 26, 1969 it has been, and at the present time is, open for the appellee Lucretia Peteros Richardson to apply for employment at Boston State Hospital and enjoy full consideration pursuant to the terms of the decision of the District Court; "2. Employment consonant with her abilities and qualifications has been and is periodically available should she wish to apply for such employment; "3. The project for which the appellee was hired is still on-going at Boston State Hospital." I do not see how one can even arguably maintain that the cases are moot. The question tendered is an important one. The state oath struck down by the District Court on the grounds of vagueness reads as follows: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants “the owner of copyright under this title” certain “exclusive rights,” including the right “to distribute copies of the copy righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership.” 17 U.S. C. These rights are quali fied, however, by the application of various limitations set forth in the next several sections of the Act, through 122. Those sections, typically entitled “Limitations on exclusive rights,” include, for example, the principle of “fair use” permission for limited library archival reproduction, and the doctrine at issue here, the “first sale” doctrine Section 109(a) sets forth the “first sale” doctrine as follows: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the section that grants the owner exclusive distribution rights], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or other wise dispose of the possession of that copy or 2 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court phonorecord.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, even though forbids distribution of a copy of, say, the copyrighted novel Herzog without the copyright owner’s permission, adds that, once a copy of Her- zog has been lawfully sold (or its ownership otherwise lawfully transferred), the buyer of that copy and subse quent owners are free to dispose of it as they wish. In copyright jargon, the “first sale” has “exhausted” the copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right. What, however, if the copy of Herzog was printed abroad and then initially sold with the copyright owner’s permis sion? Does the “first sale” doctrine still apply? Is the buyer, like the buyer of a domestically manufactured copy, free to bring the copy into the United States and dispose of it as he or she wishes? To put the matter technically, an “importation” provi sion, says that “[i]mportation into the United States, without the au thority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies under section 106” 17 U.S. C. (2006 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). Thus makes clear that importing a copy without permission violates the owner’s exclusive distri- bution right. ut in doing so, refers explicitly to the exclusive distribution right. As we have just said, is by its terms “[s]ubject to” the various doc trines and principles contained in through 122, in- cluding ’s “first sale” limitation. Do those same modifications apply—in particular, does the “first sale” modification apply—when considering whether prohibits importing
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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does the “first sale” modification apply—when considering whether prohibits importing a copy? In Quality Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court Int’l, Inc., we held that ’s reference to ’s exclusive distribution right incorporates the later subsections’ limitations, in cluding, in particular, the “first sale” doctrine of Thus, it might seem that, notwithstanding, one who buys a copy abroad can freely import that copy into the United States and dispose of it, just as he could had he bought the copy in the United ut Quality considered an instance in which the copy, though purchased abroad, was initially manufac tured in the United States (and then sent abroad and sold). This case is like Quality but for one important fact. The copies at issue here were manufactured abroad. That fact is important because says that the “first sale” doctrine applies to “a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title.” And we must decide here whether the five words, “lawfully made under this title,” make a critical legal difference. Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the “first sale” doctrine applies to protect a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. Can that buyer bring that copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, someone who purchases, say at a used bookstore, a book printed abroad subsequently resell it without the copyright owner’s permission? In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. We hold that the “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. I A Respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., publishes aca demic s. Wiley obtains from its authors various foreign and domestic copyright assignments, licenses and 4 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court permissions—to the point that we can, for present pur poses, refer to Wiley as the relevant American copyright owner. See Wiley often assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language s abroad. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a–48a. Each copy of a Wiley Asia foreign edition will likely contain language making clear that the copy is to be sold only in a particular country or geograph ical region outside the United For example, a copy of Wiley’s American edition says, “Copyright © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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“Copyright © John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.” J. Fundamentals of Physics, p. vi A copy of Wiley Asia’s Asian edition of that book says: “Copyright © John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd[.] All rights reserved. This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East only and may be not exported out of these territories. Ex portation from or importation of this book to another region without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The Pub lisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. Printed in Asia.” J. Fundamentals of Physics, p. vi (8th ed. Wiley Int’l Student ed.). oth the foreign and the American copies say: “No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means except as permitted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act.” Compare, e.g., with at vi (American ed.). The upshot is that there are two essentially equivalent versions of a Wiley each ver Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court sion manufactured and sold with Wiley’s permission: (1) an American version printed and sold in the United States, and (2) a foreign version manufactured and sold abroad. And Wiley makes certain that copies of the second version state that they are not to be taken (without per mission) into the United Petitioner, Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the United States in 1997 to study mathemat ics at Cornell University. He paid for his educa tion with the help of a Thai Government scholarship which required him to teach in Thailand for 10 years on his return. rief for Petitioner 7. Kirtsaeng successfully completed his undergraduate courses at Cornell, success fully completed a Ph. D. program in mathematics at the University of Southern California, and then, as promised, returned to Thailand to teach. While he was study ing in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked his friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition English language s at Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him in the United at 7–8. Kirtsaeng would then sell them, reimburse his family and friends, and keep the profit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a–49a. In Wiley brought this federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for copyright Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation of its books and his later resale of those books amounted to an infringement
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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his later resale of those books amounted to an infringement of Wiley’s exclusive right to dis tribute as well as related import prohibition. 17 U.S. C. § (2006 ed.), 602(a) (2006 ed., Supp. V). See also (2006 ed.) (authorizing infringement action). App. 204–211. Kirtsaeng replied that the books he had acquired were “ ‘lawfully made’ ” and that he had acquired them legitimately. Record in No. 1:08–CV–4–DCP 6 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court (SDNY), Doc. 14, p. 3. Thus, in his view, ’s “first sale” doctrine permitted him to resell or otherwise dispose of the books without the copyright owner’s further permis sion. at 2–3. The District Court held that Kirtsaeng could not assert the “first sale” defense because, in its view, that doctrine does not apply to “foreign-manufactured goods” (even if made abroad with the copyright owner’s permission). App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a. The jury then found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s American copyrights by selling and importing without authorization copies of eight of Wiley’s copyrighted titles. And it assessed statutory damages of $600,000 ($75,000 per work). 654 F.3d, at 215. On appeal, a split panel of the Second Circuit agreed with the District Court. It pointed out that ’s “first sale” doctrine applies only to “the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title.” at 218–219 And, in the majority’s view, this language means that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufac tured abroad. A dissenting judge thought that the words “lawfully made under this title” do not refer “to a place of manufacture” but rather “focu[s] on whether a particular copy was manufactured lawfully under” Amer- ica’s copyright statute, and that “the lawfulness of the manufacture of a particular copy should be judged by U. S. copyright law.” We granted Kirtsaeng’s petition for certiorari to con- sider this question in light of different views among the Circuits. Compare (“first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside the United States), with Omega S. (“first sale” doctrine applies to copies manufactured outside the United States only if an authorized first sale occurs within the United Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court States), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 562 U. S. (2010), and Sebastian Int’l, (limita tion of the first sale doctrine to copies made within the United States “does not fit comfortably within the scheme of the Copyright Act”). II We must decide whether the words “lawfully made under this title” restrict the
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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whether the words “lawfully made under this title” restrict the scope of ’s “first sale” doctrine geographically. The Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, Wiley, and the Solicitor General (as amicus) all read those words as imposing a form of geographical limi tation. The Second Circuit held that they limit the “first sale” doctrine to particular copies “made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law,” which (the Circuit says) are copies “manufactured domestically,” not “outside of the United ” 654 F.3d, –222 Wiley agrees that those five words limit the “first sale” doctrine “to copies made in conformance with the [United States] Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is appli cable,” which (Wiley says) means it does not apply to copies made “outside the United States” and at least not to “for eign production of a copy for distribution exclusively abroad.” rief for Respondent 15–16. Similarly, the Solicitor General says that those five words limit the “first sale” doctrine’s applicability to copies “ ‘made subject to and in compliance with [the Copyright Act],’ ” which (the Solicitor General says) are copies “made in the United ” rief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5 (hereinafter rief for United States) And the Ninth Circuit has held that those words limit the “first sale” doctrine’s applicability (1) to copies lawfully made in the United States, and (2) to copies lawfully made outside the United States but initially sold in the United States with the copyright owner’s permission. Denbicare 8 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court U. S. 1149–1150 (1996). Under any of these geographical interpretations, ’s “first sale” doctrine would not apply to the Wiley Asia books at issue here. And, despite an American copy right owner’s permission to make copies abroad, one who buys a copy of any such book or other copyrighted work— whether at a retail store, over the Internet, or at a library sale—could not resell (or otherwise dispose of) that partic ular copy without further permission. Kirtsaeng, however, reads the words “lawfully made under this title” as imposing a non-geographical limita tion. He says that they mean made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. rief for Peti tioner 26. In that case, ’s “first sale” doctrine would apply to copyrighted works as long as their manu facture met the requirements of American copyright law. In particular, the doctrine would apply where, as here, copies are manufactured abroad with the permission of the copyright owner. See (referring to the owner’s right to authorize). In our view, ’s language,
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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the owner’s right to authorize). In our view, ’s language, its context, and the common-law history of the “first sale” doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation. We also doubt that Congress would have intended to create the practical copyright-related harms with which a geograph ical interpretation would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities. See Part II– D, infra. We consequently conclude that Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical reading is the better reading of the Act. A The language of read literally favors Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical interpretation, namely, that “lawfully made under this title” means made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. The language of Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court says nothing about geography. The word “under” can mean “[i]n accordance with.” 18 Oxford English Dic tionary 950 (2d ed. 1989). See also lack’s Law 1525 (6th ed. 1990) (“according to”). And a nongeograph ical interpretation provides each word of the five-word phrase with a distinct purpose. The first two words of the phrase, “lawfully made,” suggest an effort to distinguish those copies that were made lawfully from those that were not, and the last three words, “under this title,” set forth the standard of “lawful[ness].” Thus, the nongeograph- ical reading is simple, it promotes a traditional copyright objective (combatting piracy), and it makes word-by-word linguistic sense. The geographical interpretation, however, bristles with linguistic difficulties. It gives the word “lawfully” little, if any, linguistic work to do. (How could a book be unlaw fully “made under this title”?) It imports geography into a statutory provision that says nothing explicitly about it. And it is far more complex than may at first appear. To read the clause geographically, Wiley, like the Sec ond Circuit and the Solicitor General, must first empha size the word “under.” Indeed, Wiley reads “under this title” to mean “in conformance with the Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable.” rief for Respond ent 15. Wiley must then take a second step, arguing that the Act “is applicable” only in the United And the Solicitor General must do the same. See rief for United States 6 (“A copy is ‘lawfully made under this title’ if Title 17 governs the copy’s creation and the copy is made in compliance with Title 17’s requirements”). See also post, at 7 (GINSURG, J., dissenting) (“under” describes something “governed or regulated by another”). One difficulty is that neither “under” nor any other word in the phrase means “where.” See, e.g., 18 Oxford English 47–952 (definition of “un der”). It might mean “subject to,”
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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47–952 (definition of “un der”). It might mean “subject to,” see post, at 6, but as this 10 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court Court has repeatedly acknowledged, the word evades a uniform, consistent meaning. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 245 (2010) (“ ‘under’ is chameleon”); Ardestani v. INS, (“under” has “many dic tionary definitions” and “must draw its meaning from its context”). A far more serious difficulty arises out of the uncer tainty and complexity surrounding the second step’s effort to read the necessary geographical limitation into the word “applicable” (or the equivalent). Where, precisely, is the Copyright Act “applicable”? The Act does not instantly protect an American copyright holder from unauthorized piracy taking place abroad. ut that fact does not mean the Act is inapplicable to copies made abroad. As a matter of ordinary English, one can say that a statute imposing, say, a tariff upon “any rhododendron grown in Nepal” applies to all Nepalese rhododendrons. And, similarly, one can say that the American Copyright Act is applicable to all pirated copies, including those printed overseas. Indeed, the Act itself makes clear that (in the Solicitor General’s language) foreign-printed pirated copies are “sub ject to” the Act. (2006 ed., Supp. V) (refer ring to importation of copies “the making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable”); rief for United States 5. See also post, at 6 (suggesting that “made under” may be read as “subject to”). The appropriateness of this linguistic usage is under scored by the fact that of the Act itself says that works “subject to protection under this title” include un published works “without regard to the nationality or domicile of the author,” and works “first published” in any one of the nearly 180 nations that have signed a copyright treaty with the United §(a), (b) (2006 ed.) ; (2006 ed., Supp. V) (defining Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court “treaty party”); U. S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 38A, International Copyright Relations of the United States (2010). Thus, ordinary English permits us to say that the Act “applies” to an Irish manuscript lying in its author’s Dublin desk drawer as well as to an original recording of a ballet performance first made in Japan and now on display in a Kyoto art gallery. 4 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright pp. 17–18, 17–19 (2012) (herein after Nimmer on Copyright) (noting that the principle that “copyright laws do
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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on Copyright) (noting that the principle that “copyright laws do not have any extraterritorial operation” “requires some qualification”). The Ninth Circuit’s geographical interpretation pro- duces still greater linguistic difficulty. As we said, that Cir cuit interprets the “first sale” doctrine to cover both (1) copies manufactured in the United States and (2) copies manufactured abroad but first sold in the United States with the American copyright owner’s permission. Den bicare U. S. –1150. See also rief for Respondent 16 (suggesting that the clause at least excludes “the foreign production of a copy for distribution exclusively abroad”); (the Court need “not de- cide whether the copyright owner would be able to restrict further distribution” in the case of “a downstream domes tic purchaser of authorized imports”); rief for Petitioner in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S. O. T. 2010, No. 08–1423, p. 12 (excepting imported copies “made by unrelated foreign copyright holders” (emphasis deleted)). We can understand why the Ninth Circuit may have thought it necessary to add the second part of its defini tion. As we shall later describe, see Part II–D, infra, without some such qualification a copyright holder could prevent a buyer from domestically reselling or even giving away copies of a video game made in Japan, a film made in Germany, or a dress fabric (with a design copyright) made in China, even if the copyright holder has granted permis sion for the foreign manufacture, importation, and an initial 12 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court domestic sale of the copy. A publisher such as Wiley would be free to print its books abroad, allow their im- portation and sale within the United States, but prohibit students from later selling their used texts at a campus bookstore. We see no way, however, to reconcile this half geographical/half-nongeographical interpretation with the language of the phrase, “lawfully made under this title.” As a matter of English, it would seem that those five words either do cover copies lawfully made abroad or they do not. In sum, we believe that geographical interpretations create more linguistic problems than they resolve. And considerations of simplicity and coherence tip the purely linguistic balance in Kirtsaeng’s, nongeographical, favor. oth historical and contemporary statutory context in dicate that Congress, when writing the present version of did not have geography in mind. In respect to history, we compare ’s present language with the language of its immediate predecessor. That predecessor said: “[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, pre vent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
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vent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copy righted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.” Copyright Act of 1909, See also Copyright Act of 1947, The predecessor says nothing about geography (and Wiley does not argue that it does). So we ask whether Congress, in changing its language implicitly introduced a geograph ical limitation that previously was lacking. See also Part II–C, infra (discussing 1909 codification of common-law principle). A comparison of language indicates that it did not. The Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court predecessor says that the “first sale” doctrine protects “the transfer of any copy the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.” The present version says that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title is entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” What does this change in language accomplish? The language of the former version referred to those who are not owners of a copy, but mere possessors who “lawfully obtained” a copy. The present version covers only those who are owners of a “lawfully made” copy. Whom does the change leave out? Who might have law- fully obtained a copy of a copyrighted work but not owned that copy? One answer is owners of movie theaters, who during the 1970’s (and before) often leased films from movie distributors or filmmakers. See S. Donahue, American Film Distribution 134, 177 (1987) (describing producer-distributer and distributer-exhibitor agreements); Note, The Relationship etween Motion Picture Distribu tion and Exhibition: An Analysis of the Effects of Anti- lind idding Legislation, 9 Comm/Ent. L. J. 131, (1). ecause the theater owners had “lawfully ob tained” their copies, the earlier version could be read as allowing them to sell that copy, i.e., it might have given them “first sale” protection. ecause the theater owners were lessees, not owners, of their copies, the change in language makes clear that they (like bailees and other lessees) cannot take advantage of the “first sale” doctrine. (Those who find legislative history useful will find confir mation in, e.g., House Committee on the Judiciary, Copy right Law Revision, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copy right Law: 1965 Revision ill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, p. 30 (Comm. Print 1965) (hereinafter Copyright Law Revision) (“[W]here a person has rented a print of a mo tion picture from the copyright owner, he would have no 14 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of
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14 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court right to lend, rent, sell, or otherwise dispose of the print without first obtaining the copyright owner’s permission”). See also Platt & Munk (pointing out predecessor statute’s leasing problem)). This objective perfectly well explains the new language of the present version, including the five words here at issue. Section 109(a) now makes clear that a lessee of a copy will not receive “first sale” protection but one who owns a copy will receive “first sale” protection, provided, of course, that the copy was “lawfully made” and not pi rated. The new language also takes into account that a copy may be “lawfully made under this title” when the copy, say of a phonorecord, comes into its owner’s possession through use of a compulsory license, which “this title” provides for elsewhere, namely, in Again, for those who find legislative history useful, the relevant legislative report makes this clear. H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 79 (1976) (“For example, any resale of an illegally ‘pirated’ phonorecord would be an infringement, but the disposition of a phonorecord legally made under the compulsory li censing provisions of section 115 would not”). Other provisions of the present statute also support a nongeographical interpretation. For one thing, the stat ute phases out the “manufacturing clause,” a clause that appeared in earlier statutes and had limited importation of many copies (of copyrighted works) printed outside the United (“Prior to July 1, 1982 the importation into or public distribution in the United States of copies of a work consisting preponderantly of nondramatic literary material is prohibited unless the portions consisting of such material have been manufac- tured in the United States or Canada”). The phasing out of this clause sought to equalize treatment of copies manu factured in America and copies manufactured abroad. See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 165–166. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court The “equal treatment” principle, however, is difficult to square with a geographical interpretation of the “first sale” clause that would grant the holder of an American copyright (perhaps a foreign national, see ) permanent control over the American distribution chain (sales, resales, gifts, and other distribution) in respect to copies printed abroad but not in respect to copies printed in America. And it is particularly difficult to believe that Congress would have sought this unequal treatment while saying nothing about it and while, in a related clause (the manufacturing phase-out), seeking the opposite kind of policy goal. Golan v. Holder, 565 U. S. (2012)
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of policy goal. Golan v. Holder, 565 U. S. (2012) (slip op., at 30) (Congress has moved from a copyright regime that, prior to 1891, entirely excluded foreign works from U. S. copyright protection to a regime that now “en sure[s] that most works, whether foreign or domestic, would be governed by the same legal regime” (emphasis added)). Finally, we normally presume that the words “lawfully made under this title” carry the same meaning when they appear in different but related sections. Department of Revenue of 342 (1994). ut doing so here produces surprising conse quences. Consider: (1) Section 109(c) says that, despite the copyright own er’s exclusive right “to display” a copyrighted work (provided in (5)), the owner of a particular copy “law- fully made under this title” may publicly display it with out further authorization. To interpret these words geographically would mean that one who buys a copy righted work of art, a poster, or even a bumper sticker, in Canada, in Europe, in Asia, could not display it in America without the copyright owner’s further authorization. 16 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court (2) Section 109(e) specifically provides that the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted video arcade game “lawfully made under this title” may “publicly perform or display that game in coin-operated equipment” with out the authorization of the copyright owner. To inter pret these words geographically means that an arcade owner could not (“without the authority of the copyright owner”) perform or display arcade games (whether new or used) originally made in Japan. Red aron- Franklin Park, (CA4 1989). (3) Section 110(1) says that a teacher, without the copy right owner’s authorization, is allowed to perform or display a copyrighted work (say, an audiovisual work) “in the course of face-to-face teaching activities”—unless the teacher knowingly used “a copy that was not law- fully made under this title.” To interpret these words geographically would mean that the teacher could not (without further authorization) use a copy of a film dur ing class if the copy was lawfully made in Canada, Mex ico, Europe, Africa, or Asia. (4) In its introductory sentence, provides the Act’s basic exclusive rights to an “owner of a copyright under this title.” The last three words cannot support a geo graphic interpretation. Wiley basically accepts the first three readings, but ar- gues that Congress intended the restrictive consequences. And it argues that context simply requires that the words of the fourth example receive a different interpretation. Leaving the fourth example to the side, we shall
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interpretation. Leaving the fourth example to the side, we shall explain in Part II–D, infra, why we find it unlikely that Congress would have intended these, and other related consequences. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of the Court C A relevant canon of statutory interpretation favors a nongeographical reading. “[W]hen a statute covers an is- sue previously governed by the common law,” we must pre- sume that “Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. n. 13 (2010) (slip op., n. 13). See also Isbrandtsen (“Statutes which invade the common law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long established and familiar principles, except when a statu- tory purpose to the contrary is evident”). The “first sale” doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree. In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels. Referring to Lit tleton, who wrote in the 15th century, Gray, Two Contri butions to Coke Studies, 1 (2005), Lord Coke wrote: “[If] a man be possessed of a horse, or of any other chattell and give or sell his whole interest therein upon condition that the Donee or Vendee shall not alien[ate] the same, the [condition] is voi[d], be cause his whole interest is out of him, so as he hath no possibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it is against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man and man: and it is within the reason of our Author that it should ouster him of all power given to him.” 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England p. 223 (1628). A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other disposition of a chattel once sold is simi- larly “against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and con- tracting.” With these last few words, Coke emphasizes the im 18 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court portance of leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods. American law too has generally thought that com petition, including freedom to resell, can work to the ad vantage of the consumer. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, (restraints with “manifestly anticompetitive effects” are per se illegal; others are subject to the rule of reason (internal quotation marks omitted)); 1 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶100, p. 4 (“[T]he principal objective of antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by
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objective of antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively”). The “first sale” doctrine also frees courts from the ad ministrative burden of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods. And it avoids the selective enforcement inherent in any such effort. Thus, it is not surprising that for at least a century the “first sale” doctrine has played an important role in American copy right law. See obbs-Merrill (1908); Copyright Act of 1909, See also Copyright Law Revision, Further Discussions and Com ments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, p. 212 (Comm. Print 1964) (Irwin Karp of Authors’ League of America express ing concern for “the very basic concept of copyright law that, once you’ve sold a copy legally, you can’t restrict its resale”). The common-law doctrine makes no geographical dis tinctions; nor can we find any in obbs-Merrill (where this Court first applied the “first sale” doctrine) or in ’s predecessor provision, which Congress enacted a year later. See Rather, as the Solicitor General acknowledges, “a straightforward application of obbs- Merrill” would not preclude the “first sale” defense from applying to authorized copies made overseas. rief for Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 19 Opinion of the Court United States 27. And we can find no language, context, purpose, or history that would rebut a “straightforward application” of that doctrine here. The dissent argues that another principle of statutory interpretation works against our reading, and points out that elsewhere in the statute Congress used different words to express something like the non-geographical reading we adopt. Post, at 8–9 (quoting (prohib iting the importation of copies “the making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable” (emphasis deleted))). Hence, Con gress, the dissent believes, must have meant ’s different language to mean something different (such as the dissent’s own geographical interpretation of ). We are not aware, however, of any canon of interpretation that forbids interpreting different words used in different parts of the same statute to mean roughly the same thing. Regardless, were there such a canon, the dissent’s inter pretation of would also violate it. That is because Congress elsewhere in the 1976 Act included the words “manufactured in the United States or Canada,” 90 Stat. 2588, which express just about the same geographical thought that the dissent reads into ’s very different language. D Associations of libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums point
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libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums point to various ways in which a geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional copyright objec tives, in particular “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 8. The American Library Association tells us that library collections contain at least 200 million books published abroad (presumably, many were first published in one of 20 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court the nearly 180 copyright-treaty nations and enjoy Ameri can copyright protection under 17 U.S. C. see ); that many others were first published in the United States but printed abroad because of lower costs; and that a geographical interpretation will likely require the li- braries to obtain permission (or at least create significant uncertainty) before circulating or otherwise distributing these books. rief for American Library Association et al. as Amici Curiae 4, 15–20. at 16–20, 28 (discussing limitations of potential defenses, including the fair use and archival exceptions, –108). See also Library and ook Trade Almanac 511 (D. ogart ed., 55th ed. 2010) (during 2000–2009 “a significant amount of book printing moved to foreign nations”). How, the American Library Association asks, are the libraries to obtain permission to distribute these millions of books? How can they find, say, the copyright owner of a foreign book, perhaps written decades ago? They may not know the copyright holder’s present address. rief for American Library Association 15 (many books lack indica tion of place of manufacture; “no practical way to learn where [a] book was printed”). And, even where addresses can be found, the costs of finding them, contacting owners, and negotiating may be high indeed. Are the libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the millions of books in their collections that were printed abroad? Used-book dealers tell us that, from the time when enjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson built commer cial and personal libraries of foreign books, American readers have bought used books published and printed abroad. rief for Powell’s ooks Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (citing M. Stern, Antiquarian ookselling in the United States (1985)). The dealers say that they have “operat[ed] for centuries” under the assumption that the “first sale” doctrine applies. rief for Powell’s ooks 7. ut under a geographical interpretation a contemporary Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 21 Opinion of the Court tourist who buys, say, at Shakespeare and Co. (in Paris), a dozen copies of a foreign book for American friends might find that she had violated the copyright law. The
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might find that she had violated the copyright law. The used book dealers cannot easily predict what the foreign copy right holder may think about a reader’s effort to sell a used copy of a novel. And they believe that a geographical interpretation will injure a large portion of the used-book business. Technology companies tell us that “automobiles, micro waves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers” contain copyrightable software programs or packaging. rief for Public Knowledge et al. as Amici Curiae 10. See also rief for Association of Service and Computer Dealers International, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 2. Many of these items are made abroad with the American copyright holder’s permission and then sold and imported (with that permission) to the United rief for Retail Litigation Center, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 4. A geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car, without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of copyrighted automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that foreign auto manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of permis sion from their software component suppliers, and Wiley did not indicate to the contrary when asked. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30. Without that permission a foreign car owner could not sell his or her used car. Retailers tell us that over $2.3 trillion worth of for- eign goods were imported in rief for Retail Litiga tion Center 8. American retailers buy many of these goods after a first sale abroad. And, many of these items bear, carry, or contain copyrighted “packaging, logos, labels, and product inserts and instructions for [the use of] everyday packaged goods from floor cleaners and health and beauty products to breakfast cereals.” at 10–11. The retailers add that American sales of more 22 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court traditional copyrighted works, “such as books, recorded music, motion pictures, and magazines” likely amount to over $220 billion. See also (electronic game industry is $16 billion). A geographical interpreta tion would subject many, if not all, of them to the disrup tive impact of the threat of infringement suits. Art museum directors ask us to consider their efforts to display foreign-produced works by, say, Cy Twombly, René Magritte, Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, and others. See (describing how often makes such works “subject to” American copyright protection). A geograph ical interpretation, they say, would require the museums to obtain permission from the copyright owners before they could display the work, see at 15—even if the copyright owner has already sold or
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at 15—even if the copyright owner has already sold or donated the work to a foreign museum. rief for Association of Art Museum Directors et al. as Amici Curiae 10–11. What are the museums to do, they ask, if the artist retained the copy right, if the artist cannot be found, or if a group of heirs is arguing about who owns which copyright? These examples, and others previously mentioned, help explain why Lord Coke considered the “first sale” doctrine necessary to protect “Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting,” and they help explain why American copyright law has long applied that doctrine. at 17–18. Neither Wiley nor any of its many amici deny that a geographical interpretation could bring about these “hor ribles”—at least in principle. Rather, Wiley essentially says that the list is artificially invented. rief for Re spondent 51–52. It points out that a federal court first adopted a geographical interpretation more than 30 years ago. CS, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (ED Pa. 1983), summarily aff ’d, 738 F.2d 424 (CA3 1984) (table). Yet, it adds, these problems have not occurred. Why not? ecause, says Wiley, the prob Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 23 Opinion of the Court lems and threats are purely theoretical; they are unlikely to reflect reality. See also post, at 30–31. We are less sanguine. For one thing, the law has not been settled for long in Wiley’s favor. The Second Circuit, in its decision below, is the first Court of Appeals to adopt a purely geographical interpretation. The Third Circuit has favored a nongeographical interpretation. Sebastian Int’l, The Ninth Circuit has favored a modified geographical interpretation with a nongeograph ical (but textually unsustainable) corollary designed to diminish the problem. Denbicare U. S. See at 11–12. And other courts have hesitated to adopt, and have cast doubt upon, the validity of the geo graphical interpretation. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407 (SDNY 2009); Red-aron Franklin Park, No. 88–0156–A, WL 167344, rev’d on other grounds, (CA4 1989). For another thing, reliance upon the “first sale” doctrine is deeply embedded in the practices of those, such as book sellers, libraries, museums, and retailers, who have long relied upon its protection. Museums, for example, are not in the habit of asking their foreign counterparts to check with the heirs of copyright owners before sending, e.g., a Picasso on tour. rief for Association of Art Mu seum Directors 11–12. That inertia means a dramatic change is likely necessary before these institutions, in structed by their
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is likely necessary before these institutions, in structed by their counsel, would begin to engage in the complex permission-verifying process that a geographical interpretation would demand. And this Court’s adoption of the geographical interpretation could provide that dramatic change. These intolerable consequences (along with the absurd result that the copyright owner can ex- ercise downstream control even when it authorized the import or first sale) have understandably led the Ninth Circuit, the Solicitor General as amicus, and the dissent to 24 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court adopt textual readings of the statute that attempt to mitigate these harms. rief for United States 27–28; post, at 24–28. ut those readings are not defensible, for they require too many unprecedented jumps over linguis tic and other hurdles that in our view are insurmountable. See, e.g., post, at 26 (acknowledging that its reading of “significantly curtails the independent effect of ”). Finally, the fact that harm has proved limited so far may simply reflect the reluctance of copyright holders so far to assert geographically based resale rights. They may decide differently if the law is clarified in their favor. Regardless, a copyright law that can work in practice only if unenforced is not a sound copyright law. It is a law that would create uncertainty, would bring about selective enforcement, and, if widely unenforced, would breed disre spect for copyright law itself. Thus, we believe that the practical problems that peti tioner and his amici have described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come about for us to dismiss them as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever growing importance of foreign trade to America. See The World ank, Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) (imports in 18% of U. S. gross domestic product compared to 11% in 1980), online at http:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS? (as visited Mar. 15, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The upshot is that copyright-related consequences along with language, context, and interpretive canons argue strongly against a geographical interpretation of III Wiley and the dissent make several additional impor tant arguments in favor of the geographical interpretation. First, they say that our Quality decision strongly supports its geographical interpretation. In that case Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 25 Opinion of the Court we asked whether the Act’s “importation provision,” now (then barred importation (without permission) of a copyrighted item (labels affixed to hair care products) where an American copyright owner au thorized the first sale and export of hair care products with copyrighted labels made in
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export of hair care products with copyrighted labels made in the United States, and where a buyer sought to import them back into the United States without the copyright owner’s permission. 523 U.S., at 138–139. We held that the importation provision did not prohibit sending the products back into the United States (without the copyright owner’s permission). That section says: “Importation into the United States, without the au thority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phono records under section 106.” 17 U.S. C. (2006 ed., Supp. V) See also (1994 ed.). We pointed out that this section makes importation an infringement of the “exclusive right to distribute under 106.” We noted that ’s “first sale” doctrine limits the scope of the exclusive distribution right. We took as given the fact that the products at issue had at least once been sold. And we held that consequently, importa tion of the copyrighted labels does not violate 523 U.S., at In reaching this conclusion we endorsed obbs-Merrill and its statement that the copyright laws were not “in tended to create a right which would permit the holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it.” 210 U.S., at 26 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court 349–350. We also explained why we rejected the claim that our interpretation would make pointless. Those advancing that claim had pointed out that the 1976 Copy right Act amendments retained a prior anti-piracy provi sion, prohibiting the importation of pirated copies. Qual ity 6. Thus, they said, must prohibit the importation of lawfully made copies, for to allow the importation of those lawfully made copies after a first sale, as Quality ’s holding would do, would leave without much to prohibit. It would become superfluous, without any real work to do. We do not believe that this argument is a strong one. Under Quality ’s interpretation, would still forbid importing (without permission, and subject to the exceptions in (3)) copies lawfully made abroad, for example, where (1) a foreign publisher operating as the licensee of an American publisher prints copies of a book overseas but, prior to any authorized sale, seeks to send them to the United States; (2) a foreign printer or other
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to the United States; (2) a foreign printer or other manufacturer (if not the “owner” for purposes of e.g., before an authorized sale) sought to send copyrighted goods to the United States; (3) “a book publisher trans ports copies to a wholesaler” and the wholesaler (not yet the owner) sends them to the United States, see Copyright Law Revision, pt. 4, at 211 (giving this example); or (4) a foreign film distributor, having leased films for distri bution, or any other licensee, consignee, or bailee sought to send them to the United See, e.g., 2 Nimmer on Copyright at 8–159 (“Section 109(a) pro vides that the distribution right may be exercised solely with respect to the initial disposition of copies of a work, not to prevent or restrict the resale or other further trans fer of possession of such copies”). These examples show that retains significance. We concede it has less significance than the dissent believes appropriate, but the Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 27 Opinion of the Court dissent also adopts a construction of that “signifi cantly curtails” ’s effect, post, at 26, and so limits the scope of that provision to a similar, or even greater, degree. In Quality we rejected the “superfluous” argument for similar reasons. ut, when rejecting it, we said that, where an author gives exclusive American distribution rights to an American publisher and exclusive ritish distribution rights to a ritish publisher, “presumably only those [copies] made by the publisher of the United States edition would be ‘lawfully made under this title’ within the meaning of” 523 U.S., 8 (empha sis added). Wiley now argues that this phrase in the Quality opinion means that books published abroad (under license) must fall outside the words “lawfully made under this title” and that we have consequently already given those words the geographical interpretation that it favors. We cannot, however, give the Quality statement the legal weight for which Wiley argues. The language “lawfully made under this title” was not at issue in Qual ity ; the point before us now was not then fully argued; we did not canvas the considerations we have here set forth; we there said nothing to suggest that the example assumes a “first sale”; and we there hedged our state- ment with the word “presumably.” Most importantly, the statement is pure dictum. It is dictum contained in a rebuttal to a counterargument. And it is unnecessary dictum even in that respect. Is the Court having once written dicta calling a tomato a vegetable bound to deny that it is a fruit
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a vegetable bound to deny that it is a fruit forever after? To the contrary, we have written that we are not neces sarily bound by dicta should more complete argument demonstrate that the dicta is not correct. Central Va. Community (“[W]e are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in 28 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court which the point now at issue was not fully debated”); Humphrey’s 627–628 (1935) (rejecting, under stare decisis, dicta, “which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling”). And, given the bit part that our Quality statement played in our Quality decision, we believe the view of stare decisis set forth in these opinions applies to the matter now before us. Second, Wiley and the dissent argue (to those who con sider legislative history) that the Act’s legislative history supports their interpretation. ut the historical events to which it points took place more than a decade before the enactment of the Act and, at best, are inconclusive. During the 1960’s, representatives of book, record, and film industries, meeting with the Register of Copyrights to discuss copyright revision, complained about the difficulty of dividing international markets. Copyright Law Revi sion Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copy right Law, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 212 (English editions of “particular” books “fin[d]” their “way into this country”); (works “pub li[shed] in a country where there is no copyright protection of any sort” are put into “the free stream of commerce” and “shipped to the United States”); (similar concern in respect to films). The then-Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, found these examples “very troubl[ing].” And the Copyright Office released a draft provision that it said “deals with the matter of the importation for distribution in the United States of foreign copies that were made under proper authority but that, if sold in the United States, would be sold in contravention of the rights of the copyright owner who holds the exclusive right to sell copies in the United ” pt. 4, at 203. That draft version, without reference to simply forbids unau Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 29 Opinion of the Court thorized imports. It said: “Importation into the United States of copies or rec ords of a work for the purpose of distribution to the public shall, if such articles are imported without the authority of the owner of the exclusive right to distrib- ute copies or records under
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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the exclusive right to distrib- ute copies or records under this title, constitute an infringement of copyright actionable under section 35 [17 U.S. C. ].” Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, pp. 32–33 (Comm. Print 1964). In discussing the draft, some of those present expressed concern about its effect on the “first sale” doctrine. For example, Irwin Karp, representing the Authors League of America asked, “If a German jobber lawfully buys cop- ies from a German publisher, are we not running into the problem of restricting his transfer of his lawfully obtained copies?” pt. 4, at 211. The Copyright Office repre sentative replied, “This could vary from one situation to another, I guess. I should guess, for example, that if a book publisher transports [i.e., does not sell] copies to a wholesaler [i.e., a nonowner], this is not yet the kind of transaction that exhausts the right to control disposition.” The Office later withdrew the draft, replacing it with a draft, which, by explicitly referring to was similar to the provision that became law, now The Office noted in a report that, under the new draft, importation of a copy (without permission) “would violate the exclusive rights of the U. S. copyright owner where the copyright owner had authorized the making of copies in a foreign country for distribution only in that country.” pt. 6, at 150. Still, that part of the report says nothing about the “first sale” doctrine, about or about the five words, 30 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court “lawfully made under this title.” And neither the report nor its accompanying 1960’s draft answers the question before us here. Quality 523 U.S., at (with out those five words, the import clause, via its reference to imports the “first sale” doctrine). ut to ascertain the best reading of rather than dissecting the remarks of industry representatives concerning at congressional meetings held 10 years before the statute was enacted, see post, at 13–16, we would give greater weight to the congressional report accompanying written a decade later when Con gress passed the new law. That report says: “Section 109(a) restates and confirms the principle that, where the copyright owner has transferred own ership of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to whom the copy or phonorecord is trans ferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any other means. Under this principle, which has been established by the court decisions and the present law,
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
|
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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been established by the court decisions and the present law, the copyright owner’s exclusive right of public distribution would have no effect upon anyone who owns ‘a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title’ and who wishes to transfer it to someone else or to destroy it. “To come within the scope of section 109(a), a copy or phonorecord must have been ‘lawfully made under this title,’ though not necessarily with the copyright owner’s authorization. For example, any resale of an illegally ‘pirated’ phonorecord would be an infringe ment but the disposition of a phonorecord legally made under the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 would not.” H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 79 Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 31 Opinion of the Court Accord, S. Rep. No. 94–473, pp. 71–72 (1975). This history reiterates the importance of the “first sale” doctrine. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, 1964 Revision ill with Discussions and Comments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, p. 66 (Comm. Print 1965) (“[F]ull ownership of a lawfully-made copy authorizes its owner to dispose of it freely”). It explains, as we have explained, the nongeo graphical purposes of the words “lawfully made under this title.” Part II–, And it says nothing about geog raphy. Nor, importantly, did ’s predecessor provi sion. See This means that, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, any lack of legislative history per taining to the “first sale” doctrine only tends to bolster our position that Congress’ 1976 revision did not intend to create a drastic geographical change in its revision to that provision. See post, at 18, n. 13. We consequently believe that the legislative history, on balance, supports the non- geographical interpretation. Third, Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeograph ical interpretation will make it difficult, perhaps impos sible, for publishers (and other copyright holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets. We concede that is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to charge different prices for the same book in different geographic markets. ut we do not see how these facts help Wiley, for we can find no basic principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such rights. The Constitution describes the nature of American copyright law by providing Congress with the power to “secur[e]” to “[a]uthors” “for limited [t]imes” the “exclusive [r]ight to their [w]ritings.” Art. I, cl. 8. The Found ers, too, discussed the need to grant an author a limited right to exclude competition. Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 Papers of
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 440, 442–443 (J. oyd ed. 1956) (arguing against any monopoly) with Letter from James 32 KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. Opinion of the Court Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 at 16, 21 (J. oyd ed. 1958) (arguing for a limited monopoly to secure production). ut the Constitution’s language nowhere suggests that its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say to increase or to maximize gain. Neither, to our knowledge, did any Founder make any such suggestion. We have found no precedent suggesting a legal preference for interpretations of copyright statutes that would pro vide for market divisions. Copyright Law Revision, pt. 2, at 194 (statement of arbara Ringer, Copyright Office) (division of territorial markets was “primarily a matter of private contract”). To the contrary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through the “first sale” doctrine) limits copyright holders’ ability to divide domestic markets. And that limitation is consistent with antitrust laws that ordinarily forbid mar ket divisions. Palmer v. RG of Ga., Inc., 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (“[A]greements between compet itors to allocate territories to minimize competition are illegal”). Whether copyright owners should, or should not, have more than ordinary commercial power to divide international markets is a matter for Congress to decide. We do no more here than try to determine what decision Congress has taken. Fourth, the dissent and Wiley contend that our decision launches United States copyright law into an unprece dented regime of “international exhaustion.” Post, at 18– 23; rief for Respondent 45–46. ut they point to nothing indicative of congressional intent in 1976. The dissent also claims that it is clear that the United States now opposes adopting such a regime, but the Solicitor General as amicus has taken no such position in this case. In fact, when pressed at oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that the consequences of Wiley’s reading of the Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 33 Opinion of the Court statute (perpetual downstream control) were “worse” than those of Kirtsaeng’s reading (restriction of market seg mentation). Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. And the dissent’s reliance on the Solicitor General’s position in Quality is under- mined by his agreement in that case with our reading of rief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Quality O. T. 1996, No. 1470, p. 30 (“When Con gress wishes to make the location of manufacture relevant to Copyright
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Justice Breyer
| 2,013 | 2 |
majority
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Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959744/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/
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wishes to make the location of manufacture relevant to Copyright Act protection, it does so expressly”); (calling it “distinctly unlikely” that Congress would have provided an incentive for overseas manufacturing). Moreover, the exhaustion regime the dissent apparently favors would provide that “the sale in one country of a good” does not “exhaus[t] the intellectual-property owner’s right to control the distribution of that good elsewhere.” Post, at 18–19. ut our holding in Quality that is a defense in U. S. courts even when “the first sale occurred abroad,” 523 U.S., at n. 14, has already significantly eroded such a principle. IV For these reasons we conclude that the considerations supporting Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical interpretation of the words “lawfully made under this title” are the more persuasive. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 568 U. S. (2013) 1 KAGAN, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 11–697 SUPAP KIRTSAENG, DA LUECHRISTINE99, PETITIONER v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
|
Justice Alito
| 2,019 | 8 |
concurring
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Flowers v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4631844/flowers-v-mississippi/
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As the Court takes pains to note, this is a highly un- usual case. Indeed, it is likely one of a kind. In 1996, four defenseless victims, three white and one black, were slaughtered in a furniture store in a small town in Mont- gomery County, Mississippi, a jurisdiction with fewer than 11,000 inhabitants. One of the victims was the owner of the store, which was widely frequented by residents of the community. The person prosecuted for this crime, peti- tioner Curtis Flowers, an African-American, comes from a local family whose members make up a gospel group and have many community ties. By the time jury selection began in the case now before us, petitioner had already been tried five times for com- mitting that heinous and inflammatory crime. Three times, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death, but all three convictions were reversed by the State Su- preme Court. Twice, the jurors could not reach a unani- mous verdict. In all of the five prior trials, the State was represented by the same prosecutor, and as the Court recounts, many of those trials were marred by racial dis- crimination in the selection of jurors and prosecutorial misconduct. Nevertheless, the prosecution at the sixth trial was led by the same prosecutor, and the case was tried in Montgomery County where, it appears, a high 2 FLOWERS v. MISSISSIPPI ALITO, J., concurring percentage of the potential jurors have significant connec- tions to either petitioner, one or more of the victims, or both. These connections and the community’s familiarity with the case were bound to complicate a trial judge’s task in trying to determine whether the prosecutor’s asserted reason for striking a potential juror was a pretext for racial discrimination, and that is just what occurred. Petitioner argues that the prosecution improperly struck five black jurors, but for each of the five, the prosecutor gave one or more reasons that were not only facially legit- imate but were of a nature that would be of concern to a great many attorneys. If another prosecutor in another case in a larger jurisdiction gave any of these reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge and the trial judge credited that explanation, an appellate court would proba- bly have little difficulty affirming that finding. And that result, in all likelihood, would not change based on factors that are exceedingly difficult to assess, such as the num- ber of voir dire questions the prosecutor asked different members of the venire. But this is not an ordinary case, and the jury selection process cannot be analyzed as if
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
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At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) 16-1-20, enacted in 1978, which authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools "for meditation";[1] (2) 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1981, which authorized a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer";[2] and (3) 16-1-20.2, enacted in 1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world."[3] *41 At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the District Court distinguished 16-1-20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with 16-1-20,[4] but that 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity."[5] After the trial on the merits, the District Court did not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses to do so.[6] The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's initial interpretation of the purpose of both 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional.[7] We have already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect to 16-1-20.2.[8] Moreover, appellees have not questioned the holding that 16-1-20 is valid.[9] Thus, the narrow question for decision is whether 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a *42 law respecting the establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.[10] I Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County, Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade students and the third was then in kindergarten. The complaint named members of the Mobile County School Board, various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teachers as defendants.[11] The complaint alleged that the appellees brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each of them from maintaining or allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms of religious observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."[12] The complaint further alleged that two of the children had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination "from the beginning of the school year in September, 1981";[13] that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led their classes
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
|
defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led their classes in saying certain prayers in unison;[14] that the minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer group class members if they did not participate;[15] and that Ishmael Jaffree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested that the devotional services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute. *43 On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint seeking class certification,[16] and on June 30, 1982, they filed a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Alabama and various state officials as additional defendants. In that amendment the appellees challenged the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes: 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and 16-1-20.2.[17] On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. At that hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified that he was the "prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted in 1981 as 16-1-20.1.[18] He explained that the bill was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools it is a beginning and a step in the right direction."[19] Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had "no other purpose in mind."[20] A week after the hearing, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction.[21] The court held that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because the enactment of 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a clearly secular purpose.[22] *44 In November 1982, the District Court held a 4-day trial on the merits. The evidence related primarily to the 1981-1982 academic year the year after the enactment of 16-1-20.1 and prior to the enactment of 16-1-20.2. The District Court found that during that academic year each of the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer activities, even after being informed of appellees' objections to these activities.[23] In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court reviewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the *45 Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then embarked on a fresh examination of the question whether the First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After reviewing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered historical evidence, the District Court concluded that "the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a religion."[24] In a separate opinion, the District Court dismissed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama statutes because of a failure to state any claim for
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
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statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause did not bar the States from establishing a religion.[25] *46 The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not surprisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this Court had considered and had rejected the historical arguments *47 that the District Court found persuasive, and that the District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis.[26] The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.[27] With respect to 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2, the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes advance and encourage religious activities."[28] The Court of Appeals then quoted with approval the District Court's finding that 16-1-20.1, and 16-1-20.2, were efforts " `to encourage a religious activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an establishment of religion.' "[29] Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type which the Supreme Court addressed in Engel [v. Vitale, ]."[30] *48 A suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional.[31] When this Court noted probable jurisdiction, it limited argument to the question that those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. II Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment concerning 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms *49 protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States. As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.[32] Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States.[33] But when the Constitution was amended to
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
|
to the States.[33] But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power. This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary proposition of law time and time again.[34] *50 Writing for a unanimous Court in Justice Roberts explained: ". We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion." Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the First Amendment.[35] Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF JUSTICE recently wrote: *51 "We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of ; A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of `individual freedom of mind.' "The Court in was faced with a state statute which required public school students to participate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both with words and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in Minersville the Court held that `a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may [not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
|
upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our Constitution.' Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as in we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view to be an *52 instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State `invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.'" Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.[36] But when the underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the *53 Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.[37] This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful,[38]*54 and from recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects or even intolerance among "religions" to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain.[39] *55 As Justice Jackson eloquently stated in West Virginia Board of : "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." The State of Alabama, no less than the Congress of the United States, must respect that basic truth. III When the Court has been called upon to construe the breadth
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
|
the Court has been called upon to construe the breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in we wrote: "Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of ; finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive *56 government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, ]." It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by this case. As the District Court correctly recognized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose.[40] For even though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion, see, e. g., Abington School 296- the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.[41] In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask "whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion."[42] In this case, the answer to that question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals that the enactment of 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose indeed, the statute had no secular purpose. IV The sponsor of the bill that became 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record apparently *57 without dissent a statement indicating that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools.[43] Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the question whether he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated: "No, I did not have no other purpose in mind."[44] The State did not present evidence of any secular purpose.[45] *58 The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship between this statute and the two other measures that were considered in this case. The District Court found that the 1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enactment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,985 | 16 |
majority
|
Wallace v. Jaffree
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111464/wallace-v-jaffree/
|
enactment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences between 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, 16-1-20, are examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the same wholly religious character. There are only three textual differences between 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to grades one through six, whereas 16-1-20.1 applies to all grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas 16-1-20.1 uses the word "may"; (3) the earlier statute refers *59 only to "meditation" whereas 16-1-20.1 refers to "meditation or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no relevance in this litigation because the minor appellees were in kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic year. The second difference would also have no impact on this litigation because the mandatory language of 16-1-20 continued to apply to grades one through six.[46] Thus, the only significant textual difference is the addition of the words "or voluntary prayer." The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday. The 1978 statute already protected that right, containing nothing that prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer during a silent minute of meditation.[47] Appellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by 16-1-20 before the enactment of 16-1-20.1. Thus, only two conclusions are consistent with the text of 16-1-20.1: (1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing but a meaningless or irrational act.[48] We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing law[49] and that it was motivated *60 by the same purpose that the Governor's answer to the second amended complaint expressly admitted; that the statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and that Senator Holmes' testimony frankly described. The legislature enacted 16-1-20.1, despite the existence of 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday. The addition of "or voluntary prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion.[50] The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a few words of symbolic speech
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,972 | 18 |
second_dissenting
|
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108638/tidewater-oil-co-v-united-states/
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The Expediting Act, enacted in 1903, provides that in civil antitrust actions brought by the United "an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court." (Emphasis added.) Section 1292 (b), enacted in 1958, provides that when a district court, "in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section," shall appropriately certify the question involved, the court of appeals has discretionary jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from that order. Thus, the Expediting Act, by its terms, relates only to appeals from final judgments in a limited category of cases, while 1292 (b) applies to appeals from certain interlocutory orders in all civil actions. The Expediting Act does not prohibit court of appeals jurisdiction under 1292 (b), for the former applies only to final judgments, while the latter applies only to interlocutory orders. To find any inconsistency whatever between the two statutes thus requires rejection of the plain meaning of each of themrejection, in short, of a most basic principle of statutory construction. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized in Fisons "the language of each [can] be given full effect without limiting the scope of the other." *179 Moreover, the purpose of 1292 (b) is wholly consistent with that of the Expediting Act. The 1903 statute was motivated by the view that Government antitrust actions are so important that they should be expedited. Shenandoah Valley[1] So, too, the motivation behind 1292 (b), enacted 55 years later, was the contemporary view that interlocutory appeals involving important and controlling questions of law are a useful means of expediting litigation. Although 1292 (b) authorizes a departure from the general rule against interlocutory appeals, it does so only for the purpose of materially advancing the ultimate termination of the litigation.[2] Thus, the Expediting *180 Act and 1292 (b) are animated by precisely the same objectives and warranted by precisely the same circumstances, and they should be read together as supplementing one another, not as antagonistic. The legislative history of 1292 (b) indicates that its primary benefit was expected to occur in the protracted or "big" cases, including civil antitrust litigation.[3] Yet, if no appeal can be taken to a court of appeals under 1292 (b) in a civil antitrust suit where the Government is plaintiff, then the purpose behind the statute cannot be served at all in these cases, for no statute provides for such an interlocutory appeal directly to this Court. It seems to me that if Congress had wanted to exclude cases like this one from
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Justice Stewart
| 1,972 | 18 |
second_dissenting
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Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108638/tidewater-oil-co-v-united-states/
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Congress had wanted to exclude cases like this one from the beneficent provisions of 1292 (b), it would have said so.[4] *181 The Expediting Act originally provided that Government antitrust cases would be heard by a panel of judges upon the certification of the Attorney General. That provision is now 15 U.S. C. 28, which provides for a panel of three. The purpose of the provision was to ensure that cases would receive full consideration by a panel of judges before presentation to this Court.[5] The Expediting Act, of course, has been criticized because it routes complex cases directly here without benefit of screening by the courts of appeals. As we stated in United : "Whatever may have been the wisdom of the Expediting Act in providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of its enactment in 1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory. Direct appeals not only place a great burden on the Court but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of Appeals." See also Brown Shoe ; ; United ; Ford Motor 5 U.S. 562, Interlocutory appeals under 1292 (b) in Government antitrust cases would provide screening of at least some issues in at least some cases by courts of appeals before those issues reach this Court; and this, as shown above, would be consistent with the original policy of the Expediting Act. The Court's decision today precludes, in cases like this, both the useful expediting effect of 1292 (b) and the equally desirable potential of intermediate review by the courts of appeals of important legal issues. It is said that a ban on court of appeals jurisdiction under 1292 (b) in Government antitrust cases is to be derived from the provisions of 1292 (a) (1). The latter section provides that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of district courts granting or denying injunctions "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." The argument is that that language expressly excludes court of appeals jurisdiction in Expediting Act cases; and since there is nothing in the language of 1292 (b) that contradicts this express exclusion, interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases are likewise not appealable under 1292 (b). If 1292 (b) did allow court of appeals jurisdiction in this case, it is said, the result would be that an interlocutory order in a Government antitrust case could be appealed to a court of appeals only if it did not involve an injunction; and that result would effectively turn 1292 on its head, because in
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Justice Stewart
| 1,972 | 18 |
second_dissenting
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Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108638/tidewater-oil-co-v-united-states/
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result would effectively turn 1292 on its head, because in non-Expediting Act cases, 1292 gives priority to injunctive orders, which may be appealed as of right. There are several answers to this argument. At the outset, it is not clear that the major premisethat 1292 (a) (1) expressly excludes court of appeals jurisdiction in Expediting Act casesis valid. On that question, the *183 Circuits are divided, the First and the Ninth denying their jurisdiction,[6] and the Third upholding appealability.[7] We have never before faced the question nor resolved the conflict. But even if the Expediting Act does bar court of appeals jurisdiction to review interlocutory injunctive orders under 1292 (a) (1) in Government antitrust cases, it does not follow that there must be a similar bar to 1292 (b) jurisdiction. The very fact that 1292 (a) (1) contains express language which at least arguably creates an exception to court of appeals jurisdiction, while 1292 (b) contains no such language, is reason enough to treat the two differently. Beyond that, 1292 (a) (1) has a history dramatically different from 1292 (b). That history was thoroughly reviewed in United in United and in the Court's opinion today, ante, at 155-163, and need not be discussed in detail here. Suffice it to say that the original version of 1292 (a) (1) was *184 enacted in 1891, and that the provision went through several changes in language in succeeding years, during which its relationship to the 1903 Expediting Act was often unclear. See United 410 F. 2d, at 666-669. The provision was finally codified in its present form in 1948, although, as the above-mentioned conflict among the circuits demonstrates, that codification did not make its relationship to the Expediting Act any clearer. Section 1292 (b), on the other hand, was an entirely new statute, written on a clean slate in 1958, and representing a sharp break with the traditional policy against appeals from noninjunctive interlocutory orders. At that time, there was already growing doubt about the wisdom of the Expediting Act; and the fact that Congress conferred 1292 (b) jurisdiction without making any express exception for cases where direct review may be had in this Courtsuch as had been in 1292 (a) (1) for some yearsis surely some indication that Congress in 1958 was expressing the contemporary view that interlocutory appeals to the courts of appeals on controlling questions of law provide a desirable tool that should not be denied even in Expediting Act cases. As to the point that this interpretation would "turn 1292 on its head," it is certainly arguable that if
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Justice Stewart
| 1,972 | 18 |
second_dissenting
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Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108638/tidewater-oil-co-v-united-states/
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1292 on its head," it is certainly arguable that if an appeal from an injunctive order in an Expediting Act case cannot be had under 1292 (a) (1), it may still be taken under 1292 (b). Section 1292 (b) relates to orders "not otherwise appealable under this section," whatever the nature of the order and whatever the reason for its nonappealability. Hence, if, in Government antitrust cases, courts of appeals have no jurisdiction under 1292 (a) (1), then an interlocutory injunctive order would be an order "not otherwise appealable," and 1292 (b)'s discretionary jurisdiction might well be held to apply. *185 In short, there is no validity to the argument that the terms of 1292 (a) (1), whatever they may mean, have any bearing upon the proper interpretation of 1292 (b). It is also argued that the basic policy of the Expediting Act was to remove all court of appeals jurisdiction in Government antitrust cases. According to this argument, although the Act speaks only of final judgments, it must be understood to include interlocutory appeals, since, at the time the Act was passed, the courts of appeals could review interlocutory orders only in cases where they could review final judgments. From United to Brown Shoe n. 9, the argument goes, this Court has consistently indicated that courts of appeals may not exercise jurisdiction in Expediting Act cases, regardless of whether the appeal is from a final or interlocutory order; and it should not be assumed that Congress in 1958 repealed this longstanding interpretation by legislation that is not addressed specifically to appeals in these cases. I fail to see how we effect anything like a repealer of the Expediting Act by construing 1292 (b) to permit court of appeals jurisdiction thereunder in Expediting Act cases. As demonstrated above, there is no inconsistency whatever between this construction of 1292 (b) and the plain language of the Expediting Act. It is equally clear that the reason why in 1903, and indeed for 55 years thereafter, courts of appeals could not review noninjunctive interlocutory orders in cases where they could not review the final judgment is not that the Expediting Act forbade such review, but that there was no statutory authority for such review in any cases whatsoever. In 1958, however, Congress broke with the old policy against interlocutory appeals from noninjunctive orders and specifically provided that such appeals *186 may be taken to the courts of appeals in their discretion in all civil actions, where the question is properly certified. I see no reason, in the absence of some statutory prohibition, to
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Justice Stewart
| 1,972 | 18 |
second_dissenting
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Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108638/tidewater-oil-co-v-united-states/
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no reason, in the absence of some statutory prohibition, to refrain from applying that clear language, whether or not the court of appeals can review the final judgment. The cases cited by the Government do not persuade me otherwise. California Canneries, of course, was decided 29 years before the enactment of 1292 (b); and whatever was said there was a judgment on what Congress had done, not on what it could do or on the meaning of what it was to do 29 years later. Brown Shoe does postdate the enactment of 1292 (b); but that case involved a direct appeal to this Court, and the only question about appealability was whether the appealed order was final. The issue of court of appeals jurisdiction under 1292 (b) was not involved there, nor was the 1958 Act even mentioned in the short footnote dictum so heavily relied on by the Government. That dictum did little more than quote the language of California Canneries, and it surely cannot be understood to decide the issue now before us. Finally, it is said that it would be anomalous for a court of appeals that is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a final judgment to decide an interlocutory issue that could control the outcome of the case. But there is no case in which the judgment of a court of appeals is necessarily final. Whenever a court of appeals decides a controlling question of law in any litigation, its views are subject to review here. Far from being anomalous, interlocutory review of potentially dispositive questions by the courts of appeals in Government antitrust cases would be helpful to this Court, giving us the benefit of intermediate appellate consideration in these cases. We could then exercise our certiorari power informed by the reasoning of an appellate *187 court, and there might be no later direct appeal at all from the final judgment. And surely interlocutory appeals under 1292 (b) in Government antitrust cases would serve to lighten the burden on trial courts and litigants alike. We cannot, of course, create an appellate jurisdiction not created by Congress, however desirable. But what Congress has conferred, we should not reject. I would reverse the order of the Court of Appeals denying Tidewater's petition to appeal under 1292 (b) for lack of jurisdiction, and I would remand this case to that court with directions to consider the merits of the petition to appeal.
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure. the safety of any other person and the community." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional, because, in that court's words, this type of pretrial detention violates "substantive due process." We granted certiorari because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the validity of the Act.[1] We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted by these respondents, the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements. We therefore reverse. *742 I Responding to "the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release," S. Rep. No. 98-22, p. 3 (1983), Congress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S. C. 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National Legislature's considered response to numerous perceived deficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail applications and the circumstances under which bail is granted, Congress hoped to "give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released." S. Rep. No. 98-22, at 3. To this end, 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section 3142(e) provides that "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial." Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards. He may request the presence of counsel at the detention hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf, as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in writing, 3142(i), and support his conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," 3142(f). The judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in making the detention determination. Congress has specified the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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has specified the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government's evidence against the arrestee, the *743 arrestee's background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect's release. 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate review of the detention order. 314(b), (c). Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested on March 21, after being charged in a 29-count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling violations. The RICO counts alleged 3 acts of racketeering activity, including fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy to commit murder. At respondents' arraignment, the Government moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursuant to 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release would assure the safety of the community or any person. The District Court held a hearing at which the Government made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government's case showed that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese crime family of La Cosa Nostra and that Cafaro was a "captain" in the Genovese family. According to the Government's proffer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enterprises through violent means. The Government also offered the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging the credibility of the Government's witnesses. He offered the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a letter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a serious medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations as merely "tough talk." The District Court granted the Government's detention motion, concluding that the Government had established by *744 clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the community or any person: "The activities of a criminal organization such as the Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest of its principals and their release on even the most stringent of bail conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many years, require constant attention and protection, or they will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong incentive on the part of its leadership to continue business as usual. When business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present danger such people pose in the community is self-evident."[2] Respondents appealed, contending that to the extent that the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention on the ground that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is unconstitutional on its face. Over a dissent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. Although the court agreed that pretrial detention could be imposed if the defendants were likely to intimidate witnesses or otherwise jeopardize the trial process, it found " 3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention [on the ground of future dangerousness] repugnant to the concept of substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future crimes." The court concluded that the Government could not, consistent with due process, detain persons who had not been accused of any crime merely because they were thought to present a danger to the community. quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F. *74 2d 984, 1000-1001 (opinion of Newman, J.). It reasoned that our criminal law system holds persons accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions. Although a court could detain an arrestee who threatened to flee before trial, such detention would be permissible because it would serve the basic objective of a criminal system bringing the accused to trial. The court distinguished our decision in in which we upheld police detention pursuant to arrest. The court construed as limiting such detention to the " `administrative steps incident to arrest.' " quoting The Court of Appeals also found our decision in upholding postarrest, pretrial detention of juveniles, inapposite because juveniles have a lesser interest in liberty than do adults. The dissenting judge concluded that on its face, the Bail Reform Act adequately balanced the Federal Government's compelling interests in public safety against the detainee's liberty interests. II A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. We think respondents have failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the Act is "facially" unconstitutional.[3] *746 Respondents present two grounds for invalidating the Bail Reform Act's provisions permitting pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness.
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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provisions permitting pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness. First, they rely upon the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act exceeds the limitations placed upon the Federal Government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, they contend that the Act contravenes the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive bail. We treat these contentions in turn. A The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" This Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two types of government action. So-called "substantive due process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience," or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has traditionally been referred to as "procedural" due process. Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process because the pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible punishment before trial. See The Government, however, has never argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is. As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. at *747 37. To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on " `whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].' " Ib quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-ez, We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on the regulatory side of the dichotomy. The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. No. 98-22, at 8. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem. There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve. The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes. See 18 U.S. C. 3142(f) (detention hearings available if case involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders). The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, ib and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.[4] See 18 U.S. C. 3161 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Moreover, as in the conditions of confinement envisioned by the Act "appear to reflect the regulatory purposes relied upon by the" Government. * As in the statute at issue here requires that detainees be housed in a "facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal." 18 U.S. C. 3142(i)(2). We conclude, therefore, that the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that "the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure, without regard to the duration of the detention." Respondents characterize the Due Process Clause as erecting an impenetrable "wall" in this area that "no governmental interest rational, important, compelling or otherwise may surmount." Brief for Respondents 16. We do not think the Clause lays down any such categorical imperative. We have repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest. For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous. See U.S. 160 ; Even outside the exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons. Thus, we have found no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings. ; Wong We have also held that the government may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a danger *749 to the public, and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand trial, ; We have approved of postarrest regulatory detention of juveniles when they present a continuing danger to the community. Even competent adults may face substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of our criminal justice system. If the police suspect an individual of a crime, they may arrest and hold
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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an individual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral magistrate determines whether probable cause exists. Finally, respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight, see or a danger to witnesses. Respondents characterize all of these cases as exceptions to the "general rule" of substantive due process that the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial. Such a "general rule" may freely be conceded, but we think that these cases show a sufficient number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action challenged here can hardly be characterized as totally novel. Given the well-established authority of the government, in special circumstances, to restrain individuals' liberty prior to or even without criminal trial and conviction, we think that the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the same manner that we evaluated the laws in the cases discussed above. The government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling. De In we recognized the strength of the State's interest in preventing juvenile crime. This general concern with crime prevention is no less compelling when the suspects are adults. Indeed, "[t]he *70 harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator." The Bail Reform Act of 1984 responds to an even more particularized governmental interest than the interest we sustained in The statute we upheld in permitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any charge after a showing that the individual might commit some undefined further crimes. The Bail Reform Act, in contrast, narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in which the Government interests are overwhelming. The Act operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses. 18 U.S. C. 3142(f). Congress specifically found that these individuals are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest. See S. Rep. No. 98-22, at 6-7. Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious crimes. The Government must first of all demonstrate probable cause to believe that the charged crime has been committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a fullblown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person. 18 U.S. C. 3142(f). While the Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its greatest. On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's strong interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right. But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated *71 to the greater needs of society. We think that Congress' careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Finally, we may dispose briefly of respondents' facial challenge to the procedures of the Bail Reform Act. To sustain them against such a challenge, we need only find them "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [persons] charged with crimes," whether or not they might be insufficient in some particular circumstances. We think they pass that test. As we stated in "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct." ; see ; Under the Bail Reform Act, the procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination. Detainees have a right to counsel at the detention hearing. 18 U.S. C. 3142(f). They may testify in their own behalf, present information by proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention is guided by statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the putative offender, *72 and the danger to the community. 3142(g). The Government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. 3142(f). Finally, the judicial officer must include written
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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convincing evidence. 3142(f). Finally, the judicial officer must include written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for a decision to detain. 3142(i). The Act's review provisions, 314(c), provide for immediate appellate review of the detention decision. We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge. The protections are more exacting than those we found sufficient in the juvenile context, see and they far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited postarrest detention in Given the legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose of the Act and the procedural protections it offers, we conclude that the Act is not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. B Respondents also contend that the Bail Reform Act violates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue because it found that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We think that the Act survives a challenge founded upon the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required." This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all. Respondents nevertheless contend that this Clause grants them a right to bail calculated solely upon considerations of flight. They rely on in which the Court stated that "[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant's presence at trial] is `excessive' under the Eighth Amendment." In respondents' view, since the Bail Reform Act allows a court essentially to set bail at an infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight, it *73 violates the Excessive Bail Clause. Respondents concede that the right to bail they have discovered in the Eighth Amendment is not absolute. A court may, for example, refuse bail in capital cases. And, as the Court of Appeals noted and respondents admit, a court may refuse bail when the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by intimidating witnesses. Brief for Respondents 21-22. Respondents characterize these exceptions as consistent with what they claim to be the sole purpose of bail to ensure the integrity of the judicial process. While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dictum in is far too slender a reed on which to rest this argument. The Court in
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
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United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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reed on which to rest this argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at trial. The holding of Stack is illuminated by the Court's holding just four months later in In that case, remarkably similar to the present action, the detainees had been arrested and held without bail pending a determination of deportability. The Attorney General refused to release the individuals, "on the ground that there was reasonable cause to believe that [their] release would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States." at 29 The detainees brought the same challenge that respondents bring to us today: the Eighth Amendment *74 required them to be admitted to bail. The Court squarely rejected this proposition: "The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable." at 4-46 was a civil case, and we need not decide today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to Congress' power to define the classes of criminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to conclude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive limitations on the National Legislature's powers in this area, we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government considerations solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be "excessive" in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to determine whether the Government's
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,987 | 19 |
majority
|
United States v. Salerno
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111891/united-states-v-salerno/
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the perceived evil. Of course, to determine whether the Government's response is excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus, when the Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more. We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention *7 of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail. III In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon that primary concern of every government a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens on its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed.
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,016 | 1 |
concurring
|
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3181500/gobeille-v-liberty-mut-ins-co/
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I join the Court’s opinion because it faithfully applies our precedents interpreting 29 U.S. C. the express pre-emption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). I write separately because I have come to doubt whether is a valid exercise of congressional power and whether our approach to ERISA pre-emption is consistent with our broader pre-emption jurisprudence. I Section 1144 contains what may be the most expansive express pre-emption provision in any federal statute. Section 1144(a) states: “Except as provided” in (b) ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” Under the ordinary meaning of the phrase “relate to,” (a) pre-empts all state laws that “ ‘stand in some relation’ ” to, “ ‘have bearing or concern’ ” on, “ ‘pertain’ ” to, “ ‘refer’ ” to, or ‘ “bring into association with or connection with’ ” an ERISA plan. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97, n. 16 (1983) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). And (b) seemingly acknow- 2 GOBEILLE v. LIBERTY MUT. INS. CO. THOMAS, J., concurring ledges how broadly (a) extends by excepting “gener- ally applicable criminal law[s]” and state laws “regulat[ing] insurance, banking, or securities”—but not generally applicable civil laws—from pre-emption. §(b)(2)(A), (b)(4). Section 1144, in sum, “is clearly expansive”—so much so that “one might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether the words of limitation (‘insofar as they relate’) do much limiting.” New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 Read according to its plain terms, raises constitu- tional concerns. “[T]he Supremacy Clause gives ‘supreme’ status only to those [federal laws] that are ‘made in Pur- suance’ ” of the Constitution. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 585 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Art. VI, cl. 2). But I question whether any provi- sion of Article I authorizes Congress to prohibit States from applying a host of generally applicable civil laws to ERISA plans. “The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.” United If the Federal Government were “to take over the regula- tion of entire areas of traditional state concern,” including “areas having nothing to do with the regulation of com- mercial activities,” then “the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.” United (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Just because Congress can regulate some aspects of ERISA plans pursuant to the Commerce Clause does
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,016 | 1 |
concurring
|
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3181500/gobeille-v-liberty-mut-ins-co/
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aspects of ERISA plans pursuant to the Commerce Clause does not mean that Congress can exempt ERISA plans from state regulations that have nothing to do with inter- state commerce. See 59–60 (2005) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Cite as: U. S. (2016) 3 THOMAS, J., concurring II This Court used to interpret according to its text. But we became uncomfortable with how much state law would pre-empt if read literally. “If ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,” we explained, “then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course.” Rather than addressing the constitutionality of we abandoned efforts to give its text its ordinary meaning. In we adopted atextual but what we thought to be “workable” standards to construe Ante, at 6. Thus, to determine whether a state law impermissibly “relates to” an ERISA plan due to some “connection with” that plan, we now “look both to the objectives of the ERISA statute as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (citing ; internal quotation marks omitted). We decided in 1995. I joined that opinion and have joined others applying the approach we adopted in But our interpretation of ERISA’s express pre- emption provision has become increasingly difficult to reconcile with our pre-emption jurisprudence. departed from the statutory text, deeming it “unhelpful.” But, in other cases involving express pre-emption provisions, the text has been the beginning and often the end of our analysis. E.g., Chamber of Com- merce of United States of America v. 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011) (“ ‘focus[ing] on the plain wording’ ” to define the scope of the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s express pre-emption clause); see also National Meat Assn. v. Harris, 565 U. S. – (2012) (slip op., at 4, 6–10) (parsing the text to determine the scope of the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s express pre-emption clause). We have likewise refused to look to policy limits that are not “remotely discernible in the statutory text.” 4 GOBEILLE v. LIBERTY MUT. INS. CO. THOMAS, J., concurring We have not given a sound basis for departing from these principles and treating differently from other express pre-emption provisions. ’ approach to ERISA pre-emption also does not avoid constitutional concerns. We have continued to interpret as pre-empting “substantial areas of tradi- tional state regulation” and “pre-empt[ing] a state law even if the state law exercises a traditional state power.” Ante, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Until we confront whether Congress had the constitutional authority
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
concurring
|
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110753/patsy-v-board-of-regents-of-fla/
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As discussed in JUSTICE POWELL's dissenting opinion, as well as in the opinion of the court below, considerations of sound policy suggest that a 1983 plaintiff should be required to exhaust adequate state administrative remedies before filing his complaint. At the very least, prior state administrative *517 proceedings would resolve many claims, thereby decreasing the number of 1983 actions filed in the federal courts, which are now straining under excessive caseloads. However, for the reasons set forth in the Court's opinion, this Court already has ruled that, in the absence of additional congressional legislation, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in 1983 actions. Perhaps Congress' enactment of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S. C. 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), which creates a limited exhaustion requirement for prisoners bringing 1983 suits, will prompt it to reconsider the possibility of requiring exhaustion in the remainder of 1983 cases. Reluctantly, I concur. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part. I fully agree with the Court that our frequent and unequivocal statements on exhaustion cannot be explained or distinguished away as the Fifth Circuit attempted to do. For nearly 20 years and on at least 10 occasions, this Court has clearly held that no exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in a 1983 suit. Ante, 0. Whether or not this initially was a wise choice, these decisions are stare decisis, and in a statutory case, a particularly strong showing is required that we have misread the relevant statute and its history. I have no difficulty in concluding that on the issue of exhaustion, unlike the question of municipal immunity faced in the Court has not previously misapprehended the meaning of the 1871 debates in rejecting an exhaustion rule in and adhering to that position ever since. Our precedents and the legislative history are sufficient to support reversal, and I accordingly join the judgment and all but Part III-B of the opinion of the Court. In Part III-B, the Court unnecessarily and unwisely ventures further to find support where none may be had. The wisdom of a general no-exhaustion rule in 1983 suits was *518 not at issue when Congress considered and passed the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S. C. 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As JUSTICE POWELL persuasively points out in his dissenting opinion, and as reflected in the title of the Act, congressional attention was narrowly focused on procedures concerning the legal rights of prisoners and other institutionalized persons. Unsurprisingly, the legislation which emerged addressed only the specific problem under investigation; it indicates neither
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,982 | 14 |
concurring
|
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110753/patsy-v-board-of-regents-of-fla/
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addressed only the specific problem under investigation; it indicates neither approval of a noexhaustion rule nor an intent to preclude us from reconsidering the issue. As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 513, the policy arguments cut in both directions. The Court concludes that "the very difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence suggest that legislative not judicial decisions are preferable." To be sure, exhaustion is a statutory issue and the dispositive word on the matter belongs to Congress. It does not follow, however, that, were the issue not foreclosed by earlier decisions, we would be institutionally incompetent to formulate an exhaustion rule. The lack of an exhaustion requirement in 1983 actions is itself an exception to the general rule, judicially formulated, that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in a civil action. ; Unlike other statutory questions, exhaustion is "a rule of judicial administration," Myers v. Bethlehem Shipping and unless Congress directs otherwise, rightfully subject to crafting by judges. Our resolution of this case as governed by stare decisis, reinforced by the legislative history of 1983, should not be taken as undercutting the general exhaustion principle of long standing. The result today is also fully consistent with our decisions that a defendant in a civil or administrative enforcement proceeding may not enjoin and sidetrack that proceeding by resorting to a 1983 action in federal court, Huffman ; ; ; and that a federal action should be stayed pending determination of state-law issues central to the constitutional dispute. Railroad On this understanding, I join all but Part III-B of the opinion of the Court.[*] The statutes at issue in cases recited by JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 522-523, n. 5, presented more equivocal embodiments of state intent. For example, in Florida Dept. of the authorization to sue and be sued was limited to contract actions and, unlike the instant provision, did not extend to "all courts of law and equity." The same is true of the interstate compact involved in The decision in Kennecott Copper v. Tax Comm'n, which involved a statute providing for suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction," turned on the incongruity of federal courts' interpreting state tax laws and the fact that "Utah employs explicit language to indicate, in other litigation, its consent to suits in federal courts." Thus, while I do not object to the Court's leaving the Eleventh Amendment issue for further consideration by the lower courts at least where, as here, there is no logical priority in resolving Eleventh Amendment immunity before exhaustion I find the issue sufficiently clear to
|
per_curiam
| 1,971 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Johnson v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108368/johnson-v-mississippi/
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Petitioner, a defendant in a criminal proceeding in the Circuit Court of Grenada County, Mississippi, was summarily convicted of criminal contempt by Judge Marshall Perry of that court. The alleged contempt occurred on January 23, 1967. It occurred after Judge Perry directed the bailiffs and deputies to keep all people entering the courtroom from walking between the space reserved for jurors and county officers and the judge, while jurors were being called. A deputy attempted to route petitioner around the area *213 in question whereupon, according to the orders adjudging petitioner in contempt, he said: "What the Hell do you mean go around. "Said Johnson, defendant, then continued to stand and look around over the room, disrupting the court proceedings." Judge Perry, however, did not take instant action on the alleged contempt but only had petitioner removed from the courtroom. The next day, January 24, he ordered that process issue against petitioner directing him to appear February 1, 1967, an action he later rescinded. On January 27, 1967, petitioner, an active civil rights worker, asked through his attorney that Judge Perry recuse himself, asserting: "a. That Judge Perry is personally prejudiced against the defendant and against the civil rights organizations he represents. "b. That Judge Perry is personally prejudiced against the lawyers' organization defending Mr. Johnson, namely the Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under Law." The motion was supported by two affidavits of lawyers that Judge Perry, through charges made to grand juries in his courtroom, revealed deep prejudice against civil rights workers and civil rights lawyers. No hearing was ever granted on that motion. When petitioner was removed from the courtroom on January 23, 1967, his lawyer, one Rowe, objected to Judge Perry's action. Judge Perry ordered Rowe arrested and charged with criminal contempt. On January 31, 1967, a federal court in Mississippi issued a temporary restraining order enjoining trial of the contempt charge against Rowe; and we are advised that that charge has never been further prosecuted. *214 On February 1, 1967, petitioner filed a petition for removal of the contempt proceedings in his case to the federal court. On November 14, 1968, that court remanded the case to Judge Perry's court. Thereupon Judge Perry ordered that a $1,000 bond be posted guaranteeing petitioner's appearance on January 27, 1969, to answer the contempt charge. On January 22, 1969, petitioner and others filed suit in the federal court to enjoin trials of either Negroes or women in the Circuit Court of Grenada County until such time as Negroes and women were not systematically excluded from juries. Judge Perry was
|
per_curiam
| 1,971 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Johnson v. Mississippi
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108368/johnson-v-mississippi/
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women were not systematically excluded from juries. Judge Perry was named as a defendant. The federal court held a hearing on January 24, 1969, and on January 25, 1969, temporarily enjoined Judge Perry from discrimination "by reason of race, color, or sex" in jury selections. Two days later, January 27, 1969, Judge Perry adjudged petitioner in contempt and sentenced him to four months and set bail at $2,000 pending appeal. He denied petitioner's request for a hearing on the merits and for an opportunity to show why Judge Perry should recuse himself. On appeal the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the contempt but reduced the sentence to one month. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. Instant action may be necessary where the misbehavior is in the presence of the judge and is known to him, and where immediate corrective steps are needed to restore order and maintain the dignity and authority of the court. ; The contempt power is within the judge's "arsenal of authority" which we recently described in But there was no instant action here, a week expiring before removal of the case to the federal court was sought. *215 Moreover, from this record we cannot be sure that Judge Perry was personally aware of the contemptuous action when it occurred. The State's version of what happened is described as follows in its motion that petitioner show cause why he should not be punished for contempt: "[T]he Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff, Howard Hayward seized Robert Johnson and immediately carried him before the Circuit Judge, Marshall Perry, and related to the Judge what had transpired." (Italics added.) As we said in In re Oliver, "If some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that he must depend upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing" And see In re Savin, It would, therefore, seem that a fair hearing would entail the opportunity to show that the version of the event related to the judge was inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete. We mention this latter point because our remand will entail a hearing before another judge. In concluding that Judge Perry should have recused himself, we do not rely solely on the affidavits filed by the lawyers reciting intemperate remarks of Judge Perry concerning civil rights litigants. Beyond all that was the fact that Judge Perry immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was a defendant in one of
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,976 | 18 |
dissenting
|
Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109405/colorado-river-water-cons-dist-v-united-states/
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The Court says that the United States District Court for the District of Colorado clearly had jurisdiction over this lawsuit. I agree.[1] The Court further says that the McCarran Amendment "in no way diminished" the District Court's jurisdiction. I agree.[2] The Court also says that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation. to exercise the jurisdiction given them." I agree.[3] And finally, the Court says that nothing in the abstention doctrine "in any of its forms" justified the District Court's dismissal of the Government's complaint. I agree.[4] These views would seem to lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the District Court was wrong in dismissing the complaint. Yet the Court holds that the order of dismissal was "appropriate." With that conclusion I must respectfully disagree. *822 In holding that the United States shall not be allowed to proceed with its lawsuit, the Court relies principally on s reflecting the rule that where "control of the property which is the subject of the suit [is necessary] in order to proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the jurisdiction of one court must of necessity yield to that of the other." Penn General Casualty See also Here the federal court did not need to obtain in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction in order to decide the issues before it. The court was asked simply to determine as a matter of federal law whether federal reservations of water rights had occurred, and, if so, the date and scope of the reservations. The District Court could make such a determination without having control of the river. The rule invoked by the Court thus does not support the conclusion that it reaches. In the Princess Lida for example, the reason for the surrender of federal jurisdiction over the administration of a trust was the fact that a state court had already assumed jurisdiction over the trust estate. But the Court in that recognized that this rationale "ha[d] no application to a in a federal court wherein the plaintiff seeks merely an adjudication of his right or his interest as a basis of a claim against a fund in the possession of a state court" The Court stressed that "[n]o question is presented in the federal court as to the right of any person to participate in the res or as to the quantum of his interest in it." Similarly, in the *823 Bank of New York the Court stressed that the "object of the suits is to take the property from the depositaries and from the control of the state court,
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,976 | 18 |
dissenting
|
Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109405/colorado-river-water-cons-dist-v-united-states/
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the depositaries and from the control of the state court, and to vest the property in the United States" "The suits are not merely to establish a debt or a right to share in property, and thus to obtain an adjudication which might be had without disturbing the control of the state court." Ibid.[5] See also ; 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 3631, pp. 19-22 (1976). The precedents cited by the Court thus not only fail to support the Court's decision in this but expressly point in the opposite direction. The present suit, in short, is not analogous to the administration of a trust, but rather to a claim of a "right to participate," since the United States in this litigation does not ask the court to control the administration of the river, but only to determine its specific rights in the flow of water in the river. This is an almost exact analogue to a suit seeking a determination of rights in the flow of income from a trust. The Court's principal reason for deciding to close the doors of the federal courthouse to the United States in this seems to stem from the view that its decision will avoid piecemeal adjudication of water rights.[6] To *824 the extent that this view is based on the special considerations governing in rem proceedings, it is without precedential basis, as the decisions discussed above demonstrate. To the extent that the Court's view is based on the realistic practicalities of this it is simply wrong, because the relegation of the Government to the state courts will not avoid piecemeal litigation. The Colorado courts are currently engaged in two types of proceedings under the State's water-rights law. First, they are processing new claims to water based on recent appropriations. Second, they are integrating these new awards of water rights with all past decisions awarding such rights into one all-inclusive tabulation for each water source. The claims of the United States that are involved in this have not been adjudicated in the past. Yet they do not involve recent appropriations of water. In fact, these claims are wholly dissimilar to normal state water claims, because they are not *825 based on actual beneficial use of water but rather on an intention formed at the time the federal land use was established to reserve a certain amount of water to support the federal reservations. The state court will, therefore, have to conduct separate proceedings to determine these claims. And only after the state court adjudicates the claims will
|
Justice Stewart
| 1,976 | 18 |
dissenting
|
Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109405/colorado-river-water-cons-dist-v-united-states/
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And only after the state court adjudicates the claims will they be incorporated into the water source tabulations. If this suit were allowed to proceed in federal court the same procedures would be followed, and the federal court decree would be incorporated into the state tabulation, as other federal court decrees have been incorporated in the past. Thus, the same process will occur regardless of which forum considers these claims. Whether the virtually identical separate proceedings take place in a federal court or a state court, the adjudication of the claims will be neither more nor less "piecemeal." Essentially the same process will be followed in each instance.[7] As the Court says, it is the virtual "unflagging obligation" of a federal court to exercise the jurisdiction that has been conferred upon it. Obedience to that obligation is particularly "appropriate" in this for at least two reasons. First, the issues involved are issues of federal law. A federal court is more likely than a state court to be familiar with federal water law and to have had experience in interpreting the relevant federal statutes, regulations, *826 and Indian treaties. Moreover, if tried in a federal court, these issues of federal law will be reviewable in a federal appellate court, whereas federal judicial review of the state courts' resolution of issues of federal law will be possible only on review by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. Second, some of the federal claims in this lawsuit relate to water reserved for Indian reservations. It is not necessary to determine that there is no state-court jurisdiction of these claims to support the proposition that a federal court is a more appropriate forum than a state court for determination of questions of life-and-death importance to Indians. This Court has long recognized that " `[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.' " quoting The Court says that "[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal" of a lawsuit within the jurisdiction of a federal court. In my opinion there was no justification at all for the District Court's order of dismissal in this I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. MR.
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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" `[T]he Free Exercise Clause,' " the Court explains today, " `is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.' " Ante, at 451 ). Pledging fidelity to this unremarkable constitutional principle, the Court nevertheless concludes that even where the Government uses federal land in a manner that threatens the very existence of a Native American religion, the Government is simply not "doing" anything to the practitioners of that faith. Instead, the Court believes that Native Americans who request that the Government refrain from destroying their religion effectively seek to exact from the Government de facto beneficial ownership of federal property. These two astonishing conclusions follow naturally from the Court's determination *459 that federal land-use decisions that render the practice of a given religion impossible do not burden that religion in a manner cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause, because such decisions neither coerce conduct inconsistent with religious belief nor penalize religious activity. The constitutional guarantee we interpret today, however, draws no such fine distinctions between types of restraints on religious exercise, but rather is directed against any form of governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice. Because the Court today refuses even to acknowledge the constitutional injury respondents will suffer, and because this refusal essentially leaves Native Americans with absolutely no constitutional protection against perhaps the gravest threat to their religious practices, I dissent. I For at least 200 years and probably much longer, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians have held sacred an approximately 25-square-mile area of land situated in what is today the Blue Creek Unit of Six Rivers National Forest in northwestern California. As the Government readily concedes, regular visits to this area, known to respondent Indians as the "high country," have played and continue to play a "critical" role in the religious practices and rituals of these Tribes. Brief for Petitioners 3. Those beliefs, only briefly described in the Court's opinion, are crucial to a proper understanding of respondents' claims. As the Forest Service's commissioned study, the Theodoratus Report, explains, for Native Americans religion is not a discrete sphere of activity separate from all others, and any attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life "is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories." App. 110; D. Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet-Orleans Road, Six Rivers National Forest (1979). Thus, for most Native Americans, "[t]he area of worship cannot be delineated from *460 social, political, cultur[al], and other areas o[f] Indian
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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from *460 social, political, cultur[al], and other areas o[f] Indian lifestyle." American Indian Religious Freedom, Hearings on S. J. Res. 102 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 86 (1978) (statement of Barney Old Coyote, Crow Tribe). A pervasive feature of this lifestyle is the individual's relationship with the natural world; this relationship, which can accurately though somewhat incompletely be characterized as one of stewardship, forms the core of what might be called, for want of a better nomenclature, the Indian religious experience. While traditional Western religions view creation as the work of a deity "who institutes natural laws which then govern the operation of physical nature," tribal religions regard creation as an ongoing process in which they are morally and religiously obligated to participate. U. S. Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report 11 (1979) (Task Force Report). Native Americans fulfill this duty through ceremonies and rituals designed to preserve and stabilize the earth and to protect humankind from disease and other catastrophes. Failure to conduct these ceremonies in the manner and place specified, adherents believe, will result in great harm to the earth and to the people whose welfare depends upon it. In marked contrast to traditional Western religions, the belief systems of Native Americans do not rely on doctrines, creeds, or dogmas. Established or universal truths the mainstay of Western religions play no part in Indian faith. Ceremonies are communal efforts undertaken for specific purposes in accordance with instructions handed down from generation to generation. Commentaries on or interpretations of the rituals themselves are deemed absolute violations of the ceremonies, whose value lies not in their ability to explain the natural world or to enlighten individual believers but in their efficacy as protectors and enhancers of tribal existence. Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, Native American faith is inextricably *461 bound to the use of land. The site-specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from the Native American perception that land is itself a sacred, living being. See Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 1, 10 Rituals are performed in prescribed locations not merely as a matter of traditional orthodoxy, but because land, like all other living things, is unique, and specific sites possess different spiritual properties and significance. Within this belief system, therefore, land is not fungible; indeed, at the time of the Spanish colonization of the American Southwest, "all Indians held in some form a belief in a sacred and
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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held in some form a belief in a sacred and indissoluble bond between themselves and the land in which their settlements were located." E. Spicer, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960, p. 576 (1962). For respondent Indians, the most sacred of lands is the high country where, they believe, prehuman spirits moved with the coming of humans to the Earth. Because these spirits are seen as the source of religious power, or "medicine," many of the tribes' rituals and practices require frequent journeys to the area. Thus, for example, religious leaders preparing for the complex of ceremonies that underlie the Tribes' World Renewal efforts must travel to specific sites in the high country in order to attain the medicine necessary for successful renewal. Similarly, individual tribe members may seek curative powers for the healing of the sick, or personal medicine for particular purposes such as good luck in singing, hunting, or love. A period of preparation generally precedes such visits, and individuals must select trails in the sacred area according to the medicine they seek and their abilities, gradually moving to increasingly more powerful sites, which are typically located at higher altitudes. Among the most powerful of sites are Chimney Rock, Doctor Rock, and Peak 8, all of which are elevated rock outcroppings. *462 According to the Theodoratus Report, the qualities "of silence, the aesthetic perspective, and the physical attributes, are an extension of the sacredness of [each] particular site." App. 148. The act of medicine making is akin to meditation: the individual must integrate physical, mental, and vocal actions in order to communicate with the prehuman spirits. As a result, "successful use of the high country is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting." Although few Tribe members actually make medicine at the most powerful sites, the entire Tribe's welfare hinges on the success of the individual practitioners. Beginning in 1972, the Forest Service began preparing a multiple-use management plan for the Blue Creek Unit. The plan's principal features included the harvesting of 733 million board feet of Douglas fir over an 80-year period and the completion of a 6-mile segment of paved road running between two northern California towns, Gasquet and Orleans (the G-O road). The road's primary purpose was to provide a route for hauling the timber harvested under the management plan; in addition, it would enhance public access to the Six Rivers and other national forests,
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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public access to the Six Rivers and other national forests, and allow for more efficient maintenance and fire control by the Forest Service itself. In the mid-1970's, the Forest Service circulated draft environmental impact statements evaluating the effects of several proposed routes for the final segment of the G-O road, including at least two that circumnavigated the high country altogether. Ultimately, however, the Service settled on a route running along the Chimney Rock Corridor, which traverses the Indians' sacred lands. Respondent Indians brought suit to enjoin implementation of the plan, alleging that the road construction and timber harvesting would impermissibly interfere with their religious practices in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First *463 Amendment.[1] Following a trial, the District Court granted the requested injunctive relief. The court found that "use of the high country is essential to [respondents'] `World Renewal' ceremonies which constitute the heart of the Northwest Indian religious belief system," and that " `[i]ntrusions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high country are potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest [Indian] religious beliefs and practices.' " Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Concluding that these burdens on respondents' religious practices were sufficient to trigger the protections of the Free Exercise Clause, the court found that the interests served by the G-O road and the management plan were insufficient to justify those burdens. In particular, the court found that the road would not improve access to timber resources in the Blue Creek Unit and indeed was unnecessary to the harvesting of that timber; that it would not significantly improve the administration of the Six Rivers National Forest; and that it would increase recreational access only marginally, and at the expense of the very pristine environment that makes the area suitable for primitive recreational use in the first place. -596. The court further found that the unconnected segments of the road had independent utility,[2] and that although completion of the *464 Chimney Rock segment would reduce timber-hauling costs, it would not generate new jobs but would instead merely shift work from one area of the region to another. Finally, in enjoining the proposed harvesting activities, the court found that the Blue Creek Unit's timber resources were but a small fraction of those located in the entire National Forest and that the local timber industry would not suffer seriously if access to this fraction were foreclosed. While the case was pending on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Congress passed the California Wilderness Act of 1984, Stat. 1619, which designates most of the Blue
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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of 1984, Stat. 1619, which designates most of the Blue Creek Unit a wilderness area, and thus precludes logging and all other commercial activities in most of the area covered by the Forest Service's management plan. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's determination that the proposed harvesting and construction activities violated respondents' constitutional rights. Recognizing that the high country is "indispensable" to the religious lives of the approximately 5,000 Tribe members who reside in the area, Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective the court concluded "that the proposed government operations would virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion."[3] Like the lower court, the Court of Appeals found *465 the Government's interests in building the road and permitting limited timber harvesting interests which of course were considerably undermined by passage of the California Wilderness Act did not justify the destruction of respondents' religion. II The Court does not for a moment suggest that the interests served by the G-O road are in any way compelling, or that they outweigh the destructive effect construction of the road will have on respondents' religious practices. Instead, the Court embraces the Government's contention that its prerogative as landowner should always take precedence over a claim that a particular use of federal property infringes religious practices. Attempting to justify this rule, the Court argues that the First Amendment bars only outright prohibitions, indirect coercion, and penalties on the free exercise of religion. All other "incidental effects of government programs," it concludes, even those "which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs," simply do not give rise to constitutional concerns. See ante, at 450. Since our recognition nearly half a century ago that restraints on religious conduct implicate the concerns of the Free Exercise Clause, see we have never suggested that the protections of the guarantee are limited to so narrow a range of governmental burdens. The land-use decision challenged here will restrain respondents from practicing their religion as surely and as completely as any of the governmental actions we have struck down in the past, and the Court's efforts simply to define away respondents' injury *466 as nonconstitutional are both unjustified and ultimately unpersuasive. A The Court ostensibly finds support for its narrow formulation of religious burdens in our decisions in and In those cases, the laws at issue forced individuals to choose between adhering to specific religious tenets and forfeiting unemployment benefits on the one hand, and accepting work repugnant to their religious
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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the one hand, and accepting work repugnant to their religious beliefs on the other. The religions involved, therefore, lent themselves to the coercion analysis the Court espouses today, for they proscribed certain conduct such as munitions work (Thomas) or working on Saturdays (Sherbert, Hobbie) that the unemployment benefits laws effectively compelled. In sustaining the challenges to these laws, however, we nowhere suggested that such coercive compulsion exhausted the range of religious burdens recognized under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, in we struck down a state compulsory school attendance law on free exercise grounds not so much because of the affirmative coercion the law exerted on individual religious practitioners, but because of "the impact that compulsory high school attendance could have on the continued survival of Amish communities." Like respondents here, the Amish view life as pervasively religious and their faith accordingly dictates their entire lifestyle. See Detailed as their religious rules are, however, the parents in Yoder did not argue that their religion expressly proscribed public education beyond the eighth grade; rather, they objected to the law because "the values of the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion." By exposing Amish children "to a *467 `worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs," and by removing those children "from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life" when Amish beliefs are inculcated, the compulsory school law posed "a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice." Admittedly, this threat arose from the compulsory nature of the law at issue, but it was the "impact" on religious practice itself, not the source of that impact, that led us to invalidate the law. I thus cannot accept the Court's premise that the form of the government's restraint on religious practice, rather than its effect, controls our constitutional analysis. Respondents here have demonstrated that construction of the G-O road will completely frustrate the practice of their religion, for as the lower courts found, the proposed logging and construction activities will virtually destroy respondents' religion, and will therefore necessarily force them into abandoning those practices altogether. Indeed, the Government's proposed activities will restrain religious practice to a far greater degree here than in any of the cases cited by the Court today. None of the religious adherents in Hobbie, Thomas, and Sherbert, for example, claimed or could have claimed that the denial of unemployment benefits rendered the practice of their religions impossible; at most, the challenged laws made those practices more expensive. Here, in
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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the challenged laws made those practices more expensive. Here, in stark contrast, respondents have claimed and proved that the desecration of the high country will prevent religious leaders from attaining the religious power or medicine indispensable to the success of virtually all their rituals and ceremonies. Similarly, in Yoder the compulsory school law threatened to "undermin[e] the Amish community and religious practice," and thus to force adherents to "abandon belief. or to migrate to some other and more tolerant region." 406 U.S., Here the threat posed by the desecration of sacred lands that are indisputably essential to *468 respondents' religious practices is both more direct and more substantial than that raised by a compulsory school law that simply exposed Amish children to an alien value system. And of course respondents here do not even have the option, however unattractive it might be, of migrating to more hospitable locales; the site-specific nature of their belief system renders it nontransportable. Ultimately, the Court's coercion test turns on a distinction between governmental actions that compel affirmative conduct inconsistent with religious belief, and those governmental actions that prevent conduct consistent with religious belief. In my view, such a distinction is without constitutional significance. The crucial word in the constitutional text, as the Court itself acknowledges, is "prohibit," see ante, at 451, a comprehensive term that in no way suggests that the intended protection is aimed only at governmental actions that coerce affirmative conduct.[4] Nor does the Court's distinction comport with the principles animating the constitutional guarantee: religious freedom is threatened no less by governmental action that makes the practice of one's chosen faith impossible than by governmental programs that pressure one to engage in conduct inconsistent with religious beliefs. The Court attempts to explain the line it draws by arguing that the protections of the Free Exercise Clause "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development," ib *469 for in a society as diverse as ours, the Government cannot help but offend the "religious needs and desires" of some citizens. Ante, at 452. While I agree that governmental action that simply offends religious sensibilities may not be challenged under the Clause, we have recognized that laws that affect spiritual development by impeding the integration of children into the religious community or by increasing the expense of adherence to religious principles in short, laws that frustrate or inhibit religious practice trigger the protections of the constitutional guarantee. Both common sense and our prior cases teach us, therefore, that governmental action that makes the
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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cases teach us, therefore, that governmental action that makes the practice of a given faith more difficult necessarily penalizes that practice and thereby tends to prevent adherence to religious belief. The harm to the practitioners is the same regardless of the manner in which the government restrains their religious expression, and the Court's fear that an "effects" test will permit religious adherents to challenge governmental actions they merely find "offensive" in no way justifies its refusal to recognize the constitutional injury citizens suffer when governmental action not only offends but actually restrains their religious practices. Here, respondents have demonstrated that the Government's proposed activities will completely prevent them from practicing their religion, and such a showing, no less than those made out in Hobbie, Thomas, Sherbert, and Yoder, entitles them to the protections of the Free Exercise Clause. B Nor can I agree with the Court's assertion that respondents' constitutional claim is foreclosed by our decision in There, applicants for certain welfare benefits objected to the use of a Social Security number in connection with the administration of their 2-year-old daughter's application for benefits, contending that such use would "rob the [child's] spirit" and thus interfere with her spiritual development. In rejecting that challenge, *470 we stated that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens." ; see also ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not give an individual the right to dictate the Government's method of recordkeeping"). Accordingly, we explained that Roy could "no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets. The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." Today the Court professes an inability to differentiate Roy from the present case, suggesting that "[t]he building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security number." Ante, at 449. I find this inability altogether remarkable. In Roy, we repeatedly stressed the "internal" nature of the Government practice at issue: noting that Roy objected to "the widespread use of the social security number by the federal or state governments in their computer systems," we likened the use of such recordkeeping numbers to decisions concerning
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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likened the use of such recordkeeping numbers to decisions concerning the purchase of office equipment. When the Government processes information, of course, it acts in a purely internal manner, and any free exercise challenge to such internal recordkeeping in effect seeks to dictate how the Government conducts its own affairs. Federal land-use decisions, by contrast, are likely to have substantial external effects that government decisions concerning *471 office furniture and information storage obviously will not, and they are correspondingly subject to public scrutiny and public challenge in a host of ways that office equipment purchases are not.[5] Indeed, in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S. C. 1996, Congress expressly recognized the adverse impact land-use decisions and other governmental actions frequently have on the site-specific religious practices of Native Americans, and the Act accordingly directs agencies to consult with Native American religious leaders before taking actions that might impair those practices. Although I agree that the Act does not create any judicially enforceable rights, see ante, at 455, the absence of any private right of action in no way undermines the statute's significance as an express congressional determination that federal land management decisions are not "internal" Government "procedures," but are instead governmental actions that can and indeed are likely to burden Native American religious practices. That such decisions should be subject to constitutional challenge, and potential constitutional limitations, should hardly come as a surprise. The Court today, however, ignores Roy's emphasis on the internal nature of the Government practice at issue there, *472 and instead construes that case as further support for the proposition that governmental action that does not coerce conduct inconsistent with religious faith simply does not implicate the concerns of the Free Exercise Clause. That such a reading is wholly untenable, however, is demonstrated by the cruelly surreal result it produces here: governmental action that will virtually destroy a religion is nevertheless deemed not to "burden" that religion. Moreover, in AIRFA Congress explicitly acknowledged that federal "policies and regulations" could and often did "intrud[e] upon [and] interfer[e] with" site-specific Native American religious ceremonies, Stat. 469, and in Roy we recognized that this Act "with its emphasis on protecting the freedom to believe, express, and exercise a religion accurately identifies the mission of the Free Exercise Clause itself." 476 U.S., Ultimately, in Roy we concluded that, however much the Government's recordkeeping system may have offended Roy's sincere religious sensibilities, he could not challenge that system under the Free Exercise Clause because the Government's practice did not "in any degree impair Roy's `freedom to believe,
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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did not "in any degree impair Roy's `freedom to believe, express, and exercise' his religion." -701 (quoting AIRFA, 42 U.S. C. 1996) That determination distinguishes the injury at issue here, which the Court finds so "remarkably similar" to Roy's, ante, at 456, for respondents have made an uncontroverted showing that the proposed construction and logging activities will impair their freedom to exercise their religion in the greatest degree imaginable, and Congress has "accurately identifie[d]" such injuries as falling within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court's reading of Roy, therefore, simply cannot be squared with our endorsement in that very same case of this congressional determination. More important, it lends no support to the Court's efforts to narrow both the reach and promise of the Free Exercise Clause itself. *473 C In the final analysis, the Court's refusal to recognize the constitutional dimension of respondents' injuries stems from its concern that acceptance of respondents' claim could potentially strip the Government of its ability to manage and use vast tracts of federal property. See ante, at 452-453. In addition, the nature of respondents' site-specific religious practices raises the specter of future suits in which Native Americans seek to exclude all human activity from such areas. These concededly legitimate concerns lie at the very heart of this case, which represents yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate cultures the dominant Western culture, which views land in terms of ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system that holds land sacred. Rather than address this conflict in any meaningful fashion, however, the Court disclaims all responsibility for balancing these competing and potentially irreconcilable interests, choosing instead to turn this difficult task over to the Federal Legislature. Such an abdication is more than merely indefensible as an institutional matter: by defining respondents' injury as "nonconstitutional," the Court has effectively bestowed on one party to this conflict the unilateral authority to resolve all future disputes in its favor, subject only to the Court's toothless exhortation to be "sensitive" to affected religions. In my view, however, Native Americans deserve and the Constitution demands more than this. Prior to today's decision, several Courts of Appeals had attempted to fashion a test that accommodates the competing "demands" placed on federal property by the two cultures. Recognizing that the Government normally enjoys plenary authority over federal lands, the Courts of Appeals required Native Americans to demonstrate that any land-use decisions they challenged
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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Native Americans to demonstrate that any land-use decisions they challenged involved lands that were "central" or "indispensable" to their religious practices. See, e. g., Northwest *474 Indian Cemetery Protective ; ; cert. denied, ; (CA6), cert. denied, ; aff'd, (CA8), cert. denied, Although this requirement limits the potential number of free exercise claims that might be brought to federal land management decisions, and thus forestalls the possibility that the Government will find itself ensnared in a host of Lilliputian lawsuits, it has been criticized as inherently ethnocentric, for it incorrectly assumes that Native American belief systems ascribe religious significance to land in a traditionally Western hierarchical manner. See Michaelsen, American Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J. Law & Rel. 47 (1985); Pepper, Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause Some Reflections on Recent Cases, It is frequently the case in constitutional litigation, however, that courts are called upon to balance interests that are not readily translated into rough equivalents. At their most absolute, the competing claims that both the Government and Native Americans assert in federal land are fundamentally incompatible, and unless they are tempered by compromise, mutual accommodation will remain impossible. I believe it appropriate, therefore, to require some showing of "centrality" before the Government can be required either to come forward with a compelling justification for its proposed use of federal land or to forgo that use altogether. "Centrality," however, should not be equated with the survival or extinction of the religion itself. In Yoder, for example, we treated the objection to the compulsory school attendance of adolescents as "central" to the Amish faith even though such attendance did not prevent or otherwise render the practice of that religion impossible, and instead simply *475 threatened to "undermine" that faith. Because of their perceptions of and relationship with the natural world, Native Americans consider all land sacred. Nevertheless, the Theodoratus Report reveals that respondents here deemed certain lands more powerful and more directly related to their religious practices than others. Thus, in my view, while Native Americans need not demonstrate, as respondents did here, that the Government's land-use decision will assuredly eradicate their faith, I do not think it is enough to allege simply that the land in question is held sacred. Rather, adherents challenging a proposed use of federal land should be required to show that the decision poses a substantial and realistic threat of frustrating their religious practices. Once such a showing is made, the burden should shift to the Government to come forward with a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the infringement
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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with a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the infringement of those practices. The Court today suggests that such an approach would place courts in the untenable position of deciding which practices and beliefs are "central" to a given faith and which are not, and invites the prospect of judges advising some religious adherents that they "misunderstand their own religious beliefs." Ante, at 458. In fact, however, courts need not undertake any such inquiries: like all other religious adherents, Native Americans would be the arbiters of which practices are central to their faith, subject only to the normal requirement that their claims be genuine and sincere. The question for the courts, then, is not whether the Native American claimants understand their own religion, but rather whether they have discharged their burden of demonstrating, as the Amish did with respect to the compulsory school law in Yoder, that the land-use decision poses a substantial and realistic threat of undermining or frustrating their religious practices. Ironically, the Court's apparent solicitude for the integrity of religious belief and its desire to forestall the possibility that courts might second-guess the *476 claims of religious adherents leads to far greater inequities than those the Court postulates: today's ruling sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with the spiritual well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents, so that the Forest Service can build a 6-mile segment of road that two lower courts found had only the most marginal and speculative utility, both to the Government itself and to the private lumber interests that might conceivably use it. Similarly, the Court's concern that the claims of Native Americans will place "religious servitudes" upon vast tracts of federal property cannot justify its refusal to recognize the constitutional injury respondents will suffer here. It is true, as the Court notes, that respondents' religious use of the high country requires privacy and solitude. The fact remains, however, that respondents have never asked the Forest Service to exclude others from the area. Should respondents or any other group seek to force the Government to protect their religious practices from the interference of private parties, such a demand would implicate not only the concerns of the Free Exercise Clause, but also those of the Establishment Clause as well. That case, however, is most assuredly not before us today, and in any event cannot justify the Court's refusal to acknowledge that the injuries respondents will suffer as a result of the Government's proposed activities are sufficient to state a constitutional cause of action. III Today, the Court holds that
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Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
dissenting
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Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112037/lyng-v-northwest-indian-cemetery-protective-assn/
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constitutional cause of action. III Today, the Court holds that a federal land-use decision that promises to destroy an entire religion does not burden the practice of that faith in a manner recognized by the Free Exercise Clause. Having thus stripped respondents and all other Native Americans of any constitutional protection against perhaps the most serious threat to their age-old religious practices, and indeed to their entire way of life, the Court assures us that nothing in its decision "should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious *477 needs of any citizen." Ante, at 453. I find it difficult, however, to imagine conduct more insensitive to religious needs than the Government's determination to build a marginally useful road in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the road will render the practice of respondents' religion impossible. Nor do I believe that respondents will derive any solace from the knowledge that although the practice of their religion will become "more difficult" as a result of the Government's actions, they remain free to maintain their religious beliefs. Given today's ruling, that freedom amounts to nothing more than the right to believe that their religion will be destroyed. The safeguarding of such a hollow freedom not only makes a mockery of the " `policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the[ir] traditional religions,' " ante, at 454 (quoting AIRFA), it fails utterly to accord with the dictates of the First Amendment. I dissent.
|
Justice Marshall
| 1,972 | 15 |
concurring
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Johnson v. New York State Ed. Dept.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108631/johnson-v-new-york-state-ed-dept/
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While I join the Court's decision, I feel obliged to state somewhat more fully what I view to be the reasons for and meaning of this remand. The New York statutory scheme here under attack effectively denies textbooks to indigent elementary public school children unless the voters of their district approve a tax especially for the purpose of providing the books.[1] Petitioners who are indigent recipients of public assistance allege, inter alia, that the statute, as applied to their children, creates a wealth classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. When this action was initiated in September 1970, respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 27 was not providing free textbooks to petitioners' children, although textbooks were available upon the payment of a fee, which petitioners were unable to afford.[2] The practical consequence of this situation was that indigent children were forced to sit " `bookless, side by side in the same classroom with other more *77 wealthy children learning with purchase[d] textbooks [thus engendering] a widespread feeling of inferiority and unfitness in poor children [which] is psychologically, emotionally and educationally disastrous to their well being.' "[3] Indeed, an affidavit submitted to the District Court indicated that in at least one case, an indigent child was told that "he will receive an `F' for [each] day because he is without the required text-books. When the other pupils in the class read from text-books, the teacher doesn't let him share a book with another pupil, instead she gives him paper and tells him to draw."[4] Despite this evidence, the Court of Appeals, with one Judge dissenting, affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint. We granted certiorari.[5] This case obviously raises questions of large constitutional and practical importance. For two full school years children in elementary grades were denied access to textbooks solely because of the indigency of their families while these questions were being considered by the lower courts. After we had granted certiorari, however, a majority of the voters in respondent school district finally agreed to levy a tax for the purchase of textbooks for the elementary grades, and we are told that free textbooks have now been provided. I join in the Court's decision to remand the case so that the District Court can assess the consequences of this new development. I do so because I believe that the Court acts out of a proper sense of our constitutional duty to decide only live controversies, and because I believe that the District Judge can best resolve the factual issues upon which proper resolution of the
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