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Justice White
| 1,990 | 6 |
majority
|
Minnesota v. Olson
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112416/minnesota-v-olson/
|
given a key, whereas in Jones the owner of the apartment was away and Jones had a key with which he could come and go and admit and exclude others. These differences are crucial, it is argued, because in not disturbing the holding in Jones, the Court pointed out that while his host was away, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it. We do not understand however, to hold that an overnight guest can never have a legitimate expectation of privacy except when his host is away and he has a key, or that only when those facts are present may an overnight guest assert the "unremarkable proposition," that a person may have a sufficient interest in a place other than his home to enable him to be free in that place from unreasonable searches and seizures. To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others' homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend. We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times in our lives. From either perspective, we think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home. *99 From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth "a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable," 389 U. S., That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent with
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Justice White
| 1,990 | 6 |
majority
|
Minnesota v. Olson
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112416/minnesota-v-olson/
|
has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest. It is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control over the premises. The host may admit or exclude from the house as he prefers, but it is unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest. On the other hand, few houseguests will invite others to visit them while they are guests without consulting their hosts; but the latter, who have the authority to exclude despite the wishes of the guest, will often be accommodating. The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household. If the untrammeled power to admit and exclude were essential to Fourth Amendment protection, *100 an adult daughter temporarily living in the home of her parents would have no legitimate expectation of privacy because her right to admit or exclude would be subject to her parents' veto. Because respondent's expectation of privacy in the Bergstrom home was rooted in "understandings that are recognized and permitted by society," it was legitimate, and respondent can claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. III In the Court had no occasion to "consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as `exigent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search," This case requires us to determine whether the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in holding that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless entry into the house to make the arrest. The Minnesota Supreme Court applied essentially the correct standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed. The court observed that "a warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, Welsh v. Wisconsin], ], or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." The court also apparently thought
|
Justice White
| 1,990 | 6 |
majority
|
Minnesota v. Olson
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112416/minnesota-v-olson/
|
inside or outside the dwelling." The court also apparently thought that in the absence of hot pursuit there must be at least probable cause to believe that one or more of the other factors justifying the entry were present and that in assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is armed should be considered. Applying this standard, the state court determined that exigent circumstances did not exist. We are not inclined to disagree with this fact-specific application of the proper legal standard. The court pointed out *101 that although a grave crime was involved, respondent "was known not to be the murderer but thought to be the driver of the getaway car," ib and that the police had already recovered the murder weapon, "The police knew that Louanne and Julie were with the suspect in the upstairs duplex with no suggestion of danger to them. Three or four Minneapolis police squads surrounded the house. The time was 3 p.m., Sunday. It was evident the suspect was going nowhere. If he came out of the house he would have been promptly apprehended." We do not disturb the state court's judgment that these facts do not add up to exigent circumstances. IV We therefore affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court. It is so ordered. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissent.
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,997 | 9 |
concurring
|
Klehr v. AO Smith Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118132/klehr-v-ao-smith-corp/
|
Twice this Term we have received full briefing and heard oral argument on the question of when a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action accrues; when we rise for our summer recess, the question will remain unanswered. We did not reach it in because we dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. And we do not reach it today for no particular reason except timiditydeclining to say what the correct accrual rule is, but merely rejecting the only one of the four candidates[1] under which these petitioners could recover. We thus leave reduced but unresolved the well-known split in authority that prompted us to take this case. There will remain in effect, in some Circuits, one of the three remaining accrual rules the one that their Courts of Appeals or District Courts have adopted; in the remaining Circuits litigants will have to *197 guess which of the three to follow; and in all of the Circuits no one will know for sure which rule is rightuntil, at some future date, we receive briefing and argument a third or fourth time, and finally summon up the courage to "unravel," as one commentator has put it, "the mess that characterizes civil RICO accrual decisions," Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from Civil RICO, Worse still, the reason the Court gives for regarding the accrual issue as too complex ("subtle and difficult," ante, at 192) to be decided on only the second try is a reason that implicates the merits, and that in my view gets the merits wrong. One cannot, the Court says, leap impetuously to the conclusion that the antitrust "injury" accrual rule applies, rather than a "discovery" accrual rule, because civil RICO cases are unlike antitrust cases, in that "a high percentage" of them "involve fraud claims." Ante, at 191. This erases, it seems to me, the one clear path back out of the current forest of confusion, which is the proposition that RICO is similar to the Clayton Act. This is the proposition that caused us to adopt the Clayton Act statute of limitations in the first place, specifically rejecting the argument the Court now finds plausible, that the preponderance of fraud claims under RICO makes the Clayton Act an inappropriate model. We said the similarity was close enough: "Although the large majority of civil RICO complaints use [fraud] as the required predicate offenses, a not insignificant number of complaints allege criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals such as arson, bribery, theft and political corruption." Agency Holding
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,997 | 9 |
concurring
|
Klehr v. AO Smith Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118132/klehr-v-ao-smith-corp/
|
such as arson, bribery, theft and political corruption." Agency Holding Elsewhere in today's opinion, curiously enough, the Court is quite willing to say that what is good for antitrust is good for RICOeven with respect to a matter much more intimately connected with fraud than the accrual rule, namely, whether *198 invocation of the "fraudulent concealment" rule requires "reasonable diligence" on the plaintiff's part. On this point the Court finds arguments taken from "the related antitrust context" entirely persuasive. Ante, at 194. (Apart from that illogical reliance, it seems to me also illogical even to resolve the question whether a statute should be tolled by fraudulent concealment without having resolved the antecedent question of when the statute begins to run.) Similarly, the Court relies heavily on the antitrust injury accrual rule in its analysis rejecting the Third Circuit's last predicate act rule. Ante, at 188-191. I would resolve the Circuit split we granted certiorari to consider, and would hold that, of the four main accrual rules (injury, injury discovery, injury and pattern discovery, and last predicate act), the appropriate accrual rule is the Clayton Act "injury" rulethe "cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff's business." Zenith Radio In Malley-Duff, we held that the appropriate statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is the 4-year limitations period found in the Clayton Act. We reasoned that "RICO was patterned after the Clayton Act," and that the purpose, structure, and aims of the two schemes were quite similar,[2] Although we expressly acknowledged *199 in Malley-Duff that we "ha[d] no occasion to decide the appropriate time of accrual for a RICO claim," it takes no profound analysis to figure out what that decision must be. "Presumably the accrual standards developed by the lower federal courts in civil antitrust litigation should be equally applicable to civil enforcement RICO actions." 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions 6.5.5.1, pp. 447-448 We have said that "[a]ny period of limitation is understood fully only in the context of the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a particular cause of action." It is just as true, I think, that any period of limitation is utterly meaningless without specification of the event that starts it running. As a practical matter, a 4-year statute of limitations means nothing at all unless one knows when the four years start running. If they start, for example, on the 10th anniversary of the injury, the 4-year statute is more akin to a 14-year statute than to the Clayton Act. We
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,997 | 9 |
concurring
|
Klehr v. AO Smith Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118132/klehr-v-ao-smith-corp/
|
to a 14-year statute than to the Clayton Act. We would thus have been foolish, in MalleyDuff, to speak of "adopting" the Clayton Act statute, and of "patterning" the RICO limitations period after the Clayton Act, if all we meant was using the Clayton Act number of years. We have recognized this principle in our more established practice ) of borrowing state rather than federal statutes of limitations. We have consistently followed "[s]tate law in a variety of cases that raised questions concerning the overtones and details of application of the state limitation period to the federal cause of action. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S. [696,] 6 [(1966)] (characterization of the cause of action); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. [461,] 465-467 [(1947)] (place where cause of action arose);" See also, e. g., "In virtually all statutes of limitations the chronological length of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application. Courts thus should not unravel state limitations rules unless their full application would defeat the goals of the federal statute at issue." There is no conceivable reason why the same principle should not apply to the borrowing of an analogous federal, rather than state, limitations period. Both the allurement and the vice of the "mix-and-match" approach to statutes-of-limitations borrowing (the possibility of which the Court today entertains) is that it provides broad scope for judicial lawmaking. We should have resisted that allurement today,[3] as we resisted it in the past: "[W]e find no support in our cases for the practice of borrowing only a portion of an express statute of limitations. Indeed, such a practice comes close to the type of judicial policymaking that our borrowing doctrine was intended to avoid. " Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & It is, in other words, no wonder that the Court finds the question it has posed for itself today "subtle and difficult"; judicial policywonking is endlessly demanding, and constructing a statute of limitations is much more complicated than adopting one. Finding the most analogous cause of action whose *201 limitations provision can be adopted is relatively simple (for the cause of action before us, we did it in Malley-Duff ); but limiting the adoption to merely the term of years set forth in the limitations provision, and then selecting, to go with that term of years, the precise accrual rule, tolling rule, estoppel rule, etc., that will clothe the limitations-naked statute with an ensemble of policy perfectionwell that is, I concede, a task that should not be attacked all at once, but rather
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,997 | 9 |
concurring
|
Klehr v. AO Smith Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118132/klehr-v-ao-smith-corp/
|
that should not be attacked all at once, but rather undertaken piecemeal, over several decades, as the Court has chosen to do today. I prefer to stand by the ruder, humbler, but more efficient and predictable practice we have followed in the past: When we adopt a statute of limitations from an analogous federal cause of action we adopt it in whole, with all its accoutrements. Perhaps (though I am dubious) there is room for an exception similar to the one made in our state-borrowing practice, see that would permit rejection of an element that "would defeat the goals of the federal statute at issue," 490 U.S., at But unless this exception is to gobble up the rule, nothing so extreme is represented by the Clayton Act accrual rule. Applying the Clayton Act accrual rule, I agree with the Court that petitioners' cause of action accrued more than four years before the filing of this action on August 27, 1993. See ante, at 192. Since the Court of Appeals determined, under a more relaxed accrual rule, that petitioners should have discovered all of the RICO elements (which would include their injury) prior to 1989, it follows, a fortiori, that under the Clayton Act injury accrual rule, petitioners' cause of action is untimely. I also agree with the Court that petitioners are not entitled to invoke the fraudulent concealment doctrine. As the Court persuasively demonstrates, in the antitrust context "`[t]he concealment requirement is satisfied only if the plaintiff shows that he neither knew nor, in the exercise of due diligence, could reasonably have known of the offense.' " *202 Ante, at 195 (quoting 2 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ b, p. 152 (rev. ed. 1995)). I therefore join Part III of the Court's opinion. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
Respondent David Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S. C. 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while Lanier served as a state judge. The Sixth Circuit reversed his convictions on the ground that the constitutional right in issue had not previously been identified by this Court in a case with fundamentally similar facts. The question is whether this standard of notice is higher than the Constitution requires, and we hold that it is. I David Lanier was formerly the sole state Chancery Court judge for two rural counties in western Tennessee. The trial record, read most favorably to the jury's verdict, shows that from 1989 to 1991, while Lanier was in office, he sexually assaulted several women in his judicial chambers. The two most serious assaults were against a woman whose divorce proceedings had come before Lanier and whose daughter's custody remained subject to his jurisdiction. When the woman applied for a secretarial job at Lanier's courthouse, Lanier intered her and suggested that he might have to reexamine the daughter's custody. When the woman got up to leave, Lanier grabbed her, sexually assaulted her, and finally committed oral rape. A few weeks later, Lanier inveigled the woman into returning to the courthouse again to get information about another job opportunity, and again sexually assaulted and orally raped her. App. 44-67. On five other occasions Lanier sexually assaulted four other women: two of his secretaries, a Youth Services Officer of the juvenile court over which Lanier presided, and a local coordinator for a federal program who was in Lanier's chambers to discuss a matter affecting the same court. Ultimately, Lanier was charged with 11 violations of 242, each count of the indictment alleging that, acting willfully and under color of Tennessee law, he had deprived the victim *262 of "rights and privileges which are secured and protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United namely the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, including the right to be free from wilful sexual assault." Before trial, Lanier moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that 242 is void for vagueness. The District Court denied the motion. The trial judge instructed the jury on the Government's burden to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant deprived the victim of rights secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United : "Included in the liberty protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment is the concept of personal bodily integrity and the
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
Amendment is the concept of personal bodily integrity and the right to be free of unauthorized and unlawful physical abuse by state intrusion. Thus, this protected right of liberty provides that no person shall be subject to physical or bodily abuse without lawful justification by a state official acting or claiming to act under the color of the laws of any state of the United when that official's conduct is so demeaning and harmful under all the circumstances as to shock one's consci[ence]. Freedom from such physical abuse includes the right to be free from certain sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. It is not, however, every unjustified touching or grabbing by a state official that constitutes a violation of a person's constitutional rights. The physical abuse must be of a serious substantial nature that involves physical force, mental coercion, bodily injury or emotional damage which is shocking to one's consci[ence]." The jury returned verdicts of guilty on seven counts, and not guilty on three (one count having been dismissed at the close of the Government's evidence). It also found that the two oral rapes resulted in "bodily injury," for which Lanier was *263 subject to 10-year terms of imprisonment on each count, in addition to 1-year terms under the other five counts of conviction, see 242. He was sentenced to consecutive maximum terms totaling 25 years. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, but the full court vacated that decision and granted rehearing en banc, On rehearing, the court set aside Lanier's convictions for "lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute [i. e., 242] includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage." Invoking general canons for interpreting criminal statutes, as well as this Court's plurality opinion in the Sixth Circuit held that criminal liability may be imposed under 242 only if the constitutional right said to have been violated is first identified in a decision of this Court (not any other federal, or state, court), and only when the right has been held to apply in "a factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar." The Court of Appeals regarded these combined requirements as "substantially higher than the `clearly established' standard used to judge qualified immunity" in civil cases under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. Finding no decision of this Court applying a right to be free from unjustified assault or invasions of bodily integrity in a situation "fundamentally similar" to those charged, the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
to those charged, the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction with instructions to dismiss the indictment. Two judges would not have dismissed the felony counts charging the oral rapes but concurred in dismissing the misdemeanor counts, while three members of the court dissented as to all dismissals. We granted certiorari to re the standard for determining whether particular conduct falls within the range of criminal liability under 242. We now vacate and remand. *264 II Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) "willfully" and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United[1] 18 U.S. C. 242; The en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit dealt only with the last of these elements, and it is with that element alone that we are concerned here.[2] The general language of 242,[3] referring to "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected *265 by the Constitution or laws of the United" is matched by the breadth of its companion conspiracy statute, 241,[4] which speaks of conspiracies to prevent "the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to [any person] by the Constitution or laws of the United" Thus, in lieu of describing the specific conduct it forbids, each statute's general terms incorporate constitutional law by reference, see United v. ; United v. Price, and many of the incorporated constitutional guarantees are, of course, themselves stated with some catholicity of phrasing. The result is that neither the statutes nor a good many of their constitutional referents delineate the range of forbidden conduct with particularity. The right to due process enforced by 242 and said to have been violated by Lanier presents a case in point, with the irony that a prosecution to enforce one application of its spacious protection of liberty can threaten the accused with deprivation of another: what Justice Holmes spoke of as "fair warning in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." v. United "`The principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' " ).[5] *266 There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." ; accord, ; Second, as a sort of "junior version of the vagueness doctrine," H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 95 (1968), the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. See, e. g., Liparota v. United 4 ; United v. Bass, ; at Third, although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, see, e. g., at -359; ; ; Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope, see, e. g., Marks v. United ; ; ; cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, 9, cl. 3; 10, cl. 1; In each of these guises, the touchstone is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. We applied this standard in which recognized that the expansive language of due process that provides a basis for judicial re is, when incorporated by reference into 242, generally ill suited to the far different task of giving fair warning about the scope of criminal liability. The plurality identified the affront to the warning requirement posed by employing 242 to place "the accused on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of which it gives no warning." At the same time, the same Justices recognized that this constitutional difficulty does not arise when the accused is charged with violating a "right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United or by decisions interpreting them." When broad constitutional requirements have been "made specific" by the text or settled interpretations, willful violators "certainly are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with punishment. [T]hey are not punished for violating an unknowable something." Accordingly, limited the statute's coverage to rights fairly warned of, having been "made specific" by the time of the charged conduct. See also at (parallel construction of 241).[6] *268 The Sixth Circuit, in this case, added two glosses to the made-specific standard
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
in this case, added two glosses to the made-specific standard of fair warning. In its a generally phrased constitutional right has been made specific within the meaning of only if a prior decision of this Court has declared the right, and then only when this Court has applied its ruling in a case with facts "fundamentally similar" to the case being prosecuted. None of the considerations advanced in this case, however, persuade us that either a decision of this Court or the extreme level of factual specificity envisioned by the Court of Appeals is necessary in every instance to give fair warning. First, contrary to the Court of Appeals, see ib we think it unsound to read as reasoning that only this Court's decisions could provide the required warning. Although the plurality gave two examples involving decisions of the Court, their opinion referred in general terms to rights made specific by "decisions interpreting" the Constitution, see 325 U.S., and no subsequent case has held that the universe of relevant interpretive decisions is confined to our opinions. While United v. a case under 241 for violating *269 Thirteenth Amendment rights, did characterize our task as ascertaining the crime charged "by looking to the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition specified in our prior decisions," at in at least one other case we have specifically referred to a decision of a Court of Appeals in defining the established scope of a constitutional right for purposes of 241 liability, see v. United 223-2 It is also to the point, as we explain below, that in applying the rule of qualified immunity under 42 U.S. C. 1983 and we have referred to decisions of the Courts of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was "clearly established." See ; ; see also ; Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions in various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered, such a circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough, without any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a matter of law to provide it. Nor have our decisions demanded precedents that applied the right at issue to a factual situation that is "fundamentally similar" at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit in using that phrase. To the contrary, we have upheld convictions under 241 or 242 despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights. See United v. Guest, (prior cases established right of interstate travel, *0 but later case was the first to address the deprivation of this right by private persons); United v. Saylor, ; United v. Classic, (1) ; see also But even putting these examples aside, we think that the Sixth Circuit's "fundamentally similar" standard would lead trial judges to demand a degree of certainty at once unnecessarily high and likely to beget much wrangling. This danger flows from the Court of Appeals' stated that due process under 242 demands more than the "clearly established" law required for a public officer to be held civilly liable for a constitutional violation under 1983 or Bivens, see ; ( 1983 action). This, we think, is error. In the civil sphere, we have explained that qualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants "reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability," by attaching liability only if "[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right," So conceived, the object of the "clearly established" immunity standard is not different from that of "fair warning" as it relates to law "made specific" for the purpose of validly applying 242. The fact that one has a civil and the other a criminal law role is of no significance; both serve the same objective, and in effect the qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from civil liability and its consequences *1 that individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. To require something clearer than "clearly established" would, then, call for something beyond "fair warning." This is not to say, of course, that the single warning standard points to a single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary. See, e. g., and n. 12. But general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though "the very action in question
|
Justice Souter
| 1,997 | 20 |
majority
|
United States v. Lanier
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118098/united-states-v-lanier/
|
conduct in question, even though "the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful," As Judge Daughtrey noted in her dissenting opinion in this case: "`The easiest cases don't even arise. There has never been a section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages [or criminal] liability.' " ); see also (due process requirements are not "designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited"); Williams v. United (holding that beating to obtain a confession plainly violates 242). In sum, as with civil liability under 1983 or Bivens, all that can usefully be said about criminal liability under 242 is that it may be imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if, "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness *2 [under the Constitution is] apparent," Where it is, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied. Because the Court of Appeals used the wrong gauge in deciding whether prior judicial decisions gave fair warning that respondent's actions violated constitutional rights, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for application of the proper standard.[7] It is so ordered.
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,980 | 19 |
majority
|
United States v. Salvucci
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110325/united-states-v-salvucci/
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Relying on the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that since respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were *85 entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the legality of the search which produced the evidence against them, without regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Today we hold that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated. The automatic standing rule of is therefore overruled. I Respondents, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackular, were charged in a federal indictment with 12 counts of unlawful possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1708. The 12 checks which formed the basis of the indictment had been seized by the Massachusetts police during the search of an apartment rented by respondent Zackular's mother. The search was conducted pursuant to a warrant. Respondents filed a motion to suppress the checks on the ground that the affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant was inadequate to demonstrate probable cause. The District Court granted respondents' motions and ordered that the checks be suppressed.[1] The Government sought reconsideration of the District Court's ruling, contending that respondents lacked "standing" to challenge the constitutionality of the search. The District Court reaffirmed its suppression order and the Government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondents had "standing" and the search warrant was constitutionally inadequate. The court found that the respondents were not required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the property seized because they were entitled to assert "automatic standing" to object to the search *86 and seizure under The court observed that the vitality of the Jones doctrine had been challenged in recent years, but that "[u]ntil the Supreme Court rules on this question, we are not prepared to hold that the automatic standing rule of Jones has been overruled. That is an issue which the Supreme Court must resolve." The Court of Appeals was obviously correct in its characterization of the status of Jones, and we granted certiorari in order to resolve the controversy.[2] II As early as 1907, this Court took the position that remedies for violations of constitutional rights would only be afforded to a person who "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given." The exclusionary rule is one form of remedy afforded for Fourth Amendment violations, and the Court in held that the principle properly limited its availability. The Court reasoned
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| 1,980 | 19 |
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United States v. Salvucci
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that the principle properly limited its availability. The Court reasoned that ordinarily "it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy." Subsequent attempts to vicariously assert violations of the Fourth Amendment rights of others have been repeatedly rejected by this Court. Alderman v. United ; Brown v. United 411 U. S. *87 223, 230 (1973). Most recently, in we held that "it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule's protections." Even though the Court in Jones recognized that the exclusionary rule should only be available to protect defendants who have been the victims of an illegal search or seizure, the Court thought it necessary to establish an exception. In cases where possession of the seized evidence was an essential element of the offense charged, the Court held that the defendant was not obligated to establish that his own Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, but only that the search and seizure of the evidence was unconstitutional.[3] Upon such a showing, the exclusionary rule would be available to prevent the admission of the evidence against the defendant. The Court found that the prosecution of such possessory offenses presented a "special problem" which necessitated the departure from the then settled principles of Fourth Amendment "standing."[4] Two circumstances were found to require this exception. First, the Court found that in order to establish standing at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defendant would often be "forced to allege facts the proof of which would tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him," since several Courts of Appeals had "pinioned a defendant within this dilemma" by holding that evidence adduced at the motion *88 to suppress could be used against the defendant at trial. The Court declined to embrace any rule which would require a defendant to assert his Fourth Amendment claims only at the risk of providing the prosecution with self-incriminating statements admissible at trial. The Court sought resolution of this dilemma by relieving the defendant of the obligation of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal search or seizure. The Court also commented that this rule would be beneficial for a second reason. Without a rule prohibiting a Government challenge to a defendant's "standing" to invoke the exclusionary rule in a possessory offense prosecution, the Government would be allowed the "advantage of contradictory positions."
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| 1,980 | 19 |
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United States v. Salvucci
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the Government would be allowed the "advantage of contradictory positions." The Court reasoned that the Government ought not to be allowed to assert that the defendant possessed the goods for purposes of criminal liability, while simultaneously asserting that he did not possess them for the purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that "[i]t is not consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the Government." -264. Thus in order to prevent both the risk that self-incrimination would attach to the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as to prevent the "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction," see Brown v. United the Court adopted the rule of "automatic standing." In the 20 years which have lapsed since the Court's decision in Jones, the two reasons which led the Court to the rule of automatic standing have likewise been affected by time. This Court has held that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial. Simmons v. United Developments in the principles of Fourth Amendment standing, as well, clarify that a prosecutor may, with legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that a defendant *89 charged with possession of a seized item did not have a privacy interest violated in the course of the search and seizure. We are convinced not only that the original tenets of the Jones decision have eroded, but also that no alternative principles exist to support retention of the rule. A The "dilemma" identified in Jones, that a defendant charged with a possessory offense might only be able to establish his standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt, was eliminated by our decision in Simmons v. United In Simmons, the defendant Garrett was charged with bank robbery. During the search of a codefendant's mother's house, physical evidence used in the bank robbery, including a suitcase, was found in the basement and seized. In an effort to establish his standing to assert the illegality of the search, Garrett testified at the suppression hearing that the suitcase was similar to one he owned and that he was the owner of the clothing discovered inside the suitcase. Garrett's motion to suppress was denied, but his testimony was admitted into evidence against him as part of the Government's case-in-chief at trial. This Court reversed, finding that "a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissible against him at
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,980 | 19 |
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United States v. Salvucci
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knows that his testimony may be admissible against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testimonial proof of standing necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim." -393. The Court found that, in effect, the defendant was "obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment *90 grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection." This Court's ruling in Simmons thus not only extends protection against this risk of self-incrimination in all of the cases covered by Jones, but also grants a form of "use immunity" to those defendants charged with nonpossessory crimes. In this respect, the protection of Simmons is therefore broader than that of Jones. Thus, as we stated in Brown v. United "[t]he self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones decision, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution [in Simmons]." B This Court has identified the self-incrimination rationale as the cornerstone of the Jones opinion. See Brown v. United We need not belabor the question of whether the "vice" of prosecutorial contradiction could alone support a rule countenancing the exclusion of probative evidence on the grounds that someone other than the defendant was denied a Fourth Amendment right. The simple answer is that the decisions of this Court, especially our most recent decision in clearly establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction. To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in self-contradiction in Jones, the Court necessarily relied on the unexamined assumption that a defendant's possession of a seized good sufficient to establish criminal culpability was also sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment "standing." This assumption, however, even if correct at the time, is no longer so.[5] *91 The person in legal possession of a good seized during an illegal search has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation.[6] As we hold today in Rawlings v. Kentucky, post, p. 98, legal possession of a seized good is not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment interest, for it does not invariably represent
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,980 | 19 |
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United States v. Salvucci
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a Fourth Amendment interest, for it does not invariably represent the protected Fourth Amendment interest. This Court has repeatedly repudiated the notion that "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law" ought to control our Fourth Amendment inquiry. In another section of the opinion in Jones itself, the Court concluded that, "it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law." See also ; While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, see property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry. In this Court held that an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have "a legitimate *92 expectation of privacy in the invaded place." See also We simply decline to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. In Jones, the Court held not only that automatic standing should be conferred on defendants charged with crimes of possession, but, alternatively, that Jones had actual standing because he was "legitimately on the premises" at the time of the search. In this Court rejected the adequacy of this second Jones standard, finding that it was "too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." In language appropriate to our consideration of the automatic standing rule as well, we reasoned: "In abandoning `legitimately on premises' for the doctrine that we announce today, we are not forsaking a time-tested and workable rule, which has produced consistent results when applied, solely for the sake of fidelity to the values underlying the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment. Where the factual premises for a rule are so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so. We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling." As in we again reject "blind adherence" to the other underlying assumption in Jones that possession of the
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,980 | 19 |
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United States v. Salvucci
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the other underlying assumption in Jones that possession of the seized good is an acceptable measure of Fourth Amendment interests. As in we find that the Jones standard "creates too *93 broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights" and that we must instead engage in a "conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment" by asking not merely whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the items seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched. Thus neither prosecutorial "vice," nor the underlying assumption of Jones that possession of a seized good is the equivalent of Fourth Amendment "standing" to challenge the search, can save the automatic standing rule. C Even though the original foundations of Jones are no longer relevant, respondents assert that principles not articulated by the Court in Jones support retention of the rule. First, respondents maintain that while Simmons v. United eliminated the possibility that the prosecutor could use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as substantive evidence of guilt at trial, Simmons did not eliminate other risks to the defendant which attach to giving testimony on a motion to suppress.[7] Principally, respondents assert that the prosecutor may still be permitted to use the defendant's testimony to impeach him at trial.[8] This Court *94 has not decided whether Simmons precludes the use of a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at trial.[9] But the issue presented here is quite different from the one of whether "use immunity" extends only through the Government's case-in-chief, or beyond that to the direct and cross-examination of a defendant in the event he chooses to take the stand. That issue need not be and is not resolved here, for it is an issue which more aptly relates to the proper breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for retaining automatic standing. Respondents also seek to retain the Jones rule on the grounds that it is said to maximize the deterrence of illegal police conduct by permitting an expanded class of potential challengers. The same argument has been rejected by this Court as a sufficient basis for allowing persons whose Fourth Amendment rights were not violated to nevertheless claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule. In Alderman v. United 394 U. S., at -175, we explicitly stated: "The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that
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| 1,980 | 19 |
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United States v. Salvucci
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the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." See also ; United v. Ceccolini, ; United v. Calandra, Respondents' deterrence *95 argument carries no special force in the context of possessory offenses and we therefore again reject it. We are convinced that the automatic standing rule of Jones has outlived its usefulness in this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The doctrine now serves only to afford a windfall to defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated. We are unwilling to tolerate the exclusion of probative evidence under such circumstances since we adhere to the view of Alderman that the values of the Fourth Amendment are preserved by a rule which limits the availability of the exclusionary rule to defendants who have been subjected to a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. This action comes to us as a challenge to a pretrial decision suppressing evidence. The respondents relied on automatic standing and did not attempt to establish that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of Zackular's mother's home where the goods were seized. We therefore think it appropriate to remand so that respondents will have an opportunity to demonstrate, if they can, that their own Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See Combs v. United Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR.
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Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
majority
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Bowen v. Galbreath
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112013/bowen-v-galbreath/
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The question before us is whether, under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, a district court has the authority to order the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold a portion of past-due supplemental security income benefits for the payment of attorney's fees. After the Secretary of Health and Human Services denied Mary Alice Galbreath's application for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security *75 Act, she appealed to a Federal District Court. The District Court reversed the denial, and the Secretary accordingly paid Galbreath her full $7,954 in past-due benefits. Galbreath's attorney, Anthony W. Bartels, then moved for attorney's fees equal to 25% of the past-due benefits. The District Court determined that the amount requested was reasonable and, relying on 42 U.S. C. 406(b)(1), ordered the Secretary "to compute, certify, and pay" Bartels his requested fee of $1,988.50 out of the the past-due benefits awarded Galbreath. The Secretary appealed, arguing that 406(b)(1) applies only to cases under Title II of the Social Security Act and that the relevant statutes and regulations do not permit withholding past-due SSI benefits for payment of attorney's fees in Title XVI cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals,[*] and now reverse. Title II is an insurance program. Enacted in 1935, it provides old-age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals irrespective of financial need. See 42 U.S. C. 403, 423 (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Title XVI is a welfare program. Enacted in 1972, it provides SSI benefits to financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled regardless of their insured status. See 42 U.S. C. 1382(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Until Title II contained no provision expressly authorizing a district court to award fees to a claimant's attorney. In however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 42 U.S. C. 405(g) implicitly authorized district courts to order the payment of attorney's fees out of *76 past-due benefits. See Under 42 U.S. C. 405(g), a court reviewing a decision of the Secretary has the power to enter "a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary." The court in Sparks reasoned that where a statute gives a court jurisdiction, it must be presumed, absent any indication to the contrary, that the court was intended to exercise all the powers of a court, including the power to provide for payment of attorney's fees out of any -289. Later in Congress effectively codified Sparks by adding a
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Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
majority
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Bowen v. Galbreath
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-289. Later in Congress effectively codified Sparks by adding a new subsection (b)(1) to 42 U.S. C. 406 that allows withholding of past-due benefits to pay attorney's fees incurred in judicial proceedings under Title II. Social Security Amendments of Pub. L. 89-97, 332, Subsection (b)(1) provides: "Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Secretary may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(i) of this title, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits." In 1968, Congress amended 42 U.S. C. 406(a) by adding two sentences giving the Secretary similar withholding authority to pay attorney's fees incurred in Title II administrative proceedings. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, 173, Thus, the District Court's order in this case would clearly be valid if this were a Title II case. When Congress enacted Title XVI in 1972, however, it provided no similar authority to withhold past-due benefits for attorney's fees. This omission is particularly telling because Congress incorporated *77 many other provisions of Title II into Title XVI. In particular, while incorporating almost every other provision of 406 into Title XVI, Congress left out the provisions in 406(b)(1) and 406(a) that authorized judicial withholding and administrative withholding. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-603, 301, -1477, codified at 42 U.S. C. 1383(d)(2). This omission does not appear to have been inadvertent. Indeed, with respect to administrative proceedings, the House Report specifically noted and explained the omission of withholding authority by twice stating: "Where an individual who has requested a hearing is represented before the Secretary by an attorney there would be no withholding of attorney fees from such individual's benefits. Your committee believes that to withhold such fees would be contrary to the purpose of the program." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, pp. 156, 187 (1971). The Senate Report also indicates the omission of administrative withholding authority was intentional. See S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 392 (1972) ("Where an individual who has requested a hearing is represented before the Secretary by an attorney there would be no withholding of attorney fees from the individual's benefits"). Although the legislative history offered no explanation specifically linked to the omission
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Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
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Bowen v. Galbreath
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legislative history offered no explanation specifically linked to the omission of judicial withholding authority, it is fair to assume that this omission also reflected Congress' view that withholding past-due SSI benefits would be inconsistent with the purpose of the program. Given the extreme financial need of SSI beneficiaries, this view is not irrational. Nor would it be odd for Congress to conclude that withholding past-due benefits from financially needy individuals under Title XVI would cause greater hardship than withholding past-due benefits from insured individuals under Title II. We thus conclude that, as originally enacted, Title XVI evidenced a congressional intent not to allow the withholding of past-due *78 SSI benefits to pay attorney's fees incurred in judicial proceedings. Respondent and the courts finding judicial withholding authority under Title XVI do not dispute the conclusion that Congress intended to disallow judicial withholding when it enacted Title XVI in 1972. Rather, they contend that courts possess inherent authority to order withholding and that a 1976 amendment to 42 U.S. C. 1383(c)(3) the judicial review provision of Title XVI demonstrates Congress' intent to allow that authority to be exercised. As enacted in 1972, 42 U.S. C. 1383(c)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) provided: "The final determination of the Secretary after a hearing under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in Section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Secretary's final determinations under Section 405 of this title; except that the determination of the Secretary after such hearing as to any fact shall be final and conclusive and not subject to review by any court." Pub. L. 92-603, 301, The 1976 amendment simply deleted the italicized portion of the statute. Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Stat. 1135. The clear and expressed intent was to make the Secretary's factual findings under Title XVI subject to judicial review, just as they were under Title II. Nothing in the legislative history mentions withholding benefits to pay attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals below and other courts have nonetheless reasoned that, because Congress intended to make judicial review under Title XVI the same as judicial review under Title II, courts adjudicating Title XVI cases must have the same inherent authority to order withholding under 405(g) that, under Sparks, courts adjudicating Title II cases had even before 406(b)(1) was added. We find this analysis unpersuasive. On its face, the deletion of a provision making factual findings unreviewable *79 bears no apparent relation to whether withholding of pastdue benefits should be allowed. Indeed, the deletion does not even purport to address cases
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Justice Brennan
| 1,988 | 13 |
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Bowen v. Galbreath
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Indeed, the deletion does not even purport to address cases involving legal, rather than factual, disputes, and we can hardly imagine that Congress meant to change the ban on withholding without addressing both kinds of cases. The courts that have concluded that the 1976 amendment authorizes judicial withholding rely on statements in the legislative history indicating Congress' intent to make judicial review under Title II and Title XVI "virtually identical," to "provide the same rights to judicial review" under both Titles, and "to apply the same rules of judicial review to Title XVI cases as apply to Title II cases." S. Rep. No. 94-550, pp. 1, 3-4 (1975). None of these statements suggests that Congress intended to allow withholding of past-due benefits. Rather, they simply state the obvious point that removing the provision barring review under Title XVI of the Secretary's factual determinations makes the scope of issues reviewable under Title XVI and Title II the same. Even assuming courts have inherent authority under Sparks to withhold a portion of past-due SSI benefits to pay attorney's fees in Title XVI cases, we see no reason why Congress cannot divest courts of that authority if it so chooses. In originally enacting Title XVI, Congress manifested its intent, by selective incorporation and legislative history, to disallow the withholding of past-due SSI benefits to pay attorney's fees incurred in Title XVI cases. Until Congress sees fit to override its original decision, by amending Title XVI in a way that manifests an intent to allow withholding, that original decision stands. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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For the second time in recent years we consider constitutional questions arising from a program designed to facilitate *221 extracurricular student speech at a public university. Respondents are a group of students at the University of Wisconsin (hereinafter University). They brought a First Amendment challenge to a mandatory student activity fee imposed by petitioner Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System and used in part by the University to support student organizations engaging in political or ideological speech. Respondents object to the speech and expression of some of the student organizations. Relying upon our precedents which protect members of unions and bar associations from being required to pay fees used for speech the members find objectionable, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals invalidated the University's student fee program. The University contends that its mandatory student activity fee and the speech which it supports are appropriate to further its educational mission. We reverse. The First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral. We do not sustain, however, the student referendum mechanism of the University's program, which appears to permit the exaction of fees in violation of the viewpoint neutrality principle. As to that aspect of the program, we remand for further proceedings. I The University of Wisconsin is a public corporation of the State of Wisconsin. See (1) (-1994). State law defines the University's mission in broad terms: "to develop human resources, to discover and disseminate knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of its campuses and to serve and stimulate society by developing in students heightened intellectual, cultural and humane sensitivities and a sense of purpose." the Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden; and for Owen Brennan Rounds et al. by Thomas H. Nelson. *222 36.01(2). Some 30,000 undergraduate students and 10,000 graduate and professional students attend the University's Madison campus, ranking it among the Nation's largest institutions of higher learning. Students come to the renowned University from all 50 States and from 72 foreign countries. Last year marked its 150th anniversary; and to celebrate its distinguished history, the University sponsored a series of research initiatives, campus forums and workshops, historical exhibits, and public lectures, all reaffirming its commitment to explore the universe of knowledge and ideas. The responsibility for governing the University of Wisconsin System is vested by law with the board of regents. 36.09(1). The same law empowers the students to share in aspects of
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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same law empowers the students to share in aspects of the University's governance. One of those functions is to administer the student activities fee program. By statute the "[s]tudents in consultation with the chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the board [of regents] shall have the responsibility for the disposition of those student fees which constitute substantial support for campus student activities." 36.09(5). The students do so, in large measure, through their student government, called the Associated Students of Madison (ASM), and various ASM subcommittees. The program the University maintains to support the extracurricular activities undertaken by many of its student organizations is the subject of the present controversy. It seems that since its founding the University has required full-time students enrolled at its Madison campus to pay a nonrefundable activity fee. App. 154. For the 19951996 academic year, when this suit was commenced, the activity fee amounted to $331.50 per year. The fee is segregated from the University's tuition charge. Once collected, the activity fees are deposited by the University into the accounts of the State of Wisconsin. The fees are drawn upon by the University to support various campus services and extracurricular student activities. In the University's *223 view, the activity fees "enhance the educational experience" of its students by "promot[ing] extracurricular activities," "stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse points of view," enabling "participa[tion] in political activity," "promot[ing] student participa[tion] in campus administrative activity," and providing "opportunities to develop social skills," all consistent with the University's mission. The board of regents classifies the segregated fee into allocable and nonallocable portions. The nonallocable portion approximates 80% of the total fee and covers expenses such as student health services, intramural sports, debt service, and the upkeep and operations of the student union facilities. Respondents did not challenge the purposes to which the University commits the nonallocable portion of the segregated fee. The allocable portion of the fee supports extracurricular endeavors pursued by the University's registered student organizations or RSO's. To qualify for RSO status students must organize as a not-for-profit group, limit membership primarily to students, and agree to undertake activities related to student life on campus. During the 1995-1996 school year, 623 groups had RSO status on the Madison campus. To name but a few, RSO's included the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats; the College Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. As one would expect, the expressive activities undertaken by RSO's are diverse in range and content, from displaying posters and circulating newsletters throughout the campus, to
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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from displaying posters and circulating newsletters throughout the campus, to hosting campus debates and guest speakers, and to what can best be described as political lobbying. RSO's may obtain a portion of the allocable fees in one of three ways. Most do so by seeking funding from the Student Government Activity Fund (SGAF), administered *224 by the ASM. SGAF moneys may be issued to support an RSO's operations and events, as well as travel expenses "central to the purpose of the organization." As an alternative, an RSO can apply for funding from the General Student Services Fund (GSSF), administered through the ASM's finance committee. During the 1995-1996 academic year, 15 RSO's received GSSF funding. These RSO's included a campus tutoring center, the student radio station, a student environmental group, a gay and bisexual student center, a community legal office, an AIDS support network, a campus women's center, and the Wisconsin Student Public Interest Research Group (WISPIRG). The University acknowledges that, in addition to providing campus services (e. g., tutoring and counseling), the GSSF-funded RSO's engage in political and ideological expression. Brief for Petitioner 10. The GSSF, as well as the SGAF, consists of moneys originating in the allocable portion of the mandatory fee. The parties have stipulated that, with respect to SGAF and GSSF funding, "[t]he process for reviewing and approving allocations for funding is administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion," and that the University does not use the fee program for "advocating a particular point of view." A student referendum provides a third means for an RSO to obtain funding. While the record is sparse on this feature of the University's program, the parties inform us that the student body can vote either to approve or to disapprove an assessment for a particular RSO. One referendum resulted in an allocation of $45,000 to WISPIRG during the 1995-1996 academic year. At oral argument, counsel for the University acknowledged that a referendum could also operate to defund an RSO or to veto a funding decision of the ASM. In October 1996, for example, the student body voted to terminate funding to a national student organization to which the University belonged. Both parties *225 confirmed at oral argument that their stipulation regarding the program's viewpoint neutrality does not extend to the referendum process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19, 29. With respect to GSSF and SGAF funding, the ASM or its finance committee makes initial funding decisions. App. 14-15. The ASM does so in an open session, and interested students may attend meetings when RSO funding is discussed. It also appears that the ASM
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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RSO funding is discussed. It also appears that the ASM must approve the results of a student referendum. Approval appears pro forma, however, as counsel for the University advised us that the student government "voluntarily views th[e] referendum as binding." Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Once the ASM approves an RSO's funding application, it forwards its decision to the chancellor and to the board of regents for their review and approval. App. 18, 19. Approximately 30% of the University's RSO's received funding during the 1995-1996 academic year. RSO's, as a general rule, do not receive lump-sum cash distributions. Rather, RSO's obtain funding support on a reimbursement basis by submitting receipts or invoices to the University. Guidelines identify expenses appropriate for reimbursement. Permitted expenditures include, in the main, costs for printing, postage, office supplies, and use of University facilities and equipment. Materials printed with student fees must contain a disclaimer that the views expressed are not those of the ASM. The University also reimburses RSO's for fees arising from membership in "other related and non-profit organizations." The University's policy establishes purposes for which fees may not be expended. RSO's may not receive reimbursement for "[g]ifts, donations, and contributions," the costs of legal services, or for "[a]ctivities which are politically partisan or religious in nature." -252. (The policy does not give examples of the prohibited expenditures.) A separate policy statement on GSSF funding states that an RSO can receive funding if it "does not have a primarily *226 political orientation (i. e. is not a registered political group)." The same policy adds that an RSO "shall not use [student fees] for any lobbying purposes." At one point in their brief respondents suggest that the prohibition against expenditures for "politically partisan" purposes renders the program not viewpoint neutral. Brief for Respondents 31. In view of the fact that both parties entered a stipulation to the contrary at the outset of this litigation, which was again reiterated during oral argument in this Court, we do not consider respondents' challenge to this aspect of the University's program. The University's Student Organization Handbook has guidelines for regulating the conduct and activities of RSO's. In addition to obligating RSO's to adhere to the fee program's rules and regulations, the guidelines establish procedures authorizing any student to complain to the University that an RSO is in noncompliance. An extensive investigative process is in place to evaluate and remedy violations. The University's policy includes a range of sanctions for noncompliance, including probation, suspension, or termination of RSO status. One RSO that appears to operate in a manner distinct from
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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RSO that appears to operate in a manner distinct from others is WISPIRG. For reasons not clear from the record, WISPIRG receives lump-sum cash distributions from the University. University counsel informed us that this distribution reduced the GSSF portion of the fee pool. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. The full extent of the uses to which WISPIRG puts its funds is unclear. We do know, however, that WISPIRG sponsored on-campus events regarding homelessness and environmental and consumer protection issues. App. 348. It coordinated community food drives and educational programs and spent a portion of its activity fees for the lobbying efforts of its parent organization and for student internships aimed at influencing legislation. In March 1996, respondents, each of whom attended or still attend the University's Madison campus, filed suit in the *227 United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against members of the board of regents. Respondents alleged, inter alia, that imposition of the segregated fee violated their rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. They contended the University must grant them the choice not to fund those RSO's that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to their personal Respondents requested both injunctive and declaratory relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in their favor, declaring the University's segregated fee program invalid under and The District Court decided the fee program compelled students "to support political and ideological activity with which they disagree" in violation of respondents' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a. The court did not reach respondents' free exercise claim. The District Court's order enjoined the board of regents from using segregated fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. As the District Court had done, the Court of Appeals found our compelled speech precedents controlling. After examining the University's fee program under the three-part test outlined in it concluded that the program was not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital policy of the University, and imposed too much of a burden on respondents' free speech rights. "[L]ike the objecting union members in Abood," the Court of Appeals reasoned, the students here have a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with their own personal It added that *228 protecting the objecting students' free speech rights was "of heightened
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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protecting the objecting students' free speech rights was "of heightened concern" following our decision in because "[i]f the university cannot discriminate in the disbursement of funds, it is imperative that students not be compelled to fund organizations which engage in political and ideological activitiesthat is the only way to protect the individual's rights." n. 11. The Court of Appeals extended the District Court's order and enjoined the board of regents from requiring objecting students to pay that portion of the fee used to fund RSO's engaged in political or ideological expression. Three members of the Court of Appeals dissented from the denial of the University's motion for rehearing en banc. In their view, the panel opinion overlooked the "crucial difference between a requirement to pay money to an organization that explicitly aims to subsidize one viewpoint to the exclusion of other viewpoints, as in Abood and Keller, and a requirement to pay a fee to a group that creates a viewpoint-neutral forum, as is true of the student activity fee here." Other courts addressing First Amendment challenges to similar student fee programs have reached conflicting results. Compare ; Hays County cert. denied, ; ; with These conflicts, together with the importance of the issue presented, led us to grant certiorari. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. *229 II It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of its citizens. The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies. See, e. g., ; The case we decide here, however, does not raise the issue of the government's right, or, to be more specific, the state-controlled University's right, to use its own funds to advance a particular message. The University's whole justification for fostering the challenged expression is that it springs from the initiative of the students, who alone give it purpose and content in the course of their extracurricular endeavors. The University having disclaimed that the speech is its own, we do not reach the question whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible government action would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under the principle that the government can speak for itself. If the challenged speech here were financed
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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speak for itself. If the challenged speech here were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the speaker. That is not the case before us. The University of Wisconsin exacts the fee at issue for the sole purpose of facilitating the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students. We conclude the objecting students may insist upon certain safeguards with respect to the expressive activities which they are required to support. Our public forum cases are instructive here by close *230 analogy. This is true even though the student activities fund is not a public forum in the traditional sense of the term and despite the circumstance that those cases most often involve a demand for access, not a claim to be exempt from supporting speech. See, e. g., Lamb's ; The standard of viewpoint neutrality found in the public forum cases provides the standard we find controlling. We decide that the viewpoint neutrality requirement of the University program is in general sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting students. The student referendum aspect of the program for funding speech and expressive activities, however, appears to be inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality requirement. We must begin by recognizing that the complaining students are being required to pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find objectionable, even offensive. The Abood and Keller cases, then, provide the beginning point for our analysis. ; While those precedents identify the interests of the protesting students, the means of implementing First Amendment protections adopted in those decisions are neither applicable nor workable in the context of extracurricular student speech at a university. In Abood, some nonunion public school teachers challenged an agreement requiring them, as a condition of their employment, to pay a service fee equal in amount to union -212. The objecting teachers alleged that the union's use of their fees to engage in political speech violated their freedom of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court agreed and held that any objecting teacher could "prevent the Union's spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative." *231 The principles outlined in Abood provided the foundation for our later decision in Keller. There we held that lawyers admitted to practice in California could be required to join a state bar association and to fund activities "germane" to the
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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state bar association and to fund activities "germane" to the association's mission of "regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services." 496 U.S., -14. The lawyers could not, however, be required to fund the bar association's own political expression. The proposition that students who attend the University cannot be required to pay subsidies for the speech of other students without some First Amendment protection follows from the Abood and Keller cases. Students enroll in public universities to seek fulfillment of their personal aspirations and of their own potential. If the University conditions the opportunity to receive a college education, an opportunity comparable in importance to joining a labor union or bar association, on an agreement to support objectionable, extracurricular expression by other students, the rights acknowledged in Abood and Keller become implicated. It infringes on the speech and beliefs of the individual to be required, by this mandatory student activity fee program, to pay subsidies for the objectionable speech of others without any recognition of the State's corresponding duty to him or her. Yet recognition must be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the University, which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech. In Abood and Keller, the constitutional rule took the form of limiting the required subsidy to speech germane to the purposes of the union or bar association. The standard of germane speech as applied to student speech at a university is unworkable, however, and gives insufficient protection both to the objecting students and to the University program itself. Even in the context of a labor union, whose functions are, or so we might have thought, well known and understood by the law and the courts after a long history of government *232 regulation and judicial involvement, we have encountered difficulties in deciding what is germane and what is not. The difficulty manifested itself in our decision in where different Members of the Court reached varying conclusions regarding what expressive activity was or was not germane to the mission of the association. If it is difficult to define germane speech with ease or precision where a union or bar association is the party, the standard becomes all the more unmanageable in the public university setting, particularly where the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of speech and ideas. The speech the University seeks to encourage in the program before us is distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored bounds. To insist upon asking what speech is germane would be contrary to the very goal the University
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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germane would be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to pursue. It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning. Just as the vast extent of permitted expression makes the test of germane speech inappropriate for intervention, so too does it underscore the high potential for intrusion on the First Amendment rights of the objecting students. It is all but inevitable that the fees will result in subsidies to speech which some students find objectionable and offensive to their personal If the standard of germane speech is inapplicable, then, it might be argued the remedy is to allow each student to list those causes which he or she will or will not support. If a university decided that its students' First Amendment interests were better protected by some type of optional or refund system it would be free to do so. We decline to impose a system of that sort as a constitutional requirement, however. The restriction could be so disruptive and expensive that the program to support extracurricular speech would be ineffective. The First Amendment does not require the University to put the program at risk. *233 The University may determine that its mission is well served if students have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall. If the University reaches this conclusion, it is entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these ends. The University must provide some protection to its students' First Amendment interests, however. The proper measure, and the principal standard of protection for objecting students, we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support. Viewpoint neutrality was the obligation to which we gave substance in There the University of Virginia feared that any association with a student newspaper advancing religious viewpoints would violate the Establishment Clause. We rejected the argument, holding that the school's adherence to a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its student fee program would prevent "any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the University." While Rosenberger was concerned with the rights a student has to use an extracurricular speech program already in place, today's case considers the antecedent question, acknowledged but unresolved in Rosenberger: whether a public university may require its students to pay a fee which creates the mechanism for the extracurricular speech in the first instance. When a university requires its
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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speech in the first instance. When a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others. There is symmetry then in our holding here and in Rosenberger: Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the student to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program's operation once the funds have been collected. We conclude that the University of Wisconsin may sustain *234 the extracurricular dimensions of its programs by using mandatory student fees with viewpoint neutrality as the operational principle. The parties have stipulated that the program the University has developed to stimulate extracurricular student expression respects the principle of viewpoint neutrality. If the stipulation is to continue to control the case, the University's program in its basic structure must be found consistent with the First Amendment. We make no distinction between campus activities and the off-campus expressive activities of objectionable RSO's. Those activities, respondents tell us, often bear no relationship to the University's reason for imposing the segregated fee in the first instance, to foster vibrant campus debate among students. If the University shares those concerns, it is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules restricting offcampus travel or other expenditures by RSO's, for it may create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected. Cf. We find no principled way, however, to impose upon the University, as a constitutional matter, a requirement to adopt geographic or spatial restrictions as a condition for RSOs' entitlement to reimbursement. Universities possess significant interests in encouraging students to take advantage of the social, civic, cultural, and religious opportunities available in surrounding communities and throughout the country. Universities, like all of society, are finding that traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes in communications, information transfer, and the means of discourse. If the rule of viewpoint neutrality is respected, our holding affords the University latitude to adjust its extracurricular student speech program to accommodate these advances and opportunities. Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its agents or employees, orof *235 particular importanceits faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. See ; The Court
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
majority
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Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621017/board-of-regents-of-univ-of-wis-system-v-southworth/
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analysis likely would be altogether different. See ; The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into play. When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position. In the instant case, the speech is not that of the University or its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor or a professor in the academic context, where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered. Cf. Rosenberger, III It remains to discuss the referendum aspect of the University's program. While the record is not well developed on the point, it appears that by majority vote of the student body a given RSO may be funded or defunded. It is unclear to us what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality in this part of the process. To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires. The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon majoritarian consent. That principle is controlling here. A remand is necessary and appropriate to *236 resolve this point; and the case in all events must be reexamined in light of the principles we have discussed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In this Court, the parties shall bear their own costs. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.
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Justice Alito
| 2,009 | 8 |
concurring
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Locke v. Karass
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145919/locke-v-karass/
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I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to note that our decision, as I understand it, does not reach the question of what “reciprocity” means. Petitioners have taken an all-or-nothing position, contending that non members of a local may never be assessed for any portion of the national’s extraunit litigation expenses. See ante, at 4 (noting that petitioners “claimed that the First Amend ment prohibits charging them for any portion of the ser vice fee that represents what we have called ‘national litigation,’ i.e., litigation that does not directly benefit the local” (emphasis added)). The opinion correctly concludes, “as did the lower courts, that the existence of reciprocity is assumed by the parties and not here in dispute.” Ante, at 13. Thus, this case does not require us to address what is meant by a charge being “reciprocal in nature,” or what showing is required to establish that services “ ‘may ulti mately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organi zation.’ ” Ante, at 12 ). I understand the Court’s opinion to conclude that the litigation expenses at issue here are chargeable only because the parties assumed that 2 LOCKE v. KARASS ALITO, J., concurring the benefit of any such expenses would be reciprocal. In its brief as amicus curiae, the United States argues that a national union must bear the burden of proving that any expenditures charged to nonmembers of a local are made pursuant to a bona fide pooling arrangement. See Brief for United States 28–29. Once nonmembers object to a charge, the Government submits, the union must prove that the challenged expenditure was made pursuant to an arrangement that is akin to an insurance policy. See This is necessary, the Government contends, to ensure that a charge is in fact “reciprocal in nature.” Because important First Amendment rights are at stake, the Government’s argument regarding the burden of establishing true reciprocity has considerable force. Nonetheless, since petitioners in this case did not raise the question whether the Maine State Employees Associa tion’s pooling arrangement was bona fide, we need not reach that question today
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,990 | 14 |
majority
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Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112457/cooter-gell-v-hartmarx-corp/
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This case presents three issues related to the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: whether a district court may impose Rule 11 sanctions on a plaintiff who has voluntarily dismissed his complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; what constitutes the appropriate standard of appellate review of a district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions; and whether Rule 11 authorizes awards of attorney's fees incurred on appeal of a Rule 11 sanction.[*] I In 1983, Danik, Inc., owned and operated a number of discount men's clothing stores in the Washington, D. C., area. In June 1983, Intercontinental Apparel, a subsidiary of respondent Hartmarx Corp., brought a breach-of-contract action against Danik in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Danik, represented by the law firm of Cooter & Gell (petitioner), responded to the suit by filing a counterclaim against Intercontinental, alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S. C. 13. In March 1984, the District Court granted summary judgment for Intercontinental in its suit against Danik, and, in February a jury returned a verdict for Intercontinental on Danik's counterclaim. Both judgments were affirmed on appeal. Danik, ; Intercontinental Apparel, While this litigation was proceeding, petitioner prepared two additional antitrust complaints against Hartmarx and its *389 two subsidiaries, respondents Hart, Schaffner & Marx and Hickey-Freeman One of the complaints, the one giving rise to the Rule 11 sanction at issue in this case, alleged a nationwide conspiracy to fix prices and to eliminate competition through an exclusive retail agent policy and uniform pricing scheme, as well as other unfair competition practices such as resale price maintenance and territorial restrictions. App. 3-14. Petitioner filed the two complaints in November 1983. Respondents moved to dismiss the antitrust complaint at issue, alleging, among other things, that Danik's allegations had no basis in fact. Respondents also moved for sanctions under Rule 11. In opposition to the Rule 11 motion, petitioner filed three affidavits setting forth the prefiling research that supported the allegations in the complaint. In essence, petitioner's research consisted of telephone calls to salespersons in a number of men's clothing stores in New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, D. C. Petitioner inferred from this research that only one store in each major metropolitan area nationwide sold Hart, Schaffner & Marx suits. In April 1984, petitioner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the complaint, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i). The dismissal became effective in July 1984, when the District Court granted petitioner's motion to dispense with notice of dismissal to putative class
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,990 | 14 |
majority
|
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112457/cooter-gell-v-hartmarx-corp/
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motion to dispense with notice of dismissal to putative class members. In June 1984, before the dismissal became effective, the District Court heard oral argument on the Rule 11 motion. The District Court took the Rule 11 motion under advisement. In December 3 1/2 years after its hearing on the motion and after dismissal of the complaint, the District Court ordered respondents to submit a statement of costs and attorney's fees. Respondents filed a statement requesting $61,917.99 in attorney's fees. Two months later, the District Court granted respondents' motion for Rule 11 sanctions, holding that petitioner's prefiling inquiry was grossly inadequate. *390 Specifically, the District Court found that the allegations in the complaint regarding exclusive retail agency arrangements for Hickey-Freeman clothing were completely baseless because petitioner researched only the availability of Hart, Schaffner & Marx menswear. In addition, the District Court found that petitioner's limited survey of only four Eastern cities did not support the allegation that respondents had exclusive retailer agreements in every major city in the United States. Accordingly, the District Court determined that petitioner violated Rule 11 and imposed a sanction of $21,452.52 against petitioner and $10,701.26 against Danik. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Danik, Three aspects of its decision are at issue here. First, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's argument that Danik's voluntary dismissal of the antitrust complaint divested the District Court of jurisdiction to rule upon the Rule 11 motion. After reviewing the decisions of other Circuits considering the issue, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the policies behind Rule 11 do not permit a party to escape its sanction by merely dismissing an unfounded case." The court reasoned that because Rule 11 sanctions served to punish and deter, they secured the proper functioning of the legal system "independent of the burdened party's interest in recovering its expenses." Accordingly, the court held that such sanctions must "be available in appropriate circumstances notwithstanding a private party's effort to cut its losses and run out of court, using Rule 41 as an emergency exit." Second, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's determination that petitioner had violated Rule 11. Petitioner's arguments failed to "cal[l] into doubt" the two fatal deficiencies identified by the District Court. Rather, petitioner's *391 "account of [its] efforts d[id] no more than confirm these shortcomings." Third, the Court of Appeals considered respondents' claim that petitioner should also pay the expenses respondents incurred in defending its Rule 11 award on appeal. Relying on the Court of Appeals held that an
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,990 | 14 |
majority
|
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112457/cooter-gell-v-hartmarx-corp/
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appeal. Relying on the Court of Appeals held that an appellant that successfully defends a Rule 11 award is entitled to recover its attorney's fees on appeal and remanded the case to the District Court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and to enter an appropriate award. II The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S. C. 2072, authorizes the Court to "prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before Magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals." The Court has no authority to enact rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Pursuant to this authority, the Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to "govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. We therefore interpret Rule 11 according to its plain meaning, see Pavelic & in light of the scope of the congressional authorization. Rule 11 provides, in full: "Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of *392 an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,990 | 14 |
majority
|
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112457/cooter-gell-v-hartmarx-corp/
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initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." An interpretation of the current Rule 11 must be guided, in part, by an understanding of the deficiencies in the original version of Rule 11 that led to its revision. The 1938 version of Rule 11 required an attorney to certify by signing the pleading "that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support [the pleading]; and that it is not interposed for delay or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule." 28 U.S. C., pp. 6-7 (1940 ed.). An attorney who willfully violated the rule could be "subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." Moreover, the pleading could "be stricken as sham and false and the action [could] proceed as though the pleading had not *393 been served." In operation, the Rule did not have the deterrent effect expected by its drafters. See Advisory Committee Note on Rule 11, 28 U.S. C. App., pp. 5-576. The Advisory Committee identified two problems with the old Rule. First, the Rule engendered confusion regarding when a pleading should be struck, what standard of conduct would make an attorney liable to sanctions, and what sanctions were available. Second, courts were reluctant to impose disciplinary measures on attorneys, see and attorneys were slow to invoke the Rule. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F. R. D. 189, 191 To ameliorate these problems, and in response to concerns that abusive litigation practices abounded in the federal courts, the Rule was amended in 1983. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 A Closer Look, 104 F. R. D. 181 It is now clear that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus, consistent with the Rules Enabling Act's grant of authority, streamline the administration and procedure of the federal courts. See Advisory Committee Note on Rule 11, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 576. Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and "not interposed for any improper purpose." An attorney who signs the paper without such a substantiated belief "shall" be penalized by "an appropriate sanction." Such
|
Justice O'Connor
| 1,990 | 14 |
majority
|
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
|
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substantiated belief "shall" be penalized by "an appropriate sanction." Such a sanction may, but need not, include payment of the other parties' expenses. See Although the Rule must be read in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy, any interpretation must give effect to the Rule's central goal of deterrence. III We first address the question whether petitioner's dismissal of its antitrust complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) *394 deprived the District Court of the jurisdiction to award attorney's fees. Rule 41(a)(1) states: "(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim." Rule 41(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice only when he files a notice of dismissal before the defendant files an answer or motion for summary judgment and only if the plaintiff has never previously dismissed an action "based on or including the same claim." Once the defendant has filed a summary judgment motion or answer, the plaintiff may dismiss the action only by stipulation, Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), or by order of the court, "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," Rule 41(a)(2). If the plaintiff invokes Rule 41(a)(1) a second time for an "action based on or including the same claim," the action must be dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner contends that filing a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to this Rule automatically deprives a court of jurisdiction over the action, rendering the court powerless to impose sanctions thereafter. Of the Courts of Appeals to consider this issue, only the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a voluntary dismissal acts as a jurisdictional bar to further Rule 11 proceedings. See Johnson *395 Chemical The view more consistent with Rule 11's language and purposes, and the one supported by the weight of Circuit authority, is
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the one supported by the weight of Circuit authority, is that district courts may enforce Rule 11 even after the plaintiff has filed a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). See Szabo Food Service, cert. dism'd, ; ; The district court's jurisdiction, invoked by the filing of the underlying complaint, supports consideration of both the merits of the action and the motion for Rule 11 sanctions arising from that filing. As the "violation of Rule 11 is complete when the paper is filed," Szabo Food Service, Inc., a voluntary dismissal does not expunge the Rule 11 violation. In order to comply with Rule 11's requirement that a court "shall" impose sanctions "[i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule," a court must have the authority to consider whether there has been a violation of the signing requirement regardless of the dismissal of the underlying action. In our view, nothing in the language of Rule 41(a)(1)(i), Rule 11, or other statute or Federal Rule terminates a district court's authority to impose sanctions after such a dismissal. It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending. For example, district courts may award costs after an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S. C. 1919. This Court has indicated that motions for costs or attorney's fees are "independent proceeding[s] supplemental to the original proceeding and not a request for a modification of the original decree." Thus, even "years after the entry of a judgment on the merits" a federal court could consider an award of counsel fees. A criminal contempt charge is likewise " `a separate and independent proceeding at law' " that is not part of the original action. quoting A court may make an adjudication of contempt and impose a contempt sanction even after the action in which the contempt arose has been terminated. See United ; Like the imposition of costs, attorney's fees, and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate. Such a determination may be made after the principal suit has been terminated. Because a Rule 11 sanction does not signify a district court's assessment of the legal merits of the complaint, the imposition of such a sanction after a voluntary dismissal does not deprive the plaintiff of his right under Rule 41(a)(1)
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not deprive the plaintiff of his right under Rule 41(a)(1) to dismiss an action without prejudice. "[D]ismissal without prejudice" is a dismissal that does not "operat[e] as an adjudication upon the merits," Rule 41(a)(1), and thus does not have a res judicata effect. Even if a district court indicated that a complaint was not legally tenable or factually well founded for Rule 11 purposes, the resulting Rule 11 sanction would nevertheless not preclude the refiling of a complaint. Indeed, even if the Rule 11 sanction imposed by the court were a prohibition against refiling the complaint (assuming that would be an "appropriate sanction" for Rule 11 purposes), the preclusion of refilling would be neither a consequence of the *397 dismissal (which was without prejudice) nor a "term or condition" placed upon the dismissal (which was unconditional), see Rule 41(a)(2). The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the policy and purpose of Rule 41(a)(1), which was designed to limit a plaintiff's ability to dismiss an action. Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules, liberal state and federal procedural rules often allowed dismissals or nonsuits as a matter of right until the entry of the verdict, see, e. g., N. C. Code 1-224 (1943), or judgment, see, e. g., La. Code Prac. Ann., Art. 491 (1942). See generally Note, The Right of a Plaintiff to Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss His Action Without Prejudice, Rule 41(a)(1) was designed to curb abuses of these nonsuit rules. See 2 American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules, Cleveland, Ohio, 350 (1938) (Rule 41(a)(1) was intended to eliminate "the annoying of a defendant by being summoned into court in successive actions and then, if no settlement is arrived at, requiring him to permit the action to be dismissed and another one commenced at leisure") (remarks of Judge George Donworth, member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure); ; see also 9 C. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2363, p. 152 (1971). Where state statutes and common law gave plaintiffs expansive control over their suits Rule 41(a)(1) preserved a narrow slice: It allowed a plaintiff to dismiss an action without the permission of the adverse party or the court only during the brief period before the defendant had made a significant commitment of time and money. Rule 41(a)(1) was not designed to give a plaintiff any benefit other than the right to take one such dismissal without prejudice. Both Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule 11 are aimed at curbing abuses of the judicial system, and thus their policies, like
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abuses of the judicial system, and thus their policies, like their language, are completely compatible. Rule 41(a)(1) limits a litigant's power to dismiss actions, but allows one dismissal without prejudice. Rule 41(a)(1) does not codify any policy *398 that the plaintiff's right to one free dismissal also secures the right to file baseless papers. The filing of complaints, papers, or other motions without taking the necessary care in their preparation is a separate abuse of the judicial system, subject to separate sanction. As noted above, a voluntary dismissal does not eliminate the Rule 11 violation. Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the action, the harm triggering Rule 11's concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a litigant who violates Rule 11 merits sanctions even after a dismissal. Moreover, the imposition of such sanctions on abusive litigants is useful to deter such misconduct. If a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11 merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to "stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers." Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F. R. D. 165, 192 (1983) (Letter from Judge Walter Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules) We conclude that petitioner's voluntary dismissal did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction to consider respondents' Rule 11 motion. Although Rule 11 does not establish a deadline for the imposition of sanctions, the Advisory Committee did not contemplate that there would be a lengthy delay prior to their imposition, such as occurred in this case. Rather, "it is anticipated that in the case of pleadings the sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the end of the litigation, and in the case of motions at the time when the motion is decided or shortly thereafter." Advisory Committee Note on Rule 11, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 576. District courts may, of course, "adopt local rules establishing timeliness standards," White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment for filing and deciding Rule 11 motions. *399 IV Petitioner further contends that the Court of Appeals did not apply a sufficiently rigorous standard in reviewing the District Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 11 involves a consideration of three types of issues. The court must consider factual questions regarding the nature of the attorney's prefiling inquiry and the factual basis of the pleading or other paper. Legal issues are raised in considering whether a pleading is
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Legal issues are raised in considering whether a pleading is "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" for changing the law and whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule 11. Finally, the district court must exercise its discretion to tailor an "appropriate sanction." The Court of Appeals in this case did not specify the applicable standard of review. There is, however, precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit for applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the determination whether a filing had an insufficient factual basis or was interposed for an improper purpose, but reviewing de novo the question whether a pleading or motion is legally sufficient. See, e. g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (Airline ; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 248 U. S. App. D. C., at -11. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted the appropriate approach. That Circuit reviews findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard, the determination that counsel violated Rule 11 under a de novo standard, and the choice of sanction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See The majority of Circuits follow neither approach; rather, they apply a deferential standard to all issues raised by a Rule 11 violation. See Kale v. Combined Ins. of America, 7-8 ; Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F. *400 2d 66, 68 (CA3), cert. denied, ; Stevens v. Lawyers Mutual Liability Ins. of North Carolina, ; Thomas v. Capital Services, Inc., ; Century Products, ; Mars Steel ; Although the Courts of Appeals use different verbal formulas to characterize their standards of review, the scope of actual disagreement is narrow. No dispute exists that the appellate courts should review the district court's selection of a sanction under a deferential standard. In directing the district court to impose an "appropriate" sanction, Rule 11 itself indicates that the district court is empowered to exercise its discretion. See also Advisory Committee Note on Rule 11, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 576 (suggesting that a district court "has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted"). The Circuits also agree that, in the absence of any language to the contrary in Rule 11, courts should adhere to their usual practice of reviewing the district court's findings of fact under a deferential standard. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
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opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses"). In practice, the "clearly erroneous" standard requires the appellate court to uphold any district court determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions. See, e. g., ("If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice *401 between them cannot be clearly erroneous"); Inwood Laboratories, When an appellate court reviews a district court's factual findings, the abuse-of-discretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable: A court of appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous. The scope of disagreement over the appropriate standard of review can thus be confined to a narrow issue: whether the court of appeals must defer to the district court's legal conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings. A number of factors have led the majority of Circuits, see as well as a number of commentators, see, e. g., C. Shaffer & P. Sandler, Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other Powers 14-15 (hereinafter Shaffer & Sandler); American Judicature Society, Rule 11 in Transition, The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, pp. 45-49 to conclude that appellate courts should review all aspects of a district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions under a deferential standard. The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues. See Making such distinctions is particularly difficult in the Rule 11 context. Rather than mandating an inquiry into purely legal questions, such as whether the attorney's legal argument was correct, the Rule requires a court to consider issues rooted in factual determinations. For example, to determine whether an attorney's prefiling inquiry was reasonable, a court must consider all the circumstances of a case. An inquiry that is unreasonable when an attorney has months to prepare a complaint may be reasonable when he has only a *402 few days before the statute of limitations runs. In considering whether a complaint was supported by fact and law "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief," a court must make some assessment of the signer's credibility. Issues involving credibility are normally considered factual matters. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52; see also United
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matters. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52; see also United The considerations involved in the Rule 11 context are similar to those involved in determining negligence, which is generally reviewed deferentially. See Mars Steel ; see also 9 C. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2590 (1971); Familiar with the issues and litigants, the district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11. Of course, this standard would not preclude the appellate court's correction of a district court's legal errors, e. g., determining that Rule 11 sanctions could be imposed upon the signing attorney's law firm, see Pavelic & or relying on a materially incorrect view of the relevant law in determining that a pleading was not "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" for changing the law. An appellate court would be justified in concluding that, in making such errors, the district court abused its discretion. "[I]f a district court's findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis." See also Icicle Seafoods, 4 U.S. 709, *403 strongly supports applying a unitary abuse-of-discretion standard to all aspects of a Rule 11 proceeding. In the Court held a District Court's determination under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S. C. 2412(d) (1982 ed.), that "the position of the United States was substantially justified" should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. As a position is "substantially justified" if it "has a reasonable basis in law and fact," n. 2, the EAJA requires an inquiry similar to the Rule 11 inquiry whether a pleading is "well grounded in fact" and legally tenable. Although the EAJA and Rule 11 are not completely analogous, the reasoning in is relevant for determining the Rule 11 standard of review. Two factors the Court found significant in are equally pertinent here. First, the Court indicated that " `as a matter of the sound administration of justice,' " deference was owed to the " `judicial actor better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.' " -560, quoting Because a determination whether a legal position is "substantially justified" depends greatly on factual determinations, the Court reasoned that the district court was "better positioned" to make such factual determinations. See A district court's ruling that a litigant's position is factually well grounded and legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes is similarly fact specific. also concluded that the district court's rulings on legal issues should be reviewed deferentially. See
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court's rulings on legal issues should be reviewed deferentially. See According to the Court, review of legal issues under a de novo standard would require the courts of appeals to invest time and energy in the unproductive task of determining "not what the law now is, but what the Government was substantially justified in believing it to have been." Likewise, an appellate court reviewing legal issues in the Rule 11 context would be required to determine whether, at the time the attorney filed the *404 pleading or other paper, his legal argument would have appeared plausible. Such determinations "will either fail to produce the normal law-clarifying benefits that come from an appellate decision on a question of law, or else will strangely distort the appellate process" by establishing circuit law in "a most peculiar, secondhanded fashion." Second, noted that only deferential review gave the district court the necessary flexibility to resolve questions involving " `multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization.' " -562. The question whether the Government has taken a "substantially justified" position under all the circumstances involves the consideration of unique factors that are "little susceptible of useful generalization." The issues involved in determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 11 likewise involve "fact-intensive, close calls." Shaffer & Sandler 15. Contrary to petitioner's contentions, is not distinguishable on the ground that sanctions under Rule 11 are mandatory: That sanctions "shall" be imposed when a violation is found does not have any bearing on how to review the question whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule 11. Rule 11's policy goals also support adopting an abuse-of-discretion standard. The district court is best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11's goal of specific and general deterrence. Deference to the determination of courts on the front lines of litigation will enhance these courts' ability to control the litigants before them. Such deference will streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district court; it will also discourage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals, thus reducing the amount of satellite litigation. Although district courts' identification of what conduct violates Rule 11 may vary, see Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, *405 ; Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 Yale L. J. 901 some variation in the application of a standard based on reasonableness is inevitable. "Fact-bound resolutions cannot be made uniform through appellate review, de novo or otherwise." Mars Steel 880
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through appellate review, de novo or otherwise." Mars Steel 880 F. 2d, at 936; see also Shaffer & Sandler 14-15. An appellate court's review of whether a legal position was reasonable or plausible enough under the circumstances is unlikely to establish clear guidelines for lower courts; nor will it clarify the underlying principles of law. See In light of our consideration of the purposes and policies of Rule 11 and in accordance with our analysis of analogous EAJA provisions, we reject petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals should have applied a three-tiered standard of review. Rather, an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination. A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Here, the Court of Appeals determined that the District Court "applied the correct legal standard and offered substantial justification for its finding of a Rule 11 violation." 277 U. S. App. D. C., at 8 F.2d, at 896. Its affirmance of the District Court's liability determination is consistent with the deferential standard we adopt today. V Finally, the Court of Appeals held that respondents were entitled to be reimbursed for attorney's fees they had incurred in defending their award on appeal. Accordingly, it remanded to the District Court "to determine such expenses and, ultimately, to enter an appropriate award." 8 F.2d, at 898. This ruling accorded with the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the First and Seventh Circuits, see *406 838 F. 2d, at 607, and and conflicted with the decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, see 1 cert. denied, and Orange Production Credit On its face, Rule 11 does not apply to appellate proceedings. Its provision allowing the court to include "an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee" must be interpreted in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which indicates that the Rules only "govern the procedure in the United States district courts." Neither the language of Rule 11 nor the Advisory Committee Note suggests that the Rule could require payment for any activities outside the context of district court proceedings. Respondents interpret the last sentence of Rule 11 as extending the scope of the sanction to cover any expenses, including fees on appeal, incurred "because of the filing." In this case, respondents
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appeal, incurred "because of the filing." In this case, respondents argue, they would have incurred none of their appellate expenses had petitioner's lawsuit not been filed. This line of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that expenses incurred "because of" a baseless filing extend indefinitely. Cf. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owens, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984) ("In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity. As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability" (footnote omitted)). Such an interpretation of the Rule is overbroad. We believe Rule 11 is more sensibly understood as permitting an award only of those expenses directly caused by the filing, logically, those at the trial level. A plaintiff's filing requires the defendant *407 to take the necessary steps to defend against the suit in district court; if the filing was baseless, attorneys' fees incurred in that defense were triggered by the Rule 11 violation. If the district court imposes Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff appeals, the expenses incurred in defending the award on appeal are directly caused by the district court's sanction and the appeal of that sanction, not by the plaintiff's initial filing in district court. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure place a natural limit on Rule 11's scope. On appeal, the litigants' conduct is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which provides: "If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." If the appeal of a Rule 11 sanction is itself frivolous, Rule 38 gives appellate courts ample authority to award expenses. Indeed, because the district court has broad discretion to impose Rule 11 sanctions, appeals of such sanctions may frequently be frivolous. See 9 J. Moore, B. Ward, & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 238.03[2], pp. 38-13, 38-14 ("[W]here an appeal challenges actions or findings of the district court to which an appellate court gives deference by judging under an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous standard, the court is more likely to find that the appellant's arguments are frivolous"). If the appeal is not frivolous under this standard, Rule 38 does not require the appellee to pay the appellant's attorney's fees. Respondents' interpretation of Rule 11 would give a district court the authority to award attorney's fees to
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a district court the authority to award attorney's fees to the appellee even when the appeal would not be sanctioned under the appellate rules. To avoid this somewhat anomalous result, Rules 11 and 38 are better read together as allowing expenses incurred on appeal to be shifted onto appellants only when those expenses are caused by a frivolous appeal, and not merely because a Rule 11 sanction upheld on appeal can ultimately be traced to a baseless filing in district court. *408 Limiting Rule 11's scope in this manner accords with the policy of not discouraging meritorious appeals. If appellants were routinely compelled to shoulder the appellees' attorney's fees, valid challenges to district court decisions would be discouraged. The knowledge that, after an unsuccessful appeal of a Rule 11 sanction, the district court that originally imposed the sanction would also decide whether the appellant should pay his opponent's attorney's fee would be likely to chill all but the bravest litigants from taking an appeal. See Moreover, including appellate attorney's fees in a Rule 11 sanction might have the undesirable effect of encouraging additional satellite litigation. For example, if a district court included appellate attorney's fees in the Rule 11 sanction on remand, the losing party might again appeal the amount of the award. It is possible that disallowing an award of appellate attorney's fees under Rule 11 would discourage litigants from defending the award on appeal when appellate expenses are likely to exceed the amount of the sanction. There is some doubt whether this proposition is empirically correct. See American Judicature Society, Rule 11 in Transition, The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, p. 51 The courts of appeals have ample authority to protect the beneficiaries of Rule 11 sanctions by awarding damages and single or double costs under Rule 38 which they may do, as we have noted, when the appellant had no reasonable prospect of meeting the difficult standard of abuse of discretion. Beyond that protection, however, the risk of expending the value of one's award in the course of defending it is a natural concomitant of the American Rule, i. e., that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Wilderness Society, Whenever *409 damages awards at the trial level are small, a successful plaintiff will have less incentive to defend the award on appeal. As Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute, the policies for allowing district courts to require the losing party to pay
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allowing district courts to require the losing party to pay appellate, as well as district court attorney's fees, are not applicable. "A movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees or any other sanction, and the contrary view can only breed appellate litigation." American Judicature Society, We affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a voluntary dismissal does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over a Rule 11 motion and hold that an appellate court should review the district court's decision in a Rule 11 proceeding for an abuse of discretion. As Rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award attorney's fees incurred on appeal, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment remanding the case to the district court for a determination of reasonable appellate expenses. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court below is affirmed in part and reversed in part. It is so ordered. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Rule 11 and Rule 41(a)(1) are both designed to facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of cases in federal court. Properly understood, the two Rules should work in conjunction to prevent the prosecution of needless or baseless lawsuits. Rule 11 requires the court to impose an "appropriate sanction" on a litigant who wastes judicial resources by filing a pleading that is not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for its extension, modification, or reversal. Rule 41(a)(1) permits a plaintiff who decides not to continue a lawsuit to withdraw his complaint before an answer or motion for summary judgment has been filed and avoid further proceedings on the basis of that complaint. The Court today, however, refuses *410 to read the two Rules together in light of their limited, but valuable, purposes. By focusing on the filing of baseless complaints, without any attention to whether those complaints will result in the waste of judicial resources, the Court vastly expands the contours of Rule 11, eviscerates Rule 41(a)(1), and creates a federal common law of malicious prosecution inconsistent with the limited mandate of the Rules Enabling Act. Prior to the adoption of Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff in federal court could dismiss an action at law up until the entry of the verdict or judgment. Under that practice, an unscrupulous plaintiff could harass a defendant by filing repetitive baseless lawsuits as long as each was dismissed prior to an adverse ruling on the merits. The Rule is designed to further the just decision of cases in two significant ways. First, by
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just decision of cases in two significant ways. First, by providing that a second voluntary dismissal is an adjudication on the merits, and that the first such dismissal is without prejudice only if the dismissal precedes the filing of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, Rule 41(a)(1) satisfies the interest in preventing the abusive filing of repetitious, frivolous lawsuits. Second, and of equal importance, by giving the plaintiff the absolute, unqualified right to dismiss his complaint without permission of the court or notice to his adversary, the framers of Rule 41(a)(1) intended to preserve the right of the plaintiff to reconsider his decision to file suit "during the brief period before the defendant had made a significant commitment of time and money." Ante, at 397. The Rule permits a plaintiff to file a complaint to preserve his rights under a statute of limitations and then reconsider that decision prior to the joinder of issue and the commencement of litigation. In theory, Rule 11 and Rule 41(a)(1) should work in tandem. When a complaint is withdrawn under Rule 41(a)(1), the merits of that complaint are not an appropriate area of further inquiry for the federal court. The predicate for the imposition of sanctions, the complaint, has been eliminated *411 under the express authorization of the Federal Rules before the court has been required to take any action on it, and the consideration of a Rule 11 motion on a dismissed complaint would necessarily result in an increase in the judicial workload. When a plaintiff persists in the prosecution of a meritless complaint, however, or the defendant joins issue by filing an answer or motion for summary judgment, Rule 11 has a proper role to play. The prosecution of baseless lawsuits and the filing of frivolous papers are matters of legitimate concern to the federal courts and are abuses that Rule 11 was designed to deter. The Court holds, however, that a voluntary dismissal does not eliminate the predicate for a Rule 11 violation because a frivolous complaint that is withdrawn burdens "courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay." Ante, at 398. That assumption is manifestly incorrect with respect to courts. The filing of a frivolous complaint which is voluntarily withdrawn imposes a burden on the court only if the notation of an additional civil proceeding on the court's docket sheet can be said to constitute a burden. By definition, a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) means that the court has not had to consider the factual allegations of the complaint or ruled on a motion to dismiss
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of the complaint or ruled on a motion to dismiss its legal claims. The Court's observation that individuals are burdened, even if correct, is irrelevant. Rule 11 is designed to deter parties from abusing judicial resources, not from filing complaints. Whatever additional costs in reputation or legal expenses the defendant might incur, on top of those that are the product of being in a dispute,[1] are likely to be either minimal or noncompensable.[2] More fundamentally, the fact that the *412 filing of a complaint imposes costs on a defendant should be of no concern to the rulemakers if the complaint does not impose any costs on the judiciary: the Rules Enabling Act does not give us authority to create a generalized federal common law of malicious prosecution divorced from concerns with the efficient and just processing of cases in federal court. The only result of the Court's interpretation will be to increase the frequency of Rule 11 motions and decrease that of voluntary dismissals. I agree that dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to resolve collateral issues.[3] A court thus may impose sanctions for contempt on a party who has voluntarily dismissed his complaint or impose sanctions under 28 U.S. C. 1927 against lawyers who have multiplied court proceedings vexatiously. A court may also impose sanctions under Rule 11 for a complaint that is not withdrawn before a responsive pleading is filed or for other pleadings that are not well grounded and find no warrant in the law or arguments for the law's extension, modification or reversal. If a plaintiff files a false or frivolous affidavit in response to a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, I have no doubt that he can be sanctioned for that filing. In those cases, the action of the party constitutes an abuse of judicial resources. But when a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed a complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), a collateral proceeding to examine whether the complaint is well grounded will stretch out the matter long beyond the time in which either the plaintiff or the defendant would otherwise want to litigate the merits of the claim. An interpretation that can only have the unfortunate consequences of encouraging the filing of sanction motions and discouraging voluntary dismissals cannot be a sensible interpretation of Rules that are designed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive *413 determination of every action." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Despite the changes that have taken place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago,
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,979 | 19 |
concurring
|
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110101/reiter-v-sonotone-corp/
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I join the Court's opinion and write separately only to point out that the concern expressed by the Court of Appeals that an interpretation of "business or property" in the manner in which the Court interprets it today would "add a substantial volume of litigation to the already strained dockets of the federal courts and could be used to exact unfair settlements from retail businesses," ante, at 336, is by no means an unfounded one. And pronouncements from this Court exhorting district courts to be "especially alert to identify frivolous *346 claims brought to extort nuisance settlements" will not be a complete solution for those courts which are actually on the firing line in this type of litigation. Ante, at 345. But I fully agree that we must take the statute as Congress wrote it, and I also fully agree with the Court's construction of the phrase "business or property." I think that the Court's observation, ante, at 343 n. 6, that "the treble-damages remedy of 4 took on new practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23" is a miracle of understatement; and in the absence of any jurisdictional limit, there is considerable doubt in my mind whether this type of action is indeed ultimately of primary benefit to consumers themselves, who may recover virtually no monetary damages, as opposed to the attorneys for the class, who stand to obtain handsome rewards for their services. Be that as it may, the problem, if there is one, is for Congress and not for the courts.
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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The issue in this case is the meaning of the phrase, in 18 U.S. C. 2119, "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." (For convenience' sake, I shall refer to it in this opinion as simply intent to kill.) As recounted by the Court, petitioner's accomplice, Vernon Lennon, "testified that the plan was to steal the cars without harming the victims, but that he would have used his gun if any of the drivers had given him a `hard time.' " Ante, at 4. The District Court instructed the jury that the intent element would be satisfied if petitioner possessed this "conditional" *13 intent. Today's judgment holds that instruction to have been correct. I dissent from that holding because I disagree with the following, utterly central, passage of the opinion: "[A] carjacker's intent to harm his victim may be either `conditional' or `unconditional.' The statutory phrase at issue theoretically might describe (1) the former, (2) the latter, or (3) both species of intent." Ante, at 7 (footnote omitted). I think, to the contrary, that in customary English usage the unqualified word "intent" does not usually connote a purpose that is subject to any conditions precedent except those so remote in the speaker's estimation as to be effectively nonexistentand it never connotes a purpose that is subject to a condition which the speaker hopes will not occur. (It is this last sort of "conditional intent" that is at issue in this case, and that I refer to in my subsequent use of the term.) "Intent" is "[a] state of mind in which a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course of action." Black's Law Dictionary 810 (6th ed. 1990). One can hardly "seek to accomplish" a result he hopes will not ensue. The Court's division of intent into two categories, conditional and unconditional, makes the unreasonable seem logical. But Aristotelian classification says nothing about linguistic usage. Instead of identifying two categories, the Court might just as readily have identified three: unconditional intent, conditional intent, and feigned intent. But the second category, like the third, is simply not conveyed by the word "intent" alone. There is intent, conditional intent, and feigned intent, just as there is agreement, conditional agreement, and feigned agreementbut to say that in either case the noun alone, without qualification, "theoretically might describe" all three phenomena is simply false. Conditional intent is no more embraced by the unmodified word "intent" than a sea lion is embraced by the unmodified word "lion." *14 If I have made a categorical determination to go to Louisiana
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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I have made a categorical determination to go to Louisiana for the Christmas holidays, it is accurate for me to say that I "intend" to go to Louisiana. And that is so even though I realize that there are some remote and unlikely contingencies"acts of God," for examplethat might prevent me. (The fact that these remote contingencies are always implicit in the expression of intent accounts for the humorousness of spelling them out in such expressions as "if I should live so long," or "the Good Lord willing and the creek don't rise.") It is less precise, though tolerable usage, to say that I "intend" to go if my purpose is conditional upon an event which, though not virtually certain to happen (such as my continuing to live), is reasonably likely to happen, and which I hope will happen. I might, for example, say that I "intend" to go even if my plans depend upon receipt of my usual and hoped-for end-of-year bonus. But it is not common usageindeed, it is an unheard-of usageto speak of my having an "intent" to do something, when my plans are contingent upon an event that is not virtually certain, and that I hope will not occur. When a friend is seriously ill, for example, I would not say that "I intend to go to his funeral next week." I would have to make it clear that the intent is a conditional one: "I intend to go to his funeral next week if he dies." The carjacker who intends to kill if he is met with resistance is in the same position: He has an "intent to kill if resisted"; he does not have an "intent to kill." No amount of rationalization can change the reality of this normal (and as far as I know exclusive) English usage. The word in the statute simply will not bear the meaning that the Court assigns. The Government makes two contextual arguments to which I should respond. First, it points out that the statute criminalizes not only carjackings accomplished by "force and violence" but also those accomplished by mere "intimidation." Requiring an unconditional intent, it asserts, would make the number of covered carjackings accomplished by intimidation *15 "implausibly small." Brief for United States 22. That seems to me not so. It is surely not an unusual carjacking in which the criminal jumps into the passenger seat and forces the person behind the wheel to drive off at gunpoint. A carjacker who intends to kill may well use this modus operandi, planning to kill the driver in a
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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this modus operandi, planning to kill the driver in a more secluded location. Second, the Government asserts that it would be hard to imagine an unconditional-intent-to-kill case in which the first penalty provision of 2119 would apply, i. e., the provision governing cases in which no death or bodily harm has occurred. That is rather like saying that the crime of attempted murder should not exist, because someone who intends to kill always succeeds. Notwithstanding the clear ordinary meaning of the word "intent," it would be possible, though of course quite unusual, for the word to have acquired a different meaning in the criminal law. The Court does not claimand falls far short of establishingsuch "term-of-art" status. It cites five state cases (representing the majority view among the minority of jurisdictions that have addressed the question) saying that conditional intent satisfies an intent requirement; but it acknowledges that there are cases in other jurisdictions to the contrary. See ante, at 10, n. 9 ; ); see also ; (Ala. Crim. App.), writ denied, As I understand the Court's position, it is not that the former cases are right and the latter wrong, so that "intent" in criminal statutes, a term of art in that context, includes conditional intent; but rather that "intent" in criminal statutes may include conditional intent, depending upon the statute in question. That seems to me not an available option. It is so utterly clear in normal usage that "intent" does not include conditional intent, that only an accepted convention in the criminal law could *16 give the word a different meaning. And an accepted convention is not established by the fact that some courts have thought so some times. One must decide, I think, which line of cases is correct, and in my judgment it is that which rejects the conditional-intent rule. There are of course innumerable federal criminal statutes containing an intent requirement, ranging from intent to steal, see 18 U.S. C. 2113, to intent to defeat the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, see 152(5), to intent that a vessel be used in hostilities against a friendly nation, see 962, to intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights, see 1204. Consider, for example, 21 U.S. C. 841, which makes it a crime to possess certain drugs with intent to distribute them. Possession alone is also a crime, but a lesser one, see 844. Suppose that a person acquires and possesses a small quantity of cocaine for his own use, and that he in fact consumes it entirely himself. But assume further that, at
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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fact consumes it entirely himself. But assume further that, at the time he acquired the drug, he told his wife not to worry about the expense because, if they had an emergency need for money, he could always resell it. If conditional intent suffices, this person, who has never sold drugs and has never "intended" to sell drugs in any normal sense, has been guilty of possession with intent to distribute. Or consider 18 U.S. C. 2390, which makes it a crime to enlist within the United States "with intent to serve in armed hostility against the United States." Suppose a Canadian enlists in the Canadian army in the United States, intending, of course, to fight all of Canada's wars, including (though he neither expects nor hopes for it) a war against the United States. He would be criminally liable. These examples make it clear, I think, that the doctrine of conditional intent cannot reasonably be applied across-the-board to the criminal code. I am unaware that any equivalent absurdities result from reading "intent" to mean what it says a conclusion strongly supported by the fact that the Government has cited only a single case involving another federal *17 statute, from over two centuries of federal criminal jurisprudence, applying the conditional-intent doctrine (and that in circumstances where it would not at all have been absurd to require real intent).[1] The course selected by the Court, of course"intent" is sometimes conditional and sometimes notwould require us to sift through these many statutes *18 one-by-one, making our decision on the basis of such ephemeral indications of "congressional purpose" as the Court has used in this case, to which I now turn. Ultimately, the Court rests its decision upon the fact that the purpose of the statutewhich it says is deterring carjacking"is better served by construing the statute to cover both the conditional and the unconditional species of wrongful intent." Ante, at 9. It supports this statement, both premise and conclusion, by two unusually uninformative statements from the legislative history (to stand out in that respect in that realm is quite an accomplishment) that speak generally about strengthening and broadening the carjacking statute and punishing carjackers severely. Ante, at 9, n. 7. But every statute intends not only to achieve certain policy objectives, but to achieve them by the means specified. Limitations upon the means employed to achieve the policy goal are no less a "purpose" of the statute than the policy goal itself. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Under the Court's analysis, any interpretation of the statute that would broaden its reach
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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any interpretation of the statute that would broaden its reach would further the purpose the Court has found. Such reasoning is limitless and illogical. The Court confidently asserts that "petitioner's interpretation would exclude from the coverage of the statute most of the conduct that Congress obviously intended to prohibit." Ante, at 9. It seems to me that one can best judge what Congress "obviously intended" not by intuition, but by the words that Congress enacted, which in this case require intent (not conditional intent) to kill. Is it implausible that Congress intended to define such a narrow federal crime? Not at all. The era when this statute was passed contained well publicized instances of not only carjackings, and not only carjackings involving violence or the threat of violence (as, of course, most of them do); but also of carjackings in which the perpetrators senselessly harmed the car owners *19 when that was entirely unnecessary to the crime. I have a friend whose father was killed, and whose mother was nearly killed, in just such an incidentafter the car had already been handed over. It is not at all implausible that Congress should direct its attention to this particularly savage sort of carjackingwhere killing the driver is part of the intended crime.[2] Indeed, it seems to me much more implausible that Congress would have focused upon the ineffable "conditional intent" that the Court reads into the statute, sending courts and juries off to wander through "would-a, could-a, should-a" land. It is difficult enough to determine a defendant's actual intent; it is infinitely more difficult to determine what the defendant planned to do upon the happening of an event that the defendant hoped would not happen, and that he himself may not have come to focus upon. There will not often be the accomplice's convenient confirmation of conditional intent that exists in the present case. Presumably it will be up to each jury whether to take the carjacker ("Your car or *20 your life") at his word. Such a system of justice seems to me so arbitrary that it is difficult to believe Congress intended it. Had Congress meant to cast its carjacking net so broadly, it could have achieved that resultand eliminated the arbitrarinessby defining the crime as "carjacking under threat of death or serious bodily injury." Given the language here, I find it much more plausible that Congress meant to reachas it saidthe carjacker who intended to kill. In sum, I find the statute entirely unambiguous as to whether the carjacker who hopes to obtain the car without inflicting harm
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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carjacker who hopes to obtain the car without inflicting harm is covered. Even if ambiguity existed, however, the rule of lenity would require it to be resolved in the defendant's favor. See generally United The Government's statement that the rule of lenity "has its primary application in cases in which there is some doubt whether the legislature intended to criminalize conduct that might otherwise appear to be innocent," Brief for United States 31 (emphasis added), is carefully crafted to conceal the fact that we have repeatedly applied the rule to situations just like this. For example, in (18), the statute at issue made it a crime to assault a federal officer with a deadly weapon. The defendant, who fired one shotgun blast that wounded two federal officers, contended that under this statute he was guilty of only one, and not two, assaults. The Court said, in an opinion joined by all eight Justices who reached the merits of the case: "This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. If Congress desires to create multiple offenses from a single act affecting more than one federal officer, Congress can make that meaning clear. We thus hold that the single discharge of a shotgun *21 alleged by the petitioner in this case would constitute only a single violation of 254." In (15), the issue was similar: whether transporting two women, for the purpose of prostitution, in the same vehicle and on the same trip, constituted one or two violations of the Mann Act. In an opinion authored by Justice Frankfurter, the Court said: "When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this is not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment." If that is no longer the presupposition of our law, the Court should say so, and reduce the rule of lenity to a historical curiosity. But if it remains the presupposition, the rule has undeniable application in the present case. If the statute is not, as I think, clear in the defendant's favor, it is
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,999 | 9 |
dissenting
|
Holloway v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118265/holloway-v-united-states/
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as I think, clear in the defendant's favor, it is at the very least ambiguous and the defendant must be given the benefit of the doubt. * * * This seems to me not a difficult case. The issue before us is not whether the "intent" element of some commonlaw crime developed by the courts themselvesor even the "intent" element of a statute that replicates the commonlaw definitionincludes, or should include, conditional intent. Rather, it is whether the English term "intent" used in a statute defining a brand new crime bears a meaning that contradicts normal usage. Since it is quite impossible to say that longstanding, agreed-upon legal usage has converted this word into a term of art, the answer has to be no. And it would be no even if the question were doubtful. *22 I think it particularly inadvisable to introduce the new possibility of "conditional-intent" prosecutions into a modern federal criminal-law system characterized by plea bargaining, where they will predictably be used for in terrorem effect. I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
|
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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In this Court for the first time held that a local government was subject to suit as a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S. C. 1983. Aside from concluding that a municipal body was not wholly immune from civil liability, the Court had no occasion to explore the nature or scope of any particular municipal immunity under the The question presented by this case is whether a municipality may be held liable for punitive damages under 1983. I A Respondent Fact Concerts, Inc., is a Rhode Island corporation organized for the purpose of promoting musical concerts.[1] In 1975, it received permission from the Rhode Island Department *250 of Natural Resources to present several summer concerts at Fort Adams, a state park located in the city of Newport. In securing approval for the final concerts, to be held August 30 and 31, respondent sought and obtained an entertainment license from petitioner city of Newport.[2] Under their written contract, respondent retained control over the choice of performers and the type of music to be played while the city reserved the right to cancel the license without liability if "in the opinion of the City the interests of public safety demand." App. 27. Respondent engaged a number of well-known jazz music acts to perform during the final August concerts. Shortly before the dates specified, the group Blood, Sweat and Tears was hired as a replacement for a previously engaged performer who was unable to appear. Members of the Newport City Council, including the Mayor, became concerned that Blood, Sweat and Tears, which they characterized as a rock group rather than as a jazz band, would attract a rowdy and undesirable audience to Newport. 2 Record Appendix (R. A.) 265, 316-317, 325.[3] Based on this concern, the Council attempted to have Blood, Sweat and Tears removed from the program. On Monday, August 25, Mayor Donnelly informed respondent by telephone that he considered Blood, Sweat and Tears to be a rock group, and that they would not be permitted to perform because the city had experienced crowd disturbances at previous rock concerts. Officials of respondent appeared before the City Council at a special meeting the next day, and explained that Blood, Sweat and Tears in fact were a jazz band that had performed at Carnegie Hall in New York City and at similar symphony hall facilities *251 throughout the world. Speaking for the Council, the Mayor reiterated that the city did not condone rock festivals. Without attempting to investigate either the nature of the group's music or the representations made by respondent, the Council
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
|
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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group's music or the representations made by respondent, the Council voted to cancel the license for both days unless Blood, Sweat and Tears were removed from the program. The vote received considerable publicity, and this adversely affected ticket sales. at 248-G. Later in the same week, respondent was informed by the City Solicitor that the Council had changed its position and would allow Blood, Sweat and Tears to perform if they did not play rock music. On Thursday, August 28, respondent agreed to attend a second special Council meeting the following day. The second Council session convened on the afternoon of August 29, the day before the first scheduled performance. Mayor Donnelly informed the Council members that the city had two optionsit could either allow Blood, Sweat and Tears to perform subject to the prohibition against rock music, or cancel the concert altogether. Although the City Solicitor advocated the first alternative and advised that cancellation would be unlawful, 3 R. A. 478, the Council did not offer the first option to respondent. Instead, one of the Council members inquired whether all provisions of the contract had been fulfilled. The City Manager, who had just returned from the concert site, reported that the wiring together of the spectator seats was not fully completed by 3 p.m., and that the auxiliary electric generator was not in place. Under the contract, respondent had agreed to fulfill these two conditions as part of the overall safety procedures. App. 28.[4] The *252 Council then voted to cancel the contract because respondent had not "lived up to all phases" of the agreement. 4 R. A. 10. The Council offered respondent a new contract for the same dates, specifically excluding Blood, Sweat and Tears. Respondent, however, indicated that it would take legal action if the original contract was not honored. 1 R. A. 96; 2 R. A. 202; 4 R. A. 11. After the meeting adjourned at 9:30 p.m., the decision to revoke respondent's license was broadcast extensively over the local media. 1 R. A. 97; 2 R. A. 204. On Saturday morning, August 30, respondent obtained in state court a restraining order enjoining the Mayor, the City Council, and the city from interfering with the performance of the concerts. The 2-day event, including the appearance of Blood, Sweat and Tears, took place without incident. Fewer than half the available tickets were sold. B Respondent instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, naming the city, its Mayor, and the six other Council members as defendants. Alleging, inter alia,
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
|
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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the six other Council members as defendants. Alleging, inter alia, that the license cancellation amounted to content-based censorship, and that its constitutional rights to free expression and due process had been violated under color of state law, respondent sought compensatory and punitive damages against the city and its officials under 42 U.S. C. 1983 and under two pendent state-law counts, including tortious interference with contractual relationships. App. 8. At the conclusion of six days of trial, the District Court charged the jury with respect to the 1983 and tortious interference counts. Included in its charge was *253 an instruction, given without objection, that authorized the jury to award punitive damages against each defendant individually, "based on the degree of culpability of the individual defendant." App. 62.[5] The jury returned verdicts for respondent on both counts, awarding compensatory damages of $72,910 and punitive damages of $275,000; of the punitive damages, $75,000 was spread among the seven individual officials and $200,000 was awarded against the city.[6] Petitioner moved for a new trial, arguing that punitive damages cannot be awarded under 1983 against a municipality, and that even if they can, the award was excessive.[7] Because petitioner challenged the punitive damages instruction to which it had not objected at trial, the District Court noted that the challenge was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51. But the court was determined not to "rest its decision on this procedural ground alone." App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3. Reasoning that "a careful resolution of this novel question is critical to a just verdict in this case," *254 at B-7, the court proceeded to consider petitioner's substantive legal arguments on their merits. The District Court recognized, ib that had left undecided the question whether municipalities may be held liable for punitive The court observed, however, that punitive damages often had been awarded against individual officials in 1983 actions, and it found no clear basis for distinguishing between individuals and municipalities in this regard. Emphasizing the general deterrent purpose served by punitive damages awards, the court reasoned that a municipality's payment of such an award would focus taxpayer and voter attention upon the entity's malicious conduct, and that this in turn might promote accountability at the next election. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-9. Although noting that the burden imposed upon tax-paying citizens warranted judicial caution in this area, the court concluded that in appropriate circumstances municipalities could be held liable for punitive damages in a 1983 action.[8] The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. That court noted, as an initial matter,
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
|
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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First Circuit affirmed. That court noted, as an initial matter, that the challenge to the punitive damages award was flawed due to petitioner's failure to object to the charge at trial. The court observed that such a failure should be overlooked "only where the error is plain and `has seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.'" The court found none of these factors present, because the law concerning municipal liability under 1983 was in a state of flux, and no appellate decision had barred punitive damages awards against a municipality. The Court of Appeals also expressed a belief that the *255 challenged instruction might well not have been error at 626 F.2d, Citing its own prior holdings to the effect that punitive damages are available against 1983 defendants, and this Court's recent determination in that a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of 1983, the court identified the "distinct possibility that municipalities, like all other persons subject to suit under 1983, may be liable for punitive damages in the proper circumstances." 626 F.2d, Because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. II At the outset, respondent asserts that the punitive damages issue was not properly preserved for review before this Court. Brief for Respondents 7-9. In light of Rule 51's uncompromising language[9] and the policies of fairness and judicial efficiency incorporated therein, respondent claims that petitioner's failure to object to the charge at trial should foreclose any further challenge to that instruction. The problem with respondent's argument is that the District Court in the first instance declined to accept it. Although the punitive damages question perhaps could have been avoided simply by a reliance, under Rule 51, upon petitioner's procedural default,[10] the judge concluded that the interests of justice required careful consideration of this "novel question" of federal law.[11]*256 Because the District Court reached and fully adjudicated the merits, and the Court of Appeals did not disagree with that adjudication, no interests in fair and effective trial administration advanced by Rule 51 would be served if we refused now to reach the merits ourselves.[12] Nor are we persuaded that our review should be limited to determining whether "plain error" has been committed, an exception to Rule 51 that is invoked on occasion by the Courts of Appeals absent timely objection in the trial court.[13] No "right" to a specific standard of review exists in this setting, any more than a "right" to review existed at all once petitioner failed to except to the charge at trial. But given the special circumstances of
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
|
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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the charge at trial. But given the special circumstances of this case, limiting our review to a restrictive "plain error" standard would be peculiarly inapt. "Plain error" review under Rule 51 is suited to correcting obvious instances of injustice or misapplied law. A court's interpretation of the contours of municipal liability under 1983, as both courts below recognized, hardly could give rise to plain judicial error since those contours are currently in a state of evolving definition and uncertainty. See ; See *257 also ; Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., ante, p. 1. We undertake review here in order to resolve one element of the uncertainty, that is, the availability of punitive damages, and it would scarcely be appropriate or just to confine our review to determining whether any error that might exist is sufficiently egregious to qualify under Rule 51. The very novelty of the legal issue at stake counsels unconstricted review. In addition to being novel, the punitive damages question is important and appears likely to recur in 1983 litigation against municipalities.[14] And here the question was squarely presented and decided on a complete trial record by the court of first resort, was argued by both sides to the Court of Appeals, and has been fully briefed before this Court. In light of all these factors, we conclude that restricting our review to the plain-error standard would serve neither to promote the interests of justice nor to advance efficient judicial administration.[15] We therefore turn to the merits of petitioner's claim.[16] *258 III It is by now well settled that the tort liability created by 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum. In the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress created a federal remedy against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional rights. See Congress, however, expressed no intention to do away with the immunities afforded state officials at common law, and the Court consistently has declined to construe the general language of 1983[17] as automatically abolishing such traditional immunities by implication. ; ; ; Instead, the Court has recognized immunities of varying scope applicable to different officials sued under the [18] One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary. At the same time, the Court's willingness to recognize certain traditional immunities as affirmative defenses has not led it to
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
|
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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traditional immunities as affirmative defenses has not led it to conclude that Congress incorporated all immunities existing *259 at common law. See Indeed, because the 1871 Act was designed to expose state and local officials to a new form of liability, it would defeat the promise of the statute to recognize any pre-existing immunity without determining both the policies that it serves and its compatibility with the purposes of 1983. See ; ; Only after careful inquiry into considerations of both history and policy has the Court construed 1983 to incorporate a particular immunity defense. Since was decided three years ago, the Court has applied this two-part approach when scrutinizing a claim of immunity proffered by a municipality. In the Court held that neither history nor policy supported a construction of 1983 that would allow a municipality to assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability for 657. Owen, however, concerned only compensatory damages, and petitioner contends that with respect to a municipality's liability for punitive damages, an examination of the common-law background and policy considerations yields a very different result. A By the time Congress enacted what is now 1983, the immunity of a municipal corporation from punitive damages at common law was not open to serious question. It was generally understood by 1871 that a municipality, like a private corporation, was to be treated as a natural person subject to suit for a wide range of tortious activity,[19] but this understanding *260 did not extend to the award of punitive or exemplary Indeed, the courts that had considered the issue prior to 1871 were virtually unanimous in denying such damages against a municipal corporation. E. g., Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N. H. 387 (1870); City of ; City Council of ; Order of Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of 4 Clark 120, Brightly N. P. 116 (Pa. 1847);[20] Judicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a municipality has persisted to the present day in the vast majority of jurisdictions.[21] See generally 18 E. McQuillin. Municipal Corporations 53.18a (3d rev. ed. 1977); F. Burdick, Law of Torts 245-246 (4th ed. *261 1926); 4 J. Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations 1712 (5th ed. 1911); G. Field, Law of Damages 80 (1876). The language of the opinions themselves is instructive as to the reasons behind this common-law tradition. In McGary, for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to allow punitive damages against the city of Lafayette despite the malicious acts of its municipal officers, who had violated an injunction by ordering the demolition of
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
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Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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who had violated an injunction by ordering the demolition of plaintiff's house. Reasoning that the officials' malice should not be attributed to the taxpaying citizens of the community, the court explained its holding: "Those who violate the laws of their country, disregard the authority of courts of justice, and wantonly inflict injuries, certainly become thereby obnoxious to vindictive These, however, can never be allowed against the innocent. Those which the plaintiff has recovered in the present case being evidently vindictive, cannot, in our opinion, be sanctioned by this court, as they are to be borne by widows, orphans, aged men and women, and strangers, who, admitting that they must repair the injury inflicted by the Mayor on the plaintiff, cannot be bound beyond that amount, which will be sufficient for her indemnification." Similarly, in the Missouri Supreme Court held that a municipality could not be found liable for treble damages under a trespass statute, notwithstanding the statute's authorization of such damages against "any person." After noting the existence of "respectable authority" to the effect that municipal corporations "can not, as such, do a criminal act or a willful and malicious wrong and they cannot therefore be made liable for exemplary damages," the court continued: "[T]he relation which the officers of a municipal corporation sustain toward the citizens thereof for whom they act, is not in all respects identical with that existing between *262 the stockholders of a private corporation and their agents; and there is not the same reason for holding municipal corporations, engaged in the performance of acts for the public benefit, liable for the willful or malicious acts of its officers, as there is in the case of private corporations." Of particular relevance to our current inquiry is Order of Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of which involved a Pennsylvania statute that authorized property owners within the county to bring damages actions against it for the destruction of their property by mob violence.[] The court observed that the "persons" against whom the statute authorized recovery included the county corporation, and it held that plaintiffs were entitled to compensatory damages as part of the county's duty to make reparation to its citizens for injuries sustained as a result of lawless violence. While noting that punitive damages would have been available against the rioters themselves, the court nonetheless held that such exemplary damages were not recoverable against the county. The rationale of these decisions was reiterated in numerous other common-law jurisdictions. E. g., ; City of ; City Council of In general, courts viewed punitive damages as contrary to
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
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Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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of In general, courts viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised. The courts readily distinguished between liability to compensate for injuries inflicted by a municipality's officers and agents, and vindictive damages appropriate as punishment for the bad-faith conduct of those same officers and agents. Compensation was an obligation properly shared by the municipality itself, whereas punishment properly applied only to the actual wrongdoers. The courts thus protected the public from unjust punishment, and the municipalities from undue fiscal constraints.[23] Given that municipal immunity from punitive damages was well established at common law by 1871, we proceed on the familiar assumption that "Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine." Nothing in the legislative debates suggests that, in enacting 1 of the Civil Rights Act, *264 the 42d Congress intended any such abolition. Indeed, the limited legislative history relevant to this issue suggests the opposite. Because there was virtually no debate on 1 of the Act, the Court has looked to Congress' treatment of the amendment to the Act introduced by Senator Sherman as indicative of congressional attitudes toward the nature and scope of municipal liability. n. 57.[24] Initially, it is significant that the Sherman amendment as proposed contemplated the award of no more than compensatory damages for injuries inflicted by mob violence. The amendment would not have exposed municipal governments to punitive damages; rather, it proposed that municipalities "shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified" by mob violence. Globe, at 749, 755 (emphasis added).[25]*265 That the exclusion of punitive damages was no oversight was confirmed by Representative Butler, one of the amendment's chief supporters, when he responded to a critical inquiry on the floor of the House: "The invalidity of the gentleman's argument is that he looks upon [the amendment] as a punishment for the county. Now, we do not look upon it as a punishment at It is a mutual insurance. We are there a community, and if there is any wrong done by our community, or by the inhabitants of our community, we will indemnify the injured party for that wrong" We doubt that a Congress having no intention of permitting punitive awards against municipalities in the explicit context of the Sherman amendment would have meant to expose municipal bodies to such novel liability sub silentio under 1 of the Act. Notwithstanding the compensatory focus of the amendment, its proposed extension of municipal liability met substantial resistance
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
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Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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amendment, its proposed extension of municipal liability met substantial resistance in Congress, resulting in its defeat on two separate occasions.[26] In addition to the constitutional reservations broached by legislators, which the Court has discussed at some length in -683. Members of both Chambers also expressed more practical objections. Notably, supporters as well as opponents of 1 voiced concern that this extension of public liability might place an unmanageable financial burden on local governments.[27] Legislators *266 also expressed apprehension that innocent taxpayers would be unfairly punished for the deeds of persons over whom they had neither knowledge nor control.[28] Admittedly, both these objections were raised with particular reference to the threat of the expansive municipal liability embodied in the Sherman amendment. The two concerns are not without relevance to the present inquiry, however, in that they reflect policy considerations similar to those relied upon by the common-law courts in rejecting punitive damages awards. We see no reason to believe that Congress' opposition to punishing innocent taxpayers and bankrupting local governments would have been less applicable with regard to the novel specter of punitive damages against municipalities. B Finding no evidence that Congress intended to disturb the settled common-law immunity, we now must determine whether considerations of public policy dictate a contrary result. In doing so, we examine the objectives underlying punitive damages in general, and their relationship to the goals of 1983. Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor *267 whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 908 ; W. Prosser, Law of Torts 9-10 (4th ed. 1971). Regarding retribution, it remains true that an award of punitive damages against a municipality "punishes" only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort. These damages are assessed over and above the amount necessary to compensate the injured party. Thus, there is no question here of equitably distributing the losses resulting from official misconduct. Cf. Indeed, punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.[29] Under ordinary principles of retribution, it is the wrongdoer himself who is made to suffer for his unlawful conduct. If a government official acts knowingly and maliciously to deprive others of
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
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Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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government official acts knowingly and maliciously to deprive others of their civil rights, he may become the appropriate object of the community's vindictive sentiments. See generally ; cert. denied, A municipality, however, can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials. Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself. To the extent that the purposes of 1983 have any bearing on this punitive rationale, they do not alter our analysis. The Court previously has indicated that punitive damages *268 might be awarded in appropriate circumstances in order to punish violations of constitutional rights, but it never has suggested that punishment is as prominent a purpose under the statute as are compensation and deterrence. See, e. g., ; ; -257. Whatever its weight, the retributive purpose is not significantly advanced, if it is advanced at all, by exposing municipalities to punitive The other major objective of punitive damages awards is to prevent future misconduct. Respondent argues vigorously that deterrence is a primary purpose of 1983, and that because punitive awards against municipalities for the malicious conduct of their policymaking officials will induce voters to condemn official misconduct through the electoral process, the threat of such awards will deter future constitutional violations. Brief for Respondents 9-11. Respondent is correct in asserting that the deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of 1983. ; It is in this context that the Court's prior statements contemplating punitive damages "in `a proper' 1983 action" should be understood. ; 435 U. S., at For several reasons, however, we conclude that the deterrence rationale of 1983 does not justify making punitive damages available against municipalities. First, it is far from clear that municipal officials, including those at the policymaking level, would be deterred from wrongdoing by the knowledge that large punitive awards could be assessed based on the wealth of their municipality. Indemnification may not be available to the municipality under local law, and even if it were, officials likely will not be able themselves to pay such sizable awards. Thus, assuming, *269 arguendo, that the responsible official is not impervious to shame and humiliation, the impact on the individual tortfeasor of this deterrence in the air is at best uncertain. There also is no reason to suppose that corrective action, such as the discharge of offending officials who were appointed and the public excoriation of those who were elected, will not occur unless punitive damages are awarded against the municipality. The Court recently observed in a
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
majority
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Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110553/newport-v-fact-concerts-inc/
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awarded against the municipality. The Court recently observed in a related context: "The more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc but also by concern for the Government's integrity." This assumption is no less applicable to the electorate at large. And if additional protection is needed, the compensatory damages that are available against a municipality may themselves induce the public to vote the wrongdoers out of office. Moreover, there is available a more effective means of deterrence. By allowing juries and courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending official, based on his personal financial resources, the statute directly advances the public's interest in preventing repeated constitutional deprivations.[30] In our view, this provides sufficient protection against the prospect that a public official may *270 commit recurrent constitutional violations by reason of his office. The Court previously has found, with respect to such violations, that a damages remedy recoverable against individuals is more effective as a deterrent than the threat of damages against a government employer. We see no reason to depart from that conclusion here, especially since the imposition of additional penalties would most likely fall upon the citizen-taxpayer. Finally, although the benefits associated with awarding punitive damages against municipalities under 1983 are of doubtful character, the costs may be very real. In light of the Court's decision last Term in the 1983 damages remedy may now be available for violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. But cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., ante, p. 1. Under this expanded liability, municipalities and other units of state and local government face the possibility of having to assure compensation for persons harmed by abuses of governmental authority covering a large range of activity in everyday life. To add the burden of exposure for the malicious conduct of individual government employees may create a serious risk to the financial integrity of these governmental entities. The Court has remarked elsewhere on the broad discretion traditionally accorded to juries in assessing the amount of punitive Electrical ; 349- Because evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is traditionally admissible as a measure of the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded,[31] the unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a prejudicial impact on the jury, in effect encouraging it to impose a sizable award. The impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be both unpredictable *271 and, at times, substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local treasuries and therefore on
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,996 | 16 |
concurring
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Bank One Chicago, NA v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117993/bank-one-chicago-na-v-midwest-bank-trust-co/
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Given the fact that the Expedited Funds Availability Act was a measure that easily passed both Houses of Congress,[1] Justice Scalia is quite right that it is unlikely that more than a handful of legislators were aware of the Act's drafting history. He is quite wrong, however, to conclude from that observation that the drafting history is not useful to conscientious and disinterested judges trying to understand the statute's meaning. Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute such as the Expedited Funds Availability Act has bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the views of the committee members in casting their votes. In such circumstances, since most Members are content to endorse the views of the responsible committees, the *277 intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress. In this case, as the Court and Justice Scalia agree, ante, at 273-274, post, at 282, the statutory text of 4010 supports petitioner's construction of the Act. However, the placement of the authorization for interbank litigation in subsection (f) rather than subsection (a) lends some support to the Court of Appeals' interpretation. When Congress creates a cause of action, the provisions describing the new substantive rights and liabilities typically precede the provisions describing enforcement procedures; subsection (f) does not conform to this pattern. The drafting history, however, provides a completely satisfactory explanation for this apparent anomaly in the text. Justice Scalia nevertheless views the Court's reference to this history as unwise. As he correctly notes, the simultaneous removal of the provision for interbank liability from subsection (a) and the addition of a new subsection (f) support another inference favoring the Court of Appeals' construction of the statute: that the drafters intended to relegate the resolution of interbank disputes to a different tribunal. Justice Scalia is mistaken, however, in believing that this inference provides the "most plausible explanation" for the change, In my judgment the Court has correctly concluded that the most logical explanation for the change is a decision to consolidate the aspects of 4010 that relate to interbank disputesliability limits and rulemaking authorityin the same subsection. Ante, at 273. Thus, the net result of the inquiry into drafting history is to find the answer to an otherwise puzzling aspect of the statutory text. I must also take exception to Justice Scalia's psychoanalysis of judges who examine legislative history when construing statutes. He confidently
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Justice Stevens
| 1,996 | 16 |
concurring
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Bank One Chicago, NA v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117993/bank-one-chicago-na-v-midwest-bank-trust-co/
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judges who examine legislative history when construing statutes. He confidently asserts that we use such history as a makeweight after reaching a conclusion on the *278 basis of other factors. I have been performing this type of work for more than 25 years and have never proceeded in the manner Justice Scalia suggests. It is quite true that I have often formed a tentative opinion about the meaning of a statute and thereafter examined the statute's drafting history to see whether the history supported my provisional conclusion or provided a basis for revising it. In my judgment, a reference to history in the Court's opinion in such a case cannot properly be described as a "make weight." That the history could have altered my opinion is evidenced by the fact that there are significant cases, such as in which the study of history did alter my original analysis. In any event, I see no reason why conscientious judges should not feel free to examine all public records that may shed light on the meaning of a statute. Finally, I would like to suggest that Justice Scalia may be guilty of the transgression that he ascribes to the Court. He has confidently asserted that the legislative history in this case and in Wisconsin Public supports a result opposite to that reached by the Court. While I do not wish to reargue the Mortier case, I will say that I remain convinced that a disinterested study of the entire legislative history supports the conclusion reached by the eight-Member majority of the Court. Even if his analysis in both cases is plausible, it is possible that Justice Scalia's review of the history in Mortier and in this case may have been influenced by his zealous opposition to any reliance on legislative history in any case. In this case, as in Mortier, his opinion is a fine example of the work product of a brilliant advocate.[2] It is the Court's opinion, *279 however, that best sets forth the reasons for reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Breyer has authorized me to say that he agrees with the foregoing views. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court's opinion, except that portion of it which enters into a discussion of "[t]he drafting history of 4010." Ante, at 273. In my view a law means what its text most appropriately conveys, whatever the Congress that enacted it might have "intended." The law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather
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Justice Stevens
| 1,996 | 16 |
concurring
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Bank One Chicago, NA v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117993/bank-one-chicago-na-v-midwest-bank-trust-co/
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says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it. See United Moreover, even if subjective intent rather than textually expressed intent were the touchstone, it is a fiction of Jack-and-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of those Senators and Members of the House who voted for the final version of the Expedited Funds Availability Act, and the President who signed it, were, when they took those actions, aware of the drafting evolution that the Court describes; and if they were, that their actions in voting for or signing the final bill show that they had the same "intent" which that evolution suggests was in the minds of the drafters. Justice Stevens acknowledges that this is so, but asserts that the intent of a few committee members is nonetheless dispositive because legislators are "busy people," and "most Members [of Congress] are content to endorse the views of the responsible committees." Ante, at 276. I do not know the factual basis for that assurance. Many congressional committees tend not to be representative of the full House, but are disproportionately populated by Members whose constituents have a particular stake in the subject matter agriculture, merchant marine and fisheries, science and technology, etc. I think it quite unlikely that the House of Representatives *280 would be "content to endorse the views" that its Agriculture Committee would come up with if that committee knew (as it knows in drafting committee reports) that those views need not be moderated to survive a floor vote. And even more unlikely that the Senate would be "content to endorse the views" of the House Agriculture Committee. But assuming Justice Stevens is right about this desire to leave details to the committees, the very first provision of the Constitution forbids it. Article I, 1, provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." It has always been assumed that these powers are nondelegableor, as John Locke put it, that legislative power consists of the power "to make laws, not to make legislators." J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government 87 (R. Cox ed. 1982). No one would think that the House of Representatives could operate in such fashion that only the broad outlines of bills would be adopted by vote of the full House, leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and voted upon only by the cognizant committees. Thus, if legislation consists of forming an "intent" rather than adopting a text
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Justice Stevens
| 1,996 | 16 |
concurring
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Bank One Chicago, NA v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117993/bank-one-chicago-na-v-midwest-bank-trust-co/
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consists of forming an "intent" rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do not agree), Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent to a small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an intent of the Congress. There is no escaping the point: Legislative history that does not represent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful. Our opinions using legislative history are often curiously casual, sometimes even careless, in their analysis of what "intent" the legislative history shows. See Wisconsin Public Perhaps that is because legislative history is in any event a make weight; the Court really makes up its mind on the basis of other factors. Or perhaps it is *281 simply hard to maintain a rigorously analytical attitude, when the point of departure for the inquiry is the fairyland in which legislative history reflects what was in "the Congress's mind." In any case, it seems to me that if legislative history is capable of injecting into a statute an "intent" that its text alone does not express, the drafting history alluded to in today's opinion should have sufficed to win this case for respondent. It shows that interbank liability was not merely omitted from subsection (a), entitled "Civil liability." It was removed from that subsection, simultaneously with the addition of subsection (f), 12 U.S. C. 4010(f), which gave the Federal Reserve Board power to "impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks of loss and liability in connection with any aspect of the payment system" (language that is at least as compatible with adjudication as with rulemaking). Now if the only function of this new subsection (f) had been to give the Board rulemaking power, there would have been no logical reason to eliminate interbank disputes from the "Civil liability" subsection, whose basic prescription (banks are civilly liable for violations of the statute or of rules issued under the statute[1]) applies no less in the interbank than in the bank-customer context. Nor can the removal of interbank disputes from subsection (a) be explained on the ground that Congress had decided to apply different damages limits to those disputes. The former subsection (a), in both House and Senate versions, already provided varying damages limits for individual suits and class actions, see S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 609(a) (1987); H. R. Rep. No. 100-52, pp. 10-11 (1987), and it would have been logical to set forth the newly desired interbank variation there as well, leaving
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Justice Stevens
| 1,996 | 16 |
concurring
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Bank One Chicago, NA v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117993/bank-one-chicago-na-v-midwest-bank-trust-co/
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forth the newly desired interbank variation there as well, leaving to the new subsection (f) only *282 the conferral of rulemaking authority. Or, if it were thought essential to "consolidate" all the details of interbank disputes in subsection (f), it would still not have been necessary to specifically exclude interbank disputes from the general "civil liability" pronouncement of subsection (a). The prologue of that subsection, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section," would have made it clear that interbank civil liability was limited as set forth in subsection (f). The most plausible explanation for specifically excluding interbank disputes from the "Civil liability" subsection when subsection (f) was addedand for avoiding any reference to "civil liability" in subsection (f) itselfis an intent to commit those disputes to a totally different regime, i. e., to Board adjudication rather than the normal civil-liability regime of the law courts.[2] Today's opinion does not consider this argument, but nonetheless refutes it (in my view) conclusively. After recounting the drafting history, the Court states that "nothing in 4010(f)'s text suggests that Congress meant the Federal Reserve Board to function as both regulator and adjudicator *283 in interbank controversies." Ante, at 273 (emphasis added). Quite so. The text's the thing. We should therefore ignore drafting history without discussing it, instead of after discussing it.
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,016 | 0 |
dissenting
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Williams v. Pennsylvania
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3211607/williams-v-pennsylvania/
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In 1986, Ronald Castille, then District Attorney of Phil- adelphia, authorized a prosecutor in his office to seek the death penalty against Terrance Williams. Almost 30 years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, he participated in deciding whether Williams’s fifth habeas petition—which raised a claim unconnected to the prosecution’s decision to seek the death penalty—could be heard on the merits or was instead untimely. This Court now holds that because Chief Justice Castille made a “critical” decision as a prosecutor in Williams’s case, there is a risk that he “would be so psychologically wedded” to his previous decision that it would violate the Due Process Clause for him to decide the distinct issues raised in the habeas petition. Ante, at 6–7 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, that conclusion follows from the maxim that “no man can be a judge in his own ” Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion rests on proverb rather than prec- edent. This Court has held that there is “a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” To overcome that presumption, the majority relies on In re We concluded there that the Due 2 WILLIAMS v. PENNSYLVANIA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting Process Clause is violated when a judge adjudicates the same question—based on the same facts—that he had already considered as a grand juror in the same Here, however, Williams does not allege that Chief Justice Castille had any previous knowledge of the contested facts at issue in the habeas petition, or that he had previously made any decision on the questions raised by that petition. I would accordingly hold that the Due Process Clause did not require Chief Justice Castille’s recusal. I In 1986, petitioner Terrance Williams stood trial for the murder of Amos Norwood. Prosecutors believed that Williams and his friend Marc Draper had asked Norwood for a ride, directed him to a cemetery, and then beat him to death with a tire iron after robbing him. Andrea Foulkes, the Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney prosecut- ing the case, prepared a one-and-a-half page memo for her superiors—Homicide Unit Chief Mark Gottlieb and Dis- trict Attorney Ronald Castille—“request[ing] that we actively seek the death penalty.” App. 424a. The memo briefly described the facts of the case and Williams’s prior felonies, including a previous murder conviction. Gottlieb read the memo and then passed it to Castille with a note recommending the death penalty. at 426a. Castille wrote at the bottom of the memo, “Approved to proceed on the death penalty,” and signed his name.
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,016 | 0 |
dissenting
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Williams v. Pennsylvania
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3211607/williams-v-pennsylvania/
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to proceed on the death penalty,” and signed his name. At trial, Williams testified that he had never met Nor- wood and that someone else must have murdered him. After hearing extensive evidence linking Williams to the crime, the jury convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death. 79–80 (1990). In 1995, Williams filed a habeas petition in Pennsylva- nia state court, alleging that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence of his Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 3 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting childhood sexual abuse, among other claims. At a hearing related to that petition, Williams acknowledged that he knew Norwood and claimed that Norwood had sexually abused him. Pa. The petition was denied. Williams filed two more state habeas petitions, which were both dismissed as untimely, and a federal habeas petition, which was also denied. See This case arises out of Williams’s fifth habeas petition, which he filed in state court in 2012. In that petition, Williams argued that he was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the prosecution at trial had failed to turn over certain evidence suggesting that “Norwood was sexually involved with boys around [Williams’s] age at the time of his murder.” Crim. No. CP–51–CR–0821–1984 (Phila. Ct. Common Pleas, Nov. 27, 2012), App. 80a. It is undisputed that Williams’s fifth habeas petition is untimely under Pennsylvania law. In order to overcome that time bar, Pennsylvania law required Williams to show that “(1) the failure to previously raise [his] claim was the result of interference by government officials and (2) the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Pa., at 105 A. 3d, at The state habeas court held that Williams met that burden because “the govern- ment withheld multiple statements from [Williams’s] trial counsel, all of which strengthened the inference that Amos Norwood was sexually inappropriate with a number of teenage boys,” and Williams was unable to access those statements until an evidentiary proceeding ordered by the court. App. 95a. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and Williams filed a motion requesting that Chief Justice Castille recuse himself on the ground that he had “personally authorized his Office to seek the death penalty” nearly 30 years earlier. at 181a (em- 4 WILLIAMS v. PENNSYLVANIA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting phasis deleted). Chief Justice Castille summarily denied the recusal motion, and the six-member Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceeded to hear the The court unanimously reinstated Williams’s sentence. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams failed to make the
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,016 | 0 |
dissenting
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Williams v. Pennsylvania
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3211607/williams-v-pennsylvania/
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to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams failed to make the threshold showing necessary to over- come the time bar because there was “abundant evidence” that Williams “knew of Norwood’s homosexuality and conduct with teenage boys well before trial, sufficient to present [Norwood] as unsympathetic before the jury.” Pa., at The court pointed out that Williams was, of course, personally aware of Norwood’s abuse and could have raised the issue at trial, but instead chose to disclaim having ever met Norwood. The court also noted that Williams had raised similar claims of abuse in his first state habeas proceeding. Chief Justice Castille concurred separately, criticizing the lower court for failing to dismiss Williams’s petition as “time- barred and frivolous.” at II A In the context of a criminal proceeding, the Due Process Clause requires States to adopt those practices that are fundamental to principles of liberty and justice, and which inhere “in the very idea of free government” and are “the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government.” Twin- A fair trial and appeal is one such right. See ; Aetna Life Ins. 5 U.S. 813, In ensuring that right, “it is normally within the power of the State to regulate proce- dures under which its laws are carried out,” unless a procedure “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” (internal quotation marks Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 5 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting omitted). It is clear that a judge with “a direct, personal, substan- tial, pecuniary interest” in a case may not preside over that We have also held that a judge may not oversee a criminal contempt proceeding where the judge has previously served as grand juror in the same case, or where the party charged with contempt has conducted “an insulting attack upon the integrity of the judge carrying such potential for bias as to require disqualification.” (internal quotation marks omitted); see Prior to this Court’s decision in we had declined to require judicial recusal under the Due Process Clause beyond those defined situations. In Caperton, however, the Court adopted a new standard that requires recusal “when the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or deci- sionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” at 872 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court framed the inquiry as “whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,016 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Williams v. Pennsylvania
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3211607/williams-v-pennsylvania/
|
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” at 883–884 (internal quotation marks omitted). B According to the majority, the Due Process Clause re- quired Chief Justice Castille’s recusal because he had “significant, personal involvement in a critical trial deci- sion” in Williams’s Ante, at 9. Otherwise, the major- ity explains, there is “an unacceptable risk of actual bias.” Ante, at 11. In the majority’s view, “[t]his conclusion follows from the Court’s analysis in In re” Ante, at 6. But does not support the majority’s 6 WILLIAMS v. PENNSYLVANIA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting new rule—far from it. involved a peculiar Michigan law that au- thorized the same person to sit as both judge and “one- man grand jury” in the same (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to that law, a Michigan judge—serving as grand jury—heard testimony from two witnesses in a corruption The testimony “persuaded” the judge that one of the witnesses “had committed perjury”; the second witness refused to answer questions. at 134–135. The judge accordingly charged the witnesses with criminal contempt, presided over the trial, and convicted them. We reversed, holding that the trial had violated the Due Process The Court today, acknowledging that “dif- fer[s] in many respects from a case like this one,” ante, at 7, earns full marks for understatement. The Court in fact fails to recognize the differences that are critical. First, found a due process violation because the judge (sitting as grand jury) accused the witnesses of contempt, and then (sitting as judge) presided over their trial on that charge. As a result, the judge had made up his mind about the only issue in the case before the trial had even begun. We held that such prejudgment violated the Due Process Second, expressed concern that the judge’s recollection of the testimony he had heard as grand juror was “likely to weigh far more heavily with him than any testimony given” at trial. For that reason, the Court found that the judge was at risk of calling “on his own personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand jury room,” rather than the evidence presented to him by the parties. Neither of those due process concerns is present here. Chief Justice Castille was involved in the decision to seek the death penalty, and perhaps it would be reasonable under to require him to recuse himself from Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 7 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting any challenge casting doubt on that recommendation. But that is not this
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,016 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Williams v. Pennsylvania
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3211607/williams-v-pennsylvania/
|
casting doubt on that recommendation. But that is not this This case is about whether Williams may overcome the procedural bar on filing an untimely habeas petition, which required him to show that the government inter- fered with his ability to raise his habeas claim, and that “the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Pa., at 105 A. 3d, at Even if Williams were to overcome the timeliness bar, moreover, the only claim he sought to raise on the merits was that the prosecution had failed to turn over certain evidence at trial. The problem in was that the judge, having been “part of the accusatory process” regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendants, could not then be “wholly disinterested” when called upon to decide that very same issue. 349 U.S., at 137. In this case, in contrast, neither the procedural question nor Williams’s merits claim in any way concerns the pretrial decision to seek the death penalty. It is abundantly clear that, unlike in Chief Justice Castille had not made up his mind about either the contested evidence or the legal issues under review in Williams’s fifth habeas petition. How could he have? Neither the contested evidence nor the legal issues were ever before him as prosecutor. The one-and-a-half page memo prepared by Assistant District Attorney Foulkes in 1986 did not discuss the evidence that Williams claims was withheld by the prosecution at trial. It also did not discuss Williams’s allegation that Norwood sexually abused young men. It certainly did not discuss whether Williams could have obtained that evidence of abuse ear- lier through the exercise of due diligence. Williams does not assert that Chief Justice Castille had any prior knowledge of the alleged failure of the prosecu- tion to turn over such evidence, and he does not argue that Chief Justice Castille had previously made any decision 8 WILLIAMS v. PENNSYLVANIA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting with respect to that evidence in his role as prosecutor. Even assuming that Chief Justice Castille remembered the contents of the memo almost 30 years later—which is doubtful—the memo could not have given Chief Justice Castille any special “impression” of facts or issues not raised in that memo. The majority attempts to justify its rule based on the “risk” that a judge “would be so psychologically wedded to his or her previous position as a prosecutor that the judge would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position.” Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). But as
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,016 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Williams v. Pennsylvania
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3211607/williams-v-pennsylvania/
|
position.” Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). But as a matter of simple logic, nothing about how Chief Justice Castille might rule on Williams’s fifth habeas petition would suggest that the judge had erred or changed his position on the distinct question whether to seek the death penalty prior to trial. In sum, there was not such an “objective risk of actual bias,” ante, at 13, that it was fundamentally unfair for Chief Justice Castille to participate in the decision of an issue having nothing to do with his prior participation in the * * * The Due Process Clause did not prohibit Chief Justice Castille from hearing Williams’s That does not mean, however, that it was appropriate for him to do so. Williams cites a number of state court decisions and ethics opinions that prohibit a prosecutor from later serving as judge in a case that he has prosecuted. Because the Due Process Clause does not mandate recusal in cases such as this, it is up to state authorities—not this Court—to de- termine whether recusal should be required. I would affirm the judgment of the Pennsylvania Su- preme Court, and respectfully dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–5040 TERRANCE WILLIAMS, PETITIONER v.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,982 | 11 |
second_dissenting
|
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110762/nixon-v-fitzgerald/
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I join JUSTICE WHITE's dissent. For me, the Court leaves unanswered his unanswerable argument that no man, not even the President of the United States, is absolutely and fully above the law. See United[1] and[2] Until today, I had thought this principle was the foundation of our national jurisprudence. It now appears that it is not. Nor can I understand the Court's holding that the absolute immunity of the President is compelled by separation-of-powers concerns, when the Court at the same time expressly leaves open, ante, at 748, and n. 27, the possibility that the President nevertheless may be fully subject to congressionally created forms of liability. These two concepts, it seems to me, cannot coexist. I also write separately to express my unalleviated concern about the parties' settlement agreement, the key details of which were not disclosed to the Court by counsel until the veritable "last minute," and even then, only because the Halperins' motion to intervene had directed the Court's attention to them. See ante, at 743-744, n. 24. The Court makes only passing mention of this agreement in Part II-B of its opinion. For me, the case in effect was settled before argument by petitioner's payment of $142,000 to respondent. A much smaller sum of $28,000 was left riding on an outcome favorable to respondent, with nothing at all to be paid if petitioner prevailed, as indeed he now does. The parties publicly stated that the amount of any payment would depend upon subsequent proceedings in the District Court; in fact, the parties essentially had agreed that, regardless of this Court's ruling, no further proceedings of substance would occur in the District Court. Surely, had the details of this agreement been known at the time the petition for certiorari came before the Court, certiorari would have been denied. I cannot escape the feeling that this long-undisclosed agreement *799 comes close to being a wager on the outcome of the case, with all of the implications that entails. Havens Realty most recently and, it now appears, most conveniently decided, affords less than comfortable support for retaining the case.[3] The pertinent question here is not whether the case is moot, but whether this is the kind of case or controversy over which we should exercise our power of discretionary review. Cf. United Apprised of all developments, I therefore would have dismissed the writ as having been improvidently granted. The Court, it seems to me, brushes by this factor in order to resolve an issue of profound consequence that otherwise would not be here. Lacking support for such
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
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Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any sub- sequent owner, a right to use or resell that article. Such a sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make new copies of the patented invention. The question in this case is whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may repro- duce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission. We hold that he may not. I Respondent Monsanto invented a genetic modification that enables soybean plants to survive exposure to glypho- sate, the active ingredient in many herbicides (including Monsanto’s own Roundup). Monsanto markets soybean seed containing this altered genetic material as Roundup Ready seed. Farmers planting that seed can use a glyphosate- based herbicide to kill weeds without damaging their crops. Two patents issued to Monsanto cover various aspects of its Roundup Ready technology, including a seed in- corporating the genetic alteration. See Supp. App. SA1–21 (U. S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 and RE39,247E); see also 2 Monsanto sells, and allows other companies to sell, Roundup Ready soybean seeds to growers who assent to a special licensing agreement. See App. 27a. That agree- ment permits a grower to plant the purchased seeds in one (and only one) season. He can then consume the resulting crop or sell it as a commodity, usually to a grain elevator or agricultural processor. See –1345. But under the agreement, the farmer may not save any of the harvested soybeans for replanting, nor may he supply them to anyone else for that purpose. These restrictions reflect the ease of producing new generations of Roundup Ready seed. Because glyphosate resistance comes from the seed’s genetic material, that trait is passed on from the planted seed to the harvested soybeans: Indeed, a single Roundup Ready seed can grow a plant containing dozens of genetically identical beans, each of which, if replanted, can grow another such plant—and so on and so on. See App. 100a. The agreement’s terms prevent the farmer from co-opting that process to produce his own Roundup Ready seeds, forcing him instead to buy from Monsanto each season. Petitioner Vernon Bowman is a farmer in Indiana who, it is fair to say, appreciates Roundup Ready soybean seed. He purchased Roundup Ready each year, from a company affiliated with Monsanto, for his first crop of the season. In accord with the agreement just described, he used all of that seed for planting, and sold his entire crop to a grain elevator (which typically would resell it to an agricultural processor for human or
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
|
would resell it to an agricultural processor for human or animal consumption). Bowman, however, devised a less orthodox approach for his second crop of each season. Because he thought such late-season planting “risky,” he did not want to pay the premium price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed. at 78a; see Brief for Petitioner 6. He therefore went to a grain elevator; purchased “commodity soybeans” Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court intended for human or animal consumption; and planted them in his fields.1 Those soybeans came from prior har- vests of other local farmers. And because most of those farmers also used Roundup Ready seed, Bowman could anticipate that many of the purchased soybeans would contain Monsanto’s patented technology. When he applied a glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields, he confirmed that this was so; a significant proportion of the new plants survived the treatment, and produced in their turn a new crop of soybeans with the Roundup Ready trait. Bowman saved seed from that crop to use in his late-season plant- ing the next year—and then the next, and the next, until he had harvested eight crops in that way. Each year, that is, he planted saved seed from the year before (sometimes adding more soybeans bought from the grain elevator), sprayed his fields with glyphosate to kill weeds (and any non-resistant plants), and produced a new crop of glyphosate- resistant—i.e., Roundup Ready—soybeans. After discovering this practice, Monsanto sued Bowman for infringing its patents on Roundup Ready seed. Bow- man raised patent exhaustion as a defense, arguing that Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans be- cause they were the subject of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to the grain elevator). The District Court rejected that argument, and awarded damages to Monsanto of $84,456. The Federal Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that patent exhaustion did not protect Bowman because he had “created a newly infringing article.” 657 F. 3d, at 1348. The “right to use” a patented article follow- —————— 1 Grain elevators, as indicated above, purchase grain from farmers and sell it for consumption; under federal and state law, they generally cannot package or market their grain for use as agricultural seed. See 7 U.S. C. –15–1–32 (2012). But because soybeans are themselves seeds, nothing (except, as we shall see, the law) pre- vented Bowman from planting, rather than consuming, the product he bought from the grain elevator. 4 ing an authorized sale, the court “does not include the right to construct an essentially new article on the template of
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
|
to construct an essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to make the article remains with the patentee.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Bowman could not “ ‘replicate’ Monsanto’s patented technology by planting it in the ground to create newly infringing genetic material, seeds, and plants.” We granted certiorari to consider the important ques- tion of patent law raised in this case, 568 U. S. (2012), and now affirm. II The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what others can do with an article embody- ing or containing an invention.2 Under the doctrine, “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.” Quanta Computer, And by “ex- haust[ing] the [patentee’s] monopoly” in that item, the sale confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, “the right to use [or] sell” the thing as he sees fit. United We have the basis for the doctrine as follows: “[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his reward by the sale of the article”; once that “purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.” Consistent with that rationale, the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the “particular article” sold, ibid.; it leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent —————— 2 ThePatent Act grants a patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.” 35 U.S. C. see (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention infringes the patent”). Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court a buyer from making new copies of the patented item. “[T]he purchaser of the [patented] machine does not acquire any right to construct another machine either for his own use or to be vended to another.” Mitchell v. Hawley, ; see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, (holding that a purchas- er’s “reconstruction” of a patented machine “would im- pinge on the patentee’s right ‘to exclude others from mak- ing’ the article” (quoting 35 U.S. C. (1964 ed.))). Rather, “a second creation” of the patented item “call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the patent grant, into play for a second time.” Mfg. That is because the patent holder has “received his reward” only for the actual article sold, and not for subsequent recreations of it. 316 U. S., If the purchaser of that article could make and sell endless copies, the patent would
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
|
article could make and sell endless copies, the patent would effectively protect the invention for just a single sale. Bowman himself disputes none of this analysis as a gen- eral matter: He forthrightly acknowledges the “well set- tled” principle “that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” Brief for Petitioner 37 (citing 365 U. S., at ). Unfortunately for Bowman, that principle decides this case against him. Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented soybeans he purchased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself or feed them to his animals. Monsanto, although the patent holder, would have no business interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready beans. But the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission (either express or implied). And that is precisely what Bowman did. He took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his fields at the time he thought best; applied glyphosate to kill weeds (as well as any soy plants lacking 6 the Roundup Ready trait); and finally harvested more (many more) beans than he started with. That is how “to ‘make’ a new product,” to use Bowman’s words, when the original product is a seed. Brief for Petitioner 37; see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1363 (“make” means “cause to exist, occur, or appear,” or more specifically, “plant and raise (a crop)”). Because Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented invention, the ex- haustion doctrine does not protect him.3 Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit. After inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be sure, “receiv[e] [its] reward” for the first seeds it sells. 316 U. S., But in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product and market it to growers, thus depriving Mon- santo of its monopoly. And farmers themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each time profiting from the patented seed without compensating its inventor. Bowman’s late-season plantings offer a prime illustration. After buying beans for a single harvest, Bowman saved enough seed each year to reduce or eliminate the need for additional purchases. —————— 3 This conclusion applies however Bowman acquired Roundup Ready seed: The doctrine of patent exhaustion no more protected Bowman’s reproduction of the seed he purchased for his first crop (from a Monsanto- affiliated seed company) than the beans he bought for his second
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
|
seed company) than the beans he bought for his second (from a grain elevator). The difference between the two purchases was that the first—but not the second—came with a license from Monsanto to plant the seed and then harvest and market one crop of beans. We do not here confront a case in which Monsanto (or an affiliated seed company) sold Roundup Ready to a farmer without an express license agreement. For reasons we explain below, we think that case unlikely to arise. See infra, at 9. And in the event it did, the farmer might reasonably claim that the sale came with an implied license to plant and harvest one soybean crop. Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court Monsanto still held its patent, but received no gain from Bowman’s annual production and sale of Roundup Ready soybeans. The exhaustion doctrine is limited to the “par- ticular item” sold to avoid just such a mismatch between invention and reward. Our holding today also follows from J. E. Ag Supply, We considered there whether an inventor could get a patent on a seed or plant, or only a certificate issued under the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U.S. C. et seq. We decided a patent was available, rejecting the claim that the PVPA implicitly repealed the Patent Act’s coverage of seeds and plants. On our view, the two stat- utes established different, but not conflicting schemes: The requirements for getting a patent “are more stringent than those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the pro- tections afforded” by a patent are correspondingly greater. J. E. Most notable here, we ex- plained that only a patent holder (not a certificate holder) could prohibit “[a] farmer who legally purchases and plants” a protected seed from saving harvested seed “for replanting.” ; see (noting that the Patent Act, unlike the PVPA, contains “no exemptio[n]” for “saving seed”). That statement is inconsistent with apply- ing exhaustion to protect conduct like Bowman’s. If a sale cut off the right to control a patented seed’s progeny, then (contrary to J. E. ) the patentee could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed. Indeed, the patentee could not stop the buyer from selling such seed, which even a PVP certificate owner (who, recall, is supposed to have fewer rights) can usually accomplish. See 7 U.S. C. 2543. Those limitations would turn upside-down the statutory scheme J. E. described. Bowman principally argues that exhaustion should apply here because seeds are meant to be planted. The exhaustion doctrine, he reminds us, typically prevents
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
|
be planted. The exhaustion doctrine, he reminds us, typically prevents a 8 patentee from controlling the use of a patented product following an authorized sale. And in planting Roundup Ready seeds, Bowman continues, he is merely using them in the normal way farmers do. Bowman thus concludes that allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would “creat[e] an impermissible exception to the exhaustion doctrine” for patented seeds and other “self-replicating technologies.” Brief for Petitioner 16. But it is really Bowman who is asking for an unprece- dented exception—to what he concedes is the “well settled” rule that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” See Reproduc- ing a patented article no doubt “uses” it after a fashion. But as already we have always drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude that activity, so that the patentee retains an undiminished right to prohibit others from making the thing his patent protects. See, e.g., Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 93–94 (1882) (holding that a purchaser could not “use” the buckle from a patented cotton-bale tie to “make” a new tie). That is because, once again, if simple copying were a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first sale of the first item containing the invention. The undiluted patent monopoly, it might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as the Patent Act promises), but for only one transaction. And that would result in less incentive for innovation than Congress wanted. Hence our repeated insistence that exhaustion applies only to the particular item sold, and not to reproductions. Nor do we think that rule will prevent farmers from making appropriate use of the Roundup Ready seed they buy. Bowman himself stands in a peculiarly poor position to assert such a claim. As noted earlier, the commodity soybeans he purchased were intended not for planting, but for consumption. See at 2–3. Indeed, Bowman conceded in deposition testimony that he knew of no other Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court farmer who employed beans bought from a grain elevator to grow a new crop. See App. 84a. So a non-replicating use of the commodity beans at issue here was not just available, but standard fare. And in the more ordinary case, when a farmer purchases Roundup Ready seed qua seed—that is, seed intended to grow a crop—he will be able to plant it. Monsanto, to be sure, conditions the farmer’s ability to reproduce Roundup Ready; but it does not—could not realistically—preclude all planting. No
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,013 | 3 |
majority
|
Bowman v. Monsanto Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/867645/bowman-v-monsanto-co/
|
Ready; but it does not—could not realistically—preclude all planting. No sane farmer, after all, would buy the product without some ability to grow soybeans from it. And so Monsanto, predictably enough, sells Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to make a crop. See n. 3. Applying our usual rule in this context therefore will allow farmers to benefit from Roundup Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation. Still, Bowman has another seeds-are-special argument: that soybeans naturally “self-replicate or ‘sprout’ unless stored in a controlled manner,” and thus “it was the planted soybean, not Bowman” himself, that made replicas of Monsanto’s patented invention. Brief for Petitioner 42; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 (“[F]armers, when they plant seeds, they don’t exercise any control over their crop” or “over the creative process”). But we think that blame-the-bean defense tough to credit. Bowman was not a passive ob- server of his soybeans’ multiplication; or put another way, the seeds he purchased (miraculous though they might be in other respects) did not spontaneously create eight suc- cessive soybean crops. As we have at 2–3, Bowman devised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from Roundup Ready seeds without paying the usual premium. He purchased beans from a grain elevator anticipating that many would be Roundup Ready; applied a glyphosate-based herbicide in a way that culled any plants without the patented trait; and saved beans from the rest for the next season. He then planted those 10 Roundup Ready beans at a chosen time; tended and treated them, including by exploiting their patented glyphosate- resistance; and harvested many more seeds, which he either marketed or saved to begin the next cycle. In all this, the bean surely figured. But it was Bowman, and not the bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of Monsanto’s patented invention. Our holding today is limited—addressing the situa- tion before us, rather than every one involving a self- replicating product. We recognize that such inventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose. Cf. 17 U.S. C. (“[I]t is not [a copyright] in- fringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make another copy or adaptation of that computer program provide[d] that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the com- puter program”). We need not address here whether
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,993 | 1 |
concurring
|
Graham v. Collins
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112810/graham-v-collins/
|
By deciding this case on the basis of the Court has avoided a direct reconsideration of I join the Court's opinion because I agree that the holding sought by Graham is not compelled by the cases upon which rests and would therefore, if adopted, be a new rule for Teague purposes. I write separately, however, to make clear that I believe was wrongly decided. *9 Several Members of the Court have commented on the "tension" between our cases on the constitutional relevance of mitigating circumstances in capital sentencing and those decisions applying the principle, first articulated in that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit States from giving sentencers unguided discretion in imposing the death penalty. E. g., ; ; In my view, Texas had largely resolved this tension through the use of the three special issues repeatedly approved by this Court. however, is at war with the former Texas scheme. As the most extreme statement in our "mitigating" line, creates more than an unavoidable tension; it presents an evident danger. I A It is important to recall what motivated Members of this Court at the genesis of our modern capital punishment case law. was decided in an atmosphere suffused with concern about race bias in the administration of the death penaltyparticularly in Southern States, and most particularly in rape cases. The three petitioners were black.[1] Lucious Jackson was a 21-year-old black man sentenced to death by Georgia for raping a white woman. Elmer Branch was sentenced to death by Texas for the rape of a 65-year-old white widow. William Henry faced the death penalty in Georgia for unintentionally killing a white homeowner during a burglary. See *80 253[2] In his opinion concurring in the Court's judgment that the death penalty in these cases was unconstitutional, Justice Douglas stressed the potential role of racial and other illegitimate prejudices in a system where sentencing juries have boundless discretion. He thought it cruel and unusual to apply the death penalty "selectively to minorities whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the board." Citing studies and reports suggesting that "[t]he death sentence [was] disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups," especially in cases of rape, Justice Douglas concluded that "the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,993 | 1 |
concurring
|
Graham v. Collins
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112810/graham-v-collins/
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or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position." Justice Marshall echoed these concerns. See at 36 366 He wrote that "[r]acial or other discriminations [in sentencing] should not be surprising," because, in his view, the Court's earlier decision in upholding a procedure that had "committ[ed] to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death," was "an open invitation to discrimination," Justice Stewart also agreed that "if any basis can be discerned *81 for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race." The unquestionable importance of race in is reflected in the fact that three of the original four petitioners in the cases were represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. This representation was part of a concerted "national litigative campaign against the constitutionality of the death penalty" waged by a small number of ambitious lawyers and academics on the Fund's behalf. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, Although their efforts began rather modestly, assisting indigent black defendants in isolated criminal casesusually rape caseswhere racial discrimination was suspected, the lawyers at the Fund ultimately devised and implemented (not without some prompting from this Court) an all-out strategy of litigation against the death penalty. See generally M. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment (193) (hereinafter Meltsner); Muller, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death,[3] This campaign was part of a larger movement carried on in the 1's by "abolitionist lawyers" whose *82 agenda for social and legal change depended on an activist judiciary; their "unmistakable preference for the courts, especially the federal courts," came as a direct "response to the Supreme Court's willingness to redraw America's ethical and legal map, a task state houses and executive mansions were slow to tackle." Meltsner 25, 1.[] In mustering every conceivable argument"ethical, legal, polemical, theological, speculative, [and] statistical"for abolishing capital punishment, the Fund lawyers and other civil rights advocates supplied the empirical and rhetorical support for the observations of Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart with respect to race bias. See Brief for Petitioner in Aikens v. O. T. 191, No. 68 502, pp. 50-5; Brief for Petitioner in Jackson v. Georgia, O. T. 191, No. 69-5030, p. 15 ("The racial figures for all men executed in the United States for the crime of rape since 1930 are as follows: 8 white, 05 Negro, 2 other.
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concurring
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1930 are as follows: 8 white, 05 Negro, 2 other. In Georgia, the figures are: 3 white, 58 Negro") (footnotes omitted). See also Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae in Aikens v. and App. A (discussing, in particular, history of South's use of death penalty in rape cases prior to Civil War, when it was typical for rapes or attempted rapes committed by black men upon white women to be punishable by mandatory death or castration, while rapes committed by whites were not punishable by death); Brief for Synagogue Council of America et al. as Amici Curiae in Aikens v.[5] In the end, Justice Douglas and the other Members of the Court concluded that "[w]e cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were black." See ("racial discrimination has not been proved"). The Court focused more generally on the uncontrolled discretion placed in judges and juries. Such unbridled discretion, it was argued, practically invited sentencers to vent their personal prejudices in deciding the fate of the accused. See Brief for Petitioner in O. T. 191, No. 69-5003, p. 12 ("The jury knew nothing else about the man they sentenced, except his age and race"). "Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12." Justice Stewart observed that "the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed," and concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate sentencing procedures that allow the penalty to be "so wantonly and so freakishly" inflicted. The practice of delegating unguided authoritya practice "largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness *8 of the law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence"actually allowed a jury, "in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any statutory policy, [to] refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime." 3, 31 In sum, the Court concluded that in a standardless sentencing scheme there was no "rational basis," as Justice Brennan put it, to distinguish "the few who die from the many who go to prison." See also 3 ("no meaningful basis for distinguishing"). It cannot be doubted that behind the Court's condemnation of unguided discretion lay the specter of racial prejudicethe paradigmatic capricious and irrational sentencing factor. B At its inception, our "mitigating" line of cases sprang in part from the same concerns that underlay In response to 35 States
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concurring
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the same concerns that underlay In response to 35 States enacted new death penalty statutes. See In five cases decided on a single day in 196, we passed on the constitutionality of a representative sample of the new laws.[6] The principal opinion in each case was a joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. In the lead case, these Justices squarely rejected the argument that the death penalty is cruel and unusual under all circumstances. Rather, they focused on the States' capital sentencing procedures, distilling from two complementary rationalizing principles about sentencing discretion: The discretion given the sentencer must be "directed and limited" to avoid "wholly arbitrary *85 and capricious action," and this discretion must be exercised "in an informed manner," was read as holding that "to minimize the risk that the death penalty [will] be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it ha[s] to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority [will] focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant." The jury should be "given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision." "Otherwise, the system cannot function in a consistent and a rational manner." `s requirement that the sentencer be guided by information about the particular defendant and the particular circumstances of the crimein other words, by traditionally accepted sentencing criteria, see -190added a second dimension to `s rule against open-ended discretion. The jury's discretion must be focused on rational factors, and its decision should be based on information about the circumstances of the crime and about the accused as an individual, not merely as a member of a group. In itself, for example, the jury was given almost no particularized information about the accused: "About himself, the jury knew only that he was black and that, according to his statement at trial, he was 26 years old and worked at `Superior Upholstery.' It took the jury one hour and 35 minutes to return a verdict of guilt and a sentence of death." n. 8 (citations omitted). Moreover, it was irrelevant to the jury's determination that the killing committed by was accidental. Without a focus on the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of his crime, an uninformed jury could be tempted to resort to irrational considerations, such as class or race animus. * Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens applied these principles in upholding the guided discretion procedures of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, and in striking down the mandatory death
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Florida, and Texas, and in striking down the mandatory death penalty provisions of North and Louisiana. The Georgia, Florida, and Texas schemes were held constitutional because they "guide[d] and focuse[d] the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender." The "essential" factor was that "the jury ha[d] before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Moreover, the Georgia statute featured "an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice": a provision for automatic appeal of a death sentence that required the State Supreme Court to determine, inter alia, whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice and whether it was disproportionate to other sentences imposed in similar cases. The mandatory death penalty statutes, on the other hand, were held to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for three reasons. First, the Justices believed, a mandatory death penalty departed from "contemporary standards" of punishment. Second, experience had suggested that such statutes "simply papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion" by provoking arbitrary jury nullification. Thus, "[i]nstead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified in by resting the penalty determination on the particular jury's willingness to act lawlessly." ; see Third, the mandatory nature of the penalty prevented the sentencer from considering "the character and record of the individual *8 offender or the circumstances of the particular offense," and thus treated all convicted persons "not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass." The latter concern echoed Justice Douglas' suggestion that sentences of death might have fallen disproportionately upon the "member[s] of a suspect or unpopular minority." One would think, however, that by eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants equally, a mandatory death penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable legislative response to the concerns expressed in See See also Justice White was surely correct in concluding that "a State is not constitutionally forbidden to provide that the commission of certain crimes conclusively establishes that the criminal's character is such that he deserves death." See also ; I would also agree that the plurality in and erred in equating the "raw power of [ jury] nullification" with the unlimited sentencing discretion condemned in The curious and counterintuitive outcomes of our 196 casesupholding sentences of death imposed under statutes that explicitly preserved the sentencer's discretion while vacating those imposed under mandatory provisions precisely because of a perceived potential for arbitrary and uninformed discretionmight in some measure be attributable, once again,
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concurring
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and uninformed discretionmight in some measure be attributable, once again, to the powerful influence of racial concerns.[] Be that as it may, *88 we are not now confronted with a mandatory sentencing provision, and I have no occasion here to flesh out my disagreement with the Court's prohibition of such schemes. The significant point for present purposes is that and Sumner `s invalidation of the mandatory death penalty guaranteed that sentencers would exercise some degree of discretion in every capital case. And under our precedents, in turn, any such exercise of discretion is unavoidably bound up with the two requirements of as identified in : first and foremost, that the sentencing authority be "provided with standards to guide its use of the information" developed at sentencing, and second, in support of this principle, that the sentencer be "apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence." By discovering these two requirements in the Constitution, and by ensuring in and its progeny that they would always be in play, the Court has put itself in the seemingly permanent business of supervising capital sentencing procedures. While the better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to place only substantive limitations on punishments, not procedural requirements on sentencing, see ; stare decisis requires that we make efforts to adhere to the Court's Eighth Amendment precedents, see v. *89 The mitigating branch of our death penalty jurisprudence began as an outgrowth of the second of the two / requirements. The plurality's conclusion in 38 U.S. 5 that the sentencer in a capital case must "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense," (emphasis deleted)effectively guarantees the sentencer's access to categories of information favorable to the defendant. Thus, was built on the premise, given credence in that "where sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge's possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics is [h]ighly relevant." -603 The sentencing statute at issue in failed to satisfy this requirement, in the plurality's view, because it eliminated from the jury's consideration significant facts about the defendant and her "comparatively minor role in the offense."[8] The Court's adoption in of the rule and its corollarythat the sentencer may not categorically refuse to consider relevant mitigating circumstancesagain drew upon `s notion that capital sentencing is less likely to be arbitrary where the jury's exercise of discretion is focused on the particularized circumstances of the offender and the
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| 1,993 | 1 |
concurring
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focused on the particularized circumstances of the offender and the crime. See (relying on ). *90 Therefore, although it is said that and represent an "about-face" and "a return to the pre- days," there was at root a logicalif by now attenuatedconnection between the rationalizing principle of and the prophylactic rule of protects the accused's opportunity to "appris[e]" the jury of his version of the information relevant to the sentencing decision. Our early mitigating cases may thus be read as doing little more than safeguarding the adversary process in sentencing proceedings by conferring on the defendant an affirmative right to place his relevant evidence before the sentencer. See (19). Cf. "). Consistent with this (admittedly narrow) reading, I would describe as a kind of rule of evidence: It governs the admissibility of proffered evidence but does not purport to define the substantive standards or criteria that sentencers are to apply in considering the facts. By requiring that sentencers be allowed to "consider" all "relevant" mitigating circumstances, we cannot mean that the decision whether to impose the death penalty must be based upon all of the defendant's evidence, or that such evidence must be considered the way the defendant wishes. Nor can we mean to say that circumstances are necessarily relevant for constitutional purposes if they have any conceivable mitigating value. Such an application of would eclipse the primary imperative of that the State define the relevant sentencing criteria and provide rational "standards to guide [the sentencer's] use" of the evidence. That aspect of must operate for the most part independently of the rule. This is essential to the effectiveness *91 of since providing all relevant information for the sentencer's consideration does nothing to avoid the central danger that sentencing discretion may be exercised irrationally. I realize, of course, that is susceptible to more expansive interpretations. See, e. g., 9 U. S., at 661, 66 ( rule "has completely exploded whatever coherence the notion of `guided discretion' once had" by making "random mitigation" a constitutional requirement); 81 U. S., at 306 And even under the narrow reading of there is still a tension in our case law, because implies something of an outer boundary to the primary principle: The sentencing standards chosen by the State may not be so stingy as to prevent altogether the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. But with the exception of our most recent mitigating cases have been careful to read narrowly in an effort to accommodate the "competing commandments" of and ante, at 68. We have held that States must be free to channel and
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