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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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above 70. See App. 107–108; Brief for Petitioner 50. 4 See –2515A(1)(b) (Lexis Cum. Supp. 1); Pizzuto v. State, (stating that “the legislature did not require that the IQ score be within five points of 70 or below” and giving the District Court discretion to interpret the defendant’s IQ). 5 Montana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming have not ruled on the subject. Two States have not defined “significantly subaverage” intel lectual functioning. See –1.–1101(2) (1); S. C. Code Ann. ( and 1 Cum. Supp.); Franklin v. Maynard, 56 S. C. 276, 278–279, (per curiam). Two States have statutes that impose rebuttable presump tions of intellectual disability if a defendant’s IQ is below 65 or 70 but have not said whether a defendant would be allowed to provide further evidence if his IQ were over 70. See –4–618 (1); –105.01 (1 Supp.). One State’s Supreme Court mentioned measurement errors but only to explain why a defendant 6 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting death-penalty states, 10 (including Florida) do not require that the SEM be taken into account, 12 consider the SEM, and 9 have not taken a definitive position on this question. These statistics cannot be regarded as establishing a national consensus against Florida’s approach. Attempting to circumvent these statistics, the Court includes in its count the 19 States that never impose the death penalty, but this maneuver cannot be justified. It is true that the Court has counted non-death-penalty States in some prior Eighth Amendment cases, but those cases concerned the substantive question whether a class of individuals should be categorically ineligible for the death penalty. In for example, the Court counted non-death-penalty States as part of the consensus against the imposition of a capital sentence for a crime committed by a minor. The Court reasoned that a State’s decision to abolish the death penalty necessarily “demonstrates a judgment that the death penalty is inappropriate for all offenders, includ ing juveniles.” No similar reasoning is possible here. The fact that a State has abolished the death penalty says nothing about how that State would resolve the evidentiary problem of identifying defendants who are intellectually disabled. As I explain below, a State may reasonably conclude that Florida’s approach is fairer than and just as accurate as the approach that the Court now requires, and therefore it cannot be inferred that a non-death-penalty State, if forced to choose between the two approaches, would neces sarily select the Court’s. For all these reasons, it is quite —————— must prove deficits in adaptive behavior despite having an IQ below 70. See Another State’s Supreme
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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despite having an IQ below 70. See Another State’s Supreme Court mentioned the SEM in responding to an argument by the defendant, but it did not suggest that the SEM was legally relevant. See 191 S.W.d 0–1, and n. 7 (Mo. 06). Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 7 ALITO, J., dissenting wrong for the Court to proclaim that “the vast majority of States” have rejected Florida’s approach. Ante, at 16. Not only are the States divided on the question whether the SEM should play a role in determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually disabled, but the States that require consideration of the SEM do not agree on the role that the SEM should play. Those States differ, for example, on the sort of evidence that can be introduced when IQ testing reveals an IQ over 70. Some require further evidence of intellectual deficits, while others per mit the defendant to move on to the second prong of the test and submit evidence of deficits in adaptive behavior.6 The fairest assessment of the current situation is that the States have adopted a multitude of approaches to a very difficult question. In light of all this, the resolution of this case should be straightforward: Just as there was no methodological consensus among the States at the time of there is no such consensus today. And in the absence of such a consensus, we have no basis for holding that Florida’s method contravenes our society’s standards of decency. C Perhaps because it recognizes the weakness of its argu ments about a true national consensus, the Court places heavy reliance on the views (some only recently an nounced) of professional organizations, but the Court attempts to downplay the degree to which its decision is dependent upon the views of these private groups. In a game attempt to shoehorn the views of these associations into the national-consensus calculus, the Court reasons as follows. The views of these associations, the Court states, help in determining “how [IQ] scores relate to the holding —————— 6 Compare 247 P.d 269, (11), with State v. Dunn, 01–165, pp. 25–26 (La. 5/11/10), 41 So. d 454, 470. 8 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting in ”; “[t]his in turn leads to a better understanding of how the legislative policies of various States, and the holdings of state courts, implement the rule”; and “[t]hat understanding informs our determination whether there is a consensus that instructs how to decide the spe cific issue presented here.” Ante, at 7. I cannot follow the Court’s logic. Under our modern Eighth Amendment cases,
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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follow the Court’s logic. Under our modern Eighth Amendment cases, what counts are our society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American people—not the standards of professional associations, which at best represent the views of a small professional elite. The Court also mistakenly suggests that its methodol ogy is dictated by See ante, at 16–19. On the con trary, expressly left “to the States” the task of defining intellectual disability. And although the Court perceived a “professional consensus” about the best procedure to be used in identifying the intellectually dis abled, the Court declined to import that view into the 56 U.S., at 16, n. 21. Instead, the Court made clear that this professional consensus was “by no means dispositive.” n. 21; see and n. 22. D The Court’s reliance on the views of professional associ ations will also lead to serious practical problems. I will briefly note a few. First, because the views of professional associations often change,7 tying Eighth Amendment law to these views will lead to instability and continue to fuel pro tracted litigation. This danger is dramatically illustrated by the most recent publication of the APA, on which the Court relies. This publication fundamentally alters the —————— 7 See Forensic Psychology and Neuropsychology for Criminal and Civil Cases 57 (hereinafter Forensic Psychology). Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 9 ALITO, J., dissenting first prong of the longstanding, two-pronged definition of intellectual disability that was embraced by and has been adopted by most States. In this new publication, the APA discards “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” as an element of the intellectual-disability test.8 Elevating the APA’s current views to constitutional significance therefore throws into question the basic ap proach that approved and that most of the States have followed. It is also noteworthy that changes adopted by profes sional associations are sometimes rescinded. For example, in 1992 the AAIDD extended the baseline “intellectual functioning cutoff ” from an “IQ of 70 or below” to a “score of approximately 70 to or below.” AAIDD 11th ed. 10 (Table 1.) (boldface deleted); see 2 Kaplan & Sadock’s Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 449 (hereinafter Kaplan & Sadock’s). That change “generated much con troversy’; by 00, “only 4 states used the 1992 AAIDD definition, with 44 states continuing to use the 198 defi nition.” And in the 02 AAIDD, the baseline “IQ cut-off was changed” back to approximately “70 or less.” Second, the Court’s approach implicitly calls upon the Judiciary either to follow every new change in the think ing of these professional organizations or to judge the validity of
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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of these professional organizations or to judge the validity of each new change. Here, for example, the Court tacitly makes the judgment that the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability that prevailed at the time when was decided are no longer legitimate. The publica tions that cited differ markedly from more recent —————— 8 Compare APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor ders 9, 41, 42 (rev. 4th ed. 00) (hereinafter DSM–IV–TR), with APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 809 (5th ed. 1) (hereinafter DSM–5). 10 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting editions now endorsed by the Court. See 56 U.S., at 08, n. Third, the Court’s approach requires the Judiciary to determine which professional organizations are entitled to special deference. And what if professional organizations disagree? The Court provides no guidance for deciding which organizations’ views should govern. Fourth, the Court binds Eighth Amendment law to definitions of intellectual disability that are promulgated for use in making a variety of decisions that are quite different from the decision whether the imposition of a death sentence in a particular case would serve a valid penological end. In a death-penalty case, intellectual functioning is important because of its correlation with the ability to understand the gravity of the crime and the purpose of the penalty, as well as the ability to resist a momentary impulse or the influence of others. See at 18, By contrast, in determining eligibility for social services, adaptive functioning may be much more im portant. Cf. DSM–IV–TR, at xxxvii (clinical “considera tions” may not be “relevant to legal judgments” that turn on “individual responsibility”); DSM–5, (similar). Practical problems like these call for legislative judg ments, not judicial resolution. II Because I find no consensus among the States, I would not independently assess the method that Florida has adopted for determining intellectual disability. But even if it were appropriate for us to look beyond the evidence of societal standards, I could not conclude that Florida’s method is un The Court faults Florida for “tak[ing] an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity” and for failing to recog nize that an IQ score may be imprecise. Ante, at 10. In my view, however, Florida has adopted a sensible stand Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 11 ALITO, J., dissenting ard that comports with the longstanding belief that IQ tests are the best measure of intellectual functioning. And although the Court entirely ignores this part of the Florida scheme, the State takes into account the inevitable risk of testing error by permitting defendants
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
|
Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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account the inevitable risk of testing error by permitting defendants to introduce multi ple scores. In contrast, the Court establishes a standard that conflates what have long been understood to be two inde- pendent requirements for proving intellectual disability: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and (2) deficits in adaptive behavior. The Court also mandates use of an alternative method of dealing with the risk of testing error without any hint that it is more accurate than Florida’s approach. A 1 The first supposed error that the Court identifies is that Florida “takes an IQ score” as “conclusive evidence” of intellectual functioning. Ante, at 10. As an initial matter, one would get the impression from reading the Court’s opinion that introduced only one test score (of 71). See ante, at 14. In truth, the Florida courts considered multiple scores, all above 70, on the particular IQ test that has dubbed the “gold standard.” See Brief for Peti tioner 50; App. 107–108.9 Florida’s statute imposes no limit on the number of IQ scores that a defendant may introduce, so the Court is simply wrong to analyze the Florida system as one that views a single IQ score above 70 as “final and conclusive evidence” that a defendant does not suffer from subaverage intellectual functioning. See —————— 9 See Brief for Petitioner 50 (listing his valid IQ scores of 71, 72, 7, and 80). alleges that he also scored a 69 on a Wechsler test, but that score was not admitted into evidence because of doubts about its validity. App. 107. does not allege that any potential “practice effect” skewed his scores. 12 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting Brief for Respondent 44 (“Florida’s Rule allows for multi ple evaluations, and if believed a statistical error rate prevented any of his tests from reflecting his true score, he could have sought still more testing”). The proper question to ask, therefore, is whether Flor ida’s actual approach falls outside the range of discretion allowed by The Court offers no persuasive reason for concluding that it does. Indeed, the Court’s opinion never identifies what other evidence of intellectual func tioning it would require Florida to admit. As we recog nized in the longstanding practices of the States, and at least the previous views of professional organiza tions, seem to reflect the understanding that IQ scores are the best way to measure intellectual functioning. See 56 U.S., at 16.10 Until its most recent publication, the APA, for example, ranked the severity of intellectual disability exclusively by IQ scores, necessarily pinpointing the onset of the disability according
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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IQ scores, necessarily pinpointing the onset of the disability according to IQ. See DSM–IV–TR, We have been presented with no solid evidence that the longstanding reliance on multiple IQ test scores as a measure of intellectual functioning is so unreasonable or outside the ordinary as to be un The Court has certainly not supplied any such information. 2 If the Court had merely held that Florida must permit defendants to introduce additional evidence (whatever that might be) of significantly subaverage intellectual —————— 10 See AAIDD 11th ed. 10 (cataloguing history of IQ “cutoff criteria” since 19); DSM–IV–TR, at 9 (“Mental Retardation” is “characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of approxi mately 70 or below)” (boldface deleted)); (“General intellec tual functioning is defined by the intelligence quotient” (italics deleted)); AAMR, Mental Retardation 14 (hereinafter AAMR 10th ed.) (“[I]ntellectual functioning is still best represented by IQ scores”). Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting functioning, its decision would be more limited in scope. But as I understand the Court’s opinion, it also holds that when IQ tests reveal an IQ between 71 and defendants must be allowed to present evidence of deficits in adaptive behavior—that is, the second prong of the intellectual disability test. See ante, at 9–10, 12, That is a re markable change in what we took to be a universal under standing of intellectual disability just 12 years ago. In we instructed that “clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only [(1)] subaverage intel lectual functioning, but also [(2)] significant limitations in adaptive skills.” 56 U.S., at 18 (emphasis and altera tions added). That is the approach taken by the vast majority of States.11 As the Court correctly recognizes, most States require “concurrent deficits” in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, requiring defendants to prove both. Ante, at 8 (emphasis added).12 Yet the Court now holds that when a defendant’s IQ score is as high as a court must “consider factors indi cating whether the person has deficits in adaptive func tioning.” Ante, at 12; see ante, at 9–10, In other words, even when a defendant has failed to show that he meets the first prong of the well-accepted standard for intellectual disability (significantly subaverage intellec tual functioning), evidence of the second prong (deficits in adaptive behavior) can establish intellectual disability. The Court offers little explanation for this sea change. —————— 11 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, (07); – 2515A; (1); –264.:1.1 (Lexis Cum. Supp. 1). 12 The longstanding views of professional organizations have also been that intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior are
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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have also been that intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior are independ ent factors. See, e.g., DSM–IV–TR, at 9. These organizations might recommend examining evidence of adaptive behavior even when an IQ is above 70, but that sheds no light on what the legal rule should be given that most States appear to require defendants to prove each prong separately by a preponderance of the evidence. 14 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting It asserts vaguely that “[i]t is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment.” Ante, at 21. But the Court ignores the fact that deficits in adaptive behavior cannot be used to estab lish deficits in mental functioning because the two prongs are meant to show distinct components of intellectual disability. “[I]ntellectual functions” include “reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and learning from experience,” while adaptive functioning refers to the ability “to meet devel opmental and sociocultural standards for personal inde pendence and social responsibility.” DSM–5, at Strong evidence of a deficit in adaptive behavior does not necessarily demonstrate a deficit in intellectual function ing. And without the latter, a person simply cannot be classified as intellectually disabled. It is particularly troubling to relax the proof require ments for the intellectual-functioning prong because that is the prong that most directly relates to the concerns that led to our primary holding in There, we explained that “the diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses”—i.e., diminished intel- lectual functioning—“make it less likely that [a defendant] can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty” and therefore be deterred from committing 56 U.S., ; see also at 18 (“[T]hey often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premedi tated plan”); see also ante, at 6. A defendant who does not display significantly subaverage intellectual function ing is therefore not among the class of defendants we identified in Finally, relying primarily on proof of adaptive deficits will produce inequities in the administration of capital punishment. As far as I can tell, adaptive behavior is a malleable factor without “firm theoretical and empirical Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 15 ALITO, J., dissenting roots.” See 2 Kaplan & Sadock’s 448. No consensus exists among States or medical practitioners about what facts are most critical in analyzing that factor, and its measurement relies largely on subjective judgments. Florida’s approach avoids the disparities that reliance on such a factor tends to produce. It thus promotes con sistency in
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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factor tends to produce. It thus promotes con sistency in the application of the death penalty and confi dence that it is not being administered haphazardly. B The Court’s second “interrelated” objection to Florida’s rule is that it fails to account for the risk of error inherent in IQ testing. In order to diminish this risk, the Court establishes a rule that if IQ testing reveals an IQ between 71 and a claim of intellectual disability cannot be rejected on the basis of test scores alone. Ante, The Court both misunderstands how the SEM works and fails to explain why Florida’s method of accounting for the risk of error (allowing a defendant to take and rely on multiple tests) is not as effective as the approach that the Court compels. 1 The Court begins with the simple and uncontroversial proposition that every testing situation is susceptible to error and thus may result in an imperfect measurement of “true” IQ. The Court then wades into technical matters that must be understood in order to see where the Court goes wrong. There are various ways to account for error in IQ test ing. One way is Florida’s approach (evaluate multiple test results). Another is to use a mathematical measurement called the “standard error of measurement” or SEM. See AAMR 10th ed. 67–71 (App. 4.1). Of critical importance, there is not a single, uniform SEM across IQ tests or even across test-takers. Rather, “the [SEM] varies by test, 16 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting subgroup, and age group.” User’s Guide To Accompany AAIDD 11th ed.: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 22 (12). Once we know the SEM for a particular test and a par ticular test-taker, adding one SEM to and subtracting one SEM from the obtained score establishes an interval of scores known as the 66% confidence interval. See AAMR 10th ed. 57. That interval represents the range of scores within which “we are [66%] sure” that the “true” IQ falls. See Oxford Handbook of Child Psychological Assessment 291 (D. Saklofske, C. Reynolds, & V. Schwean eds. 1). The interval is centered on the obtained score, and it includes scores that are above and below that score by the amount of the SEM. Since there is about a 66% chance that the test-taker’s “true” IQ falls within this range, there is about a 4% chance that the “true” IQ falls outside the interval, with approximately equal odds that it falls above the interval (17%) or below the interval (17%). An example: If a test-taker scores a 72 on an IQ
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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example: If a test-taker scores a 72 on an IQ test with a SEM of 2, the 66% confidence interval is the range of 70 to 74 (72 ± 2). In this situation, there is approxi mately a 66% chance that the test-taker’s “true” IQ is between 70 and 74; roughly a 17% chance that it is above 74; and roughly a 17% chance that it is 70 or below. Thus, there is about an 8% chance that the score is above 70. Similarly, using two SEMs, we can build a 95% confi dence interval. The process is the same except that we add two SEMs to and subtract two SEMS from the ob tained score. To illustrate the use of two SEMs, let us hypothesize a case in which the defendant’s obtained score is 74. With the same SEM of 2 as in the prior example, there would be a 95% chance that the true score is be tween 70 and 78 (74 ± 4); roughly a 2.5% chance that the score is above 78; and about a 2.5% chance that the score is 70 or below. The probability of a true score above 70 would be roughly 97.5%. As these two examples show, the Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 17 ALITO, J., dissenting greater the degree of confidence demanded, the greater the range of scores that will fall within the confidence interval and, therefore, the further away from 70 an ob tained score could be and yet still have 70 fall within its confidence interval. 2 The Court misunderstands these principles and makes factual mistakes that will surely confuse States attempt ing to comply with its opinion. First, the Court unjustifiably assumes a blanket (or very common) error measurement of 5. See ante, That assumption gives rise to the Court’s holding that a de fendant must be permitted to introduce additional evi dence when IQ tests reveal an IQ as high as See SEMs, however, vary by IQ test and test-taker, and there is no reason to assume a SEM of 5 points; indeed, it ap pears that the SEM is generally “estimated to be three to five points” for well-standardized IQ tests. AAMR 10th ed. 57. And we know that the SEM for ’s most recent IQ test was 2.16—less than half of the Court’s estimate of 5. Brief for Petitioner 40, n. 17. Relatedly, the Court misreads the authorities on which it relies to establish this cutoff IQ score of It is true that certain professional organizations have advocated a cutoff of and that cited
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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professional organizations have advocated a cutoff of and that cited those organizations’ cutoff. See ante, at 12, But the Court overlooks a critical fact: Those organizations endorsed a IQ cutoff based on their express understanding that “one standard error of measurement [SEM]” is “three to five points for well-standardized” IQ tests. AAMR, Mental Retardation 7 (9th ed. 1992) (hereinafter AAMR 9th ed.); 56 U. S., 09, n. 5 (citing AAMR 9th ed.; 2 Kaplan & Sadock’s 22 (B. Sadock & V. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 00)); see also AAMR 10th ed. 57; AAIDD 11th ed. 6. In other words, the number was relevant only to the extent that a 18 HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting single SEM was “estimated” to be as high as 5 points. AAMR 9th ed. 7. Here, by contrast, we know that the SEM for ’s latest IQ test was less than half of that estimate; there is no relevance to the number in this case. To blindly import a five-point margin of error when we know as a matter of fact that the relevant SEM is 2.16 amounts to requiring consideration of more than two SEMs—an approach that finds no support in or anywhere else. Because of these factual errors and ambiguities, it is unclear to me whether the Court concludes that a defend ant is constitutionally entitled to introduce non-test evi dence of intellectual disability (1) whenever his score is or lower, on the mistaken understanding that the SEM for most tests is 5; (2) when the 66% confidence interval (using one SEM) includes a score of 70; or () when the 95% confidence interval (using two SEMs) includes a score of 70. In my view, none of these approaches is defensible. An approach tied to a fixed score of can be dismissed out of hand because, as discussed, every test has a differ ent SEM. The other two approaches would require that a defend ant be permitted to submit additional evidence when his IQ is above 70 so long as the 66% or 95% confidence inter val (using one SEM or two SEMs, respectively) includes a score of 70, but there is no foundation for this in our Eighth Amendment case As concedes, the Eighth Amendment permits States to assign to a defend ant the burden of establishing intellectual disability by at least a preponderance of the evidence. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. In other words, a defendant can be required to prove that the probability of a 70 or sub-70 IQ is greater than 50%. Under the Court’s approach, by
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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IQ is greater than 50%. Under the Court’s approach, by contrast, a defend ant could prove significantly subaverage intellectual func tioning by showing simply that the probability of a “true” IQ of 70 or below is as little as 17% (under a one-SEM Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 19 ALITO, J., dissenting rule) or 2.5% (under a two-SEM rule). This totally trans forms the allocation and nature of the burden of proof. I have referred to the 66% and 95% confidence intervals only because they result from the most straightforward application of the SEM in this context: One SEM estab lishes the 66% confidence interval; two SEMs establish the 95% confidence interval. See AAIDD 11th ed. 6. But it would be simple enough to devise a 51% confidence inter val—or a 99% confidence interval for that matter. There is therefore no excuse for mechanically imposing stand ards that are unhinged from legal logic and that over- ride valid state laws establishing burdens of proof. The appropriate confidence level is ultimately a judgment best left to legislatures, and their judgment has been that a defendant must establish that it is more likely than not that he is intellectually disabled. I would defer to that determination. The Court also fails to grasp that Florida’s system al ready accounts for the risk of testing error by allowing the introduction of multiple test scores. The Court never explains why its criticisms of the uncertainty resulting from the use of a single IQ score apply when a defendant consistently scores above 70 on multiple tests. Contrary to the Court’s evident assumption, the well-accepted view is that multiple consistent scores establish a much higher degree of confidence.1 —————— 1 See Oxford Handbook of Child Psychological Assessment 291 (D. Saklofske, C. Reynolds, & V. Schwean eds. 1) (multiple scores provide “greater precision”); A. Essentials of Psychiatric Diagnosis: Responding to the Challenge of DSM–5, p. 1 (rev. ed. 1) (“The pattern of test scores is more important than the score on any given test”). When there are multiple scores, moreover, there is good reason to treat low scores differently from high scores: “Although one cannot do better on an IQ test than one is capable of doing, one can certainly do worse.” Forensic Psychology 56. (“[A] sharp, unexplained HALL v. FLORIDA ALITO, J., dissenting The Court’s only attempt to address this is to say that “the analysis of multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor,” ante, but any evaluation of intellectual disability, whether based on objective tests or subjective observations, is “complicated.” If conducting the proper
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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tests or subjective observations, is “complicated.” If conducting the proper analysis of multiple scores produces an IQ as reliable as the approach mandated by the Court, there is no basis for rejecting Florida’s approach.14 * * * For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. —————— drop in IQ scores following incarceration can be strong evidence of malingering”); at 1 (“[H]igher scores are likely to be the more indicative, since there are many reasons why a given score might underestimate a person’s intelligence, but no reason why scores should overestimate it”). 14 The Court also states that because IQ testing itself may be flawed, “multiple examinations may result in repeated similar scores” that are “not conclusive evidence of intellectual functioning.” Ante, at 12. That argument proves too much: If potential flaws in administering multiple tests are sufficient to render them inaccurate, the Court should con clude that even scores of 90 or are not sufficient. The appropriate remedy for incorrectly administered tests is for a court to disregard those tests, not to ignore the well-established fact that multiple, prop- erly administered tests yielding scores above 70 can give a high degree of confidence that an individual is not intellectually disabled. Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash ington, D. C. 54, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–10882 FREDDIE LEE HALL, PETITIONER v. FLORIDA ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA [May 27, 14] JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. This Court has held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability. 21 Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less. If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is fore closed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is un I On February 21, 1978, Freddie Lee petitioner here, and his accomplice, Mark Ruffin, kidnaped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst, a pregnant, 21-year-old new lywed. Afterward, and Ruffin drove to a convenience store they planned
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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Afterward, and Ruffin drove to a convenience store they planned to rob. In the parking lot of the store, they killed Lonnie Coburn, a sheriff’s deputy who at tempted to apprehend them. received the death penalty for both murders, although his sentence for the Coburn murder was later reduced on account of insuffi cient evidence of premeditation. 40 2 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court So. 2d 119, 121 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam). argues that he cannot be executed because of his intellectual disability. Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term “mental retardation.” This opin ion uses the term “intellectual disability” to describe the identical phenomenon. See Rosa’s Law, 124 Stat. 264 (changing entries in the U. S. Code from “mental retarda tion” to “intellectual disability”); Schalock et. al, The Re naming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 Intellectual & De velopmental Disabilities 116 (07). This change in ter minology is approved and used in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists and other experts; the manual is often referred to by its initials “DSM,” followed by its edition number, e.g., “DSM–5.” See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statisti cal Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 1). When was first sentenced, this Court had not yet ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits States from imposing the death penalty on persons with intellectual disability. See 40 And at the time, Florida law did not consider intellectual disability as a statutory mitigating factor. After this Court held that capital defendants must be permitted to present nonstatutory mitigating evidence in death penalty proceedings, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 9, 98–99 (1987), was resentenced. then presented substantial and unchallenged evidence of intel lectual disability. School records indicated that his teach ers identified him on numerous occasions as “[m]entally retarded.” App. 482–48. had been prosecuted for a different, earlier crime. His lawyer in that matter later testified that the lawyer “[c]ouldn’t really understand anything [] said.” And, with respect to the murder trial given him in this case, ’s counsel recalled Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) Opinion of the Court that could not assist in his own defense because he had “ ‘a mental level much lower than his age,’ ” at best comparable to the lawyer’s 4-year-old daughter. Brief for Petitioner 11. A number of medical clinicians testified that, in their professional opinion, was “significantly retarded,” App. 507; was “mentally retarded,” ; and had levels of understanding “typically [seen] with toddlers,”
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dissenting
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; and had levels of understanding “typically [seen] with toddlers,” at 52. As explained below in more detail, an individual’s abil ity or lack of ability to adapt or adjust to the requirements of daily life, and success or lack of success in doing so, is central to the framework followed by psychiatrists and other professionals in diagnosing intellectual disability. See DSM–5, at 7. ’s siblings testified that there was something “very wrong” with him as a child. App. 466. was “slow with speech and slow to learn.” at 490. He “walked and talked long after his other brothers and sisters,” and had “great difficulty forming his words,” ’s upbringing appeared to make his deficits in adap tive functioning all the more severe. was raised—in the words of the sentencing judge—“under the most horri ble family circumstances imaginable.” at 5. Al though “[t]eachers and siblings alike immediately recog nized [] to be significantly mentally retarded [t]his retardation did not garner any sympathy from his mother, but rather caused much scorn to befall him.” was “[c]onstantly beaten because he was ‘slow’ or because he made simple mistakes.” His mother “would strap [] to his bed at night, with a rope thrown over a rafter. In the morning, she would awaken by hoisting him up and whipping him with a belt, rope, or cord.” was beaten “ten or fifteen times a week sometimes.” His mother tied him “in a ‘croaker’ sack, swung it over a fire, and beat him,” “buried him in the sand up to his neck to ‘strengthen his legs,’ ” and 4 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court “held a gun on while she poked [him] with sticks.” 614 So. 2d 47, (Fla. 199) (Barkett, C. J., dissenting). The jury, notwithstanding this testimony, voted to sentence to death, and the sentencing court adopted the jury’s recommendation. The court found that there was “substantial evidence in the record” to support the finding that “Freddie Lee has been mentally retarded his entire life.” App. 46. Yet the court also “suspect[ed] that the defense experts [were] guilty of some professional overkill,” because “[n]othing of which the experts testified could explain how a psychotic, mentally-retarded, brain damaged, learning-disabled, speech-impaired person could formulate a plan whereby a car was stolen and a conven ience store was robbed.” The sentencing court went on to state that, even assuming the expert testimony to be accurate, “the learning disabilities, mental retarda tion, and other mental difficulties cannot be used to justify, excuse or extenuate the moral culpability of the defendant in this cause.” was again sen
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dissenting
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culpability of the defendant in this cause.” was again sen tenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that “’s argument that his mental retarda tion provided a pretense of moral or legal justification” had “no merit.” Chief Justice Barkett dissented, arguing that executing a person with intellectual disability violated the State Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. at 481– 482. In 02, this Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of persons with intellectual disa bility. 56 U.S., at 21. On November 0, filed a motion claiming that he had intellec tual disability and could not be executed. More than five years later, Florida held a hearing to consider ’s mo tion. again presented evidence of intellectual disabil ity, including an IQ test score of 71. ( had received Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 5 Opinion of the Court nine IQ evaluations in 40 years, with scores ranging from 60 to 80, Brief for Respondent 8, but the sentencing court excluded the two scores below 70 for evidentiary reasons, leaving only scores between 71 and 80. See App. 107; 109 So. d 704, 707 (Fla. 12)). In response, Florida argued that could not be found intellectually disabled be cause Florida law requires that, as a threshold matter, show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of his intellectual disability. App. 278–279 (“[U]nder the law, if an I. Q. is above 70, a person is not mentally retarded”). The Florida Supreme Court rejected ’s appeal and held that Florida’s 70-point threshold was 109 So. d, at 707–708. This Court granted certiorari. 571 U. S. (1). II The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Four teenth Amendment applies those restrictions to the States. ; 408 U.S. 28, 29–240 (per curiam). “By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” 0; see also 56 U.S. 86, (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man”). The Eighth Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en lightened by a humane justice.” 217 U.S. 49, 78 To enforce the Constitution’s protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the “evolv ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” The Eighth 6 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court Amendment’s protection of dignity reflects the
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Justice Alito
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dissenting
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Opinion of the Court Amendment’s protection of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the Nation’s constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force. The Eighth Amendment prohibits certain punishments as a categorical matter. No natural-born citizen may be denaturalized. No person may be sentenced to death for a crime committed as a juvenile. And, as relevant for this case, persons with intellectual disability may not be executed. 56 U.S., at 21. No legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with intellectual disability. To do so contravenes the Eighth Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being. “[P]unishment is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.” Rehabilitation, it is evident, is not an applicable rationale for the death penalty. See 428 U.S. 15, 18 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). As for deterrence, those with intellectual disability are, by reason of their condition, likely unable to make the calculated judgments that are the premise for the deterrence rationale. They have a “diminished ability” to “process information, to learn from experience, to en gage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses [which] make[s] it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.” 56 U.S., Retributive val ues are also ill-served by executing those with intellectual disability. The diminished capacity of the intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retribu tive value of the punishment. See at 19 (“If the cul Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 7 Opinion of the Court pability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution”). A further reason for not imposing the death penalty on a person who is intellectually disabled is to protect the integrity of the trial process. These persons face “a special risk of wrongful execution” because they are more likely to give false confessions, are often poor witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel. –21. This is not to say that under current law persons with intellectual disability who “meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility” may not be tried
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility” may not be tried and punished. at 06. They may not, however, re ceive the law’s most severe sentence. at 18. The question this case presents is how intellectual disability must be defined in order to implement these principles and the holding of To determine if Florida’s cutoff rule is valid, it is proper to consider the psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of IQ scores to determine how the scores relate to the holding of This in turn leads to a better understanding of how the legislative policies of various States, and the holdings of state courts, imple ment the rule. That understanding informs our determination whether there is a consensus that instructs how to decide the specific issue presented here. And, in conclusion, this Court must express its own independent determination reached in light of the instruction found in those sources and authorities. III A That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in determining intellectual disability is unsurprising. Those 8 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court professionals use their learning and skills to study and consider the consequences of the classification schemes they devise in the diagnosis of persons with mental or psychiatric disorders or disabilities. Society relies upon medical and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental condition at issue. And the definition of intellectual disability by skilled professionals has implications far beyond the confines of the death penalty: for it is relevant to education, access to social programs, and medical treatment plans. In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community’s opinions. As the Court noted in the medical community defines intellectual disability according to three criteria: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and onset of these deficits during the developmental period. See at 08, n. ; DSM–5, at ; Brief for American Psychologi cal Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12–1 (hereinafter APA Brief). This last factor, referred to as “age of onset,” is not at issue. The first and second criteria—deficits in intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning—are central here. In the context of a formal assessment, “[t]he existence of concurrent deficits in intellectual and adap tive functioning has long been the defining characteristic of intellectual disability.” On its face, the Florida statute could be consistent with the views of the medical community noted and discussed
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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with the views of the medical community noted and discussed in Florida’s statute defines intellectual disability for purposes of an proceeding as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing con currently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” Fla. Stat. §921.17(1) (1). The statute further defines “signifi Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 9 Opinion of the Court cantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.” The mean IQ test score is The concept of standard deviation describes how scores are dispersed in a popula tion. Standard deviation is distinct from standard error of measurement, a concept which describes the reliability of a test and is discussed further below. The standard devia tion on an IQ test is approximately 15 points, and so two standard deviations is approximately 0 points. Thus a test taker who performs “two or more standard deviations from the mean” will score approximately 0 points below the mean on an IQ test, i.e., a score of approximately 70 points. On its face this statute could be interpreted consistently with and with the conclusions this Court reaches in the instant case. Nothing in the statute precludes Florida from taking into account the IQ test’s standard error of measurement, and as discussed below there is evidence that Florida’s Legislature intended to include the meas urement error in the calculation. But the Florida Su preme Court has interpreted the provisions more nar rowly. It has held that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his facul ties are limited. See 712– 71 (Fla. 07) (per curiam). That strict IQ test score cutoff of 70 is the issue in this case. Pursuant to this mandatory cutoff, sentencing courts cannot consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the defendant’s failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment, including medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances. This is 10 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court so even though the medical community accepts that all of this evidence can be probative of intellectual disability, including for individuals who have an IQ test score above 70. See APA Brief 15–16 (“[T]he relevant clinical authori ties all agree that an individual with an IQ score above
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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all agree that an individual with an IQ score above 70 may properly be diagnosed with intellectual disability if significant limitations in adaptive functioning also exist”); DSM–5, at 7 (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of indi viduals with a lower IQ score”). Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise. The professionals who design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a range. See D. Wechsler, The Measurement of Adult Intel ligence 1 (d ed. 1944) (reporting the range of error on an early IQ test). Each IQ test has a “standard error of measurement,” ib often referred to by the abbreviation “SEM.” A test’s SEM is a statistical fact, a reflection of the inherent imprecision of the test itself. See R. Furr & V. Bacharach, Psychometrics 118 (2d ed. 14) (identify ing the SEM as “one of the most important concepts in measurement theory”). An individual’s IQ test score on any given exam may fluctuate for a variety of reasons. These include the test-taker’s health; practice from earlier tests; the environment or location of the test; the examin er’s demeanor; the subjective judgment involved in scoring certain questions on the exam; and simple lucky guessing. See American Association on Intellectual and Develop Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 11 Opinion of the Court mental Disabilities, R. Schalock et al., User’s Guide To Accompany the 11th Edition of Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 22 (12) (hereinafter AAIDD Manual); A. Kaufman, IQ Testing 101, pp. 18–19 The SEM reflects the reality that an individual’s intel lectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single numeri cal score. For purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score. The SEM allows clinicians to calculate a range within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies. See APA Brief 2 (“SEM is a unit of measurement: 1 SEM equates to a confidence of 68% that the measured score falls within
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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a confidence of 68% that the measured score falls within a given score range, while 2 SEM provides a 95% confidence level that the measured score is within a broader range”). A score of 71, for instance, is generally considered to re flect a range between 66 and 76 with 95% confidence and a range of 68.5 and 7.5 with a 68% confidence. See DSM– 5, at 7 (“Individuals with intellectual disability have scores of approximately two standard deviations or more below the population mean, including a margin for meas urement error (generally +5 points). [T]his involves a score of 65– (70 ± 5)”); APA Brief 2 (“For example, the average SEM for the WAIS-IV is 2.16 IQ test points and the average SEM for the Stanford-Binet 5 is 2.0 IQ test points (test manuals report SEMs by different age group ings; these scores are similar, but not identical, often due to sampling error)”). Even when a person has taken mul tiple tests, each separate score must be assessed using the SEM, and the analysis of multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor. See Schneider, Principles of As sessment of Aptitude and Achievement, in The Oxford Handbook of Child Psychological Assessment 286, 289– 291, 18 (D. Saklofske, C. Reynolds, V. Schwean, eds. 1). In addition, because the test itself may be flawed, 12 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court or administered in a consistently flawed manner, multiple examinations may result in repeated similar scores, so that even a consistent score is not conclusive evidence of intellectual functioning. Despite these professional explanations, Florida law used the test score as a fixed number, thus barring further consideration of other evidence bearing on the question of intellectual disability. For professionals to diagnose—and for the law then to determine—whether an intellectual disability exists once the SEM applies and the individual’s IQ score is or below the inquiry would consider factors indicating whether the person had deficits in adaptive functioning. These include evidence of past performance, environment, and upbringing. B A significant majority of States implement the protec tions of by taking the SEM into account, thus acknowledging the error inherent in using a test score without necessary adjustment. This calculation provides “objective indicia of society’s standards” in the context of the Eighth Amendment. 54 U.S., Only the Kentucky and Legislatures have adopted a fixed score cutoff identical to Florida’s. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §52.10(2) (Lexis Supp. 1); 16 S.W.d 61, ; Va. Code Ann. §19.2–264.:1.1 (Lexis Supp. 1); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 5, vacated and remanded on other grounds, Alabama also
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Va. 5, vacated and remanded on other grounds, Alabama also may use a strict IQ score cutoff at 70, although not as a result of legislative action. See 71 So. d 12, (“The Alabama Supreme Court did not adopt any ‘margin of error’ when examining a defendant’s IQ score”). Petitioner does not question the rule in States which use a bright-line cutoff at or greater, Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, and Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 1 Opinion of the Court so they are not included alongside Florida in this analysis. In addition to these States, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington have statutes which could be interpreted to provide a bright-line cutoff leading to the same result that Florida mandates in its cases. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §1–(F) (West 1); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, (d)() (12 Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. (1 Supp.); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A–05 (Lexis 1); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.00(2)(c) (12). That these state laws might be interpreted to require a bright-line cutoff does not mean that they will be so inter preted, however. See, e.g., 17, (10) (Although Nebras ka’s statute specifies “[a]n intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test,” “[t]he district court found that [the defendant’s] score of on the [IQ test], considered in light of the standard error of measurement, could be considered as subaverage general intellectual functioning for purposes of diagnosing mental retardation”). Arizona’s statute appears to set a broad statutory cutoff at 70, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §1–(F) (West 1), but another provision instructs courts to “take into account the margin of error for a test administered.” at (K)(5). How courts are meant to interpret the statute in a situation like ’s is not altogether clear. The prin cipal Arizona case on the matter, State v. Roque, 141 P.d 68, (Ariz 06), states that “the statute accounts for margin of error by requiring multiple tests,” and that “if the defendant achieves a full-scale score of 70 or below on any one of the tests, then the court proceeds to a hearing.” at 40. But that case also notes that the defendant had an IQ score of 80, well outside the margin of error, and that all but one of the sub-parts of the IQ test were “above” Kansas has not had an execution in almost five decades, 14 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court and so its laws and jurisprudence on this issue are unlikely to receive attention on this specific question. See 56 U.S., at 16 (“[E]ven in
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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this specific question. See 56 U.S., at 16 (“[E]ven in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon. Some States continue to authorize executions, but none have been carried out in decades. Thus there is little need to pursue legislation barring the execution of the mentally retarded in those States”). Delaware has executed three individuals in the past dec ade, while Washington has executed one person, and has recently suspended its death penalty. None of the four individuals executed recently in those States appears to have brought a claim similar to that advanced here. Thus, at most nine States mandate a strict IQ score cutoff at 70. Of these, four States (Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington) appear not to have considered the issue in their courts. On the other side of the ledger stand the 18 States that have abolished the death penalty, either in full or for new offenses, and Ore gon, which has suspended the death penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40 years. See 54 U.S., (“[The] Court should have considered those States that had abandoned the death penalty altogether as part of the consensus against the juvenile death penalty”). In those States, of course, a person in ’s position could not be executed even without a finding of intellectual disability. Thus in 41 States an individual in ’s position—an individual with an IQ score of 71—would not be deemed automatically eligible for the death penalty. These aggregate numbers are not the only considera tions bearing on a determination of consensus. Consistency of the direction of change is also relevant. See at 565–566 (quoting at 15). Since many States have passed legislation to comply with the constitutional requirement that persons with intellectual disability not be executed. Two of these States, Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 15 Opinion of the Court and Delaware, appear to set a strict cutoff at 70, although as discussed, Delaware’s courts have yet to interpret the In contrast, at least 11 States have either abolished the death penalty or passed legislation allowing defend ants to present additional evidence of intellectual disabil ity when their IQ test score is above 70. Since five States have abolished the death pen alty through legislation. See 12 Conn. Pub. Acts no. 12– 5; Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 725, (West 12); Md. Cor rec. Servs. Code Ann. §–901 et seq. ; N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:11–(b)(1) (West Supp. 1); 09 N. M. Laws ch. 11, In addition, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated New York’s death
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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the New York Court of Appeals invalidated New York’s death penalty under the State Constitution in see People v. LeValle, N.Y. d 88, 817 N.E.2d 41 and legislation has not been passed to reinstate it. And when it did impose the death penalty, New York did not employ an IQ cutoff in determining intellectual disability. N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. In addition to these States, at least five others have passed legislation allowing a defendant to present addi tional evidence of intellectual disability even when an IQ test score is above 70. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §176 (West Supp. 14) (no IQ cutoff); –2515A (Lexis Supp. 1) (“seventy (70) or below”); Pizzutto v. State, (“The alleged error in IQ testing is plus or minus five points. The district court was entitled to draw reasonable infer ences from the undisputed facts”); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5.1 (West Supp. 14) (no IQ cutoff); Nev. Rev. Stat. (1) (no IQ cutoff); Utah Code Ann (Lexis 12) (no IQ cutoff). The U. S. Code likewise does not set a strict IQ cutoff. See 18 U.S. C. §6(c). And no State that previously allowed defendants with an IQ score over 70 to present additional evidence of intellectual disability has modified its law to create a 16 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court strict cutoff at 70. Cf. 6 no State that previ ously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles has reinstated it”). In summary, every state legislature to have considered the issue after —save ’s—and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to that of Florida. Indeed, the Florida Legisla ture, which passed the relevant legislation prior to might well have believed that its law would not create a fixed cutoff at 70. The staff analysis accompanying the 01 bill states that it “does not contain a set IQ level Two standard deviations from these tests is ap proximately a 70 IQ, although it can be extended up to” Fla. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, CS/SB 28, p. 11 (Feb. 14, 01). But the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the law to require a bright-line cutoff at 70, see 9 So. 2d, at 712–71, and the Court is bound by that interpretation. The rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of States and the “consistency in the trend,” 7, toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evi dence of consensus that our society does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane. C itself acknowledges the inherent error in IQ testing.
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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humane. C itself acknowledges the inherent error in IQ testing. It is true that “did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental retardation” falls within the protection of the Eighth Amendment. 556 U.S. 825, In the Court stated: “Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wain- Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 17 Opinion of the Court wright with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to en force the constitutional restriction upon [their] execu tion of sentences.’ ” 56 U.S., ; citation omitted). As discussed above, the States play a critical role in ad vancing protections and providing the Court with infor mation that contributes to an understanding of how intel lectual disability should be measured and assessed. But did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection. The Court twice cited definitions of intellectual disability which, by their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70. first cited the definition provided in the DSM–IV: “ ‘Mild’ mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50–55 to approximately 70.” 56 U.S., at 08, n. (citing Diag nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 00)). The Court later noted that “ ‘an IQ between 70 and or lower is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.’ ” 56 U.S., at 09, n. 5. Further more, immediately after the Court declared that it left “ ‘to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction,’ ” the Court stated in an accompanying footnote that “[t]he [state] statutory definitions of mental retardation are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions,” Thus itself not only cited clinical definitions for intellectual disability but also noted that the States’ standards, on which the Court based its own conclusion, conformed to those definitions. In the words of those persons who meet the “clinical definitions” of intel 18 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court lectual disability “by definition have diminished capac ities to understand and process information, to communi cate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” at 18. Thus, they bear
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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understand the reactions of others.” at 18. Thus, they bear “diminish[ed] personal culpability.” The clinical definitions of intellectual disability, which take into account that IQ scores represent a range, not a fixed number, were a fundamental premise of And those clinical definitions have long included the SEM. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 28 (rev. d ed. 1987) (“Since any measurement is fallible, an IQ score is generally thought to involve an error of meas urement of approximately five points; hence, an IQ of 70 is considered to represent a band or zone of 65 to Treat ing the IQ with some flexibility permits inclusion in the Mental Retardation category of people with IQs somewhat higher than 70 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior”). Respondent argues that the current Florida law was favorably cited by the Court. See Brief for Re spondent 18 (“As evidence of the national consensus, the Court specifically cited Florida’s statute at issue here, which has not substantively changed”). While did refer to Florida’s law in a citation listing States which had outlawed the execution of the intellectually disabled, 56 U.S., at 15, that fleeting mention did not signal the Court’s approval of Florida’s current understanding of the As discussed above, when was decided the Florida Supreme Court had not yet interpreted the law to require a strict IQ cutoff at 70. That new interpretation runs counter to the clinical definition cited throughout and to Florida’s own legislative report indicating this kind of cutoff need not be used. Respondent’s argument also conflicts with the logic of and the Eighth Amendment. If the States were to Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 19 Opinion of the Court have complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not become a reality. This Court thus reads to provide substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disability. D The actions of the States and the precedents of this Court “give us essential instruction,” 54 U.S., at 564, but the inquiry must go further. “[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.” Coker v. Georgia, 4 U.S. 584, 7 That exercise of independent judgment is the Court’s judicial duty. See (“[T]o the extent Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or offenders, it suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions” (citation omitted). In this Court’s independent judgment, the Florida stat ute, as interpreted by its courts, is un In addition to the views of the States and the Court’s precedent, this determination is informed by the views of medical experts. These views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not disregard these informed assessments. See 54 U.S. 407, 41 (“[T]he science of psychiatry informs but does not control ultimate legal determinations”). It is the Court’s duty to interpret the Constitution, but it need not do so in isolation. The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic frame HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court work. itself points to the diagnostic criteria em ployed by psychiatric professionals. And the professional community’s teachings are of particular help in this case, where no alternative definition of intellectual disability is presented and where this Court and the States have placed substantial reliance on the expertise of the medical profession. By failing to take into account the SEM and setting a strict cutoff at 70, Florida “goes against the unanimous professional consensus.” APA Brief 15. Neither Florida nor its amici point to a single medical professional who supports this cutoff. The DSM–5 repudiates it: “IQ test scores are approximations of conceptual functioning but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in real-life situa tions and mastery of practical tasks.” DSM–5, at 7. This statement well captures the Court’s independent assess ment that an individual with an IQ test score “between 70 and or lower,” at 09, n. 5, may show intellectual disability by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning. The flaws in Florida’s law are the result of the inherent error in IQ tests themselves. An IQ score is an approxi mation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning. See APA Brief 24 (“[I]t is standard pyscho metric practice to report the ‘estimates of relevant reliabil ities and standard errors of measurement’ when reporting a test score”); (the margin of error is “inherent to the accuracy of IQ scores”); Furr, Psychometrics, 9 (“[T]he standard error of measurement is an important psychometric value with implications for applied meas urement”). SEM is not a concept peculiar to the psychiat ric profession and IQ tests. It is a measure that is recog nized and relied
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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It is a measure that is recog nized and relied upon by those who create and devise tests of all sorts. 8 (identifying the SEM as “one of the most important concepts in measurement theory”). This awareness of the IQ test’s limits is of particular Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 21 Opinion of the Court importance when conducting the conjunctive assessment necessary to assess an individual’s intellectual ability. See American Association on Intellectual and Develop mental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 40 (11th ed. 10) (“It must be stressed that the diagnosis of [intellectual disability] is intended to reflect a clinical judgment rather than an actuarial determination”). Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. See DSM–5, at 7. Courts must recognize, as does the medical community, that the IQ test is imprecise. This is not to say that an IQ test score is unhelpful. It is of considerable significance, as the medical community recognizes. But in using these scores to assess a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, a State must afford these test scores the same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests do, and understand that an IQ test score repre sents a range rather than a fixed number. A State that ignores the inherent imprecision of these tests risks exe cuting a person who suffers from intellectual disability. See APA Brief 17 (“Under the universally accepted clinical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability, the court’s determination that Mr. is not intellectually disabled cannot be considered valid”). This Court agrees with the medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowl edged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disa bility, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. It is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment. See DSM–5, at 7 (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score”). The Florida statute, as interpreted by its courts, misuses IQ score on its own terms; and 22 HALL v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court this, in turn, bars consideration of evidence that must be considered in determining whether a defendant in a capi tal case has intellectual disability. Florida’s rule is invalid under the Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. E Florida seeks to execute a man because he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ
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Justice Alito
| 2,014 | 8 |
dissenting
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Hall v. Florida
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2676594/hall-v-florida/
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he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test. Florida is one of just a few States to have this rigid rule. Florida’s rule misconstrues the Court’s statements in that intellectually dis ability is characterized by an IQ of “approximately 70.” 56 U.S., at 08, n. Florida’s rule is in direct opposition to the views of those who design, administer, and interpret the IQ test. By failing to take into account the standard error of measurement, Florida’s law not only contradicts the test’s own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing court’s inquiry into adaptive functioning. Freddie Lee may or may not be intellectually dis abled, but the law requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability, including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime. The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution. Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the Constitu tion protects. The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–10882 FREDDIE LEE HALL, PETITIONER v.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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Seeking habeas corpus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondent Jimmie Wayne Jeffers raised two challenges to Arizona's "especially heinous. or depraved" aggravating circumstance. (F)(6)[1] First, Jeffers contended that the Arizona Supreme *78 Court has failed to articulate a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction of the (F)(6) circumstance. In the alternative, Jeffers argued that, even if a suitable limiting construction had been developed, its application to his case failed to satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court of Appeals, deeming itself bound by Circuit precedent, rejected respondent's first contention. citing cert. denied, With respect to the second contention, however, the court concluded that the standard enunciated by the Arizona Supreme Court "seems to call for conduct or attitudes more shocking than those exhibited by Jeffers," and that "[b]ecause we conclude that the standard of heinousness and depravity delineated in prior Arizona cases cannot be applied in a principled manner to Jeffers, his death sentence must be struck down as arbitrary." The State then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The panel indicated that its ruling on the rehearing petition would be deferred "`pending further decision of this court, sitting en banc, in'" Order of March 30, quoted in Brief for Respondent 21. Several months later the en banc court issued its decision in cert. pending, No. 88-1. After exhaustive analysis of the relevant Arizona precedents, the en banc court concluded: "[T]he (F)(6) circumstance has not been given a sufficiently narrow construction by the Arizona Supreme Court such that its application will be kept within identifiable boundaries. Among the more than fifty cases in which an (F)(6) finding was appealed, we are unable to distinguish rationally those cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the finding from the few in which it did not. Because neither the legislative standard nor the case law has properly channeled decisionmaking on the imposition of the `especially heinous, cruel or depraved' *786 aggravating circumstance, we find that this circumstance has been arbitrarily and capriciously applied by the Arizona courts."[2] The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the State's request for rehearing in Jeffers' case. As respondent in this Court, Jeffers defends the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the grounds that no satisfactory limiting construction of the (F)(6) circumstance can be derived from the Arizona precedents, and, alternatively, that if such a construction does exist, it was improperly applied in his case.[3] Jeffers' first claim is logically antecedent to the second; it raises an issue of greater general importance, and, given the decision of the en banc Court
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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importance, and, given the decision of the en banc Court of Appeals in Adamson, it can hardly be regarded as insubstantial. The Court today, however, simply refuses to discuss the merits of respondent's broad challenge to the (F)(6) circumstance; in lieu of analysis, it relies on a single sentence of dictum in an opinion *787 in another case issued today. Because I believe that Arizona's application of the (F)(6) factor cannot be squared with this Court's governing precedentsand because I regard the majority's approach as a parody of constitutional adjudication I dissent. I This Court consistently has recognized that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." The application to respondent of Arizona's (F)(6) circumstance can be sustained only if that aggravating factor provides a "principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." The majority does not contend that the statutory language, which requires only that the murder be "especially heinous or depraved," is itself sufficiently precise to meet constitutional standards.[] Rather, the Court refers repeatedly to a "narrowing construction" of the (F)(6) circumstance announced by the Arizona Supreme Court. See, e. g., ante, at 776, 780, 783, *788 and 78. The Court nowhere states precisely what that narrowing construction is, nor does it examine other Arizona cases to see whether that construction has been consistently applied. The majority suggests, however, that the "narrowing construction" was announced by the Arizona Supreme Court in See ante, at 78. Analysis of the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in and of its relationship to prior Arizona capital cases, belies that characterization. Prior to the Arizona Supreme Court's application of the (F)(6) circumstance was based principally on its decision in cert. denied, in which the court recited dictionary definitions of each of the statutory terms. "Heinous" was defined as "hatefully or shockingly evil; grossly bad"; "cruel" was defined as "disposed to inflict pain esp. in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner: sadistic"; and "depraved" was defined as "marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration." 62 P. 2d, at 716. The court concluded: "What our legislature intended to include as an aggravating circumstance was a killing wherein additional circumstances of the nature enumerated above set the crime apart from the usual or the norm." The court did not suggest that the Knapp definitions were insufficient to guide the sentencer's discretion or that further narrowing
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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insufficient to guide the sentencer's discretion or that further narrowing was required. To the contrary, the court quoted these definitions with approval and stated: "We believe that the statutory phrase `especially heinous, cruel, or depraved' has been construed in a constitutionally narrow fashion, and has been properly applied in individual cases. A summary of the law which has been developing in the area supports this conclusion." 69 P. 2d, at 9. In explaining what kinds of murders properly would be regarded as "especially heinous or depraved," the court *789 stated that "[i]n contrast to the emphasis upon the victim's suffering and feelings in the case of cruelty, the statutory concepts of heinous and depraved involve a killer's vile state of mind at the time of the murder, as evidenced by the killer's actions. Our cases have suggested specific factors which lead to a finding of heinousness or depravity." Next, drawing on examples from prior Arizona cases, the court identified five factors the presence of which would indicate that a particular killing was "especially heinous. or depraved." These factors were (1) "the apparent relishing of the murder by the killer," (2) "the infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim," (3) "the needless mutilation of the victim," () "the senselessness of the crime," and () "the helplessness of the victim." Finally, the court noted: "[W]here no circumstances, such as the specific factors discussed above, separate the crime from the `norm' of first degree murders, we will reverse a finding that the crime was committed in an `especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.'" The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in obviously did not announce a "narrowing construction" of the (F)(6) circumstance. The court did not suggest that the standards previously applied were inadequate, or that further constraints on the sentencer's discretion were essential. Instead, the Arizona Supreme Court cited the Knapp definitions with approval and then gave examples of their application. No matter how vaguely defined an aggravating circumstance is, there will be a finite number of cases in which that circumstance has been applied. It hardly limits the application of that aggravating factor to list those prior decisions, or to provide illustrative examples from among them. I do not see how the Arizona Supreme Court's description of the manner in which a vague aggravating factor has been applied can be regarded as the establishment of a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction. *790 Nor did the court narrow the discretion of future sentencers simply by grouping its prior decisions into categories. The use of categories could serve to guide the sentencer if (a) the categories
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
|
could serve to guide the sentencer if (a) the categories themselves are narrow enough that a significant number of homicides will not fall within any of them, and (b) the court indicates that a murder is covered by the aggravating circumstance only if it falls within one of the enumerated categories. The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in satisfies neither of these criteria. Most first-degree murders will fall within at least one of the five categories listed in hardly a surprising result, since the categories were simply descriptive of the prior period during which the Knapp definitions had governed the application of this aggravating factor. Since moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court has continued to identify additional circumstances that will support the conclusion that a particular murder is "especially heinous or depraved." That fact is also unsurprising. The court in did not purport to lay down rules for the future; it simply summarized prior case law and indicated that an (F)(6) finding would be proper when "circumstances, such as the specific factors discussed above, separate the crime from the `norm' of first degree murders." 13 Ariz., The majority does not contend that the Knapp definitions furnished constitutionally sufficient guidance to capital sentencers in Arizona prior to Just as a reasonable sentencer might conclude that every first-degree murder is "especially heinous, cruel or depraved," see n. a reasonable judge could surely believe that all such killings are "hatefully or shockingly evil" or "marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration."[] Yet the majority *791 apparently concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court cured the constitutional infirmity by summarizing its prior decisions, reiterating with approval the constitutionally deficient construction relied on previously and pledging to follow the same approach in the future.[6] The majority undertakes no close examination of or of other Arizona cases, prior or subsequent. It makes no attempt to explain how the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the terms "especially heinous or depraved" can be said to satisfy the constitutional requirements announced in this Court's prior decisions. Indeed, the majority's conclusion that the Arizona court has satisfactorily limited the reach of the statutory language is supported by no analysis at all. The Court instead relies on the assertion that "we resolved any doubt about the matter in Walton v. Arizona, ante, p. 639, where we upheld, against a vagueness challenge, the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case." Ante, at 777.[7] The majority's claim that Walton *792 involves "the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case," however, fundamentally misrepresents the operation of the Arizona statute. The Arizona Supreme Court consistently has
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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of the Arizona statute. The Arizona Supreme Court consistently has asserted that the terms "heinous," "cruel," and "depraved" "are considered disjunctive; the presence of any one of three factors is an aggravating circumstance." 22, 762 P.2d 9, 9 cert. denied, 91 U.S. 910 It is therefore more accurate to characterize the (F)(6) circumstance as three aggravating factors than as one.[8] In Walton, the Arizona Supreme Court, in determining that the (F)(6) factor had been established, relied primarily on the conclusion that the murder was especially cruel. Although the court also indicated that the murder was especially depraved, it stated clearly that this conclusion was not necessary to its finding of the (F)(6) circumstance. See 1033-103 In affirming Jeffrey Walton's death sentence today, this Court also focuses its attention on the constitutional sufficiency of the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "cruelty." The Court concludes: *793 "Recognizing that the proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision, we conclude that the definition given to the `especially cruel' provision by the Arizona Supreme Court is constitutionally sufficient because it gives meaningful guidance to the sentencer. Nor can we fault the state court's statement that a crime is committed in an especially `depraved' manner when the perpetrator `relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or `shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure' in the killing." Ante, at 6 In the present case, however, the adequacy of the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "cruelty" is not at issue. That court expressly found that Jeffers' crime was not "especially cruel"; its affirmance of the death sentence was based entirely on the conclusion that this murder was especially "heinous" and "depraved." In stating that Arizona has placed constitutionally sufficient limits on the State's "especially heinous or depraved" aggravating factor, today's majority therefore is not in a position to rely, and cannot rely, on either the holding or the analysis of Walton. Rather, the majority relies entirely on the italicized sentence quoted abovethe only sentence in the Walton opinion that discusses the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the word "depraved." That sentence is wholly gratuitous: The Arizona Supreme Court's holding in Walton, and this Court's affirmance, do not depend upon a determination that Walton's crime was "especially depraved." The opinion in Walton, moreover, makes no effort whatsoever to justify its suggestion that the state court's construction of "depravity" is sufficient to meet constitutional standards. I think it is important that we be frank about what is happening here. The death penalty
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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be frank about what is happening here. The death penalty laws of many States establish aggravating circumstances similar to the one at issue in *79 this case.[9] Since the statutory language defining these factors does not provide constitutionally adequate guidance, the constitutionality of the aggravating circumstances necessarily depends on the construction given by the State's highest court. We have expressed apparent approval of a limiting construction requiring "torture or serious physical abuse." 86 U.S. 36, This Court has not held that this is the only permissible construction of an aggravating circumstance of this kind, but prior to today we have never suggested that the aggravating factor can permissibly be construed in a manner that does not make reference to the suffering of the victim. The decision today will likely result in the execution of numerous inmates, in Arizona[10] and elsewhere, who would not otherwise be put *79 to death. Yet neither in this case nor in Walton has the Court articulated any argument in support of its decision. Nor has the majority undertaken any examination of the way in which this aggravating circumstance has been applied by the Arizona Supreme Court. Instead, the Court relies on a conspicuous bootstrap. Five Members have joined the majority opinion in Walton, which in a single sentence asserts without explanation that the majority cannot "fault" the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the statutory term "depraved." In the present case the same five Members proclaim themselves to be bound by this scrap of dictum. In any context this would be a poor excuse for constitutional adjudication. In a capital case it is deeply disturbing. It is to some degree understandable that the majority chooses to rely exclusively on the brief and passing dictum in Walton. Had the Court examined the range of homicides which the Arizona Supreme Court has held to be "especially heinous or depraved," it could not plausibly have argued that the state court has placed meaningful limits on the application of this aggravating circumstance. My dissent in Walton explains in some detail the reasons for its conclusion that this aggravating factor, as defined by the Arizona Supreme Court, fails to satisfy constitutional requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, after exhaustive analysis of the relevant state precedents, also concluded that the "especially heinous. or depraved" circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. See 86 F. 2d, at 1031-1039. There is no need to reiterate these arguments here. It is sufficient to *796 note that neither this Court nor the Arizona Supreme Court has attempted to refute that analysis.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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the Arizona Supreme Court has attempted to refute that analysis. Indeed, the constitutional defects in the Arizona Supreme Court's application of the (F)(6) circumstance are illustrated by the state court's conclusion that respondent "relished" the murder, and that this factor supports a finding that the killing was "especially heinous or depraved." The court based its conclusion on testimony indicating that respondent struck the victim several times after she appeared to be dead, that while striking her he called her a "bitch" and a "dirty snitch," and that with each striking blow he said, "This one is for" naming several of his friends on whom the victim had informed to the 13 Ariz., at 30, The Arizona Supreme Court did not explain precisely what it meant by saying that the respondent "relished" his crime. But the evidence does not suggest that Jeffers killed for the sake of killing or found some intrinsic pleasure in the act of murder. Rather, the evidence indicates that respondent killed out of hatred for a particular individual and a desire for revenge. There is a difference. It may be that a State could rationally conclude that a murder committed out of personal hatred is more reprehensible than is a killing committed for other reasons.[11] But the State of Arizona cannot be said to have arrived at any such conclusion. The Arizona Supreme Court has also held that a murder is "especially heinous or depraved" if it is committed to eliminate a witness, see 18 Ariz. 68, 81, 73 ; 12 Ariz. 6, (198), cert. denied, 70 U. S. *797 109 (198); 11 Ariz. 0, 1-2, (198), or if it is "senseless," see 13 Ariz., -12; and the statute itself provides that it shall be an aggravating circumstance if the murder is committed for pecuniary gain. See (F)()[12] The Arizona Supreme Court has also identified other blameworthy motives which, in the court's view, suggest that a murder is "especially heinous or depraved."[13] Taken together, the decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court hold that a murder will be deemed especially blameworthy if it is committed for virtually any reason, or for no reason at all. The Arizona Supreme Court's decisions dealing with especially improper motives are symptomatic of a larger pattern in that court's construction of the (F)(6) circumstance. At least since the court has generally avoided the error of simply recounting the events surrounding a particular crime and then announcing, in conclusory fashion, that the murder was "especially heinous or depraved." Rather, the court typically identifies specific factors to support its conclusion that the aggravating circumstance has
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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factors to support its conclusion that the aggravating circumstance has been established. And if any one decision is examined in isolation, it may appear that the state court has narrowly construed the (F)(6) circumstance in a manner that satisfies constitutional requirements. The problem is that the Arizona *798 Supreme Court has identified so many such factors, and has shown itself so willing to add new factors when a perceived need arises, that the body of its precedents places no meaningful limitations on the application of this aggravating circumstance.[1] The constitutional infirmity of the court's approach cannot be recognized through examination of any one opinion. It becomes very apparent upon examination of the relevant decisions taken as a whole. Unfortunately, the inquiry required for an informed assessment of the Arizona Supreme Court's application of this aggravating factor is one that this Court simply refuses to undertake. II The majority devotes most of its energy arguing that a federal habeas court, having concluded that a State has adopted *799 a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction of an aggravating circumstance, largely should refrain from engaging in case-specific comparisons between the homicide under review and prior decisions in which the aggravating factor has been found. The Court concludes that since a rational factfinder could have determined that respondent "relished" the murder and engaged in "gratuitous violence," the death sentence must be allowed to stand. I concede that respondent's crime was not plainly distinguishable from the other murders that the Arizona Supreme Court has found to be "especially heinous or depraved." Indeed, my conclusion could hardly be otherwise: having argued that the (F)(6) circumstance has been construed so broadly as to cover virtually every first-degree murder, I could scarcely contend that the court's finding in this case was bizarre or aberrational. I, however, do have some brief observations concerning the role of federal habeas courts in reviewing state-court findings of aggravating circumstances. (1) I think that the majority is wrong in arguing that a state court's application of a valid aggravating circumstance involves a question of state law only. See ante, at 780. The statutory aggravating circumstances do perform the state-law function of determining who will be sentenced to death. But the aggravating factors also perform the distinct function of determining which murderers are eligible for the death penalty as a matter of federal law. See 62 U. S., at 878 ; 8 U.S. 231, 2 That point is particularly clear in cases like the present one, where the (F)(6) circumstance is the only aggravating factor that the Arizona Supreme Court found to exist. If the
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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that the Arizona Supreme Court found to exist. If the state court erred in its determination that this aggravating circumstance had been proved, that error is of federal constitutional significance: The defendant who claims *800 that no aggravating factor has been established is contending that the Eighth Amendment (and not simply state law) prohibits his execution.[1] (2) As the majority points out, under 28 U.S. C. 22(d) "federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings must generally accord a presumption of correctness to a state court's factual findings." Ante, at 782 The presumption of correctness does not apply, however, if the habeas petitioner demonstrates "that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing." 28 U.S. C. 22(d)(2).[16] In the present case the trial-level sentencing procedure was conducted under a clearly unconstitutional scheme. See n. The relevant factfinder is therefore the Arizona Supreme Court, as the majority appears to acknowledge. See ante, at 783 (arguing that "a federal court should adhere to the Jackson standard even when reviewing the decision of a state appellate court that has independently reviewed the evidence"). This Court has held that the general presumption of correctness mandated by 28 U.S. C. 22(d) is applicable to the factual findings of state appellate courts. 9 U.S. 9, -7 The Court has also recognized, however: "[T]here might be instances in which the presumption would not apply to appellate factfinding because appellate factfinding procedures were not `adequate,' see 28 U.S. C. 22(d)(2). For example, the question might in a given case turn on credibility determinations that *801 could not be accurately made by an appellate court on the basis of a paper record." 7 U.S. 376, 388, n. Indeed, in the present case the inadequacy of the Arizona Supreme Court's procedure goes beyond the fact that the court did not see the witnesses and was forced to rely upon a paper record. At the times of respondent's trial and sentencing hearing, and even when his appellate briefs were submitted and oral argument was conducted, respondent had no reason to believe that the sentencer would attach particular importance to its conclusion that the defendant had "relished" the killing and inflicted "gratuitous violence" on the victim after her death.[17] The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in was issued 18 days prior to its decision in Jeffers' casefar too late for Jeffers to submit evidence or argument regarding the presence of the factors. In the present case there appears to be no dispute regarding the primary facts underlying the Arizona Supreme Court's finding of the (F)(6)
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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facts underlying the Arizona Supreme Court's finding of the (F)(6) circumstance. That is, respondent apparently does not deny that he struck the victim after she was dead or that he cursed her while doing so. But if there were a conflict in the testimony regarding this point, I would not regard the Arizona Supreme Court's factfinding procedures as "adequate" to resolve that conflict. (3) In determining that Jeffers "relished" his crime and inflicted "gratuitous violence" on the victim, the Arizona Supreme Court did not simply apply determinate standards to a new set of facts. Rather, the assertion that respondent "relished" *802 the killing of Penelope Cheney said as much about the court's understanding of the word "relish" as it did about Jeffers' state of mind at the time of the murder. Thus, despite the prior Ninth Circuit decision holding that the (F)(6) circumstance had been adequately narrowed, the federal court could not properly limit itself to the question whether a rational factfinder might conclude that Jeffers "relished" the killing or employed "gratuitous violence." Rather, the habeas court had both the right and the duty to ask whether the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the (F)(6) circumstance remained adequate to satisfy the Constitution in light of its application to the case at hand. Thus, the habeas court's review in cases of this kind necessarily involves a comparison between the case under review and prior state-court decisions applying the aggravating factornot as a means of determining whether the state court "incorrectly" applied its construction of the statutory terms, but as a means of determining whether the state court's application of its construction to the instant case expands the scope of the aggravating factor in such a way as to make a previously valid limiting construction unconstitutionally broad. () Indeed, I think that a comparative approach is necessary no matter what standard of review the habeas court employs. Even if the state court's finding is reviewed under a "rational factfinder" standard, the majority is wrong to say that the Court of Appeals erred in comparing Jeffers' crime to other cases in which the (F)(6) factor was established. Words like "relish" may be somewhat more precise than are "heinous" and "depraved," but they still are of less than crystalline clarity. A court attempting to apply the Jackson standard must ask whether a rational factfinder could believe that Jeffers "relished" the crime as that term has been construed by the Arizona Supreme Court. If the Arizona Supreme Court had used the word "relish" to mean one thing in each of its other decisions, and something
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lewis v. Jeffers
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112487/lewis-v-jeffers/
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one thing in each of its other decisions, and something very different in Jeffers' case, its application to Jeffers would be *803 arbitraryeven if both meanings could be found in a given dictionary. If the Court of Appeals departed from the "rational factfinder" standard here, it was by requiring too close a correlation between this case and others, not simply by employing a comparative approach. Suppose, for example, that the Arizona Supreme Court had consistently construed the (F)(6) circumstance as requiring "physical abuse," but had found that standard satisfied only in cases where the killer subjected the victim to prolonged, severe physical suffering. Presumably that construction would be valid. See 86 U. S., at Suppose that the court in a subsequent case found that the (F)(6) factor had been proved when the defendant slapped the victim once and then shot him dead. The defendant, on federal habeas, could raise two related but distinct challenges. First, the defendant might argue that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that a single slap constituted "physical abuse" as that term had previously been construed by the Arizona Supreme Court. (This would amount to a contention that the state court had misapplied its own rule.) Alternatively, the defendant might argue that "physical abuse" could no longer be deemed an adequate limiting construction if that phrase was construed as including a single slap. However the challenge was framed, though, the habeas court could not limit itself to the question whether a rational factfinder could conclude that the slap fell within some plausible definition of "physical abuse." III The majority's discussion of the way in which a federal habeas court should review the application of a valid aggravating circumstance to the facts of a particular case seems to me to be flawed in significant respects. My principal disagreement, however, is with the Court's insistence on addressing the issue. The majority makes no effort to justify its holding that the Arizona Supreme Court has placed constitutionally *80 sufficient limitations on its "especially heinous. or depraved" aggravating circumstance. Instead the Court relies entirely on a sentence of dictum from today's opinion in Waltonan opinion which itself offers no rationale in support of the Court's conclusion. My dissenting opinion in Walton notes the Court's increasing tendency to review the constitutional claims of capital defendants in a perfunctory manner, but the Court's action in this case goes far beyond anything that is there observed. I dissent.
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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In this case we consider the validity of a state tax affecting cargo containers used in international trade, a subject we have addressed once before. See Japan We sustain Tennessee's sales tax on leases of containers owned by a domestic company and used in international shipping. I The use of large steel containers to transport goods by truck, rail, and oceangoing carrier was a major innovation in transportation technology. In 10, the United States shipped, by value, 60% of its marine imports and 52% of its marine exports in these containers. Itel Containers International *63 Corporation, the petitioner here, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place ofbusiness in California. Itel's primary business is leasing cargo containers to participants in the international shipping industry, and all its leases restrict use of its containers to international commerce. The leases are solicited and negotiated through Itel marketing offices in California, Illinois, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington, and the leased containers are delivered to lessees or their agents in many of the 50 States, including Tennessee. The Tennessee deliveries occur either at Itel's Memphis terminal or at several designated thirdparty terminals. In December 186, the Tennessee Department of Revenue assessed $382,465 in sales tax, penalties, and interest on the proceeds Itel earned from leased containers delivered in Tennessee for the period of January 183 through November 186. Itel paid under protest and filed an action for a refund, challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee tax under the Commerce Clause, the Import-Export Clause and the Supremacy Clause. The last challenge to the tax was based on an alleged conflict both with federal regulations and with two international conventions to which the United States is a signatory. Customs Convention on Containers, Dec. 2, 172, [175] 88 U. N. T. S. 43 (hereinafter 172 Container Convention); Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 156, [16] 20 U. S. T. 301, T. I.A. S. No. 66 (hereinafter 156 Container Convention). The Tennessee Chancery Court reduced the assessment to $158,012 on state-law grounds but rejected Itel's constitutional claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Itel maintained that the Tennessee tax is pre-empted by the Container Conventions and their implementing federal regulations. The court concluded, however, that congressional regulation of cargo containers is not pervasive and that Congress has not otherwise acted to bar state sales taxes on cargo container leases. Itel Containers Int'l Instead, the court held, Congress merely prohibits the imposition of federal customs duties on containers, and that prohibition does not pre-empt Tennessee's sales tax, which is not a customs duty. Itel also
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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sales tax, which is not a customs duty. Itel also claimed that Tennessee's tax violates the Foreign Commerce Clause principles announced in Japan because the tax "prevents the Federal Government from `speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments' " and "creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation." The state court rejected this argument because the tax is imposed only upon a discrete transaction the transferred possession of cargo containers within Tennesseeand therefore does not risk multiple taxation or impede federal regulation of foreign -37. Last, Itel argued that the tax violates the Import-Export Clause because it prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one voice in international affairs and is a tax on exports that is per se impermissible under Richfield The court dismissed Itel's one voice argument for reasons similar to those given in its Commerce Clause and held the Tennessee tax does not violate Richfield `s per se restriction because it is not a direct tax on the value of goods destined for We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II Itel's primary challenge is that the imposition of the Tennessee sales tax is proscribed by both the 172 and 156 Container Conventions. The Conventions restrict the authority of signatories to tax cargo containers by requiring signatory nations to grant the containers "temporary admission" into their borders, subject to exportation "within three months *65 from the date of importation" unless this period is extended by customs authorities. 172 Container Convention, Arts. 3 and 4; 156 Container Convention, Arts. 2 and 3. Temporary admission status permits the containers to enter a nation "free of import duties and taxes" under the 172 Convention and "free of import duties and import taxes" under the 156 Convention. 172 Container Convention, Art. 1; 156 Container Convention, Art. 2. The Conventions define these key phrases in similar terms. The 172 Convention defines "import duties and taxes" to mean "Customs duties and all other duties, taxes, fees and other charges which are collected on, or in connexion with, the importation of goods, but not including fees and charges limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered." 172 Container Convention, Art. 1. The 156 Convention defines "import duties and import taxes" to mean "not only Customs duties but also all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of importation." 156 Container Convention, Art. 1. Itel does not claim the Tennessee sales taxes on its container leases is a "Customs dut[y]" under either Convention. Rather, it says that because its containers would not be available for lease, and hence taxation, in
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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would not be available for lease, and hence taxation, in Tennessee but for their importation into the United States, the Tennessee tax must be a tax "collected on, or in connexion with, the importation of goods" in contravention of the 172 Convention and a tax "chargeable by reason of importation" in contravention of the 156 Convention. We cannot accept Itel's interpretation of the Container Conventions. Our interpretation must begin, as always, with the text of the Conventions. See Air The text, instead of supporting Itel's broad construction, makes clear that it is the reason a State imposes a tax, not the reason for the presence of the containers within a State's jurisdiction, that determines whether a tax violates the Container Conventions. The *66 Conventions thus disallow only those taxes imposed based on the act of importation itself. In contrast, Itel's interpretation would bar all taxes on containers covered by the Conventions, because each covered container is, by definition, in the United States as a result of its temporary importation. This reading makes superfluous the Conventions' qualifying language that the only taxes proscribed are those "collected on, or in connexion with, the importation of goods" and those "chargeable by reason of importation." 172 Container Convention, Art. 1; 156 Container Convention, Art. 1. In an attempt to counteract the interpretation that the Conventions prohibit only those taxes based on the importation of containers, Itel asserts that the consistent practice of other signatory nations and a prior interpretation of the 156 Convention by the United States prove that signatory nations read the Conventions to proscribe all taxes on containers within their borders. See Itel, however, overstates the probative value of these actions. As evidence that other signatory nations free cargo containers of all domestic taxation, Itel places primary reliance on the Economic Community Sixth Directive and the United Kingdom Value Added Tax (VAT), as illuminated in an amicus brief filed by the United Kingdom. Brief for United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae 7-. Under the European VAT system, no direct tax, be it a VAT, sales, or use tax, is imposed on the value of international container leases. See Sixth Council Directive of May 17, 177, Arts. 14(1)(i) and 15(13), reprinted in CCH Common Mkt. Rep. ¶¶ 3165P and 3165Q. The value of international container leases, however, is included in the cost of transporting goods, which in turn is added to the value of the goods when calculating VAT tax liability. Itel admits this is tantamount to an indirect tax on the value of international container leases, but
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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indirect tax on the value of international container leases, but claims the distinction between an indirect tax (paid by the consumer of * import goods) and a direct tax on the container itself (paid by either the lessor or lessee of the container) is significant. Whether or not, in the abstract, there is a significant difference between direct and indirect taxation, the Container Conventions do not distinguish between the two methods or differentiate depending upon the legal incidence of a tax. For example, the first declaration in both Convention Protocols of Signature states that inclusion of the weight or value of containers in the weight or value of goods for calculating import duties and taxes upon those goods conflicts with the Conventions, even though this would be only an indirect tax on the containers and the legal incidence of the tax would not fall on the container lessor or lessee. 172 Container Convention, Protocol of Signature, [175] 88 U. N. T. S., at 74; 156 Container Convention, Protocol of Signature, [16] 20 U. S. T., at 326. The Conventions, in short, prohibit both direct and indirect taxes imposed based on the importation of a container, but permit direct and indirect taxes imposed on some other basis. As further evidence in support of its position, Itel points to the statements of signatory nations objecting to Tennessee's taxation of container leases. With all due respect to those statements, we adhere to our interpretation. We are mindful that 11 nations (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), each a signatory to at least one Container Convention, have sent a diplomatic note to the United States Department of State submitting that they do not "impose sales taxes (or equivalent taxes of different nomenclatures) on the lease of cargo containers that are used in international commerce among the Contracting Parties to the Conventions." App. to Brief for United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae 1a. The meaning these nations ascribe to the phrase "equivalent taxes" is not clear. For purposes of calculation and assessment, the European VAT system, enacted in most of the *68 objecting nations, is by no means equivalent to a sales tax. See Trinova But as we discussed above, for the purpose of determining whether a tax is one based on importation, the European VAT system is equivalent to Tennessee's sales tax systemthat is, neither system imposes a tax based on the act of importation. Only this latter form of equivalence is relevant under the Container Conventions. Directing our attention
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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equivalence is relevant under the Container Conventions. Directing our attention to the amicus brief filed by the United States in Japan Itel next claims the United States Government once interpreted the 156 Container Convention to prohibit all domestic taxes on international cargo containers. Even if this were true, the Government's current position is quite different; its amicus brief in this case expresses agreement with our interpretation of both the 172 and the 156 Container Conventions. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12. In its amicus brief in Japan moreover, the United States did not say that the 156 Container Convention prohibited the imposition of any domestic tax on international cargo containers. Its position was simply that under the 156 Convention the United States gave containers "the same status it gives under the customs laws to articles admitted to a `bonded manufacturing warehouse.' " Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Japan O. T. 178, No. 77-1378, p. 25 (quoting 1 U.S. C. 1311). Starting from this premise the Government argued that, like state taxes on goods in customs bonded warehouses destined for foreign trade, see state taxes on containers would frustrate a federal scheme designed to benefit international commerce. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Japan at 27-2, and n. 22. We declined, and continue to decline, to adopt this expansive view of and the pre-emptive effect of the Container *6 Conventions. See infra, at 70-71. And, in any event, the Government's pre-emption argument in Japan does not conflict with its present interpretation that the Container Conventions themselves are violated only by a tax assessed upon the importation of containers. Tennessee's sales tax is imposed upon the "transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, lease or rental, conditional, or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever of tangible personal property for a consideration." Tenn. Code Ann. -6102(23)(A) It is a sales tax of general application that does not discriminate against imported products either in its purpose or effect. Indeed, its assessment bears no relation to importation whatsoever. The tax is not pre-empted by the 172 or 156 Container Convention. III Itel next argues that the application of Tennessee's sales tax to its container leases is pre-empted because it would frustrate the federal objectives underlying the Container Conventions and the laws and regulations granting favored status to international containers, in particular 1 U.S. C. 1322 and 1 CFR 10.41a See The federal regulatory scheme for cargo containers, it claims, parallels the regulatory scheme creating customs bonded warehouses which we have found to pre-empt
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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creating customs bonded warehouses which we have found to pre-empt most state taxes on warehoused goods. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco ; Xerox ; Itel's reliance on these decisions is misplaced. In and its progeny, we stated that Congress created a system for bonded warehouses where imports could be stored free of federal customs duties while under the continuous *70 supervision of local customs officials "in order to encourage merchants here and abroad to make use of American ports." Xerox By allowing importers to defer taxes on imported goods for a period of time and to escape taxes altogether on reexported goods, the bonded warehouse system "enabled the importer, without any threat of financial loss, to place his goods in domestic markets or to return them to foreign commerce and, by this flexibility, encouraged importers to use American facilities." R. J. Reynolds Tobacco This federal objective would be frustrated by the imposition of state sales and property taxes on goods not destined for domestic distribution, regardless of whether the taxes themselves discriminated against goods based on their destination. Xerox See also R. J. Reynolds Tobacco ; at In contrast, the federal regulatory scheme for containers used in foreign commerce discloses no congressional intent to exempt those containers from all or most domestic taxation. In Japan we said that the 156 Container Convention acknowledged "[t]he desirability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign commerce" and "reflect[ed] a national policy to remove impediments to the use of containers." -453. But we did not hold that the Convention and the federal regulatory scheme for cargo containers expressed a national policy to exempt containers from all domestic taxation. Rather, we relied on the federal laws, along with proof of an international customary norm of home port taxation and California's creation of an asymmetry in international maritime taxation, for our conclusion that California's ad valorem property tax violated the Foreign Commerce Clause by impeding the Government's ability to "`spea[k] with one voice' " in conducting our Nation's foreign affairs. Itel does not better its pre-emption argument by claiming that the federal regulatory scheme for containers, like the *71 customs bonded warehouse scheme, is so pervasive that it demonstrates a federal purpose to occupy the field of container regulation and taxation. We doubt that the container regulatory scheme can be considered as pervasive as the customs warehouse scheme. The latter provides for continual federal supervision of warehouses, strict bonding requirements, and special taxing rules, see 1 U.S. C. 1555 and 1557; 1 CFR pt. 1 whereas former the is limited more to general the certification
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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whereas former the is limited more to general the certification and taxing of containers, see 1 U.S. C. 1322; 1 CFR 10.41a and 115.25-115.43 Even if Itel were correct on this point, however, we have not held that state taxation of goods in bonded warehouses is pre-empted by Congress' intent to occupy the field of bonded warehouse regulation. In fact, in R. J. Reynolds we specifically held that the bonded warehouse statutes and regulations did not evidence such a purpose. So, too, we cannot conclude that in adopting laws governing the importation of containers Congress intended to foreclose any and all concurrent state regulation or taxation of containers. The precise federal policy regarding promotion of container use is satisfied by a proscription against taxes that are imposed upon, or discriminate against, the importation of containers. We find that Tennessee's general sales tax, which applies to domestic and foreign goods without differentiation, does not impede the federal objectives expressed in the 172 and 156 Container Conventions and related federal statutes and regulations. IV A Itel's third challenge to Tennessee's tax on container leases is that the tax violates the Foreign Commerce Clause as interpreted by Japan U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. We began our in Japan with a reformulation of the Foreign Commerce Clause test: *72 "In addition to answering the nexus, apportionment, and nondiscrimination questions posed in Complete Auto [Transit, ], a court must also inquire, first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from `speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.' " 441 U.S., Without passing on the point, we assumed the California property tax in question would have met the test of Complete Auto Transit, See 441 U.S., Proceeding to the two foreign commerce requirements we had identified, we found the California tax incompatible with both. We held that because Japan had the established right, consistent with the custom of nations, see to tax the property value of the containers in full, California's tax "produce[d] multiple taxation in fact," We held further that California's tax prevented the United States from speaking with one voice in foreign affairs, in that "[t]he risk of retaliation by Japan, under these circumstances, [was] acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole." Four years later we again addressed whether a California tax offended the Foreign Commerce Clause, this time in the context of a unitary business income tax. Container of Although recognizing that California's
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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unitary business income tax. Container of Although recognizing that California's income tax shared some of the same characteristics as the property tax involved in Japan see we nevertheless upheld it based on two distinguishing characteristics. First, the problem of double taxing in Container "although real, [was] not the `inevitabl[e]' result of the California [income] taxing scheme." (quoting Japan ). On the other hand, "[i]n Japan we relied strongly on the fact that one taxing jurisdiction *73 claimed the right to tax a given value in full, and another taxing jurisdiction claimed the right to tax the same entity in parta combination resulting necessarily in double taxation." 463 U.S., That the Japan Court adopted a rule requiring States to forgo assessing property taxes against foreign-owned cargo containers "was by no means unfair, because the rule did no more than reflect consistent international practice and express federal policy." Container Second, we noted that "in [Container ] unlike Japan the Executive Branch ha[d] decided not to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the state tax." Together with our conclusion that the California income tax did not result in automatic double taxation, the Government's nonintervention suggested that the tax presented no serious threat to United States foreign policy. See B Before reconciling the holdings of Japan and Container we first address the Complete Auto test, a test we assumed, arguendo, was satisfied by the tax in Japan 441 U. S., A state tax satisfies the Complete Auto Domestic Commerce Clause test "when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto, at Because Itel accepts the Supreme Court of Tennessee's conclusion that "Tennessee's sales tax meets the four-fold requirements of Complete Auto, " we need not retrace that court's careful We do note, however, that Tennessee's compliance with the Complete Auto test has relevance to our conclusion that the state tax meets those inquiries unique to the Foreign Commerce Clause. That the tax is a fair measure of the State's contacts with a given commercial transaction in all four aspects of the Complete Auto test *74 confirms both the State's legitimate interest in taxing the transaction and the absence of an attempt to interfere with the free flow of commerce, be it foreign or domestic. C We proceed to evaluate the tax under Japan `s two Foreign Commerce Clause factors. Left to decide whether Tennessee's tax rests on the Japan or the Container side
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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Tennessee's tax rests on the Japan or the Container side of the scale, we have no doubt that the and holding of Container control. Itel asserts that Tennessee's law invites multiple taxation of container leases because numerous foreign nations have a sufficient taxing nexus with the leases to impose equivalent taxes, and many nations in fact would do so were it not for the Container Conventions' prohibitions. As an initial matter, of course, we have concluded that the Conventions do not prohibit Tennessee's sales tax or equivalent taxes imposed by other nations. To the extent Tennessee has invited others to tax cargo container leases, foreign sovereigns, in an exercise of their independent judgment, have chosen not to accept. Furthermore, the Foreign Commerce Clause cannot be interpreted to demand that a State refrain from taxing any business transaction that is also potentially subject to taxation by a foreign sovereign. "Japan does not require forbearance so extreme or so one-sided." Container Tennessee has decided to tax a discrete transaction occurring within the State. See Wardair Canada 1, code, And, according to its interpretation of its revenue which we accept, Tennessee credits against its own tax any tax properly paid in another jurisdiction, foreign or domestic, on the same transaction. Tenn. Code Ann. -6313(f) (18). By these measures, Tennessee's sales tax reduces, if not eliminates, the risk of multiple international taxation. Absent a conflict with a "consistent international practice *75 [or] federal policy," Container 463 U. S., the careful apportionment of a state tax on business transactions conducted within state borders does not create the substantial risk of international multiple taxation that implicates Foreign Commerce Clause concerns. Itel further claims that if other States in this country follow Tennessee's lead and tax international container leases, the United States will be unable to speak with one voice in foreign trade because international container leases will be subject to various degrees of domestic taxation. As a consequence, Itel insists, container owners and users will be hit by retaliatory foreign taxes. To the extent Itel is arguing that the risk of double taxation violates the one voice test, our response is the same as above: Tennessee's tax does not create the substantial risk of international multiple taxation that implicates Foreign Commerce Clause concerns. To the extent Itel is arguing that taxes like Tennessee's engender foreign policy problems, the United States disagrees. The Federal Government, in adopting various conventions, statutes, and regulations that restrict a State's ability to tax international cargo containers in defined circumstances, has acted on the subject of taxing cargo containers and their use.
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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on the subject of taxing cargo containers and their use. It has chosen to eliminate state taxes collected in connection with the importation of cargo containers. The state tax here does not fall within that proscription, and the most rational inference to be drawn is that this tax, one quite distinct from the general class of import duties, is permitted. Unlike in Japan or Container moreover, the United States has filed an amicus brief defending Tennessee's law: "Far from conflicting with international custom, the Tennessee tax appears to promote it. The Tennessee tax thus does not interfere with our ability `to speak with one voice' on this issue involving foreign commerce." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. This submission "is by no means dispositive." Container 463 U. S., at 15-16. But given the strong indications *76 from Congress that Tennessee's method of taxation is allowable, and with due regard for the fact that the nuances of foreign policy "are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court," we find no reason to disagree with the United States' submission that Tennessee's tax does not infringe the Government's ability to speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with other nations. "It would turn dormant Commerce Clause entirely upside down to apply it where the Federal Government has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow." Wardair Canada, V Itel's final avenue of attack on the Tennessee tax is that, as applied to international container leases, it violates the Import-Export Clause. U. S. Const., Art. I, 10, cl. 2. Our modern Import-Export Clause test was first announced in Michelin Tire v. Wages, (176): "The Framers of the Constitution sought to alleviate three main concerns by committing sole power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Government, with no concurrent state power: [1] the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power; [2] import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and [3] harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as favorably geographically." *77 The first
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,993 | 4 |
majority
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Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/
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other States not situated as favorably geographically." *77 The first and third components in this formulation mirror inquiries we have already undertaken as part of our Foreign Commerce Clause That is, the one voice component of the Michelin test is the same as the one voice component of our Japan test. Japan 441 U. S., at 44-450, n. 14. And the state harmony component parallels the four Complete Auto requirements of the Foreign and Domestic Commerce Clause. Department of Revenue of 435 U.S. 7, (178) Having concluded that the Tennessee tax survives Commerce Clause scrutiny, we must conclude the tax is consistent with the first and third component of our Michelin test. This leaves only Michelin `s second component: ensuring that import revenues are not being diverted from the Federal Government. We need not provide a detailed explanation of what, if any, substantive limits this aspect of Michelin places on state taxation of goods flowing through international channels, for the tax here is not a tax on importation or imported goods, but a tax on a business transaction occurring within the taxing State. The tax does not draw revenue from the importation process and so does not divert import revenue from the Federal Government. For similar reasons, we reject the argument that the tax violates the prohibition on the direct taxation of imports and exports "in transit," the rule we followed in Richfield 32 U. S., at 78-7, 84. Even assuming that rule has not been altered by the approach we adopted in Michelin, it is inapplicable here. Tennessee's sales tax is levied on leases transferring temporary possession of containers to third parties in Tennessee; it is not levied on the containers themselves or on the goods being imported in those containers. The tax thus does not divert import revenue from the Federal Government because *78 "the taxation falls upon a service distinct from [import] goods and their value." Washington See also Canton R. v. Rogan, 0 U.S. 511, (151). VI For the reasons we have stated, we hold that Tennessee's sales tax, as applied to Itel's international container leases, does not violate the Commerce, Import-Export or Supremacy Clause. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
dissenting
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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203762/spokeo-inc-v-robins/
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In the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA or Act), 15 U.S. C. et seq., Congress required consumer reporting agencies, whenever preparing a consumer re- port, to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the indi- vidual about whom the report relates.” e(b). To promote adherence to the Act’s procedural requirements, Congress granted adversely affected consumers a right to sue noncomplying reporting agencies. n (willful noncompliance); o (negligent noncompliance).1 Thomas Robins instituted suit against Spokeo, Inc., alleg- ing that Spokeo was a reporting agency governed by the FCRA, and that Spokeo maintains on its Web site an inaccurate consumer report about Robins. App. 13. In particular, Robins alleged that Spokeo posted “a picture purport[ing] to be an image of Robins [that] was not in fact [of him],” and incorrectly reported that Robins “was in his 50s, married, employed in a professional or technical field, and has children.” at 14. Robins further alleged that Spokeo’s profile of him continues to misrepresent “that he has a graduate degree, —————— 1 Congress added the right of action for willful violations in 1996 as part of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, –426. 2 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS GINSBURG, J., dissenting that his economic health is ‘Very Strong[,]’ and that his wealth level [is in] the ‘Top 10%.’ ” Spokeo displayed that erroneous information, Robins asserts, when he was “out of work” and “actively seeking employment.” Because of the misinformation, Robins stated, he encoun- tered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.” 2 As Robins elaborated on brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers would be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities. See Brief for Respondent 44. I agree with much of the Court’s opinion. Robins, the Court holds, meets the particularity requirement for standing under Article III. See ante, at 8, 11 (remanding only for concreteness inquiry). The Court acknowledges that Congress has the authority to confer rights and delin- eate claims for relief where none existed before. Ante, at 9; see Federal Election 19– 20 (1998) (holding that inability to procure information to which Congress has created a right in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 qualifies as concrete injury satisfy- ing Article III’s standing requirement); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, (holding that plaintiff advocacy organizations’ inability to obtain information that Congress made subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory Committee Act “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”); Havens Realty ——————
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
dissenting
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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203762/spokeo-inc-v-robins/
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distinct injury to provide standing to sue”); Havens Realty —————— 2 Because this case remains at the pleading stage, the court of first instance must assume the truth of Robins’ factual allegations. In particular, that court must assume, subject to later proof, that Spokeo is a consumer reporting agency under 15 U.S. C. a(f ) and that, in preparing consumer reports, Spokeo does not employ reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy, in violation of the FCRA. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 GINSBURG, J., dissenting (identifying, as Article III injury, violation of plaintiff ’s right, secured by the Fair Housing Act, to “truthful infor- mation concerning the availability of housing”).3 Con- gress’ connection of procedural requirements to the pre- vention of a substantive harm, the Court appears to agree, is “instructive and important.” Ante, at 9; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“As Government programs and policies become more complex and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action”); Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (“Congress cannot authorize individual plaintiffs to enforce general- ized rights that belong to the whole public. But Congress can create new individual rights, and it can enact effective remedies for those rights.”). See generally Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: and Beyond, I part ways with the Court, however, on the necessity of a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized injury was “concrete.” See ante, at 11. Judged by what we have said about “concreteness,” Robins’ allegations carry him across the threshold. The Court’s opinion observes that time and again, our decisions have coupled the words “concrete and particularized.” Ante, at 8 (citing as exam- ples, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 8); ; Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., ; Massachu- ). True, but true —————— 3 Just as the right to truthful information at stake in Havens Realty was closely tied to the Fair Housing Act’s goal of eradicating racial discrimination in housing, so the right here at stake is closely tied to the FCRA’s goal of protecting consumers against dissemination of inaccurate credit information about them. 4 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS GINSBURG, J., dissenting too, in the four cases cited by the Court, and many others, opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms “concrete” and “particularized.” Inspection of the Court’s decisions suggests that the particularity requirement bars complaints raising general- ized grievances, seeking relief that no more benefits
|
Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
dissenting
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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203762/spokeo-inc-v-robins/
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raising general- ized grievances, seeking relief that no more benefits the plaintiff than it does the public at large. See, e.g., Lujan, –574 (a plaintiff “seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large does not state an Article III case or contro- versy” (punctuation omitted)); (plaintiffs lack standing because they failed to show injury to “a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of the law”). Robins’ claim does not pre- sent a question of that character. He seeks redress, not for harm to the citizenry, but for Spokeo’s spread of misin- formation specifically about him. Concreteness as a discrete requirement for standing, the Court’s decisions indicate, refers to the reality of an injury, harm that is real, not abstract, but not necessarily tangi- ble. See ante, at 8–9; ante, at 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Illustrative opinions include (“[C]ourts will not pass upon abstract, intellectual prob- lems, but adjudicate concrete, living contests between adversaries.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); (plaintiff ’s “abstract concern does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art[icle] III” (internal quota- tion marks and ellipsis omitted)); Los (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome Abstract injury is not enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, (“The differ- ence between an abstract question and a ‘case or contro- versy’ is one of degree, of course, and is not discernable by Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 5 GINSBURG, J., dissenting any precise test. The basic inquiry is whether the conflict- ing contentions of the parties present a real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal inter- ests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.” (citation, some internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted)); (“organization’s abstract concern does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III”); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, (“There must be con- crete adverseness”; “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)); Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, (controversy must be “defi- nite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract”); Coleman v. Miller, (19) (opinion of Frankfur- ter, J.) (“[I]t [is] not for courts to pass upon abstract, intellectual problems but only concrete, living con- test[s] between adversaries call[ing] for the arbitrament of law.”). Robins would not qualify, the Court observes, if he alleged a “bare” procedural violation, ante, at 10, one that results in no harm, for example, “an incorrect zip code,” ante, at 11. Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins com- plains of misinformation about his education,
|
Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
dissenting
|
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203762/spokeo-inc-v-robins/
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zip code, Robins com- plains of misinformation about his education, family situa- tion, and economic status, inaccurate representations that could affect his fortune in the job market. See Brief for Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae 13 (Spokeo’s inaccuracies bore on Robins’ “ability to find employment by creating the erroneous impression that he was overqualified for the work he was seeking, that he might be unwilling to relocate for a job due to family commitments, or that his salary demands would exceed what prospective employers were prepared to offer him.”); Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 35 (“An applicant can lose [a] job for being over- qualified; a suitor can lose a woman if she reads that he is 6 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS GINSBURG, J., dissenting married.”). The FCRA’s procedural requirements aimed to prevent such harm. See 115 Cong. Rec. 2410–2415 (19). I therefore see no utility in returning this case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’ complaint al- ready conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation “cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.” App. 14. * * * For the reasons stated, I would affirm the Ninth Cir- cuit’s judgment
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S. C. 505, provides in relevant part that in any copyright infringement action "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs."[1] The question presented in this case is what standards should inform a court's decision to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a copyright infringement actiona question that has produced conflicting views in the Courts of Appeals. Petitioner John Fogerty is a successful musician, who, in the late 1960's, was the lead singer and songwriter of a popular music group known as "Creedence Clearwater Revival."[2] In 1970, he wrote a song entitled "Run Through the Jungle" and sold the exclusive publishing rights to predecessors-in-interest of respondent Fantasy, Inc., who later obtained the copyright by assignment. The music group disbanded in 1972 and Fogerty subsequently published under another recording label. In he published and registered a copyright to a song entitled "The Old Man Down the Road," which was released on an album distributed by Warner Brothers Records, Inc. Respondent Fantasy, Inc., *520 sued Fogerty, Warner Brothers, and affiliated companies[3] in District Court, alleging that "The Old Man Down the Road" was merely "Run Through the Jungle" with new words.[4] The copyright infringement claim went to trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Fogerty. After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U.S. C. 505. The District Court denied the motion, finding that Fantasy's infringement suit was not brought frivolously or in bad faith as required by Circuit precedent for an award of attorney's fees to a successful defendant.[5] The Court of Appeals affirmed, and declined to abandon the existing Ninth Circuit standard for awarding attorney's fees which treats successful plaintiffs and successful defendants differently. Under that standard, commonly termed the "dual" standard, prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney's fees as a matter of course, while prevailing defendants must show that the original suit was frivolous *521 or brought in bad faith.[6] In contrast, some Courts of Appeals follow the so-called "evenhanded" approach in which no distinction is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.[7] The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled that "we do not require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance of fees as a concomitant of prevailing in every case, but we do favor an evenhanded approach." We granted certiorari, to address an important area of federal law and to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit's "dual" standard for awarding attorney's fees
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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between the Ninth Circuit's "dual" standard for awarding attorney's fees under 505, and the so-called "evenhanded" approach exemplified by the Third Circuit.[8] We reverse. *522 Respondent advances three arguments in support of the dual standard followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. First, it contends that the language of 505, when read in the light of our decisions construing similar fee-shifting language, supports the rule. Second, it asserts that treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently comports with the "objectives" and "equitable considerations" underlying the Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, respondent contends that the legislative history of 505 indicates that Congress ratified the dual standard which it claims was "uniformly" followed by the lower courts under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act. We address each of these arguments in turn. The statutory language"the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs"gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defendants. But respondent contends that our decision in Garment in which we construed virtually identical language, supports a differentiation in treatment between plaintiffs and defendants. construed the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in relevant part provided that the court, "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5(k). We had earlier held, interpreting the cognate provision of Title II of that Act, 42 U.S. C. 2000a-3(b), that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily *523 recover an attorney's fee unless some special circumstances would render such an award unjust." This decision was based on what we found to be the important policy objectives of the Civil Rights statutes, and the intent of Congress to achieve such objectives through the use of plaintiffs as "`private attorney[s] general.'" In we determined that the same policy considerations were not at work in the case of a prevailing civil rights defendant. We noted that a Title VII plaintiff, like a Title II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is "the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate `a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.'" We also relied on the admittedly sparse legislative history to indicate that different standards were to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to successful defendants. Respondent points to our language in Flight that "fee-shifting statutes' similar language is a `strong indication' that they are to be interpreted alike." But here we think this normal indication is overborne by the factors relied upon in our opinion
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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is overborne by the factors relied upon in our opinion that are absent in the case of the Copyright Act.[9] The legislative history of 505 provides no support for treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recovery of attorney's fees. The attorney's fees provision of 505 of the 1976 Act was carried forward verbatim from the 1909 Act with very little discussion.[10] The relevant House Report provides simply: "Under section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney's fees are left to the court's discretion, and the section also makes clear that neither costs nor attorney's fees *524 can be awarded to or against `the United States or an officer thereof.'" H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 163 (1976).[11] See also S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 145 Other courts and commentators have noted the paucity of legislative history of 505. See, e. g., aff'd on other grounds, See also Jaszi, 505 And All ThatThe Defendant's Dilemma, 55 Law & Contemp. Prob. 107, 107-108, and nn. 1, 2 (1992). The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not completely similar. Oftentimes, in the civil rights context, impecunious "private attorney general" plaintiffs can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants with more resources. Congress sought to redress this balance in part, and to provide incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms of the award of attorney's fees. The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. See infra, at 527. In the copyright context, it has been noted that "[e]ntities which sue for copyright infringement as plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists; the same is true of prospective copyright infringement defendants." *525 We thus conclude that respondent's argument based on our fee-shifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act must fail.[12] Respondent next argues that the policies and objectives of 505 and of the Copyright Act in general are best served by the "dual approach" to the award of attorney's fees.[13] The most common reason advanced in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright infringement. See, e. g., (citations omitted); Indeed, respondent relies heavily on this argument. We think the argument is flawed because it expresses a one-sided view of the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is true that one of the goals of
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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While it is true that one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is by no means the only goal of that Act. In the first place, it is by no means always the case that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only holder of a copyright; often times, defendants hold copyrights too, as exemplified in the case at hand. See 788 F. 2d, at 155 (noting that "in many cases the defendants are the [copyright] holders"). More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright infringement. The Constitution grants to Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 8. We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward," are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good. Sony Corp. of For example, in Twentieth Century Music we discussed the policies underlying the 1909 Copyright Act as follows: "The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an `author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by *527 this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good." (Footnotes omitted.) We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications, where we said: "The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but `[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." (Citations omitted.) Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement. In the case before us,
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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litigate meritorious claims of infringement. In the case before us, the successful defense of "The Old Man Down the Road" increased public exposure to a musical work that could, as a result, lead to further creative pieces. Thus a successful defense of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by the holder of a copyright. Respondent finally urges that the legislative history supports the dual standard, relying on the principle of ratification. See Respondent surveys the great number of lower court cases interpreting the identical provision in the 1909 Act, 17 *528 U. S. C. 116 (1976 ed.), and asserts that "it was firmly established" that prevailing defendants should be awarded attorney's fees only where the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or brought with a vexatious purpose. Brief for Respondent 40-45. Furthermore, respondent claims that Congress was aware of this construction of former 116 because of two copyright studies submitted to Congress when it was studying revisions to the Act. W. Strauss, Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, Study No. 22 (hereinafter Strauss Study), and R. Brown, Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, Study No. 23 (hereinafter Brown Study), Studies Prepared for Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960). Before turning to the import of the two studies and the cases decided under the 1909 Act, we summarize briefly the factual background of whence comes the statement upon which respondent relies. There the question was whether there was a right to jury trial in an action for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of (ADEA). In enacting that statute, Congress provided, inter alia, that the provisions of the ADEA were to be "enforced in accordance with the `powers, remedies and procedures'" of specified sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S. C. 626(b). 434 U. S., at In the three decided cases which had treated the right to jury trial under the FLSA, each court had decided that there was such a right. In enacting the ADEA, "Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation." Here, by contrast, the Strauss and Brown Studies deal only briefly with the provision for the award of attorney's fees. In the Strauss Study, the limited discussion begins with a quote to A. Weil, American Copyright Law 530-531 *529
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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a quote to A. Weil, American Copyright Law 530-531 *529 (1917), for an explanation of the "discretionary awarding of attorney's fees": "`The amount of money frequently involved in copyright letigation [sic], especially on the part of the defendant is trifling. The expense of any letigation [sic] is considerable. Unless, therefore, some provision is made for financial protection to a litigant, if successful, it may not pay a party to defend rights, even if valid, a situation opposed to justice. It is increasingly recognized that the person who forces another to engage counsel to vindicate, or defend, a right should bear the expense of such engagement and not his successful opponent'" Strauss Study 31. The study then notes that the pending bills contemplate no change in the attorney's fees provision and concludes with the simple statement "[t]he cases indicate that this discretion has been judiciously exercised by the courts." [14] This *530 limited discussion of attorney's fees surely does not constitute an endorsement of a dual standard. The Brown Study was intended as a supplement to the Strauss Study and, inter alia, provides information from a survey distributed to practitioners about the practical workings *531 of the 1909 Copyright Act.[15] It also does not endorse a standard of treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently. At one point, the study notes that "courts do not usually make an allowance at all if an unsuccessful plaintiff's claim was not `synthetic, capricious or otherwise unreasonable,' or if the losing defendant raised real issues of fact or law." Brown Study 85.[16] Our review of the prior case law itself leads us to conclude that there was no settled "dual standard" interpretation of former 116 about which Congress could have been aware. We note initially that at least one reported case stated no reason in awarding attorney's fees to successful defendants. See, e. g., More importantly, while it appears that the majority of lower courts exercised their discretion in awarding attorney's fees *532 to prevailing defendants based on a finding of frivolousness or bad faith, not all courts expressly described the test in those terms.[17] In fact, only one pre-1976 case expressly endorsed a dual standard.[18] This is hardly the sort of uniform construction that Congress might have endorsed. *533 In summary, neither of the two studies presented to Congress, nor the cases referred to by the studies, support respondent's view that there was a settled construction in favor of the "dual standard" under 116 of the 1909 Copyright Act. We thus reject each of respondent's three arguments in support of the dual standard. We now
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,994 | 19 |
majority
|
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112934/fogerty-v-fantasy-inc/
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three arguments in support of the dual standard. We now turn to petitioner's argument that 505 was intended to adopt the "British Rule." Petitioner argues that, consistent with the neutral language of 505, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded attorney's fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional circumstances. For two reasons we reject this argument for the British Rule. First, just as the plain language of 505 supports petitioner's claim for disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in arguing for the British Rule. The statute says that "the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." The word "may" clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion. Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the strong background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where counsel fees are regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline Service ; Flight While 505 is one situation in which *534 Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of attorney's fees in the court's discretion, we find it impossible to believe that Congress, without more, intended to adopt the British Rule. Such a bold departure from traditional practice would have surely drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative comment. Cf. Isbrandtsen Not surprisingly, no court has held that 505 (or its predecessor statute) adopted the British Rule. Thus we reject both the "dual standard" adopted by several of the Courts of Appeals and petitioner's claim that 505 enacted the British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney's fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion. "There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations," but instead equitable discretion should be exercised "in light of the considerations we have identified." U.S. 424,[19] Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held petitioner, the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than that applicable to a prevailing *535 plaintiff, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,004 | 16 |
dissenting
|
Dretke v. Haley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134737/dretke-v-haley/
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The unending search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget about justice. This should be a simple case. Respondent was convicted of the theft of a calculator. Because of his prior theft convictions, Texas law treated respondent's crime as a "state jail felony," which is punishable by a maximum sentence of two years in jail. (a) (2003). But as a result of a congeries of mistakes made by the prosecutor, the trial judge, and his attorney, respondent was also erroneously convicted and sentenced under Texas' habitual offender law, 12.42(a)(2) (Supp. 2004). Respondent consequently received a sentence of more than 16 years in the penitentiary. The State concedes that respondent does not qualify as a habitual offender and that the 16-year sentence was imposed in error.[1] Respondent has already served more than 6 years of that sentence a sentence far in excess of the 2-year maximum that Texas law authorizes for respondent's crime. *397 Because, as all parties agree, there is no factual basis for respondent's conviction as a habitual offender, it follows inexorably that respondent has been denied due process of law. ; And because that constitutional error clearly and concededly resulted in the imposition of an unauthorized sentence, it also follows that respondent is a "victim of a miscarriage of justice," entitled to immediate and unconditional release. The Magistrate Judge, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals all concluded that respondent is entitled to such relief. Not a word in any federal statute or any provision of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides any basis for challenging that conclusion. The Court's contrary determination in this case rests entirely on a procedural rule of its own invention. But having also invented the complex jurisprudence that requires a prisoner to establish "cause and prejudice" as a basis for overcoming procedural default, the Court unquestionably has the authority to recognize a narrow exception for the unusual case that is as clear as this one. Indeed, in the opinion that first adopted the cause and prejudice standard, the Court explained its purpose as providing "an adequate guarantee" that a procedural default would "not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." The Court has since held that in cases in which the cause and prejudice standard is inadequate to protect against fundamental miscarriages of justice, the cause and prejudice requirement "must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration."
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,004 | 16 |
dissenting
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Dretke v. Haley
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134737/dretke-v-haley/
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yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration." If there were some uncertainty about the merits of respondent's claim that he has been incarcerated unjustly, it *398 might make sense to require him to pursue other avenues for comparable relief before deciding the claim.[2] But in this case, it is universally acknowledged that respondent's incarceration is unauthorized. The miscarriage of justice is manifest. Since the "imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration" will lead to the issuance of the writ regardless of the outcome of the cause and prejudice inquiry, the Court's ruling today needlessly postpones final adjudication of respondent's claim and perversely prolongs the very injustice that the cause and prejudice standard was designed to prevent. That the State has decided to oppose the grant of habeas relief in this case, even as it concedes that respondent has already served more time in prison than the law authorized, might cause some to question whether the State has forgotten its overriding "obligation to serve the cause of justice." United ; see post, p. 399 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). But this Court is surely no less at fault. In its attempt to refine the boundaries of the judge-made doctrine of procedural default, the Court has lost sight of the basic reason why the "writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence." Engle, Habeas corpus is, and has for centuries been, a "bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental *399 fairness." Fundamental fairness should dictate the outcome of this unusually simple case. I respectfully dissent.
|
Justice White
| 1,993 | 6 |
dissenting
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Brecht v. Abrahamson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112845/brecht-v-abrahamson/
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Assuming that petitioner's conviction was in fact tainted by a constitutional violation that, while not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, did not have "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," it is undisputed that he would be entitled to reversal in the state courts on appeal or in this Court on certiorari review. If, however, the state courts erroneously concluded that no violation had occurred or (as is the case here) that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and supposing further that certiorari was either not sought or not granted, the majority would foreclose relief on federal habeas review. As a result of today's decision, in short, the fate of one in state custody turns on whether the state courts properly applied the Federal Constitution as then interpreted by decisions of this Court, and on whether we choose to review his claim on certiorari. Because neither the federal habeas corpus statute nor our own precedents can support such illogically disparate treatment, I dissent. *645 I A established the federal nature of the harmless-error standard to be applied when constitutional rights are at stake. Such rights, we stated, are "rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James Madison, who told the Congress that the `independent' federal courts would be the `guardians of those rights.' " at 21 (footnote omitted). Thus, "[w]hether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied. With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States, we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative laws, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights." Chapman, it is true, never expressly identified the source of this harmless-error standard. But, whether the standard be characterized as a "necessary rule" of federal law, ib, or criticized as a quasi-constitutional doctrine, see at 46, 51 the Court clearly viewed it as essential to the safeguard of federal constitutional rights. Otherwise, there would have been no justification for imposing the rule on state courts. Cf. at 48-51 As far as I can tell, the majority does not question Chapman `s vitality on direct review and, therefore, the federal and constitutional underpinnings on which it rests. That being so, the majority's conclusion is untenable. Under Chapman, federal law requires reversal of a state *646 conviction involving a constitutional violation that
|
Justice White
| 1,993 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Brecht v. Abrahamson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112845/brecht-v-abrahamson/
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of a state *646 conviction involving a constitutional violation that is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant whose conviction has been upheld despite the occurrence of such a violation certainly is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," 28 U.S. C. 2254(a), and therefore is entitled to habeas relief. Although we have never explicitly held that this was the case, our practice before this day plainly supports this view, as the majority itself acknowledges. See, e. g., ; see also ante, at 630. B The Court justifies its decision by asserting that "collateral review is different from direct review," ante, at 633, and that "we have applied different standards on habeas than would be applied on direct review with respect to matters other than harmless-error analysis," ante, at 634. All told, however, it can only uncover a single example of a constitutional violation that would entitle a state prisoner to relief on direct, but not on collateral, review. Thus, federal habeas review is not available to a defendant claiming that the conviction rests on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though such claims remain cognizable in state courts. I have elsewhere stated my reasons for disagreeing with that holding, at 536-537 (White, J., dissenting), but today's decision cannot be supported even under Stone `s own terms. Stone was premised on the view that the exclusionary rule is not a "personal constitutional right," at 486, and that it "does not exist to remedy any wrong committed against the defendant, but rather to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment by law enforcement personnel," In other words, one whose conviction rests on evidence obtained in a search or seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment is deemed not to be unconstitutionally *647 detained. It is no surprise, then, that the Court of Appeals in this case rested its decision on an analogy between the rights guaranteed in and those at issue in Stone. See Doyle, it concluded, "is aprophylactic rule designed to protect another prophylactic rule from erosion or misuse." But the Court clearly and, in my view, properly rejects that view. Indeed, it repeatedly emphasizes that Doyle "is rooted in fundamental fairness and due process concerns," that "due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant's post-Miranda silence," and that it "does not bear the hallmarks of a prophylactic rule." Ante, at 629. Because the Court likewise leaves undisturbed the notion that Chapman `s harmlesserror standard is required to protect constitutional rights, see its conclusion that a Doyle
|
Justice White
| 1,993 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Brecht v. Abrahamson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112845/brecht-v-abrahamson/
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to protect constitutional rights, see its conclusion that a Doyle violation that fails to meet that standard will not trigger federal habeas relief is inexplicable. II The majority's decision to adopt this novel approach is far from inconsequential. Under Chapman, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained." In contrast, the Court now invokes a case involving a nonconstitutional error of trial procedureto impose on the defendant the burden of establishing that the error "resulted in `actual prejudice.' " Ante, at 637. Moreover, although the Court of Appeals limited its holding to Doyle and other socalled "prophylactic" and although the parties' arguments were similarly focused, see Brief for Respondent 36-37; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, 19, n. 11, the Court extends its holding to all "constitutional error[s] of the trial type," ante, at 638. Given that *648 all such "trial errors" are now subject to harmless-error analysis, see and that "most constitutional errors" are of this variety, the Court effectively has ousted Chapman from habeas review of state convictions.[*] In other words, a state court determination that a constitutional erroreven one as fundamental as the admission of a coerced confession, see at 308is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has in effect become unreviewable by lower federal courts by way of habeas corpus. I believe this result to be at odds with the role Congress has ascribed to habeas review, which is, at least in part, to deter both prosecutors and courts from disregarding their constitutional responsibilities. "[T]he threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards." ; see also In response, the majority characterizes review of the Chapman determination by a federal habeas court as "scarcely logical," ante, at 636, and, in any event, sees no evidence that deterrence is needed. Yet the logic of such practice is not ours to assess for, as Justice Frankfurter explained: "Congress could have left the enforcement of federal constitutional rights governing the administration of criminal justice in the States exclusively to the State courts. These tribunals are under the same duty as the federal courts to respect rights under the United States Constitution. But the wisdom of such a modification in the law is for Congress to consider" Brown v. * "[T]he prior State determination of a claim under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such a claim, else the State court would have the final say
|
Justice White
| 1,993 | 6 |
dissenting
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Brecht v. Abrahamson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112845/brecht-v-abrahamson/
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claim, else the State court would have the final say which the Congress provided it should not have." at 500. See also As for the "empirical evidence" the majority apparently seeks, I cannot understand itsimport. Either state courts are faithful to federal law, in which case there is no cost in applying the Chapman as opposed to the Kotteakos standard on collateral review; or they are not, and it is precisely the role of habeas corpus to rectify that situation. Ultimately, the central question is whether States may detain someone whose conviction was tarnished by a constitutional violation that is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman dictates that they may not; the majority suggests that, so long as direct review has not corrected this error in time, they may. If state courts remain obliged to apply Chapman, and in light of the infrequency with which we grant certiorari, I fail to see how this decision can be reconciled with Congress' intent. III Our habeas jurisprudence is taking on the appearance of a confused patchwork in which different constitutional rights are treated according to their status, and in which the same constitutional right is treated differently depending on whether its vindication is sought on direct or collateral review. I believe this picture bears scant resemblance either to Congress' design or to our own precedents. The Court of Appeals having yet to apply Chapman to the facts of this case, I would remand to that court for determination of whether the Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I dissent.
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,013 | 24 |
concurring
|
Burt v. Titlow
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2641235/burt-v-titlow/
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In my view, this case turns on Vonlee Titlow’s failure to present enough evidence of what Frederick Toca did or did not do in the handful of days after she hired him and before she withdrew her plea. As our opinion notes, she bore the burden of overcoming two presumptions: that Toca performed effectively and that the state court ruled correctly. She failed to carry this burden. We need not say more, and indeed we do not say more. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately, however, to express my understanding of our opinion’s limited scope, particularly with respect to two statements that it makes about the adequacy of Toca’s performance. First, we state that “[a]lthough a defendant’s proclama- tion of innocence does not relieve counsel of his normal responsibilities under Strickland, it may affect the advice counsel gives.” Ante, at 8. The first part of that statement bears emphasis: Regardless of whether a defendant as- serts her innocence (or admits her guilt), her counsel must “make an independent examination of the facts, circum- stances, pleadings and laws involved and then offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered.” Von (plurality opinion). A defendant possesses “ ‘the ultimate authority’ ” to determine her plea. 2 BURT v. TITLOW SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 187 (2004). But a lawyer must abide by his client’s deci- sion in this respect only after having provided the client with competent and fully informed advice, including an analysis of the risks that the client would face in proceed- ing to trial. Given our recognition that “a defendant’s proclamation of innocence does not relieve counsel of his normal responsibilities,” ante, at 8, our further observa- tion that such a proclamation “may affect the advice coun- sel gives,” ibid., states only the obvious: that a lawyer’s advice will always reflect the objectives of the representa- tion, as determined by the adequately informed client. Second, we state that it was reasonable for the Michigan Court of Appeals to reject respondent’s claim, “given that respondent was claiming innocence and only days away from offering self-incriminating testimony” at her aunt’s trial. Ante, at 9. This is true in context: Because respond- ent failed to carry her burden of showing that Toca’s per- formance was not adequate, the state court reasonably held that it was. But our statement about the facts of this case does not imply that an attorney performs effectively in advising his client to withdraw from a plea whenever the client asserts her innocence and has only a few days to make the
|
Justice Sotomayor
| 2,013 | 24 |
concurring
|
Burt v. Titlow
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2641235/burt-v-titlow/
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innocence and has only a few days to make the decision. Had respondent made a better factual record—had she actually shown, for example, that Toca failed to educate himself about the case before recom- mending that she withdraw her plea—then she could well have prevailed. Because (and only because) respondent failed to present enough evidence to overcome the twin presumptions of AEDPA and Strickland, I join fully in the opinion of the Court. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 1 GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–414 SHERRY L. BURT, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. VONLEE NICOLE TITLOW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [November 5, 2013] JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment. While I join the Court’s judgment, I find dubious the Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Toca acted reasonably in light of Titlow’s protestations of innocence. Toca became Titlow’s counsel on the recommendation of the deputy sheriff to whom Titlow professed innocence. App. 298. As the Court rightly observes, Toca’s conduct was “far from exemplary.” Ante, at 10. With virtually no time to make an assessment of Titlow’s chances of prevail- ing at trial, and without consulting the lawyer who had negotiated Titlow’s plea, Toca told Titlow he could take the case to trial and win. App. 295 (Titlow’s uncontra- dicted averment). With Toca’s aid, Titlow’s plea was with- drawn just three days after Toca’s retention as defense counsel. At sentencing, the prosecutor volunteered that Titlow had been the “victim of some bad advice.” at 291. Nevertheless, one thing is crystal clear. The prosecu- tor’s agreement to the plea bargain hinged entirely on Titlow’s willingness to testify at her aunt’s trial. See App. 42–43, 45. Once Titlow reneged on that half of the deal, the bargain failed. Absent an extant bargain, there was nothing to renew. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (“Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts. 2 BURT v. TITLOW GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment [W]hen one of the exchanged promises is not kept we say that the contract was broken.”); Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1953 (1992) (“When defendants promise to plead guilty in return for government concessions and then do so, they are legally entitled to the concessions. At the same time, if the de- fendant fails to perform, the prosecutor need not perform either.” (footnote omitted)). In short, the prosecutor could not be ordered to “renew” a plea proposal never
|
Justice Souter
| 1,994 | 20 |
concurring
|
Simmons v. South Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/
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I join in Justice Blackmun's opinion that, at least when future dangerousness is an issue in a capital sentencing determination, the defendant has a due process right to require that his sentencing jury be informed of his ineligibility for parole. I write separately because I believe an additional, related principle also compels today's decision, regardless of whether future dangerousness is an issue at sentencing. The Eighth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury capable of a reasoned moral judgment about whether death, rather than some lesser sentence, ought to be imposed. The Court has explained that the Amendment imposes a heightened standard "for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case," ; see also, e. g., ; Thus, it requires provision of "accurate sentencing information [as] an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die," and invalidates "procedural rules that ten[d] to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination," That same need for heightened reliability also mandates recognition of a capital defendant's right to require instructions on the meaning of the legal terms used to describe the sentences (or sentencing recommendations) a jury is required to consider, in making the reasoned moral choice between sentencing alternatives. Thus, whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that a juror will misunderstand a sentencing term, a defendant may demand instruction on its meaning, and a death sentence following the refusal of such a request *173 should be vacated as having been "arbitrarily or discriminatorily" and "wantonly and freakishly imposed." (internal quotation marks omitted); at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). While I join the other Members of the Court's majority in holding that, at least,counsel ought to be permitted to inform the jury of the law that it must apply, see ante, at 169 (plurality opinion); post, at 174 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); post, at 178 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), I also accept the general rule that, on matters of law, arguments of counsel do not effectively substitute for statements by the court. "[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law." I would thus impose that straightforward duty on the court. Because Justice Blackmun persuasively demonstrates that juries in general are likely to misunderstand the meaning of the term "life imprisonment" in a given context,
|
Justice Souter
| 1,994 | 20 |
concurring
|
Simmons v. South Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/
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meaning of the term "life imprisonment" in a given context, see ante, at 159, 169-170, and n. 9, the judge must tell the jury what the term means, when the defendant so requests. It is, moreover, clear that at least one of these particular jurors did not understand the meaning of the term, since the jury sent a note to the judge asking, "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" Ante, at 160, 170, n. 10. The answer here was easy and controlled by state statute. The judge should have said no. Justice Blackmun shows that the instruction actually given was at *174 best a confusing, "equivocal direction to the jury on a basic issue," and that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violated petitioner's rights. By effectively withholding from the jury the life-without-parole alternative, the trial court diminished the reliability of the jury's decision that death, rather than that alternative, was the appropriate penalty in this case. While States are, of course, free to provide more protection for the accused than the Constitution requires, see they may not provide less. South Carolina did so here. For these reasons, as well as those set forth by Justice Blackmun, whose opinion I join, the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina must be reversed.
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,992 | 9 |
dissenting
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Richmond v. Lewis
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112794/richmond-v-lewis/
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The Court today holds that Justice Cameron's special concurrence erred in that, after having found that this murder was not committed in an "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," (F)(6) (1989), it failed thereupon to reweigh the remaining aggravating and mitigating circumstances before affirming petitioner's death sentence. The Court does not reach petitioner's claim that Chief Justice Holohan's opinion erred in applying the Arizona *54 limiting construction of this aggravating circumstance, see and in thus finding this murder to have been "heinous." Under Arizona law, a murderer is eligible for the death penalty if the trial court finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. (E) (1989). Even accepting both of petitioner's arguments with regard to the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" factor, it is beyond dispute that two constitutionally valid aggravating circumstances were found namely, that petitioner had "been convicted of another offense in the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable" (specifically, first-degree murder), 13-703(F)(1), and that petitioner had been "previously convicted of a felony in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person" (specifically, armed kidnaping), 13-703(F)(2). App. 73-74. Thus, the death sentence unquestionably complied with the narrowing requirement imposed by the line of cases commencing with In my view this Court has no colorable basis, either in constitutional text or in national tradition, for imposing upon the States a further constitutional requirement that the sentencer consider mitigating evidence, see As this and other cases upon our docket amply show, that recently invented requirement has introduced not only a mandated arbitrariness quite inconsistent with Furman, but also an impenetrable complexity and hence a propensity to error that make a scandal and a mockery of the capital sentencing process. Since in my view compliance with Furman is all that was required, any error committed by Chief Justice Holohan's *55 opinion in finding "heinousness" was harmless, and any failure by Justice Cameron's special concurrence to reweigh raises no federal question. Accordingly, I would affirm.
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
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The question presented by this appeal is whether a Massachusetts statute that mandates suspension of a driver's license because of his refusal to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is void on its face as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Commonly known as the implied consent law, the Massachusetts statute provides: "Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way shall be deemed to have consented to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath in the event that he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis, after *4 having been informed that his license to operate motor vehicles in the commonwealth shall be suspended for a period of ninety days for such refusal, no such test or analysis shall be made, but the police officer before whom such refusal was made shall immediately prepare a written report of such refusal[, which] shall be endorsed by a third person who shall have witnessed such refusal[,] shall be sworn to under the penalties of perjury by the police officer before whom such refusal was made[,] shall set forth the grounds for the officer's belief that the person arrested had been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and shall state that such person had refused to submit to such chemical test or analysis when requested by such police officer to do so. Each such report shall be endorsed by the police chief and shall be sent forthwith to the registrar. Upon receipt of such report, the registrar shall suspend any license or permit to operate motor vehicles issued to such person for a period of ninety days." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 90, 24 (1) (f) I While driving a vehicle in Acton, Mass., appellee Donald Montrym was involved in a collision about 8:15 p. m. on May 15, 1976. Upon arrival at the scene of the accident an Acton police officer observed, as he wrote in his official report, that Montrym was "glassy eyed." unsteady on his feet, slurring his speech, and emitting a strong alcoholic odor from his person. The officer arrested Montrym at 8:30 p. m. for operating his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, driving to endanger, and failing to produce his motor vehicle registration upon request. Montrym was then taken to the Acton police station. *5 There, Montrym was asked to take a breath-analysis examination
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
|
*5 There, Montrym was asked to take a breath-analysis examination at 8:45 p. m. He refused to do so.[1] Twenty minutes after refusing to take the test and shortly after consulting his lawyer, Montrym apparently sought to retract his prior refusal by asking the police to administer a breath-analysis test. The police declined to comply with Montrym's belated request. The statute leaves an officer no discretion once a breath-analysis test has been refused: "If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis, the police officer before whom such refusal was made shall immediately prepare a written report of such refusal." 24 (1) (f) (emphasis added). The arresting officer completed a report of the events, including the refusal to take the test. As mandated by the statute, the officer's report recited (a) the fact of Montrym's arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (b) the grounds supporting that arrest, and (c) the fact of his refusal to take the breath-analysis examination. As required by the statute, the officer's report was sworn to under penalties of perjury, and endorsed by the arresting officer and another officer present when Montrym refused to take the test; it was counterendorsed by the chief of police. The report was then sent to the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles pursuant to the statute. On June 2, 1976, a state court dismissed the complaint brought against Montrym for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.[2] Dismissal apparently was predicated on the refusal of the police to administer a breath-analysis test at Montrym's request after he sought to retract his initial *6 refusal to take the test. The dismissal order of the state court cryptically recites: "Dismissed. Breathalyzer refused when requested within 1/2 hr of arrest at station. See affidavit & memorandum." According to Montrym's affidavit incorporated by reference in the state court's dismissal order, he was visited by an attorney at 9:05 o'clock on the night of his arrest; and, after consulting with counsel, he requested a breath-analysis test. The police, however, refused the requests made by Montrym and his counsel between 9:07 and 10:07 p.m. Montrym's attorney immediately advised the Registrar by letter of the dismissal of this charge and asked that the Registrar stay any suspension of Montrym's driver's Enclosed with the letter was a copy of Montrym's affidavit attesting to the officer's refusal to administer a breath-analysis test at his request. However, Montrym's attorney did not enclose a certified copy of the state court's order dismissing the charge. The Registrar, who has no discretionary authority to stay a
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
|
The Registrar, who has no discretionary authority to stay a suspension mandated by the statute,[3] formally suspended Montrym's license for 90 days on June 7, 1976. The suspension notice stated that it was effective upon its issuance and directed Montrym to return his license at once. It advised Montrym of his right to appeal the suspension.[4] *7 When Montrym received the suspension notice, his attorney requested an appeal on the question of whether Montrym had in fact refused a breath-analysis test within the meaning of the statute. Montrym surrendered his license by mail on June 8, 1976. Under the Massachusetts statute, Montrym could have obtained an immediate hearing before the Registrar at any time after he had surrendered his license; that hearing would have resolved all questions as to whether grounds existed for the suspension.[5] For reasons not explained, but presumably *8 on advice of counsel, Montrym failed to exercise his right to a hearing before the Registrar; instead, he took an appeal to the Board of Appeal. On June 24, 1976, the Board of Appeal advised Montrym by letter that a hearing of his appeal would be held on July 6, 1976. Four days later, Montrym's counsel made demand upon the Registrar by letter for the return of his driver's The letter reiterated Montrym's acquittal of the driving-under-the-influence charge, asserted that the state court's finding that the officer had refused to administer a breath-analysis test was binding on the Registrar, and declared that suspension of Montrym's license without first holding a hearing violated his right to due process. The letter did not contain a copy of the state court's dismissal order, but did threaten the Registrar with suit if the license were not returned immediately. Had Montrym's counsel enclosed a copy of the order dismissing the drunken-driving charge, the entire matter might well have been disposed of at that stage without more. Thereafter, forgoing his administrative appeal scheduled for hearing on July 6, Montrym brought this action asking the convening of a three-judge United States District Court. The complaint alleges that 24 (1) (f) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in that it authorized the suspension of Montrym's driver's license without affording him an opportunity for a presuspension hearing. Montrym sought a temporary restraining order enjoining the suspension of his license, compensatory and punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all persons whose licenses had been suspended pursuant to the statute without a prior hearing. On July 9, 1976, a single District Judge issued the temporary restraining order sought by Montrym and directed *9
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
|
the temporary restraining order sought by Montrym and directed *9 the Registrar to return Montrym's license pending further order of the court. Subsequently, a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2281 (1970 ed.), 2284, and Montrym moved for partial summary judgment on stipulated facts. With one judge dissenting, the three-judge District Court granted Montrym's motion. Relying principally on this Court's decision in the District Court concluded that Montrym was entitled as a matter of due process to some sort of a presuspension hearing before the Registrar to contest the allegation of his refusal to take the test. In a partial summary judgment order issued on April 4, and a final judgment order issued on April 12, the District Court certified the suit under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2) as a class action on behalf of all persons whose licenses to operate a motor vehicle had been suspended pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 90, 24 (1) (f) The court then declared the statute unconstitutional on its face as violative of the Due Process Clause, permanently enjoined the Registrar from further enforcing the statute, and directed him to return the driver's licenses of the plaintiff class members. After taking timely appeals from the District Court's judgment orders, the Registrar moved the District Court for a stay and modification of its judgment, which motions were denied. After release of our opinion in upholding the constitutionality of an Illinois statute authorizing the summary suspension of a driver's license prior to any evidentiary hearing, the Registrar moved for reconsideration of his motions for a stay and modification of judgment. In a second opinion issued October 6, 1977, the District Court reasoned the was distinguishable on several grounds and denied the Registrar's motion to reconsider; the *10 dissenting judge thought controlled. We noted probable jurisdiction following the submission of supplemental briefs by the parties. Sub nom. We reverse.[6] II The Registrar concedes here that suspension of a driver's license for statutorily defined cause implicates a protectible property interest;[7] accordingly, the only question presented by this appeal is what process is due to protect against an erroneous deprivation of that interest. Resolution of this inquiry requires consideration of a number of factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
|
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." *11 Applying this balancing test, the District Court concluded due process required an opportunity for hearing before suspension of a -400. Later, the court further held that our decision in did not control. was thought distinguishable because the potential for irreparable personal and economic hardship was regarded as greater under the Massachusetts statutory scheme than the Illinois scheme; the risk of error was deemed more substantial as well; and requiring a hearing before suspending a driver's license for refusing to take a breath-analysis test was believed not to offend the state interest in safe -1161. We conclude that cannot be materially distinguished from the case before us. Both cases involve the constitutionality of a statutory scheme for administrative suspension of a driver's license for statutorily defined cause without a presuspension hearing. In each, the sole question presented is the appropriate timing of the legal process due a licensee. And, in both cases, that question must be determined by reference to the factors set forth in A The first step in the balancing process mandated by is identification of the nature and weight of the private interest affected by the official action challenged. Here, as in the private interest affected is the granted license to operate a motor vehicle. More particularly, the driver's interest is in continued possession and use of his license pending the outcome of the hearing due him. As we recognized in that interest is a substantial one, for the Commonwealth will not be able to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through postsuspension review procedures. But, however substantial Montrym's property interest may *12 be, it is surely no more substantial than the interest involved in The private interest involved here actually is less substantial, for the Massachusetts statute authorizes suspension for a maximum of only 90 days, while the Illinois scheme permitted suspension for as long as a year and even allowed for the possibility of indefinite revocation of a To be sure, as the District Court observed, the Illinois statute in contained provisions for hardship relief unavailable under the Massachusetts statute. Though we adverted to the existence of such provisions in they were in no sense the "controlling" factor in our decision that the District Court believed them to be. Hardship relief was available under the Illinois scheme only after a driver had been suspended and had demonstrated his eligibility for such relief. See n.
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
|
and had demonstrated his eligibility for such relief. See n. 10. The bearing such provisions had in stemmed from the delay involved in providing a postsuspension hearing. Here, unlike the situation in a postsuspension hearing is available immediately upon a driver's suspension and may be initiated by him simply by walking into one of the Registrar's local offices and requesting a hearing. The statute, in contrast, did not mandate that a date be set for a postsuspension hearing until 20 days after a written request for such a hearing was received from the affected driver. The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interest involved. The District Court's failure to consider the relative length of the suspension periods involved in and the case at bar, as well as the relative timeliness of the postsuspension review available to a suspended driver, was erroneous. Neither the nature nor the weight of the private interest involved in this case compels a result contrary to that reached in *13 B Because a primary function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions, ; the second stage of the inquiry requires consideration of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used. And, although this aspect of the test further requires an assessment of the relative reliability of the procedures used and the substitute procedures sought, the Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible "property" or "liberty" interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. The Due Process Clause simply does not mandate that all governmental decisionmaking comply with standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations. Thus, even though our legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error, the "ordinary principle" established by our prior decisions is that "something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action." And, when prompt postdeprivation review is available for correction of administrative error, we have generally required no more than that the predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be. See, e. g., Barry v. Barchi, post, at 64-65; As was the case in the predicates for a driver's suspension under the Massachusetts scheme are objective
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
|
MacKey v. Montrym
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
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for a driver's suspension under the Massachusetts scheme are objective facts either within the personal knowledge of an impartial government official or readily ascertainable by him. Cause arises for license suspension if the driver has been arrested for *14 driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, probable cause exists for arrest, and the driver refuses to take a breath-analysis test. The facts of the arrest and the driver's refusal will inevitably be within the personal knowledge of the reporting officer; indeed, Massachusetts requires that the driver's refusal be witnessed by two officers. At the very least, the arresting officer ordinarily will have provided the driver with an informal opportunity to tell his side of the story and, as here, will have had the opportunity to observe the driver's condition and behavior before effecting any arrest. The District Court, in holding that the Due Process Clause mandates that an opportunity for a further hearing before the Registrar precede a driver's suspension, overstated the risk of error inherent in the statute's initial reliance on the corroborated affidavit of a law enforcement officer. The officer whose report of refusal triggers a driver's suspension is a trained observer and investigator. He is, by reason of his training and experience, well suited for the role the statute accords him in the presuspension process. And, as he is personally subject to civil liability for an unlawful arrest and to criminal penalties for willful misrepresentation of the facts, he has every incentive to ascertain accurately and truthfully report the facts. The specific dictates of due process must be shaped by "the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases" rather than the "rare exceptions." And, the risk of erroneous observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the facts by the reporting officer in the ordinary case seems insubstantial. Moreover, as this case illustrates, there will rarely be any genuine dispute as to the historical facts providing cause for a suspension. It is significant that Montrym does not dispute that he was arrested, or that probable cause existed for his arrest, or that he initially refused to take the breath-analysis test at the arresting officer's request. The allegedly "factual" *15 dispute that he claims a constitutional right to raise and have determined by the Registrar prior to his suspension really presents questions of law; namely, whether the state court's subsequent finding that the police later refused to administer a breath-analysis test at Montrym's request is binding on the Registrar as a matter of collateral estoppel; and, if so, whether that finding undermines
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Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
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MacKey v. Montrym
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
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of collateral estoppel; and, if so, whether that finding undermines the validity of Montrym's suspension, which may well be justified under the statute solely on the basis of Montrym's initial refusal to take the breath-analysis test and notwithstanding the officer's subsequent refusal to honor Montrym's belated request for the test.[8] The Commonwealth must have the authority, if it is to protect people from drunken drivers, to require that the breath-analysis test record the alcoholic content of the bloodstream at the earliest possible moment. Finally, even when disputes as to the historical facts do arise, we are not persuaded that the risk of error inherent in the statute's initial reliance on the representations of the reporting officer is so substantial in itself as to require that the Commonwealth stay its hand pending the outcome of any evidentiary hearing necessary to resolve questions of credibility or conflicts in the evidence. Cf. Barry v. Barchi, post, at 64-65. All that Montrym seeks was available to him immediately upon his suspension, and we believe that the "same day" hearing before the Registrar available under 24 (1)(g) provides an appropriately timely opportunity for the licensee to tell his side of the story to the Registrar, to obtain correction of clerical errors, and to seek prompt resolution of any factual disputes he raises as to the accuracy of the officer's report of refusal. *16 Nor would the avowedly "nonevidentiary" presuspension hearing contemplated by the District Court substantially enhance the reliability of the presuspension process. Clerical errors and deficiencies in the officer's report of refusal, of course, could be called to the Registrar's attention if the driver were provided with an opportunity to respond to the report in writing prior to suspension. But if such errors and deficiencies are genuinely material they already will have been noted by the Registrar in the ordinary course of his review of the report. Just as the Registrar has no power to stay a suspension upon receipt of a report of refusal that complies on its face with statutory requirements, he has no power to suspend a license if the report is materially defective. Necessarily, then, the Registrar must submit the officer's report to his independent scrutiny. This independent review of the report of refusal by a detached public officer should suffice in the ordinary case to minimize the only type of error that could be corrected by something less than an evidentiary hearing. The only other purpose that might be served by an opportunity to respond to the report of refusal prior to a driver's suspension would be alerting the
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
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MacKey v. Montrym
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
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refusal prior to a driver's suspension would be alerting the Registrar to the existence of factual disputes between the driver and the reporting officer. This would be an exercise in futility, for the Registrar has no discretion to stay a suspension pending the outcome of an evidentiary hearing. And, it simply begs the question of a driver's right to a presuspension evidentiary hearing to suggest, as did the District Court, that the Registrar be given such discretion. The Massachusetts Legislature has already made the discretionary determination that the District Court apparently would have the Registrar make on a case-by-case basis. It has determined that the Registrar, who is further removed in time and place from the operative facts than the reporting officer, should treat a report of refusal that complies on its face with the statutory requirements as presumptively accurate notwithstanding any factual disputes raised by a driver. Simply put, it has determined that the *17 Registrar is not in a position to make an informed probable-cause determination or exercise of discretion prior to an evidentiary hearing. We cannot say the legislature's judgment in this matter is irrational. In summary, we conclude here, as in that the risk of error inherent in the presuspension procedures chosen by the legislature is not so substantial in itself as to require us to depart from the "ordinary principle" that "something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action." We fail to see how reliability would be materially enhanced by mandating the presuspension "hearing" deemed necessary by the District Court. C The third leg of the balancing test requires us to identify the governmental function involved; also, to weigh in the balance the state interests served by the summary procedures used, as well as the administrative and fiscal burdens, if any, that would result from the substitute procedures sought. Here, as in the statute involved was enacted in aid of the Commonwealth's police function for the purpose of protecting the safety of its people. As we observed in the paramount interest the Commonwealth has in preserving the safety of its public highways, standing alone, fully distinguishes this case from on which Montrym and the District Court place principal reliance. See -115. We have traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety. States surely have at least as much interest in removing drunken drivers from their highways as in summarily seizing mislabeled drugs or destroying spoiled foodstuffs.[9]E. g., ; North American Storage The Commonwealth's interest in public safety is substantially served in several
|
Justice Burger
| 1,979 | 12 |
majority
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MacKey v. Montrym
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110126/mackey-v-montrym/
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Commonwealth's interest in public safety is substantially served in several ways by the summary suspension of those who refuse to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest. First, the very existence of the summary sanction of the statute serves as a deterrent to drunken driving. Second, it provides strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test and thus effectuates the Commonwealth's interest in obtaining reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings. Third, in promptly removing such drivers from the road, the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the safety of public The summary and automatic character of the suspension sanction available under the statute is critical to attainment of these objectives. A presuspension hearing would substantially undermine the state interest in public safety by giving drivers significant incentive to refuse the breath-analysis test and demand a presuspension hearing as a dilatory tactic. Moreover, the incentive to delay arising from the availability of a presuspension hearing would generate a sharp increase in the number of hearings sought and therefore impose a substantial fiscal and administrative burden on the Commonwealth. Nor is it any answer to the Commonwealth's interest in public safety that its interest could be served as well in other ways. The fact that the Commonwealth, for policy reasons of its own, elects not to summarily suspend those drivers who *19 do take the breath-analysis test does not, as the District Court erroneously suggested, in any way undermine the Commonwealth's strong interest in summarily removing from the road those who refuse to take the test. A state plainly has the right to offer incentives for taking a test that provides the most reliable form of evidence of intoxication for use in subsequent proceedings. Indeed, in many cases, the test results could lead to prompt release of the driver with no charge being made on the "drunken driving" issue. And, in exercising its police powers, the Commonwealth is not required by the Due Process Clause to adopt an "all or nothing" approach to the acute safety hazards posed by drunken drivers. We conclude, as we did in that the compelling interest in highway safety justifies the Commonwealth in making a summary suspension effective pending the outcome of the prompt postsuspension hearing available. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR.
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Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that petitioner Larry Hope, a former prison inmate at the Limestone Prison in Alabama, was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when prison guards twice handcuffed him to a hitching post to sanction him for disruptive conduct. Because that conclusion was not supported by earlier cases with "materially similar" facts, the court held that the respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore affirmed summary judgment in their favor. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals' qualified immunity holding comports with our decision in United I In 1995, Alabama was the only State that followed the practice of chaining inmates to one another in work squads. It was also the only State that handcuffed prisoners to "hitching posts" if they either refused to work or otherwise disrupted work squads.[1] Hope was handcuffed to a hitching *734 post on two occasions. On May 11, 1995, while Hope was working in a chain gang near an interstate highway, he got into an argument with another inmate. Both men were taken back to the Limestone prison and handcuffed to a hitching Hope was released two hours later, after the guard captain determined that the altercation had been caused by the other inmate. During his two hours on the post, Hope was offered drinking water and a bathroom break every 15 minutes, and his responses to these offers were recorded on an activity log. Because he was only slightly taller than the hitching post, his arms were above shoulder height and grew tired from being handcuffed so high. Whenever he tried moving his arms to improve his circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists, causing pain and discomfort. On June 7, 1995, Hope was punished more severely. He took a nap during the morning bus ride to the chaingang's worksite, and when it arrived he was less than prompt in responding to an order to get off the bus. An exchange of vulgar remarks led to a wrestling match with a guard. Four other guards intervened, subdued Hope, handcuffed him, placed him in leg irons and transported him back to the prison where he was put on the hitching The guards made him take off his shirt, and he remained shirtless all *735 day while the sun burned his skin.[2] He remained attached to the post for approximately seven hours. During this 7hour period, he was given water only once or twice and was given no bathroom breaks.[3] At one point, a guard taunted Hope about his thirst. According to Hope's affidavit:
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Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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guard taunted Hope about his thirst. According to Hope's affidavit: "[The guard] first gave water to some dogs, then brought the water cooler closer to me, removed its lid, and kicked the cooler over, spilling the water onto the ground." App. 11. Hope filed suit under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 193, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against three guards involved in the May incident, one of whom also handcuffed him to the hitching post in June. The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge who treated the responsive affidavits filed by the defendants as a motion for summary judgment. Without deciding whether "the very act of placing him on a restraining bar for a period of hours as a form of punishment" had violated the Eighth Amendment, the Magistrate concluded that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity.[4] Supplemental App. to Pet. for Cert. 21. The District Court agreed, and entered judgment for respondents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Before reaching the *736 qualified immunity issue, however, it answered the constitutional question that the District Court had bypassed. The court found that the use of the hitching post for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, applying Circuit precedent concerning qualified immunity, the court stated that "`the federal law by which the government official's conduct should be evaluated must be preexisting, obvious and mandatory,' " and established, not by "`abstractions,' " but by cases that are "`materially similar' " to the facts in the case in front of us." The court then concluded that the facts in the two precedents on which Hope primarily and "[t]hough analogous," were not "`materially similar' to Hope's situation.' " 240 F.3d, We granted certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit's qualified immunity holding. The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation. The Court of Appeals held that "the policy and practice of cuffing an inmate to a hitching post or similar stationary object for a period of time that surpasses that necessary to quell a threat or restore order is a violation of the Eighth Amendment." 91. The court rejected respondents' submission that Hope could have ended his shackling by offering to return to work, finding instead that the purpose of the practice was punitive,[5] and that the circumstances of his confinement created *737 a substantial risk of harm of which the officers were aware. Moreover, the court relied on Circuit precedent condemning similar practices[6]
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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Moreover, the court relied on Circuit precedent condemning similar practices[6] and the results of a United States Department of Justice (DOJ) report that found Alabama's systematic use of the hitching post to be improper corporal punishment. [7] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the attachment of Hope to the hitching post under the circumstances alleged in this case violated the Eighth Amendment. "`[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.' " We have said that "[a]mong `unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are `totally without penological justification.' " In making this determination in the context of prison conditions, *73 we must ascertain whether the officials involved acted with "deliberate indifference" to the inmates' health or safety. We may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious. 511 U.S. 25, 42 As the facts are alleged by Hope, the Eighth Amendment violation is obvious. Any safety concerns had long since abated by the time petitioner was handcuffed to the hitching post because Hope had already been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported back to the prison. He was separated from his work squad and not given the opportunity to return to work. Despite the clear lack of an emergency situation, the respondents knowingly subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and the restricted position of confinement for a 7-hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.[] The use of the hitching post under these circumstances violated the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is nothing less than the dignity of man." 356 U.S. 6, (195). This punitive treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of "wanton and unnecessary" pain that our precedent clearly prohibits. *739 I Despite their participation in this constitutionally impermissible conduct, respondents may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. 00, 1 (192). In assessing whether the Eighth Amendment violation here met the test, the Court of Appeals required that the facts of previous cases be "`materially similar' to Hope's situation." 240 F.3d, This rigid gloss on the qualified immunity standard, though supported by Circuit precedent,[9] is not consistent with our cases. As we have explained,
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Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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is not consistent with our cases. As we have explained, qualified immunity operates "to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful." For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours "must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell [v. Forsyth,] 535, n. 12; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 43 U.S. 635, Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S. C. 193 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 1 U.S. C. 242. Section 242 makes it a crime for a state official to act "willfully" and under color of law to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution. In United we held that the defendant was entitled *740 to "fair warning" that his conduct deprived his victim of a constitutional right, and that the standard for determining the adequacy of that warning was the same as the standard for determining whether a constitutional right was "clearly established" in civil litigation under 193.[10] In Lanier, the Court of Appeals had held that the indictment did not charge an offense under 242 because the constitutional right allegedly violated had not been identified in any earlier case involving a factual situation "`fundamentally similar' " to the one in issue. at 263 ). The Court of Appeals had assumed that the defendant in a criminal case was entitled to a degree of notice "`substantially higher than the "clearly established" standard used to judge qualified immunity' " in civil cases under 193. We reversed, explaining that the "fair warning" requirement is identical under 242 and the qualified immunity standard. We pointed out that we had "upheld convictions under 241 or 242 despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights." We explained: "This is not to say, of course, that the single warning standard points to a single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some circumstances, as when an *741 earlier case expressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high degree of prior
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Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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of conduct at issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary. But general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though `the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful,' at" Our opinion in Lanier thus makes clear that officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Indeed, in Lanier, we expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be "fundamentally similar." Although earlier cases involving "fundamentally similar" facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding. The same is true of cases with "materially similar" facts. Accordingly, pursuant to Lanier, the salient question that the Court of Appeals ought to have asked is whether the state of the law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning that their alleged treatment of Hope was unconstitutional. It is to this question that we now turn. IV The use of the hitching post as alleged by Hope "unnecessar[ily] and wanton[ly] inflicted pain," 475 U. S., at and thus was a clear violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Part Arguably, the violation was so obvious that our own Eighth Amendment cases gave respondents fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution. Regardless, in light of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, an Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) regulation, and a DOJ report *742 informing the ADOC of the constitutional infirmity in its use of the hitching post, we readily conclude that the respondents' conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U. S., at 1. Cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit before 191 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit today. See In one of those cases, decided in the Court of Appeals reviewed a District Court decision finding a number of constitutional violations in the administration of Mississippi's prisons. That opinion squarely held that several of those "forms of corporal punishment run afoul of the Eighth Amendment [and] offend contemporary concepts of decency, human dignity, and precepts of civilization which we profess to possess." Among those forms of punishment were "handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of time, and forcing inmates to stand, sit or lie on crates, stumps, or otherwise maintain awkward positions for
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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lie on crates, stumps, or otherwise maintain awkward positions for prolonged periods." The fact that Gates found several forms of punishment impermissible does not, as respondents suggest, lessen the force of its holding with respect to handcuffing inmates to cells or fences for long periods of time. Nor, for the purpose of providing fair notice to reasonable officers administering punishment for past misconduct, is there any reason to draw a constitutional distinction between a practice of handcuffing an inmate to a fence for prolonged periods and handcuffing him to a hitching post for seven hours. The Court of Appeals' conclusion to the contrary exposes the danger of a rigid, over reliance on factual similarity. As the Government submits in its brief amicus curiae: "No reasonable officer could have concluded that the constitutional holding of Gates turned on the fact that inmates were handcuffed to fences or the bars of cells, rather than a specially designed metal bar designated for shackling. If anything, the use of *743 a designated hitching post highlights the constitutional problem." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. In light of Gates, the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct should have been apparent to respondents. The reasoning, though not the holding, in a case decided by the Eleventh Circuit in sent the same message to reasonable officers in that Circuit. In the Court of Appeals held that an officer's temporary denials of drinking water to an inmate who repeatedly refused to do his share of the work assigned to a farm squad "should not be viewed as punishment in the strict sense, but instead as necessary coercive measures undertaken to obtain compliance with a reasonable prison rule, i. e., the requirement that all inmates perform their assigned farm squad duties." "The officer's clear motive was to encourage Ort to comply with the rules and to do the work required of him, after which he would receive the water like everyone else." The court cautioned, however, that a constitutional violation might have been present "if later, once back at the prison, officials had decided to deny [Ort] water as punishment for his refusal to work." So too would a violation have occurred if the method of coercion reached a point of severity such that the recalcitrant prisoner's health was at risk. Although the facts of the case are not identical, Ort' s premise is that "physical abuse directed at [a] prisoner after he terminate[s] his resistance to authority would constitute an actionable eighth amendment violation." This premise has clear applicability in this case. Hope was not restrained at
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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clear applicability in this case. Hope was not restrained at the worksite until he was willing to return to work. Rather, he was removed back to the prison and placed under conditions that threatened his health. Ort therefore gave fair warning to respondents that their conduct crossed the line of what is constitutionally permissible. Relevant to the question whether Ort provided fair warning to respondents that their conduct violated the Constitution *744 is a regulation promulgated by ADOC in 1993.[11] The regulation authorizes the use of the hitching post when an inmate refuses to work or is otherwise disruptive to a work squad. It provides that an activity log should be completed for each such inmate, detailing his responses to offers of water and bathroom breaks every 15 minutes. Such a log was completed and maintained for petitioner's shackling in May, but the record contains no such log for the 7-hour shackling in June and the record indicates that the periodic offers contemplated by the regulation were not made. App. 43-4. The regulation also states that an inmate "will be allowed to join his assigned squad" whenever he tells an officer "that he is ready to go to work." The findings in (MD Ala. 199), as well as the record in this case, indicate that this important provision of the regulation was frequently ignored by corrections officers. If regularly observed, a requirement that would effectively give the inmate the keys to the handcuffs that attached him to the hitching post would have made this case more analogous to the practice upheld in Ort, rather than the kind of punishment Ort described as impermissible. A course of conduct that tends to prove that the requirement was merely a sham, or that respondents could ignore it with impunity, provides equally strong support for the conclusion that they were fully aware of the wrongful character of their conduct. Respondents violated clearly established law. Our conclusion that "a reasonable person would have known," 457 U. S., at 1, of the violation is buttressed by the fact that the DOJ specifically advised the ADOC of the unconstitutionality of its practices before the incidents in this case took place. The DOJ had conducted a study in 1994 of Alabama's use of the hitching *745 Among other findings, the DOJ report noted that ADOC's officers consistently failed to comply with the policy of immediately releasing any inmate from the hitching post who agrees to return to work. The DOJ concluded that the systematic use of the restraining bar in Alabama constituted improper corporal punishment. Accordingly, the DOJ
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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bar in Alabama constituted improper corporal punishment. Accordingly, the DOJ advised the ADOC to cease use of the hitching post in order to meet constitutional standards. The ADOC replied that it thought the post could permissibly be used "`to preserve prison security and discipline.' " In response, the DOJ informed the ADOC that, "`[a]lthough an emergency situation may warrant drastic action by corrections staff, our experts found that the "rail" is being used systematically as an improper punishment for relatively trivial offenses. Therefore, we have concluded that the use of the "rail" is without penological justification.' " Although there is nothing in the record indicating that the DOJ's views were communicated to respondents, this exchange lends support to the view that reasonable officials in the ADOC should have realized that the use of the hitching post under the circumstances alleged by Hope violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The obvious cruelty inherent in this practice should have provided respondents with some notice that their alleged conduct violated Hope's constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Hope was treated in a way antithetical to human dignityhe was hitched to a post for an extended period of time in a position that was painful, and under circumstances that were both degrading and dangerous. This wanton treatment was not done of necessity, but as punishment for prior conduct. Even if there might once have been a question regarding the constitutionality of this practice, the Eleventh Circuit precedent of Gates and Ort, as well as the DOJ report condemning the practice, put a reasonable officer on notice that the use of the hitching *746 post under the circumstances alleged by Hope was unlawful. The "fair and clear warning," Lanier, that these cases provided was sufficient to preclude the defense of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. V In response to Justice Thomas' thoughtful dissent, we make the following three observations. The first is that in granting certiorari to review the summary judgment entered in favor of the officers, we did not take any question about the sufficiency of pleadings and affidavits to raise a genuine possibility that the three named officers were responsible for the punitive acts of shackling alleged. All questions raised by petitioner (the plaintiff against whom summary judgment was entered) go to the application of the standard that no immunity is available for official acts when "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." The officers' brief in opposition to certiorari likewise addressed only the legal
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Justice Stevens
| 2,002 | 16 |
majority
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Hope v. Pelzer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/121169/hope-v-pelzer/
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brief in opposition to certiorari likewise addressed only the legal standard of what is clearly established. The resulting focus in the case was the Eleventh Circuit's position that a violation is not clearly established unless it is the subject of a prior case of liability on facts "`materially similar' " to those charged. 240 F.3d, We did not take, and do not pass upon, the questions whether or to what extent the three named officers may be held responsible for the acts charged, if proved. Nothing in our decision forecloses any defense other than qualified immunity on the ground relied upon by the Court of Appeals. Second, we may address the immunity question on the assumption that the act of field discipline charged on each occasion was handcuffing Hope to a hitching post for an extended period apparently to inflict gratuitous pain or discomfort, with no justification in threatened harm or a continuing refusal to work. at 90 The Court of Appeals clearly held the act of cuffing petitioner to the hitching post itself to suffice as an unconstitutional act: "We find that cuffing an inmate to a hitching post for a period of time extending past that required to address an immediate danger or threat is a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Although the court continued that "[t]his violation is exacerbated by the lack of proper clothing, water, or bathroom breaks," ibid., this embellishment was not the basis of its decision, and our own decision adequately rests on the same assumption that sufficed for the Court of Appeals. Third, in applying the objective immunity test of what a reasonable officer would understand, the significance of federal judicial precedent is a function in part of the Judiciary's structure. The unreported District Court opinions cited by the officers are distinguishable on their own terms.[12] But regardless, they would be no match for the Circuit precedents[13] in 501 F. 2d, which held that "handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of time" was unconstitutional, and 13 F. 2d, which suggested that it would be unconstitutional to inflict gratuitous pain on an inmate (by refusing him water) when punishment was unnecessary to enforce *74 on-the-spot discipline. The vitality of Gates and Ort could not seriously be questioned in light of our own decisions holding that gratuitous infliction of punishment is unconstitutional, even in the prison context, see at 737 (citing 475 U. S., at ; 452 U. S., at ). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
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Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112890/harper-v-virginia-dept-of-taxation/
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I am surprised to see an appeal to stare decisis in today's dissent. In Justice O'Connor wrote for a plurality that openly rejected settled precedent controlling the scope of retroactivity on collateral review. "This retroactivity determination," the opinion said, "would normally entail application of the Linkletter [v. Walker,] standard, but we believe that our approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review requires modification." The dissent in was a sort of anticipatory echo of today's dissent, criticizing the plurality for displaying "infidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis," for "upset[ting]. our time-honored precedents," for "repudiating our familiar approach without regard for the doctrine of stare decisis," and for failing "so much as [to] mention stare decisis," *103 I joined the plurality opinion in Not only did I believe the rule it announced was correct, see but I also believed that abandonment of our prior collateral-review retroactivity rule was fully in accord with the doctrine of stare decisis, which as applied by our Court has never been inflexible. The plurality opinion set forth good reasons for abandoning Linkletter reasons justifying a similar abandonment of Chevron It noted, for example, that Linkletter "ha[d] not led to consistent results," ; but neither has Chevron Proof that what it means is in the eye of the beholder is provided quite nicely by the separate opinions filed today: Of the four Justices who would still apply Chevron two find retroactive, see post, at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), two find it not retroactive, see post, at 122 Second, the plurality opinion noted that Linkletter had been criticized by commentators, ; but the commentary cited in the opinion criticized not just Linkletter, but the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence in general, of which it considered Chevron an integral part, see Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, Other commentary, of course, has also regarded the issue of retroactivity as a general problem of jurisprudence. See, e. g., Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, ; Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 S. Ct. Rev. 1; Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 631 ; Forward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, *104 Finally, the plurality opinion in justified the departure from Linkletter by implicitly relying on the well-settled proposition that stare decisis has less force where intervening decisions "have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision." Justice O'Connor endorsed the reasoning expressed by Justice Harlan in his separate opinions in
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112890/harper-v-virginia-dept-of-taxation/
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reasoning expressed by Justice Harlan in his separate opinions in and and noted that the Court had already adopted the first part of Justice Harlan's retroactivity views in See -305. Again, this argument equallyindeed, even more forcefullysupports reconsideration of Chevron Griffith returned this Court, in criminal cases, to the traditional view (which I shall discuss at greater length below) that prospective decisionmaking "violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." Griffith, One of the conceptual underpinnings of Chevron was that retroactivity presents a similar problem in both civil and criminal contexts. See Chevron ; see also Thus, after Griffith, Chevron can be adhered to only by rejecting the reasoning of Chevron that is, only by asserting that the issue of retroactivity is different in the civil and criminal settings. That is a particularly difficult proof to make, inasmuch as Griffith rested on "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and "the nature of judicial review." 479 U.S., ; see also (Griffith "appear[s] to have constitutional underpinnings").[1] *105 What most provokes comment in the dissent, however, is not its insistence that today a rigid doctrine of stare decisis forbids tinkering with retroactivity, which four Terms ago did not; but rather the irony of its invoking stare decisis in defense of prospective decisionmaking at all. Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. It was formulated in the heyday of legal realism and promoted as a "techniqu[e] of judicial lawmaking" in general, and more specifically as a means of making it easier to overrule prior precedent. B. Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, *106 Thus, the dissent is saying, in effect, that stare decisis demands the preservation of methods of destroying stare decisis recently invented in violation of stare decisis. Contrary to the dissent's assertion that Chevron articulated "our traditional retroactivity analysis," post, at 113, the jurisprudence it reflects "came into being," as Justice Harlan observed, less than 30 years ago with It is so unancient that one of the current Members of this Court was sitting when it was invented. The true traditional view is that prospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no authority to engage in the practice. See ante, at 94; James B. Distilling ; American Trucking Assns., ; ; Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst & Refining Co., Linkletter itself recognized that "[a]t common law there was no authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future." -623. And before Linkletter, the academic proponents of prospective judicial decisionmaking acknowledged that their proposal contradicted traditional
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112890/harper-v-virginia-dept-of-taxation/
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of prospective judicial decisionmaking acknowledged that their proposal contradicted traditional practice. See, e. g., and n. 2; Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, Indeed, the roots of the contrary tradition are so deep that Justice Holmes was prepared to hazard the guess that "[j]udicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years." Justice O'Connor asserts that "`[w]hen the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.' " Post, at 115 (quoting ). That concept is quite foreign to the American legal and constitutional *107 tradition. It would have struck John Marshall as an extraordinary assertion of raw power. The conception of the judicial role that he possessed, and that was shared by succeeding generations of American judges until very recent times, took it to be "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, " not what the law shall be. That original and enduring American perception of the judicial role sprang not from the philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Blackstone, which viewed retroactivity as an inherent characteristic of the judicial power, a power "not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (1765). Even when a "former determination is most evidently contrary to reason [or] contrary to the divine law," a judge overruling that decision would "not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation." "For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law. " Fully retroactive decisionmaking was considered a principal distinction between the judicial and the legislative power: "[I]t is said that that which distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases." T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *91. The critics of the traditional rule of full retroactivity were well aware that it was grounded in what one of them contemptuously called "another fiction known as the Separation of powers." Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, 17 A. B. A. J. 180, 181 (1931). Prospective decisionmaking was known to foe and friend alike as a practical tool of judicial activism, born out of disregard *108 for stare decisis. In the eyes of its enemies,
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112890/harper-v-virginia-dept-of-taxation/
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*108 for stare decisis. In the eyes of its enemies, the doctrine "smack[ed] of the legislative process," "encroach[ed] on the prerogatives of the legislative department of government," Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, removed "one of the great inherent restraints upon this Court's depart[ing] from the field of interpretation to enter that of lawmaking," caused the Court's behavior to become "assimilated to that of a legislature," Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, and tended "to cut [the courts] loose from the force of precedent, allowing [them] to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis, " All this was not denied by the doctrine's friends, who also viewed it as a device to "augmen[t] the power of the courts to contribute to the growth of the law in keeping with the demands of society," Mallamud, Prospective Limitation and the Rights of the Accused, as "a deliberate and conscious technique of judicial lawmaking," as a means of "facilitating more effective and defensible judicial lawmaking," 8. Justice Harlan described this Court's embrace of the prospectivity principle as "the product of the Court's disquietude with the impacts of its fast-moving pace of constitutional innovation," The Court itself, however, glowingly described the doctrine as the cause rather than the effect of innovation, extolling it as a "technique" providing the "impetus for the implementation of long overdue reforms." Whether cause or effect, there is no doubt that the era which gave birth to the prospectivity principle was marked by a newfound disregard for stare decisis. As one *109 commentator calculated, "[b]y 1959, the number of instances in which the Court had reversals involving constitutional issues had grown to sixty; in the two decades which followed, the Court overruled constitutional cases on no less than forty-seven occasions." Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, It was an era when this Court cast overboard numerous settled decisions, and indeed even whole areas of law, with an unceremonious "heave-ho." See, e. g., ; U.S. 335 ; ; 389 U.S. 7 and ). To argue now that one of the jurisprudential tools of judicial activism from that period should be extended on grounds of stare decisis can only be described as paradoxical.[2] In sum, I join the opinion of the Court because the doctrine of prospective decisionmaking is not in fact protected *110 by our flexible rule of stare decisis; and because no friend of stare decisis would want it to be. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice White joins, concurring in
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112890/harper-v-virginia-dept-of-taxation/
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be. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice White joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I remain of the view that it is sometimes appropriate in the civil context to give only prospective application to a judicial decision. "[P]rospective overruling allows courts to respect the principle of stare decisis even when they are impelled to change the law in light of new understanding." American Trucking Assns., When a court promulgates a new rule of law, prospective application functions "to avoid injustice or hardship to civil litigants who have justifiably relied on prior law." See ; ; And in my view retroactivity in civil cases continues to be governed by the standard announced in Chevron Thus, for the reasons explained by Justice O'Connor, post, at 113-117, I cannot agree with the Court's broad dicta, ante, at 95-97, that appears to embrace in the civil context the retroactivity principles adopted for criminal cases in As Justice O'Connor has demonstrated elsewhere, the differences between the civil and criminal contexts counsel strongly against adoption of Griffith for civil cases. See American Trucking Assns., at -199. I also cannot accept the Court's conclusion, ante, at 96-99, which is based on Justice Souter's opinion in James B. Distilling that a decision of this Court must be applied in a retroactive manner simply because the rule of law there announced happened to be applied to the parties then before the Court. *111 See post, at 117-122 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting); James B. Distilling -552 For these reasons, I do not join Part II of the Court's opinion. I nonetheless agree with the Court that must be given retroactive effect. The first condition for prospective application of any decision is that itmust announce a new rule of law. Ashland ; American Trucking Assns., ; United ; Chevron 404 U. S., -107. The decision must "overrul[e] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied" or "decid[e] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Because did neither, it did not announce new law and therefore must be applied in a retroactive manner. Respondent argues that two new principles of law were established in First, it points to the holding that 4 U.S. C. 111, in which the United States consents to state taxation of the compensation of "an officer or employee of the United States," applies to federal retirees as well as current federal employees. Brief for Respondent 16-18. See -810. In however, we indicated that this holding was "dictate[d]" by "the plain language of the statute," and we added for good measure our view that
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,993 | 9 |
concurring
|
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112890/harper-v-virginia-dept-of-taxation/
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statute," and we added for good measure our view that the language of the statute was "unambiguous," "unmistakable," and "leaves no room for doubt," Given these characterizations, it is quite implausible to contend that in this regard decided "an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron The second new rule respondent contends the Court announced in was that the state statute at issue discriminated against federal retirees even though the statute treated them like all other state taxpayers except state employees. *112 Brief for Respondent 18-26. See The Court, however, anchored its decision in precedent. We observed that in Phillips Chemical "we faced th[e] precise situation" confronting us in and so Phillips Chemical controlled our n. 4. To be sure, Justice Stevens in dissent disagreed with these contentions and attempted to distinguish Phillips -826. The Court, however, was not persuaded at the time, and I remain convinced that the Court had the better reading of Phillips A contrary holding in in my view, would have created a clear inconsistency in our jurisprudence. Under Chevron application of precedent which directly controls is not the stuff of which new law is made. Far from being "revolutionary," Ashland Co. v. or "an avulsive change which caused the current of the law thereafter to flow between new banks," Hanover Shoe, was a mere application of plain statutory language and existing precedent. In these circumstances, this Court is not free to mitigate any financial hardship that might befall Virginia's taxpayers as a result of their state government's failure to reach a correct understanding of the unambiguous dictates of federal law. Because I do not believe that announced a new principle of law, I have no occasion to consider Justice O'Connor's argument, post, at 131-136, that equitable considerations may inform the formulation of remedies when a new rule is announced. In any event, I do not read Part III of the Court's opinion as saying anything inconsistent with what Justice O'Connor proposes. On this understanding, I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion and concur in its judgment.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
second_dissenting
|
California v. Ramos
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111019/california-v-ramos/
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I join Parts II through V of JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion in dissent. I had understood the issue in this case to be whether a State constitutionally may instruct a jury about the Governor's power to commute a sentence of life without parole. That issue involves jury consideration of the probability of *1029 action by the incumbent Governor or by future Governors. Instead, the Court, on its own, redefines the issue in terms of the dangerousness of the respondent, an issue that involves jury consideration of the probability that respondent will commit acts of violence in the future. Ante, at 1002-1003. As both JUSTICE MARSHALL, ante, at 1018-1019, and JUSTICE STEVENS, post, at 1030, so forcefully point out, the two questions do not relate to each other. Neither the State of California nor the solitary dissenter in the State's Supreme Court ventured such an argument. The issue actually presented is an important one, and there may be arguments supportive of the instruction. The Court, however, chooses to present none. Instead, it approves the Briggs Instruction by substituting an intellectual sleight of hand for legal analysis. This kind of appellate review compounds the original unfairness of the instruction itself, and thereby does the rule of law disservice. I dissent. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. No rule of law required the Court to hear this case. We granted certiorari only because at least four Members of the Court determined as a matter of discretion that review of the constitutionality of the so-called Briggs Instruction would represent a wise use of the Court's scarce resources. When certiorari was granted in this case, the Court had been informed by the respondent that the Briggs Instruction is unique: "Only California requires that juries be instructed selectively on the Governor's power to commute life without parole sentences." Further, the Court had been informed, accurately, that the overwhelming number of jurisdictions condemn any comment whatsoever in a capital case on the Governor's power to commute. That statement was followed by a half-page list of citations to state-court decisions. Brief in Opposition 6-7. See ante, at 1026-1027 (JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting). These facts shed an illuminating light on the Court's perception of how its discretion should be exercised. *1030 Even if one were to agree with the Court's conclusion that the instruction does not violate the defendant's procedural rights, it would nevertheless be fair to ask what harm would have been done to the administration of justice by state courts if the California court had been left undisturbed in its determination. It is clear that omission of the instruction could
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
second_dissenting
|
California v. Ramos
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111019/california-v-ramos/
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determination. It is clear that omission of the instruction could not conceivably prejudice the prosecutor's legitimate interests. Surely if the character of an offense and the character of the offender are such that death is the proper penalty, the omission of a comment on the Governor's power to commute a life sentence would not preclude the jury from returning the proper verdict. If it were true that this instruction may make the difference between life and death in a case in which the scales are otherwise evenly balanced, that is a reason why the instruction should not be given not a reason for giving it. For the existence of the rarely exercised power of commutation has absolutely nothing to do with the defendant's culpability or his capacity for rehabilitation. The Governor's power to commute is entirely different from any relevant aggravating circumstance that may legitimately impel the jury toward voting for the death penalty. See ante, at 1012. The Briggs Instruction has no greater justification than an instruction to the jury that if the scales are evenly balanced, you should remember that more murders have been committed by people whose names begin with the initial "S" than with any other letter. No matter how trivial the impact of the instruction may be, it is fundamentally wrong for the presiding judge at the trial who should personify the evenhanded administration of justice to tell the jury, indirectly to be sure, that doubt concerning the proper penalty should be resolved in favor of the most certain method of preventing the defendant from ever walking the streets again. The Court concludes its opinion by solemnly noting that we "sit as judges, not as legislators, and the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of possible commutation is *1031 best left to the States." Ante, at 1014. Why, I ask with all due respect, did not the Justices who voted to grant certiorari in this case allow the wisdom of state judges to prevail in California, especially when they have taken a position consistent with those of state judges in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming? I repeat, no rule of law commanded the Court to grant certiorari. No other State would have been required to follow the California precedent if it had been permitted to stand. Nothing more than an interest in facilitating the imposition of the death penalty in California justified this Court's exercise
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
|
Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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The Constitution’s Appointments Clause says that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con- sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States” Art. II, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In 2016, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Man- agement, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). 130 Stat. 549, 48 U.S. C. et seq. That Act created a Fi- nancial Oversight and Management Board, and it provided, as relevant here, that the President could appoint its seven members without “the advice and consent of the Senate,” i.e., without Senate confirmation. The question before us is whether this method of appoint- ment violates the Constitution’s Senate confirmation re- quirement. In our view, the Appointments Clause governs the appointments of all officers of the United States, includ- ing those located in Puerto Rico. Yet two provisions of the Constitution empower Congress to create local offices for the District of Columbia and for Puerto Rico and the Terri- tories. See Art. I, cl. 17; Art. IV, cl. 2. And the Clause’s term “Officers of the United States” has never been understood to cover those whose powers and duties are pri- marily local in nature and derive from these two constitu- tional provisions. The Board’s statutory responsibilities consist of primarily local duties, namely, representing Puerto Rico in bankruptcy proceedings and supervising as- pects of Puerto Rico’s fiscal and budgetary policies. We therefore find that the Board members are not “Officers of Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 3 Opinion of the Court the United States.” For that reason, the Appointments Clause does not dictate how the Board’s members must be selected. I A In 2006, tax advantages that had previously led major businesses to invest in Puerto Rico expired. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Many industries left the island. Emigration increased. And the public debt of Puerto Rico’s government and its instru- mentalities soared, rising from $39.2 billion in 2005 to $71 billion in 2016. See Dept. of Treasury, Puerto Rico’s Eco- nomic and Fiscal Crisis 1, 3, https://www.treasury.gov/ connect/blog/Documents/Puerto_Ricos_fiscal_challenges.pdf; GAO, U. S. Territories: Public Debt Outlook 12 (GAO–18– 160, 2017). Puerto Rico found that it could not service that debt. Yet Puerto Rico could not easily restructure it. The Federal Bankruptcy Code’s municipality-related Chapter 9 did not apply to Puerto Rico (or to the District of Columbia). See 11 U.S. C. 101(52). But at the same time, federal bankruptcy law invalidated Puerto Rico’s own local “debt- restructuring” statutes. Puerto Rico v. Franklin
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