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Justice Breyer
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majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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Rico’s own local “debt- restructuring” statutes. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax- Free Trust, 579 U. S. (2016). In 2016, in response to Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis, Congress enacted PROMESA. 48 U.S. C. et seq. PROMESA allows Puerto Rico and its entities to file for federal bankruptcy protection. See 302, 130 Stat. 577, 579; cf. 11 U.S. C. (related to bankruptcies of lo- cal governments). The filing and subsequent proceedings are to take place in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, before a federal judge selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. PROMESA 308, PROMESA also created the Financial Oversight and Management Board—with seven members 4 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court appointed by the President and with the Governor serving as an ex officio member. (e), 554–555. PROMESA gives the Board authority to file for bankruptcy on behalf of Puerto Rico or its instrumentalities. The Board can supervise and modify Puerto Rico’s laws (and budget) to “achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.” ; see at 563–575. And it can gather evidence and conduct investigations in support of these efforts. –561. As we have just said, PROMESA gives the President of the United States the power to appoint the Board’s seven members without Senate confirmation, so long as he selects six from lists prepared by congressional leaders. at 554–555. B On August 31, 2016, President Obama selected the Board’s seven members in the manner just described. The Board established offices in Puerto Rico and New York, and soon filed bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the Common- wealth and (eventually) five Commonwealth entities. Title III Petition in No. 17–BK–3283 (PR); see Order Pursuant to PROMESA Section 304(g), No. 17–BK–3283 Doc. 8829 (consolidating petitions filed on behalf of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation, the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, the Employees Retirement Sys- tem of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, and the Puerto Rico Public Buildings Authority). And the Chief Justice then selected a federal judge to serve as bankruptcy judge for Puerto Rico. Designation of Presiding District Judge, No. 17–BK–3283 (PR, May 5, 2017), Doc. 4. After both court and Board had decided a number of mat- ters, several creditors moved to dismiss all proceedings on Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 5 Opinion of the Court the ground that the Board members’ selection violated the Appointments The court denied the motions. See In
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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violated the Appointments The court denied the motions. See In re Financial Oversight and Management Bd. of Puerto Rico, The credi- tors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. That court reversed. It held that the selec- tion of the Board’s members violated the Appointments But it concluded that those Board actions taken prior to its decision remained valid under the “de facto officer” doctrine. at 862–863; see, e.g., (1895) (judicial decisions could not later be attacked on ground that an unlawfully sitting judge presided); Ball v. United States, The Board, the United States, and various creditors then filed petitions for certiorari in this Court, some arguing that the appointments were constitutionally valid, others that the de facto officer doctrine did not apply. Compare Pets. for Cert. in Nos. 18–1334, 18–96, 18–15 with Pets. for Cert. in Nos. 18–75, 18–1521. In light of the importance of the questions, we granted certiorari in all the petitions and consolidated them for argument. 588 U. S. II Congress created the Board pursuant to its power under Article IV of the Constitution to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the United States.” cl. 2; see PROMESA 130 Stat. 553. Some have argued in these cases that the Ap- pointments Clause simply does not apply in the context of Puerto Rico. But, like the Court of Appeals, we believe the Appointments Clause restricts the appointment of all offic- ers of the United States, including those who carry out their powers and duties in or in relation to Puerto Rico. The Constitution’s structure provides strong reason to be- lieve that is so. The Constitution separates the three basic 6 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court powers of Government—legislative, executive, and judi- cial—with each branch serving different functions. But the Constitution requires cooperation among the three branches in specified areas. Thus, to become law, proposed legislation requires the agreement of both Congress and the President (or, a supermajority in Congress). See INS v. Chadha, (noting that the Consti- tution prescribes only four specific actions that Congress can take without bicameralism and presentment). At the same time, legislation must be consistent with constitu- tional constraints, and we usually look to the Judiciary as the ultimate interpreter of those constraints. The Appointments Clause reflects a similar allocation of responsibility, between President and Senate, in cases in- volving appointment to high federal office. That Clause re- flects the Founders’ reaction to “one of [their] generation’s greatest grievances against [pre-Revolutionary] executive
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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to “one of [their] generation’s greatest grievances against [pre-Revolutionary] executive power,” the manipulation of appointments. ; see also The Federalist No. 76, p. 455 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (the Ap- pointments Clause helps to preserve democratic accounta- bility). The Founders addressed their concerns with the ap- pointment power by both concentrating it and distributing it. On the one hand, they ensured that primary responsi- bility for nominations would fall on the President, whom they deemed “less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism” than a collective body. v. United States, See also The Fed- eralist No. 76, at 455 (“The sole and undivided responsibil- ity of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation”). On the other hand, they ensured that the Senate’s advice and consent power would provide “an excellent check upon a spirit of favorit- ism in the President and a guard against the appointment of unfit characters.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. (2017) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 7 Opinion of the Court omitted). By “limiting the appointment power” in this fash- ion, the Clause helps to “ensure that those who wielded [the appointments power] were accountable to political force and the will of the people.” ; see also 520 U.S., at “The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely,” while “[t]he censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the senate.” (internal quotation marks omitted). These other structural constraints, designed in part to ensure political accountability, apply to all exercises of fed- eral power, including those related to Article IV entities. Cf., e.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports 270–271 (MWAA) (separation-of-powers principles apply when Congress acts under its Article IV power to leg- islate “respecting other Property”). See also, e.g., Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, (the First Congress using bi- cameralism and presentment to make rules and regulations for the Northwest Territory). The objectives advanced by the Appointments Clause counsel strongly in favor of that Clause applying to the appointment of all “Officers of the United States.” Why should it be different when such an officer’s duties relate to Puerto Rico or other Article IV en- tities? Indeed, the Appointments Clause has no Article IV ex- ception. The Clause says in part that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con- sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments shall be established by Law” Art. II, cl. 2. That text firmly indicates that it applies to the appointment of all “Officers of the United States.” And history confirms 8 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court this reading. Before the writing of the Constitution, Con- gress had enacted an ordinance that allowed Congress to appoint officers to govern the Northwest Territory. As soon as the Constitution became law, the First Congress “adapt[ed]” that ordinance “to the present Constitution of the United States,” Act of Aug. 7, 1789, in large part by providing for an appointment process consistent with the constraints of the Appointments In par- ticular, it provided for a Presidential-appointment, Senate- confirmation process for high-level territorial appointees who assumed federal, as well as local, duties. See n. (a); (appointment by President, and confir- mation by Senate, of Governor, secretary, and members of the upper house); Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 68 (Governor “discharg[ed]” the federal “duties of superin- tendent of Indian affairs”). Later Congresses took a similar approach to later territorial Governors with federal duties. See Act of June 6, 1900, (appointment of Governor of Territory of Alaska by President with confir- mation by Senate); (federal duties of Alaska territorial Governor include entering into contracts in name of the United States and granting reprieves for federal of- fenses); Act of Mar. 2, 1819, § 10, 495 (similar for Governor of Arkansas). We do not mean to suggest that every time Congress chooses to require advice and consent procedures it does so because they are constitutionally re- quired. At times, Congress may wish to require Senate con- firmation for policy reasons. Even so, Congress’ practice of requiring advice and consent for these Governors with im- portant federal duties supports the inference that Congress expected the Appointments Clause to apply to at least some officials with supervisory authority over the Territories. Given the Constitution’s structure, this history, roughly analogous case law, and the absence of any conflicting au- thority, we conclude that the Appointments Clause con- strains the appointments power as to all “Officers of the Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 9 Opinion of the Court United States,” even when those officers exercise power in or related to Puerto Rico. III A The more difficult question before us is whether the Board members are officers of the United States such that the Appointments Clause requires Senate confirmation.
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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United States such that the Appointments Clause requires Senate confirmation. If they are not officers of the United States, but instead are some other type of officer, the Appointments Clause says nothing about them. (No one suggests that they are “Am- bassadors,” “other public Ministers and Consuls,” or “Judges of the supreme Court.”) And as we shall see, the answer to this question turns on whether the Board mem- bers have primarily local powers and duties. The language at issue does not offer us much guidance for understanding the key term “of the United States.” The text suggests a distinction between federal officers—offic- ers exercising power of the National Government—and nonfederal officers—officers exercising power of some other government. The Constitution envisions a federalist struc- ture, with the National Government exercising limited fed- eral power and other, local governments—usually state governments—exercising more expansive power. But the Constitution recognizes that for certain localities, there will be no state government capable of exercising local power. Thus, two provisions of the Constitution, Article I, cl. 17, and Article IV, cl. 2, give Congress the power to legislate for those localities in ways “that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual” in other contexts. Pal- Using these powers, Congress has long legislated for entities that are not States—the District of Columbia and the Territo- ries. See District of And, in doing so, Congress has both made local law directly and also created structures 10 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court of local government, staffed by local officials, who them- selves have made and enforced local law. Compare, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1962, (changing D. C. liquor tax from $1.25 per gallon to $1.50 per gallon), with District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganiza- tion Act, (giving local D. C. government pri- mary legislative control over local matters). This structure suggests that when Congress creates local offices using these two unique powers, the officers exercise power of the local government, not the Federal Government. Cf. Ameri- can Ins. (Marshall, C. J.) (territorial courts may exercise the judicial power of the Territories without the life tenure and salary protections mandated by Article III for federal judges); Cin- cinnati Soap (territorial legislators may exercise the legislative power of the Territories without violating the nondelegation doc- trine). History confirms what the Constitution’s text and struc- ture suggest. See 524 (20) (relying on history and structure in interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, (emphasizing the util- ity of historical practice in
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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v. Maryland, (emphasizing the util- ity of historical practice in interpreting constitutional pro- visions). Longstanding practice indicates that a federal law’s creation of an office in this context does not automat- ically make its holder an “Officer of the United States.” Ra- ther, Congress has often used these two provisions to create local offices filled in ways other than those specified in the Appointments When the First Congress legislated for the Northwest Territories, for example, it created a House of Representatives for the Territory with members selected by election. It also created an upper house of the territorial legislature, whose members were appointed by the President (without Senate confirmation) from lists pro- Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 11 Opinion of the Court vided by the elected, lower house. And it created magis- trates appointed by the Governor. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, n. (a). The practice of creating by federal law local offices for the Territories and District of Columbia that are filled through election or local executive appointment has continued una- bated for more than two centuries. See, e.g., (North- west Territories local offices filled by election); Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ; Act of May 7, 1800, ; Act of May 15, 1820, ; Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ; Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ; Act of Aug. 23, 1968, 82 Stat. 837 (Virgin Islands, same); Act of Sept. 11, 1968, Pub. L. 90–497, ; Act of May 4, 1812, ; Act of June 4, 1812, ; Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ; Act of June 6, 1900, ; Act of Sept. 11, 1968, Like JUSTICE THOMAS, post, at 6 (opinion concurring in judg- ment), we think the practice of the First Congress is strong evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. We find this subsequent history similarly illuminates the text’s meaning. Puerto Rico’s history is no different. It reveals a longstanding practice of selecting public officials with im- portant local responsibilities in ways that the Appoint- ments Clause does not describe. In 1898, at the end of the Spanish-American War, the United States took responsibil- ity for determining the civil rights of Puerto Ricans as well as Puerto Rico’s political status. Treaty of Paris, Art. 9, Dec. 10, 1898, In 1900, the Foraker Act pro- vided for Presidential appointment (with Senate confirma- tion) of Puerto Rico’s Governor, the heads of six depart- ments, the legislature’s upper house, and the justices of its 12 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court high court. Organic Act
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court high court. Organic Act of 1900, 17, 18, 33, 84. But it also provided for the selection, through popular election, of a lower legislative house with the power (subject to upper house concurrence) to “alter, amend, modify, and repeal any and all laws of every character.” 27, 32, There is no indication that anyone thought members of the lower house, wielding important local re- sponsibilities, were “Officers of the United States.” Congress replaced the Foraker Act with the Jones Act in 1917. Organic Act of Puerto Rico, ch. 5, Un- der the Jones Act the Puerto Rican Senate was elected and consequently no longer satisfied the Appointments Clause criteria. See Similarly, the Governor of Puerto Rico nominated four cabinet members, confirmed by the Senate of Puerto Rico. at –956. The elected legislature retained “all local legislative powers,” including the power to appropriate funds. 25, 34, 37, 962, 964. Congress amended the Jones Act in 1947 to provide for an elected Governor of Puerto Rico, and granted that Gov- ernor the power to appoint all cabinet officials. See Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 490, 1, 3, 771. The Presi- dent retained the power to appoint (with Federal Senate confirmation) judges, an auditor, and the new office of Co- ordinator of Federal Agencies, who was to supervise federal functions in Puerto Rico and recommend to higher federal officials ways to improve the quality of federal services. In 1950, Congress enacted Public Law 600, “in the nature of a compact” with Puerto Rico and subject to approval by the voters of Puerto Rico. Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, § 2, The Act adopted the Jones Act, as amended, as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and provided for the Jones Act’s substantial (but not complete) repeal upon the effective adoption of a contemplated Puerto Rican con- stitution. § 5, at 319–320. Among the provisions of Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 13 Opinion of the Court the Jones Act that Public Law 600 retained were several related to Puerto Rico’s public debt. Congress retained, for example, the triple-tax-exempt nature of Puerto Rican bonds. Jones Act, It also retained a (later repealed) cap on the amount of public debt Puerto Rico or its subdivisions could accumulate. In a public refer- endum, the citizens of Puerto Rico approved Public Law 600—including the limits on debt in of the Federal Rela- tions Act—and then began the constitution-making pro- cess. Pub. L. 600, § 3, ; see Act of July 3, 1, ; A. Fernós-Isern, Original Intent in
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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of July 3, 1, ; A. Fernós-Isern, Original Intent in the Constitution of Puerto Rico 13 (2d ed. 2002). Puerto Rico’s popularly ratified Constitution, which Con- gress accepted with a few fairly minor changes, does not in- volve the President or the Senate in the appointment pro- cess for local officials. That Constitution provides for the election of Puerto Rico’s Governor and legislators. Art. III, Art. IV, And it provides for gubernatorial appoint- ment (and Puerto Rican Senate confirmation) of cabinet of- ficers. Art. IV, The upshot is that Puerto Rico’s history reflects long- standing use of various methods for selecting officials with primarily local responsibilities. This history is consistent with the history of other entities that fall within the scope of Article IV and with the history of the District of Colum- bia. See at 10–11. And it comports with our prece- dents, which have long acknowledged that Congress may structure local governments under Article IV and Article I in ways that do not precisely mirror the constitutional blue- print for the National Government. See, e.g., Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, (1962) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that local governments created by Congress could, like govern- ments of the States, “dispense with protections deemed in- herent in a separation of governmental powers”). Some- times Congress has specified the use of methods that would FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court satisfy the Appointments Clause, other times it has speci- fied methods that would not satisfy the Appointments Clause, including elections and appointment by local offi- cials. Officials with primarily local duties have often fallen into the latter categories. We know of no case endorsing an Appointments Clause based challenge to such selection methods. Indeed, to read Appointments Clause constraints as binding Puerto Rican officials with primarily local duties would work havoc with Puerto Rico’s (federally ratified) democratic methods for selecting many of its officials. We thus conclude that while the Appointments Clause does restrict the appointment of “Officers of the United States” with duties in or related to the District of Columbia or an Article IV entity, it does not restrict the appointment of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local du- ties under Article IV, or Article I, cl. 17. B The question remains whether the Board members have primarily local powers and duties. We note that the Clause qualifies the phrase “Officers of the United States” with the words “whose Appointments shall be established by Law.” And we also note that PROMESA says that the Board
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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And we also note that PROMESA says that the Board is “an entity within the territorial government” and “shall not be considered a department, agency, establish- ment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government.” But the most these words show is that Congress did not intend to make the Board members “Officers of the United States.” It does not prove that, inso- far as the Constitution is concerned, they succeeded. But we think they have. Congress did not simply state that the Board is part of the local Puerto Rican government. Rather, Congress also gave the Board a structure, a set of duties, and related powers all of which are consistent with this statement. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 15 Opinion of the Court The government of Puerto Rico pays the Board’s ex- penses, including the salaries of its employees (the mem- bers serve without pay). ; see at 556. The Board possesses investigatory powers. It can hold hearings. It can issue subpoenas, subject to Puerto Rico’s limits on personal jurisdiction and enforceable under Puerto Rico’s laws. ), And it can enforce those subpoenas in (and only in) Puerto Rico’s courts. 104(f )(2), 106(a), 562. From its own offices in or outside of Puerto Rico, the Board works with the elected government of Puerto Rico to develop a fiscal plan that provides “a method to achieve fis- cal responsibility and access to the capital markets.” If it finds it necessary, the Board can develop its own budget for Puerto Rico which is “deemed approved” and becomes the operative budget. It can ensure compliance with the plan and budget by reviewing the Puerto Rico government’s laws and spending and by “direct[ing]” corrections or taking “such [other] actions as it considers necessary,” including pre- venting a law from taking effect. 203(d), 204(a), at 569, 571. The Board controls the issuance of new debt for Puerto Rico. The Board also may initiate bankruptcy proceedings for Puerto Rico or its instrumentalities. It may take any related “action necessary on behalf of,” and it serves as “the representative of,” Puerto Rico or its instru- mentalities. 15, These proceedings take place in the U. S. District Court for Puerto Rico. 07, To repeat: The Board has broad investigatory powers: It can administer oaths, issue subpoenas, take evidence and demand data from governments and creditors alike. But these powers are backed by Puerto Rican, not federal, law: Subpoenas are governed by Puerto Rico’s personal jurisdic- tion statute; false testimony is punishable under the law of 16 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT,
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court Puerto Rico; the Board must seek enforcement of its sub- poenas by filing in the courts of Puerto Rico. See –561. These powers are primarily local in nature. The Board also oversees the development of Puerto Rico’s fiscal and budgetary plans. It receives and evaluates pro- posals from the elected Governor and legislature. It can create a budget “deemed” to be that of Puerto Rico. It can intervene when budgetary constraints are violated. And it has authority over the issuance of new debt. at 563–575. These powers, too, are quintessentially lo- cal. Each concerns the finances of the Commonwealth, not of the United States. The Board members in this respect discharge duties ordinarily held by local officials. Last, the Board has the power to initiate bankruptcy pro- ceedings. But in doing so, it acts not on behalf of the United States, but on behalf of, and in the interests of, Puerto Rico. The proceedings take place in federal court; but the same is true of all persons or entities who seek bankruptcy protec- tion. The Board here acts as a local government that might take precisely the same actions. See, e.g., 11 U.S. C. 921 (related to bankruptcies of local govern- ments). Some Board actions, of course, may have nationwide con- sequences. But the same can be said of many actions taken by many Governors or other local officials. Taking actions with nationwide consequences does not automatically transform a local official into an “Officer of the United States.” The challengers rely most heavily on the nation- wide effects of the bankruptcy proceedings. E.g., Brief for Aurelius et al. 31; Brief for Petitioner Unión de Trabaja- dores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego, Inc. (UTIER) 49. But the same might be said of any major municipal, or even corporate, bankruptcy. E.g., In re Detroit, (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mich. 2013) (restructuring $18 billion in municipal debt). Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 17 Opinion of the Court In short, the Board possesses considerable power—in- cluding the authority to substitute its own judgment for the considered judgment of the Governor and other elected offi- cials. But this power primarily concerns local matters. Congress’ law thus substitutes a different process for deter- mining certain local policies (related to local fiscal respon- sibility) in respect to local matters. And that is the critical point for current purposes. The local nature of the legisla- tion’s expressed purposes, the representation of local inter- ests in bankruptcy proceedings, the focus of the Board’s
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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inter- ests in bankruptcy proceedings, the focus of the Board’s powers upon local expenditures, the local logistical support, the reliance on local laws in aid of the Board’s procedural powers—all these features when taken together and judged in the light of Puerto Rico’s history (and that of the Territo- ries and the District of Columbia)—make clear that the Board’s members have primarily local duties, such that their selection is not subject to the constraints of the Ap- pointments IV The Court of Appeals, pointing to three of this Court’s cases, reached the opposite conclusion. See Buckley v. Valeo, v. Commis- sioner, and Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. It pointed out that the Court, in those cases, dis- cussed the term “Officer of the United States,” and it con- cluded that, for Appointments Clause purposes, an appoin- tee is such an “officer” if “(1) the appointee occupies a ‘continuing’ position established by federal law; (2) the ap- pointee ‘exercis[es] significant authority’; and (3) the signif- icant authority is exercised ‘pursuant to the laws of the United States.’ ” The Court of Appeals concluded that the Board members satisfied this test. See at 856–857. We do not believe these three cases set forth the critical legal test relevant here, however, and we do not apply any 18 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court test they might enunciate. Each of the cases considered an Appointments Clause problem concerning the importance or significance of duties that were indisputably federal or national in nature. In Buckley, the question was whether members of the Federal Election Commission—appointees carrying out federal-election related duties—were “officers” for Appointments Clause purposes. In the Court asked the same question about special federal trial judges serving on federal tax courts. And in Lucia the Court asked the same question about federal administrative law judges carrying out Securities and Exchange Commission duties. Here, PROMESA, a federal law, creates the Board and its duties, and no one doubts their significance. But we cannot stop there. To do so would ignore the history we have dis- cussed—history stretching back to the founding. See at 10–13. And failing to take account of the nature of an appointee’s federally created duties, i.e., whether they are primarily local versus primarily federal, would threaten in- terference with democratic (or local appointment) selection methods in numerous Article IV Territories and perhaps the District of Columbia as well. See, e.g., 48 U.S. C. (providing for an elected Governor of Guam); (same for Virgin Islands); District of Columbia Self-Government Act, ;
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Justice Breyer
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majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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(same for Virgin Islands); District of Columbia Self-Government Act, ; 87 Stat. 790 (describing D. C. Mayor’s appointment powers); 48 U.S. C. c (same for Guam’s Governor); (same for Virgin Islands). There is no reason to understand the Appointments Clause—which, at least in part, seeks to advance democratic accountability and broaden appoint- ments-related responsibility, see at 6–7—as making it significantly more difficult for local residents of such ar- eas to share responsibility for the implementation of (stat- utorily created) primarily local duties. Neither the text nor the history of the Clause commands such a result. Neither do or MWAA, help Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 19 Opinion of the Court those challenging the Board’s constitutional legitimacy. Lebron considered whether, for First Amendment purposes, Amtrak was a governmental or a private entity. 513 U.S., at 379. All here agree that the Board is a Government en- tity, but that fact does not answer the “primarily local ver- sus primarily federal” question. In MWAA, the Court held that separation-of-powers principles forbid Members of Congress to become members of a board that controls fed- erally owned –276 and INS v. Chadha, ). The Court expressly declined to answer any question related to the Appoint- ments n. 23. While we have found no case from this Court directly on point, we believe that the Court’s analysis in O’Donoghue v. United States, and especially v. United States, provides a rough analogy. In O’Donoghue, the Court considered whether Article III’s tenure and salary protections applied to judges of the courts in the District of Columbia. The Court held that they did. Those courts, it believed, were “ ‘courts of the United States’ ” and “recipients of the judicial power of the United States.” 289 U.S., at 548. The judges’ salaries conse- quently could not be reduced. In however, the Court reached what might seem the precisely opposite conclusion. A criminal defendant, in- voking O’Donoghue, argued that the D. C. Superior Court Judge could not constitutionally preside over the case be- cause the judge lacked Article III’s tenure protection, namely, life tenure. But the Court rejected the defendant’s argument. Why? How did it ex- plain O’Donoghue? The difference, said the Court, lies in the fact that, in the meantime, Congress had changed the nature of the District of Columbia court. at 406–407; see District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 20 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court 1970, Congress changed what had been a uni- fied court system where judges adjudicated both local
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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a uni- fied court system where judges adjudicated both local and federal issues into separate court systems, in one of which judges adjudicated primarily local issues. Courts in that category had criminal jurisdiction over only those cases brought “ ‘under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.’ ” Its judges served for 15-year terms. This Court, in considered a local judge presiding over a local court. Congress had created that court in the exercise of its Article I power to “exercise exclusive Legisla- tion in all Cases whatsoever” over the District of Columbia. See Art I, cl. 17. The “focus” of these courts was “pri- marily upon matters of strictly local concern.” 411 U.S., at 407. Hence, the nature of those courts was a “far cry” from that of the courts at issue in O’Donoghue. The Court added that Congress had created non-Article III courts under its Article IV powers. It wrote that Con- gress could also create non-Article III courts under its Arti- cle I powers. And it held that judges serv- ing on those non-Article III courts lacked Article III protections. concerned Article I of the Constitution, not Arti- cle IV. And it concerned “the judicial Power of the United States,” not “Officers of the United States.” But it provides a rough analogy. It holds that Article III protections do not apply to an Article I court “focus[ed],” unlike the courts at issue in O’Donoghue, primarily on local matters. Here, Congress expressly invoked a constitutional provision al- lowing it to make local debt-related law (Article IV); it ex- pressly located the Board within the local government of Puerto Rico; it clearly indicated that it intended the Board’s members to be local officials; and it gave them primarily local powers, duties, and responsibilities. In his concurring opinion, JUSTICE THOMAS criticizes the Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 21 Opinion of the Court inquiry we set out—whether an officer’s duties are primar- ily local or primarily federal—as too “amorphous,” post, at 10. But we think this is the test established by the Consti- tution’s text, as illuminated by historical practice. And we cannot see how Congress could avoid the strictures of the Appointments Clause by adding to a federal officer’s other obligations a large number of local duties. Indeed, we think that our test, tied as it is to both the text and the history of the Appointments Clause, is more rigorous than the bare inquiry into the “nature” of the officer’s authority that JUSTICE THOMAS proposes, and we believe it is more faith- ful to the Clause’s
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Justice Breyer
| 2,020 | 2 |
majority
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Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4759029/financial-oversight-and-management-bd-for-puerto-rico-v-aurelius/
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we believe it is more faith- ful to the Clause’s original meaning. V We conclude, for the reasons stated, that the Constitu- tion’s Appointments Clause applies to the appointment of officers of the United States with powers and duties in and in relation to Puerto Rico, but that the congressionally man- dated process for selecting members of the Financial Over- sight and Management Board for Puerto Rico does not vio- late that Given this conclusion, we need not consider the request by some of the parties that we overrule the much-criticized “Insular Cases” and their progeny. See, e.g., (opinion of Brown, J.); (1922); (plurality opin- ion) (indicating that the Insular Cases should not be further extended); see also Brief for Official Committee of Unse- cured Creditors of All Title III Debtors (Other than COFINA) 20–25 (arguing that the Insular Cases support reversal on the Appointments Clause issue); Brief for UTIER 64–66 (encouraging us to overrule the Insular Cases); Brief for Virgin Islands Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 13–18 ; Cabranes, Citizenship and the Amer- ican Empire, 436–442 (1978) (criti- cizing the Insular Cases); Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 22 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC Opinion of the Court Harv. L. Rev. 169 Those cases did not reach this issue, and whatever their continued validity we will not extend them in these cases. See at Neither, since we hold the appointment method valid, need we consider the application of the de facto officer doc- trine. See (dis- cussing the doctrine); see also, e.g., Brief for Aurelius et al. 48–69 (arguing the doctrine does not apply in this context); Brief for UTIER 69–85 ; Reply Brief for United States 26–47 (insisting to the contrary); Brief for Cross-Re- spondent COFINA Senior Bondholders’ Coalition –46 Finally, as JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR recognizes, post, at 8 (opinion concurring in judgment), we need not, and there- fore do not, decide questions concerning the application of the Federal Relations Act and Public Law 600. No party has argued that those Acts bear any significant relation to the answer to the Appointments Clause question now be- fore us. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 18–1334, 18–75, 18–96, 18–15 and 18–1521 FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, PETITIONER 18–1334 v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS 18–75
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
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Smith v. Illinois
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111288/smith-v-illinois/
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The Court seizes upon petitioner's seven-word response "Uh, yeah, I'd like to do that," rendered during a colloquy which in its entirety could not have taken five minutes, and proclaims that petitioner thereby clearly asserted his desire to consult with an attorney before speaking to the police. In so doing, it decides this essentially factual inquiry contrary to the three other courts that have considered the question: the Illinois trial court, the Illinois Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court of Illinois. Under the guise of applying a rule of law which, however correct in the abstract, has little application to these facts, the Court permits its certiorari jurisdiction to be used to relitigate the facts, and reaches a conclusion that is no more demonstrably correct than that reached by the Illinois courts. There is no dispute that requires interrogation to cease, if and when petitioner clearly asserts his right to the assistance of counsel. But here no "interrogation" was being conducted by the *101 police; they were simply in the process of giving petitioner his full Miranda warnings. The very next statement by the police officer after petitioner's "clear assertion" of his right to counsel was to tell petitioner that "[i]f you want a lawyer and you're unable to pay for one a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of cost, do you understand that?" Surely the police should have continued to give petitioner his full warnings, even had his earlier response had the talismanic quality that the Court attributes to it. The Court also assumes that the statement, "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that," was announced affirmatively and without any tone of equivocation or inquiry. As the Illinois Appellate Court observed, the officer reading petitioner his rights did not understand the statement as a clear request. After first reading petitioner the fourth Miranda right, he immediately sought clarification by asking petitioner pointedly, "Do you wish to talk with me at this time without a lawyer being present?" To this query, petitioner responded, "Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what really." The trial judge, who was able to observe the demeanor of the officers testifying as to what took place and to listen to the tape of the interrogation, implicitly concluded that petitioner's initial statement was not a clear request. The Court asserts that subsequent statements cannot be used to call into question the clarity of an earlier "request" for counsel. It may be that a crystal-clear statement could not be rendered ambiguous by subsequent responses to questions seeking clarification. But statements are rarely that
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
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Smith v. Illinois
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111288/smith-v-illinois/
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responses to questions seeking clarification. But statements are rarely that clear; differences between certainty and hesitancy may well turn on the inflection with which words are spoken, especially where, as here, a seven-word statement is isolated from the statements surrounding it. But in the ordinary give-and-take of statement and response in a colloquy such as this, I see no reason why the entire flavor of the colloquy lasting less than five minutes cannot be considered by the trier of fact. *102 is entirely consistent with this approach. In that case Edwards, after being informed of his Miranda rights, agreed to talk to police, but during his interrogation while discussing a possible "deal" said, "I want an attorney before making a deal." -479. The police then ceased questioning him, and he was returned to jail. The next morning two detectives went to the jail and asked to see Edwards; Edwards replied that he did not want to talk to anyone, but the guard told him that "he had" to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. The Court said: "Here, the critical facts as found by the Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent on [the preceding day], but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned the next morning to confront him and as a result of the meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having exercised his right on the [preceding day] to have counsel present during interrogation, he did not validly waive that right on the [next day]. For the following reasons, we agree." Our other cases applying Edwards, and are cast in a similar mold; the suspect clearly asserts a right to counsel, questioning ceases, and then the police seek to resume interrogation at a later time. The facts of the present case simply do not fit that mold. The entire process by which petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights was transcribed in the few lines contained in the Court's opinion, ante, at 92-93; it simply slices a legal abstraction thinner than common sense will permit to conclude on the basis of this colloquy that it may not be used in its entirety to determine whether petitioner "clearly asserted" his right to counsel. *103 The Court apparently assumes that the officers were trying to trick or coerce petitioner into waiving his right to counsel. This is belied by the fact that, immediately after petitioner agreed to talk, the interrogating officer stated plainly, "All
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,984 | 19 |
dissenting
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Smith v. Illinois
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111288/smith-v-illinois/
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petitioner agreed to talk, the interrogating officer stated plainly, "All you have to do is just tell me I don't want to talk to you any more and that ends it." Subsequently, during the interrogation, when petitioner stated, "I don't want to talk to you no more. I wanta get a lawyer," the police immediately ceased questioning and complied with this request. The Court also implies that the officers badgered and coerced petitioner into changing his mind about obtaining a lawyer. In fact, between petitioner's initial statement and his indisputable expression of uncertainty, all that the officers did was advise him of the right to appointed counsel and asked him what he wanted to do: "A. Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that. "Q. Okay. If you want a lawyer and if you're unable to pay for one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of cost, do you understand that? "A. Okay. "Q. Do you wish to talk with me at this time without a lawyer being present? "A. Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what really." This can hardly be characterized as badgering. The Court makes much of the officer's subsequent clarifying explanation that "You either have to agree to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present and if you do agree to talk with me without a lawyer being present you can stop any time you want to." Tr. 230. The Court ignores the word "either." The sentence appears to be incomplete. It may well be that petitioner's response, "All right. I'll talk to you then," interrupted the completion of the sentence. The Court makes the unwarranted assumption that the officer was attempting to badger and overreach petitioner. Again, only the trier of fact can intelligently determine the import of the officer's statement. *104 Common sense suggests that the police should both complete reading petitioner his rights and then ask him to state clearly what he elects to do, even if he indicated a tentative desire while he was being informed of his rights. This is entirely consistent with applicable language in Miranda itself: "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Miranda v. The reading of this short colloquy between petitioner and the police officer satisfies me that the police were faithfully attempting to follow our Miranda decision. The Court's opinion gives the impression that it is concerned about overreaching, badgering,
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5 prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate infor- mation by individuals who are under a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such information for their personal advantage. as amended, 15 U.S. C. (prohibiting the use, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules as the [Securities and Ex- change Commission] may prescribe”);10b–5 (2016) (forbidding the use, “in connection with the sale or purchase of any security,” of “any device, scheme or arti- fice to defraud,” or any “act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit”); see United States v. O’Hagan, Individuals under this duty may face criminal and civil for trading on inside information (unless they make appropri- ate disclosures ahead of time). These persons also may not tip inside information to 2 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court others for trading. The tippee acquires the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty, and the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in disregard of that knowledge. In v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 this Court explained that a tippee’s for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tip- per breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the infor- mation. A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, we held, when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal benefit. And, we went on to say, a jury can infer a personal benefit—and thus a breach of the tipper’s duty—where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of confidential infor- mation to a trading relative or friend.” Petitioner Bassam Salman challenges his convictions for conspiracy and insider trading. Salman received lucrative trading tips from an extended family member, who had received the information from Salman’s brother-in-law. Salman then traded on the information. He argues that he cannot be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his brother-in-law) did not personally receive money or prop- erty in exchange for the tips and thus did not personally benefit from them. The Court of Appeals disagreed, hold- ing that allowed the jury to infer that the tipper here breached a duty because he made a “ ‘gift of confiden- tial information to a trading relative.’ ” 1092 (CA9 2015) ( ). Because the Court of Appeals properly
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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(CA9 2015) ( ). Because the Court of Appeals properly applied we affirm the judgment below. I Maher Kara was an investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group. He dealt with highly confidential information about mergers and acqui- sitions involving Citigroup’s clients. Maher enjoyed a Cite as: 580 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court close relationship with his older brother, Mounir Kara (known as Michael). After Maher started at Citigroup, he began discussing aspects of his job with Michael. At first he relied on Michael’s chemistry background to help him grasp scientific concepts relevant to his new job. Then, while their father was battling cancer, the brothers dis- cussed companies that dealt with innovative cancer treatment and pain management techniques. Michael began to trade on the information Maher shared with him. At first, Maher was unaware of his brother’s trading activ- ity, but eventually he began to suspect that it was taking place. Ultimately, Maher began to assist Michael’s trading by sharing inside information with his brother about pending mergers and acquisitions. Maher sometimes used code words to communicate corporate information to his brother. Other times, he shared inside information about deals he was not working on in order to avoid detection. See, e.g., App. 118, 124–125. Without his younger brother’s knowledge, Michael fed the information to others— including Salman, Michael’s friend and Maher’s brother- in-law. By the time the authorities caught on, Salman had made over $1.5 million in profits that he split with another relative who executed trades via a brokerage account on Salman’s behalf. Salman was indicted on one count of conspiracy to com- mit securities fraud, see 18 U.S. C. and four counts of securities fraud, see 15 U.S. C. §, 78ff; 18 U.S. C.10b–5. Facing charges of their own, both Maher and Michael pleaded guilty and testified at Salman’s trial. The evidence at trial established that Maher and Mi- chael enjoyed a “very close relationship.” App. 215. Ma- her “love[d] [his] brother very much,” Michael was like “a second father to Maher,” and Michael was the best man at Maher’s wedding to Salman’s sister. 104– 4 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 107. Maher testified that he shared inside information with his brother to benefit him and with the expectation that his brother would trade on it. While Maher explained that he disclosed the information in large part to appease Michael (who pestered him incessantly for it), he also testified that he tipped his brother to “help him” and to “fulfil[l] whatever needs he had.” For instance, Michael once called
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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“fulfil[l] whatever needs he had.” For instance, Michael once called Maher and told him that “he needed a favor.” Maher offered his brother money but Michael asked for information instead. Maher then disclosed an upcoming acquisition. Although he instantly regretted the tip and called his brother back to implore him not to trade, Maher expected his brother to do so anyway. For his part, Michael told the jury that his brother’s tips gave him “timely information that the average person does not have access to” and “access to stocks, options, and what have you, that I can capitalize on, that the average person would never have or dream of.” Mi- chael testified that he became friends with Salman when Maher was courting Salman’s sister and later began shar- ing Maher’s tips with Salman. As he explained at trial, “any time a major deal came in, [Salman] was the first on my phone list.” Michael also testified that he told Salman that the information was coming from Maher. See, e.g., (“ ‘Maher is the source of all this information’ ”). After a jury trial in the Northern District of California, Salman was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and over $730,000 in restitution. After his motion for a new trial was denied, Salman appealed to the Ninth Circuit. While his appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. 773 F.3d 438 (2014), cert. denied, 577 U. S. (2015). There, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions of two portfolio Cite as: 580 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court managers who traded on inside information. The defendants were “several steps removed from the corpo- rate insiders” and the court found that “there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside information.” The court acknowledged that and Second Circuit case law allow a factfinder to infer a personal benefit to the tipper from a gift of con- fidential information to a trading relative or friend. 773 F.3d, at 452. But the court concluded that, “[t]o the ex- tent” permits “such an inference,” the inference “is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”1 Pointing to Salman argued that his conviction should be reversed. While the evidence established that Maher made a gift of trading information to Michael and that Salman knew it, there was no
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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to Michael and that Salman knew it, there was no evidence that Maher received anything of “a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange—or that Salman knew of any such benefit. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed Sal- man’s conviction. The court reasoned that the case was governed by ’s holding that a tip- per benefits personally by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. Indeed, Ma- her’s disclosures to Michael were “precisely the gift of confidential information to a trading relative that envisioned.” (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent went further and re- quired additional gain to the tipper in cases involving gifts —————— 1 The Second Circuit also reversed the defendants’ convic- tions because the Government introduced no evidence that the defend- ants knew the information they traded on came from insiders or that the insiders received a personal benefit in exchange for the tips. 773 F.3d, at 453–454. This case does not implicate those issues. 6 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court of confidential information to family and friends, the Ninth Circuit “decline[d] to follow it.” We granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the Second Circuit’s decision and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case.2 577 U. S. (2016). II A In this case, Salman contends that an insider’s “gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend,” 463 U.S., is not enough to establish securi- ties fraud. Instead, Salman argues, a tipper does not personally benefit unless the tipper’s goal in disclosing inside information is to obtain money, property, or some- thing of tangible value. He claims that our insider-trading precedents, and the cases those precedents cite, involve situations in which the insider exploited confidential information for the insider’s own “tangible monetary profit.” Brief for Petitioner 31. He suggests that his —————— 2 v. SEC, established the personal-benefit framework in a case brought under the classical theory of insider- trading which applies “when a corporate insider” or his tippee “trades in the securities of [the tipper’s] corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.” United 521 U.S. 642, 651–652 In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and takes advantage of, the shareholders of his corporation. By con- trast, the misappropriation theory holds that a person commits securi- ties fraud “when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information” such as an employer or client. In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and defrauds, the source of the information,
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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a duty to, and defrauds, the source of the information, as opposed to the shareholders of his corporation. The Court of Appeals observed that this is a misappropriation case, 792 F. 3d, 1087, 1092, n. 4 (CA9 2015), while the Government represents that both theories apply on the facts of this case, Brief for United States 15, n. 1. We need not resolve the question. The parties do not dispute that ’s personal-benefit analysis applies in both classical and misappropriation cases, so we will proceed on the assumption that it does. Cite as: 580 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court position is reinforced by our criminal-fraud precedents outside of the insider-trading context, because those cases confirm that a fraudster must personally obtain money or property. at 33–34. More broadly, Salman urges that defining a gift as a personal benefit renders the insider- trading offense indeterminate and overbroad: indetermi- nate, because may turn on facts such as the close- ness of the relationship between tipper and tippee and the tipper’s purpose for disclosure; and overbroad, because the Government may avoid having to prove a concrete per- sonal benefit by simply arguing that the tipper meant to give a gift to the tippee. He also argues that we should inter- pret ’s standard narrowly so as to avoid constitutional concerns. Brief for Petitioner 36–37. Finally, Salman contends that gift situations create especially troubling problems for remote tippees—that is, tippees who receive inside information from another tippee, rather than the tipper—who may have no knowledge of the relationship between the original tipper and tippee and thus may not know why the tipper made the disclosure. 50. The Government disagrees and argues that a gift of confidential information to anyone, not just a “trading relative or friend,” is enough to prove securities fraud. See Brief for United States 27 (“’s personal-benefit test encompasses a gift to any person with the expectation that the information will be used for trading, not just to ‘a trading relative or friend’ ” ( 463 U.S., ; emphasis in original)). Under the Government’s view, a tipper personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading information for a noncorporate pur- pose. Accordingly, a gift to a friend, a family member, or anyone else would support the inference that the tipper exploited the trading value of inside information for per- sonal purposes and thus personally benefited from the disclosure. The Government claims to find support for 8 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court this reading in and the precedents on which relied. See, e.g., (“fraud” in an
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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the precedents on which relied. See, e.g., (“fraud” in an insider-trading case “derives ‘from the inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage’ of ‘information intended to be avail- able only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone’ ” ( In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E. C. 933, 936 (1968))). The Government also argues that Salman’s concerns about unlimited and indeterminate for remote tippees are significantly alleviated by other statutory elements that prosecutors must satisfy to convict a tippee for insider trading. The Government observes that, in order to establish a defendant’s criminal as a tippee, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the information being disclosed would be used in securities trading. Brief for United States 23– 24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Government also notes that, to establish a defendant’s criminal as a tippee, it must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty—in other words, that the tippee knew that the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the tipper expected trading to ensue. Brief for United States 43; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37, 39. B We adhere to which easily resolves the narrow issue presented here. In we explained that a tippee is exposed to liabil- ity for trading on inside information only if the tippee participates in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty. Whether the tipper breached that duty depends “in large part on the purpose of the disclosure” to the tippee. 463 U.S., at 662. “[T]he test,” we explained, “is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Thus, the disclosure of confidential information without personal benefit is not enough. In Cite as: 580 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of the Court determining whether a tipper derived a personal benefit, we instructed courts to “focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earn- ings.” This personal benefit can “often” be inferred “from objective facts and circumstances,” we explained, such as “a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.” at 664. In particular, we held that “[t]he elements of fiduci- ary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential infor- mation to a trading relative or friend.” (emphasis added). In
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Justice Alito
| 2,016 | 8 |
majority
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Salman v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4327562/salman-v-united-states/
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mation to a trading relative or friend.” (emphasis added). In such cases, “[t]he tip and trade resemble trad- ing by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” We then applied this gift-giving principle to resolve itself, finding it dispositive that the tip- pers “received no monetary or personal benefit” from their tips to “nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to” (emphasis added). Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case. Maher, the tipper, provided inside information to a close relative, his brother Michael. makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to “a trading relative,” and that rule is suffi- cient to resolve the case at hand. As Salman’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Maher would have breached his duty had he personally traded on the infor- mation here himself then given the proceeds as a gift to his brother. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3–4. It is obvious that Maher would personally benefit in that situation. But Maher effectively achieved the same result by disclosing the information to Michael, and allowing him to trade on it. appropriately prohibits that approach, as well. Cf. 10 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court (holding that “insiders [are] forbidden” both “from personally using undisclosed corporate infor- mation to their advantage” and from “giv[ing] such infor- mation to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain”). specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to “a trading relative or friend,” the jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift. In such situations, the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds. Here, by disclosing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it, Maher breached his duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients—a duty Salman acquired, and breached himself, by trading on the information with full knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed. To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with C Salman points out that many insider-trading cases— including several that cited—involved insiders who personally profited through the misuse of trading infor- mation. But this observation does
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the misuse of trading infor- mation. But this observation does not undermine the test articulated and applied. Salman also cites a sam- pling of our criminal-fraud decisions construing other federal fraud statutes, suggesting that they stand for the proposition that fraud is not consummated unless the defendant obtains money or property. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U. S. (2013) (Hobbs Act); (honest-services mail and wire fraud); Cite as: 580 U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court (wire fraud); (1987) (mail fraud). Assuming that these cases are rele- vant to our construction of (a proposition the Gov- ernment forcefully disputes), nothing in them undermines the commonsense point we made in Making a gift of inside information to a relative like Michael is little different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading relative. The tipper benefits either way. The facts of this case illustrate the point: In one of their tipper-tippee interactions, Mi- chael asked Maher for a favor, declined Maher’s offer of money, and instead requested and received lucrative trading information. We reject Salman’s argument that ’s gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. created a simple and clear “guiding principle” for determining tippee 463 U.S., and Salman has not demonstrated that either itself or the gift-giving standard “leav[e] grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” or are plagued by “hopeless indeterminacy,” Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. (2015) (slip op., at 5, 7). At most, Salman shows that in some factual circumstances assessing for gift-giving will be difficult. That alone cannot render “shapeless” a federal criminal prohibi- tion, for even clear rules “produce close cases.” at (slip op., at 9, 10). We also reject Salman’s appeal to the rule of lenity, as he has shown “no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty that would trigger the rule’s application.” (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, Salman’s conduct is in the heartland of ’s rule concerning gifts. It remains the case that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.” 463 U.S., at 664. But there is no need for us to address those difficult 12 SALMAN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court cases today, because this case involves “precisely the ‘gift of confidential information to a trading relative’ that envisioned.” ( 463 U.S., ). III Salman’s jury was properly instructed that a personal benefit includes “the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential information to a
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2646093/heimeshoff-v-hartford-life-accident-ins-co/
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A participant in an employee benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. et seq., may bring a civil action under to re- cover benefits due under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S. C. Courts have generally required partici- pants to exhaust the plan’s administrative remedies before filing suit to recover benefits. ERISA does not, however, specify a statute of limitations for filing suit under Filling that gap, the plan at issue here requires participants to bring suit within three years after “proof of loss” is due. Because proof of loss is due before a plan’s administrative process can be completed, the ad- ministrative exhaustion requirement will, in practice, shorten the contractual limitations period. The question presented is whether the contractual limitations provision is enforceable. We hold that it is. I In petitioner Julie Heimeshoff began to report chronic pain and fatigue that interfered with her duties as 2 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court a senior public relations manager for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Her physician later diagnosed her with lupus and fibromyalgia. Heimeshoff stopped working on June 8. On August 22, Heimeshoff filed a claim for long- term disability benefits with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., the administrator of Wal-Mart’s Group Long Term Disability Plan (Plan). Her claim form, sup- ported by a statement from her rheumatologist, listed her symptoms as “ ‘extreme fatigue, significant pain, and difficulty in concentration.’ ”1 App. to Pet. for Cert. 7. In November Hartford notified Heimeshoff that it could not determine whether she was disabled because her rheumatologist had never responded to Hartford’s request for additional information. Hartford denied the claim the following month for failure to provide satisfactory proof of loss. Hartford instructed Heimeshoff that it would con- sider an appeal filed within 180 days, but later informed her that it would reopen her claim, without the need for an appeal, if her rheumatologist provided the requested information. In July 2006, another physician evaluated Heimeshoff and concluded that she was disabled. Heimeshoff sub- mitted that evaluation and additional medical evidence in October 2006. Hartford then retained a physician to review Heimeshoff ’s records and speak with her rheuma- tologist. That physician issued a report in November 2006 concluding that Heimeshoff was able to perform the activi- ties required by her sedentary occupation. Hartford de- nied Heimeshoff ’s claim later that November. In May 2007, Heimeshoff requested an extension of the Plan’s appeal deadline until September 30, 2007, in order —————— 1 The insurance policy
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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September 30, 2007, in order —————— 1 The insurance policy provides: “ ‘Written proof of loss must be sent to The Hartford within 90 days after the start of the period for which The Hartford owes payment. After that, The Hartford may require further written proof that you are still Disabled.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court to provide additional evidence. Hartford granted the extension. On September 26, 2007, Heimeshoff submitted her appeal along with additional cardiopulmonary and neuropsychological evaluations. After two additional physicians retained by Hartford reviewed the claim, Hart- ford issued its final denial on November 26, 2007. On November 18, 2010, almost three years later (but more than three years after proof of loss was due), Heimeshoff filed suit in District Court seeking review of her denied claim pursuant to ERISA Hart- ford and Wal-Mart moved to dismiss on the ground that Heimeshoff ’s complaint was barred by the Plan’s limita- tions provision, which stated: “Legal action cannot be taken against The Hartford [more than] 3 years after the time written proof of loss is required to be furnished according to the terms of the policy.” The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. Rec- ognizing that ERISA does not provide a statute of limita- tions for actions under the court explained that the limitations period provided by the most nearly analogous state statute applies. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, Under Connecticut law, the Plan was permitted to specify a limitations period expiring “[not] less than one year from the time when the loss insured against occurs.”2 Conn. Gen. Stat. (2012); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 13. The court held that, under Circuit precedent, a 3-year limitations period set to begin when proof of loss is due is enforceable, and Heimeshoff ’s claim was therefore untimely.3 —————— 2 The parties do not dispute that Connecticut provides the relevant state law governing the limitations period in this case. 3 Heimeshoff also argued before the District Court that even if the Plan’s limitations provision were enforceable, her suit was still timely because Hartford had granted her request for an extension until September 30, 2007. Even crediting the contention that proof of loss was not due until that date, the court held that the Plan’s limitations 4 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court (per curiam)). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. 496 Fed. Appx. 129 (2012). Applying the precedent relied on by the Dis- trict Court, the Court of
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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relied on by the Dis- trict Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that it did not offend ERISA for the limitations period to commence before the plaintiff could file suit under Because the policy language unambiguously provided that the 3-year limitations period ran from the time that proof of loss was due under the Plan, and because Heimeshoff filed her claim more than three years after that date, her action was time barred. We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the enforceability of this common contractual limitations provision. 569 U. S. (2013). Compare, e.g., at (plan provision requiring suit within three years after proof-of-loss dead- line is enforceable); and with 245–248 (CA4 2007) (not enforceable); and We now affirm. II Statutes of limitations establish the period of time within which a claimant must bring an action. As a gen- eral matter, a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action “ ‘accrues’ ”—that is, when “the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Bay Area and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997). —————— provision barred her from bringing legal action any later than Septem- ber 30, 2010. Heimeshoff did not file suit until November 18, 2010. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court ERISA and its regulations require plans to provide certain presuit procedures for reviewing claims after par- ticipants submit proof of loss (internal review). See 29 U.S. C. –1 (2012). The courts of appeals have uniformly required that participants exhaust internal review before bringing a claim for judicial review under See (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). A participant’s cause of action under ERISA accordingly does not accrue until the plan issues a final denial. ERISA does not specify a statute of limita- tions. Instead, the parties in this case have agreed by contract to a 3-year limitations period. The contract speci- fies that this period begins to run at the time proof of loss is due. Because proof of loss is due before a participant can exhaust internal review, Heimeshoff contends that this limitations provision runs afoul of the general rule that statutes of limitations commence upon accrual of the cause of action. For the reasons that follow, we reject that argument. Absent a controlling statute to the contrary, a participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limita- tions period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable. A Recognizing that Congress generally sets statutory limitations periods to begin when their associated causes of action accrue, this Court has often construed statutes of limitations to commence when the plaintiff is permitted to file suit. See, e.g., Graham County Soil & Water Conserva- tion 418 (resolving an ambiguity in light of “the ‘stand- ard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action’ ” 6 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court (quoting Bay Area )); Rawlings v. Ray, At the same time, we have recognized that statutes of limitations do not inexorably commence upon accrual. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (noting the possibility that a cause of action may “accru[e] at one time for the purpose of calcu- lating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit”); see also (the statute of limitations in the federal habeas statute runs from “ ‘the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court’ ” even if the right has not yet been “ ‘made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review’ ”); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 26–27 (11) (the limitations period in the Suits in Admiralty Act runs from the date of injury rather than when plaintiffs may sue). None of those decisions, however, addresses the critical aspect of this case: the parties have agreed by contract to commence the limitations period at a particular time. For that reason, we find more appropriate guidance in prece- dent confronting whether to enforce the terms of a contractual limitations provision. Those cases provide a well-established framework suitable for resolving the ques- tion in this case: “[I]n the absence of a controlling statute to the con- trary, a provision in a contract may validly limit, be- tween the parties, the time for bringing an action on such contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations, provided that the shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period.” Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. We have recognized that some statutes of limitations do not permit parties to choose a shorter period by contract. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court See, e.g., Louisiana & Western R. Co. v. Gardiner, 273 U.S. 280, 284 (1927) (contractual provision requiring suit against common carrier within two years and one day after
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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against common carrier within two years and one day after delivery was invalid under a federal statute “declar[ing] unlawful any limitation shorter than two years from the time notice is given of the disallowance of the claim”). The rule set forth in recognizes, however, that other statutes of limitations provide only a default rule that permits parties to choose a shorter limitations period. See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386, 390 (1869) (finding “nothing in th[e] language or object [of statutes of limitations] which inhibits parties from stipulating for a shorter period within which to as- sert their respective claims”); see also Missouri, K. & T. R. (citing examples). If parties are permitted to contract around a default statute of limitations, it follows that the same rule applies where the statute creating the cause of action is silent regarding a limitations period. The rule necessarily allows parties to agree not only to the length of a limitations period but also to its commencement. The duration of a limitations period can be measured only by reference to its start date. Each is therefore an integral part of the limitations provision, and there is no basis for categorically preventing parties from agreeing on one aspect but not the other. See Electrical (1976) (noting that “the parties could conceivably have agreed to a contract” specifying the “ ‘occurrence’ ” that commenced the statutory limitations period). B The principle that contractual limitations provisions ordinarily should be enforced as written is especially appropriate when enforcing an ERISA plan. “The plan, in short, is at the center of ERISA.” US Airways, Inc. v. 8 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court McCutchen, 569 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 11). “[E]mployers have large leeway to design disability and other welfare plans as they see fit.” Black & Decker Dis- ability And once a plan is established, the administrator’s duty is to see that the plan is “maintained pursuant to [that] written instru- ment.” 29 U.S. C. This focus on the written terms of the plan is the linchpin of “a system that is [not] so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.” Varity 497 (1996). Heimeshoff ’s cause of action for benefits is likewise bound up with the written instrument. ERISA authorizes a plan participant to bring suit “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S. C. (emphasis added). That “statutory language speaks of ‘enforc[ing]’ the ‘terms of the plan,’ not of changing them.” CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U. S. (slip op., at 13). For that reason, we have recognized the particular importance of enforcing plan terms as written in claims. See at (slip op., at 13–14); Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 512–513 (2010); 299–301 Because the rights and duties at issue in this case are no less “built around reliance on the face of written plan documents,” Curtiss-Wright we will not presume from statu- tory silence that Congress intended a different approach here. III We must give effect to the Plan’s limitations provision Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court unless we determine either that the period is unreason- ably short, or that a “controlling statute” prevents the limitations provision from taking effect. 331 U.S., at Neither condition is met here. A Neither Heimeshoff nor the United States claims that the Plan’s 3-year limitations provision is unreasonably short on its face. And with good reason: the United States acknowledges that the regulations governing internal review mean for “mainstream” claims to be resolved in about one year, Tr. of Oral Arg. 22, leaving the participant with two years to file suit.4 Even in this case, where the administrative review process required more time than usual, Heimeshoff was left with approximately one year in which to file suit. Heimeshoff does not dispute that a hypothetical 1-year limitations period commencing at the conclusion of internal review would be reasonable. at 4. We cannot fault a limitations provision that would leave the same amount of time in a case with an unusually long internal review process while providing for a signifi- cantly longer period in most cases. Heimeshoff ’s reliance on Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, is therefore misplaced. There, we declined to enforce a State’s 1-year statute of limitations as applied to Title VII employment discrimina- tion actions where the limitations period commenced before accrual. We concluded that “[i]t would hardly be reasonable” to suppose that Congress intended to enforce state statutes of limitations as short as 12 months where —————— 4 Heimeshoff, drawing on a study by the American Council of Life Insurers of recent cases where timeliness was at issue, states that exhaustion can take 15 to 16 months in a typical case. Reply Brief 17–18, n. 3 (citing Brief for American Council of Life Insurers et al. as
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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Brief for American Council of Life Insurers et al. as Amici Curiae 29). In our view, that still leaves ample time for filing suit. 10 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission faced a backlog of 18 to 24 months, leaving claimants with little chance of bringing a claim not barred by the State’s stat- ute of limitations. at 369–371. In the absence of any evidence that there are similar obstacles to bringing a timely claim, we conclude that the Plan’s limitations provision is reasonable. B Heimeshoff and the United States contend that even if the Plan’s limitations provision is reasonable, ERISA is a “controlling statute to the contrary.” at But they do not contend that ERISA’s statute of limita- tions for claims of breach of fiduciary duty controls this action to recover benefits. See 29 U.S. C. Nor do they claim that ERISA’s text or regulations contradict the Plan’s limitations provision. Rather, they assert that the limitations provision will “undermine” ERISA’s two-tiered remedial scheme. Brief for Petitioner 39; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. We cannot agree. 1 The first tier of ERISA’s remedial scheme is the internal review process required for all ERISA disability-benefit plans. –1. After the participant files a claim for disability benefits, the plan has 45 days to make an “adverse benefit determination.” Two 30-day extensions are available for “matters beyond the control of the plan,” giving the plan a total of up to 105 days to make that determination. The plan’s time for making a benefit determination may be tolled “due to a claimant’s failure to submit information necessary to decide a claim.” Following denial, the plan must provide the participant with “at least 180 days within which to appeal the determination.” (h)(4). The plan Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court has 45 days to resolve that appeal, with one 45-day exten- sion available for “special circumstances (such as the need to hold a hearing).” (i)(3)(i). The plan’s time for resolving an appeal can be tolled again if the participant fails to submit necessary information. In the ordinary course, the regulations contemplate an internal review process lasting about one year. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. If the plan fails to meet its own deadlines under these procedures, the participant “shall be deemed to have exhausted the administrative reme- dies.” Upon exhaustion of the internal review process, the participant is entitled to proceed im- mediately to judicial review, the second tier of ERISA’s remedial scheme. 2 Heimeshoff and
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2646093/heimeshoff-v-hartford-life-accident-ins-co/
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the second tier of ERISA’s remedial scheme. 2 Heimeshoff and the United States first claim that the Plan’s limitations provision will undermine the foregoing internal review process. They contend that participants will shortchange their own rights during that process in order to have more time in which to seek judicial review. Their premise—that participants will sacrifice the benefits of internal review to preserve additional time for filing suit—is highly dubious in light of the consequences of that course of action. First, to the extent participants fail to develop evidence during internal review, they risk forfeiting the use of that evidence in district court. The Courts of Appeals have generally limited the record for judicial review to the administrative record compiled during internal review. See, e.g., 1231 (CA10 2012); Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 121 (CA3 2012); Second, participants are not likely to value judicial review of plan determinations over internal review. Many plans (including this Plan) 12 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court vest discretion over benefits determinations in plan ad- ministrators. See Firestone Tire & Rubber (19) (permitting the vesting of discretion); see also App. in No. 12–651–cv (CA2), p. 34. Courts ordinarily review determinations by such plans only for abuse of discretion. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, In short, partici- pants have much to lose and little to gain by giving up the full measure of internal review in favor of marginal extra time to seek judicial review. 3 Heimeshoff and the United States next warn that it will endanger judicial review to allow plans to set limitations periods that begin to run before internal review is com- plete. The United States suggests that administrators may attempt to prevent judicial review by delaying the resolution of claims in bad faith. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19; see also – 248. But administrators are required by the regulations governing the internal review process to take prompt action, see –11, and the penalty for failure to meet those deadlines is immediate access to judicial re- view for the participant. –1(l). In addi- tion, that sort of dilatory behavior may implicate one of the traditional defenses to a statute of limitations. See infra, at 14–15. The United States suggests that even good-faith admin- istration of internal review will significantly diminish the availability of judicial review if this limitations provision is enforced. Forty years of ERISA administration sug- gest otherwise. The limitations provision at issue is quite common; the vast majority of States require certain insur- ance policies to include
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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majority of States require certain insur- ance policies to include 3-year limitations periods that run Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court from the date proof of loss is due.5 But there is no signifi- cant evidence that limitations provisions like the one here have similarly thwarted judicial review. As explained above, see –11, ERISA regulations structure internal review to proceed in an expeditious manner. It stands to reason that the cases in which internal review leaves participants with less than one year to file suit are rare. Heimeshoff identifies only a handful of cases in which plaintiffs are actually time barred as a result of this 3-year limitations provision. See v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., ; —————— 5 See –19–14, 27–20–5(7) (2007); Alaska Stat. (2012); –85–116, 23–86–102(c)(7) (2004); Cal. Ins. Code Ann. (West 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2013); Conn. Gen. Stat. §38a–4(a)(11) (2012); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 18, 3541(7) (1999); –29– 3(b)(11) (2013); :10A–105(11) (Cum. Supp. 2012); –2115, 41–2207(7) (Lexis 2010); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 215, (West 2012); –8–5–3(a)(11) (2004); Iowa Code ; –150, 304.18– 070(7) (West 2012); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24–A, (2000); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 175, ; Mich. Comp. Laws (2002); Minn. Stat. (2012); Miss. Code Ann. §–9–5(1)(k) ; (1)(11) (2000); Mont. Code Ann. (2013); –710.03(11) (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. 689B.080(9) ; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (West Supp. 2012); N. J. Stat. Ann. (West 2006); N. M. Stat. Ann. (2013); N. Y. Ins. Law (West Supp. 2013); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 15(a)(11) ; N. D. Cent. Code Ann. (Lexis 2010); (K) (Lexis 2010); Okla. Stat., Tit. 36, ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §743. ; 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. (1999); R. I. Gen. Laws ; S. D. Codified Laws (2004); –26– 108(11) ; (West Supp. 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 8, ; –3540 (Lexis 2007); (2012); –15– 4(k) ; –18–115, 26–19–107(a)(vii) (2013). 14 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court (ED Mich., Aug. 14, 2012); v. Unum Provident, 2012 WL 1436458 (WD Ky., Apr. 24, 2012); ; v. Hartford Life & Acc. Group, 2010 WL 37200 (SDNY, Sept. 22, 2010). Those cases suggest that this barrier falls on participants who have not diligently pursued their rights. See (by his own admission, there was “no reason” plaintiff could not have filed suit during the remaining seven months of limitations period); (plaintiff filed suit four years after the limitations period expired, and six years after final de- nial); (“Application of the limita- tions period works no unfairness here”); see also Rice, 578 F.3d, at 457 (the participant
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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here”); see also Rice, 578 F.3d, at 457 (the participant “has not established that he has been diligently pursuing his rights” and “has given no reason for his late filing”); (follow- ing exhaustion, “two years and five months of the limita- tions period remained”); WL 2412732, (“Plaintiff ’s proof of loss was untimely by over ten years”). The evidence that this 3-year limitations provision harms diligent participants is far too insubstantial to set aside the plain terms of the contract. Moreover, even in the rare cases where internal review prevents participants from bringing actions within the contractual period, courts are well equipped to apply traditional doctrines that may nevertheless allow participants to proceed. If the administrator’s conduct causes a participant to miss the deadline for judicial re- view, waiver or estoppel may prevent the administrator from invoking the limitations provision as a defense. See, e.g., 2–299 (1890); LaMantia v. Voluntary Plan Adm’rs, Inc., 401 F.3d 1114, 1119 To the extent the partici- pant has diligently pursued both internal review and judicial review but was prevented from filing suit by ex- Cite as: 571 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court traordinary circumstances, equitable tolling may apply. 4 U.S. 89, (1990) (limitations defenses “in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling’ ”).6 Finally, in addition to those traditional remedies, plans that offer appeals or dispute resolution beyond what is contemplated in the internal review regulations must agree to toll the limitations provision during that time. 29 CFR Thus, we are not persuaded that the Plan’s limitations provision is inconsistent with ERISA. C Two additional arguments warrant mention. First, Heimeshoff argues—for the first time in this litigation— that the limitations period should be tolled as a matter of course during internal review. By effectively delaying the commencement of the limitations period until the conclu- sion of internal review, however, this approach reconsti- tutes the contractual revision we declined to make. As we explained, the parties’ agreement should be enforced unless the limitations period is unreasonably short or foreclosed by ERISA. The limitations period here is nei- ther. See at 9–10, 11–14, and this page. Nor do the ERISA regulations require tolling during internal review. A plan must agree to toll the limitations provision only in one particular circumstance: when a plan offers voluntary internal appeals beyond what is permit- ted by regulation. Even then, the limitations period is tolled only during that specific por- tion of internal review. This limited tolling requirement would be superfluous if the regulations contemplated tolling throughout the process. —————— 6 Whether the Court
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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
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contemplated tolling throughout the process. —————— 6 Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those doc- trines in this case is not before us. 569 U. S. (2013); Pet. for Cert. i. 16 HEIMESHOFF v. HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. Opinion of the Court Finally, relying on our decision in Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (19), Heimeshoff contends that we must in- quire whether state law would toll the limitations period throughout the exhaustion process. In Hardin, we inter- preted 42 U.S. C. §13 to borrow a State’s statutory limitations period. We recognized that when a federal statute is deemed to borrow a State’s limitations period, the State’s tolling rules are ordinarily borrowed as well because “ ‘[i]n virtually all statutes of limitations the chronological length of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling’ ” (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975)); see also Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. (10) (in §13 actions “a state statute of limitations and the coor- dinate tolling rules” are “binding rules of law”). But here, unlike in Hardin, the parties have adopted a limitations period by contract. Under these circumstances, where there is no need to borrow a state statute of limitations there is no need to borrow concomitant state tolling rules. IV We hold that the Plan’s limitations provision is enforce- able. The judgment is, accordingly, affirmed. It is so ordered
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United States v. Bryant
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In response to the high incidence of domestic violence against Native American women, Congress, in 2005, en- acted 18 U.S. C. which targets serial offenders. Section 117(a) makes it a federal crime for any person to “commi[t] a domestic assault within Indian country” if the person has at least two prior final convictions for domestic violence rendered “in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings.” See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA Reauthorization Act), Pub. L. 109–162, 909, 3084.1 Respondent Michael Bryant, Jr., has multiple tribal-court convictions for domestic assault. For most of those convictions, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment, none of them exceeding one year’s dura- tion. His tribal-court convictions do not count for purposes, Bryant maintains, because he was uncounseled —————— 1 “Indian country” is defined in 18 U.S. C. to encompass all land within any Indian reservation under federal jurisdiction, all dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished. 2 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court in those proceedings. The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants, in state and federal criminal proceedings, appointed coun- sel in any case in which a term of imprisonment is im- posed. But the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings. See Plains Commerce The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. 90–284, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S. C. et seq., which governs criminal pro- ceedings in tribal courts, requires appointed counsel only when a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment is imposed. Bryant’s tribal-court convictions, it is undisputed, were valid when entered. This case pre- sents the question whether those convictions, though uncounseled, rank as predicate offenses within the com- pass of Our answer is yes. Bryant’s tribal-court convictions did not violate the Sixth Amendment when obtained, and they retain their validity when invoked in a prosecution. That proceeding generates no Sixth Amendment defect where none previously existed. I A “[C]ompared to all other groups in the United States,” Native American women “experience the highest rates of domestic violence.” 151 Cong. Rec. 9061 (2005) (remarks of Sen. McCain). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as many as 46% of American Indian and Alaska Native women have been victims of physical violence by an intimate partner. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, M. Black et al., National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey 2010 Summary Report 40 (Table 4.3), online at http://www.cdc.gov/ ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_report2010-a.pdf (all Internet Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016)
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http://www.cdc.gov/ ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_report2010-a.pdf (all Internet Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court materials as last visited June 9, 2016). American Indian and Alaska Native women “are 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than women in the United States in general.” Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on American Indian and Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence, Ending Violence So Children Can Thrive 38 (Nov. 2014), online at https:// www.justice.gov /sites /default/files/defendingchildhood/ pages/attachments/2015/03/23/ending_violence_so_children_ can_thrive.pdf. American Indian women experience battery “at a rate of 23.2 per 1,000, compared with 8 per 1,000 among Caucasian women,” and they “experience 7 sexual assaults per 1,000, compared with 4 per 1,000 among Black Americans, 3 per 1,000 among Caucasians, 2 per 1,000 among Hispanic women, and 1 per 1,000 among Asian women.” VAWA Reauthorization Act, As this Court has noted, domestic abusers exhibit high rates of recidivism, and their violence “often escalates in severity over time.” United States v. Castleman, U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 2). Nationwide, over 75% of female victims of intimate partner violence have been previously victimized by the same offender, Dept. of Jus- tice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, S. Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence 1993–2010, p. 4 (rev. 2015) (Figure 4), online at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf, often multiple times, Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, P. Tjaden & N. Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence, p. iv (2000), online at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (“[W]omen who were physically assaulted by an intimate partner averaged 6.9 physical assaults by the same part- ner.”). Incidents of repeating, escalating abuse more than occasionally culminate in a fatal attack. See VAWA Reau- thorization Act, –3078 (“[D]uring the period 1979 through 1992, homicide was the third leading 4 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court cause of death of Indian females aged 15 to 34, and 75 percent were killed by family members or acquaintances.”). The “complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law” governing Indian country, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680, n. 1 (1990), has made it difficult to stem the tide of domestic violence experienced by Native American women. Although tribal courts may enforce the tribe’s criminal laws against Indian defendants, Congress has curbed tribal courts’ sentencing authority. At the time of ’s passage, ICRA limited sentences in tribal court to a maximum of one year’s imprisonment. 25 U.S. C. (2006 ed.).2 Congress has since expanded tribal courts’ sentencing authority, allowing them to im- pose up to three years’ imprisonment, contingent on adop- tion of additional procedural safeguards. – 2280 (codified at 25 U.S.
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of additional procedural safeguards. – 2280 (codified at 25 U.S. C. (C), (c)).3 To date, however, few tribes have employed this enhanced sentencing authority. See Tribal Law and Policy Inst., Implementation Chart: VAWA Enhanced Jurisdiction and TLOA Enhanced Sentencing, online at http://www.tribal-institute.org/ download/VAWA/VAWAImplementationChart.pdf.4 —————— 2 Until 1986, ICRA permitted sentences of imprisonment up to only six months. See –146. 3 Among the additional safeguards attending longer sentences is the unqualified right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel. 25 U.S. C. (2). 4 Tribal governments generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non- Indians who commit crimes in Indian country. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, In the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Congress amended ICRA to author- ize tribal courts to “exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdic- tion” over certain domestic violence offenses committed by a non-Indian against an Indian. Pub. L. 113–4, –122 (codified at 25 U.S. C. Tribal courts’ exercise of this jurisdiction requires procedural safeguards similar to those required for imposing on Indian defendants sentences in excess of one year, including the unqualified right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel. See We express no view on the validity of those provisions. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court States are unable or unwilling to fill the enforcement gap. Most States lack jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country against Indian victims. See United In 3, Con- gress increased the potential for state action by giving six States “jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country within the States and provid[ing] for the [voluntary] as- sumption of jurisdiction by other States.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, (1987) (footnote omitted). See Act of Aug. 15, 3, Pub. L. 280, (codified, as amended, at 18 U.S. C. and 25 U.S. C. 1360). States so empowered may apply their own criminal laws to “offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State.” Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S., at ; see 18 U.S. C. (a). Even when capable of exercising jurisdiction, however, States have not de- voted their limited criminal justice resources to crimes com- mitted in Indian country. Jimenez & Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1636–16 (1998); Tribal Law and Policy Inst., S. Deer, C. Goldberg, H. Valdez Singleton, & M. White Eagle, Final Report: Focus Group on Public Law 280 and the Sexual Assault of Native Women 7–8 (2007), online at http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/Final %20280%20FG%20Report.pdf. That leaves the Federal Government. Although federal law generally governs in Indian country, Congress
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Government. Although federal law generally governs in Indian country, Congress has long excluded from federal-court jurisdiction crimes com- mitted by an Indian against another Indian. 18 U.S. C. see Ex parte Crow Dog, (requiring “a clear expression of the intention of Congress” to confer federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian). In the Major Crimes Act, Congress authorized federal jurisdiction over enumerated grave criminal offenses when the perpetrator is an Indian and 6 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court the victim is “another Indian or other person,” including murder, manslaughter, and felony assault. At the time of ’s enactment, felony assault subject to federal prosecution required “serious bodily injury,” (2006 ed.), meaning “a substantial risk of death,” “extreme physical pain,” “protracted and obvious disfigurement,” or “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” (incorporated through In short, when was before Congress, Indian perpetrators of domestic violence “escape[d] felony charges until they seriously injure[d] or kill[ed] someone.” 151 Cong. Rec. 9062 (2005) (remarks of Sen. McCain). As a result of the limitations on tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction in Indian country, serial domestic violence offenders, prior to the enactment of faced at most a year’s imprisonment per offense—a sentence insufficient to deter repeated and escalating abuse. To ratchet up the punishment of serial offenders, Congress created the federal felony offense of domestic assault in Indian coun- try by a habitual offender. (2012 ed.); see No. 12– 30177 (CA9, July 6, 2015), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a (Ow- ens, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Tai- lored to the unique problems that American Indian and Alaska Native Tribes face, provides felony- level punishment for serial domestic violence offenders, and it represents the first true effort to remove these recidivists from the communities that they repeatedly —————— 5 Congress has since expanded the definition of felony assault to in- clude “[a]ssault resulting in substantial bodily injury to a spouse[,] intimate partner, [or] dating partner” and “[a]ssault of a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner by strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate.” Violence Against Women Reau- thorization Act of 2013, (codified at 18 U.S. C. (8)). The “substantial bodily injury” requirement remains difficult to satisfy, as it requires “a temporary but substantial disfig- urement” or “a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court terrorize.”). The section provides in pertinent part: “Any person who commits a
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section provides in pertinent part: “Any person who commits a domestic assault within Indian country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to Federal jurisdiction any assault, sex- ual abuse, or serious violent felony against a spouse or intimate partner shall be fined imprisoned for a term of not more than 5 years, or both” (1).6 Having two prior convictions for domestic violence crimes—including tribal-court convictions—is thus a predicate of the new B This case requires us to determine whether ’s inclusion of tribal-court convictions is compatible with the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. The Sixth Amend- ment to the U. S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant in state or federal court “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” See Gideon v. Wainwright, 2 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). This right, we have held, requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants whenever a sentence of imprisonment is imposed. Argersinger v. Hamlin, But an indigent defend- ant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel if his conviction results in a fine or other noncustodial punish- ment. 440 U.S., at “As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by —————— 6 Section 117(a) has since been amended to include as qualifying pred- icate offenses, in addition to intimate-partner crimes, “assault, sexual abuse, [and] serious violent felony” offenses committed “against a child of or in the care of the person committing the domestic assault.” 18 U.S. C. (Supp. II 2014). 8 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.” Santa Clara The Bill of Rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, therefore, does not apply in tribal-court proceedings. See Plains Commerce 554 U.S., at In ICRA, however, Congress accorded a range of proce- dural safeguards to tribal-court defendants “similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.” ; see at 62–63 (ICRA “modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments”). In addition to other enumerated protections, ICRA guarantees “due process of law,” 25 U.S. C. and allows tribal- court defendants to seek habeas corpus review in federal court to test the legality of their imprisonment, The right to counsel under ICRA is not coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right. If a tribal court imposes a sentence in excess of one year, ICRA requires the court to
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in excess of one year, ICRA requires the court to accord the defendant “the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” including appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant at the tribe’s expense. (2). If the sentence imposed is no greater than one year, however, the tribal court must allow a defendant only the opportunity to obtain counsel “at his own expense.” In tribal court, therefore, unlike in federal or state court, a sentence of imprisonment up to one year may be imposed without according indigent defendants the right to appointed counsel. The question here presented: Is it permissible to use uncounseled tribal-court convictions—obtained in full compliance with ICRA—to establish the prior-crimes predicate of ? It is undisputed that a conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of the Court right to counsel cannot be used in a subsequent proceeding “either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another ” In Burgett, we held that an uncounseled felony conviction obtained in state court in violation of the right to counsel could not be used in a subsequent proceeding to prove the prior-felony element of a recidivist statute. To permit such use of a constitutionally infirm conviction, we ex- plained, would cause “the accused in effect [to] suffe[r] anew from the [prior] deprivation of [his] Sixth Amend- ment right.” ; see United 404 U.S. 443, (invalid, uncounseled prior convictions could not be relied upon at sentencing to impose a longer term of imprisonment for a subsequent conviction); cf. (plurality opinion) (“use of convictions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright to impeach a defendant’s credibility deprives him of due process of law” because the prior convictions “lac[k] reliability”). In we stated an important limitation on the principle recognized in Burgett. In the case under review, Nichols pleaded guilty to a federal felony drug Several years earlier, unrepresented by counsel, he had been convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), a state-law misdemeanor, and fined $250 but not impris- oned. Nichols’ DUI conviction, under the then- mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, effectively elevated by about two years the sentencing range for Nichols’ federal drug We rejected Nichols’ contention that, as his later sentence for the federal drug offense involved imprisonment, use of his uncounseled DUI conviction to elevate that sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. at 746–. “[C]onsistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution,” we held, “an uncoun- seled misdemeanor conviction, valid under because 10 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court
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because 10 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent ” at 748–749. C Respondent Bryant’s conduct is illustrative of the do- mestic violence problem existing in Indian country. Dur- ing the period relevant to this case, Bryant, an enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, lived on that Tribe’s reservation in Montana. He has a record of over 100 tribal-court convictions, including several misdemeanor convictions for domestic assault. Specifically, between 1997 and 2007, Bryant pleaded guilty on at least five occasions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court to commit- ting domestic abuse in violation of the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code. On one occasion, Bryant hit his live-in girl- friend on the head with a beer bottle and attempted to strangle her. On another, Bryant beat a different girl- friend, kneeing her in the face, breaking her nose, and leaving her bruised and bloodied. For most of Bryant’s repeated brutal acts of domestic violence, the Tribal Court sentenced him to terms of im- prisonment, never exceeding one year. When convicted of these offenses, Bryant was indigent and was not appointed counsel. Because of his short prison terms, Bryant acknowledges, the prior tribal-court proceedings complied with ICRA, and his convictions were therefore valid when entered. Bryant has never challenged his tribal-court convictions in federal court under ICRA’s habeas corpus provision. In Bryant was arrested yet again for assaulting women. In February of that year, Bryant attacked his then girlfriend, dragging her off the bed, pulling her hair, and repeatedly punching and kicking her. During an interview with law enforcement officers, Bryant admitted that he had physically assaulted this woman five or six Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court times. Three months later, he assaulted another woman with whom he was then living, waking her by yelling that he could not find his truck keys and then choking her until she almost lost consciousness. Bryant later stated that he had assaulted this victim on three separate occasions during the two months they dated. Based on the assaults, a federal grand jury in Montana indicted Bryant on two counts of domestic as- sault by a habitual offender, in violation of Bry- ant was represented in federal court by appointed counsel. Contending that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior, uncounseled, tribal-court misdemeanor convic- tions to satisfy ’s predicate-offense element, Bryant moved to dismiss the indictment. The District Court denied the motion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a, and Bryant entered a conditional
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to Pet. for Cert. 32a, and Bryant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal that decision. Bryant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 46 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be followed by three years of supervised release. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction and directed dismissal of the indictment. 769 F.3d 671 (2014). Bryant’s tribal-court convictions were not themselves constitutionally infirm, the Ninth Circuit comprehended, because “the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel does not apply in tribal court proceed- ings.” But, the court continued, had the con- victions been obtained in state or federal court, they would have violated the Sixth Amendment because Bryant had received sentences of imprisonment although he lacked the aid of appointed counsel. Adhering to its prior deci- sion in United7 —————— 7 In United the Ninth Circuit proscribed the use of an uncounseled tribal-court guilty plea as evi- dence of guilt in a subsequent federal prosecution arising out of the same incident. Use of the plea was impermissible, the Court of Appeals reasoned, “because the tribal court guilty plea was made under circum- 12 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court the Court of Appeals held that, subject to narrow excep- tions not relevant here, “tribal court convictions may be used in subsequent [federal] prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right.” 769 F.3d, at 677. Rejecting the Government’s argument that our decision in Nichols required the opposite result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Nichols applies only when the prior conviction did comport with the Sixth Amendment, i.e., when no sentence of imprisonment was imposed for the prior –678. Judge Watford concurred, agreeing that Ant controlled the outcome of this case, but urging reexamination of Ant in light of This Court’s deci- sion in Nichols, Judge Watford wrote, “undermines the notion that uncounseled convictions are, as a categorical matter, too unreliable to be used as a basis for imposing a prison sentence in a subsequent case.” The Court of Appeals declined to rehear the case en banc over vigorous dissents by Judges Owens and O’Scannlain. In disallowing the use of an uncounseled tribal-court conviction to establish a prior domestic violence conviction within ’s compass, the Ninth Circuit created a Circuit split. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have both held that tribal-court “convictions, valid at their inception, and not alleged to be otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove the elements of United ; see United To resolve this disagreement, we granted
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United ; see United To resolve this disagreement, we granted certiorari, 577 U. S. (2016), and now reverse. —————— stances which would have violated the United States Constitution were it applicable to tribal proceedings.” Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 13 Opinion of the Court II Bryant’s tribal-court convictions, he recognizes, in- fringed no constitutional right because the Sixth Amend- ment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings. Brief for Respondent 5. Those prior convictions complied with ICRA, he concedes, and therefore were valid when en- tered. But, had his convictions occurred in state or federal court, Bryant observes, Argersinger and would have rendered them invalid because he was sentenced to incar- ceration without representation by court-appointed coun- sel. Essentially, Bryant urges us to treat tribal-court convictions, for purposes, as though they had been entered by a federal or state court. We next explain why we decline to do so. As earlier recounted, we held in Nichols that “an un- counseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent ” –749. “Enhancement statutes,” we rea- soned, “do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction”; rather, repeat-offender laws “penaliz[e] only the last offense committed by the defendant.” ; see United 553 U.S. 7, (“When a defendant is given a higher sentence under a recidivism statute 100% of the punishment is for the offense of None is for the prior convictions or the defendant’s ‘status as a recidivist.’ ”). Nichols thus instructs that convictions valid when entered—that is, those that, when rendered, did not violate the Constitu- tion—retain that status when invoked in a subsequent proceeding. Nichols’ reasoning steers the result here. Bryant’s 46- month sentence for violating punishes his most recent acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes prose- cuted in tribal court. Bryant was denied no right to coun- sel in tribal court, and his Sixth Amendment right was 14 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court honored in federal court, when he was “adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for which he was imprisoned.” Ala- It would be “odd to say that a conviction untainted by a violation of the Sixth Amendment triggers a violation of that same amendment when it’s used in a subsequent case where the defendant’s right to appointed counsel is fully respected.”8 Bryant acknowledges that had he been punished only by fines in his tribal-court proceedings, Nichols would have allowed reliance on his uncounseled convictions to satisfy ’s prior-crimes predicate. Brief for Respondent 50. We see no cause to
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predicate. Brief for Respondent 50. We see no cause to distinguish for purposes be- tween valid but uncounseled convictions resulting in a fine and valid but uncounseled convictions resulting in impris- onment not exceeding one year. “Both Nichols’s and Bry- ant’s uncounseled convictions ‘comport’ with the Sixth Amendment, and for the same reason: the Sixth Amend- ment right to appointed counsel did not apply to either ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In keeping with Nichols, we resist creating a “hybrid” category of tribal-court convictions, “good for the punish- ment actually imposed but not available for sentence —————— 8 True, as Bryant points out, we based our decision in Nichols v. United States, in part on the “less exact- ing” nature of sentencing, compared with the heightened burden of proof required for determining guilt. But, in describing the rule we adopted, we said that it encompasses both “criminal history provisions,” applica- ble at sentencing, and “recidivist statutes,” of which is one. Moreover, Nichols’ two primary rationales—the validity of the prior conviction and the sentence’s punishment of “only the last of- fense”—do not rely on a distinction between guilt adjudication and sentencing. Indeed, it is the validity of the prior conviction that distin- guishes Nichols from United in which we found impermissible the use at sentencing of an invalid, uncounseled prior Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 15 Opinion of the Court enhancement in a later prosecution.” Nichols indicates that use of Bryant’s uncounseled tribal- court convictions in his prosecution did not “trans- form his prior, valid, tribal court convictions into new, invalid, federal ones.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a (opinion of O’Scannlain, J.). Our decision in Burgett, which prohibited the subse- quent use of a conviction obtained in violation of the right to counsel, does not aid Bryant. Reliance on an invalid conviction, Burgett reasoned, would cause the accused to “suffe[r] anew from the deprivation of [his] Sixth Amend- ment right.” 389 U.S., at Because a defendant convicted in tribal court suffers no Sixth Amendment violation in the first instance, “[u]se of tribal convictions in a subsequent prosecution cannot violate [the Sixth Amendment] ‘anew.’ ” Bryant observes that reliability concerns underlie our right-to-counsel decisions and urges that those concerns remain even if the Sixth Amendment itself does not shel- ter him. and Nichols, however, counter the argu- ment that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions are categorically unreliable, either in their own right or for use in a subsequent proceeding. Bryant’s recognition that a tribal-court conviction resulting in a fine would qualify
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that a tribal-court conviction resulting in a fine would qualify as a predicate offense, we further note, diminishes the force of his reliability-based argument. There is no reason to suppose that tribal-court proceedings are less reliable when a sentence of a year’s imprisonment is im- posed than when the punishment is merely a fine. No evidentiary or procedural variation turns on the sanc- tion—fine only or a year in prison—ultimately imposed. Bryant also invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in support of his assertion that tribal-court judgments should not be used as predicate offenses. But, as earlier observed, ICRA itself requires tribes to ensure “due process of law,” and it accords defend- 16 UNITED STATES v. BRYANT Opinion of the Court ants specific procedural safeguards resembling those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Further, ICRA makes habeas review in federal court available to persons incar- cerated pursuant to a tribal-court judgment. By that means, a prisoner may challenge the fundamental fairness of the proceedings in tribal court. Proceedings in compliance with ICRA, Congress determined, and we agree, sufficiently ensure the reliability of tribal-court convictions. Therefore, the use of those convictions in a federal prosecution does not violate a defendant’s right to due process. See 647 F.3d, at ; cf. State v. Spotted Eagle, 316 Mont. 0, 8–9, 1245–1246 (2003) (principles of comity support recognizing uncounseled tribal-court convictions that complied with ICRA). * * * Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions occurred in proceedings that complied with ICRA and were therefore valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate offenses in a prosecution does not violate the Constitution. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 579 U. S. (2016) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–420 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL BRYANT, JR.
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Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel
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This case turns on the interpretation and proper application of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and requires us to address the Rule's operation in the context of foreign sovereign immunity. This interpleader action was commenced to determine the ownership of property allegedly stolen by Ferdinand Marcos when he was the President of the Republic of the Two entities named in the suit invoked sovereign immunity. They are the Republic of the and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Governance, referred to in turn as the Republic and the Commission. They were dismissed, but the interpleader action proceeded to judgment over their objection. Together with two parties who remained in the suit, the Republic and the Commission now insist it was error to allow the litigation to proceed. Under Rule 19, they contend, the action should have been dismissed once it became clear they could not be joined as parties without their consent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the District Court, held the action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission as parties. Among the reasons the Court of Appeals gave was that the absent, sovereign entities would not prevail on their claims. We conclude the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to the foreign sovereign status of the Republic and the Commission, and that the court further erred in reaching and discounting the merits of their claims. I A When the opinion of the Court of Appeals is consulted, the reader will find its quotations from Rule 19 do not accord with its text as set out here; for after the case was in the Court of Appeals and before it came here, the text of the Rule changed. The Rules Committee advised the changes were stylistic only, see Advisory Committee's Notes on Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19, 28 U.S.C. A., p. 168 (2008); and we agree. These are the three relevant stylistic changes. First, the word "required" replaced the word "necessary" in subparagraph (a). Second, the 1966 Rule set out factors in longer clauses and the Rule sets out the factors affecting joinder in separate lettered headings. Third, the word "indispensable," which had remained as a remnant of the pre-1966 Rule, is altogether deleted from the current text. Though the word "indispensable" had a lesser place in the 1966 Rule, it still had the latent potential to mislead. As the substance and operation of the Rule both pre- and post- are unchanged, we will refer to the present, revised *2185 version. The pre- version is
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to the present, revised *2185 version. The pre- version is printed in the Appendix of this opinion. The current Rule states, in relevant part, as follows: "Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties. "(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. "(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: "(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or "(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: "(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or "(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. "(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the person be made a party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. "(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venue improper, the court must dismiss that party. "(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include: "(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; "(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: "(A) protective provisions in the judgment; "(B) shaping the relief; or "(C) other measures; "(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and "(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 19(a)-(b). See also Rule 19(c) (imposing pleading requirements); Rule 19(d) (creating exception for class actions). B In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic, incorporated Arelma, S.A. (Arelma), under Panamanian law. Around the same time, Arelma opened a brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) in New York, in which it deposited $2 million. As of the year 2000, the account had grown to approximately $35 million. Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during
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approximately $35 million. Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his presidency became the subject of worldwide attention and protest. A class action by and on behalf of some 9,539 of his human rights victims was filed against Marcos and his estate, among others. The class action was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See We refer to that litigation as the Pimentel case and to its class members as the Pimentel class. In a related action, the Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation (the Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against the assets to satisfy their own judgment against Marcos' widow, Imelda Marcos. See The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment by attaching the Arelma assets held by Merrill Lynch. The Republic and the Commission claim a right to the assets under a Philippine law providing that property derived from the misuse of public office is forfeited to the Republic from the moment of misappropriation. See An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep. Act No. 9, 51: After Marcos fled the in 1, the Commission was created to recover any property he wrongfully took. Almost immediately the Commission asked the Swiss Government for assistance in recovering assetsincluding shares in Arelmathat Marcos had moved to Switzerland. In compliance the Swiss Government froze certain assets and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In 1991, the Commission asked the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court of special jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited to the Republic any property Marcos had obtained through misuse of his office. That litigation is still pending in the Sandiganbayan. The Swiss assets were transferred to an escrow account set up by the Commission at the Philippine National Banc (PNB), pending the Sandiganbayan's decision as to their rightful owner. The Republic and the Commission requested that Merrill Lynch follow the same course and transfer the Arelma assets to an escrow account at PNB. Merrill Lynch did not do so. Facing claims from various Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill Lynch instead filed an interpleader action under The named defendants in the interpleader action were, among others, the Republic and the Commission, Arelma, PNB, and the Pimentel class (the respondents here). The Pimentel case had been tried as a class action before Judge Manuel Real of
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tried as a class action before Judge Manuel Real of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, who was sitting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the various human rights complaints against Marcos in that court. See Judge Real directed Merrill Lynch to file the interpleader action in the District of Hawaii, and he presided over the matter. After being named as defendants in the interpleader action, the Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), They moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b), based on the premise that the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and PNB also moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b). Without addressing whether they were entitled to sovereign immunity, Judge Real initially rejected the request by the Republic and the Commission to dismiss the interpleader action. They appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. It held the Republic and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and that under Rule 19(a) they are required parties (or "necessary" parties under the old terminology). See In re Republic of the The Court of Appeals entered a stay pending the outcome of the litigation in the Sandiganbayan over the Marcos assets. See After concluding that the pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan could not determine entitlement to the Arelma assets, Judge Real vacated the stay, allowed the action to proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel class. A week later, in the case initiated before the Sandiganbayan in 1991, the Republic asked that court to declare the Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the matter was ripe for decision. The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled. In the interpleader case the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, and PNB appealed the District Court's judgment in favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Dismissal of the interpleader suit, it held, was not warranted under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required ("necessary") parties under Rule 19(a), their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits that the interpleader action could proceed without them. One of the reasons the court gave was that any action commenced by the Republic and the Commission to recover the assets would be barred by New York's 6-year statute of limitations for claims involving the misappropriation of public property. See (West Supp.2008). The court thus found it unnecessary to consider whether any prejudice to the Republic and the Commission might
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whether any prejudice to the Republic and the Commission might be lessened by some form of judgment or interim decree in the interpleader action. The court also considered the failure of the Republic and the Commission to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayandespite the Arelma share certificates having been located and held in escrow at the PNB since -to be an equitable consideration counseling against dismissal of the interpleader suit. The court further found it relevant that allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the interests of the Pimentel class, which, at this point, likely has no other available forum in which to enforce its judgment against property belonging to Marcos. This Court granted certiorari. See 552 U.S. II We begin with the question we asked the parties to address when we granted certiorari: Whether the Republic and the Commission, having been dismissed from the interpleader action based on their successful assertion of sovereign immunity, had the right to appeal the District Court's determination under Rule 19 that the action could proceed in their absence; and whether they have the right to seek this Court's review of the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the District Court. See Respondents contend that the Republic and the Commission were not proper parties in the Court of Appeals when it reviewed the District Court's judgment allowing the action to proceed without them; and, respondents continue, the Republic and the Commission are not proper parties in the instant proceeding before us. See Brief for Respondent Pimentel 21. Without implying that respondents are correct in saying the Republic and the Commission could neither appeal nor become parties here, we conclude we need not rule on this point. Other parties before us, Arelma and PNB, also seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the District Court. They, too, moved to *2188 dismiss the action under Rule 19(b), appealed from the denial of their motion, and are petitioners before this Court. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss an action under Rule 19(b). A court with proper jurisdiction may also consider sua sponte the absence of a required person and dismiss for failure to join. See, e.g., ; see also Tradesmens & Trust Respondents argue, however, that Arelma and PNB have no standing to raise before this Court the question whether the action may proceed in the absence of the Republic and the Commission. Arelma and PNB lost on the merits of their underlying claims to the interpleaded assets in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. By failing to
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District Court and the Court of Appeals. By failing to petition for certiorari on that merits ruling, respondents contend, Arelma and PNB abandoned any entitlement to the interpleaded assets and therefore lack a concrete stake in the outcome of further proceedings. We disagree. Dismissal of the action under Rule 19(b) would benefit Arelma and PNB by vacating the judgment denying them the interpleaded assets. A party that seeks to have a judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural grounds does not lose standing simply because the party does not petition for certiorari on the substance of the order. III We turn to the question whether the interpleader action could proceed in the District Court without the Republic and the Commission as parties. Subdivision (a) of Rule 19 states the principles that determine when persons or entities must be joined in a suit. The Rule instructs that nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal. Subdivision (a) opens by noting that it addresses joinder "if Feasible." Where joinder is not feasible, the question whether the action should proceed turns on the factors outlined in subdivision (b). The considerations set forth in subdivision (b) are nonexclusive, as made clear by the introductory statement that "[t]he factors for the court to consider include." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b). The general direction is whether "in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed." The design of the Rule, then, indicates that the determination whether to proceed will turn upon factors that are case specific, which is consistent with a Rule based on equitable considerations. This is also consistent with the fact that the determination of who may, or must, be parties to a suit has consequences for the persons and entities affected by the judgment; for the judicial system and its interest in the integrity of its processes and the respect accorded to its decrees; and for society and its concern for the fair and prompt resolution of disputes. See, e.g., Illinois Brick For these reasons, the issue of joinder can be complex, and determinations are case specific. See, e.g., Under the earlier Rules the term "indispensable party" might have implied a certain rigidity that would be in tension with this case-specific approach. The word "indispensable" had an unforgiving connotation that did not fit easily with a system that permits actions to proceed even when some persons who otherwise should be parties to the action cannot be joined. As the Court noted in the use of "indispensable" in Rule 19 created *2189
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in the use of "indispensable" in Rule 19 created *2189 the "verbal anomaly" of an "indispensable person who turns out to be dispensable after all." n. 12, Though the text has changed, the new Rule 19 has the same design and, to some extent, the same tension. Required persons may turn out not to be required for the action to proceed after all. In all events it is clear that multiple factors must bear on the decision whether to proceed without a required person. This decision "must be based on factors varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests." IV We turn to Rule 19 as it relates to this case. The application of subdivision (a) of Rule 19 is not contested. The Republic and the Commission are required entities because "[w]ithout [them] as parties in this interpleader action, their interests in the subject matter are not protected." In re Republic of ; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). All parties appear to concede this. The disagreement instead centers around the application of subdivision (b), which addresses whether the action may proceed without the Republic and the Commission, given that the Rule requires them to be parties. We have not addressed the standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions. The case-specific inquiry that must be followed in applying the standards set forth in subdivision (b), including the direction to consider whether "in equity and good conscience" the case should proceed, implies some degree of deference to the district court. In this case, however, we find implicit in the District Court's rulings, and explicit in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, errors of law that require reversal. Whatever the appropriate standard of review, a point we need not decide, the judgment could not stand. Cf. The Court of Appeals erred in not giving the necessary weight to the absent entities' assertion of sovereign immunity. The court in effect decided the merits of the Republic and the Commission's claims to the Arelma assets. Once it was recognized that those claims were not frivolous, it was error for the Court of Appeals to address them on their merits when the required entities had been granted sovereign immunity. The court's consideration of the merits was itself an infringement on foreign sovereign immunity; and, in any event, its analysis was flawed. We discuss these errors first in the context of how they affected the Court of Appeals' analysis under the first factor of Rule 19(b). We then explain
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under the first factor of Rule 19(b). We then explain that the outcome suggested by the first factor is confirmed by our analysis under the other provisions of Rule 19(b). The action may not proceed. A As to the first Rule 19(b) factorthe extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(1)the judgment of the Court of Appeals is incorrect. In considering whether the Republic and the Commission would be prejudiced if the action were to proceed in their absence, the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to their sovereign status. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity has been recognized since early in the history of our Nation. It is premised upon the "perfect equality and absolute independence *2190 of sovereigns, and th[e] common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse." Schooner The Court has observed that the doctrine is designed to "give foreign states and their instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit," Dole Food The privilege is codified by federal statute. FSIA, 1602-1611, provides that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607," absent existing international agreements to the contrary. 1604; see B.V. v. Central of Nigeria, Exceptions to the general principle of foreign sovereign immunity are contained in 1605-1607 of the statute. They are inapplicable here, or at least the parties do not invoke them. Immunity in this case, then, is uncontested; and pursuant to the Court of Appeals' earlier ruling on the issue, the District Court dismissed the Republic and the Commission from the action on this ground. The District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to give full effect to sovereign immunity when they held the action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission. Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity interests that have contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., ("[F]oreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity"); National City of (foreign sovereign immunity derives from "standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the `power and dignity' of the foreign sovereign" (quoting Schooner at 136-, 143-144)). Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this case. The claims of the Republic and the Commission arise from events of historical and political significance for the Republic and its people. The Republic and the Commission have a unique interest in resolving the ownership of or claims to the Arelma
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in resolving the ownership of or claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if, and how, the assets should be used to compensate those persons who suffered grievous injury under Marcos. There is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. Then, too, there is the more specific affront that could result to the Republic and the Commission if property they claim is seized by the decree of a foreign court. Cf. Republic of Though this Court has not considered a case posing the precise question presented here, there are some authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the governmental immunity of the United States. See, e.g., Mine Safety Appliances ; 83 L. Ed. The analysis of the joinder issue in those cases was somewhat perfunctory, but the holdings were clear: A case may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to suit. These cases instruct us that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the interests of the absent sovereign. The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in undertaking to rule on the merits of the Republic and the Commission's claims. There may be cases where the person who is not joined asserts a claim that is frivolous. In that instance a court may have leeway under both Rule 19(a)(1), defining required parties, and Rule 19(b), addressing when a suit may go forward nonetheless, to disregard the frivolous claim. Here, the claims of the absent entities are not frivolous; and the Court of Appeals should not have proceeded on the premise that those claims would be determined against the sovereign entities that asserted immunity. The Court of Appeals determined that the claims of the Republic and the Commission as to the assets would not succeed because a suit would be time barred in New York. This is not necessarily so. If the Sandiganbayan rules that the Republic owns the assets or stock of Arelma because Marcos did not own them and the property was forfeited to the Republic under Philippine law, then New York misappropriation rules might not be the applicable law. For instance, the Republic and the Commission, standing in for Arelma based upon the Sandiganbayan's judgment, might not pursue a misappropriation of public property suit, as the
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not pursue a misappropriation of public property suit, as the Court of Appeals assumed they would. They might instead, or in the alternative, file suit for breach of contract against Merrill Lynch. They would argue the statute of limitations would start to run if and when Merrill Lynch refused to hand over the assets. See (West Supp.2008); Ely-Cruikshank v. of Montreal, Or the Republic and the Commission might bring an action either in state or federal court to enforce the Sandiganbayan's judgment. See 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 482, Comment a (1) (jurisdiction of foreign court rendering judgment is presumed); at Comment d (providing exceptions not relevant here); see also 28 U.S.C. 2467(c) Merrill Lynch makes arguments why these actions would not succeed, see Brief for Merrill Lynch as Amicus Curiae 26-27, to which the Republic, the Commission, and the United States respond, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-28. We need not seek to predict the outcomes. It suffices that the claims would not be frivolous. As these comments indicate, Rule 19 cannot be applied in a vacuum, and it may require some preliminary assessment of the merits of certain claims. For example, the Rule directs a court, in determining who is a required person, to consider whether complete relief can be afforded in their absence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(A). Likewise, in the Rule 19(b) inquiry, a court must examine, to some extent, the claims presented and the interests *2192 likely to be asserted both by the joined parties and the absent entities or persons. Here, however, it was improper to issue a definitive holding regarding a nonfrivolous, substantive claim made by an absent, required entity that was entitled by its sovereign status to immunity from suit. That privilege is much diminished if an important and consequential ruling affecting the sovereign's substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed, by a federal court in the sovereign's absence and over its objection. As explained above, the decision to proceed in the absence of the Republic and the Commission ignored the substantial prejudice those entities likely would incur. This most directly implicates Rule 19(b)'s first factor, which directs consideration of prejudice both to absent persons and those who are parties. We have discussed the absent entities. As to existing parties, we do not discount the Pimentel class' interest in recovering damages it was awarded pursuant to a judgment. Furthermore, combating public corruption is a significant international policy. The policy is manifested in treaties providing for international
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policy. The policy is manifested in treaties providing for international cooperation in recovering forfeited assets. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G. & A. Res. 5814, chs. IV and V, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, pp. 22, 32 (reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004)); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Art. 16, Nov. 13, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-18 (1995). This policy does support the interest of the Pimentel class in recovering damages awarded to it. But it also underscores the important comity concerns implicated by the Republic and the Commission in asserting foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the District Court and the Court of Appeals gave too much weight to the interest of the Pimentel class, but that it did not accord proper weight to the compelling claim of sovereign immunity. Based on these considerations we conclude the District Court and the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission should the interpleader proceed in their absence. B As to the second Rule 19(b) factorthe extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or measures alternative to dismissal, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(2)there is no substantial argument to allow the action to proceed. No alternative remedies or forms of relief have been proposed to us or appear to be available. See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1608, pp. 106-110 (3d ed.2001) (collecting cases using alternative forms of relief, including the granting of money damages rather than specific performance, the use of declaratory judgment, and the direction that payment be withheld pending suits against the absent party). If the Marcos estate did not own the assets, or if the Republic owns them now, the claim of the Pimentel class likely fails; and in all events, if there are equally valid but competing claims, that too would require adjudication in a case where the Republic and the Commission are parties. See State Farm Fire & Casualty ; ; Wichita & Affiliated Tribes of (C.A.D.C.1) )). C As to the third Rule 19(b) factor whether a judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(3)the Court of Appeals understood "adequacy" to refer to satisfaction of the Pimentel class' claims. But adequacy refers to the "public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible." 390 U.S., at This "social interest in the efficient administration of justice and the avoidance of multiple litigation" is an interest that has "traditionally been thought to support compulsory joinder
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interest that has "traditionally been thought to support compulsory joinder of absent and potentially adverse claimants." Illinois Brick -738, Going forward with the action without the Republic and the Commission would not further the public interest in settling the dispute as a whole because the Republic and the Commission would not be bound by the judgment in an action where they were not parties. D As to the fourth Rule 19(b) factor whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(4)the Court of Appeals made much of what it considered the tort victims' lack of an alternative forum should this action be dismissed. This seems to assume the plaintiff in this interpleader action was the Pimentel class. It is Merrill Lynch, however, that has the statutory status of plaintiff as the stakeholder in the interpleader action. It is true that, in an interpleader action, the stakeholder is often neutral as to the outcome, while other parties press claims in the manner of a plaintiff. That is insufficient, though, to overcome the statement in the interpleader statute that the stakeholder is the plaintiff. See (a) We do not ignore that, in context, the Pimentel class (and indeed all interpleader claimants) are to some extent comparable to the plaintiffs in noninterpleader cases. Their interests are not irrelevant to the Rule 19(b) equitable balance; but the other provisions of the Rule are the relevant ones to consult. Merrill Lynch, as the stakeholder, makes the point that if the action is dismissed it loses the benefit of a judgment allowing it to disburse the assets and be done with the matter. Dismissal of the action, it urges, leaves it without an adequate remedy, for it "could potentially be forced to defend lawsuits by the various claimants in different jurisdictions, possibly leading to inconsistent judgments." Brief for Merrill Lynch as Amicus Curiae 14. A dismissal of the action on the ground of nonjoinder, however, will protect Merrill Lynch in some respects. That disposition will not provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment determining the party entitled to the assets, but it likely would provide Merrill Lynch with an effective defense against piecemeal litigation and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. As matters presently stand, in any later suit against it Merrill Lynch may seek to join the Republic and the Commission and have the action dismissed under Rule 19(b) should they again assert sovereign immunity. Dismissal for nonjoinder to some extent will serve the purpose of interpleader, which is to prevent a stakeholder from *2194 having to pay
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is to prevent a stakeholder from *2194 having to pay two or more parties for one claim. Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch in this regard is outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign immunity. Dismissal under Rule 19(b) will mean, in some instances, that plaintiffs will be left without a forum for definitive resolution of their claims. But that result is contemplated under the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. See, e.g., ("[I]f a court determines that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the plaintiff will be barred from raising his claim in any court in the United States"). V The Court of Appeals' failure to give sufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission should the interpleader proceed in their absence would, in the usual course, warrant reversal and remand for further proceedings. In this case, however, that error and our further analysis under the additional provisions of Rule 19(b) lead us to conclude the action must be dismissed. This leaves the Pimentel class, which has waited for years now to be compensated for grievous wrongs, with no immediate way to recover on its judgment against Marcos. And it leaves Merrill Lynch, the stakeholder, without a judgment. The balance of equities may change in due course. One relevant change may occur if it appears that the Sandiganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a reasonable period of time. Other changes could result when and if there is a ruling. If the Sandiganbayan rules that the Republic and the Commission have no right to the assets, their claims in some later interpleader suit would be less substantial than they are now. If the ruling is that the Republic and the Commission own the assets, then they may seek to enforce a judgment in our courts; or consent to become parties in an interpleader suit, where their claims could be considered; or file in some other forum if they can obtain jurisdiction over the relevant persons. We do note that if Merrill Lynch, or other parties, elect to commence further litigation in light of changed circumstances, it would not be necessary to file the new action in the District Court where this action arose, provided venue and jurisdictional requirements are satisfied elsewhere. The present action, however, may not proceed. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to order the District Court to dismiss the inter-pleader action. It is so ordered. APPENDIX The Court of Appeals issued
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It is so ordered. APPENDIX The Court of Appeals issued its decision before the Amendments to Rule 19(b) became effective. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & The text of the Rule before those changes were adopted is as follows: "Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication "(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition *2195 of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action. "(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. "(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as prescribed in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,008 | 4 |
majority
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Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145794/republic-of-philippines-v-pimentel/
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who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. "(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23." Justice STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I join Part II of the Court's opinion holding that we have jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision and agree that we should not affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment on the merits of its analysis under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I believe the appropriate disposition of this case is to reverse and remand for further proceedings. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit erred by concluding that the New York statute of limitations provides a virtually insuperable obstacle to petitioners' recovery of the Arelma, S. A., assets, and I therefore agree that this Court should reverse. I would not, however, give near-dispositive effect to the Republic of the (Republic) and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Governance's (Commission) status as sovereign entities, as the Court does in ordering outright dismissal of the case. In my judgment, the Court of Appeals should either order the District Judge to stay further proceedings pending a reasonably prompt decision of the Sandiganbayan or order the case reassigned to a different District Judge to conduct further proceedings. There is, of course, a risk of unfairness in conducting such proceedings without the participation of petitioners. But it is a risk that they can avoid by waiving their sovereign immunity, and the record provides a basis for believing that they would do so if the case proceeded before a different judge. *2196 The Republic did not invoke its sovereign immunity until after the District Court denied its motion seeking dismissal or transfer for improper venue, dismissal on act of state grounds, or recusal of the District Judge. App. 9; In support of that motion they advanced a factual basis for suspecting that the District Judge's impartiality could be questioned. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motions to Dismiss, Transfer or Stay, and For Recusal 23-28 in Civ. No. CV00-595MLR (D.Haw.). These facts demonstrate that the District Judge would likely "have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views." It appears, for example, that the District Judge summoned an attorney representing Merrill Lynch to a meeting in chambers in Los Angeles on September 11, 2000, after learning that the Republic and the Commission sought to obtain the Arelma funds from Merrill Lynch. During these proceedings, the District Judge directed Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action before him
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,008 | 4 |
majority
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Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145794/republic-of-philippines-v-pimentel/
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directed Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action before him in the District of Hawaii and to deposit the Arelma funds with the court, despite the attorney's argument that New York would likely be the more appropriate forum. See ante, at 2186-2187; Tr. 6 (Sept. 11, 2000). Merrill Lynch filed the interpleader on September 14, 2000, and the District Judge sealed the file, making it difficult for other parties to determine the status of the proceedings. See Affidavit of Richard A. Martin in Support of the Motions to Dismiss, Transfer, or Stay Submitted by the Republic of the and the Presidential Commission on Good Government in Civ. No. CV00-595MLR (D.Haw.), ¶ 6-7, 11. These actions be-speak a level of personal involvement and desire to control the Marcos proceedings that create at least a colorable basis for the Republic and the Commission's concern about the District Judge's impartiality. Furthermore, following the Republic and the Commission's motion to dismiss the action on sovereign immunity grounds, the District Judge decided that they were not "real parties in interest." See In re Republic of The Ninth Circuit reversed and directed the District Judge to enter a stay, ; the District Court did so, but vacated the stay within months. While the District Court's decision to do so was not without some basis, it presumably increased concern about the possibility that the District Judge would not fairly consider the Republic's position on the merits. Upon reassignment, the question whether to dismiss the case, to stay the proceedings, or to require the Republic to choose between asserting its sovereign immunity and defending on the merits would be open. The District Judge might wish to hold a hearing to determine whether the Republic and the Commission have a substantial argument that the Republic owned the disputed assets when they were conveyed to Arelma in 1972. While the Court assumes that the Republic's interest in the Arelma assets is "not frivolous," ante, at 2191, on this record, it is not clear whether the Republic has a sufficient claim to those assets to preclude their recovery by judgment creditors of Marcos. The Republic's claim to disputed assets may be meritless for reasons unrelated to the potential statute of limitations. Further, in conducting the balancing inquiry mandated by Rule 19, as interpreted by Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Tradesmens & Trust *2197 I would conclude that several facts specific to this case suggest that the Republic and the Commission's sovereign interests should be given less weight than in the ordinary case. First, in all events, the Republic and
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,008 | 4 |
majority
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Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145794/republic-of-philippines-v-pimentel/
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the ordinary case. First, in all events, the Republic and the Commission must take affirmative steps in United States courts (or possibly invoke the assistance of the Attorney General to do so, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27) at some point in order to recover the assets held in the United States. Thus, the sovereign interest implicated here is not of the same magnitude as when a sovereign faces liability; the Republic's interest is in choosing the most convenient venue and time for the suit to proceed. Second, in the past two decades, the Republic has participated in other proceedings involving Marcos' assets in our courts without interposing any objection. Indeed, in 1987 it filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit in the underlying consolidated class action that led to the entry of respondents' judgment against Marcos; in that brief the Republic urged the Ninth Circuit to reverse the District Judge's dismissal of two of the cases (later consolidated) under the act of state doctrine and "to allow the Plaintiffs in those two cases to present their evidence of gross human rights violations against Ferdinand Marcos and to pursue justice in U.S. District Court." App. A to Brief for Respondent Pimentel RA-1. This was the Republic's position notwithstanding the fact that any recovery would come from a judgment against Marcos' assetsassets that the Republic and the Commission now claim to have owned in full from the moment Marcos acquired them. See, e.g., Brief for Republic in Nos. 04-16401, 04-16503, and 04-16538(CA9), p. 9 ("Under Philippine law, assets resulting from the misuse of public office, bribery, corruption, and other such crimes by public officials are forfeit to the Republic from the moment such assets are generated"); Pet. for Republic in No. 0141 (Sandiganbayon) (filed 1991) (seeking forfeiture of a large number of Marcos assets). Even if the Republic believed that Marcos might have some personal assets that were not ill gotten, under the Republic's theory that amount could not possibly have approached the judgment respondents received. Either the Republic was encouraging futile and purely symbolic litigation, or the Republic believed that other creditors would have access to at least a portion of Marcos' vast assets. In sum, I am persuaded that the Court's judgment today represents a more "inflexible approach" than the Rule contemplates. All parties have an interest in the prompt resolution of the disposition of the Arelma assets. A remand would allow a new judge to handle the matter in an expeditious fashion rather than requiring a brand new proceeding. The Court suggests that Merrill
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,008 | 4 |
majority
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Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145794/republic-of-philippines-v-pimentel/
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requiring a brand new proceeding. The Court suggests that Merrill Lynch may file in another District Courtpresumably in New Yorkif it seeks to commence further litigation. See ante, at 2194. While this solution would put the matter before another District Judge, it requires the initiation of a new proceeding that may unnecessarily delay the final resolution. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Justice SOUTER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join all but Parts IV-B and V of the Court's opinion. I differ as to relief because a conclusion of the matter pending before the Sandiganbayan may simplify the issues raised in this case and render one disposition or another more clearly correct. I would therefore vacate the *2198 judgment and remand for a stay of proceedings for a reasonable time to await a decree of the Philippine court. If it should appear later that no such decree can be expected, the Court of Appeals could decide on the next step in light of the Court's opinion. For reasons given by Justice STEVENS, I would order that any further proceedings in the District Court be held before a judge fresh to the case
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Justice Brennan
| 1,978 | 13 |
majority
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Simpson v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109806/simpson-v-united-states/
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The punishment for bank robbery of a fine of not more than $5,000 and imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, 18 U.S. C. 2113 (a), may be enhanced to a fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or both, when the robbery is committed "by the use of a dangerous weapon or device," 18 U.S. C. 2113 (d).[1] Another statute, 18 U.S. C. 924 (c), provides that whoever "uses a *8 firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years," and "[i]n the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection," to imprisonment for not less than 2 nor more than 25 years; "nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony."[2] Petitioners were convicted of two separate bank robberies committed with firearms. The question for decision is whether 2113 (d) and 924 (c) should be construed as intended by Congress to authorize, in the case of a bank robbery committed with firearms, not only the imposition of the increased penalty under 2113 (d), but also the imposition of an additional consecutive penalty under 924 (c). I On September 8, 1975, petitioners, using handguns to intimidate the bank's employees, robbed some $40,000 from the East End Branch of the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, *. Less than two months later, on November 4, 1975, petitioners returned to Middlesboro and this time, again using handguns, robbed the West End Branch of the Commercial Bank of about the same amount. Petitioners received a separate jury trial for each robbery. After the trial for the first robbery, they were convicted of both aggravated bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S. C. 2113 (a) and (d), and of using firearms to commit the robbery, in violation of 18 U.S. C. 924 (c). They were sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 years' imprisonment on the robbery count and 10 years' imprisonment on the firearms count. After the trial for the second robbery, petitioners were again convicted of one count of aggravated bank robbery in violation of 2113 (a) and (d) and of one count of using firearms to commit the crime in violation of 924 (c); again each received a 25-year sentence for the robbery and a 10-year sentence for
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Justice Brennan
| 1,978 | 13 |
majority
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Simpson v. United States
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25-year sentence for the robbery and a 10-year sentence for the firearms count, the sentences to run consecutively to each other and to the sentences previously imposed. During the sentencing proceedings following each conviction, counsel for petitioners argued that the imposition of cumulative penalties for the two crimes was impermissible because the 2113 (d) charge merged with the firearms offense for purposes of sentencing. The District Court disagreed, holding that "the statutes and the legislative history indicat[e] an intention [by 924 (c)] to impose an additional punishment." App. 17. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed without a published opinion, We granted certiorari, to resolve an apparent conflict between the decision below and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United[3] We reverse. *10 II Quite clearly, 924 (c) and 2113 (d) are addressed to the same concern and designed to combat the same problem: the use of dangerous weaponsmost particularly firearmsto commit federal felonies.[4] Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that 924 (c) creates an offense distinct from the underlying federal felony, United ; United we believe that this is the beginning and not the end of the analysis necessary to answer the question presented for decision. *11 In this Court set out the test for determining "whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment." We held that "[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." See also at ; Ianelli v. United ; Gore v. United The Blockburger test has its primary relevance in the double jeopardy context, where it is a guide for determining when two separately defined crimes constitute the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. [5] Cases in which the Government is able to prove violations of two separate criminal statutes with precisely the same factual showing, as here, raise the prospect of double jeopardy and the possible need to evaluate the statutes in light of the Blockburger test. That test, the Government argues, is satisfied in this litigation.[6] We need not reach the issue. Before an *12 examination is made to determine whether cumulative punishments for the two offenses are constitutionally permissible, it is necessary, following our practice of avoiding constitutional decisions where possible, to determine whether Congress intended to subject the defendant to multiple penalties for the single criminal
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Justice Brennan
| 1,978 | 13 |
majority
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Simpson v. United States
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subject the defendant to multiple penalties for the single criminal transaction in which he engaged. Jeffers v. United Indeed, the Government concedes that "there remains at least a possibility that Congress, although constitutionally free to impose additional penalties for violation of 18 U.S. C. 924 (c) in a case like the present one, has otherwise disclosed its intention not to do so." Brief for United 11. We believe that several tools of statutory construction applied to the statutes "in a case like the present one"where the Government relied on the same proofs to support the convictions under both statutes require the conclusion that Congress cannot be said to *13 have authorized the imposition of the additional penalty of 924 (c) for commission of bank robbery with firearms already subject to enhanced punishment under 2113 (d). Cf. Gore v. United III First is the legislative history of 924 (c). That provision, which was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, was not included in the original Gun Control bill, but was offered as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Poff. 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968).[7] In his statement immediately following his introduction of the amendment, Representative Poff observed: "For the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my substitute is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113 which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies." This statement is clearly probative of a legislative judgment that the purpose of 924 (c) is already served whenever the substantive federal offense provides enhanced punishment for use of a dangerous weapon.[8] Although these remarks are of course not dispositive of the issue of 924 (c)'s reach, they are certainly entitled to weight, coming as they do from the provision's sponsor. This is especially so because Representative *14 Poff's explanation of the scope of his amendment is in complete accord with, and gives full play to, the deterrence rationale of 924 (c). United 539 F. 2d, at 1172. Subsequent events in the Senate and the Conference Committee pertaining to the statute buttress our conclusion that Congress' view of the proper scope of 924 (c) was that expressed by Representative Poff. Shortly after the House adopted the Poff amendment, the Senate passed an amendment to the Gun Control Act, introduced by Senator Dominick, that also provided for increased
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Justice Brennan
| 1,978 | 13 |
majority
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Simpson v. United States
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Act, introduced by Senator Dominick, that also provided for increased punishment whenever a firearm was used to commit a federal offense. 114 Cong. Rec. 27142 (1968). According to the analysis of its sponsor, the Senate amendment, contrary to Mr. Poff's view of 924 (c), would have permitted the imposition of an enhanced sentence for the use of a firearm in the commission of any federal crime, even where allowance was already made in the provisions of the substantive offense for augmented punishment where a dangerous weapon is used. A Conference Committee, with minor changes,[9] subsequently adopted the Poff version of 924 (c) in preference to the Dominick amendment. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 31-32 (1968). Second, to construe the statute to allow the additional sentence authorized by 924 (c) to be pyramided upon a sentence already enhanced under 2113 (d) would violate the established rule of construction that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." United v. Bass, ; *15 Rewis v. United See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United The legislative history of 924 (c) is of course sparse, yet what there isparticularly Representative Poff's statement and the Committee rejection of the Dominick amendment points in the direction of a congressional view that the section was intended to be unavailable in prosecutions for violations of 2113 (d). Even where the relevant legislative history was not nearly so favorable to the defendant as this, this Court has steadfastly insisted that "doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses." Bell v. United ; Ladner v. United See Prince v. United As we said in Ladner: "This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." If we have something "more than a guess" in this case, that somethingRepresentative Poff's commentary and the Conference Committee's rejection of the Dominick amendmentis incremental knowledge that redounds to petitioners' benefit, not the Government's. Finally, our result is supported by the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, even if the general provision was enacted later. See Cf. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland, Statutory Construction 51.05 This guide to statutory construction has special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the punishment to which
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Justice Brennan
| 1,978 | 13 |
majority
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Simpson v. United States
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upon to determine the extent of the punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions. In this context, the principle is a corollary of the rule of lenity, an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative *16 directive. Indeed, at one time, the Government was not insensitive to these concerns respecting the availability of the additional penalty under 924 (c). In 1971, the Department of Justice found the interpretive preference for specific criminal statutes over general criminal statutes of itself sufficient reason to advise all United Attorneys not to prosecute a defendant under 924 (c) (1) where the substantive statute the defendant was charged with violating already "provid[ed] for increased penalties where a firearm is used in the commission of the offense." 19 U. S. Attys. Bull. 63 Obviously, the Government has since changed its view of the relationship between 924 (c) and 2113 (d). We think its original view was the better view of the congressional understanding as to the proper interaction between the two statutes. Accordingly, we hold that in a prosecution growing out of a single transaction of bank robbery with firearms, a defendant may not be sentenced under both 2113 (d) and 924 (c). The cases are therefore reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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In 2008, North Carolina enacted a statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to gain access to a number of websites, including commonplace social media websites like Facebook and Twitter. The ques pre- sented is whether that law is permissible under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I A North Carolina law makes it a felony for a registered sex offender “to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site per- mits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (e) A “commercial social network- ing Web site” is defined as a website that meets four crite- ria. First, it “[i]s operated by a person who derives reve- nue from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to the opera of the Web site.” 2 PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court Second, it “[f]acilitates the social introduc between two or more persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or informa exchanges.” Third, it “[a]llows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain informa such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other personal informa about the user, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site.” And fourth, it “[p]rovides users or visitors mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger.” The statute includes two express exemps. The statutory bar does not extend to websites that “[p]rovid[e] only one of the following discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or mes- sage board platform.” The law also does not encompass websites that have as their “primary pur- pose the facilita of commercial transacs involving goods or services between [their] members or visitors.” According to sources cited to the Court, ap- plies to about 20,000 people in North Carolina and the State has prosecuted over 1,000 people for violating it. Brief for Petier 6–8. B In 2002, petier Lester Gerard Packingham—then a 21-year-old college student—had sex with a 13-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to taking indecent liberties with a child. Because this crime qualifies as “an offense against a minor,” petier was required to register as a sex offender—a status that can endure
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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to register as a sex offender—a status that can endure for 30 years or more. See see As a registered sex Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court offender, petier was barred under from gaining access to commercial social networking sites. In 2010, a state court dismissed a traffic ticket against petier. In response, he logged on to Facebook.com and posted the following statement on his personal profile: “Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing spent.Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!” App. 136. At the time, a member of the Durham Police Depart- ment was investigating registered sex offenders who were thought to be violating The officer noticed that a “ ‘J. R. Gerrard’ ” had posted the statement quoted above. By check- ing court records, the officer discovered that a traffic cita for petier had been dismissed around the time of the post. Evidence obtained by search warrant con- firmed the officer’s suspicions that petier was J. R. Gerrard. Petier was indicted by a grand jury for violating The trial court denied his mo to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the charge against him violated the First Amendment. Petier was ultimately convicted and given a suspended prison sentence. At no point during trial or sentencing did the State allege that petier contacted a minor—or committed any other illicit act—on the Internet. Petier appealed to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. That court struck down on First Amendment grounds, explaining that the law is not nar- rowly tailored to serve the State’s legitimate interest in protecting minors from sexual abuse. 229 N. C. App. 293, 304, Rather, the law “arbi- trarily burdens all registered sex offenders by preventing a wide range of communica and expressive activity 4 PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court unrelated to achieving its purported goal.” The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the law is “constitual in all respects.” 368 N. C., at Among other things, the court explained that the law is “carefully tailored to prohibit registered sex offenders from accessing only those Web sites that allow them the opportunity to gather infor- ma about minors.” 777 S. E. 2d, at 747. The court also held that the law leaves open adequate alternative means of communica because it permits petier to gain access to websites that the court be- lieved perform the “same or similar” funcs as social media, such as the Paula Deen Network
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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funcs as social media, such as the Paula Deen Network and the website for the local NBC affiliate. 777 S. E. 2d, at 747. Two justices dissented. They stated that the law impermissibly “creates a criminal prohibi of alarming breadth and extends well beyond the evils the State seeks to combat.” 777 S. E. 2d, at 754 (opinion of Hudson, J.) (altera, cita, and internal quota marks omitted). The Court granted certiorari, 580 U. S. (2016), and now reverses. II A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflec, speak and listen once more. The Court has sought to protect the right to speak in this spatial context. A basic rule, for example, is that a street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights. See Even in the modern era, these places are still essential venues for public gath- erings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire. While in the past there may have been difficulty in Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 5 Opinion of the Court identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the “vast democratic forums of the Internet” in general, v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997), and social media in particular. Seven in ten American adults use at least one Internet social networking service. Brief for Electronic Frontier Founda et al. as Amici Curiae 5–6. One of the most popular of these sites is Facebook, the site used by peti- er leading to his convic in this case. According to sources cited to the Court in this case, Facebook has 1.79 billion active users. This is about three times the popula of North America. Social media offers “relatively unlimited, low-cost capac- ity for communica of all kinds.” On Facebook, for example, users can debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors or share vaca photos. On LinkedIn, users can look for work, advertise for employees, or review tips on entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can peti their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and almost every Mem- ber of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Founda 15–16. In short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics “as diverse
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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array of protected First Amendment activity on topics “as diverse as human thought.” (internal quota marks omitted). The nature of a revolu in thought can be that, in its early stages, even its participants may be unaware of it. And when awareness comes, they still may be unable to know or foresee where its changes lead. Cf. D. Hawke, Benjamin Rush: Revoluary Gadfly 341 (1971) (quoting Rush as observing: “ ‘The American war is over; but this is far from being the case with the American revolu. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the great drama 6 PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court is closed’ ”). So too here. While we now may be coming to the realiza that the Cyber Age is a revolu of historic propors, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express our- selves, and define who we want to be. The forces and direcs of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow. This case is one of the first this Court has taken to address the relaship between the First Amendment and the modern Internet. As a result, the Court must exercise extreme cau before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protec for access to vast networks in that medium. III This background informs the analysis of the North Carolina statute at issue. Even making the assump that the statute is content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision cannot stand. In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 18) (internal quota marks omitted). In other words, the law must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” at (slip op., at 19) (internal quota marks omitted). For centuries now, invens heralded as advances in human progress have been exploited by the criminal New technologies, all too soon, can become instruments used to commit serious crimes. The railroad is one exam- ple, see M. Crichton, The Great Train Robbery, p. xv (1975), and the telephone another, see 18 U.S. C. So it will be with the Internet and social media. There is also no doubt that, as this Court has recog- Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 7 Opinion of the Court nized, “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people.” 244 (2002). And it is clear that a legislature “may pass valid laws to protect children” and other victims of sexual assault “from abuse.” See ; accord, New York v. Ferber, The government, of course, need not simply stand by and allow these evils to occur. But the asser of a valid governmental interest “cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitu- al protecs.” It is necessary to make two assumps to resolve this case. First, given the broad wording of the North Carolina statute at issue, it might well bar access not only to com- monplace social media websites but also to websites as varied as Amazon.com, Washingtonpost.com, and Webmd.com. See post, –9; see also Brief for Electronic Frontier Founda 24–27; Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae 10–12, and n. 6. The Court need not decide the precise scope of the statute. It is enough to assume that the law applies (as the State concedes it does) to social networking sites “as commonly understood”—that is, websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. See Brief for Respondent 54; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Second, this opinion should not be interpreted as bar- ring a State from enacting more specific laws than the one at issue. Specific criminal acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their commission. See ( per curiam). Though the issue is not before the Court, it can be assumed that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather informa about a minor. Cf. Brief for Respond- 8 PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court ent 42–43. Specific laws of that type must be the State’s first resort to ward off the serious harm that sexual crimes inflict. (Of importance, the troubling fact that the law imposes severe restrics on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system is also not an issue before the Court.) Even with these assumps about the scope of the law and the State’s interest, the statute here enacts a prohibi- unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens. Social media allows users to gain access to informa and communicate with one another about it on any subject that might
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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with one another about it on any subject that might come to at 5. By prohibiting sex offenders from using those web- sites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing cur- rent events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet connec to “become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” 521 U.S., In sum, to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exer- cise of First Amendment rights. It is unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be used even by persons who have completed their sentences. Even con- victed criminals—and in some instances especially con- victed criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives. Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 9 Opinion of the Court IV The primary response from the State is that the law must be this broad to serve its preventative purpose of keeping convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims. The State has not, however, met its burden to show that this sweeping law is necessary or legitimate to serve that purpose. See McCullen, 573 U. S., at (slip op., at 28). It is instructive that no case or holding of this Court has approved of a statute as broad in its reach. The closest analogy that the State has cited is Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). There, the Court upheld a prohibi on campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place. That case gives little or no support to the State. The law in Burson was a limited restric that, in a context consistent with constitual tradi, was enacted to protect another fundamental right—the right to vote. The restrics there were far less onerous than those the State seeks to impose here. The law in Burson meant only that the last few seconds before voters entered a polling place were “their own, as free from interference as possible.” at 210. And the Court noted that, were the buffer zone larger than 100 feet, it “could effectively become an impermissi- ble burden” under the First Amendment. The
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,017 | 4 |
majority
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Packingham v. North Carolina
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403805/packingham-v-north-carolina/
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become an impermissi- ble burden” under the First Amendment. The better analogy to this case is Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), where the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting any “First Amendment activities” at Los Ange- les Internaal Airport because the ordinance covered all manner of protected, nondisruptive behavior including “talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing,” If a law prohibiting “all protected expression” at a single airport is not consti- tual, it follows with even greater force that the State may not enact this com- plete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on 10 PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA Opinion of the Court websites integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture. * * * It is well established that, as a general rule, the Gov- ernment “may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coali- That is what North Carolina has done here. Its law must be held invalid. The judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the considera or decision of this case. Cite as: 582 U. S. (2017) 1 ALITO,Opinion of the in J., concurring Court judgment NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publica in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that correcs may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–1194 LESTER GERARD PACKINGHAM, PETITIONER v. NORTH CAROLINA ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA [June 19, 2017] JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
concurring
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United States v. Raddatz
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110315/united-states-v-raddatz/
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While I join the Court's opinion, my analysis of the due process issue differs somewhat from that set forth therein, and I write separately to articulate it. The Court seems to focus on the diminished importance of pretrial suppression motions and the acceptability in some agency proceedings of decision-making without personal observation of witnesses. For me, these considerations are of less importance than the practical concern for accurate results that is the focus of the Due Process Clause. In testing the challenged procedure against that criterion, I would distinguish between instances where the district court rejects the credibility-based determination of a magistrate and instances, such as this one, where the court adopts a magistrate's proposed result.[1] In the latter context, the judge accurately can be described as a "backup" jurist whose review serves to enhance reliability and benefit the defendant. Respondent was afforded procedures by which a neutral decisionmaker, after seeing and hearing the witnesses, rendered a decision.[2] After that decisionmaker found against him, respondent received a second *685 turn, albeit on a cold record, before another neutral decisionmaker. In asking us to invalidate the magistrate program, respondent in effect requests removal of the second level of procedural protections afforded him and others like him.[3] In my view, such a result would tend to undermine, rather than augment, accurate decisionmaking. It therefore is not a result I could embrace under the Due Process Clause. Although MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL ably argues that this characterization of the magistrate procedure clashes with Art. III, I am not persuaded. As the Court observes, the handling of suppression motions invariably remains completely in the control of the federal district court. The judge may initially decline to refer any matter to a magistrate. When a matter is referred, the judge may freely reject the magistrate's recommendation. He may rehear the evidence in whole or in part. He may call for additional findings or otherwise "recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions." See 28 U.S. C. 636 (b) (1). Moreover, the magistrate himself is subject to the Art. III judge's control. Magistrates are appointed by district judges, 631 (a), and subject to removal by them, 631 (h). In addition, district judges retain plenary authority over when, what, and how many pretrial matters are assigned to magistrates, and "[e]ach district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties." 636 (b) (4). Thus, the only conceivable danger of a "threat" to the "independence" of the magistrate comes from within, rather than without, the judicial department. It is also significant that the Magistrates Act
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
concurring
|
United States v. Raddatz
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110315/united-states-v-raddatz/
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judicial department. It is also significant that the Magistrates Act imposes significant requirements to ensure competency and impartiality, 631 (b), (c), and (i), 632, 637 (1976 ed. and *686 Supp. II), including a rule generally barring reduction of salaries of full-time magistrates, 634 (b). Even assuming that, despite these protections, a controversial matter might be delegated to a magistrate who is susceptible to outside pressures, the district judgeinsulated by life tenure and irreducible salaryis waiting in the wings, fully able to correct errors. Under these circumstances, I simply do not perceive the threat to the judicial power or the independence of judicial decisionmaking that underlies Art. III. We do not face a procedure under which "Congress [has] delegate[d] to a non-Art. III judge the authority to make final determinations on issues of fact." Post, at 703 (dissenting opinion). Rather, we confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control over the assistants' activities. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court's interpretation of the Federal Magistrates Act in Part III of its opinion. The terms and legislative record of 636 (b) (1) plainly indicate that Congress intended to vest broad discretion in the district courts to decide whether or not to rehear witnesses already heard by a magistrate in a suppression proceeding. The Court recognizes that "serious questions" would be raised if a district judge rejected a magistrate's proposed findings on credibility. See ante, at 681, n. 7. But the Court finds no error in this case, where the District Court accepted the Magistrate's judgment on credibility. I would reach a different conclusion. Under the standards set out in due process requires a district court to rehear crucial witnesses when, as in this case, a suppression hearing turns only on credibility. As MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL points out in his dissenting opinion, *687A the private interests at stake in a suppression hearing often are substantial. Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights is real when a decider of fact has not heard and observed the crucial witnesses. The value of hearing and seeing those witnesses testify is undeniable. Finally, the government interest in limiting rehearing is not sufficient to outweigh these considerations. In sum, I agree with MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S statement that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a hearing requirement should be imposed "only in situations in which the case turns on issues of credibility
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111836/stringfellow-v-concerned-neighbors-in-action/
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The question before us is whether a district court order granting permissive intervention but denying intervention as or right is immediately appealable. I This case is part of the ongoing litigation concerning the Stringfellow Acid Pits, an abandoned hazardous waste disposal site near Glen Avon, California. Petitioners are 28 individuals, companies, or entities who formerly owned or operated the Acid Pits, or who allegedly produced or transported the wastes that were dumped at the disposal site. In 1983 the United States and the State of California filed suit against petitioners, claiming that the Acid Pits created a substantial danger to the surrounding area. The Government plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that would require petitioners to abate the release of harmful substances from the site, and to take remedial steps to correct the unsafe conditions. Both the United States and California also requested reimbursement for the costs incurred in bringing about the cleanup. Shortly after the complaint was filed, respondent Concerned Neighbors in Action (CNA), a nonprofit organization whose members live near the dumpsite, moved to intervene in the litigation. CNA claimed that it was entitled to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), because it had a substantial interest in the suit that would not be represented adequately by the existing parties.[1] CNA also asserted that the citizen suit provisions *373 of various environmental statutes allowed intervention as of right in these circumstances.[2] Alternatively, CNA claimed that it should be allowed to intervene by permission pursuant to Rule 24(b). The District Court denied the request to intervene as of right, but granted CNA's application to become a permissive intervenor. The court concluded, however, that CNA's right to participate should be subject to three conditions. First, it held that CNA could not assert any claim for relief that had not already been requested by one of the original parties. The court found that "allowing applicants to assert their individualized damage and other claims would burden and expand an already complex litigation, and could jeopardize the possibility of settlement." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-19. Second, CNA could not intervene in the Government plaintiffs' claim for recovery of the clean-up costs. Finally, in an effort to "minimize any delay and confusion involved in discovery," the District Court ruled that CNA could not file any motions or conduct its own discovery unless it first conferred with all the original parties, and then obtained permission to go forward from at least one of these litigants. at A-20. The court emphasized, though, that CNA had the right to attend
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
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Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111836/stringfellow-v-concerned-neighbors-in-action/
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court emphasized, though, that CNA had the right to attend all depositions, to participate to the extent not duplicative of the original parties, and to receive copies of all discovery material produced by the other litigants. *374 CNA filed an immediate appeal, protesting both the denial of the application to intervene as of right and the restrictions imposed on permissive intervention. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, finding that the District Court order was not a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. 1291.[3] The court's decision was largely based on the fact that CNA had been made a party to the litigation and could protect its interests fully during an appeal from the final judgment. The Ninth Circuit also noted that its decision was consistent with the results reached by other Courts of Appeals in similar cases.[4] The court subsequently withdrew its opinion, however, concluding that the holding was inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. Relying on the court ruled that "[d]enial of intervention as of right is a final appealable order, despite the grant of permissive intervention." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-26. The court ordered further briefing on the merits of the intervention application, and ultimately held that CNA must be allowed to intervene as of right. United See also We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether this type of pretrial order is subject to immediate appeal. We now vacate and remand. II CNA acknowledges that the District Court order in this case is not "final" in the traditional sense. The decision concerning * CNA's intervenor status clearly is not one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." See Instead, CNA argues that the order falls within one of the narrow categories of decisions that we have deemed final for purposes of review, even though the entire dispute has not yet been resolved. A CNA's primary argument is that the District Court ruling is covered by the "collateral order" exception to 1291. This doctrine recognizes that a limited class of prejudgment orders is sufficiently important and sufficiently separate from the underlying dispute that immediate appeal should be available. To qualify as a collateral order, a decision must: (i) "conclusively determine the disputed question"; (ii) "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action"; and (iii) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Although a party seeking appeal
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Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111836/stringfellow-v-concerned-neighbors-in-action/
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also Firestone Tire & Rubber Although a party seeking appeal must show that all three requirements are satisfied, we find it unnecessary to address each part of the test. We assume, arguendo, that the District Court order conclusively determined CNA's right to intervene, and that the intervention issue is completely separate from the merits of the underlying action. We nevertheless find that the order is not "collateral" within the meaning of Coopers & Lybrand. We conclude that because CNA is now a party to the suit by virtue of its permissive intervention, it can obtain effective review of its claims on appeal from the final judgment. An intervenor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to appeal an adverse final judgment by a *376 trial court. See ; See also 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 24-15, pp. 24-169 24-170 (An intervenor may appeal from "all interlocutory and final orders that affect him whether the right under which he intervened was originally absolute or discretionary"); 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Federal Practice and Procedure 1923, p. 517 Thus if CNA still wishes to challenge the denial of intervention as of right, or if it believes that the restrictions imposed by the District Court prevented it from protecting its interests, it can raise these claims before the Court of Appeals after the trial. That court then can decide whether the order was erroneous, and if so, whether CNA's inability to participate more fully in the proceedings may have affected the final judgment. We therefore cannot conclude that CNA's interests will be "irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal." See Richardson-Merrell CNA does not dispute that it has the right to pursue a post-trial appeal. But it argues that, given the realities of complex litigation, a dispute over the right to intervene must be resolved before trial if it is to have any practical significance. CNA argues that once the district court enters a remedial order in a case such as this, involving numerous parties and years of litigation, an appellate court will be reluctant to vacate the judgment because of an erroneous intervention order. CNA suggests that the incentives to affirm the trial court's decision will be so strong at that point that the "right" to appeal will be academic at best, and thus CNA's ability to press for the strongest possible clean-up order will indeed be "irretrievably lost." This contention may be true to some degree, but it is largely beside the point. Although it may be difficult
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111836/stringfellow-v-concerned-neighbors-in-action/
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is largely beside the point. Although it may be difficult for CNA to show that the harm from the intervention order is *377 sufficiently great to overturn the final judgment, this has little bearing on whether CNA has the right to an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The difficulties of which CNA complains are the same as those faced by any party who is subject to an adverse pretrial order. A party who has had one of several claims dismissed before trial, for example, may similarly believe that the chances of overturning the judgment on this ground are small, even if the dismissal turns out to be erroneous. Yet unless the district court specifically holds otherwise, challenges to this type of order can be raised only after judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b). See also 10 Wright, Miller, & 2653, at 25-26, 31. CNA presents no compelling reason why the intervention order in this case should be treated differently. As a permissive intervenor, CNA will have the same rights of appeal from a final judgment as all other parties; we decline to extend the collateral order doctrine to provide more. B CNA also argues that because the District Court placed such onerous limitations on its right to participate in the case, the order should be construed as a complete denial of the right to intervene. CNA correctly notes that when an order prevents a putative intervenor from becoming a party in any respect, the order is subject to immediate review. Railroad Even though CNA is now a party to the action, it maintains that the restrictions on discovery and the right to request additional relief so severely undermine its ability to influence the litigation that the order is not different in effect from one denying all participation. Indeed, CNA argues that unless it can challenge these restrictions immediately, it will be in a worse position than if the District Court had rejected its intervention application in full: CNA will be unable to participate effectively, and yet still will be bound by the final judgment because of its permissive-party *378 status. We therefore are urged to give the District Court decision a "practical" interpretation and rule that the permissive-intervention order was a constructive denial. We cannot accept this argument. In Railroad Trainmen, we found that the order denying all intervention was by necessity subject to immediate review, because the applicant "[could] not appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding" In that case the party seeking to intervene had no recourse other than pretrial review, since
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111836/stringfellow-v-concerned-neighbors-in-action/
|
to intervene had no recourse other than pretrial review, since the trial court's order terminated that party's participation in the litigation. In the present case, however, CNA is a participant in the proceeding and has alternative means for challenging the order. Consequently, the justification for immediate review found in Railroad Trainmen is absent from this case. And while the District Court restricted CNA's ability to participate as fully as it might wish, it is significant that none of the limitations interfere with CNA's ability to raise its claims on postjudgment appeal. As noted, CNA was given access to discovery information and was permitted to participate to the extent not duplicative of other parties. We therefore refuse to find that the grant of permissive intervention, even though subject to conditions, should be treated as a complete denial of the right to participate. C Finally, CNA argues that the District Court order comes within the statutory exception to finality set forth in 28 U.S. C. 1292(a)(1). That section provides that a party may take an interlocutory appeal from an order "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions." CNA asserts that the order in this case constituted a "refusal" to grant an injunction in two respects. First, by ruling that CNA could not raise any claim not asserted by an original party, the District Court necessarily denied the injunctive relief CNA sought in its Complaint in Intervention.[5]*379 Second, by denying the right to file motions without the consent of another party, CNA claims that the order prevents it from even requesting, much less obtaining, a preliminary injunction. This argument fails for the reasons discussed above. Even if we were convinced that the District Court order had the effect of denying an injunction, it still would not satisfy 1292(a)(1). This Court has made it clear that not all denials of injunctive relief are immediately appealable; a party seeking review also must show that the order will have a " `serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and that the order can be `effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal." Because we have concluded that CNA, during post-trial review, can challenge the limitations on its participation, we conclude that 1292(a)(1) provides no basis for affirming the decision below.[6] *380 III As we have noted in the past, the finality rule of 1291 protects a variety of interests that contribute to the efficiency of the legal system. Pretrial appeals may cause disruption, delay, and expense for the litigants; they also burden appellate courts by requiring immediate consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by the end of trial.
|
Justice Powell
| 1,987 | 17 |
majority
|
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111836/stringfellow-v-concerned-neighbors-in-action/
|
may become moot or irrelevant by the end of trial. In addition, the finality doctrine protects the strong interest in allowing trial judges to supervise pretrial and trial procedures without undue interference. Firestone Tire & Rubber Particularly in a complex case such as this, a district judge's decision on how best to balance the rights of the parties against the need to keep the litigation from becoming unmanageable is entitled to great deference. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b)(2) ("In exercising its discretion [concerning permissive intervention] the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties"). The judge's ability to conduct efficient and orderly trials would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by piecemeal review. See Richardson-Merrell The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) concluded that Bobby James Moore was not intellectually disabled so as to be exempt from the death penalty under v. Virginia, It reached that conclusion based on its findings that he had failed to establish either significantly subaverage intellectual functioning or related significant deficits in adaptive behavior. The latter con- clusion was based, in part, on the CCA’s analysis of a set of seven “evidentiary factors” from Ex parte 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). I agree with the Court today that those factors are an unacceptable method of enforcing the guarantee of and that the CCA therefore erred in using them to analyze adaptive deficits. But I do not agree that the CCA erred as to Moore’s intel- lectual functioning. Because the CCA’s determination on that ground is an independent basis for its judgment, I would affirm the decision below. My broader concern with today’s opinion, however, is that it abandons the usual mode of analysis this Court has employed in Eighth Amendment cases. The Court over- turns the CCA’s conclusion that Moore failed to present sufficient evidence of both inadequate intellectual func- tioning and significant deficits in adaptive behavior with- out even considering “objective indicia of society’s stand- 2 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting ards” reflected in the practices among the States. Hall v. Florida, 572 U. S. (slip op., at 12) ). The Court instead crafts a constitutional holding based solely on what it deems to be medical consensus about intellectual disability. But clinicians, not judges, should determine clinical standards; and judges, not clinicians, should de- termine the content of the Eighth Amendment. Today’s opinion confuses those roles, and I respectfully dissent. I On April 25, 1980, Moore and two others were throwing dice when they decided to commit a robbery to obtain money for car payments. Moore provided the group with two firearms, and the three men began to drive around Houston looking for a target. Eventually they settled on the Birdsall Super Market. After negotiating their respec- tive shares of the money they intended to steal and don- ning disguises, the three went inside, heading straight to a courtesy booth staffed by James McCarble and Edna Scott. When Scott realized a robbery was occurring and screamed, Moore shot McCarble in the head, killing the 70-year-old instantly. Moore fled Houston and remained on the run until his arrest in Louisiana ten days after the murder. After giving a written statement admitting his participation in the robbery and killing, Moore was charged with capital murder. A
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
|
robbery and killing, Moore was charged with capital murder. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Over the next three decades, Moore’s case traversed the state and federal court systems, finally reaching the At- kins hearing at issue today in The state habeas court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing, during which it heard testimony from family members, a fellow inmate, a prison official, and four mental health profes- sionals. The court concluded that Moore had shown intel- lectual disability and recommended that he be granted Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 3 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting relief. But it was just that: a recommendation. Under Texas law, the CCA, not the habeas court, is the ultimate fact- finder in habeas corpus proceedings. Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Ex parte Moore, Assuming that role, the CCA declined to adopt the habeas court’s findings and conclusions, instead conducting its own review of the record to determine whether Moore had shown he was intellectually The CCA began by considering the appropriate legal standard for assessing intellectual disability. Following our instruction to the States to “develop[ ] appropriate ways to enforce” (internal quota- tion marks omitted), the CCA had set out a legal definition for intellectual disability in its prior decision in Ex parte Rather than follow that test, the habeas court below crafted its own standards for intellectual disability. But “[t]he decision to modify the legal standard for intel- lectual disability in the capital-sentencing context,” the CCA explained, “rests with this Court unless and until the Legislature acts.” Just as we have corrected lower courts for taking it upon themselves to dismiss our precedent as outdated, see, e.g., Bosse v. Okla- homa, 580 U. S. (2016) (per curiam) (slip op., at 2), so too the CCA rebuked the habeas court for ignoring binding CCA precedent. The CCA went on to explain why there was no reason to modify the legal standard it had previously set out. had stated a rule that in order for an claimant to demonstrate intellectual disability he must show (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and (2) related limitations in adaptive func- tioning, (3) which had appeared prior to age 18. See 470 S.W.3d, at 486. It also laid out a set of seven evidentiary factors—the “ factors”—designed to assist “fact- 4 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting finders in weighing evidence” of intellectual disability. The three-prong definition of intellectual disability came directly from the ninth edition of the manual published by what is now the American Association
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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the manual published by what is now the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). ; see Ameri- can Association on Mental Retardation, Mental Retarda- tion: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992). By the time Moore’s case reached the CCA, the AAIDD no longer included the requirement that adap- tive deficits be “related” to intellectual functioning. But, as the CCA noted, the most recent version of the other leading diagnostic manual, the DSM–5, did include that n. 5; American Psychi- atric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 38 (5th ed. 2013) (hereinafter DSM–5). So the CCA was faced with a choice in Moore: Keeping the relatedness requirement would be inconsistent with the AAIDD’s current guidance; dropping it would be out of step with the newest version of the DSM. The CCA con- cluded that “the legal test we established in re- mains adequately ‘informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework,’ ” and went on to evaluate the case under that (quoting Hall, 572 U. S., at – (slip op., at 19–20)). Starting with intellectual functioning, the CCA conducted a painstaking analysis of the battery of tests Moore had taken over the past 40 years. The CCA concluded that five of the tests the habeas court had considered were unreli- able: two of them were neuropsychological tests rather than formal IQ measures; two were group-administered tests, which Moore’s own experts had criticized, App. 12 (Otis- Lennon Mental Abilities Test “not accepted as an instru- ment appropriate for the assessment of mental retardation or intellectual deficiency”); at 115–116 (Slosson is “not the greatest test” and “not the most reliable approach”); Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 5 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting and the administrator of the fifth test concluded it was “not a valid score” because of evidence of suboptimal effort, That left two scores for the CCA to analyze: a 78 and a 74. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is “generally shown by an [IQ] of 70 or less.” 470 S.W. 3d, at 486. “Taking into account the standard error of measure- ment” for the 78 score yielded a range of 73 to 83—i.e., a range that did not include an IQ of 70 or less. As for the 74, the CCA again considered the standard error of measurement, which yielded a score range of 69 to 79. The lower end of that range placed Moore within the parameters for significantly subaverage intellectual func- tioning. The CCA found, however, that Moore’s score was unlikely to be in the lower end of the error-generated range because
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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be in the lower end of the error-generated range because he was likely exerting poor effort and expe- riencing depression at the time the test was adminis- tered—both factors that Moore’s experts agreed could artificially deflate IQ scores. at 516–517, 519; App. 46, 92. The CCA accordingly concluded that Moore had failed to present sufficient evidence of significantly subav- erage intellectual functioning. Having failed one part of the CCA’s three-part test, Moore could not be found intellectually The CCA nonetheless went on to consider the second prong of the test, Moore’s adaptive deficits. Moore had taken a stand- ardized test of adaptive functioning in which he scored more than two standard deviations below the mean. But Dr. Kristi Compton, the state expert who had adminis- tered that test, explained that it was not an accurate measure of Moore’s abilities. She reached this conclusion not because of Moore’s adaptive strengths but instead because “she had to assign zeroes to questions asking about areas to which [Moore] had no exposure, such as writing a check and using a microwave oven.” 470 S.W. 3d, at 522. Dr. Compton further opined that her 6 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting evaluation of Moore and review of documentary evi- dence—including school, trial, and prison records—did not show adaptive deficits sufficient for an intellectual disabil- ity diagnosis. App. 185; see –524. The CCA also considered and recounted the testimony of the other experts who, unlike Dr. Compton, concluded that Moore had shown significant adaptive deficits. As fact- finders often do in confronting conflicting evidence, the CCA made a credibility determination. The opinion of Dr. Compton, the CCA concluded, was “far more credible and reliable” than those of Moore’s experts, given Dr. Comp- ton’s “considerable experience,” “thorough[ ] and rigorous[ ] review[ ] [of] a great deal of material,” and personal evalu- ation of Moore. Based on Dr. Compton’s ex- pert opinion, the CCA concluded Moore had failed to demonstrate significant adaptive deficits. Finally, the CCA considered whether, even assuming that Moore had made sufficient showings as to intellectual functioning and adaptive deficits, those two were related. Again finding Dr. Compton’s testimony the most credible, the CCA concluded that “the record overwhelmingly sup- ports the conclusion” that Moore’s observed academic and social difficulties stemmed, not from low intellectual abili- ties, but instead from outside factors like the trauma and abuse he suffered as a child and his drug use at a young age. The CCA explained that, in addi- tion to Dr. Compton’s expert testimony, consideration of the seven factors reinforced that relatedness conclusion. Given that
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
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Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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of the seven factors reinforced that relatedness conclusion. Given that Moore had failed to present sufficient evi- dence on intellectual functioning or related adaptive defi- cits, the CCA “conclude[d] that for Eighth Amendment purposes,” Moore had not shown he was intellectually Accordingly, he was not exempt from execution under Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 7 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting II A This Court’s precedents have emphasized the im- portance of state legislative judgments in giving content to the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual pun- ishment. “Eighth Amendment judgments should not be merely the subjective views of individual Justices.” (plurality opinion). For that reason, we have emphasized that “judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.” The “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values” comes from state legislative judgments. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such legislative judgments are critical because in “a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.” (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we have focused on state enactments in this realm because of the “deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal sys- tem where the specification of punishments is con- cerned.” For these reasons, we have described state legislative judgments as providing “essential instruc- tion” in conducting the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Our decisions addressing capital punishment for the intellectually disabled recognize the central significance of state consensus. In holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled individu- als in the Court first identified a national consen- sus against the practice and then, applying our own “inde- pendent evaluation of the issue,” concluded that there was “no reason to disagree” with that consensus. 536 U.S., at 321. The scope of our holding—guided as it was by the 8 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting national consensus—swept only as far as that consensus. We recognized that there remained the potential for “seri- ous disagreement in determining which offenders are in fact retarded.” And we did not seek to provide “definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental retardation will be so impaired as to fall within ’ compass.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, we left “to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” ; alterations omitted). Twelve years after the Court confronted one State’s attempt to enforce the holding of that case. Hall v.
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
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Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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attempt to enforce the holding of that case. Hall v. Florida considered Florida’s rule requiring a prisoner to present an IQ score of 70 or below to make out an claim. Although the Court thought it “proper to consider the psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose and meaning of IQ scores,” it emphasized that “[t]he legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis.” 572 U. S., at (slip op., 19). It was “the Court’s duty”—not that of medical experts—“to interpret the Constitution.” at (slip op., at 19). The Court’s conclusion that Florida’s rule was “in direct opposition to the views of those who design, administer, and interpret the IQ test” was not enough to decide the case. at (slip op., at 22). Instead, consistent with our settled approach, the Court canvassed “the legislative policies of various States,” as well as “the holdings of state courts,” because it was state policies that provided “essential instruction” for determin- ing the scope of the constitutional guarantee. at (slip op., 19) (quoting ). State policy, the Court concluded, indicated a “consensus Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 9 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting that our society does not regard [Florida’s rule] as proper or humane,” and that “consensus instruct[ed us] how to decide the specific issue presented.” 572 U. S., at (slip op., 16). The Court was sharply divided on that conclusion, see at – (slip op., at 4–7) (ALITO, J., dissenting), but not on the fact that our prece- dent mandated such an inquiry. B Today’s decision departs from this Court’s precedents, followed in and Hall, establishing that the deter- mination of what is cruel and unusual rests on a judicial judgment about societal standards of decency, not a medi- cal assessment of clinical practice. The Court rejects the CCA’s conclusion that Moore failed to make the requisite showings with respect to intellectual functioning and adaptive deficits, without any consideration of the state practices that were, three Terms ago, “essential” to the Eighth Amendment question. Hall, 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 19). The Court instead finds error in the CCA’s analysis based solely on what the Court views to be depar- ture from typical clinical practice. The clinical guides on which the Court relies today are “designed to assist clinicians in conducting clinical as- sessment, case formulation, and treatment planning.” DSM–5, at 25. They do not seek to dictate or describe who is morally culpable—indeed, the DSM–5 cautions its readers about “the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information con- tained” within its pages. The Eighth Amendment, under our precedent, is sup- posed to impose a moral backstop on punishment, prohib- iting sentences that our society deems repugnant. The Court, however, interprets that constitutional guarantee as turning on clinical guidelines that do not purport to reflect standards of decency. The Court’s refusal even to 10 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting address what we previously “pinpointed” as “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence” of such standards— the practices among the States—goes unexplained by the majority. (internal quotation marks omitted). A second problem with the Court’s approach is the lack of guidance it offers to States seeking to enforce the hold- ing of Recognizing that we have, in the very re- cent past, held that “ ‘the views of medical experts’ do not ‘dictate’ a court’s intellectual-disability determination,” the Court assures us that it is not requiring adherence “to everything stated in the latest medical guide,” ante, at 9– 10 (quoting Hall, 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 19)); States have “some flexibility” but cannot “disregard” medical standards. Ante, at 10, 17. Neither the Court’s articula- tion of this standard nor its application sheds any light on what it means. Start with the Court’s stated principle. “Disregard” normally means to dismiss as unworthy of attention, and that is plainly not what the CCA did here. For example, the Court faults the CCA for placing too much weight on Moore’s adaptive strengths and functioning in prison, implying that this marked a dismissal of clinical stand- ards. Yet the CCA was aware of and, in a prior decision, had addressed the fact that some clinicians would counsel against considering such information. See 470 S.W. 3d, at ). Both because “[m]ost courts consider all of the person’s functional abilities” and because it seemed “foolhardy” to ignore strengths, the CCA thought it proper to take note of them. As to prison conduct, the CCA decided that the fundamental questions the inquiry sought to answer were best considered—and “sound scientific principles” best served—by taking account of “all possible data that sheds light on a person’s adaptive functioning, including his conduct in a prison society.” 451 S. W. 3d, at Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 11 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting The CCA considered clinical standards and ex- plained why it decided that departure from those stand- ards was warranted. The court did not “disregard” medi- cal standards. Nor do the Court’s identified errors clarify the scope of the “flexibility” we are told
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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errors clarify the scope of the “flexibility” we are told States retain in this area. The Court faults the CCA for “overemphasiz[ing]” strengths and “stress[ing]” Moore’s conduct in prison, ante, at 12–13, suggesting that some—but not too much—consideration of strengths and prison functioning is acceptable. The Court’s only guidance on when “some” becomes “too much”? Citations to clinical guides. See But if courts do have “flexibility” in enforcing the guarantee of and need not “adhere[ ]” to these guides in every instance or particular, ante, at 10, 17, then clinical texts, standing alone, cannot answer the question of why the CCA placed too much weight on adaptive strengths and prison conduct. The line between the permissible— consideration, maybe even emphasis—and the forbidden— “overemphasis”—is not only thin, but totally undefined by today’s decision. It is not at all clear when a State’s devia- tion from medical consensus becomes so great as to “di- minish the force” of that consensus, ante, at 2, and thereby violate the Constitution. Finally, the Court’s decision constitutionalizes rules for which there is not even clinical consensus—a consequence that will often arise from the approach charted by the Court today. Consider the Court’s conclusion that, contrary to “the medical community[’s] focus[] on adaptive deficits,” “the CCA overemphasized Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths.” Ante, at 12. In support of this propo- sition, the Court cites the AAIDD’s direction that “signifi- cant limitations in conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills [are] not outweighed by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills.” AAIDD, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 47 12 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting (11th ed. 2010) (hereinafter AAIDD–11). Even assuming that all clinicians would agree with this statement, there are a number of ways it might be interpreted: as meaning that strengths in one of the three adaptive skill areas— conceptual, social, and practical—should not cancel out deficits in another; as meaning that strengths should not outweigh deficits within the same skill area; or as mean- ing that evidence of some ability to perform a skill should not offset evidence of the inability to perform that same skill. And it appears that clinicians do, in fact, disagree about what this direction means. Compare, e.g., Brief for AAIDD et al. as Amici Curiae 17 (“The clinician’s diagnos- tic focus does not—and cannot—involve any form of ‘bal- ancing’ deficits against the abilities or strengths which the particular individual may also possess” (emphasis added)) with Hagan, Drogin, & Guilmette, Assessing Adaptive Functioning in Death Penalty Cases after Hall and DSM– 5, 44 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry &
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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Hall and DSM– 5, 44 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 96, 98 (2016) (“Any assessment of adaptive functioning must give sufficient consideration to assets and deficits alike. [I]n- ventorying only assets or deficits departs from DSM–5, [the AAIDD–11], and all other established frameworks” (footnotes omitted)). The same is true about consideration of prison conduct. The two primary clinical guides do offer caution about considering functioning in prison. But the stringency of their caution differs, with the AAIDD seeming to enact a flat ban on ever looking to functioning in prison and the DSM urging “if possible” to consider “corroborative infor- mation reflecting functioning outside” of prison. AAIDD, User’s Guide: Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classifi- cation, and Systems of Supports 20 (11th ed. 2012); DSM– 5, at 38. The CCA followed the DSM–5’s instruction, relying on Dr. Compton’s conclusion that “even before [Moore] went to prison” he demonstrated a “level of adap- tive functioning too great to support an intellectual- Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 13 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting disability diagnosis.” 470 S.W. 3d, In deter- mining that the CCA erred in this regard, the Court im- plicitly rejects the DSM–5’s approach to the proper consid- eration of prison conduct and accepts what it takes to be that of the AAIDD. The Court does not attempt to explain its justification for why the Eighth Amendment should favor one side over the other in this clinical debate. “Psychiatry is not an exact science.” “[B]ecause there often is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion,” we have emphasized the importance of allowing the “primary factfinder[ ]” to “re- solve differences in opinion on the basis of the evidence offered by each party.” You would not know it from reading the Court’s opinion today, but that is precisely what the CCA—the factfinder under Texas law—did in the decision below: Confronted with dueling expert opinions about how to evaluate adaptive functioning and what conclusion to reach, the CCA resolved the dispute before it by accepting the testimony of the expert it deemed most credible. Of course, reliance on an expert opinion does not insulate a decision from further judicial review. But, unlike the Court, I am unwilling to upset the considered judgment of the forensic psychologist that the factfinding court deemed the most credible based on my own interpre- tation of a few sentences excised from medical texts. III As for how I would resolve this case, there is one aspect of the CCA’s approach to intellectual disability that is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment: the factors. As the Court explains, no state legislature has
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
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the factors. As the Court explains, no state legislature has approved the use of these or any similar factors. Although the CCA reviewed these factors to determine whether Moore’s adaptive deficits were “related” to his intellectual functioning, it may be that consideration of those factors tainted the whole of the CCA’s adaptive functioning anal- 14 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting ysis. I need not decide this question, however, because the CCA reached the issue of Moore’s adaptive functioning only after concluding that he had failed to demonstrate intellectual functioning sufficiently low to warrant a find- ing of intellectual disability, regardless of his adaptive deficits or their relation to his IQ. Moore has not presented sufficient reason to upset that independent holding. The Court concludes that the CCA’s assessment of Moore’s IQ scores is “irreconcilable with Hall.” Ante, at 10. Not so. Hall rejected a Florida rule that required a prisoner to present an IQ score of 70 or below to demon- strate intellectual disability, thereby barring consideration of the standard error of measurement (SEM) of an over-70 score. But the CCA did not apply Florida’s rule—or any- thing like it. The court in fact began by taking account of the SEM, explaining that Moore’s tested score of 74 led to an IQ range between 69 and 79. The court went on to consider additional expert testimony about potential factors affecting that score. Based on that evidence, the CCA discounted portions of the SEM-generated range and concluded that Moore’s IQ did not lie in the relevant range for intellectual disability. Hall provided no definitive guidance on this sort of approach: recognizing the inherent imprecision of IQ tests, but considering additional evidence to determine whether an SEM-generated range of scores accurately reflected a prisoner’s actual IQ.1 Indeed, in its catalog of States that —————— 1 Hall also reached no holding as to the evaluation of IQ when an claimant presents multiple scores, noting only that “the analysis of multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor.” Hall v. Flor- ida, 572 U. S. (slip op., at 11). The Court’s definition of deficient intellectual functioning as shown by “an IQ score” of roughly 70, ante, at 4 (emphasis added), is dicta and cannot be read to call into question the approach of States that would not treat a single IQ score as dispositive evidence where the prisoner presented additional higher scores. Cite as: 5 U. S. (2017) 15 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting “ha[d] taken a position contrary to that of Florida,” the Court in Hall included a State that granted trial
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
|
the Court in Hall included a State that granted trial courts discretion to draw “reasonable inferences” about IQ scores and, where appropriate, decline to consider the full range of the SEM. 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 15, 16) (quoting 202 P.3d 642, 651 (2008)).2 That is the approach the CCA took here. If that approach was “contrary” to Florida’s rule in Hall, I do not understand how Hall can be read to reject that approach today. The Court’s ruling on intellectual functioning turns solely on the fact that Moore’s IQ range was 69 to 79 rather than 70 to 80. See ante, at 11 (“Because the lower end of Moore’s score range falls at or below 70, the CCA had to move on to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning”). The CCA certainly did not “disregard” SEM in assessing Moore’s IQ, and it explained why other factors led it to conclude that his actual score did not fall near the lower end of the SEM range. Only by insisting on the absolute conformity to medical standards the Court disclaims can it find a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on that one-point difference.3 In concluding that the Eighth —————— 2 The Court correctly notes that Hall cited Pizzuto as an instance of a State that had enacted “legislation allowing a defendant to present additional evidence of intellectual disability even when an IQ test score is above 70.” Hall, 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 15). The “additional evidence” that Pizzuto considered, however, was evidence that would indicate where within the SEM range a prisoner’s IQ likely fell, 146 Idaho, 29, —that is, the same sort of evidence that the CCA considered below. 3 It is not obvious that clinicians would ignore evidence beyond the SEM in determining the appropriate range that an IQ score represents. See, e.g., Macvaugh & Cunningham, v. Virginia: Implications and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J. Psychiatry & L. 131, 147 (“Error in intellectual assessment is not solely a function [of the SEM]. Other sources of error or assessment imprecision may involve the examinee includ[ing] the mental and physical health, mood, effort, and motivation of the examinee during testing”); 16 MOORE v. TEXAS ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting Amendment turns on the slightest numerical difference in IQ score, the Court today is just as wrong as the Florida Supreme Court was in Hall. Today’s decision is not compelled by Hall; it is an expan- sion of it. Perhaps there are reasons to expand Hall’s holding—to say that States must read IQ tests as rigidly encompassing the
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,017 | 0 |
dissenting
|
Moore v. Texas
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4378726/moore-v-texas/
|
that States must read IQ tests as rigidly encompassing the entire SEM range, regardless of any other evidentiary considerations, or to say that the rea- sons that the CCA gave for discounting the lower end of Moore’s IQ range were improper. But before holding that the Constitution demands either result, our precedent requires consulting state judgments on the matter to determine whether a national consensus has developed. Moore has presented no argument as to such a consensus, and the majority does not claim that there is one. Without looking to any such “objective evidence of contemporary values,” (internal quotation marks omitted), there is a real danger that Eighth Amendment judgments will embody “merely the subjective views of individual Justices,” 433 U.S., at (plurality opinion). As Justice Frankfurter cautioned, “[o]ne must be on guard against finding in personal disap- proval a reflection of more or less prevailing condemna- tion.” Louisiana ex rel. 471 (1947) (concurring opinion). I respectfully dissent. —————— AAIDD–11, at 100–101 (“When considering the relative weight or degree of confidence given to any assessment instrument, the clinician needs to consider the conditions under which the test(s) was/were given [and] the standard error of measurement”)
|
Justice White
| 1,990 | 6 |
majority
|
Minnesota v. Olson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112416/minnesota-v-olson/
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The police in this case made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a house where respondent Robert Olson was an overnight guest and arrested him. The issue is whether the arrest violated Olson's Fourth Amendment rights. We hold that it did. I Shortly before 6 a.m. on Saturday, July 18, 1987, a lone gunman robbed an Amoco gasoline station in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and fatally shot the station manager. A police officer heard the police dispatcher report and suspected Joseph Ecker. The officer and his partner drove immediately to Ecker's home, arriving at about the same time that an Oldsmobile arrived. The driver of the Oldsmobile took evasive action, and the car spun out of control and came to a stop. Two men fled the car on foot. Ecker, who was later identified as the gunman, was captured shortly thereafter inside his home. The second man escaped. Inside the abandoned Oldsmobile, police found a sack of money and the murder weapon. They also found a title certificate with the name of Rob Olson crossed out as a secured party, a letter addressed to a Roger R. Olson of 3151 Johnson Street, and a videotape rental receipt made out to Rob Olson and dated two days earlier. The police verified that a Robert Olson lived at 3151 Johnson Street. The next morning, Sunday, July 19, a woman identifying herself as Dianna Murphy called the police and said that a man by the name of Rob drove the car in which the gas station killer left the scene and that Rob was planning to leave town by bus. About noon, the same woman called again, gave her address and phone number, and said that a man named Rob had told a Maria and two other women, Louanne and Julie, that he was the driver in the Amoco robbery. The caller stated that Louanne was Julie's mother and that the two women lived at 2406 Fillmore Northeast. The detective-in-charge who took the second phone call sent police *94 officers to 2406 Fillmore to check out Louanne and Julie. When police arrived they determined that the dwelling was a duplex and that Louanne Bergstrom and her daughter Julie lived in the upper unit but were not home. Police spoke to Louanne's mother, Helen Niederhoffer, who lived in the lower unit. She confirmed that a Rob Olson had been staying upstairs but was not then in the unit. She promised to call the police when Olson returned. At 2 p.m., a pickup order, or "probable cause arrest bulletin," was issued for Olson's arrest. The police were instructed
|
Justice White
| 1,990 | 6 |
majority
|
Minnesota v. Olson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112416/minnesota-v-olson/
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bulletin," was issued for Olson's arrest. The police were instructed to stay away from the duplex. At approximately 2:45 p.m., Niederhoffer called police and said Olson had returned. The detective-in-charge instructed police officers to go to the house and surround it. He then telephoned Julie from headquarters and told her Rob should come out of the house. The detective heard a male voice say, "tell them I left." Julie stated that Rob had left, whereupon at 3 p.m. the detective ordered the police to enter the house. Without seeking permission and with weapons drawn, the police entered the upper unit and found respondent hiding in a closet. Less than an hour after his arrest, respondent made an inculpatory statement at police headquarters. The Hennepin County trial court held a hearing and denied respondent's motion to suppress his statement. App. 3-13. The statement was admitted into evidence at Olson's trial, and he was convicted on one count of first-degree murder, three counts of armed robbery, and three counts of second-degree assault. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court ruled that respondent had a sufficient interest in the Bergstrom home to challenge the legality of his warrantless arrest there, that the arrest was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry,1] and that respondent's *95 statement was tainted by that illegality and should have been suppressed.2] Because the admission of the statement was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt, the court reversed Olson's conviction and remanded for a new trial.3] We granted the State's petition for certiorari, and now affirm. II It was held in that a suspect should not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is probable cause to arrest him. The purpose of the decision was not to protect the person of the suspect but to protect his home from entry in the absence of a magistrate's finding of probable cause. In this case, the court below held that Olson's warrantless arrest was illegal because he had a sufficient connection with the premises to be treated like a householder. The State challenges that conclusion. Since the decision in it has been the law that "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is " `one that society *96 is prepared to recognize as "reasonable," ' " at -144, n. 12, quoting The State argues that Olson's relationship
|
Justice White
| 1,990 | 6 |
majority
|
Minnesota v. Olson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112416/minnesota-v-olson/
|
-144, n. 12, quoting The State argues that Olson's relationship to the premises does not satisfy the 12 factors which in its view determine whether a dwelling is a "home."4] Aside from the fact that it is based on the mistaken premise that a place must be one's "home" in order for one to have a legitimate expectation of privacy there,5] the State's proposed test is needlessly complex. We need go no further than to conclude, as we do, that Olson's status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show *97 that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. As recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the facts of this case are similar to those in In Jones, the defendant was arrested in a friend's apartment during the execution of a search warrant and sought to challenge the warrant as not supported by probable cause. "Jones] testified that the apartment belonged to a friend, Evans, who had given him the use of it, and a key, with which Jones] had admitted himself on the day of the arrest. On cross-examination Jones] testified that he had a suit and shirt at the apartment, that his home was elsewhere, that he paid nothing for the use of the apartment, that Evans had let him use it `as a friend,' that he had slept there `maybe a night,' and that at the time of the search Evans had been away in Philadelphia for about five days."6] The Court ruled that Jones could challenge the search of the apartment because he was "legitimately on the] premises," Although the "legitimately on the] premises" standard was rejected in as too -148, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the factual holding in Jones: "We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. "We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own *98 home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place." -142. thus recognized that, as an overnight guest, Jones was much more than just legitimately on the premises. The distinctions relied on by the State between this case and Jones are not legally determinative. The State emphasizes that in this case Olson was never left alone in the duplex or given a key, whereas in Jones the owner of the
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