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Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Jones v. Barnes
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111012/jones-v-barnes/
|
the mere fact that a constitutional question is open is no argument for deciding it one way or the other. Second, the Court argues that good appellate advocacy demands selectivity among arguments. That is certainly true the Court's advice is good. It ought to be taken to heart by every lawyer called upon to argue an appeal in this or any other court, and by his client. It should take little or no persuasion to get a wise client to understand that, if staying out of prison is what he values most, he should encourage his lawyer to raise only his two or three best arguments on appeal, and he should defer to his lawyer's advice as to which are the best arguments. The Constitution, however, does not require clients to be wise, and other policies should be weighed in the balance as well. It is no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers appointed to represent them. See generally Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 Geo. L. J. 1015 (1981); Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. Conflict Res. 52 There are many reasons for this, some perhaps unavoidable even under perfect conditions differences in education, disposition, and socio-economic class and some that should (but may not always) be zealously avoided. A lawyer and his client do not always have the same interests. Even with paying clients, a lawyer may have a strong interest in having judges and prosecutors think well of him, and, if he is working for a flat fee a common arrangement for criminal defense attorneys or if his fees for court appointments are lower than he would receive for other work, he has an obvious financial incentive to conclude cases on his criminal docket swiftly. Good lawyers *762 undoubtedly recognize these temptations and resist them, and they endeavor to convince their clients that they will. It would be naive, however, to suggest that they always succeed in either task. A constitutional rule that encourages lawyers to disregard their clients' wishes without compelling need can only exacerbate the clients' suspicion of their lawyers. As in Faretta, to force a lawyer's decisions on a defendant "can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him." See 422 U.S., In the end, what the Court hopes to gain in effectiveness of appellate representation by the rule it imposes today may well be lost to decreased effectiveness in other areas of representation. The Court's opinion also seems to overstate somewhat the lawyer's role in an appeal.
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Jones v. Barnes
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111012/jones-v-barnes/
|
seems to overstate somewhat the lawyer's role in an appeal. While excellent presentation of issues, especially at the briefing stage, certainly serves the client's best interests, I do not share the Court's implicit pessimism about appellate judges' ability to recognize a meritorious argument, even if it is made less elegantly or in fewer pages than the lawyer would have liked, and even if less meritorious arguments accompany it. If the quality of justice in this country really depended on nice gradations in lawyers' rhetorical skills, we could no longer call it "justice." Especially at the appellate level, I believe that for the most part good claims will be vindicated and bad claims rejected, with truly skillful advocacy making a difference only in a handful of cases.[6] In most of such cases in most cases generally clients ultimately will do the wise thing and take their lawyers' advice. I am not willing to risk deepening the mistrust *763 between clients and lawyers in all cases to ensure optimal presentation for that fraction of a handful in which presentation might really affect the result reached by the court of appeals. Finally, today's ruling denigrates the values of individual autonomy and dignity central to many constitutional rights, especially those Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that come into play in the criminal process. Certainly a person's life changes when he is charged with a crime and brought to trial. He must, if he harbors any hope of success, defend himself on terms often technical and hard to understand that are the State's, not his own. As a practical matter, the assistance of counsel is necessary to that defense. See Yet, until his conviction becomes final and he has had an opportunity to appeal, any restrictions on individual autonomy and dignity should be limited to the minimum necessary to vindicate the State's interest in a speedy, effective prosecution. The role of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process. As Justice Black wrote in Von : ". The right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client. ". Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is this service deemed more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an accused too poor to hire a lawyer,
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Jones v. Barnes
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111012/jones-v-barnes/
|
to represent an accused too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an offense which is peculiarly abhorrent" (footnote omitted). *764 The Court subtly but unmistakably adopts a different conception of the defense lawyer's role he need do nothing beyond what the State, not his client, considers most important. In many ways, having a lawyer becomes one of the many indignities visited upon someone who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice system. I cannot accept the notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a person receives merely for being accused of a crime. Clients, if they wish, are capable of making informed judgments about which issues to appeal, and when they exercise that prerogative their choices should be respected unless they would require lawyers to violate their consciences, the law, or their duties to the court. On the other hand, I would not presume lightly that, in a particular case, a defendant has disregarded his lawyer's obviously sound advice. Cf. Faretta v. -836 The Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court, did not address the factual question whether respondent, having been advised by his lawyer that it would not be wise to appeal on all the issues respondent had suggested, actually insisted in a timely fashion that his lawyer brief the nonfrivolous issues identified by the Court of Appeals. Cf. ante, at 750-, n. 4. If he did not, or if he was content with filing his pro se brief, then there would be no deprivation of the right to the assistance of counsel. I would remand for a hearing on this question.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
In the particular context of this case we must decide whether federal law pre-empts a state-law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The suit is brought by an employee of a nuclear-fuels production facility against her employer and arises out of actions by the employer allegedly taken in retaliation for the employee's nuclear-safety complaints. I Petitioner Vera M. English was employed from 1972 to 1984 as a laboratory technician at the nuclear-fuels production facility operated by respondent General Electric Company (GE) in Wilmington, N. C. In February 1984, petitioner complained to GE's management and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about several perceived violations of nuclear-safety standards at the facility, including *75 the failure of her co-workers to clean up radioactive material spills in the laboratory. Frustrated by the company's failure to address her concerns, petitioner on one occasion deliberately failed to clean a work table contaminated with a uranium solution during a preceding shift. Instead, she outlined the contaminated areas with red tape so as to make them conspicuous. A few days later, petitioner called her supervisor's attention to the marked-off areas, which still had not been cleaned. As a result, work was halted while the laboratory was inspected and cleaned. Shortly after this episode, GE charged petitioner with a knowing failure to clean up radioactive contamination and temporarily assigned her to other work. On April 30, 1984, GE's management informed petitioner that she would be laid off unless, within 90 days, she successfully bid for a position in an area of the facility where she would not be exposed to nuclear materials. On May 15, petitioner was notified of the company's final decision affirming the disciplinary action taken against her. Petitioner did not find another position by July 30, and her employment was terminated.[1] In August, petitioner filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor charging GE with violating 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as added, 42 U.S. C. 5851(a) (1982 ed.), which makes it unlawful for an employer in the nuclear industry to "discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee "(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as *76 amended, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; "(2) testified or is about to testify in any such
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
"(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or; "(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended."[2] In her charge, petitioner alleged that GE's actions constituted unlawful employment discrimination in retaliation for her nuclear-safety complaints to GE's management and to the NRC. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to whom the matter was referred found that GE had violated 210(a) when it transferred and then discharged petitioner. The Secretary, however, dismissed the complaint as untimely because it had not been filed, as required by 210(b)(1), within 30 days after the May 15 notice of the company's final decision.[3] *77 In March 1987, petitioner filed a diversity action against GE in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Petitioner in four counts raised two claims, one for wrongful discharge and one for intentional infliction of emotional distress.[4] With respect to the latter, petitioner alleged that she was suffering from severe depression and emotional harm as a result of GE's "extreme and outrageous conduct." App. 20. Petitioner alleged that, in addition to transferring and ultimately firing her, GE (1) had removed her from the laboratory position under guard "as if she were a criminal," ; (2) had assigned her to degrading "make work" in her substitute assignment, ibid.; (3) had derided her as paranoid; (4) had barred her from working in controlled areas; (5) had placed her under constant surveillance during working hours; (6) had isolated her from co-workers, even during lunch periods; and (7) had conspired to charge her fraudulently with violations of safety and criminal laws. -17. Petitioner sought punitive as well as compensatory damages. Although the District Court concluded that petitioner had stated a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law, it nonetheless granted GE's motion to dismiss. The court did not accept GE's argument that petitioner's claim fell within the field of nuclear safety, a field that, according to GE, had been completely pre-empted by the Federal Government. The court held, however, that petitioner's claim was pre-empted because it conflicted with three particular aspects of 210: (1) a provision that bars recovery under the section to any employee who "deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of [the Energy Reorganization *78 Act,] or of the Atomic Energy Act," 210(g); (2) the absence of any provision generally authorizing the Secretary to award exemplary or punitive
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
provision generally authorizing the Secretary to award exemplary or punitive damages; and (3) the provisions requiring that a whistle-blower invoking the statute file an administrative complaint within 30 days after the violation occurs, and that the Secretary resolve the complaint within 90 days after its filing. See 210(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). In the court's view, Congress enacted this scheme to foreclose all remedies to whistle-blowers who themselves violate nuclear-safety requirements, to limit exemplary damages awards against the nuclear industry, and to guarantee speedy resolution of allegations of nuclear-safety violations goals the court found incompatible with the broader remedies petitioner sought under state tort law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's emotional distress claim on the basis of the District Court's reasoning. That court concluded that Congress had intended to foreclose nuclear whistle-blowers from pursuing state tort remedies and stated its belief that the District Court "correctly identified and applied the relevant federal and state law." at Because of an apparent conflict with a decision of the First Circuit, see we granted certiorari. II A The sole question for our resolution is whether the Federal Government has pre-empted petitioner's state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Our cases have established that state law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, in three circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. See Preemption *79 fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, see and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one. Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," or where an Act of Congress "touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." 0 Although this Court has not hesitated to draw an inference of field pre-emption where it is supported by the federal statutory and regulatory schemes, it has emphasized: "Where the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted" includes areas that have "been traditionally occupied by the States," congressional intent to supersede state laws must be " `clear and manifest.' " quoting 331 U.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
must be " `clear and manifest.' " quoting 331 U. S., at 0. Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, see, e. g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." See also[5] *80 It is undisputed that Congress has not explicitly pre-empted petitioner's state-law tort action by inserting specific pre-emptive language into any of its enactments governing the nuclear industry. The District Court and apparently the Court of Appeals did not rest their decisions on a field pre-emption rationale either, but rather on what they considered an actual tension between petitioner's cause of action and the congressional goals reflected in 210. In this Court, respondent seeks to defend the judgment both on the lower courts' rationale and on the alternative ground that petitioner's tort claim is located within a field reserved for federal regulation the field of nuclear safety. Before turning to the specific aspects of 210 on which the lower courts based their decisions, we address the field pre-emption question. B This is not the first case in which the Court has had occasion to consider the extent to which Congress has pre-empted the field of nuclear safety. In Pacific Gas & Electric the Court carefully analyzed the congressional enactments relating to the nuclear industry in order to decide whether a California law that conditioned the construction of a nuclear powerplant on a state agency's approval of the plant's nuclear-waste storage and disposal facilities fell within a pre-empted field. Although we need not repeat all of that analysis here, we summarize briefly the Court's discussion of the actions Congress has taken in the nuclear realm and the conclusions it drew from these actions. Until 1954, the use, control, and ownership of all nuclear technology remained a federal monopoly. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S. C. *81 2011 et seq. (1982 ed.), stemmed from Congress' belief that the national interest would be served if the Government encouraged the private sector to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal regulation and licensing. The Act implemented this policy decision by opening the door to private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear-power reactors under the strict supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). See Duke Power The AEC was given exclusive authority to license
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
Duke Power The AEC was given exclusive authority to license the transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of all nuclear materials. As was observed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., : "The [Federal Government's] prime area of concern in the licensing context [was] national security, public health, and safety." With respect to these matters, no significant role was contemplated for the States. In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to "clarify the respective responsibilities of the States and the [Federal Government] with respect to the regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials," 42 U.S. C. 2021(a)(1) (1982 ed.), and generally to increase the States' role. The 1959 amendments authorized the AEC, by agreements with state governors, to discontinue the Federal Government's regulatory authority over certain nuclear materials under specified conditions. State regulatory programs adopted under the amendment were required to be "coordinated and compatible" with those of the AEC. 2021(g). In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act, 88 Stat. 13, 42 U.S. C. 5801 et seq. (1982 ed.), which abolished the AEC and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority to the NRC. 5841(f). The 1974 Act also expanded the number and range of safety responsibilities under the NRC's charge. As was observed in Pacific Gas, the *82 NRC does not purport to exercise its authority based upon economic considerations, but rather is concerned primarily with public health and safety. See Finally, in 1978, Congress amended both the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act. Stat. 2947. Among these amendments is 210, 42 U.S. C. 5851 (1982 ed.), which, as discussed above, encourages employees to report safety violations and provides a mechanism for protecting them against retaliation for doing so. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and legislative history, the Court in Pacific Gas concluded that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States." Although we ultimately determined that the California statute at issue there did not fall within the pre-empted field, we made clear our view that Congress intended that only "the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant." In the present dispute, respondent and petitioner disagree as to whether petitioner's tort action falls within the boundaries of the pre-empted field referred to in Pacific Gas. Respondent maintains that the pre-empted field of "nuclear safety" is a large one, and that 210 is an integral part of it. Specifically, respondent contends that because the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
integral part of it. Specifically, respondent contends that because the Federal Government is better able to promote nuclear safety if whistle-blowers pursue the federal remedy, the whole area marked off by 210 should be considered part of the pre-empted field identified in Pacific Gas. Accordingly, respondent argues that all state-law remedies for conduct that is covered by 210 are pre-empted by Congress' decision to have the Federal Government exclusively regulate the field of nuclear safety. Petitioner and the United States as amicus curiae, on their part, contend that petitioner's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not pre-empted because the *83 Court made clear in Pacific Gas that state laws supported by nonsafety rationales do not lie within the pre-empted field. They argue that since the state tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is supported by a nonsafety rationale namely, the State's "substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which [petitioner] complain[s]," see petitioner's cause of action must be allowed to go forward. We think both arguments are somewhat wide of the mark. With respect to respondent's contention, we find no "clear and manifest" intent on the part of Congress, in enacting 210, to pre-empt all state tort laws that traditionally have been available to those persons who, like petitioner, allege outrageous conduct at the hands of an employer. Indeed, acceptance of respondent's argument would require us to conclude that Congress has displaced not only state tort law, which is at issue in this case, but also state criminal law, to the extent that such criminal law is applied to retaliatory conduct occurring at the site of a nuclear employer. For example, if an employer were to retaliate against a nuclear whistle-blower by hiring thugs to assault the employee on the job (conduct literally covered by 210), respondent's position would imply that the state criminal law prohibiting such conduct is within the pre-empted field. We simply cannot believe that Congress intended that result. Instead, we think the District Court was essentially correct in observing that while 210 obviously bears some relation to the field of nuclear safety, its "paramount" purpose was the protection of employees.[6] See Accordingly, we see no basis for respondent's contention that all state-law claims arising from conduct covered by the section are necessarily included in the pre-empted field. *84 Nor, however, can we accept petitioner's position, or the reading of Pacific Gas on which it is based. It is true that the holding in that case was premised, in part, on the conclusion that the California ban
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
premised, in part, on the conclusion that the California ban on nuclear construction was not motivated by safety concerns. Indeed, the majority of the Court suggested that a "state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited field." In other words, the Court defined the pre-empted field, in part, by reference to the motivation behind the state law. This approach to defining the field had some support in the text of the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which provided, among other things, that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 42 U.S. C. 2021(k) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added). But the Court did not suggest that a finding of safety motivation was necessary to place a state law within the pre-empted field. On the contrary, it took great pains to make clear that state regulation of matters directly affecting the radiological safety of nuclear-plant construction and operation, "even if enacted out of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless [infringe upon] the NRC's exclusive authority." Thus, even as the Court suggested that part of the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law in question, it made clear that another part of the field is defined by the state law's actual effect on nuclear safety. Because it is clear that the state tort law at issue here is not motivated by safety concerns, the former portion of the field argument is not relevant.[7] The real issue, then, is *85 whether petitioner's tort claim is so related to the "radiological safety aspects involved in the operation of a nuclear [facility]," see that it falls within the pre-empted field. In addressing this issue, we must bear in mind that not every state law that in some remote way may affect the nuclear safety decisions made by those who build and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within the pre-empted field. We have no doubt, for instance, that the application of state minimum wage and child labor laws to employees at nuclear facilities would not be pre-empted, even though these laws could be said to affect tangentially some of the resource allocation decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety. Instead, for a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels. We recognize that the claim for
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
concerning radiological safety levels. We recognize that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress at issue here may have some effect on these decisions, because liability for claims like petitioner's will attach additional consequences to retaliatory conduct by employers. As employers find retaliation more costly, they will be forced to deal with complaints by whistle-blowers by other means, including altering radiological safety policies. Nevertheless, we believe that this effect is neither direct nor substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the pre-empted field. This result is strongly suggested by the decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 464 U.S. 8 The Court there held that a claim for punitive damages in a state tort action arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear facility did not fall within the pre-empted field discussed in Pacific Gas. The Court reached this result notwithstanding the "tension between the conclusion *86 that [radiological] safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a State may nevertheless award damages [including punitive damages] based on its own law of liability" governing unsafe working conditions. Although the decision in Silkwood was based in substantial part on legislative history suggesting that Congress did not intend to include in the pre-empted field state tort remedies for radiation-based injuries, see we think it would be odd, if not irrational, to conclude that Congress intended to include tort actions stemming from retaliation against whistle-blowers in the pre-empted field but intended not to include tort actions stemming from radiation damage suffered as a result of actual safety violations. Potential liability for the kind of claim at issue in Silkwood will affect radiological safety decisions more directly than will potential liability under the kind of claim petitioner raises, because the tort claim in Silkwood attaches additional consequences to safety violations themselves, rather than to employer conduct that merely arises from allegations of safety violations. Moreover, and related, the prospect of compensatory and punitive damages for radiation-based injuries will undoubtedly affect nuclear employers' primary decisions about radiological safety in the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities far more substantially than will liability under the kind of claim petitioner asserts. It is thus not surprising that we find no evidence of a "clear and manifest" intent on the part of Congress to pre-empt tort claims like petitioner's. Cf. Goodyear Atomic v. Miller, Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner's claim does not lie within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety.[8] *87 C We now turn to the question whether, as the lower courts concluded, petitioner's claim conflicts with
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
whether, as the lower courts concluded, petitioner's claim conflicts with particular aspects of 210. On its face, the section does no more than grant a federal administrative remedy to employees in one industry against one type of employer discrimination retaliation for whistle-blowing. Ordinarily, the mere existence of a federal regulatory or enforcement scheme, even one as detailed as 210, does not by itself imply pre-emption of state remedies. The Court has observed: "Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however, that every federal statute ousts all related state law. Instead, we must look for special features warranting pre-emption." Hillsborough Here, the District Court identified three "special features" of 210 that it believed were incompatible with petitioner's claim. The District Court relied first on 210(g), which provides that "Subsection (a) of this section [the prohibition on employer retaliation] shall not apply" where an employee "deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of this Act or of the Atomic Energy Act." According to the District Court and respondent, this section reflects a congressional desire to preclude all relief, including state remedies, to a whistle-blower who deliberately commits a safety violation referred *88 to in 210(g). Permitting any state-law claim based on whistle-blowing retaliation, the court reasoned, would frustrate this congressional objective. We do not agree. As an initial matter, we note that the text of 210(g) specifically limits its applicability to the remedy provided by 210(a) and does not suggest that it bars state-law tort actions. Nor does the legislative history of 210 reveal a clear congressional purpose to supplant state-law causes of action that might afford broader relief. Indeed, the only explanation for any of the statute's remedial limitations is the Committee Report's statement that employees who deliberately violate nuclear-safety requirements would be denied protection under 210(g) "[i]n order to avoid abuse of the protection afforded under this section." S. Rep. No. 95-848, p. 30 (emphasis added). In any event, even if the District Court and respondent are correct in concluding that Congress wanted those who deliberately commit nuclear-safety violations, as defined under 210(g), to be denied all remedies against employer retaliation, this federal interest would be served by pre-empting state law only to the extent that it afforded recovery to such violators. See In the instant case, the ALJ found that petitioner had not deliberately committed a safety violation within the meaning of 210(g), App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, and neither the Secretary nor the lower courts have suggested otherwise. Thus, barring petitioner's tort action would not
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
|
have suggested otherwise. Thus, barring petitioner's tort action would not even serve the federal interest the lower courts and respondent have gleaned from their reading of this section. The District Court also relied on the absence in 210 of general authorization for the Secretary to award exemplary damages against employers who engage in retaliatory conduct. The District Court concluded, and respondent now argues, that this absence implies a congressional intent to bar a state action, like petitioner's, that permits such an award. *89 As the District Court put it, 210 reflects "an informed judgment [by Congress] that in no circumstances should a nuclear whistler blower receive punitive damages when fired or discriminated against because of his or her safety complaints." We believe the District Court and respondent have read too much into Congress' decision not to authorize exemplary damages for most 210 violations. First, even with respect to actions brought under 210, the District Court was incorrect in stating that "in no circumstances" will a nuclear whistle-blower receive punitive damages; 210(d) authorizes a district court to award exemplary damages in enforcement proceedings brought by the Secretary. Moreover, and more importantly, we think the District Court failed to follow this Court's teaching that "[o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law." California v. ARC America Absent some specific suggestion in the text or legislative history of 210, which we are unable to find, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to pre-empt all state actions that permit the recovery of exemplary damages. Finally, we address the District Court's holding that the expeditious timeframes provided by Congress for the processing of 210 claims reflect a congressional decision that no whistle-blower should be able to recover under any other law after the time for filing under 210 has expired. The District Court reasoned, and respondent agrees, that if a state-law remedy is available after the time for filing a 210 complaint has run, a whistle-blower will have less incentive to bring a 210 complaint. As a result, the argument runs, federal regulatory agencies will remain unaware of some safety violations and retaliatory behavior and will thus be unable to ensure radiological safety at nuclear facilities. We cannot deny that there is some force to this argument, but we *90 do not believe that the problem is as great as respondent suggests. First, many, if not most, retaliatory incidents come about as a response to safety complaints that employees register with federal regulatory agencies. The Federal Government thus is already aware of
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,990 | 11 |
majority
|
English v. General Elec. Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112446/english-v-general-elec-co/
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regulatory agencies. The Federal Government thus is already aware of these safety violations, whether or not the employee invokes the remedial provisions of 210. Also, we are not so sure as respondent seems to be that employees will forgo their 210 options and rely solely on state remedies for retaliation. Such a prospect is simply too speculative a basis on which to rest a finding of pre-emption. The Court has observed repeatedly that pre-emption is ordinarily not to be implied absent an "actual conflict." See, e. g., The "teaching of this Court's decisions enjoin[s] seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists." Huron Portland Cement III We conclude that petitioner's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not fall within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases. Nor does it conflict with any particular aspect of 210. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice White
| 1,984 | 6 |
concurring
|
Nix v. Williams
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111204/nix-v-williams/
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I join fully in the opinion of the Court. I write separately only to point out that many of Justice Stevens' remarks are beside the point when it is recalled that was a 5-4 decision and that four Members of the Court, including myself, were of the view that Detective Leaming had done nothing wrong at all, let alone anything unconstitutional. Three of us observed: "To anyone not lost in the intricacies of the prophylactic *451 rules of Miranda v. Arizona, the result in this case seems utterly senseless" It is thus an unjustified reflection on Detective Leaming to say that he "decide[d] to dispense with the requirements of law," post, this page, or that he decided "to take procedural shortcuts instead of complying with the law," post, at 457. He was no doubt acting as many competent police officers would have acted under similar circumstances and in light of the then-existing law. That five Justices later thought he was mistaken does not call for making him out to be a villain or for a lecture on deliberate police misconduct and its resulting costs to society. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. This litigation is exceptional for at least three reasons. The facts are unusually tragic; it involves an unusually clear violation of constitutional rights; and it graphically illustrates the societal costs that may be incurred when police officers decide to dispense with the requirements of law. Because the Court does not adequately discuss any of these aspects of the case, I am unable to join its opinion. I In holding that respondent's first conviction had been unconstitutionally obtained, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, correctly observed: "The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially when the crime is murder and the victim a small child. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all." There can be no denying that the character of the crime may have an impact on the decisional process. As the Court *452 was required to hold, however, that does not permit any court to condone a violation of constitutional rights.[1] Today's decision is no more an ad hoc response to the pressures engendered by the special facts of the case than was Williams I. It was the majority in Williams I that recognized that "evidence of where the body was found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have
|
Justice White
| 1,984 | 6 |
concurring
|
Nix v. Williams
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111204/nix-v-williams/
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be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams." It was the author of today's opinion of the Court who characterized this rule of law as a "remarkable" and "unlikely theory." The rule of law that the Court adopts today has an integrity of its own and is not merely the product of the hydraulic pressures associated with hard cases or strong words. II The constitutional violation that gave rise to the decision in Williams I is neither acknowledged nor fairly explained in the Court's opinion. Yet the propriety of admitting evidence relating to the victim's body can only be evaluated if that constitutional violation is properly identified. Before he was taken into custody, Williams, as a recent escapee from a mental hospital who had just abducted and murdered a small child, posed a special threat to public safety. Acting on his lawyer's advice, Williams surrendered to the Davenport police. The lawyer notified the Des Moines police of Williams' imminent surrender, and police officials, *453 in the presence of Detective Leaming, agreed that Williams would not be questioned while being brought back from Davenport. Williams was advised of this agreement by his attorney. After he was arraigned in Davenport, Williams conferred with another lawyer who was acting as local counsel. This lawyer reminded Williams that he would not be questioned. When Detective Leaming arrived in Davenport, local counsel stressed that the agreement was to be carried out and that Williams was not to be questioned. Detective Leaming then took custody of respondent, and denied counsel's request to ride to Des Moines in the police car with Williams. The "Christian burial speech" occurred during the ensuing trip.[2] As JUSTICE POWELL succinctly observed, this was a case "in which the police deliberately took advantage of an inherently coercive setting in the absence of counsel, contrary to their express agreement." The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the conviction of the accused will be the product of an adversarial process, rather than the ex parte investigation and determination by the prosecutor.[3]Williams I grew out of a line of cases in which this Court made it clear that the adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment may not be undermined by the strategems of the police. dealt with the confession of an uncounseled defendant after prolonged interrogation subsequent to his indictment for first-degree *454 murder. Four Justices indicated that this questioning violated the Sixth Amendment, noting that to hold otherwise would totally undermine the adversarial process of proof: "Our Constitution guarantees
|
Justice White
| 1,984 | 6 |
concurring
|
Nix v. Williams
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111204/nix-v-williams/
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totally undermine the adversarial process of proof: "Our Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to a man on trial for his life in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the law. Surely a Constitution which promises that much can vouchsafe no less to the same man under midnight inquisition in the squad room of a police station." As Justice Douglas asked: "[W]hat use is a defendant's right to effective counsel at every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in the absence of counsel until he confesses? In that event the secret trial in the police precincts effectively supplants the public trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." This view ripened into a holding in : "We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." Williams I held that Detective Leaming had violated "the clear rule of Massiah" by deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from respondent during the pendency of the adversarial process and outside of that process. See -401. The violation was aggravated by the fact that Detective Leaming had breached a promise to counsel, an act which can only undermine the role of counsel in the adversarial process.[4] The *455 "Christian burial speech" was nothing less than an attempt to substitute an ex parte, inquisitorial process for the clash of adversaries commanded by the Constitution.[5] Thus the now-familiar plaint that " `[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered,' " ante, at 447 ), is entirely beside the point. More pertinent is what THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote for the Court on another occasion: "This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo's words, `the constable blundered,' rather, it is one where the `constable' planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of counsel." United[6] *456 III Once the constitutional violation is properly identified, the answers to the questions presented in this case follow readily. Admission of the victim's body, if it would have been discovered anyway, means that the trial in this case was not the product of an inquisitorial process; that process was untainted by illegality. The good or bad faith of Detective Leaming is therefore simply irrelevant. If the trial process was not tainted as a result of his
|
Justice White
| 1,984 | 6 |
concurring
|
Nix v. Williams
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111204/nix-v-williams/
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trial process was not tainted as a result of his conduct, this defendant received the type of trial that the Sixth Amendment envisions. See United ; ; United 388 U.S. 8, Generalizations about the exclusionary rule employed by the majority, see ante, at 443-448, simply do not address the primary question in the case. The majority is correct to insist that any rule of exclusion not provide the authorities with an incentive to commit violations of the Constitution. Ante, at 445-446. If the inevitable discovery rule provided such an incentive by permitting the prosecution to avoid the uncertainties inherent in its search for evidence, it would undermine the constitutional guarantee itself, and therefore be inconsistent with the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule.[7] But when the burden of proof on the inevitable discovery question is placed on the prosecution, ante, at 444, it must bear the risk of error in the determination made necessary by its constitutional violation. The uncertainty as to whether the body would *457 have been discovered can be resolved in its favor here only because, as the Court explains ante, at 448-450, petitioner adduced evidence demonstrating that at the time of the constitutional violation an investigation was already under way which, in the natural and probable course of events, would have soon discovered the body. This is not a case in which the prosecution can escape responsibility for a constitutional violation through speculation; to the extent uncertainty was created by the constitutional violation the prosecution was required to resolve that uncertainty through proof.[8] Even if Detective Leaming acted in bad faith in the sense that he deliberately violated the Constitution in order to avoid the possibility that the body would not be discovered, the prosecution ultimately does not avoid that risk; its burden of proof forces it to assume the risk. The need to adduce proof sufficient to discharge its burden, and the difficulty in predicting whether such proof will be available or sufficient, means that the inevitable discovery rule does not permit state officials to avoid the uncertainty they would have faced but for the constitutional violation. The majority refers to the "societal cost" of excluding probative evidence. Ante, at 445. In my view, the more relevant cost is that imposed on society by police officers who decide to take procedural shortcuts instead of complying with the law. What is the consequence of the shortcut that Detective Leaming took when he decided to question Williams in this case and not to wait an hour or so until he arrived in *458 Des Moines?[9] The answer
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,992 | 19 |
majority
|
Mississippi v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112796/mississippi-v-louisiana/
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This action was originally commenced by private plaintiffs suing other private defendants in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to quiet title to certain land riparian to the Mississippi River. The State of Louisiana intervened in the action and filed a third-party complaint against the State of Mississippi seeking to determine the boundary between the two States in the vicinity of the disputed land. We hold that 28 U.S. C. 1251(a), granting to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two States, deprived the District Court of jurisdiction of Louisiana's third-party complaint against Mississippi. The land in question lies along the west bank of the Mississippi River near Lake Providence, Louisiana. The private plaintiffs, known as the Houston Group, alleged that they own the land in fee simple as a result of a homestead patent issued by the United States in 88 and a deed issued by Mississippi in 13. Louisiana and the Lake Providence Port Commission intervened in the title dispute and filed a third-party complaint against Mississippi seeking a determination of the boundary between the States. Louisiana then sought leave to file a bill of complaint against Mississippi in this Court. Mississippi opposed the motion in view of the pendency of the District Court action, and also emphasized that the case was originally a dispute between private parties: "Houston brought the suit to establish the boundary line to their land. It is incidental that the boundary line is also alleged to be the State line." App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. *75 We denied leave to file, The District Court thereafter found that the thalweg, frozen by an avulsive shift in the river, was to the west of the disputed land and thus placed it within Mississippi. Alternatively, the District Court concluded that the disputed land was part of Mississippi because "Louisiana has acquiesced in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction over the island by. Mississippi." App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. Having found the land to be part of Mississippi, the District Court then considered the ownership question and quieted title in the Houston Group. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the District Court's rulings both on the location of the thalweg and on acquiescence, We granted certiorari on these two questions and on a third that we formulated: "Did the District Court properly assert jurisdiction over respondents' third-party complaint against petitioner State of Mississippi?" We now reverse. The constitutional and statutory provisions necessary to our decision are these: Article III, 2, of the Constitution: "The judicial Power [of the United
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,992 | 19 |
majority
|
Mississippi v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112796/mississippi-v-louisiana/
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2, of the Constitution: "The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend. to Controversies between two or more States; "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." Title 28 U.S. C. 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Title 28 U.S. C. 1251(a): "The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States." *76 Mississippi, even though its contentions as to the boundary between itself and Louisiana were rejected by the Court of Appeals, urges us to find that the District Court had jurisdiction of the third-party complaint that Louisiana brought against it. Mississippi argues that our refusal to allow Louisiana to file an original complaint to determine the boundary between the two States must, by implication, have indicated that the District Court was a proper forum for the resolution of that question. This is particularly true, Mississippi argues, since its opposition to Louisiana's motion to file its complaint in this Court was premised in part on the contention that the boundary question could be determined in the then-pending action between the private landowners in the District Court. Mississippi asserts that that court had jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S. C. 1331, which confers jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under federal law on the District Court. If it were not for the existence of 28 U.S. C. 1251(a), Mississippi's arguments would be quite plausible. We have said more than once that our original jurisdiction should be exercised only "sparingly." See ; ; Indeed, Chief Justice Fuller wrote nearly a century ago that our original "jurisdiction is of so delicate and grave a character that it was not contemplated that it would be exercised save when the necessity was absolute." Recognizing the "delicate and grave" character of our original jurisdiction, we have interpreted the Constitution and 28 U.S. C. 1251(a) as making our original jurisdiction "obligatory only in appropriate cases," and as discretion to make case-by-case judgments providing us "with substantial as to the practical necessity of an original forum in this Court," *77 We first exercised this discretion not to accept original actions in cases within our nonexclusive original jurisdiction, such as actions by States against citizens of other States, see 401 U.S. 4 and actions between the United States and a State, see United States v.Nevada, But we have since carried over its exercise to actions
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,992 | 19 |
majority
|
Mississippi v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112796/mississippi-v-louisiana/
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But we have since carried over its exercise to actions between two States, where our jurisdiction is exclusive. See ; Determining whether a case is "appropriate" for our original jurisdiction involves an examination of two factors. First, we look to "the nature of the interest of the complaining State," (19), focusing on the "seriousness and dignity of the claim," City of at "The model case for invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction is a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign." at 571, n. Second, we explore the availability of an alternative forum in which the issue tendered can be resolved. City of at In for example, we declined to exercise original jurisdiction of an action by Arizona against New challenging a New electricity tax because of a pending state-court action by three Arizona utilities challenging the same tax: "[W]e are persuaded that the pending state-court action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered here may be litigated." But Mississippi's argument for jurisdiction in the District Court here founders on the uncompromising language of 28 U.S. C. 1251(a), which gives to this Court "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States" (emphasis added). Though phrased in terms of a grant of jurisdiction to this Court, the description of our jurisdiction as "exclusive" necessarily denies jurisdiction of *78 such cases to any other federal court.[1] This follows from the plain meaning of "exclusive," see Webster's New International Dictionary 890 (2d ed. 1942) ("debar from possession"), and has been remarked upon by opinions in our original jurisdiction cases, e. g., Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Louisiana's third-party complaint against Mississippi, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it purports to grant any relief to Louisiana against Mississippi. The District Court is conceded to have had jurisdiction over the claims of the private plaintiffs against the private defendants, and in deciding questions of private title to riparian property, it may be necessary to decide where the boundary lies between the two States. Adjudicating such a question in a dispute between private parties does not violate 1251(a), because that section speaks not in terms of claims or issues, but in terms of parties.[2] The States, of course, are not bound by any decision as to the boundary between them which was rendered in a lawsuit between private litigants. See 1 (19). Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case intermixed the questions of title to
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
dissenting
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Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109381/alamo-land-cattle-co-v-arizona/
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The question in this case is whether, under 28 of the *312 New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, the State of Arizona had the power to grant to petitioner a compensable leasehold interest in the property in issue. The question is solely one of statutory construction. As I agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that Congress intended that lessees of land covered by the Act should acquire a compensable interest in leased land only to the extent of "improvements placed thereon by such lessee," United I dissent. The Act states expressly, with respect to the lands involved here, that "no mortgage or other encumbrance of the said lands shall be valid in favor of any person or for any purpose or under any circumstances whatsoever." A lease, if not terminable at will by the State or terminable automatically upon sale or condemnation, is clearly an "encumbrance." 7 G. Thompson, Real Property 3183, p. 277 (1962); 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1530 (8th ed. 19). A lease not so terminable is, therefore expressly prohibited by the Act. The majority opinion, however, finds implicit in the Act an exception to the express ban on encumbrances in the case of leases for terms of 10 years or less. It points to the fact that 10-year leases of school trust lands are expressly permitted by the Act and states that to treat a lease as an "encumbrance" under the circumstances would be to "downgrade a 10-year grazing lease, fully recognized and permitted by the Act, into a lease terminable at will or into one automatically terminated whenever the State sells the property or it is condemned." Ante, at 307. Treating the lease as an encumbrance would certainly have the effect which the majority says it would. The majority does not disclose, however, why such an effect is contrary to the intent of the Act. Apparently, it simply finds illogical *313 the notion that a lease could be terminable on sale or condemnation and still be a "10-year" lease, notwithstanding the fact that treating 10-year leases as being so terminable is the only way to square them with the Act's unqualified ban on encumbrances. It is Congress' policy, however, and not our own which we must apply to the Act; and Congress' prior statutes governing leases by States of school trust lands granted to them by the United States strongly support the proposition that Congress viewed an express statutory provision permitting leases of such land for a term of years as entirely consistent with provisions making such leases terminable at will or by sale
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
dissenting
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Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109381/alamo-land-cattle-co-v-arizona/
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provisions making such leases terminable at will or by sale or condemnation. In 1888 Congress provided, with respect to school trust lands granted to Wyoming, that the lands could be leased for 5-year periods but that such leases could be annulled at will by the Secretary of the Interior. Of far more significance to this case was Congress' treatment of the lands granted to Oklahoma the State to enter the Union most recently prior to the entry of Arizona and New Mexicoin the Oklahoma Enabling Act. C. 3335, In that Act, Congress expressly provided Oklahoma with the authority to lease school trust lands for 10-year periods while also clearly providing that upon sale of the lands during the period of the lease, the lessee would receive only the value of its improvements. That Act states with respect to sales of lands subject to a lease that "preference right to purchase at the highest bid [is] given to the lessee at the time of such sale," ; and then provides: "[I]n case the leaseholder does not become the purchaser, the purchaser at said sale shall, under such rules and regulations as the legislature may prescribe, pay to or for the leaseholder the appraised value *3 of improvements, and to the State the amount bid for said lands, exclusive of the appraised value of improvements" The Oklahoma Enabling Act thus clearly provides for the result which the majority finds so illogical and which it declines for that reason alone to attribute to Congress under the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act passed only four years later. Moreover, in the single piece of legislative history shedding any light on the relevant portion of the Act, the Senate sponsor of the ActSenator Beveridgespoke approvingly of the restrictions placed on Oklahoma in dealing with school trust lands granted to it in the Oklahoma Enabling Act and indicated his belief that the restrictions on Arizona and New Mexico were more stringent. He stated: "We took the position [in drafting the Act] that the United States owned this land, and in creating these States we were giving the lands to the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions should be thrown about it which would assure its being used for those purposes." "We have thrown conditions around land grants in several States heretofore, notably in the case of Oklahoma, but not so thorough and complete as this." 45 Cong. Rec. 8227 (1910). The Oklahoma Enabling Act prevents the creation of a compensable interest in a lessee of school trust lands except to the extent of improvements placed thereon by
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109381/alamo-land-cattle-co-v-arizona/
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lands except to the extent of improvements placed thereon by him. A literal application of the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act at issue here reaches the same result. The latter Act, passed only four years after the Oklahoma Enabling Act, had purposes similar to those of the former. I cannot but conclude that it should also be *315 construed to prevent the creation of a compensable interest in leaseholds of school trust lands. Congress' reasons for so limiting the rights of leaseholders is easily discernible from the Act and its legislative history. Congress anticipated that the value of the school trust lands would increase over time and it intended that the schools, not leaseholders, benefit from this increase. Pursuing this end, the Act set a minimum sales price for school trust lands of $3 per acre, the House committee report explaining: "The bill fixes a minimum price at which the lands granted for educational purposes subject to sale may be sold. "It is recognized by the committee as well as by other earnest advocates of a minimum price, that practically none of these lands are worth now anything like the minimum price fixed. It is believed, however, that the advance of science, the extension of public and private irrigation projects, and the tendency toward the higher development of smaller holdings will, in the case of Arizona and New Mexico, as in the case of other States, result in a sure, although possibly slow, increase of land values. "The educational lands which are subject to sale would probably not bring on the market now much more than 25 cents an acre, but if the history of other states in which minimum prices, which at the time were considered prohibitive, were fixed shall be repeated in Arizona and New Mexico, it is of the utmost importance that some restriction be placed upon the sale of these lands. "The experience of other States and the importance of fixing a minimum selling price for educational lands is indicated in the following extract *316 from a letter from former Secretary of the Interior Garfield addressed to the chairman of the committee in the last Congress: " `The history of the public-land States in the matter of the disposal of granted school lands has convinced me that those States which have a minimum price fixed on their lands granted for educational purposes get a much larger return from their lands. I am informed that most States with no minimum have not disposed of their lands to the best advantage, thus seriously failing to derive the full benefit
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
dissenting
|
Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109381/alamo-land-cattle-co-v-arizona/
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best advantage, thus seriously failing to derive the full benefit to which the schools are entitled. The States of North and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, and Washington have a $10 minimum fixed on their lands, and I am informed that none of these States, unless it is Wyoming, feels that this high minimum is harmful. " `On the contrary, I find that officials of these States are zealous and proud of the splendid school funds which they are creating from the sale of school lands. North Dakota, which a few years ago seemed to contain immense areas of poor land, is, I am informed, obtaining in many cases $15 or $20 per acre for its school sections. Colorado seems to have an exceedingly low minimum, $2.50; and nevertheless it has administered its land grants unusually well, securing from them very large returns, both from sales and from leases. For these reasons, I urge that a minimum price be fixed for these proposed new States. They will be able to lease most of their land, if it is not worth to-day the minimum price, and will thereby obtain an income.' " H. R. Rep. No. 152, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1910). If leases were permitted to encumber school trust lands *317 at a time when they were worth less than the minimum sales price, then when the land rose in valueas Congress anticipated it wouldand was sold for the minimum price or more, the State would have to give part of such sales price to the lessee. Such a result is utterly irreconcilable with the reasons for setting minimum sales prices. Plainly, Congress intended the school trust to receive the full sales price and to prevent the States from disposing of the lands in any fashion which would result in its receiving any less. Lessees were to receive none of the proceeds of sale of the land itself even if the land had appreciated in value subsequent to the creation of the lease. To make its purpose even clearer, Congress, in dealing with the very question of whether the lessee should share in the proceeds when lands subject to the lease are sold, provided: "Nothing herein contained shall prevent (4) the Legislature of the State of Arizona from providing by proper laws for the protection of lessees of said lands, whereby such lessees shall be protected in their rights to their improvements (including water rights) in such manner that in case of lease or sale of said lands to other parties the former lessee shall be paid by the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse. The State of South Carolina prohibited petitioner Lucas from building a permanent structure on his property from 1988 to 1990. Relying on an unreviewed (and implausible) state trial court finding that this restriction left Lucas' property valueless, this Court granted review to determine whether compensation must be paid in cases where the State prohibits all economic use of real estate. According to the Court, such an occasion never has arisen in any of our prior cases, and the Court imagines that it will arise "relatively rarely" or only in "extraordinary circumstances." Almost certainly it did not happen in this case. Nonetheless, the Court presses on to decide the issue, and as it does, it ignores its jurisdictional limits, remakes its traditional rules of review, and creates simultaneously a new categorical rule and an exception (neither of which is rooted in our prior case law, common law, or common sense). I protest not only the Court's decision, but each step taken to reach it. More fundamentally, I question the Court's wisdom in issuing sweeping new rules to decide such a narrow case. Surely, as Justice Kennedy demonstrates, the Court could have reached the result it wanted without inflicting this damage upon our Takings Clause jurisprudence. My fear is that the Court's new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the present case. For that reason, I, like the Court, will give far greater attention to this case than its narrow scope suggests not because I can intercept *7 the Court's missile, or save the targeted mouse, but because I hope perhaps to limit the collateral damage. I A In Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act. 16 U.S. C. 1451 et seq. The Act was designed to provide States with money and incentives to carry out Congress' goal of protecting the public from shoreline erosion and coastal hazards. In the 1980 amendments to the Act, Congress directed States to enhance their coastal programs by "[p]reventing or significantly reducing threats to life and the destruction of property by eliminating development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas."[1] 16 U.S. C. 1456b(a)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. II). South Carolina began implementing the congressional directive by enacting the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977. Under the 1977 Act, any construction activity in what was designated the "critical area" required a permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council (Council), and the construction of any habitable structure was prohibited. The 1977 critical area was relatively narrow. This effort did not stop the loss of shoreline.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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narrow. This effort did not stop the loss of shoreline. In October 1986, the Council appointed a "Blue Ribbon Committee on Beach front Management" to investigate beach erosion and *8 propose possible solutions. In March 1987, the Committee found that South Carolina's beaches were "critically eroding," and proposed land-use restrictions. Report of the South Carolina Blue Ribbon Committee on Beach front Management i, 6-10 In response, South Carolina enacted the Beach front Management Act on July 1, 1988. S. C. Code Ann. 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp. 1990). The 1988 Act did not change the uses permitted within the designated critical areas. Rather, it enlarged those areas to encompass the distance from the mean high watermark to a setback line established on the basis of "the best scientific and historical data" available.[2] S. C. Code Ann. 48-39-280 B Petitioner Lucas is a contractor, manager, and part owner of the Wild Dune development on the Isle of Palms. He has lived there since 1978. In December 1986, he purchased two of the last four pieces of vacant property in the development.[3] The area is notoriously unstable. In roughly half of the last 40 years, all or part of petitioner's property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide. Tr. 84. Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner's property was under water. Between 1963 and 1973 the shoreline was 100 to 150 feet onto petitioner's property. In 1973 the first line of stable vegetation was about halfway through the property. Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms issued 12 emergency orders for *9 sandbagging to protect property in the Wild Dune development. Determining that local habitable structures were in imminent danger of collapse, the Council issued permits for two rock revetments to protect condominium developments near petitioner's property from erosion; one of the revetments extends more than halfway onto one of his lots. C The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the Beach front Management Act did not take petitioner's property without compensation. The decision rested on two premises that until today were unassailable that the State has the power to prevent any use of property it finds to be harmful to its citizens, and that a state statute is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. The Beach front Management Act includes a finding by the South Carolina General Assembly that the beach/dune system serves the purpose of "protect[ing] life and property by serving as a storm barrier which dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an economical and effective manner." S.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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to shoreline stability in an economical and effective manner." S. C. Code Ann. 48-39-250(1)(a) (Supp. 1990). The General Assembly also found that "development unwisely has been sited too close to the [beach/dune] system. This type of development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent property." 48-39-250(4); see also 48-39-250(6) (discussing the need to "afford the beach/dune system space to accrete and erode"). If the state legislature is correct that the prohibition on building in front of the setback line prevents serious harm, then, under this Court's prior cases, the Act is constitutional. "Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce *1040 it." Keystone Bituminous ; see also and n. 18. The Court consistently has upheld regulations imposed to arrest a significant threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic effect on the owner. See, e. g., ; ; ; Petitioner never challenged the legislature's findings that a building ban was necessary to protect property and life. Nor did he contend that the threatened harm was not sufficiently serious to make building a house in a particular location a "harmful" use, that the legislature had not made sufficient findings, or that the legislature was motivated by anything other than a desire to minimize damage to coastal areas. Indeed, petitioner objected at trial that evidence as to the purposes of the setback requirement was irrelevant. Tr. 68. The South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly understood petitioner not to contest the State's position that "discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm," 304 S. C. 3, and "to prevent serious injury to the community." The court considered itself "bound by these uncontested legislative findings [in the absence of] any attack whatsoever on the statutory scheme." 404 S.E.2d, at Nothing in the record undermines the General Assembly's assessment that prohibitions on building in front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and property from storms, high tides, and beach erosion. Because that legislative determination cannot be disregarded in the absence of such evidence, see, e. g., ; O'Gorman & Young, and because its determination *1041 of harm to life and property from building is sufficient to prohibit that use under this Court's cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly found no taking. II
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly found no taking. II My disagreement with the Court begins with its decision to review this case. This Court has held consistently that a land-use challenge is not ripe for review until there is a final decision about what uses of the property will be permitted. The ripeness requirement is not simply a gesture of good will to land-use planners. In the absence of "a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property," MacDonald, Sommer & and the utilization of state procedures for just compensation, there is no final judgment, and in the absence of a final judgment there is no jurisdiction, see San Diego Gas & Electric ; This rule is "compelled by the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause," because the factors applied in deciding a takings claim "simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question." Williamson Regional Planning See also MacDonald, Sommer & 477 U. S., at (citation omitted). The Court admits that the 1990 amendments to the Beach front Management Act allowing special permits preclude Lucas from asserting that his property has been permanently taken. See ante, at 1011-1012. The Court agrees that such a claim would not be ripe because there has been no final decision by respondent on what uses will be permitted. *1042 The Court, however, will not be denied: It determines that petitioner's "temporary takings" claim for the period from July 1, 1988, to June 25, 1990, is ripe. But this claim also is not justiciable.[4] From the very beginning of this litigation, respondent has argued that the courts "lac[k] jurisdiction in this matter because the Plaintiff has sought no authorization from Council for use of his property, has not challenged the location of the baseline or setback line as alleged in the Complaint and because no final agency decision has been rendered concerning use of his property or location of said baseline or setback line." Tr. 10 (answer, as amended). Although the Council's plea has been ignored by every court, it is undoubtedly correct. Under the Beach front Management Act, petitioner was entitled to challenge the setback line or the baseline or erosion rate applied to his property in formal administrative, followed by judicial, proceedings. S. C. Code Ann. 48-39 280(E) Because Lucas failed to pursue this administrative remedy, the Council never finally decided whether Lucas' particular piece of
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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the Council never finally decided whether Lucas' particular piece of property was correctly categorized as a critical area in which building would not be permitted. This is all the more crucial because Lucas argued strenuously in the trial court that his land was perfectly safe to build on, and that his company had studies to prove it. Tr. 20, 25, 36. If he was correct, the Council's *1043 final decision would have been to alter the setback line, eliminating the construction ban on Lucas' property. That petitioner's property fell within the critical area as initially interpreted by the Council does not excuse petitioner's failure to challenge the Act's application to his property in the administrative process. The claim is not ripe until petitioner seeks a variance from that status. "[W]e have made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking." United See also Williamson[5] Even if I agreed with the Court that there were no jurisdictional barriers to deciding this case, I still would not try to decide it. The Court creates its new takings jurisprudence based on the trial court's finding that the property *1044 had lost all economic value.[6] This finding is almost certainly erroneous. Petitioner still can enjoy other attributes of ownership, such as the right to exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Petitioner can picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer. State courts frequently have recognized that land has economic value where the only residual economic uses are recreation or camping. See, e. g., Turnpike Realty ; Turner v. of Del Norte, cert. denied, ; Petitioner also retains the right to alienate the land, which would have value for neighbors and for those prepared to enjoy proximity to the ocean without a house. Yet the trial court, apparently believing that "less value" and "valueless" could be used interchangeably, found the property "valueless." The court accepted no evidence from the State on the property's value without a home, and petitioner's appraiser testified that he never had considered what the value would be absent a residence. Tr. 54-55. The appraiser's value was based on the fact that the "highest and best use of these lots [is] luxury single family detached dwellings." The trial court appeared to believe that the property could be considered "valueless" if it was not available for its most profitable use. Absent that erroneous assumption, see I find no evidence in
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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Absent that erroneous assumption, see I find no evidence in the record supporting the trial court's conclusion that the damage to the lots by virtue of the restrictions *1045 was "total." Record 128 (findings of fact). I agree with the Court, ante, 0, n. 9, that it has the power to decide a case that turns on an erroneous finding, but I question the wisdom of deciding an issue based on a factual premise that does not exist in this case, and in the judgment of the Court will exist in the future only in "extraordinary circumstance[s]," ante, at 1017. Clearly, the Court was eager to decide this case.[7] But eagerness, in the absence of proper jurisdiction, must and in this case should have been met with restraint. III The Court's willingness to dispense with precedent in its haste to reach a result is not limited to its initial jurisdictional decision. The Court also alters the long-settled rules of review. The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision to defer to legislative judgments in the absence of a challenge from petitioner comports with one of this Court's oldest maxims: "[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed." United Indeed, we have said the legislature's judgment is "well-nigh conclusive." U.S. 26, See also ; Accordingly, this Court always has required plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance to provide "some factual foundation of record" that contravenes the legislative findings. O'Gorman & Young In the absence of such proof, "the presumption of constitutionality must prevail." We only recently have reaffirmed that claimants have the burden of showing a state law constitutes a taking. See Keystone Bituminous 480 U. S., 5. See also (citing "the usual presumption of constitutionality" that applies to statutes attacked as takings). Rather than invoking these traditional rules, the Court decides the State has the burden to convince the courts that its legislative judgments are correct. Despite Lucas' complete failure to contest the legislature's findings of serious harm to life and property if a permanent structure is built, the Court decides that the legislative findings are not sufficient to justify the use prohibition. Instead, the Court "emphasize[s]" the State must do more than merely proffer its legislative judgments to avoid invalidating its law. Ante, at 1. In this case, apparently, the State now has the burden of showing the regulation is not a taking. The Court offers no justification for its sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could. IV The Court does not reject the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision simply
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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does not reject the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision simply on the basis of its disbelief and distrust of the legislature's findings. It also takes the opportunity to create a new scheme for regulations that eliminate all economic value. From now on, there is a categorical rule finding these regulations to be a taking unless the use they *1047 prohibit is a background common-law nuisance or property principle. See ante, 8-1. A I first question the Court's rationale in creating a category that obviates a "case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced," ante, at 1015, if all economic value has been lost. If one fact about the Court's takings jurisprudence can be stated without contradiction, it is that "the particular circumstances of each case" determine whether a specific restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay compensation. United This is so because although we have articulated certain factors to be considered, including the economic impact on the property owner, the ultimate conclusion "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests." When the government regulation prevents the owner from any economically valuable use of his property, the private interest is unquestionably substantial, but we have never before held that no public interest can outweigh it. Instead the Court's prior decisions "uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a `taking.' " Penn Central Transp. This Court repeatedly has recognized the ability of government, in certain circumstances, to regulate property without compensation no matter how adverse the financial effect on the owner may be. More than a century ago, the Court explicitly upheld the right of States to prohibit uses of property injurious to public health, safety, or welfare without paying compensation: "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property." 123 *-669. On this basis, the Court upheld an ordinance effectively prohibiting operation of a previously lawful brewery, although the "establishments will become of no value as property." ; see also Mugler was only the beginning in a long line of cases.[8] In the Court upheld legislation prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine, despite the owner's allegation that "if prevented from continuing it, the value of his property employed therein would be entirely lost and he be deprived of the means of livelihood." In the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting a brickyard, although the owner had made excavations on the
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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a brickyard, although the owner had made excavations on the land that prevented it from being utilized for any purpose but a brickyard. In the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not require Virginia to pay compensation to the owner of cedar trees ordered destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple orchards. The "preferment of [the public interest] over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property." Again, in Omnia Commercial the Court stated that "destruction of, or injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a `taking' in the constitutional sense." More recently, in the Court upheld a town regulation that barred continued operation of an existing sand and gravel operation in order to protect public safety. 369 *. "Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant," the Court stated, "it is by no means conclusive." [9] at 594. In 1978, the Court declared that "in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that `the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulation that destroyed recognized real property interests." Penn Central Transp. Co., In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. of Los Angeles, the owner alleged that a floodplain ordinance had deprived it of "all use" of the property. The Court remanded the case for consideration whether, even if the ordinance denied the owner all use, it could be justified as a safety measure.[10] at 313. And in Keystone Bituminous the Court summarized over 100 years of precedent: "[T]he Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely affect real property interests." [11] 480 U. S., 9, n. 18. *1050 The Court recognizes that "our prior opinions have suggested that `harmful or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation," ante, 2, but seeks to reconcile them with its categorical rule by claiming that the Court never has upheld a regulation when the owner alleged the loss of all economic value. Even if the Court's factual premise were correct, its understanding of the Court's cases is distorted. In none of the cases did the Court suggest that the right of a State to prohibit certain activities without paying compensation turned on the availability of some residual valuable use.[12] Instead, the cases depended on whether the *1051 government interest was sufficient to prohibit the activity, given the significant private cost.[13]
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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sufficient to prohibit the activity, given the significant private cost.[13] These cases rest on the principle that the State has full power to prohibit an owner's use of property if it is harmful to the public. "[S]ince no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not `taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity." Keystone Bituminous n. 20. It would make no sense under this theory to suggest that an owner has a constitutionally protected right to harm others, if only he makes the proper showing of economic loss.[14] See Pennsylvania U.S. 393, ("Restriction upon [harmful] use does not become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives the owner of the only use to which the property can then be profitably put"). *1052 B Ultimately even the Court cannot embrace the full implications of its per se rule: It eventually agrees that there cannot be a categorical rule for a taking based on economic value that wholly disregards the public need asserted. Instead, the Court decides that it will permit a State to regulate all economic value only if the State prohibits uses that would not be permitted under "background principles of nuisance and property law."[15]Ante, at 1. Until today, the Court explicitly had rejected the contention that the government's power to act without paying compensation turns on whether the prohibited activity is a common-law nuisance.[16] The brewery closed in Mugler itself was not a common-law nuisance, and the Court specifically stated that it was the role of the legislature to determine *1053 what measures would be appropriate for the protection of public health and safety. See In upholding the state action in Miller, the Court found it unnecessary to "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute." 2 U.S., See also ; Instead the Court has relied in the past, as the South Carolina court has done here, on legislative judgments of what constitutes a harm.[17] The Court rejects the notion that the State always can prohibit uses it deems a harm to the public without granting compensation because "the distinction between `harmpreventing' and `benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder." Ante, 4. Since the characterization will depend "primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate," ante, 5, the Court decides a legislative judgment of this kind no longer can provide the desired "objective, value-free
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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this kind no longer can provide the desired "objective, value-free basis" for upholding a regulation, ante, 6. The Court, however, fails to explain how its proposed common-law alternative escapes the same trap. *1054 The threshold inquiry for imposition of the Court's new rule, "deprivation of all economically valuable use," itself cannot be determined objectively. As the Court admits, whether the owner has been deprived of all economic value of his property will depend on how "property" is defined. The "composition of the denominator in our `deprivation' fraction," ante, at 1017, n. 7, is the dispositive inquiry. Yet there is no "objective" way to define what that denominator should be. "We have long understood that any land-use regulation can be characterized as the `total' deprivation of an aptly defined entitlement. Alternatively, the same regulation can always be characterized as a mere `partial' withdrawal from full, unencumbered ownership of the landholding affected by the regulation"[18] Michelman, Takings, 1987, The Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous illustrates this principle perfectly. In Keystone, the Court determined that the "support estate" was "merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner." Thus, the Court concluded that the support estate's destruction merely eliminated one segment of the total property. The dissent, however, characterized the support estate as a distinct property interest that was wholly destroyed. The Court could agree on no "value-free basis" to resolve this dispute. Even more perplexing, however, is the Court's reliance on common-law principles of nuisance in its quest for a valuefree takings jurisprudence. In determining what is a nuisance at common law, state courts make exactly the decision that the Court finds so troubling when made by the South Carolina General Assembly today: They determine whether the use is harmful. Common-law public and private nuisance *1055 law is simply a determination whether a particular use causes harm. See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They determined a harm in the same way as state judges and legislatures do today. If judges in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm from a benefit, why not judges in the 20th century, and if judges can, why not legislators? There simply is no reason to believe that new interpretations of the hoary common-law nuisance doctrine will be particularly "objective" or "value free."[19] Once one abandons the level of generality of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, ante, at 1, one searches in vain, I think, for anything resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance. C
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance. C Finally, the Court justifies its new rule that the legislature may not deprive a property owner of the only economically valuable use of his land, even if the legislature finds it to be a harmful use, because such action is not part of the "`long recognized' " "understandings of our citizens." Ante, 7. These "understandings" permit such regulation only if the use is a nuisance under the common law. Any other course is "inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause." Ante, 8. It is not clear from the Court's *1056 opinion where our "historical compact" or "citizens' understanding" comes from, but it does not appear to be history. The principle that the State should compensate individuals for property taken for public use was not widely established in America at the time of the Revolution. "The colonists inherited a concept of property which permitted extensive regulation of the use of that property for the public benefit regulation that could even go so far as to deny all productive use of the property to the owner if, as Coke himself stated, the regulation `extends to the public benefit for this is for the public, and every one hath benefit by it.'" F. Bosselman, D. Callies, & J. Banta, The Taking Issue 80-81 quoting The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Co. Rep. 12-13 (1606) (hereinafter Bosselman). See also Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L. J. 694, 697, n. 9[20] Even into the 19th century, state governments often felt free to take property for roads and other public projects without paying compensation to the owners.[21] See M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, pp. 63-64 (1977) (hereinafter Horwitz); Treanor, 94 Yale L. J., at 695. As one court declared in 1802, citizens "were bound *1057 to contribute as much of [land], as by the laws of the country, were deemed necessary for the public convenience." There was an obvious movement toward establishing the just compensation principle during the 19th century, but "there continued to be a strong current in American legal thought that regarded compensation simply as a `bounty given by the State' out of `kindness' and not out of justice." Horwitz 65, quoting See also[22] Although, prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, America was replete with land-use regulations describing which activities were considered noxious and forbidden, see Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 Buffalo L. Rev. 735, 751
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 Buffalo L. Rev. 735, 751 ; L. Friedman, A History of American Law 66-68 the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause originally did not extend to regulations of property, whatever the effect.[23] See ante, at 1014. Most state courts agreed with this narrow interpretation of a taking. "Until the end of the nineteenth century jurists held that *1058 the constitution protected possession only, and not value." Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, ; Bosselman 106. Even indirect and consequential injuries to property resulting from regulations were excluded from the definition of a taking. See ibid.; 1 Pick. Even when courts began to consider that regulation in some situations could constitute a taking, they continued to uphold bans on particular uses without paying compensation, notwithstanding the economic impact, under the rationale that no one can obtain a vested right to injure or endanger the public.[24] In the Coates cases, for example, the Supreme Court of New York found no taking in New York's ban on the interment of the dead within the city, although "no other use can be made of these lands." See also Brick Presbyterian ; ; St. Louis Gunning Advertisement appeal dism'd, 231 U.S. 1 More recent cases reach the same result. See Consolidated Rock Products ; 394 Mass. 7, ; ; Turner v. of Del Norte, In addition, state courts historically have been less likely to find that a government action constitutes a taking when the affected land is undeveloped. According to the South Carolina court, the power of the legislature to take unimproved land without providing compensation was sanctioned by "ancient rights and principles." Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S. C. L. 38, 57 (1796). "Except for Massachusetts, no colony appears to have paid compensation when it built a state-owned road across unimproved land. Legislatures provided compensation only for enclosed or improved land." Treanor, 94 Yale L. J., at 695 (footnotes omitted). This rule was followed by some States into the 1800's. See Horwitz 63-65. With similar result, the common agrarian conception of property limited owners to "natural" uses of their land prior to and during much of the 18th century. See at Thus, for example, the owner could build nothing on his land that would alter the natural flow of water. See ; see also, e. g., Merritt v. Parker, 1 Coxe 460, 463 (N. J. 1795). Some more recent state courts still follow this reasoning. See, e. g., Just v. Marinette 201 N.W.2d 1, 8 Nor does history indicate any common-law
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,992 | 11 |
dissenting
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112787/lucas-v-south-carolina-coastal-council/
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201 N.W.2d 1, 8 Nor does history indicate any common-law limit on the State's power to regulate harmful uses even to the point of destroying all economic value. Nothing in the discussions in Congress concerning the Takings Clause indicates that the Clause was limited by the common-law nuisance doctrine. Common-law courts themselves rejected such an understanding. They regularly recognized that it is "for the legislature to interpose, and by positive enactment to prohibit a use of property which would be injurious to the public." *1060 Tewksbury, 11 Metc., at 57.[25] Chief Justice Shaw explained in upholding a regulation prohibiting construction of wharves, the existence of a taking did not depend on "whether a certain erection in tide water is a nuisance at common law or not." Alger, ; see also State v. Paul, 5 Rawle I. 185, 193 (1858); 5, ("[T]he legislature may change the common law as to nuisances, and may move the line either way, so as to make things nuisances which were not so, or to make things lawful which were nuisances"). In short, I find no clear and accepted "historical compact" or "understanding of our citizens" justifying the Court's new takings doctrine. Instead, the Court seems to treat history as a grab bag of principles, to be adopted where they support the Court's theory, and ignored where they do not. If the Court decided that the early common law provides the background principles for interpreting the Takings Clause, then regulation, as opposed to physical confiscation, would not be compensable. If the Court decided that the law of a later period provides the background principles, then regulation might be compensable, but the Court would have to confront the fact that legislatures regularly determined which uses were prohibited, independent of the common law, and independent of whether the uses were lawful when the owner purchased. What makes the Court's analysis unworkable is its attempt to package the law of two incompatible eras and peddle it as historical fact.[26] *1061 V The Court makes sweeping and, in my view, misguided and unsupported changes in our takings doctrine. While it limits these changes to the most narrow subset of government regulation those that eliminate all economic value from land these changes go far beyond what is necessary to secure petitioner Lucas' private benefit. One hopes they do not go beyond the narrow confines the Court assigns them to today. I dissent.
|
Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
concurring
|
Cruz v. Hauck
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108400/cruz-v-hauck/
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Petitioners are prisoners who claim that the prison authorities have denied them access to law books needed to seek judicial remedies. They are inmates of the Bexar County Jail in Texas and instituted this action in the District Court to restrain the respondent's interference with their reasonable access to hardbound law books and other legal matter.[1] They asserted that county jail regulations and practices deprived them of their rights to seek judicial redress. Their custodians answered that prison security necessitated removing hardback covers as part of an overall scheme to arrest smuggling of contraband. Without conducting a hearing into the matter, the District Court summarily dismissed the complaint.[2] *60 The question is an important one in the evolution by statutes and constitutional decisions of a Bill of Rights for prisoners. Prisoners are not statistics, known only to a computer, but humans entitled to all the amenities and privileges of other persons, save as confinement and necessary security measures curtail their activities. Whatever security measures may be needed respecting books, it is not conceivably plausible to maintain that essential books can be totally banned. That question is submerged in this case as the initial issue concerns these prisoners' request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal from the District Court's dismissal of their action, the Court of Appeals having refused to docket their cases without prepayment of filing fees and security which litigants normally advance. Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal and pursuant to Fed. Rule App. Proc. 24 (a) (first paragraph) sought from the District Judge leave to appeal in forma pauperis as to prepayment of a $25 filing fee[3] and the $250 minimum security deposit required by Fed. Rule App. Proc. 7. The District Judge refused the request, certifying in relevant part that: "This Court is of the opinion that any appeal taken from the order of denial in this case would be frivolous, without merit, and not taken in good faith."[4] No other explanation was offered although in his earlier unreported order dismissing the original action the District Judge said that prisoners do not have "a right to be furnished with an extensive collection of legal materials" and that courts "may not interfere with the conduct of a prison."[5] *61 Petitioners then applied to the Court of Appeals for a similar waiver of filing fees and security. Their application was denied without opinion[6] and their motion for reconsideration was also refused without opinion.[7] Presented with their motion for reconsideration were memoranda posing their primary contention now before this Court that these denials of leave to proceed in
|
Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
concurring
|
Cruz v. Hauck
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108400/cruz-v-hauck/
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this Court that these denials of leave to proceed in forma pauperis offended these petitioners' rights of equal access to judicial machinery.[8] I We have held, in line with that an indigent prisoner cannot be deprived of a direct criminal appeal or of state habeas relief solely on account of his inability to prepay docketing fees. ;[9] In 1892 Congress authorized the federal courts to provide the disadvantaged with a wide range of in forma pauperis relief. Act of July 20, 1892, The benefits of this *62 generous provision, now codified at 28 U.S. C. 1915, have been limited, however, by the important proviso added in 1910 () which, as now amended, reads: "An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." "Good faith" has been defined as a requirement that an appeal present a nonfrivolous question for review. If the district court certifies that an appeal would not present such a question, then an indigent may ask the court of appeals for permission to proceed in forma pauperis. That court must grant the renewed motion if after a de novo determination it disagrees with the district court's application of the good-faith test. If both lower courts refuse permission, then, unless this Court vacates the court of appeals' finding, the pauper's appeal is ended without a hearing on the merits. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 24 (a). It is important that in all of these proceedings the only cognizable issue is whether a summary survey (as opposed to plenary deliberation) suggests that a substantial argument could be presented. For a discussion of the procedures employed see ; II Our holdings have steadily chipped away at the proposition that appeals of the poor can be disposed of solely on summary and abbreviated inquiries into frivolity rather than upon the plenary consideration granted paying appellants.[10] In we held that a State may not withhold a transcript and thereby deny an appeal to a poor man merely because a trial judge believed his own conduct had avoided the production of nonfrivolous questions for review. See also In we decided that an impoverished prisoner's appeal from a state coram nobis hearing could not be thwarted simply because a public defender officer believed his case lacked merit. In we emphasized that a criminal appellant seeking to establish nonfrivolity under 28 U.S. C. 1915 is entitled to more than appointed counsel's private view that his appeal would be worthless and that if counsel withdrew for that reason the Court of Appeals
|
Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
concurring
|
Cruz v. Hauck
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108400/cruz-v-hauck/
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if counsel withdrew for that reason the Court of Appeals was duty bound to replace him. We have also held that a Court of Appeals may not overrule the permission granted by a District Court to proceed in forma pauperis, but that a Court of Appeals must review de novo a trial judge's certification that an appeal would not be in good faith, Moreover, in federal criminal appeals on direct review most circuits have provided as a matter of course the entire panoply of 1915 relief, including counsel, transcripts, and waiver of filing fees and security, merely upon a showing of poverty. And, to the extent that the nonfrivolity test is still enforceable elsewhere, our opinions in and have partially attenuated its harsher effects by requiring the appointment of counsel and the provision of transcripts for the preliminary purpose of ascertaining whether appeals would produce worthwhile issues. It is true, of course, that most of these decisions involved *64 criminal appeals rather than civil appeals.[11] But the equal protection concept is "not limited to criminal prosecutions" and its "protections extend as well to civil matters." See Indeed, last Term, in we held on equal protection and due process grounds that a State could not deny a divorce to an impecunious wife solely because she could not pay relatively small filing and service-of-process fees. Moreover, of the Griffin progeny at least two of our opinions concerned civil habeas appeals, condemning filing fees substantially less burdensome than those required below by the Fifth Circuit. See and And lower court decisions have nurtured the sturdy expansion of Griffin to non-habeas civil appeals. In a civil rights case similar to the instant one, the Third Circuit held that in forma pauperis aid should normally be granted as a matter of course in order to minimize courts' treatment of litigants based upon economic circumstances. The upshot of these judicial pronouncements was forcefully summarized by Mr. Justice Black last Term: "In my view, the decision in can safely rest on only one crucial foundationthat the civil courts of the United States and each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney."[12] The elusive nature of the frivolity standard is partly demonstrated by the number of times this Court has vacated findings of bad faith by the lower courts.[13] It is no answer that we may continue to rectify
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Justice Douglas
| 1,971 | 10 |
concurring
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Cruz v. Hauck
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108400/cruz-v-hauck/
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It is no answer that we may continue to rectify such errors on an ad hoc basis, for even so indigents are nonetheless required to return to courts of appeals and only then after substantial delayobtain plenary review on the merits. Wealthier litigants, of course, have no such hurdles to pass before obtaining full review of their assignments of error. Although these hurdles might be justifiable where indigents requested more substantial relief, they are too onerous where all that is at stake is the prepayment of a $25 filing fee and $250 security deposit. It is apparent that this disparate treatment has the effect of classifying appellants according to wealth, which, like race, is a suspect classification. ; See also Accordingly, this classification could withstand challenge only upon a showing of compelling circumstances. Respondent offers none but simply repeats the discredited maxim that paupers' appeals are privileges, not rights.[14] Thus, I would not remand this case on the limited ground that the Court of Appeals may have underestimated the weight of the petitioners' claim. Rather, I would hold that upon a showing of poverty courts of *66 appeals henceforth must waive prepayment and may not inquire into whether an appeal may eventually pose a fruitful issue, at least in cases, such as this one, involving fundamental civil liberties. I would grant certiorari and remand the case to the Fifth Circuit so that these petitioners may have their appeal docketed without prepayment of fees or security.
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work because of a physical or mental disability. To determine whether an applicant is entitled to benefits, the agency may hold an informal hearing examining (among other things) the kind and number of jobs available for someone with the appli- cant’s disability and other characteristics. The agency’s factual findings on that score are “conclusive” in judicial review of the benefits decision so long as they are sup- ported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S. C. This case arises from the SSA’s reliance on an expert’s testimony about the availability of certain jobs in the economy. The expert largely based her opinion on private market-survey data. The question presented is whether her refusal to provide that data upon the applicant’s re- quest categorically precludes her testimony from counting as “substantial evidence.” We hold it does not. 2 BIESTEK v. BERRYHILL Opinion of the Court I Petitioner Michael Biestek once worked as a carpenter and general laborer on construction sites. But he stopped working after he developed degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He then applied for social security disability benefits, claiming eligibility as of Octo- ber 2009. After some preliminary proceedings, the SSA assigned an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to hold a hearing on Biestek’s application. Those hearings, as described in the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. et seq., are recognizably adjudicative in nature. The ALJ may “receive evidence” and “examine witnesses” about the contested issues in a case. 1383(c) (1)(A). But many of the rules governing such hear- ings are less rigid than those a court would follow. See An ALJ is to conduct a disability hearing in “an informal, non- adversarial manner.” (b) ; Most notably, an ALJ may receive evidence in a disability hearing that “would not be admissible in court.” 416.1450(c); see 42 U.S. C. (1), 1383(c)(1)(A). To rule on Biestek’s application, the ALJ had to deter- mine whether the former construction laborer could suc- cessfully transition to less physically demanding work. That required exploring two issues. The ALJ needed to identify the types of jobs Biestek could perform notwith- standing his disabilities. See (c)(1), 416.960(c)(1). And the ALJ needed to ascertain whether those kinds of jobs “exist[ed] in significant numbers in the national economy.” 416.960(c)(1); see 416.966. For guidance on such questions, ALJs often seek the views of “vocational experts.” See 416.966(e); SSA, Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 3 Opinion of the Court Manual I–2–5–50 (Aug. 29, 2014). Those experts are professionals under contract with
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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(Aug. 29, 2014). Those experts are professionals under contract with SSA to provide impar- tial testimony in agency proceedings. See at I–2–1– 31.B.1 (June 16, 2016); at I–2–5–48. They must have “expertise” and “current knowledge” of “[w]orking condi- tions and physical demands of various” jobs; “[k]nowledge of the existence and numbers of [those jobs] in the national economy”; and “[i]nvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers[ ] with disabilities[] into jobs.” at I–2– 1–31.B.1. Many vocational experts simultaneously work in the private sector locating employment for persons with disabilities. See C. Kubitschek & J. Dubin, Social Security Disability Law & Procedure in Federal Court (2019). When offering testimony, the experts may invoke not only publicly available sources but also “information obtained directly from employers” and data otherwise developed from their own “experience in job placement or career counseling.” Social Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000). At Biestek’s hearing, the ALJ asked a vocational expert named Erin O’Callaghan to identify a sampling of “seden- tary” jobs that a person with Biestek’s disabilities, educa- tion, and job history could perform. Tr. 59 (July 21, 2015); see (a), 416.967(a) (defining a “seden- tary” job as one that “involves sitting” and requires “lifting no more than 10 pounds”). O’Callaghan had served as a vocational expert in SSA proceedings for five years; she also had more than ten years’ experience counseling peo- ple with disabilities about employment opportunities. See Stachowiak v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2013 WL 593825, *1 (ED Mich., Jan. 11, 2013); Record in No. 16– 10422 (ED Mich.), Doc. 17–13, p. 1274 (resume). In re- sponse to the ALJ’s query, O’Callaghan listed sedentary jobs “such as a bench assembler [or] sorter” that did not require many skills. Tr. 58–59. And she further testified th40,000 bench assembler jobs and 120,000 sorter jobs 4 BIESTEK v. BERRYHILL Opinion of the Court existed in the national economy. See On cross-examination, Biestek’s attorney asked O’Callaghan “where [she was] getting those [numbers] from.” O’Callaghan replied that they came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and her “own individ- ual labor market surveys.” The lawyer then re- quested that O’Callaghan turn over the private surveys so he could review them. O’Callaghan responded that she wished to keep the surveys confidential because they were “part of [her] client files.” The lawyer suggested that O’Callaghan could “take the clients’ names out.” But at that point the ALJ interjected that he “would not require” O’Callaghan to produce the files in any form. Biestek’s counsel asked no further ques- tions about the basis for O’Callaghan’s assembler and sorter
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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ques- tions about the basis for O’Callaghan’s assembler and sorter numbers. After the hearing concluded, the ALJ issued a decision granting Biestek’s application in part and denying it in part. According to the ALJ, Biestek was entitled to bene- fits beginning in May 2013, when his advancing age (he turned fifty that month) adversely affected his ability to find employment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a, 112a– 113a. But before that time, the ALJ held, Biestek’s dis- abilities should not have prevented a “successful adjust- ment to other work.” at 110a–112a. The ALJ based that conclusion on O’Callaghan’s testimony about the availability in the economy of “sedentary unskilled occupa- tions such as bench assembler [or] sorter.” at 111a (emphasis deleted). Biestek sought review in federal court of the ALJ’s denial of benefits for the period between October 2009 and May 2013. On judicial review, an ALJ’s factual findings— such as the determination that Biestek could have found sedentary work—“shall be conclusive” if supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S. C. see at 1. Biestek contended that O’Callaghan’s testimony could Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 5 Opinion of the Court not possibly constitute such evidence because she had declined, upon request, to produce her supporting data. See Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 16– 10422 (ED Mich.), Doc. 22, p. 23. But the District Court rejected that argument. See (Mar. 30, 2017). And the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. See That court recognized that the Seventh Circuit had adopted the categorical rule Biestek proposed, precluding a vocational expert’s testimony from qualifying as substantial if the expert had declined an applicant’s request to provide supporting data. See at 790 (citing 910–911 (2004)). But that rule, the Sixth Circuit observed in join- ing the ranks of unconvinced courts, “ha[d] not been a popular export.” (internal quotation marks omitted). And no more is it so today. II The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. (2015) (slip op., at 7). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it con- tains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the thresh- old for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substan- tial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” ; see, e.g., (inter- nal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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mere scintilla.” ; see, e.g., (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated 6 BIESTEK v. BERRYHILL Opinion of the Court See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard). Today, Biestek argues that the testimony of a vocational expert who (like O’Callaghan) refuses a request for sup- porting data about job availability can never clear the substantial-evidence bar. See Brief for Petitioner 21–34. As that formulation makes clear, Biestek’s proposed rule is categorical, rendering expert testimony insufficient to sustain an ALJ’s factfinding whenever such a refusal has occurred.1 But Biestek hastens to add two caveats. The first is to clarify what the rule is not, the second to stress where its limits lie. Biestek initially takes pains—and understandably so— to distinguish his argument from a procedural claim. Reply Brief 12–14. At no stage in this litigation, Biestek says, has he ever espoused “a free-standing procedural rule under which a vocational expert would always have to produce [her underlying data] upon request.” That kind of rule exists in federal court: There, an expert witness must produce all data she has considered in reach- ing her conclusions. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(a)(2)(B). But as Biestek appreciates, no similar requirement applies —————— 1 In contrast, the principal dissent cannot decide whether it favors such a categorical rule. At first, JUSTICE GORSUCH endorses the rule Biestek and the Seventh Circuit have proposed. See post, But in then addressing our opinion, he takes little or no issue with the reason- ing we offer to show why that rule is too broad. See post, at 4–7. So the dissent tries to narrow the scope of Biestek’s categorical rule—to only cases that look just like his. See post, at 7–8. And still more, it shelves all the “categorical” talk and concentrates on Biestek’s case alone. See post, at 1, 4–8. There, JUSTICE GORSUCH’s dissent joins JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s in concluding that the expert evidence in this case was insubstantial. But as we later explain, see infra, at 11, Biestek did not petition us to resolve that factbound question; nor did his briefing and argument focus on anything other than the Seventh Circuit’s categori- cal rule. We confine our opinion accordingly. Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 7 Opinion of the Court in SSA hearings. As explained above, Congress intended those proceedings to be “informal” and provided that the “strict rules of evidence, applicable in the courtroom, are not to” apply. ;
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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evidence, applicable in the courtroom, are not to” apply. ; see 42 U.S. C. So Biestek does not press for a “procedural rule” governing “the means through which an evidentiary record [must be] created.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6; Reply Brief 13. Instead, he urges a “substantive rule” for “assess[ing] the quality and quantity of [record] evi- dence”—which would find testimony like O’Callaghan’s inadequate, when taken alone, to support an ALJ’s fact- finding. And Biestek also emphasizes a limitation within that proposed rule. For the rule to kick in, the applicant must make a demand for the expert’s supporting data. See Brief for Petitioner i, 5, 18, 40, 55; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–26. Consider two cases in which vocational experts rely on, but do not produce, nonpublic information. In the first, the applicant asks for the data; in the second, not. Accord- ing to Biestek, the expert’s testimony in the first case cannot possibly clear the substantial-evidence bar; but in the second case, it may well do so, even though the admin- istrative record is otherwise the same. And Biestek un- derscores that this difference in outcome has nothing to do with waiver or forfeiture: As he acknowledges, an appli- cant “cannot waive the substantial evidence standard.” 7. It is just that the evidentiary problem arises from the expert’s refusal of a demand, not from the data’s absence alone. In his words, the testimony “can constitute substantial evidence if unchallenged, but not if chal- lenged.” Reply Brief 18. To assess Biestek’s proposal, we begin with the parties’ common ground: Assuming no demand, a vocational ex- pert’s testimony may count as substantial evidence even when unaccompanied by supporting data. Take an exam- ple. Suppose an expert has top-of-the-line credentials, 8 BIESTEK v. BERRYHILL Opinion of the Court including professional qualifications and many years’ experience; suppose, too, she has a history of giving sound testimony about job availability in similar cases (perhaps before the same ALJ). Now say that she testifies about the approximate number of various sedentary jobs an applicant for benefits could perform. She explains that she arrived at her figures by surveying a range of repre- sentative employers; amassing specific information about their labor needs and employment of people with disabili- ties; and extrapolating those findings to the national economy by means of a well-accepted methodology. She answers cogently and thoroughly all questions put to her by the ALJ and the applicant’s lawyer. And nothing in the rest of the record conflicts with anything she says. But she never produces her survey data. Still, her testimony would be
|
Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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never produces her survey data. Still, her testimony would be the kind of evidence—far “more than a mere scintilla”—that “a reasonable mind might accept as ade- quate to support” a finding about job availability. Consol- idated Of course, the testimony would be even better—more reliable and probative—if she had produced supporting data; that would be a best prac- tice for the SSA and its experts.2 And of course, a different (maybe less qualified) expert failing to produce such data might offer testimony that is so feeble, or contradicted, that it would fail to clear the substantial-evidence bar. The point is only—as, again, Biestek accepts—that expert testimony can sometimes surmount that bar absent under- lying data. But if that is true, why should one additional fact—a —————— 2 The SSA itself appears to agree. In the handbook given to voca- tional experts, the agency states: “You should have available, at the hearing, any vocational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon” because “the ALJ may ask you to provide relevant portions of [those] materials.” SSA, Vocational Expert Handbook 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_ (VE)_Handbook-508.pdf (as last visited Mar. 28, 2019). Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 9 Opinion of the Court refusal to a request for that data—make a vocational expert’s testimony categorically inadequate? Assume that an applicant challenges our hypothetical expert to turn over her supporting data; and assume the expert declines because the data reveals private information about her clients and making careful redactions will take a fair bit of time. Nothing in the expert’s refusal changes her testi- mony (as described above) about job availability. Nor does it alter any other material in the record. So if our expert’s opinion was sufficient—i.e., qualified as substantial evi- dence—before the refusal, it is hard to see why the opinion has to be insufficient afterward. Biestek suggests two reasons for that non-obvious re- sult. First, he contends that the expert’s rejection of a request for backup data necessarily “cast[s her testimony] into doubt.” Reply Brief 16. And second, he avers that the refusal inevitably “deprives an applicant of the material necessary for an effective cross-examination.” But Biestek states his arguments too broadly—and the nuggets of truth they contain cannot justify his proposed flat rule. Consider Biestek’s claim about how an expert’s refusal undercuts her credibility. Biestek here invokes the estab- lished idea of an “adverse inference”: If an expert declines to back up her testimony with information in her control, then the factfinder has a reason to think she is hiding something. See at 16 (citing cases). We do not
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
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Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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hiding something. See at 16 (citing cases). We do not dispute that possibility—but the inference is far from always required. If an ALJ has no other reason to trust the ex- pert, or finds her testimony iffy on its face, her refusal of the applicant’s demand for supporting data may properly tip the scales against her opinion. (Indeed, more can be said: Even if the applicant makes no demand, such an expert’s withholding of data may count against her.) But if (as in our prior hypothetical example, see at 7–8) the ALJ views the expert and her testimony as otherwise 10 BIESTEK v. BERRYHILL Opinion of the Court trustworthy, and thinks she has good reason to keep her data private, her rejection of an applicant’s demand need not make a difference. So too when a court reviews the ALJ’s decision under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. In some cases, the refusal to disclose data, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent a court from finding that “a reasonable mind” could accept the expert’s testimony. Consolidated 305 U. S., at 229. But in other cases, that refusal will have no such consequence. Even taking it into account, the expert’s opinion will qualify as “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. Which is to say it will count, contra Biestek, as substantial. And much the same is true of Biestek’s claim that an expert’s refusal precludes meaningful cross-examination. We agree with Biestek that an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider obstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to credit an expert’s opinion. See –406. But Biestek goes too far in suggesting that the refusal to provide supporting data always interferes with effective cross-examination, or that the absence of such testing always requires treating an opinion as unreliable. Even without specific data, an applicant may probe the strength of testimony by asking an expert about (for example) her sources and methods— where she got the information at issue and how she ana- lyzed it and derived her conclusions. See, e.g., Chavez v. Berryhill, And even without significant testing, a factfinder may conclude that testimony has sufficient indicia of reliability to support a conclusion about whether an applicant could find work. Indeed, Biestek effectively concedes both those points in cases where supporting data is missing, so long as an expert has not refused an applicant’s demand. See at 7. But once that much is acknowledged, Biestek’s argument cannot hold. For with or without an express Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 11 Opinion of the Court refusal, the absence
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Justice Kagan
| 2,019 | 3 |
majority
|
Biestek v. Berryhill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4605634/biestek-v-berryhill/
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S. (2019) 11 Opinion of the Court refusal, the absence of data places the selfsame limits on cross-examination. Where Biestek goes wrong, at bottom, is in pressing for a categorical rule, applying to every case in which a voca- tional expert refuses a request for underlying data. Some- times an expert’s withholding of such data, when com- bined with other aspects of the record, will prevent her testimony from qualifying as substantial evidence. That would be so, for example, if the expert has no good reason to keep the data private and her testimony lacks other markers of reliability. But sometimes the reservation of data will have no such effect. Even though the applicant might wish for the data, the expert’s testimony still will clear (even handily so) the more-than-a-mere-scintilla threshold. The inquiry, as is usually true in determining the substantiality of evidence, is case-by-case. See, e.g., 410 (rejecting a categorical rule pertaining to the substantiality of medical reports in a disability hearing). It takes into account all features of the vocational expert’s testimony, as well as the rest of the administrative record. And in so doing, it defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close. That much is sufficient to decide this case. Biestek petitioned us only to adopt the categorical rule we have now rejected. He did not ask us to decide whether, in the absence of that rule, substantial evidence supported the ALJ in denying him benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. It is so ordered. Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17–1184 MICHAEL J. BIESTEK, PETITIONER v. NANCY A.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,978 | 11 |
dissenting
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Sanabria v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109894/sanabria-v-united-states/
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This case, of course, is an odd and an unusual one, factually and procedurally. Because it is, the case will afford little guidance as precedent in the Court's continuing struggle to create order and understanding out of the confusion of the lengthening list of its decisions on the Double Jeopardy Clause. I would have thought, however, that the principles enunciated late last Term in which I deem a more difficult case for the Government than this onehad application to the facts here. I do not share the Court's distinction of Lee, ante, at 75, and I do not agree that Lee is "manifestly inapposite." Here, as in Lee, there is misdescription by the trial court of the nature of its order, and, as in Lee, the defendant-petitioner's maneuvers *81 should result in a surrender of his right to receive a verdict by the jury that had been drawn. Further, it appears to me that petitioner has succeeded in having the indictment read one way in the trial court, and another way here, as the situation required. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
|
Justice Sotomayor
| 2,012 | 24 |
majority
|
Gonzalez v. Thaler
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/620566/gonzalez-v-thaler/
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This case interprets two provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The first, 28 U.S. C. provides that a habeas peti- tioner must obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal a federal district court’s final order in a habeas proceeding. The COA may issue only if the petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and “shall indicate which specific issue” satisfies that showing. We hold that is not a jurisdictional require- ment. Accordingly, a judge’s failure to “indicate” the requisite constitutional issue in a COA does not deprive a court of appeals of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudi- cate the habeas petitioner’s appeal. The second provision, 28 U.S. C. estab- lishes a 1-year limitations period for state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions, running from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 2 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court review or the expiration of the time for seeking such re- view.” We hold that, for a state prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment be- comes “final” on the date that the time for seeking such review expires. I Petitioner Rafael Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court. The intermediate state appellate court, the Texas Court of Appeals, affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez then allowed his time for seeking discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (Texas CCA)—the State’s highest court for criminal appeals—to expire on August 11, 2006. Tex. Rule App. Proc. 68.2(a) (2011). The Texas Court of Ap- peals issued its mandate on September 26, 2006. After Gonzalez, proceeding pro se, petitioned unsuccess- fully for state habeas relief, he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S. C. on January 24, in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. His petition alleged, inter alia, that the nearly 10-year delay between his indictment and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The District Court, without discussing Gonzalez’s constitutional claims, dis- missed Gonzalez’s petition as time barred by the 1-year statute of limitations in Although Gonza- lez argued that his judgment had not become final until the Texas Court of Appeals issued its mandate, the Dis- trict Court held that Gonzalez’s judgment had become final when his time for seeking discretionary review in the Texas CCA expired on August 11, 2006. Counting from that date, and tolling the limitations period for the time during which Gonzalez’s state habeas petition was pend- ing,
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,012 | 24 |
majority
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Gonzalez v. Thaler
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/620566/gonzalez-v-thaler/
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time during which Gonzalez’s state habeas petition was pend- ing, Gonzalez’s limitations period elapsed on December 17, 2007—over a month before he filed his federal habeas petition. The District Court denied a COA. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court Gonzalez applied to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a COA on two grounds: (1) his habeas petition was timely, and (2) his Sixth Amendment speedy- trial right was violated. A Court of Appeals judge granted a COA on the question “whether the habeas application was timely filed because Gonzalez’s conviction became final, and thus the limitations period commenced, on the date the intermediate state appellate court issued its mandate.” App. 347. The COA did not mention the Sixth Amendment question. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Acknowledging that a sister Circuit had run the limita- tions period from the date of a state court’s issuance of a mandate, the Court of Appeals deemed the mandate’s issuance “irrelevant” to determining finality under ). The Court of Appeals held that because a judgment becomes final at “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” the limita- tions period begins to run for petitioners who fail to appeal to a State’s highest court when the time for seeking fur- ther direct review in the state court expires. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that Gonzalez’s conviction became final on August 11, 2006, and his habeas petition was time barred. The Court of Appeals did not address Gonzalez’s Sixth Amendment claim or discuss whether the COA had been improperly issued. Nor did the State allege any defect in the COA or move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Gonzalez petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. In its brief in opposition, the State argued for the first time that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to adju- dicate Gonzalez’s appeal because the COA identified only a procedural issue, without also “indicat[ing]” a constitu- tional issue as required by We granted certio- 4 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court rari to decide two questions, both of which implicate splits in authority: (1) whether the Court of Appeals had juris- diction to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal, notwithstanding the defect;1 and (2) whether Gonzalez’s habeas petition was time barred under due to the date on which his judgment became final.2 564 U. S. (2011). II We first consider whether the Court of Appeals had juris- diction to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal. A Section 22, as amended by AEDPA, governs appeals in
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Justice Sotomayor
| 2,012 | 24 |
majority
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Gonzalez v. Thaler
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/620566/gonzalez-v-thaler/
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A Section 22, as amended by AEDPA, governs appeals in habeas corpus proceedings. The first subsection, is a general grant of jurisdiction, providing that district courts’ final orders in habeas proceedings “shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals.” 28 U.S. C. The second, limits jurisdiction over a particular type of final order. See (“There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceed- ing to test the validity of a warrant [of] remov[al]”). This case concerns the third, which provides: “(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifi- cate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to —————— 1 The Circuits have divided over whether a defect in a COA is a juris- dictional bar. Compare, e.g., (CA9 2004) ; ; with United (yes). 2 The Circuits have divided over when a judgment becomes final if a petitioner forgoes review in a State’s highest court. Compare, e.g., 6 F.3d 222, 226 (case below) (date when time for seeking such review expires); 1073–1074 (same), with 855–856 (date when state court issues its mandate). Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court the court of appeals “(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a sub- stantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. “(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).” When, as here, the district court denies relief on procedur- al grounds, the petitioner seeking a COA must show both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitution- al right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” In this case, the Court of Appeals judge granted a COA that identified a debatable procedural ruling, but did not “indicate” the issue on which Gonzalez had made a sub- stantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as required by The question before us is whether that defect deprived the Court of Appeals of the power to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal. We hold that it did not. This Court has endeavored in recent years to “bring some discipline” to the use of the term “jurisdictional.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. (2011) (slip op., at 5). Recognizing our “less than meticulous” use of the term in the past, we have pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which
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have pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern “a court’s adjudicatory authority,” and nonjurisdictional “claim- processing rules,” which do not. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–455 (2004). When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consid- er sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented. See United States v. Cotton, 5 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be 6 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court waived or forfeited. The objections may be resurrected at any point in the litigation, and a valid objection may lead a court midway through briefing to dismiss a complaint in its entirety. “[M]any months of work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at (slip op., at 5). Courts, we have said, should not lightly attach those “drastic” consequences to limits Congress has enacted. We accordingly have applied the following principle: A rule is jurisdictional “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.” 515 (2006). But if “Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.”3 That clear-statement principle makes particular sense in this statute, as we consider—against the backdrop of clear jurisdictional grant to the courts of ap- —————— 3 Wehave also held that “context, including this Court’s interpreta- tion of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. (slip op., at 13). Here, however, even though the requirement of a COA (or its predecessor, the certifi- cate of probable cause (CPC)) dates back to 1908, Congress did not enact the indication requirement until 1996. There is thus no “long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by Congress” on which to rely. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Central Region, 558 U. S. (slip op., at 13). The issuance of a CPC, like the issuance of a COA, was jurisdictional. Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, post, at 8–10 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), that fact does not suggest that the indication requirement is juris- dictional as well. If anything, the inference runs the other way. For nearly a century, a judge’s granting or withholding of a CPC, absent any indication of issues, was the fully effective “expression of opinion,” post, at 8, required for an appeal to proceed. AEDPA’s new require- ment that judges indicate the specific issues to
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new require- ment that judges indicate the specific issues to be raised on appeal has no predecessor provision—indeed, it is the primary difference between a CPC and COA. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court peals and ’s clear limit on that grant—the extent to which Congress intended the COA process outlined in to further limit the courts of appeals’ jurisdiction over habeas appeals. Here, the only “clear” jurisdictional language in appears in As we explained in Miller-El v. Cockrell, (1)’s plain terms— “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals”—establish that “until a COA has been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.” The parties thus agree that (1) is jurisdictional. The parties also agree that (2) is nonjurisdic- tional.4 That is for good reason. Section 22(c)(2) speaks only to when a COA may issue—upon “a substantial show- ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” It does not contain (1)’s jurisdictional terms. See Russello v. United States, (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally”). And it would be passing strange if, after a COA has issued, each court of appeals adjudicating an appeal were dutybound to revisit the threshold showing and gauge its “substan- tial[ity]” to verify its jurisdiction. That inquiry would be largely duplicative of the merits question before the court. It follows that is nonjurisdictional as well. Like it too reflects a threshold condition for the issuance of a COA—the COA’s indication of “which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).” It too “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the [ap- —————— 4 The United States as amicus curiae contends that (2) is jurisdictional, but the State concedes that it is not. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. 8 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court peals] courts.” (internal quo- tation marks omitted). The unambiguous jurisdictional terms of § (b), and (c)(1) show that Congress would have spoken in clearer terms if it intended to have similar jurisdictional force. Instead, the contrast underscores that the failure to obtain a COA is jurisdictional, while a COA’s failure to indicate an issue is not. A defective COA is not equivalent to the lack of any COA. It is telling, moreover, that Congress placed the power to
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It is telling, moreover, that Congress placed the power to issue COAs in the hands of a “circuit justice or judge.”5 It would seem somewhat counterintuitive to render a panel of court of appeals judges powerless to act on ap- peals based on COAs that Congress specifically empow- ered one court of appeals judge to grant. Indeed, whereas (2)’s substantial-showing requirement at least de- scribes a burden that “the applicant” seeking a COA bears, ’s indication requirement binds only the judge issuing the COA. Notably, Gonzalez advanced both the timeliness and Sixth Amendment issues in his appli- cation for a COA. A petitioner, having successfully ob- tained a COA, has no control over how the judge drafts the COA and, as in Gonzalez’s case, may have done everything required of him by law. That fact would only compound the “unfai[r] prejudice” resulting from the sua sponte dismissals and remands that jurisdictional treatment would entail. Henderson, 562 U. S., at (slip op., at 5).6 —————— 5 The courts of appeals uniformly interpret “circuit justice or judge” to encompass district judges. See United States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1129 (collecting cases); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22(b). Habeas Corpus Rule 11(a) requires district judges to decide whether to grant or deny a COA in the first instance. 6 That fact also distinguishes the indication requirement from every “ ‘similar provisio[n]’ ” that the dissent claims we have deemed jurisdic- tional. Post, at 5–6. None of our cases addressing those provisions, moreover, recognized or relied on the sweeping “rule” that the dissent now invokes, whereby this Court should enforce as jurisdictional all Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court Treating as jurisdictional also would thwart Congress’ intent in AEDPA “to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. (slip op., at 16). The COA process screens out issues unworthy of judicial time and attention and ensures that frivolous claims are not assigned to merits panels. Once a judge has made the determination that a COA is warranted and resources are deployed in briefing and argument, however, the COA has fulfilled that gatekeeping function. Even if additional screening of already-issued COAs for defects could further winnow the cases before the courts of appeals, that would not outweigh the costs of further delay from the extra layer of review. This case, in which the alleged defect would be dispositive, exemplifies those inefficiencies; the State requests that we vacate and remand with instruc- tions to dismiss the appeal based on a defect that it raised for
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the appeal based on a defect that it raised for the first time in response to a petition for certiorari. And delay would be particularly fruitless in the numerous cases where, as here, the district court dis- missed the petition on procedural grounds and the court of appeals affirms, without having to address the omitted constitutional issue at all. —————— “procedural conditions for appealing a case from one Article III court to another.” ; but see, e.g., post, at 6–7, n. 2 (conceding that the “rule” does not apply to criminal appeals); Becker v. Montgomery, 2 U.S. 757, 763 (failure to sign notice of appeal is a nonjurisdictional omission). All the cases, meanwhile, involved time limits (save one involving Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1), which we address infra). In we emphasized our “century’s worth of precedent” for treating statutory time limits on appeals as jurisdictional, but even “Bowles did not hold that all statutory conditions imposing a time limit should be con- sidered jurisdictional,” Reed Elsevier, 559 U. S., at (slip op., at 12). This case, in any event, involves a different type of procedural condition. 10 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court B The State, aided by the United States as amicus curiae, makes several arguments in support of jurisdictional treatment of None is persuasive. First, the State notes that although does not speak in jurisdictional terms, it refers back to (1), which does. The State argues that it is as if (1) provided: “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifi- cate of appealability that shall indicate the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2), an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals.” The problem is that the statute provides no such thing. In- stead, Congress set off the requirements in distinct para- graphs and, rather than mirroring their terms, excluded the jurisdictional terms in one from the other. Notably, the State concedes that (2) is nonjurisdictional, even though it too cross-references (1) and is cross-referenced by Second, the State seizes on the word “shall” in arguing that an omitted indication renders the COA no COA at all. But calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection can be ignored. If a party timely raises the COA’s failure to indicate a constitutional issue, the court of appeals panel must address the defect by considering an amendment to the COA or remanding to the district judge for specification of the issues.7 This Court, moreover, has —————— 7 The dissent’s
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the issues.7 This Court, moreover, has —————— 7 The dissent’s insistence that there is “no practical, real-world effect” to treating this rule as mandatory, post, at 4, ignores the real world. Courts of appeals regularly amend COAs or remand for specification of issues, notwithstanding the supposed potential to “embarras[s] a colleague.” Post, at 5; see, e.g., 545 (amending COA to add issue); United (remanding for specifi- cation of issues). The government frequently alleges COA defects as grounds for dismissal (as the State did here, at this late stage), appar- Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court long “rejected the notion that ‘all mandatory prescriptions, however emphatic, are properly typed jurisdictional.’ ” Henderson, 562 U. S., at (slip op., at 9); see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U. S. (slip op., at 5) (statute’s reference to “shall” alone does not render statu- tory deadline jurisdictional). Nothing in ’s prescription establishes that an omitted indication should remain an open issue throughout the case. Third, the United States argues that the placement of in a section containing jurisdictional provisions signals that it too is jurisdictional. In characterizing certain requirements as nonjurisdictional, we have on occasion observed their “ ‘separat[ion]’ ” from jurisdictional provisions. E.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. (slip op., at 7); The converse, however, is not necessarily true: Mere prox- imity will not turn a rule that speaks in nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdictional hurdle. In fact, ’s proximity to § (b), and (c)(1) highlights the ab- sence of clear jurisdictional terms in Finally, the State analogizes a COA to a notice of ap- peal, pointing out that both a notice and its contents are jurisdictional prerequisites. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1) provides that a notice of appeal must: “(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal”; “(B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being ap- pealed”; and “(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.” We have held that “Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdic- tional in nature.” —————— ently not sharing the dissent’s concern that such efforts “yield nothing but additional litigation expenses.” Post, at 5; see, e.g., Porterfield, 258 F.3d, at ; Habeas petitioners, too, have every incentive to request that defects be resolved, not only to defuse potential problems later in the litigation, but also to ensure that the issue on which they sought appeal is certified and will receive full briefing and consideration. 12 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court We reject this analogy. We construed the content re- quirements for notices of
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analogy. We construed the content re- quirements for notices of appeal as jurisdictional because we were “convinced that the harshness of our construction [wa]s ‘imposed by the legislature.’ ” Rule 4, we noted, establishes mandatory time limits for filing a notice of appeal. Excusing a failure to name a party in a notice of appeal, in violation of Rule 3, would be “equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal,” in violation of Rule 4. And “time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century.” Accord- ingly, the Advisory Committee Note “makes no distinction among the various requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4,” treating them “as a single jurisdictional threshold.” 487 U.S., ; see also (“the Advisory Committee viewed the requirements of Rule 3 as jurisdic- tional in nature”). Here, we find no similar basis for treat- ing the paragraphs of as a single jurisdictional threshold. Moreover, in explaining why the naming requirement was jurisdictional in we reasoned that an unnamed party leaves the notice’s “intended recipient[s]”—the appellee and court—“unable to determine with certitude whether [that party] should be bound by an adverse judg- ment or held liable for costs or sanctions.” at The party could sit on the fence, await the outcome, and opt to participate only if it was favorable. That possibility of gamesmanship is not present here. Unlike the party who fails to submit a compliant notice of appeal, the habe- as petitioner who obtains a COA cannot control how that COA is drafted.8 And whereas a party’s failure to be —————— 8 The dissent claims that we fail to give stare decisis effect to Post, at 10. Setting aside the fact that involved an unrelated Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 13 Opinion of the Court named in a notice of appeal gives absolutely no “notice of [his or her] appeal,” a judge’s issuance of a COA reflects his or her judgment that the appeal should proceed and supplies the State with notice that the habeas litigation will continue. Because we conclude that is a nonjurisdic- tional rule, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to adju- dicate Gonzalez’s appeal. III We next consider whether Gonzalez’s habeas petition was time barred. AEDPA establishes a 1-year limitations period for state prisoners to file for federal habeas relief, which “run[s] from the latest of ” four specified dates.9 This case concerns the first of those dates: “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
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the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” The question before —————— Federal Rule featuring a different textual, contextual, and historical backdrop, the dissent notably fails to grapple with—indeed, its opinion is bereft of quotation to—any supporting reasoning in that opinion. That reasoning is simply not applicable here. 9 Title 28 U.S. C. provides: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— “(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; “(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application creat- ed by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; “(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recog- nized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or “(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 14 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court us is when the judgment becomes “final” if a petitioner does not appeal to a State’s highest court. A In construing the language of we do not write on a blank slate. In Clay v. United States, 7 U.S. 522 we addressed AEDPA’s statute of limitations for federal prisoners seeking postconviction relief. See (2006 ed., Supp. III) (beginning 1-year period of limitations from “the date on which the judgment of con- viction becomes final”). We held that the federal judgment becomes final “when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari,” or, if a petitioner does not seek certiorari, “when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.” at 527. In so holding, we rejected the argument that, if a petitioner declines to seek certiorari, the limitations peri- od “starts to run on the date the court of appeals issues its mandate.” In we described Clay’s interpretation as comporting “with the most natural reading of the statutory text” and saw “no reason to depart” from it in “construing the similar lan- guage of ” The state court had permitted
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similar lan- guage of ” The state court had permitted Jimenez to file an out-of-time direct appeal. We held that this “reset” the limitations period; Jimenez’s judgment would now become final at “the con- clusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking review of that [out-of-time] appeal.” –121. Because Jimenez did not seek certiorari, we made no mention of when the out-of-time appeal “con- clu[ded].” Rather, we held that his judgment became final when his “time for seeking certiorari review in this Court expired.” Nor did we mention the date on which the state court issued its mandate. Both Clay and Jimenez thus suggested that the direct review process Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 15 Opinion of the Court either “concludes” or “expires,” depending on whether the petitioner pursues or forgoes direct appeal to this Court. We now make clear what we suggested in those cases: The text of which marks finality as of “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” consists of two prongs. Each prong—the “conclusion of direct review” and the “expira- tion of the time for seeking such review”—relates to a distinct category of petitioners. For petitioners who pur- sue direct review all the way to this Court, the judgment becomes final at the “conclusion of direct review”—when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits or denies a petition for certiorari. For all other petitioners, the judg- ment becomes final at the “expiration of the time for seek- ing such review”—when the time for pursuing direct review in this Court, or in state court, expires. We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that because Gonzalez did not appeal to the State’s highest court, his judgment be- came final when his time for seeking review with the State’s highest court expired. B Gonzalez offers an alternative reading of (A): Courts should determine both the “conclusion of direct review” and the “expiration of the time for seeking such review” for every petitioner who does not seek certiorari, then start the 1-year clock from the “latest of ” the two dates. Gonzalez rejects our uniform definition of the “conclusion of direct review” as the date on which this Court affirms a conviction on the merits or denies a peti- tion for certiorari. In his view, whenever a petitioner does not seek certiorari, the “conclusion of direct review” is the date on which state law marks finality—in Texas, the date on which the mandate issues. Ex parte Johnson, 12 S.W. 3d 472, Applying this
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Gonzalez v. Thaler
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issues. Ex parte Johnson, 12 S.W. 3d 472, Applying this approach, Gonzalez contends that his habeas petition was 16 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court timely because his direct review “concluded” when the mandate issued (on September 26, 2006), later than the date on which his time for seeking Texas CCA review “expired” (August 11, 2006). We find his construction of the statute unpersuasive. First, Gonzalez lacks a textual anchor for his later- in-time approach. The words “latest of” do not appear anywhere in Rather, they appear in and refer to the “latest of” the dates in subpar- agraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D)—the latter three of which are inapplicable here. Nothing in (A) contem- plates any conflict between the “conclusion of direct re- view” and the “expiration of the time for seeking such review,” much less instructs that the later of the two shall prevail. Nor is Gonzalez’s later-in-time reading necessary to give both prongs of (A) full effect. Our reading does so by applying one “or” the other, depending on whether the direct review process concludes or expires. Treating the judgment as final on one date “or” the other is con- sistent with the disjunctive language of the provision. Second, Gonzalez misreads our precedents. Gonzalez asserts that in Jimenez, we made a later-in-time choice between the two prongs. That is mistaken. Rather, we chose between two “expiration” dates corresponding to different appeals: Jimenez initially failed to appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals and that appeal became final when his “time for seeking discretionary review ex- pired.” 119. When Jimenez was later allowed to file an out-of-time appeal, he pursued appeals with both the Texas Court of Appeals and Texas CCA; the out-of-time appeal thus became final when his “[t]ime for seeking certiorari review with this Court expired.” at 116, 120. We adopted the out-of-time appeal’s date of finality over the initial appeal’s date of finality. at 119–121. Critically, by deeming the initial appeal final at Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 17 Opinion of the Court the expiration of time for seeking review in state court, and the out-of-time appeal final at the expiration of time for seeking certiorari in this Court, we reinforced Clay’s suggestion that the “expiration” prong governs all peti- tioners who do not pursue direct review all the way to this Court.10 Third, Gonzalez argues that AEDPA’s federalism con- cerns and respect for state-law procedures mean that we should not read (A) to disregard state law. We agree. That is why a state court’s reopening of direct review will reset the limitations
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state court’s reopening of direct review will reset the limitations That is also why, just as we determine the “expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review” from this Court’s filing deadlines when petitioners forgo certiorari, we look to state-court filing deadlines when petitioners forgo state- court appeals. Referring to state-law procedures in that context makes sense because such deadlines are inherent- ly court specific. There is no risk of relying on “state-law rules that may differ from the general federal rule.” Clay, 7 U.S., at 1. By contrast, Gonzalez urges us to scour each State’s laws and cases to determine how it defines finality for every petitioner who forgoes a state-court appeal. That ap- proach would usher in state-by-state definitions of the con- clusion of direct review. It would be at odds with the uniform definition we adopted in Clay and accepted in the (A) context in Jimenez. And it would pose serious administrability concerns. Even if roughly “half of the States define the conclusion of direct review as the issuance of the mandate or similar process,” Brief for —————— 10 Gonzalez also argues that supports his focus on the state court’s issuance of the mandate because it referred to a mandate in determining when state postconvic- tion proceedings were no longer pending. Lawrence, however, is inap- posite. The case involved a different provision, 28 U.S. C. which by its terms refers to “State” procedures. 18 GONZALEZ v. THALER Opinion of the Court Petitioner 40, that still leaves half with either different rules or no settled rules at all.11 Fourth, Gonzalez speculates that our reading will rob some habeas petitioners of the full 1-year limitations pe- riod. Gonzalez asserts that our reading starts the clock running from the date that his time for seeking Texas CCA review expired, even though, under Texas law, he could not file for state habeas relief until six weeks later, on the date the Texas Court of Appeals issued its man- date. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 11.07, (Vernon Supp. 2011). His inability to initiate state habeas proceedings during those six weeks, he argues, reduced his 1-year federal habeas filing period by six weeks. We expect, however, that it will be a rare situation where a petitioner confronting similar state laws faces a delay in the mandate’s issuance so excessive that it prevents him or her from filing a federal habeas petition within a year.12 A petitioner who has exhausted his or her claims in state court need not await state habeas proceedings to seek federal habeas relief on those claims. To the
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to seek federal habeas relief on those claims. To the extent a petitioner has had his or her federal filing period severely truncated by a delay in the mandate’s issuance and has unexhausted claims that must be raised on state habeas review, such a petitioner could file a request for a stay and abeyance from the federal district court. See Rhines v. —————— 11 Compare, e.g., PSL Realty 304, ; 934 P.2d 12, (judgment is final when “opinion is filed with the clerk”), with Ex parte Johnson, (judgment is final at “issuance of the mandate”). 12 We note that Gonzalez waited four months from the date of the mandate’s issuance before filing a state habeas petition. See 6 F.3d, at 2. When that petition was dismissed as improperly filed, Gonzalez waited another three months before refiling. Even then, his state habeas proceedings concluded several weeks before his 1-year federal deadline elapsed. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 19 Opinion of the Court Weber, Finally, Gonzalez argues, as an alternative to his later- in-time construction, that his petition should be consid- ered timely because it was filed within a year of when his time for seeking this Court’s review—as opposed to the Texas CCA’s review—expired. We can review, however, only judgments of a “state court of last resort” or of a lower state court if the “state court of last resort” has denied discretionary review. This Court’s Rule 13.1; see also 28 U.S. C. (2006 ed.). Because Gonzalez did not appeal to the Texas CCA, this Court would have lacked jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari from the Texas Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Gonzalez’s conviction. We therefore decline to incorporate the 90-day period for seeking certiorari in determining when Gonzalez’s judg- ment became final. * * * In sum, we hold that is a mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule. Here, the COA’s failure to “indi- cate” a constitutional issue did not deprive the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal. We further hold that, with respect to a state prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judg- ment becomes “final” under (A) when the time for seeking such review expires—here, August 11, 2006. We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that Gonzalez’s federal habeas petition was time barred. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is Affirmed. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 1 SCALIA, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–895 RAFAEL ARRIAZA GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v.
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Hankerson v. North Carolina
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The issue in this case is whether the North Carolina Supreme Court correctly declined to give retroactive application to this Court's decision in I Petitioner Hankerson was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20-25 years in prison. It was conceded at his trial that petitioner killed a man named Gregory Ashe by shooting him through the heart with a pistol at 11 at night on September 29, 1974. The issue at trial was whether petitioner acted in self-defense. The relevant evidence is described below. Ashe and two friends, Dancy and Whitley, were, according to the testimony of the latter two, driving around in Ashe's *235 car on the evening of September 29. They went to a pool hall shortly before 11 p. m. and, on discovering that the pool hall was closed, returned to Ashe's car. The car would not start. Ashe asked his companions for a light for his cigarette, but neither had one. Whitley began walking to his home, which was one block away. Ashe and Dancy followed him. Then Ashe decided to return to his car to try to "crank" it. Dancy, according to his and Whitley's testimony, ran after Whitley. Both testified that they then heard a gunshot, heard Ashe yell that he had been shot, and saw petitioner's car speed away. Ashe's body was not found for an hour, and when it was, a fully burned cigarette was lodged between two fingers. Petitioner testified at trial that he had been driving his car very slowly because of holes in the road when someone asked him for a light. Through his mirror he saw two men. One, i. e., Ashe, walked up to the driver's window. Petitioner pushed his cigarette lighter in and gave it to Ashe. When the lighter was returned, petitioner felt the car shake and saw the other man at the other door, which was locked. Ashe then grabbed petitioner's shoulder with his right hand, and put a knife to petitioner's throat with his left hand. Petitioner then grabbed his gun and shot Ashe. The knife fell inside the car. Petitioner then drove away. Shortly after the murder, the knife was recovered by a policeman from petitioner's car. Petitioner readily admitted the shooting at that time and told a story to the policeman which was roughly equivalent to his trial testimony. The State then introduced evidence tending to prove that Ashe had never been seen with a knife of the type found in petitioner's car; that petitioner falsely claimed to the policeman who questioned him shortly after the
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Hankerson v. North Carolina
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claimed to the policeman who questioned him shortly after the shootingno longer to have possession of the gun; that Ashe was right handed, even though petitioner testified that the knife was wielded with Ashe's left hand; and that although petitioner had told police that Ashe had left a grease mark on his shirt *236 when Ashe grabbed him, Ashe had no grease on his hand when his body was examined. The State argued in its summation that Ashe would not still have had his cigarette in his hand when shot if he had, as petitioner testified, used two hands to attack petitioner. The jury was instructed, in part, as follows: "I charge that for you to find the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the State must prove two things beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that the defendant intentionally and without justification or excuse and with malice shot Gregory Ashe with a deadly weapon."[1] App. 9 The judge instructed the jury that self-defense constituted an excuse for an intentional killing.[2] However, he instructed the jury: "If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt or it is admitted that the defendant intentionally killed Gregory Ashe with a deadly weapon, or intentionally inflicted a wound upon Gregory Ashe with a deadly weapon, that proximately caused his death, the law raises two presumptions; first, that the killing was unlawful, and second, that it was done with malice. Then there will be some other things I will charge you about, but, nothing else appearing, if you are satisfied of those two things beyond a reasonable doubt then you would find the defendant guilty of second degree murder. ". [I]n order to excuse his act altogether on the grounds of self-defense, the defendant must prove not beyond a reasonable doubt but simply to your satisfaction *237 that he acted in self-defense."[3] The judge proceeded to instruct on the elements of self-defense.[4] No objection was made to any of these instructions *238 at the trial, and the jury found petitioner guilty of second-degree murder. Petitioner objected to the above-quoted portions of the instructions to the jury for the first time on direct review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. He argued that the instructions placed a burden on him to persuade the jury that he was not guilty, by proving that the killing was not unlawful; and he claimed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed in required that the State persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to all elements of the crime, including that of unlawfulnesshere the absence
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Hankerson v. North Carolina
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elements of the crime, including that of unlawfulnesshere the absence of self-defense. The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that unlawfulness was an essential ingredient of the crime, and ruled that under this Court's recently decided cases, the Due Process Clause required that the jury be instructed in a case such as this that the State must persuade it beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense. Under the presumptions contained in the trial judge's instructions, once an intentional killing with a deadly weapon had been shown, petitioner had the burden to "satisfy" the jury that he had acted in self-defense. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that a burden to "satisfy" the jurors of a fact is not "significantly less" than a burden to persuade them of the fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court therefore held that the charge was erroneous under this Court's decision in which required the *239 State to establish all elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt and which, despite longstanding practice to the contraryas in North Carolina since 1864invalidated presumptions that shifted the burden of proof with respect to such elements to the defendant. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated the rule for future cases: "If there is evidence in the case of all the elements of self-defense, the mandatory presumption of unlawfulness disappears but the logical inferences from the facts proved may be weighed against this evidence. If upon considering all the evidence, including the inferences and evidence of self-defense, the jury is left with a reasonable doubt as to the existence of unlawfulness it must find the defendant not guilty." 288 N. C., at 651-652, Petitioner's conviction was nevertheless affirmed, for it was concluded that the constitutional rule announced in Mullaney was inapplicable in this case because it was handed down after the conclusion of petitioner's trial.[5] In declining to apply to trials occurring before the date on which it was decided, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that in Ivan V. v. City of New we held fully retroactive our earlier decision in In re Winship, to the effect that the Federal Constitution requires the States to apply the reasonable-doubt standard of proof in juvenile proceedings. It also recognized that, as in Ivan V., it was dealing with a constitutional rule the primary purpose of which was to prevent the erroneous conviction of innocent persons. Even so, the court concluded that the retroactive application of Mullaney would have a devastating impact on the administration of justice in this country in view of the number
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Hankerson v. North Carolina
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of justice in this country in view of the number of murderers who would be releasedmany of whom could not now be retiredin the *240 eight States that the court identified as placing the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant. Accordingly, it declined to apply Mullaney to trials occurring before the date on which it was decided. This Court granted Hankerson's petition for a writ of certiorari, which raised the single question whether Mullaney should be held retroactive. The State of North Carolina has filed an answering brief in which it argues (1) that the North Carolina Supreme Court was correct in holding Mullaney not retroactive; and (2) that in any event the judgment below should be affirmed because the instructions given in this case did leave the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution, or at least did not require the accused to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence in contravention of Mullaney. These are the only two issues before this Court, and we treat them in order.[6] II The Supreme Court of North Carolina erred in declining to hold retroactive the rule in In Ivan V. v. City of New this Court addressed the question whether our decision in In re Winship, holding the reasonable-doubt standard applicable to *241 state juvenile proceedingswas to be applied retroactively. The Court there said: "`Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.' See ; "Winship expressly held that the reasonable-doubt standard `is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary" principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law". "Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt." To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."' -364. "Plainly, then, the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced
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Hankerson v. North Carolina
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the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Winship was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect." 407 U.S., *242 Ivan V. controls this case. In as in In re Winship, the Court held that due process requires the States in some circumstances to apply the reasonable-doubt standard of proof rather than some lesser standard under which an accused would more easily lose his liberty. In Mullaney, as in Winship, the rule was designed to diminish the probability that an innocent person would be convicted and thus to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that "substantially impairs the truth-finding function." Respondent and the North Carolina Supreme Court seek to avoid the force of Ivan V. on two grounds. First, the North Carolina Supreme Court thought that the State had justifiably relied upon the validity of the burden-shifting presumptions flowing from intentional killing with a deadly weapon before whereas the State in Ivan V. should have known, even before Winship, that the reasonable-doubt standard of proof would be held applicable to juvenile proceedings. Second, it viewed the retroactive impact of the Mullaney rule on the administration of justice as far more devastating than the retroactive impact of Winship. Winship involved only juveniles, while Mullaney would affect the convictions of murderers. Respondent recognizes that Ivan V. did not rely on the absence of reliance by the State on pre-Winship law or on the absence of a devastating impact on the administration of justice. However, respondent claims that in deciding whether a new constitutional rule is to be applied retroactively, the Court has traditionally inquired not only, as in Ivan V., into the purpose of the rule but also into the extent of the State's justified reliance on the old rule and the impact that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. See, e. g., ; ; ; It claims that *243 even where the purpose of the new rule is to improve the "integrity of the factfinding process," the rule has been held nonretroactive when the impact of the new rule on the administration of justice would otherwise be devastating and when the States have justifiably relied on the old rule. See, e. g., that counsel be present at a pretrial lineup); that counsel be present at a preliminary hearing). The force of Ivan V. may not be avoided so easily. It is true that we have said that the question of whether the purpose
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we have said that the question of whether the purpose of a new constitutional rule is to enhance the integrity of the factfinding process is a question of "degree," ; and when the degree to which the rule enhances the integrity of the factfinding process is sufficiently small, we have looked to questions of reliance by the State on the old rule and the impact of the new rule on the administration of justice in deciding whether the new rule is to be applied retroactively. ; ; But we have never deviated from the rule stated in Ivan V. that "`[W]here the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule [is] given complete retroactive effect.'" The reasonable-doubt standard of proof is as "substantial"[7] a *244 requirement under Mullaney as it was in Winship. Respondent's attempt to distinguish Ivan V. is without merit.[8] III Respondent next argues in support of the judgment below that the instruction in this casethat the defendant must "satisfy" the jury that he acted in self-defenseis the equivalent of an instruction that the jury should acquit if it entertains a reasonable doubt on the subject, or is so nearly the equivalent of such an instruction that it is not in violation of the rule announced in Mullaney, where the burden impermissibly placed on the defendant was to persuade the jury by a preponderance of the evidence. Respondent's argument is squarely contrary to the construction given by the North Carolina Supreme Court to the jury charge in this case. That court concluded that a burden to "satisfy" the jury of self-defense places a burden on a defendant "no greater and at the same time one not significantly less than persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence." 288 N. C., at 648, The Court has no basis for disagreeing with this interpretation of the charge, which is essentially a question of *245 state law. Since the issue of whether due process requires the prosecution to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt under North Carolina law was not raised by either party in this case, we decline to consider it now. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR.
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United States v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
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We are concerned here with certain features of what appears to be the final stage of the long-continuing and sometimes strained controversy between the United States and the State of Louisiana over the proceeds of mineral leases on lands off *255 Louisiana's Gulf Coast. Specifically at issue are the asserted obligation of the United States for interest on, or for the value of the use of, impounded funds that have been awarded and paid to Louisiana, and the asserted obligation of Louisiana to account to the United States for certain unimpounded lease revenues received by the State. I Litigation between the United States and the State of Louisiana over rights in lands submerged in the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast began over 30 years ago, in 1948, when the United States moved this Court, under its original jurisdiction, for leave to file a complaint. The Government prayed for a decree (a) declaring rights of the United States as against Louisiana over lands "underlying the Gulf of Mexico, lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of Louisiana and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward twenty-seven marine miles and bounded on the east and west, respectively, by the eastern and western boundaries of the State of Louisiana," and (b) requiring that Louisiana account to the United States for money received by the State after June 23, 1947, from the area so designated. Over opposition, the requested leave was granted. United Louisiana was directed to answer. The State, however, filed a demurrer and motions to dismiss and for other relief. These were overruled and denied. Louisiana then did answer, placing in issue the claims of the United States and asserting affirmative defenses. The plaintiff's responsive motion for judgment was set down for argument. The Court ruled that United then recently decided, controlled the Louisiana litigation. In that case, the Court had held that California was not the owner of the marginal belt along its coast beyond the low-water mark, and that the Federal Government *256 had primary rights in and power over that belt. The rationale, it was said, was that "[n]ational rights must therefore be paramount in that area." A decree was entered enunciating the United States' possession of "paramount rights" and Louisiana's lack of "title thereto or property interest therein"; enjoining Louisiana from carrying on activities in the area for the purpose of taking petroleum, gas, or other mineral products without authority first obtained from the United States; and stating that the United States was entitled to an accounting from Louisiana of sums derived by
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entitled to an accounting from Louisiana of sums derived by the State from the area since June 5, 1950 (the date of the Court's opinion). A like decree was entered in a companion case against Texas. United The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S. C. 1301 et seq., passed May 22, 1953, came in response to these rulings. By that statute, the United States released to the coastal States its rights in the submerged lands within stated limits and confirmed its own rights therein seaward of those limits. The Act was sustained as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to dispose of federal property. The passage of the Act, however, did not end the controversy. Opposing claims continued to be asserted, and Louisiana continued to conduct leasing activities with respect to submerged lands in the disputed area. Accordingly, in 1956, the United States sought and was granted leave to file a complaint in a new suit (the present litigation) against Louisiana. In response to this ruling, on October 12, 1956, the parties entered into an Interim Agreement designed to permit further development of the submerged lands in dispute. Interpretation of this agreement is the central task of this *257 opinion. The lawsuit continued, and in 1957 the other Gulf States in effect were requested to intervene. In due course this Court held, among other things, that the Submerged Lands Act granted Louisiana ownership "to a distance no greater than three geographical miles from its coastlines, wherever those lines may ultimately be shown to be." A "Final Decree" was entered accordingly. That decree, like the one of 1950 in the earlier litigation, confirmed in the United States as against Louisiana all the land, minerals, and other natural resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico more than three geographic miles seaward from the coastline; recited that Louisiana had no interest therein and was enjoined from interfering with the rights of the United States; stated that as against the United States Louisiana was entitled to all the lands, minerals, and other natural resources underlying the Gulf extending seaward from its coastline three geographic miles, and that the United States was not entitled to any interest therein (with a stated exception inapplicable here); and provided that whenever the location of the coastline of Louisiana should be agreed upon or determined, the State was to render the United States an appropriate accounting of all sums derived by it since June 5, 1950, "either by sale, leasing, licensing, exploitation or otherwise from or on account of any of the lands or resources [decreed to the United States] provided,
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the lands or resources [decreed to the United States] provided, however, that as to the State of Louisiana the allocation, withdrawal and payment of any funds now impounded under the Interim Agreement between the United States and the State of Louisiana, dated October 12, 1956, shall, subject to the terms hereof, be made in accordance with the appropriate provisions of said Agreement." at 503. On December 13, 1965, a supplemental decree was entered. It generally reconfirmed the respective rights of the United States and Louisiana as theretofore determined; released to the United States all sums held impounded by it *258 under the Interim Agreement and attributable to the lands confirmed in the United States; released to Louisiana all sums held impounded by it under that agreement and attributable to the lands confirmed in the State; directed, within 75 days, the payments required of the respective parties, and an accounting from each of sums attributable to lands confirmed in the other, ; and retained jurisdiction particularly with respect "to the remainder of the disputed area," The determination of the exact location of the Louisiana coastline remained for resolution. In United this Court held that Congress had left to the courts the task of defining "inland waters," and the Court adopted for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act the definitions contained in the international Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ratified by the United States in 1961. [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2) 1607, T. I. A. S. No. 5639. In the present litigation, in March 1969, the Court held that that part of Louisiana's coastline which, under the Submerged Lands Act, consists of "the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters," see 43 U.S. C. 1301 (c), is also to be drawn in accordance with the definitions of the Convention. It decided to refer to a Special Master particularized disputes over the precise boundary between the submerged lands belonging to the United States and those belonging to Louisiana. A second supplemental decree was entered December 20, 1971. That decree, among other things, determined that the United States had exclusive rights to an area of the Continental Shelf lying more than one foot seaward of a line therein described; recited that sums held impounded by the United States under the Interim Agreement and derived from those lands were released to the United States, ; and provided that leases of lands lying partly within that area and partly landward thereof were not affected *259 by the decree, so that revenues derived therefrom were to remain subject to impoundment,
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that revenues derived therefrom were to remain subject to impoundment, Still a third supplemental decree was entered October 16, 1972. By this decree, the Court ruled that, with a stated exception, Louisiana was entitled to all lands, minerals, and other natural resources lying more than one foot landward of a line therein described and seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the Louisiana shore, ; that leases of land partly within that area and partly seaward thereof were not affected by the decree, so that revenues derived therefrom were to remain subject to impoundment; and that all sums held impounded by Louisiana or the United States under the Interim Agreement derived from leases of lands wholly within areas allotted to Louisiana were released to that State, The Special Master thereafter filed his report dated July 31, 1974. Exceptions to that report made by the United States and by Louisiana, respectively, were overruled, the Special Master's recommendations were accepted, and the parties were directed to prepare and file a proposed decree establishing "a baseline along the entire coast of the State of Louisiana." The parties were able to agree, and a fourth supplemental decree was entered June 16, 1975. Exclusive rights were affirmed in the respective parties in areas lying landward or seaward of a line three geographical miles seaward of the baseline, and impounded sums were released accordingly. Cross-payments within 90 days and cross-accountings within 60 days were ordered. The decree recited: "It is understood that the parties may be unable to agree on whether interest may be due on funds impounded pursuant to the Interim Agreement of October 12, 1956." The required accountings were filed and referred to the Special Master. The Master held hearings on the accountings and on the objections that were interposed. He now has filed his supplemental *260 report dated August 27, 19. Louisiana and the United States have each filed exceptions to that report. II As was observed at the beginning of this opinion, the parties and this Court should be near the end of this long-enduring litigation. The territorial dispute has been resolved. The boundary between federal and state submerged lands, except for the formal entry of yet another supplemental decree describing that boundary, has been fixed. And each party has been directed to account for revenues derived from areas adjudicated to the other sovereign. The Special Master's supplemental report recites the filing of the several accountings by Louisiana and by the United States; the respective objections made to those accountings; the agreements reached by the parties; and the fact that three issues
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United States v. Louisiana
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reached by the parties; and the fact that three issues remain unresolved. As phrased by the Master, these issues are: First issueIs the United States obligated to account for and pay to the State of Louisiana either the value of the use of Louisiana's share of the impounded funds or interest upon that portion of those funds? Second issueDoes Louisiana have the obligation to account for revenues received by it from mineral leases on areas lying within Zone 1? Third issueDoes Louisiana have the obligation to account for as unimpounded funds and to pay to the United States money collected by it as severance taxes on minerals removed from areas subsequently determined to belong to the United States? The Master's ruling on each issue was in the negative. He has recommended that all exceptions to the accountings be overruled, and that the accountings be approved as filed. Before this Court, Louisiana has filed exceptions only to the Special Master's recommendations as to the first stated *261 issue. The United States has filed exceptions only as to the second stated issue. The Master's recommendations as to the third stated issue, concerning money collected by Louisiana as severance taxes, thus are not the subject of any exceptions here.[1] In the absence of present controversy we accept the Special Master's recommendations on that issue. We consider the exceptions to the other issues in turn. III The First Stated Issue The Interim Agreement of October 12, 1956, between the United States and Louisiana, referred to in this Court's "Final Decree" of December 12, 1960, see came into being after the Court, on June 11, 1956, had provided: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Louisiana and the United States of America are enjoined from leasing or beginning the drilling of new wells in the disputed tidelands area pending further order of this Court unless by agreement of the parties filed here." The Interim Agreement recites that the parties "desire to provide for the impoundment of sums payable under mineral leases in the disputed area, pending the final settlement or adjudication of the said controversy." App. to Reply Brief for Louisiana 9a. It divided the submerged lands off the Louisiana coast into four zones therein described. The zone contiguous to the coastline was designated as Zone 1, the next most seaward as Zone 2, the next as Zone 3, and the most *262 seaward as Zone 4. at 10a-11a. It described the area comprising Zones 2 and 3 as the "disputed area," at 11a, and it conferred upon the United States (with certain exceptions)
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United States v. Louisiana
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and it conferred upon the United States (with certain exceptions) the responsibility for collecting receipts from the disputed zones, at 26a-27a. By ¶ 7 (a), the United States agreed (with exclusions not material here) "to impound in a separate fund in the Treasury of the United States a sum equal to all payments heretofore or hereafter paid to it for and on account of each lease, or part thereof, in Zones 2 and 3." at 14a. Certain other payments were to be impounded by Louisiana. Paragraph 9 of the agreement then provides: "[T]he impounded funds provided for herein shall be held intact, in a separate account for each lease or portion thereof affected, by each party until title to the area affected is determined. Whereupon, except as otherwise herein provided: "(b) Any funds derived from an area finally determined to be owned by the State of Louisiana [with an exception not here material] shall be taken from the separate and impounded fund in the Treasury of the United States provided for herein," and paid to the appropriate officer of Louisiana. at 18a-19a. Pursuant to these provisions of the Interim Agreement, the United States collected and retained payments on mineral leases for operations within the designated disputed area. As a consequence of the first supplemental decree, entered December 13, 1965, see 382 U.S., the United States paid Louisiana some $34 million of impounded funds. Indeed, with an additional payment of some $136 million in 1975, pursuant to the supplemental decree of June 16, 1975, see -15, all payments due Louisiana from the funds impounded by the United States have been made. But *263 the United States has not paid Louisiana any interest on the funds so impounded, and has not made any payment for the use of those funds while they were held in the United States Treasury. Louisiana asserts a claim for such interest, apparently approximating $88 million, or for the value of the use of the money during the period of impoundment, and the United States resists these claims. Louisiana's position is at least fourfold: (1) The impoundment provisions of the Interim Agreement implied a trust that imposed on the United States the fiduciary duty of a trustee in its handling of the impounded funds. It is said that an escrow arrangement in fact was established. The presence of a trust is evident from the conduct and relationship of the parties, from documentary evidence, and from admissions by federal officials. (2) The United States used Louisiana's money for its own purposes and without authority under the Interim Agreement. The
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own purposes and without authority under the Interim Agreement. The funds were deposited in the general account of the Treasurer of the United States where they were available, and used, to meet cash needs of the Federal Government. (3) The United States had the duty to invest the impounded funds for the benefit of both parties. This duty is implied from the provisions of the agreement; is imposed upon the United States as a trustee as a matter of law; was breached by the refusal of the United States to honor a request by Louisiana to invest the funds; is supported by the provisions of 31 U.S. C. 547a to the effect that "[a]ll funds held in trust by the United States shall be invested" in interest-bearing securities; and is not limited by the supplemental decree of June 16, 1975. (4) Equitable remedies to prevent the unjust enrichment of the United States at the expense of Louisiana are appropriate. We find no merit in any of Louisiana's contentions. The Interim Agreement provided only that the payments made to the United States on each lease within the disputed area were to be impounded "in a separate fund in the Treasury of the United States" and, upon determination of the ownership *264 of the land, were to be taken from that separate and impounded fund and paid to the party entitled to them. The agreement contains no express provision for the payment of interest or for the use of the funds or for investment. Neither do we find anything in the agreement's use of the word "impound" or, indeed, in Louisiana's characterization of the arrangement as an escrow (a word that does not appear in the agreement), that implies an obligation on the part of the United States to pay interest or to pay for the use of the money. The word "impound," in its application to funds, means to take or retain in "the custody of the law." Black's Law Dictionary 681 (5th ed., 19); Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1515 (8th ed., 1914). That obligation, as is an escrow, is to hold and deliver property intact. What actually happened here, of course, was that, as the funds were paid to the United States, the lessees' checks were cashed and the resulting cash was commingled with general funds of the Treasury and used in governmental operations. A separate account, No. 14X6709, nonetheless, was established on the books of the Treasury for these payments, and a credit entry covered every receipt from the disputed area. The United States did not stockpile that inflowing cash
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United States v. Louisiana
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area. The United States did not stockpile that inflowing cash in a far corner of the Government vaults. But the special account was maintained and it accurately recorded the increasing potential liability of the United States to Louisiana. This was much more than a recordkeeping device. The receipts were never treated as governmental revenues. The recognition of a contingent liability, corresponding to the cash deposited, enabled the United States to make prompt payment to Louisiana without special congressional authorization or appropriation. There was no proof or even suggestion that at any time there were insufficient funds in the United States Treasury to pay any amount that might be determined to be due Louisiana from the impoundment. Apart from constitutional requirements, in the absence of specific provision by contract or statute, or "express consent *265. by Congress," interest does not run on a claim against the United States. ; ; United See also 28 U.S. C. 2516. It follows that the same is true as to any claim of duty to invest. We are persuaded, also, that the omission, in the Interim Agreement, of any provision for interest was a conscious one. When the agreement was signed in 1956, almost $60 million in disputed revenues already had accumulated. The importance of any interest obligation was obvious. And pertinent here is the fact that two of Louisiana's negotiators candidly conceded that they did not insist on an interest clause because they knew the United States would not agree to one. Tr. 70, 95, 98, 99, 102, 103, 163. Nor does Louisiana's intimation that it was willing to pass the matter in silence because the agreement was expected to be short lived carry weight. The agreement itself no term, and, in its ¶ 13, it provided for operations after a year had elapsed. We note, too, that Louisiana is not in a position to assert that it was unaware that the funds were not invested or that it did not know that the United States held itself not responsible for interest. The State received regular monthly reports of the amounts credited to the impounded account, as the agreement's ¶ 8 required. Those reports reflected no interest. Louisiana accepted the $34 million distribution, made pursuant to the 1965 decree, without complaint about the absence of interest. And communications flowed from officers of the State and its representatives in Congress, suggesting the deposit of some of the funds in Louisiana banks, presumably so that they might enjoy the free use of those funds. The Louisiana Legislature, it is true, on June 6, 1967, by House
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
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Legislature, it is true, on June 6, 1967, by House Concurrent Resolution No. 251, did call upon the United States "to take such steps as are necessary to effect a prudent and effective investment of the funds now and hereafter *266 so " See 1967 Louisiana Legislative Calendar 161-162. The quoted language, however, was only precatory and suggestive; it was not demanding. At most, it amounted to a request for a change of status. A Treasury official, pleading absence of authority, promptly returned a negative answer. In fact, Louisiana apparently never took the position that it was entitled to interest upon, or payment for the use of, its share of the impounded funds until 1975 when it filed its objections to the accounting. And Louisiana made no request for modification of the Interim Agreement. The State thus acquiesced for two decades. We conclude that the United States fulfilled the obligations imposed upon it by the agreement; that the impoundment served its intended purpose; that there is no liability on the part of the United States for interest or for the use of the funds; and that the United States has no further obligation for payment beyond those it has performed. IV The Second Stated Issue This issue concerns money paid to Louisiana by oil and gas lessees since 1950 in respect to Zone 1 areas now adjudicated to the United States. Louisiana asserts a right permanently to retain that money. The amount involved is some $19 million.[2] *267 During the past three decades these federal lands have been administered by Louisiana. Before the Interim Agreement of 1956, Louisiana acted unilaterally in leasing those areas; after that date, it acted with the acquiescence of the United States given by the agreement. The Special Master concluded that, by permitting Louisiana to administer Zone 1, the United States waived its rights to demand an accounting of, and payment with respect to, the revenues derived from its lands in the Zone. The Master did acknowledge that the very opposite result "would certainly be the case in the absence of any adjudication or agreement between the parties to the contrary." Supplemental Report 15. He found a waiver on the part of the United States, however, that centered in a provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S. C. 1336, which he read as foreclosing the federal claim to the money. He noted that the Interim Agreement contained no specific language regarding payments derived from leases on areas lying within Zone 1 or Zone 4, although it did with respect to revenues derived from
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Louisiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
|
4, although it did with respect to revenues derived from leases on areas lying within Zones 2 and 3. He stressed ¶ 6 of the agreement, which provided that notwithstanding any adverse claim, Louisiana, as to any area in Zone 1 (and the United States, as to any area in Zone 4), "shall have exclusive supervision and administration, and may issue new leases and authorize the drilling of new wells and other operations without notice to or obtaining the consent of the other party." App. to Reply Brief for Louisiana 14a. Louisiana, in fact, collected rentals on mineral leases on areas in Zone 1. The United States did not question Louisiana's right to do so. The Master observed that Louisiana anticipated the possibility that some portions of Zone 1, upon which it granted leases, might ultimately be adjudged to belong to the United States, for it inserted in almost all the leases a provision to the effect that it was granting the right to extract minerals only from those parts of the leasehold areas owned by Louisiana. The conclusion the Master drew was that Louisiana was entitled to *268 keep all rentals derived prior to the entry of the supplemental decree of June 16, 1975, from leases upon areas lying within Zone 1, and that the United States had no right to recover them. We are constrained to disagree with the Special Master on this issue. We accept the submission of the United States that the "ground rules" of the controversy were laid down in 1950. The Court's very first decree, issued December 11, 1950, that the United States was entitled to an accounting from Louisiana of all sums derived by the State from lands adjudicated to the United States. This was a principle laid down independently of the not-yet-enacted Submerged Lands Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The principle had its roots in the Court's decision in United The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 did not change the ground It released and "confirmed" a coastal belt to the coastal States, and the United States thereby "release[d] and relinquishe[d] all claims of the United States for money arising out of [past] operations" within the belt. 43 U.S. C. 1311 (b) (1). For areas seaward of that belt, however, the States' obligation to account and pay remained unchanged. This Court's decision of May 31, 1960, in the second suit, was unambiguous on this matter, and the Court made plain the continued vitality of the original ground 83, and n. 140. The cited footnote stated flatly: "On June 5, 1950, the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Louisiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
|
The cited footnote stated flatly: "On June 5, 1950, the date of this Court's decision in the Louisiana and Texas cases, all coastal States were put on notice that the United States was possessed of paramount rights in submerged lands lying seaward of their respective coasts. [T]he United States remains entitled to an accounting for all sums derived since June 5, 1950, from lands not so relinquished [by the Sub-merged Lands Act]." *269 The preceding Interim Agreement of October 1956 was forced into being by continuing conflict, by an injunction obtained by Louisiana in its courts, and by the injunction issued by this Court on June 11, 1956. See As we have noted, the agreement divided the submerged lands into the four zones hereinabove described. The first, nearest the shore, was to be administered by Louisiana. The others were to be administered by the United States, except for certain leases already granted by Louisiana in Zone 2 and the requirement of state concurrence for any new leasing in that zone. Receipts from Zones 2 and 3 were to be "" No such impoundment obligation, however, was imposed on the United States with respect to Zone 4 or upon Louisiana with respect to Zone 1. It turned out that the seaward boundary of Louisiana's submerged lands, as finally determined, does not coincide with the line that divided Zones 1 and 2. The final boundary meanders back and forth across the agreement's line between those two Zones producing bulges on each side. Louisiana has been successful in some of its claims to lands within Zone 2, and the United States has accounted for and paid over funds received from those areas. Yet Louisiana denies any corresponding obligation to account for and pay over revenues it received from those portions of Zone 1 that the United States has successfully claimed. Louisiana asserts that the United States, by the Interim Agreement, waived and abandoned its right to revenues from Zone 1 during the life of the agreement. The agreement itself contains no express words of waiver. On the other hand, neither does it provide specifically for eventual repayment of any revenues from portions of Zone 1 ultimately adjudicated to the United States. But the agreement does recite: "nor shall any provision hereof be the basis for waiving in any manner any right, interest, claim, or demand whatsoever of either party now pending in the proceedings above referred *270 to, or otherwise." App. to Reply Brief for Louisiana 9a. And it further recites that the baseline from which the several zones were measured had not
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Louisiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
|
baseline from which the several zones were measured had not been surveyed or finally fixed, and that no inference was to be drawn from the use of that baseline. at 10a. These provisions of the agreement persuade us that each party specifically was reserving any monetary claims it might have outside Zones 2 and 3. It was to be expected, of course, that most of Zone 1 would ultimately be adjudicated to Louisiana. This fact accounts for the decision to permit the State to enjoy, for the interim, the revenues from that area.[3] The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was the complement of the Submerged Lands Act, for it provided in detail for the administration of federal submerged lands lying beyond those granted to the coastal States. It authorized an agreement with a State "respecting operations under existing mineral leases" and the issuance of new leases "pending the settlement or adjudication" of a controversy as to ultimate ownership. 43 U.S. C. 1336. This provision is referred to in the Interim Agreement, and it is the one on which the Special Master focused his attention. The Master placed particular stress on the following sentence in the statute: "Payments made pursuant to such agreement, or pursuant to any stipulation between the United States and a State, shall be considered as compliance with section 1335 (a) (4) of this title." The Master viewed the payments made by Louisiana's lessees in Zone 1 as governed by this language and concluded *271 that any federal claim with respect to those payments was foreclosed. We do not so read that sentence. The provision, we feel, means no more than that a lessee is not in default so long as the agreement remains in effect and he makes the payments required by it. The Act protects the lessee. Whatever the lessee's ultimate obligation, if any, to the United States might turn out to be, there is no basis for reading into 1336 a waiver by the United States of Louisiana's independent duty to account, or a waiver of any claim for money due the United States. The State's obligation does not derive from the Shelf Lands Act; it was imposed by this Court's 1950 decree, was not waived by the Interim Agreement, and is not excused by the quoted provision of the Shelf Lands Act. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that until 1975 the actions of the parties and the rulings of this Court consistently indicate that this was the common understanding. The 1960 decree was prepared by the parties at the invitation of the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Louisiana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
|
was prepared by the parties at the invitation of the The decree itself recognized that once the coastline was determined, Louisiana was to account and to The decree of December 13, 1965, although distinguishing between impounded and nonimpounded funds, contained no waiver of any obligation relating to receipts that were not This Court's decision of March 17, 1975, and the implementing decree of June 16, 1975, recognized that in some places the true limit of Louisiana's submerged lands was shoreward of the Zone 1 line. That decree, also, was proposed by the parties at the invitation of the 420 U.S., at It declared rights divided by a boundary line which, in many places, did not correspond with the seaward edge of Zone 1. It required each party to account for and to pay over impounded revenues attributable to lands adjudicated to the 422 U.S., -16. We see no reason to conclude that those accounting provisions were included only for informational *272 purposes, rather than to spell out the parties' pecuniary obligations.[4] V In summary: We accept, upon acquiescence of the parties, the Special Master's recommendations that Louisiana has no obligation to account for and to pay to the United States money collected by it as severance taxes on minerals removed from areas adjudicated to the United States. We agree with and accept the Special Master's recommendations that the United States is not obligated to account for and pay Louisiana either the value of the use of Louisiana's share of the impounded funds or interest upon that portion of those funds. We therefore overrule Louisiana's exceptions to the supplemental report of the Special Master. We disagree with and do not accept the Special Master's recommendations with respect to Louisiana's obligation to account for revenues derived by it from mineral leases on areas within Zone 1 adjudicated to the United States. Instead, we sustain the exception of the United States and rule that Louisiana does have the obligation to account for such revenues received by it. Subject to this ruling, the respective accountings are approved as filed. We leave to the Special Master and the parties the determination of the final amount due and owing, and of the *273 method of payment. The case is remanded to the Special Master for further proceedings. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court's opinion except with respect to its
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,980 | 11 |
majority
|
United States v. Louisiana
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110252/united-states-v-louisiana/
|
concur in the Court's opinion except with respect to its disposition of the "second stated issue." Ante, at 266-272. As framed by the Special Master, the second issue is whether Louisiana has "the obligation to account for revenues received by it from mineral leases on areas lying within Zone 1." Ante, at 260. The Special Master found that the State had no such obligation. The United States filed an exception, and the Court sustains it. I would accept the recommendations of the Master on all three issues, including his finding that Louisiana has no obligation to account for revenues derived from Zone 1. The latter finding certainly is not free from doubt, but the able Master has a more intimate familiarity with this "long-continuing and sometimes strained controversy," ante, at 254, than an appellate judge possibly can acquire by studying only the available record. Although we have the duty to make an independent judgment, I cannot conclude that the Master's finding on the second stated issue is erroneous. Accordingly, I dissent on this issue.
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
|
O'CONNOR v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118014/oconnor-v-consolidated-coin-caterers-corp/
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This case presents the question whether a plaintiff alleging that he was discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 621 et seq., must show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA to make out a prima facie case under the framework established by McDonnell Douglas Petitioner James O'Connor was employed by respondent Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation from 1978 until August 10, 1990, when, at age 56, he was fired. Claiming that he had been dismissed because of his age in violation of the ADEA, petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. After discovery, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, and petitioner *310 appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that petitioner could establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas only if he could prove that (1) he was in the age group protected by the ADEA; (2) he was discharged or demoted; (3) at the time of his discharge or demotion, he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) following his discharge or demotion, he was replaced by someone of comparable qualifications outside the protected class. Since petitioner's replacement was 40 years old, the Court of Appeals concluded that the last element of the prima facie case had not been made out.[1] Finding that petitioner's claim could not survive a motion for summary judgment without benefit of the McDonnell Douglas presumption (i. e., "under the ordinary standards of proof used in civil cases," ), the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of dismissal. We granted O'Connor's petition for certiorari. In McDonnell Douglas, we "established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases." St. Mary's Honor We held that a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., could establish a prima facie case by showing "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [the] complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, * Once the plaintiff has met this initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the employer "to articulate
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
|
O'CONNOR v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118014/oconnor-v-consolidated-coin-caterers-corp/
|
the burden of production shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." If the trier of fact finds that the elements of the prima facie case are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the employer remains silent, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor and n. 3; Texas Dept. of Community In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others,[2] has applied some variant of the basic evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it. Cf. St. Mary's Honor at n. 1 (assuming that "the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable to racial-discrimination-inemployment claims under 42 U.S. C. 1983"). On that assumption, the question presented for our determination is what elements must be shown in an ADEA case to establish the prima facie case that triggers the employer's burden of production. As the very name "prima facie case" suggests, there must be at least a logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for which it *312 establishes a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," at n. 7. The element of replacement by someone under 40 fails this requirement. The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is discrimination "because of [an] individual's age," 29 U.S. C. 623(a)(1), though the prohibition is "limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age," 631(a). This language does not ban discrimination against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination against employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those who are 40 or older. The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age. Or to put the point more concretely, there can be no greater inference of age discrimination (as opposed to "40 or over" discrimination) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a 39-year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old. Because it lacks probative value, the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Perhaps some courts have been induced to adopt the principle urged by respondent in order to avoid creating a prima facie case on
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
majority
|
O'CONNOR v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118014/oconnor-v-consolidated-coin-caterers-corp/
|
in order to avoid creating a prima facie case on the basis of very thin evidencefor example, the replacement of a 68-year-old by a 65-year-old. While the respondent's principle theoretically permits such thin evidence (consider the example above of a 40-year-old replaced by a 39-year-old), as a practical matter it will rarely do so, since the vast majority of age-discrimination claims come from older employees. In our view, however, the proper solution to the problem lies not in making an utterly irrelevant factor an element of the prima facie case, but rather in recognizing that the prima facie case requires "evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion " In the age-discrimination context, such an inference cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger. Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
|
The plurality and JUSTICE THOMAS find in the Sixth Amendment a right of criminal defendants to pay for an attorney with funds that are forfeitable upon conviction so long as those funds are not derived from the crime alleged. That unprecedented holding rewards criminals who hurry to spend, conceal, or launder stolen property by assuring them that they may use their own funds to pay for an attorney after they have dissipated the proceeds of their crime. It matters not, under today’s ruling, that the de- fendant’s remaining assets must be preserved if the victim or the Government is to recover for the property wrong- fully taken. By granting a defendant a constitutional right to hire an attorney with assets needed to make a property-crime victim whole, the plurality and JUSTICE THOMAS ignore this Court’s precedents and distort the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The result reached today makes little sense in cases that involve fungible assets preceded by fraud, embezzle- ment, or other theft. An example illustrates the point. Assume a thief steals $1 million and then wins another $1 million in a lottery. After putting the sums in separate accounts, he or she spends $1 million. If the thief spends his or her lottery winnings, the Government can restrain the stolen funds in their entirety. The thief has no right to 2 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting use those funds to pay for an attorney. Yet if the thief heeds today’s decision, he or she will spend the stolen money first; for if the thief is apprehended, the $1 million won in the lottery can be used for an attorney. This result is not required by the Constitution. The plurality reaches its conclusion by weighing a de- fendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice against the Government’s interest in preventing the dissi- pation of assets forfeitable upon conviction. In so doing, it—like JUSTICE THOMAS—sweeps aside the decisions in Caplin & Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), and United (1989), both of which make clear that a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend forfeitable assets (or assets that will be forfeitable) on an attorney. The princi- ple the Court adopted in those cases applies with equal force here. Rather than apply that principle, however, the plurality and concurrence adopt a rule found nowhere in the Constitution or this Court’s precedents—that the Sixth Amendment protects a person’s right to spend oth- erwise forfeitable assets on an attorney so long as those assets are not related to or the direct proceeds of the charged
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
|
not related to or the direct proceeds of the charged crime. Ante, at 1 (plurality opinion); ante, at 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). The reasoning in these separate opinions is incorrect, and requires this respectful dissent. I This case arises from petitioner Sila Luis’ indictment for conspiring to commit health care fraud against the United States. The Government alleges that, as part of her illegal scheme, Luis used her health care companies to defraud Medicare by billing for services that were not medically necessary or actually provided. The charged crimes, the Government maintains, resulted in the payment of $45 million in improper Medicare benefits to Luis’ companies. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 KENNEDY, J., dissenting The same day Luis was indicted, the Government initi- ated a civil action under 18 U.S. C. to restrain Luis’ assets before her criminal trial, including substitute prop- erty of an amount equivalent to the value of the proceeds of her alleged crimes. To establish its entitlement to a restraining order, the Government showed that Luis and her co-conspirators were dissipating the illegally obtained assets. In particular, they were transferring money in- volved in the scheme to various individuals and entities, including shell corporations owned by Luis’ family mem- bers. As part of this process, Luis opened and closed well over 40 bank accounts and withdrew large amounts of cash to hide the conspiracy’s proceeds. Luis personally received almost $4.5 million in funds and used at least some of that money to purchase luxury items, real estate, and automobiles, and to travel. Based on this and other evidence, the District Court entered an order prohibiting Luis from spending up to $45 million of her assets. Before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Luis argued that the Sixth Amendment required that she be allowed to spend the restrained substitute assets on an attorney. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that “[t]he arguments made by Luis are foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Caplin & [and] Monsanto.” ( per curiam). In my view the Court of Appeals was cor- rect, and its judgment should be affirmed. II A In Caplin & a law firm had represented a defendant charged with running a massive drug- distribution scheme. The defendant pleaded guilty and agreed to forfeit his assets. The law firm then sought to recover a portion of the forfeited assets for its legal fees. The firm argued that, when a defendant needs forfeitable 4 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting assets to pay for an attorney, the forfeiture of
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
|
dissenting assets to pay for an attorney, the forfeiture of those assets violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be represented by his counsel of choice. The Court rejected the firm’s argument. The Sixth Amendment, the Court explained, “guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to adequate representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are ade- quately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.” Caplin & As for the right to choose one’s own attorney, the Court observed that “noth- ing in [the forfeiture statute] prevents a defendant from hiring the attorney of his choice, or disqualifies any attor- ney from serving as a defendant’s counsel.” Even defendants who possess “nothing but assets the Government seeks to have forfeited may be able to find lawyers willing to represent them, hoping that their fees will be paid in the event of acquittal, or via some other means that a defendant might come by in the future.” The burden imposed by forfeiture law, the Court concluded, is thus “a limited one.” Caplin & also repudiated the firm’s contention that the Government has only a modest interest in forfeit- able assets that may be used to retain an attorney. In light of the importance of separating criminals from their ill-gotten gains and providing restitution to victims of crime, the Court found “a strong governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets, an interest that overrides any Sixth Amendment interest in permit- ting criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense.” The same day the Court decided Caplin & it decided Monsanto, which addressed the pretrial restraint of a defendant’s assets “where the defendant seeks to use those assets to pay an attorney.” The Court rejected the notion that there is a meaningful dis- Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 5 KENNEDY, J., dissenting tinction, for Sixth Amendment purposes, between the restraint of assets before trial and the forfeiture of assets after trial: “[I]f the Government may, post-trial, forbid the use of forfeited assets to pay an attorney, then surely no constitutional violation occurs when, after probable cause is adequately established, the Government obtains an order barring a defendant from frustrating that end by dissipating his assets prior to trial.” The Court noted, moreover, that “it would be odd to conclude that the Government may not restrain property in [a defendant’s] possession, based on a finding of probable cause, when we have held that (under appropriate circum- stances), the Government may restrain persons where
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
|
(under appropriate circum- stances), the Government may restrain persons where there is a finding of probable cause.” at 615–616. When a defendant himself can be restrained pretrial, there is “no constitutional infirmity” in a similar pretrial restraint of a defendant’s property “to protect its ‘appear- ance’ at trial and protect the community’s interest in full recovery of any ill-gotten gains.” B The principle the Court announced in Caplin & Drys- dale and Monsanto controls the result here. Those cases establish that a pretrial restraint of assets forfeitable upon conviction does not contravene the Sixth Amendment even when the defendant possesses no other funds with which to pay for an attorney. The restraint itself does not prevent a defendant from seeking to convince his or her counsel of choice to take on the representation without advance payment. See Caplin & 491 U.S., at 625. It does not disqualify any attorney the defendant might want. And it does not prevent a defendant from borrowing funds to pay for an attorney who is other- wise too expensive. To be sure, a pretrial restraint may make it difficult for a defendant to secure counsel who insists that high defense costs be paid in advance. That 6 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting difficulty, however, does not result in a Sixth Amendment violation any more than high taxes or other government exactions that impose a similar burden. See, e.g., at 631–632 (“Criminal defendants are not exempted from federal, state, and local taxation simply because these financial levies may deprive them of resources that could be used to hire an attorney”). The pretrial restraint in Monsanto was no more burden- some than the pretrial restraint at issue here. Luis, like the defendant in Monsanto, was not barred from obtaining the assistance of any particular attorney. She was free to seek lawyers willing to represent her in the hopes that their fees would be paid at some future point. In short, ’s authorization of a pretrial restraint of substitute assets places no greater burden on a defendant like Luis than the forfeiture and pretrial restraint statute placed on the defendant in Monsanto. In addition, the Government has the same “strong interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets” here as it did in Caplin & and Monsanto. See Caplin & If Luis is convicted, the Government has a right to recover Luis’ substitute assets—the money she kept for herself while spending the taxpayer dollars she is accused of stealing. Just as the Government has an interest in ensuring Luis’ presence at trial—an interest that can
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
|
interest in ensuring Luis’ presence at trial—an interest that can justify a defendant’s pretrial detention—so too does the Government have an interest in ensuring the availability of her substitute assets after trial, an interest that can justify pretrial restraint. One need look no further than the Court’s concluding words in Monsanto to know the proper result here: “[N]o constitutional violation occurs when, after probable cause [to believe that a defendant’s assets will be forfeitable] is adequately established, the Government obtains an order barring a defendant from dissipating his assets prior to trial.” 491 U.S., The Government, having estab- Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 7 KENNEDY, J., dissenting lished probable cause to believe that Luis’ substitute assets will be forfeitable upon conviction, should be per- mitted to obtain a restraining order barring her from spending those funds prior to trial. Luis should not be allowed to circumvent that restraint by using the funds to pay for a high, or even the highest, priced defense team she can find. III The plurality maintains that Caplin & and Monsanto do not apply because “the nature of the assets at issue here differs from the assets at issue in those earlier cases.” Ante, at 5. According to the plurality, the property here “belongs to the defendant, pure and simple.” It states that, while “title to property used to commit a crime often passes to the Government at the instant the crime is planned or committed,” title to Luis’ untainted property has not passed to the Government. Ante, at 6. “That fact,” the plurality concludes, “undermines the Government’s reliance upon precedent, for both Caplin & and Monsanto relied critically upon the fact that the property at issue was ‘tainted,’ and that title to the property therefore had passed from the defendant to the Government before the court issued its order freezing (or otherwise disposing of) the assets.” These conclusions depend upon a key premise: The Government owns tainted assets before a defendant is convicted. That premise is quite incorrect, for the common law and this Court’s precedents establish that the opposite is true. The Government does not own property subject to forfeiture, whether tainted or untainted, until the Gov- ernment wins a judgment of forfeiture or the defendant is convicted. As Blackstone noted with emphasis, “goods and chattels are forfeited by conviction.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 380 (1769) (Black- stone). Justice Story likewise observed that “no right to 8 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction of the offender.” The Palmyra, ; (“In the contempla- tion of the common law, the offender’s right was not de- vested until the conviction”). These authorities demonstrate that Caplin & and Monsanto cannot be distinguished based on “the nature of the assets at issue.” Title to the assets in those cases did not pass from the defendant to the Government until conviction. As a result, the assets restrained before conviction in Monsanto were on the same footing as the assets restrained here: There was probable cause to be- lieve that the assets would belong to the Government upon conviction. But when the court issued its restraining order, they did not. The Government had no greater ownership interest in Monsanto’s tainted assets than it has in Luis’ substitute assets. The plurality seeks to avoid this conclusion by relying on the relation-back doctrine. In its view the doctrine gives the Government title to tainted assets upon the commission of a crime rather than upon conviction or judgment of forfeiture. Even assuming, as this reasoning does, that the relation-back doctrine applies only to tainted assets—but see United 270–272 (CA4 2003)—the doctrine does not do the work the plurality’s analysis requires. The relation-back doctrine, which is incorporated in some forfeiture statutes, see, e.g., 21 U.S. C. has its origins in the common law. Under this legal construct, the Government’s title to certain types of forfeitable prop- erty relates back to the time at which the defendant com- mitted the crime giving rise to the forfeiture. See 4 Black- stone 375 (“forfeiture [of real estates] relates backwards to the time of the treason committed; so as to avoid all in- termediate sales and incumbrances”); United States v. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 9 KENNEDY, J., dissenting Parcel of N. J., Land, (plurality opinion). The doctrine’s purpose is to prevent defendants from avoiding forfeiture by transferring their property to third parties. The doctrine, however, does not alter the time at which title to forfeitable property passes to the Government. Title is transferred only when a con- viction is obtained or the assets are otherwise forfeited; it is only once this precondition is met that relation back to the time of the offense is permitted. See (The rela- tion-back doctrine’s “fictional and retroactive vesting” is “not self-executing”); (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“The relation-back rule applies only in cases where the Government’s title has been consummated by seizure, suit, and judgment,
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
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Luis v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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Government’s title has been consummated by seizure, suit, and judgment, or decree of condemnation, whereupon the doctrine of relation carries back the title to the commission of the offense” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)); United (Marshall, C. J., opinion for the Court) (a forfeitable asset does not “ves[t] in the gov- ernment until some legal step shall be taken for the asser- tion of its right”); 4 Blackstone 375 (“But, though after attainder the forfeiture relates back to the time of the treason committed, yet it does not take effect unless an attainder be had”). In short, forfeitable property does not belong to the Government in any sense before judgment or conviction. Cf. ante, at 9 (plurality opinion). Until the Government wins a judgment or conviction, “someone else owns the ” Parcel of The plurality is correct to note that Caplin & discussed the relation-back provision in the forfeiture statute at issue. The Caplin & Court did not do so, however, to suggest that forfeitable assets can be re- strained only when the assets are tainted. Rather, the Court referred to the provision to rebut the law firm’s argument that the United States has less of an interest in forfeitable property than robbery victims have in their 10 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting stolen –628. More to the point, central to the Court’s decision was its observation that, because the Government obtained “title to [the defend- ant’s] assets upon conviction,” it would be “peculiar” to hold that the Sixth Amendment still gave the defendant the right to pay his attorney with those assets. Monsanto reinforced that view, holding that the pretrial restraint of assets—money to which the Government does not yet have title—is permissible even when the defendant wants to use those assets to pay for counsel. 491 U.S., at 616. True, the assets in Caplin & and Monsanto happened to be derived from the criminal activity alleged; but the Court’s reasoning in those cases was based on the Government’s entitlement to recoup money from criminals who have profited from their crimes, not on tracing or identifying the actual assets connected to the crime. For this reason, the principle the Court announced in those cases applies whenever the Government obtains (or will obtain) title to assets upon conviction. Nothing in either case depended on the assets being tainted or justifies refusing to apply the rule from those cases here. The plurality makes much of various statutory provi- sions that, in its view, give the United States a superior interest before trial in tainted assets but not
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
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Luis v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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a superior interest before trial in tainted assets but not untainted ones. See ante, at 8–9. That view, however, turns not on any reasoning specific to the Sixth Amendment but rather on Congress’ differential treatment of tainted versus untainted assets. The plurality makes no attempt to explain why Congress’ decision in to permit the pretrial restraint of substitute assets is not also relevant to its analysis. More to the point, Congress’ statutory treatment of property is irrelevant to a Sixth Amendment analysis. The protections afforded by the Sixth Amend- ment should not turn on congressional whims. The plurality’s concern over the implications of the Government’s position appears animated by a hypothetical Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 11 KENNEDY, J., dissenting future case where a defendant’s assets are restrained not to return stolen funds but, for example, to pay a fine. That case, however, is not the case before the Court. Section 1345 authorizes pretrial restraints to preserve substitute assets, not to provide for fines greater than the amounts stolen. The holdings in Caplin & and Monsanto, and what should be the holding today, thus, do not ad- dress the result in a case involving a fine. The govern- mental interests at stake when a fine is at issue are quite separate and distinct from the interests implicated here. This case implicates the Government’s interest in prevent- ing the dissipation, transfer, and concealment of stolen funds, as well as its interest in preserving for victims any funds that remain. Those interests justify, in cases like this one, the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. IV The principle the plurality and JUSTICE THOMAS an- nounce today—that a defendant has a right to pay for an attorney with forfeitable assets so long as those assets are not related to or the direct proceeds of the crime alleged— has far-reaching implications. There is no clear explana- tion why this principle does not extend to the exercise of other constitutional rights. “If defendants have a right to spend forfeitable assets on attorney’s fees, why not on exercises of the right to speak, practice one’s religion, or travel?” Caplin & 491 U.S., Nor does either opinion provide any way to distinguish between the restraint at issue here and other governmental interfer- ences with a defendant’s assets. If the restraint of Luis’ assets violates the Sixth Amendment, could the same be said of any imposition on a criminal defendant’s assets? Cf. (“[S]eizures of assets to secure potential tax liabilities may impair a defendant’s ability to retain counsel [y]et these assessments have been upheld against constitutional attack”). If
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
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Luis v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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[y]et these assessments have been upheld against constitutional attack”). If a defendant is fined in a 12 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting prior matter, is the Government barred from collecting the fine if it will leave the defendant unable to afford a partic- ular attorney in a current case? No explanation is pro- vided for what, if any, limits there are on the invented exemption for attorney’s fees. The result today also creates arbitrary distinctions between defendants. Money, after all, is fungible. There is no difference between a defendant who has preserved his or her own assets by spending stolen money and a defendant who has spent his or her own assets and preserved stolen cash instead. Yet the plurality and concurrence—for different reasons—find in the Sixth Amendment the rule that greater protection is given to the defendant who, by spending, laundering, exporting, or concealing stolen money first, preserves his or her remain- ing funds for use on an attorney. The true winners today are sophisticated criminals who know how to make criminal proceeds look untainted. They do so every day. They “buy cashier’s checks, money orders, nonbank wire transfers, prepaid debit cards, and traveler’s checks to use instead of cash for purchases or bank deposits.” Dept. of Treasury, National Money Laun- dering Risk Assessment 2015, p. 3. They structure their transactions to avoid triggering recordkeeping and report- ing requirements. And they open bank accounts in other people’s names and through shell companies, all to disguise the origins of their funds. The facts of this case illustrate the measures one might take to conceal or dispose of ill-gotten gains. In declara- tions relied on by the District Court, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent investigating the case explained that “Luis transferred monies or caused the transfer of monies received from Medicare to family members and companies owned by family members,” including $1,471,000 to her husband, and over a million dollars to her children and former daughter-in-law. App. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 13 KENNEDY, J., dissenting 72–73. She also “used Medicare monies for foreign travel,” including approximately 31 trips to Mexico, “where she owns several properties and has numerous bank ac- counts.” She “transferred Medicare monies overseas through international wire transfers to Mexico.” And the Government was “able to trace Medicare proceeds going into [all but one of the] bank account[s] owned by Defendant Luis and/or her companies listed in the Court’s” temporary restraining order. No doubt Luis would have enjoyed her travel and expendi- tures even more had she known that, were her alleged
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
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Luis v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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tures even more had she known that, were her alleged wrongs discovered, a majority of the Justices would insist that she be allowed to pay her chosen legal team at the price they set rather than repay her victim. Notwithstanding that the Government established probable cause to believe that Luis committed numerous crimes and used the proceeds of those crimes to line her and her family’s pockets, the plurality and JUSTICE THOMAS reward Luis’ decision to spend the money she is accused of stealing rather than her own. They allow Luis to bankroll her private attorneys as well as “the best and most industrious investigators, experts, paralegals, and law clerks” money can buy—a legal defense team Luis claims she cannot otherwise afford. See Corrected Motion to Modify the Restraining Order in No. 12–Civ–23588, p. 13 (SD Fla., Nov. 16, 2012). The Sixth Amendment does not provide such an unfettered right to counsel of choice. It is well settled that the right to counsel of choice is limited in important respects. A defendant cannot de- mand a lawyer who is not a member of the bar. Wheat v. United States, Nor may a de- fendant insist on an attorney who has a conflict of inter- est. at 164. And, as quite relevant here, “a de- fendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford.” at As noted earlier, “those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.” Caplin & As a result of the District Court’s order, Luis simply cannot afford the legal team she desires unless they are willing to represent her without advance payment. For Sixth Amendment purposes, the only question here is whether Luis’ right to adequate representation is protected. That question is not before the Court. Neither Luis nor the plurality nor JUSTICE THOMAS suggests that Luis will receive inadequate repre- sentation if she is not able to use the restrained funds. And this is for good reason. Given the large volume of defendants in the criminal justice system who rely on public representation, it would be troubling to suggest that a defendant who might be represented by a public defender will receive inadequate representation. See generally T. Giovanni & R. Patel, Gideon at 50: Three Reforms to Revive the Right to Counsel 1 (2013), online at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ Gideon_Report_040913.pdf (as last visited Mar. 28, 2016). Since Luis cannot afford the legal team she desires, and because there
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
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Luis v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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cannot afford the legal team she desires, and because there is no indication that she will receive inade- quate representation as a result, she does not have a cognizable Sixth Amendment complaint. The plurality does warn that accepting the Govern- ment’s position “would—by increasing the government- paid-defender workload—render less effective the basic right the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect.” Ante, at 15. Public-defender offices, the plurality suggests, already lack sufficient attorneys to meet nationally recommended caseload standards. But concerns about the case- loads of public-defender offices do not justify a constitu- tional command to treat a defendant accused of commit- ting a lucrative crime differently than a defendant who is indigent from the outset. The Constitution does not re- quire victims of property crimes to fund subsidies for Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 15 KENNEDY, J., dissenting members of the private defense bar. Because the rule announced today is anchored in the Sixth Amendment, moreover, it will frustrate not only the Federal Government’s use of but also the States’ administration of their forfeiture schemes. Like the Fed- eral Government, States also face criminals who engage in money laundering through extensive enterprises that extend to other States and beyond. Where a defendant has put stolen money beyond a State’s reach, a State should not be precluded from freezing the assets the de- fendant has in hand. The obstacle that now stands in the States’ way is not found in the Constitution. It is of the Court’s making. Finally, the plurality posits that its decision “should prove workable” because courts “have experience separat- ing tainted assets from untainted assets, just as they have experience determining how much money is needed to cover the costs of a lawyer.” Ante, at 15–16. Neither of these assurances is adequate. As to the first, the plurality cites a number of sources for the proposition that courts have rules that allow them to implement the distinction it adopts. Those rules, however, demonstrate the illogic of the conclusion that there is a meaningful difference between the actual dollars stolen and the dollars of equivalent value in a defendant’s bank account. The plurality appears to agree that, if a defendant is indicted for stealing $1 million, the Govern- ment can obtain an order preventing the defendant from spending the $1 million he or she is believed to have sto- len. The situation gets more complicated, however, when the defendant deposits the stolen $1 million into an ac- count that already has $1 million. If the defendant then spends $1 million from the account, it cannot be deter- mined
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
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Luis v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
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$1 million from the account, it cannot be deter- mined with certainty whether the money spent was stolen money rather than money the defendant already had. The question arises, then, whether the Government can re- 16 LUIS v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting strain the remaining million. One of the treatises on which the plurality relies an- swers that question. The opinion cites A. Scott’s Law of Trusts to support the claim that “the law has tracing rules that help courts implement the kind of distinction require[d] in this case.” Ante, at 15–16. The treatise says that, if a “wrongdoer has mingled misappropriated money with his own money and later makes withdrawals from the mingled fund,” assuming the withdrawals do not result in a zero balance, a person who has an interest in the misappropriated money can recover it from the amount remaining in the account. 4 A. Scott, Law of Trusts pp. 3309–3310 (1956). Based on this rule, one would expect the plurality to agree that, in the above hypothetical, the Government could restrain up to the full amount of the stolen funds—that is, the full $1 million— without having to establish whether the $1 million the defendant spent was stolen money or not. If that is so, it is hard to see why its opinion treats as different a situa- tion where the defendant has two bank accounts—one with the $1 million from before the crime and one with the stolen $1 million. If the defendant spends the money in the latter account, the Government should be allowed to freeze the money in the former account in the same way it could if the defendant spent the money out of a single, commingled account. The Sixth Amendment provides no justification for the decision to mandate different treat- ment in these all-but-identical situations. The plurality sees “little reason to worry” about defend- ants circumventing forfeiture because courts can use rules like the tracing rule discussed above. Ante, at 16. It also asserts that these rules “will likely prevent Luis from benefiting from many of [her] money transfers and pur- chases.” That proposition is doubtful where, as here, “a lot of money was taken out in cash from the defendant’s bank accounts” because “[y]ou can’t trace cash.” App. 155. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 17 KENNEDY, J., dissenting Even were that not the case, this assertion fails to appre- ciate that it takes time to trace tainted assets. As the FBI agent testified, at the time of the hearing both the tracing and the FBI’s analysis were “still ongoing.”
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